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36–140 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 109–921

FBI OVERSIGHT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 6, 2006

Serial No. J–109–122

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 3

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 295

Grassley, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 293

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ................. 1

WITNESS 

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C. ............................................................................... 6

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Robert S. Mueller III to questions submitted by Senators Specter, Grassley, Sessions, Leahy, Kennedy, Biden, Feinstein, Feingold, Schumer and Durbin .................................................................................................... 38

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Burlington Free Press, Burlington, Vermont: 

Anonymous, November 8, 2006 ....................................................................... 286

Adam Silverman, November 10, 2006 ............................................................ 290

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department 

of Justice, Washington, D.C., prepared statement and charts ......................... 299

(1)

FBI OVERSIGHT 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2006

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, Pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in room 

226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Arlen Specter, Chairman 

of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Specter, Grassley, Kyl, Sessions Cornyn, 

Leahy, Kohl, Feinstein, and Feingold. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Chairman SPECTER. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The 

Judiciary Committee will now proceed with the oversight hearing. 

We welcome the distinguished Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. We have been trying to schedule this session since 

the arrests were made of terrorists in Great Britain in August. 

The issues raised by those arrests and the continuing threat of 

terrorism constitute an enormous problem for the United States. I 

think it continues to be our number-one problem, to protect the 

homeland from terrorist attacks. 

In that light, we are very concerned about the success on the 

interfacing of the various intelligence agencies in the United 

States. I think there is very forceful evidence that, had there been 

appropriate communication between the FBI and the CIA, 9/11 

might well have been prevented. 

Now we have a more complicated intelligence field, with the Director of National Intelligence added to the mix with FBI, CIA and 

the Department of Homeland Security, and we are very anxious to 

see exactly how things are working out. 

There are continuing suggestions that the United States would 

be better served if the Nation had a counterintelligence unit, like 

in the mold of Britain’s MI–5, and there is constant analysis as to 

whether there might be a better way to organize the FBI, and that 

is a subject we will be looking into. 

On November 9, less than a month ago, Dame Eliza 

Manningham-Buller, the Director-General of MI–5, gave a detailed 

account of the terrorist threat facing Britain. She revealed that 

MI–5 was currently investigating ‘‘some 200 groupings or networks, 

totaling over 1,600 identified individuals’’ believed to be involved in 

nearly 30 plots to attack Britain. We would be interested in a similar accounting by Director Mueller. 

2

We are interested to know how the administration’s Terrorist 

Surveillance Program is working. That program, disclosed almost 

a year ago on December 17, 2005 by the New York Times, has been 

a source of considerable attention by this Committee with our effort 

to structure some legislation and procedures which would have the 

traditional safeguards of a warrant where probable cause is established before there is wire tapping, before there is a search and seizure. That is a work in process. 

Regrettably, the Judiciary Committee has never been briefed on 

the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and we should have been. It is 

very difficult for us to conduct oversight when we deal with Director Negroponte of National Intelligence. 

I talked to Mr. Negroponte, tried to get him to come to a hearing 

here. He agreed, and then for some reason it was not carried out, 

just as we worked with Secretary Michael Chertoff. 

But we do have oversight authority with the FBI, and we do 

want to know how well the Terrorist Surveillance Program is working so that we can make an evaluation as best we can on limited 

information. Since, as I say, we are not privy to being briefed as 

to the success of the program contrasted with the invasion of privacy, our committee cannot make an evaluation. Some of that may 

have to be conducted in a closed session and we are prepared to 

do that to get at those facts. 

We want to know how successful the FBI has been in thwarting 

terrorist attacks. There are periodic reports in the media, but we 

do not have really a good handle on that. We need the details on 

how the Patriot Act is working; there again exists a delicate balance between our needs for effective law enforcement and protection of civil rights. 

We will be inquiring into what is happening with the technology, 

inquiring into a briefing by Congress on the anthrax case. The FBI 

has had a hand in making arrests, later turned over to the CIA, 

in a complex series of transactions involving Rendition. 

I have requested of the Department of Justice that two reports 

be made available to this committee, as has Senator Leahy in a 

separate letter, regarding interrogation methods. We will be pursuing that with you. 

Your role is not as extensive, but the FBI was involved in the 

arrest of Mahir Arrar, a Syrian-born Canadian citizen, where Canada has issued a detailed report saying that there was an inappropriate action by the United States. 

We are also concerned, and the oversight with you again is not 

as extensive as with the Department of Justice, as to what is happening in the Maggi Kahn case, where the allegation is made that 

in interrogation procedures, that there was torture. 

The Department of Justice is taking the position that they cannot countenance a disclosure of the interrogation techniques because al Qaeda might learn from those techniques how to prepare 

their agents to withstand those techniques, which is, in my view, 

an untenable position. 

If someone is challenging what has happened and makes a case 

that the line has been passed, how can we deal with it if he is foreclosed from testifying as to what has happened? 

3

So, these are a very, very wide range of subjects. Senator Leahy 

and I were discussing with the Director for a few minutes in the 

anteroom the failure of the Director to submit questions for the 

record from our May hearing. 

As disclosed, the Director made a prompt submission of those to 

the Department of Justice and they have not been approved or disapproved. They have simply not come forward. That is just not tenable and makes a major restriction and restraint on this oversight 

hearing when we do not have those written responses to prepare 

for. 

But we appreciate the work you have done, Director Mueller. We 

appreciate your availability when we called. We appreciate sitting 

down on an informal basis. But there is no substitute for these formal oversight hearings where it is on the record and the American 

people can have some insights as to what is happening on the very 

important job you have on protecting security, and also balancing 

civil rights. 

I now yield to the distinguished Ranking Member. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On this last point, I met with Attorney General Gonzales last 

week, along with Bruce Cohen, the Chief Counsel, and Ed Pagano, 

my Chief of Staff, and I raised this issue, that the Department of 

Justice is doing a disservice to the Director of the FBI in not clearing these answers quicker. 

We might get frustrated at not getting the answers, but I pointed 

out to the Attorney General that the frustration is with Justice 

when it takes that long to clear answers you have given them. 

I said that the alternative is going to be that when he comes up 

here next year, is that the hearing will go on much, much longer 

if we think we cannot get the answers to these questions. 

I mean, the other alternative is, we are here into the evening, 

asking the questions right here. We submit the questions as a courtesy and service to you and to the Department, and they are not 

helping. 

But having said that, I am glad we are doing this. Again, I commend the Bureau’s skilled workforce, the agents, technicians, the 

men and women on the front line behind the scenes that work year 

after year to protect our communities. 

I also am well aware that, as the elected representatives, we 

have a solemn duty to conduct meaningful oversight. It is a valuable tool to make the FBI as good as the American people need it 

to be in countering terrorism, but also in strengthening law enforcement. 

Now, I take this responsibility seriously, as does the Chairman. 

For this reason, oversight of the FBI and the Department of Justice 

will again be one of my highest priorities as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the next Congress as it was when 

I last had the privilege of chairing this committee. 

The recent revelation that the Bush administration, since 9/11, 

has been compiling secret dossiers on millions of unwitting, totally 

4

law-abiding Americans who travel across our borders highlights the 

importance of diligent oversight. 

It is incredible that the administration is willing to share the 

sensitive information that they pick up on law-abiding, innocent 

Americans. They want to share it with foreign governments, and 

even private employers, while refusing to allow the citizens it is 

gathered on to see or challenge the so-called terror score they have 

assigned them based on their travel habits and schedules. 

You might be the most law-abiding person in the world, and all 

of a sudden they do not get a job. They have no idea why they did 

not get the job, and it is because this government has compiled a 

secret dossier on them and made a mistake somewhere on it. 

Lord knows, with the poor track record of some of the departments in this administration with keeping secret the data they 

have, like the Veterans Administration and others, it is worrisome. 

If it is done poorly or without proper safeguards and oversight, 

data banks do not make us safer, they just further erode Americans’ privacy. 

The administration has gone to unprecedented lengths to hide its 

own activities from the public, while at the same time collecting an 

unprecedented amount of data on private citizens. I think data 

banks like this are due for meaningful oversight, and I can assure 

you we are going to have it. 

One of the greatest challenges facing the FBI today is striking 

a successful balance between fulfilling its core counterterrorism 

missions while respecting and preserving the democratic principles 

and freedoms that have made America such a great, great, and 

very resilient Nation. 

Now, I have repeatedly sought, for the last couple of years, answers from not only the FBI, but others, regarding reported, and 

in some instances documented, cases of abuse of detainees in U.S. 

custody. Just recently, I wrote to the Attorney General about press 

reports after years of denials. 

After years of denials, the Central Intelligence Agency now admits the existence of additional classified documents detailing the 

Bush administration’s interrogation and detention policy for terrorism suspects, something that the Chairman has already alluded 

to. 

When the Director appeared before this Committee in May of 

2004, I asked him if FBI agents had witnessed objectionable interrogation practices in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Guantanamo Bay. He 

gave a purposely narrow answer, saying no FBI agent witnessed 

abuses in Iraq. 

Well, documents released by the FBI in December of 2004 made 

clear the FBI agents witnessed abusive treatment of prisoners at 

least at Guantanamo Bay, and the Director’s own answers to subsequent questions have shed some more light on the subject. 

Now, the Congress and the American people deserve to learn the 

relevant facts about the Bush administration’s interrogation policies and practices. I hope the Director will continue moving away 

from the Bush administration’s policy of secrecy and concealment 

on this issue toward the responsiveness the American people deserve. 

5

In private conversation with the Director, I pointed out that I 

was gratified to see in some of the publicized instances where the 

CIA was using techniques that we would not agree to as Americans, that the FBI agents said that this was not acceptable to them 

and made it very clear it was not acceptable to them. 

It troubles me deeply, though, that 5 years after 9/11 that the 

FBI is still not as strong as it should be. The FBI lags far behind 

when it comes to the number of agents who are proficient in Arabic. 

The Washington Post reports only 33 FBI agents have at least 

a limited proficiency in Arabic, and only 1 percent of FBI agents 

have any familiarity with the language at all. The FBI is supposed 

to be a world-class intelligence agency, and this is a very significant part—especially now—of the world. 

I am worried about the FBI’s new paperless case management 

system, Sentinel. We are told that it was going to cost American 

taxpayers $425 million, but still will not be operational until 2009. 

On Monday, the Department of Justice’s Office of Inspector General issued a report finding that the FBI would need an additional 

$56.7 million just to pay for Phase II of Sentinel, and there are serious concerns about the impact this will have on the FBI’s nonIT programs. So, we cannot afford another fiasco like Trilogy. 

Last, on a positive note, since 9/11 the FBI has made significant 

strides to adjust to the threats and challenges of our time. The Director who came in just days before 9/11 and was handed probably 

the worst challenge of any Director in the history of this country, 

in the history of the FBI, has worked hard. There are hard-working 

men and women in the FBI who work very, very hard to adjust to 

an entirely new world. 

