55126 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 206 / Tuesday, October 27, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

airworthy or installed on the affected 

airplanes before the revision of the ALS, as 

required by paragraph (f) of this AD, do not 

need to be reworked in accordance with the 

CDCCLs. However, once the ALS has been 

revised, future maintenance actions on these 

components must be done in accordance 

with the CDCCLs. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(j)(1) The Manager, International Branch, 

ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to 

ATTN: Tom Stafford, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; telephone (425) 227–1622; fax (425) 

227–1149. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. 

Related Information 

(k) EASA airworthiness directive 2007– 

0096 R1, dated May 2, 2007, also addresses 

the subject of this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(l) You must use Airbus A310 ALS Part 5— 

Fuel Airworthiness Limitations, dated May 

31, 2006; and Airbus A310 Fuel 

Airworthiness Limitations, Document 

95A.1930/05, Issue 2, dated May 11, 2007; to 

do the actions required by this AD, unless the 

AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

previously approved the incorporation by 

reference of Airbus A310 ALS Part 5—Fuel 

Airworthiness Limitations, dated May 31, 

2006; and Airbus A310 Fuel Airworthiness 

Limitations, Document 95A.1930/05, Issue 2, 

dated May 11, 2007; on November 20, 2007 

(72 FR 58499, October 16, 2007). 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus SAS—EAW 

(Airworthiness Office), 1 Rond Point Maurice 

Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; 

telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 

93 44 51; e-mail: account.airwortheas@airbus.com; Internet http:// 

www.airbus.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221 or 425–227–1152. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 

19, 2009. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–25774 Filed 10–26–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–0018; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–NE–01–AD; Amendment 39– 

16044; AD 2009–21–07] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; General 

Electric Company CF6–80C2 Series 

Turbofan Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for General 

Electric Company (GE) CF6–80C2 series 

turbofan engines with certain thrust 

reverser ballscrew gearbox assembly 

adjustable-length end actuators 

installed. This AD requires initial visual 

inspections and repetitive replacements 

of the 3⁄8-inch rod-ends installed on the 

thrust reverser ballscrew gearbox 

assembly adjustable-length end 

actuators. This AD also allows an 

optional terminating action to those 

repetitive replacements. This AD also 

requires initial visual inspections and 

replacements, if necessary, of the other 

hardware connecting the thrust reverser 

transcowls to the engine. This AD 

results from reports of four failures of 

rod-ends on certain thrust reverser 

ballscrew gearbox assembly adjustablelength end actuators, leading to partial 

or complete separation of the transcowl 

from the engine and airplane during 

thrust reversal. We are issuing this AD 

to prevent loss of asymmetric thrust and 

thrust control. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

December 1, 2009. The Director of the 

Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference of certain 

publications listed in the regulations as 

of December 1, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You can get the service 

information identified in this AD from 

Middle River Aircraft Systems, 103 

Chesapeake Park Plaza, MF 46, 

Baltimore, MD 21220; telephone (410) 

682–0080; fax (410) 682–0100; or e-mail: 

bulletins@mras-usa.com. 

The Docket Operations office is 

located at Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Christopher J. Richards, Aerospace 

Engineer, Engine Certification Office, 

FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 

New England Executive Park, 

Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: 

christopher.j.richards@faa.gov; 

telephone (781) 238–7133; fax (781) 

238–7199. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with 

a proposed AD. The proposed AD 

applies to GE CF6–80C2 series turbofan 

engines with certain thrust reverser 

ballscrew gearbox assembly adjustablelength end actuators installed. We 

published the proposed AD in the 

Federal Register on March 16, 2009 (74 

FR 11043). That action proposed to 

require initial visual inspections and 

repetitive replacements of the 3⁄8-inch 

rod-ends installed on the thrust reverser 

ballscrew gearbox assembly adjustablelength end actuators. That action also 

proposed to allow optional terminating 

action to those repetitive replacements. 

That action also proposed to require 

initial visual inspections and 

replacements, if necessary, of the other 

hardware connecting the thrust reverser 

transcowls to the engine. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (telephone 

(800) 647–5527) is provided in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

Comments 

We provided the public the 

opportunity to participate in the 

development of this AD. We have 

considered the comments received. 

