FMFRP 12-11

German Tactical Doctrine

U.S. Marine Corps io 12UOO 00

PCN

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-0001

13 April 1989

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-11, German Tactical

Doctrine, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful

information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published

in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 Series are a special

category: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

2. SCOPE

This reference publication came about as the result of reports from

American officers who attended the German General Staff School from

1935-1939. It describes the doctrinal similarities and differences which

enabled the German Armies to achieve success in the early years of World

War II, and gives the reader a view of German training and planning.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. SULLIVAN

Major General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commander for Warfighting

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION:
German Tactical Doctrine

Prepared by Military Intelligence Service

War Department

December 20, 1942
FOREWORD

litII)l'ItI(.1( 'I'I II ( ItEA'I', :LS the I'('StIIt of his CXI.)eriences iii

tl)e Seven \'ars' Wat, IS CI'e(hitO(l with estal)IishitIg the

lirsi (ene1Ll Stall in the history of military forces, This

t.all Was cre:LLe( I i I tam tt i 10 a( liii immisirative (10t41i Is, tints

releasing tII()t'O liii i.e to the conuii.anders for t;actical Colt—

Si(Iei'ailOiIS. It was hut., hi()WOVO1', iiiit;iI 181(1 that F red—

eii(k'M Sll(CeSSOI'S (StaI )lISII(( I t school to trait i officers for

( enei'al Stall d tity. Iee:uise siicceasliil 'nilitary results

were achieved, France, Great lritain, the United States,

.htl )aJ 1, at 1(1 olliet' coutitnes based tI te formation of tI seir

( eiieral St.:i(is 111)011 tile itiocki Set by (ennany.

Regiiiii ii ig with Sd iariih,orst, such (iisluIgwslie(I lea( hers

and strategists as s'1oltk (the elder) and von Schmlielleti

'eie closely assodlate(l with the lIOVelOJ)meflt, of the

wwral Stafi' School, which o)crated (,onl,muouSly from

I I 0 tititil the outbreak of World War 1. Subsequent to

that war the Versiul los 'I'reaty forbade LI to comitintiamice of

lime school, afl(I it was not until 1933 that the Kriegsakode—

in/c, as the (lerinans call it, was officially reopened in the

Rerun location that it was occupying at the outl)reak of

\\roi.I(1 War 11.

During the years from 1935 to 1939, the United States

was :hJIowe(I to scud four in(hivi(llIal officers to take the

course. F rout their illuminating reports it is possible to

learn the trend of German methods and teachings tip to

I litler's attack on Poland. Our ohsezvers unanimously

agreed t.hi8t time ham bO(ly of (lOctrifle taught at the

UI
IV FORE WORD

Kriegsakademie—thc body of doctrine that underlies the

German waif are of today—is setforth in Truppenfuhrung,

the German tactical bible so very similar iu matter and

precept to our own FM 100—5, Field Service Regulations,

Operations.

rfho following partial rásuiné of doctrine taught at the

Kriegsakademic is actually a practical adaptation of relevant parts of Truppenfuhrung. It will be noted that this

résumé (ignoring the factor of translation) is written

ahuost exactly as a German would instruct Geriiuuis.

This faithfulness to the tone of the original lectures has

beet made possible beca iso of Ii ic extre i tel y zu le( tate

reports which were made by the U. S. officer-students.

'lii roughout, striking similarities will be observed

between German tactical doctrine and that set down in

pertinent manuals of the U. S. Army. Ti. S. officers,

however, should not be misled by the similarities to overlook the differences that also exist. With regard to one

of the basic similarities in doctrine, it has been pointed

out by one of our Kriegsakademie graduates that "Owing

to the phlegmatic nature of the German individual,

initiative and aggressive action have to be forced on the

lower leaders and staff, rank and file, whereas we 1)OSSCSS

these characteristics as a natural heritage."

The Military Intelligence Service tia.s pihlislicd the following I milet.tu,s

which describe various aspects of Ocrinan inilil ary nietliods: '"l'lie (,inia,,

Armored Division," information Bulletin, No: 18, June 15, 1042; ''(erIIoul Methods f Warfare in the Lihyan Desert," Information Bulletin, No. 20,

July 5, 1942, °Tlie Ocriiiati Aritiored Army," Special Series, No. 4, Ot:I.ohu:r

17, 1942; "The Development of Oclinan Defensive 'l'aclics in Cyrenaica—

19-Il," Special Seriea, No. 5, October 19, 1942; "Artillery iii tue 1 )esert,"

Special Series, No. 6, Nove,iml.cr 25, 1942. Informimatiut, iiboiit 51)oeitiC

organizations and weapons may be found iii TM 30—450, flawlbuok a,,

(Jer,,,an Military l"orces.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

SscIon I. POST OF THE COMMANDER -

H. DUTIES OF THE STAFF 2

Ili. ESTIMATE OF THE TERRAtN a

I. ltOAI)$ *NI I)IJTIS 3

2. ltAII,IftIAl)N - 4

3. i'KIIHA IN FOIl 'ION A'I—I'M;K.. 4

1. 'I'I'ltItA IN yost 'i'iii 1)I.vNNHivN AC'VION_.. 5

ii. (ien rut ... — .. — b. QIucsliw,8 'i'v He ('onsjk'rcd 5

11. 'I':.au,t IN you 'ri.s I )i,* YINU ACTION 6

6. 'l'lILiLAIN lIIt TON flivuis*u;.. — ... 6

IV. CONCEALMENT ., .. 7

7. l'IIuYl'NC'rlON AOA INFI' 1.1 IIOUN I) RECONNAISMANI'N_ 7

a. IImclile Obaervalivn.. 7

I). Ojf naive con.cealniene 7

c. lhifruaive Concealment 8

(I. I"iile ilppeara:uea.. — — .. .. 8

8. l'lto'rMl'IoN ItIlA If4$'r As it JtECONNA 188* NC .. .. - — 8

9. ( NCEAI.MNN'r IN 1tis'i' Ait*s... 9

10. OF TILO0V MOVNMENTS 9

IL. I,O(UlflfJ (lfl(l Unloading 1)

I). load ftlovc,u,ents .. .. U 11. (o NAI.ftINNI' IN B*'ii'i.it_ .. .. - 1(1

V. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 11 12. 'I'IIN I'IIEPAIIATION OF IN'VELI,IOENCu 1ton'is.. - — 11 13. W HAT 'I'll ltNI'OIIT 12

II. ( I)NI'AC1' ANI) (uoItoINA'rIoN i3'l'VNNN I"ItINNII.Y

UNITS 12

15. 'I'IIANSMISSION or Onu;ns ANI) Ra:iowi's 12

16. I I)V A NUN M KNHAON (Ni'Euts.. — 13

17. IN I'()IIMA'Il()N 'I',ittosju,i Ss'NcIA I. MNANN — 14

I . I LI 1(fl('IANi' I'IIINUII'I.N$ 1)1" t(EC()NNAISSANCE.. — — — 14

19. S'iitvs',o IU ItKUI)NN A ISSANCN_ - — . — 15

90. TAC'I'IeAI, It Nu:ONNAINSANCE 15

21. II NUONNAISSANCE BArl'AlJt)NS 10

V
VI TABLE OI' CONTENTS

Section V. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE—Continued.

IHgt'

22. Mu'IoIuzKD 1tICuN NA ISA NCN I3A'rIAI.IONH 16

23. flNCONNAI8SANC 13ArrAI.ION OP 'IIIN INPAN'II(Y

])IvlstoN 1$

24. BA!I-FLE 1tECONNAISSANCE IS

VI. PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATION 20

25. OPERATION OF SIGNAL COMMIJNICAIION 'IIeOOI'M .. 20

26. ORDER OP TIlE J)IvIsloN COMM(INICAIIIIN ur—

PICER 21

27. CoIftIuNlcA'IloN IN TIlE 1)IrENni.. -. ... .. 22

28. VARIoUS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION 22

VII. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 26

29. (1 a i ap Na I'iti NW PIES.. — .. — .. ... — '26

30. TIlE M INSION .. ... 28

:11. SEIZINO TIlE IN(IIA'IIvK — 2$

VIII. THE DECISION . - - - - - - .. - 21)

IX. FIELD ORDERS 30

32. (hNNHAb Rui.is. 30

33. WARNING ORI)EI18 (Vonnpwpoii.i).. .. 3$

:34. ('oi i'ip'r ()PEIIATIONS OIIl)ER$ (( EMA MIII K—

KIuI.E) 32

35. SNIAIIAlE Oicu,a (IINysI.IIEFEIlI.K) 33

36. SI'PiCIAL INSTRUCTIONS (IiEsoNaiolE ANoIIJINIINlIEN) — .. .. 38

X. MARCHES. 3.)

37. M ARChING IN 51 iii.,'ii'..i (oIIftuNs — 31

:38. MARCHING IN SINGLE COLt!ftIN.... 35

39. l'ROTEC'IION AUA INST AIR Al—lACE $_ — :35

lu. N,o,ri' MARChES 37 4$. I)ty MARCIINH -- 3$

42. ORUANIZA'vIoN YOU MARChING - - - 31)

48. (4,NNI,CiION ANI) COMMUNICATION.. ... — 41 44. ItATES OF MAIOlI . .. -- 41

IS. MARCH RESTS - 42

III. MARCII Ohl'IPt)$lS. . .. .. .. 4:1
'FAn1E or CON'I'E.N'L'S vu

i'ngc

Section XI. VARIOUS TYPES OF BATTLE -

XII. THE ATTACK.... 45

17. I'o iui s o v ArrA c K .. — .. 45

48. (oNsll NATIONS IOfl AN ATTACK 46

19. M ,:(,ulANns Ole' Ai'TA(,K 47

50. A'riei U NIl A I'OMITION .19

.111. A U'l'lt,I.KiLY JMI'I.OYMKNT . . . - 50

52. I NiAN'UI(Y I'USITION (IF RKAU)INKMS (1iii,as'wiu.i,—

53. IN FA t'ruv A TION TI' TO fl K Us, ASSA ii,;,,.. . 52

r.i. Awi'i ui.ity Si'i'oni' OF Ttll INFANTRY ADVANK.. 53

55. I NrKltMll'l;Nl' 1tI)V.. N4'N OF TIIK B KsEnv.. — — - .. .. 53

56. I.UKA Kill ltOl?(lll — — .. — .. .. — — — 54 i Pcuelratjon of lh( hostile !'osition.. 54

h. Time of Attark .. .. — — .. .. — .. — .. . 51 C. JI'///,,/,oua/ — . . SI

57. Aviu ItKCOMM KNOKU FOUL CERTAIN Si'i':c, u. (AsIM -- ... -. - -. .1.)

58. Miiria ENOAUEMEN'J' 56

a. 8eed and (Surprise .. . — .. — 56

I. T4IIH (1?,)! •S/?WC. — — .. — .. — - .. 57

f. Coordination. 57

ii. )IIrlboil.s

r1o. I'IltsI,lU 5$

XIII. THE DEFENSE 61

(iO. 1A VI)i(Al(l.l 'I'EIIIIAiN 11)11 (II

61. O-r,,pu (NsiuEuA'noNs 62

a. Defense or Ikinying Ic1iou? 62

h. l'repurulion of 1)efense urea 62

c. Maneuvers.. - 62

(Ii.:rn.nL l'U(INCII'i.NS l)l'INsI.. . 63

63. URUANIZA'vIlN 01. I)uiis. AU1u.As_.. 63

a. in Jkplh — .. . — .. (13

b. cYot'cr (171(1 Obstarles .. 64

lii - ItI:SERV s, H Eli EU'S, A NI) ltEAit I'OSITJONS — .. — (U

65. ACTUAL OJ'EJLATION o' 'riri J)1wENsE 65

a. Main Line of Resistance . 65

b. I1(1VUflCC Pmitwn.. ,. — .. .. .. .. — — 60

C. Outpost I'osition 66
VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS

S.ctlon XIII. THE DEFENS-—ConHnv.d. Pio

08. Awnl.1.ERY IN 'tilPi DPiFNPiPi 67

a. conroi by Ari1tery C'ontmander.... - .. (17

h. Tarlicp_ -- -. -. 67

o. Iiurruqe_ - - .. .. - 07

67. 1NYANIRY IN iiN DPVNN .. 68

68. II nwui,;P I'I'N KiIIA'flONN .. 68

09. TIIN CoI!NTnArrAcK . OR 70. VIIIInnAwAt. TO A Il KARVAIIP POSIUION - - - 60

XIV. THE DELAYING ACTION - - - 70

XV. RETREAT-RETIREMENT 72

XVI. THE EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY 73

71. ORaANIZATION.. - - 73

72. Io(,ArION IN r,i krr CK .. .. 75

73. 1,OVA'FION IN lUK I)K-;NRK .... - - -. — . 75

74. (t ,rKRA'IIUN WITH I ASTill. ... 75

APPENDIX. SAMPLE GERMAN ORDERS. 77

ILLUSTRATION

I"igsire I. ArIiIItry in (Ilvusioll tIack .... - - - - - 74
Sectkn I. POST OF THE COMMANDER

The personal influence of the commander upon his

troops is of the greatest sigmIicLuice. lie ILIUSI be lOCatC(l

where iie CLLIL most efleetively lead. On tiLe march he

should be as far forward as security l)CrILILLS, and his

location should be definitely known by the members of

his stall so that all reports may rctch him 1)rO1fl)tly. In

the attack his conitnamid post shouki be located as far

forward aS possible, yet l)rOLCCthd from hostile lire so as to

ittsIue (uldistlIrbed operation; for tactiemLi reasons, the post

is l)laCt(l near (.1)0 I?UUJ) effort., facili tatiiig control at the

mOSt. lln1)Ortant point of the battlefield. The movement,

of (lie (OIn1fluI(l J)08t is infILlelleed by the location of existing

wire hues, and the divisional signal olkeer is kept constantly

ii formed so that commumcatiom i requirements may be

better anticipated. lii a (lelaynig action, the commander

remains in the forward position until he is convinced that

his order for withdrawal is being successfully carried out;

then, with his artillery commander, he goes back to the

IICW 1)OSitiOJI. in very difficult or dangerous situations,

ofteim present while withdrawals arc being executed, the

c(nh)Imuumder will remain with his troops.

•I9T73r 2— -.2
Sectkn II. DUTIES OF THE STAFF

The commander should not be troubled with details.

To insure frictionless performances, there are definite

assigmudnts to staff positions and duties. Ea.(th staff

maintains its prescribed strength. The tactical staff

remains with the command echelon, whereas the supply

811(1 adt,i.iistrution stall remains well LA) the rear, iii tue

vicinity of the trains.

2
Section III ESTIMATE OF THE TERRAIN

Proper utilization of modern iniplements of war (artil—

levy, nirI)Ianes, gas, tanks, etc.) caii only be accoml)hshed

through tll(ir (lf1lt a(bLl)tatiolp to tue tQITaIII. The

c1)tlilllll.II(h1r liiiiiscll (ll Ol)LLill 1)1113' a gelieuth )icL1lve 01

the i;ei'raiii ; lie hits, JI)weer, many supplet entary Inealis

I )' %VI iicli 1 ie Citli IPflrlI the Iii ic CO1i( Ii I;ion if the area. in

which his commtuid is e1n1)h)yed: for example, recoiuiais—

sauce, air )Ilotographs, maps, sketches, LUId (uestl()nnlg

of inhabitants, In judging t,crrain for specific purposes,

you imist bear in mind the plan of the commander and

the immediate task—to determine how that plan will be

ipihlimeimeed (aided or hiijitlered) by the terrain.

1. ROADS AND ROUTES

tJse the best roads availal)Ie as routes for supply trains;

gain protection against air observation, but avoid defiles

a.i iii iarrow ':tl leys. l"or C( )i ii) )lLt trali is, rem neml er that.

cover from ground observation is also required. How are

time roads COlIStiUctC(l, and liow will bad weather influence

them? What are the bad or unpossil)le stretches, and

what is the possibility of avoiding or repairing them?

'rhe form of the material, here and at many other points, is governed by

the fact that It was presented as lectures at the Kriegsakademie.

3
4 ORMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

What are the widths? 2 defiles and excavated passages?

t)ridges? fords?' ferries? steep grades? 6

2. RAILROADS

Differentiate between standard gage (1.435 meters, or

4 feet 8X inches) and narrow gage (1.20 meters, or 3 feet

I l inches, to 0.6 meter, or 1 foot 1l inches). Differentiate alSo between field line, cable line, electric, awl

steam. how many rails are there, and does room for

a(huit,io.n exist alongside the rails? After a small aummount

of work on the bridges, tracks can usually be adapted

use as marching routes for foot and mounted troops,

as well as for motor vehicles.

3. TERRAIN FOR THE ATTACK

(a) Where will the enemy resist the attack? Where

are his advance outposts, main position, switch positions?

(b) how has he disposed his forces—infantry, artillery,

reserve? (c) Where is a position of readiness (Be,rei!-

slellung), and how can the terrain be best utilized for advance to it? Is there conceahnent. from air observation?

Until what point wilt the attacking force be concealed

from hostile ground observation? (d) Where are covered

approaches for iiifantiy toward the hostile position? Are

attack objectives so conspicuous and so located that coiicentrated artillery fire may be directed upon them?

For motor vehicles at least 2.5 meters, or 8 feet 44 inches, and for passing

at. least 5 meters, or 16 feet 9 inches.

Construction material, capacity, destruction and repair possibilities.

Current speeds, beds, depths (for infantry tip to 1 meter, or 3 foot 3.4

incites, for machine guits and heavy infantry weapons up to 0.6 meter, or 1

foot 11.6 inches, and for armored cars up to 0.0 meter or 2 feet 11.4 inches).

Capacity and time required for crossing.

• Usually negotiable by motor vehicles if the ratio is not higher than I to 7.
ESTIMATE OF THF TERRAIN 5

Where are the best j)OSitiOflS for artillery and observation

posts? \Vliere is the terrain most favorable for tanks?

Where (1OCS the Leri'ttiii favor the CilCifly'S couitterattack?

(e) And, lastly, what kind of attack 'is most favored by

the terrain—))cnetratioli, en vclol)tnent, or fron tat attack?

4. TERRAIN FOR THE DEFENSIVE ACTION

a. General

A (lefensiVe l)OSiLiOi) iS fre(IueIItly selected through

examination of maps. immediately thereafter, officers

arc se it 01 terrain recom iaissai ice. General Staff, artillery, and engineer officers reconnoiter for their restectivc

purposes or weapons; later, a coordinated defense l)1a1) is

built up from their information.

'b. Questions To Be Considered

Such questions as the following arise:

(a) What should be the locations of the inahi line of

resistance, the flank support, the outpost line, and the

advance positions? (b) Where can artillery and heavy

infantry weapons, as well as their required. observation

posts, he located to bring time enemy under fire at long

ranges? (c) How can time enemy be subjected to frontal

and flanking fire immediately in front of the main line of

resistance, and where can a counterblow be effectively

delivered? (d) What obstacles must be constructed to

canalize time attack of the enemy, including his tanks, and

to cause him to advance where heavily concentrated fire

Can be dehvere(l? (e) Where will the reserves be ho—

cated to obtain cover and also to facilitate counterattacks?

(J Should it be necessary to limit the enemy's peietra—
6 (DRMAN TACTICAL DO'IflN

tioii, and how can the defensive be established in a position to the rear?

