[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-10176

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cv-02832-RAL-EAJ

BERNARD TOOMER,

 Plaintiff- Appellant,

 versus

CACI, INC. – FEDERAL,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(May 21, 2014)

Before HULL, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Bernard Toomer appeals the summary judgment in favor of his former 

employer, CACI, Inc. – Federal, and against his complaint that he was fired 

because of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

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U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.01. We 

affirm.

CACI contracts with the government to provide information technology 

services in the areas of defense, intelligence, and homeland security. Between 

2000 and 2010, Science Applications International Corporation subcontracted with 

CACI to provide technology services to the Defense Information System Agency 

and its field offices around the world. In 2000, CACI hired Toomer, as a level 

three engineer, to work in Bahrain to evaluate and recommend products for the 

Agency to use in operating and maintaining the security of its global computer 

network systems.

In 2008, CACI assigned Toomer to a two-phase project in which he would 

move the network domain operations for the Agency from Bahrain to MacDill Air 

Force Base outside of Tampa, Florida, and then transition the Southwest Asia 

Promina Domain from a Transport technology to an Internet Protocol technology. 

During the project, Glenn Morefield, a project manager at CACI, supervised 

Toomer, while Anthony McFadden, a Division Chief for the Agency, oversaw 

Toomer’s daily work. During the first phase of the project, McFadden was 

“disappointed with [Toomer’s] performance and capabilities.” On July 30, 2010, 

Stephen Gessling, an employee of Science Applications who served as a liaison

between the Agency and CACI, sent an email to CACI reciting McFadden’s 

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criticisms of Toomer’s work; stating that Toomer lacked the skills necessary to 

work on the second phase of the project; and requesting that CACI remove Toomer 

from the project. In a later email, Gessling stated that McFadden disapproved 

strongly of Toomer’s performance and that McFadden “rebuffed” Gessling’s 

suggestions to “plac[e] Mr. Toomer in another position.” Later, Toomer spoke 

with McFadden in his office. McFadden told Toomer that “we are getting rid of 

you” and that he had 30 days to seek other employment.

CACI removed Toomer from the project because the contract between 

Science Applications and CACI required it to “remove and replace any keyprimary personnel or individual whose performance is determined by the 

Government to be so deleterious as to jeopardize successful performance of the 

Subcontract.” CACI found Toomer another position as a level 2 engineer at Scott 

Air Force Base in Illinois, but Toomer declined the position because his salary 

would be decreased. Later, CACI sent Toomer a separation letter stating that he 

was fired “based on [his] inability to meet the work performance requirement in 

[his] current position”; that he was eligible to be rehired by CACI; and that a 

representative was available to help him find another position with CACI. Toomer 

signed the separation letter.

Toomer complained that CACI terminated him because he was AfricanAmerican. CACI filed a motion for summary judgment to which it attached the 

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email sent by Gessling and a copy of Toomer’s deposition during which he 

acknowledged that CACI had the limited options of giving him another position or 

firing him. Toomer argued in opposition that he was given positive performance 

evaluations by Morefield and that there was no evidence that he lacked the skills 

needed to perform the next phase of the project. Toomer argued that the reason 

given for his termination was pretextual because it was inconsistent with the 

enthusiastic praise he had received in his evaluations. 

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of CACI. The district 

court ruled that Toomer could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination 

because he was not qualified to work on a project when CACI was contractually 

required to remove him at the request of the Agency. In the alternative, the district 

court ruled that Toomer failed to prove that the legitimate, race-neutral reason that 

CACI gave for the termination was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. 

The district court did not err when it entered summary judgment against 

Toomer’s complaint. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination

under Title VII and under the Florida Civil Rights Act, Toomer had to establish 

that he was a member of a protected class; he was qualified to do the job; he was 

subjected to an adverse employment action; and he was treated less favorably than 

similarly situated individuals outside his protected class. See Holland v. Gee, 677 

F.3d 1047, 1055 (11th Cir. 2012); Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 

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1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010). Toomer failed to establish that he was qualified to 

work on the project after the government demanded his removal from that project. 

Toomer argues that a genuine factual dispute exists about whether McFadden was 

dissatisfied because “[t]he only support for [his] observations comes from emails . 

. . [from] Gessling” and because “a reasonable argument can be made that Gessling 

pursued Toomer’s removal and McFadden merely acquiesced to [that] decision,”

but Toomer failed to submit any evidence to substantiate these arguments. See

Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nsupported 

speculation . . . does not meet a party’s burden of producing some defense to a 

summary judgment motion.” (quoting Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 

931–32 (7th Cir. 1995)). The record establishes, without dispute, that McFadden, 

who is also African-American, told Toomer that he was being fired. According to 

its contract, CACI was required to remove Toomer from the project at the request 

of the government and regardless of the positive evaluations that Toomer received 

from his supervisor at CACI. And Toomer acknowledged that, when he declined 

to accept the other position offered by CACI, it had no alternative but to fire him. 

For the same reasons, even if we were to assume that Toomer established a prima 

facie case of discrimination, he failed to establish that the reason proffered for his 

termination was a pretext for discrimination. See Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 

381 F.3d 1230, 1235-36 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that this Court may affirm the 

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district court’s judgment on any ground that finds support in the record and 

affirming when plaintiff established a prima facie case but failed to establish 

pretext).

We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of CACI. 

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