IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA19-530

Filed: 6 October 2020

Cumberland County, No. 01 CRS 059934

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JAMES RYAN KELLIHER, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 13 December 2018 by Judge Carl 

R. Fox in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 

February 2020.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly N. 

Callahan, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Kathryn L. 

VandenBerg, for Defendant.

McGEE, Chief Judge.

James Ryan Kelliher (“Defendant”), following a troubled early life marked by 

physical abuse and substance use, participated in a robbery at age 17 that ended with 

the murders of a man and his pregnant girlfriend. Defendant was sentenced to two 

consecutive mandatory punishments of life without parole (“LWOP”). Following the 

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 183 L. 

Ed. 2d 407 (2012), and the General Assembly’s enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1340.19A, et seq. in response, Defendant sought and received a resentencing hearing. 
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At resentencing, the trial court determined that mitigating factors outweighed the 

circumstances of the offenses, concluded Defendant was neither “incorrigible” nor 

“irredeemable,” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72, 75, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825, 844, 846 

(2010), and resentenced him to two consecutive sentences of life with parole. Under 

the terms of these sentences, Defendant will not be eligible for parole until he has 

served 50 years in prison, placing his earliest possible release at age 67. Defendant 

now appeals, arguing that the consecutive sentences constitute de facto LWOP in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina 

Constitution. We agree with Defendant and reverse and remand for resentencing.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Defendant’s Early Life

Defendant was born in 1984 as the youngest of three siblings. Though he had 

good relationships with his mother and older sisters, Defendant’s father physically 

abused him during his childhood. Defendant began abusing substances at an early 

age; he began drinking alcohol at age 13, was drinking daily and using marijuana at 

age 15, and was under the continuous influence of some combination of alcohol, 

marijuana, ecstasy, acid, psilocybin, and cocaine at age 17. Defendant attempted 

suicide on three occasions: first by overdose at age 10, again at age 17 on the night 

after the murders, and a final time while awaiting trial. He dropped out of school in 

the ninth grade, and exhibited the equivalent of a sixth grade education at age 17.
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Defendant committed several thefts in his teenage years, breaking and 

entering into vehicles and stores after they had closed. On one occasion, Defendant 

stole from a video store with the help of someone named Jerome Branch. Defendant, 

Mr. Branch, and Joshua Ballard would “hang out” together during this time, drinking 

alcohol and doing drugs. 

B. The Murders

In the days before the murders involved in this appeal, Mr. Ballard suggested 

to Defendant that they rob a cocaine and marijuana dealer named Eric Carpenter. 

The two discussed the matter several times, with Mr. Ballard stating in later 

conversations that he believed he would have to kill Mr. Carpenter in order to avoid 

being identified as one of the perpetrators of the robbery. Defendant offered to give 

a firearm he had previously stolen from a pawn shop to Mr. Ballard for this purpose. 

They continued to plan the robbery over future phone calls, ultimately agreeing that 

Defendant would serve as the driver while Mr. Ballard killed and robbed Mr. 

Carpenter. Mr. Branch was later included in the planning, though he was never 

given a defined role. Defendant also told his friend Liz Perry about the plans to rob 

and murder Mr. Carpenter. 

Mr. Ballard arranged to purchase drugs from Mr. Carpenter behind a local 

furniture store on 7 August 2001. On the night of the drug deal, Defendant drove Mr.

Ballard and Mr. Branch to the furniture store in Mr. Ballard’s truck. They met with 
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Mr. Carpenter when they arrived, but they spotted a marked police vehicle in the 

parking lot and arranged with Mr. Carpenter to move the deal to his apartment. 

Carpenter’s girlfriend, Kelsea Helton, also lived at the apartment, and was present 

when the group reconvened in the apartment parking lot a short time later. 

Following introductions, everyone went inside the apartment and began talking 

civilly. Ms. Helton left the apartment briefly; when she returned,

1 the conversation 

turned to her pregnancy. What exactly occurred after that conversation is disputed; 

what is certain, however, is that when it came time to carry out the robbery, 

Defendant, Mr. Ballard, or both shot and killed Mr. Carpenter and Ms. Helton. 

Defendant, Mr. Branch, and Mr. Ballard met in the parking lot after the 

shooting and split the drugs they had stolen from the apartment. The three met with 

another group, which included Defendant’s friend, Ms. Perry, at a local park where 

they drank cognac and smoked marijuana laced with cocaine. At some point during 

the evening, Defendant told Ms. Perry about the robbery and murders. Defendant, 

Mr. Ballard and Mr. Branch were later arrested for the murders.

C. Defendant’s Plea and Ballard’s Trials

Defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of 

robbery with a dangerous weapon, and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery 

 

1 Ms. Helton’s father, in his victim impact statement, said Ms. Helton left the apartment to 

call her sister to finalize plans to vacate Mr. Carpenter’s apartment and move in with her sister later 

that evening because Ms. Helton felt there were “some things that [were] happening [she] d[id]n’t 

like.” 
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with a dangerous weapon by a grand jury on 25 March 2002. He pleaded guilty to all 

charges in 2004 and was sentenced to two consecutive terms of LWOP for the murders

and concurrent terms of years for the robbery and conspiracy convictions.

2 Mr. 

Ballard was also charged with two counts of first-degree murder but pleaded not 

guilty. 

Although his plea agreement did not require it, Defendant testified for the 

State at Mr. Ballard’s trial,3 as did Ms. Perry and a friend of Mr. Ballard, Lisa 

Boliaris. Defendant testified that he did not shoot either Mr. Carpenter or Ms. Helton, 

instead stating that Mr. Ballard shot both victims. Ms. Perry offered a different 

account, stating that Defendant had admitted to killing the couple on the night of the 

murders. Ms. Boliaris gave yet another recollection of events, testifying that Mr. 

Ballard told her he shot Mr. Carpenter while Defendant killed Ms. Helton.4 

Mr. Carpenter was convicted of the killings at the conclusion of his trial. 

However, his convictions were set aside on appeal and Mr. Ballard was granted a new 

trial. Ballard, 180 N.C. App. at 646, 638 S.E.2d at 481. Defendant again testified for 

the State on retrial, but Mr. Ballard was ultimately acquitted. The district attorney 

who secured Defendant’s plea and prosecuted both of Mr. Ballard’s trials later wrote 

 

2 Defendant has since served the terms for robbery and conspiracy. 

3 Mr. Branch pled guilty to accessory after the fact and was sentenced to a six-to-eight-year 

term of imprisonment. He did not testify against Mr. Ballard. 

4 A more detailed rendition of this testimony is available in this Court’s opinion in State v. 

Ballard, 180 N.C. App. 637, 638 S.E.2d 474 (2006). 
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a letter to Defendant’s counsel stating that he believed Defendant “testified truthfully 

in both trials.” 

D. Defendant’s Resentencing

Defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) in June 2013. In that 

motion, Defendant asserted that: (1) the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 

Miller rendered his LWOP sentences unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina 

Constitution; (2) resentencing was required under the recently enacted N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 15A-1340.19B;

5 and (3) life with the possibility of parole was the appropriate 

sentence. The MAR was denied by the trial court on the grounds that Miller and N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B did not apply retroactively. That order was subsequently 

reversed by order of this Court, and Defendant received a resentencing hearing on 13 

December 2018. 

At the resentencing hearing, Defendant and the State consented to a recitation 

of the facts surrounding the murders consistent with the above history. The State 

called the fathers of Mr. Carpenter and Ms. Helton to give victim impact statements. 

Both testified to the indescribable hardship of losing a child—and future grandchild—

 

5 Defendant’s MAR sought relief under subsection (a)(1) of the statute, which applies to 

juvenile felony murder convictions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(1) (2019). Defendant was 

ultimately resentenced pursuant to subsection (a)(2), which applies to all other juvenile first-degree 

murder convictions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(2) (2019). Defendant did not argue the 

applicability of subsection (a)(1) at resentencing, conceded that this was not a felony murder case 

before the trial court, and does not raise the issue on appeal. 
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and the enduring impact on their families. Each expressed their love for their 

children, their dismay at the loss of life, the sadness of lost opportunities to raise their

grandchild, and the lasting emotional trauma inflicted on their families. The State 

rested its presentation following their testimony.

