2020 IL App (4th) 170639-U 

NO. 4-17-0639 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RAY T. OVERTON, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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 Appeal from the

 Circuit Court of 

 Sangamon County 

 No. 90CF652 

 Honorable 

 Peter C. Cavanagh,

 Judge Presiding. 

 PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for

 leave to file a successive postconviction petition. 

¶ 2 In November 1991, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (Ill. Rev. 

Stat. 1989, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1(a)(1)). The State alleged that defendant and three others started a fist 

fight with Paul Babcock and defendant and another, Clarence Smith, later stabbed Babcock in 

the head with screwdrivers. In January 1992, the trial court sentenced defendant to 90 years in 

prison. Defendant appealed, arguing only that his sentence was excessive, and this court 

affirmed. People v. Overton, No. 4-92-0096 (Nov. 5, 1992) (unpublished order under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 3 In July 1993, defendant filed a postconviction petition. The trial court dismissed 

the petition after second-stage proceedings, and this court later affirmed on appeal. People v. 

Overton, No. 4-96-0085 (June 3, 1997) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

FILED

December 22, 2020

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
- 2 - 

23). 

¶ 4 In June 2017, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition. Relevant to this appeal, defendant alleged that (1) the State violated 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel

from his prior attorneys who failed to argue that the trial court improperly excluded a confession 

from a codefendant that was admissible pursuant to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 

(1973) (holding due process sometimes requires the admission of an out-of-court statement that 

the declarant, and not the defendant, committed the crime). The State filed a response to 

defendant’s motion for leave to file, contending that defendant failed to establish cause and 

prejudice. In August 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion and denied 

it. 

¶ 5 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred by denying defendant leave to file 

a successive postconviction petition. We agree and reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 A. Procedural History

¶ 8 In September 1990, the State charged defendant with first degree murder (Ill. Rev. 

Stat. 1989, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1(a)(1)), alleging that he and three other people started a fist fight with the 

victim, Paul Babcock, and later stabbed him causing his death. 

¶ 9 In November 1991, the State presented evidence at defendant’s jury trial that 

police officers found Babcock lying in an alley. He was taken to a hospital and died about two 

weeks later. Dr. Alfonso Strano testified that he performed an autopsy on Babcock and 

concluded that Babcock died from stab wounds to his head. Strano initially believed the small, 

circular wounds were caused by an ice pick, but he agreed that the wounds were also consistent 
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with being stabbed with a Philips and flathead screwdriver.

¶ 10 Carrie Cook and Rita Davidson testified that they were friends with defendant and 

Clarence Smith. On September 9, 1990, the four of them drove together from Jacksonville, 

Illinois, to Springfield, where they met other friends. Everyone was sitting on the front porch 

drinking beer when Babcock rode by on a bicycle. Someone called Babcock over to the porch 

and began asking him questions. Shortly thereafter, defendant, Smith, and two other men began 

punching and beating Babcock. The men eventually beat Babcock unconscious before carrying 

him and his bike to an alley. 

¶ 11 According to Cook and Davidson, a few minutes later they and Smith got into a 

car driven by defendant with the intention of leaving. Defendant drove to the alley, and he and 

Smith exited the vehicle. The men walked towards Babcock and then returned to the car, where 

they opened the trunk and took items from what sounded like a toolbox. Defendant and Smith

then walked back down the alley towards Babcock. This time, when they returned, the men 

seemed hyper or energized. One of them, Cook believed it was Smith, said, “He was a hard one 

to kill,” and the other said, “Yeah, he was.” Cook testified that Smith was splattered with blood 

from head to toe while defendant merely had some blood on his shoes and the bottom of his 

pants. 

¶ 12 On cross-examination, defendant asked Cook if she had a conversation with 

Smith on September 11, 1990. The State objected, and at a sidebar, defense counsel proffered 

that Cook would testify that Smith told her he alone stabbed Babcock and defendant had nothing 

to do with it. Counsel also explained that Smith would refuse to testify on fifth amendment 

grounds. Finally, counsel asserted that the statement was not being offered for the truth of the 

matter asserted but the jury should be able to consider the fact that the statement was made. The 
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trial court sustained the State’s objection because it concluded the statement was not relevant if it 

was not offered for its truth. 

¶ 13 The State played for the jury a recorded interview, dated September 13, 1990, 

between defendant and detectives Charles Pennell and Tim Young. Defendant claimed he drove 

to the alley because Smith asked him to do so and Smith said he wanted to take the bicycle. 

