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THE UZBEKISTAN CRISIS: ASSESSING THE IMPACT

AND NEXT STEPS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 29, 2005

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

[CSCE 109–1–10]

(

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HOUSE SENATE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,

Co-Chairman 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,

New York 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas,

Chairman 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

VACANT 

VACANT 

VACANT

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

VACANT, Department of State 

VACANT, Department of Defense 

WILLIAM H. LASH III, Department of Commerce 

(II) 
THE UZBEKISTAN CRISIS: ASSESSING THE 

IMPACT AND NEXT STEPS 

JUNE 29, 2005

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 1

Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 3

Hon. Robert B. Aderholt, Commissioner, Commission on

Security and Cooperation in Europe ...................................... 12

WITNESSES 

Galima Bukharbaeva, Correspondent, Institute for War and 

Peace Reporting ....................................................................... 3

Marcus Bensmann, Correspondent, Neue Zuercher Zeitung ... 8

Holly Cartner, Executive Director, Europe & Central Asia 

Division, Human Rights Watch .............................................. 14

Robert Templer, Director, Asia Program, International Crisis 

Group ........................................................................................ 19

Muhammad Salih, Chairman, Erk Party .................................. 22

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, CoChairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe ...................................................................................... 31

Prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking 

Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in

Europe ...................................................................................... 33

Prepared statement of Robert Templer ..................................... 34

(III) 

(1)

THE UZBEKISTAN CRISIS: ASSESSING THE 

IMPACT AND NEXT STEPS 

JUNE 29, 2005

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC

The hearing was held at 2:12 p.m. in room 124, Dirksen Senate 

Office Building, Washington, DC, Senator Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Joseph R. 

Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe; and Hon. Robert B. Aderholt, Commissioner, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present; Galima Bukharbaeva, Correspondent, Institute 

for War and Peace Reporting; Marcus Bensmann, Correspondent, 

Neue Zuercher Zeitung; Holly Cartner, Executive Director, Europe 

& Central Asia Division, Human Rights Watch; Robert Templer, 

Director, Asia Program, International Crisis Group; and Muhammad Salih, Chairman, Erk Party. 

HON. SAM BROWNBACK, CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Good afternoon. The hearing’s going to come to 

order. Thank you all for joining us today. 

We were hoping to have Mira Ricardel, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, testify today, as 

well as the Department of State. However, we have not been able 

to work out an arraignment, but hope to have both State and Department of Defense address the critical issues facing us in 

Uzbekistan at some future time. 

I do have a longer statement I’m going to go ahead and put in 

the record, but I just want to make a few remarks as we get this 

hearing going. 

For many years, I’ve been hoping for gradual democratization in 

Uzbekistan. Nearly 15 years now after the collapse of the USSR, 

Uzbekistan’s political system under President Karimov today still 

retains many of the Soviet characteristics. Neither political nor economic reforms have taken place despite repeated calls for President 

Karimov to begin this process, which I personally have extended 

and asked President Karimov to do, as well. 

This Commission over the years has held several hearings, as 

well as issued reports on the situation in Uzbekistan. We have con-
2

sistently urged President Karimov to reform. His failure to do so 

is one of the main reasons, I believe, why the tragedy occurred in 

Andijon in early May. 

And these protests will continue, I believe. And the violence will 

continue if President Karimov does not take dramatic and decisive 

actions, which include an independent investigation of the events 

in Andijon. Along with the U.S. Government, the European Parliament, the OSCE, and many international organizations, the Helsinki Commission has urged President Karimov to permit such an 

independent international investigation. 

He has refused to do so, suggesting that we rely on the conclusions of a parliamentary commission of investigation. Unfortunately, given the absence of meaningful separation of powers in 

Uzbekistan, we cannot place any faith in that commission, whose 

conclusions will surely echo those already pronounced by President 

Karimov. 

It is essential that an internationally accepted account of the 

events be established. The OSCE is the best form for organizing 

such an inquiry. For that reason, I am suggesting that the United 

States invoke the Moscow Mechanism. 

Though perhaps unfamiliar to many people, the Moscow Mechanism is so named because it was agreed to by all Participating 

states at the OSCE meeting in Moscow in 1991. It is an instrument 

available to the OSCE to investigate extraordinary events or serious, ongoing human rights violations in a member state. The Moscow Mechanism allows the state involved to name a rapporteur and 

have input in the report. 

I hope President Karimov will rethink his opposition to an independent investigation. I do not, however, hold out a great deal of 

hope that he will do so. 

So today, Uzbekistan presents Washington with a classical dilemma. The leader of a dictatorial state in a strategically important, resource-rich region wants cooperation and to be a friend of 

the United States. He cooperates with us on security matters, allowing us to use a military base. 

He claims to be pursuing an agenda of gradual democratization, 

occasionally making some gestures, yet he allows no fundamental 

reforms of his own repressive policies at home, contradicts OSCE 

values, alienates the population, and undermines the country’s stability. Nor is there any reason to expect any change while President Karimov is ruling. 

How long can we work with such a leader without damaging our 

own interest? Are we risking long-term losses for short-term gains? 

Are we strengthening terrorism or fighting it by aligning ourselves 

with President Karimov? 

To address these questions, we’ve assembled our group of wellqualified witnesses. I’m disappointed that we were not able to get 

administration witnesses for this hearing. However, we have with 

us a number of important witnesses, including two reporters who 

were in Andijon at the time of the shootings and in the aftermath. 

Before identifying them, I should note that we did invite the 

Uzbek Embassy to testify at this hearing, but Uzbek authorities 

chose not to attend. I would also state that I have attempted personally to call President Karimov, and my call has been rejected. 
3

I’ve attempted to work with the Uzbek Government, and those efforts have been rejected, as well. 

We will have a panel of five witnesses, whom we would like to 

have come forward. And we start, actually, with the testimony with 

the two eyewitnesses reporters. But if I could have all five come 

forward and take your seats at the table, I would appreciate it. 

While they’re taking their place, other members of the Commission will be coming. Congressman Pitts is here. 

Congressman, I don’t know if you have an opening statement 

that you would like to make? If you would, we’d be pleased to receive that at this time. 

HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding 

this important hearing. I think it’s vital that we and other nations 

continue to fight against terror and that we ensure that fundamental human rights are not violated. 

And of course, like everyone, we’re deeply disturbed by events 

that have occurred in Central Asia. I look forward to the insight 

and analysis that today’s witnesses will provide. 

I do think it would be important to hear from the Government 

of Uzbekistan to get their view, especially on the involvement of 

the terrorist groups in the events that occurred there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you, Congressman. 

I do want to go to the two eyewitnesses first on this. So we’ll 

have the two reporters that were present speak first on this panel. 

I want to apologize ahead of time if I mispronounce your names. 

I’m best with Sam, and Smiths, and Lees, and these names are not 

such, but I do appreciate very much your being here and my lack 

of being able to enunciate your name correctly is no reflection on 

how much we do appreciate your coming. 

Galima Bukharbaeva, since 2005, she has been project director 

for the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Born 

in Tashkent, she graduated from State University in Tashkent, 

Journalism Facility. From 1997 to ’98, she worked for Internews 

Network, an American NGO supporting independent media, as a 

correspondent and training coordinator. From 1998 to 2003, she 

was a correspondent for AFP in Uzbekistan. Her articles on 

Andijon events have been reprinted in numerous sources. 

And so I would turn to you first for your statement for the Commission. 

GALIMA BUKHARBAEVA, CORRESPONDENT, INSTITUTE FOR 

WAR AND PEACE REPORTING 

Ms. BUKHARBAEVA. Thank you very much. 

I would like to thank you, Senator Brownback, and other distinguished members of this Commission for giving me this opportunity to testify about the massacre in Andijon on May 13th, where 

I was myself with my other colleagues, journalists, among the people from Andijon. 
4

I am Galima Bukharbaeva, a journalist from Uzbekistan. I work 

as a country director of the Uzbekistan Project for IWPR in 

Uzbekistan since 2000. 

I was in Bobur Square in Andijon among thousands of Andijon 

citizens, when, at 5:20 p.m. local time on May 13th, the merciless 

authorities of Uzbekistan opened fire on their own people. Before 

the attack, the government didn’t warn unarmed people to leave 

the square. 

Thousands of people were unarmed, and they were not forced by 

rebels to stay on the place. Everybody we spoke to came to the 

square by his own will, either only to look or to protest. It wasn’t 

an Islamic uprising. I didn’t hear any ‘‘Allahu Akbar’’ outcries or 

any demands to build Islamic state. People demanded justice, 

human rights, economical, and social, and political reforms. 

And the monument of Bobur, which was in the center of the 

square—it was full of people. The monument itself, it became a 

tribune for all speakers. These demonstrations and some of the 

speeches were continued from the moment when I arrived to the 

square at 12 o’clock p.m. and until 5 o’clock when fire was opened. 

And the people, they didn’t have even political demands, and 

they didn’t call for resignation of President Karimov. I didn’t see 

any foreign fighters, mujahedeens from Chechnya or Afghanistan. 

The armed people belonged to the group of friends and relatives of 

23 businessmen, who were arrested a year before and were on trial 

in Andijon city court since February 2005. 

At the time of the government’s attack, there were no shootings 

from the rebels’ side or any aggressions from their side. All armed 

person were inside the Governor’s office or in the yard of the buildings, surrounded by the fence. 

A huge demonstration of Andijon unarmed citizens was taking 

place on the square. The government’s troops attacked completely 

unexpectedly for everybody who was at that moment on the main 

square of Andijon. 

The shooting of Andijon citizens, everyone who was on the 

square that time—children, teenagers, women, old people, journalists—took place in cold blood without mercy or pity. It was just 

simply professional mass murder. 

One of the soldiers also tried to kill me. A bullet from his weapon 

hit my rucksack, which was on my back when I tried to escape 

from this bullet, and went through it, passing through my notebook 

and my journalistic identity card. 

I can even show you. This is my notebook. And the bullet went 

through this and my press card. And also, I have my rucksack 

where you can see the front bullet. And I was really lucky, because 

bullet left my rucksack from this side. It was the question of a few 

centimeters. 

During the shooting, when I fled in terror from bullets along 

with the other people, I felt a real animal fear. I had never been 

so scared in my life before. The bullets fell on us like hail, and I 

saw people who were running next to me falling down. 

It seemed that all of Andijon had been turned into a slaughterhouse, and all its inhabitants turned to cannon fodder. President 

Islam Karimov ignored the opinion of his people, the capital of the 
5

most densely populated part of the region, Fergana Valley. He 

scorned the life of every person who was there. 

And I will just very briefly try to explain to you why and how—

my understanding of why this unrest happened. This unrest was 

closely connected with the trial of 23 businessmen charged with belonging to the religious organization Akromiya. The hearing of this 

case finished at the Andijon city court on May 11th, and the court 

withdrew to deliver a sentence. 

These 23 businessmen were arrested in summer 2004. Over the 

year they were detained in a cellar of National Security Service in 

Andijon and were tortured. Their families and lawyers tried all 

legal acts to prove that they are not guilty. 

The last press-conference was held in Tashkent on May 3rd, 10 

days before this massacre in Andijon. And it was at Freedom 

House office in Tashkent. 

And what is interesting, on May 11th, just 2 days before the 

massacre, my colleague, Marcus, he was in Andijon. And he interviewed the prosecutor. He was very interesting. He was asking for 

a 6-, 7-year sentence for these defenders, businessmen. 

