GAO/NSIAD-00-212R DOD Strategic C4 Systems

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-285810

August 25, 2000

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

U. S. House of Representatives

Subject: Defense Acquisitions: Status of Strategic C4 System Modernization and Plans

To Integrate Additional Mission Capabilities

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Your letter of October 18, 1999, referred to the Department of Defense’s (DOD) plans to

modernize its current strategic command, control, communications, and computer (C4)

capabilities for ballistic missile warning, space control, and air sovereignty/defense missions.

Your letter mentioned that command and control functions for national missile defense may

be centralized with these missions and that the U.S. Space Command has been assigned new

missions called computer network defense/attack.1 You expressed concern about how DOD

plans to integrate the systems needed for new missions into the systems used for current

missions. As agreed, this report provides information on DOD’s plans to (1) modernize

current strategic C4 capabilities and (2) integrate additional system capabilities for newly

planned and assigned missions.

The U.S. Space Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command

(hereinafter referred to as the Commands) are supported by DOD’s strategic C4 system

capabilities associated with missile warning, space control, and air sovereignty/defense.2 The

Air Force acquired the current C4 systems during a 17-year effort called the Cheyenne

Mountain Upgrade program that began in 1981. The systems, which cost about $1.8 billion,

were declared operational in 1998. The Commands have now determined that some of the

systems’ components are not well integrated, are becoming unsupportable because spare

parts are no longer available, and would be unresponsive to future mission needs. As a

1 Computer network defense includes activities to protect and defend information in computers and computer

networks, and computers and networks themselves, from disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction.

Computer network attack is the ability to deny, disrupt, or degrade enemy computers and networks.

2 The U.S. Space Command is a DOD unified combatant command that is responsible for conducting space

operations, including providing missile warning and space surveillance support to the North American

Aerospace Defense Command. The North American Aerospace Defense Command is a binational U.S. and

Canadian command responsible for warning of an attack against North America, including surveillance and

control of North American airspace.
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result, the Commands initiated a long-term program that is intended to exploit off-the-shelf

technology to achieve modernized capabilities that are less costly to operate. The

modernized capabilities to be developed are referred to as the North American Aerospace

Defense Command/U.S. Space Command Warfighting Support System (hereinafter referred

to as the warfighting support system).

Also, in anticipation of implementing additional missions, the Commands are studying other

system capabilities that may be needed. For example, assuming that the United States

deploys a national missile defense system, the necessary command and control functions

could become the Commands’ responsibility.3 Also, the U.S. Space Command assumed the

responsibility for DOD’s computer network defense mission on October 1, 1999, and it is to

assume the responsibility for the computer network attack mission on October 1, 2000.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

The U.S. Space Command’s and the North American Aerospace Defense Command’s plan to

modernize their strategic command, control, communications, and computer systems is being

implemented by the Air Force, which is overseeing the efforts of two competing contractors

to develop detailed plans for designing and implementing the modernization program. In

September 2000, the Air Force expects to select one of the contractors to incrementally

execute the program, which could last 15 years. Until a single contractor is selected, final

modernization plans and estimated total acquisition and implementation costs will not be

available.

The Commands have not completed plans for integrating new mission areas into their

command, control, communications, and computer systems. The Commands, in conjunction

with other DOD organizations, are studying, developing, and testing concepts for a national

missile defense system. The command, control, communications, and computer capabilities

for such a system could be incorporated into DOD’s ballistic missile warning infrastructure

located at Cheyenne Mountain and eventually the modernization program. However, until

the President decides that a national missile defense system should be deployed and assigns

the mission to a specific military command for execution, plans to integrate the necessary

command, control, communications, and computer capabilities into the Commands’ systems

will remain preliminary. In addition, the Secretary of Defense assigned responsibility to the

U.S. Space Command for implementing DOD’s computer network defense/attack missions.

The Command’s plans for implementing the computer network attack mission beginning

October 1, 2000, have been finalized and are awaiting Secretary of Defense approval; plans

for integrating these missions with current missions have not been completed.