Defendant stated that Smith walked ahead of him in the alley and pulled out a Phillips 

screwdriver. Smith then stabbed Babcock several times in the head and stated he was going to 

kill Babcock. Defendant stated that on the way home, Smith threw the screwdriver into a 

cornfield. Defendant denied stabbing Babcock. Young testified on cross-examination that the 

tape recording had not been edited, shortened, or altered in any way. 

¶ 14 The State also presented a written statement signed by defendant at a subsequent 

interview conducted on September 27, 1990. The detectives informed defendant that Smith 

claimed defendant stabbed Babcock. Defendant changed his story to say that he grabbed a 

flat-head screwdriver from the trunk of the car and stabbed Babcock with the handle. Defendant 

maintained Smith stabbed Babcock in the head. Defendant also stated that he threw his 

screwdriver into a cornfield just like Smith. Pennell testified that instead of having defendant 

read the statement, he read the statement to defendant before having him sign it. The interview 

was not otherwise recorded. 

¶ 15 Defendant testified in his own defense and admitted to participating in the beating 

of Babcock and dragging him and his bike to the alley. Defendant stated that Smith asked 

defendant to go to the alley because he wanted to take the “rims” of the bicycle. Defendant said 

that when they first returned to the car, he took a socket and rachet from the trunk so he could 

remove the rims. Smith was six or seven feet ahead of defendant when defendant noticed Smith 
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stabbing Babcock. Defendant grabbed at Smith’s arm, scratching it, and eventually got him to 

stop. Defendant testified that Pennell told defendant “they saw a picture of Mr. Smith’s arm” that 

defendant had scratched. Defendant further testified that when Pennell read his signed statement, 

Pennell left out the parts that defendant stabbed Babcock in the back and that defendant threw a 

screwdriver into a cornfield.

¶ 16 On cross-examination, the State pressed defendant about whether he told police 

about the ratchet and trying to stop Smith. The following exchange occurred: 

“Q. But when you were explaining on the tape, you never mentioned 

anything at all about ratchets, did you? *** Did you mention anything? 

 A. *** If you notice, that tape keeps stopping too, doesn’t it? 

 Q. No, did you mention it? 

A. Yes, I mentioned it.

 Q. And I guess you told [the detective] too that you tried to stop [Smith] 

too when he was stabbing him? 

 A. Yes, I did, and as I understand they are supposed to have pictures of 

Mr. Smith’s arm.

 Q. But I guess they turned the tape off too when they said that? 

 A. About a scratch? 

Q. Yes.

 A. I guess so.” 

¶ 17 In closing argument, the State asserted, “[T]he crux of the whole case is the 

statement that this defendant gave to Detectives Pennell and Young on September 27, 1990.” 

“You never like to accuse somebody of perjury but I submit to you that either Detective Pennell 
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and Detective Young are committing perjury or this defendant is committing perjury. It can’t be 

both ways.” 

¶ 18 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. In January 1992, the trial 

court sentenced defendant to 90 years in prison. 

¶ 19 On direct appeal, defendant challenged only that his sentence was excessive. In 

November 1992, this court affirmed. People v. Overton, No. 4-92-0096 (Nov. 5, 1992) 

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 20 B. The Postconviction Petition 

¶ 21 In July 1993, defendant pro se filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to 

the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1992)), alleging, among 

other things, that he was denied due process when Cook was not allowed to testify that Smith 

confessed to killing Babcock. The trial court advanced the petition to the second stage, and 

postconviction counsel filed an amended petition that incorporated all of defendant’s pro se 

claims. The amended petition did not elaborate on defendant’s claim regarding Cook; instead, it 

addressed ineffective assistance of counsel on various grounds. The trial court subsequently 

dismissed the petition on the State’s motion. 

¶ 22 This court affirmed the dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition on 

appeal. People v. Overton, No. 4-96-0085 (June 3, 1997) (unpublished order under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 23). This court concluded that defendant had forfeited the only claim 

advanced on appeal—namely, that counsel was ineffective because he was allegedly drunk 

during trial—by not raising it before the trial court. This court also concluded that absent 

forfeiture, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim was meritless.

