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i 

71–527 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–88] 

THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTION FOR U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

POLICY AND POSTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

NOVEMBER 2, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

TIM MORRISON, Professional Staff Member 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, November 2, 2011, The Current Status and Future Direction 

for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Posture ................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, November 2, 2011 ............................................................................... 47 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTION FOR U.S. NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS POLICY AND POSTURE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 5 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy .......................................................... 12 

Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF, Commander, United States Strategic Command ..................................................................................................................... 9 

Miller, Hon. James N., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................................... 7 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 

Security, U.S. Department of State .................................................................... 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P. ............................................................................ 84 

Kehler, Gen C. Robert ...................................................................................... 70 

Miller, Hon. James N. ...................................................................................... 60 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta ...................................................................................... 57 

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O. ................................................................................... 80 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

All DOE Current Directives—11/17/11 ........................................................... 98 

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and 

the Department of Energy Concerning Modernization of the U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure ...................................................................................... 93 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 127 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 169 

Dr. Fleming ....................................................................................................... 171 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 166 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 167 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 159 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 174 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 131 
(1) 

THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTION FOR 

U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AND POSTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 2, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:37 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. I call to order the subcommittee. Good afternoon 

and welcome everyone to today’s hearing on ‘‘The Current Status 

and Future Direction for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Posture.’’ 

We have here today an all-star panel of government witnesses. 

While they need no introduction, I will do an introduction for those 

of you who are perhaps on C–SPAN. We have the Honorable James 

N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

at the U.S. Department of Defense; General C. Robert Kehler, U.S. 

Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command; the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, 

the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 

Security at the U.S. Department of State. 

We are glad to see you here today, and I must acknowledge 

Ellen, of course, as the past chair here and she—well, I served as 

ranking member. I can tell you that not only did we work in a 

great bipartisan basis, but I count Ellen Tauscher to be one of my 

mentors, and I greatly appreciate the help that you provided me 

when you served as chair of the committee. 

And then we have the Honorable Thomas D’Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration at the U.S. 

Department of Energy. 

The administration has undertaken a series of ambitious 

‘‘projects’’ regarding U.S. nuclear policy and posture, and the Congress has a significant role to play here as a co-equal branch of government entrusted by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, with 

responsibility to ‘‘raise and support armies . . . provide and maintain a Navy . . .’’ and, under Article I, Section 9, to pay for those actions of the government Congress deems prudent. 

And these ‘‘projects’’ that are currently pending with the administration are the U.S. nuclear force reductions under the New 

START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty and the associated Section 1251 Plan, which provides for the modernization of 
2 

the U.S. nuclear deterrent, including the triad of nuclear delivery 

systems, nuclear warheads, and the infrastructure that supports 

them; the so-called Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study 

or ‘‘mini-NPR,’’ which we understand is intended to provide the 

President with options, possibly for future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces; and NATO’s [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, or DDPR, which will likely 

make recommendations regarding U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. 

As the witnesses know, the House of Representatives in the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, exercised its constitutional responsibilities for supporting the Armed 

Forces—and stewardship of taxpayers’ resources—to pass a variety 

of provisions regarding these administration projects. In reviewing 

Dr. Miller’s testimony, I see that he is prepared to discuss these 

NDAA provisions in detail, and we certainly look forward to that. 

Regarding the modernization program, it is at the heart of the 

agreement that led to ratification of the New START Treaty. Let 

me quote from Secretary Gates in his testimony before the Armed 

Services Committee last June. 

He said, ‘‘Frankly, and just basically realistically, I see this treaty as a vehicle to finally be able to get what we need in the way 

of modernization that we have been unable to get otherwise.’’ 

These are powerful words, and they effectively show what I think 

all the witnesses understand: that New START and nuclear modernization are a package deal. 

Indeed, the New START Resolution of Ratification that was 

passed by the Senate makes it clear that in the absence of full 

funding for the modernization program, the President needs to explain to the Congress whether it is still in the interests of the 

United States to remain party to the agreement. 

I quote from condition nine of the resolution: it says, ‘‘If appropriations are enacted that fail to meet the resource requirements 

set forth in the President’s 10 year [Section 1251] plan . . . the 

President shall submit to Congress . . . a report detailing . . . whether and why, in the changed circumstances brought about by the resource shortfall, it remains in the national interest of the United 

States to remain a Party to the New START Treaty.’’ I am pleased 

the President followed through on his commitment to request the 

funds for modernization of the nuclear deterrent pursuant to his 

revised Section 1251 Plan. 

I am, however, concerned that the administration did not request 

an anomaly for the nuclear modernization program for this first 

continued resolution that expires on the 18th of this month. In 

other words, the administration asked for the dollars in the budget, 

but when it comes to the issue of actually funding that, the administration did not ask for, in the continuing resolution, an anomaly 

that would have preserved that funding, the short-term CR [continuing resolution]. 

As we are now heading toward a second CR, possibly until the 

end of this year, it will be telling to me as to whether or not the 

administration requests an anomaly for NNSA [National Nuclear 

Security Administration] Weapons Activities this time around. 

Likewise, I am deeply troubled that your written testimony for 

today, Mr. D’Agostino, appears to us to have been watered down 
3 

by the White House Office of Management and Budget from its initially strong statement of complete support for the President’s full 

budget request for Weapons Activities, to what can be considered 

a tepid statement of support for some level of modernization funding. 

One would think it would be relatively easy for administration 

officials to state support for the President’s full budget request. 

General Kehler, I understand that you have been working with 

DOD [Department of Defense] and OMB [Office of Management 

and Budget] to finalize a letter regarding the proposed cuts to 

Weapons Activities. I wanted to express my interest in hearing 

from you directly, and Admiral Winnefeld, the senior military leadership for nuclear weapons on this issue. 

I am not certain why the OMB cannot support the President’s 

budget request for fiscal year 2012, but I intend to ask each of the 

witnesses whether or not they would recommend to the President 

an anomaly for NNSA in the event of another CR, and whether the 

continued funding of the nuclear modernization program in fiscal 

year 2013, pursuant to the current Section 1251 Plan, should be 

supported. 

The answer to the second question should be an easy ‘‘yes’’ because, as the witnesses know, in a letter to several Senators in December of last year—while working to secure a ratification of the 

New START Treaty—the President pledged to support the nuclear 

modernization program for as long as he is in office. 

I am, however, pleased that the Department of Defense is working hard to assist in securing this funding. Of course, a lot of this 

funding is the Department of Defense’s own money. As the ‘‘Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the 

Department of Energy Concerning Modernization of the U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure’’ makes clear, in May 2010, DOD committed to 

invest $5.7 billion of its own budgetary authority in NNSA’s modernization program, with an additional $2.6 billion promised since 

then. 

Now, these funds now must go to that purpose and not to other 

parochial purposes, like local water infrastructure projects, which 

we see as a threat to some of this continued funding. 

Now, this document, the ‘‘Memorandum of Agreement between 

the Department of Defense and Department of Energy Concerning 

Modernization of the U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure,’’ kind of a long 

title, is marked ‘‘For Official Use Only’’ and, therefore, I hesitate 

to put it as part of the unclassified record of this hearing. 

I am going to ask Dr. Miller and Mr. D’Agostino if your staff will 

work with our committee staff concerning what portion of this document is sensitive and what needs to be redacted so that we can 

put in an unclassified version as part of the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 93.] 

Mr. TURNER. Regarding the NPR Implementation Study, I am 

anxious to learn the process being followed for the study, and the 

policy considerations and force structure options that are under review. 

While I am aware that many previous administrations have put 

their imprint on these matters, I am not aware of any previous ad-
4 

ministration that has stated the answer to its review before conducting or completing it. 

In this case, the predetermined answer appears to be that further reductions are being considered and may be made. Let’s look 

at the record of statements from administration officials about this 

study. 

From the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review: ‘‘The President has directed a review of potential future reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons below New START levels.’’ 

President Obama’s National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon, at 

the Carnegie Endowment in March of this year stated, ‘‘We’re making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions.’’ 

Gary Samore, the White House coordinator for Arms Control and 

WMD [weapons of mass destruction] Terrorism in an interview in 

May stated, ‘‘We’ll need to do a strategic review of what our first 

requirements are and then, based on that, the President will have 

options available for additional reductions . . . there may be parallel 

steps that both sides could take or even unilateral steps the U.S. 

could take.’’ 

Now, let me say again, his quote includes, ‘‘unilateral steps the 

U.S. could take.’’ Now, I am curious as to how this could square— 

a senior White House official—with that of Secretary Panetta, who 

said the following on the October 13th committee hearing—Secretary Panetta just said before us—‘‘With regards to reducing our 

nuclear arena, I think that is an area where I don’t think we ought 

to do that unilaterally—we ought to do that on the basis of negotiations with the Russians and others to make sure we are all walking 

the same path.’’ 

I agree with Secretary Panetta, partially because I have yet to 

see any dividend from the unilateral steps that we took in abandoning, via the NPR, the submarine-launched nuclear cruise missile capability or the multiple warhead ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] capability. 

And, of course, all of this is taking place when the ink on the 

New START Treaty is barely dry, and when data exchanges with 

the Russian Federation reveal that Russia has actually increased 

its deployed nuclear forces since the treaty entered into force. Increased. 

What’s more, the witness testimony before this subcommittee on 

October 14th from Dr. Mark Schneider, a member of the New 

START Treaty negotiation team, and Mr. Richard Fisher, respectively, made clear that ‘‘Russia is modernizing every leg of its nuclear triad with new, more advanced systems’’ and ‘‘China is steadily increasing the numbers and capabilities of the ballistic missiles 

it deploys’’ and is ‘‘actively working to develop a submarine-based 

nuclear deterrent force, something it has never had.’’ Yet, the administration reviews are all being done to support further U.S. reductions. This is concerning. 

Lastly, there is the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review that is being discussed with our allies in Europe. Recently, as 

the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I was able to discuss this issue with our allies at the meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly in Bucharest. 
5 

It was clear that many of our allies were deeply concerned with 

the direction that this review may take. For example, some NATO 

members have suggested that geographical relocation would be a 

serious step that the Russians could take to address the thousands 

of tactical nuclear weapons they have deployed on our allies’ borders. 

Of course, mere relocation of Russian nuclear weapons to some 

point farther east is not a serious step, and is certainly no reduction in their disproportionately large stockpile of tactical nuclear 

weapons. 

That is why the Defense and Security Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly adopted, unanimously, my proposal to make 

clear that the geographic relocation will not be considered a reduction in Russian arms. I note that even the Russian delegation did 

not object to the designation that geographical relocation does not 

constitute a reduction in Russian arms. 

I look forward to learning more about the DDPR from our witnesses, and finally, I am most concerned that the administration 

may be seeking to amend the NATO-Russia Council Charter to create guarantees regarding missile defense. That has no support here 

and it should be a non-starter. 

This is a very important hearing, and I want to reiterate my 

thanks to each of our witnesses for appearing. I will now turn to 

the ranking member of the subcommittee, Ms. Sanchez, for her 

opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to you for 

my voice. I am a little under the weather today. I would like to join 

Chairman Turner in welcoming Dr. Miller, General Kehler, Under 

Secretary Tauscher, and Administrator D’Agostino for being before 

us once again. I look forward to hearing about the opportunities 

and the progress in moving beyond a Cold War arsenal. 

I would like to know, hopefully, through this hearing what our 

requirements are and how we will implement the policies and vision outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, including how we can 

maintain a strong and reliable deterrent at lower levels, and what 

kind of arsenal we need to address current and foreseeable threats 

and, of course, how do we do that in a fiscally responsible manner? 

And at the end of my comments, I will make a comment about 

the controversial NDAA provisions contained in that bill. But first, 

I am pleased that the President is leading the much-needed efforts 

to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons in this post-war 

era because, of course, we need to move beyond policies and force 

structure derived from Cold War-era requirements and shift to deterrents that protect us today. 

Looking in particular at the threats that are out there—and 

there are many—President Obama noted in his Palm Sunday 

speech in Prague in 2009 that ‘‘The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War.’’ Even 
6 

with the considerable reductions of the past decades, it is still important to remember that the United States and Russia still maintain thousands of nuclear weapons. 

Over 95 percent of the nuclear weapons available are in those 

two countries’ hands. And so there is a lot of progress that can be 

made in bringing down those levels and ensuring and checking and 

working with each other to ensure that it is a safer world. 

In 2009, the National Defense Authorization Act-mandated independent Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 

States—it was led by Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger—concluded 

that ‘‘This is a moment of opportunity to revise and renew the U.S. 

nuclear strategy, but also a moment of urgency.’’ I think we all 

agree and we have talked off to the side, many of us, including the 

chairman. There is a lot of movement going on right now in these 

times, and it is a time of opportunity. 

The two Secretaries noted that ‘‘the nuclear deterrent of the 

United States need not play anything like the central role that it 

did for decades in U.S. military policy and national security strategy. But it remains crucial for some important problems.’’ 

And in their 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed, ‘‘A World Free of 

Nuclear Weapons,’’ Secretaries Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, 

William Perry and Senator Sam Nunn recommended ‘‘a series of 

agreed and urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world 

free of the nuclear threat.’’ 

And among those have included, ‘‘Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to . . . reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon,’’ and ‘‘Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all 

states that possess them,’’ and ‘‘Eliminating short-range nuclear 

weapons designed to be forward-deployed,’’ and ‘‘Initiating a bipartisan process . . . to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test 

Ban Treaty.’’ 

We must also take a hard look at what we need to meet our national and our allies’ deterrence requirements in light of the current and new threats out there. And we also have the responsibility 

to bear in mind the ramifications of the current economic crisis, 

and we must carefully consider what is urgent, what can be delayed, and what is no longer necessary. 

Given what the requirements are, we must find ways to make 

smarter investments, and nuclear weapons activities and operations are no exception—are no exception. We are going through 

that right now with the ‘‘super committee’’ and we have to also 

take a look at this arena. These are important oversight decisions 

and, quite honestly, pretty awesome responsibilities for all of us up 

here and there to take a look at. 

So I look forward to discussing what the requirements are for our 

nuclear deterrent, including: how do we size our nuclear arsenal to 

best reflect and address the current threats? What further nuclear 

weapons reductions may be needed as a tool to strengthen U.S. and 

international security and stability? Do we need, and can we afford, 

to sustain the triad for the next 70 years; what are the decision 

points; and what considerations impact that decision now? And 

what are the risks and the costs of retaining forward-based nuclear 

weapons in Europe merely as a political symbol if they are no 
7 

longer a unifying element of NATO and a useful military asset? 

And are there other ways to maintain a strong nuclear NATO alliance? 

Third, our committee has had an engaging and serious debate on 

the nuclear policy provisions proposed by the chairman and my Republican colleagues during markup of the House-passed NDAA. 

There was significant disagreement on these, and for the need 

for legislative action. There are issues that we have to revise, revisit, address with the Senate as we finalize our bill, and I remain 

concerned about several of these provisions, including their impact 

on national security and, quite frankly, whether they are even constitutional. 

So, public debate on these issues is important. I look forward to 

advancing that debate today, and again, I thank all four of you for 

being before our committee. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield 

back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I will now turn to our witnesses. Before 

they begin, of course, I would like, if you would, to summarize your 

testimony in the 5-minute period so we can get to the issue of questions from Members. 

But also, reminding you of my opening statement, we would appreciate if you, in your comments, might incorporate whether you 

would recommend that, in this upcoming continuing resolution, 

that NNSA Weapons Activities receive full funding and receive, as 

you know, an anomaly, and also if you believe that the President 

should, in 2013, continue his commitment of full funding for modernization. 

Dr. Miller. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. MILLER. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am very pleased to join STRATCOM [United States 

Strategic Command] Commander Bob Kehler, Under Secretary 

Ellen Tauscher, and Administrator D’Agostino. 

The subcommittee asked us to address the ongoing administration review of U.S. nuclear planning guidance and several additional issues. I would like to summarize key points from my written statement and ask that the full statement be entered into 

record. First, I am going to start with some numbers for context. 

The U.S. nuclear arsenal today consists of about 5,000 warheads. 

In addition, we have several thousand warheads awaiting dismantlement. Unclassified estimates suggest that Russia has 4,000 

to 6,500 total nuclear warheads, of which 2,000 to 4,000 are tactical 

nuclear warheads. 

China is increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal, but is estimated to have only a few hundred nuclear weapons. North Korea 

has tested a plutonium-based weapon design and appears to be trying to develop a highly enriched uranium design and Iran con-
8 

tinues to defy the will of the international community and pursue 

its nuclear ambitions. 

It is in this context that President Obama directed a follow-on 

analysis to implement the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR. 

That work, as the chairman and ranking member noted, is now 

under way and we are focused on achieving the five objectives described in the Nuclear Posture Review. 

First, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; second, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy; 

third, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; fourth, strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and fifth, and critically, sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. We expect this 

analysis to be completed before the end of the calendar year. 

This NPR Implementation Study will be followed by new Presidential guidance, and then in succession, the Secretary of Defense 

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will then issue more detailed 

planning guidance to the military, and then STRATCOM will revise its military plans. 

When complete, our analysis of deterrence requirements will also 

help inform future arms control proposals, as the Under Secretary 

will discuss in more detail, and I might note, as the military did 

and the Department of Defense did as part of the Nuclear Posture 

Review to inform New START treaty negotiations. 

As the chairman noted, in parallel to this administration work, 

NATO is undertaking a Deterrence and Defense Posture Review to 

determine the appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile 

defense forces that NATO will need to deter and defend against 

threats to the alliance. 

Work is ongoing. We expect it to be complete before spring 2012, 

prior to the NATO summit in Chicago. And it is proceeding in accordance with the principles that have been central to NATO’s nuclear posture for decades, including retaining an appropriate mix of 

conventional and nuclear capabilities, sharing the risks and burdens of nuclear deterrence, and encouraging Russia to better secure 

and reduce its arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons. 

The United States is fully engaged in this effort, and I want to 

reiterate that any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture would only 

be undertaken as part of a decision by the alliance. A critical issue 

that we face is ensuring funding for the nuclear enterprise. When 

he took office, President Obama made reversing the declining budgets for the nuclear complex a top priority. And the administration’s 

Section 1251 Report, in fact, includes a plan for over $125 billion 

in spending on strategic delivery systems, and about $88 billion for 

stockpile and infrastructure costs over a 10-year period. 

And I would like to thank this subcommittee for supporting the 

administration’s budget request for fiscal year 2012. Cuts to NNSA 

funding in the House and Senate appropriations bills are a big concern. The President has asked for the resources that we need even 

in a tough fiscal environment. Now we need Congress’ help. We 

look forward to working with this committee and other Members 

to that end. 

I also want to touch very briefly on a number of provisions of 

concern in the current version of the NDAA, the Defense Author-
9 

ization Act, as passed by the House, H.R. 1540. And I would be 

pleased to discuss them further after this statement. H.R. 1540 

would dictate the pace of reductions under New START in a way 

that would bar DOD and DOE [Department of Energy] from following the most cost-effective means to implement reductions. 

It could preclude DOD from being logistically able to meet New 

START Treaty timelines for reductions. It would divert resources 

from stockpile sustainment in ways that tax the very programs 

that we all want to support, and it would encroach on the authorities to set nuclear employment policy that have been exercised by 

every President in the nuclear age. 

In conclusion, sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent will be the 

work of many administrations and many Congresses, and we believe strongly that it will require sustained bipartisan support. And 

even as we face sustained downward pressure on DOD and DOE 

budgets, we believe we need to sustain a strong bipartisan consensus to address these nuclear issues as apolitical national security priorities. 

As our work on the NPR Implementation Study continues, we 

welcome vigorous and important debate on these matters of national importance, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

today and look forward to follow-on conversations, including in a 

classified environment, and look forward to working with the committee on these issues. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, 

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General KEHLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sanchez, members of the subcommittee. I really appreciate you inviting me to share my views on strategic nuclear deterrence issues, 

including the implementation of the Nuclear Posture Review, New 

START, and nuclear deterrent force requirements. I, too, appreciate the opportunity to join with my colleagues here today as well, 

and would ask that my full statement be accepted into the record 

as well. 

Like Dr. Miller, I think it is useful to place my remarks in the 

context of the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which placed the 

prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the top of the 

U.S. policy agenda, and described how the United States will reduce the role and the numbers of nuclear weapons. At the same 

time, the NPR recognized as long as nuclear weapons exist, the 

United States must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 

arsenal to maintain strategic stability with other nuclear powers, 

deter potential adversaries, and reassure our allies and partners of 

our security commitments to them. 

The United States Strategic Command is assigned several important roles in executing the Nation’s nuclear strategy, as it was described in the NPR. First, we are responsible for synchronizing 

planning for DOD combating weapons of mass destruction efforts, 
10 

in coordination with the other combatant commands, the services, 

and appropriate U.S. Government agencies. 

Second, our men and women operate the Nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent forces 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, as directed 

by the President. And third, we are responsible with providing the 

President with credible response options to deter attack and to 

achieve national security objectives should deterrence fail. 

We do so mindful that deterrence is no longer a one-size-fits-all 

proposition, that the Nation’s deterrence approaches must be tailored to today’s global environment, and that the Nation’s deterrence toolkit includes capabilities beyond nuclear weapons. In 

short, these demands drive our strategy and, in turn, our nuclear 

requirements and employment planning. 

As directed in the Nuclear Posture Review, we are now working 

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the 

services to inform the review of the nuclear weapons employment 

guidance that STRATCOM receives from the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

STRATCOM plays a significant role in analyzing how the deployment planning guidance drives nuclear force requirements and 

force structures, and we are playing such a role in the strategic requirements study. We are supporting the study by providing military advice regarding potential changes in employment guidance 

consistent with the NPR, and we are providing analysis and advice 

on the force structuring and the force posture required to meet our 

strategic needs. 

As you know, STRATCOM played a similar role providing analysis and advice to the team that developed the U.S. New START 

negotiating position. We have a little more than 6 years to comply 

with treaty limits, so we are also working closely with OSD [Office 

of the Secretary of Defense], the Joint Staff and the services to determine how to implement the treaty provisions safely, securely, 

and efficiently, what resources are required, if any, to implement 

the eventual force structure decisions, and how best to phase and 

synchronize the implementation strategy. 

The NPR validated the continuing need for the triad, and the 

1251 Report outlined the necessary sustainment and modernization 

plans, including requirements and timelines. These plans are essential to maintaining long-term confidence in our nuclear deterrent capabilities. Unfortunately, the nuclear enterprise simultaneously faces significant recapitalization challenges and extraordinary fiscal pressures. 

But in my view as the combatant commander responsible for the 

nuclear deterrent force, for our Nation’s security, we must invest 

in these forces and the highly specialized enterprise that supports 

them. This includes completing our nuclear weapon life extensions, 

sustaining and beginning the phased modernization of our delivery 

platforms, conducting scientific surveillance of the stockpile, eliminating unneeded weapons, and positioning for further reductions 

that may be directed. 

Mr. Chairman, STRATCOM is moving forward to implement the 

New START and NPR effectively, while maintaining our focus on 

ensuring a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent force today 

and for the long term. 
11 

Thank you again for this opportunity, and thanks to you and the 

committee for your interest and support. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in the 

Appendix on page 70.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Under Secretary Tauscher. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Chairman Turner and Ranking Member 

Sanchez, members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for 

this opportunity to testify on the future direction of U.S. nuclear 

weapons policy and posture. 

I am really happy to appear before your subcommittee, which 

provided me the honor of working side by side with many of you 

over seven terms in the House. I am equally proud to be sitting 

next to my esteemed interagency colleagues and testifying on the 

Obama administration’s nuclear policies. 

I will focus my initial marks on two areas where State is playing 

a major role. The ongoing Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, 

or DDPR, in NATO, and the preparations, process, and expectations for future arms control efforts with Russia and other countries. As outlined 2 years ago by President Obama in Prague, the 

administration is committed to continuing a step-by-step process to 

increase U.S. security by reducing nuclear weapons worldwide. 

That effort includes the pursuit of a future agreement with Russia 

for reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons: strategic, nonstrategic, deployed, and non-deployed. 

President Obama is committed to seeking to initiate negotiations 

to address the disparity between the non-strategic nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the United States, and to secure and reduce 

non-strategic nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner. The key 

principles that Secretary Clinton outlined at the 2010 NATO Foreign Ministerial meeting in Tallinn will guide our approach. 

We aim to show strong Allied support for the President’s Prague 

vision and underscore our common view, as the Alliance agreed at 

the November 2010 Lisbon summit, that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. 

At Lisbon, the Alliance reaffirmed that the strategic nuclear 

forces of NATO’s nuclear armed member states are the ‘‘supreme 

guarantee of the security of the Allies’’ and agreed that NATO 

should maintain the broadest possible level of burden-sharing on 

nuclear matters. 

NATO allies further agreed to seek to create the conditions for 

future nuclear reductions, and noted that the Alliance should seek 

Russia’s agreement to increase the transparency of its nuclear 

weapons in Europe and to relocate those weapons away from the 

territories of NATO members. We are committed to consulting 

closely with allies and making decisions by consensus on NATO’s 

nuclear deterrent. 

The DDPR is examining NATO’s overall posture in deterring and 

defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance. The review is to identify the appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, 
12 

and missile defense capabilities that NATO needs to respond effectively to 21st century security challenges. The review also aims to 

strengthen deterrence as part of our commitment to Allied security. 

The goal is to complete the review for the May 2012 NATO summit 

that President Obama will host in Chicago. 

The DDPR also provides us an important opportunity to consult 

with allies about nuclear deterrence in future Russian nuclear 

talks. Those consultations will inform our consideration in the next 

steps with Russia on nuclear reductions. As a next step in our bilateral dialogue with Russia, we seek to conduct a broad policy discussion on the various considerations that affect strategic stability. 

We also hope to deepen this engagement to discuss key concepts 

in terminology which will become relevant as we prepare to discuss 

future reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, 

including both deployed and non-deployed weapons. We also would 

like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with Russia. We 

are thinking through how such transparency measures might be 

implemented, and have consulted with our allies through the 

DDPR. 

I am happy to report that implementation on the New START 

Treaty is proceeding smoothly since its entry into force on February 5th. The New START Treaty places equal arms limits on 

both sides, limits that are significantly lower than the levels provided for in the earlier START treaty and the Moscow Treaty. 

The New START Treaty provides us confidence that, as Russia 

modernizes its strategic forces, Russian force levels will not exceed 

the treaty limits 7 years after entering into force and continuing 

for the remainder of the treaty’s duration. The New START Treaty 

contributes to our security not only through its limits, but also 

through its strong verification regime. 

The treaty provides us greater certainty about the composition of 

Russia’s forces. This verification regime provides information and 

access that we would otherwise lack. Without the New START 

Treaty, our inspectors would not be able to visit Russian strategic 

weapons bases. To date, we have conducted 13 onsite inspections 

inside Russia. New START’s verification regime enhances predictability and stability with the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, 

and reduces the risk of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and mistrust. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, I look forward to answering 

any of your questions and, once again, it is an honor and a privilege to be here. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Tauscher can be found in 

the Appendix on page 80.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. D’Agostino. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez 

and members of the subcommittee, it is a real honor to be here 

today and be able to talk to you about the work we are doing in 
13 

the National Nuclear Security Administration as well as with our 

interagency partners on taking care of this vital mission. 

I also want to thank the committee for your continued support 

of the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security 

Administration. We have more than 35,000 men and women across 

our enterprise working to keep the country safe, protect our allies, 

and enhance global security. Your leadership and support have 

made their jobs easier. 

The President has made strengthening the nuclear security and 

the nonproliferation regime one of his top priorities. Over the last 

few years, we have worked tirelessly to establish a consensus on 

U.S. nuclear policy. The commitment of the White House has reinvigorated my entire organization. Furthermore, President Obama’s 

commitment to reverse a decline in investment that took place before he entered office is essential for accomplishing our nuclear security work. 

This commitment was reflected in the President’s 2012 budget 

request for the NNSA and, in fact, it was also reflected in his 2011 

budget request. This request reflects an integrated 10-year plan 

and identifies the funding necessary to ensure the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile, modernizing infrastructure we need to execute our mission, and revitalize the science, 

technology, and the engineering base that supports the full range 

of our nuclear security activities. 

Investment in these capabilities over the next decade is essential, 

and—I cannot over emphasize this point—it will require sustained, 

multi-year support from future administrations and Congress. 

The stability we have gained from the NPR and New START has 

allowed us to plan and use our resources much more effectively. We 

have a comprehensive Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

Plan that is updated annually and provides a long out-year review 

on the stockpile as well as the science, infrastructure, and human 

capital necessary to execute the nuclear modernization work and 

perform the full range of nuclear security work. 

I would like to express my concern, however, that this sense of 

stability could be eroded given the uncertainties stemming from 

the reductions Congress is contemplating in the fiscal year 2012 

budget process. These uncertainties directly impact our workforce, 

our ability to efficiently plan and execute our programs and, ultimately, the ability to be successful. 

In order to plan and execute an integrated, complicated program 

efficiently, we have developed and received support for the 10-year 

plan outlined in the 1251 Report. However, this consensus for nuclear modernization is facing great uncertainty in the face of today’s fiscal challenges and limitations imposed by Congress in the 

Budget Control Act. 

This consensus is also under attack by some who are spreading 

incorrect cost estimates. By using numbers at potentially three or 

four times higher than what it would actually cost to modernize 

and maintain our stockpile, the approach appears to use our current fiscal environment to potentially tear up the path that the 

President and Congress have laid out for us. 

The 1251 Report makes clear that the total for the Department 

of Defense and NNSA will cost approximately $200 billion over the 
14 

next 10 years, not the $600-plus billion or so that some are claiming. 

It is critical to accept the linkage between modernizing our current stockpile in order to achieve the policy objective of decreasing 

the number of weapons we have in our stockpile, while still ensuring that the deterrent is safe, secure, and effective. 

As you know, the United States will continue to have nuclear 

weapons for the foreseeable future, and many of our projects are 

vital to national security. The longer these projects are delayed, the 

more expensive they become. Projects like the Uranium Processing 

Facility and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Replacement Facility 

will allow us to replace aging Cold War infrastructure. 

And at the other end of the life cycle of these materials, the 

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility represents a critical nonproliferation effort that will result in the elimination of enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. It is the only permanent plutonium disposition method agreed to by the United 

States and Russia, and has been supported by every President and 

Congress since the idea was introduced. 

Our Stockpile Stewardship Program, which allows us to assess 

and certify the stockpile without returning to underground testing, 

has grown increasingly important. Our world-class scientific capabilities, for example in modeling and simulation, continue to be developed to realize the Stockpile Stewardship Program today. And 

today we actually have a greater understanding of how a nuclear 

weapon behaves than we did during the days of testing. 

Investing in a modern 21st century enterprise is not just about 

the stockpile. As the President said in Prague in April of 2009, the 

threat of a terrorist acquiring and using a nuclear weapon is the 

most immediate and extreme threat we face. 

The investments we make today help support the full range of 

our nuclear security mission, which includes countering nuclear 

terrorism. 

As part of our nonproliferation work, we are working to support 

the International Atomic Energy Agency and assisting many member states around the world to implement their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. 

In our strategic arms control verification work, we are leveraging 

the expertise of our physicists, our engineers, and our scientists to 

advance radiation protection technology and equipment, and we are 

leading the international effort to implement more stringent standards for the physical protection of nuclear material around the 

world. 

Our engineers are also working to complete the design work on 

the nuclear reactor plant for the Ohio-class replacement submarine. This effort is a continuation of the longstanding unique 

role the NNSA serves in partnership with the United States Navy. 

I would like to take a moment, a brief moment, to answer your 

question about the anomaly, Mr. Chairman. The anomalies depend 

of course if they are—we anticipate a continuing resolution coming, 

we know the day is approaching us, 18 November. But the decision 

of whether to pursue an anomaly involves a couple of factors. One 

is the length of the anomaly. At this point right now, we don’t 

know if there will be an anomaly, first of all, and if there is a con-
15 

tinuing resolution, how long it will be. A short-term continuing resolution coupled with the second factor, which is, what kind of resources do we currently have available to continue our programs 

without impact to the overall direction that we have—those two 

factors are key elements in deciding whether the administration 

pursues an anomaly. We are working very closely with the White 

House on this question and as we get closer to the date, we will 

be in a position to make a recommendation on this particular point. 

It really depends on those two particular factors of which right 

now, I don’t have all the data, particularly on the first one, the 

length of the continuing resolution. 

That concludes my statement, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. D’Agostino can be found in the 

Appendix on page 84.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I just, to follow on your comment on the 

anomaly. I certainly understand your answer and it certainly is a 

very practical and reasonable statement of, basically, if you need 

the money you would ask for it, and if you have other reasons, 

other ways to—you have the money or it is not needed in the short 

term, that you might not ask. 

But I would like you to consider, and all of our witnesses to consider, the message that it sends. Because at the same time the 

House is looking at cutting, if the anomaly is not requested, it 

looks as if it is not necessary for the House to fund, and so that 

might be your third environmental context that you might want to 

put in, as far as your request for anomaly, because it doesn’t look 

like the administration is doing an ‘‘I want it’’ in one hand, and a 

wink in the other, by not asking for the anomaly. So if you would 

take that into consideration, and all of you, as you look to recommendations of the anomaly, I would appreciate that. 

Because we have so many Members in attendance we want to 

make certain that we have an ability for people to ask questions. 

I am going to ask three questions for my start, two of which, the 

first two, are relatively easy because they are commercials. I am 

going to give an opportunity for each of you to give a commercial 

for us. 

Mr. D’Agostino, you begin, actually, in your statement, addressing what my first concern is of the first of those two where I am 

asking for a commercial. And that is, the issue of the statements 

that have been circulating that the U.S. is going to spend over $700 

billion of nuclear weapons and related programs over the next 10 

years. Mr. Markey circulated a letter signed by 62 Members that 

said that. It was followed on by The New York Times in an editorial that said the number is $600 billion over the next 10 years. 

You, in your statement before us just now, said it is slightly over $200 billion that is going to be spent. So I would like each of you 

to respond to that, the issue of the actual cost. 

The second part of that is, is the reason why that that is coming 

about is because we are under these budgetary pressures? I think 

that this false assumption that with budgetary pressures that if 

there are reductions, there is this great savings that is going to 

occur. And I try to tell people that, you know for example, if this 

room was a nuclear storage facility and you had a nuclear weapon 

in it, and you only had 1, versus if you had 20, you are not going 
16 

to have less people outside the door. And, similarly, I know, Mr. 

D’Agostino, you tell us about the room down the hall where we 

have scientists charged with knowledge with respect to nuclear 

weapons, and knowledge is not something that has a reduced demand based upon the numbers of weapons that we have deployed. 