Continue Operating to Next C-Check 

Lufthansa Technik asks if the current 

risk assessment for the 3⁄8-inch rod-ends 

failure also takes into account mixed 

configurations, meaning lower or upper 

position with 7⁄16-inch or fixed 

configuration rod-ends. The commenter 

states that if so, then a mixed 

configuration should therefore allow the 

operator to continue operating until 

next C-Check without any higher risk. 


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The commenter points out that 

transcowl liberations were already 

communicated via FAA Special 

Airworthiness Information Bulletin No. 

NE–08–44 and GE All Operators Wire 

07/CF6/012, where it was stated that the 

thrust reverser is designed to be able to 

continue normal operation to the next 

C-Check with a single failed actuator at 

either the upper or lower position. 

We do not agree. All of the failure 

events occurred following the failure of 

only one rod-end. Additionally, two of 

the four failures were partial liberations, 

where one rod-end stayed intact, and 

only the section of the transcowl near 

the failed rod-end tore apart and 

liberated from the engine and aircraft. 

Additionally, the manufacturer’s life 

assessment shows that a thrust reverser 

operating with a failed rod-end may not 

be capable of operating safely until the 

next C-Check. 

Proposal To Change Optional 

Terminating Action Paragraph 

Honeywell Engine Systems and 

Accessories proposes that the Optional 

Terminating Action paragraph should 

be changed to the following: ‘‘As an 

optional terminating action to the 

repetitive 3⁄8-inch rod-end replacements 

required by this AD, replace the 3⁄8-inch 

adjustable rod-ends with a 7⁄16-inch 

adjustable rod-end and nut, P/N 

3238729–1 and 3238730–1 respectively, 

or you may replace the adjustable end 

actuator P/N 3272602–2, –3 with a fixed 

end actuator P/N 3275538–2, –3. Use 

paragraph 3.E. (1) of Middle River 

Aircraft Systems (MRAS) Alert Service 

Bulletin (ASB) No CF6–80C2 S/B 

78A1162, Revision 1, dated February 13, 

2009, to do the replacements.’’ The 

commenter states that a shop visit is 

required to upgrade 3⁄8-inch adjustable 

rod-end actuators P/N 3272602–2,–3 to 

the 7⁄16-inch adjustable rod-ends. In the 

proposed AD, there is a reference to 

replacing the 3⁄8-inch rod ends with 

either a fixed length rod-end, P/N 

3238726–1, –2 or MS9560–08. These 

two parts, P/N 3238726–1,–2 and 

MS9560–08, are components of and 

designed for, the fixed length actuator 

P/N 3275538–2, –3. These parts will not 

fit onto an adjustable end actuator, P/N 

3272602–2, –3. 

We agree. However, we are not 

specifying the part numbers for the 

replacement rod-ends, to prevent 

prohibiting installation of third party 

equipment that has been certified to be 

installed on the aircraft and has not 

been shown to create a safety risk. We 

are also updating the referenced Service 

Bulletin to Revision 3, dated September 

10, 2009, in place of Revision 1. 

Proposal To Change Applicability 

Paragraph 

Onur Air proposes that applicability 

paragraph (c) be changed to state that if 

the lower end actuator is a locking 

actuator assembly (part number 

3275546–1, 3275546–2, 3275548–1, or 

3275548–2), then the AD does not 

apply. This change would establish the 

same effectivity of parts for both the AD 

and MRAS ASB, and would eliminate 

confusion. 

We do not agree. Even if a locking 

actuator assembly is installed in the 

lower actuator position, a 3⁄8-inch rodend may be installed in the upper 

actuator position. MRAS ASB No. 

78A1162 Revision 1, dated February 13, 

2009; Revision 2, dated June 22, 2009; 

and Revision 3, dated September 10, 

2009, clarify that reverser halves that 

have a locking actuator assembly 

installed at the lower actuator position 

and an adjustable-length end actuator 

with 3⁄8-inch rod-end installed at the 

upper actuator position, are affected. We 

did not change the AD. 

Request for Rod-End Serial Numbers 

Onur Air states that because the 

proposed AD and associated Service 

Bulletin require a repetitive replacement 

of 3⁄8-inch rod-ends at 11,000 flight 

cycle intervals, the rod-ends should 

have physical serial numbers associated 

with them. The rod-ends need to be 

traceable to comply with the 11,000 

cycle repetitive inspection and without 

a serial number, replacement data 

cannot be monitored or proven. 

