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THAILAND: THE PATH TOWARD RECONCILIATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND 

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 10, 2010

Serial No. 111–118

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Ambassador 

for ASEAN Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................................................................................................ 7

Ms. Catharin E. Dalpino, Visiting Associate Professor, Asian Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University . 23

Karl Jackson, Ph.D., Director of Asian Studies and South East Asia Studies, 

The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies ......................... 33

Mr. Richard Cronin, Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center ............... 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and 

the Global Environment: Prepared statement ................................................... 4

The Honorable Scot Marciel: Prepared statement ................................................ 10

Ms. Catharin E. Dalpino: Prepared statement ...................................................... 27

Karl Jackson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 35

Mr. Richard Cronin: Prepared statement .............................................................. 45

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega: Material submitted for the record ...... 68

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THAILAND: THE PATH TOWARD 

RECONCILIATION 

THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC

AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment will 

come to order. The hearing today is to review the current crisis in 

Thailand. I know that my good friend, ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Manzullo, will be here later, and I am sure other 

members of the subcommittee will also join us. I am very appreciative of our experts who will be testifying, especially my good 

friend, Secretary Marciel, for taking time from his busy schedule 

to participate in this hearing this afternoon. 

So I will proceed with my opening statement. 

I had the privilege of meeting earlier this afternoon with the 

Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of Thailand. He is meeting 

with various officials in the administration and Members of Congress. For the life of me, I have a very difficult time pronouncing 

his name. I thought my name was bad. I will learn to get the rest 

of his name for the record down the line. I would like to proceed 

now with my opening statement for this hearing this afternoon. 

For over 5 years, the people of Thailand have seen their country 

embroiled in political strife, principally, but not exclusively, between two groups commonly referred to as the Yellow Shirts and 

the Red Shirts. The tension between the previous government 

under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the Yellow Shirts 

led to a military coup in 2006 and the exile of Prime Minister 

Thaksin. 

After 1 year of rule by an interim government established by the 

coup, control of the country reverted to a democratically-elected 

government. But the political strife continued, peaking with the recent Red Shirt antigovernment demonstrations in Bangkok, which 

left over 80 people dead. The bloodshed and ongoing instability is 

cause for concern for the United States as well as for Thailand’s 

many other friends in the region and in the world. 

Although relative calm has returned to Bangkok in recent days, 

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cent riots and crackdowns appear to have deepened divisions within Thai society. The process of reconciliation must be reinvigorated, 

hopefully, and properly, or tensions will remain, and the risk of 

further violence and instability will grow. 

I honestly believe the five-point plan proposed by Prime Minister 

Abhisit in early May of this year provided the right starting point 

for such a process. The plan called for all parties to uphold the 

monarchy, to resolve fundamental problems of social justice, to ensure that the media could operate freely and constructively, to create an independent committee to investigate casualties of the recent crackdowns and to carry out political reforms resulting in 

fresh elections that I believe were to be called this November. The 

plan formed the most pragmatic and plausible path toward an amicable return to stability, democracy and the rule of law. 

Just today, in a nationwide telecast, Prime Minister Abhisit 

called on all Thais to participate in the five-point plan for reconciliation. As a start, a religious ceremony involving five religious 

faiths was held this morning. The Prime Minister also asked leaders across the spectrum to gather opinions over the next 2 weeks 

on how best to implement the road map through meetings, which 

the Prime Minister and his Cabinet would facilitate. In addition, 

he announced that a committee to review the Constitution was 

being formed and next week the government would organize an assembly of three agencies—the National Economic and Social Development Board; the National Health Insurance Board; and the Thai 

Health Promotion Foundation—to gather opinions on how to solve 

the problems of social disparities. 

Thailand has gone through political crises in the past, including 

the Black May crisis of 1992; student massacre at Thammasat University in 1976; and the student uprising in 1973. What we have 

witnessed over the past few months, however, exceeds all of these 

in terms of those injured and killed, as well as the depth of the social fissures underlying the crisis. There is no doubt that Thailand 

has entered a critical period, one that could determine the direction 

of the country for years to come. 

Clearly the conflict in Thailand is an internal issue, and only the 

people and the leaders of Thailand can chart their way toward a 

resolution. Yet, as a close friend of Thailand, we should stand by 

the country during this difficult period and encourage the Thai 

Government and the people of Thailand to move toward reconciliation and the rule of law. 

It was with those words in mind that I introduced House Resolution 1321 last month expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the political situation in Thailand be resolved 

peacefully and democratically. While that resolution has yet to advance, on May 24, the Senate introduced and adopted Senate Resolution 538, which was based on House Resolution 1321, and which 

expressed precisely the same position. I continue to believe the 

House should pass its own resolution due to the importance of the 

bilateral relationship. Our long history of friendship gained official 

sanction in 1833 when Thailand became the first treaty ally of the 

United States in the Asia-Pacific region. 

In recent decades we have strengthened our ties to the military 

alliance we forged in 1954, through our designation of Thailand as 

3

a major non-NATO ally in 2003 and Thailand’s valued contributions of troops in support of our U.S. military operations in Korea, 

Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq. 

I just want to note for the record that, in my service as a Vietnam veteran, I will never forget the contributions and what it 

means to have a friend in those days of the Vietnam War. Thailand 

was one of our most important allies, and I will say this publicly 

to my colleagues and to the people, on behalf of our country, we 

are grateful for all that Thailand has done as a close friend and 

ally of the United States. 

Thailand has also been a major trading partner of the United 

States, a regional leader, a force for stability in Southeast Asia and 

a country with which we share common values and interests. The 

United States has always appreciated Thailand’s many international contributions and we respect and admire its unique culture. 

Just prior to this hearing, His Excellency Mr. Kiat Sitthiamorn, 

Special Envoy of the Prime Minister, met with the members of the 

Foreign Affairs Committee and gave a first-hand account of the 

issues confronting Thailand. The crisis is complex and multidimensional, one that involves political conflict, economic tensions, social 

strifes and personal enmities. Fortunately, we have with us today 

our good friend Deputy Assistant Secretary Marciel and a group of 

experts to help us understand the things happening in Thailand, 

and they will be sharing with us their testimony as well. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And with that, I would like to begin the 

hearing by having our Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs and Ambassador to ASEAN, Secretary Scot 

Marciel, as our first witnesses this afternoon. Secretary Marciel is 

a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and has served in 

posts in Vietnam, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Brazil and Turkey, 

and as staff in the Economic Bureau’s Office of Monetary Affairs. 

He is a resident of California, a graduate of the University of California at Davis—actually you should have gone to Berkeley, but 

that is okay, I forgive you—and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is married and has two daughters. 

Secretary Marciel. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR FOR ASEAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Manzullo, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you 

very much for inviting me here today to discuss recent events in 

Thailand, our longtime friend and treaty ally in Southeast Asia. 

While the streets of Bangkok have returned to relative calm, the 

situation remains fragile, and the issues that must be addressed 

for calm to become stability are complex and challenging. Thailand 

has just experienced the worst political violence in a generation. 

The causes of the recent events are complex, and the consequences 

are not easy to predict. We were greatly saddened by the loss of 

life that resulted from the clashes. One hopeful sign, however, is 

that the Thai political debate now is once again taking place in the 

Parliament rather than through violent street protests. 

Our friendship with Thailand is based on a relationship that 

spans over two centuries and a common set of values that define 

our two peoples. Among these are a commitment to democracy; an 

emphasis on good governance, accountability, and transparency in 

the actions of government; and the rights of peaceful freedom of assembly and expression. These values are an integral part of the vibrant society that Thailand is today, and they serve as important 

touchstones for all sides in efforts to chart a path forward to national reconciliation. 

The importance to the United States of our long-standing friendship with Thailand cannot be overstated. As one of only five U.S. 

treaty allies in Asia, Thailand remains crucial to U.S. interests in 

the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The U.S. mission in Thailand, 

one of the largest in the world, affords the United States a regional 

operating platform that would be difficult to replace elsewhere. Our 

bilateral relationship provides incalculable benefits in health, security, trade and investment, in law enforcement cooperation, and 

humanitarian assistance to refugees to both countries. 

The last several years have been turbulent for Thailand. The restoration of elected government in early 2008 ended the short-lived 

post-2006 coup interim government, but left major divisions in the 

Thai body politic. Court decisions forced two Prime Ministers from 

office in 2008, and three times in the past 2 years the normal patterns of political life took a back seat to disruptive street protests. 

8

The yellow-shirted People’s Alliance for Democracy occupied Government House from August to December 2008, shutting down 

Bangkok’s airports for 8 days, to protest governments led by the 

People’s Power Party, the heir to the Thai Rak Thai Party of deposed Prime Minister Thaksin. 

The fall of the PPP-led coalition government in December 2008 

and its replacement by the current coalition reversed the previous 

political configuration. In April 2009, the red-shirted United Front 

for Democracy against Dictatorship, UDD, disrupted a regional 

Asian summit, ASEAN summit, and sparked riots in Bangkok after 

Mr. Thaksin, now a fugitive in the wake of his conviction on abuse 

of power charges, called for revolution to bring him home. 

Neither of these earlier protest cycles, however, approached the 

March 12 to May 19 crisis in terms of the human and financial toll 

exacted. The crisis, which paralyzed the government, left 88 people 

dead and caused an estimated $1.5 billion in arson-related property 

losses, accentuated major political cleavages in the Thai population. 

Throughout the recent turmoil, the United States has been active 

in promoting dialogue, reconciliation, and the peaceful settlement 

of political disputes. Secretary Clinton, for example, released a 

video message to the Thai people on April 13 urging peaceful dialogue. Our embassy in Bangkok engaged with Thai Government officials at all levels as well as leaders of the opposition Red Shirt 

movement to underscore both the value we place on our relationship with Thailand and the importance of resolving political differences through compromise rather than force or violence. We also 

worked to ensure that we were doing everything possible to protect 

the safety and well-being of American citizens in Thailand. 

While the government succeeded in ending the protest and restoring order, the fundamental divisions within Thai society that 

lie at the root of the political tensions remain. We welcome Prime 

Minister Abhisit’s vow to follow through on the reconciliation road 

map proposal he originally put forward with the goal of ending the 

UDD protest peacefully. We support the establishment of an independent fact-finding commission to review the incidents of violence 

from March through May and determine who is responsible. 

While this would be a positive first step, it should not be the last. 

Now more than ever it is critical for all Thai actors to promote dialogue and reconciliation, to recognize the legitimate grievance of 

Thai citizens, to support the equal and impartial application of the 

law, and to foreswear the use of violence to resolve political differences. 