5. TERRAIN FOR THE DELAYING ACTION

Where is an effective first line of defense? Where are

lines of defense to the rear? Where is favorable ground

for an outpost line? Where are covered avenues of

withdrawal? Where is observation for supporting weal)-

ons? Where are natural obstacles and terrain features

vIucIt can he converted into effective obstacles? Where

is t(HTflJII which )crInits long—range observation and tiring?

6. TERRAIN FOR THE BIVOUAC

Before the troops arrive, reconnoiter bivouac areas and

routes leading thereto. Avoid large assemblages of personnel. 'Liic smaller the groups, the easier to conceal in

villages, woo(led areas, or other smtabl.o locations. Maui—

laiji the tactical integrity of units in bivouac. if it is

necessary to bivouac by day in open terrain, increase the

(listaitce and intervals to minimize the effect of hostile

bombing. I'or tactical purposes, bivouac requirements

wclu( Ic: A (Le( i nate room; security and screening forces

which ()C(tIl)Y coirunanding terrain and are sufliciently

str(mg to I)erItut time and space for the main force to

iiunieuver aeeou I ing to the situation; and routes connecting the various groups and leading to potential defensive

area.s. Bivouac requirements for troops demand dry

ground and land (preferably uncultivated) which is

lightly wooded, protected against wind, and convenient

to a supply of water, straw, and wood. The proximity

of villages is desirable.
Sectkn IV. CONCEALMENT

'Troops must use every opportunity and means to deny

information to the enemy. Otherwise the essential olemont in the attack, surprise, is lost. Concealment is

most effective when the enemy rcquircs a long tirn to

discover that he has l)een deceived.

7. PROTECTION AGAINST GROUND RECONNAISSANCE

a. Hostile Observation

Hostile observers and stalls can see great distances

front high points (observation J)OSts) with field glasses

fln,(l telescopes; therefore, (a) when troop moVements are

(O1itC1Iil Ia,ted , sti uly t,1 ie TI ut) c:trefil ly to insure cover

against j)ossll)ie hostile observ:rt,ion ; (b) conceal moVe—

ments, posit ens, and installations i.y ti screen of security

forces to the front an(l flanks.

6. Offensive Concealment

Security iii all (liroctions ntnst be considered. Concealment may 1)0 either offensive or defensive. If offensive,

cavalry and other highly mobile combat units arc launched

against the hostile reconnaissance forces to drive them

back. This methlo(1 is effective, but occasionally hostile

patrols are able to in 1jlt;rato or go :trOLWd the attacking

force.

7
8 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

c. Defensive Concealment

Defensive concealment is particularly effective when

the terrain contributes natural ol)stacles such as a river,

a chain of lakes, a swamp, or some similar area. The

stronger the natural obstacles, the weaker the force employed to protect the avenues of approach, and also the

stronger the force that can be held as mobile reserve.

Reconnaissance units are sent far forward, operating

energetically and according to opportunity against the

hostile reconnaissance force.

d. False Appearances

In situations where it is desired to deceive the enemy

and impart the impression of great strength, circulate

false rumors, execute false marches, and send troops

against hostile reconnaissance forces with instructions to

fire a great tleal of ammnunitioii ral)idly, to tie ill) the

hostile communications net, to disturb radio transmission, and to organize deceptive transmission on radio or

wire.

8. PROTECTION AGAINST AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Strong activity on the part of the hostile air force

requires careful consideration for the conceahneiit of

troops am 1(1 ii sl4Ll latioi is, particularly wi ie.i m aim tiaireraft

means are lacking or very limite(.l. rIli( fact that photographs reveal every detail must not be overlooked. Artilicial means of concealuiemit, such as camouflage, smoke,

or nets, are effective; but it is more important to survey

carefully time surrounding area. Avoid coi istruc tioi is and

artificial works, sharp color contrasts, and lights. Realize, on the other hand, that measures for concealment
CON'CEALMEN'r 9

lIiiI(ler the troops, render mole difficult, freedom Of movement and distribution of orders, and through night

marches and detours cause loss of time and decrease the

capacity to fight.

9. CONCEALMENT IN REST AREAS

Seiect rest areas iii wooded locations or IT) several

villages. Place horses, tanks, vehicles, etc., under trees

or in stalls or courts, but avoid regular parking or parade—

ground (listribution. Regulate traffic in the area, keeping the main roads and intersections free.

10. CONCEALMENT OF TROOP MOVEMENTS

a. Loading and Unloading

In rail 'novements it is practically impossible to conceal

loading and unloading areas froliL hostile air rCCOJIHUIS—

sauce. When 1)ossil)k, march the troops l)y night to a

villag( near the loading station, permit them to rest, and

then JUOVO theliL on HI smaller groups to the village where

the loading station is located. Load rapidly and vacate

the vicinity promptly.

b. Road Movements

In road movements, the concealment given by darkness

is m st (fI(tCtiVO. AVr1flIg( the let )mIrtur( of th)01)$ from

bivouatc at. 1.1)0 I egii mmi U g of t tarki icss, whim arrival im m ti me

fl(T ea before daybreak. When marching by (lay,

select routes leadnig through woods, villages, om other

partially covereti LLVCUS. rfI)c shadows of trees along

the roads offer excellent mneans for concealing columns,

md udh ig vehicles. l3ridge construction cannot he eon—

cealC(l, hut equijnnent CUll 1)0 so disposed prior to the

4ft77:r. 42——3
10 OMAN; PAT1CAL DOcPRIN.E

tictual construction that there is little or no tell-tale

indication, of the preparations.

11. CONCEALMENT IN BATTLE

Carry out development and deployment, or either,

under the concealment of darkness. If the situation

requires execution by daylight, seek covered areas.

Utilize camouflage to conceal the positions of guns, of

headquarters, and of observation posts.
Section V. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

The coii UI LaIl(ler u inst coiitm (Lal l, (lay afl(l nigh t, con—

(ILirt re()JIJiaJSSflMce W(l iitiliz intelligence means to

seek information clarifying the enemy situation. As sooii

as l)ssil)1(, he will forward information and important

reports to the next hiighir coiieriancler. Once contact with

the eiieiy iS gained, stepS shioulol be taken not to Jose

contact. In higher coiniiiands, and sometimes with the

lower units, a special officer (intelligence officer) will be

(1014u1e(l to handle tii iJLtellig('nee matters. Siteli an

officer works in coor(hitlatiotl with all time conunan(lcrs of

attach 10(1 intelligence units and i nfor'nation services, aiid

keeps them constantly informed of the situation.

12. THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

hoe1) in nihid time following mimics goverimitig the )reparL—

tion of reports: (a) Determine beforehand what reports

must he sent in code and also what means of signal

eoinmniwicttiOJiS are to be used. (b) Differentiate be—

between what one has personally seen and what another

has remarked Or reported. (c) Avoid euphemistic phrases

and exaggerations. (d) State strength, time, and place

exactly. (e) Include information on the condition of the

terrain. (f) Send in pertinent information yourself,

never assuming that another unit has already sent it in.

(g) In very urgent cases, send a report not only to the

next higher commander but also direct to the commander—

11
12 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

ui—chief. (Ii) From time to time, sul)init a coinplete

assembly of reports; frequently a sketch will suffice.

13. WHAT TO REPORT

En battle, utilize pauses to send in reports on enemy

movements, your owim situation, the ainiuuiiitioii supply,

the COIL(IIL1OII of the terrain, and your owim imupressiomis.

Make suggestions for time seizing of favorable oppor—

tmiities. Reports giving such information as exists

just l)efore darkness sets iii are especially vahlal)Ic.

After a battle, report inimnediately what enemy Lrool)s

oppose your force, what the enemy is doing, what the

comhi Lion of your own troops is, where your troops are

located, and what the status of the ammunition skml)j)Iy is.

14. CONTACT AND COORDINATION BETWEEN

FRIENDLY UNITS

Liaison between neigh ibori ng uni ts, and between higl icr

arid next lower units, is accomplished through a mutual

exchange of reports and a prompt communication of

friendly intentions. Large units utilize liaisoi m officers

for this purpose, each unit sending one of its officers to

(lie other and holding him respomlsil)le for the exehimuige of

iiiformation. Such officers keep their commanders informed of the situation with reference to the enemy, all

(ieVeloplfleflts of the situation, and the intentions of the

other commander. The duties of a liasion officer dcmnaiid

tactical knowledge, intelligence, and tact.

15. TRANSMISSION OF ORDERS AND REPORTS

Several communication means should always 1 e avail—

able to a commander. Where technical communication
COMBA'r IN'iELL.IuENCE 13

iiieans are uncertaill or Caluilot be Illallutalned, tliei'i

coi irier service is established. Very iinportan t orders

or reports are generally sent L)y oflicer messengers in

niotorcycles or ears. [f delivery is uncertain, several

means of transmission are used, as well as different routes,

to insure the prompt arrival of the information at its

dest;i ii a tu )II

I'ery cOiflhllafldeI is rCqLIire(l to know the routes of

coiriniiniication and the messenger route. All units assist

iii the utui Iii telTu )1.e( I tratisi ii issioii of re )orLs at 1(1 1) uessagcs.

higher colIun:Ln(lers and eollnuIan(.lers of reeonnaissuice

an(l security units are authorized to examine the messages

%VhIiChi t.hi&y COIItLCt CII roiit;c, noting ott the iiiessige (,hztt

they have done so, tile hour, and the date.

16. ADVANCE MESSAGE CENTERS

To expe(htc the receipt of information, advance message

centers are established, particularly in ti te area or sector

whei'e communications will be fl Un ICrOUS. Such ii uessagc

centers should be easily lOCatC(l, 1)rotected from hostile

lire, and definitely connected with the rearward message

center. Under certain circumstances (for example, Ofl tile

front of a cavalry corps), advance message centers and

message asseitibly points iiiay be estal)lisiled at considerable distances from the main hleadq(larters, in order to

511111)1 ify and cxi ed ite the transmission of in fort nation

between tile reconnaissance units and the main head—

(lLILrt(1S.

flu III crs, ii tutiti led nicit, bicyclists, or n iotorcyeiists.
14 GI!RMAN TACTICAL DOCPRTNg

17. INFORMATION THROUGH SPECIAL MEANS

The air intelligence service observes hostile air activity

and provides information relative to the air situation, and

front this one can obtain a fairly accurate concetion of

the enemy's intentions. The signal comnumication intelligence service observes all hostile communications

(radio, telephone, telegraph, etc.) through goniometric

ifltCrCCl)t, listening posts, wire tapping, observers, .fl(l

other means. The routine interrogation of prisoners of

war yields in iscellaneous information. Captured doci—

men t.s may include Or(lCrs, maps, messages, notehooks,

news :q ,crs, I )1)otograplls, and films. Scru tiny ol the

Iu)Ntile j)reSs and pUbliCations is maintained.

18. IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF RECONNAISSANCE

I )o not (lissipate reciinais.sance strength. Superiority

of i OCifil S is very ii) Ij)OIttUi t successful reconnaissance:

l)flt, MIuI)CrU)ril.y in mnoI)ility and clever employment ten(l

to offset innucrical inferiority. It will frequently be

necessary to fight for information. Advanced hostile

security and reconnaissance forces must be penetrated

or thrown hack ,to make contact possible with the hostile

niain force. hi this connection, it is often advisable to

oCC(tl)Y 'I )(Wtmtflt p01mm ts (jmcldy with mnOtOrize( I forces.

When there is great inferiority to the eneirmy, fighting

should be avoided, and an endeavor should he made to

penetrate time enemy screen or go around it.

'lime commnitanoler who specifies what information is to

I e ol )taine(I should coordinate all his StIl)o)Edinate recomi—

intis.sai ice iieamis. !flicidn t recommaissaimee is in

tamed through employment of large numbers of recon—
COMBAT 1NPJLLIGENcE. 15

noitering units, bitt, l)y the careful direction and instruction of these units as to what the commander wishes to

know. J)eIiiiite in issions afl(i their relative urgency nmsf,

be jndieated, and tim meanS of sending information to

the rear, including (lelinhlely regulated radio traffic,

must 1)e insured.

19. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE

Strategic, or oI)erati ire, reconnaissance endeavors to

l)Uild Uj) a general J)ictlII'C of the overall sitIIati(m, thus

1u(ling the coInlnan(ler in chief in making the (iccisions

which have iInI>0r141.nl inlliience oii tim cii,(jr cumpr.1qn.

Missions i)lLy iu)CItI( le ol)servation of hostile mobiliza—

tions, assemblies, initial itutrch (I iree.tions, rn,ilroa(l move—

inetits, l)O1t, inoveineti ts, supply echelons, construction of

fort.ifieations, air :tclivi ties, locations, strengths, move—

men (,s of unotA)rize(I and mechanized forces, and, par—

tiemmlarly, oi mim [Ian ks. Such in issions performed by

ni r reck )lI I18.ISSflil cc lfl i t;s, lflOL()riZC(,I JCCOI1 naissa.n cc I )al—

t,alions, and army cavalry units. The three nimist supplement each other and be carefully coordinated to that end.

20. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

Tactical rCConna!sSance i.s concerned with the move—

muents of the CflCifl in closer l)roximnity: his nioveinents,

bivouac areas, organization, breadth an ci (lepti of clisposi—

tion, supply service, construction of defensive works, air

activity, amid location of LirfiCI(lS and antiaircraft. Especially unportant is liniely reports of the ]ocatjon of

lnolorizc(l or ii iri I;I.Ii ize(I f( )re(S.

For air rccoii imaissalire, lI)( rOitIIil:tfl(ler utilizes the air—

l)laliC SqlltLdr()fl which is placed at his disposal for such
16 O1IRMAN TACTICAL DOTRflE

purpose by the' air force. For ground reconnaissance, be

utilizes mdepcnden t motorized reconnaissance battalions,

lll()tOriZCd VCCOHflIUSS:LflCC battalions of the eav:Ll 1y,

tuoun ted reconnaissance battalions of LI e CftVILI ry, and

reconnaissance battalions of the infantry (liViSiOflS.

21. RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS

.I)cfini tc sectors are generally assigned to reconnaissance

l)attalions. Within the corps, boundaries between divisions are (lcsignated, and on open flanks the houn(lary is

designated between the flank reconnaissance area of the

(livision and that of the corps. Reconnaissance units

:LVOi(l (iglititig unless it. is al)Sohutely re(lllire(I 1 )( the

situation in the accoini 1 isi uncut of their missions. If a

reconnaissance Unit l)e giveti a security mission, the unit

should be reinforced by others units: for example, by

maci iine gull, light artillery, anti tank, and engineer troops.

If a reconnaissance battalion is directly in front of the

division and in contact with tile enemy, it should he

ordered either: (a) to 1HOVC off to a side afl(i continue

reconnaissance in that area, or (b) to await relief from

troops coining up front the rear, or (c) to fall back U1)OU

the troops in the rear. In the absence of any orders,

under the aforesaid circumstances the reconnaissance

battalion should fall back upon tile troops in the rear.

On an open flank, reconnaissance battalions are echeloned

forward.

22. MOTORIZED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS

The important advantage is speed. Motorized recouiimaissauice l)attal Ions Cttfl i(COIi Ifl H ter by (lay :1.11(1 tiilLrchi

on by night, and are restricted only by limitations of the
C0(II5A'I' IN'flEI.LItENCE 17

IHOtOl' vehicles, terrain, wetttliei', routs, fuel supply, lUI(l

signal COflllflUuiCtLtiOil. They itittilitEtili eoiinectioii wit) i

tHOUhit.C(1 recoflhiaIssaiuC ittiits l)y radio. Advancing for-.

Wttl(L I 'j I )O H H Is II i arer (1 te CI)CU iy, the shorter the

1)01111(15 they 1'Cll)lLIll as long as JR)Skible OH roads. lii

hiosti Ic tern tory, (Ii (leicut ioutes for the return are

selected, and iflIpOrttLIIt points along the road, or

p01'tILtlt )ltL(eS, are secured. J{est during the itight is

Ol.)tailled by avoiding main i'oads and villages, aII(.I by

hal tiiig tlIl(ler available cover iii isolated areas. Contact

with the eneiiiy, Jiow'cver, imist be niaiiitained.

Tue width of a sector should not be over 50 kilometers

(31 miles). Tue depth is limited by fuel supply. Motor

VehIicl(s III IIlO(lelII I tIIIiss:Ilt(e iiiiils 1IILVC IL imlnis

of action of between 200 to 250 kiloiiiet,ers (.125 to .155

Illiles) 'it]ioiit repleiiisliiiieiit.

Scouting groups will generally be organized and dis—

patched by the commander of a battalion. Such groups

include arnlore(1 scout cars, motorcycles, and radio

eqUi)flIClit. Along the more important roads and those

leading to the (ICCIS1VC areas 01' 1)OiJItS, patrols should 1)e

str()llger, hut too large a patrol increases the diiliculty of

COItCeId tneiit from the enemy. An noted car patrols

within scouting groups will be given written orders per—

tai.iiiiig to route, (lestinatioll, and imiforniation desired;

they advance by bounds, wi (Ii distance and speed sometimes prescribed; generally, however, they precede the

(IiViSiO)I at; about 1. hour (approximately 40 kilometers, or

25 iiiiles). Motorcycles are used to fill iii gaps and intervats, thereby thickening (lie reconnaissance itet. The ic—

tntiiider of the tnotonzed reconnaissance I)attalioir Serves as

a reserve 101(1 US IL receiving am uI ILSSCI Ill )ly 1)01 ut for IO )OI'tS.

.11)77(I •I2----4
I8 0RMAN TACTICAL DOCTRTNI

23. RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION

'[lie recoimaissance battalion of the infantry division is

employed as a unit, even if the division is advancing over

a broad front in several columns. The advance is made

by bounds somewhat shorter than those of the motorized

recoiinais&uice battalion. Scout groups are sent out

liiI(lcr the direction of the battalion commander. The

l)zLttalion can reconnoiter an area approximately 10 kilometers (6 miles) ii width, a.1i(l seldom is sent more than 30

or 40 kilometers (25 to 30 miles) forward. The strength

of the scout groups (sometimes up to that of a platoon

vi0i light miiacliiiie guns) is, however, deteriniimeil by time

situation and the mission. Patrols sent out from the

scout grottps remain oii the roads as long as possible,

:ulvanciimg by bounds from observation point to observa—

tion point.

Becommaissance battal ioiis Of ill tenor diViSiOl IS are

usually withdrawn to the rear after time battle actually

I megnis. If, hmowevei, time (Iivision IS Ol)erlLti uig over a

broad front or in difficult terrain, the battalion may lie

reimiforced, and utilized to fill in a gap or to seize aim unpor—

(ant terrain feature. Communications imist be carefully

J)EO'i(lC(l. Extra sigimal equipment and l)ersonlmel may he

attached iii exceptjonal cases. 24. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE

'lime plIiJ)ose of battle reconnaissance is to reconnoiter

(lie enemy's front, flanks, amid rear to establish definitely

the location of his flanks, artillery, heavy infantry

weapons, and reserves. Such reconnaissance locates our
CONCEALMlfNT 19

own front line and often provi(Ies close—in security 1111(1

teiTttin rceonwussanee.8 eciirity is necessary at Itli tunes,

l)ut reconnaissance imist not he neglected to accomplish

security. Rattle recomi IULISSaOCC is (tal )Iished usually at

the openIng phases of the (ICVCIOI)tiien t. or (lepPOyflien t.

