GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, Veterans Affairs,

and International Relations, Committee

on Government Reform, House of

Representatives

August 2000 DOD PERSONNEL

More Actions Needed

to Address Backlog of

Security Clearance

Reinvestigations

GAO/NSIAD-00-215

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-285889 Letr

August 24, 2000

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

Veterans Affairs, and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

At the end of fiscal year 1998, about 2.4 million Department of Defense

(DOD) military, civilian, and contractor personnel held security clearances

granting them access to classified information. To lessen the government’s

vulnerability to espionage and thereby reduce national security risks,

federal standards require a periodic reinvestigation of individuals with

security clearances. An individual’s security clearance is outdated if a

reinvestigation has not been initiated in the past 5 years for top secret

clearances, 10 years for secret clearances, and 15 years for confidential

clearances. Undertaking reinvestigations on time is particularly important

because DOD regulations permit individuals to maintain access to

classified information regardless of whether and how long their

reinvestigations are overdue. In January 2000, DOD estimated that its

backlog of overdue reinvestigations had grown to over 505,000. However,

DOD has also reported that the actual backlog size is unknown because

existing personnel security databases cannot provide an accurate count of

overdue reinvestigations.

This letter responds to your concerns about DOD’s estimates of its

reinvestigation backlog. Specifically, we (1) determined how DOD

estimates the backlog, (2) assessed the soundness of DOD’s backlog

estimates, and (3) identified DOD’s plans to address the backlog problem.

Results in Brief In the absence of a Department-wide database that can accurately measure

the reinvestigation backlog, DOD estimates the backlog on an ad-hoc basis,

using two primary methods—manual counts and statistical sampling. Using

the counting method, the military services and Defense agencies ask

security managers to review their personnel and count those overdue for a

reinvestigation. The counts are totaled to provide a DOD-wide backlog

estimate. Using the sampling method, DOD makes a rough—and known to
B-285889

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

be inaccurate—estimate from existing personnel security databases. It

then selects a random sample of individuals from this estimate and surveys

them to determine whether they are currently associated with DOD,

currently require a security clearance, and are overdue for a

reinvestigation. DOD uses this information and statistical analysis to

develop a refined and more accurate estimate.

DOD’s two most recent estimates each used a different method and arrived

at similar results: about one of every five individuals with a security

clearance is overdue for a reinvestigation. However, both estimates had

methodological limitations, were 6 months old or older by the time they

were reported, and excluded thousands of overdue reinvestigations

because they used a restricted backlog definition. Primarily using the

counting method, DOD reported in January 2000 that the backlog totaled

505,786. However, because the estimate was composed of unverified

counts from the military services and other Defense agencies, and because

these entities used inconsistent methods and different time periods, the

accuracy of the estimate is questionable. Using the sampling method, a

DOD contractor reported in February 2000 that the backlog totaled

between 451,757 and 558,552 (with a mean estimate of 505,155). Despite a

low survey response rate, the contractor assumed that there were no

statistical differences between respondents and nonrespondents and did

not perform the necessary follow-up to verify this assumption. Moreover,

reinvestigations submitted for processing but not yet completed were not

included in either estimate because the backlog definition excluded

reinvestigations in process.1 These totaled about 94,000 in February 2000,

and, according to DOD, the vast majority of them were overdue.

DOD recognizes that the reinvestigation backlog is a problem. After not

making progress in meeting an earlier goal to eliminate the backlog, the

services and other Defense agencies, at the direction of the Deputy

Secretary of Defense and the DOD Comptroller, have begun to formulate

plans to eliminate the backlog by March 31, 2002. DOD also plans to

implement a new personnel security database in mid-2001. Among other

things, the database is designed to include information that could allow

real-time counts of overdue reinvestigations. However, DOD has not

specified how it plans to ensure that future reinvestigation requests are

1

A reinvestigation is in process from the time an individual submits a reinvestigation request

until the time the reinvestigation is completed and a decision is made on the individual’s

clearance.
B-285889

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

submitted when they are due or use the information in the new personnel

security database system to help manage the reinvestigation program.

We are recommending that DOD design routine reports that show the full

extent of the backlog and develop incentives to keep reinvestigation

information current and submit requests for reinvestigations on time. In its

comments on our draft report, DOD agreed with these recommendations.

