U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

66–818 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

GRANTING PERMANENT NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS (PNTR) STATUS TO CHINA: IS IT IN

THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 2000

Serial No. 106–143

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

FRANCIS C. RECORD, Senior Professional Staff Member

MARILYN C. OWEN, Staff Associate
(III)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress from California ..................................................................................................................... 9

The Honorable Sander M. Levin, a Representative in Congress from Michigan ......................................................................................................................... 12

Wei Jingsheng, Former Prisoner of Conscience in China, Chinese Democracy

Activist .................................................................................................................. 30

Sandra J. Kristoff, Senior Vice President, New York Life International, Inc. ... 31

Mike Jendzejczyk, Washington Director, Human Rights Watch/Asia ................. 33

Nicholas D. Giordano, International Trade Counsel, National Pork Producers

Council, and on behalf of the National Association of Wheat Growers ........... 35

Steve T. McFarland, Executive Director, U.S. Commission for International

Religious Freedom ................................................................................................ 52

Rev. Daniel B. Su, Special Assistant to the President, China Outreach Ministries, Inc. ............................................................................................................ 54

APPENDIX

Prepared Members’ Statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 70

The Honorable Christopher Cox ............................................................................. 73

The Honorable Sander M. Levin ............................................................................ 76

Prepared Witness Statements:

Wei Jingsheng, Wei Jingsheng Foundation ........................................................... 80

Sandra J. Kristoff .................................................................................................... 82

Mike Jendrzejczyk ................................................................................................... 86

Nicholas D. Giordano .............................................................................................. 95

Steve T. McFarland ................................................................................................. 105

Rev. Daniel B. Su ..................................................................................................... 113

Additional materials submitted for the record:

Testimony of The China/U.S. Trade Agreement on behalf of the National

Association of Wheat Growers, Wheat Export Trade Education Committee

and U.S. Wheat Associates (Exhibit A) .............................................................. 115

Statement of Paul J. Cassingham, President, American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei (Exhibit B) ................................................................................. 119

Letter to Paul Cassingham from Chen Shui-Bian, President-Elect, Republic

of China, dated May 4, 2000 (Exhibit C) ........................................................... 121

Letter from James P. Hoffa, General President, International Brotherhood

of Teamsters, dated May 23, 2000 (Exhibit D) .................................................. 122

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GRANTING PERMANENT NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS (PNTR) STATUS TO CHINA: IS IT IN

THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST?

Wednesday, May 10, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 2172,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. I am very

pleased to welcome you to our hearing this morning on Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization and the related legislation

extending trade relations to China on a permanent basis. Certainly

I don’t have to remind my colleagues this will be one of the most

important trade votes in our 106th Congress. Our decision, pro or

con, will send a powerful message determining China’s role in the

global economy and in the community of nations for years to come.

I take great pleasure in welcoming—about to arrive—Congressman Chris Cox, from the 47th District of California, and Sander

Levin from the 12th District of Michigan, to our hearing this morning. While I remain skeptical of the merits of the PNTR arguments,

in general, and the advantages of the so-called parallel legislation,

in particular, I would like to pay tribute to their expertise on trade

and security issues between our two nations and their tireless efforts to try to find common ground in a very polarized PNTR debate.

We are also joined this morning by several panels of outstanding

witnesses from the business, trade, and human rights communities

who can bring their personal and professional experiences to bear

on granting normal trade relations to China.

I am concerned about China’s poor track record of abiding by its

existing agreements with us in a number of trade, prison labor and

proliferation areas. We need enhanced monitoring of existing agreements, yet our agencies are currently underfunded and unequipped

to meet the challenges of enforcing our current agreements with

China.

In the area of proliferation, a recent report by the Council on

Foreign Relations, National Defense University and the Institute

for Defense Analyses, cautioned that China’s continuing support to

Pakistan’s weapons program has fueled continuing concern, and its

involvement in the effort to reverse North Korea’s nuclear weapons

program has been weak. Yet we are told by the Administration not
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to be concerned, that their proliferation record will improve in

time; but we are still waiting.

We are also told that by giving permanent normal trade relations

to the People’s Republic of China, we will be granting benefits to

American businesses without giving away anything to China. I

strongly disagree with that viewpoint. I believe that supporting

PNTR will give China something it desperately wants: relief from

the spotlight on its human rights record. Under the current arrangement, we in the Congress are able to open a door into the

human rights situation in China every year. Along with our attention comes the attention of the world. Our hearings and debates

focus the cameras and tape recorders and word processors of the

news media. We have the bully pulpit on this issue, and I am very

concerned that once we give it away, we may never get it back.

Are Chinese human rights and labor practices important to us?

I believe that they are the most important in the world today.

China has the world’s largest population and one of the fastest

growing economies. If China is allowed to trample on individual

freedoms, then how can we tell Indonesia or Malaysia or Nigeria

or Sudan or any other nation that they cannot do that?

The Beijing regime has fought a vigorous public relations battle

to win this philosophical argument. They have manipulated prisoner releases, effectively blackmailed dozens of countries and nearly corrupted some of our very own American corporations with

their efforts. We must not shrink away from this battle of values.

Public opinion polls show that many Americans have deep reservations about our policies toward China and the proposal to extend normal trade relations to that country. By granting PNTR to

China, we will be sacrificing much of our ability to affect public

opinion on Chinese human rights practices.

I would also note that the recent report of the United States

Commission on International Religious Freedom included a recommendation by nine Commissioners that the Congress not grant

PNTR to China until substantial improvements are made in respect for religious freedom in that nation.

While the nine voting members include strong free trade proponents and represent a wide diversity of opinion and religions,

they are unanimous that China needs to take concrete steps to release all persons imprisoned for their religious beliefs, to ratify the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and to take

other measures to improve respect for religious freedom.

Metternich, the late Austrian Foreign Minister, said that ‘‘public

opinion is one of the most powerful weapons which, like religion,

penetrates the most hidden corners where administrative measures

lose their influence; to despise public opinion is like despising

moral principals.’’ So I urge my colleagues to think long and hard

before we dispose of that weapon.

Before I recognize our distinguished witnesses, I would like to

recognize our Ranking Democratic Member, the gentleman from

Connecticut Mr. Gejdenson, for any opening remarks he may have.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend you for holding this hearing and particularly point out the

hard work by Representative Levin in trying to bridge what are

some considerable issues here. We are going to have to make a de-
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cision on whether or not the advantages for market access and

lower tariffs outweigh our concerns about general principles in our

relationship with China and other countries on labor rights, environmental rights and human rights. We are going to have to decide

whether, although the list of countries the Chairman and others

listed are already members of the WTO and many do not respect

human rights, whether China, being the significant player it is, a

place we need to make our stand.

It is clear that in other trade agreements, the United States has

long ignored human rights, the situation for labor and environmental standards. The question for us is how do we best move forward on those principles that are so central to this democratic society.

There are those in the Administration and in Congress who

argue that simply by increased economic commerce, by increased

economic activity, we will improve the situation in the lives of the

average Chinese; that today, even with the Falun Gong crackdown,

with the horrors at Tiananmen Square, that the average Chinese

is freer to travel, freer to make decisions about where they live and

where they work. But there is still a grave concern about a country

in excess of a billion people where the order of the day deprives

people of human rights, where workers have no say in their working conditions or their salaries, and where even groups without political agendas are often harassed by the government.

This Congress for many years refused to give the Soviet Union

any kind of favorable trade treatment because of its treatment of

Soviet Jews, small in number and even smaller in the number they

imprisoned. Today we are being asked to give permanent status to

China even though they imprison thousands of their own citizens,

have very few freedoms for people, and continue to run an oppressive regime that is involved in proliferation.

There is not an easy answer. Human rights and the rights of

working people are values that I think many of the Members in

this Congress have a strong concern about. The question is, however, whether simply rejecting the President’s proposal will improve their situation, whether we will have a better opportunity to

move China in the right direction if we reject this PNTR today and

try to get an agreement that does address some of those fundamentals, and whether that will be possible.

So I thank the Chairman for holding this hearing and look forward to hearing from my colleagues and other witnesses.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be succinct because I want to hear from our two distinguished colleagues.

First, the most important fact is that the approval of PNTR is

clearly in our national interest. That is the ultimate bottom line.

Second, PNTR makes it substantially less likely that American

jobs are exported to China because of the WTO accession agreement. That is a secondary but very important element as well.

I would say that despite the inflammatory rhetoric we are going

to hear over the next several weeks, some of it irrelevant, those are

the considerations that are most important.
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Finally, I want to state my firm belief that the approval of PNTR

will advance human rights and democracy and the rule of law in

the People’s Republic of China. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Any other Members seeking recognition?

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Brown?

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This Committee is built

upon the common desire to promote democratic ideals throughout

the world. But as we strive to encourage democracy in developing

nations, something is sorely amiss in our China policy. When the

CEO’s of multinational corporations lobby for increased trade with

China, they talk about access to the 1.2 billion potential consumers

in the People’s Republic of China. What they don’t say is their real

interest is 1.2 billion workers in China, workers whom they pay 20

cents, 30 cents, 40 cents an hour. These CEO’s will tell you that

increasing trade with China, engaging with China will allow

human rights to improve. Democracy, they say, flourishes with free

trade. But as we engage with developing countries in trade and investment, democratic countries of the developing world are losing

ground to authoritarian countries. Democratic nations such as

India are losing out to more totalitarian governments such as

China, where the people are not free and the workers do as they

are told.

In the post-Cold War decade, the share of developing country exports to the U.S. for democratic nations fell from 53 percent in

1989 to 34 percent in 1998, a decrease of 18 percentage points. Corporate America wants to do business with countries with docile

work forces that earn below-poverty wages and are not allowed to

organize to bargain collectively. In manufacturing goods, developing democracies’ share of developing country exports fell 21 percentage points, from 56 percent to 35 percent. Corporations are relocating their manufacturing businesses from democratic countries

to more authoritarian governments where the workers don’t talk

back for fear of being punished. Western corporations want to invest in countries that have below-poverty wages, poor environmental standards, no worker benefits and no opportunities to bargain collectively. China is just perfect for that.

As developing countries make progress toward democracy, as

they increase worker rights and create regulations to protect the

environment, things that we applaud every day in this Committee,

the American business community punishes them by pulling its

trade and investment dollars and moving them toward totalitarian

government.

Decisions about the economy are made in China by three groups

of decisionmakers, the Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army, and Western investors. The People’s Liberation

Army, and Communist Party obviously control the country. The

People’s Liberation Army controls a significant amount of the businesses that export to the U.S., and Western investors clearly are

making major economic decisions. Which of these three wants to

empower workers? Does the Chinese Communist Party want the

Chinese people to enjoy increased human rights? I don’t think so.

Does the People’s Liberation Army want to close the labor camps

that Wei Jingsheng and Harry Wu have talked about? I don’t think
5

so. Do Western investors want Chinese workers to be able to organize and bargain collectively? I don’t think so.

None of these three groups—the Communist Party of China, the

People’s Liberation Army, and Western investors—none of these

three groups wants the current situation in China to improve; so

when CEO’s wandering the halls of Congress tell us that engagement with China will bring democracy to China, I think their real

intentions are a bit suspect. I appreciate the efforts of my friend,

Mr. Levin, and what he is trying to do, but the People’s Republic

of China has repeatedly ignored the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights. They ignore the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. They ignore the State Department’s

country reports, and they have broken almost every agreement

they have made with the United States. Why would the Chinese

pay any attention to a congressional task force? Passing PNTR will

only confirm that China’s behavior will continue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Brown.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, seven years ago when President Clinton issued

an Executive Order linking significant progress on human rights

with the continuance of Most Favored Nation status (MFN) for

China, giving them a probationary year to reform, this Republican

Congressman had nothing but praise for the Administration. I believe as do, I think, many other Members of Congress that partisanship has no place in the struggle for equality, fairness, and

the observance of human rights. Yet in 1994, when it became clear

that human rights had actually deteriorated and suffered significant regression the President, sadly, delinked MFN trading privileges with human rights.

Looking back in hindsight is often 20–20—the more cynical take

on that Executive Order was that, while we thought we had the

votes in both the House and Senate to strip MFN from China, the

preemptive, proactive action by the President—giving them one

more year—rendered that action in the House and the Senate

moot. When things regressed from no significant progress to significant regression, the President then tore up his own Executive

Order.

Since then, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on International

Operations and Human Rights, I have chaired 18 hearings and

markups focused exclusively on Chinese human rights abuses, and

several others where China’s shameless record was a part, and led

three congressional fact-finding missions to China. The president of

the AFL–CIO, John Sweeney, the courageous Harry Wu, who spent

19 years in 12 different forced labor camps in China, and perhaps

the most well-known political dissident of all who will testify again

today, Wei Jingsheng, the leader of the Democracy Wall movement,

and many others testified before our Subcommittee regarding the

horrific human rights abuses in China.

Mr. Chairman, today egregious human rights abuses in China

are commonplace, and that should inflame our conscience. With all

due respect for my good friend from Nebraska, when we get impassioned about this issue, it is because people are being tortured each
6

and every day. It is a part of their way of repression. The police

and the army and the military use torture in a commonplace, pervasive way.

Even the State Department’s human rights reports make it clear

China’s religious, political, and labor violations have all increased

with each passing year. Violations include, as I said, the pervasive

use of torture by government thugs and an ongoing systematic

crackdown on religious believers.

As Mr. Gilman, the Chairman, just pointed out, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, which is comprised of

many free traders, said this is not the year to convey permanent

NTR on China, at a time when they are cracking down on Falun

Gong and many other religious believers, Catholic, Protestant, and

the Buddhists in Tibet and elsewhere. Forced labor in ‘‘the Laogai,‘‘

and coercive population control are getting worse, and there continues to be the stifling of all political dissent. You can add to that

the exponential buildup of China’s military war machine. It is not

only in response to Taiwan, but to their own country as well.

Mr. Chairman, Chinese workers are denied freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively. China labor

activists are routinely imprisoned in concentration camps when

they speak about working conditions, corruption, inadequate

wages, or for even speaking to Western journalists. The dictatorship is especially cruel to those Chinese who advocate for independent trade unions.

Mr. Chairman, the deplorable state of workers’ rights in China

not only shows that Chinese men women and children are exploited, but that U.S. workers are severely hurt as well by the unfair advantage in trade by corporations who choose to benefit from

heinous labor practices. Perhaps that is why the trade imbalance

in China is a staggering $70 billion this year.

Let me be clear. Human rights violations in China are robbing

Americans of their jobs and livelihoods, and I believe it must stop.

Let’s also be clear, I and my colleagues who want to continue the

annual review of MFN, or NTR as it is now called, we don’t advocate isolation. What we want, what we demand, is principled engagement, respect for workers’ rights and human rights.

Let me just conclude by saying I respect those on the other side

of this issue. I respect them deeply. They come to it from a different perspective. They think perhaps this may be a constructive

way of trying to promote change. But I have to say in all candor

I deeply resent comments made by the President of the United

States in today’s Washington Post where he says that lawmakers

who oppose the measure are focusing on politics rather than its

merits. That is an insult, I say, Mr. Chairman. Politics has nothing

to do with this. This has everything to do with people who are suffering as a result of a dictatorship.

As the President went on to say, virtually 100 percent of the people at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue know it is the right

decision. No, it is not 100 percent, Mr. Chairman. There are many

of us who believe strongly and passionately that human rights and

now, increasingly, the security issues trump continuing the most

favored nation status or permanent NTR for China this year.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
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Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to thank Chairman Gilman for the leadership that he has provided on this issue. He has been a steady

hand, and he has been fair to both sides on this very volatile issue,

and at the same time he has maintained his own moral and personal convictions. So I thank Chairman Gilman for the good job he

has been doing.

I would also like to associate myself with Mr. Brown’s statements. Mr. Brown, I didn’t find anything I could disagree with at

all. I thought your statement was exceptionally thoughtful.

Let me just say that permanent normal trade relations will not

be any different, as far as I can see, than what we have had with

most favored nations status over the years, just that we would be

making it permanent, and most favored nation status that we had

for over a decade has not been in America’s interest. It has demonstratively been— undercutting America’s interest.

Economically, what have we seen in this relationship with Communist China? We have seen the transfer of manufacturing capability; in other words, jobs going overseas under the guise of, we

have to have this because we need it for American exports. We are

not exporting American products over there. We have studied it

now and know that is just not true. What is happening is the term

‘‘exports,’’ American exports, is being used to cover the fact that we

are setting up factories over there to take advantage of slave labor,

of people who have no rights to quit their job or to ask for a raise

or to ask for better living conditions.

Sending our manufacturing capabilities over to a country like

that, is that good for the United States in the long run? Even in

the short run it just helps some American billionaires, so that

hasn’t been good for us.

In terms of our national security, Congressman Cox will be testifying in a few moments, verifying that there has been a heinous

transfer of technology, of weapons technology, to Communist China

that now puts us in jeopardy. This has worked against our national

security to have this kind of relationship with Communist China,

and morally—Mr. Smith has outlined it very well—morally this

has been a catastrophe for the United States of America. We have

just thrown away the moral foundation that we have been so proud

of here in the United States since our Founding Fathers established this country, a country supposedly based on liberty and justice for all. We just have cast that aside so a few billionaires could

make a quick buck. This will turn around and hurt us in the long

run.

If we continue just trying to let some very powerful interest

groups in here, make a quick buck off just discarding all of the

moral parts of the equation, that is not debatable. How many businessmen have to tell us that you don’t mix business with moral decisions like human rights? We don’t need to hear that, because the

fact is that if we act immorally, it is going to hurt America in the

long run, and it already has with this transferred technology and

this transfer both of weapons technology and manufacturing technology. We have given leverage to this monstrous regime, the
8

world’s worst human rights abuser, a belligerent, militaristic regime.

This is not with whom we should establish a permanent normal

trade relationship, especially considering the past. It serves so

much against the interest of our country and against the interest

of human freedom.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. Martinez, my colleague, our witnesses have other obligations

and would want to be on their way shortly, so please be brief.

Mr. MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be as brief as

possible, but I am a little appalled at some of the statements I have

heard in this debate on permanent normal trade relations with

China. We are appalled by the human rights. I think we have

every right to be. They have not had an exemplary human rights

record. But they are changing, and you know what I have always

believed, and I have seen it in the past years. Communism has

given way to capitalism, and to be engaged in China in an economic way is to further that capitalism growth and eventually have

that conquering communism. We saw it in East and West Germany. We saw it in Communist Russia. If you look around the

map, I remember a while back looking at a map that showed in red

the colors of the Communist countries, and that has been reduced

dramatically, especially even in our own Western hemisphere.

The fact is we talk about human rights. I wonder if people judging us on our human rights when we had slavery in this country

would have given us any better record than these people are giving

China today.

I was in China right after World War II for two and a half-years,

and I saw the kinds of deprivation that the Chinese people suffered

under the nationalist government which we recognized, and with

whom we had great relations with and praised all the time. I think

conditions have improved and will continue to improve.

I have a tape in my office that I will share with anyone. An

American gentleman went over to China, and he is now franchising

paint stores. Have you ever heard of such a thing in a Communist

country, franchises? It is a little change.

Like I say, capitalism will conquer communism in the end. I

think we ought to keep engaging these people. I am not absolutely

certain we should give them permanent normal trading relations,

but we have been doing it, like Dana Rohrabacher said, for the last

ten years. It hasn’t yet changed much, but I think it is just the beginning and you have to give things time. At this point in time I

lean toward voting for it, because I think that the sooner that we

fully engage the Chinese people, the sooner we will see communism

give way to capitalism.

I think that we are divided in the House, and in Congress probably in both Houses, into two kinds of people: one part the Henny

Penny, the sky is falling, the Chinese are going to take all our help

and build missiles and then blow us up with them; and the other

part who are very optimistic people, who can see only the bright

future of full trading relations with China. I think somewhere

along the line we have got to come back to reality and say what
9

is factual and what is fiction in our minds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Martinez. I understand that

Mr. Levin has an appointment downtown. Would Mr. Cox agree to

allow him to proceed?

Mr. COX. By all means.