Defendant presented the testimony of several witnesses in mitigation. A 

clinical and forensic psychologist who had examined Defendant in January and 

February of 2019 testified that Defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress 

disorder as a result of the murders. He further reported that although Defendant 

had a history of antisocial behavior, Defendant had ceased to exhibit those traits since 

he had been imprisoned in 2004. The psychologist’s report detailed Defendant’s 

childhood physical and drug abuse, his shortened education, and his efforts at selfimprovement while in prison. Specifically, the report disclosed that Defendant had 

earned his GED and was pursuing a bachelor’s degree in ministry from Southeastern 

Baptist Theological Seminary (“the Seminary”). Based on Defendant’s history, 

current diagnoses, and efforts to better himself, the psychologist determined that 

Defendant presented a low risk of future violence and was neither incorrigible nor 

irredeemable. This low risk aligned with a separate assessment conducted by the 

Department of Public Safety. 

Defendant offered additional testimony from the director of prison programs 

at the Seminary. He testified that Defendant was accepted into the four-year 
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seminary program after a rigorous application process, describing him as an active 

and very good student. Another witness from the Seminary testified that Defendant 

assisted other students, was professional in his conduct, and sought to minister to 

inmates outside the program who were struggling with incarceration. A pastor from 

Redeemer Lutheran Church in Fayetteville also testified, stating he had visited with 

Defendant every week since his arrest and had seen a remarkable change: “[T]oday 

unfortunately [Defendant] makes me ashamed of my own spirituality. . . . [H]e is the 

one who sometimes comforts me instead of vice versa. . . . He’s the one who has 

consoled me. So, I enjoy immensely our visits because I think frankly I get more out 

of it than he does.” 

Defendant also tendered documentary evidence in support of mitigation, 

including his record of two nonviolent infractions while in prison and the assessments 

of low risk completed by the Department of Public Safety and Defendant’s 

psychologist. He concluded his presentation of evidence by colloquy, telling the trial 

court that he knew he had “failed to do anything resembling the right thing” and 

thought about the victims everyday with sorrow and regret. He stated that although 

he knew he could never undo the pain caused, he sought to improve himself so that 

he might help others “as harm reduction.” He concluded by telling the court he 

“wish[ed] more than anything that [he] could somehow do something to change the 

events from August 7, 2001.” 
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In closing arguments, the State asked the trial court to sentence Defendant to 

either LWOP, or to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole as an 

alternative. Defendant argued for concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of 

parole, requesting that the Department of Correction have the opportunity to review 

Defendant’s eligibility for parole at 25 years rather than 50 years. The trial court 

then announced its order, which included thirteen findings in mitigation based on 

Defendant’s troubled early life, his immaturity and drug addictions at the time of the 

offenses, and the substantial evidence of rehabilitation. Based on these findings, the 

trial court concluded that “[t]he mitigating factors and other factors and 

circumstances present outweigh all the circumstances of the offense[,]” and 

“Defendant is neither incorrigible nor irredeemable.” The trial court then sentenced 

Defendant to two consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole. 

Defendant appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant presents one principal argument on appeal: Defendant’s two 

consecutive sentences, considered in the aggregate, constitute a disproportionate de 

facto punishment of LWOP in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Article I, Section 27 of the North Carolina Constitution. 

More specifically, he contends that because he is a juvenile defendant and is neither 

incorrigible nor irredeemable, this de facto LWOP sentence violates Miller and 
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related United States Supreme Court precedents, as determined by several state and 

federal courts that have considered the question. The State, in response, contends 

that Defendant failed to preserve this issue and, in the alternative, asks us to follow 

a different line of state and federal decisions that have rejected arguments similar to 

Defendant’s. We first address the State’s preservation argument before reaching the 

merits of Defendant’s appeal.

A. Preservation

Our Supreme Court has made clear that the North Carolina Rules of Appellate 

Procedure require constitutional sentencing errors be raised before the trial court in 

order to be preserved for appellate review. State v. Meadows, 371 N.C. 742, 749, 821 

S.E.2d 402, 407 (2018). However, a party is only required to “stat[e] the specific 

grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were 

not apparent from the context[,]” N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (2020) (emphasis added), 

and our Supreme Court has held constitutional arguments “implicitly presented to 

the trial court” are preserved for review. State v. Murphy, 342 N.C. 813, 822, 467 

S.E.2d 428, 433 (1996). Defendant insists that his argument was preserved on appeal 

under these precedents because: (1) his MAR sought a sentence that comported with 

the Eighth Amendment, Miller, and the North Carolina Constitution; and (2) his 

counsel argued for concurrent sentences based on Miller at the resentencing hearing. 

Reviewing the transcript from the resentencing hearing, Defendant’s counsel did 
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argue that concurrent sentences were appropriate, given the alternative would 

prohibit parole for 50 years:

I would just say this as far as the punishment is concerned. 

I’m 68, if you sentence me to 50 years, I’ll do the best I can 

but I’m going to leave most of that time on the floor. If you 

sentence me to 25, I may make it.

If you sentence a 17-year old to 25 years, he’ll do 100 

percent of that sentence probably. But at the end of 25 

years if he’s serving consecutive sentences, he doesn’t get 

out.

. . . .

And then at some point possibly he’ll be paper paroled6

from the first one and get to serve a minimum of 25 more 

years before he’s reviewed again and then every two years.

. . . .

Now he’s going to be in prison for a while. He’s only done 

17 years. But we’re asking the Court to put it in the hands 

of Department of Corrections [sic] to let them review him 

as they have scrutinized his life for 17 years and sentence 

him to life with parole and run the sentences concurrently.

Construed together with his MAR, we hold that Defendant has, at a minimum, raised 

an implied argument that two concurrent sentences of life—with the possibility of 

 

6 We note that the practice of issuing “paper parole” is no longer permitted under North 

Carolina law. See Robbins v. Freeman, 127 N.C. App. 162, 165, 487 S.E.2d 771, 773 (1997) (“[W]e can 

find no statutory authority for [the Department of Correction’s and Parole Commission’s] practice of 

issuing ‘paper paroles.’ ”), aff’d per curiam, 347 N.C. 664, 496 S.E.2d 375 (1998). We thus understand 

counsel’s argument as asserting that parole is not available under two consecutive sentences for life 

with the possibility parole until 50 years into a defendant’s sentence. Both Defendant and the State 

agree on appeal that Defendant must serve 50 years before being eligible for parole under the 

consecutive sentences imposed in this case. 
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parole after 25 years, as opposed to 50 years—are proportional punishment under the 

Eighth Amendment, Miller, and the North Carolina Constitution. Defendant has 

therefore preserved his constitutional argument for review.

Although we hold Defendant has preserved his argument, we note that he has 

requested this Court use its discretion to invoke Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules 

of Appellate Procedure and set aside the requirements of Rule 10. See N.C. R. App. 

P. 2 (2020) (“To prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the 

public interest, either court of the appellate division may, except as otherwise 

expressly provided by these rules, suspend or vary the requirements of any of these 

rules in a case pending before it[.]”). Assuming arguendo that Defendant’s 

constitutional question was not preserved under Rule 10, a discretionary 

implementation of Rule 2 is warranted under the circumstances. Our Supreme Court 

has employed the Rule “on several occasions to review issues of constitutional 

importance.” State v. Mobley, 200 N.C. App. 570, 573, 684 S.E.2d 508, 510 (2009) 

(first citing State v. Dudley, 319 N.C. 656, 356 S.E.2d 361 (1987); and then citing State 

v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 565 S.E.2d 22 (2002)). Given that multiple state appellate
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courts7 and federal courts of appeal8 have addressed the constitutional issues

presented here—and there are at least four other similar cases presently pending 

before this Court9—Defendant’s appeal is certainly of “constitutional importance.” 