And when Marcus asked, ‘‘What crime these people committed 

actually?’’ And they said, ‘‘Oh, they didn’t do anything yet.’’ ‘‘But 

you ask for 6 years. Don’t you think it’s very much for what they 

didn’t do or nothing?’’ ‘‘But anyway, we have to be careful. Just in 

case, we have to punish them.’’ So we have a tape of this interview 

included in his interview in my testimony documents, in English. 

When we arrived to Andijon on Friday, on May 13th, we had a 

chance to speak to some leaders of this unrest. And one of them, 

Sharif Shakirov, his two brothers were among these 23 businessmen on trial, explained how it happened. 

On the last 2 days of the court hearings, on 10 and 11th May, 

up to 5,000 people gathered outside the court building who came 

to express their support for the businessmen on trial. The crowd 

was so large because it was not ordinary people who were on trial, 

but successful businessmen, heads of various manufacturing companies. 

These 23 businessmen provided jobs to 2,000 people. Their employees, friends, and relatives filled the entire park by the court 

building on Tuesday and Wednesday. Later, as Sharif Shakirov 

told us, it was revealed that, starting on Wednesday and Thursday, 

11 and 12 May, the National Security Service arrested six people 

who were standing outside the court. 

Though the city traffic police department started to arrest even 

cars who were parking in front of the court and which belonged to 

the families of these defendants. And as we found out later, the 

verdict was announced secretly on Thursday 12th May in a jail. 

And 23 businessmen got sentences from 12 to 22 years of imprisonment. 

This exhausted their patience. And people began to gather and 

decided to go to the traffic police in the late evening, Thursday, 

May 12th. They gathered together and went backward to the traffic 

police department together in demand for their cars to be released. 

But they had no success at the traffic people. 

They were very angry. And afterwards they went to the NSS, 

and also demanded to release the six new people who were ar-
6

rested. Of course, they couldn’t release them. And after their attack 

on a military unit, and took weapons, and attacked [inaudible] security service, at that moment, as Sharif Shakirov told us, 30 people were killed. And they decided to go to prison and release prisoners in the prison. 

When we asked Sharif Shakirov who was sitting in the Governor’s office, ‘‘So what do you want? What demands do you have?’’ 

And he said that they demand truth and justice. He said that, in 

the morning, they had applied already to Russian President Vladimir Putin through the Reuters News Agency to regulate the conflict. 

Evidently, they didn’t imagine that Andijon citizens would help 

them, that the entire center would be blocked with cars in order 

to stop a storm by authorities. Because when we tried to go to the 

center of the square, all the square, all roads were blocked by cars. 

And I was thinking maybe police did this, but I didn’t see any police or soldiers. 

And as we understood later, that it was done by civilians, who 

tried to support these rebels inside the Governor’s office. And when 

we asked these rebels, ‘‘What do you control at the moment?’’ they 

said, ‘‘We do not control anything. We’re just sitting in this Governor’s office.’’

And after we told them, ‘‘You know, all roads are blocked,’’ ‘‘This 

what Andijon people do.’’

Later, we could speak with another leader, Kabuljon Parpiev. 

And he said that they had folks with the Interior Ministry Zakir 

Almatov. Parpiev said that also they didn’t have any political demands and the only thing they want, the Uzbek Constitution to be 

observed, they want freedom and justice. 

And they also asked if Interior Minister Zakir Almatov can release Akrom Yuldashev. This is a guy who wrote a book. He was 

accused that he is leader of this organization, Akromiya. According 

to Parpiev, Yuldashev didn’t create any organization, but wrote a 

book which became a spiritual guide for many of them. 

In the afternoon, again, they had a call from Interior Minister 

Almatov. This time, Almatov said that it would not be possible to 

free Yuldashev, as the judge is against it. Then, said Parpiev, the 

minister began making threats. 

‘‘He told us that there would be a storm anyway. He said that 

even if they had to kill 300, 1,400 people, they would take the 

rebels,’’ Parpiev told us. 

I asked Parpiev if he was afraid. And he was looking in my eyes 

and he said, ‘‘Can you call this life? It’s better to die.’’ And everybody who was in the Governor’s office in that moment, there was—

I had a feeling that all of them had made decision to die, because 

they said it’s not a life anyway. It’s better to die. 

I went out and started interviewing people on the square. At that 

moment, square was full of people. I can’t say how many. Some 

people were saying 20,000, but I believe that not less than 10,000. 

It was really full. The square was like 200 meters long, but it was 

full of people. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Ms. Bukharbaeva, if I could, I’ve got to vote. 

What I would like to do is for you to go ahead with your testimony. 
7

And then, Mr. Bensmann, if you could proceed with your testimony after that. I’ll go vote and get back as quickly as I can. If 

I’m not back by the time you’re done testifying, if Congressman 

Aderholt or Pitts would like to question those two witnesses, and 

then we’ll proceed to the rest of the panel. That would keep us 

going and flowing on forward. 

So please proceed with your statement. 

And, Mr. Bensmann, as an eyewitness, please testify as well, if 

you could. And if I’m not back by then, two Congressman will go 

with questions. And then I’ll get back for that. My apologies, but 

I’ve got to slip out to a vote. 

Please proceed. 

Ms. BUKHARBAEVA. So I was continuing interviewing people. It 

was almost 5 o’clock. At the moment, I think it was 5:10 or maybe 

5:20. 

I saw that on the main avenue, which is like going along the 

square, a few APCs, armored personal carriers, with two or three 

vehicles driving one after another. 

People were frightened and began running. And I also ran, but 

an APC drove past at a very high speed. But literally 2 minutes 

later, a new line of APCs appeared. As they drove up to the square, 

they opened fire without warning. And everyone ran. I also ran. 

The bullets flew at such a rate that it seemed hail was falling 

on all sides. When the shooting began, I was 5 meters from this 

avenue. But it’s hard to say how many people were killed on May 

13–14 in Andijon. Andijon is in fear now, and no one can speak. 

Even people cannot complain that they lost relatives or someone 

was killed in their family. 

Uzbek Government does everything to hide this massacre, to destroy evidence. They repress people and journalists. They arrest 

even taxi drivers who served journalists, and other locals, who also 

helped journalists to work, stringers or fixers, and also human 

rights defenders who were also eyewitnesses of this massacre. 

High official police source in Andijon just 2 weeks ago gave us 

secretly an interview. And he said that, that day were killed up to 

a few thousand people. He was eyewitness when governments tried 

to hide bodies in mass graves all over Uzbekistan, mostly in 

Fergana Valley. And I ask U.S. Government for help and assistance. 

First, I ask President of USA, George Bush, to condemn this 

massacre. I ask U.S. Government to use all their pressure to convince Uzbek Government to let international commission to come 

to Uzbekistan for independent investigation. If Uzbek Government 

will not let this commission investigate events in Andijon, then I 

ask to start sanctions against Uzbek Government, reconsider your 

relations with Uzbekistan, limit or stop some kind of cooperation, 

including military, and even to remove an American airbase in 

Khanabad, Karshi. 

I ask not to give U.S. visa to all members of Uzbek Government, 

if they will refuse in independent investigation. I ask U.S. Government to act through international organizations such as NATO, 

United Nations, OSCE for letting international commission come to 

Uzbekistan and to condemn massacre in Andijon. 
8

And I ask to help the new Government of Kyrgyzstan to save 

lives of Uzbek refugees and to protect them from pressure from 

Uzbekistan. And I ask to help United Nations to send refugees as 

soon as possible to third countries. 

I also ask to make clear statement that Uzbek Government 

shouldn’t prevent work of local and international journalists in 

Uzbekistan and to stop repressions and abusing local journalists in 

the Uzbek press. 

I ask for help to release as soon as possible human rights defenders, who were arrested after Andijon massacre. And I also ask for 

help and financial assistance for local human rights groups and 

journalists, who still doing great job in Uzbekistan, despite all 

threats. 

So thank you very much. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Bensmann? 

MARCUS BENSMANN, CORRESPONDENT, NEUE ZUERCHER 

ZEITUNG 

Mr. BENSMANN. First of all, I would like to thank you that you 

are ready to hear my statement about what I saw in Andijon. My 

name is Marcus Bensmann, and I am working since 10 years in 

Central Asia, mainly for the Swiss newspaper Neue Zurcher 

Zeitung. 

I was in Andijon 2 days before the massacre, because I wrote a 

story about this trial against the 23 businessmen in Andijon. And 

the interesting thing at this trial was—usually in Uzbekistan, this 

kind of trials are common. You have at least every week a trial 

against a person who has been accused of being a member of an 

Islamic terrorist group. 

But in that case, the people allied with the defendants, the relatives, friends, and employees who worked in the companies, they 

stood up. They started to protest against this arrest and the trial. 

And they did it already for a year. And they used every method to 

make clear that the defendants are innocent. 

And as I was there, there was quite an impressive picture. In 

front of this court, I counted in the evening more than 2,000 people, women, and men, and children, kids, young men, were standing in front of the court, saying nothing, no placards in their 

hands. There was only standing, and they had their best suits on. 

I went inside the court. And I was present as the defendants 

were saying their last words. And you have to know, usually, if you 

have a trial against Islamic radicals in Uzbekistan, I observed two 

patterns. One, if the defendant is completely broken and confesses 

everything. Or you have defendant saying, ‘‘I’m not accepting this 

trial. I’m only believing in God, and we will buildup the Islamic 

state.’’

But in this case, these people were not broken, but they were defending themselves with the Constitution in their hand. They were 

defending themselves, quoting the President, and saying, ‘‘We are 

businessmen. We did what the President wanted to buildup our 

economy. We are not guilty. We are not members of any group.’’

And one even said, ‘‘It’s absurd to turn men running a bakery, 

giving work to the people into a terrorist.’’
9

And also, they had high knowledge about their rights. They was 

demanding, ‘‘We don’t have the opportunity to see our lawyers.’’ 

Then they were saying that they were tortured to sign testimonies. 

And torture is common in Uzbekistan. 

I went back at the same day to Tashkent and was really impressed about this kind of trial, because I hadn’t seen it before. 

And just after the day I made this interview with this prosecutor 

asking him—because I was very impressed by this testimony of the 

defendants ‘‘What did these people commit?’’

And they told me, ‘‘Nothing. They commited nothing. But we will 

put them in jail because they may in future do something.’’ ‘‘And 

are they terrorists?’’ ‘‘No, they are not terrorists.’’ ‘‘That they are 

making anti-constitutional statements?’’ ‘‘No.’’ ‘‘But what is their 

guilt?’’ ‘‘Yes, they are members of this Islamic group.’’

And then I went back to Tashkent. And on Friday morning, I got 

the information that the uprising started. And we, together with 

Galima and two journalists from AP, we succeeded to sneak into 

the city in Andijon. The place is full of people. 

And it was really interesting, because I also observed the uprising in Kyrgyzstan. And in Kyrgyzstan, that was people from the 

mountains, who were forced by the leaders of the clan to go into 

the city. But this, it was really a feeling of a city uprising. Everybody went on the street and participate in it. 

And then they started to gather around this monument of Bobur, 

making speeches. But I didn’t hear any ‘‘Allahu Akbar.’’ I didn’t 

hear any demands to build an Islamic state. And you know, I 

worked during the Tajik civil war. I worked in Afghanistan and recently also in Iraq. I know how these trained fighters looks like, 

but there weren’t any. 

These people who were armed in this night before freed [inaudible] the prisoners, and I haven’t been there at that day in Andijon, 

therefore I do not know exactly what happened. But the people I 

saw who were armed, there were same people from Andijon—not 

well-trained Chechen Mujahedeen or Taliban. 