'Ilie advance of the infantry in the attack reveals very

(1lIiCkly t.he location of hostile infantry and artillery; also,

lire from our arti I lery i ipon liosli he infantry will generally

result in the hostile artillery (lehi\'erimlg cotuiterfure and

tb us revealing its location.

'11 tere are imotli air ni iti groim mit) miteans flVlI.1 Itt) ile for

J)crfoemning I)attle reconnaissance. Soii ie of the sped 1w

means of l)iLLLIe econnaiss:tnee are: (a) Iflf(tflt?7/ 7)(ttrot.s,

sometimes rei,iforcecl with light machine guiis, heavy

machue guns, light mortars, or antitank guns. (b) Knyi—

neer patrols, particularly valuable in approaching a forti—

110(1 area, a defile, or a river. (c) A rtillerj patrols, coti—

isting usually of an officer H.fl(l a few imiounteti IT1CI)

assigned to reconnoiter routes of ap )roacli, O1)SefVatH Hi

posts, flhl(l lire positions. (il) Obscrt'atum battalion (arfil—

ldVy), Skille(l Ill locat.iiig targets I)y 801111(1 amid flash, and

in evaluating aerial photographs.° (c) Captive balloons, suppleinen tiiig the preceding means and permitting a

general view over the hostile front. — Our observation posts and other friendly personnel, who are reconiioutering

for our own artillery, heavy infantry weapon, mu( nntitak positions, can gain

iiiticli lid pfiu I iii formation from u iii ts of i.lic recoil Iuiissnncc baLl al ion. Sonic—

(hues actually CCOIDJ)UI)Y the lat,talinn to get early information al>oiit

the tOirtLiu,, potential targets, and gun positions.

II assists our own artillery iii firing on cOIIceaIe(I targets by l.raiisiuittiuig

I her data. By acci irate survey i ng pri nci ites, it. est aI ii islins Lhc loent.io ii

net for the batteries. The net is not, restricted to tho division sector, but.

,4ornct.iu)es extends 0 t.o 10 kilometers (as much as 6 miles).
Section VI. PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATION

The higher tinit is responsible for the cstablislnnent and

maintenance of comnumication with the next lower unit.

%Tire connection with neighboring units is always established to the unit on the right. This rule does not release

the commanders of responsibility, however, to maintain

contact with units to their left.

Of special importance is the connection between artillery

and infantry. If an artillery unit is attached to an in—

lantry inut, tlicii the lnf(uttry is responsible f. the (OJI—

nection; if the artillery is supporting an infantry unit, but

not attached to it, then the artillery is responsible for the

corn iection. If, however, thic artillery, through some

special circumstances, is unable to establish the coniìcc1ioii, then the infantry must undertake the reSpOflSil)ility.

Connection with heavy infantry weapons is the responsibility of the infantry commander concerned.

25. OPERATION OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

TROOPS

The commander issues orders for th eniployinent of his

communication units ordinarily after receiving the recoinmendations of the communication officer. It is most

essential that the commander punctually give the coininunication officer a complete picture of the situation,

including the conirnander's intentions. The comnmunication means of a cornluan(l post arc assembled in a message

20
P1t1NCIPLES OF COMM UNICAT1ON 21

center. The proper functioning of coinmun ication is

:Iependent U0fl its useful employment on the part of the

commander and upon the technical training of personnel.

26. ORDER OF THE DIVISION' COMMUNICATION

OFFICER

'Flie order of the division coimnunication officer should

contain: (a) The enemy situation, our own troops, the

plan of the commander; (b) the mission of the signal

battalion; (c) specific orders for the signal coimnunication

companies and supply train; (d) when applicable, instruc—

tio us relative to secrecy, reJ)lace] ad t, uti I ization of coni—

mercial nets, and system maintenance.

Iii II ie ad ':oice iarehi, the (Ii vision coiiutwiicaion

l)attaLion builds and Thaintains au axis of signal corn—

utuincation (wire lines) along the route upon winch the

(iLVisiOIL CO)Itinaflder and his headquarters are advaiHiflg.

In friendly territory, the existing comitiercial net is titil—

ized to a niaximui it; ilL Cfldi ny territory, heavy field cal )le

is generally installed overhead. When contact with the

enemy has been estal)hshcd by the division, wire corn—

nuijiication must be nlluntaiflc(l at all COStS with the corps

and inustalso be supploineutted by radio and other means.

Establishment of lateral connections within the division

aJH I 1 ctweeit (hivisioris is also very ilfll)Ortaflt in co—

ordiutating the tactical effort.

Writ hiin the division, all command posts and observation

posts should be connected according to their relative

uhLl)OrtaflCe. The division sigiual battalion will establish

hues to the infantry regiurients, artillery commander, and

the artillery units operating wider the artillery coin—

as well as lateral connection to adjoining di—
22 ORMAN TACTICAL D0CTRrNg

visions. When there is a deficiency of means, the ostablishment of the aforementioned artillery connection has

priority. The division signal officer will coordinate the

establishment of the communication net and supervise its

construction by his own signal troops and the communication troops of the various units. In a rapidly advancing

attack, in pursuit, or in wtihdrawals or retreat, he will

restrict the amount of installation.

27. COMMUNICATION IN THE DEFENSE

In the defense a very extensive communication net is

established. Its construction is governed by the situation,

:111(1 by the time, inatéiiel, inul j)ersonhle[ available.

Several means of communication bctwceii all important

defensive installations are provided. Wire cornmunication is carried by buried cables. Special communication

nets (such as infantry, artillery, antiaircraft) are establislied. Alarms for gas and air attacks are installed.

Technical means to intercept hostile messages are

intensified.

28. VARIOUS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

When new troops are attached to a command, additional

con nnunication requi1e nents are introduced; so reserve

conununication personnel should always be held out.

The operation of communication troops must not be

interfered with in any manner by other units. The

various means of conmiunication can be characterized

as follows:

(a) Telephone.—lnstallation of the telephone requires

tiiite and materiel. Wire lines are sensitive to such dis—

turl)tuices as fire, wind, snow, frost, and storms. '[lie
I'RINCIPLES OI' COMM 1JNCATL0N 23

enemy cait easily listen in on conversations, l)artidularly

over single—wire connections; in the danger zone, therefore.

double lines and heavy insultded wires are used.

(b) Telegraph.—The telegraph is snuple in operation

and installation, and very often cannot be easily inter—

ecptc(l. Tue Morse code is utilized.

(c) A 'i(onwbile, mounted messenger, In C7/liSt, motorcyclist,

runner.—--in a war of movement, these nicans are often

the most reliable. They are used withon hesitancy when

technical i (L1lM flI iiot available. Sj )cet Is of trans IllSSiOfl

vary.'0

(d) I?adio.When wire connections fail or are not

ftinctioning st.e:ulily, ii e ra(l iO IS ifl(liSl en.sahle. Electric

4oti I IS, slalic, oil icr rat I i( ) lr:Li 1511 iiSSi( HI ( ) I SIll LI lar WaVe

lengths, n touiitaius, and oti icr interferences nUfli]iLiZe

effective range of hearing, in practice, radio is valuable

only if messages are short; traiisiuissioiis should therefore

1)0 iii telegram foitit, oinit;ting all unessential wor(ls.

(e) Bhinker.--——-This is an important signal means in

battle wlieii wire hues are (k)StlOyC(l. It cannot be used

for great distances, and i greatly restricted by fog, mist,

brigl it St 11)51)010, or j)1OX1I I iity of cnei i y observation.

Blinker liLessages ]lLIlst he very short, since 20 words

req WEe al )OUt 10 I Li mites for ransniission.

U) Rockets, Very lights, jlarcs.-----These serve as signals

whose meaning has l)eeJL prearranged and is thoroughly

understood by the troops concerned. Very l)1SO)S and

l)Yroled nile equipment are cairietl I ial )itnally on light

M esseliger on horse, 1 k I loitiet er (tlis iii lie) in 5 to 7 iii liii lis; nit toinobile

or motorcycle, 3() to 40 kilotiteters (25 to :t i tithes) jier hoiir—on good roads

considerably faster; bicyclist, 15 to 20 kilometers (12 to 15 miles) per hour.
24 OFRMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

telephone carts and also in all combat trains. Ability to

see the.se signal lights is greatly influenced by the terrain.

Also, there is always the chuiice of confusion with enemy

signal lights.

(g) Signal flags and panels.- -•Prearranged signals with

these means enable ground troops to send short messages,

particularly in communicating with airphuies and balloons.

(h) Alarms.—I-Iorns, sirens, bells, and go rigs are used

f. gas or hostile airplane warning.

(i) Signal gun.—Thi small mortar, which projects a

message container, is useful in position warfare.

(j) Courier pigeons.—-Althiough requiring at least 3

(lays to orient, courier pigeons are useful tIIl(ler heavy

lire, for they are sensitive to gas, and terrain does not

influence them. They fly about 1 kilometer (5I8ths

mile) in a minute. They do not fly in darkness, rain, or

storm, and with snow it is difficult for them to orient

themselves.

(k) Message dogs. —Expert and affectionate care by

the men in charge of message dogs results in most satisfactory returns. Such dogs can be used under heavy

tire, and can remember and find locations on a battlefield

in a radius of about 2 kilometers (13' miles). r11y will

efficiently follow an artificially made track (scent) up to

6 kilometers (about 4 miles).

(1) Listening-in apparatus.—This apparatus is established to determine the location of hostile activity in

planting mines, and to listen in on hostile communications.

(m) Airplanes.---An airplane may be used to connect

a division headquarters with its foremost elements or

neighbor units. In such cases, no other reconnaissance

mission should be given the plane. It is iinportaitt to
PRINCIPLES 01? COMMUNICATiON 25

estal)liSil the location of the foremost line of infantry and

of the hostile hue; the infantry troops on prearranged

signal will ( his )htiy HLI ieis tO assist; LI I( J )laI)e oui the i ILISSIOII. Planes niay be uSe(1 for aitilleiy ,lire direction, and for

ii nu I rtau III ig COl ill ectioi 1 1 )etween (Ii ViSiOn, CiLVtIry (Ii VISIO11,

a11(l eOVl)S oi' army h1((k1lIULeI'S. They are particularly

a(lal)ted to CliStI'ih(It.uIIg quickly llUi)OItallt orders or

(id I 'eui ng I'C1)O1'LS to units a C( InSideral lie (listance away.

(n) Captive b(fiiOOflS.—ILhIOOUS o))SerVe artillery fire,

give preamniged signals ijidictting the time of the thty,

the signal to OI)Cfl ijie, etc. Their dOIiIIIllIIuiCatiOll iuieails

ii i(h1 i( he flags, i )allels, hi n i kei's, :u n I Leli l )l I( )I s. Weati ier

(OI1(Ii t,i011S, heavy—wooded Leriltin, ILII(l rilOUhIt:WIOUS COWL—

try iPSLl'id( thI('iI uisefuiliiess.

•1UTi5
Section VII. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

You must thoroughly work yourself into the stituatiori.

Place upon the situation map the location of your orni

troops and put down the hiformnation that you have

about the enemy. This information is built up by

reports from various sources, as suggested above under

the heading "Combat Intelligence." Tnforinatioii must

be evaluated objectively; one must be extremely careful

not to interpret what is received as one WoUld like it to

be, or as one hoped it would be. A large part of the iiiformation received in war is contradictory, a still greater

part is false, and by far the greatest part is very uncertain.

29. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Carefully read the orders received from the itext higher

commander, and consider all ii mformnatio.n iecci ved. In

considering the situation, the following principles govern:

The first and most important principle is to utilize to

the maximum the available means. Any moderation in

this regard is a deterring factor in attaining the ultimate

goal. Second, concentrate as much of your force as

possible where you plait or believe the principal blow (the

main effort) will fall, and expose yourself disadvantageously at other points, in order to be more certain of

success at the point of the main effort. The success of

the main effort more than compensates for any minor

losses sustained. Third, lose no time. Unless special

26
FS'rIMA'I'U OF TIlE SITUATION 27

1111 VIU I tages accrue by (lelay, it is very i in portant that you

PXC1l te yolli' plans as (lUicidy as possible; through Sj)CC(iy

action many measures of the enemy are nullified in their

initial stages, Finally, you must weigh each situation

mdependeiitly, restricthig yourself only to a consideration

of the esset I t.ials. TI l( following (ltIeSt,iOflS may here

occur:

lIiUSU)fl. What 15 iiiy lllisSu)n? Does it require de—

cisive action or delaying action? Must I light an iIl(iC—

Pefl(lcI)t action Or will I be ill(hlIeIIeed by the movements

or action of ot,lier troops?

'I'errai'u. W1111 is the cOlI(l I lion of terrain hetweeii my

troOh)S lU)(I the enciiiy? \Vhichi routes Iea(l toward the

('I ieiiiy? \V.l ie (lOPS ii 10 leir;ti I I )CFI Ill t. )l 1 111c1 IPS

c(wc1cd ff0111 air OF 11111(1 ol)Scrvation for au attack on the

enemy position? When Ifl ILILSSLOI1 requires defense,

where does the terrain offer favorable defensive positions?

What l)OSSibilitieS are therefore avaiIal)le for the ful—

lihhtnent of 1113' tnissioii?

/ncini/ WI nIt, cati t;I ic eliot I1 ( In IA) 001 III t.er uiy iI;tns?

\\T1p1.( is the enemy now located? Are there any bases

mi' his streiigthi lLfl(l orgauiizatioui? \Viiat can he do,

11111k lug C()l'i'eOt tactical 5111)1 )OSitiOiISP2 Are there n.uiv

indications that the enemy has acted iiicorrectly? Do I

know anything about the ability or personality of the

coJIlUIan(ler or the con(hit.ion of his troops? Ilow will the

terrain influence the enemy's action? How can I best

fulfill iiiy misSion with tile most damage to the enemy?

II Always favor Ilie enemy in coiiipul ing I.he ItsIances possibly covered by

I I K! (!I loll))' since his posi lion was In sf reported.

I? Al wnvs .isiiiiie flint, lie will cnrry 0111, his plan rinet lisa, tvantageoiisly In

you.
28 UUMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINT.

Own troops.—Where are my own troops? Which are

immediately availal)le? Which troops caii be later drawn

in? And when? Are special transportation means such

as a railroad or motor trucks at my disposal? What can

I expect from my troops considering their past perform—

ance? how is the supply situation, especially with regard to aniniunitioti? Is support from other organiza—

t,ioiis possil 1e? WI i icli of the present possible solutions

will give the greatest success?

30. CHANGING THE MISSION

As a resitl t of all these COJlSidCflttiOiIS, IS the aCCoInJ)lish—

iiieiit. of iiiy tIlISSiOJI HO loiiger l)05S11)1C? (When, owing

to lInaVoJ(IILI)le ci rctunsta.nces or unj )redictuble events, it

is ilnln)Ssil)le to carry out a Ifll5SIOli, then and then only

may I change my mission, and J must then assume full

FCSI)OtISil)ility fr the change. I must select a sul)stitute

mission to assist effectively the general scheme of maneuver. I irnist notify at once the next higher (,oInuIaIL(ler

in case I decide that it is impossible to carry out my

assigned nnsion.)

31. SEIZING THE INITIATIVE

In general, when confronted by a vague situation and

difficult circumstances, as is often the case in war—be

active. Seize and maintain the initiative. 1)o not expect

or await hints or suggestions from the enemy relative to

your next move.
Sectkn VIII. THE DECISION

The decision nuist indicate a clear objective to be

attante(l Iy the eOOrdiIULte(.l 1L1l(l aggressive use of avail—

ld)le means. Time strong will of time iea(ter must dominate

at all tiumes; often time stronger will einnpeis victory.

Never let, anxiety over l)CrSOlliLl security interfere o

iiiflttejmec ill inmy inannei the real task, which is the amnmilmila—

(doll of time emmemny. Caltuly weigh time situat;ioii, thimmking

(1t11(k l\' I nit ovcrl(nJkumg JIOU wig CSSCII LuLl. I IISUI'C t.lnLt

:d I :issist;aim Is clearly u t IdersIahm( I your ilan. Nervous—

HCSS omi your l)alt is quickly reflected by subordinates.

Never 1101(1 a council of war. (.oIni)lication and confusion are frequently ilmtrO(hICCd, and generally only an

iticOllli)iCtC (LeciSiOll results. One caim think through a

situation imuicli better and reach a definite decision by

i'SUICJ)CfldCflhifJ estiiriatung the SittiLt,IOlI.

Once a decision is juade, do not deviate, except for

excellent reasons. in this connection, however, one cumi

bring about disaster by obstinately clinging to the initial

decision wimemi juStiIinJ)le grounds are presetit for a change.

The trtie art (11 lca(lersllii) IS tile abilit)' to recognize wheit

a miew (lecisiomi is re(luired by the developments or cinuiges

in time sut;uation. rIJ)e commander should be resolute but

il( it oh )Sti nate.

• 'I'iU• III 'I.I(l II IlliHift HI lii I'HI gru(,,,1 I IY 111:111 I III iigg.sI JIll l ililti pro—

I)0S1118 Ill 11iP4 (Ili4,1 ()( taIT.

29
Section IX. FIELD ORDERS

Publishing orders is an art that can be learned only by

continual pi'actice. Prompt distribution of faultless

orders furthers the confidence of the troops in the leader

and often has decisive influence in achieving success in

combat. Conversely, power in the attack or strength to

resist in the defense cati be greatly t'educed by faulty

ot'dci'.

Commanders of divisions or larger units generally use

written orders. Simple imistructions :01(1 l)rief missions

may be conununicated oi'ally or through time comnmnunicutions net, but the text should be simultaneously recorded.

Commanders of units smaller than a division generally use

oi'al orders, but again, the text must be recorded in writing. While higher commanders usually make reference

to points or areas on maps, commanders of small units

point ou1 or make such designations actually on the terrain. Although oral discussions with' subordinates may

contribute to clarity, the leader should not become deI)emm(lexIt upon such discussions. Decisions and O1'(ICI'S

i'emain the direct responsibility of the leadem' himself.

32. GENERAL RULES

The following rules embrace accepted fundamentals

tu1(L help to gain uniformity: (a) Do not issue orders mtiI

your plan of action is definitely established. (b) I)istribute the order early enough o allow the lower echelons

tune for further dissemination and full compliance.

30
1'IELI) ORDERS 31

(c) Create conditions that are conducive to clearness and

conciseneSs, leaving )U)tllUlg to mutual agreements. (d)

Place yourself nu tafly in the shoes of the subordinates

receiving the order. (e) State only what subordinates

must know for the proper perfoimance of their tasks.

(f) Always state definitely whether the combat is to be

LLti1Lek, delaying action, or defense, and whether the

tn)() )S I I lUst ron ULi]L ''prepared for action'' ør whether

they ''niay rest.'' (g) Issue affirmative statements,

avon I mg alt ii ogi 10(15 01' vague cx O'OSSIOIlS and statci iients

of oxaggeratio •I4 (h) Inoludo a 1 )Ficf colt wiendatioii of

a unit for the execution of a (lifliCtIlt or unusual task,

lartimilarly when troops are or(lere(l to withdraw, to

tetire, or to hHlI'slIe tindei' CirelIlILStallCCS difficult for the

tI'001)S to comprehend. (i.) Use I)lescnbecl abbrcvia—

lions. (j) EIIL1)Ody 1)0I't1e1It iIIforJtLation for each sub—

ject, unit, or weapon in a separate paragraph, underlining

key words or phrases. (k) Number all orders successively, also the paragrahs wrjtliiii the order.

