alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Synenberg, 138 Ohio St.3d 1214, 2013-Ohio-5916.] 

IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF SYNENBERG. 

STATE v. UNTIED. 

[Cite as In re Disqualification of Synenberg, 138 Ohio St.3d 1214, 

2013-Ohio-5916.] 

Judges—Affidavit of disqualification—R.C. 2701.03—Affiant bears the burden of 

showing compliance with statutory filing deadline—Affidavit denied.

(No. 13-AP-118—Decided December 6, 2013.) 

ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Cuyahoga County Court of Common 

Pleas Case No. CR 13-575483. 

____________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant David M. Untied has filed an affidavit with the clerk of 

this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to disqualify Judge Joan Synenberg from 

presiding over any further proceedings in case No. CR13-575483, now pending 

for trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County. 

{¶ 2} Untied alleges that he has made eight “costly two hour one way 

trips” to Cleveland for scheduled hearings and conferences before Judge 

Synenberg, only to discover upon his arrival that the hearing was continued or 

that the judge refused to see him. In addition, Untied claims that Judge 

Synenberg has falsified the court’s journal and has refused his request to represent 

himself. According to Untied, the judge’s actions demonstrate her bias and 

prejudice against him. 

{¶ 3} Untied, however, filed his affidavit on Friday, December 6, 2013, 

and the trial in the underlying case is scheduled for Tuesday, December 10, 2013. 

Under R.C. 2701.03(B), an affidavit of disqualification must be filed “not less 

than seven calendar days before the day on which the next hearing in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

proceeding is scheduled.” This statutory deadline may be set aside only “when 

compliance with the provision is impossible,” such as when the alleged bias or 

prejudice occurs fewer than seven days before the hearing date or the case is 

scheduled or assigned to a judge within seven days of the next hearing. In re 

Disqualification of Leskovyansky, 88 Ohio St.3d 1210, 723 N.E.2d 1099 (1999). 

The affiant bears the burden of showing that he or she has complied with the 

statutory filing deadline. In re Disqualification of Eyster, 105 Ohio St.3d 1246, 

2004-Ohio-7350, 826 N.E.2d 304, ¶ 3. 

{¶ 4} Untied claims that he was prevented from filing his affidavit before 

the seven-day deadline because of the financial hardship caused by Judge 

Synenberg’s conduct. In addition, he alleges that he attempted to file the affidavit 

in person on the seventh day before trial, but his car broke down on the way to 

Columbus. Finally, Untied states that after his car problems, he had to prepare a 

new affidavit because he had not initially included a certificate of service, as 

required by R.C. 2701.03(B). 

{¶ 5} On this record, Untied has not set forth a sufficient basis for 

excusing his failure to comply with the seven-day requirement in R.C. 

2701.03(B). Accordingly, his affidavit of disqualification is dismissed as 

untimely. The case may proceed before Judge Synenberg. 

________________________
EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of CNE Group,  Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, George W.  Benoit,
Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350,  as adopted  pursuant  to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that:

            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

            (2) The information  contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.


                                                 /s/ George W. Benoit
                                                 --------------------
                                                 George W. Benoit
                                                 Chief Executive Officer

Date: August 12, 2005
§ 238.76 Waiting period. ( a ) *At expiration of period.* A proposed director or senior executive officer may begin service at the end of the 30-day period and any extension as provided under § 238.74 unless the Board or Reserve Bank notifies you that it has disapproved the notice before the end of the period.
( b ) *Prior to expiration of period.* A proposed director or senior executive officer may begin service before the end of the 30-day period and any extension as provided under section 238.74 of this section, if the Board or the Reserve Bank notifies in writing the savings and loan holding company or individual submitting the notice of the Board's or Reserve Bank's intention not to disapprove the notice.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>       5
<CIK>           0000794927
<NAME>          CANTERBURY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                            1
<CURRENCY>                          US DOLLARS
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                         1
       