We do not agree. The rod-ends 

themselves are not serialized, but they 

can be tracked through the actuator 

assemblies. Only one rod-end is 

installed per actuator, so tracking the 

actuator assembly will track the number 

of cycles that the rod-end has 

accumulated. We did not change the 

AD. 

Extend the Compliance Time to Next CCheck 

Onur Air, FedEx Express, and 

Lufthansa Technik suggest that the 

initial compliance time be extended 

from within 500 flight cycles from the 

effective date of the AD to within the 

next C-Check after the effective date of 

the AD. The commenters cite that due 

to some airlines not having access to the 

MRAS component maintenance manual, 

it would be difficult to replace the clevis 

fasteners found failed as required in 

proposed AD paragraph (g)(4). 

Additionally, some replacement work 

would be more suitably done off-wing 

as opposed to at the next on-wing 

inspection. 

We do not agree. The compliance time 

of 500 flight cycles is based on 

component life calculations. 

Additionally, a C-Check is not defined 

consistently across the industry, and 

may be performed at a variety of 

intervals depending on the operator’s 

maintenance schedule, some of which 

may be significantly longer than the 500 

flight-cycle-limit mandated in this AD. 

Disagreement With the Unsafe 

Condition Statement 

Boeing, GE, and MRAS state that they 

disagree with the proposed AD unsafe 

condition statements of ‘‘possible loss of 

thrust control, asymmetric thrust, 

increased stopping distance’’. They state 

that conditions are not the expected 

result based on a review of the event on 

the Boeing 767 airplane. There was no 

indication, neither tactile nor flight deck 

light, that alerted the pilot that the event 

had occurred. The only effect from the 

failed rod-end at the airplane level was 

the parts on the runway. There was no 

reported thrust control problem or 

airplane control problem. The statement 

‘‘hazardous debris on the runway’’ 

however, is accurate. The commenters 

state that this information was 

determined as not a safety matter. This 

was based on the analysis showing there 

was no control issue. Additionally, 

transcowl liberation does not result in 

the loss of engine thrust control. 

We do not agree. Although one 

particular case may not have needed 

crew response, other instances of 

transcowl liberation that led to the 

development of this AD included 

reports of airplane yaw upon loss of the 

transcowl. The possibility of this 

occurring again led to the unsafe 

conditions of ‘‘possible loss of 

asymmetric thrust and thrust control.’’ 

Loss of thrust control is included, 

because the asymmetric thrust created 

by transcowl liberation is not 

commanded by the crew. We changed 

the AD to simplify the unsafe condition 

by addressing only the conditions that 

pose an immediate threat to the aircraft. 

Request To Re-Examine the Cost of 

Compliance 

FedEx Express, GE, and MRAS 

request that the FAA re-examine the 

criteria and considerations used to 

estimate the cost of compliance for 

accomplishing the proposed AD. The 

true costs to U.S. operators will be 

higher than the figures published in the 

NPRM. Revised cost estimates should be 

provided which also reflect transcowl 

rigging work-hours as well as cost for 

repetitive accomplishment (versus 

termination), reworking common end 

actuator hardware installed on nonVerDate Nov<24>2008 16:23 Oct 26, 2009 Jkt 220001 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\27OCR1.SGM 27OCR1

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55128 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 206 / Tuesday, October 27, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

CF6–80C2 engines, and include 

adjustment for higher levels of 

discrepant clevis fastener discoveries. 

The commenters state that the workhours quoted, need for repetitive 

inspections, percentage of transcowls 

needing repair work, and parts 

replacement are not reflective of what 

the actual operating fleet will encounter. 

We agree. We updated the number of 

work-hours to provide a more accurate 

accounting for the cost of this AD. Our 

best, and most substantiated, estimate of 

parts expected to fail is about 10%, 

therefore we did not change the 

percentage in our calculations. 