Background The federal government uses personnel security investigations to

determine whether an individual should be granted access to classified

information.2 In addition to requiring an initial investigation, federal

standards require periodic reinvestigations of individuals granted access to

classified information. DOD estimated in November 1999 that the typical

cost to perform a top secret and a secret reinvestigation was about $1,800

and $250, respectively.3 Although such investigations do not guarantee that

individuals will not later engage in espionage activities, they remain a

critical step in identifying those who can be trusted to access and safeguard

classified information. Of the 2.4 million DOD military, civilian, and

contractor employees with personnel security clearances at the end of

fiscal year 1998, 96,000 held confidential clearances, 1.8 million held secret

clearances, and 524,000 held top secret clearances.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications,

and Intelligence) is responsible for DOD’s personnel security program,

including the periodic reinvestigation program. The Assistant Secretary

oversees the Defense Security Service, which is responsible for

investigations and reinvestigations of DOD’s civilian and military personnel

and contractors. Over 5,000 security managers within the services and

Defense agencies are responsible for ensuring that individuals submit

reinvestigation requests as their updates become due.

DOD Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program, states that a

clearance shall not be suspended or downgraded solely because a periodic

reinvestigation was not conducted precisely within 5 years for top secret

2

We recently reviewed DOD’s personnel security investigative functions. See DOD

Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks

(GAO/NSIAD-00-12, Oct. 27, 1999).

3

A more detailed investigation is required for a top secret reinvestigation.
B-285889

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

clearances and 10 years for secret clearances. The regulation requires that

DOD agencies, in recognition of mission requirements, be flexible in

administering the reinvestigation requirement. Thus, as a matter of

practice, the services and DOD agencies normally do not suspend or

downgrade individuals’ access to classified information regardless of

whether or how long their reinvestigations are overdue.

Historically, DOD has reported a large backlog of overdue reinvestigations.4

In fiscal year 1986, DOD had a backlog of 300,000 overdue reinvestigations

that had not been submitted to the Defense Security Service for an update.

The backlog has reportedly increased significantly over the past few years

due to several factors. First, new standards, approved in 1997, increased

periodic reinvestigation requirements by shortening the time interval

between reinvestigations for secret clearances from 15 to 10 years and by

establishing a new, 15-year periodic reinvestigation requirement for

confidential clearances. Second, for 4 years starting in fiscal year 1996,

DOD tried to help the Defense Security Service clear up its backlog of

pending investigations by imposing quotas on the number of

reinvestigations the services and Defense agencies could request. This led

to pent-up demand for reinvestigation requests. Finally, in October 1998,

the Defense Security Service began having significant difficulties

implementing a new automated case control management system. The

problems led to reduced productivity and increased completion times.

Lack of Database Led

DOD to Use Two

Methods to Estimate

Its Backlog

DOD is developing but currently does not have an information system that

can routinely track and report on the status of security clearances. As a

result, DOD headquarters cannot identify when security clearances are due

to be updated, accurately project the investigative workload, or know the

extent of the reinvestigation backlog without extra effort and resources.

Without readily available information on the status of clearances, DOD has

estimated its reinvestigation backlog on an ad-hoc basis using two primary

methods—manual counting and statistical sampling.

4

The backlog can include overdue reinvestigations from the following DOD services and

agencies: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Uniformed Services University of the Health

Sciences, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Defense Advanced Research Project

Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency,

Washington Headquarters Services, National Security Agency, Inspector General, Defense

Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Finance and Accounting Service,

Defense Security Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Staff, and DOD contractors.
B-285889

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

DOD Does Not Have a

Database That Can Provide

an Accurate Backlog Count

DOD does not have a Department-wide information system to track the

status of security clearances. DOD’s primary database containing personnel

security information, the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index,

contains about 28 million records of past and current military, civilian, and

contractor personnel who have been the subjects of criminal or security

clearance investigations. Managed by the Defense Security Service, the

index is used to study policy options and to prepare required and ad-hoc

reports on the functioning of the personnel security program. Although the

index was not designed to provide real-time, actual counts of overdue

reinvestigations, it can provide a rough estimate of the backlog. The

problem is that the rough estimate overstates the backlog because the

index includes (1) many individuals no longer employed by DOD, (2) many

individuals eligible for clearance but no longer requiring access to

classified information, and (3) data showing only the highest eligible

classification level of many individuals who currently require access only at

a lower classification level.