There is work to be done. I think if the Bureau makes mistakes, 

they should acknowledge it, learn from them, move forward, and 

know that we are in a new century, a new world, and those will 

be the areas that I will be looking into as we go forward. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the additional time. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy. 

[The prepard statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

We, on occasion, turn to other members for opening statements. 

We have such a good turnout for you, Mr. Director, that I am reluctant to spend too much time on it. But if anybody has anything 

special that they would like to say on the panel, we would entertain it at this time. [No response]. I see everybody is anxious to 

hear your testimony, Director Mueller. 

We appreciate your being with us today. The Director brings an 

outstanding resume to this position. He has been the Director of 

the FBI since September 4, 2001 just one week prior to 9/11. 

He has a unique position, in that he has tenure. He has a 

tenured term of office, so it is longer than the presidential appointment, which gives him quite a degree of independence, which is 

very, very important. 

Director Mueller has an outstanding academic background. He is 

a graduate of Princeton, has a masters in International Relations 

at New York University, and a law degree from the University of 

6

Virginia. He has served as the leader of a rifle platoon in the Marine Corps in the Vietnam war, and is a decorated veteran. 

He has a unique record as a prosecuting attorney, having been 

an Assistant U.S. Attorney, then the Assistant Attorney General in 

charge of the Criminal Division, a very prominent position in the 

Department of Justice. 

Then after being with a prestigious Boston law firm, he came 

back to be litigator in the Homicide Section of the District of Columbia’s U.S. Attorney’s Office, which is quite a line of activity; 

real devotion to being a prosecuting attorney. 

As those of us who have been Assistant Prosecutors know, that 

is the best job, better than being the U.S. Attorney, which he later 

was in San Francisco. He now comes to this position, where he has 

served with real distinction. 

We welcome you here, Director Mueller, and look forward to your 

testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I may, my remarks today will be 10 minutes at the most. 

Chairman SPECTER. Take whatever time you need. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you. 

Good morning to the Senators who are here. Senator Leahy was 

here. I look forward to working with you, Senator Leahy. I would 

like to start by acknowledging and thanking you, Mr. Chairman, 

for your leadership of this Committee over the last 2 years and, of 

course, I look forward to continuing to work with you in the new 

year. 

I have submitted, Mr. Chairman, a formal statement which provides substantial detail about the transformation and the accomplishments of the FBI in the 5 years since the terrorist attacks of 

September 11. 

Chairman SPECTER. That will be made a part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Director Mueller appears as a submission for the record.] 

Director MUELLER. Thank you. Thank you, sir. As reflected in 

that statement, each branch of the FBI—the National Security, the 

Criminal Investigations, Science and Technology, Office of Chief Information Office, and Human Resources branches—has demonstrated the ability and the willingness to embrace change for a 

better, stronger, and more effective FBI. 

The accomplishments set forth in my statement include terrorist 

acts that have been thwarted, espionage activities intercepted, 

cyber intrusions detected, corrupt government officials convicted, 

violent gangs dismantled, and corporate fraud uncovered. 

Examples of our counterterrorism efforts include: in Lackawanna, New York, six individuals arrested and pleading guilty to 

providing material support to al Qaeda after undergoing weapons 

training in an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan; an Ohio truck driver, 

Lyman Farris, admitting to casing a New York City bridge for al 

Qaeda, and researching and providing information regarding the 

tools necessary for possible attacks on U.S. targets; and in New 

7

York as well, Mohammed Babbar pleading guilty to providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization; and last, more recently, in Torrence, California, four men indicted last year, charged 

with plotting to attack U.S. military recruiting facilities and synagogues in the Los Angeles area. 

While fighting terrorism, we continue to fulfill our crime-fighting 

mission as well. Public corruption is the top criminal priority for 

the FBI. Over the last two years, our investigations have led to the 

conviction of over 1,000 government employees involved in corrupt 

activities, to include 177 Federal officials, 158 State officials, 360 

local officials, and more than 365 police officers. 

In addition to public corruption, we continued to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle violent gangs, to investigate and combat world 

proliferation of child pornography and sexual exploitation of children facilitated by the Internet, and to root out fraudulent accounting schemes and other financial crimes perpetrated by corporate 

executives, as evidenced by the recent convictions of senior management of the Enron Corporation. 

These accomplishments are by no means exhaustive, but the do 

provide a vivid illustration of the extraordinary work d1 day in and 

day out across all of the FBI programs by the men and women of 

the FBI. 

Along with my longer statement, I have provided the Committee 

with a time line setting forth milestones in the FBI’s national security efforts. I have also provided an organizational chart that reflects the most recent changes to FBI executive management structure. 

The recent creation of an Associate Deputy Director and a Chief 

Human Capital Officer are positions within the FBI that have improved the administrative functions of the Bureau. 

In addition, we have established a Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

or WMD, mission or directorate. 

The directorate’s mission is to prevent and disrupt the acquisition of WMD capabilities for use against the U.S. homeland by terrorists or other adversaries, including nation states. 

More than 5 years have now passed since the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, and I do believe that the FBI is effectively organized and strategically focused to fulfill our mission as both a law 

enforcement and a domestic intelligence agency. 

I believe that our successes, some of which I have just described, 

are the best evidence of our capabilities in both arenas. In addition, 

we are ever mindful that our duty is to protect the Nation, while 

at the same time preserving civil liberties. 

As the Committee knows, independent reviews of the FBI’s national security programs have found that it is the FBI’s adherence 

to the constitution and the rule of law that make it the appropriate 

agency to handle intelligence collection in this country. 

In a report issued July of 2004, the 9/11 Commission expressed 

concern that abuses of civil liberties could occur in a new domestic 

intelligence agency if one were to be created. In addition, the 9/11 

Commission recognized the value of integrating, not segregating, 

law enforcement and domestic intelligence. 

The Commission noted that, because the FBI can have agents 

working criminal matters and agents working intelligence invesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:28 Jun 25, 2007 Jkt 036140 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\36140.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
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tigations concerning the same international terrorism target, the 

full range of investigative tools can be used against a suspected terrorist. 

Nearly a year later, the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction also examined the FBI’s dual role. In its report in 2005, 

the Commission noted that the FBI’s hybrid nature is one of its 

strengths. 

In today’s world of transnational threats, the line between criminal activity and national security information is increasingly 

blurred, as is well illustrated by the use of illegal drug proceeds to 

fund terrorist activity. 

And, like the 9/11 Commission, the WMD Commission urged continued coordination between the FBI’s national security and criminal programs to help ensure continued attention to civil liberties. 

Mr. Chairman, although maintaining criminal justice and national security capabilities within the FBI is the most effective approach to protecting this Nation, we also recognize the importance 

of adopting best practices from other agencies. 

Indeed, we established our Directorate of Intelligence, and as we 

did so a high-level executive from Britain’s MI–5 was detailed to 

us for a substantial period of time to advise us as we sought to improve and enhance our domestic intelligence program. We have 

found his insights and suggestions to be invaluable as we have 

grown. 

Prior to the terrorist attacks in 2001, as you have alluded to, Mr. 

Chairman, various walls existed, real and perceived. They no 

longer exist today. Legal walls that prevented the integration of intelligence and the criminal tools in terrorism investigations were 

broken down by provisions of the U.S. Patriot Act, for which credit 

is due to this committee, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Court. 

Yet, we cannot overlook the importance of the breakdown of cultural walls that hampered coordination between the FBI, other 

members of the intelligence community, and our 800,000 partners 

in State and local law enforcement. 

Since September 11, we have increased the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces from 35 to over 100. We have established the 

National Joint Terrorism Task Force with 40 member agencies. 

We have established the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, led by a former police chief, to facilitate information sharing 

and coordination between the FBI and our State and local partners. We have personnel assigned to the interagency National 

Counterterrorism Center. 

We have established the Terrorist Screening Center; established 

the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force; established the Terrorist Explosive Device Analysis Center; established six regional 

computer forensics laboratories; established the National Gang Intelligence Center; and established 13 new legal attache ́ offices in 

places such as Baghdad, Beijing, and Kabul. Finally, we are participating in the development of State and Regional Intelligence 

Fusion Centers along with our partners at DHS. 

The sum result of each of these initiatives is that the FBI’s approach to our partners has shifted from providing information on 

a need-to-know basis to a need-to-share basis. We are well aware 

9

that our partnerships with other Federal agencies, State and local 

police, and our international allies have been the key to our effective response to terrorism. 

In addition to the enhancements to our coordination and cooperation with our partners, we have improved our internal capabilities 

as well. For example, since September 11 we have increased the 

number of language analysts by 82 percent. 

We have doubled the number of intelligence analysts from over 

1,000 to over 2,000. Since September 11, we have disseminated 

over 20,000 intelligence information reports, over 800 intelligence 

assessments, and 400 intelligence bulletins. 

We have increased from 30 percent to 100 percent the number 

of field offices with secure, top-secret space known as SCIFs. We 

have deployed nearly 30,000 new desktop computers, as well as 

high-speed, secured networks to enable personnel around the country to share data, including audio, video, and image files. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that my remarks this morning, as well as 

the documents I have provided the subcommittee, adequately portray some of the progress of the Bureau during the past 5 years. 

Before I take the committee’s questions, I would like to take a 

moment to address the concerns that have been raised by Senator 

Leahy about the funding for the FBI’s information technology 

project known as Sentinel. 

In short, there are no cost overruns and there are no budget shortfalls. The total projected cost of $425 million for all four 

phases of Sentinel has not changed. The recent report of the Office 

of Inspector General highlights the fact that the President’s budget 

request includes $100 million of the $157 million needed to fund 

Phase II of Sentinel. 

We have negotiated this request for money with the administra- tion and set aside from our existing resources $57 million that was 

not included in the President’s request. We work closely with our 

appropriations committees to identify those funds and have ensured that our operational programs are not negatively impacted. 

As this Committee has been briefed, the Sentinel project is on 

budget, with Phase I scheduled to be delivered in spring of 2007 

as projected. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind each member 

of this Committee of my standing invitation for each of you to visit 

FBI Headquarters and be fully briefed on whatever aspects of the 

FBI you would wish to be briefed on, or to visit our FBI offices in 

each of your States to observe our transformation for yourselves. 

It is the dedicated men and women of the FBI who have made 

our transformation possible, and we, indeed, together, are proud of 

the progress, but understand that we still have a ways to go. 

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am 

happy to answer any questions that you might have, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Director Mueller. 

We will now proceed with 5-minute rounds by the members. We 

will have more than one round and see how it goes, but I know 

there will be a great many questions. 

Mr. Director, I begin with the Terrorist Surveillance Program 

disclosed on December 16 of last year. It caused a great deal of conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:28 Jun 25, 2007 Jkt 036140 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\36140.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
10

cern about intrusion on privacy, without the traditional court authorization. 

What assurances can you provide to this Committee and the 

American people that the program is worthwhile? Have arrests 

been made? Have terrorist cells been broken up? Be as specific as 

you can to tell us what the program has achieved. 

Director MUELLER. I am not going to be able to satisfy, here, 

your desire for specificity. I can tell you that that program—

Chairman SPECTER. Well, would a closed session enable you to 

be more responsive to that question? 

