[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-12862

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JUAN LLAURO, 

CARLOS LLAURO, 

JORGE LLAURO, 

MARIA MARTINEZ, 

Individually, 

SAMUEL ABAD, 

JOEL BRITO, 

SANDRA LLAURO, 

IRENE TOVAR, 

ESTATE OF NIDIA LLAURO, 

CAPRI CONSTRUCTION CORP.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 1 of 14
2 Opinion of the Court 20-12862

DETECTIVE MICHAEL LINVILLE, 

Individually, 

DETECTIVE JOEL VALDES, 

Individually, 

BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, 

BRIDGEFIELD EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 

GREGORY TONY,

in his official capacity as 

Sheriff of Broward County Sheriff’s Office, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-20638-DPG

____________________

Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Juan Llauro, Carlos Llauro, Jorge Llauro, Maria Martinez, 

Samuel Abad, Joel Brito, Sandra Llauro, Irene Tovar, Estate of 

Nidia Llauro, and Capri Construction Corporation (Capri) (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their First 

Amended Complaint (FAC) with prejudice and subsequent denial 

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 2 of 14
20-12862 Opinion of the Court 3

to reopen their case and grant leave to file a second amended complaint. In denying Plaintiffs’ post-dismissal motions to reopen their 

case and for leave to file a second amended complaint, the district 

court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiffs filed the 

motions after their Notice of Appeal. Plaintiffs also argue that the 

affidavits attached to their complaint were not a “written instrument” for the purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) and 

that the district court improperly accepted facts from those affidavits as true despite Plaintiffs alleging that the affidavits were false. 

After careful review, we affirm. 

I.

On February 19, 2019, Plaintiffs initiated their civil action 

against Detectives Michael Linville and Joel Valdes, the Broward 

County Sheriff’s Office (BSO),1 and Bridgefield Employers Insurance Company (collectively, Defendants) and filed their FAC on 

April 17, 2019. In the FAC, the individual plaintiffs alleged 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Detectives Linville and Valdes for violating their Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest, search, 

and seizure warrants that lack probable cause. Also, the individual 

plaintiffs alleged state law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment against Detectives Linville and Valdes, and vicarious liability 

1 The FAC named Gregory Tony, Broward County’s Sheriff, as a defendant in 

his official capacity. Because Plaintiffs sued Sheriff Tony in his official capacity, 

Plaintiffs sued Broward County Sheriff’s Office. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 165–66 (1986). Thus, we will use BSO when referring to any allegations against Sheriff Tony. 

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 3 of 14
4 Opinion of the Court 20-12862

claims against BSO. The crux of Plaintiffs’ FAC is that the affidavits 

by Detectives Linville and Valdes, which were used to obtain arrest, search, and seizure warrants, lacked probable cause. Juan 

Llauro, Jorge Llauro, Abad, Martinez, and Brito were arrested and 

charged with various crimes relating to workers’ compensation 

fraud and money laundering.2

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC. Relevant for 

this appeal, Defendants argued that Detectives Linville and Valdes 

are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs cannot show 

that Detectives Linville and Valdes violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth 

Amendment rights or that the Fourth Amendment right was 

clearly established at the time. Notably, Defendants argued that 

the affidavits of Detectives Linville and Valdes demonstrate probable cause and Plaintiffs’ FAC fails to negate that probable cause. 

Defendants further argued that qualified immunity shields Detectives Linville and Valdes from the state law claims. Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’ motion to dismiss and requested leave to amend 

their complaint “to correct any technical deficiencies” that the district court may have found. 