So my first question is, would you all speak—and Under Secretary Tauscher, you are welcome to chime in on this one also if 

you would like, but it is not directed at you—to the issue of that 

we are not spending $700 or $600 billion, that it is slightly over 

$200 billion over the next 10 years. And the second aspect is that 

policy, not budgetary pressures, should be the focus of reductions, 

and that the savings are somewhat elusive, they are not as they 

are being expressed in these calls for reductions. If you might give 

us some of your wisdom on that, I would appreciate it. 

We will start with Dr. Miller. 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Section 1251 Report that was submitted by the administration included our best 

estimate of the total costs of sustaining and modernizing the nuclear enterprise and the delivery systems from fiscal year 2012 

through fiscal year 2021. That estimate was $125.8 billion for the 

delivery systems and about $88 billion for the NNSA-related costs. 

And my math suggests that that is, as the administrator said, a 

little over $200 billion over that period—close to $214 billion. 

I have had an opportunity to look at some of the materials that 

were referenced in the cost estimates just before coming over here 

and I, without giving this more time than it deserves, suffice it to 

say there was double counting and some rather curious arithmetic 

involved. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you wish to comment with respect to the issue 

of savings? Because I think that people really do look at this as a 

‘‘take a number and divide by how ever many you reduce them, 

and you have those savings,’’ and that is not exactly the case. 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, I would like to comment, thank you. 

A strategic approach to the budget overall does not involve taking an equal percentage from every element of the budget, and the 

Department of Defense certainly is committed to taking a strategic—in a different sense than strategic weapons, now, but a 

thoughtful approach, a strategy-driven approach to the reductions. 

We are looking to take north of $450 billion out of the defense program over the next decade and as a result of that, as Secretary 

Gates had said and Secretary Panetta has said since, essentially 

everything is on the table; that doesn’t mean everything should get 

the same treatment. 

We will look hard at our own spending within nuclear forces to 

ask where savings could be gained while still producing the same 

capabilities that we need, just as we are looking hard in other 

areas. And I know that we will owe another Section 1251 Report 

with the new budget. 

And the one constant I can promise in that is that we will continue to propose what we believe is necessary for sustaining a safe, 

secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, including the delivery systems and including the infrastructure, science, and technology and 

work on weapons that is required. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 
17 

General Kehler. 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, I would agree with both those comments. I, too, agree with the 1251 Report and the $200-plus billion that it documented for the need to both sustain and begin the 

modernization of the nuclear enterprise over the next 10 years. 

The second point—and I would agree here, totally, with Dr. Miller as well—given the magnitude of the first round of budget cuts 

that the Department is dealing with, and certainly that the combatant commanders have been asked to help the services deal with, 

we are looking for every possible place that we can find that we 

can be more efficient while we maintain our military capability. I 

would say that we have not been immune from that look, nor 

should we have been immune from that look. I think that Congressman Sanchez said this, though, in her opening remarks, that 

there are decision points that are along the way here that do give 

us some flexibility in terms of how we ultimately decide to modernize and how we can go forward. 

So I do think that, in addition to looking for every place we can 

save money, I also agree with you, in some places, this is not a onefor-one, ‘‘take something out and you automatically save some X 

amount of money.’’ It is a more complicated answer than that. But 

there are also some key decision points that are coming along, 

where I think that there is still some flexibility to do some shaping. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. D’Agostino, would you like to embellish your 

comment you made in your statement? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I would agree with Dr. Miller with respect to 

the math and the numbers that the administration put out in its 

1251 Report. Regarding your second question, I would like to add 

a little bit if I could. 

I think it is important to recognize that what we have is a capability-based enterprise. This is a nuclear security enterprise. It is 

not a nuclear weapons enterprise; it is a nuclear security enterprise. It is an enterprise that, of course, takes care of the deterrent—because the President said, as long as weapons exist, we are 

going to take care of them to make sure they are safe, secure, and 

effective. 

But it is an enterprise that does so much more. As an enterprise, 

it does nuclear nonproliferation work in over 100 countries around 

the world with the State Department. It is an enterprise that does 

nuclear counterterrorism work with our partners in the Intelligence Community and the Defense Department. 

It is an enterprise that does nuclear forensics work, as we work 

with our key allies to make sure that, if material is found, we are 

in a best position to be able to attribute where this material came 

from, and it is an enterprise that does nuclear emergency response. 

And nuclear emergency response is something that we actually 

used earlier this year in assisting our Japanese colleagues with the 

Fukushima event. Those assets, those key assets, came from the 

account that Congress authorized and appropriates. It is called the 

Weapons Activities Account. In reality, not all of that account, that 

Weapons Activities Account, is work exactly on the nuclear weapon. 

It provides that base capability to address all of these other things. 

One last point, and I will yield back. This enterprise, because it 

is a capability-based enterprise, it can work up and take care of a 
18 

stockpile size. I mean, it is fairly independent at low numbers. And 

this is where we are. 

Jim Miller talked about the number of warheads that we have 

and are active in the stockpile. It is able to take—that capability, 

whether you do one or whether you do more than one, you need 

the same amount of material. And that is the kind of enterprise we 

have. 

This is not a Cold War enterprise, where we can do thousands 

and thousands and thousands of warheads, as we did back in the 

1960s, where we had over 31,000 warheads. It is completely different. 

But I wanted to make—the shift we are making in the NNSA 

and in the administration is to shift the work from a nuclear weapons complex to a nuclear security enterprise, to bring in those other 

elements, because those are the elements that the President had 

laid out in the NPR, that we feel would be a key national security 

and global security challenge. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. And in the second aspect of the commercial, we are all in agreement that the nuclear modernization 

needs to go forward. I mean, this committee passed in its bill full 

funding, the administration asked for full funding. 

We are all facing now the bills that came out of the Senate and 

the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittees, and 

then that had reductions in funding for nuclear modernization. So 

a question, obviously, that people will have is, you know, what is 

the difference? Is there? What is the effect, if the cuts go into place, 

instead of what we all have agreed would be the appropriate level 

of funding? 

I will start with you, Dr. Miller. 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I will answer at a general level, and 

leave the technical details to Administrator D’Agostino. 

At a general level, the first order effects are going to be that the 

NNSA, with the overall level of funding, will be forced to make 

very difficult trades between investing in science and technology 

that is necessary to support the overall efforts that the administrator described, and the infrastructure that is required to implement those, and to do the life extension programs that the Department of Defense is focused on. As you look at the level of reductions that have been proposed by both the House and the Senate 

in the appropriations, some essential activities will not be undertaken. 

If you look within those reductions, at the specifics, we have particular concerns for the Department of Defense reductions in funding for the B61 Life Extension Program. 

That is a critical weapon system for both our bombers and for 

our dual-capable aircraft, and reductions also in the W78 Life Extension Program, where there are cascading effects, if one program 

is delayed, the next one is delayed. And again, Mr. D’Agostino can 

give greater details, but one of those effects is that, at the end of 

the day, the United States gets less product for more cost because 

these changes in programs are going to drive up costs overall. 

Mr. TURNER. General Kehler. 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that if we are 

referring specifically to the markups dealing with Department of 
19 

Energy and NNSA part of the budget, then I would just add that 

I am very concerned about the impact on life extension programs. 

I have a concern for the broader enterprise as well, as the administrator suggested, but we have got some near-term issues that will 

impact us in terms of life extension programs for aging weapons. 

In a broader context, though, I also have concerns as budget reductions are related, either to our efforts to sustain the existing 

force, or our efforts to modernize the existing force. And we find 

ourselves at a point in time where several modernization programs 

have begun. 

It is important for us to continue to sustain this safe, secure, and 

effective deterrent force as we transition this time period to future 

modernization. And, of course, I have concerns in both of those 

areas, in the macro sense, as we struggle with budget reductions. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. D’Agostino. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Obviously, we have two bills—one from the 

House, one from the Senate, in both subcommittees; the marks are 

different. The House is down, overall, for the NNSA by $1.16 billion. That is out of about the request of $11 billion or so. So it is 

a pretty sizable percentage-wise reduction. The Senate reduction is 

significantly less, $732 million as a result of that. 

Focus a little bit on the weapons account, I believe that may be 

where some of your questions come from, but I do want to mention 

nonproliferation, because that has an impact. The President has 

laid out a fairly clear message with respect to the desire to secure 

nuclear material around the world in 4 years, which, we believe, 

is absolutely critically important. 

Both bills are marked on the plutonium and uranium facilities, 

about $150 to $200 million. Those reductions are going to cause us 

to look very closely—if they, if we end up, in some way, in this region, are going to cause us to have to look very closely at both of 

those facilities. 

It doesn’t, because we obviously are authorized and appropriated 

on an annual basis, the 1251 Report makes very clear about outyear commitments and requirements to do this. 

It would be difficult to actually run—in fact, I would say close 

to impossible—to run a large construction project efficiently if 

every year we will anticipate having huge deltas between House 

and Senate and the administration requests, whether it is President Obama’s budget request or whatever happens out in the future. 

It is just a horribly inefficient way to deliver a construction 

project. And nobody, frankly, in their right mind would run a program this way. 

We will have to take a look at what makes sense, balancing what 

Congress will support in the out-years but, more importantly what 

the requirements are, because the requirements are the things that 

ultimately will take us in the direction that we believe the Nation 

needs to go into. And the President has been very clear about his 

requirements and he has done it with two budgets in a row. 

On the life extension area, both the Senate and the House took 

different approaches in the life extension area. Essentially, the 

House largely did not reduce the resources in the Directed Stock-
20 

pile Work account, which is actually the account that works on the 

stockpile itself directly. 

But the Senate took a bit of an aggressive approach. That is 

going to have to get worked out if there is a conference, if things 

don’t work out, we are going to wait and see how that one looks. 

But I am with General Kehler on this. 

We have very real needs with respect to the B61 warhead. We 

are looking at it from a strategy standpoint, on it being able to address the Nation’s needs out in the future. We don’t want to necessarily disarm by, you know, just attrition, because we can’t agree. 

We are seeking—we believe this is the right plan, and this is 

why we have it put forward. 

This group has spent a lot of time on Capitol Hill talking to 

folks, both Members and staff, and obviously we are going to continue to need to work with you and others to make sure that there 

is clear understanding about what the President has put forward 

in his plan and what the best way to move forward in that area. 

It is important also to say that reductions in what we call the 

campaigns—the science campaigns, the computing work—these 

types of reductions themselves, in one area it is cut by $140 million, in another area it is only cut by $60 million. But this is work 

that directly supports enabling technologies. 

This is the work to make sure these technologies are the ones 

that allow us to certify the stockpile on an annual basis without 

underground testing. Reductions in these areas have a direct impact on the President today in the ability to certify the stockpile 

without underground testing. We cannot overemphasize that particular point. 

I should probably just state one thing about nonproliferation, and 

then the naval reactors area before I stop. Unfortunately, I could 

probably talk for too long on this area. 

Nonproliferation work we have right now, we are deeply concerned about our ability to convert research reactors worldwide 

from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. And two, 

having the resources to buy the long-lead material, the casks and 

containers necessary to move highly enriched uranium and plutonium materials from around the world back to the United States 

or back to Russia where it is in a secure area. 

We are on the ragged edge, in my opinion, of dropping the—making it very difficult for us to meet the President’s vision here. And 

I don’t think that is good for anybody. 

The Naval Reactors Program itself, in both cases, has undergone 

either, depending on how you look at it, $60 million or $100 million 

reduction or so. Those reductions, in many cases, foreshadow decisions that the Defense Department has already made—decisions on 

the path forward on the need to replace the submarine. 

So, we are responding with a program. This is what this does. 

And what this does is put significant—makes it very difficult, in 

my opinion, to be able to honor those commitments that the Defense Department is asking us to do. 

I will stop there. I think I can go longer, but—— 

Mr. TURNER. I am going to hold the—you guys have given such 

great and excellent answers on those topics, which are very impor-
21 

tant. So, I am going to hold the rest of my questions until the second round. 

But before I turn it over to the ranking member, Dr. Miller, I 

have one real quick one for you. In the same vein that you were 

commenting, we all know that those cuts coming out of the Energy 

and Water Appropriations bills affect the fact that Secretary Gates 

transferred $8.3 billion in DOD top line budget authority at the 

NNSA over a 5-year period to help the modernization efforts. 

Did you know the Energy and Water Appropriations bills cut 

those modernization efforts while adding money to the President’s 

budget request for water projects? What is DOD’s view of that? 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, let me say on the record that DOD 

transferred those funds with the expectation and understanding 

that the resources would go to weapons-related activities. 

I think I do not want to get into the question of trying to track 

dollars and proposals as it goes from the administration over to the 

Hill. But clearly, as we look at the future of NNSA funding and we 

look at any possibility of DOD transferring additional resources, 

some of which of the amount you have noted have been withheld 

in DOD. We would want to have an understanding that the budget 

provided by Congress was going to be at a level that was, of course, 

both sufficient but also sustainable over time so they can get stability in the program. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The current Nuclear Force Modernization Plans call for the Navy to spend around $110 billion to build a new fleet of nuclear-armed 

submarines. And the Pentagon estimates that the total cost of 

building and operating the new submarine is going to be about 

$350 billion over its 50-year lifespan. And the Air Force also intends to spend about $55 billion on procurement of 100 new bombers and an unknown sum on new landbased intercontinental ballistic missiles. And additionally, the 

NNSA plans to spend $88 billion over the next decade to refurbish 

existing nuclear warheads and rebuild the factories that make key 

nuclear warhead parts. However, U.S. military leaders have stated 

that our nuclear weapons budget is not grounded in a coherent 

overall strategy. 

Former Vice Chair of the Joint Chief of Staff General Cartwright 

noted in July 2011, ‘‘We haven’t really exercised the mental gymnastics, the intellectual capital on that, what is required for nuclear deterrence, yet . . . I’m pleased that it’s starting, but I 

wouldn’t be in favor of building too much until we had that discussion.’’ Now, that was in July of 2011. 

Do you agree with General Cartwright that the U.S. shouldn’t 

make procurement commitments until we establish how many nuclear weapons we need for deterrence? Dr. Miller. 

Dr. MILLER. General Cartwright was involved in the, as we 

began planning for the study that we were talking about earlier. 

And so his comments about thinking hard about the requirements 

for deterrence in the future I think are well taken, and they are 

something that this administration is working hard on. We intend 

to have a conclusion by the end of the year. 
22 

At the same time, the requirement to reconsider what is needed 

for deterrence and how to best provide stability, what is the best 

approach for nonproliferation, is something that has got to be done 

on an ongoing basis. And, in fact, Congress should expect future 

administrations to conduct comprehensive Nuclear Posture Reviews 

that address those questions. 

And we can’t say that, because the world is going to change, 

therefore we are going to wait until the world stabilizes and stops 

changing in order to make the necessary investments in our nuclear weapons infrastructure and delivery systems. 

The figures that you cited for the future SSBN, the Ohio-class replacement, would be consistent—although they are very rough estimates at this point, would be consistent with something that—not 

10-year, not 20-year, not 30-year, but over even a longer period of 

time. And the fact is that the cost of these systems are significant. 

The requirement to provide effective deterrence and to have stability is critical to this country. And these investments, while we 

are looking at every possible means to save costs, these investments are essential enough that they deserve—in my view, they 

deserve to get serious consideration. And if we can have a stable 

approach with bipartisan political support over time for a level of 

investment, we would do the right thing by not just this administration, but by future administrations as well. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. General. 

General KEHLER. If I may add, I completely agree that our force 

structure and our force posture need to be strategy-based. And we 

would argue that every single time the question is asked. 

Here is what we know: what we know is that, at present, we are 

still looking to sustain our current triad of strategic forces. Even 

as we are looking at the appropriate mixture in there, both to, 

within the limits of the New START, to sustain our military effectiveness, but also to see if we can get some fiscal efficiency out of 

doing that. 

We know that the sustainment programs that are under way for 

those three legs will take those forces to a certain point in time. 

This gets back to your question about decision points. What we do 

know is that, as far as we can see into the future, the need for a 

sea-based leg and the attributes that it brings is going to remain. 

And so, the current Ohio submarine has a finite life. We don’t 

know exactly what year that is. The Navy probably can’t draw a 

specific bright line on the chart and say it is that year. But what 

we know is that risk will go up as life increases. And so there will 

have to be a replacement in place at some time, we think in the 

late 2020s or so. 

That brings it to today to begin research and development, given 

acquisition lead times. So, in my view, it is not premature to go forward with research and development for a replacement to the 

Ohio-class submarine, a part of our strategic deterrent that we believe is going to be with us for a very, very long time. 

That leads to the next one in serial order, which would be the 

bomber, the B–52s, of course, that have been around since the 

early 1960s. The Air Force intends to field a new long-range strike 

platform that will be dual-capable, both conventional- and nuclearcapable. 
23 

My view is we should leverage that. That is a wise leverage point 

for us. That decision point is here now and, again, research and development money is under way. 

That leaves the ICBM, and there is not a decision yet about how 

to go forward. Those analyses of alternatives are under way. 

And so I think there are a series of decision points here as we 

go forward. Some we have reached. Some have crossed the threshold, I think, of needing to have investment made starting today. 

And then there is the part about the warheads that we have 

been discussing here, as well as some of the other pieces that go 

with this; command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, other things that make this a credible deterrent. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. General, my reason for asking the question was 

just to put on the record that, in fact, it is fluid and we continue 

to reassess, and that there are key milestones or break points 

where we have to make a decision. And that it is a long lead time 

to get some of this done. 

But it is a lot of money that we are talking about also. That is 

why we need to continually assess it. 

And it really leads—I don’t know if the other two had any comment on that. But it really leads to my next question about—not 

my next question, but one that I had in here. 

The whole issue of, if we can decide unilaterally that we can reduce the weapons and still be as strong as we need to be. Or if we 

reach a particular point in time in the near future where we can 

actually sit down with the Russians and decide to reduce even further, despite or according to or whatever the New START. Would 

that be a smart investment also to leave those decision points open 

also? 

Dr. MILLER. Ma’am. Let me answer first, and then I know that 

each of my colleagues is likely to want to add as well. 

The Nuclear Posture Review stated that although precise numerical equality or parity is not as important as it might have been 

during the Cold War, that it was still important to us that Russia 

join us as we work to further reductions. And indeed, as Under 

Secretary Tauscher has suggested, our approach is to work towards 

a proposal that would include strategic, non-strategic, deployed, 

and non-deployed. 

The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review is also seeking to 

have Russian involvement with respect to transparency, a movement of weapons and reductions as well. 

There is one point that is worth parsing on this, and that is, as 

we look at how to manage the stockpile to support those weapons 

that are deployed as part of our strategic deterrent, and that are 

forward-deployed and forward-deployable as well, we do need to 

take cost into consideration. We need to take reasonable planning 

for both what we call the technical hedge and the geopolitical 

hedge into account. 

The technical hedge is about being prepared to deal with any 

problem or technological issue that arises with a warhead or delivery system. And the geopolitical hedge being to be prepared for 

changes in the environment in the future. And we need to take 

those into account. 
24 

But then we need to, in my view, have a stockpile, a combined 

stockpile and infrastructure that is able to support those hedges at 

a reasonable cost. And just by way of example, President George 

W. Bush reduced the stockpile from 10,000 weapons to 5,000 during his time. It wasn’t a negotiated change; it was a very sensible 

change that allowed the different scaling for future size of the infrastructure and allowed NNSA to plan along the lines that they 

are now. 

So, those changes, with respect to the stockpile ought to be considered in a different light than the changes with respect to deployed strategic or with respect to our forward-deployed or forwarddeployable weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Dr. Miller. 

Anybody else want to chime in? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, I will very quickly add that, as Dr. 

Miller said, when the Nuclear Posture Review was completed, the 

President directed a review of the nuclear requirements in the 

post-START environment and objectives to consider for future reductions. And specifically, our goals with New START bilateral negotiations with Russia include reducing non-strategic tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear weapons as well as deployed strategic nuclear weapons on ICBMs, SLBMs [submarinelaunched ballistic missiles], and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. 

When the President wrote in February and certified to the Senate that we would initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation, we also said we would consult with our NATO allies. And that 

is part of the consultation that you know is going on now. 

And Secretary Clinton also made very clear last year that Allies 

agreed in the NATO new Strategic Concept, which is the previous 

detailed thought pattern, that any further steps on U.S. nuclear 

weapons in Europe must take into account the disparity between 

our stockpiles and the much larger Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons. 

So, we have unilateral steps that the previous administration 

took, bilateral steps that this administration took. We are talking 

about strategic, non-strategic, deployed, non-deployed. We are talking about consultations with our allies. So, as you can see, this as 

a very turbulent—not necessarily in a bad way—but lots of activities going on and lots of decision points coming forward based on 

a lot of consultation and a lot of results in the post-New START 

implementation phase. 

So, I think that this is a very energetic area. Obviously, it is important that we keep in mind the long-term goal of a world without 

nuclear weapons. But at the same time, what we are specifically 

talking about today is the investment strategy that gets us a safe 

and reliable and effective stockpile in the meantime. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back because I know there are a lot of people waiting. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for being here. I want to extend a special 

thanks to Under Secretary Tauscher for being here. I had the privilege of sitting with her on committees in the past. It is really nice 

to see you here. 
25 

So, Ms. Tauscher, in the short time I have, you know how these 

things are. I hope you will grant me diplomatic immunity here. But 

everything I say is in the greatest deference. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Not until I hear the question. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. All right. Well, here it goes. See, she has 

gone and done it now. 

Ma’am, in your the recent remarks at the Atlantic Council you 

said the following: ‘‘The Obama Administration’s approach provided 

more protection sooner against the existing threat, using proven 

systems, and at a lower cost than the previous proposal.’’ 

Now, I understood that the MDA [Missile Defense Agency] is developing a new interceptor, the SM–3 [Standard Missile-3] IIB for 

that process, which at this point hasn’t been developed yet, and a 

brand-new satellite system, the Precision Tracking Space System, 

about which this committee, of course, has already expressed some 

considerable concerns because of the unproven approach regarding 

technology. 

So, I guess my first diplomatic question is, can you explain the 

statement ‘‘using proven systems’’ in connection with the EPAA 

[European Phased Adaptive Approach]? Help me understand your 

understanding of these two European Phased Adaptive Approach 

components? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, the EPAA is a huge success, Congressman. It is not only on station and working, but it is using a 

proven system, as you remember from many years of committee 

testimony. 

The EPAA is based on the SM–3 interceptor, which is an over 

25-year-old Navy rocket that has been fully tested and tested with 

great success. It is both a land-based and a sea-based system, as 

you know—Aegis and Aegis Ashore—and the focus on the ‘‘now’’ 

distinguishes our approach from the previously proposed system, 

which focused on a longer-range missile threat that has been slower to develop and a system that is still under testing, which is the 

ground-based interceptor. 

We already have the monitoring on station. So, the EPAA is now 

actually working. It is now protecting not only our NATO allies, 

populations, and territories against a proven short-, medium-, and 

intermediate-range threat, but it also protects American forwarddeployed troops. 

We also have finished all three negotiations with Poland, Turkey, 

and Romania. Actually, the Poland and Turkey agreements are in 

force, and the Romanian agreement is just about to be ratified by 

their parliament. 

So, we have the entire system; it is proposed, it is agreed to by 

our NATO allies. It is the United States contribution as a national 

asset to the NATO system. And we are working to NATO-ize the 

planning and the command and control of that system. So, that is 

pretty much the difference between what was proposed and what 

is now actually on station and protecting our NATO allies and forward-based American troops. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me shift gears a little bit. Your legislative affairs staff was asked to provide the committee the basis for the 

statement ‘‘at a lower cost than the previous proposal.’’ When could 

this committee receive that information? 
26 

Secretary TAUSCHER. I didn’t understand that you hadn’t received it, but I think that we certainly will endeavor to get it to 

you very quickly. The proposal for the EPAA is one that you have 

not only passed through this committee, but you have also voted 

on. So, I am assuming it is something that meets with your approval. 

But it is at lower cost than the previous system, not only because 

the previous system was out into the future, but because we use 

systems, including Aegis system, that is a multipurpose system. So, 

it has cost-benefits as opposed to systems that just rely on groundbased interceptors. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Dr. Miller, I am going to try to get through this one here quickly, 

I am about running out of time here. Regarding the EPAA, the 

committee’s majority has stated its concerns that, with the current 

budget environment, it may not be possible to provide to Europe’s 

missile defense through the EPAA and homeland defense in the 

United States. 

Part of this is, of course, understanding the actual cost of the 

EPAA, which the administration, it appears, has generously offered 

to Europe free of charge, essentially to be a U.S. contribution to the 

defense of Europe. At the same time, the administration, the previous majority in the House, and the Senate majority cut funding 

significantly for the GMD [ground-based midcourse defense] system 

by $1.6 billion in President Obama’s 3 years in office. 

When Chairman Langevin and Representative Turner wrote to 

GAO [Government Accountability Office] and asked for a comprehensive review of the EPAA, the GAO responded, ‘‘We found 

that the DOD has not fully implemented a management process 

that synchronized EPAA acquisition activities and ensured transparency and accountability. The limited visibility into cost and 

schedule for the EPAA reflect the oversight challenges with the acquisition of missile defense capabilities that we have previously reported.’’ 

Since then, the committee has told us that the EPAA approach 

and content has matured significantly since this document was developed. So, we have already talked about PTSS [Precision Tracking Space System]. We already talked about the SM–3 IIB missile 

which, it appears, the 2009 assumptions have been essentially 

changed dramatically. 

So, I guess my question to you, I will throw it out here quickly. 

Dr. Miller, and to you, Ms. Tauscher, can you provide to this committee by, say, the end of the month, a comprehensive, soup to 

nuts, whole of Federal Government cost for each phase of the 

EPAA? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, we have included in the Missile Defense Agency’s budget submission the key elements of EPAA in terms of our 

best estimate over this coming year and over the Future Year Defense Program. One of the issues I think may have possibly confused the GAO is that the EPAA, the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach, while it includes two fixed sites, the Aegis Ashore sites 

in Poland and Romania, and includes the fixed radar in Turkey 

which, as Under Secretary Tauscher noted, are all agreed, relies 

very heavily on mobile systems. 
27 

And these mobile systems will be available globally and on Aegis 

ships. The SM–3 IA missile that we have in the force today is a 

proven technology with a very strong record of testing. The TPY– 

2 [Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance] radar is a proven 

technology with a very strong record. 

The phases of the system were defined by the steps that we intended to take to bring additional capability to bear and, predominantly, defined by the next types of missiles from IA to IB, to IIA 

to IIB. And so we knew that there was going to be technological 

growth in the system that would improve those capabilities. 

It is also important to understand that the costs of the system 

are shared. For NATO there is the ALTBMD [Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense] system for command and control, 

that is NATO shared costs. For the SM–3 IIA missile, we are codeveloping it with Japan. And so it is true that we are devoting 

significant resources to Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe. It is 

also true that the investment in the systems that will help on 

EPAA will also be valuable for a scenario in Northeast Asia or for 

a scenario in the Middle East or Southwest Asia. 

Finally, very briefly, with respect to your question of the national 

missile defense, the administration remains fully committed to defending the Nation against limited missile attacks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. There we go. Thank you. Again, it is a pleasure 

to have the panel before us, and especially I want to welcome back 

Secretary Tauscher. 

It is wonderful to see you back here with us as always, and we 

miss you in the House, of course. But we are certainly glad to have 

your leadership at State and your guidance, first from this subcommittee, and now in the administration, have been valuable to 

our Nation. And I just want to thank you for all your work. 

And if I could, Madam Secretary, I will start with you. Could you 

please comment on the status of the implementation of the New 

START Treaty to date? Can you tell us how much data the two 

sides have exchanged about each other’s nuclear forces? How many 

on-site inspections has the U.S. performed in Russia? 

Can you share any information on what we have learned about 

Russia’s nuclear arsenal as a result of the treaty that we did not 

know if the treaty were not in force? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. And it is always my pleasure to be back here. 

As you know, we have implemented the treaty and the treaty is, 

you know, we are doing our exchanges and our inspections. We 

have had a number of them in a very short term. We have a question right now of, me finding the page that tells me all the numbers, which is right here someplace. But we have a significant 

record right now in the New START Treaty. 

Right now we have, as you know, the New START limit of 700 

deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear-capable bombers will allow 

the United States to retain their current 14 SSBNs. And we have 

56 SLBM launchers. Not deploying SLBMs, but an additional 40 

launchers. 
28 

So, we have, I think in the last number of months we have had 

seven or eight exchanges that have brought to us a significant 

amount of information. As we said repeatedly during the ratification process of START, this is not only about bringing us down to 

lower levels, but it is also about the fact of access. 

If we didn’t have the New START Treaty, it was likely that both 

countries would have reduced weapons, but very unlikely that we 

would have been able to verify it. So the verification regime that 

is part of New START and the compliance regime that is part of 

New START, much of it that is adding technology and new ways 

for us to improve the accounting rules so that we have much greater assurance that this weapon that we see this time is the weapon 

that we see the next time. 

All of that information is vitally important to the kind of assurance that we get here in the United States about what the Russians are doing, what they get when they come to see us. But I 

think what is most important, too, is that it is important for the 

two great nuclear powers to be able to do this so that the world 

sees what we are doing. So we are able to also reassure everyone 

else that we have these inspections. 

As I said, we have had eight or nine inspections, but back and 

forth. And I think that we are expecting new inspections. 

Do you know what the next date is, by any chance? 

Dr. MILLER. I don’t have the next date, but I could suggest that 

we provide the data for the record. 

My recollection is that we have conducted 13 and the Russians 

have conducted 12 inspections. We have done two data exchanges 

and had two meetings at the Bilateral Consultative Commission. 

And that because these are occurring almost real time—— 

Secretary TAUSCHER. That is right. 

Dr. MILLER [continuing]. If we could provide something for the 

record I think it would be—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That would be helpful. Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And then let me now open the question up to the 

panel. The House version of the Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA includes 

a provision, Section 1055, that would delay force reduction under 

New START until the Secretaries of Defense and Energy certify 

that the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex and delivery systems is being carried out. 

The provision also limits reductions in the stockpile of U.S. warheads held in reserve until several conditions are met. In particular, two new facilities, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Replacement [CMRR] nuclear facility and the Uranium Processing 

Facility [UPF] must be operational, which will not be until at least 

2024. 

Finally, Section 1055 prevents any unilateral reductions below 

the limits contained in New START. A Statement of Administration Policy threatened to veto the final bill if it includes this provision. Could you elaborate on how these conditions could prevent 

the Pentagon from implementing New START? 
29 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to offer some examples. The requirement not to make any reductions until CMRR and 

UPF are in place, as you noted, would push the timeline for those 

reductions into the 2020s. The requirement under the New START 

Treaty is to make all reductions within a 7-year period after the 

entry into force of the treaty, so that that would become infeasible. 

If it is applied only to reductions in the stockpile, if the requirement for CMRR and UPF is interpreted to apply only to making 

reductions in the nuclear stockpile, what that would then mean is 

that the administration would be required to sustain a level of the 

stockpile through to the mid-2020s, irrespective of the requirements for a geopolitical hedge or a technical hedge. And that additional cost to the government, in an era of limited budgets, what 

that means is that less is going to something else. So maybe less 

science and technology—— 

Mr. TURNER. Just a second, please, if I can interrupt for just a 

moment. The second point that you are making is not a New 

START Treaty issue, correct? 

Dr. MILLER. The second point is not—— 

Mr. TURNER. I want to make that clear. The language that is actually in that provision clearly limits it to non-deployed. So, it 

would be the second—that you are talking about, which is not a 

New START. I think his question was how does it affect our New 

START compliance, and this really wouldn’t. 

Dr. MILLER. So, then we focus on the second part. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. The issue with respect to the stockpile is as I said, 

that the provision would require this administration, the next administration, the administration after that, to sustain the stockpile 

at the present level at additional cost, and irrespective of the geopolitical and technical requirements. 

If that provision had been in place under President George W. 

Bush, we would have a stockpile of 10,000 instead of 5,000 today. 

It would be excess to need for national security and it would be 

something that we, in an era of limited budgets, that we would be 

wasting resources. 

The question of no unilateral reductions under the levels of the 

New START Treaty, I think is worth considering in two parts. 

The first is that if the interpretation is that the United States 

must maintain precisely no fewer than 1,550 accountable deployed 

nuclear weapons under the New START Treaty, one gets into the 

question of, if it makes more sense because of the specifics of how— 

to take one example, how SSBNs are loaded to have slightly fewer 

to allow a balance loading of our SSBNs. That is something that 

would be precluded. So, to be required to hit 1,550 on the nose 

doesn’t necessarily make operational sense. 

And the second element, and a critical element for the administration, is that it is going well beyond what the Senate had in the 

Resolution of Ratification. The Resolution of Ratification said that 

any militarily significant reductions below New START levels 

should be—I will paraphrase. I don’t have it in front of me. But 

should be negotiated and brought back for the consent and advice 

of the Senate. 

To understand that requirement, understand that militarily significant changes should come back to the Senate, back to the Con-
30 

gress. But to say that it has to be a specific number exactly, under 

the treaty can be no more, under this law, can be no less, would 

tie the hands of the commander and of the President. And to say 

no reductions, no changes whatsoever will be allowed, those are 

constitutional issues. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, if the rest of the panel could respond in kind for the record if we have time right now. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Mr. TURNER. That would be great. And we also have a second 

round if you want to revisit the issue. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you. 

Continuing this discussion, you heard the chairman mention 

Condition 9(B) of the Senate Resolution of Ratification. And do you 

all agree that the U.S. should go to the point of reconsidering remaining a party to the New START Treaty if indeed we do not 

have the dollars the President—and this is to the President’s credit. He asked for the dollars for modernization in fiscal year 2012 

NNSA budget. And I would like all of you to respond to that. 

Dr. MILLER. Two parts to the answer, sir. 

The first is that we understand the requirement to report if we 

have less funding than in the Section 1251 as requested in Section 

1251 Report. Our interpretation of that has been substantially less. 

In fiscal year 2011 actually slightly less was appropriated than requested. Our judgment was that a one percent or less change didn’t 

require us to submit the report. The difference we are looking at 

now in both the House and the Senate appropriations bill, I think, 

would trigger that, and we would have to examine that question. 

We entered into New START Treaty because it was in our national security interest. We have the right to withdraw from that 

treaty as a country. And, in principle, this is an issue that should 

be considered whenever the security conditions arise that would require it. 

If there is substantially less funding than requested, we will, of 

course, provide the report to Congress. 