Director MUELLER. Well, the program is classified. It is compartmented. I can tell you that we have given a full briefing to the Intelligence Committee that is responsive to the questions you are 

asking. 

Chairman SPECTER. We are very interested in that, Director 

Mueller, but not as interested as a full briefing to this committee. 

When we asked the Director of the CIA for a briefing, he tells 

us he reports to the Intelligence Committee. So, I am not too anxious to hear that you report to the Intelligence Committee. I am 

anxious to hear your report to this Committee because this Committee has oversight jurisdiction over the FBI. 

Director MUELLER. I understand that, Mr. Chairman. Whatever 

briefing we give on the specifics of that program would have to be 

classified, and it is compartmented. I would be happy to, if given 

approval to give such a briefing, give you the same briefing that 

we have given to the Intelligence Committee, but I am not the person who makes the decision on that briefing. 

Chairman SPECTER. So a closed session would not do any good. 

Director MUELLER. All I can tell you, sir, is that the information 

is classified. It is compartmented. If given the permission to provide such a briefing, as we have briefed the Intelligence Committee, we are happy to do so, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, my question is not too complicated. A 

closed session would not do any good. 

Director MUELLER. The program is classified, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I will not repeat the question. Senator 

Leahy said he might. That means he will. 

Well, we are going to pursue that, Director Mueller. That is not 

what I view as a satisfactory response by the administration. I understand that is the best response you can make, but it would do 

no good to go into closed session when you start talking about 

being compartmentalized. But this committee’s oversight functions 

cannot be carried out with that kind of response by the administration. 

Moving on, the Patriot Act was worked out, after very extensive 

negotiations, between this Committee and the administration. 

Then the President issued a signing statement saying that the 

President would respond to the reporting requirements as the 

President saw fit, in line with his constitutional responsibilities. 

I believe that that is an unconstitutional response because the 

Constitution says Congress passes laws and submits them to the 

President for a signature or a veto, especially in the context where 

we have negotiated it, and where there has been a give and take 

11

between the administration and the Congress as to what the Patriot Act ought to consist of. 

But the question that I have for you is, have the reporting requirements of the Patriot Act been fulfilled or has the executive 

branch withheld information based on their contention of inherent 

Article 2 power? 

Director MUELLER. I have no reason to believe that we are not 

fulfilling the requirements of the Patriot Act with regard to reporting. I have heard nothing with regard to not providing that information, as is required under the Patriot Act, regardless of the basis 

upon which that might be done. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that, Director Mueller, is an answer in 

the negative. You do not have any reason to believe that. 

Do you have reason to believe that the Patriot Act has been fully 

complied with on the reporting requirements? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. Well, I would say I have not looked at 

the reporting requirements and not, myself, looked and seen what 

has been filed. I would be happy to do that. I have every reason 

to believe that, yes, we are putting together the information and 

providing the reporting as requested. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, we would appreciate it if you would 

look at them and give us your assurances on that question. 

Director MUELLER. All right. 

Chairman SPECTER. Before my red light goes on, I have one further question. That is, there was an extensive study made as to 

what intelligence analysts are doing. This goes to the issue as to 

whether the FBI is really moving into the intelligence field. The 

analysts are allegedly spending only half their time on analysis 

and not really working through the counterintelligence phase. Is 

that true? 

Director MUELLER. No, I do not believe that is true. I think that 

was true at the outset, certainly right after September 11. I think 

we have grown substantially, both in the number of analysts and 

the quality of the analysts that we have hired. 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, you were right in the 

midst of finishing the answer to the question as to whether your 

analysts are really full-time on the job. 

Director MUELLER. I would say, again, Mr. Chairman, there will 

be anecdotes where there is an analyst here and an analyst there 

who is not, but we have, since September 11, established field intelligence groups in every one of our 56 field offices to which the 

analysts are assigned. 

We understand the necessity of having analysts be somewhat detached so they can do the analytical work that is necessary, and 

I believe we are effectively utilizing analysts at this point in time. 

I do believe that studies have been done by others who would support that. 

That does not mean that we do not have additional work to be 

done, but we have come a long way since September 11 and we are 

using analysts the way analysts are meant to be used. 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, check on the Department 

of Justice survey of last year of more than 800 FBI analysts, twothirds of those employed with the FBI. The study found that, on 

average, the analysts were spending only half-time actually doing 

12

analytical work. Would you check on that and supplement your answer? 

Director MUELLER. I will check on that. Yes. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Leahy? 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. 

Director MUELLER. I am sorry. Senator Specter, can I respond to 

one other thing that I learned while the lights were out? 

Chairman SPECTER. Yes, of course you may. 

Director MUELLER. That is, in terms of the reporting requirements under the Patriot Act, we are up to date on our reporting 

requirements under the Patriot Act. In other words, in response to 

your question as to, were we withholding information as a result 

of the signing statement of the President, I am saying, as far as 

the FBI is concerned, in our reporting requirements, we are fulfilling each one of our reporting requirements that are required by 

the Patriot Act. 

Chairman SPECTER. You are giving your assurance as Director 

that the reporting requirements of the Patriot Act are being complied with, and the President or the executive branch has not exercised any of the limitations included in the signing statement to 

withhold information? 

Director MUELLER. Not as to the FBI. I can speak as to the FBI 

only. 

Chairman SPECTER. And they have not gone through the Department of Justice, like the response to written questions delayed 

until last week, before responding to my inquiries? 

Director MUELLER. Well, they do go through the Department of 

Justice. Excuse me just one second. 

[Pause] 

We would have to check with Department of Justice and make 

certain they are out of the Department of Justice and to the committee, but we have fulfilled our reporting requirements. 

Now, you make a good point in terms of, it does go through the 

Department of Justice, and I would have to check to make certain 

that they have been forwarded by the Department of Justice. 

Chairman SPECTER. Is your coordination with the CIA as good as 

your coordination with the Department of Justice? 

Director MUELLER. They are both equally good, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. I cannot hear you. 

Director MUELLER. They are both equally good. We have very 

good relationships both with the CIA, as well as the with the Department of Justice. 

Chairman SPECTER. Equally good and equally bad. 

Senator Leahy? 

Director MUELLER. I would characterize the relationships as exceptionally positive and mutually supportive. 

Chairman SPECTER. I raise it in a serious vein because your communications with the Department of Justice do not appear to be too 

good. You submit answers to questions in July, we get the responses on November 30, 7 months later. We are talking about reporting requirements. You cannot be sure as to what happened 

after you report through the Department of Justice. 

13

That raises a very serious question as to communications. There 

are a lot more reasons to have difficulties communicating with the 

CIA than with the Attorney General. So, check it out and let us 

know. 

Director MUELLER. I will check it out, Mr. Chairman. I will do 

that. 

Chairman SPECTER. Yes. 

Senator Leahy? 

Senator LEAHY. Would you please make it a point to have somebody get back to both Senator Specter and myself and tell us, on 

the reporting, whether it ever got out of the DOJ? 

Director MUELLER. We will check on that. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. 

I do not think I am unique in saying—not a unique American—

that I am shocked at the revelation that, since 9/11, the U.S. Government has been secretly assigning terror scores to millions of 

law-abiding Americans who cross our borders. Like so many other 

millions of Americans, I cross our border quite often, sometimes 

driving an hour from my home in Vermont into Canada. 

Now, data mining technologies have a place in our security regimen. I am not denying that. But the Department of Homeland Security’s Automated Targeting System, ATS, shows what some of 

the dangers can be in just blanket surveillance of law-abiding 

Americans. 

There have been press reports that the Department of Homeland 

Security shares information contained in this database with the 

FBI and others. If you do this without proper safeguards and oversight, then it does not make us more secure, it just erodes our liberties. We will ask further questions next year. 

Can you please explain to the American people why the administration is secretly compiling dossier’s of people’s travel habits and 

then assigning terror scores to them? For example, when I drive 

across the Canadian border to visit relatives. 

Director MUELLER. Well, Senator, I am not familiar with the program, therefore, I am not in a position to describe it and to be able 

to report on it. It is a DHS program. We may well get information 

from that program. 

Senator LEAHY. I want to back up. You mean, they are assigning 

terror scores to every single American, law-abiding though they 

may be, and they are not passing those on to the FBI? 

Director MUELLER. I am not certain what information they are 

passing on, Senator Leahy, and I would have to get back to you on 

that. My understanding is, from the same reports you have, DHS 

uses this at the borders. And they may well pass on information 

to us, but I am not familiar with the conduit of that information 

or the basis for developing the scores, and I would have to get back 

to you on that. 

Senator LEAHY. Are you aware of a legal authority for this program? 

Director MUELLER. I am not. I do not know what the legal authority is. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. 

During the May 2 oversight hearing, you testified about the Investigative Data Warehouse, IDW. 

14

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator LEAHY. This was put up after 9/11. It now contains over 

half a billion FBI and other agency documents, with nearly 12,000 

users, Federal, State, local law enforcement who can access this 

through the FBI network. 

Now, like you, I have long advocated to use technology in the 

FBI to carry out your programs. But I am worried, partly because 

I read about the ATS program and their data mining. Does this 

have adequate security? Does the IDW database share information 

or otherwise interface with the ATS data mining program? 

Director MUELLER. The ATS data mining program? I am not familiar with what you are referring to, sir. 

Senator LEAHY. We were just talking about the ATS. 

Director MUELLER. Do you mean DHS? 

Senator LEAHY. What DHS calls ATS. I realize we are using 

acronyms. This is the one that checks on everybody crossing our 

borders. You have the Department of Homeland Security’s Automated Targeting System. Does your database interface with that? 

Director MUELLER. I do not believe so, but again, I would have 

to go back and check. I do not believe so. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, this is very important to me. I wish you 

could get back to me in the next few days and let me know directly. 

Director MUELLER. I will do so. I will do so. 

Senator LEAHY. Because there are also Federal privacy laws 

here. 

Has the Bureau filed a notice in the Federal Register about a 

program publicly released, a privacy impact statement, for IDW? 

Director MUELLER. I know we have a privacy statement. I would 

have to check as to whether it has been publicly disclosed. We adhere to the requirements of the Privacy Act. 

Again, I would encourage you and your staff to visit us and we 

would be very willing to give you a full briefing on what IDW is, 

what the records are in IDW, and the intersection the IDW has 

with other such databases. 

Senator LEAHY. Yes. Because I am not sure I am getting the answers here, and I am not sure you are prepared to give the answers, partly because, as you said, you are not sure just what goes 

back and forth there. 

I really think this is extremely important, because if we are having database after database after database with things that talk 

about Americans, and then we see what happens when there are 

mistakes—sometimes getting in airplanes, Senator Kennedy, the 

second most senior member of the U.S. Senate, has been stopped 

several times boarding a flight that he has been taking for 40 years 

back home to Massachusetts because he is on some terrorist watch 

list. 

Congressman John Lewis, who faced enough problems during the 

civil rights era, has been stopped. A one-year-old child has been 

stopped because the child mistakenly gets on and the parents are 

not allowed on until they get a passport for the child. 