On June 30, 2020, the district court granted with prejudice 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In its order, the district court followed this court’s decision in Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, 

941 F.3d 504 (11th Cir. 2019), that provided guidance on how to 

address when allegations in the complaint conflict with exhibits, 

2 Ultimately, the Miami-Dade State Attorney’s Office dismissed all charges.

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 4 of 14
20-12862 Opinion of the Court 5

such as affidavits. Specifically, the district court noted that if the 

complaint contains conclusory and general allegations that are contradicted by an exhibit, then the exhibit governs. However, if the 

complaint contains specific well-pleaded allegations that are contradicted by conclusory allegations in an exhibit, the allegations in 

the complaint govern. Using the framework from Gill, the district 

court ultimately found that the arrests were objectively reasonable 

based on probable cause from the affidavits and that Detectives 

Linville and Valdes did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 

Thus, the district court found Detectives Linville and Valdes were 

entitled to qualified immunity on the Section 1983 claims.3 The 

district court also denied Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend their 

complaint because Plaintiffs did not provide “a compelling reason 

to allow amendment in the face of dismissal on the merits.”

On July 29, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal in the 

district court. On July 30, 2020, a Notice of Appeal was docketed 

in this court. After receiving additional time to file their opening 

brief in this court, on November 9, 2020, Plaintiffs moved the district court to reopen the original case under Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 59 and 60 and for leave to file a second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Subsequently,

Plaintiffs moved to stay their appeal until the district court ruled on 

3 Because the district court dismissed the federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law 

claims. 

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 5 of 14
6 Opinion of the Court 20-12862

its pending motion. This court granted Plaintiffs’ request and 

stayed this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).

The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motions to reopen the 

case and for leave to file a second amended complaint. Specifically, 

the district court stated that Plaintiffs’ motion under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 15(a) and 59(b) was untimely and found that 

Plaintiffs did not meet the standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Plaintiffs argued that no final judgment was entered 

and thus the time to appeal had not run under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 58. But the district court found that Plaintiffs acknowledged the dismissal order was a final judgment, which ended the 

litigation on the merits, when Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal.

Plaintiffs filed an amended notice of appeal to include the district 

court’s order denying the motions to reopen the case and for leave 

to file a second amended complaint. This appeal followed.

II.

Plaintiffs raise two issues. First, Plaintiffs argue the district 

court erred as a matter of law in denying their post-dismissal motions for leave to file an amended complaint and to reopen their 

case under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), 59(e), and 60(b). 

Second, Plaintiffs argue the district court erred as a matter of law 

in making the affidavits of Detectives Linville and Valdes a part of 

the FAC and in permitting Defendants to use them to defeat Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations in their FAC. We will address each 

issue in turn. 

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 6 of 14
20-12862 Opinion of the Court 7

A.

“We generally review the denial of a motion to amend a 

complaint for an abuse of discretion, but we review questions of 

law de novo.” Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 

F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). We review questions of jurisdiction de novo. Williams v. Chatman, 510 

F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in finding their 

motion to reopen the case and motion for leave to file a second 

amended complaint untimely because the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. To support their argument that their motions were timely, Plaintiffs rely on the separate document requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Under Rule 58(a), 

“every judgment . . . must be set out in a separate document” with 

certain exceptions. Rule 58(c) also provides that if the clerk does 

not enter a separate judgment, final judgment is deemed entered if 

“150 days have run from the entry in the civil docket.” Plaintiffs 

assert that Rule 58(c) governs because the district court did not enter a separate judgment, and the final judgment date is not until 

150 days from the entry of the district court’s dismissal order—November 27, 2020. Plaintiffs then argue that they timely filed their 

motion because they filed their motion on November 9, 2020, 

which was before November 27, 2020.

First, we must determine what is the date of final judgment. 

Plaintiffs argue that under Rule 58 the date of final judgment is

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 7 of 14
8 Opinion of the Court 20-12862

November 27, 2020, 150 days after the district court’s order dismissing the case with prejudice.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Rule 58 is misplaced.4 Plaintiffs completely overlook their own Notice of Appeal filed in the district 

court on July 29, 2020. By filing their Notice of Appeal, Plaintiffs 

construed the dismissal as an order that “end[ed] the litigation on 

the merits” and thus was immediately appealable. See Plaintiff A 

v. Schair, 744 F.3d 1247, 1252 (11th Cir. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 

2107(a). And as Defendants correctly point out, in Bankers Trust 

Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978) (per curiam), the Supreme Court 

held that under certain circumstances a party can waive the separate document requirement under Rule 58. 