Chairman GILMAN. I look forward to hearing from our colleagues

from both California and Michigan: Mr. Cox, the distinguished

Chairman of our Republican Policy Committee, the gentleman from

California; and Mr. Levin, the gentleman from Michigan, Ways and

Means Trade Subcommittee Ranking Member. Both gentlemen, feel

free to summarize your statements, and we will make certain that

your full statement will be entered into the record.

Mr. Levin?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Gilman, I know I will be available for questions,

and Mr. Cox was going to go first, so I would like to respect that

so he can proceed. I appreciate your courtesy.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Cox.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHRISTOPHER COX, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. COX. I have already offered to let Mr. Levin go first. He

wishes for me to go first, and one of us has to start, so I will be

pleased to do so.

I don’t think there has been a stronger voice for PNTR with the

People’s Republic of China in the media, at least, than the Wall

Street Journal, but in recent weeks the Wall Street Journal has

also recounted on page one the extent of human rights abuse that

is ongoing in the People’s Republic of China. They describe how a

57-year-old mother was forced by the Government of the People’s

Republic of China to endure Communist reeducation because of her

religious beliefs; how she was subjected to repeated shocks from a

cattle prod and forced to endure barefoot marches through the

snow; and how ultimately on February 21st of this year, Chen

Zixiu died, while in custody, from a heart attack.

I don’t think anyone here, whichever side of the PNTR debate

you find yourself on, believes that it should not be our priority to

promote freedom and human rights around the world, and specifically in the People’s Republic of China. I am confident that this

Congress will refuse to renounce its belief that human rights are

a vital part of the American character and any conception of American foreign policy, whether Republican or Democrat. That is why

we are having this hearing today, because the legislation that has

been submitted by the President for Congress to vote on has a fatal

flaw. It goes too far.

The President has told us that he is in favor of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) with the People’s Republic of China;

that our annual review of those normal trade relations should be

no more. There is a healthy debate about whether that is a good

idea or not. But the present legislation does more than this. It not

only ends the annual review of the trade status of the People’s Republic of China, it not only establishes permanent normal trade relations, but it does something else separate, something else very

different and something unsupportable. That is, it completely re-
10

peals all of the nontrade parts of the 25-year-old Jackson-Vanik

law as they pertain to the People’s Republic of China. There is no

excuse for this, no justification for it. Indeed, I am quite sure most,

if not essentially all, of the proponents of PNTR are unaware that

the legislation was drafted in this way, that it contains this illegitimate rider.

The Jackson-Vanik law has served the United States well for a

quarter century. It covers far more than tariff levels, although that

has been the subject of the PNTR debate. If we were to vote for

the President’s bill without considering separate legislation in this

Committee, as you are wisely doing today, then not only would we

establish permanent normal trade relations with the People’s Republic of China, but we would end the statutory annual Presidential review of human rights conditions in China. We would end

the opportunity of this Congress to either concur or dissent in

whole or in part with that assessment; and we would yank out the

non-trade teeth contained in that legislation, specifically, a prohibition on U.S. credit facilities and U.S. subsidies for human rights

abusers.

Those nontrade-related provisions—they are nontrade-related because no trading partner of ours or of any nation has a right to

subsidies from its other trading partners—ought to be maintained.

The annual human rights review—the routine regular human

rights review—ought to be maintained in this Congress. The Presidential role ought to be maintained. The President of the United

States has not advanced a single reason for us to repeal those

things, and so we need to simply fill the void that we are creating

unnecessarily with this legislation.

Wherever you stand in the debate on granting permanent normal

trade relations, I hope that one principle that we can all agree on

is that the protection of human rights is an essential element of

America’s foreign policy. That is why I am here today. I have proposed legislation that is appropriately not titled the Cox bill, not

the Levin bill, not even the Gilman bill, Mr. Chairman, but Jackson-Vanik II, because it restores what we would otherwise negligently erase in current law. I have named it after these two

Democratic ancestors of this Congress as well, to do them honor,

because their legislative product has served our country so well for

so long.

Under Jackson-Vanik II, we would actually step up the nontrade

human rights role of the Congress and the President. Semiannually

the President would report to the Congress, not just annually. And

semiannually, the Congress would have the opportunity to consider

that report and to vote up or down on it. If the President and the

Congress did not give a clean human rights bill of health not just

to the People’s Republic of China, but all 15 of the countries covered by Jackson-Vanik currently, then those countries would be ineligible for foreign aid and subsidies, for affirmative U.S. taxpayer

benefits. There is no reason in the world that this feature of existing law should be jettisoned. If the President sought to do so for

national security reasons and for good human rights reasons because, despite the problems in a given country, he thought or she

thought—whoever the future President might be—that human

rights progress is being made, then the President could grant a
11

waiver. In fact, in Jackson-Vanik II, a modest change that is made,

an improvement, is that the President can grant this waiver by Executive Order, but the Congress as under current Jackson-Vanik

would have the opportunity to reconsider that and to overrule it by

a joint resolution. As under current law, the President could then

veto the joint resolution, and it would require two-thirds vote in

the House and the Senate to ultimately prevail.

That is the existing system. We ought to retain it. There is no

reason for us to dismantle the U.S. human rights review in current

law. Some good reasons have been advanced, whether I or anyone

on this panel agree with all of them or not, to have permanent normal trade relations with the People’s Republic of China. Not a single good reason has been advanced to dismantle the annual human

rights review in current law.

Seated to my right is the father of the Chinese democracy movement, Wei Jingsheng, who is well known certainly to all of the

Members of this Committee and I daresay to many people throughout the United States of America. He served 18 years in prison for

doing nothing more nor less, because it was extraordinarily important, than founding the Democracy Wall movement and advancing

the cause of that modernization to add to Deng Xiaopeng’s list.

After serving 18 years in prison, in part because of the efforts of

the U.S. Congress, but also in part because of the efforts of our

counterparts all around the world, the Communist Government of

the People’s Republic of China finally agreed to release this man

of courage from prison, but they didn’t permit him to stop enduring

punishment. Instead they send him into lifelong exile and so he is

sitting next to me listening to our testimony today through a translator because he does not speak English. This is not his native

country, and more than anything else he would like to be in China,

but the latest gruesome punishment inflicted on this leader of the

Chinese democracy movement is exile from his homeland of China.

If we believe in human rights, if we share his cause, we cannot

in good conscious cast a vote on the floor of the House of Representatives to repeal the U.S. human rights review that is a part

of Jackson-Vanik and that has been American Policy for 25 years.

So I implore my colleagues whatever else you do with parallel legislation—my colleague, Mr. Bereuter, and my colleague, Mr. Levin,

have proposed some very good ideas that I am looking forward to

hearing more about this morning—at least retain the parts of Jackson-Vanik that deal with human rights review. Don’t erase them.

One of the tragedies of where we find ourselves today is that we

are on the precipice of taking yet another step away from U.S. support for human rights. President Clinton has already thoroughly

delinked trade and human rights. There are intellectual arguments

that have been made, I think very well, in support of that. But

there is no argument in support of taking the next step, through

negligence, of going beyond delinking trade and human rights to altogether erasing the nontrade human rights review. We can’t do

that. We can fix the PNTR legislation here so that those who believe in permanent normal trade relations might pursue their arguments, and those who are strongly opposed to those same trade

changes can advance those arguments.
12

Jackson-Vanik II, were it enacted today, with or without the

PNTR legislation, would improve the law, and so I would urge you

to take up this legislation anyway regardless of whether PNTR advances. Most significantly, while the annual Jackson-Vanik debate

has come to encompass a whole panoply of human rights covered

by the universal declaration, the statute itself written a quarter

century ago mentions only one such human right, emigration. We

should codify our recent pattern of practice, and that is what this

legislation does.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I hope that everyone here will take

seriously your responsibility, just as Members of the Ways and

Means Committee have taken seriously their responsibility, to

move legislation in real time so that we can have an honest debate

on the merits when this issue comes to the floor in just a few

weeks. I would urge you to mark up this legislation in Full Committee so that it is available for us to vote on in the House of Representatives at precisely the same time that we consider permanent normal trade relations. I thank you for your time.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cox.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cox appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Levin.

STATEMENT OF HON. SANDER M. LEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to all of

your colleagues whom I have had the privilege of knowing over, in

most cases, a number of years and whom I deeply respect. Deeply

respect.

The issue before us in this Congress, as we know, is not whether

China is going to go into the WTO, because it is going to in almost

all likelihood. The U.S. has no veto power over its admission into

the WTO. I don’t think the basic issue is over globalization. It is

here to stay. It is here to grow. In my judgment, the issue is

whether we are going to actively get involved in shaping

globalization so that it widely benefits Americans and everyone

else.

Let me say just a couple of words on the economic aspects, if I

might, since they have been raised, just a few words. It may take

me beyond five minutes. If we don’t grant PNTR, the evidence is

clear we are going to lose many of the benefits of what we negotiated, while our competitors will gain all the benefits. Also, we will

not be able to enforce effectively what we negotiated. For example,

Mr. Rohrabacher, the technology transfer provisions, they are

much stronger in our agreement with China than we have with virtually any other country, and we will be able to use the dispute settlement mechanism if the Chinese—the WTO dispute mechanism,

if the Chinese violate their promise, their commitment not to insist

on any more technology transfers that I have been deeply worried

about in the industrial sector.

There is also an antisurge provision in there. Mr. Bereuter and

I issued a framework document yesterday that incorporates it, so

for the next 12 years, if there is a surge in any product area that

will adversely affect American workers and producers, there can be

essentially an instantaneous response by the United States beyond
13

what is presently in place vis-a-vis any other nonmarket economy.

So I think in many, many respects economically there are very

valid arguments, provided we place in legislation the antisurge provision, and provided we put in place some strong compliance oversight mechanisms that Mr. Bereuter and I have contained in our

proposal.

But if I might, let me talk about the third peg of what we have

been working on with a number of you that Mr. Bereuter and I described yesterday, and that relates to human rights. It is a third

and critical peg of this, and I deeply appreciate the chance to join

you, Mr. Cox, and Mr. Wei Jingsheng. Welcome to this Committee,

though I am not a member of it. I am glad you are here.

First of all, engagement, in my judgment, is an important aspect

of the effort on human rights. I think we need to actively engage,

vigorously engage in order to have some impact on the course of

human rights in China. I also think, though, that we need to confront. I think that the challenge is whether we can combine engagement and confrontation with the Chinese.

In this respect, I don’t think the status quo is working. I don’t

think that the annual review has worked effectively. It is a threat

that hasn’t been implemented in the past. I don’t see any plan to

use it in the future, and I think it is an instrument that is unlikely

to be utilized barring a threat to national security. There is a WTO

exception for our taking back our permanent NTR if there is a

threat to national security.

So let me just focus, if I might, then, on our proposal in terms

of human rights, and that is a Helsinki-type commission, a U.S.

congressional executive commission that is familiar to many on this

Committee.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Gejdenson, you have my full testimony,

and I assume it will be placed in the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the full testimony will be

made part of the record. Thank you, Mr. Levin.

Mr. LEVIN. The Helsinki Commission has demonstrated that benefits can be gained from bringing two branches of government together in a single institution to pursue a common, focused objective. Particularly in the area of human rights, the Commission’s

role has complemented that of the State Department, providing additional expertise, focused attention on priorities that reflect its

unique institutional perspective. Its achievements include putting

pressure on the former Soviet Union to release prisoners of conscience. I believe that a similar commission focused on China—and

I agree so much with Mr. Cox, there must be no vacuum here—

that a commission focused on China can achieve a comparable

record of effective pressure. It would consist of Members of both

houses of Congress and Presidential appointees. Its scope would

have three pillars: human rights, labor market issues and the development of the rule of law. It would have a permanent professional staff with expertise in areas including law, workers’ rights,

economics, and Chinese politics and history, with a rich intelligence

network that would be developed, including contacts with NGO’s.

It would report once a year to the President and Congress on developments in the areas within its jurisdictions, and importantly, it

would make recommendations for congressional and/or executive
14

action that may enforce or help bring about positive changes. It

would also maintain a list of persons subjected to human rights

abuses and other abuses in China.

So it would be, first of all, a permanent concentrated spotlight

on human rights. Second, it would serve as an effective base from

which to mobilize bipartisan pressure on China in this vital area.

Third, as people in China gain greater access to the Internet—

when I was there in January for ten days, it was clear how dramatically that is growing—it would be an important point of contact between Chinese citizens. Also, you could provide recommendations for action by this Congress that were WTO-consistent.

Recommendations for action: As I said earlier, my ten days in

China of person-to-person exchange with people from various walks

of life in Beijing and Hong Kong demonstrated to me the change

in China is irreversible, but its direction is not inevitable. We must

persistently continue to strive to impact that change. In my judgment, there is no realistic choice but a step-by-step activist approach. I remember, in closing, the work of so many of us when it

came to the former Soviet Union, our visits there, our efforts to

pressure them, the work of the Helsinki Commission. I think it was

a useful device and can well be here.

Chairman GILMAN. Permit me to interrupt the witness. We will

continue right through the voting, so if you’d like to go over and

vote and come right back, I welcome that.

Mr. LEVIN. In my last paragraph, Mr. Chairman, is a reference

to President Carter’s statement of yesterday, and I was in AID

when Mr. Carter introduced human rights into foreign assistance.

His record was way beyond anybody else’s. China, he concluded in

his statement yesterday, has still not measured up to the human

rights and democracy standards and labor standards of America,

but there is no doubt in my mind that a negative vote on this issue

in the Congress will be a serious setback and impediment for the

further democratization, freedom and human rights in China. That

should be the major consideration for the nation and for the Congress.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Levin.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levin appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Cox has gone over to vote and will be

right back.

The so-called parallel legislation has drawn fire from those critics

who argue that it would duplicate WTO procedures and lacks teeth

in enforcement mechanisms. Is this a fair criticism?

Mr. LEVIN. No.

Chairman GILMAN. Can you tell us why not?

Mr. LEVIN. First of all, it has teeth. For example, on the

antisurge provision, which is not right before you, it has very clear

teeth. If there are imports that come into the United States that

would injure our workers and producers, there could be a prompt

and swift and meaningful action.

Second, in my judgment, the Helsinki Commission proposal has

teeth. Indeed, I think it will end up having more of an impact than

our present annual review that has essentially been perfunctory. It
15

will be a continuing, strong focus spotlight on human rights, including labor rights practices and malpractices within China with

the power of making recommendations for action to this Congress.

Those actions, if we so determine, would have teeth in them. They

would have to be WTO-consistent and essentially nontrade-related.

So this has teeth; indeed, I think it has more reality to it in terms

of impact than the status quo.

Mr. LEVIN. How much time?

Chairman GILMAN. Seven minutes. I am reserving my time and

yielding to Mr. Smith for questions.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, and I will be very

brief and continue when we get back.

Mr. Levin, as you know, I chair the Helsinki Commission. I have

been on the Helsinki Commission for nine of my ten terms in the

U.S. House of Representatives. There are gaping differences between what you are proposing and what the Helsinki Final Act,

signed in 1975, and the Helsinki Commission that was created by

Congress in 1976 to monitor the three baskets of the Helsinki Final

Act. One basic difference is that all of the countries that are part

of the OSCE process have agreed to the human rights, the security,

and the trade baskets and the documents that follow it.

I proposed way back in the 1980’s that we consider such a thing

for China. We did a report on it, the State Department did, and

the bottom line was how do you get China to sign such a thing so

that there is indeed access to prisoners, so that there is indeed a

real transparency without which it is just us knocking on the

door—the way the ICRC, the human rights organizations, and our

own Congress does. You and I, if we had tried to get into a prison

to visit Wei Jingsheng when he was in prison, would have been

shown the door. I did try to visit him when he was in prison.

The other point is we already have Assistant Secretary of State

Harold Koh of the Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau,

who does a magnificent job. The Country Reports on Human Rights

Practices shows a very fair assessment of the abysmal state of

human rights in China. This year’s report is a good, accurate

record of the state of affairs. I know your motives are pure and you

want to do the right thing, but there will be some people who will

use this creation of another watchdog Committee when we already

have a number of such things as a cover, a fig leaf. That is one of

the concerns I have.

Mr. LEVIN. Could I respond quickly, because I may not be able

to come back unless the Chairman orders me because I am supposed to go elsewhere.

Chris, I have been so determined over these years that there is

a vacuum, in that we handle in Congress these issues sporadically.

There is an executive department, but it is out there. There is no

high-level congressional executive commission that has as its sole

responsibility to shine the spotlight, to go there on a regular basis,

to interface with other countries—we do a poor job of this—that

really makes it our first line of responsibility, that recommends

concrete actions to the Congress of the United States. I want to tell

you my deep faith that if we institutionalize this, if we concertize

it, if we put a number of us on as our first line of responsibility

to put the pressure on the Chinese, that combined with engage-
16

ment—and if we vote down PNTR, it is going to undermine our engagement with the Chinese—that we will make more progress on

human rights and labor rights than what has become a perfunctory, and it isn’t for you. You are out there all the time, but it has

become a perfunctory exercise. What I want is an institution that

has a clear charge, a clear responsibility, a clear obligation. I deeply believe that it will be a more effective step than we now have.

Mr. SMITH. Just very briefly, because I know we all have to vote.

The Helsinki Final Act was agreed to by Russia, then the USSR,

and the other Warsaw Pact countries. But even after they agreed

to its provisions, we still denied most favored nation status to the

USSR. The idea was that, until there was a demonstrable improvement, we don’t reward them with significant trade.

Mr. LEVIN. But they granted it after that.

Mr. SMITH. Not for a very, very long time, as you know.

Mr. LEVIN. But they were granted it.

Mr. SMITH. But my deep concern, I say to my good friend and

colleague, is that this will be seen as something in lieu of the annual review and the pressure that can accrue from that, rather

than something that is stand-alone.

Mr. LEVIN. Let me just say I don’t think the annual review is a

useful pressure, and this will not be in lieu of. This will be a crystallization of what is badly needed on a day-to-day basis.

Mr. SMITH. Would it be your view that the Human Rights Bureau is not doing its job then?

Mr. LEVIN. It doesn’t have the statute, the standing, the involvement of us, the resources. To do the job that we need to do, we

need to combine engagement and confrontation, and I think this is

the way to do it.

Chairman GILMAN. If I might interrupt, Mr. Cox is on his way

back. I am going to ask Mr. Levin if he would be kind enough to

return for just a few minutes of interrogation. I am going to ask

Dr. Cooksey to take over. Mr. Cox is on his way back, and he can

continue as soon as Mr. Cox comes back. The Committee stands in

recess momentarily.

[Recess.]

Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] The Committee will resume its sitting. Chairman Gilman asked me if we would start. Mr. Cox is

here. Perhaps Mr. Levin is coming back shortly.

At this time we will recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Dr.

Cooksey for questions that he might have for Representative Cox.

Dr. Cooksey.

Dr. COOKSEY. Congressman Cox, we welcome you to the International Relations Committee. We have a lot of fascinating debates

here. We have passed great resolutions, and oftentimes they are ignored, but we are glad to have someone with your integrity and

background in this area.

I have a question. I, too, am concerned about the human rights

abuses not just in China, but everywhere. I agree that no matter

where you fall on this issue, whether you are for PNTR or for admission of them and subsequent admission of China to the WTO.

My question I have is that last week we voted on the African trade

bill and the CBI, which I voted for and I think a big majority of

the House voted for. We voted for this at a time that there is major
17

turmoil in Zimbabwe. They are shooting white farmers just because

they are white and have land. In Sierra Leone the same people

that were amputating the hands of children and adults with machetes a year or so ago are now shooting people in the streets. The

very groups that are opposed to PNTR and the admission of China

into the WTO labor unions, protectionists, isolationists, environmentalists, have not raised their voice about this issue. I used to

work in east Africa. I was in Mozambique toward the end of that

civil war, and I know that there were some atrocities over there.

So why all of the very loud discussion about China, and everyone

is ignoring the atrocities that we know are being committed in Africa right now, and we voted for that trade bill?

Mr. COX. I think some of the reason that so much trade attention

is paid to the People’s Republic of China amounts to the same reason that so much human rights attention is paid to it. It is the

most populous nation on Earth. At the same time, I would agree

with you that human rights are universal, and wise U.S. foreign

policy would address itself to human rights in general and try to

be evenhanded in our application of our policies.

