alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:****National Park Servicedirector�s report [electronic resource].**
 
SuDoc Number:I 29.1:

Item Number:0653-A (online)
CGP systemNumber:000789152
 
2007 | 2008
 
April 8, 2020
**Exhibit 23.1****CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**As independent registered public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of our reportdated March 6, 2006, relating to the consolidated financial statements of ElcomInternational, Inc. for the years ended December 31, 2005 and 2004 included in this Form 10-KSB,into the Company’s previously filed Registration Statements on Form S-3 File No. 333-94743 and333-90964 and Form S-8 File Nos. 333-00362, 333-24809, 333-34193, 333-67927, 333-81795, 333-54852,333-61316 and 333-91488.Our report dated March 6, 2006 contains an explanatory paragraph that states that the Company hassuffered recurring losses from operations and has an accumulated deficit that raise substantialdoubt about its ability to continue as a going concern. The consolidated financial statements donot include any adjustments that might result from the outcome of that uncertainty./s/ VITALE, CATURANO & COMPANY, LTD.VITALE, CATURANO & COMPANY, LTD.March 28, 2006
#### § 252.20 [Reserved]
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You havereached the Federal Depository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC)Archive. This archive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC.Access to publications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of catalogingand locator services, including the Catalog of U.S. GovernmentPublications.  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the eventthat publications are no longer available from the original publishing agencysite. (Historical purposes)
**Title:**** 
SuDocNumber:
ItemNumber:
CGPSystem Number:
 
1983
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997**
<PAGE>   1

                                                                   EXHIBIT 23.01



                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS
                        -------------------------------


The Board of Directors
LXR Biotechnology Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No.
33-92488) on Form S-8 of LXR Biotechnology Inc. of our report dated February
13, 1998, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of LXR Biotechnology Inc.
and subsidiary as of December 31, 1997 and 1996, and the related consolidated
statements of operations, stockholders' equity (deficit), and cash flows for
each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 1997, and for the 
period from April 20, 1992 (date of incorporation) through December 31, 1997,
which report appears in the December 31, 1997, annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of
LXR Biotechnology Inc.

Our report dated February 13, 1998, contains an explanatory paragraph that
states that the Company has suffered recurring losses from operations that
raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern. The
consolidated financial statements do not include any adjustments that might
result form the outcome of that uncertainty.


                                             /s/ KPMG PEAT MARWICK LLP



San Francisco, California
April 15, 1998
United States Steel Corporation – Minntac

Response to U. S. EPA Section 114 Request

April 24, 2012

Item 6

Provide an electronic Excel workbook with the complete nitrogen oxide (NOX) and

sulfur dioxide (SO2) facility-wide potential to emit calculations. Include in the

response a written description of how each column in the Excel workbook is

generated.

Person(s): that provided information used or considered in responding to the question or 

were consulted in the preparation of the response: 

Stephani Campbell, Teresa Simetkosky, Chrissy Bartovich, Liesch (consultant)

Answer:

The Excel workbook is included for this item. The summary sheet along with the related 

spreadsheets is included in the Excel file. The file is not protected so equations can be viewed. 

This file was used in the preparation of the Minntac Title V permit renewal application. The 

application was submitted to MPCA as required on August 9, 2007.
**AD Economic Evaluation**

Docket No . FAA - 2015 - 0673 Directorate ID : 2014 - SW - 034 - AD Helicopter Model: Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350C, AS350D, AS350D1, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS35 5F2, AS355N, AS355NP, EC130B4, and EC130T2 Helicopters Number of Helicopters (U.S. Operators): 1,132 Helicopters in the US Registry . Reason : The actions of this AD are intended to detect a crack in the rotating star and prevent failure of the rotating star and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. Costs : Parts per Helicopter $ 8,354 for the rotating star replacement Labor per Helicopter ( 0.25 work - hour x $ 8 5 /work hour for the visual inspection ) (1 work - hour x $85/work hour for the dye - penetrant inspection) (16 work - hour x $85/work hour for the rotating star replacement) $ 21 $85 $1,360 Other (Explain) Total Cost per Helicopter $ 21 for the visual inspection $85 for the dye -penetrant inspection $9,714 for the rotating star replacement Total US Fleet Cost $23,772 for the visual inspection $96,220 for the dye - penetrant inspection Executive Order 12866 : Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action?” Yes ( ) No (  ) DOT Regulatory

Policies and Procedures : Is the AD significant? Yes ( ) Explain Below No (  ) Regulatory

Flexibility

Act : Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Yes ( ) No (  ) Project Engineer : Robert Grant
PIEDAD PATINO

, Appellant,

v.

REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE APPEALS COMMISSION and S T

. A NNE ' S N URSING C ENTER & RESIDENCE

, Appellee s

.

__________________ _ ____________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF A PPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

N OT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

CASE NO. 1D 15

- 2625

Opinion filed June 24, 2016.

An ap peal from an order of the Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission.

Piedad Patino, pro se

, A ppellant.

Nor man A. Blessing, General Counsel, and Cristina A. Velez, Assistant General Counsel, Reemployment Assistance Appeals Commission, Tallahassee , for Appellee s

.

PER CURIAM.

Appellee’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction is treated as a confession of

error, th e final order is quashed, and the cause is rem anded for further proceedings.

ROBERTS, C.J., WOLF and RAY, JJ., CONCUR.
# C_2008323EN.01001501.xml

| 18.12.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 323/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.12.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 323/15

---

Action brought on 12 November 2008 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority against the Kingdom of Norway

(Case E-6/08)

(2008/C 323/10)

An action against the Kingdom of Norway was brought before the EFTA Court on 12 November 2008 by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by Niels Fenger and Ólafur Jóhannes Einarsson, acting as Agents of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, rue Belliard 35, B-1040 Brussels.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority requests the EFTA Court to declare that:

| 1. | by failing to adopt or to notify the Authority within the time prescribed, of the measures necessary to implement Articles 6-10 of the Act referred to at point 17 of Annex IV to the Agreement on the European Economic Area as adapted to the EEA Agreement by Protocol 1 thereto, the Kingdom of Norway has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 15(1) of that Act and Article 7 EEA,
  and |
| --- | --- |

1.

by failing to adopt or to notify the Authority within the time prescribed, of the measures necessary to implement Articles 6-10 of the Act referred to at point 17 of Annex IV to the Agreement on the European Economic Area as adapted to the EEA Agreement by Protocol 1 thereto, the Kingdom of Norway has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 15(1) of that Act and Article 7 EEA,

and

| 2. | the Kingdom of Norway be ordered to bear the costs of these proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

2.

the Kingdom of Norway be ordered to bear the costs of these proceedings.

Legal and factual background and pleas in law adduced in support:

Legal and factual background and pleas in law adduced in support:

| — | the case concerns the failure by Norway to implement into its national law the Act referred to at point 17 of Annex IV to the EEA (Directive 2002/91/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the energy performance of buildings), within the prescribed time limit. |
| --- | --- |

—

the case concerns the failure by Norway to implement into its national law the Act referred to at point 17 of Annex IV to the EEA (Directive 2002/91/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the energy performance of buildings), within the prescribed time limit.

Directive 2002/91/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the energy performance of buildings)

---
#### STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. A. V. DOERRIES, Appellant.

Kansas City Court of Appeals,

February 17, 1913.

1. CHANGE OF VENUE: Criticism in Presence of Jury. It is prejudicial error for a trial court in sustaining a motion for a change of venue to a judge to be called in, to make an address in criticism of the practice, in the bearing of the jury, ” wherein the motive of the applicant is attacked.

2. INDICTMENT: Lost Record: Supplied Paper. If the record shows that there was no judgment or order supplying a lost indictment, it is error to allow a paper alleged to be a copy to be treated as a supplied paper.

Appeal from Callaway Circuit Court — Now. *John A. Rich,*Judge.

Reversed;

*Robertson & Robertson*for appellant.

*J. W. Tincher, C. M. Hay*and *J. R. Baker*for respondent.

ELLISON, J.

Defendant was indicted and convicted of the offense of disturbing the peace. He appealed to this court and we transferred it to the Supreme Court on account of a constitutional question. That court thought the question not properly raised and returned the record to this court.

A change of venue was asked in the trial court on account of alleged prejudice of the judge. The change was granted and another judge called in. The judge to whom the application was made delivered a'lengthy address, in the presence of the jury, on the evil practice of applications for change of venae. The exceedingly, spirited character of the criticism was such as naturally to prejudice the jury. Doubtless the privilege of a change of venue, intended as it is for a just *325and beneficent purpose, is frequently abused. But the time of the criticism objected to was unfortunate. We passed upon an identical question in an opinion by Judge Johnson in which it was held to be prejudicial. [State v. Wright, 161 Mo. App. 597.]