The Navy and the Air Force maintain personnel security databases for their

personnel. However, according to service officials, these databases have

many of the same limitations as DOD’s index. As a result, the officials

stated, their databases cannot provide an accurate count of reinvestigation

backlogs. The Army does not maintain an Army-wide personnel security

database. The Defense Security Service maintains information on DOD

contractors in its new case control management system. However, this

system has experienced implementation problems, and summary backlog

information is not readily available on a real-time basis. Defense Security

Service officials stated that despite this limitation, the system’s data on

contractor employees and their clearance details are accurate. Because

overdue reinvestigations from other Defense agencies appear to comprise

less than 5 percent of the total backlog, we did not determine the type of

personnel security databases these agencies maintain.

DOD Has Used Two Primary

Methods to Make Backlog

Estimates

Without a central database to help it determine the reinvestigation backlog,

DOD has used two primary methods for ad-hoc estimates of the backlog—

manual counts and statistical sampling techniques to refine rough

estimates. Using the counting method, the military services and Defense

agencies ask security managers at units, installations, and command levels

to review their personnel and count those that are overdue for a

reinvestigation. The overdue counts are totaled to provide a DOD-wide

backlog estimate. Performing a manual count in this fashion requires input

from a large number of security managers, according to service officials—
B-285889

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

about 300 in the Army, 1,500-2,000 in the Navy, over 3,200 in the Air Force,

and 150-200 in the Marine Corps. DOD officials stated that because security

managers are responsible for knowing the clearance status of individuals

under their cognizance, this method should result in an accurate estimate

of the backlog.

Using the sampling method, first a rough backlog estimate is made using

information in the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and other

databases of current military, civilian, and contractor personnel. This

estimate is known to be inaccurate because it is higher than the actual

backlog. Then, a sample of individuals included in the rough estimate is

selected, and the individuals are surveyed to determine whether they are

currently associated with DOD, require a security clearance, and are

overdue for a reinvestigation. DOD uses this information and statistical

analysis to make a more accurate backlog estimate.

Reliability of DOD’s

Backlog Estimates Is

Questionable

DOD’s two most recent attempts to determine the backlog size had

methodological limitations, produced estimates that were 6 months old or

older by the time they were reported, and did not include thousands of

overdue reinvestigations that had been submitted for reinvestigation. The

two estimates—one by a DOD process team and the other by a contractor,

the MITRE Corporation—were developed independently and used different

estimating methods but coincidentally arrived at similar estimates of about

505,000 overdue reinvestigations, or about 1 overdue reinvestigation for

every 5 individuals with a security clearance. These estimates differed from

several previous backlog estimates that have been cited in various DOD

documents and statements.

Limitations of the DOD

Process Team’s Backlog

Estimate

In November 1999, the Deputy Secretary of Defense formed the Personnel

Security Overarching Integrated Process Team to review the accuracy of

the reinvestigation backlog and develop solutions to manage and eliminate

the backlog. To develop its backlog estimate, the team first defined the

backlog and included only reinvestigations that were (1) overdue according

to the time lapsed since the individual’s last investigation, (2) currently

required, and (3) not yet submitted to the Defense Security Service for an

update. Also, individuals with security clearances were to be evaluated

according to the classified access level required to do their current jobs and

not according to the highest level of classified access for which they were

eligible. For example, an individual needing only a secret clearance but
B-285889

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

holding a top secret clearance was not considered overdue for a

reinvestigation until 10 years, not 5 years, after the last investigation.

The team then calculated its estimate using the counting method. The team

asked the services to determine their reinvestigation backlog using the

established backlog definition. For DOD agencies and contractors,

however, the team used previously developed estimates rather than

developing new backlog counts. The team did not verify the accuracy of

these prior estimates or of the backlog counts reported by the services.

After tallying the results, the team reported in January 2000 that the

reinvestigation backlog totaled 505,786 (see table 1). On February 16, 2000,

the Defense Security Service Director cited this estimate in testimony

before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and

International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform.