Mobley, 200 N.C. App. at 573, 684 S.E.2d at 510 (citations omitted). Furthermore, 

the State’s alleged violation of the United States Constitution in resentencing 

implicates a substantial right supporting application of Rule 2. See State v. Bursell, 

372 N.C. 196, 201, 827 S.E.2d 302, 306 (2019) (affirming this Court’s discretionary 

invocation of Rule 2 where the trial court “committed error relating to a substantial 

right,” namely the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under 

the Fourth Amendment). Our Supreme Court has invoked Rule 2 “more frequently 

in the criminal context when severe punishments were imposed[,]” lending further 

support to its application here. State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 316, 644 S.E.2d 201, 205 

 

7 See Pedroza v. State, 291 So.3d 541 (Fla. 2020); State v. Slocumb, 827 S.E.2d 148 (S.C. 2019); 

Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695 (Md. 2018); Veal v. State, 810 S.E.2d 127 (Ga.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. 

____, 139 S. Ct. 320, 202 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2018); Ira v. Janecka, 419 P.3d 161 (N.M. 2018); Kinkel v. 

Persson, 417 P.3d 401 (Or. 2018), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 139 S. Ct. 789, 202 L. Ed. 2d 585 (2019);

Lucero v. People, 394 P.3d 1128 (Colo. 2017), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 138 S. Ct. 641, 199 L. Ed. 2d 

544 (2018); State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 138 S. Ct. 640, 199 

L. Ed. 2d 543 (2018); State ex. rel Carr v. Wallace, 527 S.W.3d 55 (Mo. 2017); Steilman v. Michael, 407 

P.3d 313 (Mont. 2017); State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, (N.J. 2017); State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650 (Wash. 

2017) (en banc); People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884 (Ill. 2016); State ex rel. Morgan v. State, 217 So.3d 266 

(La. 2016); State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127 (Ohio 2016); Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920

(Va. 2016); Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031 (Conn. 2015); State v. Boston, 363 P.3d 453

(Nev. 2015); Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 

2013); People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012).

8 See United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d 

285 (3rd Cir. 2018); Kelly v. Brown, 851 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2017); Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th 

Cir. 2013); Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir.); Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012).

9 See State v. Anderson, No. COA19-841; State v. Slade, No. COA19-969; State v. Conner, No. 

COA19-1087; State v. Brimmer, No. COA19-1103.
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(2007) (first citing State v. Moore, 335 N.C. 567, 612, 440 S.E.2d 797, 823 (1994); then 

citing State v. Booher, 305 N.C. 554, 564, 290 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1982); then citing State 

v. Poplin, 304 N.C. 185, 186-87, 282 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1981); and then citing State v. 

Adams, 298 N.C. 802, 804, 260 S.E.2d 431, 432 (1979)). We therefore conclude that, 

even if Defendant failed to preserve his constitutional argument through valid 

objection under Rule 10, review of his appeal is appropriate pursuant to Rule 2.

B. The Eighth Amendment and Juveniles

Resolution of this appeal requires consideration of the Eighth Amendment as 

applied to juveniles under four decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: 

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

48, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407

(2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ____ U.S. ____, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016).

1. Roper Prohibits Execution of Juveniles

In the first of these cases, the Supreme Court considered “whether it is 

permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . to execute a juvenile 

offender who was older than 15 but younger than 18 when he committed a capital 

crime.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-56, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 13. It examined the question first 

by conducting “a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular 

by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question[,]” before 

“determinin[ing], in the exercise of our own independent judgment, whether the 
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death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.” Id. at 564, 193 L. Ed. 

2d at 18. The Supreme Court ultimately answered the question in the affirmative, 

issuing a categorical holding that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid 

imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their 

crimes were committed.” Id. at 578, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 28.

In conducting the first step of its two-pronged examination, the Supreme Court 

observed that, in the years leading up to the case, there was a “significant” and 

“consistent” trend away from the execution of juveniles amongst the States, id. at 

565-66, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 19-20, leading to the conclusion that “[a] majority of States 

have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18[.]” 

Id. at 568, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 21. It then turned to the second step: whether the Eighth 

Amendment compelled a categorical prohibition against the execution of juveniles. 

Id. The majority found the answer by recognizing that “the death penalty is reserved 

for a narrow category of crimes and offenders[,]” id. at 568-69, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 21, 

and then discerning that, because of their unique developmental characteristics,

“juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.” 

Id. at 569, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 21. Once these precepts were established, the Supreme 

Court concluded that “the penological justifications for the death penalty apply to 

them with lesser force than to adults[,]” id. at 571, 161 L. Ed. 2d. at 23, meaning that 

“[w]hen a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of 
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some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his 

potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.” Id. at 573-74, 161 

L. Ed. 2d at 24.

Roper makes clear that its logic is grounded in the fundamental recognition 

that juveniles are of a special character for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment. 

In examining juveniles as a class of criminal offenders, the Supreme Court observed 

that “[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate 

that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst 

offenders.” Id. at 570, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 21. Compared to adults, juveniles possess 

“ ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . . These 

qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.’ ” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367, 125 L. Ed. 2d 

290, 306 (1993)) (additional citation omitted). Such immaturity “means ‘their 

irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’ ” Id. at 570, 

161 L. Ed. 2d at 22 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 101 L. Ed. 

2d 702, 719 (1988) (plurality opinion)). Juveniles are likewise “more vulnerable or 

susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer 

pressure. . . . [J]uveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over their 

own environment,” id. at 569, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 22 (citations omitted), providing them 

“a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in 
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their whole environment.” Id. at 570, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 22 (citation omitted). Lastly, 

“the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality 

traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.” Id. (citation omitted). “From a 

moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those 

of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will 

be reformed.” Id. This is no less true of juveniles guilty of “a heinous crime.” Id. On 

the whole, juveniles are thus of “diminished culpability[.]” Id. at 571, 161 L. Ed. 2d 

at 23.

These unique qualities and resultant lesser culpability undercut the 

penological justifications behind the death penalty. Id. Death as retribution is 

disproportionate: 

Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s 

moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the 

wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong 

with a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not 

proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on 

one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to 

a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.

Id. Deterrence does not even the scales:

[I]t is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant 

or even measurable deterrent effect on juveniles . . . . [T]he 

absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of special concern 

because the same characteristics that render juveniles less 

culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be 

less susceptible to deterrence. . . . To the extent the 

juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent 

effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life 
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imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a 

severe sanction, in particular for a young person.

Id. at 571-72, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 23. The Supreme Court would later examine exactly 

when the “severe sanction” of LWOP may be imposed on juveniles in Graham.

2. Graham Prohibits LWOP for Juveniles in Non-Homicide Cases

In Graham, the Supreme Court extended the categorical rationale in Roper to 

hold that juveniles may not be sentenced to LWOP for non-homicide offenses under 

the Eighth Amendment. 560 U.S. at 61-62, 74, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837, 845. Taking the 

same two-pronged approach, the majority first determined that, in light of actual 

sentencing practices rather than strict consideration of legislative prohibitions, “life 

without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes is as rare as 

other sentencing practices found to be cruel and unusual.” Id. at 66, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 

840. Thus, though the practice was permitted in many states, it was nonetheless 

“exceedingly rare. And ‘it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed 

against it.’ ” Id. at 67, 176 L. Ed. 2d. at 841 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 

316, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 347 (2002)).

At the second step, the Graham Court took Roper’s observations about 

juveniles as foundational precepts:

Roper established that because juveniles have lessened 

culpability they are less deserving of the most severe 

punishments. 543 U.S., at 569. As compared to adults, 

juveniles have a “ ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped 

sense of responsibility’ ”; they “are more vulnerable or 
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susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 

including peer pressure”; and their characters are “not as 

well formed.” Id., at 569–570. These salient 

characteristics mean that “[i]t is difficult even for expert 

psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender 

whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, 

and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 

irreparable corruption.” Id., at 573. Accordingly, “juvenile 

offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the 

worst offenders.” Id., at 569. A juvenile is not absolved of 

responsibility for his actions, but his transgression “is not 

as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” Thompson,

supra, at 835 (plurality opinion).