But they were separated in this [inaudible] yard, which was surrounded by the fence. And there I saw mostly these armed people. 

And on the place, these meetings continued, people were making 

speeches, people camped. 

You have to know Andijon is a provincial city, yes? If something 

happened, everybody is going to to see what’s going on. And even 

there was a rumor that Karimov is coming. They wanted to see 

Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan, to demand and say, ‘‘What’s 

going wrong?’’ That means it was natural that the people was 

there. 

And suddenly, 5 o’clock or 5:20, they started. These armed personal carrier passed by, soldiers sitting on the armed personal carriers, started to fire into the crowd. There was no warning before. 

They didn’t give the people on the square the chance to run. 

They could say, ‘‘In 10 minutes, we will shoot. Please leave the 

place.’’ They could even wait 4 hours when it became dark and everybody went voluntarily home, because in the same evening was 

heavily raining. But they didn’t give the people a chance. 

And even—I would say—if it were even Osama bin Laden sitting 

in this Governor building, yes, at least he would give the people the 
10

chance to go. And they were not forced to be there, because they 

went and camped. There were no armed people who said, ‘‘You 

have to be here.’’

And I was there—to see one APC by APC, and the soldiers were 

sitting and shooting. And we escaped. And the next day, we were 

forced to leave Andijon. But on Sunday, I snuck in again. And I 

had the chance to work another week there. That was very difficult, because every person was frightened by the secret service 

and the police inside. 

But I succeeded to meet families, to go to funeral services. I succeeded to get from one person some death certification, where we 

had [inaudible] the number 372. I do not know. Maybe it’s become 

higher, but that is the number which I have. 

I saw a mass grave [inaudible] with the number 49. And then I 

had to leave also, because they arrested my stringer. But I went 

on Friday to the police station and said, ‘‘Give my man back.’’ And 

I brought him back to Tashkent, and now he is safe in another 

country. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bensmann, for your testimony, and Ms. Bukharbaeva. 

In accordance with the instruction of the chairman, we will proceed to ask some questions, if that’s OK, before going to the other 

witnesses. 

Galima, I have a couple of questions. Some analysts see Andijon 

as Karimov’s Tiananmen Square, if you will, a brutally violent gesture to intimidate any existing or potential opposition. And I suppose it could be argued that violence has worked for the Communist Party in China, which is still in power 15 years later. 

What is your perspective regarding whether or not President 

Karimov deliberately ordered his troops to shoot to send a message? Do you think that can work in Uzbekistan like it worked in 

China? Give me your perspective. 

Ms. BUKHARBAEVA. I also agree that massacre in Andijon is possible to compare with Tiananmen Square tragedy. And it was the 

same, like shooting people without no mercy, without any chance 

for them to leave the square or to save their life. 

And for me, as an Uzbek citizen, and for many people in 

Uzbekistan, I’m sure for the whole country, it was something like 

September 11th for America, because everything changed. Because, 

for instance, not as a journalist, but I’m just only like an Uzbek 

citizen, I can’t imagine how it’s possible to live in a country to 

know that your president, he’s a murderer. 

And because what happened in Andijon, it was mass murder. 

And I’m sure that the whole country, of course, is absolutely 

shocked. And they’re afraid. But at the same time, in China after 

Tiananmen Square, there was also still possibility for economic reforms, yes? Countries thought it should grow very fast. 

But in Uzbekistan, I’m sure that this government will not be able 

to provide economic reforms. And as long as this government will 

stay in power, so it will be country like really falling down. It will 

be in collapse. And it’s really scary to think about the future of my 

country. 
11

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Bensmann, what’s your perspective? Do you think 

Mr. Karimov deliberately ordered troops to shoot to send a message, or what’s your perspective? 

Mr. BENSMANN. He is saying that he supports everything, that 

he controlled every minute of the Andijon massacre. He’s not naming it a massacre. He’s even saying that everything happened 1 

hour later. They even changed the time. 

But it could be also that there is other theory—Uzbekistan is always like an old former Soviet country. You have [inaudible] the 

Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Minister of Security. And 

maybe even he was not so informed and they did something else, 

but Karimov, by himself, he is saying that ‘‘I am responsible for 

what’s going on, and I have everything under control.’’ And therefore, you have to take him by his word. 

Mr. PITTS. Now, a London-based scholar, Shirin Akiner, has written a report about Andijon, which concludes that the government 

version is much closer to reality than yours. Have you read her 

version? What do you think of it? 

I’ll ask both of you. 

Mr. BENSMANN. I will point out two things of this report. First 

of all, she is saying in this report they started to shoot at 6:30. Is 

that right? But they start to shoot at 5:20. And I can prove it by 

wire. I can prove it even by my satellite-phone bill. That means she 

even changed the time, because Karimov was saying nothing was 

happened before 6. 

And then she is giving her own testimony—I think it’s the last 

page—saying, ‘‘We went to Andijon and ‘‘the deputy Hakim’’—the 

is the Governor of the province—‘‘met me and remained the whole 

day with me.’’ And she was there only 1 day. 

I’ll tell you. If you’re invited by the Deputy Hakima in an Uzbek 

province, you have a very big lunch. You have a very big dinner. 

How could she make all these 40 interviews and in the presence 

of the deputy of the Governor? Every person will be frightened into 

saying only what the Governor wants to hear. 

And I think, as she is a scholar, that is desperately against 

every, every ethic to be a scientist. And I hope that organizations 

cooperating with her, like NATO or Peace First, are rethinking 

their cooperation. 

Mr. PITTS. Galima, would you like to respond? 

Ms. BUKHARBAEVA. Yes, I have the same idea, because Shirin 

Akiner, she was also like a PR person for the government. She was 

in Uzbekistan during elections, during this last year’s elections, 

parliament elections, in December 2004, before the referendum and 

before for some important events, like EBRD meeting in Tashkent. 

At that time, she all the time was doing this black PR for the 

government. But at that time, there was no blood. But now, when 

I see that she’s doing this, on people’s blood, when 1,000 people 

died, and she ignored their life, and now she tries to prove that this 

shooting, it was something they had to do, and wants to turn all 

peaceful people who were in the square to terrorists, it’s something 

like I cannot accept at all. 

Because she is saying that there were no shootings at peaceful 

civilians. Of course, they were shooting at me. Am I a terrorist or 

who am I? So I don’t think so. 
12

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. One more question. 

What is your opinion regarding whether or not the people of 

Uzbekistan perceive the U.S. military base as a powerful symbol of 

U.S. support for Karimov? What’s your opinion of that? 

Ms. BUKHARBAEVA. If you talk to some analysts in Uzbekistan, 

they would say that, if not this support from USA to Karimov, 

maybe this president will now feel himself uncomfortable. It’s very 

important to strengthen the power of President Karimov. This airbase is very tight military cooperation. 

But at the same time, you know, people, like ordinary people, 

they still have hope that USA can help them. Because when they 

watch TV and see President George Bush in Tbilisi when he was 

there in the first week of May, when it was like a celebration of 

freedom, they think, ‘‘Why they did not do something like this in 

Tashkent? At least why they do not condemn violation of human 

rights of this terrible massacre? 

And even when before Andijon, there were terrible, terrible stories about this violation of human rights. And when I talk to people, usually they said, ‘‘Why does the international society keep silent? Where is America? Where is Europe?’’

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Bensmann, do you want to comment? 

Mr. BENSMANN. I think—first of all, I have been already for a 

long time in Central Asia. And Central Asia is an Islamic region. 

But you don’t meet anti-Americanism there. The people like to be 

near to America or to Europe. They like to go there, yes? 

They feel near to this country. And I think it’s very difficult—

as I’m a German, as Germany also has a military base in Germany, 

and I think it’s very difficult to have freedom in a country which 

shoots its own people. This is a contradiction. 

And in the end, I think that people know this, also, and if they 

see that America, or even Germany, is not responding to this, then 

all the words, you know, about supporting freedom, supporting democracy, they become nothing. 

There was one point, when we came to Central Asia , the people 

would think, ‘‘Oh, people from the West, from Europe. We are 

safe,’’ yes? I mean, the hope that they are coming from the west 

and they demand building up democracy. But I think our governments shouldn’t send people into the fire and not protect them. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. Your testimony has been very informative, 

and you’re both very eloquent. Thank you. 

Congressman Aderholt? 

HON. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION 

ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

Thank you each for being here. I’ve got another commitment at 

3, so let me just ask one question before I have to leave. 

It’s pretty clear that the authorities in Uzbekistan have tried to 

cutoff foreign sources of information about, of course, what has 

happened there, and about some of the testimony you’ve talked 

about today. And of course, in general, our indication is, that they 

have censored different point of views about what has happened in 

Uzbekistan. 
13

My question to both of you would be, how effective do you think 

that censorship has been? In other words, do people all over 

Uzbekistan know what’s going on and what has been said about it 

by non-government sources? 

Mr. BENSMANN. Can you repeat that? 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Do the people of the Uzbekistan know what is 

going on, even though the government is trying to suppress news 

about what has, happened, through your testimony here today and 

through various other reports? In general, has the government 

managed to suppress that or do the people there know what is 

going on, even though they’ve tried to cover it up? 

Mr. BENSMANN. I think in the first days after Andijon, the people 

didn’t know, because there was only state TV and they also closed 

down the transmission of Russian TV. But still, radio, like BBC, 

German Wave [Deutsche Welle], and Radio Liberty, and Voice of 

America is heard. That means radio is a very important source for 

the people. 

And then with the rumors that are going on, you are not able to 

hide this kind of massacre. 

And even as I was a week later in Tashkent, I already felt that 

everybody and their brother in Tashkent was speaking about it. 

And they had a very clear picture what was going on there. 

Ms. BUKHARBAEVA. Yes. When we were leaving Andijon the next 

day, even people in the neighboring cities didn’t know what happened. And they just surrounded us, asking what happened. And 

when we told them, of course, all people were really shocked that 

this really happened. 

And after just a few days after, whole country knew already. 

Like my friends in Tashkent, they were saying that they’re absolutely, deeply stressed and shocked. And even they were saying 

that streets were absolutely empty in the evening, even markets. 

All people, they looked like they were just sitting in shock. And 

they were even afraid to go out, even to speak loudly. It was absolutely like whole country was turned to look like a prison, and they 

were afraid. And of course, it was deeply, deeply something terrible, a terrible experience for all people in Uzbekistan. 

And I know, even people from, Uzbek police, whom I talked to, 

they were also shocked. And even some people from Uzbek Government, as I know from some friends, from sources, they were also—

for them, it also something what they couldn’t expect. They were 

also like really angry or deeply shocked at what happened. 

But, yes, people know what happened. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. One other thing. Is there any reason to believe 

that systemic reforms are possible in Uzbekistan under the current 

administration there? 

Ms. BUKHARBAEVA. I’m absolutely sure that this administration 

will not be able to provide any reforms. And this administration is 

the biggest obstacle for any reforms. And you can see that even 

such a huge organization like EBRD, IMF, they couldn’t convince 

them to do something. And all they’re doing is really very artificial. 

And people, in Andijon, for instance, they had such simple demands, if you will see. Next day, this unrest was in Karasuu in 

Kyrgyzstan. And the first thing people started to do, was to rebuild 

the bridge broken by government on January 2003 because govern-
14

ment didn’t want us Uzbek people to go to Kyrgyzstan for shopping 

because some prices are lower. 

And they broke the bridge that one night. And now, 2 years ago, 

when it was just one shot for people to do something, they started 

to rebuild bridge. I don’t think that it has anything to do with Islamic terrorism. It’s such a simple thing. 

