I 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 253 

To increase the evidentiary standard required to convict a person for a 

drug offense, to require screening of law enforcement officers or others 

acting under color of law participating in drug task forces, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 5, 2007 

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To increase the evidentiary standard required to convict a 

person for a drug offense, to require screening of law 

enforcement officers or others acting under color of law 

participating in drug task forces, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No More Tulias: Drug 

5 Law Enforcement Evidentiary Standards Improvement 

6 Act of 2007’’. 

7 SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

8 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) In recent years it has become clear that 

2 programs funded by the Edward Byrne Memorial 

3 Justice Assistance Grant program (referred to in 

4 this Act as the ‘‘Byrne grants program’’) have per5 petuated racial disparities, corruption in law enforce6 ment, and the commission of civil rights abuses 

7 across the country. This is especially the case when 

8 it comes to the program’s funding of hundreds of re9 gional antidrug task forces because the grants for 

10 these antidrug task forces have been dispensed to 

11 State governments with very little Federal oversight 

12 and have been prone to misuse and corruption. 

13 (2) Numerous Government Accountability Of14 fice reports have found that the Department of Jus15 tice has inadequately monitored grants provided 

16 under the Byrne grants program. A 2001 General 

17 Accounting Office report found that one-third of the 

18 grants did not contain required monitoring plans. 

19 Seventy percent of files on such grants did not con20 tain required progress reports. Forty-one percent of 

21 such files did not contain financial reports covering 

22 the full grant period. A 2002 report by the Heritage 

23 Foundation reported that ‘‘there is virtually no evi24 dence’’ that the Byrne grants program has been sucVerDate Aug 31 2005 23:44 Jan 12, 2007 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H253.IH H253

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1 cessful in reducing crime and that the program lacks 

2 ‘‘adequate measures of performance’’. 

3 (3) A 2002 report by the American Civil Lib4 erties Union of Texas identified 17 recent scandals 

5 involving antidrug task forces in Texas that receive 

6 funds under the Byrne grants program. Such scan7 dals include cases of the falsification of government 

8 records, witness tampering, fabricating evidence, 

9 false imprisonment, stealing drugs from evidence 

10 lockers, selling drugs to children, large-scale racial 

11 profiling, sexual harassment, and other abuses of of12 ficial capacity. Recent scandals in other States in13 clude the misuse of millions of dollars in Byrne 

14 grants program money in Kentucky and Massachu15 setts, wrongful convictions based on police perjury in 

16 Missouri, and negotiations with drug offenders to 

17 drop or lower their charges in exchange for money 

18 or vehicles in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Massa19 chusetts, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 

20 (4) The most well-known Byrne-funded task 

21 force scandal occurred in Tulia, Texas, where dozens 

22 of African American residents (totaling over 16 per23 cent of the town’s African American population) 

24 were arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced to decades 

25 in prison, based solely on the uncorroborated testiVerDate Aug 31 2005 23:44 Jan 12, 2007 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H253.IH H253

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1 mony of one undercover officer whose background 

2 included past allegations of misconduct, sexual har3 assment, unpaid debts, and habitual use of a racial 

4 epithet. The undercover officer was allowed to work 

5 alone, and not required to provide audiotapes, video 

6 surveillance, or eyewitnesses to corroborate his alle7 gations. Despite the lack of physical evidence or cor8 roboration, the charges were vigorously prosecuted. 

9 After the first few trials resulted in convictions and 

10 lengthy sentences, many defendants accepted plea 

11 bargains. Suspicions regarding the legitimacy of the 

12 charges eventually arose after two of the accused de13 fendants were able to produce convincing alibi evi14 dence to prove that they were out of State or at 

15 work at the time of the alleged drug purchases. 

16 Texas Governor Rick Perry eventually pardoned the 

17 Tulia defendants (after four years of imprisonment), 

18 but these kinds of scandals continue to plague Byrne 

19 grant program spending. 

20 (5) A case arose in a Federal court in Waco, 

21 Texas concerning the wrongful arrests of 28 African 

22 Americans out of 4,500 other residents of Hearne, 

23 Texas. In November 2000 these individuals were ar24 rested on charges of possession or distribution of 

25 crack cocaine, and they subsequently filed a case 


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1 against the county government. On May 11, 2005, 

2 a magistrate judge found sufficient evidence that a 

3 Byrne-funded anti-drug task force had routinely tar4 geted African Americans to hold the county liable 

5 for the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in 

6 that lawsuit alleged that for the past 15 years, based 

7 on the uncorroborated tales of informants, task force 

8 members annually raided the African American com9 munity in eastern Hearne to arrest the residents 

10 identified by the confidential informants, resulting in 

11 the arrest and prosecution of innocent citizens with12 out cause. On the eve of trial the counties involved 

13 in the Hearne task force scandal settled the case, 

14 agreeing to pay financial damages to the plaintiffs. 