<S>                                <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  NOV-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                     JUN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                       AUG-31-1998
<PERIOD-TYPE>                            9-MOS
<CASH>                                  80,482
<SECURITIES>                                 0
<RECEIVABLES>                        1,571,413
<ALLOWANCES>                                 0
<INVENTORY>                                  0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     6,071,387
<PP&E>                               6,291,389
<DEPRECIATION>                       3,834,069
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                      25,496,736
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                2,078,525
<BONDS>                                      0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0
<PREFERRED>                                  0
<COMMON>                                 6,068
<OTHER-SE>                          16,231,718
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>        25,496,736
<SALES>                              9,436,482
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                     9,436,482
<CGS>                                4,908,980
<TOTAL-COSTS>                        4,908,980
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                     4,262,313
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                     268,715
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        751,498
<INCOME-TAX>                           180,416
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                    571,082
<DISCONTINUED>                               0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              0
<CHANGES>                                    0
<NET-INCOME>                           571,082
<EPS-PRIMARY>                              .10
<EPS-DILUTED>                              .10
        

</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 October 28, 2013

d1021

Order 

Clerk

October 28, 2013

147291

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 147291

COA: 309303

Berrien CC: 2011-002807-FH

MELODY TYNETTE JONES,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 25, 2013 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the 

case of People v Earl (Docket No. 145677) is pending on appeal before this Court and 

that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for 

leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the 

decision in that case.
§ 263.14 Witness fees and expenses. ( a ) *In general.* A witness, including an expert witness, who testifies at a deposition or hearing will be paid the same fees for attendance and mileage as are paid in the United States district courts in proceedings in which the United States is a party, except as provided in paragraph (b) and unless otherwise waived.
( b ) *Exception for testimony by a party.* In the case of testimony by a party, no witness fees or mileage need to be paid. The Board will not be required to pay any fees to, or expenses of, any witness not subpoenaed by the Board.
( c ) *Timing of payment.* Fees and mileage in accordance with this paragraph (c)must be paid in advance by the party requesting the subpoena, except that fees and mileage need not be tendered in advance where the Board is the party requesting the subpoena.
# C_2020343EN.01001701.xml

| 15.10.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 343/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.10.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 343/17

---

State aid – Decision to raise no objections

(2020/C 343/13)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority raises no objections to the following state aid measure:

| Date of adoption of the decision | 6 July 2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Case No | 85 104 |
| Decision No | 086/20/COL |
| EFTA State | Norway |
| Title | COVID-19 Compensation scheme for losses in turnover in the media sector |
| Legal basis | The regulation on a temporary compensation scheme for editorial media with a loss in turnover caused by the COVID-19 outbreak |
| Type of measure | Scheme |
| Objective | The objective of the measure is to compensate beneficiaries for losses in turnover in media products caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. The measure aims at securing that Norwegian editorial media can maintain their activities |
| Budget | NOK 300 million |
| Duration | 8.7.2020 – 30.9.2020 |
| Economic sectors | Media sector |
| Name and address of the granting authority | The Norwegian Media Authority |
| Medietilsynet |
| Nygata 4 |
| N-1607 Fredrikstad |
| NORWAY |

Date of adoption of the decision

6 July 2020

Case No

85 104

Decision No

086/20/COL

EFTA State

Norway

Title

COVID-19 Compensation scheme for losses in turnover in the media sector

Legal basis

The regulation on a temporary compensation scheme for editorial media with a loss in turnover caused by the COVID-19 outbreak

Type of measure

Scheme

Objective

The objective of the measure is to compensate beneficiaries for losses in turnover in media products caused by the COVID-19 outbreak. The measure aims at securing that Norwegian editorial media can maintain their activities

Budget

NOK 300 million

Duration

8.7.2020 – 30.9.2020

Economic sectors

Media sector

Name and address of the granting authority

The Norwegian Media Authority

Medietilsynet

Nygata 4

N-1607 Fredrikstad

NORWAY

The authentic text of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found on the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/decisions/.