The Prime Minister’s original proposal included a date in November for early elections. He has since indicated that conditions in 

Thailand do not allow for November elections. The door to early 

balloting is not closed, however, and while it will be up to the 

Thais to work out the date, the Prime Minister’s own plan acknowledged that democratic elections are an important part of reconciliation. 

The United States has stressed consistently that all sides should 

work out differences within Thailand’s democratic framework and 

without resorting to violence. Assistant Secretary Campbell reiterated this point on his recent visit to Bangkok. The right to peaceful 

9

assembly is a key component of Thai democracy, but Thais must 

also exercise their responsibility not to let that peaceful assembly 

turn violent. Responsible leaders across the Thai political spectrum 

and in civil society need to emphasize to their supporters that in 

a democracy, violence has no place in politics. Leaders who refuse 

to condemn violent acts do a disservice to their cause, to their supporters, and to their country. 

Thailand remains one of our oldest treaty allies in Asia and our 

close friends. The United States can be a source of support as the 

Thai work to resolve the issues that still divide them, but it is the 

Thai people themselves who must make the difficult choices on how 

to proceed. For our part, the United States will continue to do what 

we can to promote reconciliation among the Thai people and to preserve and strengthen this enduring friendship. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am pleased to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marciel follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. 

We are joined by the ranking member of the subcommittee, my 

good friend from Illinois, for his opening statement. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very 

important hearing. 

America’s relationship with Thailand dates back over 177 years 

to 1833, in the days of President Andrew Jackson. Thailand remains an important friend of the United States, and we value the 

relationship. 

The Ambassador of Thailand to the United States recently paid 

an official visit to the congressional district that I represent and 

Rockford College, which I have the honor to represent. We truly appreciate his visit. It was a rare opportunity for college students to 

ask questions of an ambassador, and he is a truly witty man, and 

we are absolutely thrilled he took the time to come out and spend 

time with these young people. 

We urge the good people of Thailand to seek peaceful and nonviolent ways in which to express their disagreement. We also urge 

the Royal Thai Government to hold elections as soon as feasible. 

Most importantly, elections resulting from a free and fair process 

have to be respected. I understand that the current crisis has many 

dimensions and goes beyond Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts; however, our desire is to encourage a genuine reconciliation amongst 

the good people of Thailand. 

We look forward to hearing the second panel. 

I appreciate, Mr. Marciel, your excellent testimony and the number of years you spent working on this issue. I know it has got to 

be very dear to your heart. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman from Illinois. 

Mr. Secretary, as I recall, in recent years when there was a military coup in Thailand, we immediately imposed sanctions. Are 

those sanctions still in place or have they been lifted? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, you are right. After the coup in 

2006, we did put in place sanctions as required by law because we 

determined it was a military coup under the law. We lifted those 

sanctions after the subsequent elections at the end of 2007, I believe it was. Early 2008. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Which raises another question. I wanted to 

dialogue with you on the question of sanctions. I know our law does 

stipulate that whenever there is a military coup, we put on sanctions. But there was a tremendous sense of disappointment as I 

met with the leaders of Thailand. They felt betrayed. They felt that 

the United States should not have put these sanctions in place for 

the simple reason that this is an internal matter, and that the government and the people were trying every way possible to reconcile 

and go back to a democratic form of government. 

Do you think this law still has merit? Because here is another 

instance when there was a military coup that took place in Pakistan, by I think a general named Musharraf. For 8 years the coup 

was in place and we did not put any sanctions on Pakistan. Somewhat of a contradiction, in my humble opinion. 

Should there be a better way of measurement on how our Government should react or respond to coups? Each country has their 

14

own particular situation. As to why the coup took place in Pakistan, which we didn’t put any sanctions—in fact, we gave Pakistan 

billions of dollars, and for our own reasons. But when a friendly 

ally like Thailand had a coup for whatever reasons, we put the 

same onus on them and make them feel like they are a hostile and 

undemocratic country. And I wanted to ask your opinion, do you 

think the law is good? Is it a good law? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A couple of 

comments, if I could. 

One, you are right that a number of people in the government, 

the postcoup interim government, complained about the imposition 

of sanctions, which was a cutoff of assistance, certain types of assistance. It wasn’t sanctions of the sense of ending trade or banning investment; it was rather limited. Others, I have to say, in 

Thailand criticized us for not being tough enough and not responding harshly enough, asking were we sending an adequately strong 

message about our democratic values. So we kind of got it from 

both sides, to be perfectly honest. 

I think the key for me is that the sanctions are one piece of the 

reaction, as you know, mandated by law. I think the bigger picture, 

though, is how we tried to deal with that government. We did not 

become an enemy or hostile to Thailand at all. We made it clear 

throughout this period—and I remember it well because it was a 

difficult period when a country that is an ally and a close friend 

and is important to all of us was going through a difficult period. 

We had to impose these sanctions, but we also did work very carefully and very closely with the government and others in Thailand 

to try to help them move forward out of this situation. 

So I think we played a positive role, despite the requirement to 

impose those sanctions, in helping Thailand to move on to the next 

step postcoup and back to democracy. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Do you think perhaps rather than just immediately—because the law dictates as soon as a coup is committed 

that we apply sanctions—do you think the law could be revised, or 

amended at least, to give the administration or Congress a little 

leeway or time to examine the given sanctions so that we don’t put 

sanctions automatically in the way that we have done to Thailand 

and we have done to Fiji, and we don’t do it to Pakistan? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, in all honesty I am not sure that 

I can speak for the administration on this. Certainly I think it is 

a worthwhile discussion to have certainly among Congress and between the administration and Congress. But I couldn’t give you an 

authoritative statement from the administration on that. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. 

The situation and the crisis in Thailand is a lot deeper than the 

Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. We know that. I think there is 

also the question of the rise of the middle class where they seem 

to place a very critical emphasis on this Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt 

problem that we are faced with. I just wanted to ask what is the 

current situation so far as who really is pulling the strings, thereby 

causing the Red Shirts to do what they are doing right now? According to media reports, they say Thaksin is behind it, and other 

reports say that a group of prominent middle-class businessmen 

might be behind it. It seems every time the government tries to 

15

bring everybody together to reconcile, they suddenly break off the 

negotiations. Can you elaborate? Can you share with us why there 

seems to be this uncertainty and—I shouldn’t say contradictions, 

but who is leading the Red Shirts in that respect? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, that is actually a very good and 

very difficult question. 

I have been working on Southeast Asia off and on for about 25 

years. I am not sure I have encountered a situation as complex as 

the one in Thailand right now in terms of trying to understand the 

politics. It is extraordinarily complicated. And as you pointed out, 

it is not as simple as one group against another. There are very 

many layers and complexities involved. 

Certainly we have seen a number of factors at play. One of those 

is I think there is a general consensus that one of the things that 

Prime Minister Thaksin did when he was Prime Minister was, if 

you will—I don’t know if it is the right term—empowered a certain 

part of the population that previously may not have been as active 

in politics as it was. So you have certain elements of the population 

more active in politics, which generally is a good thing in terms of 

strengthening a democracy. 

But as far as pulling strings, our view, if I could simplify, would 

be to say that there are a lot of people out there protesting who 

have legitimate grievances and complaints. There are also people, 

including the former Prime Minister, who are encouraging and supporting the protests. I think it would be a mistake to say that it 

is all Prime Minister Thaksin or anybody else pulling strings. I 

think our understanding is that was one factor, but that there are 

thousands of people out there who felt strongly about what they 

were protesting for. So it is not someone pulling strings, although 

there are obviously people who are working to support those protests. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. In our meeting earlier with the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy, Mr. Kiat Sitthiamorn, he indicated that the 

current crisis has resulted in a loss of some $50 billion, affecting 

the economy of Thailand. Their tourism industry, in particular, has 

been severely affected by the crisis. 

My understanding is that when Prime Minister Thaksin became 

Prime Minister, he made tremendous advancements in providing 

help to the poor and destitute in the rural areas. Despite problems 

that affected the Thai Government’s operations, somehow they 

helped people from the rural areas out in the country, basically 

people who are low-income level, and this is the reason why he is 

still so popular among the poor people. 

Is he the first Prime Minister who has given substantive attention to the needs of the poor in Thailand? Why does there seem to 

be such a consistent support stream of people out of the rural areas 

of the country? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know that I would say that 

he is the first Prime Minister to pay attention to the poor, but he 

certainly made it a major part of his platform to enact or expand 

programs that were designed to help rural areas. I think, as I understand it, the current government of Prime Minister Abhisit has 

actually continued a number of these programs or adjusted them 

16

somewhat, recognizing that some of them had value. So he certainly did play a role there. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. As I recall, Prime Minister Thaksin was 

taken to court for certain transactions as a businessman. Was it 

some kind of a telecommunications company that he sold or he purchased? I think he sold his company in Singapore for which he did 

not pay taxes; is that a fact? Is that true? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, I don’t remember all of the details 

of it. There was certainly an issue when he sold his telecommunications company, and it got a lot of attention in Thailand, and it 

was being looked at by the Thai authorities. He was tried for corruption in the middle of 2008. I don’t remember exactly what the 

charges are, but we could get that information to you if I can follow 

up. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you, please? I would like to make that 

part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA

Thaksin Shinawatra’s sale of a telecommunications business to a foreign firm in 

2006 (during his tenure as Prime Minister) prompted allegations of improper tax exemptions and abuse of power. The Thai Securities and Exchange Commission investigation cleared Thaksin of all wrongdoing that year. 

In October 2008, after the coup and change of government, the Thai Supreme 

Court issued an arrest warrant for Thaksin related to the 2006 sale. 

In January 2007 the Royal Thai Government charged Thaksin for allegedly improper land purchases, unlawful use of state funds, and obstructing competition 

against his personal business by imposing an excise tax on telecommunication firms.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Please, I am not pointing fingers; I am not 

trying to declare the man guilty, I am simply saying this is one of 

the problems that he encountered when he was Prime Minister. If 

there were other issues—was there some kind of a conspiracy or 

those who opposed him? Were there trumped up charges? Was he 

basically banished from Thailand, or can he return to Thailand at 

any time? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, he was convicted, and he fled Thailand, and so right now he is a fugitive. I don’t want to speak for 

the Thai Government on this. I assume he probably could come 

back to Thailand, but he would face that conviction and whatever 

sentence he had. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am going to withhold further questions 

and yield to my good friend from Illinois for his questions. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Chairman, you asked two questions that I 

wanted to ask. I think if I asked the same questions, I would get 

the same answer, and I am satisfied with the answers that you 

gave. 