15 (6) Scandals related to the Byrne grants pro16 gram have grown so prolific that the Texas legisla17 ture has passed several reforms in response to them, 

18 including outlawing racial profiling and changing 

19 Texas law to prohibit drug offense convictions based 

20 solely on the word of an undercover informant. The 

21 Criminal Jurisprudence Committee of the Texas 

22 House of Representatives issued a report in 2004 

23 recommending that all of the State’s federally fund24 ed antidrug task forces be abolished because they 

25 are inherently prone to corruption. The Committee 


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1 reported, ‘‘Continuing to sanction task force oper2 ations as stand-alone law enforcement entities—with 

3 widespread authority to operate at will across mul4 tiple jurisdictional lines—should not continue. The 

5 current approach violates practically every sound 

6 principle of police oversight and accountability appli7 cable to narcotics interdiction.’’ The Texas legisla8 ture passed a law that ends the ability of a narcotics 

9 task force to operate as an entity with no clear ac10 countability. The legislation transfers authority for 

11 multicounty drug task forces to the Department of 

12 Public Safety and channels one-quarter of asset for13 feiture proceeds received by the task forces to a spe14 cial fund to support drug abuse prevention pro15 grams, drug treatment, and other programs de16 signed to reduce drug use in the county where the 

17 assets are seized. 

18 (7) Texas’s ‘‘corroboration’’ law was passed 

19 thanks to a coalition of Christian conservatives and 

20 civil rights activists. As one Texas preacher related, 

21 requiring corroboration ‘‘puts a protective hedge 

22 around the ninth commandment, ‘You shall not bear 

23 false witness against your neighbor.’ As long as peo24 ple bear false witness against their neighbors, this 

25 Biblical law will not be outdated.’’ 


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1 (8) During floor debate, conservative Texas leg2 islators pointed out that Mosaic law requires cor3 roboration: ‘‘One witness shall not rise up against a 

4 man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that 

5 he sinneth: at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the 

6 mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be estab7 lished.’’ Deuteronomy 19:15. Jesus concurred with 

8 the corroboration rule: ‘‘If thy brother shall trespass 

9 against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee 

10 and him alone. . . . But if he will not hear thee, then 

11 take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth 

12 of two or three witnesses every word may be estab13 lished.’’ Matthew 18:15–16. 

14 (9) Texas’s ‘‘corroboration’’ law had an imme15 diate positive impact. Once prosecutors needed more 

16 than just the word of one person to convict someone 

17 of a drug offense they began scrutinizing law en18 forcement tactics. This new scrutiny led to the un19 covering of massive corruption and civil rights abuse 

20 by the Dallas police force. In what became known 

21 nationally as the ‘‘Sheetrock’’ scandal, Dallas police 

22 officers and undercover informants were found to 

23 have set up dozens of innocent people, mostly Mexi24 can immigrants, by planting fake drugs on them 

25 consisting of chalk-like material used in Sheetrock 


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1 and other brands of wallboard. The revelations led 

2 to the dismissal of over 40 cases (although some of 

3 those arrested were already deported). In April 

4 2005, a former Dallas narcotics detective was sen5 tenced to five years in prison for his role in the 

6 scheme. Charges against others are pending. 

7 (10) Many regional antidrug task forces receive 

8 up to 75 percent of their funding from the Byrne 

9 grant program. As such, the United States Govern10 ment is accountable for corruption and civil rights 

11 abuses inherent in their operation. 

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con13 gress that— 

14 (1) grants under the Byrne grants program 

15 should be prohibited for States that do not exercise 

16 effective control over antidrug task forces; 

17 (2) at a minimum, no State that fails to pro18 hibit criminal convictions based solely on the testi19 mony of a law enforcement officer or informants 

20 should receive a grant under such program; and 

21 (3) corroborative evidence, such as video or 

22 audio tapes, drugs, and money, should always be re23 quired for such criminal convictions to be sustained. 


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1 SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON RECEIPT OF BYRNE GRANT FUNDS 

2 AND OTHER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LAW 

3 ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE. 

4 (a) LIMITATION.—For any fiscal year, a State shall 

5 not receive any amount that would otherwise be allocated 

6 to that State under section 505(a) of the Omnibus Crime 

7 Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 

8 3755(a)), or any amount from any other law enforcement 

9 assistance program of the Department of Justice, unless 

10 the State— 

11 (1) does not fund any antidrug task forces for 

12 that fiscal year; or 

13 (2) has in effect throughout the State laws that 

14 ensure— 

15 (A) a person is not convicted of a drug of16 fense unless the fact that a drug offense was 

17 committed, and the fact that the person com18 mitted that offense, are each supported by evi19 dence other than the eyewitness testimony of a 

20 law enforcement officer or an individual acting 

21 on behalf of a law enforcement officer; and 

22 (B) a law enforcement officer does not par23 ticipate in an antidrug task force unless the 

24 honesty and integrity of that officer is evalu25 ated and found to be at an appropriately high 

26 level. 


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1 (b) REGULATIONS.—The Attorney General shall pre2 scribe regulations to carry out subsection (a). 

3 (c) REALLOCATION.—Amounts not allocated by rea4 son of subsection (a) shall be reallocated to States not dis5 qualified by failure to comply with such subsection. 

6 SEC. 4. COLLECTION OF DATA. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—A State that receives Federal 

8 funds pursuant to eligibility under section 3(a)(2), with 

9 respect to a fiscal year, shall collect data, for the most 

10 recent year for which funds were allocated to such State, 

11 with respect to the— 

12 (1) racial distribution of charges made during 

13 that year; 

14 (2) nature of the criminal law specified in the 

15 charges made; and 

16 (3) city or law enforcement jurisdiction in 

17 which the charges were made. 

18 (b) REPORT.—As a condition of receiving Federal 

19 funds pursuant to section 3(a)(2), a State shall submit 

20 to Congress the data collected under subsection (a) by not 

21 later than the date that is 180 days prior to the date on 

22 which such funds are awarded for a fiscal year. 

Æ 


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