Id. at 68, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 841. The Supreme Court then deemed it “relevant to 

consider next the nature of the offenses to which this harsh penalty [of LWOP] might 

apply[,]” id. at 68-69, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 842, and determined that not only are juveniles 

fundamentally less culpable, but, “when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile 

offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. 

The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the analysis.” Id. at 

69, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 842.

The Supreme Court turned next to the nature of the punishment. “[L]ife 

without parole is the second most severe penalty permitted by law.” Id. (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). LWOP sentences thus:

share some characteristics with death sentences that are 

shared by no other sentences. . . . [T]he sentence alters the 

offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives 

the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope 

of restoration[.] . . . [T]his sentence means denial of hope; 

it means that good behavior and character improvement 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might 

hold in store for the mind and spirit . . . he will remain in 

prison for the rest of his days.

Id. at 69-70, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 842 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Such 

lifelong permanence “is . . . especially harsh . . . for a juvenile. . . . A 16-year-old and 

a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in 

name only. This reality cannot be ignored.” Id. at 70-71, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 843

(citations omitted).

As a final consideration, the Supreme Court examined the penological 

underpinnings as applied to non-homicide juvenile defendants. In rejecting 

retribution and deterrence as valid objectives, id. at 71-72, 176 L. Ed. 2d. at 843-44, 

the majority relied extensively on Roper, reiterating that juveniles’ unique qualities 

render them less culpable and “less likely to take a possible punishment into 

consideration when making decisions.” Id. at 72, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 844. Incapacitation, 

too, was an inadequate justification for related reasons; juveniles are malleable, yet 

“[t]o justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever 

will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the 

juvenile is incorrigible. . . . [I]ncorrigibility is inconsistent with youth. . . . [LWOP] 

improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and 

maturity.” Id. at 72-73, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 844-45 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). The Supreme Court further held rehabilitation, a fourth penological
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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objective, is entirely irreconcilable with LWOP sentences. Id. at 74, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 

845.

Absent any adequate penological theory, and in light of “the limited culpability 

of juvenile homicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences[,]” the 

Supreme Court concluded that a categorical bar akin to Roper was required by the 

Eighth Amendment. Id. It further stressed that “[a] State is not required to 

guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. 

What the State must do, however, is give [such] defendants . . . some meaningful

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 

Id. at 75, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845-46.

3. Miller Prohibits Mandatory LWOP for Juvenile Homicide 

Defendants

The Supreme Court, relying on Roper and Graham, held in Miller that 

mandatory LWOP for a juvenile defendant convicted of homicide crimes is a 

disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 567 U.S. at 465, 183 L. 

Ed. 2d at 414-15. Its ruling was derived from “two strands of precedent reflecting our 

concern with proportionate punishment.” Id. at 470, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 417. The first,

which included Roper and Graham, announced categorical prohibitions against 

certain sentences “based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders 

and the severity of a penalty.” Id. (citation omitted). The second line “prohibited 

mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities 
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Opinion of the Court

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consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before 

sentencing him to death.” Id. at 470, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 418 (citations omitted). Taken 

together, “these two lines of precedent lead[] to the conclusion that mandatory lifewithout-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id.

The Court’s analysis in Miller began with Roper and Graham, which “establish 

that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” 

Id. at 471, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 418. Reiterating the three differences between adult and 

juvenile defendants identified in those two cases—immaturity, vulnerability to 

influence and lack of control, and malleability—as observations based “on common 

sense . . . [and] science and social science[,]” id. at 471, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 418-19, the 

Court again acknowledged that “those findings . . . both lessened a child’s moral 

culpability and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological 

development occurs, his deficiencies will be reformed.” Id. at 472, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 

419 (citations and quotation marks omitted). It once more stated that “the distinctive 

attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest 

sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” Id. Also, 

though it acknowledged Graham’s categorical holding applied only to non-homicide 

offenses, the Supreme Court clarified that “none of what [Graham] said about 

children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental 

vulnerabilities—is crime-specific. . . . So Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-
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Opinion of the Court

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without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only 

to nonhomicide offenses.” Id. at 473, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 420.

In considering the penalty itself, Miller pulled a flat parallel out of Graham: 

the “ ‘[t]reat[ment] [of] juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital punishment.’ ” 

Id. at 475, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 421 (alteration in original) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 

89, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 856 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment)). The Supreme 

Court thus turned to its line of death penalty cases, which require individualized 

sentencing “so that the death penalty is reserved only for the most culpable 

defendants committing the most serious offenses.” Id. at 475-76, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 421 

(citations omitted). When that line is considered “[i]n light of Graham’s reasoning, 

th[o]se decisions too show the flaws of imposing mandatory life-without-parole 

sentences on juvenile homicide offenders.” Id. at 476, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 422. 

Mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders thus ran afoul of both 

lines as disproportionate even though such sentences did not fit squarely within their 

express holdings. Id. at 479, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424. 

4. Montgomery: Miller Is Substantive Rule of Retroactive Effect

The core question in Montgomery was whether Miller’s holding announced a 

substantive rule of retroactive effect. ___ U.S. at ___, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 610. In 

concluding that it did, the Supreme Court clarified the applicability of Roper, 

Graham, and Miller in several ways pertinent to this appeal. First, it explained “[t]he 
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Opinion of the Court

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‘foundation stone’ for Miller’s analysis was this Court’s line of precedent holding 

certain punishments disproportionate when applied to juveniles. Those cases include 

Graham . . . and Roper.” Montgomery, ___ U.S. at ___, 193 L. ed. 2d at 618 (citations 

omitted). Second, and of particular importance to this appeal, it explained that Miller 

announced a categorical prohibition against LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide 

defendants who are not “irreparably corrupt”:

Miller . . . did more than require a sentencer to consider a 

juvenile offender's youth before imposing life without 

parole; it established that the penological justifications for 

life without parole collapse in light of “the distinctive 

attributes of youth.” Id., [567 U.S. at 472], 132 S. Ct. 2455, 

2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 419. Even if a court considers a 

child's age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in 

prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment 

for a child whose crime reflects “ ‘unfortunate yet transient 

immaturity.’ ” Id., at [479], 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 L. 

Ed. 2d 407, 424 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 573, 125 S. Ct. 

1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1). Because Miller determined that 

sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all 

but “ ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects 

irreparable corruption,’ ” 567 U.S., at [479-80], 132 S. Ct. 

2455, 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 424 (quoting Roper, supra,

at 573, 126 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1), it rendered life 

without parole an unconstitutional penalty for “a class of 

defendants because of their status”—that is, juvenile 

offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of 

youth. Penry, 492 U.S., at 330, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 

2d 256. As a result, Miller announced a substantive rule of 

constitutional law. 

Id. at ___, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 619-20. Thus, Montgomery, as a distillation of Roper, 

Graham, and Miller, made clear that juvenile homicide offenders who are neither 
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Opinion of the Court

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incorrigible nor irreparably corrupt, are—like other juvenile offenders—so distinct in 

their immaturity, vulnerability, and malleability as to be outside the realm of LWOP 

sentences under the Eighth Amendment.

C. Defendant’s Sentence and De Facto LWOP

Defendant’s argument asks us to apply the above principle from Miller, derived 

from Roper and Graham and plainly stated in Montgomery, to hold that Defendant’s 

consecutive sentences of life with parole constitute a de facto LWOP sentence in 

violation of those precedents and the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 27 of 

the North Carolina Constitution.

10 Specifically, he contends that because he will not 

be eligible for parole until age 67, he will not be afforded a “meaningful opportunity 

to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” Graham, 569 

U.S. at 75, 176 L. Ed. 2d. at 846, and will suffer “no chance for fulfillment outside 

prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.” Id. at 79, 176 L. Ed. 