Hardware Not Presently Installed 

FedEx Express requests that proposed 

AD paragraph (h) be clarified with 

regards to addressing what actions, if 

any, should be applied to end actuator 

assemblies with the 3⁄8-inch diameter 

rod-ends that are identical to the subject 

hardware specified in the proposed AD, 

but which are not presently installed on 

any CF6–80C2 series engine thrust 

reverser. After the initial 500 flight cycle 

compliance period, the installation of 

end actuators with such rod-ends could 

result in potential noncompliance with 

the intent of the AD. The commenter 

recommends additional language that 

will direct the inspection of such 

actuator rod-ends before installation on 

CF6–80C2 series engine thrust reversers, 

especially after the initial 500 flightcycle compliance period has been 

exceeded. 

We do not agree. This AD addresses 

what actions are required for end 

actuator assemblies installed on a CF6– 

80C2 engine. Any assembly installed on 

an engine affected by this AD is subject 

to the inspections and replacements as 

defined in this AD. Also, the AD limits 

which rod-ends may be installed on an 

engine. If an actuator assembly is to be 

installed on an engine, it must be 

verified that all parts comply with this 

AD. We did not change the AD. 

Include Additional Part Numbers and 

Define Wear Limits 

American Airlines requests that 

additional part numbers for replacement 

parts should be included in paragraphs 

1.E and 2.A.(1) of MRAS ASB No. 

78A1162. Also, the commenter requests 

that paragraph 3.D.(3) of this ASB 

should define wear limits to the torsion 

arm to prevent structurally sound 

torsion arms from being removed due to 

minor surface damage. The additional 

part numbers would allow parts to be 

purchased from vendors other than 

Honeywell or MRAS. 

We do not agree. We are not 

incorporating by reference Service 

Bulletin paragraphs 1.E., 3.D.(3), and 

2.A.(1) in the AD. Therefore, these 

paragraphs are not mandated by the 

FAA. We did not change the AD. 

Specifically Identify Items To Be 

Inspected 

American Airlines states that in the 

proposed AD in the ‘‘FAA’s 

Determination and Requirements of the 

Proposed AD’’ section, it should not 

state generally that ‘‘the other hardware 

that connects the thrust reverser 

transcowl to the engine’’ is subject to 

initial inspection and replacement. 

Rather, this section should specifically 

identify the items to be targeted in the 

initial inspection and replacement 

actions. 

We do not agree. The ‘‘FAA’s 

Determination and Requirements of the 

Proposed AD’’ section is a summary. 

The specific hardware needing 

inspection per this AD is defined in 

paragraph (f) of this AD. We did not 

change the AD. 

Request To Reference Alert Service 

Bulletin Revision 2 

GE and MRAS state that all references 

to ASB No. S/B 78A1162, Revision 1, 

should be changed to ASB No. S/B 

78A1162, Revision 2, before the AD is 

issued. 

We agree that we should reference the 

latest revision of the ASB. We changed 

the AD to reference the latest ASB 

revision which is Revision 3, dated 

September 10, 2009. We also updated 

the previous credit paragraph (k) to 

include Revision 1 and Revision 2. 

Remove Phrase From Discussion 

Section 

GE and MRAS request that, in the 

proposed AD Discussion section, we 

remove the phrase ‘‘or the CDU clevis 

pin to lose its retaining capability’’. 

There has never been a field finding or 

event investigation that indicates that an 

actuator-out condition contributes to the 

CDU clevis pin losing its retaining 

capability. 

We do not agree. Although the AD 

does not address the loss of CDU clevis 

pin retaining capability leading to the 

failure of an actuator rod end, the clevis 

pins should still be inspected to ensure 

the part is in good condition and is held 

securely in place. We did not change the 

AD. 

Remove Repetitive Replacements of 3⁄8- 

Inch Rod-Ends From the AD 

GE and MRAS request that we remove 

the repetitive replacements of 3⁄8-inch 

rod-ends from the AD. The commenters 

do not envision the repetitive need for 

on-wing replacements of 3⁄8-inch rodends, and state that the replacement of 

3⁄8-inch rod-ends with 7⁄16-inch or fixed 

length rod-ends would provide 

terminating action. 

We do not agree. Repetitively 

replacing the 3⁄8-inch rod-ends within 

the cyclic accumulation defined in the 

AD provides an adequate level of safety. 

Requiring replacement of all 3⁄8-inch 

rod-ends with 7⁄16-inch or fixed length 

rod-ends would require considerably 

more effort for a number of engines. 

Although it is an acceptable terminating 

action, it is not the only course of action 

that resolves the unsafe condition. We 

did not change the AD. 