Table 1: Process Team’s Backlog Estimate

a

Includes sensitive compartmented information clearances.

Source: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence).

A key limitation of the team’s estimate was the inconsistency with which

individual services arrived at their estimates. Each service used a different

method and a different point in time to determine its backlog.

• The Army asked its commands and units for a backlog count as of

September 30, 1999.

• Navy leaders did not want to ask commands and units to count overdue

reinvestigations, stating that this would disrupt mission responsibilities.

Instead, the Navy used a combination of different methods to estimate

the backlog as of September 1999. For example, it (1) counted overdue

Clearance level

DOD component Top secreta

Secret and

confidential Total Percent

Army 17,367 145,330 162,697 32

Navy and Marine Corps 23,533 96,665 120,198 24

Air Force 11,407 30,084 41,491 8

Contractors 31,999 134,156 166,155 33

Other 9,975 5,270 15,245 3

Total 94,281 411,505 505,786 100
B-285889

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

reinvestigations of civilian personnel in one major command and, on the

basis of this count, estimated through extrapolation, the Navy’s total

civilian personnel backlog; (2) estimated the military personnel backlog

by analyzing military jobs requiring clearances and the years of service

of the individuals occupying those jobs (for example, individuals with

over 6 years of service in jobs requiring a top secret clearance were

considered overdue for a reinvestigation); and (3) used a count of

overdue reinvestigations of civilian and military personnel in the Marine

Corps as of September 10, 1999.

• In March 1999, the Air Force had asked its commands and units to count

civilian and military personnel overdue for a reinvestigation. Using this

information, the Air Force then developed an estimate of its backlog as

of April 1999. The Air Force did not perform another count in response

to the process team’s request. Instead, it added all reinvestigation

requests that it had submitted between May and December 1999, and

subtracted them from its April 1999 estimate. The Air Force did not

verify whether the requests subtracted from this estimate had been

included in the original April 1999 estimate and it did not add individuals

that had become overdue for a reinvestigation from May through

December 1999.

Another limitation of the team’s estimate was its use of prior estimates of

overdue reinvestigations for DOD agencies and contractor personnel.

Because Defense agencies accounted for a very small proportion of the

backlog, the team did not ask them to count their overdue reinvestigations.

Instead, the team used backlog estimates the agencies had previously

developed for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence) in mid-1999. The team also used a prior

Defense Security Service estimate of the contractor reinvestigation

backlog, even though contractor personnel accounted for about one-third

of the total backlog. Defense Security Service officials stated that the

contractor backlog estimate was developed from the Service’s database in

May 1999. This estimate was adjusted to approximate the contractor

backlog as of September 1999 by subtracting reinvestigation requests

submitted to the Defense Security Service from June 1999 through

September 1999. The team used this adjusted number as part of its estimate

of the total DOD backlog.

Finally, the team’s estimate used a definition of overdue reinvestigations

that excluded those overdue reinvestigations submitted to but still pending

at the Defense Security Service. Normally, the Defense Security Service

does not open a reinvestigation immediately after it receives a request and
B-285889

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

usually requires about 5 to 7 months to complete a reinvestigation. When

the team reported its estimate in January 2000, about 86,000

reinvestigations were still pending at the Defense Security Service.

According to DOD officials, the vast majority of these reinvestigations were

overdue.

Limitations of the

Contractor’s Backlog

Estimate

In 1999, the Defense Security Service initiated a study to identify the true

size of the backlog and to determine how it should prioritize backlog cases

so that those with the highest security risk could be completed first. The

Defense Security Service contracted with the MITRE Corporation to assist

in this effort, which used statistical sampling.

As a starting point, the Defense Security Service asked the Defense

Manpower Data Center5 to develop a rough estimate of the reinvestigation

backlog using the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and other

DOD databases of current military, civilian, and contractor personnel. The

Center reported that 954,445 individuals were overdue for reinvestigation

as of June 30, 1999. MITRE then requested that the Center draw a random

sample of 1,200 cases—400 at the sensitive compartmented information

clearance level,6 400 at the top secret level, and 400 at the secret level—to

refine the rough estimate, which was understood to overstate the backlog.