Mallis involved appellate jurisdiction invoked under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, which provides the “courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of 

the United States.” As the Supreme Court noted, Mallis posed the 

issue of “whether a decision of a district court can be a ‘final decision’ for purposes of § 1291 if not set forth on a document separate 

from the opinion.” 435 U.S. at 383. The Supreme Court then concluded that the separate-document requirement of Rule 58 was not 

meant to “be such a categorical imperative that the parties are not 

4 The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure take into consideration the separate document requirement under Rule 58 but also notes that “[a] failure to 

set forth a judgment or order on a separate document . . . does not affect the 

validity of an appeal from that judgment or order.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(b).

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 8 of 14
20-12862 Opinion of the Court 9

free to waive it.” Id. at 384. In explaining why Rule 58 included 

the separate-document requirement, the Supreme Court noted 

that it was “intended to avoid the inequities that were inherent 

when a party appealed from a document . . . that appeared to be a

final judgment” only to then have the appellate court find that it 

lacked jurisdiction because an earlier document was the judgment,

and the appeal was untimely. Id. at 385. The Supreme Court determined that when the district court’s order is a final decision in 

the case, the losing party then appeals that decision, and the other 

party does not “object to the taking of the appeal in the absence of 

a separate judgment,” the parties are “deemed to have waived the 

separate-judgment requirement” under Rule 58 and giving the appellate court jurisdiction under § 1291. Id. at 387–88.

Like in Mallis, the doctrine of waiver is applicable here.5 

Plaintiffs chose to appeal the June 30th dismissal order to this court

and filed two requests for extensions of time to file their initial brief. 

Plaintiffs treated the June 30th dismissal order as a final appealable 

order and only when the 150 days deadline came close to expiring 

did Plaintiffs then return to the district court in an attempt to get 

another bite at the district court apple rather than assert its 

5 Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of waiver from Mallis does not apply because Rule 58 was amended in 2002, after the Supreme Court decided Mallis

and added the time frame of 150 days. However, the 2002 Amendments did 

not change Rule 58 to the point that any case law interpreting it no longer 

applicable, but rather sought to provide clear guidance on when the time to 

appeal ended and as not to cut-off a party’s time to appeal. 

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 9 of 14
10 Opinion of the Court 20-12862

arguments in this court. Thus, we use June 30th as the date of final 

judgment. 

Having resolved what the final judgment date is, we will determine if the district court erred in denying the Plaintiffs’ motions

for leave to file a second amended complaint and to reopen the 

case. 

First, we turn to Plaintiffs’ argument concerning their motion for leave to file a second amended complaint under Rule 15(a). 

“Rule 15(a), by its plain language, governs amendment of pleadings 

before judgment is entered” and “has no application afterjudgment 

is entered.” Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic, Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 

(11th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs filed their Rule 15(a) motion on November 9, 2020, over 132 days after the June 30th final judgment. Thus, 

the district court properly determined that Plaintiffs’ motion was 

untimely because Plaintiffs filed their motion after final judgment. 

Next, we turn to whether the district court correctly denied 

Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen the case under Rule 59(e). “A motion 

to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days 

after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Plaintiffs 

filed their motion to reopen their case over 132 days after the June 

30th final judgment. Because the motion was filed well past the 28-

day deadline identified in Rule 59, the district court correctly found 

that Plaintiffs’ motion was untimely. 

Last, we turn to whether the district court correctly denied 

Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen the case under Rule 60(b). Because 

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 10 of 14
20-12862 Opinion of the Court 11

Plaintiffs did not specify which subsection under Rule 60(b) supported their request, the district court construed Plaintiffs’ motion 

to fall under the catch-all provision which provides for “any other 

reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). In their brief, 

Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in requiring them to show 

exceptional circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6), because the district 

court should have used the Rule 15(a) standard. As discussed 

above, Plaintiffs filed their motion after the final judgment date, so 

Rule 15(a) does not apply to this motion. Thus, the district court 

used the correct standard under Rule 60(b) and properly found that 

Plaintiffs failed to show exceptional circumstances of hardship.6 

Thus, the district court did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend under Rule 15(a) as untimely; Plaintiffs’ 

motion to reopen the case under Rule 59(e) as untimely; and Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen under Rule 60(b) because Plaintiffs did not 

show exceptional circumstances. 