¶ 23 C. The Motion for Leave To File a Successive Postconviction Petition
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¶ 24 In June 2017, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition. Relevant to this appeal, defendant alleged that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel from his prior attorneys who failed to argue that the trial court improperly 

excluded Cook’s testimony that Smith confessed to the murder because that testimony was 

admissible pursuant to Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In support of that claim, 

defendant attached the affidavit of David Dunn, who averred that later on the morning of the 

murder, defendant, Smith, and Cook came to Dunn’s house in Jacksonville. Dunn noticed Smith 

had blood splattered on his shirt, pants, and shoes, while the others did not. Dunn asked Smith 

“what the hell was all over his clothing.” While responding, Smith began to brag that he stabbed 

a guy in the head until defendant grabbed his arm to stop him. Smith showed Dunn a scratch on 

his forearm.

¶ 25 Dunn further averred that he later called the Springfield Police Department and 

spoke with Pennell. Dunn told Pennell about Smith’s confession, and Pennell asked him to sign a 

statement. Dunn refused when he told Pennell the statement he was being asked to sign falsely 

said defendant also stabbed the victim and Pennell refused to amend the statement. Dunn 

concluded by saying he informed defense counsel about the information now contained in the 

affidavit but counsel never called him to testify. 

¶ 26 In July 2017, the State filed a response to defendant’s motion for leave to file a 

successive postconviction petition, arguing defendant’s claims could have been raised earlier and 

he did not set forth a claim of actual innocence, which would excuse any forfeiture. 

¶ 27 Later in July, defendant filed a motion to supplement his petition to include a 

claim that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Defendant alleged that the 

State had photographs of the scratch on Smith’s arm but failed to disclose them. Defendant 
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explained that he received a response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in June 

2017 that contained a police report. That report, attached to the motion to supplement, was dated 

September 13, 1990, and stated, “Per request of Det. T. Young I took photos of a cut on the right 

arm of [redacted] ***. Photos were taken at 601 E. Jefferson St.” The report was signed by 

William Sowers. Defendant asserted the photographs would have changed the outcome of the 

trial because they supported his defense. 

¶ 28 In August 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motions. The 

State was present in person, and defendant appeared by phone. Defendant argued that he had 

established cause and prejudice for each of his claims. The State was permitted to respond to 

each of defendant’s arguments as he raised them, frequently disagreeing with defendant’s 

assertions and informing the trial court that defendant offered no support for them. Specifically, 

the State noted that defendant claimed that he never received any photographs but he did not 

offer any proof. The State contended that defendant’s testimony at trial suggested the photos 

were disclosed in discovery. Defendant argued his trial counsel did ask for the photos and they 

were never produced. The State responded that, if defendant were correct, he should have raised 

the issue in his initial petition. The trial court agreed with the State and its reasoning when it 

denied leave to file, specifically noting that defendant should have brought the photographs up at 

trial and that the State did not conceal them. 

¶ 29 D. Other Proceedings 

¶ 30 In May 2018, defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to 

section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)). The trial court 

granted the State’s motion to dismiss, and in August 2020, this court affirmed on appeal. People 

v. Overton, 2020 IL App (4th) 180755-U, ¶ 30. 
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¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred by denying defendant leave to file 

a successive postconviction petition. We agree and reverse.

¶ 33 A. Delay in Resolution of This Appeal 

¶ 34 Before addressing defendant’s claims, we explain that this case presented an issue 

concerning the State’s participation at the motion for leave to file stage, which the Illinois 

Supreme Court has stated trial courts are capable of making on their own and “there is ‘no reason 

for the State to be involved.’ ” People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 29 (quoting People v. Bailey, 

2017 IL 121450, ¶ 25, 102 N.E.3d 114). Prior to the supreme court’s ruling in Lusby, the 

appellate court was split on the issue of whether the State’s participation required reversal 

irrespective of the merits of a defendant’s claims. Id. ¶ 29 n.1. The supreme court resolved that 

split by explaining that courts of review are permitted to reach the merits of a defendant’s claims 

in the interest of judicial economy. Id. We reserved ruling on the instant case until the supreme 

court answered the question. 

¶ 35 B. Successive Postconviction Petitions 

¶ 36 The Act provides a criminal defendant the means to redress substantial violations 

of his constitutional rights that occurred in his original trial or sentencing. Bailey, 2017 IL 

121450, ¶ 17; 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2016). The Act contemplates the filing of only one 

postconviction petition and expressly provides that “ ‘[a]ny claim of substantial denial of 

constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.’ ” Bailey, 2017 

IL 121450, ¶ 15 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2014)). However, a trial court may grant a 

defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition if (1) the defendant demonstrates 

cause for his failure to bring the claim in the initial petition and (2) prejudice results from that
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failure. Id. ¶ 14. The Illinois Supreme Court has described the cause and prejudice test as 

follows: 

“To show cause, a defendant must identify ‘an objective factor that impeded his 

or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction 

proceedings.’ [Citation.] To show prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate ‘that 

the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so 

infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.’ 