Defense Security Service officials stated that overdue confidential

clearances were not included in this process because the number was

relatively small—about 15,000. At MITRE’s request, the Defense Security

Service surveyed the sampled cases by asking each individual’s security

manager whether the individual (1) currently held an active clearance

under the manager’s jurisdiction, (2) currently needed access to classified

information at the clearance level indicated, and (3) had no clearance

update request in process. To be considered a true backlog case, the

security manager had to answer “yes” to all three questions.

5

To support DOD’s information requirements, the Center collects and maintains an archive

of automated manpower, personnel, training, and financial databases.

6

The sensitive compartmented information clearance level is a special top secret clearance.
B-285889

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

When MITRE wrote its report, it had received 617 survey responses

(51 percent of the sample cases).7 Of these, 246 identified true backlog

cases. On the basis of these responses, MITRE estimated that the backlog,

as of June 30, 1999, totaled between 451,757 and 558,552, with a mean

estimate of 505,155, as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Contractor’s Backlog Estimate

a

Total lower and upper limits were computed separately and do not sum up.

Source: MITRE.

A key limitation of the MITRE estimate was its low survey response rate.

First, no survey follow-up was performed to increase the response rate.

Second, because responses were fewer than 1,200, the estimate rested

upon the assumption that there were no statistical differences between

respondents and nonrespondents. However, to determine whether this

assumption was true, sampling and follow-up of nonrespondents was

required; but neither was performed. In fact, MITRE stated in its report that

the assumption probably was not true because security managers were

more likely to respond to the survey if an individual still held and needed a

security clearance than if an individual no longer held or needed a

clearance. On the basis of this belief, MITRE stated that its estimate was

probably biased on the high side, somewhat overstating the true size of the

backlog.

7

The Defense Security Service’s Backlog of Periodic Reinvestigations: Statistical Analysis

and Risk Prioritization Procedure, the MITRE Corporation (Feb. 2000). The MITRE study

also developed an algorithm to prioritize reinvestigation requests on the basis of security

risk. By comparing historical data on clearance revocations with information submitted

with each individual’s reinvestigation request, the algorithm predicts the likelihood that the

individual’s clearance might be revoked. Defense Security Service officials stated that they

plan to begin using the algorithm during summer 2000 to give priority to those

reinvestigations considered the riskiest.

Clearance level Lower limit Mean Upper limit

Sensitive compartmented information 19,635 25,288 30,941

Top secret 36,680 44,375 52,070

Secret 382,954 435,492 488,029

Totala 451,757 505,155 558,552
B-285889

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

Another limitation of the MITRE estimate was that, like the process team’s

estimate, it did not include all overdue reinvestigations. Specifically, the

estimate excluded overdue confidential reinvestigations and, by definition,

overdue reinvestigations pending at the Defense Security Service. Defense

Security Service officials have estimated that about 15,000 confidential

reinvestigations are overdue. In February 2000, when MITRE issued its

report, about 94,000 reinvestigations were pending at the Defense Security

Service. DOD officials stated that the vast majority of these were overdue.

Prior DOD Backlog

Estimates

Several widely divergent backlog estimates have been cited in various DOD

documents and statements in 1998 and 1999. However, these estimates

cannot be compared either with each other or with the more recent

estimates by the process team and MITRE because they included different

clearance levels and were developed using different methods, time periods,

and criteria for determining when an individual is overdue for a

reinvestigation. For example, the Joint Security Commission II8 used a

statistical survey and estimated that about 73,160 top secret and sensitive

compartmented information clearances were overdue for reinvestigation in

October 1998. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence) used the counting method and

estimated that the backlog totaled 624,215 for all clearance levels in

September 1999. The Defense Manpower Data Center used existing

databases, with no statistical sampling, to develop three prior rough

estimates, which ranged between 611,652 and 992,231. Although these

estimates were known to be overstated due to database problems, they

have been occasionally cited, without qualification, as representing the

reinvestigation backlog.

Appendix I summarizes key data related to DOD’s two recent and other

reinvestigation backlog estimates.

DOD Is Taking Steps to

Address the Backlog

DOD has taken several steps to deal with the reinvestigation backlog

problem, including setting goals to eliminate the backlog, requiring the

services and Defense agencies to formulate plans to meet the goals, and

expanding DOD’s investigative capacity by shifting some Defense Security

8 The Joint Security Commission, established by the Secretary of Defense and the Director

of Central Intelligence, was convened twice to review U.S. security policies and procedures.