2d at 848. See also Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424 (quoting the first 

excerpt from Graham). His ultimate argument thus consists of three constituent 

questions that do not appear to have been answered by the courts of this State and 

have caused concern in other jurisdictions: (1) are de facto LWOP sentences, as 

opposed to sentences expressly named as such, cognizable and barred as cruel and 

 

10 Our Supreme Court “historically has analyzed cruel and/or unusual punishment claims by 

criminal defendants the same under both the federal and state Constitutions.” State v. Green, 348 

N.C. 588, 603, 502 S.E.2d 819, 828 (1998). Our analysis therefore applies equally to both. 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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unusual when applied to redeemable juveniles under the Eighth Amendment; (2) can 

aggregated punishments, i.e. multiple consecutive sentences totaling a lengthy term 

of years, amount to a de facto LWOP sentence; and (3) must a de facto LWOP 

punishment obviously exceed a juvenile defendant’s natural life, or does some term 

of years that may (or may not) fall short of the juvenile’s full lifespan nonetheless 

constitute an impermissible de facto LWOP sentence?

1. De Facto LWOP Sentences

The question of whether de facto LWOP sentences are cognizable as a cruel 

and unusual punishment barred under Graham and Miller has been answered by a 

sizeable number of state appellate courts. Of those identified by this Court as having 

addressed the issue, these jurisdictions predictably fall into two camps: (1) those that 

recognize de facto LWOP sentences as cognizable and may warrant relief under the 
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Opinion of the Court

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Eighth Amendment;11 and (2) those that have thus far decided not to do so.12 A clear 

majority of these states count themselves among the former.

13 We see considerable 

reason to join the majority. 

 

11 See People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (holding consecutive sentences totaling 

110-years-to-life was de facto LWOP sentence under Graham); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 121-

22 (Iowa 2013) (holding a life sentence with parole eligibility after 60 years was a de facto LWOP 

sentence in violation of Miller); Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 141-42 (Wyo. 2014) (holding 

consecutive sentences, including a life sentence for homicide, with parole eligibility after 45 years was 

de facto LWOP controlled by Miller); Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, 1047-48 (Conn. 2015)

(holding a juvenile’s 50 year sentence without possibility of parole was a de facto LWOP sentence 

controlled by Miller); Henry v. State, 175 So.3d 675, 679-80 (Fla. 2015) (holding 90 year sentence for 

non-homicide juvenile defendant was unconstitutional under Graham); State v. Boston, 363 P.3d 453, 

458 (Nev. 2015) (holding aggregate sentences for non-homicide offenses placing parole eligibility at 

100 years are a de facto LWOP sentence in violation of Graham); People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884, 888

(Ill. 2016) (holding mandatory 97 year sentence with parole eligibility after 89 years is de facto LWOP 

and unconstitutional under Miller); State ex rel. Morgan v. State, 217 So.3d 266, 271 (La. 2016) (“We . 

. . construe the defendant’s 99-year sentence as an effective life sentence, illegal under Graham.”); 

State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127, 1140-41 (Ohio 2016) (holding consecutive terms-of-years sentences for 

non-homicide crimes with parole eligibility after 77 years is an unconstitutional de facto LWOP 

sentence under Graham); State ex. rel Carr v. Wallace, 527 S.W.3d 55, 63-64 (Mo. 2017) (holding 

mandatory concurrent sentences with parole eligibility after 50 years constituted a de facto LWOP 

sentence subject to Miller’s sentencing requirements); Steilman v. Michael, 407 P.3d 313, 319 (Mont. 

2017) (holding de facto LWOP sentences are subject to constitutional protections of Graham, Miller, 

and Montgomery); State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, 212 (N.J. 2017) (holding “lengthy term-of-years 

sentences that amount to life without parole” are controlled by Graham and Miller); State v. Ramos, 

387 P.3d 650, 659 (Wash. 2017) (en banc) (“We now join the majority of jurisdictions that have 

considered the question and hold that Miller does apply to juvenile homicide offenders facing de facto 

life-without-parole sentences.”); Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 431 (Pa. 2018) (holding a termof-years sentence constituting a de facto LWOP sentence requires sentencing protections of Miller); 

Carter v. State, 192 A.3d 695, 735 (Md. 2018) (100-year aggregate punishment for non-homicide crimes 

with parole eligibility after 50 years was de facto LWOP sentence in violation of Graham); Ira v. 

Janecka, 419 P.3d 161, 167 (N.M. 2018) (holding Roper, Graham, and Miller applied to term-of-years 

sentences); White v. Premo, 443 P.3d 597, 604-05 (Or. 2019) (holding juvenile’s 800-month sentence for 

murder with parole eligibility at 54 years was de facto LWOP sentence subject to Miller protections). 

12 Several state courts appear to have held that de facto LWOP sentences are not cognizable 

under any circumstances. See State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 414 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (holding Graham

inapplicable to term-of-years sentences); Hobbs v. Turner, 431 S.W.3d 283, 289 (Ark. 2014) (holding 

Graham and Miller do not apply to a “nonlife sentence”); Lucero v. People, 394 P.3d 1128, 1130 (Colo. 

2017) (refusing to recognize de facto LWOP sentences in part because “[l]ife without parole is a specific 

sentence”); Veal v. State, 810 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. 2018) (refusing to apply Miller and Montgomery to 

any sentences “other than LWOP”). Another state court appears to have ignored the argument 

outright. See Diamond v. State, 419 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding a 99-year 
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Opinion of the Court

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We, like many states in that majority, decline to stand behind the simple 

formalism that a sufficiently lengthy term-of-years sentence cannot be a sentence of 

LWOP because it does not bear the name and terminates at a date certain. Rejection 

of the proposition is, first, a simple “matter of common sense . . . . Otherwise, the 

Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment in the 

context of a juvenile offender could be circumvented simply by stating the sentence 

in numerical terms that exceed any reasonable life expectancy rather than labeling 

it a ‘life’ sentence.” Carter, 192 A.3d at 725. As was noted in Miller, “[t]he Eighth 

 

sentence imposed on a juvenile without discussing Graham despite counsel’s argument raising the 

issue). At least two states seem to have suggested de facto LWOP sentences may exist but have yet to 

hold as such. See State v. Quevedo, 947 N.W.2d 402, ___ (S.D. 2020) (“[O]ur cases have seemed to 

suggest that a juvenile sentence involving a lengthy term of years and the lack of a meaningful 

opportunity for release could constitute a de facto life sentence and transgress Graham’s categorical 

Eighth Amendment prohibition on life without parole[.]” (citations omitted)); Mason v. State, 235 

So.3d 129, 134 (Miss. 2017) (suggesting the defendant may have shown a de facto life sentence in 

violation of Miller and Montgomery had he presented evidence in support, but failure to do so and 

concession that his life expectancy would extend beyond parole eligibility defeated claim). Another 

grouping of states has elected not to afford relief under a de facto LWOP theory by declining to answer 

whether aggregated sentences and/or term-of-years sentences violate the Eighth Amendment absent 

a Supreme Court decision to that express effect. See State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237, 246 (Minn. 2017) 

(declining to recognize aggregated term-of-years sentences as de facto LWOP sentences “absent further 

guidance from the [Supreme] Court” on both aggregation and recognition of de facto LWOP); State v. 

Slocumb, 827 S.E.2d 148, 152 (S.C. 2019) (recognizing that de facto LWOP punishments, whether as 

a single sentence or aggregated punishment, exist and may violate Graham and Miller, but declining 

to so hold “without further input from the Supreme Court”). Still another category has held that 

aggregated sentences cannot constitute a de facto LWOP sentence and resolved the defendants’ 

appeals on that ground without affirmatively stating whether de facto LWOP sentences are otherwise 

cognizable. See Martinez v. State, 442 P.3d 154, 156-57 (Okla. Crim. App. 2019) (holding Graham, 

Miller, and Montgomery do not apply to aggregated sentences and concluding, without any discussion, 

that parole eligibility at age 79 offers a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release on parole during 

[the defendant’s] lifetime”); Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 926 (Va. 2016) (declining to 

grant relief under Graham to aggregated term-of-years sentence without addressing single term-ofyears sentences that exceed natural life). 