General KEHLER. And, sir, I would just add that, understanding 

what the language requires, I would form my recommendation in 

this regard, based upon my assessment of whether we could perform the military mission that is being asked of us. And given the 

certain number of weapons and type of weapons that we have, understanding, again, that there are some trigger conditions here for 

reporting, I would form my assessment based upon the force that 

we have and whether we can execute the missions. And as long as 

we can execute the missions, then my recommendation would be 

that we would continue to go forward. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Are you saying, General, that you would not take 

into account whether or not dollars were added to our budget for 

modernization? 

General KEHLER. I would most certainly take that into account. 

But I would be asked to provide a today recommendation, and I 

would base that recommendation on whether or not we could execute the mission that we were being asked to perform. If a budget 
31 

reduction was resulting in some decline in that mission, as we 

could look to the future, then I would offer my judgment accordingly. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. You know, I think that there has been a cojoining of these two issues for quite a long time. And in my opinion, 

it has been almost a red herring. Who is not for modernization of 

the forces? The President has made clear he is. The President has 

put a tremendous amount of increase of budget. He has talked 

about it for years. So the President has said what he wants to do. 

He has put the money in the budget. And now it is up to the Congress to provide the money. That is where we seem to be having 

the problem. 

Mr. LAMBORN. That is right. And I said—— 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Not with the President. 

Mr. LAMBORN. No, exactly. And I said, to the President’s credit, 

the House and Senate have not, however, followed up in the current status of both appropriation bills. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. That is right. That is right. But the New 

START negotiations were already something that was considered 

previous to the end of the START Treaty, which expired in December of 2009. And when we achieved those limits, way before the 

end of the START Treaty, by the way, subsequently, we had the 

Moscow Treaty that President Bush came through. And that was 

a unilateral decision to decrease forces. 

General Kehler is really the person with the Strategic Command, 

and the National Command Authority, and the DOD and the DOE, 

that are going to look to make sure that he has what he needs. You 

also have the President and the lab directors that have to sort of 

view the capability, effectiveness, safety, and reliability of the 

stockpile every year. 

So there are different components here that all add into the 

question of, does the President, as Commander in Chief, have what 

he needs in order to not only deter and defend the United States, 

but to those countries to whom we extend our deterrent, do we 

have the capability to do that? 

And so the decision was made to modernize the NNSA and the 

force and to make sure that we had at, lower levels, the kind of 

numbers that were going to be able to be agreed to by General 

Kehler and certified by the lab directors and to satisfy the President’s concern that we have what we need. 

And there is a very, you know, significant process to that. It includes the Nuclear Posture Review, as we have discussed. It also 

includes dealing with our allies on the DDPR. So there are many 

components to this. It is not just one or the other. It is not just, 

‘‘if you don’t have this, you don’t get that.’’ 

So I think that you have to look at this in a very holistic way. 

You have to look at it more than just the simple boiling down of, 

if you don’t have modernization, can you actually keep the New 

START Treaty? We have agreed to the New START levels. We 

have done that assuming that we are going to get the funding, assuming that we are going to have modernization, assuming that we 

are going to have lower levels and that we are going to be able to 

certify. 
32 

But I think that, you know, just saying ‘‘if you don’t have one, 

you don’t have the other,’’ I think almost misses the point of a very 

sophisticated strategy that numerous Presidents have been working with that have put us in a position where we do have a very 

safe and reliable stockpile, one that General Kehler can tell you is 

going to meet the military requirements. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, Under Secretary Tauscher, am I wrong in 

assuming that if we don’t have the dollars for modernization, then 

we can’t rely on the lower numbers of weapons that New START 

calls for? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. I don’t believe so. I believe that this is not 

a zero-sum game. 

Mr. LAMBORN. We could disarm through attrition, like Tom was 

saying? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. I don’t know how you get to that assumption. What I am saying is, everybody is for doing what we have 

agreed to do. The question is, where do we get the money? The 

President has made very clear that he wants to have major investments in the NNSA, the stockpile, human capital, and refurbishing 

the enterprise to make it more responsive to the reality of lower 

numbers. 

And that is what we are going to have. We have not exactly what 

the President has asked for in the budget, but we are not at zero. 

This is not, you know, a supertanker where you hit the brakes and 

you stop on a dime. This is going to take a while for the fact that 

we don’t have this money to affect the system. Will it affect the 

system? Yes. Will we be able to get what we need? No. Is it wrong 

to assume that these cuts are fungible and that we can live with 

them? No. 

But at the same time, it is not true that we endanger our ability 

to go to lower levels tomorrow because we don’t have the budget 

numbers that the Congress is meant to give us and agree with the 

President’s numbers. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, we are going to have to continue this discussion, especially after we see what the appropriations process 

yields. And my very last thing, Under Secretary Tauscher, is, and 

I will just conclude with this, because we are starting to run out 

of time. Is this administration contemplating any unilateral cuts or 

any other further cuts at all in U.S. nuclear warheads, platforms, 

delivery vehicles, or capability? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Well, as I told you, the President agreed in 

his letter to Senator Reid and Senator McConnell late last year 

during the consideration of New START by the Senate in the lameduck session that, you know, this year we would begin to work 

with the Russians on deployed, non-deployed, strategic, non-strategic. I have my counterpart in what is called the RyabkovTauscher channel. We have already sat down and started to have 

conversations with them about the kinds of framework for future 

reductions, both, as I said, on strategic and non-strategic, deployed 

and non-deployed. We have had conversations with the P5 [permanent five members of the UN Security Council] on different things, 

including verification and the new kind of technology and the new 

science involved in that. 
33 

So I don’t make the policy. I just go off and do it. But previous 

administrations have made the decision to do that. I don’t know of 

anything that the President has said where he has said that he is 

considering unilateral cuts, so I will tell you that my mission is to 

talk to the Russians and to continue what we did in New START 

and also to talk in a multilateral range with the P5. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want to thank all of you for a fascinating discussion about where we are with nuclear security. 

Mr. Miller, you dismissed those who said that the numbers are 

bigger as bad math and faulty assumptions. Could you please be 

very specific, not now, but in writing, as to the math and the assumptions, so that everybody can get it straight? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. And our first submission is the Section 

1251 Report that we provided to Congress with far estimates. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. 

Dr. MILLER. So if I can give one quick example, and—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please. I only have a few moments. 

Dr. MILLER. Okay, quick example—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. There are assumptions that were made, numbers that were put. You say they are bad math. I assume they are. 

Just tell me how, okay? Now—— 

Dr. MILLER. Will do. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. This discussion is almost occurring 

in a vacuum. Sequestration is out there. Whether there is sequestration or not, there are very significant cuts being discussed for 

the military. It is like a stovepipe here. We are only discussing the 

nuclear security in this context, and there are other things that are 

going on within the military. And it is, frankly, driving me crazy 

that all of this happens and we don’t know how we are going to 

put this together and we may have, like, a month and a half to put 

something together. 

The people around this town that think about these things, think 

tanks from the left and the right, have thought about the nuclear 

security issue over the years and have made recommendations 

from the left of about, I don’t know, $135 billion of cuts over the 

next 2 years and, from the right, a little less than $100 billion, exactly $104 billion from the Cato Institute and $139.5 billion from 

the Sustainable Defense Task Force. That is the left and the right. 

How does that figure into what we are doing here? Basically, I 

heard you say we are tied up by treaties, but apparently within 

that treaty there are some opportunities. What I am looking at is, 

I would like to know what is really viable. No cuts at all? Or, if 

there are going to be cuts in the military, where does this particular portion of the military fit? And what is viable? You know, 

it ranges from, ‘‘okay, we don’t need a triad’’ or ‘‘we don’t need all 

of those missiles’’ or ‘‘we don’t need all of those new bombers right 

now.’’ We can wait; we can wait. 

At some point, it is going to have to get beyond, ‘‘gee, it is going 

to be terrible if we have to make cuts.’’ We are going to have to 

say, ‘‘here is what can actually happen.’’ And I am waiting for that 

information. And you have got 1 minute and 53 seconds to share 

it. 
34 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Garamendi, thank you. As I said earlier, the Defense Department is looking at north of $450 billion in cuts over 

the next decade, and a good fraction of those in the next 5 years. 

Nuclear delivery systems, which are funded out of DOD, are not 

off the table for that discussion. And we are looking hard at what 

the core requirements are and the timing of those requirements, as 

well. That is true for each leg of the triad, as it is true across the 

board. Secretary Panetta has talked about these reductions being 

hard, but manageable. I can confirm that they are hard, and as I 

said, no element of the Department of Defense budget is off the 

table from examination. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And here is my point. And I said this earlier to 

the chiefs. Terrific. And I know that eventually you will tell us 

what it is. By my count, we have one month and a few days before 

December 23rd, at which point we are, by law, to make some decisions. May very well our decision is to not make a decision and we 

will just change the law, which we could do. But assuming we actually follow the law, we need to make a decision. 

So when will you share with us that information? Are we talking 

about maybe the 22nd of December? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I think it is fair to say that is a question that 

is above my pay grade. I will take it back to my bosses. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I took it to your bosses about 3 hours ago. I am 

taking it to you. I guess I am taking it to the chairman of our committee here, is that at some point along the line, we are going to 

have to make some tough decisions. And the sooner we have that 

information, the more thorough the debate will be and, quite possibly, the better the result. 

But ignorance is not a good way to proceed. And we are proceeding with a high level of ignorance, despite what you have said. 

Now, you have all talked about it, but you have not given us one 

piece of information about what a cut could be in your area, other 

than it is going to be bad. I will let it go at that. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

the panel today. You all are definitely studied up on the issue, and 

I appreciate that. 

I am going to, we have been talking about math here, and I am 

going to ask you about a little different math, General Kehler and 

Mr. Miller. If the Navy and STRATCOM were comfortable with 192 

launchers on 12 SSBN(X) submarines based on the assumption 

that New START levels will be those required in 2027 and beyond, 

meaning 48 fewer launchers than suggested for the submarinebased deterrent in the original 1251 Plan, what other reductions 

are needed to the ICBM and bomber legs to comply with the New 

START limits? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, what we have previously said is that we aimed 

toward a New START force structure of 240 SLBM launchers, up 

to 420 ICBMs, and up to 60 bombers. In the context of the budget 

situation in which we find ourselves, we are looking hard at those 

numbers again and, in fact, want to be informed by this NPR Implementation Study that is underway. 
35 

I think it is worth noting that the number of SLBM launchers 

that you described would provide a very significant number of warheads that could be deployed and that would allow the SLBM leg 

to still account for two-thirds of the overall strategic arsenal. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I would just add that I think this is another one of those areas where it is helpful to me, anyway, to separate this into two sets of questions. One is, how will we structure 

today’s force to get into the central limits of the New START Treaty? And that is one set of issues that we are working our way 

through, and that gets to the 240 up to 420 and 60, in terms of 

the three legs of the triad. 

We have been looking very hard, because we are allowed to mix, 

within the 1,550 deployed warheads that were allowed and the up 

to 700 operational delivery vehicles that were allowed, we are allowed to mix that force in many, many other ways. And so we have 

been looking whether or not there are alternative force mixtures 

that preserve a triad, that keep our military effectiveness, and that 

maybe are more financially efficient. 

So we are looking. That was certainly a baseline that we departed from, but we are looking to see if there are other ways to 

go at that mixture. The next question then becomes, for questions 

of modernization, beyond this current force structure, how should 

we go about looking at follow-ons, the Ohio replacement, for example? And we have looked at various numbers of tubes that might 

be on a replacement. 

The requirement from STRATCOM has been, we have looked at 

both 16 tube variants, we have looked at 20 tube variants. My 

number-one issue is we must be able to get a replacement platform. 

And therefore, affordability has to be an issue here. What we don’t 

have to make a decision on today is what the ultimate number of 

submarines is that we might have to deploy, depending on the 

world situation that we find as we go to the out-years. 

So my view is, I have been comfortable with talking about submarines, like they were talked about in the 1251 Report and elsewhere, that could have 16 tubes, provided we have enough to put 

to sea to meet our needs, and given that we may make different 

decisions as we go forward, our successors two or three removed 

may decide that is not the right number of submarines as we go 

forward. To me, it has to be survivable. It has to be affordable, because we have to have it. 

Dr. FLEMING. All right, let me simplify this a little bit for my understanding and for everyone here. So you are saying that it may 

be a financially driven decision to go below the understood limits 

and, in doing so, we can compensate in other areas with other 

launch devices, other platforms. And are you also saying that over 

time, in the out-years, we can actually mix that up? That is fluid. 

We can move back and forth within the total New START limits. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir, that is exactly right. Plus, we are 

making a big assumption here that the current limits in New 

START will, in fact, carry beyond the 10-year term of the treaty, 

plus another 5-year extension. We are beyond that, even, when we 

are talking about a follow-on submarine platform, for example. 

So I think preserving flexibility, preserving our ability to make 

judgments as we go forward, but committing now to the fact that 
36 

we must invest in the research and development, and we must proceed with these modernization efforts at this point in time, with 

the idea that we can make adjustments as we go to the future, I 

think, is the most prudent thing for the security of the country. 

Dr. FLEMING. Anyone else would like to add to that at all? Just 

one other quick thing. Well, the full cost of eliminating converting 

from deployed to non-deployed and converting to non-nuclear status DOD systems is known by the Department at this point? 

General KEHLER. The answer is they are not, sir, not to my 

knowledge. That is something we are still working our way through 

to include, as you know, in the number of launchers that we count. 

We talked about, the Under Secretary talked about the two data 

exchanges we have done with the Russians to date. Our numbers 

look high, and they look high in some respects because we are still 

counting what we would term as ‘‘phantoms,’’ ICBM silos that have 

already been deactivated, but still remain technically on the books 

for us, airplanes that are in the boneyard at Davis-Monthan down 

in Arizona, that need to come off the books, as well. 

Those costs are still being worked. We know we have those costs 

to bear. The services know they have those costs to bear. And we 

are working our way through how we will address those, unless 

there is something more. 

Dr. MILLER. General Kehler is exactly right. I would just add 

that the New START Treaty has more flexible provisions for the 

elimination or conversion of systems than was the case under the 

previous START Treaty. And we have asked for estimates from the 

Air Force and Navy for the alternative approaches, to include the 

lowest-cost approach, consistent with the treaty, for the elimination 

of ICBMs, for the elimination of bombers or conversion of bombers, 

and for the conversion of SLBM tubes, which amounts to taking 

them off the books. 

And I have seen some initial estimates, but we have sent them 

back for re-estimates, and we are looking to drive those numbers 

down as low as possible. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Dr. Miller, you had spoken about the provisions in the National 

Defense Authorization Act, of which some the administration had 

threatened to veto. And I want to walk through some of those 

issues, because as you know in the discussion, you know, we believed that we were just codifying the administration’s policy, that 

the administration’s stated policy, it would be X, and so we thought 

we had put it in the legislation. 

Now, I understand you not wanting it in legislation, but I am 

concerned as to why the administration would go to the level of arguing for a veto over what appears to be its own policy. So I 

thought we could have a discussion on whether or not these issues 

remain administration policy. 

And before I do that, I want to disagree with you a little, for a 

couple moments on the issue of your interpretation of those provisions. With respect to the provision that we have in the National 

Defense Authorization Act that ties modernization to reduction, 

you had said of your concern that it might be an impediment to our 
37 

implementation of New START within the requirements of New 

START. 

Well, there is a provision that permits a waiver, and it is a waiver that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy may 

sign. So the administration has the ability to waive that if it saw 

it as an impediment. So I am not necessarily persuaded by the argument that it would prevent us from complying with New START. 

The second thing that you had said is the issue of, you know, 

what if we had some operational issues that kept us going under 

the 1,550 and how that would be a concern? The numbers requirement of the legislation that we have in the NDAA says that the 

President may not retire, dismantle, or eliminate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate. Operational issues are not retiring. 

Operational issues are not dismantling, and they are not eliminating. So the only reductions that we have in here that might be 

viewed as a restraint are not, certainly, ones that you would run 

into. It is just operational. 

And with respect to the new facilities and the, with respect to 

the hedge, you know, those are the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility in New Mexico and the Uranium Processing Facility in Tennessee, having those operational before we do 

further reductions. And I believe that that has been the administration’s policy, that that was an actual need that we had to have 

those facilities up before further reductions were taken. 

But my questions go not to the issues of whether or not we 

should have this in legislation; I understand you say you would 

prefer it not. My questions go to, are these things still administration’s policy? We have got four of them. The first is, when the administration came forward and requested New START to be ratified, the premise was that the reduction would be taken in concert 

with modernization, meaning that they could not be separated; 

that, in fact, modernization had to be done in order to justify the 

lowered numbers. 

Is that still the administration’s view? Or does the administration believe that we could just go to this number and modernization is irrelevant to the reductions? 

Dr. MILLER. The administration views that both modernization 

and the New START Treaty remain in the national security interest of the United States. 

Mr. TURNER. Great. And that is what we put in the legislation, 

so we wanted to confirm it was still a policy, since we are facing 

a veto threat. 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, let me add. Each of them remains in 

the national security interest of the United States. Both of them together are strongly preferred. And so you say, what happens if we 

have somewhat less than the requested funding under the 1251 Report? Does that mean we should withdraw from the New START 

Treaty? I think the answer is—— 

Mr. TURNER. And that wasn’t my question, but go ahead and answer that one. 

Dr. MILLER. Well, the answer is, we are going to be obliged to 

provide a report on that question, but the New START Treaty has 

benefits to the United States, including the 18 on-site inspections 

per year, the exchange of data, and the ability to have a much bet-
38 

ter understanding of Russian strategic forces than otherwise would. 

So withdrawing from it would not be without other costs. 

Mr. TURNER. The next issue goes to the issue of reducing without 

the hedge. You know, our provision is that the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility in New Mexico, Uranium Processing Facility in Tennessee, that they need to be operational. President 

Obama’s National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon, said at the Carnegie Endowment earlier this year, in fact, ‘‘If Congress approves 

the President’s funding program for the nuclear complex, it allows 

us to reduce the size of our nuclear stockpile because we will be 

able to maintain a robust hedge against technical problems with a 

much smaller reserve force.’’ 

We had put in the legislation that these two facilities had to be 

operational. Obviously, if they are not operational, they are not 

contributing to the hedge. Is it now the administration’s policy that 

they are not necessary for further reductions in the hedge? 

Dr. MILLER. The administration continues to strongly support the 

CMRR and UPF facilities. The issue on the provision, and it is in, 

I believe it is 1055, says that the Secretary of Defense, Secretary 

of Energy may not retire, dismantle, or eliminate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate any deployed strategic or non-strategic 

nuclear weapon until the date that is 90 days after certification 

that these facilities are fully operational. And so—— 

Mr. TURNER. I will just read it. I mean, do you have it front of 

you? It says Department is to retire, dismantle, or eliminate or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate any non-deployed strategic 

or non-strategic weapon until the date that is 90 days after the 

date. 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, is a B–52 bomber that is no longer 

operational considered in this category? 

Mr. TURNER. The reason I am reading it is because your answer 

used the word ‘‘deployed,’’ and this clearly does not say ‘‘deployed.’’ 

I am not going to argue over what deployed and non-deployed 

means, other than to reflect that the language of the legislation is 

non-deployed. 

Dr. MILLER. So there is a semantic question that we would need 

to clarify, and this is a relatively small issue, is whether the intent 

of the House is to have this apply to nuclear warheads only or to 

delivery systems. Frankly, I have heard both of those explanations. 

That is the relatively smaller issue. 

Well, it is important, but I would hope that the intent was nuclear warhead. If that is the case, then what it says is that, given 

the timelines with—if we have received full funding—the timelines 

for making CMRR and UPF operational, it means that there may 

be no retirement, dismantlement, or elimination of non-deployed 

weapons until the mid-2020s. 

Is that something that makes sense for the country? My guess 

is, my strong view, actually, is that the answer is likely to be no. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, and I believe that that actually had reflected 

the administration’s policy, but with respect to the issue of clarifications, considering that this is going into conference, I would 

love to work with you on any language that you think would be 

necessary to clarify that for you so we don’t have language that is 

confusing. 
39 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, could I just be clear. The policy is to look to shift 

from a reliance on non-deployed warheads to a reliance on infrastructure over time. That is indeed the objective and policy of the 

administration. 

Mr. TURNER. And that is those two facilities—— 

Dr. MILLER. And, indeed, it involves more than that, but the policy is not to avoid dismantling, eliminating, or preparing to retire, 

dismantle, or eliminate any non-deployed weapon until the time 

that all those investments are complete. Indeed, the cost, that 

would be, I guess, and to use a term usually used elsewhere, that 

would be a cost-imposing strategy on the NNSA. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, if I could just jump in on that just a little 

bit. Clearly, you know, the idea of including the word ‘‘non-deployed’’ in a sentence, or even preparing to retire, dismantle, or 

eliminate, the reality is, we move these systems with the Defense 

Department from a non-deployed to deployed status all the time. 

We are constantly doing surveillance, which includes destructive 

surveillance, which actually means, in effect, we would be coming 

back to the Secretaries—both Secretaries with a bit of a bureaucratic, I would say ponderous bureaucratic process that would slow 

down and render some significant inefficiencies, in my line of work. 

I won’t speak for how it would impact the Defense Department on 

their delivery systems. 

So I don’t particularly care for the language at all, because it 

adds a level of bureaucracy that I believe is unnecessary, because 

we have proven our ability to work with the Defense Department 

on moving systems back and forth in order to meet the national 

needs at the particular time. And I just think it is extra work. It 

is unnecessary. As Jim was talking about—— 

Mr. TURNER. And you don’t think the exception that says activities determined by the Secretary of Defense ‘‘be necessary to ensure the continued safety, security, and reliability’’ is a big enough 

umbrella of your activities that exempt, because, I mean, clearly, 

the intent is, you know, it is not ‘‘dismantle’’ meaning we are cleaning. It is ‘‘dismantle’’ meaning it is not being put back together. Or 

‘‘eliminate,’’ that is pretty clear. ‘‘Retire,’’ I think that is pretty 

clear. I would be glad to work with you on language for that exception, but I certainly understand—— 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay, thank you. 

Dr. Miller, we had a conversation on the telephone today, which 

I greatly appreciated, concerning the issue of nuclear weapons targeting and doctrine and the ongoing review. We referenced as a 

great starting point that fact that you were a professional staffer 

on this committee and participated in the 1990s when those type 

of activities were ongoing. And the expectation on behalf of the 

committee that your knowledge of that exchange between staff and 

the administration is expected would be the benchmark point for 

us looking to a satisfactory exchange between the administration 

and this committee. 

I know we have the letter from Secretary Panetta indicating that 

there will be an exchange between the committee. I note your taking back to the administration our benchmarking of your participation when you were a staff member as being a level of exchange 
40 

that we are expecting, now that you are in the administration. So 

we appreciate your level of experience and expertise that you get 

to take to that discussion. And I understand from your answer that 

you are going to be endeavoring to get us clarification of that. 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I will ask for a clarification. I will 

say that the language of the letter speaks for itself, in a sense, in 

terms of what the Secretary has proposed we do. And I will ask his 

guidance on the additional questions that you have asked. 

Mr. TURNER. Great. I appreciate that. Because, again, back to 

our conversation on the phone, reading this letter in light of our 

discussion of what your experience was, we don’t have confidence 

that it is the same, and we would want the treatment of the committee to be the same with you in the administration, as it was 

when you were with the committee. Thank you. 

Under Secretary Tauscher, you and I had conversations before 

about the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. And I 

have appreciated both the exchange that we have had and your expertise. I am, as you know, very concerned on the issue of what 

will count as a reduction. You have, in your answer here today, I 

think very clearly stated that you look to reductions, if there were 

to be reductions, with respect to NATO’s nuclear posture or European—U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, that you would see that as 

tied to a response from Russia, and I would like some assurances 

from you that you agree that mere geographic relocation of Russian 

tactical nuclear weapons is neither a reduction, nor a significant 

Russian action for addressing the threat to Europe posed by Russia’s thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. 

As I indicated, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly said in its 

resolution, which we will provide you a copy of, that they do not 

view mere geographic relocation as a reduction. And I would like 

to know if you agree. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. I do. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The only question I had is to allow the other members of the 

panel to respond to my question, with respect to Section 1055, and 

how those conditions could prevent the Pentagon from implementing New START. So, Secretary Tauscher, I know that you 

have to leave. If you want to respond to me in writing, that is fine. 

If the rest of the panel, if you could just take that right now, that 

would be helpful. 

General KEHLER. Sir, again, I would just say, from my perspective, the issue of whether or not the funding would be sufficient to 

cause us to invoke a withdrawal from the treaty. My view is that 

it is about risk. 

And my perspective here is that, ultimately, I would be asked, 

and I believe that I should provide, my military advice on whether 

or not the force, as it is constituted, could accomplish the job at 

hand. But there are some risk points along the way. 

And as we began to get to some of those risk points, for example, 

we have issues today about, with the current level of funding that 

has been allowed, through the congressional marks, whether our 

air-delivered weapons can go through life extension. I think that is 
41 

a risk point that we would have to assess, and I think it would go 

on from there. So that would be my comment. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Secretary. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In our role in supporting the warfighter and 

supporting General Kehler’s organization, you know, that is ultimately the job that I have in supporting the Defense Department 

is to make sure they have the systems they need. 

I would be concerned, though, clearly it is not my area of work, 

but I would be concerned that as things change, as concerns with 

our ability, essentially, maybe to extend the life of a particular system, comes up and it becomes an issue. The Defense Department 

would be in a position to say ‘‘how do I change the mix of warheads 

necessary in order to keep the nation safe’’ and made our commitments to our allies as well. And, therefore, this provision, in my 

view, would say what, we can’t do that, until after these two facilities are completed. 

I don’t believe that is the intent. Ultimately it might not be the 

intent of the committee, but it does place a restriction on our ability, and the warfighter’s ability, to say ‘‘this is the kind of mix that 

you should might recommend to the President,’’ and then ultimately my ability to support that. 

General KEHLER. Sir, if I could just add one more piece to this, 

there are really two fundamental things that I am asked to do on 

a recurring basis. One is I am asked to comment on my view of the 

ability of the stockpile and the safety, security, and effectiveness of 

the stockpile. And so every year I provide my assessment of the 

stockpile. 

That is one place where I can make my viewpoints known, as the 

combatant commander, for the investment that we make in the 

stockpile, not only in the life extension programs, but in things like 

surveillance and basic science and the other things that go with 

that. 

So in one place, I would have an opportunity to comment on 

what I thought funding was doing to the overall health of the 

stockpile. In the other place, I have a commitment, essentially, to 

be able to tell the President whether or not the force as it is currently constituted is capable of performing the fundamental mission here. 

And the fundamental mission is to deter nuclear attack on the 

U.S. and our allies, assure our allies, et cetera. And so I am constantly looking at whether or not the force, as it is constituted, is 

capable of performing the job that we are being asked to do. As we 

would get to these decision points, where funding would begin to 

impact that, I am obligated to stand up at that point and say 

whether or not I think that either the stockpile is impacted or, 

overall, whether we are able to perform the mission that we can. 

And I would be prepared to do that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Good. 

Secretary Tauscher, did you have anything to add or—— 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Yes, I will just, you know, I will just agree 

with my colleagues. You know, I think that there is the issue of 

funding for the complex modernization and then the limitations on 
42 

nuclear forces contained in the House bill, I think that there are 

some things that I just want to make very clear. 

The first is that this administration is following through on all 

of its commitments on modernization. And modernization, as I said 

earlier, is in the same room with the New START Treaty and what 

the New START Treaty reductions will do. But they are linked tangentially. They are not specifically linked. It is not one for one. 

We didn’t go into the New START Treaty saying that, unless we 

got this money, we would not go forward with these reductions. 

The reductions are based on the Nuclear Posture Review. But the 

President made clear that he believed that these reductions are in 

the national security interest of the country, and that these investments are in the national security interest of the country. 

So, you know, they are related, but they are not a quid pro quo. 

One is not about the other. And I think my colleagues have tried 

to make that as clear as possible. The reductions that we went 

about in the New START Treaty were based on analysis conducted 

under the Nuclear Posture Review. 

And during that same review, it was very clear that we needed 

to make investments in the modernization of the complex, in the 

human capital, building facilities and making it a much more capabilities-based environment than just dealing with this number, that 

number. So I think it is a complicated situation. 

But, you know, General Kehler’s responsibilities, Dr. Miller’s, Administrator D’Agostino’s are different than mine. We all have specific responsibilities, but they are all related. But, you know, it is 

really up to General Kehler on the annual basis to make decisions 

about the safety, the reliability, and the effectiveness of the stockpile for the military requirements. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 

General KEHLER. And if I could just pile on with one more comment, there are two questions here. One question is do we need to 

modernize? Do we need to invest? And the answer from my perspective is, unequivocally, yes. Yes, we do. 

The other question is, what happens if we don’t? And at that 

point in time, that is a different set of considerations that we have 

to work our way through. And from my perspective, that is when 

we get into the military judgment about our ability to do the job. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. I share many of your concerns, and you 

know, I do have deep concern about Section 1055 and what do we 

do in terms of preventing the Pentagon from implementing New 

START. 

So as you think about it, if there are other things that you would 

like to add, and you can forward to me and to the committee in 

writing, that would be helpful so that we have full transparency 

into the implications of that section. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, my questions have ended. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. This has been a very 

long hearing, and I have two more questions, but my two questions 

are for Dr. Miller and for General Kehler. So I am going to offer 

to Mr. D’Agostino and to Under Secretary Tauscher, if they would 
43 

like to be excused, you are excused. And if you want to stay to 

watch and observe, you certainly can. But I wanted to let you know 

that the questions for you are done. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And please, you 

know, if you are keeping them behind in class, let me tell you how 

hard they work. 

Mr. TURNER. Very good. Well, I wanted to say that the reason 

why this hearing has been so long is because you all are working 

so hard. The amount of work that you have, the review you are undertaking, everything that you are doing is really the subject matter of this. 

I have only two more questions, and they really are for the 

record. But, I do certainly appreciate Under Secretary Tauscher 

and Mr. D’Agostino’s participation in the hearing. 

Turning to Dr. Miller, nuclear force structure requirements are 

developed based upon high-level guidance on nuclear targeting 

strategy and nuclear weapons employment issued by the White 

House. 

DOD has informed this committee that a 90-day Nuclear Posture 

Review Implementation Study is currently underway to review this 

guidance and consider options for changes. We understand the 

President has issued terms of reference for this study in PPD 

[Presidential Policy Directive] 11. 

Dr. Miller, what are the terms of reference for this study? I have 

a four-part question. What are the terms of reference for this 

study? Briefly, what targeting, employment, and force structure options have been considered as a part of this review? 

And how might those different options affect the size and structure of a nuclear force structure? Also, will you provide us with a 

copy of the PPD–11, and any other terms of reference or study 

charge? Also, please provide us with a list of the agencies and officials who are directly involved in the study. Please provide these 

to the committee within the next 7 days. 

Based upon statements we see in the Nuclear Posture Review 

and those made by senior administration officials, including the 

National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction Gary 

Samore in this study, is this study only considering what further 

reductions can be made? 

Or are the only possible outcomes those that enable and justify 

further reductions? Is it possible that the study’s analysis will show 

that the current U.S. stockpile and force structure is exactly right? 

Or even inadequate, especially in view of the nuclear modernization programs in Russia and China? And how is a potential failure 

to fund the modernization plan in Section 1251 Report being 

factored into the options considered as part of the NPR Implementation Study? If Congress doesn’t fully fund the modernization 

plan, does this limit what options on the table are possible? 

To give you a recap, the first one was, briefly, what targeting, 

employment, and force structure options are being considered as 

part of this review and the documents that we requested, including 

the PPD 11. 
44 

[The committee notes that the administration did not provide a 

copy of PPD–11 or a summary of that document, as had been repeatedly requested.] 

Dr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I assume by the length of that list 

that you have written it down. Many of the questions that you ask 

go to the White House, and not to the Department of Defense. I 

would propose to pass them along. 

But I can say about the—— 

Mr. TURNER. I am sorry. Before we go on, you are involved in 

this, are you not? 

Dr. MILLER. I am. 

Mr. TURNER. So you would have to be qualified to answer the 

questions. I mean, I didn’t ask a policy question of what is the conclusion. I asked the question of what is being considered. 

Dr. MILLER. The question of what is being considered under 

presidentially directed review, in my estimation, comes under the 

purview of the White House to respond to, not under the purview 

of the Department of Defense to respond to. So what I will be 

happy to do is to take that question to the White House. 

Mr. TURNER. But you are knowledgeable of these answers? 

Dr. MILLER. I am. 

Mr. TURNER. And you would be capable of answering them? 

Okay. 

Dr. MILLER. I would be capable of answering them to the best of 

my ability. What I would suggest is that you’ve asked for a copy 

of the directive, you have asked for a number of other things. That 

I would take that back to the National Security Staff. 

Mr. TURNER. I understand your answer. 

General Kehler, you have previously warned against cutting the 

budget or size of our nuclear forces too deeply, resulting in what 

you called a ‘‘hollow force.’’ 

Will you please explain what you mean by a ‘‘hollow force’’? What 

are the risks of a hollow force to readiness, morale, safety, security, 

and critical skill retention in the nuclear components of the military for the three legs of the triad? What are the break points or 

red lines in the size of the force that would result in a ‘‘hollow 

force’’? 

And what analysis has been done to examine these questions and 

anything that you would be able to share with us? And, you know, 

for example, how would cutting a whole wing of ICBMs, 150 missiles in total, affect nuclear weapons targeting? 

And have you seen any calls for or desire for changing the requirement of continuous at-sea deterrence, the number of ships required to keep that continuous presence in both the Atlantic and 

the Pacific? 

General. 

General KEHLER. Sir, let me start with the question about the 

‘‘hollow force.’’ It is a term, as I think you know, that is being used 

again extensively across the Department of Defense from my colleagues, the other combatant commanders, from the service chiefs, 

all with a cautionary note from things that we have seen in our 

past. 

Very simply, what I would say is that ‘‘hollow force’’ is one, in 

my definition now, I don’t know that there is a formal definition 
45 

for ‘‘hollow force,’’ but it is one that gives the appearance of being 

able to do the job, but doesn’t have the capability to do it. 

And I think you can have a ‘‘hollow force’’ in a lot of ways. You 

can have a ‘‘hollow force’’ because you are not properly organized, 

because you are not properly trained, because you are not properly 

equipped, because you are not properly sustained, because you 

don’t have the number of qualified people that it takes in order to 

provide an enterprise that is a complex, experienced-based enterprise, like the nuclear enterprise. 

You can have a ‘‘hollow force’’ regardless of the size of the force. 

You can have a large force that is a ‘‘hollow force’’—my opinion, 

again, sir—you can have a small force that is a ‘‘hollow force.’’ And 

so when I have referred to the potential here for a ‘‘hollow force’’ 

in the nuclear force, I am sounding the same cautionary note that 

my colleagues are sounding about the conventional forces. 

