United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight 

of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE 

Additional Steps 

Needed to Take 

Advantage of Federal 

Executive Boards’ 

Ability to Contribute 

to Emergency 

Operations 

May 2007 

 

GAO-07-515 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2007

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE 

Additional Steps Needed to Take 

Advantage of Federal Executive Boards’ 

Ability to Contribute to Emergency 

Operations 

Highlights of GAO-07-515, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

OPM, which provides direction to 

the FEBs, is now emphasizing that

in the post-9/11 environment, the 

boards have a transformed

emergency support role. The report 

discusses the boards’ emergency 

preparedness roles and 

responsibilities and their potential 

role in preparing for and 

responding to pandemic influenza. 

GAO selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for 

review because they coordinate the 

greatest number of federal 

employees or had recent

emergency management

experience. 

What GAO Recommends

Particularly given the threat of

pandemic influenza, GAO

recommends that the Director of

OPM discuss with FEMA and other 

stakeholders the feasibility of 

integrating FEBs in national

emergency plans. In completing the 

FEB strategic plan, OPM should 

also establish accountability for the

boards’ emergency support 

activities and develop a proposal to

address the uncertainty of funding

sources for the boards. While not 

commenting specifically on the

recommendations, OPM said it is 

building a business case through 

which to address the resources

FEBs need to continue operations 

and that institutionalized

relationships with partners such as

FEMA can help address funding 

issues. FEMA said that it welcomed 

the opportunity to work with OPM 

to formally define the FEB role in 

emergency planning and response.

Located outside Washington, D.C., in 28 cities with a large federal presence, 

the federal executive boards (FEB) are interagency coordinating groups 

designed to strengthen federal management practices, improve 

intergovernmental relations, and participate as a unified federal force in 

local civic affairs. Created by a Presidential Directive in 1961, the boards are

composed of the federal field office agency heads and military commanders 

in their cities. Although membership by agency heads on the boards is 

required, active participation is voluntary in practice. The boards generally

have staff of one or two full-time personnel, including an executive director. 

The FEBs have no congressional charter and receive no congressional 

appropriation but rather rely on voluntary contributions from their member 

agencies. Although the boards are not intended to be first responders, the 

regulations that guide the FEBs state that emergency operations is one of 

their functions. 

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the FEBs have 

designated emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety as a 

core function of the boards and are continuing to work on a strategic 

plan that will include a common set of performance standards for their 

emergency support activities. All of the selected FEBs were performing 

emergency activities, such as organizing preparedness training, and FEB 

representatives and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

officials reported that these activities mutually advanced their missions. 

The FEBs, however, face key challenges in carrying out their emergency

support role. First, their role is not defined in national emergency plans. 

According to several FEMA officials, FEBs could carry out their emergency

support role more effectively if it was included in national emergency 

management plans. The framework within which the FEBs operate with 

member agencies and OPM also poses challenges in holding the boards 

accountable for their emergency support function. In addition, the funding 

sources for the boards are uncertain, affecting their ability to plan for and 

commit to providing emergency support services. 

 

Despite these challenges, the nature of pandemic influenza, which presents 

different concerns than localized natural disasters, makes the FEBs a 

particularly valuable asset in pandemic preparedness and response. Many of 

the selected boards had already hosted pandemic preparedness events, 

which included their member agencies and local community organizations.

With the greatest burden of pandemic response resting on the local 

communities, the FEBs’ outreach and their ability to coordinate across 

organizations suggest that they may be an important resource in preparing 

for and responding to a pandemic. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-515.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Bernice 

Steinhardt at (202) 512-6806 or 

steinhardtb@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

FEB Emergency Preparedness and Response Roles and 

Responsibilities Are Being Developed as a Core Function of the 

Boards 8

The FEBs Face Key Challenges in Providing Emergency Support 

Services 17

The Nature of Pandemic Influenza May Make the FEBs a 

Particularly Valuable Asset in Pandemic Preparedness and 

Response 27

Conclusions 35

Recommendations for Executive Action 36 

Agency Comments 37 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 39 

Appendix II Office of Personnel Management Document Describing 

the FEB Role and Responsibilities in Emergency 

Situations 41 

Appendix III FEBs’ Host Agencies 42 

Appendix IV Comments from the Office of Personnel Management 43 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45 

 

Table 

Table 1: Number of Federal Employees and Agencies Served by 

Each FEB in Descending Order of Employees Served 23 

Page i GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Figures 

Figure 1: Location of the 28 FEBs 7 

Figure 2: Jurisdictional Boundaries of the 28 FEBs 22 

Figure 3: Participants in Two Minnesota FEB Pandemic Tabletop 

Exercises 32

Abbreviations 

AMEM Association of Minnesota Emergency Managers 

APC Advanced Pharmaceutical Cache 

COOP continuity of operations 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FEB federal executive board 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

GETS Government Emergency Telecommunications Service 

GSA General Services Administration 

HCLMSA Human Capital Leadership and Merit System Accountability 

JFO joint field office 

JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office 

NARA National Archives and Records Administration 

ONSC Office of National Security Coordination 

OPM Office of Personnel Management 

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Page ii GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 4, 2007

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

Chairman 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

 the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

Chairman 

The Honorable George V. Voinovich

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

 the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

In an April 2004 report on opportunities to improve federal continuity 

planning, we concluded that federal executive boards (FEB) are uniquely

positioned to improve coordination of emergency preparedness efforts in 

areas outside of Washington, D.C.1

 Located in 28 cities with a large federal

presence, the FEBs are interagency coordinating groups designed to 

strengthen federal management practices, improve intergovernmental 

relations, and participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. 

The membership of each board is made up of the highest ranking federal

agency officials in the FEB service area. The regulations that guide FEB 

operations state that the boards shall be responsible for emergency 

operations, such as those under hazardous weather conditions; responding 

to blood donation needs; and communicating related leave policies.2

 Much 

of the FEB emergency operations responsibility in the past has been 

providing advisories regarding hazardous weather conditions to member 

agency leaders and providing a forum in which agency leaders could make 

informed decisions about office closings affecting their employees. The 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which provides direction to the 

boards, is now emphasizing that in the post-9/11 environment the FEBs 

have a transformed role that encompasses elements of emergency 

preparedness, employee security, and continuity of operations. Although 

the boards are not intended to be first responders, we recommended in the 

2004 report that OPM should determine the desired role for the FEBs in 

improving coordination of emergency preparedness efforts and identify 

and address FEB capacity issues to meet that role. 

In an April 2004 report on opportunities to improve federal continuity 

planning, we concluded that federal executive boards (FEB) are uniquely

positioned to improve coordination of emergency preparedness efforts in 

areas outside of Washington, D.C.

 

1

 Located in 28 cities with a large federal

presence, the FEBs are interagency coordinating groups designed to 

strengthen federal management practices, improve intergovernmental 

relations, and participate as a unified federal force in local civic affairs. 

The membership of each board is made up of the highest ranking federal

agency officials in the FEB service area. The regulations that guide FEB 

operations state that the boards shall be responsible for emergency 

operations, such as those under hazardous weather conditions; responding 

to blood donation needs; and communicating related leave policies.2

 Much 

of the FEB emergency operations responsibility in the past has been 

providing advisories regarding hazardous weather conditions to member 

agency leaders and providing a forum in which agency leaders could make 

informed decisions about office closings affecting their employees. The 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which provides direction to the 

boards, is now emphasizing that in the post-9/11 environment the FEBs 

have a transformed role that encompasses elements of emergency 

preparedness, employee security, and continuity of operations. Although 

the boards are not intended to be first responders, we recommended in the 

2004 report that OPM should determine the desired role for the FEBs in 

improving coordination of emergency preparedness efforts and identify 

and address FEB capacity issues to meet that role. 

1

GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities to Improve Federal Continuity Planning

Guidance, GAO-04-384 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2004).

2

5 C.F.R. § 960.107 (c) (6). 

Page 1 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Determining the FEB role in emergency operations is particularly 

challenging given that the boards operate with no independent authority 

and with resources voluntarily provided by member agencies. The boards

depend on a host agency, generally the agency with the greatest number of 

employees in the area, to provide staff of usually one or two full-time 

personnel, including an executive director. The FEBs also rely on their 

hosts and other member agencies for operating expenses. Important to 

emergency preparedness, one of the FEB functions includes building 

relationships with state and local organizations to promote federal 

involvement within their communities. 

Emergency preparedness efforts involve dealing with the full range of 

emergencies, including natural and man-made disasters. Attention has 

focused on pandemic influenza, a real and significant threat facing the 

United States and the rest of the world. Influenza pandemics occur when a 

novel influenza virus emerges that can be effectively transmitted between 

humans who have little immunity to it. The last three pandemics in the 

20th century occurred in 1918, 1957, and 1968, and killed approximately 40 

million, 2 million, and 1 million people worldwide, respectively. Although 

the timing of the next pandemic is unpredictable, there is widespread 

agreement that an influenza pandemic will occur at some point. A 

pandemic is not a singular event, but is likely to come in waves, each

lasting months, and pass through communities of all sizes across the 

nation and the world simultaneously. A pandemic could threaten society 

and the economy by removing essential personnel, including federal 

government employees, from the workplace for weeks or months. 

To obtain a better understanding of the roles, responsibilities, and 

capacities of selected FEBs for emergency operations, particularly in the 

event of pandemic influenza, you asked us to (1) identify the actions FEBs 

have taken to fulfill their emergency preparedness and response roles and 

responsibilities, (2) describe the key challenges facing the FEBs in 

fulfilling these roles and responsibilities, and (3) evaluate the extent to 

which the FEBs can contribute to emergency preparedness and response 

to pandemic influenza. 

To address our objectives, we selected 14 FEBs for our study. The selected

FEBs are Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Denver, 

Los Angeles, Minnesota, New Orleans, New York City, Oklahoma, 

Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle. These FEBs were selected 

because they coordinate the greatest number of federal employees or have

recent experience with specific emergency management events. We 

obtained and reviewed FEB documents, such as annual reports, monthly 

Page 2 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
activity reports, minutes, and correspondence, and interviewed at least 

two key FEB representatives from each selected board, including the chair 

or vice chair and executive director. We also had discussions with and 

obtained pertinent documentation from officials at OPM and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at their headquarters in 

Washington, D.C. Because the FEBs and FEMA collaborate closely on 

continuity of operations (COOP) activities in the field, we also interviewed 

the FEMA regional directors in regions V and VI based in Chicago, Illinois, 

and Denton, Texas, respectively.3

 In addition, we reviewed academic 

literature and prior GAO reports about leveraging collaborative networks. 