And even just only one thing I can show you, this is a letter. And 

this is blood from Andijon. And this letter, it was written from one, 

I think, according to text—it wasn’t signed—by one guy who was 

released from the prison, these 23 businessmen. And I included, 

also, in English translation on this letter. 

The first thing these people saying is just economic, social problems. And even in their last letter, they’re still saying that they’re 

not Akromiya, that organization, this Islamic organization does not 

exist. They just were businessmen, and several from the government decided to take their business. That’s why they were arrested. And if you read this letter, it’s really impressive. This is 

like a voice from Andijon, Andijon [inaudible]. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

Mr. Bensmann? 

Mr. BENSMANN. I doubt that it’s possible to make with these people on the top reforms, because which kind of reform you would 

like to do? You would like to make a dialogue with the person to 

say, ‘‘You know, friend, next time you’re not shooting on people? 

You didn’t know it before?’’

But I understand. I also do not know what’s going on now. 

Maybe Uzbekistan turns now to an [inaudible] of Central Asia or 

maybe an internal struggle is going on, because I have hope still, 

because there are a lot of people, yes, who graduated either in Europe or in America. They had experience of the outside world. 

And maybe, even if they are working for the government, they 

know that this was a crossing of a red line. And maybe something 

internal will change. 

Mr. ADERHOLT. Thank you. 

I’m going to turn over back to Mr. Pitts for the testimony of the 

other people here. So thank you very much. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Congressman Aderholt. 

We’ll proceed now to the other witnesses. And I’ll ask them to go 

in this order: Holly Cartner, who’s the Executive Director of the 

Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, first; 

and then Robert Templer, who is the Asia Program Director of the 

International Crisis Group; and then, finally, Muhammad Salih, 

who’s a well-known writer and poet, the leader of the Erk [Freedom] Party. 

Holly Cartner? 

HOLLY CARTNER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, EUROPE & 

CENTRAL ASIA DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Ms. CARTNER. Thank you very much to the Commission for inviting us to speak today on this extremely important and timely topic. 

I want to focus also on the events of May 13th in Andijon. 

Human Rights Watch researchers were deployed to the region 

within days of the massacre and interviewed more than 50 witnesses to the violence in Kyrgyzstan and in Andijon. Much of what 
15

I say, at least at the beginning, will, I think, be quite consistent 

with what you’ve heard already, but I think it’s nevertheless important to know that when interviewed separately, many, many people 

have a very, very consistent story of what happened there. 

As we’ve already heard, the May 13th killings, the massacre, 

began with thousands of people participating in what was a very 

rare protest in Bobur Square in the center of Andijon. And all indications are that they were expressing their anger about growing 

poverty and government repression. 

The protests were sparked, as we’ve heard from the previous two 

witnesses, by the freeing from jail of the 23 businessmen, who had 

been charged and tried for religious fundamentalism. And I would 

just note that that particular charge is often made by the Uzbek 

authorities against anyone they consider to be a threat to their 

power. 

The armed men who broke into the prison, took over government 

buildings, took hostages, and used people as human shields, committed serious crimes, and those are punishable under Uzbek 

criminal law. But nothing that was done by the armed men, nor 

certainly nothing that was done by the peaceful protestors in the 

square, could justify the government’s response. 

Based on our research, it’s clear that the overwhelming majority 

of the people in Bobur Square at all times of the day were unarmed 

protesters. While some armed men were in the square, they remained usually on the fringes or on the margins of the crowd. This 

is confirmed both by eyewitness testimony and by photographs that 

we have reviewed. 

Despite the overwhelming presence of unarmed civilians, of men, 

women, old, elderly, women, children, the Uzbek Government never 

made an announcement to the crowd to disperse, as we’ve heard 

from other speakers already. And they gave no warning of the impending attack. They did not make any attempt to use any form 

of crowd control or to take any other steps that might have minimized the risk and danger to the unarmed protesters. 

Instead, armored personnel carriers and military trucks, as well 

as snipers from various buildings, fired indiscriminately into the 

crowd during the day and more directly at the crowd in the 

evening. In fact, our research showed that security forces never targeted the few gunmen who were around the margins of the square, 

but instead focused on the innocent and unarmed civilians who 

were protesting there. 

No ambulances were allowed into the area after the shooting was 

over to collect the wounded. Instead, the wounded were simply left 

in the streets—many of them were left in the streets to die. And 

what is more, Human Rights Watch received testimony that soldiers summarily executed some of the wounded who were still lying 

in the streets the next day, on the morning of May 14. 

The scale of the killings was so extensive and so unjustified that 

we can call this, as the other witnesses, a massacre. Eyewitnesses 

have told us that between 300 and 400 people were present at the 

worst shooting incident, which took place near the cinema. That 

was only one, though, of several shooting incidents that resulted in 

casualties during the day. So this is just an effort to try and get 

a very rough estimate of how many might have been killed. 
16

The Uzbek Government has denied all responsibility for the 

killings. It claims that the death toll was 176 people and that the 

only ones who died were either law enforcement officials or civilians killed by the gunmen, as well as the gunmen themselves. 

Not surprisingly, the Uzbek Government claims that the 

attackers were Islamic extremists. For nearly a decade now, the 

Uzbek Government has cast nearly all of its domestic critics as terrorists, extremists, and Islamic fundamentalists. 

Human Rights Watch research found no evidence that the protesters or the gunmen had an Islamist agenda. Interviews with numerous people present at the demonstration consistently showed 

that the protesters spoke about economic conditions in Andijon, 

government repression, and unfair trials, not the creation of an Islamic state. 

Uzbek authorities have done everything possible to hide the 

truth behind the massacre. In the hours after the violence, the government forces removed most of the bodies and washed away the 

evidence of the brutality without first doing any time of forensic investigation. 

At the same time, the city was virtually closed down to strangers 

and and there was a strict clampdown on media coverage. Journalists who happened to witness the killings in Andijon often had 

their materials confiscated and were threatened. 

The Uzbek authorities have also tried to ensure that other witnesses to the May events keep silent. People in Andijon have reported to us that the police had explicitly warned them not to 

speak to journalists or other outsiders. Government agents have 

also gone from house to house trying to identify those who were 

missing and confiscating passports and identification documents to 

further intimidate the families of the protesters. 

Since the May 13th events, authorities have also arrested at 

least 10 human rights defenders and opposition activists in 

Andijon. Others have been beaten by unknown assailants, threatened by local authorities, set upon by mobs, and placed under 

house arrest. 

More than 6 weeks after the massacre, Andijon residents continue to live in extreme fear of government retribution for speaking 

out about the event. The city remains essentially closed to journalists and human rights investigators. 

Despite the Uzbek Government’s best efforts to hide the truth behind the killings of May 13th, authoritative accounts on what happened in Andijon do exist, including the excellent report released 

last week by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights. 

The OSCE report is consistent with our own findings as to the 

sequence of events and the undeniable responsibility of Uzbek Government forces for the large number of killings of unarmed civilians. The OSCE report concluded that, quote, ‘‘Force was used repeatedly against unarmed civilians throughout the day, that it was 

indiscriminate and disproportionate, and that many unarmed civilians were wounded or killed,’’ unquote. 

Our respective investigations are only a first step toward setting 

the record straight, however. Many questions remain unanswered, 
17

including the precise death toll and the government—the identity 

of government troops that were responsible for the killings. 

For this reason, the main recommendation flowing from both 

Human Rights Watch’s report and the OSCE report is that an 

independent international investigation into Andijon events is 

needed. Only a full-fledged international investigation, with access 

to official records, can give a true picture of what actually happened and provide the basis for the beginning of an accountability 

process. 

However, the Uzbek Government has rejected an international 

investigation. Instead, earlier this month, it invited a number of 

governments with diplomatic presence in Tashkent, including the 

United States and France, to monitor a commission of inquiry underway by the Uzbek Parliament. 

Both the United States and France rightfully declined, but others, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan’s 

Central Asian neighbors, are taking part. Needless to say, we do 

not view this as a credible effort. 

Given the government’s overall poor human rights record, and in 

particular its record of impunity for human rights violations, it is 

unlikely that any government-led investigation could possibly be 

credible. This makes an independent, international investigation, 

led by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, imperative 

for the establishment of a true record of the killings and the start 

of accountability. 

I would also like to highlight one other troubling situation related to the events in Andijon. More than 500 Uzbek citizens who 

fled their homes after the events in Andijon have sought refuge in 

Kyrgyzstan. Many are currently sheltered in the camp near Sasyk, 

Kyrgyzstan, and there’s growing concern that the Kyrgyz Government, which is itself under intense pressure from Uzbek authorities, may not be able or willing to provide these refugees with adequate protection. 

Human Rights Watch has maintained staff in the refugee camp 

and in the region since the events in Andijon. And we have growing concern that the refugees risk refoulement. 

Twenty-nine Uzbek citizens are currently in Kyrgyz custody and 

were transferred there from the refugee camp and are at an extremely high risk of being return to Uzbekistan in the next days. 

Already on June 10th, the Kyrgyz authorities extradited four 

Uzbek asylum seekers back to Uzbekistan, although they clearly—

their asylum applications had not yet been reviewed, and they 

clearly face a serious risk of torture. No international monitor, to 

my knowledge, has had access to the four since their return to 

Uzbekistan. 

To date, the Uzbek authorities have requested the extradition of 

133 individuals who sought refuge in Kyrgyzstan after the May 

13th violence. It’s especially important to stress that everyone in 

the group in Kyrgyzstan, whether ultimately recognized as a refugee or not, is at great risk of torture if returned to Uzbekistan. 

It’s therefore absolutely prohibited by the Convention Against 

Torture for them to be returned to Uzbekistan. And Kyrgyzstan is 

a signatory to that convention. 
18

It should also be noted that Uzbek officials have been particularly eager to have these individuals return to Uzbekistan in part 

because, as I noted before, it’s trying to prevent anyone with details about the massacre from being able to tell his or her story. 

Uzbek security officials are operating in the area around the refugee camp inside Kyrgyzstan and pose a real danger to those who 

have sought shelter there. 

I agree with all of the recommendations that the previous two 

speakers have already made, and so I won’t take much more time 

on this. Clearly, the international community must make sure that 

the continued refusal on the part of the Uzbek Government to cooperate with an independent international investigation carries 

real consequences and to set a timeline for compliance. 

In a welcome note, the European Union has stated that it expects the Uzbek Government to reconsider its position on an international investigation by the end of June, and that continued lack 

of cooperation will trigger a partial suspension of its Partnership 

and Cooperation Agreement with Uzbekistan. 

With the E.U. deadline drawing near, the United States needs to 

follow suit. As a first step, the administration should publicly announce that it is suspending discussions on a long-term military 

base and explore alternative basing arrangements until the Uzbek 

Government agrees to an international investigation. 

Should the Uzbek Government persist in its refusal to accept an 

international investigation, the United States should bring to an 

end its post-September 11th strategic partnership with the country 

and discontinue its military presence. 

The administration should also urgently determine whether any 

of the Uzbek military units involved in the Andijon killings received U.S. military or counterterrorism assistance, equipment, or 

training, in the interest of ensuring that U.S. policy is in full compliance with the Leahy Amendment. 

And finally, the United States should do its share as a NATO 

member state to suspend all military activities with Uzbekistan in 

the framework of the Partnership for Peace program until the 

Uzbek Government has agreed to an international investigation 

into the Andijon events. 

Thank you for your attention. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much. 