B. 

Plaintiffs argue for the first time on appeal that an affidavit 

is not a written instrument under Rule 10(c). Although Plaintiffs 

assert that they argued to the district court that it could not incorporate the contents of the affidavits into the FAC, Plaintiffs noted 

6 Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) “is an extraordinary remedy which may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances” such as extreme 

and unexpected hardships. Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 

(11th Cir. 1984). 

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 11 of 14
12 Opinion of the Court 20-12862

that they did not present the argument of whether affidavits are 

written instruments under Rule 10(c) to the district court. Because 

Plaintiffs did not raise the argument in the district court, we need 

not consider it on appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 

385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). We have “repeatedly held that 

an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time 

in an appeal will not be considered by this court.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). Although we will sometimes address waived 

arguments if a refusal to consider them would result in a miscarriage of justice, this case is not one of them. 

Plaintiffs further argue that even if an affidavit is a written 

instrument, the district court misapplied this court’s guidance from 

Gill and accepted the affidavits’ statements as true and part of the 

complaint. 

“We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant or 

deny the defense of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing 

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Dalrymple v. 

Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003). However, when an affidavit is attached to the complaint and the complaint alleges that 

affidavit is false, the district court must review the allegations and 

counterpart in the affidavit to determine if the statements in the 

affidavit should be considered. Gill, 941 F.3d at 514. Further, 

“[w]hen a complaint contains specific, well-pleaded allegations that 

either do not appear in the attached exhibit or that contradict conclusory statements in the exhibit, we credit the allegations in the 

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 12 of 14
20-12862 Opinion of the Court 13

complaint.” Id. However, conclusory allegations in the complaint 

about the attached affidavit do not automatically require the court 

to throw out the attached affidavit. Rather, we must “compare 

each relevant allegation in the complaint with its counterpart in the 

arrest affidavit and decide if [it] is specific enough to prevent that 

statement in the affidavit from being considered.” Id. at 515. 

First, the district court looked at the Plaintiffs’ FAC and the 

affidavits and properly disposed of their allegations that were too 

vague and provide no help in determining what statements in the 

affidavit were material misstatements or what information was

omitted. Next, the district court looked at three specific allegations

that related to witnesses and their statements but found that those 

statements were too broad, making it difficult to determine if those 

allegations affected whether the detectives had probable cause. 

Then, the district court had to look at the specific alleged 

misstatements and alleged omissions to determine if removing 

those misstatements and considering those omissions would negate probable cause for a warrant affidavit and constitute a Fourth 

Amendment violation. See Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1287

(11th Cir. 2019). Using Paez, the district court properly reviewed 

the alleged misstatements and omissions and found that those allegations did not negate the probable cause.7

7 Plaintiffs do not argue that the district court incorrectly found the detectives 

were entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, we deem that argument waived 

and do not address whether the district court made a proper qualified 

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 13 of 14
14 Opinion of the Court 20-12862

Thus, the district court did not err in its consideration of the 

attached affidavits under this court’s binding precedent. 

III.

After careful review, we find the district court did not err in 

denying Plaintiffs’ post-dismissal motion to reopen the case and for 

leave to file a second amended complaint. Additionally, we find 

that Plaintiffs waived their argument on whether an affidavit is not 

a written instrument under Rule 10(c). Further, we find that the 

district court properly considered the affidavits that Plaintiffs attached to their complaint.

AFFIRMED. 

immunity determination. See Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1330 (“[A] legal claim 

or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned 

and its merits will not be addressed.”).

USCA11 Case: 20-12862 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 14 of 14