Nuns have been stopped. Having gone to Catholic school, I can 

sometimes understand, but not at this level. Maybe there was terror struck into us at the age of 8, 9 or 10 by them, but they should 

not be on a terrorist list. 

15

I just worry, as we get these intersected, you are going to have 

kids who are looking for college loans, you are going to have people 

who are trying to get a job, somebody trying to get a security clearance, and they are told, no, we cannot tell you why you are not getting it, and somebody is going to be mistakenly on a list. So, I raise 

this because we will have a lot of questions next year. 

We will do the review down at the Department headquarters, but 

we will do a review that the American public will know. We will 

do it carefully so that the classified information is not released, but 

there is a growing concern in this country that our government 

knows too much about us and may be doing things with that information that none of us want done. I am talking about the millions 

upon millions of totally law-abiding Americans, like that 1-year-old 

child. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

We will now proceed, on the early bird rule, calling on Senators 

in order of arrival. 

Senator Sessions, you are recognized. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Director Mueller, congratulations on your hard work. I know 

there are problem areas, and I will ask you about some of those, 

but you have—indeed, every U.S. Attorney’s Office has—a terrorist 

specialist in every field office of the FBI, which covers the entire 

United States. 

The speed and accuracy and responsiveness of FBI agents to information that might connect to terrorism, would you not agree, is 

light years ahead of what it was before 9/11? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. As Senator Leahy pointed out, we 

did not have databases such as IDW on September 11, the ability, 

as some would say, to connect the dots. We do have that ability 

today and it is attributable to the growth of not only the database 

structure, but also of the networks and the ability to communicate 

that information and make it available to persons whose business 

it is to prevent terrorist attacks. 

Senator SESSIONS. And the wall that separated the FBI and CIA 

was removed by the Patriot Act. Has that enabled you to be more 

effective in protecting this country from terrorist attack? 

Director MUELLER. Of all the things that have occurred, pieces 

of legislation that have been passed since September 11, the Patriot Act is the one piece of legislation I would point to as making 

a dramatic, substantial difference in our ability to work cooperatively with each other in sharing information and preventing terrorist attacks. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think that is quite clear. The American 

people want more. They also will criticize you for not maintaining 

information and not sharing it with the person at the airport so 

they can identify somebody who might be a terrorist if they happen 

to get by the system, and then they will complain that you are 

maintaining information that somehow might oppress somebody’s 

rights. 

Let me just say this to you, just briefly, on that subject. It is easy 

to criticize your program, the Automated Targeting, the TSP, the 

warehouse, the IDW, and these efforts to make our aircraft safer, 

16

to make us safer from those who would come into this country to 

attack us. 

But let me ask you, when these programs are established, just 

briefly, are legal counsel consulted before these programs are initiated, whether it is in the FBI, DOJ, or Department of Homeland 

Security? 

Director MUELLER. Absolutely. Every one of the databases and 

programs is reviewed by legal counsel. We have a specified privacy 

officer whose responsibility it is to do that. The Department of Justice has a Privacy Office whose responsibility is to do much the 

same thing. We had, in the last month, the members of the Privacy 

Board come and review what we were doing and they were provided briefings on IDW and the other databases that we maintain 

to do our work. 

I might also add that with regard to IDW, we did show and did 

give access and did a briefing on IDW to the media, so we believe 

that it is an appropriate database, and we also believe that it 

passes all privacy concerns. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, if you do not maintain those records and 

somebody slips by and kills a lot of Americans, you will be hauled 

in here to be criticized for it, there is no doubt about that. 

And you are prepared to brief the Committee on the programs 

under your jurisdiction, if we have additional questions, in confidence if that is appropriate? 

Director MUELLER. To the extent that I can, in confidence, but 

if it is classified that might present an additional hurdle. But I am 

prepared to brief whichever committee—including, quite obviously, 

the Judiciary Committee—to the extent that I am allowed to under 

the applicable rules. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, this is what I would suggest. I suggest 

you continue those programs that you believe are appropriate and 

that you believe are legal and the counsel have approved. If a court 

says it is not proper, I would expect you to stop it, and I know you 

would. 

I would just say this. I would wait to see what Congress does. 

My impression is, the pattern in Congress is to bring officials up 

and accuse them of all kinds of things, but then not offer legislation to stop it. Is it not true that if Congress disapproves one of 

these programs, we can shut off funding and require it to be 

stopped? 

Director MUELLER. I believe that to be the case, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. So it will be up to us. If we think something 

is going wrong, let us have a debate on it. Let us have legislation 

offered that will stop it. Then I would expect you to explain to the 

American people what risk this Nation is incurring if it is stopped. 

Director Mueller, I remain concerned about the interoperability 

of the Crime Information System computers between Homeland Security and the FBI, that you managed much of. I have asked you 

about this previously. 

For example, we now believe that there are 597,000 absconders 

on immigration charges, people who were arrested and have absconded. Now, if you are caught in Alabama or Massachusetts for 

reckless driving and you do not show up for court, your name goes 

into the system. Petty larceny, your name goes into the system. 

17

But the fact is, only 75,000 of the 597,000 absconders, as I understand it, have been entered into this system. You have committed to creating an interoperable system that somehow will 

work. Where are we on that? 

Is it not true that if we really expect the American people to believe that we are serious about immigration enforcement, those 

who have absconded, jumped bail, have not shown up for their deportation or their hearing, that they ought to be entered into the 

NCIC so that if they are arrested anywhere else in the country 

they would be known to be illegally here and be subject to deportation? 

Director MUELLER. My understanding, Senator, is that in August 

of 2003, NCIC established an immigration violator file. As of November 20—

Senator SESSIONS. NCIC is under your jurisdiction? 

Director MUELLER. It is. It is. It is, quite obviously, a system that 

State and local law enforcement, as well as Federal law enforcement, use to determine whether the person they are looking at has 

a record or is otherwise being pursued by Federal authorities. 

My understanding is that, as of November 20, there were over 

200,000 records in that database. Of those, over 100,000 are deported felon records and another 107,000 are absconder records. So 

my belief is that NCIC has a number of those absconder records. 

I do not know what portion of the universe of absconder records 

there may be in DHS, but my belief is that, to the extent that DHS 

wishes us to put those records in NCIC, they are being put in 

NCIC. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, my records indicate only 17 percent, 

75,000 of the 500,000 entire population of absconders, are now in 

NCIC. 

Director MUELLER. We would have to reconcile the figures you 

have, sir, with the figures that we have. I would be more than 

happy to do that so we are both on the same page. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Kohl? 

Senator KOHL. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, I would like to discuss the alarming increase 

in violent crime across our country. Unfortunately, no city has been 

afflicted more in the past year than my own City of Milwaukee. 

Violent crime in Milwaukee has risen 32 percent in 2005; robberies were up 36 percent; aggravated assaults were up nearly 32 

percent; and most concerning of all, homicides increased by 40 percent. 

We all agree that we must find out what is causing this problem 

and fix it, and that means Federal, State and local officials working 

together to get the problem under control. 

Part of the problem is that we are not giving our States and localities the help that they need. Year after year, we see a concerted 

effort by this administration to end the COPS program and gut 

funding for juvenile justice and prevention programs. 

Virtually everyone in the law enforcement community agrees 

that this has been a major contributing factor to the rise in violent 

crime. For exmaple, the Milwaukee police department received $1 

18

million from the COPS program in 2002, but by last year they had 

gone down to no funding at all for this program. 

As a result, between 2002 and 2005, the Milwaukee police department’s forces were reduced by 55 police officers, leaving it with 

nearly 200 vacancies in a force of 2,000. Years of decreases in funding have led to fewer cops on the beat and increases in violent 

crime. 

Another part of the problem is the lack of juvenile prevention at 

intervention programs. The deputy police chief in Milwaukee was 

recently quoted as saying, ‘‘We have a lot of young people involved 

in robbery, some are 10 and 11. A lot of the kids that we see never 

know anything but violence.’’ 

Juvenile crime accounted for a large part of the recent increase 

in overall crime in Milwaukee in 2005, and again it has come on 

the tail end of the administration’s efforts to eliminate prevention 

programs that have proved successful in the past. 

While FBI resources have been diverted to focus on the threat 

from terrorism, and I understand that, nevertheless, this administration has not replaced those resources and now we are faced with 

the results of neglecting these problems. We need to make our communities safe again. 

So I would like to ask you four questions, and perhaps you can 

respond to each one. First, will you please commit to coming to Milwaukee soon to discuss the dramatic rise in crime with State and 

local officials to see what can be done to help get this problem 

under control? 

Second, in July you said that the Bureau was analyzing possible 

causes of the surge in violent crime across the country. Will you 

commit to direct those undertaking that effort to focus specifically 

on what is going on in my City of Milwaukee, or if that overall report has already been completed, will you commit to taking a look 

at Milwaukee, giving me regular updates on your progress? 

Third, if the need exists, will you commit to adding Federal 

agents to the Milwaukee area on a permanent basis? And fourth, 

Director Mueller, without commenting on any specific program, 

would you agree that an increase in the State and local police 

forces and a renewed focus on juvenile prevention programs must 

be a part of any strategy to address this problem not only in Milwaukee, but across our country? 

Director MUELLER. Senator, I share your concern about the 

spikes in crime around the country. As the Chairman pointed out, 

I spent time as a homicide prosecutor here in Washington, DC. The 

one thing you take away from that, is the devastation to a community from violent crime, particularly homicides and assaults. 

We have, in areas where we have ratcheted back—we have 

ratcheted back and had to by reason of our priorities—the number 

of agents we have addressing the drug problem, smaller white-collar criminal cases, but we have not allocated resources away from 

violent crime. 

To the contrary, I have tried to build up our contributions to reducing violent crime in our cities through the Safe Street task 

forces, cold case squads, and the like. I believe that the future and 

the success is dependent on working closely together on task forces 

19

with State and local law enforcement, as well as Federal agencies, 

not just the FBI, but ATF and the like. 

I support the funding for State and local law enforcement agencies. I would like to see that funding, in part, directed towards the 

task force concept because I believe we could be more effective together when we work on task forces. 

In response specifically to your questions, I was recently in Milwaukee. I would have to see when my schedule will allow me again 

to be in Milwaukee. I know the Department of Justice has teams 

going out to various cities—I am not certain whether Milwaukee is 

one of them—to look at the causes of crime. We have agents who 

are participating in that. I will take a specific look at Milwaukee, 

but I cannot promise, necessarily, that I can be in Milwaukee in 

the near future. 

As I indicated as to your second question as to what is being 

done to look at the causes of this uptick, I know Department of 

Justice is looking at this, with teams traveling around the country. 

I would be happy to update you on their findings. 

I cannot promise additional Federal agents. I often get requests. 

There probably is not a Senator here that would not want more 

FBI agents in their particular States. 

I will talk to our SAC out there to get a better view of what is 

happening there and make certain—and I believe it is a high priority on his list, but I will again talk to him—but cannot make a 

promise to give additional agents there at this point in time. 