And now we’ll go to Mr. Templer, his testimony. Robert Templer 

is the Asia Program Director of International Crisis Group. He 

heads a team of more than 20 researchers working in 8 offices covering 20 countries in Asia. Formerly a correspondent for Agence 

France Press and a visiting scholar at the University of California, 

Berkeley. He’s the author of ‘‘Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam,’’ and two forthcoming works on conflict. 

And so, Mr. Templer, I look forward to your testimony. If you 

could hold within the timeframe of what we’ve got on the time 

clock so we can get onto to some questions, too. 

And I’ll apologize to the panel and to those present that I had 

to stay on the floor longer than I thought was necessary. 

Mr. Templer? 
19

ROBERT TEMPLER, DIRECTOR, ASIA PROGRAM, 

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 

Mr. TEMPLER. Thank you, Senator, for the invitation to speak before the Helsinki Commission. 

And thank you to the other members. 

I’m not going to repeat what we’ve heard from the eyewitnesses 

and from other researchers, though the counts very much coincide 

with our own research into the events in Andijon. Crisis Group has 

been working actually in Andijon for 6 months before the massacre, 

interviewing people in connection with the trial of the 23 businessmen. 

We had reached the conclusion even before the massacre that 

they had no engagement in violent Islamic activity of any kind and 

that the trial was just another example of an unfair persecution of 

a religious group by the government of Islam Karimov. 

It’s quite clear throughout the Islamic world that groups that are 

intent on imposing an extreme vision of Islam on people, or establishing Islamic faith, or carrying out acts of violence in the name 

of Islam, are very rarely shy about their desire to do this. They 

more often than not go out there and tell people that this is exactly 

what they want to do and why they’re doing it. 

This has never been the case in this situation. And I think all 

evidence points to the fact that this was not driven by an Islamist 

agenda in any way. 

Everybody heard in considerable detail about the events of May 

13th and 14th. I’m going to focus on the wider picture of 

Uzbekistan and Central Asia, and how it might be done in terms 

of a policy response to the massacre, and also to the failure of the 

government of Karimov to really move Uzbekistan forward in any 

way. 

I think there’s now a widespread recognition that Karimov has 

set Uzbekistan on an extremely dangerous path of self-destruction 

and that he will not be persuaded by any other government that 

his policies are a disaster for his country and a disaster for the region. 

Uzbekistan is now a member of that group of countries—and 

those include Zimbabwe, Burma, North Korea, Belarus, and a few 

others in this list—who are ruled by men who don’t just show a 

lack of concern for people but are willing to inflict any level of suffering and hardship, as long as they remain in power. 

The United States has taken strong stands against the leaders 

of those other countries. It is time to take the same stand against 

Karimov. 

Karimov’s past behavior provides us with no hope that he will 

change his policies. His background is as a Soviet state planner, 

and he still views the world through the lens of a Brezhnev-era 

apparatchik. He wants to see what he calls ‘‘civilized trade,’’ by 

which he means that all businesses are controlled by his officials. 

His edicts have crushed all economic opportunity in Uzbekistan, 

leaving people despairing and unable to earn the sparsest of incomes. He is contemptuous of the ideas of parliamentary democracy, religious freedom, press freedom, or economic freedom. He 

runs one of the most repressive police states in the world. 
20

He targets people of faith and employs his feared secret services 

to torture and abuse them. He has banned Muslim and Christian 

groups and sent thousands to some of the most terrible prison 

camps on Earth purely for the expression of their religious beliefs. 

As a result of these policies, he rules a country in which people are 

now nostalgic for the time of the Soviet Union. 

There’s a growing expectation that the end of Karimov’s rule will 

be violent. A civil conflict in Uzbekistan could be a disaster for 

Central Asia. It’s likely to send large numbers of refugees into 

neighboring countries, and these countries ill-equipped to cope. 

There’s a real risk that the very fragile states of Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, which border Uzbekistan, could be seriously undermined by any conflict that would break out within 

Uzbekistan. 

U.S. policymakers should still aim to get Karimov onto the right 

path, but they should recognize that this is unlikely to happen now 

and start planning to minimize the dangers he presents to the 

wider security of Central Asia. There are very few good options for 

the short term in Uzbekistan. There is simply no set of policies 

that can make Karimov open up his country and deal with the real 

grievances of his people. 

I think there are some steps that are important to take because 

they would at least signal to the Uzbek people that the United 

States is on their side, not the side of their despot. Among the 

steps we would like to see is a consistent demand from all parts 

of the U.S. Government calling for an independent international investigation into events in Andijon. This demand should be made in 

all fora, within the United Nations, within the OSCE, within 

NATO, as well as in all bilateral contacts, including those from the 

military and Department of Defense. 

Suspension of negotiations on the lease of the airbase until 

Uzbekistan agrees to this investigation. Given the lack of cooperation in recent months over the base, defense planners should give 

careful consideration to the usefulness of having such a grudging 

ally in the region when other countries might be more cooperative. 

The use of the Moscow Mechanism of the OSCE would allow for 

the appointment of a special rapporteur to investigate events in 

Andijon. The calling of a high-level meeting of the United States, 

the European Union, Japan to discuss a joint political and aid 

strategy for Central Asia. A full review of all engagement in 

Uzbekistan by the international financial institutions, including 

the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 

Asian Development Bank. 

We do not argue for the withdrawal of all aid from Uzbekistan, 

as this would not help many of the people in the country. Aid is 

currently so limited that making it conditional’s unlikely to have 

much effect on Uzbek policy. 

It is time, however, to consider some targeted sanctions if the 

Uzbeks do not agree to an investigation. Such sanctions could include visa and travel bans for officials known to have been involved 

in the massacre and investigations into corrupt wealth held by 

Uzbek officials overseas. The security units involved in the massacre should not receive U.S. training or equipment. 
21

In recognition of the difficulties of implementing aid projects, 

particularly those that help civil society organizations and small 

groups, Congress might consider allowing USAID and the U.S. Embassy greater latitude to implement small grants in a manner that 

prevents them from being obstructed by the Uzbek Government. 

In the longer term, a critical priority is to develop a strategy that 

both prepares Uzbekistan for change and tries to minimize the regional fallout of possible state failure there. All around the world, 

we have seen the collapse of one country—more often than not, a 

state driven into the ground by its own leader—infects other countries and leads to widespread regional conflict. 

We need to make sure this does not happen in Central Asia. 

Kyrgyzstan has found it difficult to cope with 500 refugees. If the 

number were in the hundreds of thousands, it would simply push 

the neighboring states to the point of collapse themselves. 

If Uzbekistan does collapse, it would imperil efforts to bring stability and democracy to Afghanistan, and it would risk creating a 

haven for extremists in what is already a dangerous neighborhood. 

It would mean a worsening of drug trafficking and crime. It would 

be a direct threat to security around the world. 

There are some steps that could be taken to ensure longer-term 

stability in the region. One is to work with the key neighboring 

states, particularly Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, to start planning for a possible internal conflict in 

Uzbekistan. 

Work to expand their capacity to handle natural and man-made 

disasters, including improving information and management systems and the pre-positioning of supplies to handle possible refugee 

flows. Expand educational contacts with Uzbekistan, including exchanges with all various groups in that society. 

Exposure to education in the United States, Europe or at such 

institutions as the American University in Bishkek can only help 

create a cadre of pro-Western thinkers who oppose what Karimov 

is doing to the country. Expand the training of and support for 

local independent journalists, human rights activists, and lawyers, 

and the local NGOs that support them. 

We recognize that Uzbek Government places enormous obstacles 

in the way of efforts such as this but believe that they should continue. Expand training in key areas that would be needed to run 

any transition to democracy in Uzbekistan, including civilian security, military experts, legal reform experts, parliamentary experts, 

and civil service reform experts. In short, we need to prepare all 

of the expertise that would be necessary for a post-Karimov transition. 

Expand broadcasting to Uzbekistan in Uzbek and Russian to ensure that Uzbeks can get news and educational opportunities beyond what is offered by the state-controlled media and schools. 

Start planning regional transport links in a way that means 

Uzbekistan cannot block trade and regional development, which is 

currently the case. Uzbekistan obstructs most of trade from 

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that would go through Uzbekistan to 

other countries. 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are very vulnerable to disruptions in 

road and rail transport within Uzbekistan. To work through the 
22

International Labour Organization and other partners to end the 

use of forced and child labor to pick cotton, which is a major source 

of economic grievance in the Fergana Valley. 

Events in Andijon show that we cannot wait to come up with effective policies that stabilize Central Asia. All members of the 

OSCE need to come together to find ways to ensure that change 

comes peacefully and quickly to Uzbekistan and that its young people do not become another lost generation in this part of the world, 

without hope and potentially attracted to extremism. 

We also need to work with other countries in the region to ensure that any possible violence in Uzbekistan does not become the 

spark that sets off a regional conflagration. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Templer. 

Our final witness is Muhammad Salih. He’s a well-known writer 

and poet. Muhammad Salih is the leader of Erk, the Freedom 

Party. In December 1991, he was a contender in Uzbekistan’s Presidential election, receiving, according to official tallies, 12 percent 

of the vote. 

In 1993, after President Islam Karimov closed down all opposition activity, Mr. Salih fled the country, first to Turkey, then to 

Norway. He remains an opposition leader in exile and now resides 

in Germany. This is his first visit to the United States in 10 years. 

Mr. Salih, welcome to the committee. I’m pleased to receive your 

testimony. And we look forward to the discussion. 

Mr. Salih? 

MUHAMMAD SALIH, CHAIRMAN, ERK PARTY 

Mr. SALIH [through interpreter]. Ladies and gentlemen, Chairman, Senator Brownback, thank you very much for giving me an 

opportunity to come to this audience today to these hearings. 

Thank you very much. 

The scale of atrocities that took place in Uzbekistan last month 

are becoming very clear to the world. And the testimonies of the 

previous three panelists, they only confirm this. I just want to emphasize the political aspects and overall political situation there. 

And therefore, in order to save our time, I want to give it to the 

interpreter to read the testimony. 

The group which took over the Governor’s office was prepared for 

compromises and requested the mediation of Russian President 

Putin in order to avoid a bloodshed. However, President Karimov 

denounced this proposal and ordered his forces to shoot the protesting residents of Andijon. The targeted were not extremists, but 

the crowd of Andijonis. 

Karimov was not afraid of extremists with Kalashnikovs in their 

hands. He feared unarmed crowds of peaceful populations who 

were protesting in the square and talking about their problems. He 

ordered to kill them in order to spread fear among the population 

and not to let them even think about what happened in Ukraine, 

Georgia, or Kyrgyzstan. 

An armed group gave him a good excuse to commit mass murder. 

Some say that the group who stormed government buildings using 

weapons were guided the government, and such versions should 

not be ignored, too. 
23

The Andijon massacre could be compared to Tiananmen Square 

crisis, but the response from the world community to the events in 

Andijon is many times smaller. The attempts of western governments to prevent further repression against our people are regarded by our great neighbors, like Russia and China, as interference in domestic affairs of Uzbekistan, although they do not consider their open support of the Karimov regime, which is responsible for the Andijon massacre, as open interference in the internal 

affairs, again, in Uzbekistan. 

This concludes that, when they regard sovereignty of the Uzbek 

state, they mean only the sovereignty and independence of its authoritarian leader. Such support inspires President Karimov to continue what he has been doing. 

Embarrassed after Western criticism for what happened in 

Andijon, Karimov rushed to secure Chinese support for what he 

did. On the contrary, he offered China oil and gas projects in 

Uzbekistan worth $600 million. The danger of such cooperation 

with China, with its expansionist policy toward Central Asia, must 

not be underestimated. 