33. WARNING ORDERS (VORBEFEHLE)

\arning or lot's, usually transnutte(E orally, by teic—

1)110110, or I)y ra(hio, are issue(l to troops to give advance

ill loi'i I flLtiOJi about the will of the CU) tO nander. r1I te

iii f( )tl t (atiol i contained therein is influenced by existing

circm ' istaiLees—tile time available, the situation with

I'eSjKCt to tito oifleiuy 8)51 out' OWfl tJ'OOj)S, etc.—but in

general vil I niclude such i teins 8S the plan of tile coin—

itL:L)I( let', arr:oigeiiieiuls for reco]1J1:usstLltce and security,

to I (0 a) 1(1 I )lace of departures, iuiarchi destination, bivouacs,

halts, ahI(l changes of direction. Warning orders must

14 A 8LaLUllieIlt of eoiijettuic (if eXpeettLLiwI (IlilbI, lie tIeIiiil,Iy BtfltC(l as
32 OEI(MAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

be followed as soon as Practicable by a complete order or

11.11 ifl(liVidLltl.l order.

34. COMPLETE OPERATIONS ORDERS

(GESAMTBEFEHLE)

Compicte Ol)Ol'LtiOnS Ol(ICES 1)t0S011t a full survey of the

situation with ECSpCCt to the enemy tU1(l OW r0O1)S, the

plan of the coiiuiiander, the rote cucI unit will Iay, tunl

l)ertinent inforiLation for the troops. The usual arrange—

llleHt follows:

Enerny.———Pertinent i nfori I tation of the end i y, ii id ud—

lug strength, (IIS[)OSitioILS, dOfltlitiOfl, losses SflSthilIVll,

(Iefcats su licred, and the co ro i iander's expectation of

what the enemy may do.

Own troops.— A brief orientation involving the next

higher units, neighboring units, and special SU))OFti1Ig

units.

General plan.—A clear and concise expression of the

l)lall of the eolntnan(ler (not repetition of the plan of the

iiext higl icr coInhItan(ier), to enSure that subordinates

fully uulerstaitd his intentions.

Detailed pian.—An announcement of the specific detui!s

iclating to such matters as reconnaissance, IflSSiOI is,

Sit! )Iy and evticwttioii, cotiutiunication, aiitl the coin—

inand post.'5

I) As to reconnaissance, the detniled plan ,neuitioui the cuuciny iifiiruiial,iu,,u

ihesi rc(I, the areas to 1)0 reconnoi t,retI tm I by whom iiuiit whcuu, Ilie lime aim

iIitei whero resiultiuig reports tre to lie sent, and the sequence of reco,mnziis—

sin icos accori I jug to thici r ii rgculcy. As to mzssions, wliiit caIi unit, with i iu Ii—

ctut I ,iU.cli II IWI I_s or tIet.iich,i, leli IS liii i.sl. fiilli II is clearly HI,IIIOI I. I ii reMI)evt Ii,

sit pph end evai:uafjon, the iltili iii lu Iui,cli.,ii lug of agciicles iii rehit hni to the

vuuiiInt eieuutcuits is specified. As regards com,uunication, the axis of couti—

mu,,,, teal ii ii, for (lie iii iii puil ,hishi ii ig the on hen is iuiil ic,iI.ed, ai ul s ,ecial i iisl rue—

I it), IS, suicI as those i'' iii i lug to the use (if thuc rio 110 or cx isO uug couuuuuierchil

hots, are included. As for the command peal, the location of the COiHhulail(Ier'8

headquarters and the time when it opens or closes, etc., are given.
FIELD ORDE!RS 33

35. SEPARATE ORDERS (EINZELBEFEHLE)

Separate orders (Einzeibcfehic) are issued when ciictiin—

stances render it inipractical or unnecessary to issue a

coml)letc operations order (Gesamiliefehi). Such circumstances include situations wherein individual units must

be given specific or special instructions, or where the tune

availai)le (toes not pernut the issuance of a complete

operations order. The sel)arate order (Riuzelbefehi) con—

taii is hie necessary infor, nation t insure coordination of

effort, and later the J)tIbuiCUtI()tL of the eOJi1j)lCtC held ordet'

will include such iiiforinatiojt, l)ricfly stated, as was sent.

out previously in ii Ldivi(iIial orders.

36. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

(BESONDERE ANORDNUNGEN)

Special iiisti'ictioiis SUp)lcfl1eJLt operations orders with

information )rmCi pah ly concern ii ig an Lmunitioll, con t—

munication, e(ltii 1)1 nent, food supply, transportation, meit—

ical LU id veteri itary service, cot istruction, and civil

P p%I I:Lti( )fl. lii geiie& SI)eCiLt I usirtictiomis are written

and are issued direct to the units or agencies that they

Concern.

4H7735 42—-- -6
Section X. MARCHES

All arrangements pertaining to a iruu'ch Should be

based upon the premise that the mass of the force must

arrive at the new (lestmation with the minimum effort

and the nzoxs.mnm secrecy. \'heii contact with the enemy

is hiiminent, the march formatin should favor easy ami

rapid development for Colnl)at. When ci n itact IS 1111—

likely, the comfort of the conmuth(1' is the important

consideration. In view of modern LU I (leVelOl)l non ts,

nioveitients ii ndOI cover of (larki mess will I e l;hie rule

rather than the cxceptio] . rfl.( will 1)0 01 IC) UI Lstal ICOS

requiring day marches, however; or they may be safely

undertaken when tile weather precludes hostile air

activity.

37. MARCHING IN MULTIPLE COLUMNS

The command should be itiarched UI liUIhlil)le coltiiniis,

using all available routes, U iereI)y savn ig II me slreiigtli of

the troops, affording better protection against air attacks,

and maintaining tile eonlman(l in such formation as to

facilitate development for combat. 'lhe f ,l lowil Ig CON—

siderations, however, prevail: (o) Orgaiiiza.ti )iI ii de1 )tll

permits freedom of maneuver. (b) Echielomiwut of sonte

columns on the open flank affor(ls i)rotcctiolt or facilitates

later envelopment of the hostile flamik when II ie ci reiiy is

fixed in the front. (c) The strength of colwniis and the

location of stronger columns vihI 1w (lctdnlulle(l by time

whereabouts of the enemy amid by tile l;actical j)ian, us

34
MARCHES 35

influenced by the terrain. (d) If the situation is initially

too vague to determine such dispositions, then several

weak columns should be marched into aggressive action

against the enemy to clarify the ituation; the mass of

the force may then follow in one or more columns. (e)

The width of the advance should not be so broad as to

preclude the building up of a main effort when contact

with the enemy is na(1e. (f) Zones of advance with

boundaries shuld he indicated. (g) And,listly, trans—

inision of orders and reports must he carefully organize(l.

38. MARCHING IN SINGLE COLUMN

'ilie division SOIIU'tiIIIPS (U1fl()t aVOi(I inareliiuig iii a

single column. rpIe great disadvantage is the extraordinary length, which precludes assembling for a coozdinated effort in 1 (lay. An advantage of the single

column over multiple columns is greater security and

flexibility for changing direction.

39. PROTECTION AGAINST AIR ATTACKS

The movements of large forces are protected by antiaircraft precautions, particularly at mi tial points, river

crossings, and defiles. Antiaircraft batteries advanci i g

by })OIIfldS are set out in advance to front and flanks to

p rovi Ic )F( )tec tio at U ese cr1 Li cal poll ts. TI c (( H I I—

mander must insure that antiaircraft units have prioritY

on roads. rfte danger from air attacks during daylight

is greatly reduced by the fOllOWing ap)ro)riate IilethO(15

Increasing the depth of march columns—At the coinIflali(l I"iicjcrmarscIitwfe! (air defense depth), the troop

units, I iorse—drawii dcii ien ts, and other 'eh ides doul Je

the dista ces iiorniully inamtained on the IIIILIell. Siiuiiil—
36 OERMANT AUTICAJ. I)C'FRLNl

tniieously it is indicated whether security forces, such as

flank or advance guards, inaintaiii, increase, or (Icercase

(Listances. Arrangenients are made for air defense depth,

if eirciinisthnccs require such precaution, j.t the l)CglJH

of (,be march; or rest periods may be used (.0 ease or

(lecrease distances. With short march columns, extensiomi

or retraction are also accomplished during the nuireh.

increasing the breadth of march columns.—A t, the corn—

,natl(l 1"ieqermarschbrezte! (air defense brea(lt.J i), time

troops spread out, using both sides of a highway or

eveim exj)andmg into the adjacent fields. The formation

invariably immiposes march difficulties upon the troops

and is avoided whenever possil)le. When troops are

already ina.rchiiig in air defense depth, it is seldom

necessary to require the addi tioiial precaution of inarclii mig

in air defense breadth.

1)ividin..q a column.—Very long columns marching along

a single route are broken up into several short groups

wi Iii I etween I — and 3—kilometer 04— to 2—mile) in terv;m,ls.

Disposing of (lie nw(onze.d units.—The motorized L.umits

of tile flhfa.1i try (livisioJi, except time recOn.mlliiSslUlee

l)attalioll or unit.s enil)loycd on security IflISSIOBS, are

divided iitt groups and follow the various columns,

advancing by bounds. If the situatioli peruli ts, they

are organized into a. fllOtOFiZC(l coluiimn and marched on

a special road. Motor vehicles are also marched in the

intervals between the advance guard and time main body,

anti between units of time rnam i)Ody.

Avertinq h.o.stie ptwies.—Upon the approach of hostile

Ia1 mes, :m.i r g ian Is rom )tly son mid time warn i 1i, usi 1i pro—

arram mge 1 sigi mals. Marchum ig troops throw themselves

down on, or off to the sides of, the road. Motor vehicles
i\IAIt('IIES 37

li:tI I., :1.11(1 their drivers set. th( I )t'tLl(t'S . Moitu ted tl'())j)S

rle:ti ('I I(' Ioa(l :Ll1(l coil tiIltl(' tIi(' iiiurrl i 1LI1(1CI a'aiIal)l('

cover. Antiaircraft WCl)OilS immediately lire U011 the

hostile phuies, bitt riflemen do not fire unless a plane comes

witliimi r:uige. lreqmieimtlv the troops nrc I)If Ill I'C:L(IIIlCSS

to withstand a SII1IUILaIICOIIS fliF and gas n.tt8.Cl(. At night,

if flares are employed by the hostile fliers', foot soldiers

throw tliemtiselves to the ground off the roadside. Everyone cisc and au vehicles remain ab.soiuiely motionless

while amitiancraft artillery 1novides defetise.

40. NIGHT MARCHES

Although night marches initially tax the strength of

troops, this disadvantage is nmininnzed after troops be—

COItIC adjusted to resting in day bivouacs and eating regularly on a changed schedule. Night marches have

decide(I advantages: they deny altogether or restrict

niaterially hostile ground and air reconnaiSsance, and by

keeping the timciiiy igmmottnt, they c()iltril)Ute to SUrl)ltSe;

ii igi it unite1 ICS bi'iiig tEOOJ)S intO 1 )OSitiOIi for btLttlC

with few'er losses an(i conSc(fuen tly higher itiorale.

lit spite of the fact that maw highways are often iihtnii—

nated wit] i flares by ,lostile aviators, it is' fre uently

necessary to utilize highways for marches. If Jnany alternative 1)afallel routes are avaihLl)lC, the principal high—

iTays are avoided, or utilized by motor elements only.

Ihe hour of assembly at the beginning of time umiareli

should COltIC aftei' dark in order to pi'ehtde observation

b hush Ic planes. Trooi )S are funned as for a i.lay tfltUCII

wi thou I. ext,ciision of d ist.auicc ir exj>ammsioii of vidtlm for

air defense; but the security forces are drawn in sottiewhiat.
:38 UE.RMAN: TACTICAL DOcTRIN g

doser, and distances between units are slightly increased

to itisiiie suflicient, muTer i'ooiuu. J)oublc connecting

files, sent by the principal unit to the subordinate unit.,

or from the rear unit to the forward unit, are liberally

used to maintain contact. The order of march is similar

to time arrangement for a day march. If time tactical

situation permits, foot troops precede the mounted troops.

On good roads and by starlight or moonlight, time rate of

march is practically the same as that of a day march.

On poor roads or in heavy darkness, the rate decreases to

:3 kilometers (just under 2 miles) per hour and even less.

Bicycle troops and motorized units also mardi appreciably

slower by night than by day. it is advisable to arrange

short, re.sts——aboumt i() minutes in every hour; long rest

periods tend to immake time troops sleepy.

The alert commander does not march his troops directly

into bivouac if daylight is about to arrive. He halts

theni ill an available covered area and arranges to have

them divided into small groups before the troops march on

to bivouac or other destination.

41. DAY MARCHES

When conf,1.ct. with the enemy is at. all possible, the

counnander must march his command dthing the day

with "preparedness for combat" as the foremost consideration. When contact with the enemy is not imminent, the commander can divide his command and march

the various units on several routes. When time is not

pressing, time movement also can be carried out in small

groups over long periods of time. In any case, the first

consideration in a day march is tactical; but time J)OSSf—

l)Ihities of cover should not be overlooked. Time stronger
MARCHES 39

columns 5110111(1 be marched over the routes offering the

inosi, coVer, while (lie weaker eaii l.)e Sen I over time more

o)Cfl routes. TI IC Lime of (lepartlile Oil a (lay match is

inhluence(l by time Situation, the weather, time season, the

length of (he iii (('mu ie( I itiardi

, (lie condition of the tI'0o1)S,

UI( 1 oIl icr fac(,( us. .11 is deSi rat)ie to ii iard i fiot IL LI1 Old

bivouac area tIn(.lcr cover of darkness and reach a new

(InC l)y (layliglit.

42. ORGANIZATION FOR MARCHING

In fan try I I tare] I es iii (1)1 in i miis of Lii ice i ten :tt)rcast,,

riLViLily iii:tmeiics in cOlutlIns of two abreast (exceptionally

four), and 1II0IA)r vehicles travel in single columns. In

general Ilie rigli I side of tue fOa(l IS L1SC(i l)UL wlmeii organ—

iztti,iotis are lIliXPd, the infantry should be l)C1uuitted to

ina,rchi 011 the more conifortable side for walking. Within

time infantry division, the commander must organize his

troops for the itiarchi so that lie can bring all of thieiii to

bear against the enemy iii a concerted attack iti a single

day. in order to accoimimlis1m this, it may be necessary to

march in two, three, or four columns, with each column

jwoviditig its own security. Examples are illustrated by

time 1olI )wiilg (I iagraiiis:

Example I (Where the division is marching in columns a, b, and c,

and there are no adjacent units)

a fc

t
Example 2 (Where the division is marching with its leFt flank open)

b

+ + Adjacent Unit a

I

t

1L

Example 3 (Where the division is marching as an Interior unit) a b

4 + Adjacent Unit I Adjacent Unit

I

I I I

Example 4 (Where there Is a containing force and the division Is

marching as an enveloping Force)

Adjacent Unit Itt a
MAIICIJES 41

43. CONNECTION AND COMMUNICATION

'l'lie commander of a larger unit is responsible for COil—

nection with the iiext lower; the smaller units musi.

cooperate, however, when difficulties arise. In terrain,

or under circi onstances, where visibility is restricted,

arrangeineiits for continuous connectioxi are intensified.

On a march in several coiuiinis, communication between

the colujiuts is maintained through the most appropriate

available ) ucaits. " 44. RATES OF MARCH

Si lice i (. i liii! It titiuit to )FOVI( Ic coiid itiojis wh ichi j )ClDU t,

an even rate of march, the mixing of different sorts of

troops should be avoided as i,imcli as possible.'7 On good

roads and under favorable conditions the following

average speeds can be accomplished:'8

Per hour

I'OOtLfl)O)S . Skin (3iin)

U'oot ttot.tps (small units) -, .. — . 6 kin (3 mi)

Moutited Itoops (trot and wnlk) .. 7 km (4 mi)

Moumited ItoopS (trot) 10 kin (6 itii)

Bicyclists ..... 2 kin (75iiii)

Motorcyclists - 40 km (25 titi)

I tuge olgiti ii zatiot is WiLii til I vciipoiis

(I) I ucludimig mest, periods ... 4 kin (25 mi)

(2) Umulri sti('SS, vit1idtiV iS( I)eLiO(JL, 5 km (3 iiii)

Motorized units . 30 kin (18 miii)

'' A iI ilains I liSpS 'l)°' JIflISIM iiiiii 51511111 r,i,pii I lie air observer), radio

(wlieii ssl'eey does lint. t,recllIil. its Use) lILY litiiil)s, liaiso,i i,lliccis (through

liii liosse I i51l systA iii), wire fete, ittono ii,ui I f.t'ft.griti di (when coofact with, flu'

iqienly is iiiuiiiiici,I.) blinker (trisiliIlLIy) , and sigii:tI flitg.s (seldom)

I? Pack aol iiials are otie ihist.urbiiig factor ii, inaintaiiuilig at, eve_, rate of

iiiareht.

lot Ii,iil I. ,,,s ;utitlvr ordinary coiidition the distance 1at4erih,cd aM ft

'In, ITet'' bel,weq'i, (i)tii patties, or similar no its, is 10 paces; for titoi ,tif.cd troops

tiiid (.niiiis I tIaces. Such distances do tiof. appiy, of course, wheii air de—

1i,ist tIe-pitt ints bee-u ordered.
42 GE VIAl AN TACT LCA L DIM THIN 1,

Intense heat, poor roads, snow, ice, absence of bridges,

8.11(1 otlnr local cO1I(IItIOJIS greatly ijilltiejice the march

rate and the travel distaiLce accomplished. 'l'lie rate foi

foot troops on a cross-country or mountainous titarch

decreases from tile normal hourly rate by as itweli as 2

or 3 kilometers..

WTJicn great distances must be covered rapidly, motor

and rail trammsj)ortat.ion can be used to expedite marches;

for distances under 150 kilometers (93 miles) the use of

IV LOtOF transportation is ECCOfflI Ii Cli (1C(1. WI ien ci ret in i—

stances require foot or mounted troops to make forced

marches, every effort is made to assist the accomplislimitent.

Strict march discipline is preserved, and severe measures

(fl'C mctcd out ayalnst na1uucrers. 'l'hc nien are toli I why

the particular march is being made, amid arrai igei i iem its are

11131k fur rests where rcfrcshnicnts such as hot coffee I)!

tea will be served. Their packs arc carried, if possible, in

trains.

45. MARCH RESTS

r1IC commander should indicate in the itiarehi order all

the necessary information concerning the duration and

other con(litJyns of the march. An officer, should he sent.

forward to reconnoiter suitable areas [or ists. Arrange—

meuts shouhl be made for a short halt, itot longem Luau

15 minutes, to begin after the troops have marched about.

2 kilometers (1% miles) so that equipment and ci timing

may be comfortably readjusted on the men and aniumials.

