United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 06-1992

RADFORD TRUST,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

FIRST UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Torruella, Lynch, and Lipez,

Circuit Judges.

Warren H. Pyle, with whom Pyle, Rome, Lichten, Ehrenberg &

Liss-Riordan, P.C. was on brief, for appellant.

Mark E. Porada, with whom Geraldine G. Sanchez and Pierce

Atwood LLP were on brief, for appellee.

June 27, 2007
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. In this case under the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-

1461, the sole remaining issue concerns the district court's

determination of the date on which postjudgment interest on an

award of benefits would begin, and the effect of this determination

on the court's discretionary decision to award prejudgment

interest. We find that the district court incorrectly held that

postjudgment interest began to accrue on a date prior to the

resolution of a disputed issue of damages. In light of this, we

remand to the district court to decide the matter of prejudgment

interest and any other matters raised in the aftermath of the

parties' settlement of an additional issue on appeal.

We recite only those facts relevant to the issue on

appeal. Additional background can be found in the district court's

opinions in this case. See Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Ins.

Co. of Am. (Radford Trust I), 321 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Mass. 2004);

Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. (Radford Trust

II), 399 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D. Mass. 2005).

Radford Trust is the assignee of a claim by a John Doe

for benefits under a group long-term disability policy issued by

First Unum Life Insurance Company to Doe's former employer. After

First Unum denied Doe's claim and Doe exhausted his administrative

appeals, Radford Trust filed this suit under ERISA seeking damages

for the allegedly wrongful denial of benefits.
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On March 31, 2004, the district court granted Radford

Trust's motion for "partial summary judgment on the issue of

liability." The court held that Radford Trust was entitled to

collect twenty-four months of benefits, plus costs, prejudgment

interest, and postjudgment interest. The court determined that

prejudgment interest would run from October 17, 1999, the beginning

of the period for which the court found Doe was entitled to

benefits. The court then required First Unum to submit a

calculation of the benefits owed and gave Radford Trust the

opportunity to challenge that calculation.

On April 14, 2004, First Unum submitted its calculation

of benefits. On April 28, Radford Trust filed a response in which,

inter alia, it challenged the applicability of an offset for Social

Security benefits received by Doe.

On June 15, 2004, the district court issued an opinion

explaining the reasoning behind its March 31 order. See Radford

Trust I, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 230. In the June 15 opinion, the court

sua sponte revised the accrual date for prejudgment interest to

June 13, 2000, the date on which Doe submitted an Employer's

Statement and Job Analysis as part of the proof of disability

required under the policy. Id. at 253. The court made no mention

of the Social Security offset issue.

On November 15, 2005, the court issued another opinion in

which it resolved a number of pending motions, mostly relating to
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an award of attorneys' fees. Radford Trust II, 399 F. Supp. 2d at

8. At this point, the court granted Radford Trust's motion for

First Unum to make an initial determination of whether the Social

Security offset applied, and the court ordered First Unum to

incorporate its determination into an updated calculation of the

amount owed Radford Trust. Id. at 21.

At this point, the court also denied a motion by Radford

Trust to amend the June 2004 order "by ruling that the prejudgment

interest continues until the date the Court quantifies damages."

Citing Mogilevsky v. Bally Total Fitness Corp., 311 F. Supp. 2d 212

(D. Mass. 2004), the court explained that it was of the view that

"interest on the awarded attorney's fees and costs shall accrue as

of the date of the underlying merits judgments." Radford Trust II,

399 F. Supp. 2d at 24.

First Unum included a Social Security offset in its

calculation submitted on November 29, 2005. Radford Trust

continued to challenge the applicability of the offset in its

response. On December 22, 2005, the district court ruled that the

offset did apply. The court also held that "the appropriate date

to begin accrual of post-judgment interest on the benefits award is

the date upon which the merits were decided, not the date on which

sum-certain was known" and that "[p]rejudgment interest ceased to

accrue" on that date, March 31, 2004.
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On appeal, Radford Trust challenges the district court's

determination that prejudgment interest ceased to accrue as of the

date of the initial March 2004 order. In ERISA cases, the district

court has broad discretion both to determine whether to award

prejudgment interest and to determine the parameters of such an

award. Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d 220,

223 (1st Cir. 1996). Our review of such determinations is only for

abuse of discretion. Id. Here, however, the district court

appears not to have set the March 2004 end date as a matter of

discretion, but rather set the date based on its determination as

to when postjudgment interest should begin. This raises a legal

issue, which we review de novo. See Fratus v. Republic W. Ins.