Indeed, one of the reasons that Jackson-Vanik II is necessary is

that if we were to vote on the PNTR legislation as it is drafted, not

only would it do the one thing that everybody expects it to do, and

that is establish permanent normal trade relations with the People’s Republic of China, but it would do something else. It would

establish a special carve-out from the nontrade parts, the human

rights review of Jackson-Vanik. This would be done for only one of

the 15 countries that is currently covered by Jackson-Vanik.

So you would have the irony of disparate treatment between the

world’s largest Communist country, the People’s Republic of China

on the one hand and a democracy like Ukraine, which would remain covered by Jackson-Vanik. You would be according special

treatment where it is not deserved.

In order to maintain the consistency and coherence of our foreign

policy and of the Jackson-Vanik statute that is already on the

books, we need to be careful not to negligently erase the nontrade

human rights review for the PRC.

Dr. COOKSEY. Let me ask you this: Would Jackson-Vanik II, as

you have proposed, have any impact on similar trade reviews or

human rights reviews for African countries, because we are now

going to really enhance the trade with Africa?

Mr. COX. Jackson-Vanik, as it was written, encompasses what

was a statutory euphemism for Communist countries: ‘‘nonmarket

economies.’’ Therefore, in the post-Soviet era Jackson-Vanik encompasses the following: the PRC, Russia, Armenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Albania,

Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. No

African country is on that list, and our African human rights review, therefore, falls under a different rubric.

Dr. COOKSEY. I was in Mozambique in 1991 and 1992, and we

were over there doing eye surgery at a hospital, and the Russian

eye surgeons left the day before we got there because their contract

ran out, and Mozambique was under a Communist government

when I was there theoretically, the day before I got there. What is
18

the difference? These other countries have disavowed—some of the

countries you mentioned have disavowed.

Mr. COX. Precisely. That is why I think there is this irony that

we would take the world’s largest Communist country, and have a

special carve-out for it, while leaving newly mended democracies

covered by Jackson-Vanik under stricter human rights review. Just

a few weeks ago when I was in Russia, I met with the Foreign Minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov, who very pointedly in his opening comments to me—we met for an hour and a half, I think—laid out Russian complaints that they are still covered by Jackson-Vanik even

though it was designed for the Soviet Union, even though they are

no longer the Soviet Union, even though they are now a democracy,

and even though 75 percent of the state-owned assets have been

transferred into private hands. Now, with Chechnya ongoing, one

wonders whether it would be viable to propose lifting JacksonVanik from Russia at this time, but surely any objective observer

can see the strange message that we are sending when we excise

the People’s Republic of China from Jackson-Vanik coverage while

leaving Russia, and certainly while leaving the Ukraine and other

democracies covered by the law.

But I take your point. As you know, there are some Communist

countries, such as Cuba, that were not on the list I just read you

for Jackson-Vanik coverage not because nominally they aren’t covered, but rather because they are covered by even stricter trade

sanctions, such as a complete embargo with respect to Cuba, for example.

Dr. COOKSEY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.

Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cox, you have raised a real interesting issue of which I was

totally unaware until I heard you talking about it a few days ago.

I am curious about your use of the term ‘‘negligent.’’ Is that based

on your assumption that the Administration could never have intended to provide executive branch discretion regarding all the provisions of Jackson-Vanik, and, therefore, they must never have realized the bill that has been introduced went far beyond the trade

issues, or is there some other reason why you refer to it as negligence?

Mr. COX. I am confident that it is at least negligent. If it is willful, I have much greater concern. The reason I am willing to extend

the benefit of the doubt is that there has been no advertisement

this is the purpose of the legislation. All of the debate, all of my

meetings with my business constituents have been focused on normal trade relations with the People’s Republic of China. No business has come to me, for example, and said they wish to have the

nontrade parts of Jackson-Vanik repealed or that they wish to get

rid of the annual human rights review. Likewise, there has been

no intellectual argument advanced by the Administration in support of lifting the nontrade portions of Jackson-Vanik from the

PRC.

Mr. BERMAN. Putting it aside, the issue whether negligence is a

compliment compared to willful, it could well be that the business
19

community you have talked to hasn’t even focused on the other implications of the bill the Administration has introduced, and it

might be that the Administration hasn’t addressed the substance

of those issues because there has been no criticism of those issues

until you came along.

Mr. COX. That is possible.

Mr. BERMAN. And that they might have a very coherent and rational explanation for doing that, or it could be negligence, I don’t

know. You are surmising at this point that it was not a conscious

intent on their part.

Mr. COX. That is right. As a Member of the leadership in the

Congress, I have been a participant in many discussions of this

issue over many, many months, and I simply have not heard from

the Administration that they are asking us to repeal not only the

trade, but also the non-trade human rights review.

Mr. BERMAN. Have you ever asked them why they did this?

Mr. COX. I have not had that opportunity. But our consideration

of this legislation has been like opening the toys at holiday time.

If you ever tried to assemble a toy for your little kids, you know

that when all else fails, you read the directions. Every once in a

while after we debate a proposal around here long enough, we go

and read the legislation, and that is what I did.

Mr. BERMAN. I am just getting to that point. Then we have plenty of time.

Mr. COX. It is not a long piece of legislation, by the way. It is

very simple in its operation, but it has two very different impacts.

One is to establish permanent normal trade relations. The other is

an illegitimate rider. It repeals all the nontrade parts of JacksonVanik.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Berman.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both

of our distinguished colleagues for their presentation. In particular,

I appreciate the opportunity to work with my colleague from Michigan, Sandy Levin, on our proposed draft framework. He and I have

both made it clear that we welcome constructive ideas, and this is

a place for us to start on parallel legislation.

I know with respect to Mr. Cox, our distinguished colleague, his

intent is to always be constructive as we look at various bills that

relate to Asia. My comments will be directed to Mr. Cox because

I have specific points of concern about his legislation. I must say

that the questions are based upon draft legislation you were good

enough to give me about eight or ten days ago. There may well

have been changes of which I am unaware.

Mr. COX. Let me preempt at least one potential comment but

saying that based on our discussions in our meeting, I did make

changes to the legislation to simplify it. The legislation that is before the Committee at this point is, with respect to the nontrade

sanctions, precisely the same as existing law, existing JacksonVanik. There is no other provision in the bill than that.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Cox, I knew you were planning to do that so

I hope my comments are based upon what you have actually presented. My basic conclusion is that your legislation loses U.S. votes
20

for PNTR, and, given how close the vote is expected to be, obviously

I am not interested in seeing that happen. Here are the concerns

I would specifically mention.

The certification standard in section 2 of the bill is much higher

and more far-reaching than the current Jackson-Vanik freedom of

immigration standard. Your certification, I believe, is a comprehensive human rights standard. Section 2 also requires biannual reports analyzing these wide-ranging human rights issues in comparison to the current Jackson-Vanik requirement for a biannual

‘‘determination of full compliance,’’ with the freedom of the annual

Presidential waiver of full compliance with Jackson-Vanik, as in

the case of Belarus and China. This would result in two China debates per year, something our colleagues are not looking forward

to, I would guess. The Cox certification would apply to all countries

subject to Title 4 of the Trade Act of 1974 as of January 1, 2000.

That would include countries like Kyrgyzstan, which were subject

to the title on January 1st, but may not be at the time of the enactment of any bill here, that would occur because Kyrgyzstan and Albania are removed from Title 4 status and accorded full NTR in the

Africa trade conference report.

Section 3 of your bill is designed to compel debate and action of

the Senate regardless of whatever action may or may not be taken

in the House. The sanctions required in section 4 are sanctions on

all forms of bilateral/multilateral foreign aid—perhaps you can correct me if that has been changed—including development of systems, democracy and rule of law programs.

Mr. COX. That one was changed at your request.

Mr. BEREUTER. I appreciate your effort in that respect.

On a more positive side, section 5 provides a broad and fairly

minimal presidential waiver standard that virtually any targeted

country could meet.

Section 6 uses the current Jackson-Vanik procedures as a basis

of the proposed Jackson-Vanik II resolution consideration process.

Those are my concerns. They form very important reasons why

currently, as it’s drafted, the bill loses U.S. votes. I am hoping if

you can and if you care to, accommodate those concerns which you

have not already taken into account.

Thank you for listening to this, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps you might like to respond.

Mr. COX. I think I am with the gentleman in his narrative, but

not in his conclusion. The narrative—I made quick notes—went as

follows. First you mentioned that there is a higher standard for

giving a country a human rights clean bill of health. That is an explicit point in the legislation that coincides with the pattern and

practice over the last quarter century. The Jackson-Vanik debate,

the annual debate is not just about emigration rights, so the bill,

Jackson-Vanik II, enumerates human rights such as freedom of religion, freedom of the press and so on that are always the subject

of our debate.

I certainly intended that. It is meant to be an explicit rendition

of human rights, not drawn from one’s left ear, but rather coinciding with the universal declaration of human rights. As you

pointed out, we actually streamlined the waiver process. The President can waive these by Executive Order, and in that sense there
21

is a balance. While the existing standard, at least in statute, concerns only emigration, the PRC has never met the standard. So it

has always required a waver making explicit the rest of the human

rights statue doesn’t really change pattern and practice. It has the

same statute. It has the same debate that we have always had.

You mentioned, second, that there would be semiannual rather

than annual debates. As I mentioned in my opening testimony,

that is one of the upgrades in focusing on human rights. The reason that that is important is that we are admittedly and intentionally in the PNTR vote disconnecting trade from human rights.

If there are no longer any trade sanctions, and all you have is the

debate, then at least you ought to have a healthy and regular debate. But what we are doing in the PNTR legislation as written is

erasing the debate, too. I think that is wholly legitimate and loses

you votes. It certainly loses mine.

The third thing is that——

Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. COX. Sure.

Mr. BEREUTER. We have, as you know, very little foreign assistance to PRC. Generally, what we have now is aimed at human

rights and democracy. I can’t imagine us wanting to eliminate that

small amount, but that seems to be the direction we are trying to

push the Chinese. I would like to hear a response if you wish.

Mr. COX. There is no reason to maintain that. We have JacksonVanik now. We provide that aid. All I am saying is leave that statute alone if it doesn’t involve trade. The argument has been made,

and I think roundly, that trade sanctions are not helpful to the

U.S. interests. Some—many people perhaps on this Committee disagree with that, but the debate is full; and on the other hand, no

argument has been made that nontrade sanctions or a Presidential

review of human rights or a congressional review of that Presidential review and a debate about it is illegitimate. That, in fact,

is quite constructive, and it is probably right that Beijing doesn’t

like it. They probably would just as soon we stop talking about

human rights. If we ask the Ambassador whether, after we get rid

of all the trade sanctions, he would like us also to get rid of the

human rights debate, he would probably say yes, but that is why

we need to have it.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. BEREUTER. He probably would. That is why the Levin-Bereuter proposal is there.

Mr. COX. We need to have it in Congress. I don’t think we want

to send the PRC a signal that we are repealing the existing procedures for monitoring human rights abuse.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Pomeroy.

Mr. POMEROY. I want to pursue the questions asked by Congressman Bereuter, and I want to begin by commending Congressman

Bereuter and Congressman Levin for their bipartisan effort to articulate an ongoing concern of the United States on human rights

and workers’ rights even as we move PNTR forward.

We are very close to a vote, and the vote is going to be close, and

I think that the proposal you have advanced, Mr. Cox, is quite interesting, but I worry just as a matter of almost process and politics if we start to have a mushrooming of these other alternatives
22

that address human rights even as we move PNTR forward, it is

going to at least confuse and at worst divide the intention to address that concern in a manner that still captures support for

PNTR.

Have you tried to work with Congressman Bereuter and Levin

and meld your two proposals?

Mr. COX. Indeed, the reason that I am the lead-off witness at

this hearing is I came to the Committee of jurisdiction as a Member of the leadership of the House with a proposal on which I had

previously met with Chairman of the Subcommittee, Mr. Bereuter,

and I fully intend to be constructive in doing so.

Wei Jingsheng, who is seated next to me, has written a letter,

which I think now is public, that complained about the inadequacy

of the brand new process, the completely alternative process that

is being suggested in Levin-Bereuter. He said that a review outside

of the Congress, outside of the current process of Jackson-Vanik, is

not enough; and so I am here and he is here on this panel simply

to ask us to do what a doctor would do—first do no harm. Our object is to enact permanent normal trade relations; let’s do that. But

let’s not negligently, as I put it earlier, do more than that.

You have to remember that the very vote that we are being

asked to cast on the bill, as reported from Ways and Means, will

do two things: It will not only give us permanent normal trade relations, but it will also erase the nontrade parts of Jackson-Vanik.

We don’t have to do that. There is no reason to do that.

Mr. POMEROY. On that point, Mr. Cox, you would be more persuasive to me had you discussed with the Administration whether

or not it was negligent omission or whether or not it was essentially tied to the——

Mr. COX. I don’t think it much matters.

Mr. POMEROY [continuing]. The initiative. You indicated to us

you have yet to have the dialogue with the Administration on

the——

Mr. COX. The Administration has yet to advance a single argument in favor of repealing Jackson-Vanik. I think Mr. Berman put

his finger on it. Even the business community hasn’t focused on

this. It may be that somebody is trying to pull a fast one here. I

don’t know. But in any case, there isn’t a good reason for it. I don’t

think that Democrats or Republicans agree with it. As I said earlier, I don’t have any objection to——

Mr. POMEROY. You have told us you haven’t had the discussion,

and so you assert that there is no good reason for it. You don’t

know. I mean, it seems to me that Jackson-Vanik, I would be the

first to say I have but a layman’s understanding of it. It was

passed to basically address concern about the Soviet Union stopping emigration of Soviet Jews. That was the purpose for JacksonVanik. Now, the so-called Jackson-Vanik II idea that you are advancing, and I haven’t seen the language—I guess the Minority

staff got some language yesterday—does seem to be a brand new

application. You are using an old name of two revered legislators,

but a brand new application of something devised for quite a different purpose.

Mr. COX. I would point out to the gentleman that as a participant, as he has been, in the Jackson-Vanik debates on an annual
23

basis, he knows that in our pattern and practice in Congress over

the last quarter century, the Jackson-Vanik debate has come to encompass human rights, all of them. If one reads the record of last

year’s debate, the year before and so on, you will see full discussion

of freedom of religion, freedom to join a trade union, all of these

things covered in our annual debate. All that we are doing in this

legislation is codifying current practice.

If the Committee found that objectionable—this is a Committee

of jurisdiction. I hope you mark up the legislation. If for some reason you wanted to leave it precisely the same as exists in JacksonVanik, and focus only on emigration, frankly that would be acceptable to me. I don’t think that this represents the best work that

Congress could do, because while you are at it, you might as well

make it conform to what we know Congress is doing.

Mr. POMEROY. This looks—and I just basically offer this as an

observation, I am going to vote for the PNTR proposition for China,

but I am very supportive of the effort Congressman Bereuter and

Levin to identify these other issues and constructively find a way

to respond to them. I find that your initiative, while maybe—obviously well-intended, it occurs in a process that I think complicates

the effort to achieve both ends, PNTR and codified means to effectively monitor human rights and worker rights issues in China.

Mr. COX. I have to say the gentleman must misunderstand the

proposal because they are perfectly complementary. Indeed, Jackson-Vanik II is perfectly complementary to the Bereuter-Levin initiative. The only question is whether or not, if all you did were Bereuter-Levin, when would you be satisfied that you aren’t worse off

than you started. On the nontrade human rights side, I just want

us to do no damage, no unnecessary injury to the Jackson-Vanik

process.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. First of all, I would like to congratulate Mr.

Cox. For those who don’t know, Chris worked for several years in

the Reagan White House during the height of the Cold War and

understands fully how different strategies have an impact on

human freedom. The first question I would like to ask Mr. Cox,

with your experience in the White House and since in Congress,

was it the trade expansion that President Reagan focused on with

the Soviet Union that helped bring down that tyranny and end that

threat to the United States and the rest of the world, or did Ronald

Reagan insist on Jackson-Vanik and other human rights measures

and strategies in order to accomplish that great end that we enjoy

today?

Mr. COX. I think the gentleman puts his finger on an important

fact of history, and that is that we have a lot of experience with

bringing down Communist governments through the use of sanctions and bringing down other noxious governments, such as the

apartheid government in South Africa. We have no experience in

the history of the 20th century ever bringing down a Communist

government through trade.

It is not to say it cannot work, and indeed not every Communist

government is the same. It is always pointed out early and often

in this debate about the People’s Republic of China that Chinese
24

communism or, as Jiang Zemin has wont to put it, ‘‘Socialism with

Chinese characteristics,’’ is different than the Russian variety of it

that started in 1917. Our policies, certainly under President

Reagan and under succeeding Presidents toward the Communist

Government of the People’s Republic of China, have been different

than they were toward these other Communist governments.

Having set out in a direction, I think a lot of people want to see

if we cannot make it work, but I wouldn’t rely on some economic

determinism here to guarantee our results. As President Reagan

said in a different context, in this ideology of advancing democracy

and political rights through advancing trade, we should trust, but

we should also verify. We should have some other means; at a minimum we ought to talk about human rights.

What has pained me in watching the Clinton Administration implementation of our China policy is that while they have put a very

healthy emphasis on trade, they have not put a concomitant emphasis on human rights. When the President took that extended

visit to the People’s Republic of China, the founders of the Chinese

Democratic Party were not yet in prison. He could have met with

them, as President Reagan certainly would have in the Soviet

Union under similar circumstances. He did not do that.

Sometimes just talking about human rights when you have the

world’s media at your disposal or when you are in the Congress of

the United States can accomplish a great deal, and I know that

Wei Jingsheng, who is sitting next to me, is very grateful for the

efforts of Democrats and Republicans in this Congress to attempt

to secure his release through public diplomacy. Perhaps if he had

not been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, perhaps if we had

not kept such an intense glare of publicity on his imprisonment

which caused the Communist government in Beijing to squirm, he

might still be imprisoned. As it is, he is now in exile. That is somewhat better, but we would still like freedom for Wei Jingsheng.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This proposal that if we keep expanding

American economic trade and ties with Communist China, that it

will result in greater freedom and respect for human rights, runs

totally contrary to the strategy that Ronald Reagan used in order

to bring about the greatest expansion of human freedom in the history of mankind.

Mr. COX. That is right, but it doesn’t run totally contrary to the

strategy that President Reagan used with the PRC. Since President

Reagan is not here for us to inquire, the only thing—since you and

I worked in the White House, we know a lot of people who made

the policy—the only thing that we can ask is whether or not, with

the collapse of the Soviet empire, we might have reoriented our

China policy.

Mr. LEVIN. Would you give me 30 seconds?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will, but just let me make one point first,

and that is having also worked with Ronald Reagan and written

some of the speeches that he gave when he went to China, let me

note that when President Reagan dealt with Communist China,

there was an expanding democracy movement at that time, and

that President Reagan was fully aware of that and fully aware that

it was becoming—that there was an alternative building, and that

China was going in the right direction, and while it was going in
25

the right direction, he had those policies. Yes, I would be happy to

yield.

Mr. LEVIN. If I might, just give me 30 seconds or 45 seconds.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would ask unanimous consent for an additional one minute.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. LEVIN. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.

I urge that we not put this in either/or frames of reference. It

seems to me that expanded trade by itself is not a magic wand. I

think it will need to be reinforced, to put it mildly, by pressures

on China in terms of human rights and worker rights; but, a lot

of leadership was at the White House yesterday, including some

from the Reagan Administration, who do believe that economic

freedom can have some impact, though I don’t think by itself it is

enough in terms of developing democratic freedoms. For example,

the breakup of the state-owned enterprises in China, which I think

is a good idea, there is a very good argument that as you break up

the state-owned enterprises, that you are going to foster the opportunities for more freedom because the state-owned enterprises essentially are controlling the lives of people not only in terms of the

factory, but in terms of housing, in terms of how they get help, and

there is no chance for a free trade labor movement with stateowned enterprises. The more that changes, I do think it can help

lead to democratic processes provided there are other important external pressures and internal pressures leading in that direction.