The regime of Karimov is coming to its end. That problem is to 

end it bloodlessly. Karimov may think otherwise, but he must understand that he would be brought accountable for any violence. 

The role of America in this peaceful end of the regime would be 

crucial. 

But first of all, America and the rest of the world must understand that estimates that Islamic fundamentalists would come to 

power after Karimov are not true. There is no religious group in 

Uzbekistan that has the real support of mass populations. They are 

rather marginalized and disintegrated. And most importantly, they 

do not have a support platform among the population. 

They are usually gathered around one mullah or religious scholar 

who has no political vision nor concrete program. There could be 

one Hizb-ut-Tahrir, but even this group will never progress in Central Asia because its ideology is based on pan-Arabism, which is 

alien to our people. 

Their effective activities could be explained by the social and economic crisis in Uzbekistan, or simply by poverty of the population, 

where well-funded men, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, can hire large numbers of 

unemployed youth to distribute its propaganda. 

Another feature of this group is that they call ‘‘non-believers’’ 

those who do not join them. And such a radical approach has 

distanced our people from them. Therefore, such groups like Hizbut-Tahrir will remain alien, even for the most vigorous opponents 

of Karimov. 

The attempts of certain political analysts and experts to portray 

Islamic fundamentalism as the only alternative to the Karimov regime only bolsters the regime’s assertion that, if Karimov is gone, 

the Islamists will take over. Such obligations only help Karimov to 

remain in power. 

These quasi-estimates are simply baseless without any statistics 

and public opinion research, such as now are produced outside 

Uzbekistan, and geopolitical interests of certain great powers are 

taken into account while producing them. 
24

We must understand that the sense of unaccountability has 

played a big role after the events in Andijon. Karimov is convinced 

that he will not be accountable for what happened there. And now 

it is the time to eliminate that sense. 

Last year, the U.S. Congress has passed an act on democracy in 

Belarus against the regime of Lukashenka. It would be fair to pass 

such act on Uzbekistan, too. While meeting many people in organizations in the United States, numerous times I hear, ‘‘ How could 

America help to progress democracy in Uzbekistan?’’

We ask the following: the legalization of the Uzbek democratic 

opposition, the safe return of the democratic opposition leaders to 

Uzbekistan under the Western and U.N. security guarantees, ensure free and fair parliamentary and Presidential elections with 

participation of the opposition groups. 

At first stage, this would be sufficient to change anti-democratic 

regime by democratic methods. All other attempts of replacing bad 

Karimov by good Karimov would only mean betrayal of our people 

and democracy. Presently, such scenarios are actually being pushed 

by certain groups inspired by the inner-circle—inspired by the support of Karimov’s inner-circle. 

It’s important to have fundamental changes, bringing young 

leaders with new mentality, free of communism radiation. After the 

collapse of USSR, all newly formed states renamed their Red 

Squares to the Freedom or Independence Squares. But yet, they 

have not become free and independent, overshadowed by dictatorship and tyranny. 

The Western world must support the democratic movements of 

Central Asia, Uzbekistan in particular. Democratic forces are the 

only key to the solution of conflicts, of problems of Central Asia. 

You could see this phenomenon in the example of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. There’s no other alternative. Events in 

Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan have given [inaudible] hope to 

millions of my hopeless countrymen. Please support our democracy. 

Thank you very much for your attention. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much. And I’m pleased that 

you’re hear to testify. And I have some questions. 

Mr. Salih, first, I would want to—I want to start off with a question, that there’s been a number of accusations about you from 

Uzbek authorities. 

They say you’re responsible for explosions in Tashkent in 1999, 

that you’ve had ties with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. It’s 

a terrorist organization. You’ve also been accused of contacts with 

a Chechen terrorist. And even charges last week that your son 

trained at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. 

Because those accusations are out and swirling around, I would 

like for you to, if you would, to please address those questions directly. 

Mr. SALIH [through interpreter]. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman, for asking this question, because it’s really, indeed, a 

very important question, because I can feel the hand of Karimov 

behind this. 

And actually, I wanted to read out my statement that I prepared. 

And it would answer, actually, all of these questions, if you allow. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Yes, please. 
25

Mr. SALIH [through interpreter]. After being exiled from 

Uzbekistan in early ’90s, I sought many avenues to bring democratic reforms to Uzbekistan. From 1994 to 1996, I met with many 

groups offering assistance in liberating Uzbekistan. I do not deny 

meeting with some of these people. However, I do deny supporting 

them. 

The Karimov regime, in order to discredit me as its opponent, for 

many years blamed me for the contacts with Islamic radicals. The 

only witness who has testified against me during the trial of 1999 

bombing in Tashkent, is Zaynettin Askarov, a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. On 26 November, 2003, during an 

interview to Radio Liberty and BBC from the Tashkent prison, he 

publicly denied his previous testimony, which he gave during 1999 

trials. 

During his interview with Radio Liberty and BBC, Zaynettin 

Askarov said that Muhammad Salih has never had any connection 

with their group or any other religious groups and that his previous statement accusing Salih in connection with IMU and other 

groups were given under extreme pressure at the direct order of 

Zakir Almatov, Uzbekistan Interior Minister. He publicly apologized for the lie that he had to tell during the 1999 Tashkent trial. 

Furthermore, in 1999, after the bombings in Tashkent, President 

Karimov stated during the press conference that Muhammad 

Salih’s son, Timur at that time was in one of Afghanistan’s terrorist training camps. Ironically, at that time, my son Timur and 

I were in Istanbul and gave an interview to BBC Radio Uzbek service. The interview is available in BBC radio archives. 

I state with full responsibility that my son, Timur Salih has 

never been in Afghanistan. As for the so-called evidence, it is photographs of my links to terrorists that have been circulating. The 

picture of me and IMU leader, Tahir Yuldosh, was made in 1996. 

At that time, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan did not exist as a 

terrorist organization. 

Furthermore, Tahir Yuldosh, now a well-known terrorist, met 

with many other politicians in his capacity as the member of the 

United Tajik Opposition, which later joined the Tajik-coalition government. Once I realized his radical stance on the issues, I quickly 

distanced myself from him. 

I have no link with and never supported the Islamic Movement 

of Uzbekistan ideology, which is based on violence. And as I have 

always been a dedicated democrat, I condemn violence in any form. 

The photograph of then-President of Chechnya Zelimkhan 

Yandarbiyev, my former classmate at the Moscow Institute of Literature, was made during Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev’s official visit to 

Turkey in 1996, after he was received by the Kremlin in Moscow 

where he signed a peace accord with President Yeltsin. 

I do not—and never will—support the use of terrorism by any 

group. The 1998 bombing on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, 

the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, the attack on the World 

Trade Center in 2001, all these acts are deplorable. The use of terrorism is a disdainful practice and does not bring about true reform. 

I urge the world community not to believe in the lies and old Soviet-style disinformation of the Karimov regime. Thank you. 
26

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Salih, some analysts have been going back 

and forth on the U.S. connection and role in Uzbekistan. I believe 

Ms. Cartner was saying we should pull out of Uzbekistan, if I’m 

paraphrasing her correctly, if no progress is being made. We should 

not negotiate a long-term base agreement. 

Others are saying we should not abandon Uzbekistan because 

that will have a negative impact on the growth of—the future 

growth of democracy in this regime and economic liberalization in 

a post-Karimov era. What are your thoughts on the U.S. connection 

to Uzbekistan in the future? 

Mr. SALIH [through interpreter]. The U.S. military presence, the 

presence of the U.S. military bases in Uzbekistan, actually have 

made a positive psychological effect in Uzbekistan, because of our 

situation, where our country is squeezed between two other great 

powers with their expansionist policies, China and Russia, it provided us some sort of security guarantees. 

But on the other hand, we did not want America to become a 

hostage of its own base there, when the questions of human rights 

and democracy advancement are sidelined. The ideal option, of 

course, would be to have both, to have U.S. military presence there, 

and also, at the same time, to continue to use pressure on the Government of Uzbekistan, if there was an opportunity for that. 

But it is highly unlikely that both could come together. And we 

hope that America chooses freedom. And thinking long term, the 

long-term interests of the United States, as well as the interests of 

the people of Uzbekistan are establishing a democracy there, and 

even if it comes at the expense of abandoning a military base there. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Let me understand then correctly, because I 

thought you were saying at the outset that the presence of U.S. 

military has had a positive impact on the region, but are you saying now that, if democracy is not engaged in Uzbekistan, the 

United States should pull its military presence out? 

Mr. SALIH [through interpreter]. As an Uzbek, as a person who 

knows this regime, this unchangeable regime, very well, and also 

knowing that the regime understands only pressure, I do believe 

that, if there was an opportunity to have both, to preserve the military base and at the same time to continue to put pressure on the 

government, on the regime, I would support this. 

Because we also have concerns about growing Chinese interest. 

And they could be interested in establishing a military presence in 

Uzbekistan. And that could put in danger not only Uzbekistan but 

the entire Central Asian region. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Some analysts see Andijon as Islam Karimov’s 

Tiananmen Square—you cited that analogy—a violent gesture to 

intimidate any existing or potential opposition. Do you think President Karimov deliberately ordered his troops to shoot to send a 

message? 

Mr. SALIH [through interpreter]. I’m convinced that President 

Karimov deliberately ordered to kill people in order to give a message, in order to prevent people of Uzbekistan to go protesting to 

the streets, just like it happened in Kyrgyzstan, in Ukraine, in 

order to keep people under fear. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Congressman Pitts? 
27

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll continue with Mr. 

Salih. 

You said pressure is important, it’s good. What kind of pressure 

specifically might induce Islam Karimov to make meaningful 

changes in Uzbekistan? 

Mr. SALIH [through interpreter]. First of all, the pressure could 

include economic pressure, including financial, and also political 

pressure. And at the same time the United States could use the 

neighboring countries, surrounding Uzbekistan to put those kind of 

pressure, as well. 

And also, at the same time, I wouldn’t want to see Uzbekistan 

as completely isolated from the Western World. So in this way, the 

pressure could be calculated in a very balanced way that there 

could be some, at least, some minimum opportunity left for President Karimov under which he could either agree to reform or under 

that pressure he could peacefully resign or agree to resign, to give 

up power. 

Mr. PITTS. Let me ask the other panelists to comment. I’ll rephrase the question. 

Is there any form of pressure that might induce Islam Karimov 

to make meaningful changes in Uzbekistan? And is there any reason to believe that systemic reforms are possible in Uzbekistan 

while Karimov is in power? 

Ms. Cartner first? 

Ms. CARTNER. Taking your last question first, I have very serious 

doubts that any kind of systemic reform can be carried out with the 

current administration, the current Government in Uzbekistan. 

Karimov and others in the government have shown no willingness to take up recommendations and the engagement of the international community on human rights issues, even in terms of 

working out a long-term action plan, for example, on torture. And 

it’s something that was very concrete and would theoretically be 

something that could be taken on step-by-step. 

There’s no willingness of the government to do so. I don’t see any 

indication there of any willingness to reform. On the contrary, we 

see efforts to make quite superficial changes only when there’s real 

pressure coming, which are then superficial at best. So I don’t have 

great hope that we’ll see significant changes at this point. 

I honestly don’t know the answer to your first question. I think 

that our colleague from the ICG has put it very well, that it’s hard 

to see what pressure there is that will change this particular government at this point. 

However, I would argue that that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t 

be trying. And that doesn’t mean that the U.S. Government 

shouldn’t be trying. Everyone in their own capacity has to look for 

the things that the government might care about and to push in 

that way. 