Last, I think I addressed the fact that I do believe that there has 

to be a coordination in terms of funding of State and local police 

departments. My hope is that funding in some way ties in with 

State and local police officers being participants and task forces. 

Too often, the State and local police officers—and rightfully so—

have a very realistic concern about issues within their communities. The first officers that are taken off, are those taken off of 

task forces. 

But I think task forces are one of the best tools for addressing 

crime, cyber crime, and particularly violent crime. I am supportive 

of funding so that we can work more closely together with State 

and local law enforcement in these areas. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Kohl. 

Senator Cornyn? 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask you 

a little bit about the violence that we are seeing along our border 

between the United States and Mexico. Particularly of concern to 

me is the violence among drug cartels in Nuevo Laredo and the 

various kidnappings and other problems associated with that violence. 

I have discussed this matter with our ambassador to Mexico, 

Tony Garza. I have addressed it with Attorney General Gonzales. 

And, as you probably know, he sent a Violent Crime Impact Team 

to Laredo. I have also discussed this with officials from the Government of Mexico. 

First of all, can you confirm for me that the FBI does, in fact, 

have membership on the Violent Crime Impact Team? 

20

Director MUELLER. I believe we do. I would have to check on 

that. I know we are participating in a number of task forces down 

there. I would have to get back to you as to what our participation 

is. I believe we probably are, but I would have to get back to you 

and confirm that we are. 

Senator CORNYN. I cannot imagine you would not be, but apparently there were some questions raised. I would appreciate that. 

Director MUELLER. That is fine. 

Senator CORNYN. Are you prepared at this point to update us on 

what is happening as far as the kidnappings of American citizens 

in Nuevo Laredo? 

Director MUELLER. Without getting into the details because it is 

an ongoing investigation, if you are talking about a recent, relatively highly publicized kidnapping, we are still participating in 

the investigation of that. It was not totally successful, but it has 

had some limited success. 

Senator CORNYN. From a 30,000-foot level, could you give us a 

general idea about the FBI’s participation? 

Director MUELLER. We participate on Safe Street task forces. 

Whenever there is a kidnapping, we specifically will have agents 

participating in the investigation. From 30,000 feet, the view does 

not look good of what is happening in Laredo Nuevo. 

Where there are incursions into the United States, we quite obviously have jurisdiction to act, and we act as quickly as we possibly 

can. We will in put whatever resources are needed to address the 

investigation. 

Our concern is reciprocity across the border and having identified 

individuals with whom we can exchange information and work cooperatively because of the difficulties of law enforcement, and indeed the military, on the other side of the border operating. 

My hope is that, with the elections over and the new government 

in, that with a pledge to address violence of the cartels, we will enhance our ability to have counterparts across the border which will 

enable us to work together to address the problems there. 

Senator CORNYN. Hope springs eternal, I guess. That is obviously 

a huge concern. 

At your last appearance, on another note, we discussed a report 

that found significant non-compliance with the Attorney General’s 

guidelines in the use of confidential informants. 

You will recall, the report found one or more guidelines violations 

in 87 percent of the confidential informant files examined, including a 49 percent non-compliance of FBI agents giving proper instructions to informants. 

There have been a number of high-profile cases. In my State, a 

large case in Ft. Worth had a problem with the misuse of informants in which the IG found misuse of informant Katrina Leong—

I believe I am pronouncing that name correctly—a Chinese spy. I 

have been seeking information about an ICE informant who had 

been involved in multiple murders while under ICE’s control. 

Can you tell us what has been done in the Agency to improve 

compliance with the guidelines? Are there any other tools that you 

need in order to effect compliance? 

Director MUELLER. There are several levels of concern with regard to informants. Of the cases you mentioned, one of them, the 

21

ICE case, is not ours. That is a DHS case, so I would not be familiar with that. 

Katrina Leong was a source for a number of years in the counterintelligence arena, but that case was handled out of California and 

it has gone through the judicial system there. It pointed out weaknesses in our handling of informants that we have remedied in the 

meantime, not only in the counterintelligence program in terms of 

our review of our assets, but also across the board. 

The IG pointed out, in a number of instances—those you alluded 

to—where our files were not being documented. The scrutiny was 

not being given. We have put into place programs to assure that 

that is done with appropriate follow-up. 

Last, we have in development now a software package that will 

enable us to do assessments and to do what in the past has been 

an extraordinary amount of paperwork, but do it digitally in a secure system, to give us a better overview of the sources that we use 

across the board. 

So both in terms of isolated incidents, we have changed our procedures to minimize the chance of that happening again. In terms 

of documenting the files and doing what is necessary to assure that 

we are documenting what we are doing with files, we have put into 

place procedures and we are moving ahead with a digitized system 

that will better enable us to have oversight over the program as 

a whole. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Feinstein? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Mueller. I listened very carefully to your response 

to Senator Kohl. I recall, the last time we met I asked you about 

the priorities of the FBI. You listed combatting significant violent 

crime as number eight out of eight priorities. There are 28,331 

fewer criminal cases opened by your Agency in 2004 than in 2000. 

That is a drop of 45 percent. 

Violent crime is rising in the United States, by your own statistics, at its highest rate in 15 years. Local and State law enforcement officers are telling your Inspector General that violent crime 

is getting worse and there is reduced FBI involvement in violent 

crimes in their jurisdictions. I can tell you this is true in the big 

cities in California. 

I think you have got a real need for a mission reevaluation. I 

think you have to take into consideration, the President has zeroed 

out the COPS program. JAG burn grants are gone. Gang crimes 

are substantially on the rise. I am very interested in this, so I 

watch for FBI activity in this area and have seen very little. 

I believe the President, in 2007, added one agent. I believe your 

funding level for FBI criminal case agents has decreased by almost 

1,000 agents, or 18 percent, since 9/11. I think you have got a real 

problem on your hands, and I question your priorities in that regard. I think violent crime has to be raised in the FBI priority list. 

Would you comment? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, Senator. The priorities on the national 

security side are counterterrorism, preventing another terrorist attack, counterintelligence, with which you are familiar in terms of 

22

the service on the Intelligence Committee and the importance of 

that program, given the threats from outside the United States, 

and cyber crime and attacks on our infrastructure, and the like. 

Those are the three national security priorities that we have. 

On the criminal side, the first priority is public corruption, in the 

belief that if we do not investigate these cases, they perhaps will 

not be investigated. Second, is civil rights. The third priority is organized crime, because if we do not do organized crime, organized 

crime crosses borders. Those in local jurisdiction do not have the 

wherewithal to address organized crime. That is our No. 3 criminal. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Could I say one thing on that point? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Gangs are killing more people in this country 

than organized crime ever did, or ever will. That is just a fact. 

They are spreading all across the country. They are being operated 

out of prisons. It is an extraordinarily serious problem. I think, to 

have this on a low level, is a big mistake. 

Director MUELLER. In other words, organized crime and violent 

crime are the two priorities we have and they intersect with each 

other because you can have organized gangs of criminals that we 

address under RICO and those tools that we have used traditionally in the past. 

The other priority is, there are substantial white-collar criminal 

cases. If we were not doing the Enron cases, if we were not doing 

the Worldcom cases, if we were not doing the Quest case, they 

would not be done. 

Consequently, I believe violent crime is tremendously important. 

My hope is that we will have, and get in the future, additional resources to put in that priority. But I think our priorities are appropriately aligned, although I would very much appreciate additional 

resources to be put into the violent crime arena. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, this Senator does not agree with the 

priorities, let me just put it that way. I represent a big State. It 

is a deep concern in big cities. I want to register that with you very 

publicly. I think the FBI has a role in fighting violent crime, crime 

that is taking place on a major scale. So, I will leave you with that. 

Let me, in response to the Chairman’s questions, ask you a couple of questions that I think you probably can answer here. 

Have terrorist acts been prevented as a result of FBI activities? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Terrorist acts in this country? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Can you give us a number? 

Director MUELLER. I can give you examples, not necessarily a 

total number. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, would you give us what you can in this 

venue, please? 

Director MUELLER. I can tell you the Torrence case that I mentioned, which is a California case. Individuals who obtained weapons, had developed an al Qaeda-like philosophy, although had no 

ties to al Qaeda, operating at the outset in prison until several of 

them got out. 

23

Last year, they came together and robbed gas stations to obtain 

money to obtain weapons. They were in the process of obtaining 

weapons so that they could, on September 11 of last year, go into 

military recruiting stations and shoot them up, and then on Yom 

Kippur, as worshippers came out of synagogues, shoot up the worshippers. That was a terrorist attack that was well along the way 

to being undertaken. That is one example. 

Another one that would have an impact on this country is the 

case where 24 individuals were arrested in August in the U.K. 

Their plans were to obtain explosives and get them on airplanes 

and blow the airplanes out of the skies, along the lines of what 

happened with Pan Am 103. 

That is a case that we worked with the CIA, we worked with our 

counterparts in the U.K., MI–5, Scotland Yard, and with our counterparts in other countries. If that attack had been allowed to go 

forward, it would have been devastating on the United States and 

on the United States’ citizens. Those are but two. 

There are a litany of them. I believe I listed a number of those 

in my longer statement of similar cases that we have addressed 

since September 11. I can name, just off the top of my head, the 

group in Lackawanna, the group in Northern Virginia. 

There was a group out of Portland, Oregon, although that group 

was training here to go into Afghanistan to fight. So, I listed a 

number of them in my longer statement, but I can provide you a 

fuller statement if you would like. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I pick it up from the Intelligence perspective, 

but I think it is also important that this Committee have an understanding. My time is up, but I would just ask you to watch that 

violent crime rate. This affects regular Americans every day, shopping, walking, going to the park. It is a real problem. The FBI has 

a role in it, and I do not think you can abdicate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director MUELLER. I absolutely agree with you. We are not abdicating it. I am looking for ways to enhance our presence. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator Grassley? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Director Mueller, I just have one issue I want 

to discuss with you in the 5 minutes I have, and that is the anthrax investigation. I wrote the Attorney General October 23 about 

your Agency’s refusal to brief Congress on the investigation into 

the 2001 anthrax attacks, which obviously targeted this Congress, 

and specifically Senator Leahy. 

It has been 5 years since those attacks and over 3 years since 

any Congressional briefings on the investigation. This investigation 

is one of the largest efforts in FBI history, I am told. 

Congress has a right and a responsibility to get some detailed information about how all those resources are being used and why 

there seems to be so little progress in the case. 

Several of my colleagues on the committees—

Feinstein, Schumer, Feingold—have all agreed to co-sign a briefing request letter that I have circulated, along with Congressman 

Reichert of New Jersey. I hope that Senator Specter and other 

members of the Committee would also sign the letter. 

24

But regardless, I need to keep asking these questions until I get 

some answers. I asked dozens of questions in my letter to the Attorney General. I do not intend to repeat all those questions today, 

but I will be submitting those questions for the record. I believe 

this Committee has an obligation to make sure that it gets full and 

complete answers to those questions. 