13 We note that, in Slocumb, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that “jurisdictions 

around the country are approximately evenly split” on whether to recognize de facto LWOP sentences 

under Graham or Miller. 827 S.E.2d at 157 n. 17. 
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Opinion of the Court

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Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment ‘guarantees individuals 

the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions[,]’ ” 567 U.S. at 469, 183 L. Ed. 

2d at 417 (emphasis added) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 16), and 

allowing sentencers to so easily avoid its application would render it no guarantee at 

all. Any holding to the contrary ignores the fact that Graham and Miller declared 

cruel and unusual those punishments imposed against redeemable juveniles that 

deprive them of “ ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’ ” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 183 L. Ed. 2d 

at 424 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 846). Stated differently, 

“[t]he court in Graham was not barring a terminology—‘life without parole’—but 

rather a punishment that removes a juvenile from society without a meaningful 

chance to demonstrate rehabilitation and obtain release.” Moore, 76 N.E.3d at 1139-

40. 

Many of the states that have declined to afford relief to juveniles sentenced to 

de facto LWOP sentences have refused to do so under the rationale that the Supreme 

Court’s decisions in Graham and Miller were limited to the specific LWOP sentences 

considered in those cases. See, e.g., Lucero, 394 P.3d at 1132 (“Graham and Miller

apply only where a juvenile is sentenced to the specific sentence of life without the 

possibility of parole for one offense.” (citations omitted)). However, such holdings 

ignore Graham’s own caution against denying the true reality of the actual 
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Opinion of the Court

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punishment imposed on a juvenile when determining whether it violates the Eighth 

Amendment. In pointing out that adults and juveniles who receive the same sentence 

of LWOP do not, in fact, receive the same punishment, the majority in Graham stated

“[a] 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole receive the 

same punishment in name only. This reality cannot be ignored.” 560 U.S. at 70-71, 

176 L. Ed. 2d at 843 (emphasis added). To hold that the factual equivalent of the 

punishments prohibited by Graham and Miller is not actually prohibited by those 

decisions is to deny the factual reality. Roper, Graham, and Miller are all concerned 

with “imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit 

terrible crimes.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 419. A de jure LWOP 

sentence is certainly as “harsh” as its functional equivalent. 

The straightforward applicability of Graham’s reasoning to de facto LWOP 

sentences is clear from the reasoning itself. Its observations about juveniles’

immaturity, underdeveloped self-control, and capacity for change are true 

independent of any sentence. That those characteristics undermined the punitive

justifications of LWOP is thus equally true of de facto LWOP sentences. See Carter, 

192 A.3d at 726 (“The same [penological] test [from Graham] applied to a sentence of 

a lengthy term of years without eligibility for parole yields the same conclusion [as 

Graham].”). Retribution concerns must be measured against the culpability of 

defendants, and, because juveniles—“even when they commit terrible crimes”—are 
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Opinion of the Court

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inherently less culpable regardless of the sentence imposed, “ ‘the case for retribution 

is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.’ ” Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 183 L. Ed. 

2d at 419 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 71, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 883). A de facto LWOP 

sentence is no more of a deterrent to a juvenile than its de jure equivalent because, 

in either case, “their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity[ ]make them less 

likely to consider potential punishment.” Id. (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72, 176 L. 

Ed. 2d at 844). De jure and de facto LWOP sentences are also equally incapacitating; 

if incapacitation is inadequate to justify the former, id. at 472-73, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 

419, then logic dictates it is inadequate for the latter. This same logic applies to 

rehabilitative concerns that are in irreconcilable conflict with LWOP sentences. Id.

at 473, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 419-20. In sum, “none of what [Graham] said about children 

. . . is crime-specific. . . . So Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-without-parole

sentence imposed on a juvenile[.]” Id. at 473, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 420 (emphasis added). 

The other authorities relied upon by those state courts that do not recognize

de facto LWOP challenges do not dissuade us of this holding. Several rely on language 

from Justice Alito’s dissent in Graham for the proposition that it was a narrow 

decision. See, e.g., Vasquez, 781 S.E.2d at 925 (“ ‘Nothing in the Court’s opinion [in 

Graham] affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility 

of parole.’ ” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 124, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 877 (Alito, J., 

dissenting))). However, as other Supreme Court Justices have noted, a dissent from 
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Opinion of the Court

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a singular justice is not binding on the application of Supreme Court precedent. 

Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 206 L. Ed. 2d 732, 748 (2020) 

(“As every judge learns the hard way, ‘comments in [a] dissenting opinion’ about legal 

principles and precedents ‘are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.’ ” (quoting 

Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 n. 10, 66 L. Ed. 2d 368, 377 n. 10

(1980)). See also Moore, 76 N.E.3d at 1157-58 (O’Connor, C.J., concurring) (observing

Justice Alito’s dissent in Graham is not controlling in the application of the majority’s 

decision). Justice Thomas’s observation in a footnote to his dissent in Graham that 

the majority did not include term-of-years sentences in calculating how many 

juveniles nationwide had been sentenced to life without parole is similarly 

unpersuasive. 560 U.S. at 113 n. 11, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 870 n. 11 (Thomas, J., 

dissenting). We note that a narrow reading of both Roper and Graham was expressly 

rejected in Miller; there, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied a defendant’s Eighth 

Amendment challenge on the grounds that “Roper and Graham were ‘narrowly 

tailored’ to their contexts,” and the Supreme Court reversed. 567 U.S. at 467, 183 L. 

Ed. 2d at 416. Our Supreme Court has also instructed this Court that we must 

“examine each of defendant’s [Eighth Amendment and analogous state Constitution] 

contentions in light of the general principles enunciated by [the North Carolina 

Supreme] Court and the Supreme Court [of the United States] guiding cruel and 

unusual punishment analysis.” Green, 348 N.C. at 603, 502 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis 
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Opinion of the Court

- 33 -

added). The “general principles enunciated” in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery are, 

as explained above, applicable to de facto LWOP sentences even if the specific facts 

of those decisions did not involve them.

Those states in the minority of jurisdictions have likewise relied on federal 

court decisions holding Graham and Miller do not apply to term-of-years sentences. 

See, e.g., Vasquez, 781 S.E.2d at 926 (relying on Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th. 

Cir. 2012)). Bunch, however, dealt with Graham in a specific context: whether, under 

the deferential standard of collateral habeas review applicable to the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, an Ohio court14 that sentenced a defendant 

to a lengthy term-of-years sentence acted contrary to “clearly established federal 

law.” 685 F.3d at 549. That standard presents a markedly different legal question 

than the one considered here. See Atkins v. Crowell, 945 F.3d 476, 480 (6th Cir. 2019)

(Cole, C.J., concurring) (noting that Miller and Graham compelled the conclusion that 

a de facto LWOP sentence was unconstitutional but denying habeas relief because 

“[o]n occasion, AEDPA’s onerous standards require us to deny . . . relief even though 

the sentence . . . is unconstitutional”). 

2. Aggregate Sentences As De Facto LWOP Sentences

 

14 Ohio’s highest court later recognized de facto LWOP sentences imposed on juveniles as 

violative of the Eighth Amendment in an appeal brought by Bunch’s codefendant. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 

at 1139. 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

- 34 -

Having held that de facto LWOP sentences for redeemable juveniles are 

unconstitutional under Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, we next address whether 

an aggregate punishment of concurrent sentences may amount to that unlawful 

punishment. Again, state courts are sharply divided on the issue. Some states that 

recognize de facto LWOP sentences do so only when imposed as a single sentence.15 

Others who have rejected recognition of de facto LWOP sentences have done so on the 

ground that aggregated sentences do not present such a circumstance.16 However, a 

majority of courts again favor recognition of aggregated sentences as de facto LWOP 

punishments subject to Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.