That’s why we’ve made the recommendation on the base. We’ve 

looked at economic issues—what does Karimov care about? Money, 

perhaps. A military engagement, and the close ties that he has 

with the U.S. Government. And therefore, those things have to be 

linked to progress on human rights issues. 

As I think some of your colleagues in the Congress have said, 

after a government massacres its citizens, the relationship with the 
28

United States cannot remain the same. And I would say that, even 

if it doesn’t make a difference in the very short term for changing 

the Karimov government, changing its conduct, that it’s a very important signal that you send to the people of Uzbekistan who are 

ultimately the ones who have to hear the message that the U.S. 

Government, that the E.U., and that others in the international 

community support them and stand with them. 

It may be a long-term strategy. But they need to know that the 

U.S. Government stands on the side of the people of Uzbekistan 

and the protection of their rights. 

And ultimately, I would also argue that it’s a question for the 

U.S. Government itself. Is the relationship with Uzbekistan at this 

point bringing such benefits that it’s worth compromising some of 

the most fundamental values that you have articulated that the 

government, that the administration has articulated, as priorities 

in the region, including fighting terrorism and also creating stability? 

And I would say that the policies being pursued at this point are 

actually counterproductive for both of those goals. 

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Templer? 

Mr. TEMPLER. Since 2001, the U.S. Government has made very 

generous offers to the Uzbek Government to support a process of 

reform, and has encouraged that process in a whole range of ways. 

And yet, the Uzbek Government has taken a whole array of steps 

backward, particularly in the economics sphere. 

So it does seem that no array of incentives or pressures is willing 

to—is capable of moving Karimov, particularly in terms of opening 

up the economy and lifting some of the extreme restrictions on individual economic activity that still exist. 

I do think that the United States needs to continue to apply both 

an offer of incentive, a plan of action for reform, and also to intensify some of the pressure that it can apply through the base issue, 

through a number of critical commodities that are the mainstay of 

Karimov’s rule, and certainly most of that money goes mostly to 

the elite. Cotton and gold, for example, mostly provide wealth to a 

very small group of people in Tashkent. 

It’s extremely difficult to control the trade in those commodities 

in any way. But I do think it would be possible to develop a series 

of increasing steps that would apply increasing pressure to 

Karimov and would certainly make him understand that his current behavior’s been unacceptable. 

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Bensmann or Galima, would you like to comment 

on that question? 

Mr. BENSMANN. I strongly believe that Uzbekistan, even 

Karimov, I would say, has a desire to be accepted by the rest of 

the world. And even as I attend during the election day, when he 

was reelected in this [inaudible] election, I think it was Senator 

Lugar, that he went to Uzbekistan and he was so impressed by 

what he was seeing. That means Karimov wants to be loved by the 

West. 

And I think what is very important, and does not cost too much, 

to make a clear statement by all [inaudible] of what is possible—

also, in Germany and in Europe, to make clear statement that that 
29

is, first of all, a massacre and that we condemn it. And that must 

be clear. 

And if that is reported also to those people in Uzbekistan by various radio stations, that is a strong support. And I also have in 

mind [inaudible] of high-ranking Uzbek bureaucrats and employees 

of the government, who know that they don’t want to go to China. 

They want to go to the West. 

I think you have to support this kind of movement. 

Ms. BUKHARBAEVA. What happened in Andijon is really a great 

tragedy not just for Uzbekistan, sure, but for whole Central Asia, 

and maybe for all people in the world, because it was absolutely 

murder during daylight, when these APCs were—and a line of 

APCs were driving along the square—and soldiers were sitting on 

APCs, shooting everybody who went in the square. 

And everybody was thinking what they have to do, like a pressure [inaudible] happens. I don’t think that they have to even know 

at the moment what will happen to the government after you press 

or not press. We have to just condemn it. 

What happened in Andijon, it’s something that shouldn’t happen 

ever. And we’re just people, not politicians or something like that. 

We have to say it’s something wrong, because it’s not just like an 

attack against Andijon people there. It was just real attack against 

humanity, against all our morals, against humanity in all the 

world. 

So it’s clear that it should be condemned. And afterwards, you 

have to think yourself, do you want to continue like to have any 

business dealings with this government or not? 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I want to thank the panelists for being here, 

and Mr. Salih in particular, after 10 years of not being here. I understand you’re also going to be meeting with a number of other 

U.S. Government officials and Members of Congress. And I’m delighted that your information will be getting out. 

It’s a very serious situation in Uzbekistan. And now what are the 

next steps to take? I think this panel’s been very helpful on advising just what it is that we should be doing in the aftermath of the 

massacre in Andijon and what should be our response to the government in Uzbekistan. 

The United States seeks to build positive relationships with 

every country in the world, and particularly, I might add, with 

those countries in Central Asia that have come out from underneath the Soviet Union, that are starting or reestablishing themselves. And now it’s been 15 years. It does take time. But we want 

to build positive relationships in the region. 

I think that’s been everybody’s desire for some period of time 

with President Karimov. And yet repeatedly he has denied very request for economic or political liberalization whatsoever, and then 

this most recent killing of his own people has taken place. 

We will be, as the U.S. Government, seriously contemplating 

what additional steps that we can use and do to move forward with 

the people of Uzbekistan and pressing forward democratic and economic reforms in that nation, a very important nation in the region. 

Thank you all for attending. The hearing’s adjourned. 
30

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
31

A P P E N D I C E S 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH,

CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. The issues 

raised by the crisis in Uzbekistan go to the very heart of the Helsinki process and some of the toughest problems U.S. policymakers 

have to address. 

Having closely followed events in Uzbekistan for years, I think 

the most populous country in Central Asia may be at a tipping 

point. It is my impression that U.S. policy toward that country has 

reached a similar stage. 

The political order that emerged in the former Soviet Union after 

its collapse is itself unraveling. As Georgian President Saakashvili 

and Ukrainian President Yushchenko have written, a third wave of 

liberty has begun in Europe. Central Asian leaders, especially 

Kyrgyz President Akaev, reacted to the Rose Revolution in Georgia 

and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine by claiming ‘‘it can’t happen 

here.’’ President Karimov took the same position. But when neighboring Kyrgyzstan experienced its own revolution in March, he 

must have felt a cold wind blowing. President Karimov made clear 

his determination that no such events would take place on his 

watch, in his country. So, when protesters began gathering in 

Andijon in mid-May, I think Karimov decided to send them a message: ‘‘If you think this is Georgia, Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan, I’ll show 

you different.’’

And he did. Though the Uzbek Government continues to insist 

that ‘‘only’’ 173 people died, the U.S. Government and most authoritative human rights NGOs believe many hundreds died. I welcome 

the report prepared by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights which helps shed some light on the events 

in Andijon. By its own admission, that report is not a comprehensive, independent investigation that many of us have sought. I look 

forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses, including those 

who were in the crowd in Andijon and, by a miracle, survived to 

tell what went on that bloody day. 

What should we conclude from the Andijon tragedy? What happened in that city demonstrates the interlinked consequences of 

Uzbekistan’s lack of political and economic reform. The bloody confrontation had its origins in a trial of 23 devout businessmen whose 

enterprises employed thousands. Their economic success drew the 

attention of officials, who, failing to control the businesses, arrested 

their owners and charged them with Islamic radicalism. The rest, 

as they say, is history. In other words, if Islam Karimov allowed 

people to make a living in Uzbekistan, instead of maintaining Soviet-style economic practices and a bloated bureaucracy, many 

more people might be alive today in Andijon. 

Similarly, the country’s unreformed judicial system, which remains fully controlled by the executive branch, leaves people unable to defend their rights and imprisons individuals by the thousands. They cannot rely on an objective examination of evidence or 

hope for an impartial verdict. The supporters of the 23 Andijon 

businessmen—including those who freed the jailed, attacked a mili-
32

tary barracks and occupied government buildings—took to the 

streets after the trial of the businessmen neared an end, in proceedings many in the local population deemed unfair and unjust. 

There is no excuse for the armed attack on a military barracks, 

the taking of hostages, or the occupation of the local government 

administration buildings. But we cannot close our eyes to the growing frustration of Uzbekistan’s longsuffering people either. 

Considering the lack of progress on core human dimension issues 

in Uzbekistan and elsewhere throughout the region, the United 

States must use every means at its disposal to move the countries 

of Central Asia to greater respect for these fundamental rights. 

Therefore, I am introducing this week the Central Asia Democracy 

and Human Rights Act, which will condition all non-humanitarian 

U.S. assistance to the individual governments of Central Asia, both 

economic and military, on whether each is making ‘‘substantial, 

sustained and demonstrable progress’’ towards democratization and 

full respect of human rights. The Act will ensure U.S. engagement 

supports American values, promotes long-term stability and security in the region, and ensures that all assistance programs support 

and reinforce these goals. 

What conclusions can we draw from Islam Karimov’s response to 

Andijon? President Karimov has shown that he will not permit a 

peaceful revolution or even any change in Uzbekistan. He is prepared to use lethal force to disperse protesters and retain power. 

If more disturbances take place, he will likely do the same. How 

long Uzbek security forces carry out his orders to fire, however, remains an open question. 

At home, Karimov has hunkered down, arresting opposition activists, independent journalists and intimidating witnesses to the 

Andijon events. When a delegation of U.S. Senators traveled to 

Uzbekistan to make inquiries, neither Karimov nor any Uzbek officials met with them. At the same time, he is lashing out at his accusers. Karimov has accused ‘‘foreign powers’’ of trying to control 

Uzbekistan. Uzbek media broadcasts barely concealed their attacks 

on the U.S. for allegedly seeking to undermine Uzbek independence. Karimov has turned to China and Russia, which have praised 

his handling of the Andijon crisis. Worsening U.S.-Uzbekistan relations have left the future of our base at K–2 uncertain. Tashkent 

has imposed new restrictions on U.S. military flights, including 

cargo flights, limiting them to daytime missions. 

Perhaps the U.S. has already broken with Islam Karimov, and 

we just don’t know it yet. In any case, it is hard to see where we 

go from here. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as the 

United States, the OSCE, and the international community attempt to come to terms with the carnage at Andijon, fleeing refugees, and overall policy toward the Karimov regime.
33

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,

RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses today on the ongoing crisis in 

Uzbekistan. 

Whether you believe President Islam Karimov or almost everyone else about how many people died in Andijon last month, it was 

a turning point in the growing confrontation between state and society in Uzbekistan. President Karimov has blamed local Islamic 

radicals and outside agitators for instigating the disturbances, in 

the hope of fostering destabilization and creating an Islamic state. 

The charge is familiar—we have been hearing such claims from 

President Karimov for years now, whenever people try to protest 

or engage in opposition political activity. 

Let us acknowledge that Uzbekistan really does face threats from 

Islamic radicals. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which the 

U.S. Government has designated a terrorist organization, has welldocumented ties to al-Qaeda and has carried out terrorist actions 

in Uzbekistan. Moreover, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, whether you support or 

decry the government’s ban, is gaining influence in the country. 

The group, which arose in the Middle East, pursues an anti-American, anti-Semitic agenda. Even if its claims to be non-violent are 

true, its values and goals—which feature the reestablishment of 

the Caliphate—stand at cross purposes with those of a secular, tolerant society. 

The United States should be cooperating with Uzbekistan 

against international terrorism and we need not be ashamed of 

doing so. Nevertheless, many observers are convinced that President Karimov’s policies are aiding and abetting terrorism, not 

fighting it. He views his own people with the most profound distrust, stubbornly insisting on total control of the political arena. 