[Citation.]” People v. Evans, 2013 IL 113471, ¶ 10, 989 N.E.2d 1096. 

¶ 37 A defendant does not need to “establish cause and prejudice conclusively prior to 

being granted leave to file a successive petition ***.” People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 29, 21 

N.E.3d 1172. But the cause-and-prejudice test presents a higher burden than the frivolous or 

patently without merit standard applied at first-stage proceedings. Id. ¶ 35. A defendant “must 

submit enough in the way of documentation to allow a circuit court to make” the 

cause-and-prejudice determination. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 30. A trial court 

should deny leave to file a successive postconviction petition “when it is clear, from a review of 

the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged 

by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting 

documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings.” Id. ¶ 35. “In other words, the court 

must determine whether defendant has made a prima facie showing of cause and prejudice.” 

Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. 

¶ 38 At this stage, a trial “court is precluded from making factual and credibility 

determinations.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 45. “[T]he well-pleaded allegations in 

the petition and supporting documents will be accepted as true unless it is affirmatively 
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demonstrated by the record that a trier of fact could never accept their veracity.” Id. ¶ 60. A trial 

court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition presents a question of law that 

appellate courts review de novo. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 13. 

¶ 39 C. Defendant’s Brady Claim

¶ 40 Defendant first argues that he made a prima facie showing of cause and prejudice 

for his Brady claim. Defendant contends that the police report he received in response to his 

FOIA request shows that the State withheld evidence that would have supported his defense. 

Specifically, the report mentions photographs depicting a scratch on a person’s arm taken at the 

direction of Young. Defendant’s trial testimony referred to photographs the detectives claimed to 

have seen, and the State argued in closing that defendant was lying and the detectives were 

telling the truth.

¶ 41 The State responds that defendant failed to establish (1) cause because he could 

have raised the claim earlier and (2) prejudice because (a) the police report does not state the 

subject of the photographs and (b) even assuming such photographs existed, the evidence was 

immaterial.

¶ 42 1. The Law

¶ 43 In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the 

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused *** violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 

prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The prosecution must disclose said favorable evidence 

whether or not there has been a request by the accused. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 

(1976). “Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different had the evidence been disclosed.” People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 
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74, 890 N.E.2d 500, 510 (2008). “[A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a 

preponderance that disclosure would have resulted ultimately in defendant’s acquittal.” People v. 

Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 393, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1077 (1998). Instead, materiality is 

demonstrated “by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the 

whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 

514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995). The ultimate focus is “whether in [the evidence’s] absence [defendant] 

received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. at 434. 

¶ 44 2. Cause

¶ 45 In this case, defendant stated at the hearing on his motion that his trial counsel 

requested all photos during discovery, including any of Smith’s arm, but the State did not 

produce any. In his motion to supplement, defendant repeatedly alleged the State failed to 

disclose the photographs. Defendant first received objective evidence of the photographs’ 

existence in response to his FOIA request in June 2017, when the State provided a redacted 

police report from an officer stating he took pictures of a person’s scratched arm at Young’s 

request. Defendant then immediately moved to supplement his petition. He could not have raised 

this claim sooner because he had nothing to suggest that photographs actually existed. See 

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283-84 (1999) (holding that it was reasonable for 

postconviction counsel to rely on the presumption that the prosecutor would perform his duty to 

disclose all exculpatory material and that such materials would be in open files tendered to 

defendant for inspection). Although the State disputes some of this information, at this stage the 

court is to accept all well-pleaded allegations in the petition and supporting documents as true. 

Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 60. Defendant’s allegations make a prima facie showing of cause. 

¶ 46 3. Prejudice
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¶ 47 Here, the police report itself is favorable evidence because defense counsel could 

have used it to question Young about whether defendant was telling the truth about the 

photographs’ existence. The State argues that any photographs are immaterial because 

defendant’s claim is “outlandish;” however, that is exactly defendant’s point. At trial, defendant 

asserted that the police omitted from his recorded interview statements defendant made that

(1) he tried to stop Smith and (2) in doing so, defendant scratched Smith’s arm. Experience tells 

us that claims that the police omitted relevant evidence are frequently met with skepticism by 

central Illinois juries. If defendant could have corroborated his otherwise self-serving claim with 

objective evidence, his credibility could have been significantly bolstered. Indeed, the State 

argued to the jury that the “crux” of the case was whether defendant or the detectives were 

committing perjury. 