More of an observation than anything, and it doesn’t require any 

comment on your part, is the Thais’ tremendous loyalty to a democratic state, for lack of a better word. I have talked to so many 

Thais, and they really love democracy. And one Thai told me, we 

love it so much that sometimes the military thinks it must enforce 

it. I thought that is an interesting comment. And yet whenever 

there has been a coup, the coup shortly thereafter talks about having elections, a continuous return to democracy. That is what 

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tant that we encourage the Thais to work through this process to 

become even more established in their democratic values and 

ideals. 

I don’t know what more the American people or our Government 

can do to encourage them to do that, because it is really engrained 

into their spirit. 

Did you want to comment on that? You don’t have to. 

Mr. MARCIEL. Well, thank you, Congressman. 

Just briefly I would say that I agree that the Thai people care 

about their democracy. They want it, and I think Secretary Clinton 

has said all democracies are works in progress by definition, and 

the Thai one clearly is, and it is going through a difficult time now. 

I think there is a strong commitment to democracy among the Thai 

people, and for that reason I am confident over time they will be 

able to work it out, but obviously one of the struggles right now 

is between two—actually more than two, but fundamentally two 

different visions on how to move ahead. 

But I agree with you very much that the Thai are committed to 

democracy, and that this is something that the American—our role 

is to be as supportive of the nation and people of Thailand as possible, and to give all possible encouragement for them to work this 

out with the understanding that they are the ones who will have 

to work it out. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I thank the gentleman from Illinois for his 

questions. I was going to follow up with a question he had alluded 

to earlier. What exactly is the role of the military right now in the 

Government of Thailand? How much influence does the military 

have in Thai society, be it business or social? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Well, the military certainly has influence in the 

broader Thai body politic. It is a very respected institution in Thailand. It doesn’t play a direct role in politics in the way in some 

countries military men are in Parliament, that sort of thing. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. How big is the Thai military? 

Mr. MARCIEL. I don’t know. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you provide that for the record? 

[The information referred to follows:]

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The estimated size of the Royal Thai Army is approximately 200,000 personnel 

and consists of seven infantry divisions, one armored division, one cavalry division, 

two special forces divisions, one field artillery division, and one air defense artillery 

division. 

According to Royal Thai Government figures, the 2009 Thai military budget was 

170 billion baht ($5.2 billion), or 8.2 percent of the total national budget and 1.9 

percent of Thailand’s GDP. The RTG has budgeted 155 billion baht ($4.8 billion) for 

2010, a decrease of approximately nine percent. 

The Thai military controls a few businesses but does not have a major role in the 

Thai economy. The military supervises a battery factory and tanning plant as well 

as small military-related production of uniforms, small arms and other items for 

military personnel use. The Thai military controls some media outlets, such as TV 

Channel 5 and numerous radio stations. According to the Thai Ministry of Finance, 

these businesses are taxed and their revenues are used mostly for internal operations.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am also curious how much the Thai Government pays into its military budget, and how it affects the entire 

18

defense structure of Thailand. I would appreciate if you can provide 

that for the record. 

Mr. MARCIEL. I will be happy to do that. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is the military also involved in businesses 

like those other countries? I am curious. 

Mr. MARCIEL. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, I am going to have 

to get back to you on that. I think there is some involvement, but 

it is not something that I have followed. I will have to get you an 

answer on that. 

My guess is one of the experts on the panel that follows me will 

be able to give you an answer on that. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. A good example of this is Indonesia. This 

has been one of the most difficult problems in controlling their 

military, because they are involved in business and a lot of illegal 

business goes on in Indonesia. I was wondering if the same is true 

of Thailand. 

How much trade do we currently conduct with Thailand, in 

terms of our investments? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I am on a losing streak 

here. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I think they should fire your political staff 

behind you for not giving you this good information. 

Mr. MARCIEL. I apologize. That is something I should have at my 

fingertips, and I don’t, but we will get that to you. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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For 2009, U.S. exports to Thailand amounted to $6.9 billion and U.S. imports 

from Thailand totaled $19.1 billion. 

According to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Thailand on a historical cost basis was $9.128 billion 

in 2008 (latest data available). 

The U.S. goods and services trade with Thailand totaled $35 billion in 2007 (latest 

data available). Exports totaled $10 billion; imports totaled $25 billion. The U.S. 

goods and services trade deficit with Thailand was $14 billion in 2007. 

Thailand is currently the United States’ 23rd largest goods trading partner with 

$26 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2009. Goods exports totaled $6.9 

billion; goods imports totaled $19.1 billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Thailand was $12.2 billion in 2008. Trade in services with Thailand (exports and imports) totaled $3.4 billion in 2008 (latest data available). Services exports were $1.7 

billion; services imports were $1.7 billion. According to Thai Government statistics, 

in 2009, Thai imports from ASEAN amounted to $26.9 billion and Thai exports to 

ASEAN reached $32.4 billion.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What is the population of Thailand? 

Mr. MARCIEL. It is about 65–70 million. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I will give you a gold star for that. 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me a question I can answer. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I do want to thank you and I do want to 

thank Secretary Clinton for her interest in making sure that our 

involvement is constructive and positive, and in assuring the people of Thailand that the United States stands ready to help in any 

way. 

I think my good friend from Illinois mentioned something about 

democracy. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Secretary, but there is 

no perfect democracy in this world today; am I wrong on that? 

19

Mr. MARCIEL. You are not wrong on that. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And I might add that democracy is nothing 

but an experimentation. It is a process. It took us 200 years to give 

African Americans the right to vote, or something like that, and we 

are still not there yet. We would like to see Mother Liberty with 

the blindfold and say that the Constitution is color blind, and that 

we look to the character of the person as the essence and not so 

much the color or ethnicity or nationality. I suppose that is the essence of democracy for which we strive, and I think we sometimes 

tend to forget that we try to democratize all other countries based 

on our application of democracy. Do you agree with that; do you 

think Thailand should follow our democratic system? We don’t have 

a king, that is for sure. 

Mr. MARCIEL. I guess I would put it this way, Mr. Chairman. 

You are right, there is no perfect democracy. We are all working 

to strengthen our democracies. I think democracies can learn from 

each other. We all, and certainly you all, try to strengthen our democracy, and that is the best we can do. Others may chose to follow to some extent or take some lessons from it, and we obviously 

follow what others do as well and sometimes learn lessons from 

others. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What do you consider to be the most critical 

issue for our country, in terms of our relationship with Thailand 

that should never waiver or never be lessened in any way? I guess 

the word ‘‘security’’ comes to my mind in terms of our relationship 

with an important country like Thailand. How is our security relationship currently working with Thailand? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Our security relationship with Thailand is very 

good. Our military has worked together very well. Thailand continues to host annually the Cobra Gold exercise, which, as you 

know, is a very large, multilateral exercise. And overall there is extremely good cooperation in many ways on the military side as well 

as on the law enforcement side, including with Thailand hosting a 

regional law enforcement academy which plays a very positive role. 

In my view, the most important thing for the United States, important as the security relationship is, the most important thing for 

the United States to keep in mind now as Thailand goes through 

this period, we are, as I said earlier, friends with the entire nation 

and all of the people of Thailand, and that is something that we 

need to remember constantly as they go through this crisis with 

different groups debating each other. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It is very interesting to note with interest 

Cambodia, Vietnam, I believe even Laos, their principal trading 

partner right now is China. And I am just curious, where does 

Thailand fall into this? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thailand is also a significant trading partner for 

all of those countries. Trade among the ASEAN countries has increased at a rapid rate, and with the advent of the ASEAN Free 

Trade Agreement this year, we can expect that to continue to increase. I can get you numbers on the trade, but it is certainly important, as well as Thai investment in those countries. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Please. And in your capacity also as Ambassador to the ASEAN organization, I am just curious, there have 

been recent reports of Myanmar’s interest in developing a nuclear 

20

weapon, and I was wondering if this would have serious implications for those countries in Southeast Asia if Myanmar seeks to do 

the same thing like in North Korea. North Korea now has eight 

atom bombs, or something like that? 

Mr. MARCIEL. We have certainly read with interest the recent reports on a possible nuclear initiative by Burma. I can’t say too 

much about it in an open hearing, but obviously we follow it very 

carefully. 

I think there are two issues. One is whether there is some kind 

of serious nuclear program in Burma, which certainly would be tremendously destabilizing to the entire region. And second is also the 

Burmese acquisition of other military equipment, conventional, 

which also can affect regional stability. So we are looking at both 

of those questions very closely. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Can you also provide for the record the 

number of Thai Americans we have in our country? Besides Tiger 

Woods. 

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According to ‘‘We the People: Asians in the United States,’’ Census 2000 Special 

Reports, CENSR–17, issued in December 2004, page 1, 110,850 respondents reported to be of Thai origin. An additional 39,243 respondents identified themselves 

as being of mixed Thai heritage. If both groups of respondents are included, there 

were 150,093 Asians with Thai heritage in the U.S. in 2000. The 2010 Census figures are not available yet.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Do you know that Tiger Woods is more Thai 

than African American because his mother is from Thailand? I 

don’t know how many Americans know that. 

I think we currently have 690,000 foreign students who attend 

American colleges and universities. And the number one country is 

China with 100,000; India with about 90,000. I am curious, how 

many students from the ASEAN countries attend American colleges and universities? 

I have always firmly believed this is probably one of our most important assets—allowing students from all over the world to come 

and study in America and see America for what it is, and to understand and appreciate the institutions and what we are striving for. 

I am just curious if Thailand is also in that light in terms of the 

number of students from Thailand who are currently attending our 

American colleges and universities. 

Mr. MARCIEL. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely agree that it is very 

much good for the United States, as well as for the sending countries, to have students studying in the United States. I can get you 

the numbers for all of ASEAN and for individual countries. Thailand is a major—I have the numbers here. Great. 

We currently have almost 9,000 students from Thailand studying 

in the United States. Sorry, this is actually from a couple of years 

ago, a few years ago. Thailand, almost 9,000; Indonesia, a little 

over 7,000; Vietnam, 6,000; and China at this point 67,000. So that 

is extraordinarily high. But overall for ASEAN, the numbers have 

been going up. Certainly from Vietnam, they have been going up 

very rapidly. Indonesia, they have gone down somewhat, which is 

21

a concern for us. And Thailand, it is more stable. I can get you all 

of the numbers. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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According to the 2009 Open Doors report, the numbers of ASEAN students studying at U.S. universities and colleges during the 2008/2009 academic year (the most 

recent available statistics) are as follows:

Brunei 39

Burma 667

Cambodia 386

Indonesia 7,509

Laos 80

Malaysia 5,942

Philippines 4,226

Singapore 3,989

Thailand 8,736

Vietnam 12,823

ASEAN Total 44,397

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. This is a program that our Government 

should engage in—to encourage and bring students from the 

ASEAN countries to study in our colleges and universities. 