17 

We also hold that aggregated sentences may give rise to a de facto LWOP 

punishment. As other courts have observed, “[n]owhere in the Graham decision does 

the Supreme Court specifically limit its holding to offenders who were convicted for 

a single nonhomicide offense[.]” Boston, 363 P.3d at 457. That decision granted 

Eighth Amendment protection to a juvenile irrespective of his numerous offenses: 

[O]ne cannot dispute that this defendant posed an 

immediate risk, for he had committed, we can assume, 

serious crimes early in his term of supervised release and 

 

15 See State v. Brown, 118 So.3d 332, 342 (La. 2013) (holding Graham does not apply to multiple 

term-of-years sentences leading to release at age 86); Willbanks v. Dep’t of Corr., 522 S.W.3d 238, 246

(Mo. 2017) (en banc) (declining to extend de facto LWOP recognition to aggregated term-of-years 

sentences); Foust, 180 A.3d at 434 (same). 

16 Martinez, 442 P.3d at 156-57; Vasquez, 781 S.E.2d at 926; Ali, 895 N.W.2d at 246. 

17 Reviewing cases from those jurisdictions cited supra nn. 11-12, we identify 11 states that 

have rejected aggregation and 13 that have recognized it. Maryland’s highest court’s observation that 

“[m]ost of the decisions in other jurisdictions applying Graham and Miller to sentences expressed in a 

term of years have actually involved stacked sentences” still appears true. Carter, 192 A.3d at 732-

33. 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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despite his own assurances of reform. Graham deserved to 

be separated from society for some time in order to prevent 

what the trial court described as an “escalating pattern of 

criminal conduct,” but it does not follow that he would be a 

risk to society for the rest of his life. 

Graham, 560 U.S. at 73, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 844 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). As

for Miller, one of the appellants in that case was also convicted of two felonies, with 

no apparent impact on the ultimate holding. 567 U.S. at 466, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 415. 

The applicability and scope of protection found in the Eighth Amendment 

under both decisions turned on the identity of the defendant, not on the crimes 

perpetrated. Graham, which followed the categorical approach used in Roper to 

invalidate death penalties against minors, noted that such categorical cases “turn[] 

on the characteristics of the offender[.]” 560 U.S. at 61, 176 L. Ed. at 837. Although 

Graham itself stated that “the age of the offender and the nature of the crime each 

bear on the analysis[,]” 560 U.S. at 69, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 842, the identity of the 

offender as a juvenile was of primary importance as recognized in Miller and 

Montgomery: “The ‘foundation stone’ for Miller’s analysis was this Court’s line of 

precedent holding certain punishments disproportionate when applied to 

juveniles. . . . Miller took as its starting premise the principle established in Roper 

and Graham that ‘children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 

sentencing.’ ” Montgomery, ___ U.S. at ___, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 618 (emphasis added) 

(citations omitted). Miller appropriately recognized that “none of what [Graham] said 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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about children . . . is crime-specific. Those features are evident in the same way, and 

to the same degree, when (as in both cases here) a botched robbery turns into a killing. 

So Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on a 

juvenile[.]” 567 U.S. at 473, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 420. That is, the categorical prohibition 

is principally focused on the offender, not on the crime or crimes committed. 

The states that have not recognized aggregate punishments as de facto LWOP 

sentences have done so on grounds that we hold distinguishable. For example, 

Pennsylvania rejected the argument on the basis that its caselaw “has long disavowed 

the concept of volume discounts for committing multiple crimes.” Foust, 180 A.3d at 

436. North Carolina law is not so averse. To be sure, our Supreme Court has held 

that “[t]he imposition of consecutive life sentences, standing alone, does not constitute 

cruel or unusual punishment. A defendant may be convicted of and sentenced for 

each specific act which he commits.” State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 786, 309 S.E.2d 

436, 441 (1983) (citations omitted). However, such consecutive sentences are not 

“standing alone” when they also involve a juvenile defendant. Cf. Graham, 560 U.S. 

at 70-71, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 843 (“A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life 

without parole receive the same punishment in name only. This reality cannot be 

ignored.” (citations and quotations omitted)). We note our own caselaw and statutes 

compel the State to consider consecutive sentences as a single punishment. See N.C. 

Gen. Stat. 15A-1354(b) (2019) (“In determining the effect of consecutive 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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sentences . . . , the Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice of the 

Department of Public Safety must treat the defendant as though he has been 

committed for a single term[.]”); Robbins, 127 N.C. App. at 165, 487 S.E.2d at 773 

(holding parole eligibility for consecutive sentences must be calculated as if serving a 

single term). 

Other states have found persuasive the following non-binding dicta from the 

Supreme Court’s decision in O’Neil v. Vermont: “ [‘]It would scarcely be competent for 

a person to assail the constitutionality of the statute prescribing a punishment for 

burglary, on the ground that he had committed so many burglaries that, if 

punishment for each were inflicted on him, he might be kept in prison for life.[’] ” 144 

U.S. 323, 331, 36 L. Ed. 450, 455 (1892) (quoting the Vermont Supreme Court). We 

do not deem this language adequate to counter Roper, Graham, Miller, and 

Montgomery; needless to say, O’Neil did not involve juveniles, and long predated the 

express adoption of categorical Eighth Amendment prohibitions in juvenile cases that 

primarily focus not on the crimes committed but instead “turn[] on the characteristics 

of the offender.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837; see also Moore, 76 

N.E.3d at 1142 (“Whether the sentence is the product of a discrete offense or multiple 

offenses, the fact remains that it was a juvenile who committed the one offense or 

several offenses and who has diminished moral culpability.” (emphasis in original)). 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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In short, “O’Neil . . . does not indicate anything about the Supreme Court’s view on 

the matter.” Ira, 419 P.3d at 166. 

3. Defendant’s Sentences Are an Unconstitutional De Facto LWOP

Punishment

The final question posed by Defendant’s argument is whether his consecutive

sentences, which place his eligibility for parole at 50 years and earliest possible 

release at age 67, are sufficiently lengthy to constitute an unconstitutional de facto 

LWOP punishment in light of the trial court’s determination that he is neither 

irredeemable nor irreparably corrupt. Though the issue of identifying de facto LWOP 

sentences certainly presents some practical challenges, we hold that Defendant’s

consecutive sentences of life and parole eligibility at 50 years constitute a de facto 

LWOP punishment. 

Several courts have held de facto LWOP sentences that do not conclusively 

extend beyond the juvenile’s natural life are nonetheless unconstitutional sentences, 

and many of them have found such sentences to exist when release (either through 

completion of the sentence or opportunity for parole) is only available after roughly

50 years, and sometimes less.18 Those states have adopted differing methods for their 

 

18 See Zuber, 152 A.3d at 212-13 (55 years); State ex rel. Carr, 527 S.W.3d at 57 (50 years);

People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d 445, 446 (Cal. 2018) (50 years); Carter, 192 A.3d at 734 (50 years); 

Casiano, 115 A.3d at 1035 (50 years); Bear Cloud, 334 P.3d at 136 (45 years); People v. Buffer, 137 

N.E.3d 763, 774 (Ill. 2019) (40 years). Courts that have not identified an exact point at which a de facto 

LWOP sentence arises have indicated that 50 years is close to the limit. See, e.g., Ira, 419 P.3d at 170 

(“Certainly the fact that Ira will serve almost 46 years before he is given an opportunity to obtain 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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delineations, see Carter, 192 A.3d at 727-28 (surveying decisions and identifying five

different means). Though the State rightly points out that the task of demarcating 

the bounds of a de facto LWOP sentence may be difficult, the task is not impossible. 