It issued reports on its work in 1994 and 1999.
B-285889

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

Service workload to the Office of Personnel Management. DOD also plans

to implement a new personnel security database with the capability of

providing accurate data on overdue reinvestigations.

DOD Is Formulating Plans

to Eliminate the Backlog

In a June 9, 1999, memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed

the services and Defense agencies to eliminate the backlog by the end of

fiscal year 2000 by ensuring that (1) all individuals had current clearances

in accordance with national standards or (2) all requests for reinvestigation

were submitted and in process. The memorandum also

• stated that, contrary to established practice, clearances were to be

administratively terminated or downgraded if they were not based upon

a current investigation or were not in process for a reinvestigation by

September 30, 2000;

• directed each service and agency to submit to the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) a

phased quarterly plan for eliminating the backlog in fiscal year 2000;

• directed the services and agencies to fund the additional costs of

eliminating the backlog from their existing budgets, acknowledging that

the costs of performing reinvestigations to eliminate the backlog had

not been planned; and

• called for shifting some Defense Security Service workload to the Office

of Personnel Management and to private sector investigative companies,

thereby expanding DOD’s investigative capacity.

Beginning in October 1999, DOD shifted all initial investigations and

reinvestigations (except overseas investigations) of its civilian personnel to

the Office of Personnel Management. Although this part of the Deputy

Secretary’s memorandum was implemented, analyses showed that the

services and other agencies were not submitting overdue reinvestigation

requests at the rate that was required to eliminate the backlog by

September 30, 2000. During fiscal year 2000, the services and Defense

agencies had planned to submit 505,786 overdue reinvestigation requests

(the same number estimated by the process team) plus 131,000 that were

becoming due. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence) and Defense Security Service analyses

of the first 7 months of fiscal year 2000 showed that the services and

agencies submitted only about 28 percent of the anticipated reinvestigation

requests from October 1999 through April 2000. The Defense Security

Service estimated that the submitted reinvestigation requests were only

about 34,000 more than the number of reinvestigations expected to become
B-285889

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

due during this period. On the basis of the backlog estimate, this would

indicate only a modest drop—about 7 percent—in overdue reinvestigations

not submitted for update. To meet the goal of eliminating the entire backlog

by September 30, 2000, the backlog should have been reduced by over

50 percent by the end of April.

According to officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), the services and

Defense agencies have not been implementing their plans primarily

because they have not budgeted the additional funds needed to cover the

costs of the increased workload and have not shifted funds from other

programs. Recognizing the problem, the Deputy Secretary of Defense

issued a memorandum on March 31, 2000, that superseded the June 9, 1999,

memorandum. The new memorandum

• extended the timeline for eliminating the backlog to March 31, 2002;

• directed that all secret and confidential initial investigations and

reinvestigations of military personnel be transferred to the Office of

Personnel Management to reduce the Defense Security Service’s

investigative workload; and

• stated that the Defense Security Service would continue to perform

overseas investigations, top secret initial investigations and

reinvestigations of military personnel, and all investigations and

reinvestigations of contractor personnel.

In a June 22, 2000, memorandum, the DOD Comptroller further discussed

DOD’s revised plan to address the backlog. This memorandum

• estimated that an additional $201.6 million was needed to pay for work

transferred to the Office of Personnel Management in fiscal years 2001

and 2002;

• directed the services and other components to (1) allocate funds from

existing resources (as per the Deputy Secretary’s June 9, 1999,

memorandum) to pay for investigations performed by both the Defense

Security Service and the Office of Personnel Management during fiscal

year 2001 and (2) include all investigation funding that would be

required for fiscal year 2002 in their budget submissions;

• directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence) to issue implementing guidance for

the revised plan within 60 days; and

• directed each service and component to (1) establish procedures for

monitoring and executing plans to eliminate the backlog and (2) appoint
B-285889

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

a senior official to monitor submissions of personnel security

investigations.

Neither memorandum issued in 2000 stated that clearances would be

canceled or downgraded if reinvestigations were not current or in process

by the new deadline. Thus, unlike the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s initial

June 9, 1999, memorandum, they did not provide the same incentive urging

security managers to submit future reinvestigation requests on time.