---
42062.

#### HOLLAND v. CITY OF CALHOUN.

*Hall, Deen and Quillian, JJ., concur.*

Decided January 24, 1967.

*Harbin M. King,*for appellant.

*T. L. Shanahan, Warren Akin,*for appellee.

Per Curiam.

The judgment of this court in *Holland v. City of Calhoun,*114 Ga. App. 51 (150 SE2d 155) having been reversed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in *City of Calhoun v. Holland,*222 Ga. 816 (152 SE2d 752), the judgment of this court is vacated, and the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this court.

*Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.*
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2009-1054

CARL J. CONFORTI

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE OCEAN GROUP, INC.

Defendant-Appellee,

and

TIMEX CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts

in case no. 06-CV-10513, Judge George A. O'Toole, Jr.

ON MOTION

Before LINN Circuit Judge.

ORDER

Carl J. Conforti moves for leave to file the appendix seven days out of time. The

Ocean Group, Inc. and Timex Corporation each object.

The Ocean Group and Timex state that the appendix submitted by Conforti does

not comply with the pagination provided to them by Conforti, rendering their appendix

citations inaccurate. The Ocean Group and Timex state that they are attempting to

resolve the pagination issues with Conforti.

Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1)	The motion for leave to file the appendix out of time is held in abeyance.
(2)	Conforti is directed to provide a status report to the court within 14 days of

the date of filing of this order concerning the status of the parties' efforts to resolve the

dispute concerning pagination. The Ocean Group and Timex may also respond within

that time.

FOR THE COURT

MAY -1 2009 /s/ Jan Horbalv

Date Jan Horbaly

Clerk U.S. F

EDERAL RilFEACI FOR THE	

CIRQuIT

cc:	Brett N. Dorny, Esq.

Raymond M. Mehler, Esq.

Robert D. Fine, Esq.

s17

MAY -1 2009

JAN HORBALY

CLERK

2009-1054	2
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Department of Energy Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission hereby gives notice that members of its staff may attend the meeting noted below. Their attendance is part of the Commission's ongoing outreach efforts. Entergy Regional State Committee Meeting October 12, 2009 (12 p.m.-5 p.m.), Astor Crown Plaza Hotel, 739 Canal St., New Orleans, LA 70130, 504-962-0500. *The discussions may address matters at issue in the following proceedings:* Docket No. OA08-59
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. OA08-61
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. OA08-149
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. OA09-27
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. EL00-66
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. EL01-88
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. EL05-15
Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Entergy Arkansas, Inc.Docket No. EL07-52
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. EL08-51
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. EL08-59
ConocoPhillips v. Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. EL09-43
Arkansas Public Service Commission v. Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. EL09-61
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. EL09-78
South Mississippi Electric Power Association v. Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER05-1065
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER07-682
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER07-956
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER08-767
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER08-1056
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER08-1057
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER09-636
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER09-659
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER09-833
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER09-877
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER09-882
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER09-1180
Entergy Services, Inc.Docket No. ER09-1214
Entergy Services, Inc.
 These meetings are open to the public. For more information, contact Patrick Clarey, Office of Energy Market Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at (317) 249-5937 or 
                    *patrick.clarey@ferc.gov*. Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary.