The troops remain nea4r the road during such short periods,

spreadmg out only a sufficient distance to secure COVf

from hostile air observation. %Vhen a long march is made,

halts are ordered about every 2 hours. Rest periods are
MARChES 43

ittil ize I f r eating, drinking, Iced itig •ninials, and check—

iI1. veitieles. lhi(' sLo;)I)iIig )Ia('('s 5110111(1 l)e 11C1E

and not too reSt;rictc(l. In suiiinier a iest, should be PVC—

ScI'iI)e(I (hiring the hottest tnne of the day. During long

rest )eIiols (lie (roo; )S :i.ie:iri:uigvd iii groups; and when

hostile airplanes flI)I)1OI.eh, the air guards sound the warn—

ilig aiii the t.I'OoI)S take cover, renlalfling itiotionfess.

46. MARCH OUTPOSTS

'I1Iie security of a force ft a rest area is obtiuncd by careful I)rcl):LrathnI wit hut the area and by sending out security forces iitsti'tteted to conduct reconiiaissanccs, these

(fl,Utli)flS I )tJ))g cx (r(iSe(t 13) OfllCY to prevcnt the enemy

fron o)I)t4uJwig ijifoijitathiji about the maui force, and iii

OV( icr t( )I( I ted U c it uti ii ft Irce Iioi It SI II] )tISC amul give it

litite tO) )Il iaic for CW11.l )at. ACCO )r(iiiig to the degree of

(bimiger, if far fromit the enciriy, Silni )ler 1)rCdaUtioflS titay be

taken.; l)u I since the effect of (listalice I ias 1 )CC1I greatly

redure(E I)y iiiotoiizatioit amid alt ol)enLtiuJis, time following

I)rinCiPles (if outposting should ap)ly:

(a) EJnpl.)y time mninnuwn itumber of troops consistent

with the situatioii. (b) Exploit the natural 1)rotectivc

features of time terrain,.' particularly if the cucitmy is liable

to CIII Iloy an i LOIc(l VOl 11d105 aI w:tys (,SttLhliSht rOa(l i)loGkS.

(c) By day, inaimit,aiit observeis II) poiitts of vantage for

distaji t viewing of time sturow uhug terrain. (d) I y night,

nianitaimi listening jioiiits aim<1 1)atlOlS Oil 01' iiCtI tft 1)OsSibiC

avenues of approach. (c) Provide protectioti for the

flanks and rear. (f) Establish air guards and a warning

systdni.
Section XI. VARIOUS TYPES OF BATTLE

'Flie most important types of battle are the attack, the

defense, an(l the witll(lrawal, or retreat. A combination

of these types occurs simultaneously or successively iii the

course of every major campaign. The commander and

the General Staff Oflicer niust master the fundamental

prmciples involved in t,hese VarIOUS f0FHLS of tactical

tiianeuvcr. Resolute application of these priflCiI.)leS mitay

l)eI)etrate, at least will help to neutralize, the ever—present

"fog of war."

44
Section XII THE ATTACK

TIi( aLl:uk iiiay be Iunol)c(I (a) froiii. one (IEFCCLIOII

against front, [lank, or rear; (b) from several direcLions

simultaneously; (c) after penetration, into a new direction.

47. FORMS OF ATTACK

'Ihe frontal attock is LIie mosl; frequent form of attack,

buL lrLccJuuuzcd and motorized weapons will decrease this

frequency. It requires superiority in strength and pro—

dtices decisive results only when the hostile front is

,enetrated.

The envelopnuj (ltt(lck (envelopment) is the most dice—

live fonn of inaieuver, and if aggressively employed deep

in the hostile [lank or rear, it cait result in a most decisive

victory, or (WCJI aJllliIlilat.lOn of the enemy. An envelop—

nent of both flanks presumes marked superiority in means.

Wide (m'eh)l)meJ1:Ls are more effective than close—in.

A tiiong LI ic f:tc Lois 1,1 ial, con tril)uLe to successful envelo —

mitents ai'e (lCceJ)tiOJi, concentration of Strcflgtll at the

cr1 Lical 1)01)1 I, tVLiml )le çcçrVes, IflOl)il i Ly, and Si tfl)hCty

of ULLL11OUVOI'. As to 9urprzse, the enemy iiiust iiot be

given the time necessary to take countermeasures. As

to mass, strength must be concentrated on the flank of the

eflVClOi)flLeflt so that hostile extension of the line can be

OVCITUfl OF 01 lOt flnvellt(xl, and hostile defei isive moves

quickly and ellectively frustrated. As to f;ing the enemy,

45
46 GFRMAN TACTICAl, DOTRIN1i

the hostile forces in the front must, be contained

sunultaneously with the erivelopmg attack

r1he penetration is an attack where the maneuver is

intended to split or separate the hostile line of resistance.

The following e,onsidcrntions contribute to success: selee—

lion of a favorable point (a weak part of the enemy position, or favorable terrain); stu'prise (such as feints at oIlier

J)OJtIt.S, or secrecy in concentration of strength); breadth of

penetration (preferable a base as wide as the depth of

the peiietration or wider) ; (.lcpth in organization. (to

exploit breaking through, and to check hostile cowi ter—

attacks) ; rapid and full exploitation, of the break—through.

The limited objective attack is a form of maneuver intended to win unportant terrain features, to contain the

enemy froritafly, or to stop the hostile advance. Orgaiui—

zatioii in depth is not required.

48. CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ATTACK

Some important general cooskicratiomis for tui attack are

flue following: (a) Obtain unity of comnmnaiut and action;

avoid piecemeal attacks. (b) Establish a main effort.

(c) Assign narrow zones of action. (d) Reinforce fire by

t( Idi tioiul artil ICJ3 and heavy mfan try WCL1 )OIIS. (e) Coordinate and intensify the lire ot all weapons. f) Make timely cmnploynuent of tanks and reserves. (g)

Exploit successes quickly and fully even though the

location of tJ.ie main effort may properly have to be '

'rh may be accomplished by point attack (which is both effective, aiid

economical in troops) by frontal attack (which involves employment of

considerable force and tl,crcbv reduces the troops available for the n,ai,,

and by alLav.k w' il h liii, iPi% object i ye (nh ku re pu res a ,,u,,siiier tnre,

,utl rulr,isvs nuore (.uoq ftu, Ilue ,,,aj it ellort)
T1i ATTACK 47

changed.2° (Ii) Recognize the crisis in a battle and react

at j )fO )riat,ely.

13e :ile,'t to every advantage, to each success no matter

how s,mitII, to aimy niistakcs made i)y the eiicmy—am:l

(X1)k)i t. I.II('M( to time ftdlest, degree. If the attack appears

(iclilmitely SLOJ)l)e(l by StIffllg hostile reSiStanCe at a certain

point, further success may be better accomplished by

nijeetiuig fi'esli tl'OOi)S, 1) eo.iicenti'miting fires omi a different

area, or by changing the disposition of troops.

49. MECHANICS OF ATTACK

rlle Vi(llIl of ti ZOnC of action is dependent upon terrain

ttiid IfliSSlOll. A l)attfluiOJu of infantry with both flanks

protected is assigned a zone of action 400 to J ,000 meters

(roughly 44() to 1, 100 yards) wide. An infantry division

ni a mneetiiig engagement, Where terrain is favorable for

euumiuloylnejit of su))ortnug WeaponS, is assigned a zone of

action 4,000 to 5,000 meters (4,400 to 5,500 yards) wide;

I ui I aim in f:u i try division having both flanks protected and

t.n:i.khug time lii:m.i ii effort zig:unst a strong hostile position is

assigned :u. zone of :uctioui of 3,00() meters (3,281 yards).

A (.Iefiuli Ic oI)•jecti VC 01' (hitoetiOul must be indicated for

LI me aitmick. Al Ii 1(11 mgI i zne of aetiomi are prescri I cd , ti mey

need not be coin pletely tilled with troops. For divisions

:Ln( I I:Li'gel' liii Is, Ii iCM( Z( H IPS time selce ted ftoi ii LI me maj

for the sumuahler units, they are determined by inspection of

the terrain itself. Time boundaries are extended dccl)

enough into hostile territory to preclude mixing of units

fj the duration of the day's operation. Strongpoints and

20 I'ur i'xninpir', iii i miiig an nI,sinc.le—-ri ver or tnou ii l.n.in linJn—(;he mail,

i(i,i tIItLV 1H' %%'ii(iI((i (ilirilig Iht' piogi('SS oF Ilie Ol)PrILI.i0Il i,ccitu of a

hreak—I.iiioiigii iii an tipiex1ecI,ed
48 UFRMAN TACTTCMJ DOCTRINE

difficult terrain iinist he lflChI(lC(l within t UI1Lt's Zone of

(t.iOI1 811(1 iiot locttted Oil itS bOUiRltLry line. troqtiently

only the designation of an objective is required in order to

I I ULI Ii tU11 (Ii i'ecttoii and to )reclude mixing of organ iztt—

(ions.

1)o not include too much detail in the attack order and

thus restrict inilitivC. The ,inssioii mitut he clear—-— whot

to do, l)Ut iWI /WW to (tO it.

'rue iiiiiortant task of all weapons iS to Cfl(Lbie the

infantry to close wit/i the enemy and to drive deep into his

pOStiOfl. i,l order to crush (iii resistance or to annihilate him.

'I hits cml caii be accoiflj)iishe(1 only if the hostile auitomnn.tic

weapons and artillery are neutralized or destroyed. Coordination between infantry and artillery must at all times

and in all situations be carefully arraiged.

When tanks and infantry are operating togethier, thI(W

both should be initially assigned the sante objective,

namely, the hostile artillery. rfaI)l(s can often attack

front a dillet'cuit direction. 'the coordination of other

weapons of the division attacking with tanks is based on

the activities of the latter. 'lhie division commander is

responsible for such coordination. Artillery supports the

tank 'ttack by firing 111)011 ant;itapk weapons, blinding

hostile observation, and neutralizin villages and edges of

woods. Artillery tue must be carefully observed and controlled to l)rCCtUdC firing upon friendly tanks and advancing troops. Engineer troops remove tank obstacles and

assist tank units forward. The air force provides con—

miection between the fast—moving tank units, time (liViSiOn,

and the artillery. Commibat aviation may be employed to

neutralize antitank weapons.

Antiaircraft troops protect tIme dcployinen t of troops,
'Ill E A'ITA(K 41)

)OSI Lioiis (if L(i,(II hess, :trtillcry lfl)Si lions, and bathe

iCcoullia.iss:l.ncc J laiies. 'l.'llC 111811! effort, niiist FCCeIVe the

I nil k f :u i t,i:tii'craft, pio Lect,.ic,ii Gas illay be used against

:trtiIleiv 811(1 reserveS, LU(l ill cOnfleCtiol) 'tvit.li road blocks

(IF block:lAk'S 011 8.11 open Ilaitic The comuninications net.

vill lie I)ased 111)011 the plan of maneuver; separate nets

for artillery and infantry will be established, the artillery

itel h:i.v I iig l )rR)ui I.'.

50. ATTACKING A POSITION

'J'hc plan of attack will be deierniiicd by the situation,

the iiior:tlc of (lie euleiiiy, :tuid the extent of his defensive

works. A )J)roach to the hiostiIc position may be possible

only under cover of darkness. If the positioii caititot be

turned or enVelol)ed, then a Penetration must be made

Li irotiglt soi ie OiI t in the froi I. TI e employment of

UnLdC(llIal.e force and means leads to severe reverses.

Careful plaits for the attack hUSh include the necessary

in font tation about U ic enemy and the terrain •21 '1'11o1•oigll

recointaissance ii.iust be conducted by the officers of all

anuS, hut reconnaissance parties must be kept restricted

Lii S17,C. Air 1cc(nItIaiSSZLlICC is of l)arLicUlal' value. 01,—

servatioti and listening posts iiiust be established. Limited—

objective attacks, Strong combat patrols, and simnilar

1!tetlt(>dS 1i.!ay be necessary to gain the information de—

SiIe(I.

'['he hlcatioul of the main efTort will be determined by

friciullyitticu lions, the situation, the defensive strength

21 •I•I Ii f liii wI hg oi ii ts slion 1(1 be cm ii lied : IV here arc the CIICIIIY 'S fl(1

Vahicci I t lOSi(liii IS, (21111 ,ost iii 11.8, 31 ItO ii Ii pie of resistiLhl CC, SWi (cli josi Lions,

reserves, arni observation posts? W'hcre doo the terrsdii favor the approach

and (lie attack? Where has the elicin)' cnuI)ioyed gas and obstacles?
50 hERMAN. TACTiCAL DOCTRINE

of ULC hostile pOSIt,iot, the COV(We(I a )J r0:IMJICS, L11(i tile

observation for supporting WCaJ)OI1S, particularly the

artillery. In selecting a place for a pciiet.ratioii 01' break—

through, Consi(Ier thc following oin ts:

(a) Find out how the attack can be further developed

after the initial break—through. (b) Insure sufficient i'ooin

for niaileuver. (c) Avoid natural strongpoints or envelop

them. (d) Locate favorable terrain for the employment

of tanks. (e) Capture points or areas that will give

good Ol)SCFVtLtiOfl (led) iiLt() hostile positions. (f) l)esig—

nate close or far—distant objectives according to the size

of the attacking unit: if the final objective cannot be

reached in one advance, designate intei'mucdiat,e objectives involving in some cases limited—objective attacks.

51. ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT

Under the protection of advance infantry units, the

artillery will 1)0 brought fOrW'flF(l. Promni,t recommii:m,iss:uiee

of ii U fvrrai ii mm ist I u c:Lrrfm ihly Ii I:L( h I y :LrtiJ leiy )fhi(cr$

in sinai1 groups. if ))Ossible, J)ositions for time batteiie.s

should be SO placC(l that the artillery IVIISSIOII limay lie

earned out without change of locations. Ammuini,iitioii

SlIl)PlY, oI)erVation, hostile 1)OSitiOH, •,t,(Hfl1LIlIIliCat,iOfl8,

:d frrilaI.(' ; )()MI LI( Ins, am 1(1 rnimgt' ii mm ist :mi I I me rum msn kred,

an(l any necessary l)rel)ILI'atiOlmS carried out LII :LtLVallcc.

The distribution of the artillery will be determined by

its mission. Units will usually be employed intact; it

may, however, be necessary to detach batteries, jmarticu—

larly the heavy artillery, in very narrow division sectors,

for example, heavy liowi tzer batteries may be taken away

from divisions to operate against distant targets tinder

corps.
TilE ATIAcJ.{ 51

'I'lIP iiii ti:i.l iii issioi i of U ic artillery inay in(thide nfl','

or all of the following: firing UJ)Oli iiiiporlaiit, targets iii

the I ):l.tllcIieId , (Irawing the fire of hostile artillery, engaging

lit 001111 Ierhatter vrk against hostile artillery and anti—

:u icraft I )atteIies as early as i )SSil)IC, ai id Ii iii )0Ii

large hostile group inoveitients at maximum ranges and

as promptly as l)osSible.

52. INFANTRY POSITION OF READINESS (BEREITSTELL UNG)

'!'lio following (()Il5!( fCt8tioItS for LII 10 In itiry ''f)OSi (iou Of

readiness" iiiay 1)0 listed as follows:

(a) A void too ciose proximity to tim enemy position in

cases where no cover is available to friendly troops. (b) If

the enemy has previously offered strong resistance in the

ugh tiiig, if there is reason to avoid premature entrance

iIIt() the efTeetive hostile (lefensive area, or if the enemy

situation in the maui l)a(tle J)OSitiOIt IS not clariFied, have

Ilie tion1,s jnr(i:thly (levvli)pe(l I)efore they are eoiiduicted

Forward iii their resj)ectiVC ZOUCS of actioim. (c) Avoid

hostile aim' ttiil giotumul obstruction l)y prohibiting large

asseinI)Iies iii iestiieted areas, by exploiting all ground folds

nIi(l available eover, .mtd' by approaching immediately

)ri( r to fl me ttit —olF :i.s CIOS( If) (ItO I R)Sti IC )051 (ion as

coVet f)0JlmIits. ((/) Select (lie iiif:wtiy jUllij)—ofl t)OSitiomI

as eloso as i)oSSihlC to the luostil )OSiL1O1i in order to permit

(he artillery to pus1i well forward and carry out its mission

without changing location.22 (e) Establish local security

W Iitti (,lti llftSLIII ttiI aV,tiIilI)l(, cover ilti itol i)eittlit. the close ajroaeli itt

(Iii, iii ftt I rv, the nrLi I ku) nit ist. be echielotied to (lie tear and prepared to

RI I m,mor ft' iii (got liv ad vance (lit the encniy position.
52 (UitMAN 'tACTiCAL. I)OU'I'tti N t'

with infantry detachments. (f) (lain sufficient depth by

drawing out and retaining reserves to the rear. (q) If the

forces going into the 1)OsLtiOfl of readiness are scheduled

10 immake a (,IOSC—It) envelopment., insure that. the 1)OSi tion

is a sufficient distance Off to the side to preclude the

enveloping force advancing into and mixing with other

friendly t)001)S on the flank, w'hcn the attack is launched.

53. INFANTRY ACTION UP TO .THE FIRST ASSAULT

rEI1C infantry action up to the first assault is carried out.

wm(Ier the support of artillery and heavy infantry wcai xnis.

Ii exceptionally strong artillery support is availal)Ie, the

infnn try can more freely advance against the eflemn)'

1,osition ; if the artillery support is not strong, however,

then the infantry must advance cautiously. In the latter

ease, nmving forward un(ler cover of darkness or of smoke,

the itifati try l4ikeM IUIVIL11LL 1)1 (0V(i to ILVOI(I ltost;ile

(.)l )serVat.i( )tt it.t I of (lefi I tt( led I grom 111(1 to av )i(I lu )8t.i l( Ii ic.

'J'hie infantry attack begins with the a(lvtLnce of l;hie

light wapons under cover of the tire of artillery and

hidavy infantry weapons. Part of lie latter should be

pushed forward with the initial echelons to insure con—

tinual close snpl)ort. Riflemen work forward through

the use of 1IIe and movement. Local fire superiority

must be exploited to the fullest degree to capture groun(l.

Those units or parts of units which cannot advance

farther should dig in and hold tenaciously the ground

already won. When weak points in the hostile position

arc found, they should he attacked aggressively and with

SCI'VCS. 'flitis a 1)usli forward can be made. Against

consolidated and extensive defensive works on the other

hand, the infantry may struggle for days, working slowly
'i'.ii p: A'ITA(.K 53

fvard. rFI.c9iclies and terrain may be won, lost, and

FCWOfl (luring the course of the action.

54. ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF THE INFANTRY ADVANCE

TIic effectiveness of coun terbattery in issions directed

by ti me arti I levy commander (lepen (is upon observation

and available amnuini tion. Neut;rahzation was often ac—

eOniplishe(l in World '\Tar I by a simultaneous concen—

tratiomi of several batteries using gas shells. Tnitially

iiiaiy batteries may be concealed in a living position

awaiting the. ojimorttinity to SlIJ)liSC the enemy,. When

new hostile batteries are discovered or additional eneniv

forces 21 are h cat.ed , then eoiwen trated lire tiiay be delivered upon theni with these batteries. This method is

much more economnical in :uninunit.ion than continual lire

of nil artillery against apparent; Itmit not (IelintI.ely 1(1011—

Ii hot I targets.