The main reason that the FBI has cited for refusing to brief Congress is the fear of leaks from members and staff of Congress. But 

one of the issues that we in Congress need to investigate is actually 

the leaking by the Justice Department and the FBI. 

As you know, Steven Hatfeld is suing the FBI for leaking his 

name to the press as a person of interest in the investigation. He 

is also suing the New York Times. We recently learned that two 

of its sources for the New York Times story were FBI agents. 

So could you please explain why the FBI can leak information 

about someone who has never been charged with anything to the 

New York Times, but the FBI will not brief Congress about one of 

the most extensive FBI investigations ever? 

Director MUELLER. Senator, I abhor leaks, whether it be from the 

FBI or any other entity. I have taken steps, when I have learned 

of leaks, to investigate such leaks. 

My understanding is that your letter did go to the Attorney General and the Attorney General responded by letter of October 31 in 

which the Justice Department took the position that, according to 

longstanding DOJ policy, where you have a grand jury investigation and nonpublic information has been developed in the course of 

the investigation, that that type of extensive briefing could not be 

given. 

We periodically meet with the victims of that horrific occurrence 

and provide them some insight into the allocation of resources to 

successfully bring the persons responsible to justice. 

We have offered that to other victims, or those such as Senator 

Leahy and Senator Daschle, but this is not the type of briefing I 

know you are asking. But I do believe that that is the subject of 

the letter from the Attorney General on October 31. 

Senator GRASSLEY. How many FBI personnel have been reprimanded or punished for leaking information in the anthrax case, 

and how many leaks on this case from the FBI or the DOJ sources 

do you think occurred? 

Director MUELLER. I believe there are at least two leaks, based 

on what I have read in the newspapers as well. That information 

comes from others, or persons to whom we would not have had access in our investigation. Specifically, I am talking about the reporters themselves. No one has at this point been punished because 

we have not been successful in identifying the source of some of 

those leaks, but that is not for want of trying. 

As to the underlying investigation, I will tell you that we are still 

pursuing it as forcefully as we possibly can. We have 17 FBI agents 

still assigned to it, and 10 postal inspectors assigned to it. It is ongoing and we will continue to press forward. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Before my time is up, there are some questions in that letter to the Attorney General that do not involve 

grand jury investigation. 

25

I am going to give you a clip from Joseph Billy, the FBI Assistant 

Director for Counterterrorism, that said, ‘‘I am not aware of a declination to brief the Congress on the anthrax investigation.’’ Another quote was, ‘‘I believe that we have regularly kept those that 

we are accountable to informed about the progress in the case.’’ 

This looks like an example of the FBI’s left hand not know what 

the right hand was doing. You are telling me that you will not answer questions about the anthrax investigation, while someone else 

is telling the public that you are keeping us fully informed. Could 

you set the record straight? Which is it? 

Director MUELLER. I would be happy to look at that clip. I was 

not aware that there was that clip out there, Senator. 

Senator GRASSLEY. He is the FBI Assistant Director of 

Counterterrorism. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator GRASSLEY. I do not have another question, but Chairman 

Specter, I think we have a right to be briefed. I hope you will take 

a look at my letter and see if we can get a briefing on this anthrax 

investigation. 

I think we owe it to people like Senator Leahy, who have put 

their lives on the line or had their lives threatened, at least, to be 

brought up to date while this was going on. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Grassley, I think you are right. I 

have it on my list for a second round, which I do not have to pursue since you have done such a good job. I will be glad to co-sign 

your letter. 

Senator LEAHY. I have avoided making many public comments 

about the anthrax case, especially on the five-year anniversary. I 

might note, at least two people who touched the envelope that I 

was supposed to open died. Five people died in all. My family was 

put under police guard until we said we really did not want that. 

It disrupted our lives enormously. 

I read in the paper, the FBI flew down the families of victims 

to Washington for a briefing. I know I was not invited to that briefing. I came out unscathed. The letter that I was supposed to open 

stopped before it got here. 

My sorrow is mostly for those who died just doing their job in 

trying to deliver a letter to me. But I also know how disruptive it 

was of my family and my own life. For me personally, I can handle 

that. I faced death threats and all when I was a prosecutor. 

But I am not satisfied with this investigation. I am not satisfied 

with the briefings I have had. I am not satisfied with the information I have received on it. I suspect, along with Senator Grassley, 

I will in the coming months be asking more questions. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Director Mueller, what is the problem with getting a briefing on 

this issue? 

Director MUELLER. On? 

Chairman SPECTER. On the anthrax issue, the anthrax investigation. 

Director MUELLER. Well, as set forth in the letter from the Attorney General, there are aspects of the investigation that are grand 

jury matters at this point. There are aspects of the information 

that can, and should not, be disclosed, even to victims. 

26

Yes, we can give an over-arching briefing as to how many people 

we have on it, but you are asking for something more. It is the Department’s policy that, where you have an ongoing investigation 

such as this, a grand jury investigation, that such a thorough briefing should not be given. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Director Mueller, I would ask you to 

take a look at the legal authorities on the proposition that we 

asked both the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General 

McNulty. If there is solid authority for Congressional oversight on 

pending investigations, you could invoke the grand jury secrecy 

cloak here in a little different area, but are there matters where 

the grand jury secrecy cloak would not be involved? 

Take a look at the authorities which were cited, and the exchange of letters that I directed, both to Attorney General Gonzales 

and Deputy Attorney General McNulty, that Congress does have 

authority for investigations on pending matters. We have that authority. Take a look at it and supplement your answer, please. 

Director MUELLER. Let me also say, Senator, I am very sympathetic to what Senator Leahy says. Both of us in our careers have 

spent a great deal of time with victims, and the frustration of victims in not having the information they feel that they need to put 

what is happening into a context. 

I am very sympathetic and will take your words and go back and 

again discuss it with the Attorney General. But do not for a moment think that I do not understand your concerns, Senator Leahy, 

and your desire to learn more about the facts of what has happened and what we have been doing. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Grassley, do you have a supplemental comment? 

Senator GRASSLEY. There was a grand jury inquiry when we 

were briefed 3 years ago. It seems to me, if we could be briefed 

then with a grand jury investigation, we could be briefed today 

with that same grand jury investigation going on. 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, include Senator Grassley’s 

latest point in your response. 

Director MUELLER. I will. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Feingold? 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to see you again, Mr. Director. Thank you for being here 

today. I have been in politics a while, but I have to say I was a 

little appalled by some of the statements made in the recent 

months by the President and the Vice President, and even the Attorney General, characterizing those who have raised concern 

about the NSA’s warrantless wire tapping program as unpatriotic 

and opposing wire tapping terrorists. 

In October, President Bush said the following: ‘‘If you don’t think 

we should be listening in on the terrorists, then you ought to vote 

for the Democrats.’’ Even after the election, the Attorney General 

said the critics of the NSA program ‘‘argue nothing could justify 

the government being able to intercept conversations like the one 

the program targets,’’ and he said that ‘‘critics’ definition of freedom is both utterly divorced from civic responsibility, in itself a 

grave threat to the liberty and security of the American people.’’ 

27

Now, these statements are blatantly false, offensive, and outrageous. Mr. Director, do you know of anyone in this country, Democrat or Republican, in government or on the outside, who has argued that the U.S. Government should not wire tap suspected terrorists? 

Director MUELLER. No. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for that answer. I also do not 

know a single person who has said the U.S. Government should not 

wire tap suspected terrorists. Of course it should. The President 

and the Attorney General should have the decency and the honesty 

to stop suggesting otherwise. 

As you well know, the issue is not whether the executive branch 

should wire tap suspected terrorists, it is whether it should have 

to follow the laws passed by Congress when it actually conducts 

these wire taps. 

So let me ask you another question. Do you agree with the Attorney General that anyone who has raised questions about the legality of the NSA’s wire tapping program poses—and let me quote the 

Attorney General again—’’a grave threat to the liberty and security 

of the American people’’? 

Director MUELLER. I do not think it is appropriate for me to comment on what the Attorney General has said. He is much more familiar with the program than I am. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you believe independently of the Attorney 

General’s statements, that people that make those statements are 

a ‘‘grave threat to the liberty and security of the American people’’? 

Director MUELLER. Again, I am going to refrain from commenting 

on what the Attorney General said. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I just asked you for your independent opinion 

of whether these types of individuals are—

Director MUELLER. I would find it very hard to divorce my independent opinion from—well, I go back to saying I think it is inappropriate for me to comment on what the Attorney General has 

said. That is his. I think he ought to be asked about those comments. 

Senator FEINGOLD. What I am asking you now, Mr. Director, is 

whether or not you believe people who have questioned the legality 

of the NSA wire tapping program pose a threat. I have taken the 

Attorney General’s quote out of it now. 

Director MUELLER. I believe that Congress should look at all aspects of the program and understand the context in which technology has developed exponentially, and there is a necessity to address new ways of giving us the tools you need to be successful in 

thwarting terrorist attacks. There can be different ways of doing 

that. 

There can be arguments on both sides, but Congress needs to 

grapple with the issues of this expanding technology and give us 

the tools we need to expeditiously do that which you said at the 

outset, which is to wire tap putative terrorists’ conversations so we 

have the information we need do our jobs. 

Now, in the midst of that, there are people who believe the same 

underlying proposition that you set forth at the outset, but may 

disagree on the tools to do that. 

28

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I can certainly say if that had been the 

statements during the campaign, Mr. Director, I would not have 

any problem and I would not be making these comments right now. 

It is time for this administration to stop exploiting the terrorist 

threat to justify its power grab. 

Congress needs to understand fully why the administration decided to violate the FISA Act. We need to have a serious dialogue 

about whether FISA has shortcomings that need to be addressed. 

I do not think we can do that when, instead of the kinds of 

things you just said, which is a reasonable statement of the issue, 

the President and the Attorney General are falsely accusing their 

critics of sympathizing with terrorists. That kind of political scare 

tactic has got to stop. I appreciate the fact that you have not engaged in this kind of inflammatory rhetoric. 

I would like to make a final point in this. A number of administration officials over the past few months have talked about the 

need to modernize FISA to make it technology neutral and address 

some of the anomalies that have been created by changes in the 

communications infrastructure, which you were alluding to. That 

sounds like a reasonable goal. Senator Feinstein and others are 

working on accommodating that. 

The problem is, the legislation the administration has presented 

as supposedly modernizing FISA really does no such thing. I think, 

to me, it pretty clearly guts FISA entirely. It wipes out 30 years 

of law and replaces it with a blank check for the President to wire 

tap whoever he wants. Now, that is typical of the kind of overreaching misrepresentations made by some in this administration. 

I would simply like to urge you, Mr. Director, to convey to your 

colleagues that if they truly want to work with the next Congress 

to accomplish goals that all of us can agree on, that they try a new 

approach. They have to stop over-reaching and come to the table 

willing to have an honest discussion about changes that they believe need to be made in light of technology advances. 

I am very open to those kinds of reasonable arguments. Honest 

discussion of these issues has been sorely lacking in recent years 

and it is going to be absolutely critical if we are going to work together to move this country forward. 