We conducted our review in the 14 case study FEB cities and Washington, 

D.C., from March 2006 through February 2007 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Detailed information 

on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I. 

OPM and the FEBs are developing a strategic plan for the boards that will 

establish emergency preparedness, security, and employee safety as a core 

FEB function with a common set of expectations for the boards’ 

emergency activities. This strategic plan should more fully ensure that the 

federal employees located in the FEB service areas receive the needed

level of emergency support. OPM officials recognize that the FEBs can add 

value to regional preparedness efforts as vehicles for communication, 

coordination, and capacity building but acknowledge that the emergency 

support activities provided by the FEBs vary. However, all of the selected

boards were involved in emergency activities such as disseminating 

emergency preparedness information, serving as federal liaisons for state 

and local emergency management officials, and organizing preparedness 

training. Officials from FEMA, which provides guidance and assistance for 

COOP planning across the executive branch, and almost all of the 

executive directors or chairs from the selected boards cited a positive and 

beneficial working relationship. In addition, although not all of the FEB 

representatives felt this was a responsibility the boards should assume, 

some of the selected boards have played a role in responding to 

emergencies in the past. For example, the Oklahoma FEB staff played a 

role in helping first responders locate building occupants after the 

April 19, 1995, bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. 

Results in Brief 

 3

COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies to ensure that the capability exists to 

continue essential agency functions across a wide range of potential emergencies. 

Page 3 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
The FEBs face several key challenges in providing support for the nation’s 

emergency preparedness and response efforts. First, the FEB role in 

supporting the nation’s emergency response structure is not developed or 

identified in federal emergency guidance and plans. According to several 

FEMA officials, including the FEBs in a formal role within federal 

emergency structures would help the boards carry out their emergency 

support role more effectively by identifying and communicating the value 

the boards can add to emergency support. In addition, the framework 

under which the boards operate poses accountability challenges. Although 

OPM is responsible for providing program direction and oversight to the 

boards, many of the FEB representatives said OPM cannot provide 

sufficient leadership and feedback to 28 boards with its one-person FEB 

program office. Also, aligning performance expectations for the FEB 

executive directors consistent with OPM direction was hampered by the 

fact that the executive directors report to a host agency and are usually 

subject to that agency’s rating and performance management system. 

Finally, the differing sizes of the FEB service areas and their funding and 

resource levels, coupled with the voluntary nature of their funding 

structure, affect the capacities of the boards to support emergency 

preparedness. The Los Angeles FEB, for example, primarily serves a sixcounty area in the immediate vicinity of Los Angeles with approximately 

120,000 federal employees, yet the executive director noted that its staffing 

is similar to FEBs covering much smaller areas and numbers of employees 

and agencies. With FEB resources dependent on the continued willingness 

of the host agency and other member agencies to contribute, several of the

executive directors from the selected boards said it was difficult to plan 

and commit to providing emergency support services. Many of the FEB 

representatives from the selected boards expressed concern that their 

activities will be further affected by reduced agency funding and resource 

support as agency budgets grow more constrained. 

Despite these FEB challenges, the nature of an influenza pandemic makes 

the boards a particularly valuable asset in planning for and responding to a 

national disaster of this nature. Unlike a localized disaster, such as a 

hurricane or earthquake, for which national resources can be mobilized 

and deployed to assist in the disaster response, pandemic influenza will be 

largely addressed by the resources available to each community it affects. 

In the current pandemic planning stages, many of the selected FEBs were 

already using their community relationships to facilitate communication 

and coordination with local federal agency leaders and state and local 

governments. These FEBs were also building capacity for pandemic 

influenza response within their member agencies and community 

organizations through hosting pandemic influenza training and exercises. 

Page 4 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
For example, 13 of the 14 selected FEBs were involved in pandemicrelated activities that ranged from sponsoring informational briefings to 

coordinating pandemic exercises. The Minnesota FEB hosted a pandemic 

influenza exercise in October 2006 that included approximately 180 

participants from 100 organizations within federal agencies, state and local 

government, and the private sector. Given their knowledge of the federal

agencies within their jurisdictions, during pandemic influenza FEBs have 

the potential to provide a forum to inform the decisions of member agency

leaders and emergency coordinators, similar to what the boards provide 

for other hazards. Additionally, several of the selected FEBs were 

considering how they could support the federal workforce during 

pandemic influenza and provide assistance in coordinating resources to 

federal agencies responding to the pandemic. 

This report contains four recommendations to the Director of OPM to 

work with the FEBs and FEMA to improve the capacity of the boards to 

enhance their emergency support services. OPM and FEMA should 

formalize the FEBs’ contribution to FEMA’s emergency preparedness 

efforts, and OPM should initiate discussion with the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) and other responsible stakeholders to 

determine the feasibility of integrating the FEB emergency support 

responsibilities into the established emergency response framework. In 

addition, OPM should also continue to work on a common set of 

performance standards for emergency support responsibilities across the 

FEB system, for which the boards will be held accountable. As part of the 

FEB strategic planning process, OPM should also develop a proposal for 

alternative funding mechanisms to help ensure that the FEBs can provide 

the appropriate level of emergency support for the federal workforce. 

We provided a draft of the report to the Director of OPM and to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security. We received written comments from 

OPM, which are included in appendix IV. While not commenting 

specifically on the recommendations, OPM stated that it understands the 

importance of the issues raised in the report. By documenting results and 

creating a consistent accountability mechanism, and through 

institutionalized relationships with strategic partners like FEMA, OPM 

believes that it is building a strong business case through which it can

address the resources FEBs need to continue operations. In comments 

received from FEMA by e-mail, FEMA concurred with the findings of the 

report and welcomed the opportunity to work with OPM to develop a 

memorandum of understanding that more formally defines the FEB role in 

emergency planning and response. 

Page 5 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
FEBs were established by a Presidential Directive in 1961 to improve 

coordination among federal activities and programs outside Washington,

D.C. The boards’ overall mission includes supporting and promoting 

national initiatives and responding to the local needs of federal agencies 

and their communities. They provide a point of coordination for the 

development and operation of federal programs having common 

characteristics. Approximately 85 percent of all federal employees work 

outside the greater Washington, D.C., area, and the number of FEBs has 

grown from 10 to 28 over the past 46 years. When President Kennedy 

established the FEBs, they were located in the major cities in each of the 

10 Civil Service Commission administrative regions. He later added 2 more

boards, while President Johnson authorized 3 more, President Nixon 

added 10, and President Ford added 1. Two more boards were added by 

OPM in the 1990s bringing the total number of boards to 28. Figure 1 

shows the metropolitan areas where the 28 boards are located.

4

Background 

 4

Federal executive associations or federal executive councils may be located in places 

where FEBs do not exist. They have purposes and objectives similar to those of the FEBs, 

although they do not function within the same formal set of parameters as FEBs (e.g., they 

are not officially established by Presidential Memorandum nor do they receive policy 

direction and guidance from OPM). 

Page 6 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Figure 1: Location of the 28 FEBs 

According to the regulations that guide the FEBs, the Director of OPM is 

responsible for overseeing and directing the operations of all of the FEBs 

consistent with the law and with the directives of the President. The 

boards are composed of the federal field office agency heads and military 

commanders in their cities, and the regulations state that each FEB should 

have a chair elected by the FEB members to serve a term not to exceed a 

year. The regulations also state that the boards should be governed by 

bylaws or other rules for their internal governance that are developed for 

each board. Although through Presidential Directive FEB membership is 

mandatory for the senior agency officials within the FEB’s geographic 

Page 7 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
boundaries, the boards have no independent authority and they rely on the 

voluntary cooperation of their members to accomplish their goals. 

The FEB funding structure is unusual within the federal government. The 

boards have no legislative charter and receive no congressional 

appropriation. Rather, each FEB is supported by a host agency, usually the 

agency with the greatest number of employees in the region. These host 

agencies provide varying levels of staffing, usually one or two full-time 

positions—an executive director and an executive assistant. Some 

agencies also temporarily detail employees to the FEB staff to assist their 

local boards and to provide developmental opportunities for their 

employees. Additionally, the FEBs are supported by member agencies 

through contribution of funds as well as in-kind support, such as office 

space, personal computers, telephone lines, and Internet access.5

 In 2006, 

OPM estimated the cost of FEB operations at approximately $6 million. 

To assist in standardizing emergency activities across the FEB system, 

OPM and the FEBs are establishing an emergency preparedness, security, 

and employee safety set of activities with performance measures that will 

be common to all of the boards. Although this effort is not completed, all 

of the selected FEBs were doing some emergency activities, such as 

hosting emergency preparedness training and exercises. For example, 

FEMA officials and the FEB representatives reported working together, 

often with the General Services Administration (GSA), on COOP training 

and exercises. In the past, some of the selected FEBs also played a role in

responding to emergencies, although not all of the FEB representatives 

felt this was an appropriate activity for the boards. 

FEB Emergency 

Preparedness and 

Response Roles and 

Responsibilities Are 

Being Developed as a 

Core Function of the 

Boards 

 5

For a time, under a governmentwide restriction against interagency financing of boards,

commissions, or other groups, interagency financing of FEBs was prohibited, including 

both cash and in-kind financial support. See, 67 Comp. Gen. 27 (1987). However, beginning

in 1996, Congress exempted FEBs from this restriction. Omnibus Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 613, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-356 (1996). 

Page 8 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
OPM and the FEBs are developing a multiyear strategic plan that will 

include a core function for the FEBs called emergency preparedness, 

security, and employee safety. The plan will include expectations and 

measures to assess how well each FEB is performing the activities. OPM 

has reported working with the boards on emergency planning issues since 

2001, and in March 2004, a document summarizing the FEB role in 

emergency situations was finalized. The boards’ emergency support 

responsibilities include elements such as serving as a federal liaison 

between state and local emergency officials, establishing notification 

networks and interagency emergency preparedness councils, and hosting 

emergency preparedness exercises for agencies. A complete list of the 

FEB emergency support responsibilities detailed in the 2004 document can 

be found in appendix II. According to an OPM official, designating 

emergency support as a core function of the FEBs will further enhance the 

FEB role in emergency situations. OPM officials recognize that the FEBs 

can add value to regional preparedness efforts as vehicles for 

communication, coordination, and capacity building but acknowledge that 

the emergency activities of the FEBs have varied from board to board. The

emergency support function is intended to provide consistent delivery of

FEB emergency preparedness and response programs and activities for 

the federal workforce across the system of 28 boards. 