Mr. MARCIEL. We do have a number of programs, Fulbright obviously, but other programs that provide scholarships or otherwise 

encourage students from ASEAN to study in the United States. We 

are always talking about how we can do more. In the President’s 

planned trip to Indonesia, looking at how we can encourage more 

Indonesian students here is a big priority for us. So, yes, it is something that we should be doing. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It is my understanding that the President’s 

trip to Indonesia has been cancelled again. Is there any indication 

when he might be doing this in the coming months? This is three 

times now that he has cancelled the trip. 

Mr. MARCIEL. He has postponed the trip, Mr. Chairman, I believe, because of the environmental crisis in the Gulf of Mexico, but 

still intends to go, but there is not a new date set yet. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I note with interest during the Presidential 

campaign there was a national blog that said that I, humble me, 

was specially appointed as an agent of Barack Obama to go to Indonesia, which I did. I went to Indonesia to go to the school that 

he attended, to make sure that there was no indication whatsoever 

that Barack Obama was born in Indonesia. Say hello to the 

birthers for me on that. 

But at any rate, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your patience and good humor in seeing this through. I do want very much 

to do all we can, at least as Members of Congress, to be as helpful 

as we can to the people and good leaders of Thailand. 

Did you want to add any more to your statement? 

Mr. MARCIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Only that the administration view is exactly the same. The 

United States wants to do all we can to help our friends in Thailand get through this, and we hope the administration and the 

Congress can work together in support of the Thai people and——

22

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And the administration is supportive of the 

five points outlined by the Prime Minister in May? 

Mr. MARCIEL. That is right, Mr. Chairman, we are. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you 

for coming. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. We have some good experts here on our next 

panel. Our second panel includes Dr. Karl Jackson, Dr. Richard 

Cronin and Ms. Catharin Dalpino. 

Dr. Jackson is the director of the Asian Studies program at the 

School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. A C.V. Starr distinguished professor of southeast asian 

studies, he also serves as the director of the Southeast Asia Studies 

program at the SAIS. Until 1991, he was professor of political 

science at the University of California, Berkeley—go, Bears—where 

he began teaching in 1972. 

Dr. Jackson served as the National Security Adviser to the Vice 

President from 1991 to 1993. Prior to that he was Special Assistant 

to the President for National Security Affairs, and was also senior 

director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council. Mr. 

Jackson served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of East 

Asian Affairs. He also was the president of the U.S.-Thailand Business Council. He has written several books and is very much up 

to date on the situation in Thailand. 

Professor Dalpino is a former diplomat, scholar, international organizations professional staff member and program manager of an 

NGO. She has been a university professor for over 10 years, teaching courses in international relations, human rights and democracy 

promotion, politics and security and international relations in 

Southeast Asia. 

Ms. Dalpino was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for 5 years, where she had special 

responsibilities for U.S. policy in China, Indonesia, Burma, Bosnia, 

Haiti and Rwanda. She also led the U.S. delegation to the Group 

of 24, which coordinates democracy promotion assistance to Eastern Europe. Prior to joining the State Department, Ms. Dalpino 

was a policy analyst for the World Bank and an officer at the Asia 

Foundation, where she served as the Foundation’s resident representative for Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. 

In 1997, Ms. Dalpino became a fellow at the Brookings Institution, where she researched and wrote on U.S.-Asian relations for 

7 years. During this time, she taught at Georgetown University, 

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and also George Washington University. She has also directed 

projects on U.S. Relations in Southeast Asia for the Stanley Foundation, on Agent Orange in Vietnam for the Aspen Institute and 

on U.S.-Cambodian relations for The Asia Society. She has written 

three books on U.S. policy toward Asia. 

Dr. Richard Cronin is a senior associate and director of the 

Southeast Asia program at the Stimson Center, a nonprofit organization dealing with foreign security policy, in Washington, DC. 

Dr. Cronin currently works on transboundary and nontraditional 

security issues in the Mekong Basin and Southeast Asia from a political economy perspective. He has written and coauthored several 

articles on Thailand’s regional relations and the political crisis that 

23

culminated in the May 19 violence for the Stimson Foundation’s 

home page. He is also lead and coauthor of several books. My gosh, 

I can go on and on here. 

He has taught comparative Asian political economy at Johns 

Hopkins and Chuo University in Tokyo, and was also a Vietnam 

veteran intelligence officer in the U.S. Army 1st Infantry Division 

in 1965 and 1966. I was there 1967 and 1968, so you left before 

I came. 

I want to thank you very much for your presence and coming 

here to testify to the subcommittee. 

If I may, I would like to give the honor to Professor Dalpino for 

her opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF MS. CATHARIN E. DALPINO, VISITING ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, ASIAN STUDIES PROGRAM, EDMUND A. 

WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Ms. DALPINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, my views on this topic today are informed by living and working in Thailand over a span of three decades and my 

present work as director of Thai studies at Georgetown University, 

but I haven’t focused my statement on the very rich history of U.S.-

Thailand relations. I would like to focus very specifically on the 

current state of the reconciliation process in Thailand and what it 

might take to put that process on firmer ground. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Without objection, all of your statements 

will be made part of the record. If you have any added materials, 

things to add, we are happy to receive them. 

Ms. DALPINO. Mr. Chairman, it has been frustrating to some of 

us who follow Thai affairs to watch the coverage over the past few 

years in Thailand, because I think in particular the international 

community is sometimes given to what I would describe as the 

myth of monoliths, of being able to parse this crisis into Red Shirt 

versus Yellow Shirt, rural versus urban, rich versus poor, even authoritarian versus democracy. I am afraid that if this kind of dichotomy continues, it is going to stigmatize a large group of people 

and lionize another large group of people on any given occasion, 

and it is important in the reconciliation process to move to a more 

nuanced view of this crisis. So I thank you very much for these 

hearings and for your interest in this topic. 

I would say at the present time Thailand is suspended somewhere between the crisis and normal political life. I share your interest and your support for the five-point reconciliation plan. I 

think, however, as that plan goes forward, many Thais, particularly those who were in opposition, will look at a number of other 

things as well to see if the government is going to be able to forge 

a genuine reconciliation. And they will look particularly at whether 

treatment of several issues is evenhanded. 

Here are some indicators. I think they will look at due process 

for the UDD leaders and demonstrators under arrest. This will be 

a good opportunity for the government not only to show adherence 

to the rule of law, but also moving to a new kind of political balance. 

24

They will look at the length of the emergency rule period which 

is currently in operation and this week was renewed for another 

month. Certainly that is part of restoring order to Thailand, but as 

that—but as the need for that begins to wane, I think there will 

be attention to when emergency rule is lifted and in what sequence, particularly when it is lifted in the north and the northeast, which is where Thaksin had a great deal of political strength. 

I am heartened that the Prime Minister is committed to an investigation of the casualties incurred on both sides during the recent crisis. I think there will be close attention to who is appointed 

to a commission and what kind of balance that represents. 

And lastly in the short term, I think the timing of elections is 

a very, very difficult issue. Obviously, elections in the shortest possible term would help to restore democracy. But I have to say in 

all candor that there is a danger that if elections are called too 

soon, and not sufficient reconciliation has been achieved, that 

whatever the outcome is, it could restart a cycle of violence if the 

losers are not prepared to accept the outcome of the democratic 

process. And I think in our own representations and recommendations to our Thai colleagues, I think we have to remember how 

very, very complicated even just the timing of the election will be 

at this point in time. 

Even if managed skillfully, I think the initial stage will not automatically ensure long-term political stability in Thailand, and I 

would like to point out three issues which have been very much at 

the center of Thai political development. One is addressing the center-province dynamic. It is true former Prime Minister Thaksin 

brought to light many issues of rural versus urban. In truth, the 

Thai system has been centralized historically. It still is, but there 

have been attempts to decentralize. I don’t think just transferring 

funds to the rural area is going to do it. I think there is also an 

issue of transferring some degree of political power, and that will 

take quite a long national discussion. 

Also, adhering to the rules of the political game in a democracy 

is something that the Thais will have to consider and to work on 

quite a lot, particularly in a parliamentary form of government. 

And again, what we have seen with the cycles of violence and retribution with the Yellow Shirts versus Red Shirts, when one side 

does not get an outcome they want, they want to pull the whole 

system down. And working toward a political culture that allows 

for loyal opposition and acceptance of the democratic process will 

be very important. 

Traditionally, Thai governments are coalition governments, and 

I think there are some good reasons for doing that, but that actually doesn’t help this idea of accepting an outcome if you can negotiate some of the aspects after election. That is just to flag that 

issue. 

Lastly, I think we will see another round of constitutional revision and reform, and that is good. I think there are particular 

issues in the current Constitution that Thailand might look at, including the clause that abolishes the political party if a party member is convicted of electoral fraud. 

When he came into office, Prime Minister Abhisit flagged that 

and tried to get the parties to discuss either revising or abolishing 

25

that, because it really is a nuclear option, and it was behind a 

great deal of the discontent in the UDD with the dissolution of 

Thai Rak Thai and the People’s Power Party. But beyond specific 

constitutional revisions, I think that strengthening the Thai sense 

of Constitution will be important as well. Thailand has had 17 Constitutions since it became a constitutional monarchy in 1932. And 

forging a Constitution that can be revised as need be but still remain will be important. 

There are two major wild cards that could affect the reconciliation process. And one would be transitions in the monarchy, both 

in the palace and in the Privy Council, which might come naturally 

and might have been expected for some time, and also the issue of 

Thaksin’s continued impact on Thai politics and the calculation of 

how much is gained or lost by having him inside or outside of the 

country, inside or outside of the tent, is something clearly that not 

only this government but other parts of the Thai system will have 

to consider. 

Let me talk very briefly about U.S.-Thailand relations and what 

the United States might do at this point in time. I agree with everything that Secretary Marciel said about the importance and the 

salience of U.S.-Thai relations and I think that the United States 

has a stake in helping to strengthen Thai democracy and supporting the return to stability. But it has to do so with some 

thought and restraint. And in contrast to some countries in the 

post-Cold-War world that had significant international involvement 

in the democratic process of their democratization Thailand’s democratization is very much of its own making. And it has welcomed 

support from the international community as a support, not as a 

leading factor. 