Update the Applicability Section 

GE and MRAS request that the 

Applicability section be updated to take 

into account the possibility of 3⁄8-inch 

rod-ends with part numbers other than 

those defined in this AD being installed. 

They state that the AD should apply to 

all 3⁄8-inch rod-ends, including those 

which may be a third-party design 

which have not been validated through 

this AD. 

We agree. The AD needs to ensure 

that all 3⁄8-inch rod-ends are replaced, 

except as noted in the AD itself. We 

updated the wording of the 

Applicability section, as well as other 

affected sections in the AD, to reflect 

this. 

Inspection and Replacement 

Paragraphs Should Be Expanded 

GE and MRAS state that in the 

compliance section, under the ‘‘Visual 

Inspection and Fastening Hardware 

Replacements’’ heading, the paragraphs 

used for the inspection and replacement 

should be expanded to read ‘‘Use 

paragraph 3.B.(1) and 3.B.(2)’’. 

Additionally, the phrase ‘‘clevis 

brackets’’ should be replaced with 

‘‘clevis assembly’’, because this is more 

appropriate nomenclature. These 

paragraphs were omitted in the 

proposed AD, but are needed to provide 

instructions on part inspection. 

We agree. We incorporated by 

reference these paragraphs into the AD; 

however, we excluded the reporting 

requirements in those paragraphs, as 

they are not required by this AD. We 

also changed clevis bracket to clevis 

assembly. 

Allow Deferral of the Repair and 

Deactivate the Thrust Reverser 

GE and MRAS state that in the 

compliance section, under the ‘‘Visual 

Inspection and Fastening Hardware 

Replacements’’ heading, the proposed 

AD paragraph (g)(4), should be 

reworded as follows: ‘‘If loose or 

missing clevis fasteners are found, 


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remove and replace the clevis fasteners, 

or defer the repair and deactivate the 

thrust reverser per existing MEL limits. 

Use paragraph 3.F.(2) of MRAS CF6– 

80C2 ASB No. 78A1162 Revision 2, 

dated June 22, 2009, to do the 

replacements or to deactivate the thrust 

reverser. Deactivation is not allowed/ 

specified if referring only to steps 

3.F.(2)(a) through 3.F.(2)(c). 

We agree that the AD needs to allow 

thrust reverser deactivation. We 

changed the AD to allow deactivation of 

the thrust reverser. 

Change the Company Contact 

Information 

GE and MRAS request that under 

‘‘Related Information’’ the company 

contact information be changed to ‘‘attn: 

Product Support Engineering; e-mail 

bulletins@mras-usa.com for a copy of 

the service information identified in this 

AD.’’ MRAS Warranty Support does not 

provide service information. MRAS 

Product Support Engineering distributes 

service bulletins via e-mail, not by 

telephone or fax. 

We partially agree. We added that 

contact information. 

Remove Documentation Requirements 

GE and MRAS request that we remove 

from the AD the documentation 

requirements that are defined in 

paragraphs 3.C.(3)(b) and 3.E.(5) of the 

Service Bulletin. 

We agree. We excluded those 

paragraphs from the incorporation by 

reference of the Service Bulletin, in the 

AD. 

Conclusion 

We have carefully reviewed the 

available data, including the comments 

received, and determined that air safety 

and the public interest require adopting 

the AD with the changes described 

previously. We have determined that 

these changes will neither increase the 

economic burden on any operator nor 

increase the scope of the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

750 GE CF6–80C2 series turbofan 

engines installed on airplanes of U.S. 

registry. We also estimate that it will 

take about 1.5 work-hours per engine to 

perform the inspection, one work-hour 

per engine to perform the rod-end 

replacement, and 48 work-hours per 

engine to perform the clevis assembly 

replacement. The average labor rate is 

$80 per work-hour. Required rod-ends 

will cost about $508 per engine. We 

estimate that 75 engines will require 

clevis bracket replacement. Required 

replacement clevis assemblies and 

associated labor will cost about 

$1,246,200. Based on these figures, we 

estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. 

operators to be $1,777,200. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

Section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a summary of the costs 

to comply with this AD and placed it in 

the AD Docket. You may get a copy of 

this summary at the address listed 

under ADDRESSES. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the Federal Aviation Administration 

amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 

2009–21–07 General Electric Company: 

Amendment 39–16044. Docket No. 