We can find ourselves in a position here, if we are not careful, 

where either through our sustainment efforts or lack thereof, or 

other elements here, that we can find ourselves in a place where 

we have a hollow nuclear force. 

I will tell you that my experience here is that, four or so years 

ago, some parts of our nuclear force, I think we came to the brink 

of, potentially, a ‘‘hollow force.’’ I think we discovered that we had 

some issues in our nuclear enterprise because of lack of 

sustainment funding. 

I think we found that there were some issues in our nuclear enterprise because lack of experience. I think we found that there 

were some issues in our nuclear enterprise because we were so 

committed to the wars that we had in the Middle East and Southwest Asia that we found that, perhaps at some level, we had taken 

our eye from some of the most critical pieces of what it takes to 

have perfection as the standard. 

So in my view, those are the cautions we need to make sure that 

we are looking at as we go forward. Where the mixture of forces 

that we are looking at, inside New START limits, at this point in 

time, no decisions have been made about what that ultimate force 

will look like. But we are looking at various alternatives here. 

Are there better ways than were described in the 1251 Report to 

get to the balancing that is going to be required, and that still allows us to sustain properly while it allows us, perhaps, to be more 

fiscally efficient? Those are the issues that we are going to continue 

to look at. 

And I must say that I would want to make it clear from my perspective, anyway, that in these budget discussions we have been 

having, the nuclear deterrent force has not been immune from the 

conversations that we have been having, nor should they have been 

immune. 

And I think what we are looking at today and what we would 

look at if sequestration occurs are two different things. I think the 

current Secretary, the previous Secretary, both said everything is 

on the table. If sequestration occurs, I think everything, certainly 

in my world, is back on the table, while we are trying to balance 

other things as well: space, cyber and the other things that I am 

responsible for. 
46 

So, again, my caution has been that if we are looking at alternative force mixtures, that we are mindful of all of the pieces that 

I believe must be in place as we go forward so that we do not result 

in a hollow force. 

One of those pieces, I believe, is professional expertise and professional experience and making sure that as we go forward to 

come up with balanced triads—and, by the way, I believe at this 

point in time, certainly, a triad is still the right way to go—that 

we do that with the thought in mind that we would be careful that 

we don’t have that as a ‘‘hollow force’’ as we go forward. 

You asked about force posture as well, and so just let me add one 

other thing about force posture. We both size and posture our force 

today based upon the job that we have to perform, recognizing that 

the force that we give to the President has to be able to do a number of things. 

One thing it has to be able to do is provide day-to-day deterrence 

and assurance. Another thing it has to be able to do is respond to 

surprise. Another thing it has to be able to do is respond in a crisis 

so that we provide stability in a crisis. And another thing it has 

to be able to do is get larger within the treaty limit so that we can 

grow that force up to the treaty limits, or close to those limits if, 

in fact, the operational need dictates that in a deep crisis or, perhaps, if we were engaged in some kind of a world situation that 

required that. 

That means that we maintain a portion of our force in a readyto-use posture on a day-to-day basis. I believe that is an appropriate posture today, and that is certainly an element of that as the 

at-sea survivable SSBNs, which I think is a critical piece of our 

posture. If that helps. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

In concluding, I wanted to say to Dr. Miller and to General 

Kehler, we greatly appreciate not only your time in working with 

this committee and your commitment to a strong deterrent, which 

is, of course, evidenced in your questions, but also the fact that you 

guys are the experts. 

Thank you for being dedicated to this topic because we rely on 

your expertise so greatly. And when you come before Congress, you 

help us learn so that we can be a very good partner with you. So 

thank you again. 

And with that, we will be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Dr. MILLER. The next inspection in Russia after November 2, 2011, was on November 16, 2011. The next inspection in the U.S. after November 2, 2011, was on 

November 7, 2011. [See page 28.] 

General KEHLER. New START identifies ceilings for deployed and non-deployed 

strategic delivery vehicles, launchers and accountable warheads. The language proposed in H.R. 1540, Section 1055, defines New START ceilings as the floor for delivery systems and warheads and restricts non-deployed warhead reductions. As the 

combatant commander responsible for the nuclear deterrence mission, my responsibility is to advise the Secretary of Defense and the President whether the force, as 

currently constituted, is mission capable. Section 1055 sets provisions that limit 

flexibility to implement treaty provisions, as well as limit our ability to efficiently 

and cost-effectively manage our strategic force structure and stockpile. These provisions could result in the diversion of strategic deterrence sustainment resources 

from critical programs needed to maintain mission capabilities and support the longterm safety, security and reliability of our nuclear deterrent. [See page 30.] 

General KEHLER. As the combatant commander responsible for managing forces 

and implementing the New START, I am concerned reporting requirements and 

waiting periods have the potential to impact New START implementation timeline. 

Additionally, the second provision restricts the DOD/DOE annual weapons requirements process by tying the adjustment of non-deployed quantities to infrastructure 

improvements that, given the current fiscal environment, may not materialize. This 

provision has the potential to divert resources from critical stockpile sustainment 

efforts and delay prudent reductions to the non-deployed stockpile. In my view, existing consultative processes (e.g., 1251, SSMP) ensure we work jointly with Congress to implement New START and manage the stockpile. [See page 42.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

NOVEMBER 2, 2011 

(131) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. At the House Armed Services Committee’s October 13 hearing, Secretary of Defense Panetta said, ‘‘With regards to reducing our nuclear arena, I think 

that is an area where I don’t think we ought to do that unilaterally—we ought to 

do that on the basis of negotiations with the Russians and others to make sure we 

are all walking the same path.’’ To ensure we are not reducing unilaterally, will we 

retain nuclear forces that are at—or very near—the limits on strategic forces imposed by the New START Treaty? Otherwise, wouldn’t it by definition be ‘‘unilateral’’ reductions? 

a. Would you support reductions if they were a part of a non-binding agreement 

with Russia? 

b. At what force levels do we need to start bringing the ‘‘others’’ Secretary Panetta 

mentions, particularly China, into the picture? 

Dr. MILLER. The Administration has not made a final decision on the specific mix 

of forces to be deployed under the New START Treaty. DOD continues to plan on 

240 SLBM launchers, up to 420 ICBM launchers, and up to 60 nuclear-capable 

heavy bombers. It is important to note that the U.S. retains the flexibility to modify 

the mix of delivery systems under the Treaty. 

a. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), because of our improved relations, the need for strict numerical parity between the United States and Russia is 

no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War. But large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. Allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term, strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced. Therefore, we will 

place importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels. 

b. Maintaining strategic stability with both Russia and China will remain a critical challenge in the years ahead. China is estimated to have only a few hundred 

nuclear weapons and to be modernizing its nuclear arsenal; a Chinese ‘‘sprint to 

parity’’ has not materialized. That said, the overall lack of transparency surrounding China’s nuclear programs and capabilities raises questions about China’s 

future strategic intentions. We continue to pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues 

with both Russia and China that seek to promote more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic relationships. It is impossible at this time to pinpoint an exact force 

level at which the United States and Russia would want to bring other nations into 

a binding agreement. However, given that the United States and Russia will still 

account for 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons after New START is implemented, there is a clear opportunity for future bilateral reductions—including of tactical nuclear weapons, which the Russians have in much larger numbers. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Miller, you noted that the NPR stated that ‘‘strict numerical parity between the United States and Russia is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War,’’ but that ‘‘we will place importance on Russia joining us as we 

move to lower levels.’’ In my mind, ‘‘placing importance on’’ is not the same as ‘‘we 

won’t do this.’’ Will the administration make reductions without reciprocal and proportionate reductions from Russia? 

Dr. MILLER. The Administration is conducting a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 

implementation study to determine the nuclear force size and structure needed to 

support U.S. national security requirements and meet international obligations in 

a dynamic security environment. The ongoing study was directed by the President 

as part of the 2010 NPR. The analysis from this study will provide options for the 

President’s guidance to the Departments of Defense and Energy on nuclear planning 

with respect to the force structure, force posture, and stockpile requirements needed 

to protect the United States and its Allies and partners, and to inform plans for the 

employment of nuclear weapons in the event that deterrence fails. As stated in the 

NPR, the United States intends to pursue further reductions in nuclear weapons 

with Russia. When complete, the analysis of deterrence requirements and force postures will inform the development of any future arms control objectives. 

Mr. TURNER. How many military and civilian personnel in the executive branch 

have full or partial access to nuclear employment and targeting guidance issued by 

the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
132 

and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command? Please break down this information by the numbers of personnel with access to each level of guidance. How many 

personnel in the legislative branch have full or partial access to each level of guidance? 

Dr. MILLER. A very small group of personnel in the executive branch have access 

to the nuclear employment guidance issued by the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander, U.S. Strategic 

Command. Even within the Department of Defense (DOD), access to this sensitive 

material is tightly controlled. Within the Department of Defense, fewer than twenty 

copies of the President’s guidance are distributed in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the Joint Staff, and U.S. Strategic Command. Fewer than 200 copies of the 

most recent amplifying guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense were produced, 

and distribution was limited primarily to Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and other Combatant Commanders. The 

Chairman’s guidance is distributed more widely within DOD (fewer than 200 copies), as the document assigns responsibilities to several defense agencies and the intelligence community. Commander, U.S. Strategic Command must issue guidance to 

his planners and forces in the field, so distribution is somewhat wider because of 

that need. 

There is a long history of debate about providing the legislative branch access to 

this material. As a result, instances of providing access to a member of Congress 

and senior staff personnel have been quite limited and under restrictive terms. 

This Administration is committed to working with Congress and supporting effective congressional oversight on nuclear policy and modernization issues. To this end, 

the Secretary of Defense has invited the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the 

House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Strategic Forces Subcommittees, and the relevant staff directors, to participate in a set of classified briefings 

that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would provide, in conjunction with the 

Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command. The provision of such information would 

be subject to strict safeguards given its extremely sensitive nature. 

Mr. TURNER. The House Appropriations Committee reported a Defense Appropriations bill that contains a 1% reduction from the President’s budget request for DOD. 

The House Appropriations Committee reported an Energy and Water appropriations 

bill that contains a 10% reduction for NNSA and all of its defense activities. This 

came after strong and vocal support from Secretary Gates and senior military leaders for NNSA’s full budget request. How do these discrepancies affect planning, 

budgeting, and coordination between NNSA and DOD on the overall nuclear security enterprise? Should all aspects of the nuclear security enterprise be consolidated 

into a single budgetary and appropriations authority? 

Dr. MILLER. The modernization program was closely coordinated between the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense to ensure that modernization 

efforts are funded, but also to manage costs wisely. If Congress makes reductions 

without context and without thoroughly examining the long-term effects on the national interest, such actions could undermine our plans to ensure a safe, secure, and 

effective nuclear deterrent. 

It is essential to look across the complete nuclear security enterprise to review 

budgetary impacts fully, particularly in light of our current fiscal situation and the 

new constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011; however, this does not 

necessarily require a single budgetary and appropriations authority. As you know, 

the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), established in Title 10, Section 179, of the U. 

S. Code, has responsibility for coordinating programming and budget matters pertaining to nuclear weapons programs between the Department of Defense and the 

Department of Energy. The NWC has been active in this role, and the Departments 

of Defense and Energy will continue to consider any steps that could further improve effective planning and oversight. 

Fulfilling the President’s commitment to modernize the nuclear enterprise will require full and sustained congressional support. As we review our defense budget for 

the most cost-effective means to secure our Nation, I look forward to working with 

Congress to ensure funding for the critical activities within the Department of Defense and Department of Energy that are necessary to sustain the most effective nuclear deterrent. 

Mr. TURNER. You said the 1251 Report shows that the total cost of sustaining, 

operating, and modernizing our nuclear forces, nuclear weapons, and their supporting infrastructure over the next ten years—for both DOD and NNSA—is on the 

order of $214 billion. What percentage of the defense budget is this? What percentage of the full federal budget is this? How does this compare to historical trends, 

including the Cold War? Please be as specific as possible. 
133 

Dr. MILLER. The $214 billion is about 3 percent of the 10-year defense base budget of $6.3 trillion (including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration) and is about 2 percent of the Federal budget of $12.2 

trillion (excluding Overseas Contingency Operations). 

The following are some historical trends based on the DOD budget: 

• Funding for Strategic Forces ($0.6 trillion) as a percent of the DOD budget 

($12.7 trillion) from FY 1962 to FY 2011 was about 4 percent. • Funding for Strategic Forces ($0.4 trillion) as a percent of the DOD budget ($4.4 

trillion) during the Cold War (based upon data from FY 1962 to FY 1991) was 

about 8 percent. • Funding for Strategic Forces ($.2 trillion) as a percent of the DOD budget ($8.3 

trillion) after the Cold War (from FY 1992 to FY 2011) was about 2 percent. 

Note: The source for the historical data was from Table 6.4, Department of Defense TOA by Program, in DOD’s ‘‘National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2012’’ 

book (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Green Book.’’ This historical data includes all 

supplementals and Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism 

funding. 

Mr. TURNER. We have heard that within the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) process, some NATO allies might be encouraging several changes to 

NATO’s nuclear posture, possibly including: (1) consolidation of U.S. nuclear forces 

in Europe to one or more centralized bases, (2) decreasing the number of dual-capable aircraft our allies are required to maintain, (3) relaxing or eliminating requirements for pilots from allied nations to be trained and exercise in the nuclear mission, and (4) potential removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. 

a. Are any of these actions being considered by the DDPR? Which ones? 

b. Would NATO and the U.S. consider taking any of these steps unilaterally, without reciprocal and proportionate action on the part of Russia? 

i. What actions would we consider taking unilaterally, and what actions would we 

only undertake bilaterally with Russia? 

ii. What reciprocal actions would the U.S. look for from Russia in exchange for 

any of these four actions? 

Dr. MILLER. The DDPR process is still in the deliberative stages. However, in 

keeping with the Strategic Concept, any future reductions will be made on the basis 

of reciprocity with Russia, not unilaterally. We have not determined what reciprocal 

actions from Russia would be sufficient for future changes. 

Mr. TURNER. Some subset of F–35 joint strike fighters are intended to be nuclearcapable, replacing the nuclear-capable F–16s that will be retired due to age. Can 

you affirm that there will be nuclear-capable F–35s? This decision has been made 

and is being implemented? 

a. How many F–35s will be nuclear-capable? 

b. Based on the current F–35 program plan, when will the first nuclear-capable 

F–35s be deployed? 

c. When will the first nuclear-capable F–35s be deployed to Europe? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed the need to retain 

a dual-capable fighter to ensure that the United States retains the ability to forward 

deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of Alliance commitments. The Air 

Force plans to replace current DCA-capable aircraft with the F–35 Joint Strike 

Fighter and intends to program, develop, and integrate nuclear capability as part 

the Joint Strike Fighter’s Block 4 upgrade planned to be released to the field in the 

early 2020s. 

a. The Air Force plans to purchase 1,763 F–35As. The Air Force remains committed to deliver the DCA capability with the Block 4 upgraded F–35As in the early 

2020s. 

b. The Air Force will be prepared to deploy nuclear-capable F–35As after the 

Block 4 upgrade in the early 2020s. 

c. The first nuclear-capable U.S. Air Force F–35As will be available for Europe 

in the early 2020s. 

Mr. TURNER. How does the deployment of the B61–12 warhead align with deployment of nuclear-capable F–35s? Is deployment of the two systems linked? Can one 

deploy without the other, while still retaining our nuclear capability in Europe? 

Dr. MILLER. The B61–12 will sustain the U.S. extended deterrence commitment 

to our Allies through life extension of the aging B61 family of bombs. As part of 

this life-extension effort, compatibility with the F–35 will be preserved; however, the 

B61 and F–35 programs are not dependent on one another. Until the F–35 becomes 

nuclear-capable, non-strategic deployment of the B61–12 will, if required, occur 

though the use of existing Dual-Capable Aircraft. 

Mr. TURNER. Are our NATO allies still planning to purchase dual-capable F–35s 

to replace their aging dual-capable aircraft? How many do they plan to purchase 
134 

and when? Please describe the plans for NATO countries to replace or modernize 

their nuclear-capable aircraft, including numbers of aircraft and timelines for purchase. How are these plans being reflected in the DDPR? 

Dr. MILLER. Although the specific dates and quantities are classified, some Allies 

are still planning to purchase F–35 aircraft. The DDPR process is still in the deliberative stage. 

Mr. TURNER. When NNSA conducts a life extension program on a particular 

weapon type, will NNSA extend the life of all warheads of that type, including those 

in the non-deployed ‘‘hedge’’ part of the stockpile? Or will it only extend those weapons in the active, deployed part of the stockpile? 

Dr. MILLER. Each nuclear weapon life extension is unique to its type and the 

hedge required to support operational requirements. Total quantities for each life 

extension are determined by accounting for operational needs, reliability and surveillance testing, spares, and hedge needs. Hedge quantities are affected by geopolitical and technical requirements to support each leg of the triad. The Administration is reviewing hedging requirements and their implication for stockpile size 

and status as part of the Nuclear Posture Review implementation study. 

Mr. TURNER. Would you please elaborate on your statement that ‘‘To date no decisions have been made with respect to future force sizing or the modernization plans 

for nuclear delivery systems; such decisions will be informed by the Administration’s 

ongoing review of deterrence requirements’’? Do the commitments made for modernization in the 1251 Report still hold? Does the President’s commitment to the 

Senate during New START consideration still hold? In a message to the Senate on 

New START, the President said: ‘‘I intend to (a) modernize or replace the triad of 

strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile, 

an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM.’’ 

Dr. MILLER. To date, no final decisions have been made with respect to the specific future force sizing or the modernization plans for nuclear delivery systems— 

i.e., the exact mix of delivery systems and warheads under the New START Treaty. 

Such decisions will be informed by the Administration’s ongoing review of deterrence requirements. I can assure you, however, that these decisions will be consistent with the goals of the NPR, including to maintain strategic stability, provide 

assurance to our Allies and partners regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella and other security commitments, and to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

The Administration is committed to making the investments necessary to recapitalize the nuclear enterprise and ensure we have the highly skilled personnel needed to maintain our nuclear capabilities. These are large investments that must be 

made over an extended period, but are essential to U.S. national security. 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) says that ‘‘the presence of 

U.S. nuclear weapons—combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons—contribute 

to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed 

to regional threats.’’ 

a. Please explain how the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe contributes to 

NATO cohesion, reassurance, and stability. 

b. In particular, which NATO allies value these nuclear weapons and ‘‘feel exposed to regional threats’’? 

c. Will unanimity among NATO members be required before any major changes 

are made to our nuclear posture in Europe? What sorts of changes to our nuclear 

posture in Europe might we undertake without unanimity of NATO members? 

Dr. MILLER. The Strategic Concept reinforced that the Alliance will maintain an 

‘‘appropriate mix’’ of nuclear and conventional forces, and that the Alliance would 

‘‘remain a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist.’’ As such, nuclear 

weapons contribute to overall cohesion and stability of the Alliance. The Strategic 

Concept also lays out the threats to which all members are exposed, including conventional threats, proliferation threats, terrorism, and cyber attacks. No major 

changes to nuclear posture would be expected without consensus from Alliance 

members. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Miller, you recently told a reporter that DOD might be willing 

to contribute more funding to NNSA’s nuclear modernization efforts, but would not 

be willing to transfer any more budget authority if the Energy and Water appropriators do not use it for the intended modernization purpose. Were you referring to 

some of the $8.3 billion in budget authority DOD has already pledged for NNSA, 

or were you referring to additional funds beyond this $8.3 billion? 

Dr. MILLER. The approximately $8.3B pledged for NNSA consisted of two separate 

transfers—the first was $5.7B during Fiscal Year (FY)11–FY15 and the second was 
135 

$2.5B during the FY12–16 period. This second transfer was intended to be distributed annually. It is the annual distribution of this second transfer that I believe 

should be reconsidered if funding is not appropriated as it was intended. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Miller, you recently said that you haven’t seen anything to suggest that $7.6 billion for NNSA Weapons Activities is not the correct figure for 

FY12. Would you please elaborate? 

Dr. MILLER. The Fiscal Year (FY)12 Presidential Budget Request for NNSA Weapon Activities was $7,629,716,000, which is the amount required to meet DOD nuclear weapons requirements. This figure was arrived at after careful consideration 

of the need to implement the policies of the Nuclear Posture Review and the requirements of the New START Treaty. This funding request is in alignment with 

the ten-year funding profile in the report pursuant to Section 1251 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010; this profile was provided to Congress in February 2011. It also includes a transfer of funds from the DOD to the 

NNSA to ensure weapon life extension programs and nuclear facility modernization 

efforts are funded appropriately. 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 NPR states that nuclear force reductions are possible because of overwhelming conventional military superiority. Since the NPR was written, $330 billion in weapons systems have been cancelled and $489 billion has been 

taken out of the defense budget. And now we have the specter of sequester looming 

ahead with the promise of an additional half trillion in cuts. Is this premise in the 

2010 NPR still valid? At what point is it not? Where is the break-point in terms 

of our conventional military superiority as we see both China’s large buildup in conventional military capability and asymmetric capabilities and China and Russia’s 

major nuclear modernization programs? 

Dr. MILLER. Under the funding levels required by the Budget Control Act, the 

United States will continue to possess overwhelming conventional capability against 

any conceivable adversary for the foreseeable future. If sequestration occurs, the 

scale and arbitrary nature of the required cuts to defense spending would inflict severe damage on the U.S. military. In this case, the United States would need to reconsider all elements of its defense strategy. 

Mr. TURNER. After implementation of the New START Treaty and the NPR, what 

percentage of our strategic forces will be deployed on submarines? 

a. Has the U.S. ever deployed so much of its deterrent on a single platform before? 

In other words, on one leg of the triad and on one type of submarine, ICBM, or 

bomber? What risks does the U.S. accept by doing so? 

Dr. MILLER. Final decisions on specific force mix under New START have not yet 

been made, but more than half of our operational strategic warheads will be deployed on submarines. 

The United States since the end of the Cold War, has deployed a large portion 

of our forces on SSBNs. The percentage of warheads deployed aboard SSBNs today 

is very similar to what we would expect after full implementation of the New 

START Treaty. 

There are both operational and technical risks associated with strategic submarines. The operational risk is that these submarines could become vulnerable— 

a scenario that appears highly unlikely for the indefinite future. The technical risk 

is that a problem with the type of warheads carried on the submarines, or with our 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or the submarines themselves, could result in 

that portion of the force becoming unavailable. A massive technical failure is also 

highly unlikely. However, because of the importance of the nuclear deterrence mission we mitigate these risks by maintaining the capability to upload other legs of 

the Triad in response. To be well-hedged against a technical surprise remains a key 

priority, and is one of the metrics we use when evaluating force structures. 

Mr. TURNER. The NPR concluded that ‘‘the current alert posture of U.S. strategic 

forces . . . should be maintained for the present.’’ Please explain why the NPR 

reached this decision. What are the benefits of our current alert posture? Do you 

anticipate changes in this decision? 

Dr. MILLER. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) considered the possibility of reducing alert response requirements for ICBMs and at-sea response requirements of 

SSBNs, and concluded that such steps could reduce crisis stability by giving an adversary the incentive to attack before ‘‘re-alerting’’ was complete. At the same time, 

the NPR concluded that returning heavy bombers to full-time nuclear alert was not 

necessary, assuming the other two Triad legs retain an adequate alert posture. 

The current alert posture supports strategic stability through an assured secondstrike capability. It ensures that, in the calculations of any potential opponent, the 

perceived gains of attacking the United States or its Allies and partners would be 

far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response. 
136 

At this time, I do not anticipate any major changes in the alert posture for U.S. 

strategic forces. 

Mr. TURNER. Germany and Norway have put forward ideas in the DDPR process 

to increase transparency in NATO’s nuclear mission and NATO’s nuclear forces. 

What transparency measures are being considered? 

a. What NATO transparency measures are the U.S. comfortable with NATO doing 

unilaterally (i.e., without reciprocal and proportionate action by Russia)? 

b. What NATO transparency measures would we only consider doing bilaterally 

based on agreements with Russia? Would you anticipate such bilateral agreements 

being based on non-binding agreements or through some sort of binding treaty or 

agreement? 

c. How does the administration define ‘‘transparency’’? How does it define 

‘‘verification’’? How are the two concepts related? 

Dr. MILLER. The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) process is still 

in the deliberative stages. We have not determined what constitutes ‘‘transparency 

measures’’ and which ones will be considered. 

Transparency and verification are closely related concepts. The New START Treaty, for instance, provides significant transparency regarding the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia through its extensive verification 

regime. The Treaty’s verification measures include extensive notifications, prohibitions on interference with National Technical Means (NTM), unique identifiers, inspections, and exhibitions. These measures allow each side to gain important insights into the other side’s strategic forces. They also reduce uncertainty about the 

future direction of Russian strategic forces and assist in improved planning for our 

future defense needs. On the whole, this shared knowledge is valuable for maintaining strategic stability between the two major nuclear powers. 

Mr. TURNER. How does the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP), which would consolidate several different versions of the B61 into a single B61–12 version, link to 

our extended deterrent in Europe? 

a. What are the implications, both to our extended deterrent and more broadly, 

of delay in the B61 LEP? 

b. Why is it important to increase surety in B61 warheads during the LEP? 

Dr. MILLER. The intent of the B61 LEP is to consolidate four current versions of 

the B61 family of bombs into one single version that will continue to sustain both 

our strategic and extended deterrence missions. NNSA, in coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD), identified the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and 

Full Operating Capability (FOC) to ensure that a seamless transition between the 

B61–12 and the earlier versions that it is replacing is achieved without any loss in 

operational capability. The NNSA and DOD will continue to address any delay in 

meeting these dates that could potentially jeopardize those missions and the extended deterrence commitment to our Allies and friends. 

As part of any life extension program, NNSA considers options for enhancing the 

safety, security, and use control features of a weapon system as part of the Phases 

6.1/2/2A process. Policy directives require an assessment of the warhead to meet 

safety and security objectives for the future. This process ensures that viable weapon surety features are identified and evaluated against all other design requirements and balanced against cost and schedule risks to assure our commitment to 

a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

Mr. TURNER. When will a decision be made regarding how specifically our nuclear 

forces will be structured to comply with the New START Treaty? When will deMIRVing of our ICBM forces begin to occur? 

Dr. MILLER. To date, no final decisions have been made with respect to force 

structure under the new START Treaty; such decisions will be informed by the 

Obama Administration’s ongoing review of deterrence requirements. I can assure 

you that these decisions will be consistent with the goals of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), including to maintain strategic stability, provide assurance to our Allies 

and partners regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and other security commitments, and to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

Partial ‘‘de-MIRVing’’ (MIRV, Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle) of our ICBM 

forces began in the 1990s as part of our reductions under the START Treaty. The 

Air Force has also begun the complete de-MIRVing of the rest of the ICBM force, 

as directed in the NPR, in conjunction with previous commitments and Air Forceestablished maintenance plans. This minimizes disruption to our operational forces 

and is the most cost-effective method for carrying out the NPR guidance to de-MIRV 

the ICBM force. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Miller, in your remarks, you said ‘‘The U.S. nuclear arsenal included 5,113 weapons as of September 30, 2009, at the time of our last unclassified 

release of stockpile totals.’’ How many of those weapons were in the various cat-
137 

egories of active, inactive, deployed, non-deployed, etc.? Is there any intention to 

make such detailed numbers public? 

Dr. MILLER. The specific numbers associated with the deployed/non-deployed, active/inactive stockpile remain classified and, as such, are not to be made public. 

However, the United States declared an aggregate 1,790 warheads on deployed 

ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and counted for deployed heavy bombers to the Russian 

Federation as part of the New START Treaty on September 1, 2011. There is no 

current plan to make public the specific numbers of deployed/non-deployed, active/ 

inactive stockpile weapons. 

Mr. TURNER. How many nuclear warheads does Russia make each year? What is 

our estimate for how many it can make? How does this compare to actual U.S. production and our potential production capacity? 

Dr. MILLER. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Miller, when you said ‘‘unclassified estimates suggest that Russia has 4,000 to 6,500 total nuclear weapons, of which 2,000 to 4,000 are non-strategic tactical nuclear weapons,’’ are those numbers active warheads or all Russia 

warheads (including those in storage or non-deployed status)? 

Dr. MILLER. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Are you concerned about reports about China potentially increasing 

the MIRVing of its land- and sea-based ballistic missiles? How might this trend affect the nuclear balance and our nuclear policies 10 or 20 years from now? Are you 

concerned about reports of Russia developing and deploying new heavy, highlyMIRV’d, silo-based ICBMs? How would deployment of this system affect strategic 

stability and U.S. nuclear policies and strategies? Did the U.S. seek to ban such systems during New START negotiations? 

Dr. MILLER. We are concerned about the pace and scope of the modernization of 

China’s nuclear capabilities, both quantitatively and qualitatively. We are also concerned about the lack of transparency regarding the strategy and doctrine guiding 

this effort. Moreover, the overall lack of transparency surrounding China’s nuclear 

programs and capabilities raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions 

and makes it difficult to assess the future nuclear balance. 

A Russian deployment of a new heavy, highly MIRVed, silo-based ICBM would 

reduce our strategic stability. The United States is taking steps to enhance strategic 

stability, including de-MIRVing ICBMs and sustaining a robust at sea presence of 

strategic submarines. These U.S. steps reduce first-strike incentives for both sides, 

thereby enhancing stability. 

These questions and potential concerns illustrate why we continue to pursue highlevel, bilateral dialogues with China and Russia that seek to promote a more stable, 

resilient, and transparent strategic relationships. 

Mr. TURNER. The NPR mentions ‘‘strategic stability’’ more than a dozen times, but 

never defined it. How does the administration define ‘‘strategic stability’’? How does 

it relate to force structure, numbers, and modernization? How do nuclear modernization programs in Russia and China affect strategic stability? How is strategic 

stability affected in the long-term if other countries continue their nuclear modernization efforts but our own modernization effort stalls or is greatly reduced in 

scope? 

Dr. MILLER. Strategic stability exists when no side has incentives or believes the 

other side has incentives to attempt to conduct a disarming first-strike, whether in 

a day-to-day situation (‘‘bolt-from-the-blue’’ scenario) or in a severe crisis (‘‘preemption in crisis’’ scenario). Survivable nuclear forces and command and control are 

critical to strategic stability, and other factors including the de-MIRVing of silobased ICBMs contribute to stability. Modernization that sustains or improves the 

survivability of nuclear forces and command and control can be stabilizing. Increased transparency and discussions on strategic doctrine, which the United States 

would like to expand with Russia and initiate with China, can also improve stability 

by reducing the prospects for miscommunication or misperception. 

Mr. TURNER. General Kehler, you cautioned against cutting the budget or size of 

our nuclear forces too deeply, resulting in what you called a ‘‘hollow force.’’ For each 

of the three legs of the triad, what are the breakpoints or red-lines in the size of 

the force or budget that would result in a ‘‘hollow force’’ for that leg? 

a. What analysis has been done to examine these questions? 

b. Would cutting one wing of ICBMs—leaving us with two wings—potentially result in a hollow force in that leg of the triad? 

General KEHLER. A hollow force is a force giving the appearance of readiness 

when, in fact, the capability is not there. The force may be hollow if it is too small 

for the job, is inadequately supported, or lacks an adequate industrial base. There-
138 

fore, any discussion and assessment on ‘‘hollow force’’ or breakpoints must be preceded by a thorough analysis of the strategy, its objectives, force composition, and 

the level of budgetary support. 

A. Resources and force structure identified in the President’s Budget and the updated 1251 Report are adequate to support today’s strategic deterrent strategy and 

policy goals as we move forward to implement New START. 

B. Eliminating a wing of ICBMs would not necessarily create a hollow force, provided the remaining wings can meet national strategic deterrent requirements, and 

are properly trained, equipped, maintained, sustained, and led. 

Mr. TURNER. At the House Armed Services Committee’s October 13 hearing, Secretary of Defense Panetta said, ‘‘With regards to reducing our nuclear arena, I think 

that is an area where I don’t think we ought to do that unilaterally—we ought to 

do that on the basis of negotiations with the Russians and others to make sure we 

are all walking the same path.’’ To ensure we are not reducing unilaterally, will we 

retain nuclear forces that are at—or very near—the limits on strategic forces imposed by the New START Treaty? Otherwise, wouldn’t it by definition be ‘‘unilateral’’ reductions? 

a. Would you support reductions if they were a part of a non-binding agreement 

with Russia? 

b. At what force levels do we need to start bringing the ‘‘others’’ Secretary Panetta 

mentions, particularly China, into the picture? 

General KEHLER. As specified in the 1251 report, we are presently looking at New 

START implementation plans that are ‘‘at or very near the limits imposed by the 

New START Treaty.’’ Any recommendations to depart from that approach would 

have to be based on the international situation and our deterrence, assurance and 

stability needs. 

Regarding bringing states other than Russia into negotiated nuclear arms reductions, the New START negotiating position took into account our total force requirement involving all potential threats. As discussed in the Nuclear Posture Review, 

we should bring others into the ‘‘picture’’ now. But the ‘‘picture’’ is not necessarily 

limited to negotiated arms reductions. Rather, the nature and objectives of our 

interactions with others should be tailored to the countries involved. 

Mr. TURNER. Would you support unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces, below 

the levels prescribed by New START? Would you support reductions if they are part 

of a non-binding agreement with Russia? 

General KEHLER. I support the 13 October statement of Secretary of Defense Panetta: ‘‘With regards to reducing our nuclear arena, I think that is an area where 

I don’t think we ought to do that unilaterally—we ought to do that on the basis of 

negotiations with the Russians and others to make sure we are all walking the 

same path.’’ We are currently looking at New START force structures that are at 

or very near the limits contained in New START. 

Mr. TURNER. General Kehler, your predecessor at U.S. Strategic Command, General Kevin Chilton, said in June 2010 that, with regards to the size of our nuclear 

arsenal, ‘‘I do not agree that it is more than is needed. I think the arsenal that we 

have is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent. And I say this in light 

of—when we talk about the non-deployed portion of the arsenal, it is sized to be 

able to allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the current deployed arsenal and any geopolitical concerns.’’ Do you agree? 

General KEHLER. The nuclear arsenal is sized to meet current policy and strategy 

objectives and manage technical and geopolitical risks. The non-deployed stockpile 

provides considerable flexibility to respond to operational issues, technical failures 

or breakthroughs, and geopolitical uncertainty. We annually review stockpile requirements to seek the most cost efficient force mix to provide deterrence capabilities and manage risk. 

Mr. TURNER. How many military personnel have full or partial access to 

STRATCOM’s OPLAN 8010? How many must have knowledge of its contents to fulfill their jobs and missions? 