It seems the indictment was lost and the trial is supposed to have proceeded upon one supplied. Unlike the case of State v. Walker, 167 Mo. Í. c. 369, we cannot presume anything in this case, for the record sets out all that was done, and it does not appear that any motion for supplying.a lost record was filed, or that any judgment or order for supplying it was made. Such judgment was necessary to supply the indictment. [State v. Burks, 132 Mo. 363; State v. Wilson, 200 Mo. l. c. 28.]

The judgment is reversed.

All concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             MAY-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-1998
<CASH>                                           6,284
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,052
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (326)
<INVENTORY>                                      4,194
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                16,019
<PP&E>                                          12,436
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (9,602)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  18,853
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           22,221
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        42,789
<OTHER-SE>                                    (46,658)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    18,853
<SALES>                                         34,579
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                34,579
<CGS>                                           39,025
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   39,025
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,573
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 847
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (18,866)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (18,866)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (18,866)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.28)
        

</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 3, 2013

d0826 

# Order

Clerk 

### September 3, 2013

146864(6)

VINCENT BURGESS,

Plaintiff,

v SC: 146864

AGC: 1353

- 13

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION,

Defendant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s May 28, 2013

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was

entered erroneously.
#### § 267.2 Definitions.

Except where the context clearly indicates otherwise, the following definitions shall apply to this part.

*Administrative offset* means withholding funds payable by the United States to, or held by the United States for, a person to satisfy a claim.

*Agency* incudes all executive departments and agencies or instrumentalities in the executive branch, and any other entity referenced in 5 U.S.C. 5514(a)(5)(B).

*Board* means the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

*Centralized offset* is an offset initiated by referral to the Secretary of the Treasury (including a debt collection center designated by the Department of the Treasury) by a creditor agency of a debt for purposes of collection under the Treasury's centralized offset program.

*Debt* or *claim* means an amount of money, funds, or property that has been determined by a Board official, in connection with the operational or regulatory activities of the Board, to be owed to the United States from any person, organization or entity (except another Federal entity), including any type of debt referenced in 31 U.S.C. 3701(b). For purposes of this part, a debt or claim owed to the Board, including a debt or claim for repayment of Board-funded benefits administered through the Office of Employee Benefits of the Federal Reserve System, is a debt owed to the United States. A debt does not include any amounts owed by a current Board employee that the Board chooses to collect solely under its debt collection policy.

*Debtor* means a person who owes a debt, and includes any individual, organization, or entity except another agency.

*Delinquent,* with respect to a debt or claim, shall have the meaning given to such term at 31 CFR 900.2(b).

*Eligible,* with respect to a debt or claim, means that referral of the debt or claim for collection is not precluded by any statute or regulation, or by any guidance issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

*Garnishment* means the process of withholding amounts from the disposable pay of a person employed outside the Federal Government, and the paying of those amounts to a creditor in satisfaction of a withholding order.

*Salary offset* means an administrative offset to collect a debt under 5 U.S.C. 5514 by deduction(s) at one or more officially established pay intervals from the current pay account of a Federal employee without his or her consent.
#### Margaret J. Hassard, Appellant, *v.*James Harold Warner, Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the City Court of the city of New York, referring this action'and all the issues, therein to a referee to hear and determine.

B. G. Oppenheim, for appellant.

David C. Bennett, Jr., for respondent.

Conlan, J.

The answer admits the allegations of the complaint and sets up a counterclaim for professional services as attorney to an amount exceeding plaintiff’s claim. The case comes within the rule laid down in Randall v. Sherman, 131 N. Y. 670, and Feeter v. Arkenburgh, 147 id. 237. Order appealed from reversed, with costs.

Fitzsimons, Ch. J., concurs.

Hascall, J. (dissenting).

I think the service of reply puts in issue the matter that requires the offices of a referee and that the order should be affirmed. For this reason I dissent.

Order reversed, with costs.
42755.

#### VULCAN MATERIALS COMPANY v. D. H. OVERMYER WAREHOUSE COMPANY.

Hall, Judge.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for a sum allegedly due for materials furnished the defendant and used in improvement of the defendant’s real estate, and for a special lien on the real estate.