OPM and the FEBs 

Continue to Work on a 

Common Set of 

Performance Standards for 

FEB Emergency Support 

Activities

Not all of the representatives from the selected FEBs were convinced that

the boards should have an expanded emergency service support role. 

Although all of the selected boards had some type of emergency 

communication network and emergency preparedness council in place, 

there was disagreement among the FEB representatives on the role the 

FEBs should play in emergency service support, particularly during an 

emergency. Without adequate staff and resources, some of the executive 

directors expressed concern that they will not be able to meet 

expectations. One executive director, for example, noted that because her 

local board lacked 24/7 communication and coordination abilities, it could 

not be held accountable for emergency service roles and responsibilities. 

Another executive director commented that there was a general 

expectation within the board’s metropolitan federal community that the 

FEB will assume a significant leadership role during a possible future 

emergency. However, he observed that limited and declining funding does 

not provide for an effective communication system. As a consequence, he

felt this expectation was unrealistic and may contribute to major 

misunderstandings in the event of a significant emergency. 

On the other hand, several of the executive directors felt that the FEBs 

would be able to accomplish much more in this area with additional 

Page 9 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
resources. For example, one executive director, with an emergency 

operations background, emphasized that if the boards were given 

dependable funding and increased stature within the federal government 

by formal recognition of their emergency support role, their return on 

investment in terms of emergency support functions would be substantial.

In general, the consensus among those who viewed the FEBs as having an

increased role in emergency operations was that with dependable funding

and resources, all the boards in the FEB system could and should provide 

a similar level of emergency operations support. Several FEB

representatives also stated that OPM leadership and direction in clearly

outlining emergency operations expectations and OPM’s oversight of these 

activities would diminish uncertainty about the boards’ role in emergency 

support, both among the boards and federal agencies in general. They 

were encouraged by the designation of emergency services as a core FEB 

function. 

All of the Selected FEBs 

Were Performing Some 

Emergency Activities 

The FEBs are charged with providing timely and relevant information to 

support emergency preparedness and response coordination, and OPM 

expects the boards to establish notification networks and communications 

plans to be used in emergency and nonemergency situations. The boards

are also expected to disseminate relevant information received from OPM 

and other agencies regarding emergency preparedness information and to

relay local emergency situation information to parties such as OPM, FEB 

members, media, and state and local government authorities. FEB 

representatives generally viewed the boards as an important 

communications link between Washington and the field and among field 

agencies. For example, the Atlanta FEB’s executive director described the

boards as a conduit for both emergency and nonemergency information to 

member agencies through e-mail, telephone, and Web sites. While many of 

the items needing dissemination are also passed through normal agency

channels, several FEB representatives noted that it usually takes longer 

for communication to be received through their agency headquarters than 

through the FEB channel. The Oklahoma FEB chair described the FEBs as 

central depositories that receive information from headquarters and 

quickly disseminate that information to the field, reducing the information 

gap between Washington, D.C., and the rest of the country. 

Previously, much of the emergency support responsibility of FEBs was in

providing communication regarding hazardous and inclement weather 

conditions. Almost all of the selected FEBs reported this as an emergency 

activity for which they continue to have responsibility. For example, the 

Atlanta FEB executive director said that during potential weather 

Page 10 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
emergencies, she and members of the Policy and Steering Committee from 

GSA and the National Weather Service gather information about the 

forecast and road conditions. The executive director, FEB chair, and 

members of the Policy and Steering Committee then conduct a 4:00 a.m. 

conference call to make a decision about suggested agency closings or 

delayed reporting. Following the conference call, the FEB executive

director posts a message on the board’s emergency hazard line that 

designated agency employees can check. This message is also posted to 

the FEB general telephone line and the FEB Web site. Several of the 

executive directors emphasized that they can only make recommendations 

to the federal agencies in their areas of service, but they cannot mandate 

that federal agencies close for weather or other emergencies.

Although each of the selected boards we reviewed reported conducting 

communications activities as a key part of its emergency support service,

they used a number of different types of communication systems. The 

Boston FEB, for example, operates two electronic communications 

mechanisms to be in contact with senior federal agency officials during 

local and national emergencies, both during and after hours. The first is an 

Internet portal, developed and maintained by the DHS Federal Protective 

Service, which is designed to provide senior agency officials access to upto-date information, such as threat assessments and emergency weather.

The second communications system is called EDIAL, housed and 

maintained by the First U.S. Coast Guard District’s 24-hour command 

system. EDIAL, funded for the FEB by GSA New England, enables the 

board to communicate with agency officials simultaneously via an 

electronic telephone message in times of emergency. Several of the 

executive directors mentioned the importance of having access to the 

Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) cards, a 

White House-directed emergency phone service. GETS provides 

emergency preparedness personnel a high probability of completion for 

their phone calls when the probability of completing a call through normal 

channels is significantly decreased. The majority of the selected boards 

reported keeping an emergency contact list for officials in their member 

agencies. 

Several of the executive directors emphasized the importance of 

standardizing the communications systems of the boards so that every 

FEB is communicating in the same way. The communication abilities 

among the selected FEBs did vary, often dependent on the communication 

system provided by a supporting agency. For example, the Atlanta FEB 

reported previously using an emergency call-down system supplied by the 

Atlanta U.S. District Court, but the system was too slow. The executive

Page 11 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
director there said she was exploring the possibility of transferring to the 

Southwestern Emergency Response Network, which would give her 

greater capacity to notify area agencies in emergency situations. A 

complaint about many of the FEB communication systems was that they 

were slow or needed to be manually updated. The Dallas-Fort Worth FEB 

executive director noted that with the boards becoming more of a national

network and serving as backups to one another, the importance of a fully 

supported national communication network for the FEBs is becoming 

even more evident. 

According to OPM, the FEB role in emergency service support also 

includes coordination activities. For example, OPM reported that it 

expects the boards to serve as federal liaisons for state and local 

emergency officials and to assess local emergency situations in 

cooperation with federal, state, and local officials. Although all of the 

boards reported some involvement of state and local officials in their 

emergency activities, the degree of board connections with state and local 

officials varied. The Minnesota FEB and the Oklahoma FEB, for example, 

reported strong relationships with state and local government officials, 

state and local emergency management leaders, and private sector 

businesses. The Dallas-Fort Worth FEB executive director reported that 

the board partners with state and local government representatives, the 

private sector, law enforcement, and first responders, all of which are key 

players in assessing local emergency situations. On the other hand, the 

Chicago FEB executive director said that because Chicago is so large, the 

board has few established relationships with state and local officials. The 

chair of the Boston FEB said its board had 24-hour contact numbers for 

some state officials but not city officials. 

In terms of coordination, the FEBs are also charged with identifying a core

group of federal leaders in each community to discuss planned courses of

action, such as delayed arrival and shelter in place, in the event of an 

emergency. All of the selected boards had some type of emergency

preparedness council. In the case of the Los Angeles FEB, however, the 

emergency preparedness committee had to disband because of significant 

transportation challenges in the Los Angeles area. The board’s executive 

director said they now have an emergency preparedness e-mail group. In 

addition, OPM expects the boards to provide problem resolution 

assistance as appropriate, to include identifying federal resources that may 

be available to assist the community in responding to, or recovering from, 

an emergency. Examples of some of the selected boards’ past responses 

during emergencies are detailed in a section below. 

Page 12 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
OPM expects the FEBs in their capacity-building role to facilitate training 

for member agencies regarding their responsibilities related to occupant 

emergency plans, COOP planning, and other emergency preparedness 

topics. All of the selected FEBs reported hosting at least one emergency 

preparedness briefing, training, or exercise during the past year. The 

Minnesota FEB, for example, hosted homeland security briefings by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Transportation Security 

Administration, the Minnesota Department of Health, the Secret Service, 

FEMA, the Federal Protective Service, state and county emergency 

management directors, and the Department of Defense. The Denver FEB 

conducts a yearly scenario-based COOP exercise usually in conjunction 

with FEMA, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 

and GSA. In addition to other preparedness exercises, the Chicago FEB 

hosted an exercise dealing with emergency preparedness and people with 

disabilities. Several FEB representatives made the point that these 

emergency preparedness exercises and activities are particularly valuable 

for the smaller federal agencies. While military, law enforcement, and 

public safety federal agencies may have a solid grasp of emergency

preparedness, some of the smaller administrative agencies need help 

defining what their responsibilities are in this area. In addition, an FEB 

executive director and a chair said that the interagency exercises help to 

ensure that federal workers are receiving consistent treatment across the 

agencies. 

FEB Representatives 

Reported Working with 

FEMA on COOP Planning 

One of the FEB emergency support responsibilities is facilitating COOP 

training for federal agencies, and the FEB representatives reported 

working with FEMA and, in many cases, GSA to accomplish this. As 

mentioned previously, COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies 

to ensure that the capability exists to continue essential agency functions 

across a wide range of potential emergencies. FEMA, GSA, and OPM are 

the three agencies that have the most direct impact on individual agency

efforts to develop viable COOP capabilities. FEMA, as the lead agency for

executive branch COOP planning, has responsibility for formulating 

guidance, facilitating interagency coordination, and assessing the status of 

executive branch COOP capabilities. GSA is responsible for working with

FEMA in providing COOP training for federal agencies and assisting 

agencies in acquiring alternate facilities in the event of an emergency, 

while OPM is responsible for maintaining and revising human capital 

management guidance for emergency situations and assisting the heads of 

other departments and agencies with personnel management and staffing

during national security emergencies. 

Page 13 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
FEB representatives said they work with FEMA and GSA to develop and 

strengthen agency COOP and other emergency plans. For example, most 

of the boards have COOP working groups or emergency committees, often 

lead by FEMA and GSA, which help conduct various emergency exercises. 

