Exemption No. 10507 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC 20591 In the matter of the petition of PHI, INC. Regulatory Docket No. 2011

- 1039 for an exemption from § 91.9(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations GRANT OF EXEMPTION By letter dated September 20, 2011, Mr. Michael C. Hurst, Chief Pilot, PHI, Inc. (PHI), P.O. Box 90808, Lafayette, LA 70509, petitioned the Federal Aviation Adm inistration (FAA) on behalf of PHI for an exemption from § 91.9(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). The proposed exemption, if granted, would allow PHI to operate Sikorsky S

- 92A (S

- 92A) helicopters with limited exposure to engine failure during takeoff and landing while carrying up to 19 passengers between land

- based and offshore facilities or when operating between two offshore facilities, day, night, visual flight rules, and instrument flight rules. The petitioner requests relief from t he following regulation: Section 91.9(a) prescribes, in pertinent part, that no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual. The petitioner supports its request w ith the following information: The petitioner states that the petition for exemption is for operations conducted in its Sikorsky S

- 92A aircraft when operating between land

- based and offshore facilities or when operating between two offshore facilities. P HI states that its S

- 92As were certificated under part 29, amendment 47 relating to safety and ditching equipment, which provides the highest level of safety today. The petitioner states its 2S

- 92As are equipped with aircraft flotation gear and are cert ified for ditching in up to sea state 4. Additionally, when operating over water, each S

- 92A occupant is provided, and wears, personal flotation equipment. Also, the S

- 92A is equipped with life rafts that can be deployed from inside or outside the aircraft

. PHI states that European operators, using the same aircraft, operate them in accordance with Joint Aviation Requirement

- OPS

- 3 which already permits similar operations with limited exposure to engine failure. In addition, petitioner states that it has op erated its S

- 92As under operations specification (OpSpec) H100 since 2003. The petitioner requests that this exemption extend to its operations “conducted outside the United States.” The petitioner believes that the requested exemption will continue to pr ovide the same level of safety that is currently in place for offshore operations. PHI states that collected data related to the engine reliability reflects that the in

- flight shutdown rate is less than 1 per 100,000 flight hours. PHI has operated under O pSpec H100 in the United States since 2003 which authorized operations similar to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Performance Class 2 with limited exposure. During this period, no S

- 92A accidents have been caused by power loss due to engin e failure during takeoff or landing. PHI has instituted operational controls through its general operations manual, training program, and management surveillance. PHI will conduct operations in such a manner as to minimize the time spent exposed to engine failure. This will be accomplished by following the manufacturer’s recommended takeoff and landing procedures whenever feasible. Operations will not be conducted unless the current aircraft weight, altitude, and temperature ensure 100 feet per minute clim b at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous one engine inoperative (OEI) power. PHI states that it further mitigates exposure by: (1) Conducting flight operations to and from helidec ks and shore based heliports that meet or exceed size and weight requirements appropriate to the aircraft configuration; (2) Training its crews in a Level D, FFS (Full Flight Simulator) initially and annually, ensuring the highest levels of proficiency and competency; (3) Conducting route checks to confirm that its crews remain procedurally compliant and use crew resource management principles during all flight operations; and (4) Using PHI's Flight Data Monitoring Program (known as LAMP) to ensure flight p rofiles are in accordance with Performance Class 2 procedures. The petitioner understands that the FAA is considering the rescission of OpSpec H

- 100. PHI notes that it has accumulated over 60,000 hours of operational experience in this make/model all in

a ccordance with OpSpec H

- 100 and Performance Class 2 profiles. This experience demonstrates that when takeoff and landing techniques are used to minimize exposure to forced landing due to engine failure, that this aircraft can be operated at an equivalent l evel of 3safety to Category A. Additionally, if the rescission occurred without this relief, the S

- 92A would become economically unfeasible which likely would result in their removal from service. The outcome would be a reversion to smaller, older, less sophisticated aircraft that do not provide the same level of safety. This would result in an overall degradation of safety and not serve the most important stakeholder, the passenger. A summary of the petition was published in the Federal Register on Oct ober 12, 2011 (76 FR 63342). No comments were received. The FAA's analysis is as follows: The FAA has considered the petitioner’s request and supporting materials and finds that, subject to the conditions and limitations below, a grant of exemption woul d be in the public interest and would provide a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the current regulations. The FAA finds that PHI provides transportation under contract to employees of various oil companies from land based facilities to offsh ore facilities within the Gulf of Mexico. Aviation operations within the U.S. are conducted under the provisions of part 135. Operations to offshore facilities present a unique operating environment which requires special consideration in operations, training, and standardization. Based on the drawings and photographs contained in the petition, “offshore facilities” include an ov erwater elevated helideck. The FAA recognizes that there may be instances in which a safe forced landing may not be possible due to environmental or other factors. The FAA notes that regulatory agencies worldwide have already applied risk management and p ermitted variations to specific operations, such as operations to helidecks where exposure to an engine failure is present without a safe forced landing area. Risk assessment is used to determine whether to permit these variations. When operations without suitable areas for safe forced landings are being considered, all relevant factors should be evaluated. These factors include the likelihood of the event, the possible consequences, and any mitigating measures weighed against the potential benefits of the operation. Accident history and other relevant safety data and analysis are crucial to making the operational determination. The FAA notes the petitioner states that it has operated since 2003 under the provisions of OpSpec H100. That operations specifica tion prohibits operations unless the current aircraft weight, altitude and temperature would ensure the ability to climb 150 feet per minute at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous OEI power. These specifications are also similar to those characteristics of operations under ICAO Performance Class 2. The ICAO standard for Performance Class 2 with limited exposure to engine failure is to have that exposure period be less than 9 seconds . The petitioner’s operations meet or exceed this standard. However, the 4