To be entitled to the lien sought the plaintiff was required to prove both the filing for record of his claim of lien within three months after the materials were furnished, and the commencement of an action for recovery of the amount of his claim within 12 months from the time it became due. Ga. L. 1874, p. 45, as amended *(Code Ann.*§ 67-2002).

The evidence showed that this plaintiff filed his materialman’s lien on November 17, 1965, and that it was recorded within three months from the last delivery of materials included in its claim of lien as required by law. *Calhoun Brick Co. v. Pattillo Lumber Co.,*10 Ga. App. 181, 183 (73 SE 23); *Hill v. Dealers Supply Co.,*103 Ga. App. 846 (120 SE2d 879). The plaintiff filed this suit for recovery of the amount of his claim within 12 months from the time it became due —the date of delivery of the last item included in his claim. *McCluskey v. Still,*32 Ga. App. 641 (124 SE 363).

The plaintiff proved his claim for materials furnished by his business records admitted in evidence without objection and by testimony that the claim was unpaid. *Chambers v. Williams Bros. Lumber Co.,*80 Ga. App. 38, 42 (55 SE2d 244); *One-In-All Corp. v. Fulton Nat. Bank,*108 Ga. App. 142, 144 (132 SE2d 116). The plaintiff was entitled to a personal judgment against the defendant in the amount shown by *793that evidence and as well to have it made a special lien on the property described in the petition.

*Felton, C. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*

Argued May 2, 1967 —

Decided May 29, 1967.

*Howard & Storey, Robert W. Storey,*for appellant.

The trial court erred in entering judgment for the defendant.

*Judgment reversed.*
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-2096

DAGOBERTO MEJIA-ALVARADO,

 Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, U.S. Attorney General,

 Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Submitted: February 27, 2020 Decided: March 6, 2020

Before KING, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part, denied in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dagoberto Mejia-Alvarado, Petitioner Pro Se. Todd J. Cochran, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for 

Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Dagoberto Mejia-Alvarado, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review 

of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the 

Immigration Judge’s denial of his applications for relief from removal. While 

Mejia-Alvarado claims on appeal that he qualified for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture, and further requests a grant of 

cancellation of removal, he did not administratively exhaust these claims before the Board. 

“[A]rguments that a petitioner did not raise in the [Board] proceedings have not been 

exhausted and the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them.” Cabrera v. Barr, 930 F.3d 

627, 631 (4th Cir. 2019); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2018) (stating that Court “may 

review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative 

remedies available to the alien as of right”). “Only after the [Board] has rendered a decision 

on an argument or claim is that argument or claim said to have been exhausted.” Cabrera, 

930 F.3d at 631. “In sum, we have consistently held that . . . when a petition contains an 

argument that has never been presented to the [Board] for consideration, we lack 

jurisdiction to consider it even if other arguments in the petition have been exhausted.” Id.

Accordingly, as Mejia-Alvarado’s claims for relief have not been administratively 

exhausted, we lack jurisdiction to consider them and dismiss the petition for review with 

respect to those claims. To the extent Mejia-Alvarado challenges the Board’s denial of his 

request for remand, we have reviewed the administrative record and find no abuse of 

discretion. See Obioha v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 400, 408 (4th Cir. 2005); see 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(a) (2019). We therefore deny the petition for review in part for the reasons stated 
3

by the Board. In re Mejia-Alvarado (B.I.A. Sept. 19, 2019). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART,

DENIED IN PART
§ 239.3 Mutual holding company reorganizations. ( a ) A mutual savings association may not reorganize to become a mutual holding company, or join in a mutual holding company reorganization as an acquiree association, unless it satisfies the following conditions: ( 1 ) A Reorganization Plan is approved by a majority of the board of directors of the reorganizing association and any acquiree association;
( 2 ) A Reorganization Notice is filed with the Board pursuant to § 238.14 of this chapter;
( 3 ) The Reorganization Plan is submitted to the members of the reorganizing association and any acquiree association pursuant and is approved by a majority of the total votes of the members of each association eligible to be cast at a meeting held at the call of each association's directors in accordance with the procedures prescribed by each association's charter and bylaws; and
( 4 ) All necessary regulatory approvals have been obtained and all conditions imposed by the Board have been satisfied.
( b ) Upon receipt of an application under this section, the Reserve Bank will promptly furnish notice and a copy of the Reorganization Plan to the primary federal supervisor of any savings association involved in the transaction. The primary supervisor will have 30 calendar days from the date of the letter giving notice in which to submit its views and recommendations to the Board.