The exercises are designed to provide insight and guidance that can be 

used to develop specific action plans that address interruptions in services 

provided by their agencies, and FEB representatives said that COOP plans 

are tested through these exercises. A FEMA official testified in May 2006 

that the COOP working groups established with the FEBs in New Orleans, 

Houston, and Miami prior to the hurricanes of 2005 and the many COOP

training and exercise activities conducted by these organizations were 

instrumental in facilitating federal agency recovery and reconstitution 

efforts following hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.6

 During the past 

year, FEMA Region III nominated the Philadelphia FEB COOP working 

group for a 2006 Excellence in Government Award because the group had

improved the federal image of preparedness among the Philadelphia 

community through training, exercises, and interagency coordination 

projects. The group received a Silver Medal Award as a result of the 

nomination. As another example of joint activities, through a campaign 

that is a collaboration between FEMA, the Red Cross, and other 

emergency response groups, the Boston FEB hosted a series of seminars 

aimed at educating employees about home preparedness. 

Almost all of the FEB executive directors or chairs from the selected

boards cited a positive and beneficial working relationship with FEMA. 

Some of the executive directors also said that a strong relationship exists 

between their boards and the FEMA regional directors in their areas. In 

addition, the regional FEMA officials we interviewed all said the FEBs 

assist FEMA with its mission. Another FEMA official noted that reaching 

out to the field can be difficult, but the FEBs provide communications and 

access to the majority of federal agencies, which makes FEMA’s job much 

easier. Although FEMA does not have a formal agreement with the FEBs, 

FEMA and the FEBs have common interests in making sure the federal 

workforce is protected, and the relationship proves mutually beneficial. 

According to a FEMA official, many of the agencies in the field have COOP 

policies, procedures, and planning in place in part because the FEBs have 

assisted FEMA in getting this program out to them. He noted that the FEBs 

carry the COOP activities forward and, although the boards operate under 

 6

Statement of Robert Shea, Acting Director of Operations Federal Emergency Management

Agency, House Committee on Government Reform, May 24, 2006.

Page 14 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
tenuous conditions, their outreach is invaluable. Similar to most of the 

opinions expressed regarding FEMA’s work with the FEBs, the Seattle 

FEB chair said that FEMA has displayed active leadership and has proven 

to be a good connection for sharing information. 

FEBs Have Played a Role 

in Responding to Past 

Emergencies 

The Oklahoma FEB response to the bombing of the Oklahoma City Murrah 

Federal Building on April 19, 1995, illustrates the role of some of the 

boards in aiding emergency response. The board staff knew all of the 

agencies in the Murrah Building; the home telephone numbers of critical 

staff; the city, county, and state principals in Oklahoma City; and which 

federal agencies were available to provide immediate relief and support. 

According to the Oklahoma executive director, with the information the 

FEB was able to provide and a blueprint of the Murrah Building, the first 

responders were able to determine where they might find more people 

after the bombing. The FEB staff also played a role in providing support to 

the victims and families of those who died in the bombing through 

activities such as arranging counseling. In addition, shortly after the 

disaster the Oklahoma FEB hosted a meeting with the Vice President in 

which local agency leaders discussed what worked well and what needed

attention in recovering from the disaster. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita represented huge disasters in the history of 

our nation, and according to a FEMA official, through these catastrophes 

the New Orleans FEB’s executive director established and maintained an

essential communication link between FEMA’s Office of National Security 

Coordination (ONSC) and OPM. A FEMA official noted that many federal 

agencies, specifically smaller agencies or agencies with limited resources, 

were better prepared because of the coordination, collaboration, training,

and resource sharing the New Orleans FEB was able to provide. The New

Orleans FEB executive director also became part of the nation’s first 

federal agency COOP and Reconstitution Team, made up of 

representatives from the New Orleans and Dallas-Fort Worth FEBs, GSA, 

NARA, OPM, and FEMA. Additionally, following the interruption of 

communications and loss of contact with federal leaders, the executive

director was able to work through ONSC to locate and reestablish contact 

with all members of the FEB Policy Committee at their alternate sites, 

beginning the reconstitution of the New Orleans FEB. The FEB served as a 

conduit for information between Washington and the representative local 

agencies, and the Policy Committee was able to provide status updates to 

identify common needs or problems that agency leaders were facing that 

required expedited assistance to resolve. According to a FEMA official, the 

lessons learned during the conference calls with the New Orleans FEB 

Page 15 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Policy Committee following Hurricane Katrina allowed for better national 

response and coordination during Hurricane Rita. The New Orleans FEB 

executive director reported that part of her role during Hurricane Katrina 

was to raise awareness that many of the essential personnel of the federal

workforce in New Orleans had no housing and, therefore, were not able to 

return to work. Eventually, essential federal and local workers and 

members of the New Orleans police and fire departments and their 

families were housed aboard ships. 

As another example of FEB support following hurricanes Katrina, Rita, 

and Wilma, FEMA Region V put into place a temporary Chicago call center 

that was scheduled to open in early September 2005. The call center was 

created in response to the projected volume of calls from victims of the 

disasters to enable FEMA to more effectively and rapidly communicate 

with them. Because of the requirement that call center staff must be 

fingerprinted and have security clearances, federal employees were the 

only ones who could immediately meet FEMA’s need to staff the center. 

The Chicago FEB executive director coordinated with agency officials in 

soliciting nearly 300 federal employees who were detailed to the center 

while negotiations were being conducted with a contractor who would 

then backfill these positions. According to FEMA and the Chicago FEB, 

the effort in sharing federal personnel was highly successful. 

During nonemergency but disruptive events, such as political conventions

or rallies, the FEBs in the affected areas have helped to contain the 

potential disturbance for federal agencies’ operations. For example, the 

FEB representatives from Boston and New York City said their boards 

played a role during the national political conventions held there in the 

summer of 2004. In preparation for the events, OPM conducted a series of

emergency preparedness seminars for local agency representatives 

through the FEBs in both cities. The sessions provided information on 

emergency planning and human resource flexibilities available to agencies

for use in emergency situations and during major public events and were 

designed to prepare all federal agencies for emergencies, both natural and 

man-made. In addition, OPM gave the Boston FEB vice chair and the New

York City chair onetime authority during the event to make decisions 

regarding the nonemergency workforce should that become necessary. As

another example, during the immigration rallies in the summer of 2006 in 

Chicago, the Chicago FEB reported that it was communicating with the 

Federal Protective Service, which shared security information with the 

board. The Chicago FEB was able to pass this information on to the local 

agencies so employees could prepare and make alternative travel 

arrangements since some streets were closed. 

Page 16 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
The distinctive characteristics of the FEBs within the federal government 

help to explain the key challenges the boards face in providing emergency

support services. Factors including the boards’ lack of a defined role in 

national emergency support structures, their accountability framework, 

and the differences in their capacities present challenges in providing a 

needed level of emergency support across the FEB service areas. 

According to several FEMA officials we interviewed, the FEBs could carry 

out their emergency support role more effectively if their role was 

included in national emergency management plans. FEMA officials from 

two different regions with responsibility for emergency activities in 11 

states said they felt the boards could be used more effectively and that 

they add value to the nation’s emergency operations. They agreed with 

several of the FEB executive directors we interviewed who felt the boards 

lacked recognition within the federal government’s emergency response 

structure and that their value in emergency support was often overlooked 

by federal agency officials unfamiliar with their capabilities. A FEMA 

regional director noted that it is very important that the FEB emergency 

support role is understood, and he believed including the boards in 

emergency management plans was an opportunity to communicate the 

role of the FEBs and how they could contribute in emergencies involving 

the federal workforce. 

The FEBs Face Key 

Challenges in 

Providing Emergency 

Support Services 

A Defined FEB Role in 

National Emergency Plans 

Would Better Ensure That 

the Boards Can Effectively 

Carry Out Their 

Emergency Support Role 

The FEMA officials provided examples of areas where the FEBs could 

support the existing emergency response structure and where the boards’ 

role could be defined in emergency management plans. For example, 

while FEBs are not first responders, the National Response Plan’s7

emphasis on local emergency response suggests using the existing local 

connections and relationships established by the FEBs. The National 

Response Plan is also intended to provide a framework for how federal 

departments and agencies will work together and coordinate with state, 

local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations during 

incidents through the establishment of several multiagency coordination 

structures. Among other activities, these coordination structures are 

 7

The National Response Plan is designed to provide the structure for the coordination of

federal support for disaster response with a basic premise that incidents are generally 

handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. State and local resources provide the

first line of emergency response and incident management support. 

Page 17 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
responsible for maintaining situational awareness,8

 information sharing, 

and communications; coordinating internal operations; and coordinating 

among the different entities. The FEMA officials agreed that the FEBs 

could provide support to the existing emergency response structure via 

these multiagency coordination centers, given the FEBs’ connections and 

knowledge of their local communities. The boards could provide real-time 

information to the centers and have access to status reports that they 

could share with high-level federal officials within their service areas 

during an emergency affecting the federal workforce. 

FEMA officials had specific suggestions for where formal inclusion of the 

FEBs should be considered in multiagency coordination centers. One 

official noted that when a disaster threatens the federal community, it 

would be advantageous for the FEB to have a seat in the joint field office 

(JFO). A JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to 

coordinate operational federal assistance activities to the affected areas 

during incidents of national significance. Within the JFO, senior federal 

representatives form a multiagency coordination entity and direct their 

staff in the JFO to share information, aid in establishing priorities among 

incidents and associated resource allocation, and provide strategic 

coordination of various federal incident management activities. The 

reasoning behind the suggestion to include the FEBs was that the boards 

have knowledge of the departments and agencies in their cities, making 

them able to assess the status of the local federal community affected by 

the disaster. According to the same official, another place for the FEBs to 

contribute that merits consideration is the regional response coordination

center, which coordinates regional response efforts, establishes federal 

priorities, and implements local federal program support until a JFO is 

established.

FEMA officials also suggested that the FEBs could maintain the vital 

records related to COOP, such as alternative COOP sites, phone numbers, 

and emergency contacts. FEMA officials proposed that FEMA could 

 8

See GAO, Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7

Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies, GAO-07-89 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 20, 2006). This report described situational awareness as a continual process of

collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, information, and knowledge to allow 

organizations and individuals to anticipate requirements, react effectively, and establish a 

common operational picture. Additionally, situational assessment includes the evaluation 

and interpretation of information gathered from a variety of sources that when 

communicated to emergency managers and decision makers, can provide a basis for 

incident management decision making. 