I have no reason to believe that they would not welcome support, 

but I think it has to be very skillful and somewhat indirect. I also 

do think that it is very important that any democracy assistance 

that the United States or U.S. organizations that are not governmental that be rendered at this point in time be perceived as being 

nonpartisan in terms of the Thai political factions. 

A second thing that I think the United States could help, if Thailand so desires this assistance, is helping to break the cycle of impunity that we have seen not only with the Red Shirts but with 

the Yellow Shirts—going back to the time in August 2008 when 

people broke into the Prime Minister’s residence and chased him 

to the airport the VIP lounge of the airport—that both the Yellow 

Shirts and Red Shirts have conducted themselves as they have because they believe that they could, and that developing a strong, 

accountable, effective security force is actually part of a democracy, 

because you will have public demonstrations. You should expect to 

have them, even welcome them as part of democracy and not see 

them as a crisis every time they are brewing. 

Our relationship on the security side has obviously focused on 

military, has not focused on police reform, but I think that there 

might be an opportunity to do so if Thailand believes that that is 

desirable. 

Lastly I think that we can help our Thai interlocutors by engaging them in what I would call ‘‘beyond the crisis thinking’’ and 

drawing them out in terms of our security, economic and cultural 

26

relations, and not waiting for that to happen automatically but 

reaching out to them. That will help to restore a sense of normalcy 

and help to regain, help Thailand regain momentum in the international community. 

Let me end with a regional postscript. I find it very interesting 

that Vietnam, in its capacity as chairman of ASEAN, 2 weeks ago 

issued a statement on the situation in Thailand that was supportive of Prime Minister Abhisit’s government, but also commented that Thai stability is very important to Southeast Asian regional stability and offered, as a group, ASEAN to help Thailand. 

That is fairly unprecedented. ASEAN has issued some statements 

on Burma under international pressure, but I think that this is an 

encouraging sign for ASEAN as well, and might be followed up on. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalpino follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you Professor Dalpino. 

We are also joined here by another distinguished member of our 

subcommittee, the gentlelady from California, Dr. Watson, former 

Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia, and we welcome her. 

Diane, did you have an opening statement you wanted to——

Ms. WATSON. I did. I might be a little late because I think that 

the professor probably has mentioned all those things. But let me 

just reiterate some of what was said. I would like to really thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the situation in 

Thailand. And in my experiences in the Far East, I was very, very 

upset over the situation in Thailand. I remember going there in the 

early sixties, and it was such a historical trip for me and such a 

peaceful, wonderful trip back to the ‘‘King and I.’’

By the way, I ended up doing that whole presentation when I 

was teaching in Okinawa because I love the culture so much and 

I trained my students—I had a gifted class and I trained them to 

play those roles. And so I just really fell in love with the Thai culture. 

So I have been very concerned, with what happened this past 

March with the red-shirt protesters occupying the streets of Bangkok for all of 9 weeks, and probably more, and at first these protests seemed to be peaceful; however, as the weeks progressed, 

clashes between the Red Shirts and the security forces escalated 

into urban warfare and by mid-May, 88 people had been killed and 

thousands wounded. 

The Red Shirts took to the streets in support of their ousted leader, Thaksin, and to demand an earlier election. Though the current 

Prime Minister offered a plan that would allow for early elections 

in return for an end to the protests, reconciliation still seems elusive. 

This morning the full Committee on Foreign Affairs led a hearing 

about human rights and democracy. Thailand is an important lesson in democracy building. Thailand has long been one of the 

brightest stars in Asia and one that saw economic and democratic 

progress throughout the nineties. However, since the military coup 

in 2006, which ousted the PM, tensions between the Red Shirts 

and the Yellow Shirts have been increasing. 

The fundamental divide between the two groups centers on the 

electoral process, with the Yellow Shirts arguing that ethical imperatives trump the polls, while the Red Shirts believe that governance should be determined entirely by the population’s vote. 

Many Thais are looking to the reigning monarch for support and 

a decision that will reduce the division between these two groups. 

The King, however, has been been ill and has not offered guidance 

in the situation as he has in the past. His son, the Crown Prince, 

is not seen as the leader his father once was, causing increased discomfort among the Thai populace. 

Thailand is standing at a crossroads, one whose road signs are 

confused by the political environment. And I don’t know if reconciliation is necessary. We can’t let the people of Thailand fall into a 

civil war without offering our help. 

33

And I missed most of the testimony. I understand we were on the 

second panel, Mr. Chairman, but I certainly want to learn more 

about what you would suggest our best action should be. 

And as I mentioned our hearing that we had in International Relations, we are looking at all of our foreign policy programs and 

how best to assist these countries. And I always have to remind 

our side of things, is that these are sovereign nations and that 

what we do is we build from the ground up. We cannot go in there 

and tell the people, but we can encourage them to look at democratic policies. 

So I would like to hear from the panelists. And I did hear what 

the professor was saying when I came in, as how you would direct 

our country, our USAID programs, millennium programs and so on, 

to assist the Thais and particularly those who are not comfortable 

with their government the way it is, and just how we can best assist in these circumstances. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I will say to the gentlelady that she has a 

very formidable understanding of the situation in Thailand. We 

had Secretary Marciel testify earlier, who pretty much corroborated 

your testimony. So you did not miss much. 

Ms. WATSON. Well if I had time, Mr. Chairman, if we could just 

hear—start with Dr. Jackson, and then the professor and Dr. 

Cronin. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. All right, Dr. Jackson would you proceed, 

please? 

STATEMENT OF KARL JACKSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF ASIAN 

STUDIES AND SOUTH EAST ASIA STUDIES, THE PAUL H. 

NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. First of all it is a great pleasure to be back 

in front of the committee. Twenty years ago I used to testify in 

front of this committee when I was in government, Steve Solarz 

would really regularly give me a thrashing, and we both became 

good friends and colleagues as a result and remain so until this 

day. 

Given that my statement is already part of the written record, 

I would make only three or four short points given the hour and 

the fact that there may be some votes. 

The first point I would make is that the demonstrations we have 

witnessed in Bangkok over the last several months are a by-product of an ongoing set of socioeconomic and political changes that 

been taking place for the last 30 years. 

The rise of upcountry political movements really began in the 

1970s and the 1980s. Thaksin didn’t cause this movement of 

upcountry. He simply sensed it better and rode it more competently 

than anyone else had before. 

Thaksin’s money and his political savvy mattered, and his personal charisma helped, but the upcountry movement to obtain a 

larger slice of the pie is here to stay in Thailand. 

The second point I would make is that a large number of 

upcountry people, especially from the lower part of the socioeconomic structure, have developed an emotional identification 

with this man, Thaksin Shinawatra, which will not wear off simply 

34

because the Government of Thailand puts in place Thaksin-like 

policies. 

Many people seem to feel that one of their own was illegally displaced by a military coup and that their votes have been repeatedly 

nullified by a Bangkok-dominated court system. 

Now it does not matter whether these perceptions are factually 

accurate. What really matters is that these feelings of alienation 

exist, are widespread, and constitute the fundamental political 

problem facing Thailand at this time. 

The third point I would make concerns reconciliation, the process 

about which the chairman, Scott Marciel, and Professor Dalpino 

have spoken. Reconciliation will take time. But it must involve a 

genuine willingness on the part of the government to collaborate 

with the opposition. Meetings with academics, with journalists, 

with thinkers, all of these being representatives of Bangkok domination, are not the same as seeking reconciliation directly with the 

leaders of the red-shirt movement. 

Jailing and labeling the Red Shirts as terrorists will drive this 

mass movement underground, I fear. Like the chairman I am a 

member of the Vietnam generation which saw many insurgencies 

around Southeast Asia. This is the last thing that any of us want 

and I’m sure it is the last thing that the Government of Thailand 

would want, but it is something we must be concerned with. 

The fourth point I would make echoes very much the comments 

of Catherin Dalpino, even though we didn’t actually talk about this 

ahead of time. Elections alone, even early elections, are not enough. 

A complex of series of political deals needs to be worked out among 

competing elites to reestablish trust and legitimacy for whatever 

government results from the next election. The parliaments of the 

streets, represented by the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts, must 

somehow be brought back into the legal Parliament itself. The critical imperative is to get politics off of the street and back into legal 

institutions. 

The best of all possible outcomes might well turn out to be a government of national unity involving all the major political parties. 

And lastly, and again echoing my colleague, Professor Dalpino, 

the legitimacy of Thai judicial and law enforcement institutions depends on making them even-handed and apolitical and perceived as 

such by most of the people of Thailand. 

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you Dr. Jackson. 

Dr. Cronin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD CRONIN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER 

Mr. CRONIN. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Dr. 

Watson. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity to testify at what I 

think is a very well-named titled hearing, this emphasis on reconciliation, path to reconciliation, that my colleagues have already 

been discussing. And to echo both of them, I mean this is really a 

major challenge and we have already heard some reasons why that 

is so. 

I am going to take a slightly different tack in my presentation, 

and that is that I am going to come at this issue somewhat from 

a more political economy way, if you would; that is, some underlying reasons that go even deeper than political developments. And 

one of these really is fundamentally the inability of the political 

system, which has been changing and adapting over time, to adapt 

to the impact of globalization and rapid economic growth that left 

some parts of the country behind. 

I would make the point that Thailand has trebled its GDP in the 

last 20, 30 years; and its poverty index, rate of poverty has dropped 

from the thirties and forties to under 10 percent recently. Things 

are a little tougher now because of the financial crisis. And so all 

the boats have been rising, but they haven’t all been rising as fast. 

So that is one, I think, important point. 

And on the other hand, Thailand—so Thailand has really benefited from globalization in many ways. It has got a key geographic 

location, it has enjoyed large-scale manufacturing investment by 

Japanese, American, European companies, and has a relatively 

well-educated population. I mentioned national income tripled in 

the past two decades. 

But on the other hand, Thailand was really the cause and the 

poster child, if you will, of the 1997 financial crisis. It was when 

Thailand’s balance of payments got too far out of whack, that they 

could not sustain the value of the baht, that they were established 

against the dollar. And that led not only to collapse and great 

chaos in financial and economic chaos and even social chaos in 

Thailand, but it also created a deep resentment against some aspects of globalization and particularly against the IMF’s prescription, which is quite wrong, of belt-tightening rather than actually 

measures to stimulate the economy to keep the GDP from falling 

too fast. 

And in some ways the democrats in Thailand have been associated with that IMF medicine, and the Prime Minister, Thaksin, 

and the past former Prime Minister never left them or the other 

people forget it. 

