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Filed 9/15/20 P. v. Rios CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ARMANDO DAVID RIOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C089642

(Super. Ct. No. 62155609)

Defendant Armando David Rios challenges an order revoking mandatory 

supervision. He has already completed his custodial time, so any ruling we could make 

can have no practical effect and cannot provide him with effective relief. We therefore 

dismiss his appeal as moot, pursuant to Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 12-14

(Spencer) and People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 645-646 (DeLeon).

I. BACKGROUND

In February 2016, defendant pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine 

for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and admitted a prior conviction for the same 
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offense (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)). The trial court sentenced him to 16 

months, plus an additional three years for the prior offense enhancement. Defendant was 

ordered to serve a split sentence of one year eight months in county jail and the remaining 

two years eight months on mandatory supervision. 

In December 2017, the Placer County Probation Department filed a petition to 

revoke mandatory supervision. In February 2018, defendant admitted violating the terms 

of his mandatory supervision, and the court ordered him to serve an additional 120 days 

in county jail.

In July 2018, the probation department filed a second petition to revoke mandatory 

supervision, alleging, in part, that defendant failed to report to the probation department 

as directed, and changed his residence without providing the department advance notice.1 

On May 22, 2019, after an evidentiary hearing, the court found defendant violated 

the terms of his mandatory supervision. The court revoked mandatory supervision and 

ordered defendant to serve the remainder of his split sentence (363 days) in county jail. 

Defendant was awarded 68 days of custody credit. 

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the admission of hearsay at the evidentiary hearing violated 

his right to due process. The People counter that his claims are moot because he has 

served his entire jail term, and reversing the court’s order would have no practical effect.

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They also contend that any error in admitting the hearsay statements was harmless. 

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 The probation department dismissed a third allegation.

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 The People filed a motion requesting that we take notice of a Placer County jail record 

reflecting his release from custody. We deferred ruling pending calendaring and

assignment of the panel. Defendant does not oppose the People’s request for judicial 

notice and does not dispute that he has completed his custody term. We now grant the

People’s request. 
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We agree with the People that Spencer, supra, 523 U.S. 1, and DeLeon, supra, 3 

Cal.5th 6403 compel us to find this matter moot because defendant has already served the 

custodial term imposed by the trial court and has been released from custody. His term 

of mandatory supervision has also ended. Even if error occurred, we could not provide 

effective relief to defendant.

“[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot 

provide the parties with effective relief.” (Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los 

Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 454.) “ ‘[A]n action that originally was based on a 

justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become 

moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical 

effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.’ ” (People v. Herrera (2006) 136 

Cal.App.4th 1191, 1198.)

Both the United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have 

held that an appeal from a parole revocation order was moot after the defendant had 

completed the entire term of imprisonment underlying the revocation. (Spencer, supra, 

523 U.S. at pp. 3, 12-16; DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 644-646.) In Spencer, the 

United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the petitioner faced “collateral 

consequences” from the potential use of the parole revocation order in a future parole or 

sentencing proceeding. (Spencer, supra, at pp. 14-15.)

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 Spencer and DeLeon both involve parole supervision. (Spencer, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 

3; DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 644.) We rely on parole-revocation cases in analyzing 

mandatory supervision issues because a split sentence under Penal Code section 1170, 

subdivision (h) that imposes a commitment to county jail followed by mandatory 

supervision is “ ‘akin to a state prison commitment.’ ” (People v. Martinez (2014) 226 

Cal.App.4th 759, 763, quoting People v. Fandinola (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422; 

see People v. Buell (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 682, 688 (Buell) [relying on parole revocation 

cases].)
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Relying on Spencer, our Supreme Court in DeLeon held that an appeal from a 

parole revocation order was moot where the defendant had completed the custody term 

imposed for the parole violation and had been discharged from parole. (DeLeon, supra, 3 

Cal.5th at pp. 645-646.) As a result, “a reviewing court’s resolution of the issues could 

offer no relief regarding the time he spent in custody or the parole term that has already 

terminated.” (Id. at p. 645.) In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the 

defendant’s claim that his appeal was not moot because he faced disadvantageous 

collateral consequences from his violation of parole. (Id. at pp. 645-646.) Rather, 

adopting the analysis in Spencer, the DeLeon court explained that “[t]he trial court’s 

finding that DeLeon violated his parole does not involve the same collateral 

consequences that attach to a criminal conviction. Future consequences will not arise 

unless there is additional criminal conduct. Even then, his parole violation is just one of 

many factors a court may consider in deciding whether to grant probation, or what 

sentence to impose. Under these circumstances, DeLeon’s parole violation does not 

constitute a disadvantageous collateral consequence for purposes of assessing 

mootness.”4(Id. at p. 646.) The court nonetheless did not foreclose “the possibility that, 

under other circumstances, a defendant could demonstrate sufficiently concrete 

consequences to avoid a finding of mootness, even if the term of imprisonment has 

already concluded.” (Id. at p. 646, fn. 2.)

Defendant “submits that his appeal is not moot because the revocation finding is 

part of his permanent record, the finding immediately harmed his reputation, and this 

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 The court nonetheless exercised its discretion to reach the issue presented in the appeal 

on the basis that it was “ ‘likely to recur, might otherwise evade appellate review, and is 

of continuing public interest.’ ” (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646.) Defendant does 

not argue we should decide the issue presented in his opening brief notwithstanding its 

mootness. Regardless, we would decline to do so. Defendant’s appeal concerns the 

application of settled law to the particular facts of his case.
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appeal is a vehicle to remove the stigma of criminality inherent in the revocation 

finding.” This is not a sufficiently concrete consequence to avoid the application of 

DeLeon. Tellingly, defendant cites in support of his argument Justice Stevens’s 

dissenting opinion in Spencer. The majority, however, stated that “ ‘the moral stigma of 

a judgment which no longer affects legal rights does not present a case or controversy for 

appellate review.’ ” (Spencer, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 8-9.) Again, in DeLeon, our

Supreme Court adopted the Spencer analysis. (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646.) 

Defendant also relies on Buell, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 682, in which an appellate court

accepted a defendant’s argument that his probation revocation had not been mooted by 

the fact he had served his sentence and had been released from custody because the 

probation violation was part of his permanent record and a successful appeal would 

remove the “ ‘ “stigma of criminality.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 688.) The Buell court did not 

discuss DeLeon or Spencer, and we are bound to follow our Supreme Court in DeLeon

rather than the Court of Appeal in Buell.

III. DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

/S/

 

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

 

RAYE, P. J.

/S/

 

HOCH, J.