Page 18 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
provide technical assistance to the FEBs to develop a COOP directory 

format containing the specific information for their member agencies, 

while the FEBs would be responsible for maintaining, updating, 

protecting, and distributing the directory. FEMA officials also suggested 

that it may be helpful for the FEBs and FEMA to draft a memorandum of 

understanding that formalizes the role and responsibilities of the FEBs in 

assisting FEMA with COOP and other emergency activities. 

The need for formal agreements on emergency roles and responsibilities 

has been highlighted in our previous work.9

 For example, in assessing the 

response to Hurricane Katrina, we recommended that it was important for 

FEMA and the Red Cross to clarify their respective roles and 

responsibilities. In May 2006, the two organizations entered into a 

memorandum of understanding that outlines their areas of mutual support 

and cooperation in disaster response and recovery operations and in 

performance of their respective roles under the National Response Plan.

The Operational 

Framework for the Boards 

Poses Accountability 

Challenges 

According to OPM, leadership and oversight of the FEBs is conducted 

from OPM Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Although the FEB 

regulations state that the chairs of the FEBs should report to OPM through 

regional representatives, who were charged with overseeing the activities 

of their FEBs, an OPM official explained that the regional oversight these 

regulations refer to is now done from headquarters. Within OPM, the 

Associate Director for Human Capital Leadership and Merit System 

Accountability (HCLMSA) supervises the Director for FEB Operations. 

Within the HCLMSA division, the field services group managers are 

intended to serve in a liaison and support role with the FEBs in their 

geographic areas. An OPM official said there are five field service 

managers who interact with the FEBs in their jurisdictions. While the 

official said the managers are not expected to provide oversight of FEB 

activities, they are expected to regularly attend FEB executive board 

meetings and help coordinate OPM-provided training. Some FEB 

representatives reported that their OPM field service managers were 

active in their FEBs, while others said their managers were not. 

 9

See, for example, GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance

and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 21, 2005), and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the 

Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, GAO-06-712 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 8, 2006). 

Page 19 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
In light of the recent emphasis on systemwide expectations and 

accountability measures for the boards, many of the FEB representatives 

we interviewed believed OPM needs to provide additional leadership and 

feedback to them. The relationship between OPM and the FEBs is 

complicated, in part because the boards need a certain level of autonomy 

to address regionally identified issues through projects and programs 

specific to their localities. More recently, however, particularly with the 

emergency support expectations for the boards that cut across the FEB 

system, many of the FEB representatives felt more assistance and 

feedback from OPM on FEB activities are warranted. Many were 

frustrated with what they perceived as a lack of priority given to the 

boards by OPM. For example, some noted that the Director of FEB 

Operations is a one-person office, which they felt was inadequate to meet

the needs of and provide oversight for the 28 boards. Several of the FEB 

representatives also pointed to a recent incident where the FEB system’s 

host Web site server, contracted out by OPM, was defaced. Service was 

not restored to some of the FEB Web sites until several weeks later. 

The accountability structure for the FEB executive directors poses 

additional challenges. An OPM official reported that the executive 

directors are rated by their supervisors of record in their host agencies. In 

2004, OPM worked with the FEB executive directors to develop critical

performance standards to be used by the FEB chairs to provide input to 

the host agency supervisors on the performance of the FEB executive

directors. Executive directors were asked by OPM to use the standards to 

solicit input from their FEB chairs for their performance evaluations, 

although there is no provision to ensure the performance standards are 

consistently applied among the individual director ratings. Of the 14 

selected boards, 5 boards had an arrangement where the performance 

appraisal was done by the host agency supervisor who received 

performance appraisal input from the FEB chair. Four executive directors

reported they were rated by their host agencies with no input from the 

FEB chairs, while for four of the executive directors, the chair provided 

the executive director’s rating to the host agency. One executive director 

did not receive a performance appraisal because she was still considered 

an employee of one agency even though her salary was paid by another 

agency. 

Some of the executive directors we interviewed said that under their 

current accountability structure, they answer to OPM, the chair or policy 

committee of the FEB, and the board’s host agency, which generally pays 

their salaries. When asked about accountability, some of the executive 

directors said they would follow the host agency’s guidance given that 

Page 20 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
their salaries were paid by them. Others said they would answer primarily 

to their chairs or policy committees. One of the FEB representatives noted 

that he believes the current performance system does not reward highperforming FEBs. 

Varying FEB Capacities 

Test the Boards’ Ability to 

Provide Consistent Levels 

of Emergency Support 

Services across the 

Country 

As we reported in 2004, the context in which the FEBs operate, including

varying capacities among the boards for emergency preparedness efforts, 

could lead to inconsistent levels of preparedness across the nation.10

Figure 2 illustrates that the service areas of the FEBs differ substantially in 

the size of their formal jurisdictions, and table 1 shows how the number of 

federal employees11 and agencies served by each board varies. These 

factors may affect a board’s capacity to provide emergency support. For 

example, FEB representatives from Chicago and Los Angeles said their 

locations in large cities made providing FEB emergency support services 

for their service areas more difficult. The Los Angeles executive director, 

for example, noted that the Los Angeles FEB primarily serves a six-county 

area in the immediate vicinity of Los Angeles with notable transportation 

problems. This makes in-person meetings a challenge. The service area

includes approximately 120,000 federal employees from 230 different 

agencies. Yet the executive director noted that the FEB’s staffing is similar 

to that of FEBs covering much smaller areas and numbers of employees 

and agencies. The Cincinnati FEB, in contrast, covers approximately 

15,000 federal employees from 90 different agencies. Appendix III lists the 

28 FEBs along with their host agencies. 

 10GAO-04-384. 

11The figures include military employees. 

Page 21 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Figure 2: Jurisdictional Boundaries of the 28 FEBs 

a

Includes civilian agencies in Guam. 

Page 22 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Table 1: Number of Federal Employees and Agencies Served by Each FEB in 

Descending Order of Employees Served

FEB Federal employees served Number of federal agencies

Los Angeles 118,250 230

San Antonio 91,130 68

Oklahoma 78,681 252

Honolulu-Pacific 72,155 96

San Francisco 70,000 150

Baltimore 69,488 140

Chicago 64,803 180

St. Louis 62,155 82

New York City 61,578 152

Atlanta 58,020 120

Dallas-Fort Worth 49,855 144

Philadelphia 48,238 154

Seattle 47,233 147

Boston 45,479 150

Denver 39,161 160

Kansas City 38,906 134

Newark 38,270 79

Minnesota 35,806 120

South Florida 35,672 129

Detroit 32,733 85

New Mexico 32,102 94

Oregon 31,000 225

Houston 29,419 115

Cleveland 25,842 91

Pittsburgh 24,898 107

New Orleans 20,141a71a

Buffalo 15,935 100

Cincinnati 14,727 90

Source: OPM.

a

Numbers are under review because of Hurricane Katrina. 

There is no consistency for funding the FEBs nationwide, and the levels of 

support provided to the boards in terms of operating expenses, personnel, 

and equipment vary considerably. For example, some of the executive

directors reported they received an operating budget allocation for travel

Page 23 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
and supplies, while others said they received nothing or very little in this 

regard. Without adequate and consistent levels of funding and resources 

across the FEB system, some FEB representatives we interviewed were 

skeptical as to whether any standardization of emergency activities could 

be implemented. 

The FEBs’ dependence on host agencies and other member agencies for 

their resources also creates uncertainty for the boards in planning and 

committing to provide emergency support services. The lack of funding in

a particular year may curtail the amount of emergency support an 

individual board could provide. Many of the FEB representatives 

characterized the board funding structure as dysfunctional, and some 

expressed concern that their activities will be further affected by reduced 

agency funding and resource support as agency budgets grow more 

constrained. When boards’ funding is precarious, the executive directors 

spend the majority of their time soliciting resources from member 

agencies, without adequate time or resources to focus on mission-related 

activities. Federal agencies that have voluntarily funded FEB positions in 

the past have begun to withdraw their funding support. Of our 14 case 

study boards, representatives from 3 of the boards said they had recently

had their host agencies withdraw funding for their boards’ executive

assistant positions. Several FEB representatives felt the uncertainty about

the funding of the FEBs raises questions as to the survivability of the 

system and its ability to fulfill its emergency support function. 

Recognizing that the capacities of FEBs vary across the nation, OPM 

established an internal working group in August 2003 to study the 

strengths and weaknesses of the boards. According to OPM, the working 

group reviewed funding and staffing levels for possible recommendations 

of funding enhancements in challenged areas and developed several 

products to assist OPM in communicating the value of the FEBs to 

agencies. In 2006, OPM proposed a three-part plan, including restructuring 

the network of 28 boards to try to address the resource issues of some of 

the boards by combining them with other boards. Federal population 

numbers and geographic proximity of existing FEBs were used to develop

the proposed structure, which reduced the 28 boards into a system of 21 

boards. The majority of the FEBs did not support the restructuring 

component of the plan, asserting that the proposal was not well developed 

and stressing the importance of maintaining local presence for FEB 

operations and activities in the current locations. OPM decided not to 

pursue the approach. However, OPM officials said they will revisit 

restructuring the FEB network if resource issues remain a problem. 

Page 24 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
There have been different options considered for FEB funding in the past. 

For example, in 1988, OPM developed a budget proposal to include in its 

fiscal year 1990 budget submission base dollars and full-time equivalents 

to fully fund the FEBs. Ultimately, OPM reported only receiving a fraction

of the money requested, and OPM did not request additional funding for 

the next fiscal year. OPM has not requested funding of this type for the 

FEBs since that time. The current funding arrangements continue to 

emphasize local agency responsibility whereby usually one major 

department or agency in each city provides funding for an executive 

director and an assistant, although other federal agencies can contribute. 

OPM officials said they continue to support local agency commitment to 

the FEBs. From OPM’s vantage point, the boards that have developed 

strong relationships with their partner agencies have more success 

securing the necessary resources within existing funding arrangements. 

Although OPM officials stated they play an integral role in facilitating 

discussions to resolve FEB funding issues, some of the FEB 

representatives reported that OPM told them that if any of the FEBs 

encountered funding difficulties, the boards were on their own to solve the 

problems since the FEBs were unwilling to accept OPM’s restructuring 

proposal. 