A lie si tii:i,lioii ( IeV('h)I)S :i.iitl elaiihit's, artillei'y lire e:UI

be switched from the man ifeLIy less important targets to

time more importantareas. [lie n fami try will sometimes

he (iflfl.VOid&)ly (lel:Lye(l in its advance by reason of changes

in time immfantry—.art,ilIery )h1Lti of COO1(hiflatiOIl. There vill

le situations in which many hostile l)atierics will not be

IoeaLe.l until friendly infan try has plmsime(l forward and

drawn fire.

55. INTERMITTENT ADVANCE OF THE RESERVES

At the disposal, of the commander, the reserves follow

licyond iange of hostile lire. W'lien time terrain permits, '

Arti llerv eiigagis the In Lst lie inf:tii try which is fight leg eu thc think or

ii, uro t. ,f friend lv jut
54 : IRM AN TACTICA i in r'rn.i NE

t.liei I' 3(1 V:LUC(' slioi 11(1 I )(' lflfl( IC I )j I )flfl I)( Is frOtH C( iver

(.0 ()VCI.

56. BREAK-THROUGH

a. Penetration oF the Hostile Position

rI1le tiiiiing of the assault is (li't.en,Iitle(l either by ll)(

Forward echelons or by the commander himself. No Ji31'(I

and fast rule can be apphe(l. Should the foremost imi t

recgiiize (lie oJ)portunity t.o I)''J' through, they niiist. take

11111 and (1uick advantage, calling II)Oii S(I)p)urtiIIg

weapons for intensified Inc to s(IJ)port their a.siiII..

\Vheii (he iii fan try is ol)serve(l 311 vaneung r:t)i(lIy on till'

lU)SLile I)oSt hon , this increased stq port nitty tim 1ev rerIatit

C1rCIIH1SI4LIWeS occir 3tItOl)ItLf.iCtLIly. 5110111(1 (lie coin—

inander order the assault—avoiding an elaborate pl:t.n

lie titust. quickly concentrate his strength at the point

of ienetration.

b. Time oF Attack

I)aybrcak is often considered the tiiost favorable (inn'

to gain surprise for the attack. \'V:.tr experience itidic:i.tes,

however, LI)31. I l3y1 )r(':Ik IS II ie liii te of Ii igi )('S(. :LIcrlness,

and it is better to change continually the Iioiii of a(.tack.

The. tini of attack should usually .b postponed if t.li

artillery has not completed all of it,s jrcparations. An

attack against a t)05it1011 must be supported by artillery

which is fully prepared to carry out. its missions. In

order to penetrate a stubbornly defended main line of

resistance, concentrations of fire by all weapons must be

arranged.

c. Enemy Withdrawals

If the enemy withdraws to rearward positions (a move

generally accomplished at iuight), the following action
TilE ATTACK 55

sun; i1 I I p t4LkeIi (a) 1\4 LIfl t1Liii eIos eon tact, wiLl; the

hostile ii;hui try. (b) Proiiiptly reroiinoj (('F (lie new hostile

J)0sf(,IoflS. (() MOVe the artillery well forwar(I. (d) Prepare for hostile co;n; teratt;acks. (e) On the following day,

)UslI ra.J )id ly f rwar I wi 1,1 all force; cotni )el the enemy

to st4wd :01(1 light, to Lake high I, or to stifTer destruction.

57. ACTION RECOMMENDED FOR CERTAIN SPECIAL

CASES

11 the ('IIPMIV h.is li:oI ioily :i short tiiiip in which to

I)1('l):Lre Jiis (ICICI1S1VC JIOSI t.iOfl , if the it)oi'tIe of tue enemy

is shaken, ur if (lip )oSsiI i1 it. of sun wise is in t.rnd;ieed

he ,rcparntnnis for n,t.t.:uk ing a position may he shortened

to IiIiIit.P(l I)III1LI5SLIiCP, IllOte rajmitl (ICVCIO1HI1CUt itIi(I

J)r('J):LJ:tion I IV II P artillery, t1)( I ('IitJ )Ioyznent, (.)f tanks

and siiioke SCJPPflS.

If the enemy resorts to delaying action. the response

SI lOuI(l be to I weak LI Ill nigh I us Ii tie at one I ill t and

CxJ)loit the l)reak Wi (Ii strong force, and to press closely

111)011 the vilIi(lraVing hostile tI0OJ)S.

I the eneiuuy N Is I eI i iiul (lie cover of a. ver strong

position, t,Iic directini; or location of the main etTort should

he ChiBOged IthO\Vlc(lg4W)f 1,Iue terrain vill hieriiuit advance

planning in this iiianeuvr. More artillery, tanks, and

engineer troops should be moved well forward, and minimum iequircineiit.s should be established in the communication system. If the enemy succeeds in falling back

UOfl an entirely new and very strong defensive position,

a regrouping of the attacking forces and new plans may

be required.
56 (;EHMANTACTICAL DOC'FIUNE

if l}i(' at,t.flCI( (()llti1itl(S I Ill fit 0 igli l11.I I Wi ti fl)i if. i )ro(l i

ing (lCCiSi'e resitil.,s, the legroli)ilig of t,Iie r()iIIlll:liI(l

shoIIl(1 be cariied Oil )In(.Ier cover of darkfless. rhlh( (lay's

I)attIe exI)erience may iiitfica,te :1 JICW 1)0111 ( for the iiia in

efl( iii., aIl(l the or(ler for attack sI U)i 11(1 I )P. issi tr I ji ist. :L5

early as pOSsil)hC. B.(cOJlI)a.iS5L1We inu.st; he energetic and

coiltunled, for the enemy viI1 also make changes in his

tLiSJ)OSi tion (luring darkness. Night attacks are useful

in dcterin;nmg 1mOSUiC mt.eimtions and nioveiuieiit.s, iii

seiziiig favorai)le J)OSit.ioIlS for the folkwing (lay's jump—

ofT, uud in ol)tailuiug ()l)S('8.t.lOI) I lar ssing fire '"V the

artillery ami ftlJ' JUgilt.—l)OJl)bJllg att,:tcks 8110111(1 be SCIl('(I—

uiled. Artillery support. may iiot he possible at. (lawn of

l.Iie fnllovmg (lay, till I('SS the ('Ntr1. (1)CilIV 8)8i lions have

I )(fl lO(I.t.C(l . Oniv then cn.ii the artillery deliver iimi—

ol ,servrd supj ,ort.i iig Iires. Si iuhiciemi t. I igli I, for artillery

ob.servat.ions siiould I)C LWait.ed Ill irefereiie to seiidiiig

the infantry fOI'WUI'(l tlulsilJ,l)orf,ed. Artillery on other

Iron ts may he fired for deer1 t.i ye purposes during the

illl.('I'V.l.l of %v:Lit.iiIg.

t'assiiig OVCF IA) t.hl(' (kielise Iunii time at.t.icL may I H'

lfl'tCSS1tl'' ))I'eill(l(' to hl0J(h1]1 CflJ)t.lIl'('d gi'ouiuiol, or may he

()fll('t'Vd l.), higher iitliority. 'I'I()L)5 Ill eit;lipr i.so' :u'e

rcorgaui7ed, and unnecessary forces i tialiawn. Artillery lEltist protect. the relief of friendly iifaiitry by heavy

cOI)CCII t.flLtiO)1S ammo I COt 10 terl)at.tCl'y lire.

58. MEETING ENGAGEMENT

a. Speed and Surprise

Eli a ineetmg ciign.genieimt., it is possible (t,lioiighi on—

probable with modern far—renclinig recommaissamice :111(1

intelligence IlleaJis) that the first information of the
THE ATTACK 57

presence of the enemy will be received through actual e )1I tact. liii tial I the situation is vague and the security

of both forces uncertain. A meeting engagement must

iiot 1 e perilmi t,tC(l to (leVelOl) iii to a wild i'ush UpOn time

hostile position; a CoordiJma,te(l plan must be carried out,

caliuuly, but so accelerated as to carry out the following

considerations: (a) Seize the initiative and fix the hostile

force insofar as the situation permits. (b) Expedite

i)1eJ)aratiofls for the attack, quickly occupying ground

favorable for observation, development, and advamice, and

for Slll)j)Ortilmg weapons. (r) I.iitensify reconnaissance,

ground and air, to determine promptly the enemy's

dispositions, strength, intentions, and weaknesses. (d)

Surprise time enciuiy, J)rn1ci)ahly by iapidi ty of movement

:Eml by screening your tr001)S and IIIOVCU)Cfl ts prior to

entrance into l)aLtlc.

b. Time and Space

The advance guard of iacim march column must provide

time and space for developmrment by the main body. An

engct.ic 1( lv:tuice Ufl( icr cover of U me advance guard

artillery often seizes important terrain features to the

front and flanks, and fixes the hostile force. By extending

over a I )road front ts infantry and artillery, the

advance guard can deceive the enemy relative to strength

and movements.

c. Coordination

In a meeting engagement in open terrain and when the

enemy has excellent observation, it is necessary to develop

and prepare for combat much earlier than otherWise.

TIme location of time main effort is promptly comnuuuimnieuttcd

to time various columns, and they deploy in keeping with
58 URMAN TACTICAL DOT1UNE

the general plan in order to insure coordination of

effort. The prompt employment of additional artillery

support should be coordinated with the general scheme of

maneuver.

d. Methods

In attacking during a meeting engagement, alternative

methods exist for utihzmg the main body: (a) prompt

employment as the units of the march columns reach tl)e

immediate combat area; (b) development, and occupation

of a position of readiness from which the attack will be

launched. In the first case, the units will be issued

individual orders as they arrive.24 All unit commanders

nnmst insure coordination between their infantry and supporting weapons. In the second case, the attack will be

conducted similarly to an attack against an enemy in

position. It will not be advantageous to push through

an attack immediately if the terrain is difficult or if the

employment of the mass of the force on the same (lay is

no longer possible. The action of neighboring iimiits must

also be taken into consideration.

59. PURSUIT

The abólute disregard of all factors xcept the annihilation of the hostile force will govern the conduct of the

pursuit. Time most imnI)ortant principles involved are to

harass continually the hostile force in front amid on the

flanks, and to block the avenues of retreat. It is most

important that time4 intention of the enemy to withdraw

The situation may so develop that the immediate employment of umiIt.

n they arrive will not be necessary. The remainder vill then be flrRt moved

Into positions of readiness.
1'HE ATTACK 59

be promptly recognized.25 When such recognition be—

conies definite, tue coinniander will inunediately elnJ)ioy

all available force and spare no effort in order to annihilate

(lie eiieiiiy. Pici I tt,i u•e l)UtSI ut can result disastrously; oiL

the other hand, ii the withdrawing enemy is permitted

time in which to break off combat, an opportunity for

decisive victory may be lost; the commander must therefore carefully coi)si(.ler the situation RI1(l evaluate the

information prior to committing his troops to the pursuit.

Commanders of subordinate units in the forward echelon

push energetically forward when the enemy gives way.

The presence of i uigl icr comnmnami ders in these forward

units spurs the troops to greater effort.

Soni.e of the 11111 ortan 1. considerations for conducting

successful pursuits are: (a) Employ air force units against

large bodies of hostile retreating troops; use reconnaissance

planes to deteritunc direction. of withdrawal and use

(living attacks with machine guns and boitibs upon tFOOj)M

aiil inatriel in marching columns, especially in defiles

and against bridges. (b) Employ artillery in harassing

missions. Let part of the long-range artillery pound

vigorously on potential avenues of withdrawal, roads,

etc., and keel) the bilk9f the artillery leap-froging

rapidly, pressing clos Lehind the friendly infantry to

rcndci support. (c) Employ infantry in pushing rapidly

forwtrd literally on the heels of (lie withdrawing enemy;

assign distant objectives in the direction of the withdrawal; have the heavy infantry weapons follow closely

the forward echelon; and give the enemy no time to organ— '

Clues may be (lerived from airplane rel)orts of rearward movements of

Linins, supply, eclioloiis, and reserves; from reports from friendly troops; and

from patroiliiig, particularly at iiiglit, and t,,isceliancous signal interceptiouR.
6(1 (.tE.RM A N 'I'AC'Ji CA I DOCTItIN:K

ize :1. (lCI('I)S(. ((1) I.'fl?7)i(fl/ (?U/1.??(('r.S' to ICLit' roa(ls III

the rear of the pursuing forces, to remove obstacles, and

to neutralize gassed areas.

\\TJ1ji the frontal attack is vigorously carried out,

en vclol)ing forces of great mobility 26 will oi erate fron i

flank and rear against the hostile retreating columns.

.l)cfilcs, bridges, and favorable observation (lee!) in rear

of the enemy will be seized, and avenues of retreat cut off.

If the enemy succeeds in organizing a delaying J)OSition,

a coordinated attack must be l)101111)tIY arranged and

lnAtnChlCd.

Coiiiinaiiders niust insure a continual flow of supplies

for the rapidly advancing units. In pursuit, matters of

)ly and evacuation require particularly careful supervision.

Pursuing troops must maintain contact with the enemy,

:umoi intist report back fre ien t,Y to) heiuk iiarters their

own locations. if time pursuit continues in to the nigh t.

iii i:ii try mini t,s p)ttsi) lorwarol :tluiig (lie rotc IS. A rtiliery

coiitiimues long—range hatassitig the, while individual hat.—

teries follow time infantry iii close l)rOXiIIU(y for reildellug

jnitmiediat,c SL1)J)Ort.27

2 f 10 Ion zed oi fafl try, 1110011 te<l troops, Hiotori zbOI 1giI.rs, and ai iii t,ai ik

and ntpt.jnircrft, hulLs.

" Artillery firing aL uiight hhpI(Ier slick condiLloips is, of course, inittu firing.
Section XIII. THE DEFENSE

'l'J1( 111115)111W I, considerations of defense are COflhI)inC(l

in ut2lizatwn. of terrain and coordination of fire. The

natural defensive characteristics of the terrain should be

unproved, and camouflage should he used freely. A

fully coor(llnaf,e,d use of all available weapons must he

arranged; strength should l)e conserved by keeping the

lOSSeS ill 1)C1'SOflfl and materiel down to time very mini—

inwn; and exact dispositions, strength, and intentions

should be denied to the enemy as long as possible. A.

weLl—organized defense capable of quickly and effectively

reVerting to time attack, wi Lii cunning and (lCce)tiOfl

eiislirouding the I1U)vClIIefltS and dispositions, wil.l offset.

hostile nunLelical superiority.

60. FAVORABLE TERRAIN FOR DEFENSE

't'lic l('fri i( kr I mas an ac I aim tage in that, he selects time

terrain fir his battle. .ULrcly viIl :iIl of the following

terrain ieiuiicimien Is for defense exist in a single combat,

area, htmL certaimi of them will he i)resen L, amid the cont—

mnander may ilmiprovise the others: (a) good observation

for artillery and other st1)J)orting weapons; (b) protection

against hostile observation; (c) natural obstacles against

tank attacks; (d) natural protection for flanks; (e) possibility for launching counterattacks.

61
62 nERMAN TACJ'ICAI IOCTRINE

61. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

a. Delense or Delaying Action?

'l'lie JuiSSiOfl must. clearly ifldicate time form of (lefense

cont.eln))lated: defense (Vertcidif/v.nq), meaning that. the

n ,si t,ion viII be Jmel(l under all circumstances; or (Iclay ing

action (JIinIaltcmidr Widcrsürnd). Fire may be o1mcned

ei LI icr at. maximum effective ranges, if time tuninmmn ition

is aimiple, or at. closer r:ulgc.s, in order to effect surprise.

b. Preparation oF DeFense Area

WThen the. hostile sit.uat.ion has not. been CLarlIiC(l

(especially if the. direction of t,lme enemy's attack is

unknown), the mass of (;he defending force should be

ref1uned in a position of readiness. When informnatioii

relative to hostile formmuttions, nI:Lin effort, strength, etc.,

becomes, available, then the troops may be moved into

(lefensive positions which have been previously recon—

nuitereci and PrePared according to the time available and

time situation. Occasionally only a skeleton posItion will

he OCCLtI)icd with artillery protected by small units of

infantry, while the nmass is held lack centrally lOetLtCd so

that it can quickly occupy positions upon time approach

of the eneimy.

c. Maneuvers

Advanced positions and outposts delay hini and give

time for the occupation and preparation of favorable

defense terrain. Reserves are used for flank protection,

for counterattacks, 'and for blocking penetrations. Fire

power must never be weakened by holding out unnecessarily large reserves. If, after contact with the enemy, the

situation requires defensive maneuver, the posit.ion is
PIII'. I)EIENS 63

t1tuirkly organize(i L5 the Lr()Ol)S (iel)loy, anti if the ternun

iS Il( ) I :trticu htrly Iflv()fll.l )Ie, Ii e t.ioops are tliawti 1 )tc1( to

better defensive terrain.

62. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DEFENSE

Sonic of the general principles of defense can be suni—

inarizcd :ts follows: (a) Tue purpose of the defense is to

iiuhhify the hostile attack. (b) The pOSition selectedis

held to the last; the commander may tinder certain cir—

eunislances, however, restrict the time. (c) The defensive I)OSitiOII selected must compel the enemy either to

:Ltt:Lrk, I'ehil)(1tIiSh lime advance, 01 attClflJ)t, (A) avoid coin—

l)at,.28 (d) I lostile eI1VelO)t1teIi1S LLC COtlIilCrC(l by cx—

leiiding or refusing time flank (or Ilanks), or by cehieloim—

imient of reserves. (c) If time enemy attempts to march

around iii order to avoid time position entirely, then he

should be attacked.

63. ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE AREAS

a. Defense in Depth

'J'Jme mmcliii I cLltIP )O)Sitit)li iS OrgafliZed ill (lejithl to

acconijhsJm demise all—around Iircsan(I effectively limit hostile j)euietrati0nS. LO(!.L"'Vitii(liavaIM 1)elore sul)erior

hostile fire immay be authorized by time regimental Coin—

Ii uLn(icr to ii is I )attal ion com mum manders, or, iii si mecitti cases,

by time latter to their subordinates; local withdrawals niust

not, however, permim it the loss of connection between tin its

in time line or hostile penetration iii to t;hme niaimi battle zone.

En terrain not too umifavoral)le for time (lefeilse, uitits

2P Tiii iii Iii, irot,i1,lIslu.d if (lit, 1,osilioti etuiliol. lii til itt'lv iivoided or

onveloped l,y (lie etienty.
64 UgRMAN TACTICAL uoc'r1uNi

OCCIi fronts double the width of those assigned for the

attack. rFIC5t islands of resistance are so organized as to

Permit all—around defense, ithi wcapoiis SO SigILtcd as to

coVel' 8,111 )OSSiI)IC aveii lies (if :L l )F( ):IcJ i tLt niaxi in Un i Imiges.

rIh1( defensive zone is orgaiuzed in (iepl;hl, Willi the iiiaiii

line of resistance in front of the terrain that is favorable

for observation posts for the artillery and heavy support—

ing weapons. Tue higher coiiiiiiandcr selects the geiiernl

defensive line on the map and assigns sectors to units.