General KEHLER. Full access to all portions of OPLAN 8010 is limited to our most 

senior leadership. OPLAN 8010 is built on a full spectrum of missions (nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic) that involve all levels of USSTRATCOM and its components. Because the majority of the base plan and supporting annexes are classified 

SECRET, military members with at least a SECRET clearance and need-to-know 

can be granted access. However, those portions of the plan do not include the details 

of our nuclear employment planning. Some portions of the plan contain data which 

are classified at a higher level, including those portions that include the details of 

our nuclear employment planning, and access to those portions is limited accordingly. 
139 

Mr. TURNER. When does our current force of Minuteman III ICBMs start aging 

out? What life extension programs are currently underway for the ICBMs? 

a. What assessments or surveillance are we doing related to aging in the ICBM 

force? 

b. What are our plans or programs to extend the life of our Minuteman III 

ICBMs? When must the decision be made to proceed with life extension? 

c. What are our plans or programs to replace the Minuteman III ICBM force? 

When must the decision be made on a replacement program? 

General KEHLER. We are confident Minuteman is sustainable through mid-2020s 

and are engaged with the Air Force to identify any additional steps required to sustain Minuteman through 2030. The Air Force is refurbishing the propulsion system 

rocket engines and warhead fuzes, making improvements to depot and field support 

equipment, and security and C2 sub-systems. 

A. The Air Force conducts a comprehensive aging and surveillance program and 

reports the results to USSTRATCOM. The surveillance and testing program includes ground and flight testing. Results are used to assess performance of the 

weapon system and provide insights on the need for refurbishment and replacement 

programs. 

B. The current Air Force plan is to extend Minuteman through component replacement. This program is ongoing and reflected in the PB12 budget. Major subsystems being refurbished include the propulsion system rocket engine and warhead 

fuzes. Guidance and propulsion sub-systems require attention in the very near future to ensure performance through 2030. Additionally, the Air Force is making investments in advanced technology to support these future efforts. 

C. Analysis is underway to support the Minuteman recapitalization. The Air Force 

plans to conduct a Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to examine the full range of alternatives including mobile options, as 

directed by the NPR. The decision on investment for a Minuteman replacement depends on AoA findings. Early investments may be required in the FY14 budget. The 

goal is to ensure current and future investments on sub-systems are leveraged in 

the recapitalization solution. 

Mr. TURNER. How do we support the industrial base for ICBMs and submarine 

launched ballistic missiles? Please compare and contrast our approach to maintaining the industrial base for these two programs. 

a. The committee has been informed that there is a low-rate production program 

in place for the D5 SLBM program. Is a similar program in place for Minuteman 

III? 

b. Do you have any concerns related to the rocket motor industrial base, now that 

NASA has canceled so many of its human spaceflight programs? Is DOD shouldering too much of the burden in this area now? 

General KEHLER. Various DOD solid rocket motor investments support the industrial base. DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) conducts 

science and technology (S&T) activities in propulsion in the Technology for 

Sustainment of Strategic Systems Program. The Air Force conducts propulsion Research Development Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) activities in the Demonstration and Validation Program. The Navy D5 Life-Extension Program executes ongoing production of the D5 missile. 

A. The Air Force conducts ongoing RDT&E efforts which could support a future 

low-rate production activity, if funded by the Air Force. 

B. In order to support strategic systems, the DOD will bear an increased proportion of the industry’s overhead costs. These increases will be reflected in ongoing 

production and future development programs. In addition, the U.S. needs to ensure 

the complete design-to-production industrial capability and suppliers are sustained. 

Loss of these capabilities would require numerous years and significant cost to reconstitute. 

Mr. TURNER. General Kehler, your predecessor as commander of Strategic Command, General Kevin Shelton, said the following in June 2010: ‘‘The reason we have 

to maintain this large inventory is because we no longer have the ability to produce 

nuclear weapons in this country. The infrastructure has been allowed to decay and 

get to a point where we cannot do that. The Russians, on the other hand, have an 

ability to produce nuclear weapons. That is how they hedge. And so, this is why 

it’s—I think, the NPR findings and the investments in the nuclear infrastructure 

and the personnel and expertise that is required to sustain the stockpile are so important so that by the time we get to next decade, we’ll be in a position to look at 

our non-deployed arsenal and consider future reductions to that. But today, I think 

we have what we need to support the deterrent.’’ Earlier this year, Administrator 

D’Agostino testified before this subcommittee that NNSA’s new plutonium and uranium facilities—the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facil-
140 

ity in New Mexico and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) in Tennessee—need 

to be ‘‘up and running’’ before we make substantial cuts to the non-deployed stockpile. General Kehler, do you agree with these statements by General Chilton and 

Administrator D’Agostino? 

a. Should ‘‘up and running’’ mean the facilities are being built, or should they 

have demonstrated actual production capability? What metrics should we be using 

to judge that the infrastructure is robust enough to support reductions in the nondeployed stockpile without undue risk? 

b. General Kehler, would you please provide the military’s perspective on the link 

between nuclear modernization and the ability to reduce non-deployed weapons? 

c. Do DOD and NNSA have a clear plan on what reductions in the non-deployed 

stockpile are possible or planned for the future, and how those reductions align with 

infrastructure and stockpile modernization milestones? 

d. Has STRATCOM provided NNSA input regarding how many non-deployed 

weapons the military requires kept in the stockpile as a ‘‘hedge’’? Please provide this 

information to the committee. 

e. If nuclear modernization is delayed or postponed, can we reduce the size of the 

non-deployed stockpile? How many non-deployed nuclear weapons would 

STRATCOM want to see retained as a risk mitigation measure or ‘‘hedge’’? If one 

or both of UPF and CMRR are delayed in getting ‘‘up and running,’’ what levels and 

types of non-deployed warheads would you recommend keeping in the stockpile as 

a risk mitigation measure or ‘‘hedge’’? Please be specific. 

General KEHLER. NNSA’s uranium and plutonium facilities are vitally important, 

but are not the only considerations associated with reductions in non-deployed 

weapons. There is a broader set of considerations including the stockpile’s condition, 

progress on life extension programs, and demonstrated infrastructure capabilities 

(existing or modernized). The current non-deployed stockpile’s purpose is to manage 

risk and we continuously assess and look for cost-efficient opportunities to mitigate 

risk. 

A. For the infrastructure to have a significant role in risk mitigation there needs 

to be demonstrated production capabilities. Again, there is a broader set of considerations beyond capacity that influence non-deployed stockpile composition. For example, NNSA needs to demonstrate the ability to conduct surveillance, perform maintenance and execute weapon life extension programs on schedule. 

B. As the U.S. currently has a limited production capacity, we rely on the nondeployed stockpile for the following reasons: 1) mitigate technical risk in our aging 

stockpile; 2) provide logistics spares to ensure efficient operations; 3) provide risk 

management for geopolitical uncertainty. The link is the ability of the infrastructure 

to assume some of these functions. 

C. The SSMP reflects our current estimate of planned reductions in the non-deployed stockpile. Considerations that went into the development of the SSMP included alignment with stockpile modernization milestones and projected infrastructure capabilities. We conduct an annual process to evaluate and adjust stockpile size 

and composition to meet strategic deterrence requirements and manage risk. 

D. We participate in an annual interagency process that proposes stockpile composition and is reviewed by the Nuclear Weapons Council and submitted to the 

President for approval. A document produced in support of this process contains a 

detailed breakdown of non-deployed weapons including those retained as a hedge. 

Release authority resides with the Chairman, Nuclear Weapons Council. 

E. I consider three important elements of nuclear modernization: 1) sustainment 

activities needed to ensure a safe, secure, and effective stockpile and annual stockpile certification; 2) progress on longer-term life extension activities; and, 3) the infrastructure’s capacity to support the stockpile and assume some of the functions 

of the non-deployed hedge. An assessment of these elements is necessary to make 

informed recommendations on further reductions. It may be possible to make prudent reductions of the non-deployed stockpile without incurring operational risk. 

Again, from my perspective, the facilities are important, but are not the only considerations associated with non-deployed reductions. 

Mr. TURNER. What are STRATCOM’s requirements for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility and Uranium Processing Facility 

(UPF) in terms of capacity at each facility? When does STRATCOM need the facilities to be fully operational? 

a. General Kehler, are you familiar with NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), which projects a 20-year plan for NNSA facilities and assumes further reductions in the number of total warheads? Has STRATCOM fully 

endorsed that plan for the entire 20-year timeframe it covers? If not, up until when 

are NNSA and STRATCOM in agreement? As NNSA’s customer for the nuclear 
141 

weapons it produces and sustains, is STRATCOM in full agreement with NNSA’s 

SSMP plan? 

General KEHLER. NNSA’s uranium and plutonium facility capacity is important 

to sustain the stockpile, dismantle retired weapons, and support non-proliferation 

efforts. These facilities represent a national capability and they need to be updated. 

USSTRATCOM’s requirement is for a capability to conduct surveillance, maintenance and life extensions in sufficient capacity to sustain our deployed and non-deployed stockpile. 

A. I am familiar with the SSMP and was consulted during development through 

the Nuclear Weapons Council. The FY12 SSMP captures the planned activities 

needed to sustain a safe, secure and effective stockpile. There is DOD and NNSA 

consensus on the need to modernize the complex and agreement on projected stockpile quantities through FY2030. The stockpile requirements are reviewed annually 

by an inter-agency process to maintain stockpile effectiveness and manage risks. 

The plan’s execution is dependent on a long-term commitment of funding. 

Mr. TURNER. If we continue reducing the total number of nuclear weapons and 

delivery vehicles, there will naturally be a drive to reduce the number of types of 

weapons and delivery vehicles. We are already seeing this with consolidation of several B61 variants into a single variant, and the drive to study a common ICBM and 

SLBM warhead. Are we increasing technical risk by this consolidation—that is, are 

we increasing the consequences and likelihood of a technical failure that puts a 

large portion of the stockpile out of action? How are we dealing with this problem 

as we move towards a smaller stockpile? 

General KEHLER. Reducing the total number of nuclear weapon types can allow 

us to cost effectively sustain capabilities without necessarily increasing technical 

risk. The principal technical risk is age related degradation. Therefore, comprehensive life extension programs that consolidate variants and improve reliability are 

more important than multiple weapon types. For example, today there are five aged 

B61 weapon types in stockpile. Upon completion of the planned B61 life extension 

there will be single B61 variant with improved long-term reliability. This reduces 

stockpile resource requirements needed for sustaining this air delivered capability. 

Likewise, introduction of commonality for multiple ballistic missile warheads increases operational flexibility and allows the reduction of non-deployed warheads retained as a hedge. Consolidation and commonality risk are further managed 

through acquisition strategies, comprehensive surveillance, and increased component testing over the life cycle. 

Mr. TURNER. General Kehler, what are your views on warhead diversity? In what 

cases would you be comfortable going down to a single warhead or bomb for a leg 

of the triad or a particular delivery system? For example, why is it helpful to have 

a B61 and a B83 in terms of failure of one warhead type? Does your view change 

at smaller stockpile sizes? 

General KEHLER. Warhead diversity and condition of the stockpile are important 

factors in our ability to mitigate the risk of technical failure. Given the ‘‘aged’’ condition of our nuclear weapons and limited production capacity of our complex, diversity becomes significant as we strive to maintain a credible deterrent over a range 

of potential risk scenarios. However, there is inherent flexibility in our Triad as we 

can mitigate risk of warhead failure in one leg with a warhead from another. We 

assess diversity and condition of the stockpile during our annual stockpile planning 

process. 

Mr. TURNER. How would cutting a wing on ICBMs—150 missiles in total—affect 

STRATCOM’s nuclear targeting? Could STRATCOM fulfill the nuclear targeting 

and employment guidance that exists today, if a wing of ICBMs were eliminated? 

General KEHLER. ICBMs remain a valuable component of our nuclear deterrent 

force. They provide a prompt response option to the President and complicate an adversary’s decision calculus in many ways. We are presently looking at a variety of 

force mixtures that would meet our deterrence objective and fulfill current nuclear 

targeting and employment guidance. Any decision by the President to reduce the 

ICBM force, or any other leg of the Triad, could require adjustments to the rest of 

the strategic force. 

Mr. TURNER. Is STRATCOM involved in setting requirements for surveillance activities needed for sustainment and monitoring of the stockpile? How? Is 

STRATCOM comfortable with NNSA’s current surveillance program—does it meet 

STRATCOM’s needs and requirements? 

General KEHLER. NNSA establishes the detailed surveillance requirements to ensure data is available to support annual stockpile certification. USSTRATCOM annually assesses the safety, security and military effectiveness of the stockpile based 

on surveillance findings. Our annual assessment process highlighted the need for 

the increased surveillance investment contained in the FY11 and FY12 budgets. 
142 

These funding levels need to be continued to address the backlog of surveillance activities and improve understanding of our aging systems. 

Mr. TURNER. After implementation of the New START Treaty and the NPR, what 

percentage of our strategic forces will be deployed on submarines? 

a. Has the U.S. ever deployed so much of its deterrent on a single platform before? 

In other words, on one leg of the triad and on one type of submarine, ICBM, or 

bomber? What risks does the U.S. accept by doing so? 

General KEHLER. Current plans detailed in the 1251 Report reflect a ∼10% increase in accountable weapons on submarines over current levels. 

A. In the early years of the Triad, bombers carried a significant percentage of our 

nuclear deterrent. As Triad systems developed, distribution of the deterrent became 

more balanced. The risk of technical failure or technological breakthrough on one 

leg of the Triad is mitigated by the unique and complimentary attributes of the 

Triad. Retaining all three legs is the best method to mitigate risk and maintain 

strategic stability. 

Mr. TURNER. The NPR concluded that ‘‘the current alert posture of U.S. strategic 

forces . . . should be maintained for the present.’’ Please explain why the NPR 

reached this decision. What are the benefits of our current alert posture? Do you 

anticipate changes in this decision? 

General KEHLER. In the NPR’s comprehensive review assurance, deterrence, nonproliferation, ability to respond to technical and geopolitical challenges and the unlikely event of deterrence failure were considered when examining the nation’s nuclear force posture. The posture today provides a responsive and survivable capability day-to-day to the President and it provides an ability to change the posture 

as necessary in response to a changed environment or crisis. We constantly review 

our force posture and will adjust it as needed to meet our strategic needs and the 

operational circumstances. 

Mr. TURNER. How does the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP), which would consolidate several different versions of the B61 into a single B61–12 version, link to 

our extended deterrent in Europe? 

a. What are the implications, both to our extended deterrent and more broadly, 

of delay in the B61 LEP? 

b. Why is it important to increase surety in B61 warheads during the LEP? 

General KEHLER. The B61 is critical to extended deterrence because it is the only 

weapon available for delivery by both heavy bombers and tactical fighter aircraft 

meeting NATO commitments. The LEP addresses critical components that are 

reaching end-of-life and require replacement and/or refurbishment. Consolidation 

into a B61–12 conserves resources and reduces life-cycle costs while enabling us to 

meet both our strategic and extended deterrence requirements. 

A. Delay to the LEP timeline will increase risk in meeting the required number 

of weapons, with the required capabilities, for both strategic and extended deterrence requirements. In addition, there will likely be a substantial cost increase. 

B. It is important to improve safety and security while maintaining the effectiveness of nuclear weapons during life extension. The upcoming planned life extension 

provides an opportunity to cost effectively make these improvements during a time 

period the nuclear complex has production capacity. It is a prudent course of action 

to improve surety given the threat of nuclear terrorism. 

Mr. TURNER. When will a decision be made regarding how specifically our nuclear 

forces will be structured to comply with the New START Treaty? When will deMIRVing of our ICBM forces begin to occur? 

General KEHLER. Discussions regarding final nuclear force structure are ongoing. 

Force structure changes will be reflected in the annual 1251 Reports to Congress. 

Air Force plans to begin de-MIRVing in FY12. 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) considered potential elimination of one or more legs of the triad, but ultimately decided to keep the full triad. 

General Kehler, in an interview two weeks ago, you said, ‘‘I continue to stand by 

the need for a triad.’’ Please explain the benefits of the triad, and why you believe 

we still need it. 

General KEHLER. I agree with the results of the NPR study that concluded that 

we should retain a nuclear triad under the New START Treaty. The triad provides 

an effective, flexible and resilient capability to deter potential adversaries, assure 

allies and partners, maintain strategic stability, and defend U.S. and allied interests 

should deterrence fail. Each leg of the triad provides unique capabilities, and presents an adversary with unique problems. 

Mr. TURNER. General Kehler, B–52 and B–2 bombers are hardened to protect 

them from electromagnetic radiation in the event of a nearby nuclear detonation. 

a. What will be the added cost to harden the next generation bomber, vs. leave 

it unhardened? 
143 

b. The Air Force has said it can save money by delaying nuclear certification and 

hardening of the next generation bomber until the current bombers are readying for 

retirement. When would this nuclear certification take place—what is the expected 

initial operational capability date for its nuclear role? Would the next generation 

bomber be hardened from the start, and just not certified initially? How much 

money would this save, and when would this savings be realized? 

General KEHLER. A. The Air Force is not at the point in the development process 

that would enable a detailed cost estimate of platform hardening. 

B. Testing and nuclear certification schedules have not been determined. We are 

in consultation with the Air Force as requirements are being developed. Certification needs to occur prior to a capability gap in our air leg. Our understanding is 

the new bomber will be built from the start to support the nuclear mission. Detailed 

cost comparisons are not yet available; however, it is more cost effective to nuclear 

harden early in development than trying to add these capabilities later. 

Mr. TURNER. Before New START, the U.S. sea-based strategic deterrent mission 

was carried out with a force of 14 ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with 24 missile tubes each. DOD has announced that to comply with New START limits, by 

2018 we will have at most 14 SSBNs with 20 missile tubes each. The SSBN(X) 

‘‘Milestone A’’ decision earlier this year indicates that when the Ohio-class replacement is fully deployed we will make do with 12 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes each. 

a. General Kehler, if the reductions in the number of missile tubes and submarines proposed by the Navy’s Ohio-class replacement ‘‘Milestone A’’ decision take 

place (from 24 to 16 missile tubes, and from 14 boats to 12), could you still meet 

the existing targeting and employment guidance that is in place today? Is the ‘‘Milestone A’’ decision anticipating changes in nuclear targeting and employment guidance? 

b. To save money, some are proposing that we should further reduce the number 

of Ohio-class replacement submarines we buy, from 12 to 10, or 8, or even lower. 

General Kehler, given the decreased flexibility we will have by going to a lower 

number of tubes per boat, what is the minimum number of 16-tube boats we can 

procure and still meet deterrence and ‘‘at-sea’’ requirements? 

c. Documents provided to the committee by the Navy show that the total cost of 

designing, building, and operating a fleet of 12 Ohio-class replacement boats with 

20 missile tubes each would have been only 1.75% more (in current year dollars) 

than the total lifecycle cost of a 12-boat fleet with 16 missile tubes each. General 

Kehler, are you comfortable with this trade-off in flexibility to save 1.75% of the program’s total lifecycle cost? 

General KEHLER. A. The Milestone A decision did not assume any specific changes 

to targeting or employment guidance. Analyses considered a range of potential security environments, strategy requirements, and submarine force structures. 

Contingent on funding, the first Ohio replacement submarine will be available for 

strategic service in 2029. While there is uncertainty about the future strategic environment and policy requirements, I am confident that a plan to procure 12 Ohio Replacement SSBNs with 16 missile tubes will meet deterrence requirements. The ultimate number of submarines and tubes will depend on a number of factors including our deterrence needs and funding. 

B. The number of available SSBNs for strategic service is as important as the 

number of tubes. Today, 12 operational SSBNs are required to meet deterrence and 

at-sea requirements. The minimum number of Ohio Replacement SSBNs is based 

on an assessment of the security environment and requirements of the strategy at 

a given time. There is sufficient flexibility to adjust future force structure plans 

across the Triad, or if required, procure additional submarines. 

C. Yes, I am comfortable with the cost-capability trade that was made to balance 

fiscal and operational considerations. 

Mr. TURNER. Are you concerned about reports about China potentially increasing 

the MIRVing of its land- and sea-based ballistic missiles? How might this trend affect the nuclear balance and our nuclear policies 10 or 20 years from now? Are you 

concerned about reports of Russia developing and deploying new heavy, highlyMIRV’d, silo-based ICBMs? How would deployment of this system affect strategic 

stability and U.S. nuclear policies and strategies? Did the U.S. seek to ban such systems during New START negotiations? 

General KEHLER. We take seriously all reports of Russian and Chinese strategic 

force modernization. Both countries have ambitious programs. In China’s case, their 

efforts involve both modernization and expansion of their forces. However, while 

there is uncertainty regarding the intended scale of their force expansion, our current assessment is that it is unlikely to affect strategic stability. The possible Russian development and deployment of a new ICBM, which would be replacing an existing system, does not result in a significant change in their capabilities. How this 
144 

or any new Russian system ultimately affects strategic stability depends on Moscow’s success in deploying the new system and whether the Russians continue to 

honor their commitments under existing arms control regimes. In the New START 

negotiations, we did not seek to ban such systems. 

Mr. TURNER. At the House Armed Services Committee’s October 13 hearing, Secretary of Defense Panetta said, ‘‘With regards to reducing our nuclear arena, I think 

that is an area where I don’t think we ought to do that unilaterally—we ought to 

do that on the basis of negotiations with the Russians and others to make sure we 

are all walking the same path.’’ To ensure we are not reducing unilaterally, will we 

retain nuclear forces that are at—or very near—the limits on strategic forces imposed by the New START Treaty? Otherwise, wouldn’t it by definition be ‘‘unilateral’’ reductions? 

a. Would you support reductions if they were a part of a non-binding agreement 

with Russia? 

b. At what force levels do we need to start bringing the ‘‘others’’ Secretary Panetta 

mentions, particularly China, into the picture? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. a. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States 

and Russia have agreed to mutual, legally binding, verifiable limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals in order to prevent an arms race, increase transparency, and 

mitigate mistrust and surprises. These agreements have contributed to building 

trust and promoting stability in the relationship between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. Unilateral reductions would not provide the same level of predictability and stability as agreed upon treaties because there would be no obligation 

to make or maintain them. Furthermore, there would be no verification regime associated with the reductions. 

b. We are mindful of China’s military modernization programs, including its nuclear modernization, and the lack of transparency surrounding them. We monitor 

carefully these developments and, in concert with our allies and partners, will adjust our policies and approaches, as necessary. However, China does not now appear 

to be seeking parity with either the United States or Russia, and its nuclear arsenal 

remains much smaller than the U.S. and Russian arsenals. As a declared nuclear 

weapon state under the NPT, China’s restraint in its nuclear modernization is important to nuclear disarmament and global non-proliferation efforts. As the United 

States and Russia conduct bilateral negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals further, 

the United States will seek to expand dialogue with China on the doctrine, force 

structure, and strategic modernization programs of our two countries to improve 

mutual understanding, build trust, and reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation. 

Mr. TURNER. Data exchanges and on-site inspections between the U.S. and Russia 

under the New START Treaty have begun. What are we learning from these exchanges and inspections? Are we learning anything that might facilitate making a 

future arms control treaty verifiable—specifically a potential future treaty focused 

on non-deployed warheads and/or non-strategic warheads? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. One of the greatest contributions of the New START Treaty 

is its strong verification regime. This regime was developed to specifically verify the 

requirements of the New START Treaty. Negotiators worked very hard to find innovative new mechanisms to aid in the verification of this Treaty and the results from 

the first year of implementing the Treaty have been positive. On-site inspections are 

now being conducted routinely, as are the daily notification requirements that help 

track movements and changes in the status of systems. The New START Treaty 

data exchanges are providing us with a detailed picture of Russian strategic forces 

and the inspections give us crucial opportunities that we otherwise would not have 

to confirm the validity of the data required to support verification of the central limits of the New START Treaty. 

As we implement New START, we’re preparing for further nuclear reduction negotiations with Russia. To date, no previous arms control agreement has included 

provisions to limit and monitor nondeployed or nonstrategic warheads. Future limits 

on such warheads would require monitoring and verification different from those 

used in New START. While the New START Treaty’s verification provisions are not 

intended to provide the United States or Russia any information on each side’s nondeployed warheads and/or nonstrategic warheads, the verification regime will help 

by creating the foundation for future agreements. 

Mr. TURNER. What are some of the technical and procedural challenges associated 

with verifying a potential future treaty with Russia that limits non-deployed and 

non-strategic weapons? What must be done to resolve these technical and procedural challenges? Do you believe a treaty that limits non-deployed and non-strategic 

weapons can be fully verifiable? 
145 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The monitoring and verification of any potential future treaty limitations on nondeployed or nonstrategic nuclear weapons will be more difficult 

due primarily to the relatively small physical size of the items to be limited. Security concerns will pose a significant technical challenge to our ability to confirm that 

an object being counted during routine inspection is actually what it is declared to 

be; similarly, we would have security concerns regarding Russian access to U.S. nuclear warheads. The fact that air, sea- and ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear 

weapons are primarily based on delivery vehicles whose primary mission is non-nuclear adds complexity to designing verifiable limits on these weapons. 

Mr. TURNER. We have heard that within the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) process, some NATO allies might be encouraging several changes to 

NATO’s nuclear posture, possibly including: (1) consolidation of U.S. nuclear forces 

in Europe to one or more centralized bases, (2) decreasing the number of dual-capable aircraft our allies are required to maintain, (3) relaxing or eliminating requirements for pilots from allied nations to be trained and exercise in the nuclear mission, and (4) potential removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. 

a. Are any of these actions being considered by the DDPR? Which ones? 

b. Would NATO and the U.S. consider taking any of these steps unilaterally, without reciprocal and proportionate action on the part of Russia? 

i. What actions would we consider taking unilaterally, and what actions would we 

only undertake bilaterally with Russia? 

ii. What reciprocal actions would the U.S. look for from Russia in exchange for 

any of these four actions? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The principle task of the Deterrence and Defense Posture 

Review (DDPR) is to determine the appropriate mix of political and military instruments including conventional, nuclear, and missile defense forces that NATO will 

need to meet 21st-century security challenges. Alliance nuclear policy will be a key 

element of the review and there are no pre-ordained outcomes. NATO Allies agreed 

in the new Strategic Concept that sharing of nuclear risks and responsibilities is 

fundamental. We believe it is important to share the burden of the nuclear mission 

as broadly as possible. How best to accomplish this in the future is an issue we are 

committed to addressing in the DDPR. 

In its Strategic Concept, adopted in November 2010, NATO declared: ‘‘In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency of its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from 

the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.’’ 

The DDPR consultations will help to inform the appropriate posture for forwardbased U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; however, we do not expect that 

NATO would take steps to eliminate its nuclear capabilities in the absence of reciprocal steps by Russia. 

As National Security Advisor Donilon explained on March 29, 2011: ‘‘We will work 

with our NATO allies to shape an approach to reduce the role and number of U.S. 

tactical nuclear weapons, as Russia takes reciprocal measures to reduce its nonstrategic force and relocates its nonstrategic forces away from NATO’s borders.’’ 

Mr. TURNER. Are our NATO allies still planning to purchase dual-capable F–35s 

to replace their aging dual-capable aircraft? How many do they plan to purchase 

and when? Please describe the plans for NATO countries to replace or modernize 

their nuclear-capable aircraft, including numbers of aircraft and timelines for purchase. How are these plans being reflected in the DDPR? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. All NATO Allies agreed in the new Strategic Concept that 

the sharing of nuclear risks and responsibilities is fundamental and we believe it 

is important to share the burden of the nuclear mission as broadly as possible. 

Dual-capable aircraft and crews are one of the key ways to share the burden of the 

nuclear mission and as long as forward-based U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons remain in Europe, the Alliance needs to commit the resources necessary to maintain 

that capability. How best to accomplish this in the future is an issue that will be 

determined following the completion of the DDPR. 

Mr. TURNER. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) says that ‘‘the presence of 

U.S. nuclear weapons—combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons—contribute 

to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed 

to regional threats.’’ 

a. Please explain how the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe contributes to 

NATO cohesion, reassurance, and stability. 

b. In particular, which NATO allies value these nuclear weapons and ‘‘feel exposed to regional threats’’? 
146 

c. Will unanimity among NATO members be required before any major changes 

are made to our nuclear posture in Europe? What sorts of changes to our nuclear 

posture in Europe might we undertake without unanimity of NATO members? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. All NATO Allies agreed in the 2010 Strategic Concept that 

deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of NATO’s overall strategy. Allies also agreed collectively that 

the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have been contemplated are extremely remote, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will 

remain a nuclear alliance. NATO’s unique nuclear burden-sharing arrangements assure each member state of the strength of the U.S. commitment to collective defense, easing fears of exposure to regional threats that may arise. The nuclear burden-sharing arrangements also assure the United States that NATO Allies would 

be key partners in any future and immensely difficult decisions regarding nuclear 

employment on behalf of NATO. The role of nuclear weapons in defending Alliance 

members and the threat environment confronting the Alliance are being discussed 

as part of NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. Any changes in NATO’s 

nuclear posture, including forward-based U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, will be taken after a thorough review within—and decisions by—the Alliance 

as a whole. 

Mr. TURNER. Germany and Norway have put forward ideas in the DDPR process 

to increase transparency in NATO’s nuclear mission and NATO’s nuclear forces. 

What transparency measures are being considered? 

a. What NATO transparency measures are the U.S. comfortable with NATO doing 

unilaterally (i.e., without reciprocal and proportionate action by Russia)? 

b. What NATO transparency measures would we only consider doing bilaterally 

based on agreements with Russia? Would you anticipate such bilateral agreements 

being based on non-binding agreements or through some sort of binding treaty or 

agreement? 

c. How does the administration define ‘‘transparency’’? How does it define 

‘‘verification’’? How are the two concepts related? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. In advance of a new treaty limiting all types of nuclear 

weapons, we plan to consult with our Allies on reciprocal actions that could be taken 

on the basis of parallel steps with Russia. At the NATO Foreign Ministerial in Berlin on April 14–15, Poland, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands submitted a 

non-paper suggesting ways to increase transparency and build confidence with Russia. After the receipt of this non-paper, NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) 

tasked the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control and Disarmament Committee 

(WCDC) to provide input into the DDPR on possible options for reciprocal measures 

to reinforce and increase transparency, mutual trust and confidence with Russia. In 

the WCDC, NATO is now developing transparency and confidence-building options 

that could be pursued on a reciprocal basis with Russia. Initially, we would like to 

increase transparency on a reciprocal basis on the numbers, locations, and types of 

nonstrategic forces in Europe. Any transparency measures on U.S. NSNW forwardbased in Europe would require Alliance agreement. 

Transparency builds stability and security by helping to ensure against strategic 

surprise and by building the necessary confidence for force planning based on a realistic view of the current and likely force levels of others. Verification, the process 

by which we gather and analyze information to make a judgment about parties’ 

compliance or non-compliance with an agreement, is an integral part of the arms 

control regime. This Administration, as well as previous Administrations before it, 

evaluates effective verification of nuclear arms control agreements based on our 

ability to detect militarily significant violations before they become a threat to our 

national security. As stated in the 1992 report on START Treaty verifiability to the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 

‘‘A key criterion in evaluating whether a START agreement is effectively 

verifiable is whether, if the other side attempts to move beyond the limits of the 

Treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such a violation 

well before it becomes a threat to national security so that we are able to respond. 

Additionally, the verification regime should enable us to detect patterns of other violations that, while they do not present immediate risks to U.S. security, could, if 

left unchallenged, encourage actions that would pose such risks.’’ 

At least to the extent the parties trust in the information they receive through 

transparency measures, such measures can help bolster our confidence in the 

verifiability of a relevant arms control agreement. 

Mr. TURNER. How does the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP), which would consolidate several different versions of the B61 into a single B61–12 version, link to 

our extended deterrent in Europe? 
147 

a. What are the implications, both to our extended deterrent and more broadly, 

of delay in the B61 LEP? 

b. Why is it important to increase surety in B61 warheads during the LEP? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The B61 bombs assigned to support NATO are intended to 

provide for the collective security of all Alliance members. The B61 bombs couple 

U.S. and NATO security, and tangibly assure the members of NATO that the 

United States is committed to their national security. NATO is currently in the 

process of reviewing its nuclear posture as part of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review and there are no pre-ordained outcomes. However, as long as forwardbased U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons remain in Europe the Alliance needs to 

commit the resources necessary to maintain that capability and the B61 LEP is an 

important element of that. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Franks asked for several pieces of information, but I wanted to 

reiterate those requests and add one of my own. Please provide the information requested within two weeks: 

a. In your recent remarks at the Atlantic Council, you stated the following, ‘‘the 

Obama Administration’s approach provided more protection sooner against the existing threat, using proven systems, and at a lower cost than the previous proposal.’’ 

Your legislative affairs staff was asked to provide this committee the basis for the 

statement ‘‘at a lower cost than the previous proposal.’’ Please provide the information requested to the committee within two weeks. 

b. Please provide this committee, within two weeks, a comprehensive, whole-ofthe-federal-government cost for each phase of the EPAA. 

c. We understand the Department of State is advocating the return of export control responsibility for commercial satellites and their related components to the Department of Commerce. I also understand the Department of State contracted with 

the Aerospace Corporation, through Project West Wing, to develop a Counter Space 

Technology List. Our committee staff has been asking for this list for over a month, 

with no progress. Please provide a copy of this report to the committee within two 

weeks. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. a. One element of the basis for the statement is that the 

Standard Missile (SM)-3, at around $10 million per interceptor, is much cheaper 

than a GBI, which costs approximately $60 to $70 million per interceptor. This 

means that we can deploy many more SM–3 interceptors than GBIs at the same 

cost. Since Iran already possesses hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic 

missiles, this additional defensive capability is critical. In addition, the EPAA (European Phased Adaptive Approach) relies on capabilities that are mobile and 

relocatable, so additional capabilities can ‘‘surge’’ into the region in a crisis. Furthermore, the deployment of the AN/TPY–2 radar to Turkey will also greatly improve 

U.S. and NATO’s capability to protect against the existing threat from short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles. 

It is important to note that the EPAA is not an acquisition program but a policy 

framework for delivering capabilities of which the principal attribute is flexibility. 

By design, it can be enhanced, expanded, and supplemented in each phase. 

b. The Department of Defense would be the appropriate organization to provide 

a cost estimate of the EPAA. 

c. The Department of State, after consultation with the Department of Defense, 

is advocating the return of export control responsibility for commercial satellites and 

their related components to the Department of Commerce, while retaining State Department jurisdiction over sensitive military and intelligence related satellites, components, and technology. The Counterspace Sensitive Technology List (CSTL) is an 

ongoing research and analytical project which is projected to be completed in late 

2012. In short, there is no finished report or list to provide at this time. We would 

be pleased to provide a classified briefing to the committees of jurisdiction on the 

CSTL effort. 