The problem of unstable resources is one that could affect any networked 

organization similar to the FEBs that relies, more or less, on voluntary 

contributions from members. Agencies may be reluctant to contribute 

resources to an initiative that is not perceived as central to their 

responsibilities, especially during periods of budgetary constraints. This 

reluctance may, however, limit the long-term investment of the federal

government in working more collaboratively. For example, we recently 

reported on the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), a 

congressionally created entity designed to plan for and coordinate a 

transformation from the current air traffic control system to the next 

generation air transportation system by 2025.12 Housed within the Federal 

Aviation Administration, JPDO has seven federal partner agencies. One of

the greatest challenges that JPDO officials cited was creating mechanisms 

to leverage partner agency resources. Although leveraging efforts have 

worked well so far, we noted that JPDO could face difficulties in securing

needed agency resources if the priorities of the partner agencies change

 12GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges Associated

with the Transformation of the National Airspace System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 13, 2006). 

Page 25 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
over time. This has been a long-standing problem for the FEBs as well. In a

1984 report, we concluded that although the FEBs have contributed to 

improved field management, the future of the boards was uncertain 

because funding for staff and board participation had declined.13 Similar to

the boards’ current situation, in 1983, five FEBs lost all or part of their 

staff support as agency budgets grew more constrained. 

In Canada, the federal government has adopted a mix of both central 

funding and departmental contributions for its regional coordinating 

entities. Regional federal councils, the Canadian equivalent of the FEBs, 

are sustained by a balance between central funding and departmental 

contributions at the local level. The role of the councils was the subject of

in-depth consideration by Canadian government officials in 1996, and at 

that time, the Treasury Board increased the level of support it provided to 

the councils, including central funding to support staff positions and some 

operating expenses. A 2000 report on the councils concluded that a 

balance between central funding and departmental contributions at the 

local level may well be the model best suited to financially sustain the 

councils.14

Although OPM and the FEBs are now involved in a strategic planning 

effort, OPM has not to date considered the resource requirements to 

support an expanded emergency support role for the FEBs. Yet, as we 

have pointed out in our previous reports, a strategic plan should include a 

description of the resources—both sources and types—that will be needed 

for the strategies intended to achieve the plan’s goals and objectives. 

 13GAO, Federal Executive Boards Contribute To Improved Field Management But Future 

Is Uncertain, GAO/GGD-84-31 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 1984). 

14Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Regional Federal Councils, January 2000. 

Page 26 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Despite the challenges the FEBs face in providing emergency support, 

their potential to add value to the nation’s emergency preparedness and 

response is particularly evident given an event like pandemic influenza. 

The distributed nature of a pandemic and the burden of disease across the 

nation dictate that the response will be largely addressed by each 

community it affects. Using their established and developing community 

relationships to facilitate communication and coordination with local 

federal agency leaders and state and local governments, FEBs are well 

positioned to assist in pandemic preparedness and response. In the 

current pandemic planning stages, many of the selected FEBs were 

already acting as conveners, hosting pandemic influenza preparedness 

events, such as briefings and training and exercises, and were considering 

how federal agencies could share resources during a pandemic. 

According to the Homeland Security Council, the distributed nature of a 

pandemic, as well as the sheer burden of disease across the nation, means 

that the physical and material support states, localities, and tribal entities

can expect from the federal government will be limited in comparison to 

the aid it mobilizes for geographically and temporarily bounded disasters 

like earthquakes and hurricanes. Unlike those incidents that are discretely

bounded in space or time, an influenza pandemic could spread across the 

globe over the course of months or over a year, possibly in waves, and

would affect communities of all sizes and compositions. While a pandemic 

will not directly damage physical infrastructure, such as power lines or 

computer systems, it threatens the operation of critical systems by 

potentially removing the essential personnel needed to operate them from 

the workplace for weeks or months. 

The Nature of 

Pandemic Influenza 

May Make the FEBs a 

Particularly Valuable

Asset in Pandemic 

Preparedness and 

Response 

Pandemic Influenza 

Preparedness and 

Response Present 

Different Concerns Than 

Localized Natural 

Disasters 

The Homeland Security Council issued two documents to help address the 

unique aspects of pandemic influenza. The November 2005 National 

Strategy for Pandemic Influenza is intended to guide the overall effort to 

address the threat and provide a planning framework consistent with the 

National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Homeland 

Security. This planning framework is also intended to be linked with the 

National Response Plan. In May 2006, the Homeland Security Council also

issued the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic 

Influenza. This plan lays out broad implementation requirements and 

responsibilities among the appropriate federal agencies and also describes 

expectations for nonfederal stakeholders, including state and local 

governments, the private sector, international partners, and individuals. 

Further, all federal agencies are expected to develop their own pandemic 

plans that along with other requirements, describe how each agency will 

Page 27 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
provide for the health and safety of its employees and support the federal

government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a 

pandemic. 

The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 

states that the greatest burden of the pandemic response will be in the 

local communities. Local communities will have to address the medical 

and nonmedical effects of pandemic influenza with available resources. 

The implementation plan maintains that it is essential for communities, 

tribes, states, and regions to have plans in place to support the full 

spectrum of their needs over the course of weeks or months, and for the 

federal government to provide clear guidance on the manner in which 

these needs may be met. As pandemic influenza presents unique 

challenges to the coordination of the federal effort, joint and integrated 

planning across all levels of government and the private sector is essential 

to ensure that available national capabilities and authorities produce 

detailed plans and response actions that are complementary, compatible, 

and coordinated. 

FEBs’ Unique Role in the 

Local Federal Community 

Can Aid in Pandemic 

Influenza Preparedness 

and Response 

Research has shown that systems like the FEBs have proven to be 

valuable public management tools because they can operate horizontally, 

across agencies in this case, and integrate the strengths and resources of a 

variety of organizations in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors to 

effectively address critical public problems, such as pandemic influenza.15

Government leaders are increasingly finding that using traditional 

hierarchical organizations does not allow them to successfully address 

complex problems. As a result, they are beginning to explore the use of 

collaborative networks that reach across agencies and programs. 

The boards bring together the federal agency leaders in their service areas

and have a long history of establishing and maintaining communication 

links, coordinating intergovernmental activities, identifying common 

ground, and building cooperative relationships. Documents supporting the 

establishment of the FEBs noted that it is important that field executives 

have a broader picture of government and a general understanding of the 

interrelationships of government activity. The boards also partner with 

 15See, for example, GAO-06-15, and Donald P. Moynihan, Leveraging Collaborative 

Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations (Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for the 

Business of Government, June 2005). 

Page 28 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
community organizations and participate as a unified federal force in local

civic affairs. This connection to the local community could play a role in 

pandemic influenza preparedness and response as predisaster relationship 

building and planning are often the cornerstones to incident management. 

Many of the selected FEBs cultivated relationships within their federal, 

state, and local governments and their metropolitan area community 

organizations as a natural outgrowth of their general activities. For 

example, FEB activities, such as the Combined Federal Campaign and

scholarship programs, brought the boards into contact with local charities 

and school boards. In addition, through activities such as hosting 

emergency preparedness training or through participation in certain 

committees, some of the selected FEBs reported a connection with 

emergency management officials, first responders, and health officials in 

their communities. Through their facilitation of COOP exercises and 

training, the FEBs bring together government leaders, health officials, and 

first responders in a venue where the parties can share ideas, discuss 

plans, and coordinate approaches. The San Francisco FEB executive

director and chair said they attend FEMA’s Regional Interaction Steering 

Committee meetings, which brought them in contact with federal, state, 

and local government emergency management partners. The Minnesota 

FEB plays an active role in both the Association of Minnesota Emergency

Managers (AMEM) and the Metropolitan (Twin Cities) Emergency 

Managers Association. The Minnesota FEB executive director, for 

example, serves on the AMEM board of directors as federal agency liaison,

a newly created partnership with the organization. As another example, 

the Oklahoma FEB partnered with the fire departments in Oklahoma City 

and Tulsa to provide site visits to the federal agencies there to help 

strengthen emergency preparedness plans and update evacuation and 

shelter-in-place plans. The executive director said the site visits also 

provided agency leaders with the opportunity to interact with the most 

likely first responders in the event of an emergency and to obtain valuable 

information to include in emergency preparedness plans. 

As with the boards’ emergency support role in general, some of the FEB 

representatives envisioned their boards taking a more active role in 

pandemic influenza preparedness and response than others did. While 

some FEB representatives stressed the unique characteristics of the 

boards that position them to help prepare and respond to pandemic 

influenza, others noted the boards’ limited staffing and resources. One 

FEB executive director remarked that although the boards have no real 

authority, they are valuable because of the community relationships they 

have forged and their unique ability to coordinate resources and 

Page 29 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
communicate. As previously discussed, several representatives were 

concerned, however, about the role the FEBs could play in the event of a 

large-scale emergency, such as an influenza pandemic. 

FEBs Are Acting as 

Conveners to Deliver 

Planning and Training 

Needed for Pandemic 

Influenza Preparedness 

and Have a Potential Role 

in Pandemic Response 

In terms of current pandemic planning, many of the selected FEBs were 

building capacity for pandemic influenza response within their member 

agencies and community organizations by hosting pandemic influenza 

training and exercises. The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy

for Pandemic Influenza highlights training and exercises as an important 

element of pandemic planning. For example, 13 of the 14 selected FEBs 

were involved in pandemic influenza-related activities that ranged from 

informational briefings to coordinating pandemic exercises, some that 

included nonprofit organizations, the private sector, and government. The 

one exception was the New Orleans FEB, where the executive director 

said the board is still too heavily involved with Hurricane Katrina recovery 

to focus on helping agencies to collaborate on pandemic influenza 

preparedness. 

A number of the selected FEBs have held pandemic influenza tabletop

exercises. A pandemic influenza tabletop exercise would be based on a 

fictitious account of a plausible outbreak of pandemic influenza with 

scenarios constructed to facilitate problem solving and to provoke 

thinking about gaps and vulnerabilities. The Boston FEB, together with the 

Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and FEMA, held a 

pandemic influenza tabletop exercise in November 2006. The exercise 

objectives included goals such as helping to increase the awareness of 

federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies of the requirement to

incorporate pandemic influenza procedures into COOP planning and 

identifying special considerations for protecting the health and safety of 

employees and maintaining essential government functions and services 

during a pandemic outbreak. In addition, the Baltimore FEB hosted a 

pandemic influenza exercise on November 1, 2006, facilitated by FEMA 

Region III and the Maryland Emergency Management Agency. The Seattle 

FEB, with the assistance of FEMA and the City of Seattle, sponsored an 

all-day conference in October 2006 called Pandemic Flu: Get Smart, Get 

Ready! Conversation Tools and Tips. 