It is not really either/or.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will be voting ‘‘no’’ on this agreement, and I am very concerned

that those of us who are voting ‘‘no’’ are characterized as isolationists, as people who do not want to let the sun shine into China, and

that simply is not true. As a matter of fact, it is the exact opposite

of what is true. Trade with China is going to continue because the

Chinese need it to continue. They send 42 percent of their exports

to the United States. We send less than one percent of our exports

to China. That is unlikely to change whether we vote for or against

this agreement in any significant way. There may be some—if we

vote against this agreement—some tiny, occasional interruptions in

Chinese exports to the United States, but those exports will pretty

much continue.

We do not wish to isolate China. There is not going to be an end

of information exchange to China. Not a single Internet-capable

computer will disappear from China if this agreement goes down,

but if the agreement is accepted, then we lose any opportunity to

have any economic effect on what China does either to open their

markets, deal with nuclear proliferation, or deal with human

rights.

We have talked about economic freedom, but the only economic

freedom that this deal provides is it allows people to work in near

slave conditions, free in the knowledge that their exports will come

to the United States freely without the slightest risk of impedi-
26

ment. If that is economic freedom, then I think it is insufficient to

bring political freedom to China.

Mr. Cox, I want to applaud you for going as far as you do in

Jackson-Vanik II. When we dealt with the world’s other great nonmarket economy, we insisted on human rights for a group of people. I am and was very concerned about the Soviet Jews. We should

certainly not want to do less with regard to the Christians and

Muslims of China, with regard to those who are struggling for autonomy in Tibet, et cetera. So for us to sweep aside any part of

Jackson-Vanik as an undisclosed part of this trade agreement

seems absurd.

But I would go further and say that while I agree with you that

just talking about human rights itself is important, let’s say China

did something outrageous. Let’s say 100,000 Buddhists monks and

nuns were killed in Tibet or a crackdown that made Tiananmen—

that exceeded Tiananmen Square. If we went with this deal, could

the United States do anything that would cost the government in

Beijing a penny in order to retaliate for such future outrages that

might occur?

Mr. COX. I think the argument the gentleman is making is an

argument in support of his vote against PNTR. The arguments on

the other side, I am sure, the gentleman is very familiar with. I

just wish to add that the reason I am here today is not that debate.

That debate is taking place in this Committee and also in the Ways

and Means Committee. I am here to focus attention on the other

half of what this PNTR vote is doing, because I think most everybody is focused on the trade part, and they are not focused on the

erasure of the annual human rights review.

Finally, I would say while supporters of PNTR ought to vote for

this because they want to advance trade, but not retard human

rights, opponents of PNTR should support this because if PNTR

does not pass, Jackson-Vanik II will improve the existing process.

First, it codifies the full panoply of human rights that are subject

of our regular discussions in Congress, and second, it creates it a

twice-a-year review.

Mr. LEVIN. Could I briefly respond?

Mr. SHERMAN. Briefly, because I have limited time.

Mr. LEVIN. First of all, in your comment about exports from

China without the slightest risk, I just want to urge that there was

negotiated an antisurge provision that is, as I said earlier, an extremely important one, which our proposal, Mr. Bereuter’s and

mine and others’, would place into law so that if there were a

threat of serious injury to any American worker/producer, we

would have a mechanism considerably beyond anything available.

Second, in terms of whether there anything that we could do in

a circumstance that you suggest, the answer is there are nontrade

institutions through which China has now been receiving very considerable sums which would be subject to action by the United

States and other countries.

Chairman GILMAN. The, gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Ballenger.

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Levin, just one question. You brought up the idea

of the breakup of businesses in China. It has come to my attention,
27

and I don’t know whether this is in the agreement, in the PNTR

or the World Trade Organization, but that no sanctions are allowed

in some agreement—which one I don’t know—no sanctions are allowed in cases where businesses are owned or managed by governments. This has come to me from one of my companies back home

that the basic idea is there is an opening about a mile wide in

there, considering that substantial pockets of the Chinese economy

are government-owned businesses. Am I mistaken in this, or do

you have any knowledge about what I am speaking?

Mr. LEVIN. I don’t think that is correct. The Chinese have made

certain commitments, and those commitments are subject to the

dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, and I do not think

there is a blanket exemption for anybody.

Mr. BALLENGER. That is a pretty broad statement. I just wondered if there is some exemption that you might——

Mr. LEVIN. I don’t know of one. I would be glad to take a look

at it, but I don’t believe that that statement that you recited is correct.

Mr. BALLENGER. All I know is there was a commitment, a verbal

commitment by a trade representative, that they would try to do

something about this gaping hole in the agreement. So it appears

to me there must be something there, and I would just——

Mr. LEVIN. I would be glad to follow that up and let you know.

Mr. BALLENGER. I appreciate it very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ballenger.

Mr. Faleomavaega. This will be our last inquiry of the panel.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My personal welcome to the colleagues, Mr.

Cox and Mr. Levin, for their presence on the Committee. I do want

to commend Mr. Levin and Mr. Bereuter for sincerely trying to find

a solution to this very serious problem in dealing with China, and

probably no two Members can understand and appreciate more the

concerns expressed by my good friend from California concerning

the Jackson-Vanik provision as it is currently applied.

I would like to ask the gentleman from Nebraska and Mr. Levin

from Michigan, in your packaging this proposal as it addresses the

human rights theme, the labor problems and environmental issues,

how did you address the Jackson-Vanik concerns as has been expressed by our good friend from California, Mr. Cox? I am sure that

you have taken this into consideration. Are we kind of putting a

double-barrel effort here? We have got the Jackson-Vanik to go

with. Now you are adding these provisions—addressing these very

serious issues that many Members have expressed concern about.

I just wanted your response in dealing with the Jackson-Vanik provision that many Members are concerned about.

Mr. LEVIN. Yes. Thank you for your question. My strong view,

and it is shared by a lot, is that the annual review mechanism has

not been an effective instrumentality in terms of pressuring China

in the area of human rights. I voted originally for a linkage proposal in the hopes that there might be some efficacy. In my judgment, it hasn’t worked. It is a sporadic kind of attention to a very

serious issue.

So what is proposed in the structure that Mr. Bereuter and I

have presented and has a lot of support among Democrats and in-
28

creasingly among Republicans, is to have a continuing permanent

institution on the highest level of Congress, and the executive

whose single charge and responsibility would be to monitor human

rights and worker rights and the rule of law within China; to increasingly be in contact with citizens within China; to increasingly

use modern means of communication to determine what is happening; and to impact what is happening; and also then to make

recommendations for specific actions to the Congress and the executive that are appropriate and WTO-consistent. Those actions

would be placed within the laps—those proposed recommendations

would be placed within the lap of the Congress and the executive

for action.

It seems to me that that focused, sharp spotlight on a regular

basis would be a more effective instrumentality to accomplish what

we all believe than the once-a-year, now perfunctory debate—and

I don’t mean for us participants, but in terms of its impact, its

being reported, where it stands in the spectrum of our activity, it

would be more effective than the once-a-year discussion that we

have that is attended, unfortunately, by few of us, and that I think

is reported, unfortunately, by very few within the media.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.

Just one last question to both of our panelists. Are your plans

consistent, and if you would please be brief since our time is running, with the rules of the World Trade Organization and the U.S.-

China bilateral agreement? Are they strong enough to keep the

pressure on Beijing to improve its policies on human rights, on

labor rights, on religious freedom and proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction?

Mr. Cox?

Mr. COX. Yes, Jackson-Vanik II is WTO-compliant. It retains the

nontrade portions of existing Jackson-Vanik law and would be completely consistent with either the passage of PNTR or its defeat in

the Congress. Second, I think it is vitally important at a minimum

as an adjunct to what Mr. Bereuter and Mr. Levin are proposing,

because while I agree with Mr. Levin that if the measure of our

success is the human rights performance of the PRC, then nothing

that we have done thus far has worked.

I would not infer from that that getting rid of the human rights

focus that we presently have in the Congress and the executive

branch is a good idea. I think that there is much merit in the proposal that they are advancing. It would probably augment what

presently we are doing, but keep in mind that if we repeal the existing Jackson-Vanik annual review, if we repeal the Presidential

reports to Congress and the opportunities for Congress to debate

this, that our strongest voices in the Congress targeted on human

rights abuse in the PRC would be silenced. Mr. Smith would have

no more opportunity. Ms. Pelosi would have no more opportunity.

Chairman Gilman, you would have no more opportunity. Mr.

Gejdenson, you would have no more opportunity to speak on these

things unless you were one of a tiny handful of people that might

be appointed to this commission. But the whole U.S. Senate and

the whole House of Representatives would be on the bench. I don’t

think that is a good idea.
29

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Levin?

Mr. LEVIN. First, it would be consistent. Second, Mr. Chairman,

and your colleagues, my colleagues, I don’t think any instrumentality by itself is going to be enough. I think there is going to have

to be a combination of pressure points, including a commission as

we propose with its clear mandate. There is also going to have to

be effective engagement. It is not going to be enough.

For my ten days by myself in China, talking to a wide variety

of people, I became convinced that change is hatching, but we have

to help shape it in the right direction, and my feeling is that simply

saying no after we have negotiated an agreement with the Chinese

is going to undermine our ability to effectively broadly engage. As

well as pressuring, you need engagement and confrontation. One or

the other isn’t enough, and it will take time, but I think that we

need to inject ourselves actively in the processes of time. Time by

itself won’t be enough. We need to be an active force in the processes of change and, by the way, try to be supportive of those that

are on the side of change in China instead of those who want to

stonewall and keep that present state that is under state control.

Chairman GILMAN. I want to thank our panelists, Mr. Cox, Mr.

Levin, for your patience for being here and for your support of

some very important resolutions. Thank you.

We will now move to the second panel. I would like to note we

very much regret that we were unable to work out an arrangement

with the Administration to testify on China PNTR issues today despite intensive bipartisan efforts to do so. I look forward to holding

a future meeting of the Committee to ensure that the Administration will be able to provide testimony on this important issue.

Our second panel today is represented by members of the American international business community and international human

rights organizations. It gives me great pleasure to introduce Sandra Kristoff, New York Life International senior vice president, is

responsible for international government affairs and represents

New York Life International in the Washington policymaking community. Ms. Kristoff has an extensive background in the Federal

Government spanning a 22-year career that included serving as a

special assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asian affairs at National Security Council. We welcome Ms. Kristoff.

Our second panel today also will open with the statement of our

good and courageous friend Wei Jingsheng, who is known to us

from previous appearances before our Committee. Mr. Wei

Jingsheng is a former prisoner from China who is now in exile and

exposing through his writings the failure of the Communist Party

to bring forth changes that would lead to democracy and freedom

for the people of China. We look forward to hearing your testimony

today, Mr. Wei.

Mr. Wei Jingsheng must leave shortly for a meeting at the National Press Club and has agreed to join us on our second panel.

We also would like to welcome Mr. Mike Jendrzejczyk, Executive

Director of Amnesty International, as our witness on this panel.

Mike has been with Amnesty International since the mid-1980’s,

more recently has been associated with their international secretariat in London. Mike has appeared before this Committee on

prior occasions due to his well-known expertise on World Bank and
30

trade policy issues, religious freedom and human rights in China

and Asia generally. We are pleased that you are able to join us

today.

Mr. Wei, would you begin your statement.

All of our witnesses, may submit their full statements for the

record. If you would like to summarize, please do so.

STATEMENT OF WEI JINGSHENG, FORMER PRISONER OF

CONSCIENCE IN CHINA, CHINESE DEMOCRACY ACTIVIST

Mr. WEI. [The following testimony was delivered through an interpreter.]

I am happy to see many people who really care about democracy

in China, either for PNTR or against PNTR.

I have noticed Mr. Smith mentioned the fact that America Government’s pressure does indeed directly affect the human rights

condition within China. Yesterday former President Carter mentioned that there was a change within China, but which kind of

condition made the change in China? I think Mr. Carter should

know very well that at the time when they formed the diplomatic

relationship with China, and that is also a way my friend in the

democracy war and myself got arrested in China. In 1994 when Mr.

Clinton, who disattached the human rights condition from the most

favored nation status, that is the time I was sent to jail for the second time along with many of my friends. Those situations tells you

clearly that international pressure, including the ones from America, do have a direct effect in the human rights condition in China.

Nowadays, the White House always emphasizes that a free economy in China would encourage progress of democracy in China.

That is right, but it is only half right. We need other conditions to

develop democracy in China.

In China we had 2000 years of free economy, but it never

brought democracy. After long times of thinking, we realized that

without human rights conditions guaranteed, we cannot get the

law of democracy in China. So if we want to promote democracy in

China, we have got to guarantee the human rights conditions in

China, not just for Chinese Government, but for all the other dictatorship governments in this world that do not voluntarily respect

the human rights. So we must meet internal and external pressure,

both working together to improve the human rights record.

There are people who also claim that, we have been sanctioning

China for all those years, but seems there wasn’t too much good

coming out of it. So Mr. Levin and Mr. Cox, they have all those

proposals to increase—in Africa—to increase such effect.

But while we were thinking of how could we improve it, we

should at least guarantee what we already have with the capacity

we already have. As a matter of fact, the annual review in the Congress in the United States provides extremely good pressure to the

Chinese Government. Because of such a pressure, our friends within China who work for democracy and freedom got a little bit of

tolerance from the Chinese Government. If we provide PNTR to

China, then we lose such a leverage, and then we also lose the protection to those people who fight for China.

This is kind of like a driver’s license. It seems we always have

everything in our pocket. It seems it doesn’t really work. We could
31

think of some good ways to improve those people’s driving records,

but we should not let everyone get a permanent driver license. Otherwise, I am afraid that driving records will deteriorate instead of

improve.

So while we try to improve—to have a moral means and the

manner to improve the human rights condition in China, we should

at least not give up the leverage and the means and the manners

that we have to maintain the present records.

Finally I must provide one fact. It seems we spent a lot of time

talking about whether we should isolate China or not; but as a

matter of fact, it is now the Chinese Government’s time in Africa

to unite with the other dictatorships and Communist countries in

Africa to isolate the Western countries, especially the United

States.

As a matter of fact, the fight regarding human rights and democracy is not just a single fight between American Government and

Chinese Government. It is a collective fight between the countries

of democracy versus countries of dictatorship. In this regard America plays an extremely important role in this fight, and I hope it

shall not retreat.

Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wei.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wei appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Ms. Kristoff.

STATEMENT OF SANDRA KRISTOFF, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,

NEW YORK LIFE INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Ms. KRISTOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am here representing

New York Life, but my perspective on this issue was really formed

through more than 20 years as a civil servant in the Federal Government assigned to negotiating in the trenches on trade, political,

military, and security issues, and it is that experience that leads

to my assessment that the full range of U.S. national interests can

best be served through the extension of PNTR to China.

First, it is profoundly in our national security interests. At the

core of our national security is our deep and abiding interest in

promoting peace and stability in the Asia Pacific. That is why we

have committed to maintain forward-deployed troops of about

100,000. That is why we have nurtured five core bilateral security

treaty alliances, a host of other informal political and military understandings with friends in the region, and that is why we are

building a regional security architecture that aims to prevent an

arms race, supports rules on nonproliferation, and rejects the use

of military force to resolve disputes. Every ally and friend in the

region, including Taiwan, has said publicly and repeatedly that a

stable U.S.-China relationship is key to regional security.

Our approach toward China has to convince it that it is in its

own national security interests to support a strong framework for

regional stability. Every President for 30 years, every Congress for

30 years, has extended normal trade relations status annually precisely because it increases the probability of cooperation with

China, the probability of a constructive, stable relationship, and

the probability of China determining that it is in its own national
32

interests to help develop peace and cooperation with the United

States.

The burden is on the opponents of PNTR to explain how denying

that status will not isolate ourselves from China, will not remove

our ability to influence Chinese decisionmakers, will not create the

conditions for confrontation, will not strengthen the hands of hardliners in Beijing, will not jeopardize the security of our allies and

friends, will not weaken the nascent international rules, rulesbased regimes on nonproliferation missile—missile technology, control of other dangerous technologies, and will not deal a body blow

to our national security.

Second, it is profoundly in our national values interest to extend

PNTR to China. At the core of our American values is the belief

that economic freedoms spark and nurture social and political freedoms. PNTR opens doors to China and expands the presence in

China of American companies, NGO’s and religious groups that

support positive change and expanded freedom for the Chinese people.

I am not suggesting WTO or PNTR is a silver bullet which is

going to overnight transform China into a Jeffersonian democracy,

but the past 20 years of extending normal trade status annually

have produced great changes within Chinese society. Twenty years

ago there was no such thing as a private sector in China. There

was no such thing as personal freedoms. Today Chinese people can

travel within and outside the country, seek education abroad, select

employment opportunities, vote in rural elections, earn higher

wages, enjoy higher living standards, live in less poverty. They

have increased access to information. They can begin to rely on the

rule of law that is becoming an increasing part of the Chinese political and legal system.

That is why virtually every Chinese dissident and Tiananmen

Square leader has spoken out in favor of PNTR. That is why Martin Lee in Hong Kong has spoken quite eloquently about the value

of having China inside the rule of law system. That is why religious leaders like Billy Graham, Pat Robertson, the Christian Coalition, and NGO’s like the International Republican Institute and

the Carter Center all support PNTR for China as a means of advancing political and religious freedom.

The burden is on the opponents of PNTR to demonstrate how isolating ourselves from China will advance political, religious freedom or improve the life of even one Chinese citizen or worker. It

is their burden to demonstrate how rejecting PNTR would not shut

down lines of communication and would not undermine the important role that NGO’s have played in promoting the rule of law. It

is their burden to show that cutting off U.S.-China trade would not

push Chinese reforms backward in time to the days when China

was isolated, markets were closed, and the worst abuses in human

rights took place.

Third, it is profoundly in our national economic interest. No one

seriously argues against the merits of the U.S.-China WTO agreement. Occasionally people raise issues about jobs. I think that argument is somewhat disingenuous when one recognizes that we are

operating practically at full employment, and none of the exports

that China makes to this market are any longer produced in this
33

country. So I would argue that even in the economic area, it is the

burden of the opponents of PNTR to explain how denying this status could possibly enhance America’s competitive advantage in the

global economy.

I would only wrap up by referring you to Steny Hoyer’s recent

speech, which I think was a revealing reflection of a personal

struggle on whether to support this issue, and he based it on the

confluence of national economic and national security interests and

a recognition that 20 years of annual renewal and review of China

has produced little, if any, evidence of improvement in human

rights.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ms. Kristoff.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kristoff appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Jendrzejczyk.

STATEMENT OF MIKE JENDRZEJCZYK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

D.C. OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA

Mr. JENDRZEJCZJK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Mike

Jendrzejczyk. I am the Washington director of the Asia Division of

Human Rights Watch. You are right, Mr. Chairman, I did work for

Amnesty International up until 1990 when I took on this position

for Human Rights Watch. Again, we appreciate the opportunity to

appear before this Committee to discuss this very important issue.

My organization does not take a position on trade agreements

per se, and we don’t endorse any particular agreement, including

the one negotiated between U.S. and China last November. However, we do believe that the WTO process should be used to press

for human rights improvements. We think that trade can be consistent with advancing human rights, but only if it is combined

with effective and sustained pressure.

Here I very much endorse Mr. Levin’s comments that engagement and pressure go hand in hand. As a WTO member, China will

commit itself to respecting global trading rules, and this is a step

toward China’s integration into the international system regulating

not only trade relations, but also the government’s treatment of its

own citizens. Restructuring China’s economy to fit WTO standards,

I think, will give a boost to those within China who are arguing

that it must open up not only economically, but also politically.

However, I don’t think you can argue credibly that WTO membership will in itself automatically lead to political change. It could

be an important catalyst over the long term, especially in the area

of legal reform. It certainly will increase pressures and expectations inside and outside China for creation of an independent legal

system, which now does not exist, and may, in fact, be years away.

Again, I want to stress that WTO membership will not in itself

guarantee the rule of law, respect for worker rights or meaningful

political reform, and, in fact, economic openness could be accompanied by tight restrictions on basic freedoms and an overall lack

of government accountability. For example, the government might

seek to build a rule of law in the economic sphere while simultaneously continuing to undermine the rule of law elsewhere.