FAA–2009–0018; Directorate Identifier 

2009–NE–01–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective December 1, 2009. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to General Electric 

Company (GE) CF6–80C2 series turbofan 

engines with thrust reverser ballscrew 

gearbox assembly adjustable-length end 

actuators having 3⁄8-inch rod-ends installed. 

These engines are installed on, but not 

limited to, Airbus A300–600/R/F and A310– 

200/300, and Boeing 747–200B/300/400/ 

400D/400F, 767–200/300/300F/400ER, and 

MD–11 airplanes. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from reports of four 

failures of rod-ends on certain thrust reverser 

ballscrew gearbox assembly adjustable-length 

end actuators, leading to partial or complete 

separation of the transcowl from the engine 

and airplane during thrust reversal. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent loss of asymmetric 

thrust and thrust control. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Visual Inspection and Fastening Hardware 

Replacements 

(f) Within 500 flight cycles after the 

effective date of this AD, do the following: 

(1) Inspect all translating cowl clevis pin 

retaining clips and associated fastening 

hardware, including those on the center drive 

unit (CDU), to ensure they are properly 

assembled and securely fastened in place. If 

a retaining clip is not completely covering 

the clevis pin and firmly attached to the 

clevis, remove and replace the fastening 

hardware. Use paragraphs 3.B.(1) and 3.B.(2), 

excluding 3.B.(2)(a), of Middle River Aircraft 

Systems (MRAS) Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 

No. CF6–80C2 S/B 78A1162, Revision 3, 

dated September 10, 2009, to do the 

inspections. 

(2) Remove and inspect all clevis pins for 

physical damage or significant corrosion. Use 

paragraphs 3.C.(1) through 3.C.(3), excluding 

the recording requirement in paragraph 

3.C.(3)(b) of MRAS ASB No. CF6–80C2 S/B 

78A1162, Revision 3, dated September 10, 


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55130 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 206 / Tuesday, October 27, 2009 / Rules and Regulations 

2009, to do the removals, inspections, and 

part disposition as necessary. 

(3) Inspect the clevis assemblies and four 

clevis fasteners at each of the clevis 

assemblies (upper, center, and lower) for 

structural integrity. Use paragraphs 3.F.(1), 

excluding 3.F.(1)(c) of MRAS ASB No. CF6– 

80C2 S/B 78A1162, Revision 3, dated 

September 10, 2009, to do the inspections. 

(4) If loose or missing clevis fasteners are 

found, remove and replace the clevis 

fasteners, or defer the repair and deactivate 

the thrust reverser. Use paragraph 3.F.(2) of 

MRAS ASB No. CF6–80C2 S/B 78A1162, 

Revision 3, dated September 10, 2009, to do 

the replacements. 

Initial Rod-End Replacements 

(g) For all 3⁄8-inch translating cowl 

adjustable-length actuator rod-ends having 

more than 600 flight cycles-since-new on the 

effective date of this AD, replace them with 

P/N M81935/1–6, or other approved part 

number, zero time rod-ends within 500 flight 

cycles after the effective date of this AD. Use 

paragraph 3.E., excluding both 3.E.(8) and the 

recording requirement in paragraph 3.E.(5) of 

MRAS ASB No. CF6–80C2 S/B 78A1162, 

Revision 3, dated September 10, 2009, to do 

the replacements. 

Repetitive 3⁄8-Inch Rod-End Replacements 

(h) Repetitively replace the 3⁄8-inch 

translating cowl adjustable-length actuator 

rod-ends that were installed as specified in 

paragraph (g) of this AD, before they 

accumulate 11,000 flight cycles, with a zero 

time 3⁄8-inch adjustable-length rod-end, P/N 

M81935/1–6 or other approved part number. 

Since the rod-ends are not serialized, track 

their life by using the associated actuator 

assembly’s life. Use paragraphs 3.E., 

excluding both paragraph 3.E.(8) and the 

recording requirement in paragraph 3.E.(5), 

of MRAS ASB No. CF6–80C2 S/B 78A1162, 

Revision 3, dated September 10, 2009, to do 

the replacements. 