The Minnesota FEB has been a leader among the boards in pandemic 

influenza planning. Using a tabletop exercise it created, the board hosted 

its first pandemic influenza exercise in February 2006, with a follow-up 

exercise in October 2006. The October exercise included approximately 

180 participants from 100 organizations within federal agencies, state and 

Page 30 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
local government, and the private sector. Figure 3 illustrates the breadth of 

participation in the exercises, including key infrastructure businesses such

as power and telecommunications. The Minnesota FEB executive director 

noted that Minnesota has excellent state and local government

relationships, which help to facilitate planning of this nature. Examples of 

partnerships the board has with state and local entities include those with 

the State of Minnesota Division of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Management, the Minnesota Department of Health, the St. Paul Chamber 

of Commerce, and the American Red Cross. 

Page 31 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Figure 3: Participants in Two Minnesota FEB Pandemic Tabletop Exercises 

Federal

• Bureau of Indian Affairs

• Congressman Jim Ramstad

• Defense Contract Audit Agency

• Defense Intelligence Agency

• Federal Air Marshal Service

• Federal Aviation Administration

• Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Federal Correctional 

 Institution—Waseca

• Federal Drug Administration

• Federal Reserve Law 

 Enforcement

• Fish and Wildlife Service

• Internal Revenue Service

• National Labor Relations Board

• National Weather Service

• Small Business Administration

• Social Security Administration

• U.S. Attorney's Office

• U.S. Bankruptcy Court

• U.S. Department of Agriculture

• U.S. Department of Homeland

Security

• U.S. Department of Housing and

 Urban Development

• U.S. Department of the Interior

• U.S. Department of Veterans

 Affairs

• U.S. Federal Reserve Law 

 Enforcement

Federal County

Municipality

Private sector

Military

State

Nonprofits

Minnesota (MN)

FEB

Page 32 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
• U.S. Geological Survey

• U.S. Marshals Service

• U.S. Postal Service

• U.S. Probation District of MN

• U.S. Secret Service

• Veterans Health Administration

State

• Airport Police Department

• Metropolitan Airports

 Commission

• MN Dept. of Agriculture

• MN Dept. of Employee Relations

• MN Dept. of Finance

• MN Dept. of Health

• MN Dept. of Human Services

• MN Dept. of Revenue

• MN Homeland Security and 

 Emergency Management

• MN Office of Enterprise 

 Technology

• MN State Lottery

• MN–1 Disaster Medical 

 Assistance Team

• State of MN

Military

• Airlift Wing–133rd

• Airlift Wing–934th

• Department of Defense– 

 Emergency Preparedness 

 Liaison Officer

• Military Affairs

• MN National Guard

• U.S. Air Force Reserve

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

• U.S. Army–88th Regional 

 Readiness Command

• U.S. Army Reserve

• U.S. Navy Reserve Center

• U.S. Pacific Command Joint 

 Information Operations Center

• Other representatives from the 

 Army, Navy, and Air Force

County

• Anoka

• Dakota

• Dodge

• Eagan

• Fillmore

• Hennepin

• Human Services of Faribault 

and Martin Counties

• Martin

• Meeker

• Mower

• Olmsted

• Ramsey

• Scott

• Steele

• Wabasha

• Washington

• Watonwan

• Winona

• Yellow Medicine

Municipality

• Blaine

• Bloomington

• Brooklyn Center

• Brooklyn Park

• Burnsville

• Edina

• Metropolitan Emergency

Services Board

• Minneapolis

• Plymouth

• Robbinsdale

• St. Louis Park

• St. Paul

• West St. Paul

Nonprofits

• American Red Cross

• Greater Twin Cities United Way

• National Marrow Donor Program

• Western Lake Superior

Private sector

• Agribank

• American Radio Relay League

• American Security

• Ameriprise

• Best Buy

• Cargill

• CFC Technology

• Channel One

• Christensen Farms

• Deluxe

• E. Lord Consulting

• Electrical Utility

• First Premier Bank

• GMAC Enterprise Risk Services

• Medtronic

• Mission Mode Solutions

• Monticello Nuclear Generating

 Plant

• Nuclear Management Company

• Simple Computing Solutions

• Target

• Time Warner Cable

• United Health Group

• Valspar

• West Health

• Wells Fargo

Source: GAO presentation of MN FEB information.

The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic 

Influenza emphasizes that government and public health officials must 

communicate clearly and continuously with the public throughout a 

pandemic. The plan recognized that timely, accurate, credible, and 

coordinated messages will be necessary. According to many of the FEB 

representatives we interviewed, the communications function of the 

boards is a key part of their activities and could be an important asset for 

pandemic response. For example, when asked about the role they envision 

the FEBs playing in the response to a pandemic, the Dallas-Fort Worth 

FEB representatives said that because the board is viewed by its member 

agencies as a credible source of information, the board’s role should be to

coordinate communications among member agencies. They gave the 

example of the Department of Health and Human Services working 

through the board to disseminate medical information to their local 

community. 

Page 33 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
In addition to their communications role, during pandemic influenza the 

FEBs have the potential to broaden the situational awareness of member 

agency leaders and emergency coordinators and provide a forum to inform 

their decisions, similar to what the FEBs provide for other hazards, such 

as inclement weather conditions. A FEMA official noted that FEBs have 

vital knowledge of the federal agencies in their jurisdictions, which can 

provide valuable situational awareness to community emergency 

responders. 

Some of the FEBs were also considering the role they can play in assisting 

member agencies by supporting human capital functions, such as 

supporting the federal workforce and coordinating the deployment of 

personnel among member agencies as may be appropriate. Several FEB

representatives said, for example, that they were considering how they 

could provide assistance in coordinating support to federal agencies 

responding to pandemic influenza, such as addressing personnel shortages 

by locating available resources among member agencies. Other FEB 

representatives we interviewed reiterated a theme that even the critical

federal employees in the field can be left to fend for themselves when 

disasters strike their communities. Consequently, they are not able to 

handle the emergency issues of the federal government. For example, 

according to the New Orleans executive director, in New Orleans after 

Hurricane Katrina the oil and gas workers had their companies as 

powerful advocates in securing housing for them so they could resume 

working. She reported that in sharp contrast, there was no entity 

nationally that was an advocate for the local federal workforce to ensure 

the speedy reconstitution of essential services. In the majority of cases, 

she said that essential federal employees queued up for temporary housing 

in long lines. She intervened to bring attention to the need for expedited 

temporary housing for federal employees, who were responsible for 

providing essential functions, but who were also victims of the disaster. 

To avoid a similar situation during pandemic influenza, the Minnesota and 

Oklahoma FEBs are trying to negotiate with their states to create 

memorandums of agreement between the states and the federal agencies, 

represented by the FEBs. Their objectives are to identify how medical 

supplies and vaccines from the Advanced Pharmaceutical Cache (APC) or 

the Strategic National Stockpile, which will be distributed by the states, 

will be dispersed to essential federal government employees in the event 

of a pandemic or bioterrorist attack. To accomplish this, the FEBs are 

working with their federal members to apply the states’ guidelines for 

vaccine priorities to the federal workforce in their areas of service so that

essential federal employees, such as air traffic controllers, federal law 

Page 34 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
enforcement officers, and correctional facilities staff, are appropriately 

integrated in the state vaccine distribution plans. They also want to 

identify federal agencies and their resources that can augment the states’ 

operation of the mass vaccine dispensing sites. The Minnesota FEB has 

inventoried all of the federal agencies within its jurisdiction and feels it 

has a good idea of the resources that will be needed. According to the 

Minnesota FEB executive director, however, Minnesota currently does not 

have enough medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and vaccines in its APC to 

cover the emergency personnel of the federal government in Minnesota 

nor does it have the resources for purchasing these supplies. 

Achieving results for the nation increasingly requires that federal agencies 

work with each other and with the communities in which they serve. The 

federal executive boards are uniquely able to bring together federal agency

and community leaders in major metropolitan areas outside Washington,

D.C., to meet and discuss issues of common interest, such as preparing for 

and responding to pandemic influenza. As we reported in 2004, such a role

is a natural outgrowth of general FEB activities and can add value in

coordinating emergency operations efforts. 

Conclusions 

Several interrelated issues limit the capacity of FEBs to provide a 

consistent and sustained contribution to emergency preparedness and 

response. These issues may present limitations to other areas of FEB 

activities, not solely to emergency preparedness. Among them are the 

following: 

• The role of the FEBs in emergency support is not defined in national 

emergency guidance and plans. 

• Performance standards, for which the boards will be held accountable, 

with accompanying measures, are not fully developed for FEB emergency

support activities. 

• The availability of continuing resource support for the FEBs is uncertain 

and the continued willingness of host and member agencies to commit 

resources beyond their core missions may decrease, especially in times of 

increasing budgetary constraints. 

While the FEBs and FEMA have established important working 

relationships in a number of locations, these have, to date, been largely 

informal. As FEMA officials have noted, including the FEBs in federal 

emergency guidance and plans provides an opportunity for the FEBs to 

leverage the network of community relationships they have already 

established. OPM and FEMA could formalize the FEBs’ contribution to 

Page 35 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
FEMA’s emergency preparedness and response efforts through a 

memorandum of understanding, or some similar mechanism, between 

FEMA and the FEBs, and a formal designation of the FEB role in FEMA 

guidance. Likewise, recognition of the FEB emergency support role in the 

national emergency structure could help the boards carry out their 

emergency support role more effectively by underscoring the value they 

add, which may be overlooked by federal agency officials unfamiliar with 

their capabilities. 

The ability of FEBs and organizations like them to fulfill important 

collaborative national missions is hampered if they are dependent on the 

willingness of host agencies to provide support. OPM has determined that 

the FEBs should have an important and prominent role in emergency

support and envisions a set of emergency support activities across the 

FEB system. The current structure of host agencies and in-kind 

contributions puts at risk the achievement of that goal. 

OPM’s work on a strategic plan with the FEBs affords the opportunity to 

complete the development of clear expectations for the FEBs in 

emergency operations and to develop appropriate performance measures 

for these expectations. OPM also has an opportunity, as part of this 

planning process, to consider alternative funding arrangements that would 

better match the roles envisioned for the FEBs. As noted earlier, a 

strategic plan should describe how goals and objectives are to be 

achieved, including how different levels of resources lead to different 

levels of achievement and the sources of those resources. 