There is also an issue that both my colleagues have raised one 

way or another, and that is an attitudinal problem between Bangkok and the rural areas, or upcountry, as Karl Jackson put it. And 

that mindset is evident in many ways. It is certainly greatly perceived by Thais outside Bangkok, particularly in the north and 

northeast, as a kind of sophisticated-urbanites-versus-countryVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:55 Nov 10, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\APGE\061010\56886 HFA PsN: SHIRL
43

bumpkins kind of attitude. And this has come out in ways that 

have been harmful to Thailand. 

For instance, we have heard reference to the 1977, sorry, 1997 

Constitution, and that Constitution aimed in a number of ways to 

eliminate revolving Cabinets but also to put educational requirements in place for membership, for running for legislature. It tried 

to create a strong Cabinet, a strong Prime Minister, and in many 

ways you could say it was a little bit of an elitist approach or an 

academic approach to Constitution making. And it backfired in a 

way. 

Prime minister Thaksin came in and took advantage of all those 

provisions and, as we already heard, was able to mobilize a huge 

electoral base in the north and northeast of Thailand, and particularly the issue of this emotional connection that Karl has mentioned is very important. 

Just a couple of points I would make. One is that much has been 

made of the fact that the army overthrew the democratic elected 

Thaksin government, but not enough attention has been given to 

the fact that constitutional changes practically made it impossible 

for Thaksin to be dislodged by constitutional means. So once he 

won the second election in 2005 by a huge margin, and then got 

in trouble over this Shin Corporation sale to Singapore’s Temasak 

Holdings Company, a sovereign holding company, he called for a 

snap election. The whole business of Shin had been a little too 

much for the population to take, even going beyond his enemy, his 

core supporters. 

And so he called a snap election in which members could not, you 

could not form a party less than 90 days before the election. He 

called it in a shorter period than 90 days, and it wasn’t possible 

for them to rename their party, to form coalitions, or even to attract members from Thaksin’s party into a different opposition 

party. 

And that is why they took to the streets, first the Yellow Shirts; 

and then, of course, eventually the Red Shirts emulated the Yellow 

Shirts for some of the same reasons, although the government had 

changed. 

So I am trying to emphasize that there are some structural 

issues and some accidents that are partly substantially connected 

to rapid economic change, globalization, et cetera, but also rooted 

in some attitudes between Bangkok people and the rest of the 

country, particularly the northeast. 

I think in terms of looking to the future, Prime Minister Abhisit 

had already made a number of I think very successful moves, and 

one is that he survived an attempted censure and no-confidence 

vote in the lower house of Parliament. 

And one of the interesting things about that is that there were 

fewer votes against him than the total number of opposition members in the Parliament. So it would appear that he has made some 

inroads there, and he also has a very high approval rating, around 

70 percent right now. And that has taken over most of the provinces, and it would seem that it would include a number of the 

provinces where the Red Shirts are prominent as well. 

He has promised to hold new elections and this has actually been 

postponed until next year. And the main reason, as we already 

44

heard I think, is that if we had another election, Thailand had another election marred by violence, it would be kind of even a bigger 

disaster than where we are right now. But at the same time, there 

has to be an election and there has to be the perception of legitimacy of whatever government is installed following that. 

To pile on in a way, but one thing that will not likely achieve 

reconciliation is demonizing Thaksin. Thaksin is a force to be reckoned with. He is a crook. He not only was a crook but he was a 

human rights abuser. He conducted this anti-narcotics campaign 

war on drugs for 3 months in 2003 where more than 1,000 people 

allegedly were killed, either in shootings on the streets, by the police and other security authorities, or died in jail having been beaten to death. And this is pretty well-documented in the human 

rights report that the State Department prepares every year—for 

that year, in which case was 2003. 

Reconciliation is very important to the United States. Thailand 

is very important to the United States. And Thailand is a middle 

power with whom the United States has robust relations and a 

broad agenda. A treaty ally, Thailand provides important cooperation against terrorism and posts the annual Cobra Gold gold multinational combined joint military exercises, as we have heard. And 

those were held, actually, as recently as February of this year. 

Bangkok is also a regional hub for USAID. We have a regional 

office there for our activities, our aid programs, and of course a 

major center for U.S. corporate investment. 

To conclude, what I would like to say is that the main thing the 

United States can do now is to promote reconciliation or to help 

promote reconciliation is to maintain constructive relations with 

the Abhisit government and support appropriate efforts to rebalance the economy in ways to promote more equitable development. 

This is a tough assignment right now because of the global financial crisis which is requiring a kind of unwanted rebalancing of 

economy in favor of domestic growth rather than export-led growth. 

In this context, though, probably the single most important thing 

the administration and Congress can do is to reject overly simplified explanations for the crisis and recognize that given Thailand’s constitutional complications, moral support for the Abhisit 

government does not represent a compromise with U.S. democratic 

values and ideals. I think that is a very important point. 

Thailand has had a tumultuous political history, as we have 

heard already. But it is also a very resilient country, and it is a 

country that values its long, sometimes interrupted, path toward a 

more participatory and more democratic system. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]

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Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Dr. Cronin. 

Congresswoman Watson for her questions. 

Ms. WATSON. I really want to thank this panel for the insight 

you share with us. And I am wondering, what is the impact of the 

turmoil in Bangkok? What does it mean to that entire ASEAN region? What impact will that have? And look at it, too, in terms of 

tourism. That was a place that was a destination for a lot of us, 

and now when you see the pictures on TV, it certainly wouldn’t attract a whole lot of tourists probably anytime soon. 

So can you comment on the political impact in the region and 

what you see in terms of business trade tourism? 

Mr. JACKSON. I would say that what is remarkable about tourism 

is that it seems to be extraordinarily resilient. Even given the 

events of this past May, apparently occupancy is back in the high 

thirties already in the Bangkok hotel system, and, of course, it is 

quite large and robust in places like Phuket. Obviously Thailand 

has been hurt and its tourism image has been hurt. But I guess 

Thailand is such an attractive place—as you found, and I did approximately at the same time—it seems to be slowly rebounding. 

Now, the second thing you asked was about the political impact 

regionally. I think ASEAN has as its absolute fundamental starting 

principle, noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries, 

other members of ASEAN. And I think ASEAN will maintain this 

principle. 

However, ASEAN as an organization functions mostly behind 

closed doors and at dinner parties and on golf courses, and I am 

sure that there will be quite frank talks and expressions of concern 

by almost all of the ASEAN countries about Thailand becoming, 

not the rock of stability, but a source of uncertainty in the region. 

And so I am sure Prime Minister Abhisit and Foreign Minister 

Kasit will hear this from their colleagues, and I am sure each of 

those gentlemen is doing as much as they possibly can to try and 

get Thailand beyond this very difficult juncture in history. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you. Professor. 

Ms. DALPINO. First, Congresswoman, let me tell you that my first 

direct experience with Thailand was also in the early sixties and 

I understand completely why you fell in love with it then. I did too. 

Let me address a couple of points. Thailand is a regional hub 

logistically in terms of transportation, and that is very important. 

Had that really been withheld for any significant amount of time, 

I think the whole region would have suffered, not just Thailand. 

Thailand has been important to our relationship to ASEAN. The 

Thais have tended to be very much a promoter of more U.S. involvement in the region and regional organizations. They will be 

very forward-leaning about supporting more of an Asia Pacific community and looking for ways to include the United States in the 

regional framework. And so that is a very important partnership. 

I agree that I think that the ASEAN states were somewhat dismayed by the events. What I worry about is that there are two 

ASEAN states, well three, but the two oldest democracies in 

ASEAN are the Philippines and Thailand. And both of them in 

their different ways are struggling with the process of consolidation, which is much more difficult than just entering into a democratic transition. Indonesia’s democracy is still a little too young to 

54

make these sorts of generalizations, and my fear is that what Thailand and the Philippines have gone through in recent years, different experiences, will slow down the democratic processes in 

other countries in the region. 

But lastly, let me also say that I think there is an opportunity 

here, and I ended my statement, my testimony, by talking about 

this statement that ASEAN did issue about Thailand, which is fairly unprecedented, and one of the reasons they were able to issue 

that is that the ASEAN Secretary General is former Thai Foreign 

Minister Surin Pitsuwan. He was Foreign Minister in the late nineties when he tried to persuade ASEAN to move to something called 

‘‘flexible engagement’’ which would give ASEAN more involvement 

in the internal affairs of a member state if it affected the whole 

group. And it is sort of exquisitely ironic that this situation is going 

to pass, and that I think that Secretary General Surin is probably 

encouraging ASEAN to step up to the plate on Thailand and hoping perhaps to change the paradigm of the group just a little bit. 

Mr. CRONIN. If I could add just something to that, more from the 

geopolitical point of view, and that is that one of the things we 

haven’t talked about—because it is not a hearing on China—is that 

China is a big factor here in the region. And the United States, 

particularly the Obama administration, has made a decision to reengage with Southeast Asia, with ASEAN, and particularly in the 

Mekong region of which Thailand is a hub. 

Thailand has welcomed and facilitated our efforts at reentry into 

the region. A senior Thai official told my colleague Tim Hamlin and 

me last summer that Thais recognize the move is geopolitical and 

they welcomed it. And this is, I think, a good indication of the political relationship. And at the same time Thailand doesn’t want to 

be nor do its neighbors want to be caught in any kind of struggle 

for influence between the United States and China. 

But that is really not what it is about. I think it is a question 

of how the regional economies will develop, what their core will be, 

and what the relationships—political relationships that will come 

out of that. 

So Thailand is a very important country. In ASEAN there are 

two countries that are kind of the poles of strongest influence. One 

is Thailand and the other is Indonesia; and presently, they are on 

the same page, if you will, with most of the issues that concern the 

United States. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you. 

Professor Dalpino, I note with interest in your statement you 

noted that Thailand has had 17 Constitutions. My gosh. And it 

seems that every time there is a coup they change their Constitution. So the Constitution is not taken in the same perspective as 

we have. We still have only one Constitution and rarely amend it 

in terms of whatever the—however the pendulum swings in terms 

of our own political development and all of that. 

And I also note with interest is that maybe this is the reality. 

You said that the road to reconciliation in Thailand is not likely 

to be smooth in either the short or long term. That is about as realistic as you can get. So does this mean also, in your best opinion, 

55

that the future of Thailand right now is, at a very, very serious 

crossroad where it could go either way? 