Optional Terminating Action 

(i) As an optional terminating action to the 

repetitive 3⁄8-inch rod-end replacements 

required by this AD, replace the 3⁄8-inch 

adjustable rod-ends with a 7⁄16-inch 

adjustable rod-end and nut or you may 

replace the adjustable end actuator with a 

fixed end actuator. Use paragraph 3.E.(1) of 

MRAS ASB No. CF6–80C2 S/B 78A1162, 

Revision 3, dated September 10, 2009, to do 

the replacements. 

Installation Prohibition 

(j) After the effective date of this AD, do 

not install rod-ends P/Ns KBE6–59, 

MS2124S06, B15946–13 or 15946000–13, on 

any engine subject to this AD. Rod-ends 

removed to comply with this AD are not 

eligible for installation on any aircraft. 

Previous Credit 

(k) Inspections and replacements and 

optional terminating action performed before 

the effective date of this AD using MRAS 

ASB No. CF6–80C2 S/B 78A1162, dated 

December 30, 2008; Revision 1, dated 

February 13, 2009; or Revision 2, dated June 

22, 2009, satisfy the required initial actions 

and optional terminating action of this AD. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(l) The Manager, Engine Certification 

Office, has the authority to approve 

alternative methods of compliance for this 

AD if requested using the procedures found 

in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Related Information 

(m) Contact Christopher J. Richards, 

Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification 

Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 

12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, 

MA 01803; e-mail: 

christopher.j.richards@faa.gov; telephone 

(781) 238–7133; fax (781) 238–7199, for more 

information about this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(n) You must use Middle River Aircraft 

Systems Alert Service Bulletin No. CF6–80C2 

S/B 78A1162, Revision 3, dated September 

10, 2009, to perform the actions required by 

this AD. The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service bulletin in accordance with 5 

U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact 

Middle River Aircraft Systems, 103 

Chesapeake Park Plaza, MF 46, Baltimore, 

MD 21220; telephone (410) 682–0080; fax 

(410) 682–0100; or e-mail: bulletins@mrasusa.com, for a copy of this service 

information. You may review copies at the 

FAA, New England Region, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on 

October 2, 2009. 

Peter A. White, 

Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E9–24391 Filed 10–26–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2006–25244; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NE–25–AD; Amendment 39– 

16054; AD 2009–22–03] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Hartzell 

Propeller Inc. ()HC–()2Y(K,R)–() Series 

Propellers 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding an 

existing airworthiness directive (AD) for 

Hartzell Propeller Inc. ()HC–()2Y()–() 

series propellers with non-suffix serial 

number (SN) propeller hubs installed on 

Lycoming O–, IO–, LO–, and AEIO–360 

series reciprocating engines. That AD 

currently requires initial and repetitive 

eddy current inspections (ECIs) of the 

front cylinder half of the propeller hub 

for cracks and removing cracked hubs 

from service before further flight. In 

addition, that AD allows installation of 

an improved design propeller hub 

(suffix SN ‘‘A’’ or ‘‘B’’) as terminating 

action to the repetitive ECI. This ad 

requires the same actions but changes 

the affected propeller series designation 

to ()HC–()2Y(K,R)–() series propellers 

with non-suffix SN propeller hubs and 

suffix SN letter ‘‘E’’ propeller hubs. This 

AD also expands the engine eligibility to 

include Lycoming LIO–, TO–, LTO–, 

AIO–, and TIO–360-series engines. This 

AD results from the need to make 

changes to the affected series 

designation of propellers, to expand the 

engine applicability, and to respond to 

comments received on AD 2006–18–15. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent 

failure of the propeller hub causing 

blade separation and subsequent loss of 

airplane control. 

DATES: Effective November 12, 2009. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the 

regulations as of November 12, 2009. 

We must receive any comments on 

this AD by December 28, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to comment on this AD. 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

Washington, DC 20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim 

Smyth, Senior Aerospace Engineer, 

Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, 

FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 2300 

East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, IL 

60018–4696; e-mail: 

timothy.smyth@faa.gov; telephone (847) 

294–7132; fax (847) 294–7834. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

amends 14 CFR part 39 by superseding 

AD 2006–18–15, Amendment 39–14754 

(71 FR 52994, September 8, 2006). That 

AD requires initial and repetitive ECIs 

of the front cylinder half of the propeller 

hub for cracks and removing cracked 

hubs from service before further flight. 


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