Mr. TURNER. What are some of the technical and procedural challenges associated 

with verifying a potential future treaty with Russia that limits non-deployed and 

non-strategic weapons? What must be done to resolve these technical and procedural challenges? Do you believe a treaty that limits non-deployed and non-strategic 

weapons can be fully verifiable? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. A future treaty that includes limits on non-deployed and nonstrategic weapons could pose technical and procedural challenges, depending on the 

specific terms of the treaty. From the perspective of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA), one of the technical challenges that we are investigating to 

help inform future decisions is warhead authentication, especially for non-deployed 

warheads. In particular, we are investigating the technical means to provide confidence that an object declared to be a nuclear warhead is a warhead through radiation and other measurement techniques. This is different from the New START 
148 

Treaty, for example, where radiation measurements may be used to confirm that an 

object placed on a deployed delivery system and declared to be non-nuclear is in fact 

non-nuclear, and therefore not counted as a warhead. We also are investigating 

technical and procedural measures to provide warhead chain of custody over time 

and between different locations. This kind of analysis and capability development 

is necessary to understand the full scope of the challenges associated with verifying 

a potential future treaty, and NNSA is accomplishing important work in this regard. 

An assessment of the verifiability of a future treaty would need to be made by 

the U.S. national security community with supporting analysis from the Intelligence 

Community. Such an assessment can only be made once the specific terms of a treaty are known. From a technical and procedural perspective, I am confident that we 

will be able to provide the tools necessary for verification. 

Mr. TURNER. Administrator D’Agostino, earlier this year, you testified before this 

subcommittee that NNSA’s new plutonium and uranium facilities—the Chemistry 

and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility in New Mexico and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) in Tennessee—need to be ‘‘up and running’’ before 

we make substantial cuts to the non-deployed hedge force. 

a. Please describe the relationship between modernizing our nuclear infrastructure and the potential future ability to reduce non-deployed weapons. 

b. What metrics should we be using to judge that the infrastructure is robust 

enough to support reductions in the non-deployed stockpile without undue risk? 

c. Do NNSA and DOD have a clear plan on what reductions in the non-deployed 

stockpile are possible or planned for the future, and how those reductions align with 

infrastructure and stockpile modernization milestones? Please provide the committee a timeline showing, side-by-side, the modernization plan with reductions in 

the non-deployed stockpile deemed possible by the modernization effort. 

d. If one or both of UPF and CMRR are delayed in getting ‘‘up and running,’’ what 

levels and types of non-deployed warheads would you recommend keeping in the 

stockpile as a risk mitigation measure or ‘‘hedge’’? Please be specific. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. a. Implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and 

appropriate nuclear infrastructure investments will allow the United States to shift 

away from retaining the large numbers of non-deployed warheads that are kept as 

a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, allowing further reductions in the 

overall nuclear stockpile. Investment is critical for maintaining a credible deterrent 

and managing risk as stockpile reductions are made. NNSA works closely with the 

Department of Defense in the Nuclear Weapons Council to appropriately manage 

risk. 

b. Page 34, Table 2 of the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

summarizes the current and future infrastructure capacities for each major NNSA 

mission function that directly supports the stockpile. These represent the infrastructure improvements needed as of April 2011 to support any future stockpile, which 

may include reductions to non-deployed weapons. The infrastructure improvement 

areas include: 

• Design Certification, Experiments, and Surveillance 

• Plutonium 

• Uranium 

• Tritium 

• High Explosives 

• Non-nuclear, and 

• Special Nuclear Materials Storage. 

Analysis continues on continuing to meet these mission functions under the caps 

established by the Budget Control Act. 

c. Details of stockpile size and composition are classified and are updated annually by the Nuclear Weapons Council and provided to the President for approval. 

Classified Annex B of the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan 

provides stockpile details as reflected in the Fiscal Year 2011–2017 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum and the FY 2011–2024 Requirements and Planning 

Document. Also included in Annex B is a discussion of potential future stockpiles 

based on events/assumptions regarding infrastructure improvements and geopolitical environment. 

d. The specific effects on stockpile size and composition would need to be addressed in a study in conjunction with the Department of Defense. 

Mr. TURNER. The House Appropriations Committee reported a Defense Appropriations bill that contains a 1% reduction from the President’s budget request for DOD. 

The House Appropriations Committee reported an Energy and Water appropriations 

bill that contains a 10% reduction for NNSA and all of its defense activities. This 

came after strong and vocal support from Secretary Gates and senior military leaders for NNSA’s full budget request. How do these discrepancies affect planning, 
149 

budgeting, and coordination between NNSA and DOD on the overall nuclear security enterprise? Should all aspects of the nuclear security enterprise be consolidated 

into a single budgetary and appropriations authority? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA is currently executing the FY 2012 enacted appropriations in coordination with DOD and will continue to work with DOD on the FY 2013 

request. NNSA closely coordinates efforts with DOD on identifying programmatic requirements in various reports, such as Annual and Quarterly Reviews conducted by 

the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). 

Consolidation of the nuclear security enterprise (NSE) with DOD appropriations 

would be at odds with the tenets of civilian agency control over the NSE as identified in the Atomic Energy Act and the NNSA Act. As such, NNSA does not believe 

all aspects of the nuclear security enterprise can, or should be, consolidated into a 

single budgetary and appropriations authority. 

Mr. TURNER. If we continue reducing the total number of nuclear weapons and 

delivery vehicles, there will naturally be a drive to reduce the number of types of 

weapons and delivery vehicles. We are already seeing this with consolidation of several B61 variants into a single variant, and the drive to study a common ICBM and 

SLBM warhead. Are we increasing technical risk by this consolidation—that is, are 

we increasing the consequences and likelihood of a technical failure that puts a 

large portion of the stockpile out of action? How are we dealing with this problem 

as we move towards a smaller stockpile? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Triad provides a sufficiently flexible force structure that allows the U.S. to hedge effectively by shifting weight from one Triad leg to another 

if necessary due to unexpected technological problems or operational vulnerabilities. 

The pursuit of a common warhead strategy is intended to provide the opportunity 

to manage risk while reducing the total size of the stockpile. This approach allows 

reductions to be made while maintaining the required stockpile hedge, and it is our 

judgment that this approach may be pursued in a manner that assures technical 

diversity. Therefore, studies conducted for all future life extension programs will 

consider the implications, including technical risk, of using the resulting warhead 

on multiple platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead types. 

Mr. TURNER. Do you anticipate having to shift NNSA’s budget and priorities to 

help pay for the B61 life extension? Do you anticipate pushing the W78 LEP further 

into the future, or reprioritizing funds allotted for the Science Campaign to B61 

LEP work? How would such shifts affect future LEPs like the W78? Is NNSA considering making the B61–12 nuclear explosive package compatible with a future airlaunched cruise missile; is such a requirement part of the B61 LEP? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA is formulating our budget and priorities to balance the 

Nation’s need for modernized weapons against our ability to manage, maintain, and 

certify the nuclear stockpile without the requirement for underground testing. Activities such as the B61 life extension are being scrutinized to ensure that their 

costs and benefits are appropriate. Budget changes are being assessed as part of the 

FY 2013 budget development, to include appropriate alignment of Directed Stockpile 

Work and campaign activities with the B61 LEP development and certification 

work. Considering the Department of Defense’s broader needs and the throughput 

of our Nuclear Security Complex, NNSA is finalizing schedules and budgets that realistically include the B61 and W78 life extension programs into the overall NNSA 

priority matrix. 

While there is no current requirement to make the B61 nuclear explosive package 

(NEP) compatible with the future air launched cruise mission, the Air Force and 

NNSA are evaluating the B61 NEP as a candidate for the future cruise mission as 

well as other existing warheads such as the W80 and W84. 

Mr. TURNER. Now that we are leaving a period of several decades with minimal 

nuclear weapons design, engineering, and production work and entering a long period of continual warhead life extension programs, how is NNSA shifting its budget 

and priorities? 

a. Is funding for scientific capabilities, which sustained the human capital and led 

to dramatically better understanding of nuclear weapon science when we were not 

actively working on the stockpile, shifting toward design, engineering, and production activities to sustain and modernize the warheads? 

b. Given the fiscal environment, is it possible to sustain the current levels of expenditures on science and also successfully execute the LEPs and direct stockpile 

work, as well as infrastructure modernization? 

c. Has NNSA prioritized what science capabilities are critical for stockpile assessment and certification, and which may be secondary for that purpose? What are 

those priorities? 

d. In real dollar terms, how much does NNSA plan to spend in FY12 on LEPs 

and other activities directly related to design, engineering, and production of nu-
150 

clear weapons (not surveillance or science-based capabilities that enable assessments and certification), as compared to history (e.g., 10, 20, and 30 years ago)? 

e. Has NNSA considered a continual low-rate production model for sustaining the 

stockpile, as opposed to its current approach of discrete and infrequent LEPs? What 

are the costs, benefits, and risks of such an approach as compared to the current 

approach? How might this analysis change if the size and diversity of the stockpile 

decrease? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. a. No, funding for scientific capabilities is not being shifted to 

engineering or production, since scientific capabilities are essential to effect the 

modernization of the stockpile along with stewarding the existing stockpile, as explained in Chapter 3 of the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. 

Science, engineering, and manufacturing are neither mutually exclusive nor fungible. There was no time in the past when we were not working actively on maintaining the stockpile. Notable stewardship milestones over the past 15 years include 

certification of the B61–11 in 1997 (the first new modification introduced into the 

stockpile since the end of testing); the completion of the W87 LEP in 2004; delivery 

of new pits manufactured in Los Alamos to the stockpile in 2007; and the design, 

engineering, and ongoing production and delivery of the W76 LEP. 

In parallel, we have developed new Stockpile Stewardship facilities, including the 

Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility; the Microsystems and 

Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA) complex; the National Ignition Facility 

(NIF); Proton radiography; the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental (JASPER) facility and U1a facilities at the Nevada National Nuclear Security (NNSS); 

as well as the extraordinarily successful series of the Advanced Simulation and 

Computing (ASC) platforms. 

All of these science and technology tools are being applied today to improve understanding and predictive capability for the stockpile, without recourse to new underground tests. While priorities do change and new problems arise each year, the 

necessary adjustments and reprioritizations have taken place throughout the history 

of the program and are reflected in the budget requests for each year in the past 

and in the future years nuclear security plan (FYNSP). 

b. Yes, the President’s budget provides a balanced portfolio of infrastructure modernization, stockpile sustainment, and pursuit of the fundamental science, technology, and engineering necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile, 

as outlined in the FY12 SSMP. Much of this effort is still in the design phase, and 

as the designs are completed, NNSA will make adjustments to ensure the portfolio 

remains balanced. 

c. Yes, NNSA has prioritized the science capabilities for Stockpile Stewardship, 

and this has resulted in the set of capabilities that have been supported and constructed over the past 20 years. These priorities are reflected in the annual budget 

requests and SSMPs. Any capabilities that are less than essential to Stockpile Stewardship have already had their supporting budgets reduced or eliminated, or are 

now principally supported by work for other Government agencies. 

Every year the science, technology, and engineering community has a summit 

with the Directed Stockpile Work teams to ensure that the long terms needs for 

stewardship without underground testing are being optimized to support near-term 

Life Extension activities, as well. There are a number of great, recent examples of 

this relating to multipoint safety, high explosives performance, and surety. 

d. For FY 2012, the President’s Budget request for Directed Stockpile Work is 

$1,963,583,000. That includes $239 million for surveillance. Without surveillance, 

DSW together with supporting Readiness and Engineering campaigns, are about 

26% of the Weapons Activity budget. For the period 2001–2011, a similar comparison is presented in the table below. Due to drastic differences in how nuclear weapons budgets were structured prior to 2001, we cannot provide a meaningful comparison prior to that year. Additionally, a significant portion of the Readiness in the 

Technical Base and Facilities budget and the campaigns budgets directly support 

stockpile sustainment outside of the support they provide to stockpile surveillance 

and that spending is not included in these percentages. 

Table 1: Yearly Percentage of Weapons Activities Funding Used for DSW (Without Surveillance) and Readiness 

and Engineering Campaign 

Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 

Percent 25 23 24 28 25 26 26 25 27 25 27 
151 

e. NNSA is currently evaluating ways to optimize its life extension program to 

achieve multiple objectives, including enhanced technology maturation and integration, sustainment of the highly specialized workforce, program affordability, increased interoperability (common technologies), and increased technology insertion 

opportunities. Costs, benefits and risks are being analyzed as part of this evaluation. Once approved, the updated life extension program will be described in the 

next Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. 

Mr. TURNER. How does the deployment of the B61–12 warhead align with deployment of nuclear-capable F–35s? Is deployment of the two systems linked? Can one 

deploy without the other, while still retaining our nuclear capability in Europe? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The deployment of the B61–12 is well aligned with the deployment of the nuclear-capable F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, but they are 

not linked. The JSF with nuclear capability is planned to be deployed a few years 

after that the first production unit for the B61. 

A key element of the B61–12 Life Extension Program is interoperability with current and planned future aircraft. 

Mr. TURNER. When NNSA conducts a life extension program on a particular 

weapon type, will NNSA extend the life of all warheads of that type, including those 

in the non-deployed ‘‘hedge’’ part of the stockpile? Or will it only extend those weapons in the active, deployed part of the stockpile? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The scope of each life extension program (LEP) is determined 

by the Nuclear Weapons Council and requirements for quantities are documented 

in the NWC Requirements and Planning Document (RPD). For each LEP, NNSA 

plans to replace the existing weapons (i.e., both active and inactive weapons) with 

life-extended weapons per quantities provided in the RPD. The ‘‘hedge’’ is a portion 

of the inactive stockpile. 

Mr. TURNER. What role did DOE and NNSA play in selection of the new directors 

of Los Alamos National Lab and Lawrence Livermore National Lab? Specifically, 

how were you and Secretary Chu involved? Given the critical role the lab directors 

play in providing the President and Congress independent assessments on the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile, do you believe it is important 

for the lab directors to have extensive backgrounds in nuclear weapons research, design, production, and assessment? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Under DOE’s contracts with Los Alamos National Security, LLC, 

and Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, the respective Boards of Governors are responsible for the selection of the laboratory directors. As laboratory directors are considered ‘‘key personnel,’’ the respective Contracting Officers of the 

LANS and LLNS contracts must approve the selection of the laboratory directors. 

The Secretary of Energy and I have no formal role in the selection process, but as 

a courtesy, the Secretary was asked to concur in the selection of Charles McMillan 

as the Los Alamos Laboratory Director, and Penrose C. Albright, as the Lawrence 

Livermore Laboratory Director, which he did. 

I believe it is important for laboratory directors to be qualified scientists that understand the complex phenomena that arise as issues in research, design, production and assessment. 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide the committee, before December 15, a list and description of the managerial and functional areas (e.g., legal, safety, security, health, 

human resources, etc.) in which the Department of Energy is involved in NNSA activities, including detailed descriptions of such involvement. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. 

• Legal Functions 

Within the Department of Energy, NNSA is managed by the Under Secretary for 

Nuclear Security, who reports to the Secretary. In accordance with section 3213(a) 

and (b) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (NNSA Act), NNSA employees ‘‘shall not be responsible to, or subject to the authority, direction, or control 

of, any . . . officer, employee, or agent of the [DOE]’’ other than the Secretary of 

Energy, acting through the NNSA Administrator, the NNSA Administrator, or the 

NNSA Administrator’s designee within NNSA. 50 U.S.C. 2403(a) and (b). In implementing the mission of NNSA (NNSA Act § 3211(b), 50 U.S.C. 2401(b)), NNSA has 

18 functional areas of responsibility, as identified in section 3212 of the NNSA Act; 

these include, for example: budget formulation, guidance, and execution, and other 

financial matters; policy development and guidance; program management and direction; safeguards and security, emergency management; environment, safety, and 

health operations; administration of contracts, including the management and operations of the operations of the nuclear weapons production facilities and the national security laboratories; legal matters; legislative affairs, and public affairs. 50 

U.S.C. 2402(b). 
152 

As part of the Department of Energy, NNSA is subject to all Departmental regulations, orders, and policies in all functional areas, except that the NNSA Administrator may establish NNSA-specific policies, unless disapproved by the Secretary of 

Energy. NNSA Act, § 3212(d), 50 U.S.C. 2402(d). See also the response to Q73b, 

below [Appendix page 155]. 

• DOE’S Involvement in NNSA Security Activities 

1. Rule making and Directives. The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) 

has primary responsibility for rule-making, and for developing and maintaining directives in the areas of nuclear safety, worker safety and health, and security (the 

NNSA Act also gives the Administrator authority to develop NNSA policies; this authority has been used for some safety and security requirements). 

2. Inspections. The HSS Office of Enforcement and Oversight conducts independent external reviews to evaluate the implementation of DOE requirements by 

DOE contractor and Federal operating organizations, evaluate the oversight of operations by DOE Program offices; and determine the adequacy of DOE requirements 

to DOE operations.. 

3. Enforcement. The HSS Office of Enforcement and Oversight also administers 

the enforcement process for the nuclear safety, worker health and safety, and classified information security rules (10 CFR Part 820, 10 CFR Part 830, 10 CFR Part 

835, 10 CFR Part 850, 10 CFR Part 851, 10 CFR Part 708, and 10 CFR Part 824). 

Based on the NNSA Act, the NNSA Administrator is assigned the authority upon 

which regulatory direction and enforcement is provided to NNSA Contractors. 

4. Technology and Data Sharing. 

a. Electronic Data Bases and Transfer of Data between Department of Energy 

(DOE) and other Federal Agencies 

NNSA personnel security is required to use the DOE’s Electronic Integrated Security System (eDISS+) to collect, process, store, and transfer personnel security data 

into the Central Verification System (CVS) maintained by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM). CVS is a national database used by all federal agencies 

for suitability/clearance verifications. 

The web-based Central Personnel Clearance Index (WebCPCI), which is one of the 

many parts of the eDISS+ initiative, tracks security clearance activity for DOE employees, contractors, and associated personnel, and provides report and query capability to Personnel Security, Headquarters, and Departmental offices. Within 

WebCPCI, individuals are assigned a Case Folder containing information on clearances, investigations, adjudicative codes, administrative reviews, and case folder actions. 

WebCPCI’s ‘‘e-delivery’’ capability is exclusively used to electronically receive and 

forward completed background investigations from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to the respective Personnel Security Office (PSO). WebCPCI is also the 

system of record PSO’s primarily use to verify that an active facility clearance (FCL) 

code has been approved and registered into the Department’s Safeguards and Security Information Management System (SSIMS) before granting a security clearance. 

DOE/HSS personnel are responsible for entering FCLs into WebCPCI once notified 

that an FCL has been approved and registered into SSIMS. 

b. Data Sharing from external Federal Agency, specifically Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Action data from OPM regarding timeliness, volume, etc. 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is provided the information regarding 

case timeliness by OPM. HSS has a responsibility to track and trend the case timeliness; however, they are a pass-through organization, not calculating the actual 

case times. On a monthly and quarterly basis, DOE provides to each Personnel Security Organization an agency roll up for the Personnel Investigation Program in 

the form of the OPM Federal Investigative Services’ Agency Specific Performance 

Metrics. The data identifies the End-to-End Overall Timeliness for the fastest 90% 

of the access authorizations reported, initiated, investigated, and adjudicated in response to the Intelligence Reform Terrorism and Prevention Act of 2004 requirements. 

5. Budget 

a. Payments to Other Federal Agencies for Personnel Security Background Investigations 

Security Investigations are paid via an Intra-Governmental Payment and Collection (IPAC) which is basically a transfer of funds from one Government treasury account to another 

• HSS remains the OPM point of contact for all investigation invoices 

• HSS receives one invoice from OPM for all of DOE 

• HSS breaks down the invoice by DOE organization and forwards to the appropriate DOE Organization for payment instruction 
153 

• DOE Organizations send payment information back to HSS 

• HSS sends entire invoice to DOE financial POC so that payment can be aligned 

into the DOE financial system 

b. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-12 Budget 

• Process is very similar to approach listed above for Investigations 

• HSS is the point of contact with GSA 

• In fiscal year (FY) 2011, HSS sent NNSA estimated costs and PSD coordinated 

all NNSA funding back to HSS 

• Process for FY12 will be similar 

6. Facility Clearance: There can be DOE involvement in the registration of security activities which includes the Foreign Ownership Control or Influence (FOCI) 

element. Within the FOCI program, DOE counterintelligence and legal interactions 

may be required when making a FOCI determination. 

7. Counterintelligence and Intelligence Support: The Department’s Office of Intelligence and its Office of Counterintelligence, each having been established by the 

NNSA Act of FY 2000, are now structured as part of the combined DOE Office of 

Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE/IN). NNSA relies upon DOE/IN for the 

effective conduct of its mission. The support is critical to the success of our core missions in Defense Programs and Nuclear Nonproliferation as well as Security and 

Nuclear Counterterrorism. Foreign intelligence collection and analyses inform our 

understanding of other countries’ capabilities and Counterintelligence (CI) protects 

our own assets and capabilities from compromise or sabotage. 

The CI directorate has aligned its functional capabilities to address the key mission areas of Insider Threat, Foreign Risk Management (regarding presence in and 

interaction with National Laboratories), Threat Assessment (to support security and 

CI objectives), Security (to manage clearances and SCIF’s), and Investigations (with 

oversight of CI investigations and operations across the complex). 

The Intelligence Analysis Directorate maintains its focus on foreign energy and 

nuclear matters, as well as science and technology capabilities more broadly. 

The IN Cyber Directorate is composed of four divisions: Strategic Initiatives, Network Architecture and Engineering Service, Information Technology Support, and 

Cyber Operations. The NNSA Chief Information Officer works in close collaboration 

with the IN Cyber Directorate to ensure comprehensive protection of NNSA networks and associated information. 

The Field Intelligence Elements (FIE’s) of DOE/IN located within the NNSA laboratories and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS) have a unique status. 

The lab FIE members are employees of the laboratory Management and Operating 

contractors. But, under a narrow exception to the general NNSA Act prohibition of 

DOE direction and control of NNSA personnel (Sec 3117 of the FY 2007 National 

Defense Authorization Act) as well as provisions in the updated Executive Order 

12333, they are not only subject to direction and control of DOE/IN but they (and 

the rest of IN) are also part of the U.S. Intelligence Community, subject to the direction of the Director of National Intelligence. NNSA relies upon DOE/IN to help manage the Intelligence Work accomplished at the NNSA labs in support of the Intelligence Community and other national security customers. 

Listing of Security Rules and Directives provided as separate attachment [see Appendix page 98]; however, the response to 73.b. should include this information. 

Listing of Security Rules and Directives 

This listing may not contain all applicable National level policy documents or Departmental 

Orders. 

Directive Title / Comment 

1. 5 CFR 732 National Security Positions 

2. 5 CFR 736 Personnel Investigations 

3. 10 CFR 30 through 40 Rules of general applicability to domestic licensing of byproduct material 

4. 10 CFR 72 Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-level Radioactive Waste, and 

Reactor-related great than Class C Waste 

5. 10 CFR 74 Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material 

6. 10 CFR 707 Workplace Substance Abuse Programs at DOE Sites 

7. 10 CFR Part 710, Subpart A General Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter or Special Nuclear 

Material 

8. 10 CFR Part 712 Human Reliability Program 

9. 10 CFR 725 Permits for Access to Restricted Data 

10. 10 CFR 824 Procedural Rules for the Assessment of Civil Penalties for 

Classified Information Security Violations 

11. 10 CFR Part 860 Trespassing on Department of Energy Property 
154 

12. 10 CFR 862 Restrictions on Aircraft Landing and Air Delivery at DOE 

Nuclear Sites 

13. 10 CFR 1016 Safeguarding of Restricted Data 

14. 10 CFR 1017 Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled 

Nuclear Information 

15. 10 CFR 1044 Security Requirements for Protected Disclosures under section 3164 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000 

16. 10 CFR 1045 Nuclear Classification and Declassification 

17. 10 CFR Part 1046 Physical Protection of Security Interests 

18. 10 CFR 1046, Subpart B Protective Force Personnel 

19. 10 CFR Part 1047 Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by Protective 

Force Officers 

20. 32 CFR 2001 Classified National Security Information 

21. DOE O 142.3A Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments Program 

22. DOE P 205.1 Departmental Cyber Security Management Policy 

23. DOE O 205.1B Department of Energy Cyber Security Program 

24. DOE M 205.1–3 Telecommunications Security Manual 

25. DOE N 206.4 Personal Identity Verification 

26. DOE O 227.1 Independent Oversight Program 

27. DOE P 310.1 Maximum Entry and Mandatory Separation Ages for Certain Security Employees 

28. DOE O 452.4B Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons 

29. DOE O 452.6A Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of 

Defense 

30. DOE O 452.7 Protection of Use Control Vulnerabilities and Designs 

31. DOE O 452.8 Control of Nuclear Weapon Data 

32. DOE O 457.1 Nuclear Counterterrorism 

33. DOE M 457.1–1 Control of Improvised Nuclear Device Information 

34. DOE O 461.2 Onsite Packaging and Transfer of Materials of National 

Security Interest 

35. DOE P 470.1A Safeguards and Security Program 

36. DOE O 470.3B Graded Security Protection (GSP) Policy 

37. DOE O 470.4B Safeguards and Security Program 

38. DOE O 471.1B Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled 

Nuclear Information 

39. DOE O 471.3 Identifying and Protecting Official Use Only Information 

40. DOE M 471.3–1 Manual for Identifying and Protecting Official Use Only 

41. DOE O 471.5 Special Access Programs 

42. DOE O 471.6 Information Security 

43. DOE O 472.2 Personnel Security 

44. DOE O 473.3 Protection Program Operations 

45. DOE O 474.2 Nuclear Material Control and Accountability 

46. DOE O 475.1 Counterintelligence Program 

47. DOE O 475.2A Identifying Classified Information 

Within the Department of Energy, NNSA is managed by the Under Secretary for 

Nuclear Security, who reports to the Secretary. In accordance with section 3213(a) 

and (b) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (NNSA Act), NNSA employees ‘‘shall not be responsible to, or subject to the authority, direction, or control 

of, any . . . officer, employee, or agent of the [DOE]’’ other than the Secretary of Energy, acting through the NNSA Administrator, the NNSA Administrator, or the 

NNSA Administrator’s designee within NNSA. 50 U.S.C. 2403(a) and (b). 

As part of the Department of Energy, NNSA is subject to all Departmental regulations, orders, and policies in all functional areas, except that the NNSA Administrator may establish NNSA-specific policies, unless disapproved by the Secretary of 

Energy. NNSA Act, § 3212(d), 50 U.S.C. § 2402(d). The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provides oversight with DOE’s Office of Human Capital of NNSA’s 

human resources systems via a periodic review of efficiency, effectiveness and compliance with regulations and law in the following areas: strategic alignment, leadership and knowledge management, performance culture, talent management, and accountability. Delegated Examining authority (to hire using competitive procedures) 

flows through the Secretary of Energy from the OPM to NNSA. Employee appointments and removals for Senior Executive Service and other Executive Review Board 

actions are subject to review or oversight by DOE. Use of the DOE excepted service 

authorities (EJ and EK) is subject to approval by DOE. Technical Qualifications 

Program (TQP) Policy is owned by DOE, and DOE provides oversight of NNSA’s 

management of the TQP. NNSA Diversity and EEO Policy is subject to review and 
155 

concurrence by DOE. Personnel recordkeeping systems are owned by DOE and must 

comply with OPM requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide the committee, before December 15, a comprehensive 

list of all DOE Orders, Manuals, and any other DOE regulations to which NNSA 

and/or its labs, plants, and facilities are held or are subject to. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. A comprehensive list of all current DOE directives (Policy, Orders, and Manuals) can be found at: www.directives.doe.gov. 

An excerpt of the current DOE directives from the web site is attached below. 

Please note the listing includes Guides which are non-mandatory. 

Listed below are the DOE Regulations to which the NNSA is subject. [Response 

to Q73b, for cross-reference—ed.] 

List of Applicable DOE Regulations 

1. 10 CFR Part 202—Production or Disclosure of Material or Information 

2. 10 CFR Part 205—Administrative Procedures and Sanctions 

3. 10 CFR Part 600—Financial Assistance Rules 

4. 10 CFR Part 601—New Restrictions on Lobbying 

5. 10 CFR Part 602—Epidemiology and Other Health Studies Financial Assistance Program 

6. 10 CFR Part 603—Technology Investment Agreements 

7. 10 CFR Part 605—The Office of Energy Research Financial Assistance Program 

8. 10 CFR Part 609—Loan Guarantees for Projects That Employ Innovative Technologies 

9. 10 CFR Part 611—Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturer Assistance Program 

10. 10 CFR Part 622—Contractual Provisions 

11. 10 CFR Part 624—Contract Clauses 

12. 10 CFR Part 625—Price Competitive Sale of Strategic Petroleum Reserve Petroleum 

13. 10 CFR Part 626—Procedures for Acquisition of Petroleum for the Strategic Petroleum 

Reserve 

14. 10 CFR Part 706—Security Policies and Practices Relating to Labor-Management Relations 

15. 10 CFR Part 707—Workplace Substance Abuse Programs at DOE Sites 

16. 10 CFR Part 708—DOE Contractor Employee Protection Program 

17. 10 CFR Part 709—Counterintelligence Evaluation Program 

18. 10 CFR Part 710—Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter or Special Nuclear Material 

19. 10 CFR Part 712—Human Reliability Program 

20. 10 CFR Part 715—Definition of Non-Recourse Project-Financed 

21. 10 CFR Part 719—Contractor Legal Management Requirements 

22. 10 CFR Part 725—Permits for Access to Restricted Data 

23. 10 CFR Part 727—Consent for Access to Information on Department of Energy Computers 

24. 10 CFR Part 733—Allegations of Research Misconduct 

25. 10 CFR Part 745—Protection of Human Subjects 

26. 10 CFR Part 760—Domestic Uranium Program 

27. 10 CFR Part 765—Reimbursement for Costs of Remedial Action at Active Uranium and 

Thorium Processing Sites 

28. 10 CFR Part 766—Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund; 

Procedures for Special Assessment of Domestic Utilities 

29. 10 CFR Part 770—Transfer of Real Property at Defense Nuclear Facilities for Economic 

Development 

30. 10 CFR Part 780—Patent Compensation Board Regulations 

31. 10 CFR Part 781—Doe Patent Licensing Regulations 

32. 10 CFR Part 782—Claims for Patent and Copyright Infringement 

33. 10 CFR Part 783—Waiver of Patent Rights 

34. 10 CFR Part 784—Patent Waiver Regulation 

35. 10 CFR Part 800—Loans for Bid or Proposal Preparation by Minority Business Enterprises Seeking Doe Contracts and Assistance 

36. 10 CFR Part 810—Assistance to foreign atomic Energy Activities 

37. 10 CFR Part 820—Procedural Rules for DOE Nuclear Activities 

38. 10 CFR Part 824—Procedural Rules for the Assessment of Civil Penalties for Classified 

Information Security Violations 

39. 10 CFR Part 830—Nuclear Safety Management 

40. 10 CFR Part 835—Occupational Radiation Protection 

41. 10 CFR Part 840—Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences 

42. 10 CFR Part 850—Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program 

43. 10 CFR Part 851—Worker Safety and Health Program 

44. 10 CFR Part 860—Trespassing On Department of Energy Property 

45. 10 CFR Part 861—Control of Traffic at Nevada Test Site 

46. 10 CFR Part 862—Restrictions on Aircraft Landing and Air Delivery at Department of 

Energy Nuclear Sites 

47. 10 CFR Part 871—Air Transportation of Plutonium 

48. 10 CFR Part 950—Standby Support for Certain Nuclear Plant Delays 

49. 10 CFR Part 960—General Guidelines for the Preliminary Screening of Potential Sites for 

A Nuclear Waste Repository 

50. 10 CFR Part 961—Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or HighLevel Radioactive Waste 

51. 10 CFR Part 962—Byproduct Material 

52. 10 CFR Part 963—Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines 
156 

53. 10 CFR Part 1000—Transfer of Proceedings to the Secretary of Energy and the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission 

54. 10 CFR Part 1002—Official Seal and Distinguishing Flag 

55. 10 CFR Part 1003—Office of Hearings and Appeals Procedural Regulations 

56. 10 CFR Part 1004—Freedom of Information 

57. 10 CFR Part 1005—Intergovernmental Review of Department of Energy Programs and 

Activities 

58. 10 CFR Part 1008—Records Maintained on Individuals (Privacy Act) 

59. 10 CFR Part 1009—General Policy for Pricing and Charging for Materials and Services 

Sold by DOE 

60. 10 CFR Part 1010—Conduct of Employees and former Employees 

61. 10 CFR Part 1013—Program Fraud Civil Remedies and Procedures 

62. 10 CFR Part 1014—Administrative Claims Under Federal Tort Claims Act 

63. 10 CFR Part 1015—Collection of Claims Owed the United States 

64. 10 CFR Part 1016—Safeguarding of Restricted Data 

65. 10 CFR Part 1017—Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information 

66. 10 CFR Part 1021—National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures 

67. 10 CFR Part 1022—Compliance with Floodplain and Wetland Environmental Review Requirements 

68. 10 CFR Part 1023—Contract Appeals 

69. 10 CFR Part 1039—Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs 

70. 10 CFR Part 1040—Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs or Activities 

71. 10 CFR Part 1041—Enforcement of Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs or Activities Conducted by the Department of Energy 

72. 10 CFR Part 1042—Nondiscrimination On the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance 

73. 10 CFR Part 1044—Security Requirements for Protected Disclosures Under Section 3164 

of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 

74. 10 CFR Part 1045—Nuclear Classification and Declassification 

75. 10 CFR Part 1046—Physical Protection of Security Interests 

76. 10 CFR Part 1047—Limited Arrest Authority and Use of force by Protective Force Officers 

77. 10 CFR Part 1048—Trespassing On Strategic Petroleum Reserve Facilities and other 

Property 

78. 10 CFR Part 1049—Limited Arrest Authority and Use of force by Protective Force Officers 

of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 

79. 10 CFR Part 1050—Foreign Gifts and Decorations 

80. 10 CFR Part 1060—Payment of Travel Expenses of Persons who are not Government Employees 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide the committee, before December 15, a comprehensive 

list of all audits conducted by any DOE office, entity, or personnel on NNSA and/ 

or any of its labs, plants, or facilities in FY11. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. [The information referred to follows on the next page.] 
157 
158 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide the committee, before December 15, the number of 

NNSA personnel assigned to the site offices at each NNSA site (e.g. Los Alamos, 

Pantex, etc.). Also, the number of NNSA personnel at other NNSA facilities, such 

as headquarters, that are conducting oversight of the labs and plants. In both cases, 

how do these numbers compare to 5 years ago and 10 years ago? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide the committee, before December 15, the number of 

personnel working in the DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The mission of the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) 

is to maintain a safe and secure work environment for all Federal and contractor 

employees, ensure that the Department’s operations preserve the health and safety 

of the surrounding communities, and protect national security assets entrusted to 

the Department. To accomplish these vital tasks, HSS requested and was authorized a Federal staff of 398 FTEs for FY 2011 and has requested a Federal staffing 

level of 376 for FY 2012. 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide the committee a detailed description of NNSA’s approach to managing, overseeing, and coordinating surveillance of the stockpile by 

the labs and plants, including the name and position of the individual within NNSA 

with responsibility for this mission. Please also provide the committee with NNSA’s 

requirements for conducting surveillance and the program plan for fulfilling these 

requirements. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In 2011 a new surveillance governance model for management 

of the surveillance program was instituted in which we selected a Senior Technical 

Advisor for Surveillance (STAS) to oversee all areas of the program and report directly to the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Stockpile Management. The gov-
159 

ernance model coordinates key surveillance activities to assure that each weapon 

system maintains a current technical basis to determine its respective requirements; 

all systems requirements are integrated into an executable plan; appropriate 

diagnostics are developed and deployed; and the surveillance plan is funded and 

supported by senior NNSA management. 