DOD Is Implementing a New

Personnel Security

Database

Officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,

Control, Communications, and Intelligence) told us that they are

overseeing implementation of a new DOD-wide personnel security

database system that, among other things, will have the capability to

provide current and accurate data on overdue reinvestigations. The system,

the Joint Personnel Adjudication System, is intended to consolidate all

critical DOD and service data systems involved in the security clearance

process and provide real-time input and retrieval of clearance-related

information by security managers throughout DOD. According to the

officials, local security managers will be responsible for ensuring that the

new data system contains each individual’s current required security

access level. Assuming that the data will be accurate and reliable, the

officials stated, the system will be able to provide current and accurate

information on the status of security clearances, including counts of

overdue reinvestigations. With this capability, DOD should no longer need

to expend resources to produce ad-hoc estimates of the backlog. The

officials said, however, they had not yet developed a framework that

specifies how and when the system’s periodic reinvestigation information

will be extracted and used to monitor program performance. The new data

system is scheduled to undergo initial operational testing beginning in

September 2000, with full implementation planned by late spring or

summer 2001.

Conclusions DOD does not have an accurate count of security clearances overdue for

reinvestigation because it (1) does not have an information system capable

of identifying all overdue security clearances, (2) used different means with

methodological limits to estimate the size of the backlog, and (3) used a

definition that excluded a significant portion of the backlog from its

estimates.
B-285889

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

DOD needs to know the full extent of its reinvestigation backlog, including

reinvestigations overdue but not yet submitted for reinvestigation and

those in process, to properly manage its reinvestigation program. DOD’s

planned Joint Personnel Adjudication System is intended to be capable of

providing DOD managers with more accurate projections of the full extent

of the backlog. However, to date, DOD has not specified how it plans to use

the information in this new personnel security database to help manage

this program or how it will ensure that data in the system is kept current.

Effective use of this database, once tested and validated, could allow DOD

to know the full extent of its backlog and enable it to better plan and

budget the investigative resources needed to effectively manage the

program. Routine reports displaying reinvestigation information would

facilitate more effective management and eliminate DOD’s inefficient

practice of estimating the backlog on an ad-hoc basis. However,

appropriate incentives, such as the downgrading or termination of an

individual’s clearance that is overdue for reinvestigation, must be in place

to ensure that the military services and Defense agencies keep information

in the database current and submit cases for reinvestigation on time.

Recommendations To improve the management of DOD’s personnel security reinvestigation

program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence) to

• design routine reports with key data from the Joint Personnel

Adjudication System database to show the full extent of overdue

reinvestigations, including those overdue but not yet submitted for

update and those in process and

• develop appropriate incentives to encourage agency security managers

to keep information in the database current and to submit

reinvestigation requests on time. Changes in existing regulations,

policies, and procedures may be necessary to provide such incentives.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the

contents of the report and concurred with the recommendations. DOD

stated that the Joint Personnel Adjudication System database will be linked

to databases at the Defense Security Service and the Office of Personnel

Management to track investigations in progress. This system will also be

used to provide reports on many personnel security clearance areas. While
B-285889

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

we believe that these actions should help, we believe that it is important

that DOD also identify the specific information related to the backlog that

will be provided and the time frames for the reports to ensure that this

problem is routinely monitored. DOD further stated that those personnel

who have not had a request for their periodic reinvestigation submitted to

the Office of Personnel Management or the Defense Security Service by

September 30, 2002, would have their security clearances downgraded or

canceled. This date corresponds to the planned completion of DOD’s most

recent effort to eliminate its reinvestigation backlog. To help minimize the

chances of future reinvestigation backlogs, it is important that DOD use

this or other similar incentives on a continuing basis.

DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also

provided technical comments that we incorporated.

Scope and

Methodology

We performed our work at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence); the Defense

Security Service; the Defense Manpower Data Center; and the headquarters

of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. At each site, we

interviewed cognizant officials and reviewed pertinent regulations and

documents. We also discussed the backlog and related audit work at the

Office of the DOD Inspector General. Because available information

indicated that overdue reinvestigations from other Defense agencies

comprised less than 5 percent of the total backlog, we did not visit any of

these agencies.

