20

- 730 Meaders v. Helwaser



## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT


# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NO TATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 2 New York, on the 2 3 r d da y of D e c e m b e r , two thousand twenty. 3 4 PRESENT: 5 ROBERT D. SACK , 6 MICH AEL H. PARK , 7 STEVEN J. MENASHI , 8 Circuit Judges. 9

_____________________________________ 10 11 PHYLISS P. MEADERS , 12 13 Plaintiff

- Appellant , 14 15

v. 20

- 730 16 17 ANTOINE HELWASER, HELWASER 18 GALLERY, HELWASER FINE ART, INC. , 19 20 Defendants

- Appellees. 21

_____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PLAINTIFF

- APPELLANT: J OSHUA L O O NEY ( Christian W. Habersaat, on 24 the brief ), Goulston & Storrs PC, New York, 25 NY 26 27 FOR DEFENDANT S

- APPELLEE S : J UDD B. G ROSSMAN , Grossman LLP, New 28 York, NY 292 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 1

New York ( Castel
, J

. ). 2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 3

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. 4
Phyliss P. Meaders (“Phyliss”) brought this diversity action against Antoine Helwaser, 5
Helwaser Gallery, and Helwaser Fine Art, Inc. (collectively, “Helwaser”), claiming conversion 6
and unjust enrichment under New York state law and seeking replevin, a decl aration of ownership, 7
and money damages. Phyliss alleged that in 2016, Helwaser purchased a n Alexander Calder 8
sculpture from her brother, Paul L. Meaders III (“Paul”) , for $277,500 ; that she held an ownership 9
interest in the sculpture and did not consent to the sale; and that Helwaser “knew
, or should have 10
known” of her ownership. The district court granted Helwaser’s motion for summary judgment, 11
holding that Phyliss had failed to present evidence from which a jury could conclude that she 12
owned the sculpture at the time of the sale. Phyliss now appeals. W e assume the parties’ 13
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. 14
Phyliss relies on two typ es of evidence to support her theory of ownership. First, she asserts 15
that the “provenance” Paul provided on the sale invoice indicates that she was
, along with Pau l, 16
the final owner of the sculpture before the sale. 1 Second, she argues that the allegat ions in her 17

verified complaint and her deposition testimony suggest that Paul distributed an ownership interest 18

to her from the estate of Jane Meaders (“Jane”) , Paul and Phyliss’s step

- mother

. 19

The district court found that this evidence was inadequate to d efeat Helwaser’s summary 20
judgment motion, and we agree. To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot simply raise 21

1 A n artwork’s provenance is “ a history of its ownership

. ” DeWeerth v. Baldinger , 836 F.2d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 1987)

.3 “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts
, ” Bellamy v. City of New York , 914 F.3d 727, 1

754 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation mark omitted) , or present e vidence that is “ merely 2

colorable ,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249

– 50 (1986)

. Instead, she must 3

“ designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial .” Parker v. Sony Pictures 4

En t. , Inc. , 260 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324 5

(1986))

. Phyllis does not meet this standard. 6

At bottom
, Phyliss identifies no direct evidence that Paul distributed to her an ownership 7

interest i n the sculpture. A s the district court noted, she points to “ no Surrogate’s Court filing, no 8
accounting, and no inventory to support her possession of anything more than a beneficial 9

interest ,” “produces no documents reflecting the details of the distribu tion of Jane’s estate,” and 10
“offers no allegations of an oral agreement or even a conversation with Paul, reflecting an intention 11
to distribute the [sculpture] in a manner such that the siblings would share joint ownership.” 12

Meaders v. Helwaser , 436 F. Su pp. 3d 677, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

. 13

T he evidence Phyliss does present fails to support her ownership claim

. Phyllis 14
undisputedly held a beneficial interest in the sculpture after Jane’s death and before distribution of 15

the estate
, ma king her inclusion in the provenance both “appropriate and logical” even if she did 16
not own the sculpture at the time of sale. Id. at 683. In any event, the document on which the 17
provenance first appeared also in cluded Paul’s express representation that he was the sole owner 18
of the sculpture , and thus the provenance is “not significantly probative” of Phyliss’s contradictory 19
theory that Paul granted her an ownership interest that survived until the sale

. Anderson , 477 U.S. 20

at 249

– 5 0. Phyliss’s remaining evidence consists of her own allegation of ownership and 21
testimony that is, at most, consistent with an inference that she at one time believed she owned the 22
sculpture. The district court correctly held that no reasonable jury , viewing this evidence, could 234 resolve the ultimate question of ownership in Phyliss’s favor. See, e.g.
, Heublein, Inc. v. United 1

States , 996 F.2d 1455, 1461 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Genuine issues of fact are not created by conclusory 2
allegations. ”). 3
Finally, Phyliss contends that if we find the record evidence insufficient to support her 4
claim of ownership, we should nevertheless remand to the district court to allow her a “proper and 5
sufficient opportunity” to develop her argument s

. Appellant’s Br. at 20. On review of the record, 6

we are satisfied that Phyliss had such an opportunity . In particular, t his case is readily 7
distinguishable from American Plastic Equipment, Inc. v. CBS Inc. , 886 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1989)
, 8

on which Phyliss re lies . Unlike the non

- moving party in American Plastic , Phyliss herself raised 9

a new theory of the case in her opposition to Helwaser’s summary judgment motion. And she 10
gives no reason to believe that she received inadequate discovery or was otherwise pre judiced in 11
any way. There is no basis for remand. 12
We have considered the appellant’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are 13
without merit. For the foregoing reasons
, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 14

FOR THE COURT: 15 Catherine O ’ Haga n Wolfe, Cler k of Court 16