Subordinate commanders carefully reconnoiter the terrain

and select the locations for their troops and various types

of weapons.

b. Cover and Obstacles

Cover for itiad iine—gun en iplaceitten ts, obsei'vat,ion

posts, and accon ipanyin g wca )ons is provided. Obstacles

are constructed to SUp)le1ILeIi t the natural (lelelisiVe

characteristics of the terrain. Priorities of defensive

works are governed by the rule that "elTectivciiess of lire

takes 'priority over cover." Tue nornial order of tasks is

the following:29 (a) clearing fIelds of fire and establishing

distances to increase the cfliciency of fire; (b) c:uiioullag—

ing installations and erecting chniuny estabhishuiients;

(e) eoiistrtiting spun tei' cover for oliervatioii I)ost.s;

(il) cotistructing lILacJu1e—gun eiiiplacements; (e) erect—

i tig I nu') )( I wi i-c or oti icr ol )stael('s ; (f) exca'aI,i I ig di ig—

outs, switch positions, or planned coiinnunication routes.

64. RESERVES, RELIEFS, AND REAR POSITIONS

Local reserves are used to fill in gaps in the line, to

counterattack against a local penetration, and to relieve

" Several of I.l)es(, tasks, such as caim n t flagi ug, may be iii it leriak cii ci ,iiei r—

rcut.Iy with other Lasks.
THE DEfENSE 65

troops in the front line. General reserves are used to

I)roteol a Flank, to counterattack against, a serious pene—

Iralion, to coun teratt,ack when the situation indicates a

reltiin to offensive tactics, and to relieve organizations

in (he line.

A. relief is only effected after a long period of defense,

and tinder cover of darkness. Infantry and artillery are never Velieve(l SlIilttl taneously. r1! relief order (lIrectS

when and where the relief is to report, the routes to be

used by the relieving force and the troops relieved; and

the Lime when the new comin:uiolcr is (Icinutely to assume

resj)onsihulity for the sector.

Only necessary under exceJ)tional circumstances, rear

JR)S1LR)flS must be located sufliciently back from the main

line of resistance to require the enemy artillery to litove

forwar(l. A rear position will be ordered OcCUpied by

the coimnander when the former position can be held only

with unlustitiable losses and when consideration for adja—

ccitt units does not forbid.

65. ACTUAL OPERATION OF THE DEFENSE

a. Main Line oF Resistance

All fires along the thitin line of resistance and in the

I 11 )l iefensive zone are carefully coordi natc(l to insure

that all areas, l):Lrti(tIlaily the potential avenues of aj—

I )roacJ 1, arc covered by strong con CCII trations. Artillery

and infantry are coordinated to permit a rapid switch

from one area to another; and fire plans are prepared to

limit. penetrations and to block envelopments.

Defensive l)re1)tratio11s are secured from hostile observation by active reconnaissance and by a screening force,

1)0th of which operate under the same commander.
66 UI'RMAN TACTCAIj Doc'rntNE

eiiei'oits use of ol)st;aries. nabir:tl 811(1 eol)St,rfleLe(l, is

made. 'I'he advanced troops are under direct control oi

the commander; after fighting in delaying action before

superior enemy forces, they witluiraw t,o rearward posi—

(.10115 aS prearranged by hini.

I,. Advance Position

'Flu' advance position, usually located within t,he sphere

of (l;)eratLon of friendly long—range artillery in the main

l)at.t,le position, is occupied to prevent the early seIzurC of

iiiiportant. terrain features by the enemy. Cantoufiage

and (IlItlIlIly works ate Itse(I freely. The advance 3)OsitiOfl

iticreases the effectiVellesS nnd the tune of eini,loyt,ieu t, of

long—range artillery by j)rotecLwg a(lvatlcVd, artillery

II )s('rvation n )sfs ; also, si tel i a js)SI ti( )fl (ICed VCS LI ie et ICI 113'

relative to the (liS1H)SitiOflS and organization for defense,

811(1 C8USCS iiit,i to deploy jreitiatnrcJy. FriCil(lly tL'OO)8

i,iiist with(lraw ))elore the enemy can overrun the position.

in wi iluirawi ng, tren.rr:i.ngeol roil (es will in' indicated to

insi ire ilial the fire (If weai H )lIS loc:Lte I iii $1 t(' fldX t )( ISP (iou

to the rear (outpost line of resistance) is not, ma.sked.

c. Outpost Position

'['lie 0U4)OSt position, h)Cflt,C(l within •f11ie sphere of opet—

atioii of tile light artillery batteries in Lie main position,

is selected to provide Lime lot LrO()()S manning tile main

defensi VC H)SLtiQl1 t 1 )FCI HtEC for aetti )I1, to Sill )1)lCI flCfl t

oi.servation, anol to deceive tile attacker relative to dis—

positions. 'l'roops from infantry units immediately to the

tear generally occupy this line and are withdrasvn by

signal according to prearranged 1)181) sO that fields l)Cfore

tile mail) line of resistance are not obstructed. Artillery

delays tue hostile appt.oadl) by the use of haraSsing fires
'rfl DEFENSg 67

(()tI .r()lle(l I Va(li() EOJ)Ort8 frotti iLdV(UiCC(l ()lJ5CI'va.tioII

posts. To increase radnis of action, a few light batteries

tiiay be advanced forward to locations between the out—

)0St line afld the adValiCC position.

66. ARTILLERY IN THE DEFENSE

a. Control by Artillery Commander

The cotiunander of the whole defensive force deter—

ifllflCS the J)ropoi'twn of artillery to be held in direct sup—

)( trt :Ifl(l ti te P1'ol)ortiOtl to be attached to inf:i,n try units.

Artilkry is kept. as far as l)OSSib1 tinder the control of the

arti Ikry comttuun icr, who tIn(kr Lil cirettitistatices rct:uits

control of the iiiass of the division artillery. If the sit.ua—

tioii l)eriilit.S Lfl(I there is an ample uwnunitioim supply,

heavy lires may he (lelivercd at long ranges.

b. Tactics

lii the initial stages of a (lefeumsuve action, artillery may

soittetittirs he kei ,t, silcit I. Iii 1:i,ciit:ite tlerej tioii

; otlicuwise,

it 'ull he etiiploycd to draw listile artillery lire, to deliver

cotili (.cri)attery uir('s, or (o bring kwii harassing fires oii

the approaching hiotile in fati try. In the advanced stages

of a defensive a ior,,.1t)i.jtilk of the artillery is used t.o

(hell vet' C(flICCI1 traLion UI) hostile 1iOsitions of readijiess,

:uul i:rrticiilarhy oil hostile heavy mfantr,y weapons; the

loll 11111111cr is USU( I to ( tel i ver coiun terbattery tire. Aii I in

the final stage vlieii the hostile force is on the j)Oillt of

lat inch i tig its :LSs:L( ii t. (.1 te at Ii I lery delivers re iaratiotis

and bai'i'ages U 1)011 tI I( tiosti he assault.

c. Barrage

Should the eneitty uttake a s(iI'prise attack at night oi' iii

a fog, a bai'i'age of all wcainiiis is delivered ittiwediately in
68 UKIM AN 'I'ACTICA h Ifll('I'fl I NE

iiit, of U e n iai ii ii no of resist:uice. I )clin I Ic restrictions

relative to coverage and duration of [ire arc issticd.'° As a

nile, heavy artillery does not participate.

67. INFANTRY IN THE DEFENSE

\\'itii J)LU't of their J)eaV3' WCat)OHS, the infantry opens

lire upon the apj )roaching enemy at goo(l (histanre; tf

friendly artillery SuJ)l)Ort is weak, at itiaxittiut i nuige.s.

l'iring positions are located in advance of the maui hue of

resistance or in the forward part of the defensive area. As

Uic eiieiuiy draws cloSer, hO is engaged by the lire of all the

defending heavy weapons, and finally by the lire of all

:LVaIIiLI lIe weapons. The infaui try fills up gaps iii t,hue line,

IcCiLI >Ltititi g any SCCLH)nS teifllflJI'al'i ly lost.

68. HOSTILE PENETRATIONS

\\'hieie IIiLhI gr()iI)s ihie (Ii('Iuiy JULVC l)t'OkPIi 1,hirotiglt,

I lit' gI()ti)s Shi()Iil(l 1)0 (I('sl.royc(l iuIiInC(liatehy. Ilox

I:trrnges )Iaccd III thOu re:ir 'ihl l)t'erhtI(1e their withi—

liavttl. When a successful l,ieak—tJi rough of large pro—

l)ortioIus has been accomplished by the euiciny, the coin—

iuiLui(ICr of the defensive force will decide whether the

position will be shifted or the lost grnd regained by

counterattack. Jf he decides to counterattack, thic fires

of all weapons are carefully coordinated, a limited )jcc—

tive is assigned, and air and tank support is provided.

69. THE COUNTERATTACK

It is most important that the psychological moment be

recognized lot' the cotIfl terbiow. '['he couuiiiiander is ever

'° Iii Uis coiiiicctio,i a Igii howitzer battery (105—mm) can cover about 100

,u,et,ers (175 yards); a tight. bntAalion, about 500 meters (550 yards).
TUE I)PFEN5E 69

nJeii; f( )r md ieations.3' The COnnLeraUaek plan rcseml)les

a Ii, ii leti—ol )jeetiye attack iii which artillery sul)l)ort,

Is)iiulaiies, tiid ()i)JCCtIVCS are Sj)Cci[iC(I. Any Ob)JCCtiVC

sel(.'cted itiust. lie a (lecisive terrain feature.

70. WITHDRAWAL TO A REARWARD POSITION

Advance orcks ate issued to cliect a withdrawal, titris

('Itsuring C()Ot(IiI)tLLiOfl. Cont.act. with :.u1a.ccnt. units is

UULJII Iaitu'd. 'l'hie l)U)'elItC1}t, to tue JC1 PS CITCCLC(I under

C()V('l ol (ltt1kn('SS.3 Attivity 01) the original position will

l)(' SiItWlfl.Le(l If) (leceiVe the efleiiiy. Firing by part. of the

Ill ItLil try and artillery will be Col) Litiucel from the forwatd

))0S1L10fl to give 1,1)0 0IWlfl the iinjression that it is still

being strongly defetitled. The hostile advance upon the

tim•v (rctiewe) )0MI Lion will lie delaycol l)y the lire of

:utiI lery and I wavy weapons, su )l)Ienlcr) ted by incaiis of

poison gas nn(1 oh ,st;aeles.

fl I I oliIe r1,iuIses, IIftv In8(s, rtieiiiv errors, ii,nraln or th' 'in'tnv, ni

1IP Or riuti'Il l.if)fI)iS.

I );y light. w 11.11(1 iL%SIiS o.ii. univ tile upt nul ui,uuhu'i tiusel or Iug, 811i(irUhl

or uuILluuIni, s,i over I, rrttiul or Vi'ty ret.iirled visil,iIil.v, vIieu, l,1u sititittlu,u,

(1(01111 tuly hid irni c's thai. Ii. will I ' cIaugeuuu is to wail. ut ii III dark ness.
Section XIV. THE DELAYING ACTION

l'lic l)tIr,)OS(' of tL (lcl:LyiIig (tI0Ii IS If) ('.IT('.ct inaxitinun

(Ie.la.y to the enemy without committing the fiieiuilv force

If) (IVciSIVC aclion It iS (I)1 )I0'e(l tO avoid 1)reaking In'—

fore SIIJ)CIi0i hostile foFee ; IA) gauui t'iIIi( 01 to iuii )I)V(' (lie

sit;IInt.u)n viLl, relerciuce to oJ)servation, cover, :111(1 field

of lire; and to mimanenver the enemy into a position iii

vhieIi lie uiiay be more effectively attacked. If a transi—

lion Irouui (lelense to delaying sLct,u)n is iiiiperative, the

first position selected should he at least, 6 jiiilcs t,o tue

rear. A fully coordinated attack by the enemy can 1w

theeked by causing hint to displace his art,illei'y and to

reorganize generally before lie launches a new :ittack.

Tue characteristic organization for delaying action in—

cii I(leS the lol tovmg consi(leI'ations: (a) Siiecessi ye (It'—

fensive lines are selected wi tJi Si ,liieien t. in frrvals to cai use

fhiSI)hLcelfleflt of the enemy's artillery. (b) Posi tiotis

S('ICCt('(l should J)CIIuuit distaiit oluscrvttt,ioui :Ln(l effective

uI.se of lonr_range \'4C8l)OnS, an(l have cover iii the lear to

facilitate withdrawal. (c) Natural ôbsiclcs are fully cx—

Ploited and supplemented by constructed obstacles and

by the use of poison gas. (d) The bulk of the artillery,

along with the long—range artillery, is held under the

artillery commander for long-range interdiction and

counterbattery misions. (e) Resistance in the forward

position is continued until the next rearward position is

occupied and fully prepared to carry on the defense.

(f) Units arc deployed over very broad fronts and

70
TRk I)ILAuINU ACTION 71

with ho olej )(;J1 . (j) SiiiaIt reserves are retained. (Ii)

iteserves EC UtiliZC(l to (O'1'1' the ViiI)(.Irawal l)ttrtIC(tltUl.y

by dayiighit (according to the situation and terrain, they

iiiay be located off to a (lank or on a commanding piece

or terrain, which facilities tue protection (If l;Jic units withdrawing). (i) \'VIien the situation permits, withdrawals

arc always II}ade tinder COVCF of darkness; sometimes, even

at the iisk (If being iitvolvcol in serious action requiring

a .strong (lelense, the sitiiatioii should be held iiiil;il

(larkuess. " 111 FILVI ,EILI )tl' I(IIfli II ft lii iii, lflftV O('(l I) 1% r lw ItI ft W II lfl fl. is

iioriiiI for qlPF(,,se. Ill Il(1LVily VOO(lNl ftl(lIS Ut Whl('I( v,sil,uhil.y is i.sl rid .l.

thie ec1.ors ale IllLrrowcr.
Section XV. RETREAT-RETIREMENT

In n ietrcat,—rctireiiiciil, coiit:tct %viLh tue eiieiny is

l)rokdn off for the purpose of seeking more favorable

terrain or conditions for the resumption of uffcnsivc

action. A coinimnuider may be forced by time tL'CII(l ol

circumstances to retire, or he niay, of Ins own free will,

('Icet to retire. Only time greatest cinergeticy is cOflSi(lered

to justify retreat. Local reverses should not be taken

seriotisly. No seeond—in—commnatmd upon receipt of no—

faVoral)le information is authorized to order a retreat.

If the sittntLion indicates time necessity, he iviust report to

a higher conmniander and state I us intentions to retire

'iLlm time reasons therefor.

A retreat should be eflected under cover of darkness,

Witi! time greatest secrecy. If troops are told the pur—

pose to imiijnove their future chance of success •their

mimorale will not, be adversely affected. Fresim t,fO()J)S if

available should be given the mission of rear and flank

guards to proLect the assembly and muovemnent, of the

cointmi:tinl II Lime eneimmy IS eiiipIo&iig immotorized or

1IICCJIZLImiZC(l troops, special provision vill have to be

un:ule IA) protect IJm(' flanks with :LiItit:LOJ( weapoiis :uid

l'OtL( I I )k)CkS.

72
Sectkn XVI. THE EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD

ARTILLERY

Tile division artillery eointnaiider is a Sj)eCiaI advisor

to the division commander on artillery employment,

1)l8CCnLCflt, and a)flmllflitiOfl he is also Conuluttider of

tite artillery regiment, which iitcludes the medium howitzer

battal 1)1, the SOlUid—aIl( I—hash battalion, and such artillery

as may be attached, lie orders artillery concentrations,

counterbattery, and harrassiug lire in cooperation with

the general scheme of maiteuver and in SUpI)OFt of tl.ie

infantry.

Tile artillery battalioii is the fire unit. r1lLe battalion

count tander indicates definitely to his batteries such

matters as the following: targets, aiming 1)0111th, amounts

of amnnmnition to be fired, time for opening fire, location

of l)0SitiOtlS, anunuttition supply, routes, types of fire,

and kinds of amninujutjon. Firing data are obtanlc(l for

the battalion by Fm Igi I tg si tots, 11 Ut COt 11.1)1 itations, opera—

tions of the obset'vatioit battalion (sowid—and—flash), and

references furnished f 'friendly troops. In very' wide

sectoi's 01' when 0)e1tLLuIg iii terrain of restricted visibility, it IIUIy lM necessai'y 101' (eI't4LiJi l)fltteIi(S to obtain

firing (ltthI illdiVidUally according to their tactical missions.

71. ORGANIZATION

l'art of the artillery, usually the light howitzers, has

the Princil)al mission of providing direct support to the

infantry. The retitainder is employed in counterbattery,

73
74 OP.RMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE

harassing fires and preparations, concentrations, and itiLer—

(I icLions. ( lose (O1 iccLioii. Wi LI I LI I( St S 115 1—ais I—hash

tahioii IS 1IU.UJlttJ,i ilC(1. 1)i )OSitiOfl lUtist he kej)L hlexi I Ic

to pent ut quick shifting of battery positions, OLiS5i(.)J1S,

aII(l targets. 'I'ite ent)loynLeJIl. fit gel)er:L1 14 oIttiiiiiiitoI

by these considerations: (a) itunber and knids of guns

available; (b) COinbILt plans of the eoflUVLtl.It(l tL.S H,

(c) terrain and we:Li;11('r; (il) I i st.iIe arLi I levy ; () ai i fit II LIII—

Lion avai lahk

444

Battahon

(fight

howitzers)

444

Battalion

(light

howilzers)

It.

Main

effort I

Infantry regiment Infantry regiment

444

Battalion

(light

howitzers)

444

Battalion

(heavy

howitzers)

bat lotion

Artillery

commander

Reserve

Infantry

regiment

Figure 1. Artillery in a division attack.
ITh1PJAJYMi.N'I' OF IiELD AJ1iL1Efl.y 75

72. LOCATION IN THE ATTACK

I i gei lertLi

, iii LI i(' :tI.t:i,e.k II ie arlilInry is located ii IL—

liLedilLIely iii rear of the infantry line, j ust beyoiid ratige

of hostile small—arms fire. Figure 1 shows a typical

arr:riigeii ie:ffl, VIth Ii ie )l )seFVtLI1OIL 1 )attalioJI. (sound—ai ni—

llnsl i) operatti ig d ii'cctly under LI ic artillery connuander.

II ree()JlnaisSaIlce and (OJIIbttt intelligence haVe given

deliiiite .II1IOF1IL:Lt.iOII :LhotIt. hostile (lisl)OSILIO1LM, t,luii a

I)r('J)aflLLJO!I may be fired, continuing i() to 30 minutes,

:o 1(1 (leJ e11(li ug UOIL tl)C 8.)nlflUIiitlOfl available, the sur—

j.niSe effect, and the itimt,ion. in the case where lrac—

t.ically .iio jjifor'natioii On the eiieiny is available, the

artillery J)JO1)t1'LtiO1I iS oiiiittcd; the infantry laLLnchcs the

attack, drawnig lire from hostile heavy weapons and

artillery, ipoii which, omice .locate(.l, the friendly artillery

(Li I II iereafter lire.