3 National missile defense is to protect the United States from limited ballistic missile attacks from certain

nations that possess such a capability.
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MODERNIZATION PLANS FOR

CURRENT C4 SYSTEMS HAVE

NOT BEEN COMPLETED

The Commands’ plans for modernizing their current strategic command and control mission

capabilities by acquiring the warfighting support system include (1) seeking solutions to the

identified deficiencies associated with supportability and future responsiveness and (2)

moving from the separate C4 systems that support the Commands’ current missions to an

integrated system that will reduce operating costs. These objectives were established for

several reasons. First, some of the mainframe computer systems that were purchased in the

1980s are no longer produced, and the supplier has stated in writing that technical assistance

and spare parts would not be provided after fiscal year 2000. Second, the Commands have

estimated that their current C4 systems are not likely to be capable of processing and

disseminating the increased amounts of data that will be generated by new sensors being

developed. An example is the Space-Based Infrared System that is to support theater and

national missile defense missions. Third, the current C4 system architecture is an

aggregation of individual mission-oriented, but overlapping, systems that are not

interoperable. According to Command officials, this situation often requires considerable

time to implement changes in response to new mission needs. The Commands’ objectives

for the modernization effort involve making incremental system replacements by applying

new technologies that comply with standards mandated by the Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to ensure interoperability—the electronic

exchange of data—among DOD’s C4 systems.

The Commands’ plans are being implemented by the Air Force whose acquisition strategy

consists of two phases—migration demonstration and execution. Contracting activities for

the migration demonstration phase started in November 1999, with the issuance of a request

for proposals. In February 2000, two contractors were each awarded a $2.5-million contract

for a 4-month migration demonstration phase. The contracts require each contractor to

produce a master plan that includes (1) a system architecture and a schedule for how the

architecture is to be implemented, (2) an acquisition strategy containing a technology

forecast and risk assessment, (3) a program management and systems engineering plan, and

(4) a model for reducing total life-cycle costs. Each master plan is to reflect the contractor’s

interpretation of the Commands’ requirements and concepts of operations and address

operational priorities for warfighting support system development and implementation. The

master plans describing the contractors’ proposed system architecture were submitted in July

2000 as competing proposals for the execution phase.

The execution phase is to begin in September 2000 following a source selection process that

started in July with the receipt of the contractors’ proposals. The Air Force will select one

contractor who will have total system performance responsibility for maintaining and

sustaining the current strategic C4 capabilities, developing and implementing new

capabilities in increments, and ensuring mission integrity throughout the period of system

improvement. According to Command officials, the modernization effort could last 15 years.

Until the Air Force selects a single contractor, final plans for modernizing the Commands’

strategic C4 capabilities will not be available.
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PLANS TO INTEGRATE ADDITIONAL

SYSTEM CAPABILITIES FOR NEW MISSIONS

HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETED

The Commands are developing plans to integrate system capabilities for the planned missile

defense mission and have recently proposed plans to implement the computer network

defense and attack missions. Plans for command and control functions for the national

missile defense system are preliminary, awaiting a decision from the Secretary of Defense

and the President on whether to deploy the system. The U.S. Space Command has developed

a plan to implement computer network defense and attack separately from other space

missions and will consider integrating them at a later time. The Command will not assume

responsibility for the computer network attack mission until October 2000, and it has

proposed an organization structure for implementing the mission.

C4 Capabilities For National

Missile Defense Are Being Studied

This summer, the Secretary of Defense is expected to recommend a course of action to the

President regarding the feasibility of deploying a national missile defense system.4 The

Commander in Chief of the Commands has stated that a national missile defense mission

would fit closely with the North American Aerospace Defense Command’s missile warning

mission and it (1) would share the Commands’ space-based and ground-based missile

warning sensors and (2) could employ the command and control infrastructure of the

Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center.5 Currently, however, the latest unified command

plan, which the President approved on September 29, 1999, does not assign the national

missile defense mission to a specific military command.6

Meanwhile, various DOD organizations, including the Commands, the Army Strategic and

Missile Defense Command, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, and the Air Force

Space Command, have been drafting requirements, studying operations concepts, and

developing technologies and systems to carry out a national missile defense mission.

In addition, the Air Force Space Command and the Air Force’s Strategic and Nuclear

Deterrence Command and Control System Program Office7 are monitoring ongoing missile

defense technology and system development to ensure that these activities do not lead to

4

See Missile Defense: Status of the National Missile Defense Program (GAO/NSIAD-00-131, May 31,

2000) for information on this planned system.

5 Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U.S. Air Force, Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace

Defense Command and U.S. Space Command, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Strategic

Subcommittee (Mar. 8, 2000).

6 A unified command plan provides basic guidance, missions, responsibilities, and force structure to all unified

combatant commanders and designates geographical and functional responsibilities for specific combatant

commanders.

7 This Air Force program office reports to the Air Force Electronic Systems Center--a component of the Air

Force Material Command—and is responsible for maintaining and sustaining the U.S. Space Command’s

existing C4 systems and acquiring the new warfighting support system.
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designs that would be incompatible with the future warfighting support system. This action

includes coordinating the development of warfighting support system architecture documents

with national missile defense command and control concepts. However, until the President

decides that a national missile defense system should be deployed and assigns the mission to

a specific military command for execution, these activities are preliminary.