And I also note that the situation with the Royal Family is a big 

factor. It is my understanding that the Crown Prince is not exactly 

well-loved by the people of Thailand, but his sister, I think the oldest of the princesses, seems to be very well loved by the Thai people. The Crown Prince is likely to be the heir to the throne if something happens to His Majesty. Could that be a critical factor in the 

future of Thailand’s situation, politically? 

Ms. DALPINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I don’t really think there will be a succession crisis. Thailand follows primogeniture in the monarchy. And so from the very beginning the 

Crown Prince, the only male, was the heir apparent. 

It is true that—and some of my colleagues might want to correct 

me on the exact history—that in the Privy Council there was a provision that would enable Princess Sirinhorn to take the throne if 

her brother could not serve. That regulation went into effect before 

the Crown Prince had a legal male heir. So I don’t know what the 

status of that would be. 

But I think that whatever the next generation would hold for 

Thailand, I think it would be a shock to have the world’s longest 

reigning monarch, who was in many ways a modernizer, pass from 

the scene. And I think even among the best of times, that would 

be a major adjustment for Thailand. 

To answer the first part of your question, I have a lot of faith 

in Thai resilience and the Thai ability to compromise. I am a little 

alarmed that the situation has almost gotten beyond that. But my 

wanting to point out that there are both short- and long-term dangers is to sort of alert the committee to the fact that things could 

take a sharp turn for the negative at any point. And I think it will 

be many years before Thais feel that politics are on firmer ground. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Jackson, I note with interest your very 

broad stroke of the brush in terms of how Thai society has evolved. 

And basically there seems to be the Bangkok urban rich people 

versus the rural areas. How does that relate to the population? Do 

the majority of people in Thailand live in urban areas; are they in 

urban city areas like Bangkok? 

Mr. JACKSON. The fundamental problem of Thai politics is that 

most of the money is in Bangkok and most of the votes are outside. 

And that is a fundamental tension in the political system that has 

grown more intensive over the last 20 years. Several of the constitutional changes have really been designed to try to modulate 

this but it will continue to be a source of difficulty unless and 

until—in my opinion—and this is only my opinion—unless and 

until some pretty fundamental decentralization takes place whereby if people were dissatisfied upcountry, they might petition their 

local government or their provincial government rather than going 

to the streets of Bangkok. 

And so in my own view, one of the things that might conceivably 

help with long-term reconciliation would be decentralization because the Bangkok system, that is, the Thai system, has always 

been a very centralized kingdom, and the whole thrust of modernization in the 20th century was to centralize and bring power 

56

to the center. And it seems to me one way to buy political space 

is to reverse this process at least partially. 

Other big cities like Chiang Mai could conceivably have their 

own elected Governor as Bangkok now does. This is one possibility. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is it your view that one reason why former 

Prime Minister Thaksin identified so well with the lower-income 

class people in the rural areas is because he probably did more 

than any previous Prime Minister to really help the lower-income 

people in the rural areas? Does that seem to be why there was such 

a close relationship between the people of the rural areas and 

Thaksin, despite the fact that he is a rich person? 

Mr. JACKSON. An enormously rich person. There are two aspects 

of it. One is that his government did do more for upcountry Thailand than other previous governments had done. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That is a fact. 

Mr. JACKSON. That is a fact. He not only promised to do something, he did the unforgivable. He delivered on his promises after 

he was elected. 

But the second aspect is the one that I think is the more critical; 

that is, he turned his own personal narrative of rags to riches into 

something with which many people who are poor in Thailand identify. This is a guy who, when his father died, had no inheritance; 

his family lived upstairs from the family coffee shop. When he 

came to the States he worked in a Kentucky Fried Chicken place 

to pick up money. Not only are there certain facts to this story, I 

am sure that on the stump, although I have never heard him on 

the stump, he can embellish this story in quite remarkable ways. 

And a lot of people identify with that rags-to-riches story, and 

Thaksin’s goal was that he was going to abolish poverty in Thailand. That is what he said his goal was. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I note with interest, Dr. Cronin, you said 

the problem with Thailand is this fundamental attitudinal issue, to 

which Dr. Jackson has alluded. Here is a fellow who goes from rags 

to riches to becoming Prime Minister. He reached out to the lowerincome people and gave them hope. They think, if he can do it, I 

can do it too. And, as Dr. Jackson said, he delivered on his promise 

to help the people in the rural areas. 

He mentioned that it seems that the government has demonized 

Prime Minister Thaksin’s problems, his human rights abuses and 

drug trafficking. Does that really go over well in the rural areas, 

the people that seem to have such a strong affinity or devotion to 

him because he was able to identify with them more so than the 

rich and the people of means, of affluence, living in Bangkok? 

Mr. CRONIN. Yes. That is a very good point, an interesting point. 

I think that those of us who look at Thailand and try to figure out 

what is going on shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that Thaksin’s sins 

were not as criticized in the rural areas as in the cities. But there 

is also this contradiction that everybody in Thailand, including 

Bangkok people, many, many people anyway, supported his antinarcotics campaign. It just got a little sticky when, say, if you are 

a middle-class professional Thai and you look over the balcony from 

your apartment or your condominium and you see a corpse lying 

in a pool of blood in the street who is alleged to have been involved 

in drugs. 

57

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Would you say that those people involved 

with drug trafficking could have been from affluent backgrounds? 

Mr. CRONIN. Probably not. Maybe the users, like here, are from 

a more affluent society, but drugs have permeated much of Thai society. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. We have got a similar problem here with 

Latin America. The Latin American leaders complained to us that 

if there wasn’t such a tremendous demand for drugs in America, 

maybe we wouldn’t have drug problems. Not so much those who 

are using the drugs, but rather those who are trafficking it. 

Mr. CRONIN. The real point is one you mentioned at the beginning of this particular exchange, and that is that, again, whatever 

Thaksin’s flaws and failings, which are widely recognized, there 

was still this attitudinal issue that for whatever reason, personality, background—hardscrabble-to-riches background, the people 

did identify with him in a way they don’t in Bangkok. 

And I mentioned earlier this issue with the Constitution and efforts to write a Constitution that was more academic and squeaky 

clean and would basically, if you will, keep them away from the 

government. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Let me ask all three of you, did you think 

his trial was impartial and fair as far as the judiciary is concerned 

in Thailand? I am talking about Prime Minister Thaksin’s. 

Mr. JACKSON. I wish I could say that I was really familiar with 

the trial itself. I am familiar with the charges, which had to do 

with a particular piece of property that was purchased by his wife; 

and the charge, if I remember correctly, was that she was allowed 

to purchase this at below market price when she was married to 

the Prime Minister of Thailand at the time. I don’t think anyone 

really challenged the facts in the case. 

The question was, is this offense sufficient to convict and send 

to jail a person who by then was a former Prime Minister? The 

Thai court decided yes. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is this an every day thing that goes on anyway? I mean this is just Prime Minister Thaksin. It happens to 

other government leaders who have these kinds of business transactions? To us it is a conflict of interest, but to them, carrying on 

to the benefits. 

Mr. JACKSON. I think your colleague outlined the two democracies problem of Thailand; that is, there is one democracy that 

thinks only in terms of who can get the most votes and therefore 

control Parliament. This is the upcountry democracy that Thaksin 

cultivated and utilized. 

There is the Bangkok democracy which says ethics are all important; we are trying to clean up the swamp, and the conflict that 

we have watched in Bangkok in the streets is the outgrowth of this 

underlying struggle. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Professor Dalpino. 

Ms. DALPINO. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to turn to 

this issue of Thaksin in the rural areas. He is not universally loved 

in the rural areas. He was not at the time. And I think we need 

to break down the monolith of rural areas. He was popular in the 

north, he was from Chiang Mai. He was popular in the northeast 

for a number of complex reasons, the relative poverty and the fact 

58

that the political dynamic in the northeast makes it all too easy to 

deliver the northeast en bloc, unfortunately. He is very unpopular 

in the rural south. 

And here I think we need to bring in the forgotten conflict which 

is the deep south conflict and the insurgency that has been going 

on since 2004. I do not think it is fair to attribute the restart of 

that conflict entirely to Thaksin, but he did not make it any easier 

with his approach which is a very ham-fisted, very heavy-handed, 

very assimilative approach. And here, ironically, he demonstrated 

all of the qualities that people are complaining about that so-called 

Bangkok leads with. It shows he is a very complex person, obviously, but he does also come from that class as well in many ways. 

So I think when we think about the rural areas, we need to remember the rural areas themselves in Thailand are much more diverse than some people would understandably——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Cronin. 

Mr. CRONIN. If I could add to that as well, the issue that you 

have raised of ‘‘doesn’t everybody do it’’ is certainly a valid issue. 

But in Thaksin’s case, of course, you have scale which was very, 

very large. The other thing is that—and really the problem isn’t 

one of perceptions. So he was a crook, yes. Was he persecuted? 

That is a matter of perception, and disagreement. And one of the 

problems for the Thai Government is, for instance, they are having 

a hard time getting international banks, Interpol, et cetera, to help 

them deal with him and the money that he has stashed abroad. 

And the problem is that the more they demonize him, the more it 

conveys an impression that, well, he may have been a bad guy, but 

this is a political thing and therefore we don’t want to have anything to do with it. 

And the real problem, I think, is that the system as it is set up 

cannot deal with a situation in which Thaksin came back. And so 

this is a huge challenge because in a new election his supporters 

could, if not gain a majority, lead a coalition where they could pass 

laws that would allow him to come back under amnesty or something like that. And that would be a nightmare. It is a nightmare 

scenario. 

So I really have to sympathize and empathize with the political 

establishment in Thailand. It is presented with this dilemma that 

is very, very difficult. And it again goes back to the issue then of 

perceptions and attitudes, so that what the government should be 

doing and what it is doing in terms of programs and funding, et 

cetera, does Thaksin one better in terms of providing more development and more services to the rural areas. But at the same time, 

if that is not done with the right psychological element to it, if it 

is done by bureaucrats who are kind of giving it down rather than 

involved in a cooperative venture, then it still leaves an opening for 

trouble in the future. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. What would be all three of your perspectives 

if, let’s say there is a point of reconciliation, and I am sure that 

it would be agreeable to the Red Shirts that Thaksin is allowed to 

come back and allowed to run for Prime Minister. Will that reconcile a lot of the current humbug and the situation of the crisis 

the way it stands right now? 