Mr. Director, will you deliver that message? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Kyl, you have joined us. I will turn to you for questioning. 

Senator KYL. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be 

happy, if you want to go ahead, to defer. 

Chairman SPECTER. No, no. You take your first round. 

Senator KYL. All right. Thank you. 

Welcome, Mr. Director. First of all, we have, over the years, responded to a lot of recommendations of the Department of Justice 

with regard to changes in the law to better fight the terrorists. 

Are there ideas that you have today for additional tools to fight 

the terrorists that you would like to share with us, or would you 

be willing to provide those for the record? 

29

Director MUELLER. I can mention two off the top of my head, but 

there may be others that I would like to get back to you on. 

One, is I go back to administrative subpoenas. I have mentioned 

this before to the Committee on several occasions in the past. It 

would ease our burden in terms of our ability to get the information we need to swiftly determine whether or not a threat is a valid 

threat and the persons who may be implicated deserve further attention. 

Second, one of the threats we face in the terrorism arena are individuals who are not necessarily aligned with a terrorist group 

overseas which would be a designated foreign entity, but is deserving of the use of the FISA process to immediately and very quickly 

determine whether or not the communications—whether it be communications over cell phones, telephones, or the Internet—and 

make those readily available. We are constrained still by Title 3. 

One of the developments that we would like to explore is utilizing the FISA process where we have individuals who do not necessarily meet the current prerequisites under FISA, but still 

present that threat, the kind of threat that we saw that led to 

Oklahoma City, and give us the FISA tool for addressing that 

threat in the United States. 

Senator KYL. In regard to that latter point, even though we provided something called the ‘‘Masawi fix’’ to deal with a person that 

could not be connected specifically to a known terrorist organization, we have now eliminated that requirement but we still require 

the person to be foreign-born. 

Director MUELLER. Right. 

Senator KYL. That is to say, not to be a U.S. citizen. So, something to deal with somebody who is not a foreign person would be 

useful. 

Director MUELLER. A McVeigh, for instance. 

Senator KYL. Yes. 

Just to remind us—I have forgotten the statistics now—but there 

are 200 or 300 administrative subpoena authorities existing in our 

government today for various agencies, from the post office, to Social Security, and so on. Can you remind us of how common that 

is and why it is useful in the context that you mentioned it? 

Director MUELLER. Just to name a few, in health care fraud, 

child pornography, drug cases the DEA has authority. The ability 

that we would have to immediately, when we get word there is a 

piece of information in a motel, or in a hotel, or at a bank that we 

need rather quickly, issue an administrative subpoena has a number of benefits, in the sense that it is an order to produce the documents, not just a letter, as you have with the national security letter. 

There also is the enforcement possibility by the courts. Those are 

the benefits to us, the speed, the ability to get that information 

quickly, and also to have the authority of the courts, which we do 

not have with the national security letter. 

On the other hand, from the perspective of the recipient of the 

letter they have an opportunity to contest if it is over-broad; if 

there are some reasons why one should not comply, there is the opportunity then to go to court and get that resolved. Both parties 

would have the right to appeal whatever initial decision is made. 

30

So from the perspective of speed, and second in terms of getting 

a swift resolution to the issues that may be raised, it is a very useful tool. That is used, as you have pointed out and we have indicated, in any number of other areas far less important to the overall weal of the country than preventing terrorist attacks. 

Senator KYL. Indeed, we will work with you on that, then. 

Finally, just a quick status report, if you would, on the work to 

combine the IDENT and IAFIS fingerprint systems, so important, 

among other things, for our border security. 

Director MUELLER. When Mike Chertoff came in and took over 

the Department of Homeland Security, we broke a logjam in terms 

of establishing two separate systems. We are well along the lines 

of addressing the complaints that first found a home in the IG reports as to two separate systems. 

I would have to get back to you on where we are in the continuum of developing that, but there certainly is will on both sides 

to get that accomplished, understanding that a ten-print is the idea 

and that there ought to be a merging of, and a development from, 

the two-print to the ten-print and a merging of the databases and 

utilizing the ultimate IAFIS database to the benefit of both the Bureau, State and local law enforcement, as well as Department of 

Homeland Security. 

Senator KYL. Thank you very much. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kyl. 

Director Mueller, there have been media reports that the FBI is 

assisting the British investigators on the allegations relating to the 

international poisoning case. Is the FBI assisting in that investigation? 

Director MUELLER. Let me just say, we have provided assistance 

in a couple of instances where there were questions that Scotland 

Yard wanted asked of individuals in the United States. That is one 

way we have been assisting. 

Also, our laboratory has been providing some guidance and substantial expertise in the U.K. But to the extent that we can add 

some assistance in terms of our understanding of Polonium 210, we 

have provided that to Scotland Yard. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that is certainly something to be pursued with all the resources available on an international basis, beyond our cooperation with the British generally. If the reports are 

true, it is really an extraordinary case and it has potential for application far beyond Great Britain, with the subtleties of the action 

taken, if true. 

So to whatever extent assistance is requested there —I know in 

law enforcement you do not stick on strictly jurisdictional lines, but 

that is something we commend you for pursuing. 

Director MUELLER. Any request from the U.K. on that case, we 

would try to accommodate. 

Chairman SPECTER. Then we can doubtless have some better 

oversight than we have on the anthrax investigation. 

Director MUELLER. Was that a question, sir? 

Chairman SPECTER. No, that was a statement. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

31

Chairman SPECTER. There was a report in the Washington Post 

on October 11 that, after 5 years beyond 9/11, the FBI still has 

only 33 Arabic-speaking agents. Is that true? 

Director MUELLER. Well, I think it ought to be put into context, 

Mr. Chairman. We have within the Bureau almost a couple of hundred agents with some capability in Arabic. 

Chairman SPECTER. How many? 

Director MUELLER. Two hundred. I am sorry. Middle Eastern 

languages, as is pointed out, 159 in Arabic. But what we measure, 

are those that are at Level II in proficiency. There the story was 

accurate in terms of, in Arabic. 

Chairman SPECTER. Only 33. 

Director MUELLER. We have a total of 52 who are proficient in 

Middle Eastern languages, which include Farsi, Turkish, and 

Urdu, for instance. 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, when you combine that 

with the answers which we finally did receive on November 30 to 

the May 2 questions submitted for the record, you had responded 

that, of the 7,028 hours of recordings that needed translating, more 

than 46 percent—33,240 hours—could not be interpreted due to obscure language and dialects so that you cannot interpret what is 

on the recordings. I see a puzzled look on your face. Is that inaccurate? 

Director MUELLER. Well, I would have to go back and look at it. 

We have, in addition to the agents who are Level II or higher, 411 

linguists in Middle Eastern languages. 

Now, in the past we have had issues with regard to particular 

esoteric dialects, but when we have had a case, particularly a Priority One case, which is a terrorist case, that presents a short-term 

threat, we have reached out to other agencies, whether it be DoD 

or CIA, to obtain whatever translation ability we need. I would 

have to go back and see what those figures reflect. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Director Mueller, we had the famous 

situation, if true—and apparently it is—that there was a recording 

on September 10, the day before 9/11, that there would be an attack and it was not transcribed until the day after, September 12. 

Now, it is obviously a difficult matter with the dialects and the 

complications. 

The recruiting of people skilled in these lines is not an easy matter. Can the Congress be of any help to you on funding or any assistance in getting the people that we need to make these interpretations, translations? 

Director MUELLER. The Congress can always be of help to us in 

funding. In fact, I do want to mention one point there, because if 

we do not get back to the computer systems, I do want to get back 

to that. 

But in terms of funding, we are looking, and have tried a number 

of approaches to attract persons to be agents. We have gone 

through thousands of individuals and are continuing to try to attract and to recruit agents with various Middle Eastern language 

skills. 

We have put together recently another task force. We have enlisted some outside help to do that. I hope, by the time I am in next 

year to testify, that we will have some results and improvements. 

32

If I might spend a moment just on the issue with regard to Sentinel, and what I raised and what Senator Leahy raised earlier 

about the $57 million. 

Chairman SPECTER. Go ahead. 

Director MUELLER. I tried to point out that the total for Phase II, which has always been the total for Phase II, is $157 million. 

I think it was $150 million, and then for some reason it went up 

to $157 million. 

When we sat down to get the budgeting on this, the administra- tion was willing to give us $100 million. In negotiations with OMB, 

we had to find the $57 million in previous-year monies and the 

like, which we have done. 

But with a continuing resolution—we are in a continuing resolu- tion phase at this juncture—the Senate mark-up is for $80 million 

of the $100 million requested. The House mark-up is for the full 

$100 million that we have requested. 

We have to go to Lockheed Martin and enter into the contract 

for Phase II in February. My concern is that we would be precluded, I believe, legally to entering into that contract if we do not 

get the monies authorized by Congress in advance of them. So we have the $157 million that has been requested, but when 

you ask, can Congress help on the funding, Congress could help on 

the funding by including the continuing resolution the $100 million 

we need to augment and supplement the $57 million we have set 

aside for Phase II of Sentinel. 

Chairman SPECTER. Congress could be of assistance to the FBI 

if Congress would fulfill its appropriations function. That is a yes 

answer, Director. 

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I agree on that. 

Director MUELLER. I had to think it through. 

Chairman SPECTER. I was on the floor yesterday on the issue of 

the Subcommittee which I chair on appropriations, Labor, Health, 

Human Services, and Education. There are so many important programs where we have held hearings and reevaluated what we 

need, and we have been stymied in bringing our bills to the floor 

and we have been stymied in having conferences. 

What you have just talked about, the difference between the 

House and the Senate, these differences are created in order to 

have negotiating room to make concessions. I think it highly likely 

that the $100 million figure would have been the result in conference. 

I have a long list of complaints about that. My squash partner 

today complained about NOAA on ocean funding. On the lower 

level, they are going to have people discharged. It is a highly deplorable situation. 

But if there is an effort made, Senator Leahy can confirm, to pick 

out the FBI, much as it is needed, that would set off a chain reaction of hundreds—probably thousands—of items. 

I am interested to hear this because it will give us additional ammunition—Senator Leahy and I are both on appropriations—to try 

to get our colleagues to do the work necessary to finish these bills. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, also, I might say, Mr. Chairman, it requires leadership to do it. We have completed action on many of 

the appropriations bills at the Committee level, but even though 

33

the law required us to get all these done by the end of September, 

we spent a great deal of time with major debate on gay marriage, 

flag burning, Terry Schiavo, and all those things, which may be 

fine and good, but it would have been nice if we had done the business that the law requires us to do, and the American people expect us to do first, and then take the time on some of these things. 

They easily could have passed every one of these appropriations 

bills if the leadership of the House and the Senate wanted to. 

Frankly, I think one of the reasons the American people have 

changed the leadership is because they knew they did not do their 

job. 