[FR Doc. E9-24574 Filed 10-13-09; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
§ 3.44 Securitization exposures to which the SSFA and gross-up approach do not apply. ( a ) *General requirement.* A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 1,250 percent risk weight to all securitization exposures to which the national bank or Federal savings association does not apply the SSFA or the gross-up approach under § 3.43, except as set forth in this section.
( b ) *Eligible ABCP liquidity facilities.* A national bank or Federal savings association may determine the risk-weighted asset amount of an eligible ABCP liquidity facility by multiplying the exposure amount by the highest risk weight applicable to any of the individual underlying exposures covered by the facility.
( c ) *A securitization exposure in a second loss position or better to an ABCP program* — ( 1 ) *Risk weighting.* A national bank or Federal savings association may determine the risk-weighted asset amount of a securitization exposure that is in a second loss position or better to an ABCP program that meets the requirements of paragraph (c)(2) of this section by multiplying the exposure amount by the higher of the following risk weights: ( i ) 100 percent; and
( ii ) The highest risk weight applicable to any of the individual underlying exposures of the ABCP program.
( 2 ) *Requirements.* ( i ) The exposure is not an eligible ABCP liquidity facility;
( ii ) The exposure must be economically in a second loss position or better, and the first loss position must provide significant credit protection to the second loss position;
( iii ) The exposure qualifies as investment grade; and
( iv ) The national bank or Federal savings association holding the exposure must not retain or provide protection to the first loss position.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should

not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED January 26, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-30817 Summary Calendar

JANET PIPPINS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus TANGIPAHOA PARISH COUNCIL; GORDON BURGESS, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Duly Elected Tangipahoa Parish President, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (USDC No. 2:03-CV-1334)

_________________________________________________________ Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * The judgment is affirmed for the following reasons: 1. We essentially agree with the analysis of the district court as set forth in the2

magistrate judge’s Order and Reasons. 2. For the Louisiana whistleblower statute, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:967 (West 1998), to apply, the employer must have committed a violation of state law. Puig v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm’n , 772 So.2d 842, 845 (La. Ct. App. 2000). The policy decision of the parish to limit animal cruelty investigations by the animal control department to pets, and to leave livestock cruelty investigations to other law enforcement officials with concurrent jurisdiction over such investigations, was not illegal or a violation of state law. 3. Summary judgment was also warranted on the Title VII sex discrimination claim. The district court did not misunderstand or misapply the law governing such claims. Assuming that appellant Pippins established a prima facie case, the defendants offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate if the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of pretext under the summary judgment standard. See Price v. Federal Express Corp. , 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, a showing that the defendant’s proffered justifications for the employment decision were rejected in part does not necessarily preclude summary judgment. Id. “Once a Title VII claim reaches the pretext stage, the only question on summary judgment is whether there is a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question regarding discrimination.” Haynes v. Pennzoil Co. , 207 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2000) . We agree with the district court that Pippins did not present sufficient evidence of pretext for a rational jury to decide this case in her favor by finding3

that her termination was due to her gender. The evidence of sexual discriminations was limited to the prima facie proof that a man replaced her, while the evidence that she was fired for other reasons, including her failure to keep the department within its budget and the failure to follow the parish policy regarding livestock, was relatively so substantial that a rational jury could not find on this record that Pippins was terminated for discriminatory reasons.
AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3105 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3105

                   For the relief of Elvira Arellano.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 16, 2003

Mr. Gutierrez introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
                   For the relief of Elvira Arellano.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR ELVIRA ARELLANO.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for 
purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Elvira Arellano shall 
be eligible for issuance of an immigrant visa or for adjustment of 
status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
upon filing an application for issuance of an immigrant visa under 
section 204 of such Act or for adjustment of status to lawful permanent 
resident.
    (b) Adjustment of Status.--If Elvira Arellano enters the United 
States before the filing deadline specified in subsection (c), she 
shall be considered to have entered and remained lawfully and shall, 
notwithstanding any provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
be eligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the such Act 
as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Deadline for Application and Payment of Fees.--Subsections (a) 
and (b) shall apply only if the application for issuance of an 
immigrant visa or the application for adjustment of status is filed 
with appropriate fees within 2 years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
    (d) Reduction of Immigrant Visa Number.--Upon the granting of an 
immigrant visa or permanent residence to Elvira Arellano, the Secretary 
of State shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 1, during the 
current or next following fiscal year, the total number of immigrant 
visas that are made available to natives of the country of the alien's 
birth under section 203(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act or, 
if applicable, the total number of immigrant visas that are made 
available to natives of the country of the alien's birth under section 
202(e) of such Act.
                                 <all>
```