Co., 147 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Westinghouse Credit

Corp. v. D'Urso, 371 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2004).

28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) provides that "[i]nterest shall be

allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a

district court." The existence of a "money judgment" requires

damages to have been ascertained in a "meaningful way." Kaiser

Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836 (1990). In

Kaiser, the district court granted a new trial as to damages only,

after finding the evidence insufficient to support the jury's

damages award. Id. at 830. The Supreme Court held that in such a

situation, postjudgment interest on a later damages award did not

begin to accrue when the initial judgment entered. Id. at 836.
 In a similar vein, we have previously held that, in the 1

absence of a determination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(b), a judgment as to some claims or some parties does not begin

to accrue postjudgment interest while another claim is still

pending. See Fratus, 147 F.3d at 30.

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Implicit in this holding is the principle that a finding of

liability alone without a corresponding determination on damages

does not suffice to start the clock on postjudgment interest. See 1

Happy Chef Sys., Inc. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 933 F.2d

1433, 1435, 1437 (8th Cir. 1991).

In this case, the district court's March 2004 order

amounted to only a finding of liability for benefits. Indeed, this

was the only finding requested by Radford Trust in its motion for

"partial summary judgment." The court's March 2004 order left open

the possibility that the parties would dispute the amount of

damages, inviting the parties to brief any such dispute.

Accordingly, Radford Trust raised the issue of the applicability of

the Social Security offset. That issue was disputed between the

parties until the district court ruled on the issue in its December

2005 order. Thus, there was no "money judgment" until December

2005.

In ruling to the contrary, the district court relied on

cases relating to whether postjudgment interest on attorneys' fees

accrues when the entitlement to fees is established or when the

amount of the fees is quantified. See Mogilevsky, 311 F. Supp. 2d

at 224-26. This court has never ruled on this issue, see Foley v.
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City of Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 22 n.16 (1st Cir. 1991), and we need

not do so here. While some courts have held that attorneys' fees

should be treated as simply a form of damages award, and thus

accrue interest only when quantified, see Eaves v. County of Cape

May, 239 F.3d 527, 535 (3d Cir. 2001), the rule as to damages

awards does not depend on the rule as to attorneys' fees. Compare

Happy Chef, 933 F.2d at 1437 (damages awards accrue interest when

quantified), with Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 1273, 1276 (8th

Cir. 1991) (attorneys' fees accrue interest when the right to fees

is established).

Nor does this case fall within the rule that damages are

considered to have been ascertained when all that remains is a

"mechanical task of computing" the exact sum based on the court's

orders. EEOC v. Gurnee Inns, Inc., 956 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir.

1992). While computing the Social Security offset might have been

a "mechanical task," determining whether it applied was not.

Because an award of prejudgment interest in ERISA cases

is discretionary, we leave to the district court on remand the

decision in the first instance whether to award prejudgment

interest for the period from March 2004 to December 2005, during

which it erroneously granted postjudgment interest. The district

court can thus address First Unum's argument that it would be

inequitable to award prejudgment interest for this period because

Radford Trust was responsible for much of the delay.
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Radford Trust initially also appealed the district

court's decision to award benefits starting from June 2000, rather

than October 1999. The parties have now settled this issue, and

the appeal on this issue is accordingly dismissed. On remand, the

district court can address Radford Trust's contention that it is

entitled to additional relief flowing from the settlement.

The appeal on the benefits accrual issue is dismissed.

The award of postjudgment interest from March 31, 2004 to December

22, 2005 is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court

to determine whether to award prejudgment interest for the same

period and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

No costs are awarded.