For example, retirement age has been used to discern whether a sentence is a 

de facto LWOP punishment. Id. at 734. North Carolina’s Constitution provides that 

persons’ “inalienable rights” include the “enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor,” 

N.C. Const. Art. I, § 1, and our Supreme Court has recognized that “a law which 

destroys the opportunity of a man or woman to earn a living in one of the ordinary 

harmless occupations of life . . . is legal grotesquery.” State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 

759, 6 S.E.2d 854, 863 (1940). It is difficult, then, to deny that incarcerating a juvenile 

with no hope for release until or after the point at which society no longer considers 

them an ordinary member of the workforce seems to run afoul of the “hope for some 

years of life outside prison walls” required by Graham and Miller. Montgomery, ___ 

U.S. at ___, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 623. Stated differently:

[T]he language of Graham suggests that the high court 

envisioned more than the mere act of release or a de 

minimis quantum of time outside of prison. Graham spoke 

of the chance to rejoin society in qualitative terms—"the 

rehabilitative ideal” ([Graham] at 130 S. Ct. 2011)—that 

contemplate a sufficient period to achieve reintegration as 

a productive and respected member of the citizenry. The 

 

release is the outer limit of what is constitutionally acceptable.” (citation omitted)). The 50-year mark 

identified by several courts “seems consistent with the observation of the Graham Court that the 

defendant in that case would not be released ‘even if he spends the next half century attempting to 

atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes.’ ” Carter, 192 A.3d at 728-29 (quoting Graham, 560 

U.S. at 79, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 848). 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

- 40 -

“chance for reconciliation with society” (id. at 130 S. Ct. 

2011), “the right to reenter the community” (id. at 130 S.

Ct. 2011), and the opportunity to reclaim one’s “value and 

place in society” (ibid.) all indicate concern for a measure 

of belonging and redemption that goes beyond mere 

freedom from confinement. . . . Confinement with no 

possibility of release until age 66 or age 74 seems unlikely 

to allow for the reintegration that Graham contemplates. 

Contreras, 411 P.3d at 454. To release an individual after their opportunity to 

directly contribute to society—both through a career and in other respects, like 

raising a family—“does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to demonstrate the 

‘maturity and rehabilitation’ required to obtain release and reenter society as 

required by Graham.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 176 

L. Ed. 2d at 845-46). Lastly, we observe that our General Assembly has elsewhere 

defined what an appropriate life with parole sentence in compliance with Miller looks 

like; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19A (2019), the statute enacted for that purpose, 

provides that “ ‘life imprisonment with parole’ shall mean that the defendant shall 

serve a minimum of 25 years imprisonment prior to becoming eligible for parole.”19 

 

19 Defendant asserted at oral argument, that, as a matter of statutory construction, juveniles 

sentenced to first-degree murder under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19A, et seq. must be given parole 

eligibility at 25 years. Defendant never raised the issue before the trial court, nor did he brief any 

statutory interpretation arguments; any arguments as to the purported construction and 

interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19A, et seq. have not been presented in this appeal. See 

N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) (2020) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a party’s brief are deemed 

abandoned.”). We therefore do not address the statutory construction of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1340.19A and instead look to it as an expression of the General Assembly’s judgment on what 

constitutes a constitutionally permissible juvenile life sentence following Miller—an issue that was

expressly argued and addressed by the parties in their briefs. 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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A holding that Defendant’s sentences constitute a de facto LWOP sentence is 

in line with the above; his ineligibility for parole for 50 years falls at the limit 

identified by numerous other jurisdictions as constituting an unconstitutional de 

facto LWOP sentence, and it affords him release only at or after retirement age. See 

United States v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 151 (surveying various means of calculating 

retirement age and observing “by all accounts, the national age of retirement to date 

is between sixty-two and sixty-seven inclusive”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 

vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2018). 

As far as identifying what a sentence that would not amount to a de facto 

LWOP punishment, our General Assembly has offered some indication. See N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19A. The definition provided therein is not strictly limited to 

single offenses: “If the sole basis for conviction of a count or each count of first degree 

murder was the felony murder rule, then the court shall sentence the defendant to 

life imprisonment with parole.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(1) (2019). 

Defendant here has clearly abandoned any assertion that he was convicted under the 

felony murder rule. But N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.19B(a)(1) nonetheless indicates 

that our General Assembly has determined parole eligibility at 25 years for multiple 

offenses sanctionable by life with parole is not so excessive as to run afoul of Miller.

See, e.g., Ramos, 387 P.3d at 661-62 (noting that “[s]tate legislatures are . . . allowed 

some flexibility in fashioning the methods for fulfilling Miller’s substantive 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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requirements, so long as the State’s approach does not ‘demean the substantive 

character of the federal right at issue.’ ” (quoting Montgomery, ___ U.S. at ___, 193 

L. Ed. 2d at 621)). This Court has twice held that life with the possibility of parole 

after 25 years does not constitute a de facto LWOP sentence subject to Miller. See 

State v. Jefferson, 252 N.C. App. 174, 181, 798 S.E.2d 121, 125 (2017) (“Defendant’s 

sentence is neither an explicit nor a de facto term of life imprisonment without parole. 

Upon serving twenty-five years of his sentence, Defendant will become eligible for 

parole[.]”); State v. Seam, 263 N.C. App. 355, 361, 823 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (2018) 

(holding Miller’s individualized sentencing requirement inapplicable to a single 

sentence of felony murder carrying mandatory punishment of life imprisonment with 

the opportunity for parole after 25 years), aff’d per curiam, 373 N.C. 529, 837 S.E.2d 

870 (2020). 

We stress, as the Supreme Court did in Graham, that nothing in our decision 

compels the State to actually release Defendant after 25 years. The Post-Release 

Supervision and Parole Commission will ultimately decide whether Defendant may 

be released in his lifetime. Our decision simply upholds the Eighth Amendment’s 

constitutional requirement that Defendant, as a juvenile who is neither incorrigible 

nor irredeemable, have his “hope for some years of life outside prison walls . . . 

restored.” Montgomery, ___ U.S. at ___, 193 L. Ed. 2d at 623. 

III. CONCLUSION
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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The facts, the law, and all that results in this appeal are difficult. As shown

by the victim impact statements offered at resentencing, the murders of Mr. 

Carpenter and Ms. Helton—two teenagers who were soon to be parents—caused

irreparable loss and irrevocable harm to victims and their families. Defendant was 

shaped by what was a profoundly troubled childhood, leading him to actively 

participate in these truly heinous crimes. These facts have led this Court in 

reviewing Defendant’s constitutional claims that have divided courts nationwide, to 

discuss the difficult subject of sentencing, for outrageous acts, a juvenile offender who 

is inherently less culpable than adults and was found by the trial court to be 

redeemable. “Few, perhaps no, judicial responsibilities are more difficult than 

sentencing.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 77, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 847. This case is certainly no 

exception, as the trial court explained following resentencing: “[T]hese are real 

tragedies. . . . [T]hey don’t put [you] in positions like this because you’re weak or 

because you’re a coward. If you can’t, you know, make hard decisions, you will never 

last as a judge and you will never last as a prosecutor or a defense lawyer.” Indeed, 

when it comes to sentencing juveniles for the most egregious crimes, these difficulties 

are heightened; in such circumstances, the (in)humanity of the perpetrator, the 

victims, the crimes, and the punishment are inseparable under the Eighth 

Amendment. 
STATE V. KELLIHER

Opinion of the Court

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This Court’s duty is to uphold the federal and state Constitutions irrespective

of these difficulties. In determining Defendant’s appeal, we hold under Eighth 

Amendment jurisprudence: (1) de facto LWOP sentences imposed on juveniles may 

run afoul of the Eighth Amendment; (2) such punishments may arise out of 

aggregated sentences; and (3) a sentence that provides no opportunity for release for 

50 or more years is cognizable as a de facto LWOP sentence. Consistent with the 

Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, these

holdings compel us to reverse and remand Defendant’s sentence. Under different 

circumstances, we would leave resentencing to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

See, e.g., State v. Nunez, 204 N.C. App. 164, 170, 693 S.E.2d 223, 227 (2010) 

(remanding for resentencing and noting that, on remand, “[w]hether the two 

sentences should run concurrently or consecutively rests in the discretion of the trial 

court”). Here, however, we hold that of the two binary options available—consecutive 

or concurrent sentences of life with parole—one is unconstitutional. We therefore 

instruct the trial court on remand to enter two concurrent sentences of life with parole 

as the only constitutionally permissible sentence available under the facts presented.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judges BRYANT and HAMPSON concur.