I was in Beijing in March with the U.N. High Commissioner of

Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and heard the Vice Premier Qian
34

Qichen lecture all of the delegates on the benefits of the rule of

law, stressing, however, that it is up to each government to decide

how the rule of law is to be maintained. As you know, China has

justified locking up Falun Gong members and activists, saying it is

simply maintaining and supporting the rule of law and doing this

according to the law.

But it is, I think, crucial that the Administration and Congress

look carefully at the question of permanent normal trade relations

and how this can be used in the context of China’s entry into the

global economic system to exert significant leverage on human

rights. We believe that Congress should set meaningful and realistic human rights conditions that China must meet before receiving permanent NTR. We think the President should be required to

certify these conditions have been met before they get PNTR, and

this could happen any time following China’s succession to the

WTO.

In my testimony I have recommended four areas where we think

there is a realistic possibility China could make significant

progress in exchange for getting PNTR: One, ratifying two important U.N. human rights treaties that China has signed, but yet to

ratify; two, taking steps to begin dismantling the huge system of

reeducation through labor which allows officials to sentence thousands of citizens to labor camps for up to three years every year

without judicial review, and we could provide technical and legal

assistance if the Chinese were to move in this direction; three,

opening up Tibet and Xinjiang to regular, unhindered access by

U.N. human rights and humanitarian agencies, foreign journalists

and independent human rights monitors; and four, reviewing the

sentences of some 2000 so-called counterrevolutionaries convicted

under provisions of Chinese law that were repealed in March 1997.

Getting China to meet these conditions I don’t think would be

easy, but it would require the same kind of hard-nosed negotiating

that the Administration committed itself to get the trade agreement last November.

Second, to replace the annual trade review, we would strongly

support the creation of a new mechanism such as a special commission appointed jointly by Congress and the executive branch along

the lines of Mr. Levin and Mr. Bereuter’s proposal. I met with Mr.

Levin in Seattle, in fact, just before the tear gas started flying, and

several times with his staff, and we believe that this could play a

very useful role.

My organization has worked closely with the CSCE both during

and after the Cold War, and we have found it an effective and constructive mechanism. However, I think for this to be effective in

the case of China, more is needed beyond the pro forma process

and the issuing of a report on an annual basis. I think that the legislation establishing the commission should require a debate in

both the House and Senate and a vote by a certain date each year

on both the findings and the recommendations of the commission.

This would accomplish, I would add, what Mr. Cox is looking for.

It would guarantee that the commission not only is engaged

throughout the year, but every single year, instead of the trade debate, we would have a debate and a vote in both the House and

Senate on the findings and recommendations of this commission.
35

A second——

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Could you

please——

Mr. JENDRZEJCZJK. I will wrap up, Mr. Chairman.

The second aspect of his proposal has to do with prison labor,

and that, I think, would also be useful, especially if it entailed renegotiating the original prison labor MOU of 1992.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we very much support the creation of a

code of conduct for American companies in China. This was an idea

first drafted as legislation in this body in 1991 and again in 1995.

I think with the trade agreement implemented and China and its

entry into the WTO, American businesses will have even greater

incentive to be on the ground where I think they can play a positive role. We think a sense of Congress bill setting out a code of

conduct for American companies with an annual report to the Secretary of State on how these principles are being adhered to would

take at face value the claims and assertions by the American business community that their presence cannot only help liberalize

China, but can also lead to the better treatment of Chinese workers.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Jendrzejczyk.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jendrzejczyk appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Now our fourth witness on this panel is Nicholas Giordano, speaking today on behalf of the U.S. Pork Producers. He is the international trade counsel for the National Pork

Producers Council, a national association that represents 44 States

and generates over $11 billion in sales. The National Pork Producers Council is the co-chair of the Agriculture Coalition for U.S.-

China Trade, a group of over 80 organizations that represent farmers, ranchers, food and agriculture companies in all 50 States.

We welcome you here today, Mr. Giordano. You may summarize

your statement or put the full statement in the record, whichever

you may deem appropriate.

Mr. GIORDANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize my

statement, and I do ask that the entire statement be included in

the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, your full statement will be

made part of the record.

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS D. GIORDANO, INTERNATIONAL

TRADE COUNSEL, NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL

Mr. GIORDANO. As you indicated, I am with the Pork Producers,

but I am also here wearing two hats, as the Pork Producers are the

co-chair of the Agriculture Coalition for U.S.-China Trade which, as

you mentioned, is comprised of over 80 organizations really from

farm to table, with all 50 States represented in our coalition.

Most sectors of U.S. agriculture have suffered from very low

prices during the past few years. Indeed, pork producers just came

through a period with the lowest prices ever in real terms. As

President Clinton, Secretary Glickman and many Members of this

body have pointed out, U.S. agriculture is missing out on the long-
36

est period of economic growth and prosperity in our Nation’s history.

For U.S. agriculture, the importance of consummating this deal

with China and getting China quickly into the WTO cannot be

overstated. The United States Department of Agriculture estimates

that the U.S.-China WTO accession agreement could add about 1.6

billion annually to U.S. agriculture exports of bulk commodities

such as grains, oils, seeds and products, and cotton by the year

2005. U.S. export gains could approach two billion as the Chinese

reduce their tariffs on high value-added products such as pork,

poultry, beef, citrus and other fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, and forest and fish products. While the United States gains access to its

growing market, China does not gain any greater access to the U.S.

market under the WTO agreement, making it a win-win for American agriculture.

As part of its WTO negotiations with the United States, China

agreed to slash tariffs on many food and agriculture products. Indeed, the tariffs agreed to by China for many of these products are

much lower than the corresponding tariffs in countries such as

Japan and Korea. The agreement also will obligate China to reform

its monopoly state purchasing agencies, eliminate scientifically unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary barriers, and provide strong

provisions against unfair trade and import surges. It requires

China to stop the subsidization of exports, which is a huge concession given the vociferous opposition we face from the European

Union when it comes to the elimination of agriculture export subsidies. Finally, WTO membership will require China to play by the

same rules and disciplines of the multilateral trading system as the

United States. The United States will have recourse to WTO dispute settlement mechanisms should China not live up to any of its

obligations, an avenue of recourse we currently do not have.

With respect specifically to pork, the package negotiated by the

United States with China has the potential, if fully and fairly implemented, to transform China into the single greatest export opportunity for U.S. pork producers. Currently China has a de facto

ban on pork imports. China blocks pork imports through a system

of high tariffs, restrictive import licensing and distribution practices, and complicated and arbitrary sanitary requirements. Under

the terms of the U.S.-China WTO agreement, China will, upon

WTO accession, phase out its restrictive import and distribution

procedures, lower tariffs on pork, and cut subsidies. Under the

terms of a separate bilateral sanitary agreement negotiated with

the United States, the U.S.-China agriculture cooperation agreement, China agreed to accept pork from any USDA-approved packing plant, which again is a huge concession, particularly given the

problems that we have had with the European Union on meat and

poultry in getting them to extend equivalence to us and recognize

our inspection system.

According to Professor Dermot Hayes, an Iowa State University

economist, the Chinese market, if fully opened to U.S. pork variety

meats, these are the variety meats, the parts that we don’t eat too

much in this country, the internal organs, if China fully opens its

market to the variety meats as stipulated by the agreement, this

would add about $5 per head—this isn’t our number, this is an
37

Iowa State economist—about $5 per head to each of the hundred

million hogs we slaughter each year.

Overall this agreement is comprehensive. It is enforceable, and

it levels the playing field in our favor. In order to realize the benefits of this agreement, Congress must vote for permanent normal

trade relations with China. If the United States fails to provide

permanent normal trade status to China, which is not special

treatment, but the same trade status that the U.S. provides to

other WTO members, China would have a right to withhold the

benefits of key WTO commitments from the United States. In such

cases, the U.S. will be greatly disadvantaged as our trading partners enjoy the benefits of China’s entry to the WTO while we are

left on the outside looking in.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Would you

please sum up?

Mr. GIORDANO. Danish pork producers, Australian beef producers, Canadian wheat producers, French poultry producers, Brazilian soybean producers and Argentine corn producers ironically

would reap the gains from America’s leadership in negotiating

strong commercial WTO accession terms.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we won the Cold War. There is no

Warsaw Pact. China wants to join the multilateral system that was

largely designed by the United States. We think that is a good

thing, and we ask that the Congress not block U.S. farmers and

ranchers from benefiting from China’s integration into the international system. We ask that Members of Congress please vote yes

on PNTR for China.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Giordano.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Giordano appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. I thank all the panelists.

Mr. Wei, do you think the vote on PNTR would affect the way

that Beijing acts toward Taiwan?

Mr. WEI. If we talk about this issue, we should see what kind

of danger Taiwan is facing. Chinese Government has lots that must

happen to solve the internal problems, so they would use typical

strategy to transform those problems into a war against somewhere

else. It has been a very hot debate within the Chinese leadership

regarding whether they should have the war against Taiwan or

not. We think China—the Chinese Government has to be successful

in making everyone extremely call for patriotism and have nobody

to say not to attack Taiwan. The only meaningful way out the Chinese Government can say is that they claim they don’t have enough

money to start a war. On one side they say, we don’t have the

money, and the other side they say, if the war starts, our economy

will suffer.

The PNTR from America would virtually give them confidence in

the trade and economy, and thus they are more likely to start such

a war. I believe this war would not be just against Taiwan. It

would also directly affect America.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wei.

To the panelists, are you confident that the U.S.-China agreement is enforceable, and are the so-called parallel legislative efforts

needed to improve the prospects for its enforcement?
38

Ms. Kristoff.

Ms. KRISTOFF. If I could start, Mr. Chairman, I think that

through the agreement we have access to the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms for the first time with China, and we can hold

their feet to the WTO dispute settlement fire, if you will. We will

also be able to draw upon all the other members of the WTO to create a bilateral pressure, a multilateral pressure on China to live up

to its commitments.

I don’t believe that China’s record on enforcement on deals that

it has negotiated with us in the trade area is any better or any

worse than any other trading partner, and, frankly, if we trusted

the Europeans on agriculture, as Nick intimated that we don’t, or

if we trusted Japan on anything on trade, we wouldn’t need the

WTO. I would expect us to have disputes with China, but I would

expect us to be able to use what is already proven to be an effective

system.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Jendrzejczyk.

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. I would just comment in two ways, Mr. Gilman. One is to allude to the fact that we have bilateral and multilateral agreements with China, some of which are trade-related

and also have to do with human rights where their track record is

very poor. One reason I suggested in my testimony that the MOU

on prison labor allowing the Customs Service access to suspected

prison labor sites negotiated in 1992, needs to be renegotiated, is

that China continues to stonewall attempts by the Customs Service

to conduct such investigations. We, in fact, made the same recommendation before this Committee in September 1993. According

to the State Department, the most recent investigation allowed was

in 1997. So I think, again, this points to the need for vigilant enforcement efforts to ensure that whatever agreements China makes

in the context of WTO, there are mechanisms to verify and press

for compliance.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Giordano.

Mr. GIORDANO. I would associate myself with Ms. Kristoff’s comments. In addition, I would say our colleagues in agriculture, the

cattlemen, have had very difficult experience with the European

Union on the hormone issue. I think we would be hard-pressed to

believe that we are going to have as difficult a time with the Chinese in enforcing agreements.

We don’t know what the future holds. This is a fantastic agreement. What we do know is that the side agriculture agreement,

which is a bilateral U.S.-China-only agreement that I alluded to in

my statement, the Agriculture Cooperation Agreement, has been

fully implemented, and that agreement covers meat and poultry,

citrus and wheat, and all of the affected sectors are very pleased

with China’s implementation there, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Giordano.

Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a great panel

that you have assembled.

Mr. Jendrzejczyk, I have some questions for you. I think almost

all of us, if not all of us, are in accord with the goals and the outcome that you would like to see, whether or not this is the proper

vehicle, or whether the WTO can effectively effectuate what we
39

would like to see accomplished in addition to the trade side of the

issue. Do you think that if we insisted on these things that we

could force China to go along with our program?

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. I want to understand what you are suggesting. Are you asking do I think that if Congress were to attach

certain human rights preconditions, that China would meet those

in order to get PNTR? Is that what you are asking?

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is my question.

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. I would answer this in two ways. One, Jiang

Zemin, the President, has staked his political future in part on his

relationship with the U.S.—continued access to the U.S. market

and investment and American technology. Therefore, I think he has

an enormous political incentive, given what he has invested, in getting this agreement signed to get it implemented. So I think, in

fact, by the time a multilateral protocol is negotiated for WTO accession, it is possible that Jiang Zemin could be convinced to at

least make progress on some of the specific areas I mentioned if it

meant that he would get in the end what he wants most of all,

which is PNTR.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do you not think that if we do not give him

PNTR—as you have appropriately stated, he has staked his political future on this—that those elements within Chinese society,

such as people in the military who would like to see him not have

much of a political future, would use this as an excuse to get rid

of him?

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. There is a constant tension and struggle, as

you know, going on within the leadership on a whole range of these

issues. Much of the Chinese bureaucracy still isn’t convince that

the WTO membership is a good idea. I think the fact, however,

that Zhu Rongji went home empty-handed last year when he came

here to get an agreement did far more damage to those in the leadership who are trying to move toward greater economic openness,

frankly, than anything Congress does this year on PNTR.

If PNTR isn’t voted on this year, I should add, I would favor simply continuing the renewal process for another year. I bet you by

next year the Europeans will finish their negotiations, we will have

a multilateral protocol, and then we can revisit the issue of PNTR.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would think everybody would be finished with

theirs and have all the benefits of what we have negotiated with

the exception of us.

I think I know your position on the death penalty, your former

organization and yourself personally, and I think I know that that

is probably the same position as a great many other Western and

westernized democracies. Do you think that if any of those Western

democracies or China or any other country would say to us that we

have to give up the death penalty in this country because they believe it is the vilest abuse of human rights, otherwise they won’t

trade with us, do you think we would tell them to get lost, or do

you think we would get rid of the death penalty? I know your view,

but what do you think we would do?

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. I don’t know what we would do. I would like

to see pressure applied on the U.S.
40

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do you think it is possible that if Belgium said

to us they won’t trade with us unless we give up the death penalty,

we give up the death penalty?

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. I don’t, because despite the fact that——

Mr. ACKERMAN. If China said to us that we had to give up the

death penalty, would we give it up?

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. Despite the fact that the U.S. is greatly out

of step with democracies in Latin American, Western Europe and

others on this issue, which is a still emerging international norm,

there is a long-term interest that our European, Latin American

and other allies have in trading with us that I think trumps their

concern about the death penalty, strongly as they hold that concern.

Mr. ACKERMAN. But if they played that card and said to us that

it would affect our trade relationship, what would we do?

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. I don’t know. I hope we would reconsider the

use of the death penalty, to be honest.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I know you do. I share your position on that, but

that is not the question. The question is as a practical matter will

China change its view because we are trying to push them around?

Will we change our view in American society and do away with

prison labor—you do know we have that here—because other countries find that an abomination?

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. I think it is much too complicated, to be honest, to answer in such a black and white way. There are growing

constituencies within China for exactly the kind of economic and

political changes that have been discussed here today. I think the

question is how can we support, enable and empower those in Chinese society, even within the party, who want to move toward

greater economic and ultimately, hopefully someday, political openness? That is the issue. I think, frankly, that is the only way to

address this in an intelligent way.

Mr. ACKERMAN. You and I have no disagreement on these issues,

but what you are suggesting is that these vehicles aren’t effective

in changing our way because nobody is using them, and they are

looking for other vehicles to try to convince us as to what their

view of morality is on other positions. Maybe I come to a different

conclusion than you do because I am a politician, but I would certainly get my dander up, and almost everybody that I talk to would

get their dander up, if somebody insisted that we release people

from prison that we have convicted under our system because they

don’t like our system, or because we have prisoners who are working for 17 cents an hour and they think that is not enough, and

they think we are executing people and that is an uncivilized thing

to do. Even though I agree with you on the positions, that we

should change them, I would be really peeved if some country said

that to us, and I would think that that is the reaction of the Chinese.

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. All I can say, Mr. Ackerman, is that the reaction of every country. When we issue, the State Department that

is, issues its annual human rights report, no government likes to

be criticized. When our State Department has to go up to the U.N.

to defend—it is a natural reaction. I don’t think there is anything

that would dissipate that.
41

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the panel for the exceptional quality presentations they have made. I have found them very helpful and very

positive.

It occurs to me, and perhaps Mr. Wei would agree with this, that

the great majority of the 1.2 billion people in China have no particular political ideology. They are not particularly sympathetic to

communism. They would just like to go on with their lives in as

positive a fashion as possible. Our opening up China to trade to a

greater extent will mean that those 1.2 billion people will benefit.

The Chinese Government may continue to ‘‘buy China,’’ as we have

pressured to ‘‘buy America,’’ but what we are interested in the vast

number of people in China who have no particular political orientation. We hope to convince them to move toward—support moves toward democracy and human rights.

I also wanted to mention, since the subject has come up, that the

dispute settlement mechanism for the WTO is one that the U.S.

thus far has used far more than any other country. With a couple

of recent exceptions, we have had a very favorable outcome from

the use of those mechanisms.

I hope all of you do focus on the recently circulated proposed

framework that Mr. Levin and I have distributed. The accession of

Taiwan to WTO that Congresswoman Dunn and I have pushed

would occur, we would hope, at the same meeting that China’s accession to the WTO occurs. Tainwan, is our seventh or eighth largest trading partner. I would think, Mr. Giordano, that information

would be particularly interesting to you to as well as to others representing the agriculture groups.

Mr. Jendrzejczyk and Dr. Kristoff, you noticed perhaps that we

do have a push for an interagency task force on the subject of prison-produced goods and the labor conditions related to prison produced goods. In section 5 of our proposal, Mr. Levin and I significantly attempt to increase the resources available in our government to promote the rule of law and to monitor whether or not

there is agreement with the trade agreement of the WTO and the

U.S. accession agreement. We also pushed very hard for additional

technical assistance for the Departments of Commerce, of Labor,

and of State, which they support, for additional resources for dealing with labor market standards, commercial law, and rule of law.

We also urge that additional resources be allowed for those purposes through the WTO, and the international financial institutions. I would welcome any comments any of the panel members

might have, and I do thank you for your very specific suggestions,

Mr. Jendrzejczyk.

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. I would just quickly add we very much support the kind of technical rule of law programs both for reform and better enforcement of the Chinese labor

laws as well as commercial law. As you know, Mr. Gejdenson had

introduced separate legislation with much of the same impetus behind it. We have had a number of discussions, in fact, with the

U.S. Labor Department about precisely how to go about doing this.

As you know, the Chinese Labor Minister was here in March 1999,
42

invited Alexis Herman, our Secretary of Labor, to visit China,

which we hope she will do relatively soon not only to begin a dialogue on worker rights and social safety nets, but also to begin putting in place precisely these kinds of programs.

Mr. BEREUTER. You are right to give Mr. Gejdenson credit. Mr.

Levin and I drew heavily on his legislation for some sections.

Ms. KRISTOFF. Mr. Bereuter, I think the technical assistance on

the development of rule and law and commercial labor markets in

China is an excellent idea. The American business community has

been involved in those kinds of technical assistance programs in

the regulatory areas in China in the financial services area for

some time, and I think it would be exceptionally helpful if this

were a mandated program.

I think compliance by China is going to be the critical next question in the WTO. We have got to monitor its implementation of

these very time-specific and very clearly drafted commitments that

Charlene has negotiated, and I think the Commerce Department

and USTR are going to need additional resources in order to be

able to do that. So anything that you can do to create within the

interagency structure and the executive branch and in cooperation

with the Congress, a more focused view or more focused scrutiny

of compliance by China with its obligations I think we would welcome.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Wei?

Mr. WEI. There are some good discussions regarding how to negotiate with the Chinese Government to improve the Chinese labor

condition, et cetera. But I must remind everyone to negotiate, to

bargain, you do not give the money to the person first, otherwise

you lost all your possibility of negotiation. Every year we hold

PNTR in our hands, and every year we give NTR. Now we have

all the quality and leverage of the right person to negotiate, but

otherwise we lose everything. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wei.