Consistent with OPM’s ongoing efforts in this regard, we recommend that 

the Director of OPM take the following four actions to help improve the 

ability of the FEBs to contribute to the nation’s emergency preparedness 

efforts, particularly given the threat of pandemic influenza: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Once OPM completes defining emergency support expectations for the 

FEBs, OPM should work with FEMA to develop a memorandum of 

understanding, or some similar mechanism, that formally defines the FEB 

role in emergency planning and response. 

• OPM should initiate discussion with DHS and other responsible 

stakeholders to consider the feasibility of integrating the FEB emergency 

support responsibilities into the established emergency response 

framework, such as the National Response Plan.

• OPM should continue its efforts to establish performance measures and 

accountability for the emergency support responsibilities of the FEBs 

Page 36 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
before, during, and after an emergency event that affects the federal 

workforce outside Washington, D.C.

• As an outgrowth of the above efforts and to help ensure that the FEBs can

provide protection of the federal workforce in the field, OPM, as part of its 

strategic planning process for the FEBs, should develop a proposal for an 

alternative to the current voluntary contribution mechanism that would 

address the uncertainty of funding sources for the boards. 

We provided the Director of OPM and the Secretary of Homeland Security 

a draft of this report for review and comment. We received written 

comments from OPM, which are reprinted in appendix IV. While not 

commenting specifically on the recommendations, OPM stated that it 

understands the importance of the issues raised in the report, noting that it

is building the boards’ capacity by developing a national FEB strategic and 

operational plan that will ensure consistent delivery of services across the 

FEB network. By documenting results and creating a consistent 

accountability mechanism, OPM said it is building a strong business case 

through which it can address the resources FEBs need to continue 

operations. OPM also stated that it believed institutionalized relationships 

with strategic partners like FEMA can demonstrate FEBs’ business value 

and help address ongoing funding issues. In comments received from 

FEMA by e-mail, FEMA concurred with the findings of the report and 

welcomed the opportunity to work with OPM to develop a memorandum 

of understanding that more formally defines the FEB role in emergency 

planning and response. FEMA also recognized the current personnel and 

budget limitations of the FEBs in supporting emergency planning and 

response activities and said that a proposal for an alternative to the 

current FEB voluntary contribution mechanism should assist with 

providing an improved capability for the boards. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Director of OPM and the 

Secretary of Homeland Security and appropriate congressional 

committees. We will also provide copies to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

Page 37 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix V. 

Bernice Steinhardt 

Director, Strategic Issues 

Page 38 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

The objectives of our review were to 

• identify the actions the federal executive boards (FEB) have taken to 

fulfill their emergency preparedness and response roles and 

responsibilities, 

• describe the key challenges facing the FEBs in fulfilling these roles and 

responsibilities, and 

• evaluate the extent to which the FEBs can contribute to emergency

preparedness and response to pandemic influenza. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed FEB annual reports and 

academic literature as well as prior GAO reports about leveraging 

collaborative networks. Additionally, we reviewed the National Response 

Plan, Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic 

Influenza, and the Joint Field Office Activation and Operations Interagency

Integrated Standard Operating Procedure to assess the feasibility of FEB 

involvement in those plans. We interviewed Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM) officials, and we consulted with three GAO field 

office managers who are members of their local FEBs to gain a greater 

understanding of FEB activities. We selected 14 of the 28 FEBs for more 

detailed review. Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, 

Denver, Los Angeles, New York City, Oklahoma, Philadelphia, San 

Francisco, and Seattle were selected because they are 12 of the 15 largest

FEBs in terms of number of federal employees served. Minnesota was 

selected because it is considered a leader in pandemic influenza planning, 

and New Orleans was selected because of its recent emergency

management experience with Hurricane Katrina. GAO headquarters and 

field office teams interviewed at least two key FEB representatives, 

including the chair or vice chair and the executive director from the 14 

selected boards. Additionally, we obtained and reviewed FEB documents, 

such as annual reports, monthly activity reports, minutes, and 

correspondence, at the selected sites. Because our selection of FEBs was 

nonprobabilistic, the results of our review of these selected FEBs are not 

generalizable to all other FEBs. However, the challenges and issues that 

were identified in our coverage of half of all FEBs along with our review of 

materials concerning the FEBs as a group suggests that these matters are 

not limited to just the selected FEBs. 

OPM provided data on the counties of jurisdiction for all of the boards as 

well as their host agencies and the number of federal and military 

employees and agencies in each service area. We determined these data 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

Page 39 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

We also interviewed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

officials at their headquarters in Washington, D.C. FEMA serves as the 

Department of Homeland Security’s designated lead agent for continuity of 

operations (COOP) plans for the FEBs’ executive branch members. 

Because the FEBs and FEMA collaborate on COOP activities in the field,

we interviewed the FEMA regional directors in regions V and VI based in

Chicago, Illinois, and Denton, Texas, respectively, to obtain an outside 

perspective of the boards and their role in emergency operations. Our 

analysis of the capacity of FEBs to support emergency preparedness is 

drawn from our collective review and assessment of information and 

documents provided to us by officials from OPM and FEMA and the FEB

representatives at the selected FEBs as well as our examination of the 

relevant literature described above.

Our review was conducted from March 2006 through February 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 40 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Appendix II: Office of Personnel Management 

Document Describing the FEB Role and Appendix II: Office of Personnel Management Responsibilities in Emergency Situations

Document Describing the FEB Role and 

Responsibilities in Emergency Situations 

ROLE: PROVIDE EMERGENCY LIAISON AND COMMUNICATIONS - FEBs stand ready to provide timely and relevant information 

to support emergency preparedness and response coordination. 

Emergency Preparedness

-FEBs will serve as a Federal liaison for State and Local emergency officials. 

-FEBs will establish notification networks and develop a protocol (Communications Plan) to be used in nonemergency and 

emergency situations. 

-FEBs will disseminate relevant information received from OPM/DC regarding emergency preparedness information (memorandums 

from OPM officials, emergency guides, training opportunities, information from other departments/agencies, etc.) 

-FEBs will identify a core group of Federal leaders in each community who will meet regularly to discuss planned courses of action 

(delayed arrival, early dismissal, shelter in place, emergency personnel only, etc.) in the event of an emergency. 

-FEBs will survey and/or facilitate training for member agencies regarding their roles and responsibilities related to occupant

emergency plans. 

-FEBs will facilitate training on Continuity of Operations (COOP), and other emergency preparedness topics, i.e., shelter in place, 

triage, onsite responder, etc. for Federal agencies. 

Response Coordination

-FEBs will assess local emergency situations in cooperation with Federal, State and Local officials. 

-FEBs will activate established notification system for transmission of local emergency information, as prescribed by the FEB’s

protocol (Communications Plan). 

-FEBs will provide problem resolution assistance as appropriate, to include identifying Federal resources which may be available to 

assist the community in responding to, or recovering from, an emergency. 

-FEBs relay local emergency situation information, by way of periodic reports to the appropriate authorities, to include, but not limited

to: OPM/DC, FEB members, media, State and Local government authorities. 

-FEBs will disseminate information received from OPM/DC regarding emergency information at the national level – decision on

employee work status, information from other departments/agencies, etc. 

Communications Plan

-FEBs alert those responsible for implementing the Occupant and Agency Emergency Plans and serve as a redundant (back-up) 

communication vehicle to ensure notification.

Source: OPM.

Page 41 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Appendix III: FEBs’ Host Agencies Appendix III: FEBs’ Host Agencies 

FEB Host agency

Atlanta Social Security Administration-Regional Office 

Baltimore Department of Defense-U.S. Army/Fort Meade 

Boston Environmental Protection Agency-Regional Office 

Buffalo Department of Homeland Security-Immigration and Customs Enforcement U.S. Coast Guard 

Chicago General Services Administration-Regional Office 

Cincinnati Department of Veterans Affairs-Regional Medical Center 

Cleveland National Aeronautics and Space Administration-Glenn Research Center 

Dallas-Fort Worth Health and Human Services-Regional Office 

Denver Department of Defense-Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

Detroit Department of Defense-U.S. Tank Automotive Command

Honolulu-Pacific Department of Defense-Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 

Houston Department of Homeland Security-Customs and Border Protection 

Kansas City Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration/Federal Aviation Administration 

Los Angeles Department of Homeland Security-Customs and Border Protection/Los Angeles Field Office 

Minnesota Department of the Interior-Headquarters National Business Center 

New Mexico Department of the Interior-Bureau of Land Management 

New Orleans Department of Agriculture-National Finance Center 

New York City Department of Transportation-Federal Aviation Administration

Newark Department of Homeland Security-Customs and Border Protection 

Oklahoma Department of Defense-Tinker Air Force Base 

Oregon Department of Veterans Affairs-Portland Veterans Affairs Medical Center 

Philadelphia Department of Defense-Defense Logistics Agency 

Pittsburgh Office of Personnel Management 

San Antonio Department of Veterans Affairs-Regional Medical Center 

San Francisco Department of Labor-Office of Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management 

Seattle Department of Housing and Urban Development-Regional Office 

Social Security Administration-Regional Office of Personnel Management 

South Florida Department of Commerce-Headquarters 

St. Louis Department of Defense-National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

Source: OPM.

Page 42 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of Appendix IV Personnel Management : Comments from the Office of 

Personnel Management 

Page 43 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of

Personnel Management 

Page 44 GAO-07-515 Federal Executive Boards
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 45 GAO-07-515

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Bernice Steinhardt (202) 512-6808 or steinhardtb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report 

were William Doherty, Assistant Director; Dominic Barranca; Scott Behen; 

Kathleen Boggs; Deirdre Brown; Beverly Burke; Jimmy Champion; Betty 

Clark; Derrick Collins; Daniel Concepcion; Amber Edwards; Richard 

Guthrie; Bonnie Hall; Charles Hodge; Aaron Kaminsky; Judith Kordahl; 

Susan Mak; Signora May; Samuel Scrutchins; Gabriele Tonsil; George 

Warnock; and Daniel Zeno. In addition, William Bates, Thomas Beall, 

David Dornisch, and Donna Miller provided key assistance. 

Federal Executive Boards

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(450461) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

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and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

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