¶ 48 We note that at this stage, this court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as 

true, and defendant need only establish a prima facie case. With this in mind, defendant’s 

argument proceeds as follows: 

¶ 49 Defendant testified at trial that he did not stab Babcock and, in fact, he scratched 

Smith’s arm to stop Smith’s stabbing Babcock. When defendant told the police this information, 

they responded that they knew about the scratch because they had seen photographs of it. On 

cross-examination, the State challenged defendant, sarcastically asking, “I guess you told [the 

detective] that you tried to stop [Smith] too when he was stabbing him?” Defendant insisted that 

(1) he did tell the police and (2) the police supposedly had pictures of Smith’s arm. The State 

again sarcastically suggested that the police turned the tape off when discussing the scratch with 

defendant, and defendant agreed. Defense counsel did not attempt to rehabilitate defendant and 

did not question Young or Pennell about defendant’s version of events. 
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¶ 50 However, the police report suggests that defendant did tell the police about the 

scratch. First, the report is dated the same day as defendant’s recorded interview. Second, the 

transcript of the interview in the record demonstrates that Pennell and Young spoke with 

defendant before and after the recorded conversation, including about material elements of the 

case such as defendant’s identification of Smith via photo lineup. This fact suggests that the 

police could have discussed defendant’s scratching Smith or the photographs showing the same 

or both during the same interview but not while it was recording. 

¶ 51 If, as defendant claims, the unredacted police report confirmed that Smith’s cut 

arm was photographed at Young’s request, defense counsel could have confronted Young with 

that information. Young would have had to either explain (1) why he omitted defendant’s 

statements from the recorded interview or (2) why he requested pictures of Smith’s cut arm if 

defendant never told him about the scratch. Counsel could then have questioned why the

photographs were never turned over during discovery, thereby bolstering defendant’s claim that 

the police were at best not being forthright and at worst were intentionally withholding evidence. 

¶ 52 To the extent the State claims the evidence is too vague to show that (1) the 

photographs exist, (2) are of Smith’s arm, or (3) that the cut photographed was caused by 

defendant instead of some other explanation, its arguments are premature. The question at this 

stage is whether the claim merits further proceedings such that defendant should be allowed to 

file a successive petition. This standard is lower than the showing necessary to survive the 

second stage. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 43. In particular, Brady claims raise issues of 

fundamental fairness and due process, with the ultimate question being whether the allegedly 

withheld evidence undermines confidence in the verdict. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Irrespective 

of the ultimate merits of his claims, defendant has met this “low threshold” here. See Robinson, 
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2020 IL 123849, ¶ 60. 

¶ 53 The State is free to make its arguments on remand. We express no opinion 

regarding whether defendant can survive a motion to dismiss or succeed at an evidentiary 

hearing. 

¶ 54 D. Chambers Claim

¶ 55 Next, defendant argues that his prior attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to argue that the trial court erred by preventing Cook from testifying that Smith told her 

he alone murdered the victim. The State argues that defendant’s claim has been procedurally 

defaulted or, alternatively, that he failed to demonstrate prejudice.

¶ 56 Both parties argue extensively about whether the Chambers factors could be 

satisfied in this case. However, we conclude that a detailed discussion is not necessary or 

appropriate at this stage. See Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 81 (“[Q]uestions regarding the 

admissibility and reliability of [Chambers] evidence are not relevant considerations at the motion 

for leave to file stage of a successive postconviction proceeding.”). As defendant notes, and we 

have repeatedly emphasized, the question a court faces when deciding whether a defendant 

should be granted leave to file a successive postconviction petition is whether defendant has 

made a prima facie showing of cause and prejudice. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24. Leave should 

be denied when the petition and supporting documentation are insufficient to justify further 

proceedings. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. We conclude that defendant has made a showing that 

further proceedings are justified. 

¶ 57 In concluding our analysis, we note (1) Robinson, which we have cited repeatedly 

because it supports defendant’s position on appeal to this court, was decided earlier this year, and 

(2) the instruction Robinson contains regarding how a motion for leave to file a successive 
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postconviction petition should be handled by a trial court was not available in August 2017, 

when the trial court in this case denied defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive 

postconviction petition. 

¶ 58 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 59 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case 

for further proceedings. 

¶ 60 Reversed and remanded.