Mr. GIORDANO. If I could comment?

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Giordano.

Mr. GIORDANO. Thank you so much.

Mr. Bereuter, with respect to your proposal, Mr. Levin’s proposal,

we in agriculture don’t have a formal position on this point, but I

think you will find a lot of support out there, and we may be moving toward a formal position. I think as a political matter, anything

that helps us to get to 218 we view as very positive. I think as a

policy matter, anything which provides more of a basis for enforcement above and beyond the rights we already have is also very

positive.

I also want to comment on the nontrade aspects of some of the

things that are in your proposal and some of the other things that

have been discussed here today. I want to underscore that people

in American agriculture, farmers and ranchers, are not deaf to the

concerns and to the pain that many feel in China. American agriculture represents mainstream American values. Many of our people are people of faith. There is great concern, but they have an

underlying faith in our system and in free enterprise, and they believe that through trade and through engagement, through increasing incomes in China, China being integrated into the multilateral
43

trading system, that there will be greater respect for human rights,

greater respect and religious tolerance, greater environmental protection, all the things that we believe in. So while we certainly

have a very parochial interest in trading with China, in increasing

our exports there, we very much believe that it is in our best national interest and are very much interested in promoting other

American values in China as well. We think that your legislation

does that.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just ask a couple of questions. First of all to Mr. Wei

Jingsheng; Bottom line, do you believe human rights will improve

if PNTR is approved by Congress in the next couple of weeks?

The INTERPRETER. If PNTR is given to China?

Mr. SMITH. Is given to China. Will human rights improve?

Mr. WEI. I want to mention not only the human rights condition

after the PNTR is given to China, but that the human rights condition will not be improved. As a matter of fact, it will deteriorate.

The reasons are very simple. For a dictatorship government, they

do not really want to respect human rights at all. They will only

be forced to respond if there is any pressure, such as we would

really like to have the trade conditions be granted to them so they

figure out maybe they have to respect the human rights matter.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask Ms. Kristoff, and perhaps Mr. Giordano

might want to touch on this. In your view, especially now that we

have had the MFN renewed annually under the Clinton Administration, has religious freedom gotten better?

Ms. KRISTOFF. I would say that over the course of the almost now

30 years that——

Mr. SMITH. Let me take the timeframe of the linking of MFN

with human rights under the Clinton Administration. Since then

has it gotten better, worse or stayed the same?

Ms. KRISTOFF. I think it has gotten better over both the last

eight years and the 12 or 22 years before that, cumulatively. I believe that American missionaries, American religious leaders have

spoken out in favor of continued engagement with China rather

than to create a condition where they can’t have access to that

market. Ten years ago you couldn’t find a Bible in China. Now they

are everywhere. The estimates of the number of religious believers

in China far understates the reality of the number of Buddhists,

Muslims, Catholics, Protestants that worship in China, albeit not

in sanctioned churches. This is vastly different than it was ten

years ago, and I think the NGO’s and the religious organizations

that have made this happen deserve an awful lot of credit. I just

don’t think that the credit should go to the perceived leverage of

the annual review, because, in fact, having given it every year for

30 years, it produces no reaction on the part of the Chinese.

Mr. GIORDANO. Mr. Smith, let me start by commending you and

many others in this Congress who have really carried the banner

on human rights issues, and as I previously said, this is something

that our producers are very concerned about. I know that growing

up, the picture that I had of China when President Nixon opened
44

the country right after the Great Leap Forward and the Culture

Revolution was a very bleak time I think in China’s history. What

we saw on the television set were people in blue Mao uniforms, carrying red Mao books, riding on bicycles.

I can tell you that in the past four years I have been to China

four times, most recently just a couple of weeks back, and the country is opening up. Is there religious persecution there? Absolutely.

I would not be credible, and I would be misleading you, and you

know better. It is certainly something our producers are concerned

about.

As I said, we believe that China’s integration into the world trading economy is something that ultimately will lead them to greater

democracy and greater respect for human rights. It is a problem,

and I believe—yes, I believe that the persecution is diminishing,

and I think as we look out in time 20 years from now, after we

have a successful vote and after China is integrated, that we will

see perhaps as much or more difference than we see when we look

back 20, 30 years ago to people in those blue Mao uniforms, carrying those red books.

Mr. SMITH. Obviously I am out of time again. That is one thing

about my Subcommittee, we usually provide almost unlimited time,

but let me make a couple of quick concluding points.

The United States Commission for International Religious Freedom will testify, as did their voluminous document, that there has

been a sharp deterioration of freedom of religion in China during

the last year. I myself visited with Bishop Su of Baoding, who, because he visited with a United States Congressman, was arrested

or rearrested, having spent so many years in their prison camp, the

Laogai. He is a full-fledged, bona-fide bishop with an allegiance to

the Holy Father in Rome, and for that he was arrested and interrogated.

I met with Wei Jingsheng when he was briefly out in the mid1990’s, but he was rearrested after meeting with John Shattuck

and myself at two different times, and was quizzed and told that

we are members of the CIA, some fanciful idea by the public security police.

My point is that we are dealing with a dictatorship.

Mr. Jendrzejczyk talked about the MOU. I was actually in a prison camp, Beijing prison number 1. Forty Tiananmen Square prisoners were there. We couldn’t meet with them individually. They

were there because they carried signs and said, we want democracy.

It seems to me that it is at best premature to be giving permanent normal trading relationship to a government that is not normal in any sense of that word. We need to see some progress. I

would respectfully submit—and I respect your opinions and I hope

you respect mine—they are going in the wrong direction. The evidence from the U.S. Commission, from the Country Reports of

Human Rights Practices and from a myriad of human rights organizations, including Mr. Jendrzejczyk’s, Amnesty International and

all the others, paints a voluminous, very incriminating picture of

overlapping layers of repression.

My good friend Mr. Ackerman talked about the death penalty. I

am against the death penalty, but there are no due process rights.
45

If Doug or I or my friend Dan Burton or any of us are not within

the very tightly circumscribed circle of an official church—or are

Falun Gong practioners, or Buddhists in Tibet, or we’re Catholics

aligned with Rome, or evangelical Protestants, you can forget it.

We go to prison, we are interrogated. There are thousands of Falun

Gong right in the face of this vote who are being arrested and interrogated.

It seems to me we do have some leverage, and I respectfully submit that not using it makes their lives that much worse. The Chinese will laugh and say they can have their cake and eat it, too.

I say that with all due respect.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you, Mr. Smith.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are on the precipice here, about to give up any chance at all

for having any way to respond if Beijing clamps down on human

rights, at least any way to respond as the United States. Obviously

if we could—if the clamp-down was so solid that the Europeans

and Japanese were ready to give up money and trade, that would

be a truly extreme circumstance.

Right now China has clamped down a little bit on dissenters and

those who practice religion, but one can only imagine what they

will do if they know that the worst that can happen to them from

Washington is that they will get a strongly worded letter. Perhaps

if Mr. Cox is successful, they would get a bad Jackson-Vanik II report.

But they wouldn’t risk either a day without MFN or what I

would like to see this House do, and that is have a graduation of

MFN so that we are not in a situation where every year we just

vote yes or no, but we are able to vote for a 10, 20, or 30 percent

reduction in the MFN benefits so that if without MFN the tariff

would be $10, and with MFN the tariff is $1, that we are able to

vote for, in effect, a $2, $3, or $4 tariff on that particular item.

A lot has been said that supporters of human rights in China

support this agreement. To me, the most courageous of those in

China are those who have actually spent time in the Chinese

gulag, in prison, and the people we need to listen to are those who

are free to speak to us, not those who are still subject to additional

imprisonment in China.

Mr. Wei, can you comment for those who have served time in

Chinese prison because of their human rights activism who are

now outside of China and free to speak their minds, what is the

view of that group of people toward whether we should go along

with this agreement?

Mr. WEI. I think that the attitude from those who could speak

freely, their attitude is quite clear. I have received many inputs, including the inputs from China from those people who have had to

spend lots of years in Chinese jails, and they are against the

PNTR.

Also, we notice that there are a few people of a little bit of fame

who seem to change their attitude in this regard, and I think they

may not speak what is really in their heart. We must remember

the pressure from the Chinese Communist is not necessarily just
46

within China—they have successfully spread overseas. So some

people’s attitudes may not reflect the people who have had to spend

years in Chinese jails. They cannot—especially—they cannot represent on several thousands of people who are still spending their

time in Chinese jails who are much less famous. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. We are a huge market for the Chinese, and I don’t

think they are going to jeopardize that market by starting to defer

trade with us to some other country, because we are probably the

biggest market they have in the world. I don’t see anything wrong

with renewing this on a yearly basis rather than giving them permanent trade status. Once we give them permanent trade status,

we have no more leverage with them as far as trade is concerned.

I think one of the panelists said that our national security depends on this, and they also said we won the Cold War. I remember one of the generals recently said that—when we were talking

about Taiwan and our possible defense of Taiwan, they said America won’t defend Taiwan. They are more concerned about Los Angeles than they are Taipei. That was a direct threat, and it was recent. Our memory seems to be so short. We don’t remember

Tiananmen Square. We don’t remember hearings we had in this

Congress just a few months ago where we found out they are taking prisoners into prisons, who are alive, and if somebody from a

foreign country needs a kidney, they take them and they remove

one of their kidneys. They immediately transplant it into a recipient at a makeshift hospital or close hospital nearby, and sometimes

they kill that prisoner to take their heart or another organ. That

goes on right now.

They are selling organs of live prisoners. Many of these prisoners

are political prisoners who committed no murder, nothing that

would involve the death penalty. If you don’t think taking someone’s heart is the death penalty to give it to someone else who

needs a new heart, then you and I don’t have the same definition

of a death penalty. That goes on today, right now.

People are being put in these gulags. They are slave laborers

right now. They are living on very meager rations. Millions of them

are in slave labor camps making products that we buy. We have

a multibillion-dollar trade deficit with China right now. I think it

is about $40 to $50 billion right now.

Mr. SHERMAN. Seventy.

Mr. BURTON. Seventy right now.

But the fact of the matter is the Chinese don’t want to lose our

market. We are the biggest market in the world. So this argument

about if we don’t go along with this, they are going to start trading

with somebody else and hold our feet to the fire, why would they

do that? Why would they want to risk losing our market? Why

would they want to risk some reciprocity if they wanted to try to

stop doing business with us?

I have a lot of agriculture in our district. I would like to see our

farmers have access to that market. I think it would be great for

us to get more trade with China, but not at the expense of people

who are having their livers and their hearts and their lungs removed who are alive in prison camps, at the expense of millions of
47

people who are starving and dying in gulags and making products

that we are buying here today, at the expense of kids who died in

Tiananmen Square under tanks, who were squashed into dog meat,

and to have the Chinese just recently say, hey, we don’t worry

about you guys because you are more concerned about Los Angeles

than Taipei?

How about the espionage that took place just recently. The W–

88 warhead that we couldn’t even talk about because it was a security risk, that security risk is no longer a security risk because the

Chinese have it. They stole it. We believe Wen Ho Lee. We are not

sure who gave it to them, but all of your nuclear secrets, almost

all of them have been given to the Chinese Communists. They can

now make a mobile-launched vehicle they can put in a forest, they

can launch it at America, and in orbit, when it gets into the outer

atmosphere, it splits into ten warheads, can hit ten cities with pinpoint accuracy, and we have no defense for it.

You say there is no arms buildup? They are building the biggest

military in the history of mankind. They are buying more ships,

more technology all the time, at the same time that this Administration in our country is diminishing our military preparedness.

Now, let me just tell you MFN permanently right now, in my

opinion, would be a mistake. I have no objection to doing it on an

annual basis, but we ought to hold that carrot out there and say,

when there is positive change, we will be more liberal with MFN

here in America. They are not going to quit doing business with us

as long as we are going to be a benefit to them, and we are right

now. Once we give that up by giving them permanent trade status,

the human rights aren’t going to improve there. They haven’t improved in Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and they aren’t going to

improve in China. They are Communists. They believe in a dictatorship and repression, and the only way they are going to change

is from pressure, not from giving them everything they want.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Burton.

Do we have any—Mr. Brady, I am sorry.

Mr. BRADY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think this is a wonderful debate Congress is having. We are debating the value of opening Chinese markets finally to American

farmers, to American businesses. We are asking a simple economic

question: Is it in America’s best interests that American farmers,

American businesses be treated as every other business in every

other country in this world?

My answer clearly is yes. It is in our best interest, but we are

also asking not if we should continue pressure on China to improve

human rights, to improve religious freedoms, to stop the practice

to force abortion, to rein in their military aggressiveness; the question isn’t should we be doing it, it is how best we can do it.

I am convinced the answer is that it will take many efforts, opening markets, opening minds, opening information, exporting our

strongest—one of our strongest freedoms. That is economic freedom. There is no question that it has helped.

There is no question we need to continue pressure on China to

improve in so many ways, and one of them at the heart of this

issue is can we best bring about lasting change from within China

or from without, and the question is how best to do it. Character
48

is described as what you do when no one is looking. Human rights

religious freedoms also occur when you change the hearts and

minds of a country, and I am convinced that as we open markets,

we help promote those freedoms.

I am also convinced we must have strong leverage and pressure

on China. I am frustrated because the annual debate on MFN is

not working. It is not bringing about those changes. But I do know

that improved trade is opening doors for our missionaries and for

our businesses. I know that we must have Congress and the President engaged on a daily basis on all the issues we have talked

about. I know that economically if we reject PNTR, China will continue to have one of the fastest-growing economies in the world.

They will continue to sell outside America. They will do business

with everyone in the world except us. It has no impact on them.

It is only economically that can we compete.

I guess my question to any of the panelists today is, isn’t it going

to take all of this to bring about change in China? Don’t we need

open markets, pressure at every point, an engaged President, an

engaged Congress in our best efforts to change China from within

to bring about the change that we desire? I would open it to any

of the panelists.

Mr. JENDRZEJCZYK. I would just say briefly I agree change will

come from both within and without, that we need carrot sticks. We

need a process of engagement because it has got to be tough and

consistent.

I very much agree that Congress and the President need to be

involved in a consistent manner as well. One of our disappointments was that at last month’s annual meeting of the U.N. Human

Rights Commission, there was an attempt by the U.S., which this

Administration should get enormous credit for putting forward, but

there was little other support. I think, to be honest, that was in

part because though the President was heavily involved in lobbying

Members of Congress on PNTR, as far as I know, he was not involved at all in lobbying on this resolution in Geneva, which, again,

is only a loss of face. It doesn’t impose sanctions.

China, for months, has been lobbying governments all over the

world just to keep this relatively mildly worded, innocuous resolution off the agenda. They won. I think that could have been prevented, and I know Members of Congress in this body and in the

Senate were urging, in fact, the Administration and the President

personally to play a much stronger role. Secretary Albright flew all

the way to Geneva from India just to give a speech, for which,

again, she should be given credit, as should Assistant Secretary

Kott for his vigorous efforts; but absent Presidential leadership has

been a consistent matter. The President can’t just go to China in

1998, say a lot of very strong things about human rights in Tibet,

and not follow them up throughout the year. I think that, in fact,

undermines the Administration’s own engagement policy.

Ms. KRISTOFF. I think Mike and I have worked for a number of

years on China issues together. I think we share your goals. Mike

and I sometimes have disagreements on the best means to get to

them. I am always disturbed that during this debate every year,

there seems to be posited this choice between trade and values,

trade and things that make us Americans as we walk around, and
49

that somehow if you want to bring China into the international

rules-based community and the WTO, that somehow that is a

statement in favor of prison labor or human rights abuses.

I don’t think engaging China in a clear-eyed, pragmatic, coordinated way among the agencies in the executive branch and with

the U.S. Congress, involving deeply the other elements of the community here, the private sector, the NGO’s, the religious leaders,

that that kind of engagement is tantamount to endorsing some of

the worst human rights abuses that have occurred. I think it is a

false choice, false dichotomy, to have to choose between trade and

values. I think we can walk and chew gum at the same time. I

think, in fact, 30 years of Congress granting normal trade relation

status annually says that it believes that that can happen, too.

What we have to do, I think, is have a continual debate on the

best way in which to do this engagement with China, and it should

be a public debate. It should involve the Administration. It should

involve the Congress. It should involve those of us who are out here

in the private sector. There are multiple tools available to all of us

to achieve security goals, economic goals, values goals. We ought to

use each and every one of those tools, but what we have found year

in and year out, that the tool—the annual review of relations does

not do anything. I think you have to question whether that lever

is an effective lever or, in fact, if it is ever used and you yank it,

it is going to break the relationship between the United States and

China.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. I

would just like to ask a followup to Ms. Kristoff.

Is there anything that the Chinese dictatorship can do that

would lead to your saying that we ought to cutoff MFN? I say that

because, again, the human rights abuses in every category have

gotten worse over the last several years ever since the delinking of

MFN with trade, the crackdown on religious freedom, the use of

forced abortion. Our Subcommittee has had numerous hearings,

one of which included a woman who ran a family planning program

in Fujian Province, Mrs. Gao, whom Harry Wu helped to get out

of China through a whole series of means. When she testified, she

said, ‘‘By day I was a monster; by night I was a wife and mother,’’

and said that the regime compels the family planning cadres right

from the top—contrary to the myth that is promulgated by some

in the population control community and UNFPA—to carry out

forced abortions and to meet quotas.

In the area of the Laogai, we know that the amount of prisonmade goods is high. Mr. Jendrzejczyk talked about the MOU. I

fault, unfortunately, George Bush and equally President Clinton,

for accepting a piece of paper that is as porous as Swiss cheese. It

gives China advance notice, first of all, and we have to prove that

there is an origin. You have got to have compelling proof, and then

the Chinese Government reserves unto itself the right to investigate and report back to Customs as to whether or not in their

view there is a problem. It is like the fox guarding the henhouse.

Then added to that, once we want to have access to a suspected

Laogai where prison-made goods are being made, 60 days or so
50

have to pass. That is like giving a drug pusher all kinds of weeks

or months advance notice that the ATF or the FBI is going to do

a raid. It becomes a Potemkin village and it is nonsensical to think

we are going to find anything after that process has been exhausted. The MOU needs to be seen for the fraud that it is.

Mr. Chairman, as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I myself proposed in the 1980’s that there be a Helsinki-type process for

Asia, and I asked the State Department to study it, and I have

pushed it many times. Regrettably you have got to get the countries themselves to be signatories to that. We now have the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that Jiang Zemin

has milked for years in terms of their acceding to it. It has no enforcement mechanism. That has to be kept right front and center

at all times, but it hasn’t even been ratified. Countries like the

Sudan and many other barbaric regimes routinely sign international covenants where there is no enforcement.

So I think we are on notice, Mr. Chairman. If there is going to

be this overlay of a new Helsinki-type process, we at least have to

have the countries signing and agreeing to access to their prisoners. You or I or any of us would love to go and visit. But even

the International Committee for the Red Cross doesn’t have access.

I remember when that carrot was dangled in front of the international community when another MFN debate was coming up for

vote, and China said, maybe we will let the Red Cross come up. As

soon as the vote was over, they just ripped up that promissory note

and said, there is no way they are coming in. We have no access

to the prisoners. When I wanted to meet with Wei Jingsheng and

others, there was no way, absolutely no way. As a matter of fact,

people I met with who were out of prison were arrested afterward.

The point I am making is: Is there anything that this dictatorship can do that would lead to you say, time out, enough is

enough? We did it with Russia. We did it because we cherished Soviet Jews and said that because of the grotesque treatment of Jews

in the Soviet Union; that country would not get the trading benefit

until it allowed the Jews to leave pursuant to Jackson-Vanik.

Now we have a situation where layer after layer of human rights

abuse have piled on top of one another. The human rights organizations to a group, and the State Department as well, have said

that what is really going on there says there is deterioration. As

I mentioned before, the U.S. Commission’s Rabbi Saperstein is a

great and honorable man. The people that make up his board are

free traders by and large. I don’t know if all of them are, but many

of them are. The collective wisdom that they have conveyed to the

Congress is, ‘‘Don’t grant MFN on a permanent basis.