Surveillance requirements are identified by Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratories and provided to the NNSA production agencies to 

perform the necessary inspections, testing, and capture of data. The primary goal 

of the Surveillance Program is to identify any design or manufacturing defects either in newly produced or in stockpiled weapons and weapon components, as well 

as, detect any issues related to deployment or aging of the weapons. Each weapon 

system has an integrated weapon evaluation plan that projects out 6 years. 

Mr. TURNER. How does the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP), which would consolidate several different versions of the B61 into a single B61–12 version, link to 

our extended deterrent in Europe? 

a. What are the implications, both to our extended deterrent and more broadly, 

of delay in the B61 LEP? 

b. Why is it important to increase surety in B61 warheads during the LEP? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The B61–12 LEP plan submitted by NNSA has a central theme 

of consolidating multiple legacy versions of the B61 that are currently deployed in 

the U.S. and abroad. As a result, the B61–12 will provide a modernized extended 

deterrent in Europe. Our planned deployment schedule will ensure that no gap in 

extended deterrent capability will occur, and will ensure seamless replacement of 

legacy B61 systems with the modernized B61–12. 

The implications of a delay in the B61–12 LEP have been studied by NNSA and 

DOD as part of our LEP alternatives analysis. NNSA has coordinated mitigation 

strategies with the Department of Defense for the contingency of a delayed B61 

LEP. If the proposed LEP is significantly delayed, several critical and costly activities must be pursued to temporarily stabilize the capabilities of legacy deployed B61 

systems. For the time period of the delay, more rigorous surveillance activities must 

be performed to ensure an adequate state of readiness is maintained for this aging 

legacy element of the stockpile. 

The B61 bomb variants have some of the most advanced safety and use control 

features in the current stockpile. However, these features are aging and designed 

for Cold War threats. The life extension program provides the opportunity to improve weapon safety and security especially against new, emerging threats of the 

21st century. The B61 LEP will incorporate improvements to the existing surety features without significant risk of schedule delays and will balance the B61 investments with those needed in other weapon LEPs. The design approach will facilitate 

future surety upgrades as threats to our nuclear deterrent evolve. 

Mr. TURNER. How many nuclear warheads does Russia make each year? What is 

our estimate for how many it can make? How does this compare to actual U.S. production and our potential production capacity? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA is responsible for the warheads in the U.S. nuclear 

weapons program. Questions about a foreign nuclear weapon program should be answered by the Intelligence Community or the Department of Defense. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. General Kehler has stated recently that ‘‘We’re not going to be able 

to go forward with weapon systems that cost what weapon systems cost today . . . 

Case in point is [the] Long-Range Strike [bomber]. Case in point is the Trident [submarine] replacement . . . . The list goes on.’’ In addition, Admiral Mullen before he 

retired as Chairman of the JCS said: ‘‘At some point in time, that triad becomes 

very, very expensive, you know, obviously, the smaller your nuclear arsenal is. And 

it’s—so at some point in time, in the future, certainly I think a decision will have 

to be made in terms of whether we keep the triad or drop it down to a dyad.’’ 

Can the U.S. guarantee its security and that of its allies in a more fiscally sustainable manner by pursuing further bilateral reductions in nuclear forces with Russia and scaling back plans for new and excessively large strategic nuclear weapons 

systems and warhead production facilities? 

Dr. MILLER. I believe that if properly structured, reductions below New START 

levels with Russia could reduce costs to the United States, while strengthening deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-a`-vis Russia and 

China, and assurance of our Allies and partners. At the same time, as noted in the 

Nuclear Posture Review, Russia’s nuclear force will remain a significant factor in 

determining how much and how fast we are prepared to reduce U.S. forces. 
160 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you have any concerns about the provisions related to nuclear 

weapons employment and that could limit or delay nuclear weapons reductions, 

which were included in the House National Defense Authorization bill? 

Dr. MILLER. Sections 1055 and 1056 of H.R. 1540 would impinge on the President’s authority to implement the New START Treaty and establish U.S. nuclear 

weapons policy. Moreover, it would set onerous conditions on the Administration’s 

ability to direct the retirement, dismantlement, or elimination of non-deployed nuclear weapons. 

This legislation would dictate the pace of reductions under New START Treaty 

in a way that would bar DOD and DOE from exploring the best means to implement 

reductions, could preclude DOD from being logistically able to meet New START 

Treaty timelines, and would add disruptions and costs at a time when our country 

and the nuclear enterprise can ill afford them. Notably, it would set conditions on 

New START Treaty implementation and divert resources from stockpile 

sustainment in ways that tax the very programs that the House Appropriations 

Committee has just cut drastically. 

Further, Section 1056 raises constitutional concerns, as it appears to encroach on 

the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to set nuclear employment policy. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 

June 2010, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft stated: ‘‘Some things 

[nuclear weapons] need to be modernized in order to be safe, secure and reliable. 

Other things don’t need to be. And I would not put modernization itself as a key 

to what we need to—we need to do.’’ 

Do you agree with this statement? 

Dr. MILLER. I agree that nuclear weapons need to be modernized (e.g., through 

warhead life extension programs) in order to be safe, secure, and reliable. This modernization does not require the development of new nuclear weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the projected costs of, and associated decision points, related to, development and production of a new nuclear bomber, a new Air-Launched 

Cruise Missile, and a new ICBM? 

Dr. MILLER. The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 contains $3.7 billion 

across FY 12–16 for a new, long-range penetrating bomber. The program would use 

a streamlined management and acquisition approach to balance capability with affordability by utilizing existing and mature technologies to the maximum extent. 

Additionally, the Air Force would limit requirements based on affordability using a 

realistic cost target to inform capability and cost trade-offs. The program plans to 

hold unit costs to the established targets to ensure sufficient production and a sustainable inventory over the long term for approximately 80 to 100 aircraft. The Air 

Force estimates an initial capability in the mid-2020s. 

The current funding for a new Air-Launched Cruise Missile, also known as Long- Range Standoff, is $884.3 million across FY 2012–16. The cost of this missile will 

be further refined when a materiel solution is selected as a product of the ongoing 

Analysis of Alternatives that is scheduled for completion in FY 2013. 

The Air Force will begin a Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence Capability-Based 

Analysis of Alternatives in FY 2013. This assessment supports development of an 

Initial Capabilities Document, and will establish a baseline of requirements for a 

future Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) replacement program. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Would the ALCM require a new warhead? 

Dr. MILLER. No. The Administration committed in the Nuclear Posture Review to 

sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal without developing new nuclear warheads. However, a new ALCM would require a decision regarding how to 

conduct a life extension program for the ALCM warhead. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Under the data provided by the New START verification regime, 

Russia’s nuclear forces were actually at one point under the New START limits that 

must be met by 2018, but now have risen slightly. Russia is deploying one new missile, the RS–24—a missile I would note that U.S. inspectors got to examine up close 

solely because New START came into force—and I believe Russia is also proposing 

a new 10-warhead missile. 

What can we do to discourage Russia from developing and fielding new weapons? 

Dr. MILLER. Under the New START Treaty, each country is permitted to shape 

and modernize its forces to meet their respective strategic requirements. There is 

little we can do to discourage Russia from developing and fielding new nuclear 

weapons as long as they remain within the limits of the Treaty. Russia continues 

to modernize its force to replace aging systems and to meet what it views as its strategic needs. The United States is also modernizing nuclear systems as allowed 

under the New START Treaty. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In the context of New START negotiations, how many deployed 

strategic warheads did the U.S. military conclude that it needed to fulfill the exist-
161 

ing targeting requirements established by the Bush administration in their nuclear 

policies. 

And how many deployed strategic warheads are needed following the analysis of 

the 90-day NPR implementation review based on the different options that will be 

presented to the President? 

Dr. MILLER. I would be glad to brief the committee leadership with a classified 

briefing to answer the first question. I cannot answer the second question because 

at this time no options have been finalized for presentation to the President. 

[OSD provided briefing to Ranking Member Sanchez on the number of deployed 

strategic warheads as part of a classified brief by Under Secretary Miller and General Kehler on July 10, 2012.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the importance of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy, an approach that makes 

sense in a world where such weapons are the only existential threat to the United 

States. 

Can you give us some examples of how the United States can further reduce the 

role of nuclear weapons? 

Can you tell us how and what further reductions in the size of the U.S. stockpile 

would be possible based on current and foreseeable requirements, and what assumptions about nuclear weapons technology and geopolitics in the next decades factor 

into these requirements? 

Dr. MILLER. The United States continues to explore options to reduce the role of 

nuclear weapons. In a regional context, continued development of conventional capabilities and missile defenses can strengthen non-nuclear deterrence and so help to 

reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. In addition, implementation of the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program and investments in our nuclear infrastructure will allow the 

United States over time to shift away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed 

warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, allowing major reductions in the nuclear stockpile. To date, no final decisions have been made with 

respect to future force structure or the modernization plans for nuclear delivery systems. The Department of Defense is close to concluding the NPR Implementation 

Study, which will inform future decisions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What assumptions underlie and inform the options presented to the 

President? 

Dr. MILLER. The key assumption that informs the options being developed is that 

the goals of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) remain valid: to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; to reduce the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. 

national security strategy; to maintain strategic stability and deterrence at reduced 

nuclear force levels; to strengthen regional deterrence and reassure our Allies and 

partners of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and other security commitments; and to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the cost of forward-deploying tactical nuclear weapons in 

Europe? Please provide detailed cost break-down (in classified form if necessary). 

How are these costs shared between the U.S. and host countries? 

Dr. MILLER. DOD estimates the annual operating costs for the United States to 

support forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe is approximately $100 million 

per year on average, as shown in the below table. 

Fiscal Year (FY)($M) FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FYDP 

Officer 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 37.6 

Enlisted 66.7 68.9 71.1 73.4 76.3 356.4 

Operations & Maintenance 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 12.2 

Security Investments 0.0 23.0 44.0 0.0 0.0 67.0 

Weapon Storage Systems 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 12.3 

Transportation Costs 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 14.5 

Total 81.9 106.9 130.4 88.8 92.0 500.0 

Beyond the above costs, Host Nations fund all facility and installation costs at the 

Munitions Support Squadrons locations. In addition to facility and installation costs, 

NATO funded $14.7M in FY 2011 to develop and procure a replacement weapon 

maintenance vehicle for all weapon sites and $63.4M in FY 2011–2012 in security 

upgrades for munitions storage sites. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. General Kehler, you’ve stated recently that ‘‘We’re not going to be 

able to go forward with weapon systems that cost what weapon systems cost today 

. . . Case in point is [the] Long-Range Strike [bomber]. Case in point is the Trident 

[submarine] replacement . . . . The list goes on.’’ In addition, Admiral Mullen before 
162 

he retired as Chairman of the JCS said: ‘‘At some point in time, that triad becomes 

very, very expensive, you know, obviously, the smaller your nuclear arsenal is. And 

it’s—so at some point in time, in the future, certainly I think a decision will have 

to be made in terms of whether we keep the triad or drop it down to a dyad.’’ 

Can the U.S. guarantee its security and that of its allies in a more fiscally sustainable manner by pursuing further bilateral reductions in nuclear forces with Russia and scaling back plans for new and excessively large strategic nuclear weapons 

systems and warhead production facilities? 

General KEHLER. U.S. policy is to maintain strategic deterrence, strategic stability, and assure our allies with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons. 

The President has certified to Congress he will seek negotiations with the Russian 

Federation for an agreement on non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpiles of Russia 

and the U.S. and to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner. I believe our triad of strategic nuclear weapons systems and our nuclear weapons infrastructure need to be sustained and modernized and there are opportunities to do 

so in a cost effective and affordable manner. New START provides the necessary 

flexibility to examine alternatives while meeting our national security policy objectives. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you have any concerns about the provisions related to nuclear 

weapons employment and that could limit or delay nuclear weapons reductions, 

which were included in the House National Defense Authorization bill? 

General KEHLER. As the combatant commander responsible for managing forces 

and implementing the New START, I am concerned reporting requirements and 

waiting periods have the potential to impact New START implementation. Additionally, I am concerned that some provisions could divert resources from critical stockpile sustainment efforts and delay prudent reductions to the non-deployed stockpile. 

In my view, existing consultative processes (e.g., 1251, Stockpile Stewardship and 

Management Plan) ensure we work jointly with Congress to implement New START 

and manage the stockpile. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 

June 2010, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft stated: ‘‘Some things 

[nuclear weapons] need to be modernized in order to be safe, secure and reliable. 

Other things don’t need to be. And I would not put modernization itself as a key 

to what we need to—we need to do.’’ 

Do you agree with this statement? 

General KEHLER. We need to sustain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. We have reached a critical point where investment is required to sustain the 

weapons, perform life extensions for substantial pieces of our deterrent, and modernize the complex. The current plans in the 1251 Report detail our best estimates 

for actions needed to sustain the stockpile while meeting our deterrence requirements. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the projected costs of, and associated decision points, related to, development and production of a new nuclear bomber, a new Air-Launched 

Cruise Missile, and a new ICBM? 

General KEHLER. The 1251 Report contains the most current projected costs for 

the new bomber, ALCM follow-on, and Minuteman follow-on. These estimates will 

be refined as the Air Force conducts the requirements and acquisition processes for 

each platform and future 1251 Reports will be updated accordingly. The current Air 

Force plan projects a technology development decision for the ALCM follow-on in 

FY14. Specific plans for the new bomber are in development. The Minuteman follow-on is dependent on the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives which is scheduled to begin in FY13. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Would the ALCM require a new warhead? 

General KEHLER. The current ALCM warhead is sustainable with investments by 

the Air Force and NNSA until 2030. The next-generation cruise missile will require 

a life-extended warhead. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Under the data provided by the New START verification regime, 

Russia’s nuclear forces were actually at one point under the New START limits that 

must be met by 2018, but now have risen slightly. Russia is deploying one new missile, the RS–24—a missile I would note that U.S. inspectors got to examine up close 

solely because New START came into force—and I believe Russia is also proposing 

a new 10-warhead missile. 

What can we do to discourage Russia from developing and fielding new weapons? 

General KEHLER. The New START Treaty was explicitly designed to permit both 

countries to shape and modernize their forces to match their requirements as they 

see fit within the treaty’s limits. In contrast to the United States, Russia is today 

conducting a modernization of their force in part to serve as replacements for existing systems that have exceeded or are ending their service lives and more generally 
163 

to meet their perceived geopolitical needs. To some degree, the United States will 

be conducting similar modernization efforts in the later half of this decade and the 

next. As discussed in the NPR, I believe the way forward is to place ‘‘importance 

on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.’’ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In the context of New START negotiations, how many deployed 

strategic warheads did the U.S. military conclude that it needed to fulfill the existing targeting requirements established by the Bush administration in their nuclear 

policies. 

And how many deployed strategic warheads are needed following the analysis of 

the 90-day NPR implementation review based on the different options that will be 

presented to the President? 

General KEHLER. As part of the Nuclear Posture Review the military conducted 

extensive studies to inform the U.S. negotiation position for the New Start Treaty. 

The resultant treaty level reflects the military’s identified requirements. The followon analysis directed in the NPR (aka ‘‘90 Day NPR implementation review’’) is ongoing and thus it would be premature to describe the content of these discussions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the importance of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy, an approach that makes 

sense in a world where such weapons are the only existential threat to the United 

States. 

Can you give us some examples of how the United States can further reduce the 

role of nuclear weapons? 

Can you tell us how and what further reductions in the size of the U.S. stockpile 

would be possible based on current and foreseeable requirements, and what assumptions about nuclear weapons technology and geopolitics in the next decades factor 

into these requirements? 

General KEHLER. The ongoing follow-on analysis directed in the NPR is examining 

these issues in detail and thus it would be premature to describe the content of 

these discussions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you have any concerns about the provisions related to nuclear 

weapons employment and that could limit or delay nuclear weapons reductions, 

which were included in the House National Defense Authorization bill? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The May 24, 2011, Statement of Administration Policy on 

H.R. 1540 made clear that the Administration had serious constitutional concerns 

with sections 1055, 1056, and 1230. Sections 1055 and 1056 would impinge on the 

President’s authority to implement the New START Treaty and to set U.S. nuclear 

weapons policy. Similarly, section 1230 would limit the president’s ability to address 

tactical nuclear weapons, a step called for in the Senate’s Resolution of Ratification 

of the New START Treaty. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Under the data provided by the New START verification regime, 

Russia’s nuclear forces were actually at one point under the New START limits that 

must be met by 2018, but now have risen slightly. Russia is deploying one new missile, the RS–24—a missile I would note that U.S. inspectors got to examine up close 

solely because New START came into force—and I believe Russia is also proposing 

a new 10-warhead missile. 

What can we do to discourage Russia from developing and fielding new weapons? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Under New START, each Party retains the right to determine for itself the structure and composition of its strategic forces within the Treaty’s overall limits. This provides both Parties to the Treaty with the flexibility to 

deploy, maintain, and modernize its strategic nuclear forces in the manner that best 

protects its national security interests. However, modernization must occur within 

the central limits of the Treaty. The Treaty limitations on U.S. and Russian forces, 

combined with mechanisms to verify compliance, will provide predictability, transparency, and stability in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship at lower nuclear 

force levels. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are we taking the necessary steps to build verification requirements into the CMRR and UPF facility designs to preserve flexibility for future 

arms control agreements? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. While designs for CMRR (Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement) and UPF (Uranium Processing Facility) are flexible, specific 

verification requirements of future agreements are unknown. The UPF facility design has been evaluated and determined to have an appropriate level of transparency within the ongoing design to accommodate potential activities that could be 

related to future treaty obligations. UPF can accommodate access, and appropriate 

areas for monitoring and measuring of fissile material for inspection teams. The 

CMRR Nuclear Facility is not considered a production facility and is not anticipated 

to be subject to routine inspections. 
164 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Could you further detail the relationship between modernization 

and reductions? 

Does delay in modernization necessarily prevent any reductions? Could the U.S. 

pursue negotiations for further reductions before CMRR and UPF are operational? 

Could the U.S. make unilateral reductions, as was done under Presidents George 

H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, if they can be done without jeopardizing deterrence requirements? Why or why not? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Appropriate investments to improve the capability and responsiveness in our nuclear infrastructure ensure the United States will retain a 

safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal so long as nuclear weapons exist and will 

help to enable further reductions. 

As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the President has directed a review of 

post-New START arms control objectives to consider further reductions in nuclear 

weapons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the cost of forward-deploying tactical nuclear weapons in 

Europe? Please provide detailed cost break-down (in classified form if necessary). 

How are these costs shared between the U.S. and host countries? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. We refer you to the answer below provided by the Department of Defense which outlines the U.S. support for forward based nuclear weapons 

in Europe as well as the contribution by host countries and the NATO Alliance. The 

current amount funded by the United States to support forward based nuclear 

weapons in Europe is: 

Fiscal Year (FY)($M) FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FYDP 

Officer 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 37.6 

Enlisted 66.7 68.9 71.1 73.4 76.3 356.4 

Operations & Maintenance 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 12.2 

Security Investments 0.0 23.0 44.0 0.0 0.0 67.0 

Weapon Storage Systems 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 12.3 

Transportation Costs 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 14.5 

Total 81.9 106.9 130.4 88.8 92.0 500.0 

The Host Nations currently fund all facility and installation costs at the Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS) locations. In addition to facility and installation 

costs, NATO funded $14.7M (FY11) to develop and procure a replacement weapon 

maintenance vehicle for all weapon sites and $63.4M (FY11/12) in security upgrades 

for the MUNSS storage sites. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Do you have any concerns about the provisions related to nuclear 

weapons employment and that could limit or delay nuclear weapons reductions, 

which were included in the House National Defense Authorization bill? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Section 1055 of H.R. 1540, the House National Defense Authorization Bill for FY 2012, would impose onerous conditions on NNSA’s ability to retire, dismantle, or eliminate non-deployed nuclear weapons. The effect of this section 

would be to preclude dismantlement of weapons in excess of military needs. Additionally, it would increase stewardship and management costs and divert key resources from our critical stockpile sustainment efforts and delay completion of programs necessary to support the long-term safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear deterrent. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 

June 2010, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft stated: ‘‘Some things 

[nuclear weapons] need to be modernized in order to be safe, secure and reliable. 

Other things don’t need to be. And I would not put modernization itself as a key 

to what we need to—we need to do.’’ 

Do you agree with this statement? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, I agree with Mr. Scowcroft’s statement. As Mr. Scowcroft 

stated, NNSA is not pursuing modernization of nuclear weapons or the nuclear security enterprise for the sake of modernization; rather, NNSA is extending the life 

of systems where necessary, on a case-by-case basis, to ensure the continued safety, 

security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, including assuring the continued capability of the entire nuclear security enterprise. 

[Text from the June hearing for context: Mr. SCOWCROFT. Yes, I am. I am comfortable. I did not use the term ‘‘modernization’’ in my comments. I said safe, reliable, assurance. Modernization for the sake of modernization, in light of the comments that Senator Lugar has made about the overall defense budget, is a separate 

question. Some things need to be modernized in order to be safe, secure, and reliable. Other things do not need to be. And I would not put modernization itself as 
165 

a key to what we need to do. We need to be assured that the system will work the 

way we want it to work.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Would the ALCM require a new warhead? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Air Force is assessing options to replace the Air Launched 

Cruise Missile (ALCM) with another long-range standoff (LRSO) capability in the 

next decade. NNSA is prepared to install new neutron generators to extend the life 

of the W80 deployed on the ALCM. NNSA will continue to support the Air Force’s 

ongoing Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to establish requirements for the LSRO. 

Until the AoA is complete, the warhead options will not be determined. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Under the data provided by the New START verification regime, 

Russia’s nuclear forces were actually at one point under the New START limits that 

must be met by 2018, but now have risen slightly. Russia is deploying one new missile, the RS–24—a missile I would note that U.S. inspectors got to examine up close 

solely because New START came into force—and I believe Russia is also proposing 

a new 10-warhead missile. 

What can we do to discourage Russia from developing and fielding new weapons? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Russian determinations regarding the development and fielding 

of weapons will be based on Russian national security considerations, just as the 

United States will make determinations based on U.S. national security considerations. Looking to the future, the President has made clear his commitment to a 

step-by-step process for further reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, while 

recognizing that this process will take time and must be based on international security conditions that will enable such reductions to occur in a secure, predictable, 

and stable manner. In this regard, the United States must continue to work with 

the international community, including Russia, to improve the regional and international security considerations affecting national security decisionmaking. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What assumptions underlie, and what requirements drive, the 50– 

80 pits and secondaries production capacity for CMRR and UPF? What is the cost 

comparison for facilities that could produce a lower maximum number of pits/ 

secondaries? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. NNSA infrastructure is capability-based and will be responsive 

to changing world demands and have the inherent capacity for uranium processing, 

plutonium analytical chemistry and material characterization support, and storage 

to support production of the required pits and canned subassemblies (CSA) per year 

while sustaining the remaining stockpile. Stockpile life extension plans developed 

jointly between the Department of Defense and NNSA provide the drivers for the 

requirements for pits and secondaries production capacity. During the NNSA Critical Decision process that resulted in approval of capability-based designs for both 

facilities, multiple alternatives were considered for meeting mission needs. Both 

project teams are currently working to achieve 90 percent design maturity in FY 

2012. NNSA will conduct independent cost reviews before setting the performance 

baselines for cost and schedule in 2013. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the projected operation and management costs of CMRR 

and UPF? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. For UPF: The projected total 50 year operational period cost of 

operations and maintenance and the average annual costs for the Uranium Processing Facility expressed in 2011 dollars are: 

Total Cost Over 50 Years Average Annual Cost Over 

50 Years 

Operations $4,693,000K $93,800K 

Maintenance $1,761,000K $34,900K 

For CMRR: The projected total 50 year operational period cost of operations and 

maintenance and the average annual costs for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement including the radiological laboratory/utility/office building expressed in 2011 dollars are: 

Total Cost Over 50 Years Average Annual Cost Over 

50 Years 

Operations $4,500,000K $90,000K 

Maintenance $1,800,000K $35,000K 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What are the costs of decontamination and decommissioning of the 

CMRR and UPF, and are these costs included in the cost estimates for these facilities? Why/why not? 
166 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Since CMRR and UPF are planned to operate for 50 years, the 

future costs of decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of CMRR and UPF 

have not been determined. 

As reflected in the Construction Project Data Sheet for CMRR in the President’s 

FY 2012 Congressional Budget request, the initial pre-conceptual cost estimate 

range for D&D of the existing CMR facility is approximately $200M–$350M in nonescalated FY 2004 dollars. 

As reflected in the Construction Project Data Sheet for UPF in the President’s FY 

2012 Congressional Budget request, the D&D of Building 9212 is included as part 

of the Integrated Facility Disposition Project proposed by the Office of Environmental Management to dispose of legacy facilities at Y–12 and Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory. Buildings 9215, 9998, and 9204–2E are being evaluated for further consolidation of non-Special Nuclear Material manufacturing functions. Since these 

buildings will not be immediately excess to program needs when UPF becomes operational, NNSA has no near term D&D plans for these facilities. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are we taking the necessary steps to build verification requirements into the CMRR and UPF facility designs to preserve flexibility for future 

arms control agreements? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. While designs for CMRR and UPF are flexible, specific 

verification requirements of future agreements are unknown. The UPF facility design has been evaluated and determined to have an appropriate level of transparency within the ongoing design to accommodate expected activities related to our 

treaty obligations. UPF can accommodate access, and appropriate areas for monitoring and measuring of fissile material for inspection teams. The CMRR Nuclear 

Facility is not considered a production facility and is not anticipated to be subject 

to routine inspections. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. Under Secretary Tauscher, during the November 2nd hearing you 

mentioned the EPAA is based on the SM–3 interceptor, implying the EPAA is comprised of proven systems; as you and I know, Phases II through IV of the EPAA 

will use new missiles and are experiencing technical difficulties. Indeed, the SM– 

3 Block IIB missile, slotted for phase IV of the EPAA, was entirely zeroed out by 

the SAC–D due its technical challenges and to devote more money to the SM–3 IB 

and IIA since they are also having challenges. It is also perplexing to assert the 

EPAA will be less expensive than the previous missile defense plan in Europe. The 

Missile Defense Agency currently does not have an estimate as to how much the 

EPAA will ultimately cost the U.S.; moreover, if the EPAA fails to deploy an effective SM–3 Block IIB, or GBIs as a hedge in the event Iran succeeds in developing 

an effective ICBM, the entire plan will fall woefully short of what the original plan 

was primarily supposed to do—provide added protection of the U.S. homeland. If the 

EPAA isn’t even going to provide the same coverage of the U.S. as the original plan, 

than it makes no sense to compare their costs. In light of the these facts, please 

provide specific evidence supporting your statement that President Obama’s approach to missile defense uses ‘‘proven systems at a lower cost than the previous 

proposal.’’ I have seen no evidence to support your statement, which causes concern 

for the viability of the entire EPAA. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The EPAA includes a number of elements such as the SM– 

3 interceptor, the Aegis SPY–1 radar, and the AN/TPY–2 radar. The current version 

of the SM–3, the SM–3 Block IA, is deployed with the fleet today. The Aegis SPY– 

1 radar has been deployed on U.S. warships for over 30 years, and AN/TPY–2 radars have been deployed and operated in Japan and Israel for a number of years. 

One element of the basis for the statement is that the Standard Missile (SM)– 

3, at around $10 million per interceptor, is much cheaper than a GBI, which costs 

approximately $60 to $70 million per interceptor. This means that we can deploy 

many more SM–3 interceptors than GBIs at the same cost. Since Iran already possesses hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, this additional defensive capability is critical. In addition, the EPAA relies on capabilities that are mobile and relocatable, so additional capabilities can ‘‘surge’’ into the region in a crisis. 

It is important to note that the EPAA is not an acquisition program but a policy 

framework for delivering capabilities of which the principal attribute is flexibility. 

By design, it can adapt to changes in threats and available technologies. 
167 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Dr. Miller, in response to a question during this subcommittee’s 

March 31, 2011 hearing on the budget for missile defense programs, your deputy, 

Dr. Brad Roberts stated, ‘‘The Administration is considering additional steps to 

strengthen the U.S. hedge posture . . . we are evaluating the deployment timelines 

associated with fielding additional capabilities . . . we have committed to brief the 

Committee on the results of this work . . . once it is complete.’’ And, you Dr. Miller, 

during this subcommittee’s March 2 hearing, stated ‘‘the Department is in the process of finalizing and refining its hedge strategy, and we will be pleased to brief this 

subcommittee on the results in a classified setting when it is complete.’’ Dr. Miller, 

here we are eight months later and the Department has not released its hedging 

strategy. When can we expect to see it? 

Dr. MILLER. The analysis conducted for the hedge strategy is informing the budget decisions under consideration as part of the development of the Department’s fiscal year 2013 budget request. The Department will ensure that Congress is briefed 

on the results of the hedge strategy in early 2013. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Do you agree with Secretary Gates who said at the Shangri-La 

Dialogue in Singapore in June, ‘‘With the continued development of long-range missiles and potentially a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued development of nuclear weapons, North Korea is in the process of becoming 

a direct threat to the United States.’’ And two weeks later he said, ‘‘North Korea 

now constitutes a direct threat to the United States. The president told [China’s] 

President Hu that last year. They are developing a road-mobile ICBM. I never 

would have dreamed they would go to a road-mobile before testing a static ICBM. 

It’s a huge problem. As we’ve found out in a lot of places, finding mobile missiles 

is very tough.’’ Do you concur with Secretary Gates’ statements? Was the question 

of a North Korean road-mobile missile factored in to the decision in 2009 to abandon 

the Third Site and the deployment of 44 ground based interceptors at the missile 

fields at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base? If North Korea begins fielding 

an array of road mobile ICBMs, and if they proliferate this technology to Iran and 

other countries as in the past, what does such activity do to current judgments 

about the adequacy of the current inventory of GBIs? 

Dr. MILLER. I agree with Secretary Gates’ assessment that North Korea constitutes a direct threat to the United States, as it does to our South Korean and 

Japanese allies. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and continued development of 

long-range missiles remain a primary focus of the development and deployment of 

the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The capabilities developed and deployed as part of the integrated BMDS protect the United States from the potential 

emergence of an ICBM threat from Iran or North Korea. To maintain this advantageous position, the Administration is taking steps to improve the protection of the 

homeland from the potential ICBM threat posed by Iran and North Korea. These 

steps include the continued procurement of ground-based interceptors (GBIs), the 

deployment of additional sensors, and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle 

Management, and Communications system. Improvements to the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, in particular, will better protect the United 

States against future ICBM threats, whether from Iran, North Korea, or other regional actors. 

In the future, if projections regarding Iran or North Korea change significantly, 

then the United States should reassess its baseline program and consider implementing some elements of our hedge posture. 

Mr. LAMBORN. This summer, when asked about the consequence of cuts to 

NNSA’s modernization program, Secretary Gates said: ‘‘This modernization program 

was very carefully worked out between ourselves and the . . . Department of Energy. 

And, frankly, where we came out on that also, I think, played a fairly significant 

role in the willingness of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the 

risks are to our own program in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon 

systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a security and a 

political standpoint, really important.’’ Do you agree with Secretary Gates that the 

modernization project is very important both from a national security standpoint 

and from a perspective of sustaining support for the New START Treaty? What are 

the consequences of not funding the ‘‘very carefully worked out’’ plan for NNSA 

modernization? 

Dr. MILLER. I agree with Secretary Gates that NNSA’s modernization is very important to U.S. national security. The nuclear security enterprise remains, today 

and for the foreseeable future, the foundation of the U.S. deterrence strategy and 

defense posture. The Administration is committed to making the investments nec-
168 

essary to recapitalize the U.S. nuclear complex and to ensure we have the highly 

skilled personnel needed to maintain our nuclear capabilities. 

With the passing of the Budget Control Act (BCA), we now face new fiscal realities. These fiscal realities do not weaken our commitment to the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent, but they must inform our path forward. 

The Administration is working to develop an FY13 budget request for NNSA that 

reflects these fiscal realities, but funds the core elements of the nuclear complex and 

meets military requirements. 

Without adequate funding for NNSA, the nuclear weapons life extension programs, nuclear infrastructure, and the retention of the people on which we depend 

to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal would be at risk. Congressional participation in this process and commitment to continuing investments in 

these programs and capabilities is critical to the future health of our nuclear deterrent. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review says that, ‘‘by modernizing our 

aging nuclear facilities and investing in human capital, we can substantially reduce 

the number of nuclear weapons we retain as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.’’ It goes on to say that these modernization ‘‘investments are essential to facilitating reductions while sustaining deterrence under New START and 

beyond.’’ If we do not carry out the modernization program, what is your military 

opinion of the risks associated with nuclear stockpile reductions? 

General KEHLER. Modernization and investment in our aging nuclear facilities 

and human capital are important to the sustainment of our nuclear weapons, the 

dismantlement of retired weapons and other non-proliferation activities. There are 

increased risks if the modernization program is not executed and it is an important 

consideration in reducing the stockpile. I believe successful life extension programs 

are critical to strategic deterrence. 

Mr. LAMBORN. This summer, when asked about the consequence of cuts to 

NNSA’s modernization program, Secretary Gates said: ‘‘This modernization program 

was very carefully worked out between ourselves and the . . . Department of Energy. 