Director MUELLER. Well, I know both are on appropriations committees. As Senator Leahy suggested at the outset, we ought to 

learn from our mistakes, and I believe we have done so. I think the 

IG’s most recent report indicated that we have learned. We are 

continuously being monitored in the Sentinel program by the IG, 

by the GAO, by this committee, and by the appropriations committees and others. 

I believe everybody believes this project is worthwhile. I believe 

they believe it is on target. It does have risks, but we do need the 

money to go forward. I would not want to have to delay the project, 

which is important to the Bureau, because we did not have the 

funding necessary to start Phase II at the time that we had indicated that we needed to. 

I might also say that this has been the subject of discussions 

with the appropriations Committee since we indicated that we were 

entering into this contract with Lockheed Martin. 

Chairman SPECTER. I have one final question before yielding to 

Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. I am going to have to leave, but go ahead. 

Chairman SPECTER. No, you go ahead. 

Senator LEAHY. No, go ahead. Go ahead. 

Chairman SPECTER. No, no. You pick it up and I will ask it when 

you finish. 

Senator LEAHY. If I might, I am going to have to leave for another thing. But I have asked for answers from the Department of 

Justice, and the FBI, and others regarding what we have seen reported—and actually in some instances documented—cases of 

abuse of detainees in U.S. custody. 

According to press reports, the CIA disclosed the existence of two 

interrogation documents. One was a presidential directive regarding the CIA’s interrogation methods and detention facilities located 

outside of the United States, and an August 2002 Department of 

Justice memorandum to the CIA General Counsel regarding CIA 

interrogation methods, the so-called second Bybee memo. This has 

turned out an ongoing FOIA lawsuit. 

Have you reviewed either the presidential directive regarding the 

CIA’s interrogation methods in secret detention facilities or the second Bybee memo? 

Director MUELLER. No, sir. 

Senator LEAHY. Would you be able to provide these documents to 

the committee? 

Director MUELLER. I do not have them and have not seen them. 

34

Senator LEAHY. I want to ask you then about a practice that is 

euphemistically known as ‘‘extraordinary rendition’’, or some have 

more accurately called it torture by proxy. Press reports have described cases in which suspects are arrested, or in some cases kidnapped on foreign soil—I am not going to go into the case of one 

arrested on American soil—and then, without any judicial process 

they are flown to third countries for the purpose of detention and 

abusive interrogation. 

A German citizen named Khalid al Masri was snatched off the 

streets in Macedonia and was flown to Afghanistan, where he was 

tortured and held for five months in a secret prison. 

Director, has the FBI participated, directly or indirectly, in any 

extraordinary rendition since you have been Director? 

Director MUELLER. Not as you describe them. I am not familiar 

with the al Masri case. I will tell you that we participate in renditions where we have an outstanding piece of paper—and by that 

I mean either an indictment or a complaint against an individual—

and we locate that individual in a foreign country, and generally 

with the cooperation of the government, that person is rendered 

back to the United States. We had a recent example of that. 

Senator LEAHY. Rendered to the United States? 

Director MUELLER. Back to the United States. Those are the renditions that we engage in. So I want to be clear, when you are talking about renditions, that we do engage in this type of rendition 

where a person is, generally with the cooperation of the foreign 

government, rendered to the United States, even though there is 

no extradition treaty. 

We had a recent case involving Bangladesh, with whom we have 

no extradition treaty, but we did have charges against an individual and we worked cooperatively with that government to have 

that person rendered back to the United States. 

Senator LEAHY. Was the FBI involved with the Canadian citizen 

who was sent to Syria? 

Director MUELLER. We were. 

Senator LEAHY. You know the case I am referring to? 

Director MUELLER. I think you are discussing the Arrar case? 

Senator LEAHY. Yes. 

Director MUELLER. I am somewhat limited in what I can say 

about that case because it is in litigation. I can say that we did 

participate here in the questioning of Mr. Arrar. We did not make 

the decision as to which country he should be deported to. 

Senator LEAHY. Of course, some might say, as a Canadian citizen 

on his way to Canada, you might have sent him to Canada. Just 

think how much better off we all would be had that been done. I 

just throw that out rhetorically. 

You talk about people coming here. Has the FBI been involved 

in identifying or locating persons who were subsequently rendered 

to other countries? 

Director MUELLER. I am sorry, sir. Could you repeat the question? 

Senator LEAHY. Has the FBI been involved in identifying or locating persons who were subsequently rendered to other countries 

by the CIA? 

35

Director MUELLER. I do not believe so. I do not believe so, but 

if I could get back to you on that, if I could spend some time looking at the question and assure that I fully understand it. 

Senator LEAHY. Are you investigating any of the allegations that 

have been made by al Masri and others concerning possible violations of U.S. laws? 

Director MUELLER. No. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, you and I will have further discussions on 

this, you can imagine. 

Let me just tell you one thing that bothers the heck out of me. 

Here is an article in a newspaper that has always been pro-law enforcement. I am going to give you this. It says, ‘‘FBI Agent’s Story 

Threatens Rooney Case’’. 

Let me tell you what that is. You are probably familiar with it. 

We have a young woman from Arlington, Virginia, Michelle Gardner Quinn, 21 years old. She was a UVM senior. She is out with 

friends of hers in Burlington, Vermont, probably one of the safest 

cities in this country. She met up with somebody and, at least as 

it appears, within hours she was brutally murdered. A person has 

been arrested. 

I had talked to law enforcement officers, State law enforcement 

officers during that time simply to make sure, if there was anything that they needed and were not getting from the Federal Government, I would be happy to make calls for them. 

Obviously I was not going to get involved in the investigation; 

they are highly competent. They assured me they were getting all 

the help they needed, but if they need more, they would call. 

Then, last month, an FBI agent wrote an article for a local 

paper, another paper, detailed the murder investigation and all the 

evidence in this case in a very self-congratulatory fashion: look 

what we did. An FBI agent did this. 

Now, as I said, State, local, county, and Federally, people cooperated beautifully in this matter in a horribly, horribly tragic thing, 

something that just stunned the State of Vermont. 

I was in Vermont at the time that the press accounts down here. 

Local press accounts were significant. It was just a horrible thing. 

It brought the community together in a way, hoping to get this. 

He detailed this. Of course, the defense attorney, doing as a defense attorney should, immediately raised this as a Motion to Dismiss, which the courts denied, saying that it would taint any future 

jury. The court ruled the right way. But it just raises another 

issue, a major issue, on appeal. 

Now, if I had had an investigator in my office when I was a prosecutor, I would have fired them on the spot. What in heaven’s 

name was this agent—has this come to your attention? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, it has. It has been referred for investigation. 

Senator LEAHY. This is something you would never do. I mean, 

you have had experience as a prosecutor and everything else. I 

mean, were you as shocked as I was? 

Director MUELLER. Let me just say, it is very unfortunate this occurred. On the one hand, I have heard, as I think you have, that 

the cooperation was excellent and the cooperation of all contributed 

36

to identifying and arresting the individual who was responsible for 

this terrific tragedy. 

We have apologized to the Burlington police department, to the 

Vermont State Police, and other partners in that investigation that 

this occurred. 

Senator LEAHY. That is what they have told me. 

Director MUELLER. We have referred this for investigation to determine what policies may well have been violated by this agent. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, I would assume that it would be FBI policy, if you are in the middle of an investigation or involved in an 

investigation that has not even gone to trial, you do not have an 

FBI agent going and writing an article or paper saying, look at 

what a great job we have done. 

I mean, I do not mind people bragging after the conviction is 

over. But can we say, at least in the abstract, that it would be totally against your policy? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator LEAHY. All right. I think that would be the same. 

Director MUELLER. That is what the investigation is looking into, 

exactly that, the disclosure of sensitive information during the 

course of an investigation. 

Senator LEAHY. I must admit, and I have been asked about this 

by the press, who defended the FBI and everybody else as being 

highly professional, and said that this had to be an aberration. But 

I cannot emphasize enough how upset we were in Vermont, how 

demoralized the police officers were. These people canceled vacations. They worked around the clock. 

In my experience in our State of Vermont, I have never seen law 

enforcement work so hard on a matter as this, and with great cooperation from the Bureau and everybody else. To see this happen 

is just awful. So I leave it at that, but I want you to know that 

this is not a matter of just passing concern to me. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Director Mueller, following up on what Senator Grassley had 

asked about leaks: there was a leak three weeks before the last 

election about an investigation into Congressman Curt Weldon, 

who represents Delaware County in the Philadelphia suburbs. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. Following the leak in the newspapers, there 

was a search and seizure, highly publicized in advance, on Congressman Weldon’s daughter’s property. I know that this is a matter which is under investigation by the Department of Justice because it was raised in a meeting I had with Attorney General 

Gonzales. 

To have that kind of a disclosure 3 weeks before an election, is 

extraordinarily unfairly prejudicial. Whatever investigation the 

Federal authorizations have is a very important matter, obviously, 

and has to be pursued. 

It does not matter who was under investigation, whether it is a 

Member of Congress, or anyone; that is outside of the realm. But 

to have the timing in such a highly prejudicial way casts a real 

question-mark on what is going on. 

37

To what extent can you shed any light on that leak, on efforts 

to determine the source of the leak or efforts to stop those leaks? 

The FBI has gigantic power, which we all know. When I was District Attorney in Philadelphia, the common parlance was that the 

D.A. has the keys to the jail. But the disclosure of a pending investigation can be disastrous. 

Comment? 

Director MUELLER. I was exceptionally disappointed—and that is 

being charitable—in terms of my response upon hearing about the 

leak. It is unfair, in advance of an election. But as importantly to 

us, it adversely affected the investigation and, consequently on that 

and several other matters that occurred at about the same time, 

we have initiated investigation. 

I am periodically updated on those particular investigations and 

believe that we are having some success. But there are a serious 

of investigations. We have undertaken some by our inspection side, 

some—at least one—we are looking at as a criminal investigation. 

Chairman SPECTER. You think you are having some success—

Director MUELLER. I do believe that we are having success. 

Chairman SPECTER. [Continuing]. On the Weldon investigation? 

Director MUELLER. I do not want to specify a particular investigation. There are a series of investigations that we undertook at 

the same time. I think it is fair to say, although I usually say I 

can neither confirm nor deny an investigation, in this particular 

case we are pursuing it. By that, I mean Congressman Weldon. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, all right. That is reassuring to hear, 

Director Mueller. 

Well, it is 11:42. You have been here a long time. You had a very 

good turnout from Senators. This is a right tough week to attract 

the attention of Senators, but you have given us very many important messages. 

I would like you to go back to the executive officials, as I will, 

to see if you cannot brief this Committee on the aspects of the Terrorist Surveillance Program which come within your jurisdiction. 

Much of it does not come within your jurisdiction, but what does 

come within your jurisdiction, I think this Committee is entitled to 

have the oversight function. 

The comments you made about the appropriations process are 

very, very, very serious. I will publicize them among my colleagues 

as to the impact that it has on a really vital program. We need you 

to get the technology up to date because your ability to track terrorists and interface with the other investigative branches depends 

upon the technology. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Director Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. That concludes our hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m. the hearing was concluded.] 

Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

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