My question, and I ask it with all sincerity, is: Is there anything

they would do that would push you over the edge and say enough

is enough? The crackdown on the Falun Gong, the Catholics, the

Protestants? If my good friend Mr. Brady and I went over and met

with Bible teachers that weren’t part of the state-sanctioned

church, they would be arrested. Minimally they would be interrogated. They probably would get a prison sentence.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Ms.KRISTOFF. I think Mike gave the answer to that a couple of

minutes ago when he said that the only way to frame this debate
51

so that we have a chance to succeed is to say we would like to have

China over a period of time embrace concepts of economic freedom,

political freedom, global peace and security. What increases the

likelihood and the chance that we will be able to push China in

that direction, the direction that we want to evolve toward, I think,

is our judgment and the judgment of many that bringing China

into the world community, giving it a stake in the rules-based systems—not just on trade, but on human rights, on nonproliferation,

et cetera, that that offers the best prospect of pushing China in the

direction that we want it to go.

To frame the debate in any other terms, in terms of the death

penalty or terms of a particular human rights abuse in a particularly narrow snapshot, is really to distort what has happened in

China over the last 20 years and to distort the effectiveness of tools

that we have in our arsenal now to affect China; and to deny

PNTR, frankly, is not going to keep China from the WTO. They

will join it. It is just the benefits will go elsewhere, and we will be

cutoff from their market.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you for 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman.

We get the full benefits if China joins WTO without giving them

permanent MFN under the 1979 treaty we have with China, but

more to the point——

Ms. KRISTOFF. That is not accurate, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. If I could continue. I have been given 30 seconds.

If that isn’t accurate, we can simply compel it by making it a contingent of our annual review of MFN for China. But more to the

point, to say that the annual review has not protected people in

China is to guess at what the future would be. We don’t know

whether there are 5,000 or 10,000 or 100,000 people the Chinese

Government would have imprisoned or killed if they did not risk

their $70 billion trade surplus with the United States.

If we go along with this agreement, there will be nothing the

United States can do unilaterally that will cost Beijing a single

penny, and then we will see whether they limit themselves to

5,000, or will it be 100,000 that they will kill? I don’t know. But

they will be able to kill and imprison all the way up to the level

where the Europeans are unwilling to do business with them because they have gotten so egregious, and I don’t want to know how

large that level is.

Let’s leave it so that the United States can deprive Beijing of at

least a few dollars, because I don’t think that roughly worded letters are sufficient to control and to limit their egregious abuses of

human rights.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

I want to thank our panelists. We are about to go to the third

panel. I thank Mr. Wei. I want to thank Ms. Kristoff, Mr.

Jendrzejczyk, and Mr. Giordano for being patient. We really overextended our time, but, again, we thank you for your expert opinions.

We will now proceed to the third panel, and we welcome Steven

McFarland, who is Executive Director of the U.S. Commission on

International Religious Freedom, a Federal legislative agency created by the International Freedom Act of 1998 which is charged
52

with the responsibility of advising the President, the Congress, and

Secretary of State on conditions of international religious freedoms.

Mr. McFarland has been a leader of a number of broad-based religious coalitions and helped to shepherd the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to passage in 1993, and the Religious Liberty Protection Act on which we worked here in our Congress with the leadership of Mr. Smith in 1999.

We look forward to hearing your testimony today, Mr. McFarland.

Our other witness today is Reverend Daniel Su. He was born in

China and is now an ordained minister working as a special assistant to the president of China Outreach Ministries, an evangelistic

Christian organization committed to reaching graduate students

from China currently studying on U.S. campuses. Reverend Su is

a frequent speaker among American Christian groups. We welcome

you here today.

Gentlemen, you may summarize your statement. Your full statements will be put in the record, and we welcome your proceeding.

Before you do so, I would like to ask unanimous consent that the

record be kept open for five legislative days to allow statements

from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. I would also ask that Mr. Smith conduct this

panel since I have to go on to another meeting.

We thank you gentlemen for being here.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN T. McFARLAND, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMISSION FOR INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Mr. MCFARLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a particular

honor to testify before this Committee whose Chair, Ranking Member and so many of its Members have been leaders in promoting

human rights as an integral part of U.S. foreign policy. So thank

you on behalf of the U.S. Commission on International Religious

Freedom, which, as you know, is a bipartisan legislative agency

independently created by a unanimous act of this Congress in 1998

to advise the President, the Secretary of State and this Congress

on conditions of international religious freedom and what the

United States can and should do to promote it.

Our first annual report came out, as the Chairman mentioned

and Mr. Smith mentioned, just last week, focusing on three countries, of which China was one. The Commission’s nine voting members come from both political parties and from a wide spectrum of

religious diversity. A number of them support free trade. Yet the

Commissioners were unanimous, unanimous, in their report in asking that Congress not grant PNTR to China until substantial improvements are made in respect for religious freedom.

The Commission’s reasoning is stated in its report, and let me

provide a short excerpt. ‘‘The Commission believes that in many

countries, including some of China’s neighbors, free trade has been

the basis for rapid economic growth, which in turn has been central

to the development of a more open society and political system. A

grant of PNTR and Chinese membership in the World Trade Orga-
53

nization may, by locking China into a network of international obligations, help advance the rule of law there in the economic sector

at first, but then more broadly over time.

‘‘Nevertheless, given the sharp deterioration in freedom of religion in China during the last year, the Commission believes that

an unconditional grant of PNTR at this moment may be taken as

a signal of American indifference to religious freedom. The Government of China attaches great symbolic importance to steps such as

the granting of PNTR and presents them to the Chinese people as

proof of international acceptance and approval. A grant of PNTR at

this juncture could be seen by Chinese people struggling for religious freedom as an abandonment of their cause at a moment of

great difficulty. The Commission, therefore, believes that Congress

should not approve PNTR for China until China makes substantial

improvements in respect for religious freedom.’’

Then the Commission unanimously offered five standards for

Congress to measure whether China is making that kind of substantial improvement in this fundamental human right: First,

whether China agrees to establish high-level and ongoing dialogue

with the U.S. Government on religious freedom matters; second,

whether China agrees to ratify the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights, which it signed in 1998; third, whether China

agrees to permit unhindered access to religious prisoners by the

Commission; fourth, whether China discloses the condition and

whereabouts of persons imprisoned for reasons of religion or belief;

and finally, whether China releases from prison all persons incarcerated for religious reasons.

Let me note that the Commission does not nominate these as

preconditions for the granting of PNTR, but rather as standards or

plumb lines. The Commission unanimously recommends that

PNTR be considered only if and when China agrees to a number

of these measures. Rather than proposing a strict formula, the

Commissioners leave up to the Congress how much progress China

must agree to on some or all of these five standards before PNTR

is granted. That China should make substantial improvement in

religious freedom before being awarded PNTR, is the Commission’s

recommendation. Whether progress is sufficiently substantial

would be left up to the Congress.

The Commission concluded that these are significant yet, frankly, doable requests to make of China. They are not pie in the sky.

The Chinese Government tomorrow could announce that it intends

to ratify the ICCPR, that it intends to commence high-level talks

on religious freedom, that it will invite this Commission to visit incarcerated religious leaders, and that it is going to begin a release

of all religious prisoners, or at least start with the elderly, the ill

and those who are children. They could announce that tomorrow.

The vote of this Congress on PNTR would not even have to be delayed.

What happened in China to lead the Commission to this unanimous recommendation? Over the last several months, the Commission has conducted research and held a hearing on limits to religious freedom in China. We heard from Mr. Wei, Harry Wu, a

number of other experts both from the mainland as well as Hong

Kong, as well as experts from this country. The Commissioners
54

found that violation of religious freedom in China is egregious, it

is ongoing, and it is systematic. In fact, conditions are worsening

as the Chinese Communist Party and government leaders promulgate new laws and policies to eliminate religious activities that are

beyond their direct control.

What little religious freedom China enjoyed in the past is being

constricted. Protestant house churches, the underground Catholic

Church, Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims and Falun Gong practitioners are all feeling the squeeze. This past year we saw the continued prohibition of religious belief for large sectors of the population, not to mention the 60 million members of the party, the

three million members of the army and the hundreds of millions

of minors under 18, all of whom are prohibited from receiving religious education. We saw the increase in the number of sects that

are branded ‘‘heretical cults’’ and, therefore, their followers are subject to immediate arrest without due process; the continued use of

notorious extra judicial summary trials and the sentencing to a ‘‘reeducation through labor’’ camps for the so-called crime associated

with religion; and we also saw credible reports of torture of religious prisoners.

In conclusion, let me reiterate the Commission’s unanimous conclusion that an unconditional grant of PNTR at this moment may

be taken as a signal of American indifference to religious freedom.

A grant of PNTR at this juncture could be seen by the Chinese people struggling for religious freedom as an abandonment of their

cause at a moment of great difficulty. The Commission, therefore,

believes that Congress should not approve PNTR for China until

China makes substantial improvements in respect for religious

freedom.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, on behalf of the Members of the U.S.

Commission on International Religious Freedom, we thank you for

the privilege of appearing before the Committee today. With your

permission I would ask that the chapter on China in both the Commission’s report as well as the staff memorandum that accompanied it be included in the hearing record with my testimony.

Mr. SMITH. [Presiding.] Without objection, that request will be

honored.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McFarland appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. I do want to thank you for your excellent testimony

and your very thorough work and that of the Commission on behalf

of religious freedom around the world. I read the report and staff

memorandum cover to cover. It was very disturbing, but well-documented and very enlightening. I think every Member of the House

and Senate and every member of the media should read that before

they make up their minds on this issue and others that are similar

to this. So thank you very much, Mr. McFarland.

Reverend Su.

STATEMENT OF REV. DANIEL B. SU, ASSISTANT TO THE

PRESIDENT, CHINA OUTREACH MINISTRIES (COM)

Reverend SU. Thank you, Congressman Smith and other Members of the Committee, for giving me this opportunity to testify

here regarding the trade status with China. As a newly naturalized
55

American citizen, I think it is an honor for me, and service to the

country as well, to participate in this public debate.

When the White House called asking for my view on the issue

two weeks ago, I commended the President for his vision to integrate China into the world community. Despite my honest disagreement with the President on many issues, I do strongly agree

with him that granting PNTR to China is vital to the U.S. moral

interests as well as economic and geopolitical interests. I believe

there are compelling reasons to support China’s PNTR and the

WTO membership.

First, as a clergyman concerned about religious freedom and

human rights, I am particularly excited that the WTO agreement

will initiate a dynamic process of change in China with far-reaching consequences. It will greatly contribute to creating a conducive

environment for promoting international norms, the rule of law and

individual rights and freedom.

The WTO agreement obligates China to play by the rules. In the

process China will need to strengthen its legal institutions, train

more legal professionals, learn to follow international legal procedures, and educate people about the concept of rights, law and

international norms. This process in itself is a breakthrough with

important philosophical implications for China as a nation.

When a Chinese citizen realizes that he has certain rights as a

businessman that government should not violate, then more likely

he will also realize he has other rights as a human being. By submitting itself to the WTO’s norms, the Beijing government is openly acknowledging the authority and legitimacy of international

norms in a very unprecedented manner. When China learns to

abide by the WTO rules, then it will more likely learn to abide by

other international norms as there in the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights.

Second, the WTO agreement will accelerate China’s economic reform, especially its privatization process. It will set more people

freer from government intrusion into their lives and enable them

to live as freer men and women. It will speed up the free flow of

information and expose the Chinese people to more ideas and values which we cherish and could be potentially revolutionary.

In its last annual report on human rights, the State Department

takes note of the increase in personal freedoms in China. Some

China trade critics are quick to argue that the increase in freedoms

is not intended by the Beijing government, and it shouldn’t get the

credit. I cannot agree more. That argument proves precisely the

need to do more trade with China. It proves the dynamics of the

free market in creating personal freedoms, even freedoms unintended by the government.

How can the same critics then in the name of human rights use

the same argument against free trade with China? Why kill the

process that is already creating freedoms for the people we say we

care about?

Finally, to grant PNTR to China is to strengthen the reformers

there. Reformers in China had fought hard to commit Beijing to the

WTO agreement. China’s current reform has its limits and has

reached a critical stage where it is confronted with daunting challenges such as massive unemployment and labor unrest. Besides,
56

there are strong forces in China trying to derail the reform process.

To grant PNTR to China and to bring it into WTO is to provide

the cover and momentum the reformers need to jump-start their

reform and to bring it to a successful completion. To deny China

PNTR is to abandon China’s reformers in this critical battle. To do

that is to unwittingly play into the hands of hard-line Communists.

That would be a major setback for China’s reform, and it is bad

news for America.

Despite my arguments for granting PNTR to China, I want to acknowledge that PNTR is not a magic weapon that will somehow

bring democracy to China. There are no such magic weapons, and

it will likely take a long process for China to become democratic.

So let us have no illusions as to what PNTR can do.

In considering the PNTR vote, these are some good questions to

ask. If we grant PNTR to China, does that help it get onto the

right track toward a rule of law and improvements of human

rights? Will the Chinese and American people be better off as a result? Will it help China play a more responsible role in the international community? I believe the answer is a resounding yes.

I share the deep frustrations you feel about China’s human

rights situation. I personally have friends in China who are in prison today for human rights reasons. Religious people and political

dissidents still find their basic rights limited and violated in various ways. With or without PNTR for China, we should always continue to work hard to address these concerns, but it is counterproductive to deny China’s PNTR because of its human rights reasons.

I myself feel the urge to seize every conceivable opportunity to

send China a message. It would make me feel good, but what good

does it do for the people in China? When we send a message, we

need to also ask: ‘‘At what cost?’’ Is it worth it if it causes a major

setback in China’s reform process? Is it worth it if it costs us this

strategic opportunity to move China in the right direction? I don’t

believe it is, especially when there are other existing channels to

send a message to China that is not counterproductive. We can always create new channels to address our concerns.

Which direction do we want China to go? That is what is at stake

in this vote. There is no guarantee China will go in the direction

we desire, but it is my conviction that granting PNTR to China and

its WTO membership give us the best hope that China may become

a more humane and responsible country. I am hopeful and my

prayers are with you as you consider this very important vote.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Reverend Su.

[The prepared statement of Reverend Su appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask a few questions. Reverend Su, do you

agree or disagree with the U.S. Commission’s conclusion that there

has been a ‘‘sharp deterioration in freedom of religion in China

during the last year?’’

Reverend SU. I believe so.

Mr. SMITH. It has gotten worse, in your view? You agree with

that?

Reverend SU. Yes, sir.
57

Mr. SMITH. You mentioned the issue of international norms. I am

sure you are aware that the WTO agreement actually further isolates noncommercial human rights issues from being considered

with regard to trade.

Reverend SU. I am sorry, I don’t understand that.

Mr. SMITH. One of the more perverse outcomes of China joining

the WTO and the U.S. acceding to that by giving permanent normal trading relations is that if we were to impose upon imported

Chinese goods some kind of tariff or some kind of blockage because

they were gulag-made, Laogai-made goods or were child-labor-made

goods, or produced in some other way that violated our social conscience under the World Trade Organization’s protocol, China

would be in a position to bring us to court. It would be an actionable offense in Geneva; they could say we have violated the spirit

and the letter of WTO rules. The only things that are protected

under the World Trade Organization, from my understanding—and

we have had two hearings on this which further illuminated this—

are commercial interests, against intellectual property rights infringements, for example. But if the labor force is exploited ad nauseam, by child labor, for example, and we said no, we put up a red

flag or stop sign and said, ‘‘that is not coming into the United

States,’’ they could bring us before a WTO tribunal and bring an

action against us. That is the perverse outcome of this. So human

rights are further isolated from trade if WTO and PNTR are agreed

to.

Reverend SU. I want to confess that I am not a trade expert in

those fields, and I don’t want to speculate, but I do understand that

we do have current laws against prison labor and child labor products being brought into the United States. So I don’t know how

that interacts with the WTO rules concerning these two issues.

Mr. SMITH. Based on the best available information that I have

seen, and we are looking into this further, that would be actionable

on the part of the Beijing dictatorship because human rights aren’t

on the table. They are off the table now, and countries that unilaterally engage in that kind of selective ban based on means of production—and even saying we don’t want those kind of goods coming

in—could be held to account. That is one of the perverse outcomes,

in my view, of the WTO ascension.

You mentioned that some of your friends are in prison, which obviously is a very heavy burden. If you yourself wanted to visit those

friends and make representation for them—and I don’t know if you

want to put their names on the record or not, it might be better

not to—would the Chinese leadership allow you to do so?

Reverend SU. I don’t assume so.

Mr. SMITH. In terms of the trend line of where the dictatorship

is going, Wei Jingsheng has mentioned previously that he feels

that it is bad and getting worse, that the hard-liners are in ascendancy, not the other way around. Matter of fact, he even points to

the bombing in Belgrade when NATO inadvertently or unwittingly

bombed the Chinese Embassy, which was used by Jiang Zemin as

a pretext to strengthen the more hard-line view within his own ruling circle. I don’t know if you agree or disagree with that—perhaps,

Mr. McFarland, you might want to speak on this. The ship is moving in one direction, getting more hard-line in its foreign policy vis-
58

a-vis other countries, especially Taiwan—which they don’t consider

a foreign policy issue, but it is a security issue for sure and there

is a crackdown which is as plain as the nose on my face against

the Falun Gong, Tibetan Buddhists, and other religious believers.

We thought it couldn’t get any worse, but it is getting worse based

on reliable evidence that we have. Why, when things are moving

in the wrong direction in a systematic way, do you have any hope

that just trading a little more with them is somehow going to bring

them out of that nose-dive?

Reverend SU. I don’t think there is cause and effect of the two.

By cutting off trade with China, I don’t think we are advancing any

human rights concerns that we care about.

Mr. SMITH. Where do you think they would find markets for the $70 billion of trade deficit and the technological transfer that they

are reaping from the United States? Where would they find that

goody, for want of a better word, that they desperately want? They

are not going to find it in Europe or Asia or anywhere else. That

is why we think we have some leverage to say, ‘‘Our markets are

open. Just reform’’.

Reverend SU. I think it is an issue that they had to consider. If

they lose the U.S. market, they have to gradually expand trade

with Europe and Japan, and, of course, I don’t think they can overcome the loss overnight. But if they continue to do that gradually,

they will recover the loss they will lose because of the U.S. sanction.

I think aside from considering what damage we can do on China,

we need to also consider how by doing that are we advancing the

moral concerns that we do have on the table.

Mr. SMITH. With all due respect, our point of view on that very

simply is that if you have a dictatorship that shows total malevolence toward those who dissent or exercise their religious belief to

the point that they routinely torture and incarcerate, that would

seem to be a group we would want to engage in a principled way,

but not by providing technological transfers and access to our markets. We do have leverage that, if unused, means they look at us

and say, ‘‘Profits trump human rights. All the Americans care

about is profit.’’

Mr. McFarland.

Mr. MCFARLAND. Representative Smith, the U.S. Commission

considered the concern that Reverend Su raised as his third point,

what would strengthen the hand of reformers, and respectfully

reached an opposite conclusion, that the message that would be

sent by giving China the biggest plum they seek economically

would be that business as usual is just fine; the Congress and Administration are indifferent to; that marked deterioration in religious freedom and human rights; so those hard-liners who have

been ostensibly getting their way in the social and human rights

field—their hand will be strengthened.

The reformers will not be strengthened by giving China the biggest plum or the pearl that China is looking for. It would simply

reward and send, in the Commission’s opinion, all the wrong messages about the importance or unimportance of religious freedom to

the American people.

Mr. SMITH. Let me yield to my friend Mr. Sherman.
59

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to trade with China, but I think we need

to trade from strength. Much has been talked about the reformers

in China, but we are blurring together two groups. One group of

reformers is in prison. They were not consulted by the Chinese

Government as to whether to enter this deal. The other group of

so-called reformers are the members of the Central Committee of

the Communist Party of China, and they are in favor of this deal;

but to call them reformers is to confuse the people in prison fighting for human rights with members of the Central Committee of

the Communist Party who may believe in certain economic reforms.