59

Ms. DALPINO. Mr. Chairman, I think in the short term that probably would just restart the cycle of conflict and violence. But in the 

long term, I think that the ideal under that scenario of his returning would be that he would be allowed to return, contest for power, 

that the outcome of the election would be respected, but that there 

would be sufficient checks and balances on the system so that he 

could not subvert the Constitution and that if he does indeed have 

any—as there should be on any Thai politician, and I have long 

maintained that Thaksin is not a throwback, a genetic throwback 

to the average politician in Thailand, but that the system could 

deal with him. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Let’s say that by a court of law he has been 

found guilty. Let’s say, and I am making a big assumption here, 

that he is pardoned. As a point of reconciliation, that would be satisfactory to the Red Shirts, and say, our leader is back now, let’s 

leave it now to the people of Thailand to make that decision of 

whether or not he is capable or has the ability to sway the majority 

of the people of Thailand to have him as the Prime Minister. 

I don’t know, this is another point that they—I am sure the government is trying to figure out exactly where the Red Shirts are 

coming from and where the Yellow Shirts are coming from. 

At what point do you think there will be some point of reconciliation that we can see something more positive than what it is now? 

Dr. Jackson. 

Mr. JACKSON. I would go back to Thai history to 1973–76. The 

military dictator of Thailand was a man named Marshal Thanom 

Kittikachorn, and in 1973 he was forced to leave the country after 

a student uprising in which people were killed on the streets. He 

subsequently returned to the country, shaved his head, became a 

Buddhist monk, and then after a time period slid seamlessly back 

into Thai society and into private life and lived out his entire existence in Thailand. 

I think that it would be very difficult for the forces in Bangkok, 

that is, the Bangkok dominated courts, the people around the monarchy, the people around the Democrat Party, to accept the idea of 

Thaksin Shinawatra being allowed to return and to run in politics. 

However, I think it is not impossible that he might be allowed to 

return quietly to Thai society. And I think that that is something 

that is terribly important to him as an individual. So there is some 

quid pro quo here that could conceivably be worked on. 

I think the people who are in power now in Bangkok would want 

to extract a promise, an enforceable promise, that he would never 

again directly participate in politics. So that is where I see the possibility of a deal; but I would add, I have no relevance to either side 

of this deal. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Professor Dalpino. 

Ms. DALPINO. I think that the immediate issue is what would 

happen if his successor party to Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party, the 

Puea Thai party, should get a plurality in the next election? 

Thaksin himself is a wild card. What he actually wants is not 

something that is entirely clear. 

So I am not sure that even the Puea Thai would want to stake 

a whole policy on his return. And one scenario might be that he 

just diminishes in importance as some of these issues, particularly 

60

having to do with discrepancies between center and provinces and 

economic discrepancies are addressed, I think it is very important 

to decouple Thaksin from those issues, because those issues are 

very longstanding. They have been existing in Thailand for decades 

and decades and decades. 

But I think that you don’t even need to think about a return. I 

think that some parts of the—many of Thaksin’s detractors believe 

that if Puea Thai party were to come into power, then Thaksin 

would be able to manipulate power through them. And that is a 

very immediate issue, and I think probably the crux, in the short 

term, of reconciliation. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Dr. Cronin. 

Mr. CRONIN. Well I would fall, I think, in the same line of argument; that is, I would distinguish between Thaksinites and 

Thaksin. And definitely Thaksinites must have a share of political 

power in the future, and that could well come in the form of plurality in the next election. I don’t know. But it is a challenge I 

think for the democrats and their ruling parties to compete in the 

rural areas with the Thaksinites. 

Eventually, I think that Thaksin is going to turn up again one 

way or the other, and the question is can he be contained in the 

sense of being forced to stay out of politics as a bargain, at the 

price of coming back and doing his business and other things that 

he does. But he will always be there behind the scenes. 

And so ultimately I think you go back to Karl Jackson talking 

about decentralization, talking about the kind of political change 

which would minimize or reduce the importance of single figures, 

you know, charismatic figures, getting back to a kind of politics 

that is more multipolar and consensual, and I think that that is 

the best way Thailand should try to go anyway. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I have not had a chance to field any critical 

editorials or commentaries made about the result of Prime Minister 

Thaksin’s court trial. And I get the impression that perhaps as 

quoted in his opinion, he wasn’t treated fairly. And for reasons, as 

you say, that he no longer comes back to the country, I suspect that 

he will immediately be put in jail, which is something that will 

cause even greater problems to the society or to the people in Thailand. 

And I raise the question—I am sorry I couldn’t get him to come 

and testify to this subcommittee. I would love to have him. I don’t 

even know if he is allowed to come to our country in terms of we 

would probably send him by way of reciprocity to Thailand if he 

ever was to come to the United States. 

But I just, as I am sure you are concerned, as are my colleagues, 

he is a very colorful leader. As you said, he went from rags to 

riches, becoming a billionaire by being a successful businessman, 

seemingly, and wanting to help Thai society in that respect by giving some of the wealth or whatever it is that the government can 

provide to those who are less fortunate. 

How serious is this idea that the middle class, and I am very 

vague on this, and I really want to understand, is there really a 

middle class in Thailand that seems to be one of critical influence, 

whether it be with the Red Shirts or the Yellow Shirts in the crisis? And then the problem is you can’t point exactly who is the 

61

leader of this so-called middle class that seems to have a lot of influence. How did they get the tires? How did they get all of these 

things to allow them to cause this demonstration that is now turning violent? Is there really a middle class that is bringing out this 

sense of frustration through these factions that we see causing the 

crisis we have in Thailand? 

Mr. JACKSON. First of all, there certainly is a Bangkok middle 

class. There is also an urban middle class up in Chiang Mai. It is 

one of the great products of the kind of economic development that 

we have seen in the last 50 years in Thailand. 

However, the middle class and its involvement in politics is 

somewhat episodic. In 1973, it very much sided with the students. 

By 1976, it didn’t support the very nascent democracy because the 

democracy and in the perceptions of the middle class had gone off 

the track. If you look across Thai history, you see the middle class 

coming in and coming out. 

In the latest series of conflicts, I don’t know that anyone ever did 

any real polling, or at least I am not aware of any, my colleagues 

may be, but if anything, civil society forces and the Bangkok middle class probably had their hearts, not with Thaksin but with the 

Yellow Shirts because they saw Thaksin absorbing all of the enterprises around Bangkok. He was becoming so overly powerful that 

he was almost strangling future opportunities for them. 

So I don’t think anyone knows exactly how the middle class of 

Bangkok splits at any given time, but it was at least my impression that, if anything, they tended to be on the side of anti-Thaksin 

forces. 

One footnote. In 2005, there was an election in Thailand. It was 

at the end of a regular term of Parliament, Thaksin’s first term. 

At the end of that term of Parliament, there was this election, and 

it was the highest turnout in the history of Thailand. And the Thai 

Rak Thai Party of Thaksin took 61 percent of the vote nationally. 

TRT took 56 percent of the vote in Bangkok. So my colleague, Professor Dalpino’s caution that this is always complex and it is always moving is well taken. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Professor Dalpino? 

Ms. DALPINO. Thailand has always had a middle class, but it has 

grown exponentially in the last several decades. In fact, in 1957, 

the public uprising in the middle class forced a very prominent political figure to be thrown out of the country. That has always been 

there. 

I would actually dissent a little bit from the idea that the middle 

classes were inherently against Thaksin. They actually were for 

him in the beginning. The Bangkok middle class, too. He represented something different to them than Thaksin represented to 

the rural areas. He represented globalization. He was the head of 

a very well known international telecommunications firm. He represented national pride. Thai Rak Thai means Thais loving Thais. 

He specifically targeted Thailand’s loss of face during the 1997 financial crisis and promised that Thailand would pay back the IMF 

bailout funds early, and he represented a kind of sophistication 

that went down very well with the younger generations. 

62

Usually when a prime minister is inaugurated, he goes to the 

temple and prays for guidance. When Thaksin was inaugurated, he 

put his wife into the family Porsche and went to Starbucks. That 

to the Bangkok middle classes was cool. It is just that they had 

more of a frontrow seat for some of his governance style after that, 

and they became disillusioned with him in many ways, and the 

rural areas, for one reason or another, were less quick to become 

disillusioned with him while he was in power. 

Mr. CRONIN. I think Catharin has put it very well. It is a very 

complex situation, and I tend by nature to look for structure or 

more general explanations for things. I think one of them is that 

Thaksin was a modern man, and Thaksin was going against——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Was he a maverick? 

Mr. CRONIN. Maverick, yes. Also, in terms of his globalization 

orientation, his business interests, the way he did things, he was 

a CEO with all of the good and bad of that kind of a personality. 

And he was going against a political order which, as I said at the 

beginning in my statement, wasn’t changing as fast as the economic situation was changing. So that is one important element. 

The other is this issue to talk about not oversimplifying things, 

a lot of the Red Shirts came to Bangkok with pickup trucks, and 

they had all of the appliances and here you are talking almost 

more of a rising expectations issue than abject poverty. So those 

rising expectations came from people who want to become part of 

the political process, and if they find themselves regarded as bumpkins and somebody to somehow be kept out of the center of power, 

that creates some real problems. And there was a kind of heady 

sense of power and empowerment that Thaksin generated and that 

these Red Shirts brought them with them to Bangkok for the demonstrations. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I know I have taken so much of your time 

already this afternoon, and I want to thank all of you for the excellent testimony you have provided the subcommittee. We may be 

holding another subcommittee hearing on the issue, but I understand that my good friend, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Asia Pacific, Senator Webb, has just 

returned from Thailand, and hopefully, we can be of help to the 

good people of Thailand in resolving this crisis that they are faced 

with right now. 

All of your statements will be made part of the record, and if you 

have any additional materials to be added, they will be made part 

of the record as well. 

I sincerely thank you for coming this afternoon. I learned a lot. 

I certainly got an education myself. I have visited Thailand a couple of times, and it is a very, very beautiful country with a rich culture. And something that I always sense that we have to be mindful of ourselves, that sometimes our tendency to tell other people 

how they should conduct themselves by way of using our form of 

democracy as the end all and be all for other countries to follow, 

I don’t think that is a very good way of helping the good people of 

Thailand. 

I do want to keep in touch with you. We may have perhaps a reunion when we find out what is going to happen in the next 5 or 

6 months. 

63

As you mentioned, Ms. Dalpino, the timing of the election is 

going to be so critical, and exactly how the negotiations, how it is 

going to come about and whether or not the people of Thailand are 

going to accept whatever the government is going to be able to negotiate with the leaders and the members of the Red Shirts and the 

Yellow Shirts. And our friend, former Prime Minister Thaksin, in 

my own humble opinion, will have a critical role to play. I hope he 

does it in a positive and constructive way for the sake of the people 

of Thailand. 

Thank you so much. The hearing is hereby adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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