Stifling all dissent, Islam Karimov appears to reject the notion that 

political opposition or any manifestation of discontent might not be 

subversive or could have motivations other than religious extremism. 

Yet in Andijon, according to eyewitnesses—some of whom are 

present in the room today—there was no sign of Islamic fervor. 

Demonstrators were protesting economic deprivation, injustice and 

the lack of hope. They were calling for freedom, not shouting 

‘‘Allahu Akbar.’’ I suspect that what happened in Andijon has bolstered the radical Islamic cause, providing recruits and engendering an implacable desire for revenge. 

Finally, I note that Uzbekistan has been identified as a country 

‘‘in danger’’ on the Failed States Index just compiled by Foreign 

Policy Magazine and the Fund for Peace. That designation is all 

the more reason for us to make every effort to prevent disaster in 

that very important country.
34

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT TEMPLER, DIRECTOR, 

ASIA PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 

I would like to thank Senator Brownback, the chairman of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the other 

distinguished members of the commission for giving me this opportunity today to testify on behalf of the International Crisis Group. 

Crisis Group has been working in Uzbekistan since 2000 and we 

have produced more than a dozen reports on the country. Our staff 

in Central Asia have interviewed hundreds of people in the country 

and carried out extensive research on key issues in the region. 

Most recently Crisis Group published a report setting out some 

of the background to the Andijon massacre and examining the social, economic and religious issues involved. Our colleagues at 

Human Rights Watch have also produced a detailed report on the 

events of May 13 and 14 that is also based on extensive interviews 

with witnesses. IWPR has also provided excellent reporting from 

Andijon. There has not been a full investigation by any intergovernmental organization into the events. Based on our research and 

that of other organisations, we have concluded: 

• The response by the Uzbek security forces was wholly disproportionate to any crimes that had been committed and excessive 

force was used against people who were not involved in criminal 

activity 

• Among the victims of the action of the security forces were 

townspeople, including women and children, who were bystanders; 

We don’t know how many died—it could be as many as 750 people, 

according to some reports. We think it is at least 300–500. 

• The 23 men on trial for being members of the so-called 

Akromiya group were not religious extremists and had no record of 

violence. 

• Economic grievances and political repression motivated many 

of those who demonstrated in Andijon rather than any Islamist 

agenda. 

• No credible evidence has been produced to show any involvement of people from outside Uzbekistan. 

The Uzbek government has responded to international concern 

about the massacre with what can only be characterised as contempt: 

• President Islam Karimov has rejected calls for an international 

investigation. 

• Diplomats were only allowed to visit Andijon on a closely supervised tour that many of them described as unsatisfactory. 

• President Islam Karimov and other Uzbek officials refused to 

meet with Senators John McCain, Lindsay Graham and John 

Sununu. 

• The Uzbek government has restricted substantially U.S. access 

to Karshi-Khanabad Air Base, limiting flights by particular planes, 

limiting hours when flights can arrive and making it more difficult 

for the U.S. to use the facilities. 

• The Uzbek government has applied intense pressure on the 

Kyrgyz government to return refugees. The repatriation of these 

people under the current circumstances would be a violation of 

international law concerning refugees and torture. 
35

• Uzbek authorities have threatened witnesses and created a climate of intense fear in Andijon. This has included the intimidation 

and harassment of the family members of refugees. • The government has withdrawn the already meagre cooperation with outside aid groups and governments, for example withdrawing visas for Peace Corps volunteers. • The events in Andijon have been followed by a country-wide 

campaign of intimidation, harassment, and in some cases detention 

of local human rights activists and independent journalists. • Foreign journalists have likewise been prevented from reporting on the events and their aftermath. For example, BBC Central 

Asia correspondent Monica Whitlock has been expelled from the 

country for ‘‘biased reporting’’ and ‘‘aiding terrorists.’’

These are just the latest steps by an uncooperative government 

that rejects the values of democracy, human rights and economic 

freedom. For nearly 15 years U.S. and European governments have 

been trying to encourage reforms and greater openness in 

Uzbekistan. Since 2001, the United States stepped up those efforts, 

offering considerable assistance and signing an agreement under 

which Uzbekistan agreed to press ahead with reforms. The bilateral agreement involved clear commitments for steady progress toward both economic and political reforms on the one hand and military cooperation in facilitating U.S. military supply lines to Afghanistan as part of the war against terrorism on the other. 

The U.S. also argued that the reform part of that agreement also 

advanced the war against terrorism by enabling the Uzbekistan 

government to demonstrate to its own citizens a better future, the 

best argument against radical recruitment. The United States extended a generous hand to support those reforms in Uzbekistan. 

However Islam Karimov has chosen to rebuff that friendship and 

become more repressive and more resistant to any outside engagement. 

Moreover, the Karimov regime has consistently drawn the wrong 

conclusions from the popular revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and 

Kyrgyzstan, brought about by the population’s frustration with corrupt, often repressive regimes dominated by representatives of the 

Soviet-era nomenklatura. The Karimov regime has interpreted the 

fall of its counterparts elsewhere in the former Soviet Union as a 

sign of ‘‘weakness’’ on their part, and has only increased his oppression of his own people, a policy that will probably only hasten his 

own regime’s demise. 

There is now a widespread recognition that Karimov has set 

Uzbekistan on a dangerous path of self-destruction and will not be 

persuaded by any government that his policies are a disaster. 

Uzbekistan is now a member of that group of countries—

Zimbabwe, Burma, North Korea, Belarus and others—who are 

ruled by men who don’t just show a lack of concern for their people 

but are willing to inflict any level of suffering and hardship on 

them as long as they remain in power. The United States has 

taken strong stands against the leaders of those other countries. It 

is time to take the same stand against Karimov. 

Karimov’s past behaviour provides us with no hope that he will 

change his policies. His background is as a Soviet state planner 

and he still views the world through the lens of a Brezhnev-era 
36

apparatchik. He wants to see what he calls ‘‘civilised trade’’ by 

which he means all businesses are controlled by his officials. His 

edicts have crushed all economic opportunity, leaving people despairing and unable to earn the sparsest of incomes. He is contemptuous of the ideas of parliamentary democracy, religious freedom, press freedom or economic freedom. He runs one of the most 

repressive police states in the world. He targets people of faith and 

employs his feared secret services to torture and abuse them. He 

has banned Moslem and Christian groups and sent thousands to 

some of the most terrible prison camps on earth purely for their religious beliefs. As a result of these policies, he rules a country in 

which people are nostalgic for the Soviet Union. 

There is a growing expectation that the end of Karimov’s rule 

will be violent. A civil conflict in Uzbekistan could be a disaster for 

Central Asia, sending refugees into neighbouring countries that are 

ill-equipped to cope, undermining fragile states in Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan and Afghanistan, reversing economic gains in 

Kazakhstan and potentially providing an area of unrest in which 

Islamic extremists and criminals would only prosper. U.S. policymakers should still aim to get Karimov onto the right path but 

they should recognise the fact that this is unlikely to happen and 

start planning to minimise the dangers he presents to the security 

of Central Asia. 

There are very few good options for the short term in 

Uzbekistan. There is no set of policies that can make Karimov immediately open up his country and deal with the real grievances 

of his people. There are some steps that are important to take because they would at least signal to the Uzbek people that America 

is on their side, not the side of their despot. 

Among the steps we would like to see: 

• A consistent demand from all parts of the U.S. government 

calling for an independent international investigation into events 

in Andijon. This demand should be made in all fora—the UN, the 

OSCE and through NATO—as well as in all bilateral contacts, including those from the military and Department of Defense. 

• Suspension of negotiations on the lease of Karshi-Khanabad 

base until Uzbekistan agrees to an independent investigation. 

Given the lack of cooperation in recent months over the base, 

defence planners should give careful consideration to the usefulness of having such a grudging ally in the region when other countries might be more cooperative. 

• The use of the ‘‘Moscow Mechanism’’ of the OSCE that would 

allow for the appointment of a special rapporteur to investigate 

events in Andijon. 

• The calling of a high-level meeting of the United States, the 

European Union and Japan to discuss a joint political and aid 

strategy for Central Asia. 

• A review of all engagement in Uzbekistan by the international 

financial institutions including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank. 

We do not argue for the withdrawal of all aid from Uzbekistan, 

which will not help the people there. Aid is currently so limited 

that making it conditional is unlikely to have much effect on Uzbek 

policies. It is time however to consider some targeted sanctions if 
37

the Uzbeks do not agree to an investigation. Such sanctions could 

include visa and travel bans for those officials known to have been 

involved in the massacre and investigations into corrupt wealth 

held by Uzbek officials overseas. Those security units involved 

should not receive US training or equipment. 

In recognition of the difficulties of implementing aid projects, 

particularly those that help civil society organisations and small 

groups, Congress might consider allowing USAID and the U.S. Embassy greater freedom to implement small grants in a manner that 

prevents them from being obstructed by the Uzbek government. 

In the longer-term, a critical priority is to develop a strategy that 

both prepares Uzbekistan for change and tries to minimise the regional fallout of possible state failure there. All around the world 

we have seen the collapse of a country—more often than not a state 

driven into the ground by a despotic ruler—infect neighbouring 

countries and leading to widespread regional conflict that becomes 

extremely difficult to contain. We need to make sure this does not 

happen in Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan has found it difficult to cope 

with 500 refugees. Imagine if the number were in the hundreds of 

thousands. If Uzbekistan does collapse, it would imperil efforts to 

bring stability and democracy to Afghanistan and it would risk creating a haven for extremists in what is already a dangerous 

neighbourhood. It would mean a worsening of drug trafficking and 

crime. It would be a direct threat to security around the world. 

There are some steps that could be taken to ensure longer-term 

stability in the region: • Work with the key neighbouring states—Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan—to start planning for possible conflict in Uzbekistan. Work to expand their capacity to handle natural and man-made disasters, including improving information and management systems and the pre-positioning of supplies 

to handle possible refugee flows. • Expand educational contacts with Uzbekistan, including exchanges with all groups. Exposure to education in the United 

States, Europe or at such institutions as the American University 

in Bishkek can only help create a cadre of pro-Western thinkers 

who oppose what Karimov is doing to his country. 

• Expand training of and support for local independent journalists, human rights activists, and lawyers, and the local NGOs that 

support them. We recognise the enormous obstacles the Uzbek government has put in the way of such efforts but believe they should 

continue. 

• Expand training in key areas that would be needed to run any 

transition to democracy including civilian security and military experts, legal reform experts, parliamentary experts, civil service reform experts—in short, all of the expertise that will be needed to 

overcome the legacies of Karimov’s rule. 

• Expand broadcasting to Uzbekistan in Uzbek and Russian to 

ensure that Uzbeks can get news and educational opportunities beyond what is offered by the state controlled media and schools. • Start planning regional transport links in a way that means 

Uzbekistan cannot block trade and development. This would also 

help in the event of any disturbance in Uzbekistan. Both 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are vulnerable to disruptions in road 
38

and rail transport in Uzbekistan. Both already suffer from Uzbek 

restrictions on trade. • Work through the International Labour Organisation and corporate partners to end the use of forced and child labour to pick 

cotton—this is a major source of grievances and economic distress 

in the Fergana valley. 

Events in Andijon show that we cannot wait to come up with effective policies to stabilise Central Asia. All members of the OSCE 

need to come together to find ways to ensure that change comes 

peacefully and quickly to Uzbekistan and that its young people do 

not become a lost generation, without hope and drawn to extremism. We also need to work with other countries in the region to 

ensure that any possible violence in Uzbekistan does not become 

the spark that sets off a regional conflagration.

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