73. LOCATION IN THE DEFENSE

i\itillrry iii the deleiise is organized (lie sante %v:Ly as ii,

It ie Itt.Uk . hli( 011 ly (Ii (i(W(',iI N' ilL (.115,1(1St LU IlLS 15 Ii

the direct sui port. wjxnts (hg1 it, I Lowitzers) arc .l(at;e(l

slightly farther to the rear, and the general support guns

(ntedmin hiowitzei; u?e in a central location where they

IIJL iflter(llCt. at long ranges to force an early deployment

(If iron.clung O1LOlI1 foiiiiat.ioii.s.

74. COOPERATION WITH INFANTRY

'l'iine and space itiust be carefully coordinated by both

the imifaittry and the artillery, it is essential that the

artillery observers be at all times alert, not only to locate

targets and hostile forces but to follow closely the movemeats of frieiidly troops, particularly the infantry. To
76 (tEJIMAti 'FACTICAL. DOCfliINI,

facilitate ti is close contact, I I devoI yes upon tIie infantry

to seize LUt( I 1101(1 terrain wi icli oilers excellent observatjon

for the artillCry. Coinntwiication is effectively ntain—

t4.ti1tc(l. Close contact l)etWeel). infantry and artillei'y

ofhcers is absolutely essential. 'l'lie division conunander

iinlica'Les, as )ro1npt.Iy as pussitic, the 1)11th of iiaiieuver

to the artillery conu)un1(ler so as to ,ernut, the ki;Uer the

IIi:Lxil)ltuIl fteedoiit iii pllUIIII3lg the role for Ille :Lr lilleiy.

En the advance the artiUery renders inunediate support

IA) the i itfaiitry witeit C0J) tact. vit,li the elienty is gaiite(l.

r1h1iS S aCC0JtLJIiSI1C(l by the artillery observers, who

aCcoIflI)aJty the foremost infantry eleinctits, or obSOIvV

front balloon oi auplaiie. lii the attack the artillery iitust

iieti tralize the hostile rC5iSt4l.JlC( and opcii the way fop thl('

advance of the infantry. Rapid reconnaissance and

JEt)) ti )t de )loylnen t for actiwi contribute to the success

of this )IIJSS1(ffl. TI, is generally advaJIt4tgeOUs for the

infantry to wait. for the support of the artillery. It. is

also nhiJ)orIAULt for the infantry to uiidersi;aud the hiiiiita—

lions and capabilities of the artillery.34

1i this e.oiiticcttwi : (1) the niiivibcr, caliber, atid effective range of bat—

terk.s avadabtc; (2) the time mmeccssary for preparat.mon of fire; (3) the nount,

and kind ot amnmtt,titioim available; (4) the type of targets a(lapt.e(I to artillery

fire.
APPENDIX. SAMPLE GERMAN ORDERS

Examples of four dilierent German orders are given

below in English translation.1 1'hougIi slightly awkward

in. expression, the hte.ral rendering tends to give the reader

t 1) L( )EO :teeii Iflth ((fl lCej )ii( )I I, I )Otll LM to (OJ it.e.tit :I,( I LM to

sl,rtitture. 'Ilic English text is, however, iiuich longer

tli:tn the original (ei'nutii P1'1t1Y becinise several EJIglisil

words are sometimes needed to carry the thought expressed ill a single Gernian word and partly because most

of the (eI'n inn military abbreviations have been translated

in full.

1. EXAMPLE A

WARNING ORDER (CORPS)

I ARMY Coin's GUT EIMARSETAUSEN

Ol'1RArJoNs SlcT1oN No.— 12.4., 1915 2

VARNING Oiwnn

I.. Our rear guards withdrew before Weak enemy

attacks. A long hostile column was observed niarching

east on the roao I: BUILEN—Wi NNENBERG—FU itST.EN]3ERG (head of COltUilfl here by J 700).

2. I Army Corps continues to retireon CASSELon 13.4.,

marching to position behind the FULDA RIVER, where

it will establish a defensive positIon.

I Examples of German combat, orders in the German language are incl(Idc(l

in "The (icrinan Rifle Coiiipany, For Study and Translation," ltzfornpation

IJulletin, No. 15, May lfl, 1942, pp. 295—307. 2

'rhis is the dale atid hour of the rdcr, namely April 12, at. 1915 (7.15

p. ni). l)al u's and tIii,e are similarly indicated throughout this and the

other orders puescntcd lucre.

77
78 GaRMAN. TACTICAL DOR1NE

3. rfl( 2d and 3(1 1I.nf Divs will march upon CASSEI1

at 0400, with the heads of their main bodies crossing the

line: VOLKMARSEN—WOLI' HAGEN—IPPINGHAtJSEN and the nortlieriutiost column of the 2d ml. Div.

over ElIltINGEN — OI3ERELSUNGEN DUItNl3Elt( .

The rear guards evacuate their present positions at

03(W) and withdraw to the line: VOLKMARSEN—-WOLFHAGEN—NAIJM )IRG. This line will he held at. leasl

until 13.4, I4($).

4. The 1st hif Div withdraws upon i:IANN MUNDEN. It will cover the wing and flaiik of the I Corps

Bowidary l)etweCii 1st and 2(1 Divs: BILLENGSFIAU—

SEN RiIODEN BREUNA E.IIRSTEN —-

S1'EEI.E -. WEJ)EMUNJ)IN (all to IsI. Div).

5. Corps Commander goes at. 0300 to 1)URNBERG, in

the course ol the In.orniiig to ESCEIERODA. Reports

to DURNBEIUJ alter 0500.

Sent by Offirer x

in pIL.s.seJiger (iAE. I (eneral

2. EXAMPLE B

COMPLETE COMBAT ORDER (CORPS) Iii ARMY Coin's Coin's II EA Dqu AItTEItS

GENERAL STAFF SECTION— FRIEDRECIIRODA

Operations No. 3 21.4., 190()

Coups QRVER FOn 'rue Ar1'ACK ON 24.4

1. In the /wstile positions along the Corps front there

have been fl() essential chatiges noted and enemy will continue to defend his position. Improvement of fleidworks

continues. Aerial photographs of the front taken on the
At'PE'N DIX 79

Iiiorliing 20.4. will be (IiStril)iite(I to(lay Lu all units dowii

hi iIIclLl(k' IMLI,hLliOIiS. Iii the sector (lit VAIt(J ULA

A1.'I'GU1tNA along the UMSTIWTT RiVER, work on

a rearward defensive position has been noted.

2. 'I'Iie I Armj Corp.s attacks at X hour oii 24.4. iii its

jireseii I; coitibat. zone and destroys the hostile force south

of the lJl\'ISTitU'i"L' Strong forces will follow tue Corps

in the 2d line available to exploit a break—through.

ii it(I.c/; ()ij((,iiV( of (lie (J017).S Ofl 24.4:

I [igli grotni I liorti icast. and north of ASCII ABA——WI E—

GLEBEN STEIN B north edge (lit IIA1tT1l.

3. Reconnaissance. a. Reconnaissance Echelon (1-1) 3

(Air) reconnoiter the Corps Coritbat Zone to include the

tJMSTEtt'TT RI V J.R during 22.4 and 23.4. Observe

I )artic(Il:Lrly br l,eci:Ll I I()St.i IC arr:LngeJ i ICII ts of disposi—

lions. ( )ii 23.4 csj )ecially reconnoiter hi locale hostile

reserves, lank batTlerS, tank delense weapons, and tank

units.

Front daylweak 24.4 on are attached to:

7th I)ivisioii .1 Airplane

8th l)ivision 3 Airplanes

I'Ianes available and prepared to fly inissioiis beginning

24.4., 0430, from u.jii,hing field FRIEDRJCIIROJ)A.

I )rop am I ,ick—ii1i field maintained until 24.4., 0430, as

follows:

by 7 t)iv at. ALS B

by 8 I)iv southwest IIAIN 13

b. Battle reconnaissance by the divisions: through

con Liii ual surveillauce of the battlelield day and night,

froiti 22.4 until 24.4, establish the location of changes

involving hostile observatioii posts, au titank defense,

'iLit, artillery positions, road bIocks and barriers,
30 (MM A N TACLi CAb I)OCTU IN E

reserves. For reasons of clecei,tioii tue activity of patrols

will not 1)0 increased.

4. Orjanizution and Combat Zones for the A Wick:

Right: 9th 1)iv

Middle: 71,Ii Div

Attached:

Corps Arty Btry 39

liv Arty Btry 35 (only until 24.4, X+2

hours)

Left: 8th Div

A ttached:

'ft Brig 12

Army Arty lteg(. 101

Smoke Bn 102

Bou,i.duric.

l)etween 9th and 7th 1)ivs: east edge ROCII—

ii El M—west edge ASU EIAItA——east edge

EC I(ARTS lEJ.3EN —east e(l ge I Li I ' 13 EN-—

275.

between 7th and 8th i)ivs: east edge BBU—

LIE! M -wet edge (JRLJM J3ACII (STEIN 13

to 7th i)iv)___wrest edge UFHOVEN—west

edge 'L'IIAMSJ3RUCK.

between 8th Div and I Army Corps: east edge

C ROSSEN 13 EHRI N GEN-—vt slope 367—

west part of C It. 1IAR'111 I

- -west edge

ALTERSTEI)T—-cast edge (JROSSEN (JOTTERN

5. Conduct of Atack.—--a. General.

Alter :u artillery l)Ieparation of 45 minutes, which will

cover the approach of the infantry to the line: NESSE—

B! EI3ER, the infantry along the entire Corps front will
APPENI)Ix 8.1.

:Litack, crossing over the NESSE—BIEBER line at X

hour. Siitult;aiieotisIy in the 8th 1)iv combat zone the

landing waves of the rfallk Brigade will cross the same

I inc.

As 1sf A (lurk (fljeetivr, the Corps and the iieigliboriiig

divisions of the I and 11. Corps, will win the line: 334

j torti icast, 1r m MOLSCI1LEBEN )—ESCI1EN BERGEN

—292 (JIoltIl from HAUSEN)—309 (northeast from

WIS]'J IA EJSEN)— north edge of WANGENIJEIM--- -

278 (west from WANGENHEIM)—LOH B—TUNGEI )A ER II l' I (..l ITS—-i FHC.I.l B—edge of wood northwest (I ROSSEN—BEI I RING EN—WA RTEN B.

The Tank Brigade will drive its attack through to

include the hostile artillery positions iii the area: TUN—

C l'1)A ItEl Cl lEN BACH— OSTE1U3EIIItUNGEN—-

LOll B. CoiltinuatioJi of the attack after reaching 1st

Oh 1 ecti VO (lilly U )0ll O1'(IC r of the Coij )S.

1). (]007dinu.t ion of Time.

X —45 iit,iil X —40 minutes: Surprise lire by all artillery

i() (liSillil) hostile comnunneations, reserves, and head—

(Plarters. Infantry and Brigade begin to move

iii to attack l)ositioi 15.

—40 until X —20 ni.yutes: Counterbattery fire by all

ai'tillery.

X—2() until X hour: Artillery lire upon hostile forward

defeiisi ye )OSi ti aiS. Smoking of B—STELLEN.3 Tile

3d Div will smoke particularly the forest edge north of

U ROSSBE1IR1N GEN.

X hour

I I)f:Ll1 try atni liii l;iaI waves of Tank Brigade cross the line:

NESSE UI EJ3EIt 13. Transfer of artillery lire to the

' OI,ervs.ioii l)OtR.
82 OBMA1 TACTICAL DOCTRINE

hostile artillery positions rearward corresponding to the

advance of the infantry attack. Sinniltaneously a box

barrage around the point of l)e1eLrat1on fired by the

artillery of the I and II Corps.

Early advance of positions of the mass of the light.

artillery to Hill 309 (9th i)iv)-278 (7th 1.)iv)— IX)!! ll

'l'IiUNOE1)AE.R—LOitC1i 13(8th l)iv) will he :trr:wgrl

and carried out.

The Tank Brigade will, after reaching the 1st Objective

and capturing the hostile artillery south of OR IIARTJ I.

assemble in the area BRU H El M-FR!EI1RICl I WE lt'11 It

awaiting further orders of the Corps Coiiiinander.

6. The Corps Artillery beginning with the aitilkwy

l)reparatioll will niain Lain Fire, by the 150—nun artillery,

upon the road: 0 RAFENTON NA—! AN 0 ESAI1ZA

(tItOSSENGOTTERN.

7. Corps Antiaircraft A nil/cry Part f Army A it A r/

I?egt 104 and Army Pursuit Squadron: 1noI.ect. the ,relar:I.—

(ion for the. :Ltt4Lek• defend the ;,sseiiil ,Iy areas fn)I,I hiostik

air observation and air attack. Siccial I 1' eI,iu,i of (lie

tank assembly onlered in I :LragraphI Jib will he pr.ivi led.

8. Corps Reserves.

29th Inf

Corps AT Bn

Corps Engr Bn

The 29th In! will reconnoiter for covered a roadies to

and possible assembly areas in the area: FROTTS'['E I )'l'.

9 Divisions will utilize to the fullest extent. (()V(W

and camouflage in preparation for time attack.

Divisions will, submit their attack and fire plans to (.hme

Corps Commander not later than 23.4, 1200.

X hour will be announced at 23.4, 2300.
APPF)NDIX 83

10. TIic Corps Command Post will remain at FRIED—

RI (ill B.( H )A tin lii 24.4 (.X ----30 when it will be estab—

liShC(l at HAIN B).

I)istrihul;ion B

General of Infantry

3. EXAMPLE C

SEPARATE ORDER (ARMY)

Aiiv ( ()MMANDIR ARMY iiQ

( ENERAL STAFF' SECrI0N I ALTENBURG, 1.12., 1500

N1UM HIHt

't'o lti's .1 NI 1tI,U'I' 19

I. Res ml ltegt II) (with .1st Bit Ites Arty Rcgt 7, 1st

(Jo ites Engr l3ii 7 atI,aeJied) is attached to the X Army

Corps (.1 t(( at WITTCHENJ)ORF). It is expected that

Ites ml Itegt 19 will be eiiijiloyed on the west hank of the

X Army Corps in the vicinity of SCI:ILEIrI1Z.

2. lteiiild Ites luf Itegt 19 will be transported in trucks

('l'ik Uii II) via S( 1 KOblN IsISIN J,3J!itG——HERMS—

I )Oltl' lo AUMA. March to begin lroiir 1IAUMBUItU

li( )l later lhaui 2. 12., 0000.

The ( oiiwiander of the Truck Battalion 11 will report

at 163() in NAUMBUiOto the Commander of the Ites

lnf ltegt 19. The loading of troops into trucks in the

bivouac area is not poSSil)le before 2200.

Alter the troops are unloaded in the new area, the Trk

I3it Ii will tiiarcli immediately to ZETZ.

3. TIme Comimniander of Ites inf Itegt 19 will report at time

COURT I l.OIJSE in AUMA at 1.12., 0200, where he will

receive further orders through time Commander of the X

Corps.

(by Radio) For the Commander-in-Chief
84 UIRMAN TAUTIeAL DUIPUINE

4. EXAMPLE D

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

1 si' I.)lvJsIoN DiVISION (.miwA.rsD I'OS'I'

GENERAL STAFF SECTION F11J.EJ)ENSTA'I' 8. 10., 1931)

lB —

S1'ECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR Sui'i'iy

(to 1)ivision Oider N wnb'r 'iieral Stall Section Ia,

8.10., 1D30)

1. A rnrnuni(ion.—Tlie supply of ammunition for the

reat guards will be provided from the balances now in

hands of troops and from the additional ainowt.s to be

delivered not later than 2200 to each regiiiient a. follows:

75,000 rifle cartridges

1,000 hand grenades

130 flares

60 signal ugh it cartridges

680 light infantry mortar shells

330 37-mm shells

rI1J, supply of ammunition for the.artiIkry will be handled

by the existing supply ilIsLalIatJ(,ns. Sii )ly of aiiiiiitiiij—

tioti for the J)ivision Iteconii:ussance Battalioii will be

handled by 1st Infantry Reginiemit.

As reserve for the reai guards, ammunition will be left

back in the presenb aniniumtion distributing point wider

guard, as follows:

100,000 arnior-piercmg cartridges

200 light infantry mortar shells
APPENDiX 85

30() 37—nun shells

600 105—mni light howitzer shells

(OIII1flU( icr ol (lie rear guard is responsible mi' the

er (Ils(.ril ni th m of (,l i is reserve annit un ition

l'Iac(' :1.11(1 (jIlI(' for ISSLIC of fl.ITIHU1OI t,oii to the troops

II tarci t ing to (lie rear vtIJ 1)0 indicated later.

2. /?i/.iinis. Rations and reduced iron rations for tue

gII:L1(ls will he left l)cl)Illd under guar(1 fl.S follow's:

,r rear gutards ii east see toy: .1 N G JRSLF]3EN

C11URCIT

l'or iiuuiiuig tear guai'ds: (lit SS1tE'ITBA(l I

(.1i UB(J:1.

These rat;ioiis will he coIlccte(l ).y the rc:i.r—giiard trooos

on 0. 1.0., 0400.

Rations for rem:iniiig troops for 9.10. will be delivered

IA) the bivouacs ol March Groups A, B, and (2, by meaiis

of supply colititin (animal—drawn) before 9.10., 0600.

'1'] iese su )ply columns will then remain with the march

groi 11)S.

3. 1l!edieui e.rvice (l'ilen). ( llveting 1oin I (severeIy 'ounded) at Fit IEI)EN—

SEA I )T.

(oIIecting point (lightly wounded) at, GA.MSTAI)T.

These collecting stations Will be closed at 21.00. The

Mcd Co and Mit And) Vial (less Section remaining with

icar guard) will march to GRAFEN1tOJ)A via KLEIM—

itETT13ACiI—BITTSTADT-—G RAWI NKEL.

Collecting point for wounded will be established in

GOSSEL to open not later than 9.10., 0700.

The F Ilosp will remain in ARNSTADT until 9.10.,

0400, and will thei be marched to SUHL. Wounded
86 O1RMAN TAcF1CAJI DO(?FRfl

will be transported from ARNSTADT up o including

9.10., 0400, in hospital trains.

To take care of unforeseen losses (nLat&ici) and

wounded within the rear guards, one—half pEat of the Mcd

Co and 5 Mtr Ambs will remain in FLU E1)ENSTA 1 )'I'

available to the Comdr of the rear guard.

4. Medical Service (Animals).

Collecting point at ERMSTEJYI' will remain opcii

until 2100.

Collecting point will be opened at GOSSEJ not later

than 9.10, 0700.

Animal park and hospital will be marched at. 2100 to

the vicinity of GEHLBERG.

5. Motor Sup plies (Gas ---Oil Grease Repairs).

Filling station for passenger cars and trucks 1CHUL1)

opet until 2200 at present location, tlieti UU)VC to

GRAFENRODA immediately.

Motor Repair Company will march at. 23(H) to

flORN BURG (south of GRAVEN lU) I )A).

6. Saivaqe.—Salvage materials not yet. (Ieliverc(l IA) IIu'

).resent division salvage collecting point, will he carJic(I

back by troops as far as is practicable. 'I'Jie inohili.ty of

trains nd transport with troops wiltnot be sacrificed for

this purpose.

7. Trains.

Combat trains march at 2000 on OBER.SHOF.

Supply trains (Mtz) march at 2000 on ELGERSBURG.

Supply trains (animal): see paragraph 2.

Distribution: - .. Same as Division Order No. -— Signed.

U. S. SOVISSNUS? p5157155 OVPICI IllS