Computer Network Defense And

Attack Mission Implementation Plans

Have Been Finalized

In December 1998, as a result of an increasing number of probes and intrusions of defense

computer systems and networks, the Secretary of Defense established the Joint Task Force

for Computer Network Defense to coordinate and direct the defense of such systems and

networks as an interim step to assigning a computer network defense mission to a unified

command. In January 1999, the Secretary assigned the responsibility for this mission to the

U.S. Space Command, which was effective on October 1, 1999. This Command has

assumed the Joint Task Force’s role of coordinating and directing operations to protect and

defend DOD’s computer systems and networks against attacks or intrusions. The Joint Task

Force now reports to the U.S. Space Command and will remain the primary operations center

to monitor and respond to such attacks. The Joint Task Force is supported by computer

emergency response teams in each of the military services that monitor and respond to

potential computer incidents within their respective organizations. The U.S. Space

Command has developed an implementation plan that outlines its computer network defense

role, responsibilities, and strategy. This plan states that the mission will initially be

performed separately from space missions, but it later will be considered for integration with

space missions as part of the warfighting support system implementation.

Also in January 1999, the Secretary assigned the responsibility for the computer network

attack mission to the U.S. Space Command, which is to be effective on October 1, 2000. The

U.S. Space Command indicated a desire to consolidate the computer network defense and

attack missions and to incorporate the military services’ emergency response teams into the

military services’ component commands of the U.S. Space Command—the Army Space

Command, the Naval Space Command, and the 14th Air Force (a component of the Air Force

Space Command). The Command and the military services collaborated in identifying and

studying organizational alternatives for executing the mission. The Command has developed

an implementation plan that proposes to assign military computer network attack forces to

the military services’ components of one or more unified commands. Under this proposal,

Army forces would be assigned to the Army Space Command, Air Force forces would be

assigned to the Air Combat Command (the Air Force component of the Joint Forces

Command), and naval forces would be assigned to all unified commanders’ naval

components. Should a crisis occur, and as directed by the President or the Secretary of

Defense, control of these computer network attack forces would be transferred to the unified

command needing support. This plan has been submitted to the Secretary of Defense for

approval in preparation for instituting this mission on October 1, 2000. At this time, it is not

known whether this proposed structure will effectively and efficiently meet the computer

network attack mission needs.
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AGENCY COMMENTS

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report, which we reprinted in enclosure 1.

DOD concurred with the report and suggested technical changes for clarification and

accuracy that we incorporated as appropriate.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

To review the plans for modernizing strategic C4 capabilities, we examined the U.S. Space

Command’s March 1998 long-range plan; the Commands’ April 1998 draft master evolution

plan, May 1998 mission need statement, February 1999 capstone requirements document,

and October 1999 operational architecture for the warfighting support system; and the Air

Force’s October 1999 statement of objectives and November 1999 request for proposals for

phase one of the contract to acquire the warfighting support system. To gain additional

understanding of the modernization plans, we discussed information contained in these

documents, the rationale for modernizing the C4 capabilities, and the preliminary plans for

implementing the modernization program with representatives from Air Force Headquarters

in Washington, D.C. and U.S. and Air Force Space Commands and the Air Force’s Strategic

and Nuclear Deterrence Command and Control System Program Office at Peterson Air Force

Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

To review the plans for integrating additional system capabilities for newly planned and

assigned missions, we examined the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1999 unified command plan; the

Secretary of Defense’s direction and the charter for creating the Joint Task Force for

Computer Network Defense; the U.S. Space Command’s computer network defense/attack

implementation plans and concept of operations; and the planning, requirements, and

architecture documents discussed above. To gain additional understanding of the planning to

implement and integrate these missions into the Commands’ mission structure, we discussed

planning and architecture information and ongoing planning efforts with representatives of

(1) the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications

and Intelligence and the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C.; (2) the Defense Information

Systems Agency, and the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense in Arlington,

Virginia; and (3) the U.S. and Air Force Space Commands and the Air Force’s Strategic and

Nuclear Defense Command and Control System Program Office at Peterson Air Force Base,

Colorado Springs, Colorado.

We performed our review from December 1999 through July 2000 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

----

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Senator Carl Levin,

Senator Ted Stevens, Senator John Warner, Representative John P. Murtha, Representative

Ike Skelton, and Representative Floyd D. Spence in their capacities as Chairs or Ranking

Minority Members of Senate and House Committees and Subcommittees. We are also

sending copies to the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable F.

Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of

Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.
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If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me on (202)

512-4841. Major contributors to this report were Homer Thomson, Frederick G. Day, and

Maria A. Durant.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
ENCLOSURE I ENCLOSURE I

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(707464)