To determine how DOD estimates the backlog, we identified DOD’s recent

backlog estimates and discussed with DOD officials how the estimates

were made. We also documented DOD’s definition of the reinvestigation

backlog and discussed the reliability and usefulness of existing personnel

security databases in making backlog estimates.

To assess the soundness of DOD’s most recent backlog estimates, we

determined whether the methods used to develop the estimates were

reasonable, were applied consistently, and included all individuals with

overdue reinvestigations. We also discussed methodology details with a

MITRE representative who helped develop the MITRE estimate. Further,

we documented the reasons why many past DOD backlog estimates have

varied and are not directly comparable with each other. We did not verify

the accuracy of the data DOD used to develop the estimates.
B-285889

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

To identify DOD’s plans for addressing the backlog problem, we

interviewed officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) and the Defense

Security Service and reviewed past and present strategies to eliminate the

backlog. We also discussed with DOD officials their plans for implementing

a new personnel security database system, but we did not review the

development and acquisition process for the new system.

We conducted our review from March through July 2000 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Honorable William S.

Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the

Army; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable

F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and General James L. Jones,

Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to

appropriate congressional committees and others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call

Christine Fossett at (202) 512-2956 or me at (202) 512-5140. Major

contributors to this report were Gary Phillips, Jim Ellis, and Jack Edwards.

Sincerely yours,

Carol R. Schuster

Associate Director

National Security Preparedness Issues
Page 18 GAO/NSIASD-00-215 DOD Personnel

Appendix I

Estimates of DOD’s Periodic Reinvestigation Apendxies

Backlog ApendxiI

Various entities estimated the extent of DOD’s periodic reinvestigation

backlog in 1998 and 1999, as shown in the following table. To determine

whether an individual is overdue for a reinvestigation, DOD normally

considers the reinvestigation interval standard for the clearance access

level required to do the job. According to DOD officials, many individuals

are eligible for a higher clearance than required to do the job. Existing

databases always include the individual’s eligibility level, but they do not

always include the individual’s required access level. The last column in the

table shows which basis was used to determine the number of overdue

investigations.

a

Top secret (TS), including sensitive compartmented information. Secret (S). Confidential (C).

b

Estimate made by Personnel Security Overarching Integrated Process Team.

c

Estimate made by the Defense Security Service and its contractor, the MITRE Corporation.

d

The estimate was between 451,757 and 558,552 with a mean estimate of 505,155.

e

The estimate was between 64,790 and 81,685 with a mean estimate of 73,160.

f

Based on lapsed time since last investigation date.

g

Based on lapsed time since the individual’s case was adjudicated; that is, the date the decision was

made to grant the clearance.

Source of the estimate

Estimate

backlog size

Clearance

levelsa

Estimating

method

Backlog“as of”

date

Basis for determining

overdue

reinvestigations

Recent refined estimates

Process teamb 505,786 TS, S, C Head count Sept./Dec. 1999 Access

MITREc 505,155d TS, S Statistical survey June 1999 Access

Prior refined estimates

Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Command, Control,

Communications, and

Intelligence)

624,215 TS, S, C Head count Sept. 1999 Access, but eligibility was

used for many individuals

Joint Security Commission II 73,160e TS Statistical survey Oct. 1998 Access

Unrefined estimates

Defense Manpower Data

Center for the Defense

Security Service

992,231 TS, S, C Rough estimate/

existing

databases

June 1999 Access, if information was

in the database;

otherwise eligibility

Defense Manpower Data

Center for the Assistant

Secretary

868,943f

611,652g

TS, S, C Rough estimate/

existing

databases

Oct. 1998 Access, if information was

in the database;

otherwise eligibility
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

(702049) Letr Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-215 DOD Personnel
Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of

reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to

the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit

cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are

discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

Orders by visiting:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders by phone:

(202) 512-6000

fax: (202) 512-6061

TDD (202) 512-2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list

from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone

phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain

these lists.

Orders by Internet:

For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet,

send an e-mail message with “info” in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web home page at:

http://www.gao.gov

To Report Fraud,

Waste, or Abuse in

Federal Programs

Contact one:

• Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

• e-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

• 1-800-424-5454 (automated answering system)

United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00