And, frankly, where we came out on that also, I think, played a fairly significant 

role in the willingness of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the 

risks are to our own program in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon 

systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a security and a 

political standpoint, really important.’’ Do you agree with Secretary Gates that the 

modernization project is very important both from a national security standpoint 

and from a perspective of sustaining support for the New START Treaty? What are 

the consequences of not funding the ‘‘very carefully worked out’’ plan for NNSA 

modernization? 

General KEHLER. I agree the nation must recapitalize its nuclear capabilities as 

all of our nuclear weapon systems and facilities are ‘‘aged’’ and require investment 

in the upcoming decades. The fiscal environment demands that we prioritize and 

synchronize the various platform, weapon and infrastructure modernization activities. Inadequate funding undermines our ability to provide a credible deterrent force 

to assure allies and respond appropriately, as directed by the President, if deterrence fails. 

Mr. LAMBORN. This summer, when asked about the consequence of cuts to 

NNSA’s modernization program, Secretary Gates said: ‘‘This modernization program 

was very carefully worked out between ourselves and the . . . Department of Energy. 

And, frankly, where we came out on that also, I think, played a fairly significant 

role in the willingness of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the 

risks are to our own program in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon 

systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a security and a 

political standpoint, really important.’’ Do you agree with Secretary Gates that the 

modernization project is very important both from a national security standpoint 

and from a perspective of sustaining support for the New START Treaty? What are 

the consequences of not funding the ‘‘very carefully worked out’’ plan for NNSA 

modernization? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Yes. A credible and affordable modernization plan is necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation’s deterrent. 

NNSA will continue to update and improve the exact details of these modernization 

plans as it completes the designs and analyzes the infrastructure needed to support 

the stockpile. The programs and capabilities of our long-term modernization plans 

for the nuclear infrastructure remain important both from a national security standpoint and from a perspective of sustaining support for the New START Treaty. 

Mr. LAMBORN. This summer, when asked about the consequence of cuts to 

NNSA’s modernization program, Secretary Gates said: ‘‘This modernization program 

was very carefully worked out between ourselves and the . . . Department of Energy. 
169 

And, frankly, where we came out on that also, I think, played a fairly significant 

role in the willingness of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the 

risks are to our own program in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon 

systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a security and a 

political standpoint, really important.’’ Do you agree with Secretary Gates that the 

modernization project is very important both from a national security standpoint 

and from a perspective of sustaining support for the New START Treaty? What are 

the consequences of not funding the ‘‘very carefully worked out’’ plan for NNSA 

modernization? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. We agree that modernization is important and we urge the Congress to provide funding. The consequence for not funding the NNSA modernization 

plan is increased risk to the long-term maintenance of the U.S. stockpile and deterrence in general. The plan for modernization of the complex was carefully crafted 

through concerted interaction between the Departments of Energy and Defense. It 

was based on national strategic planning outlined in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture 

Review (NPR). This stockpile planning has been carefully formulated in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) as a flow of complex activities over 

the next two decades. In some cases, decreases in funding would risk cessation or 

reduction of key activities (such as certain complex experiments and nuclear component manufacturing). Additional analysis will be undertaken, often in consultation 

with the Department of Defense, to minimize or eliminate such risks. 

The New START Treaty is an important part of our security strategy and provides transparency and stability between the world’s two major nuclear powers and 

will remain in our interest as long as we face nuclear challenges. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Miller, as you know, this committee has been concerned about 

what a U.S.-Russia missile defense agreement negotiated by the Obama Administration might look like. Specifically, the provision I authored in this year’s national defense authorization act would prohibit the exchange of sensitive missile defense sensor data and technology, such as our hit-to-kill technology. I note that the Administration expressed concern about this provision but it did not rise to the level of a 

veto threat. Several weeks ago, the Russian newspaper Kommersant published a report that a heretofore secret agreement tabled by Ms. Tauscher—I say secret because nothing about this ‘‘agreement’’ was briefed to Congress—with her Russian 

counterpart that President Obama actually had to reject. Surely, as a former congressional staffer, Dr. Miller, you understand that the Congress has a vital oversight function. In the absence of transparency by the Administration, the Congress 

has no choice but to resort to legislative provisions such as the amendment I offered. 

Would you please provide us get a copy of that draft agreement? It appears that 

now it is even circulating in the Russian press. 

Dr. MILLER. The Administration is committed to keeping Congress informed of its 

missile defense efforts. The Administration is currently pursuing a political framework with the Russian Federation that could open the way for practical cooperation 

with Russia on missile defense. There are a variety of ways to establish such a political framework; no agreement has been reached on the content or format of any 

such framework to date. Any finalized statement will be shared with Congress. The 

Administration has been clear that it will not agree to any constraints or limitations 

on U.S. and NATO missile defense systems. As such, any political framework we 

reach with the Russian Federation would not be a legally binding agreement. I have 

passed your specific request to the Department of State. 

Mr. BROOKS. Ms. Tauscher, as you know, this committee has been concerned 

about what a U.S.-Russia missile defense agreement negotiated by the Obama Administration might look like. Specifically, the provision I authored in this year’s national defense authorization act would prohibit the exchange of sensitive missile defense sensor data and technology, such as our hit-to-kill technology. I note that the 

Administration expressed concern about this provision but it did not rise to the level 

of a veto threat. Several weeks ago, the Russian newspaper Kommersant published 

a report that a heretofore secret agreement tabled by you—I say secret because 

nothing about this ‘‘agreement’’ was briefed to Congress—with your Russian counterpart that President Obama actually had to reject. Surely, as a former Member 

of Congress, you understand that the Congress has a vital oversight function. In the 

absence of transparency by the Administration, the Congress has no choice but to 

resort to legislative provisions such as the amendment I offered. Would you please 

provide us get a copy of that draft agreement? It appears that now it is even circulating in the Russian press. 
170 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The Administration is committed to keeping Congress informed of its missile defense efforts. We have provided numerous senior level briefings to the Congress on our efforts to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. The 

most recent briefing for this Committee was held on December 21, 2011. The Administration is currently pursuing a political framework that would open the way 

for practical cooperation with Russia on missile defense. There are a variety of ways 

to establish such a political framework. No agreement has been reached on the content, and no decision has been made on a format. The political framework would 

not be a legally binding agreement. Any finalized statement will be shared with 

Congress. The Administration has been clear that it will not agree to any constraints limiting the development or deployment of U.S. and NATO missile defense 

systems. 

Mr. BROOKS. The State Department has been negotiating a Defense Technology 

Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) with Russia since the beginning of the Obama Administration, but a copy of a draft of that agreement has never been shared with 

this committee or anywhere in the Congress as far as I am aware. Ms. Tauscher, 

by refusing to share this draft document with the Congress, it appears that the Administration seems to trust the Russians more than Congress. 

a. Can you help us resolve this situation? Can you make clear for the members 

of this subcommittee whether the United States will share with the Russian Federation telemetric information on U.S. missile defense interceptor or target vehicles? 

Do you understand why the House passed my amendment prohibiting the sharing 

of ‘‘sensitive’’ missile defense information with the Russians when we can’t even see 

what you’re offering them? This is not the only concern, with such information sharing, but it is a weighty one. Are you willing to share any classified U.S. missile defense technology with Russia? What classified information is Russia willing to share 

with us? 

b. Perhaps most distressing is talk of guarantees for Russia concerning our missile defenses. Ms. Tauscher, can you please tell us the Administration position concerning missile defense agreements and guarantees for Russia? What of NATO 

guarantees? We are told that the United States may outsource to NATO, perhaps 

at the May 2012 Chicago NATO Summit, political guarantees to Russia about our 

missile defenses. Is that something you and the State Department would support? 

Regarding the guarantees the Obama Administration is willing to provide, would 

you see any reason a future Administration wouldn’t be able to just walk away from 

the guarantees the Obama Administration is willing to provide, would you see any 

reason a future Administration wouldn’t be able to just walk away from the guarantee you’re offering? Would there be geopolitical costs to doing so? Two weeks ago, 

in the news clips distributed to members of this committee, where was a press report concerning Russia’s S–500 ICBM-killer missile defense system. Why is so much 

time spent addressing Russian concerns about our missile defense system with regards to their deterrent when never a peep is heard about the extensive Russian 

missile defense system and is implications for the U.S. deterrent? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. a. The Department of Defense is negotiating a DTCA with 

Russia. Such negotiations have been ongoing since initiated during the Bush Administration in 2004. We will not provide Russia with sensitive information about our 

missile defense systems that would in any way compromise our national security. 

For example, hit-to-kill technology and interceptor telemetry will not, under any circumstances, be provided to Russia. 

However, in the event that the exchange of classified information with Russia on 

missile defense will increase the President’s ability to defend the American people, 

U.S. deployed forces, allies, and partners, the President will retain the right to do 

so. These factors are the same ones that motivated the last Administration to have 

determined that some classified information exchange with Russia on missile defense would benefit the United States. 

In those circumstances where an exchange of sensitive data with Russia would 

benefit the national security of the United States, the Administration will only do 

so contingent on an agreement regarding information handling and protection, including the prohibition of access to such information by third parties. Additionally, 

any Russian access to classified information would be strictly governed by U.S. National Disclosure Policy and other applicable laws, including a determination that 

such exchange benefits the United States. The President has also ordered us to 

closely consult with the appropriate Members of Congress before the exchange of 

classified information with Russia. 

b. The Administration has consistently stated that it will not agree to legally 

binding restrictions or limitations on U.S. or NATO missile defenses. The Administration has stated, publicly and privately, that the missile defense system being established in Europe is not directed against Russia. The Administration is prepared 
171 

to put the same statement in writing as part of a political framework that would 

open the way for practical cooperation with Russia on missile defense. There are a 

variety of ways to establish such a political framework. No agreement has been 

reached on the content, and no decision has been made on a format. The political 

framework would not be a legally binding agreement. The Administration would 

also support, in coordination with and subject to agreement by all Allies, such a 

statement by NATO. 

With Russia, the Administration is pursuing an agenda aimed at bringing the 

strategic military postures of our two countries into alignment with our post-Cold 

War relationship—no longer enemies, no significant prospect of war between us, and 

cooperating when mutually advantageous. Therefore, Russia is not the focus of U.S. 

BMD. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING 

Dr. FLEMING. When will the New START force structure be determined? When 

does it need to be determined in order to achieve implementation not later than 

February 2017? Specifically, with respect to potential strategic force reductions 

under New START: 

a. Are the full costs of eliminating, converting from deployed to non-deployed, and 

converting to non-nuclear status DOD systems known by the Department? 

b. If the Navy and STRATCOM are comfortable with 192 launchers on 12 SSBN– 

X submarines based on the assumption that New START levels will be those required in 2027 and beyond, meaning 48 fewer launchers than suggested for the submarine-based deterrent in the original 1251 plan, what other reductions are needed 

to the ICBM and bomber legs to comply with the New START limits? 

Dr. MILLER. To date, no final decisions have been made with respect to future 

force structure or the modernization plans for nuclear delivery systems; such decisions will be informed by the Administration’s ongoing Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR) Implementation Study. These decisions will be consistent with the goals of 

the NPR, including maintaining strategic stability, providing assurance to our Allies 

and partners regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and other security commitments, and maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. 

The final costs of implementing New START Treaty will be dependent on decisions concerning the future force structure, conversion and elimination procedures, 

facility requirements for supporting inspections or conversion and elimination procedures, and possibly the development of additional inspection equipment. Although 

the NPR provided certain recommendations concerning force structure, it did not 

specify a New START Treaty-compliant structure nor set the schedule for its implementation, aside from a seven-year implementation period of the Treaty. Costs will 

also be dependent on the procedures that are selected for the conversion or elimination of U.S. strategic offensive arms. The Treaty provides the flexibility for the 

United States to decide what conversion or elimination procedures are most suitable 

given its strategic requirements. 

Dr. FLEMING. One of the binding conditions (condition 9(B)) of the Senate’s Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty says: ‘‘If appropriations are enacted 

that fail to meet the resource requirements set forth in the President’s 10-year [Section 1251] plan . . . the President shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of such 

enactment . . . a report detailing—(1) how the President proposes to remedy the resource shortfall; (2) if additional resources are required, the proposed level of funding required and an identification of the stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, 

asset, program, operation, activity, construction, or project for which additional 

funds are required; (3) the impact of the resource shortfall on the safety, reliability, 

and performance of United States nuclear forces; and (4) whether and why, in the 

changed circumstances brought about by the resource shortfall, it remains in the national interest of the United States to remain a Party to the New START Treaty.’’ 

a. Administrator D’Agostino, General Kehler, and Dr. Miller: Which of you is responsible for this report? Has the President delegated his responsibility on this requirement from the Resolution of Ratification? 

b. The current continuing resolution funds NNSA’s modernization plans wellbelow the FY12 levels laid out in the 1251 plan—essentially at a level 1.5% below 

FY11. Is the administration preparing a report for submission to Congress per this 

requirement? Please submit such a report, in writing, prior to the expiration of the 

current CR. 

c. If the funding levels for Weapons Activities in the Energy and Water appropriations bills in the House and Senate are enacted, or if sequestration or a budget deal 
172 

results in funding for Weapons Activities less than that laid out in the Section 1251 

plan, will the administration submit a report per this binding condition? 

Dr. MILLER. The President has not delegated his responsibility on this requirement from the Resolution of Ratification. Should there be a resource shortfall, DOD 

would expect to work closely with the National Security Staff (NSS) and National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in drafting the President’s report specified 

in Condition 9(B) of the Senate’s Resolution of Ratification for the New START 

Treaty. At this time, it would be inappropriate to assume that a resource shortfall 

exists; the Administration continues to support full funding in an Appropriations 

bill. 

Dr. FLEMING. When will the New START force structure be determined? When 

does it need to be determined in order to achieve implementation not later than 

February 2017? Specifically, with respect to potential strategic force reductions 

under New START: 

a. Are the full costs of eliminating, converting from deployed to non-deployed, and 

converting to non-nuclear status DOD systems known by the Department? 

b. If the Navy and STRATCOM are comfortable with 192 launchers on 12 SSBN– 

X submarines based on the assumption that New START levels will be those required in 2027 and beyond, meaning 48 fewer launchers than suggested for the submarine-based deterrent in the original 1251 plan, what other reductions are needed 

to the ICBM and bomber legs to comply with the New START limits? 

General KEHLER. Discussions regarding final nuclear force structure for New 

START are ongoing. Once a final force structure decision is reached Services will 

be able to finalize costs to conduct any necessary conversions, eliminations, and nondeployment of systems. 

A. The Air Force and the Navy estimates of expected costs are based on the force 

structure detailed in the current 1251 Report. Once a decision has been made on 

a final force structure the Services will refine estimates. 

B. The Ohio Replacement SSBN will not enter strategic service until after New 

START has expired. The future strategic environment and other factors will ultimately determine future force structure requirements. 

Dr. FLEMING. General Kehler, as you know B–52 and B–2 bombers are hardened 

to protect them from electromagnetic radiation in the event of a nearby nuclear detonation. 

a. Why is this hardening important in terms of STRATCOM’s operational construct? 

b. Will the next generation bomber be nuclear-hardened as well? 

c. Can STRATCOM estimate the additional developmental and life cycle costs associated with hardening the next generation bomber? 

d. General Kehler, you stated at a recent breakfast with the Defense Writers 

Group (10–18–11) that the follow-on bomber ‘‘has to be long range.’’ Can you please 

elaborate on the importance of this concept? Also, can you describe what its combat 

payload will be relative to our current heavy bombers, the B–52 and B–2? 

e. Will it be nuclear certified from Initial Operational Capability? If not, why? 

f. Please describe in detail STRATCOM’s requirements for warhead modernization 

on the next ALCM, a.k.a., the long-range standoff missile. Has STRATCOM performed an analysis of alternatives on warhead options, and what the projected costs 

for each alternative are? Is the W84 one of the alternatives being studied? If yes, 

do a sufficient number of W84s exist in the enduring stockpile to fulfill the requirement? 

General KEHLER. A. Bombers must be capable of operating in a variety of environments, to include nuclear effects environments—hardening directly supports bomber 

survivability and effectiveness, underwriting deterrence and assurance. 

B. Yes, USSTRATCOM has conveyed a requirement for a nuclear hardened bomber to the Air Force. 

C. The Air Force is not at a point in the development process that would enable 

a detailed cost estimate for the new bomber. We anticipate hardening to be a relatively small percentage of the overall cost, if incorporated in initial designs. 

D. Denying geographic sanctuary to potential adversaries is an important aspect 

of deterrence. The new bomber must have sufficient range to hold targets that adversaries value at risk. Trades concerning specific capabilities e.g. payload and 

range, are being evaluated. 

E. The new bomber will be nuclear capable, but nuclear certification timeline decisions have yet to be made. 

F. The next ALCM requires a safe, secure and effective warhead. The Air Force 

is conducting an analysis of alternatives including a specific working group with 

USSTRATCOM representatives to examine warhead alternatives, including the 

W84. The alternatives will require varying investments; however, a detailed concept 
173 

and cost study has not been started. There are not enough W84 assets to field a 

cruise missile replacement at current ALCM levels. 

Dr. FLEMING. General Kehler, please explain in detail why the B61 LEP is important to the bomber leg of our strategic deterrent. 

General KEHLER. The B61 is an important part of DOD’s long range planning to 

ensure the bomber leg of the strategic deterrent remains credible. The B61 LEP will 

provide a refurbished weapon capable of being employed on the B–2 and integrated 

with a future bomber. Additionally, the B61 nuclear package will be evaluated for 

incorporation into a future stand-off missile. 

Dr. FLEMING. One of the binding conditions (condition 9(B)) of the Senate’s Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty says: ‘‘If appropriations are enacted 

that fail to meet the resource requirements set forth in the President’s 10-year [Section 1251] plan . . . the President shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of such 

enactment . . . a report detailing—(1) how the President proposes to remedy the resource shortfall; (2) if additional resources are required, the proposed level of funding required and an identification of the stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, 

asset, program, operation, activity, construction, or project for which additional 

funds are required; (3) the impact of the resource shortfall on the safety, reliability, 

and performance of United States nuclear forces; and (4) whether and why, in the 

changed circumstances brought about by the resource shortfall, it remains in the national interest of the United States to remain a Party to the New START Treaty.’’ 

a. Administrator D’Agostino, General Kehler, and Dr. Miller: Which of you is responsible for this report? Has the President delegated his responsibility on this requirement from the Resolution of Ratification? 

b. The current continuing resolution funds NNSA’s modernization plans wellbelow the FY12 levels laid out in the 1251 plan—essentially at a level 1.5% below 

FY11. Is the administration preparing a report for submission to Congress per this 

requirement? Please submit such a report, in writing, prior to the expiration of the 

current CR. 

c. If the funding levels for Weapons Activities in the Energy and Water appropriations bills in the House and Senate are enacted, or if sequestration or a budget deal 

results in funding for Weapons Activities less than that laid out in the Section 1251 

plan, will the administration submit a report per this binding condition? 

General KEHLER. A number of agencies are responsible for inputs to, and review 

of the report, including USSTRATCOM. The President has not yet delegated his responsibility on this requirement from the Resolution of Ratification, but 

USSTRATCOM stands ready to assist as needed. 

Dr. FLEMING. Ms. Tauscher, please explain in detail why the B61 LEP is important to our allies. 

Secretary TAUSCHER. The B61 life extension program (LEP) will ensure its 

functionality with the dual capable aircraft as well as ensure continued confidence 

in the warhead’s safety, security, and effectiveness. The B61 LEP will ensure that 

the United States maintains the capability to forward deploy U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Europe in support of its Alliance commitments and that our arsenal is safe, secure, and effective. The decision to conduct a B61 LEP does not presume the results of future decisions within NATO about the requirements of nuclear 

deterrence and nuclear sharing, but keeps all options open. 

Likewise, the B61 plays a significant role in assuring our allies in Asia. As you 

know, as a result of our Nuclear Posture Review, the United States will retire the 

TLAM–N. That decision was made after close consultation with our allies, during 

which we assured them that there would be no diminution of our extended deterrence commitment and capabilities. The B61 is an important component of those capabilities. 

Dr. FLEMING. Mr. D’Agostino, please explain in detail why the B61 LEP is needed, 

both for the extended deterrent in Europe and to the bomber leg of the U.S. TRIAD. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) supports the 

sustainment of the U.S. strategic and non-strategic nuclear capability. Consistent 

with U.S. commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 

findings of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the B61 LEP will ensure the U.S. retains its capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of its 

Alliance commitments. Furthermore, it is a key component of the air-delivered strategic deterrent and ensures continued contribution of the bomber leg of the Triad 

to nuclear deterrence. 

The B61 bomb is one of the oldest warheads in the stockpile and has components 

dating from the 1960’s, such as vacuum tube radars. The B61 LEP provides the opportunity to include modern safety and security technologies, sustain system effectiveness, optimize NNSA production capacity, and reduce costs over the long-term. 
174 

Dr. FLEMING. One of the binding conditions (condition 9(B)) of the Senate’s Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty says: ‘‘If appropriations are enacted 

that fail to meet the resource requirements set forth in the President’s 10-year [Section 1251] plan . . . the President shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of such 

enactment . . . a report detailing—(1) how the President proposes to remedy the resource shortfall; (2) if additional resources are required, the proposed level of funding required and an identification of the stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, 

asset, program, operation, activity, construction, or project for which additional 

funds are required; (3) the impact of the resource shortfall on the safety, reliability, 

and performance of United States nuclear forces; and (4) whether and why, in the 

changed circumstances brought about by the resource shortfall, it remains in the national interest of the United States to remain a Party to the New START Treaty.’’ 

a. Administrator D’Agostino, General Kehler, and Dr. Miller: Which of you is responsible for this report? Has the President delegated his responsibility on this requirement from the Resolution of Ratification? 

b. The current continuing resolution funds NNSA’s modernization plans wellbelow the FY12 levels laid out in the 1251 plan—essentially at a level 1.5% below 

FY11. Is the administration preparing a report for submission to Congress per this 

requirement? Please submit such a report, in writing, prior to the expiration of the 

current CR. 

c. If the funding levels for Weapons Activities in the Energy and Water appropriations bills in the House and Senate are enacted, or if sequestration or a budget deal 

results in funding for Weapons Activities less than that laid out in the Section 1251 

plan, will the administration submit a report per this binding condition? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The main responsibility for this report lies with the Department 

of Defense. Should there be a resource shortfall, NNSA would work closely with the 

DOD in drafting the President’s report specified in Condition 9(B) of the Senate’s 

Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification for the New START Treaty. 

While we recognize that fiscal austerity will constrain spending on national security programs in the years ahead, our strategic and extended deterrence will continue to be the top priority. The President committed to modernizing our nuclear 

weapons and infrastructure after completion of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review— 

including a commitment to pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as 

he is President. Even in this difficult budget climate, the President’s budget for 

NNSA continues to consistently reflect those commitments. 

The Department of Defense contributed significantly to the preparation of NNSA’s 

budget requests for FY2011 and FY2012, and is prepared to continue support at 

least through FY2016. These contributions are reflective of the close linkage between NNSA’s nuclear weapons programs and the specific needs of its partner, the 

Department of Defense. Without adequate funding for NNSA, however, the nuclear 

weapons life extension programs, nuclear infrastructure modernization, and the retention of the people on which we depend to maintain a safe, secure, and effective 

nuclear arsenal, may be at risk and will continue to be analyzed in consultation 

with the Department of Defense. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. How is deterring China different from deterring Russia? 

a. How is providing extended deterrence in Europe different than doing so in East 

Asia? 

b. During a recent Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on the nuclear weapons 

programs of Russia and the People’s Republic of China, Dr. Mark Schneider stated: 

‘‘We know a lot less about China overall than we know about the Russians in nuclear capability, if for no other reason that the Russians talk about it all the time, 

where the Chinese are fairly secretive. I think you can find deliberate leaks by the 

PLA in Hong Kong Press. I think they are using that as a mechanism of debating 

some issues that they can’t openly debate in China. But I suspect we are going to 

see a very large increase in Chinese capability, including extensive MIRVing.’’ 

How do we hedge the uncertainty in our understanding of China’s nuclear weapons program? How will this be reflected in the Administration’s mini-NPR on nuclear weapons targeting? Why do you think China has a large underground tunnel 

complex for its second artillery? 

Dr. MILLER. Fundamentally, deterrence requires that, in the calculations of any 

potential adversary, the perceived gains of attacking the United States or its allies 

and partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response. 

But in seeking to deter potential adversaries, there is no ‘‘one size fits all’’ approach. 

The requirements of deterrence vary by circumstance, including the capabilities of 
175 

the adversary, the nature of the issue in dispute, and the ability and willingness 

of the adversary to escalate—and to exercise restraint. Uncertainty is an enduring 

feature of the deterrence equation, though the United States makes a priority of trying to reduce such uncertainty with detailed assessments of the intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries. Uncertainty about the potential future nuclear 

weapons capabilities of other states is also an enduring theme of U.S. deterrence 

policy. Every President in the nuclear era has sought to have some capacity to respond to a significant erosion of the nuclear security environment. The United 

States hedges against such uncertainty by ensuring that it has the technical means 

to cope with geopolitical surprise, with a mix of short-term responses (such as the 

potential to up-load existing weapons onto existing delivery systems) and long-term 

responses (the production and deployment of new capabilities). The requirements of 

this hedge are one of the many elements in review in the NPR Implementation 

Study. 

China’s large underground tunnel complex fits well with China’s overall military 

strategy. It enables China to conceal capabilities, in a manner consistent with its 

general lack of transparency. And it helps to ensure that its leadership and any hidden capabilities survive attack. 

Providing extended deterrence to Allies in NATO and in East Asia is similar in 

some ways and different in others. It is similar in a) an appropriate mix of nuclear 

and non-nuclear capabilities; b) a combination of capability and credibility to effectively deter potential adversaries and assure Allies; c) appropriate consultations between the United States and Allies; and d) adjustments over time to account for 

changes in the security environment. 

Providing extended deterrence to Allies in NATO and in East Asia is different in 

several respects, including: a) different mutual expectations about the specific modalities of nuclear deployments, as reflected in differing historical practices; and b) 

different assessments of the specific requirements for deterring potential adversaries. 

Mr. SCOTT. Some budget cutting proposals that are circulating have suggested significantly reducing the size of our intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force to 

save money. For instance, eliminating one-third of the ICBM force by cutting one 

of the three wings. 

a. Does the New START Treaty require us to close down an entire ICBM wing 

to meet its deployed strategic launcher limit? What about eliminating a squadron? 

i. Would such a cut amount to a unilateral reduction in delivery vehicles? 

ii. Is such a reduction being considered in the 90-day NPR Implementation Study? 

b. Based on the most recent public data released as part of a New START Treaty 

data exchange, if we were to eliminate 150 ICBMs this would be more than enough 

to put us below the 700 deployed strategic launchers limit. Would we then retain 

all of our forces in the other legs of the triad, to remain at or near the New START 

limit? 

c. Please describe when de-MIRVing of our ICBMs will begin to occur under the 

2010 NPR. Please describe when DOD intends to have that process and completed, 

how much it will cost, and how the skill set required to upload in the event that 

is necessary will be maintained. 

Dr. MILLER. The New START Treaty does not require the United States to reduce 

any specific element of its strategic forces. To date, no final decisions have been 

made with respect to future strategic nuclear force structure; such decisions will be 

informed by the Administration’s ongoing NPR implementation study. 

The elimination of 150 deployed ICBMs, if that were to be decided (and to respond 

to your specific conjecture) would allow the United States to retain all or virtually 

all of its current deployed strategic forces in the other legs of the Triad under the 

limits of the New START Treaty. Force structure decisions will be consistent with 

the goals of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), including maintaining strategic stability, providing assurance to our Allies and partners of the credibility of the U.S. 

nuclear umbrella and other security commitments, and maintaining a safe, secure, 

and effective nuclear deterrent. I expect a final decision regarding the specific force 

mix for New START Treaty implementation to be made following the conclusion of 

the NPR implementation study in the near term. 

The ‘‘de-MIRVing’’ (reduction of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle capability) 

of our ICBM forces has already begun. In order to maximize safety and security, 

we have allowed the Air Force to begin de-MIRVing ICBMs in conjunction with its 

previously established maintenance plans. This minimizes disruption to our operational forces and is the most cost-effective method for carrying out the NPR guidance to de-MIRV the ICBM force. 

Mr. SCOTT. How is deterring China different from deterring Russia? 
176 

a. How is providing extended deterrence in Europe different than doing so in East 

Asia? 

b. During a recent Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on the nuclear weapons 

programs of Russia and the People’s Republic of China, Dr. Mark Schneider stated: 

‘‘We know a lot less about China overall than we know about the Russians in nuclear capability, if for no other reason that the Russians talk about it all the time, 

where the Chinese are fairly secretive. I think you can find deliberate leaks by the 

PLA in Hong Kong Press. I think they are using that as a mechanism of debating 

some issues that they can’t openly debate in China. But I suspect we are going to 

see a very large increase in Chinese capability, including extensive MIRVing.’’ 

How do we hedge the uncertainty in our understanding of China’s nuclear weapons program? How will this be reflected in the Administration’s mini-NPR on nuclear weapons targeting? Why do you think China has a large underground tunnel 

complex for its second artillery? 

General KEHLER. The primary difference in how extended deterrence is provided 

today is that in Europe we have forward deployed non-strategic nuclear capabilities 

and robust nuclear burden sharing commitments with our NATO allies. We do not 

have forward deployed non-strategic nuclear capabilities in East Asia. 

In general we hedge against uncertainty, both geopolitical and technical, by retention of non-deployed warheads in the stockpile in order to provide the ability to increase warhead loading on our existing nuclear systems, and through our infrastructure’s ability to diagnose and repair weapons that develop technical problems. 

Today, this hedge relies more heavily on the stockpile, but as our infrastructure is 

modernized it will assume a larger share of the required capability. The ongoing follow-on analysis to the NPR is examining our hedge requirements. 

Since the early 1950s, the PLA has employed underground tunnels to protect and 

conceal its vital assets. These likely include both nuclear and conventional missile 

forces. 

Mr. SCOTT. Some budget cutting proposals that are circulating have suggested significantly reducing the size of our intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force to 

save money. For instance, eliminating one-third of the ICBM force by cutting one 

of the three wings. 

a. Does the New START Treaty require us to close down an entire ICBM wing 

to meet its deployed strategic launcher limit? What about eliminating a squadron? 

i. Would such a cut amount to a unilateral reduction in delivery vehicles? 

ii. If we were to eliminate a third of our ICBM force, how would you like to see 

our future SSBN force structured (number of boats, number of tubes, etc.)? Are the 

size and makeup of the ICBM and SSBN forces linked? How? 

iii. Would you support such a cut? Have you done any analysis that would support 

a cut of 150 ICBMs? 

b. Based on the most recent public data released as part of a New START Treaty 

data exchange, if we were to eliminate 150 ICBMs this would be more than enough 

to put us below the 700 deployed strategic launchers limit. Would we then retain 

all of our forces in the other legs of the triad, to remain at or near the New START 

limit? 

c. Please describe when de-MIRVing of our ICBMs will begin to occur under the 

2010 NPR. Please describe when DOD intends to have that process and completed, 

how much it will cost, and how the skill set required to upload in the event that 

is necessary will be maintained. 

General KEHLER. A. No, New START provides considerable flexibility to manage 

the deployed force and meet strategic deterrent requirements in a cost effective and 

safe manner over the duration of the treaty. 

i. The treaty provides the flexibility to manage the deployed force within central 

limits, not to exceed 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs). My principle 

concern is ensuring the strategy objectives are met and deterrence and stability are 

maintained while ensuring we are as cost efficient as possible. 

ii. Any decision to reduce Minuteman and subsequently change SSBN and bomber 

force structures must be based on strategy. The size and makeup of the SSBN and 

ICBM forces are complementary. Sufficient ballistic missile capabilities must be retained to address strategy requirements. Therefore, potential adjustments in Minuteman would result in a reassessment of the entire force structure. 

iii. Any adjustment to Minuteman must be strategy based. USSTRATCOM is participating in the ongoing National Security Staff (NSS)-led interagency activity and 

is providing analysis and military advice to OSD and the Joint Staff. Any detailed 

discussion of that analysis and potential implications to our current force structure 

is premature. 

B. Not necessarily. I am concerned about meeting policy and strategy objectives 

and maintaining deterrence and stability. New START provides the U.S. consider-
177 

able flexibility in determining the composition and structure of its strategic offensive 

arms. New START provides the option of retaining force structure, if required, and 

deployed strategic launchers should be viewed as a ‘‘ceiling’’ not a ‘‘floor,’’ so we can 

meet our operational needs with flexibility. 

C. We are working with the Air Force to develop plans to begin de-MIRVing Minuteman in FY12. There are many factors that impact completion date including integration with other maintenance activities and weather. In the near-term, skills to 

accomplish re-MIRVing is not an issue. I have asked the Air Force to develop longterm re-MIRVing plans to include cost and skill set retention. 

Mr. SCOTT. Under Secretary Tauscher, we hear the Russians are placing certain 

conditions on starting any new arms control talks—in other words, Russia is saying 

these conditions must be met before any negotiations can begin on another arms 

control agreement. For instance, we have heard that Russia is demanding that U.S. 

nuclear weapons be removed from Europe, that we destroy the infrastructure in Europe that supports those weapons so that they cannot be easily redeployed, and that 

NATO allies cease training for the nuclear mission. Is this correct? What other conditions is Russia saying must be met by the U.S. before negotiations can begin? 

What conditions is the United States saying must be met by Russia before negotiations can begin? 

Secretary TAUSCHER. Some Russian officials have suggested that several issues 

should be considered in future discussions, but whether those suggestions amount 

to preconditions remains unclear. In regards to tactical nuclear weapons, Russian 

Foreign Minister Lavrov on March 1, 2011, stated at the UN Conference on Disarmament that the ‘‘first step’’ towards reductions in these weapons should be the 

‘‘withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of the State to which they 

belong as well as removal of the infrastructure for their deployment abroad.’’ 

The United States rejects preconditions for discussions with Russia to reduce nuclear weapons. The President has certified to the Senate and the United States has 

made clear to the Russians that we seek to initiate negotiations with the Russian 

Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the nonstrategic nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States and to 

secure and reduce these weapons in a verifiable manner and that such negotiations 

shall not include defensive missile systems. Indeed, the United States is committed 

to continuing a step-by-step process, as outlined by President Obama in Prague in 

2009, to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a 

future agreement with Russia for broad reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons: strategic, nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployed. 

As a first step, we want to have a broad policy discussion with Russia on stability, 

security, and confidence-building, which will help lay the groundwork for eventual 

further nuclear arms reductions. 

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