This deal has been put before us by China because the overwhelming majority of the Central Committee of the Communist

Chinese Party is for the deal, and there is only one thing that I

am absolutely sure applies to every member of that Central Committee. They are 100 percent dedicated as their primary goal to

maintaining a total monopoly on power with the Communist Party.

Mr. Chairman, I have been a politician for awhile and have

learned something about politicians. They know their districts. Lots

of other people like to think they know what it takes to be successful in politics, but a politician knows what it takes to stay in office

or stay in power, and the overwhelming majority of those dedicated

to the continued monopoly of power by the Chinese Communist

Party have brought us this agreement, and they are counting on

us to adopt it; and they are so confident that they are cracking

down. You gentlemen have illustrated to us that they, just on the

eve of this vote, are cracking down because they are counting on

corporate power in America. They may have read too many Marxist

books. They are counting on corporate power in America to deliver

this for them.

Mr. Chairman, I am a little bit embarrassed as someone who

cared and worked for Soviet Jews. You know that I am Jewish, and

that is my own community, and when they were imperiled by what

was then the world’s superpower-controlled market, we stood up to

the plate and we said, yeah, trade with Russia, trade with the Soviet Union, fine; but human rights. Now we are faced with a directly analogous situation. China is now the other superpower.

China is now the large, controlled nonmarket economy, and we

ought to be as dedicated to the Buddhists and Christians and Muslims in China as we were to the Jews of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, there is a linkage between human rights, the

trade deficit, and the government’s control in China over what

goods actually get in, and I would like to illustrate that we are running a $70 billion trade deficit with China. That is a human rights

harm to Americans. We have full employment, near full employment in this country, but we have got a lot of $6-an-hour jobs. If

we didn’t have that $70 billion trade deficit because we could be

selling $70 billion worth of goods to China that we are not now,

those same people would be working at $20- and $30-an-hour jobs,

and that is a big difference.

So why is China not buying from us? China needs the very capital goods that the United States is expert in creating. Why are

they not buying from us? It is because the United States stands up

for human rights. It is because every time Nancy Pelosi or Chris

Smith gives a speech, there is another reason for the Chinese Com-
60

munist Party to decide to buy the French goods or the German

goods or the Japanese goods; and if we pass this deal, there will

be nothing we can do about it. That trade deficit will remain enormous. Those U.S. workers will remain at $6-an-hour jobs, and what

will get worse? When a Taiwan vote comes up, when a human

rights vote comes up, people in this House will hear from employers in their district, and they will whisper in my ear, Brad, we

have a chance of getting a contract in China, and we won’t get it

if the Congress votes for human rights. Then they will go buy from

someone else. We will be not only deprived of any dollar way, any

economic way to respond to human rights problems in China, but

we will be deprived of our voice as well. Or I will go back to my

district, and people will say, you cost us a contract; why did you

vote that way?

Notice that under the present circumstance, if China were to

dare get that blatant, they might impair their MFN status. Maybe

we would do something in Congress for a change, but if instead the

word gets out, unofficially, of course, only orally, not in writing,

that continued American pressure for Taiwan, Tibet and human

rights will mean that U.S. companies will be disfavored by Chinese

decisionmakers, then the corporate pressure that has come to Congress this last couple of weeks to tell us to give China what it

wants, otherwise they will lose their contracts; they will be here

saying, give China more of what it wants. Don’t vote on human

rights. Don’t cost us a contract.

There should be no doubt that the Chinese Government in Beijing does not need tariffs and quotas to prevent American goods

from getting in. First, the vast majority of importers are actually

owned by the government, those that would buy the big capital

goods. We are not going to sell tennis shoes to China. We are going

to sell, if we are allowed to sell, telecommunications systems. Do

you think you would sell a telecommunications system for a whole

city in China without the approval of the Communist Party? I don’t

think so. But even if it was an independent business, would you

like to be an independent businessman or woman and get a call

from the Chinese Communist Party suggesting that maybe you

ought to buy the French goods or Japanese goods because they are

ticked off by what Chris Smith said on the Floor?

I don’t think there are many business people with the courage

of some of the religious leaders that were in prison, than some of

Reverend Su’s friends. I don’t think they are going to say, oh, I am

going to buy the American goods anyway because they are 10 percent better, 10 percent less expensive.

The Communist Party of China will continue to control which

U.S. exports get into China and which don’t. They will do it orally.

Oral statements are not subject to World Trade Organization review; and so the more we speak out on human rights for the people

of China, the more we will deprive our workers of the human right

to get those $20- and $30-an-hour export jobs instead of the $6-anhour jobs.

We need to be in a position where we can actually do something,

and that would be if we vote every year, and if we have hopefully

not an all-or-nothing vote—I talked to Chris about this before—but

instead have an opportunity to vote for 90, 80, or 60 percent of
61

MFN for China instead of now granting them 100 percent every

year almost like clockwork. Just in case you haven’t realized it, we

will be voting against this deal. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Brady.

Mr. BRADY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First I want to thank you for all that you have done for so many

years on behalf of human rights all throughout this year, and all

of our efforts pale next to yours, and I want to thank you for your

leadership.

Let me second correct the isolationist view of my good colleague

Mr. Sherman regarding the trade deficit. We run a trade deficit

with China because we have one of the strongest economies we

have ever had, and we are buying more products, good-quality

products, good-price products from everywhere around this world

because, in fact, our economy allows that.

Second, we have a trade deficit specifically because China is

blocking our goods. If we do not pass PNTR, and China enters

WTO, they will continue to sell to America. We will continue to buy

from them, and the only difference is our American farmers, our

American ranchers, our American small businesses our high-tech

companies will still be blocked from markets in China. It will not

strengthen our American interests, our economies, our jobs unless

we open those markets to American competition and we can compete.

But let me tell you what is encouraging about the sketch we

heard from Reverend Su and Mr. McFarland is with Reverend Su

what we know clearly, just like good-hearted Americans debating

this issue strenuously, it is clear that dissidents in China and from

China such as Harry Wu and Wei Jingsheng believe that we should

not do this. Yet leading dissidents like yourself, Reverend Su;

Wang Dang, the leader of the demonstration at Tiananmen Square;

Wang Jen Tou, sentenced to 13 years in prison, believe that open

trade and open access will bring about these reforms. It is encouraging that both Mr. McFarland and Reverend Su have talked about

how trade can bring about a more open society and political system, as you did in your report, and that China’s entrance to WTO

may very well advance the rule of law, which has good implications. The only difference was what signal does this send?

That was the honest disagreement, and my question to you, because I really do have a question, is whether this is not a multiplequestion approach for America, where we can either trade, or keep

pressure on human rights, or have Congress engage in religious

freedoms, or ending forced abortion and military aggressiveness, or

the President being engaged. Isn’t the answer all of the above?

Open markets with open access, continued higher congressional

pressure for change in China, more engagement by the President

and the Cabinet on this, more international consensus in making

these changes within China rather than from outside China where

results have been limited at best; isn’t the real answer we have to

do all of that to bring about this change? I open it to both panelists.

Mr. MCFARLAND. I think, Representative Brady, you have spoken

a lot of truth on that score. I think, speaking on behalf of the Commission, that its opinion is that the PNTR would have some bene-
62

fits to the promotion of human rights. However, we, the United

States, would be squandering a profound opportunity to leverage

some very important progress, progress that we haven’t seen,

progress that is going actually in the wrong direction. So the calculation that the Commission made was that the benefits of PNTR

unconditionally at this time, given what we see on this issue in the

last year to two years, are outweighed by the progress that could

be extracted by demanding that there be some substantial progress

as determined by the Congress in this fundamental freedom that

is supposed to be of equal weight to our economic interests.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. McFarland, if our annual debate on this issue is

producing deteriorating conditions, why would continuing that

same debate reverse that?

Mr. MCFARLAND. I think that is an indictment of the fact that

MFN has been rubber-stamped on a regular basis to the detriment

of human rights, which has been sending the wrong message for

the last number of years.

Mr. BRADY. The Congress is strongly in support of annual MFN.

Do you see any reason that is changing?

Mr. MCFARLAND. Do I see any reason that Congress’ opinion

would change? I am really not the right person to ask to do some

fortune-telling in that regard. I am sure that given the track

record, there may very well be a good argument that there will be

continued granting of MFN on an annual basis; but we know that

the message we will send to the Chinese leadership is they never

will be held accountable on an annual basis, and they know that

we never will get to first base in Geneva, either. So why relinquish

any leverage whatsoever when this is a plum they really want?

Mr. BRADY. Actually I wish we did know, because here we have

two very good knowledgeable people with honest disagreements,

and then people like Chairman Smith and myself with honest disagreements on what signal this will send. I wish I had a crystal

ball, and it certainty would sure make this easier.

Reverend Su?

Reverend SU. First I want to say good people can disagree, and

we all have good intention of trying to bring about the improvement to human rights in China. But I agree with Congressman

Brady that it takes more than one vote. It takes more than one

way to really accomplish the goals that we want, and I don’t think

it is right to turn our current debate into a referendum to say we

don’t know if we care for human rights in China. I think that is

a very narrow interpretation of the debate. Our debate today has

a lot more to do with China as a whole society rather than just the

referendum on the human rights issue.

So I would like to encourage us all to take a look at the whole

picture. To say that our vote for PNTR is to send a message to Chinese people that we don’t care about human rights, I think, is just

too simplistic. I think it sends so many messages. I don’t think any

one message alone is enough to communicate what this vote is all

about. It is a message to encourage the reform process in China,

and I think we all agree the current economic reform is China is

good for the Chinese people. So I think it is so many multiple messages being sent to China that it is just too simplistic to say that

this means that we don’t care about human rights in China. I think
63

American people have legitimate concerns to ask about the economic world, because we are living in a very competitive world

market, and I think all these concerns are legitimate.

Even though I come from a religious background, I wouldn’t

want to define this debate as if it is all about the religious freedom

issue, and I think we all need to take a look at the whole picture.

I do believe that those of us who are concerned about losing some

leverage because we are not having this annual debate with China

in this way, I need to find good alternatives.

The current debate, the annual debate on the normal trade relationship with China, is no longer a useful tool at all. I had hoped

for it to become a useful tool, but it is not effective anymore. Just

like if I am driving a car, and it is always causing me problems.

Instead of fixing it and spending thousands of dollars, why not invest in getting a better car? I think this is what we are facing, too.

Instead of trying to beat up this bill into something else, why not

us invest in creating something good, effective and productive to

accomplish the human rights goals that we want.

The PNTR is mostly a trade issue. It is designed as a trade bill.

To try to beat it up, reshape it to turn it into a human rights weapon, it is just at best awkward. It is just like you cannot shape a

baseball bat into a fishing pole. It is just like—you cannot go fishing with a baseball bat. So this is what I am saying. We are right

in having concerns about human rights, but let us find effective

channels that do not have the counterproductive effects on the Chinese people, on the American people, on the American economy,

and let’s find a good tool to do the things that we all agree that

we want to accomplish.

I don’t understand why we need to disagree over this issue. It is

far bigger, far broader than one single issue, and I think some—

I guess some viewers may be wondering why we are debating about

this, making a very complicated issue into a single issue.

Mr. BRADY. Reverend and Mr. McFarland, I want to thank you

both for your informed views because they are very helpful, and,

we cannot give up on this issue, on human rights. We are going

to have to find and create better, more concerted efforts, and we

are going to be leaning on leaders like yourself to help shape those

as well. So thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Let me make one final comment and ask one very

short question. I think human rights is not some single issue. How

well or poorly a country treats its own people is obviously a measure of its fairness, humanity, and generosity. But labor rights certainly have an absolute connection to trade. I don’t think it could

be argued in any way, shape, or form that this is somehow

unconnected since labor produces the goods that are eventually

shipped or exported. There are no labor rights in China. If you or

I wanted to establish a free trade union, we would be on the quick

road to prison and we would be punished severely for it.

Let me also say that WTO ironically does punish for violations

of certain types of rights, but only commercial rights, intellectual

property rights, and a host of other similar rights. If a country violates those rights—pirates CD’s or video cassettes—the full weight

of the WTO will come down against them. Why is that? I find it

hard to justify that it is OK for a country to bring an action be-
64

cause intellectual property rights have been violated, but not when

the work force that produces those items have no rights. The individuals should matter more than pirated disks.

That is a major flaw, in my view and perhaps others, with regard

to the WTO. Human rights aren’t even a side-bar. They are nowhere to be found when it comes to trade or commerce between nations. It would seem to me that there should be some connection—

otherwise just roll back the clock. Why not deal with the Nazis?

You might encourage them coming out of the debacle of World War

I to be more productive and more this and more that, but we all

know that they had very despotic tendencies, and Hitler did terrible things to his people, especially the Jews.

We now have a record that is indisputable that the repression is

getting worse, and that is why I find it so incredible that when we

have at least one small opportunity to admonish a dictatorship that

it won’t be business as usual, that we don’t grab it and say, we are

not going to give a permanent NTR, we are going to have an annual review.

Let me also just make the point—and perhaps, Mr. McFarland,

you might want to answer this, I think you would be the right person—the Commission suggested that it would be very helpful for

the Congress to invite His Holiness the Dalai Lama to speak to a

joint session of Congress, which I fully support. How did that come

to be, and what are your thoughts on that?

Mr. MCFARLAND. He is perhaps the world’s greatest single figure

in personifying both religious freedom and passivism in pursuit of

human rights and a Nobel Peace Laureate. So it was the Commission’s opinion that while Beijing might not appreciate the invitation, that this individual should address a joint session of Congress. It would send the right message to the Chinese people that,

first, the atrocities going on in Tibet by the Chinese Government

are not forgotten; second that it is worth Congress’s time to hear

from a person of his stature, knowing that his message will be that

business as usual is not acceptable. I think it would send all the

right messages—the Commission believes it would send all the

right messages to both Beijing as well as the displaced government

of Tibet to invite His Holiness to address the Congress.

ReverendSU. May I have some comments on some good issues

you brought up? On the issue of labor rights—and I agree with you

that the Chinese workers today cannot set up their trade union

overnight, but that is not the issue we are concerned. We are concerned about the long-term improvements of human rights situations there, and I don’t know whether you get a chance to talk with

the average Chinese workers in China. I am from the city of

Xiamen. I have talked with people who work with different international investment, work for Hong Kong investment company,

companies set up by Americans, Japanese, those from Taiwan and

other European countries, and they all told me the same conclusion, that workers working for American companies are better

treated than workers working for any other companies run by any

other countries.

So I don’t think it is right for some people to say the labor—the

slave labor situation in China, and I think the way to improve the

labor situation in China is to bring in the highest standards that
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American companies are practicing. The Chinese people are smart.

They can see the difference, and that puts a lot of pressure on

other companies to come up with competitive labor standard measures, and I think that is a very productive way to promote the improvements in the labor—in companies for workers where you introduce the high standards and create contrasts so that those companies that have lousy standards may really come up with something to compete with the high standards in the American companies.

When I visited China, people told me the same thing, either in

my home town in Beijing or elsewhere, and I don’t think by withdrawing American company we’re going to help the labor situation

in China.

Mr. SMITH. Can I just offer one response? There is no doubt the

Chinese dictatorship has taken the measure of Congress. They can

count votes, and can count on an Administration that has been

ready to give them MFN without strings. Matter of fact, I went

over to Beijing midway through the time when the linkage was in

effect, when they were on probation. Virtually every Chinese leader

I met with said, ‘‘We are getting MFN. This Administration will

just give it to us.’’ There will be no strings at the end of that socalled review period.’’ I didn’t meet a single Chinese leader who

suggested anything other than that profits would trump everything

else.

I say that because we haven’t really had a test to see whether

or not the economic leverage will work. We need 290 votes in the

House and 67 votes in the Senate, a super majority, to overcome

a Presidential veto when it comes to MFN renewal on an annual

basis. Those votes are nowhere to be had. They are not even close.

So we are in a different situation this year with permanent MFN

where one chamber, Senate or House, can stop this from going forward, so this really is a real test. In the past it has been a bogus

test, and, again, the only time we came even close to having what

we thought was going to be a victory on this post-Tiananmen

Square was when the President was saying all the right things,

such as that he was for getting rid of MFN. The House and Senate

were poised to do just that, and in came his Executive Order which

rendered that moot.

So the Chinese Government may be a horrific dictatorship, but

they are not stupid. They have known ever since then, we never

had the two-thirds requisite number of votes to overcome a Presidential veto, which we would have gotten had we passed in both

houses a denial of the MFN. So this has not been tested.

Hopefully PNTR gives us a new first-time test as to whether or

not we really mean business, and that is why this is such an important vote. Again, even the annual MFN, they will get it. We

can’t stop that. It will be renewed for another year under this Administration, which unfortunately caved seven years ago.

Reverend SU. I have to say I don’t think this is a test to see

whether or not we care about human rights situation in China.

Mr. SMITH. Could I ask you one thing? I am sorry for interrupting you, but if my family and extended family and Kevin

Brady’s and yours were all being tortured today, would we want

MFN again? That is the everyday experience of many within the
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PRC, the Country Reports make it very clear. Amnesty this week

has called for an end to torture in China, made a broad-based appeal to the dictatorship in Beijing. Would we still say, yeah, let’s

just trade; maybe someday my kids and my wife and Kevin’s and

yours will all be let out of prison.

There is an urgency that is lacking. If we wait a decade or two

and say, ‘‘Over time this will evolve’’, those who are being tortured

will have lost their lives, and there are thousands of political prisoners and religious prisoners being tortured.

Reverend SU. I would agree with you about the urgency. I feel

the PNTR is not an effective channel to promote those concerns

that we are discussing now, and we need to move on and create

new and effective channels to deal with the concerns that we are

talking about.

If you are talking about those suffering for human rights violation, religious freedom in China, in fact I talked to many people in

prison in China for their religious faith. They don’t want their persecution to become an issue in American politics. They don’t want

to become the political football between the two countries. It is not

good for them. It is not good for the church in China. Christians

in China live in China, not in the U.S., and I think we need to be

more sensitive in suggesting that they are for removing the trade

with China, and I don’t think that is an accurate view of a lot of

people that are suffering for religious persecution.

Mr. SMITH. Regrettably Wei Jingsheng is not here to rebut that,

but at our hearing he testified and said precisely the opposite, that

it is only when there is a realistic threat, a credible threat, that

they stand to lose something, and that there is a significant economic benefit at risk, that the bully boys in the prisons and working right up to the top will ameliorate some of their brutality to

the prisoners. When it is business as usual, they have a free hand,

he testified, to do as they will with impunity, and prisoners are

told, ‘‘You are forgotten’’. So we have a difference of agreement on

that.

Mr. MCFARLAND. Mr. Wei so testified in Los Angeles on March

15 before the U.S. Commission, as did Harry Wu, and they were

quite clear, ‘‘read our lips’’ an answer on PNTR; this will not work

to the benefit of the religious adherents that are in prison or even

to those who would perhaps suffer worse. They believe in Mr. Wu’s

opinion and Mr. Wei’s opinion that it is worth the cost. So it is certainly at best a mixed question, and there is no unanimity on that.

Reverend SU. I want to say I respect the views of Wei Jingsheng.

My wife and I prayed for him many times when he was in jail and

even after he was released. But I have to say I don’t think it is accurate to say all Chinese political dissidents are for the rejection

of the PNTR vote. There are a lot of good people speaking out of

their own conviction rather than under the pressure of Beijing government, as some suggested. They truly believe in their hearts that

granting PNTR to China is good for the cause of human rights and

democracy in China.

Another very respected human rights leader stayed in prison for

many years as well. She shared our view that granting PNTR to

China is better for the human rights situation in China.
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So I think good people can disagree over this issue rather than

say Chinese political dissidents all agree that to call off trade with

China is the best.

Mr. SMITH. With all due respect, I didn’t say that, and I don’t

think anybody has ever said that.

Reverend SU. Another quote by Dai Quing, a Chinese environmentalist and also a political human rights activist; he was also in

prison in China, and he said this: ‘‘I believe that permanent normal

trade status with its implication of openness and fairness is among

the most powerful means of promoting freedom in China’’. I respect

that view as well.

Mr. SMITH. Let me thank our third panel, our two very distinguished witnesses, for their testimony and your patience. This has

been a very long day, but very, very enlightening and helpful. The

hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:16 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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