United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 

Assessment, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives

INFORMATION 

TECHNOLOGY 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, May 10, 2007

Homeland Security 

Information Network 

Needs to Be Better 

Coordinated with Key 

State and Local Initiatives 

Statement of David A. Powner, Director 

Information Technology Management Issues 

GAO-07-822T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 10, 2007

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 

Homeland Security Information Network 

Needs to Be Better Coordinated with Key 

State and Local Initiatives 

Highlights of GAO-07-822T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 

Assessment, Homeland Security

Committee, House of Representatives 

The Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) is responsible for 

coordinating the federal 

government’s homeland security

communications with all levels of 

government, the private sector, and 

the public. In support of its 

mission, the department has 

deployed a Web-based informationsharing application—the Homeland 

Security Information Network 

(HSIN)—and operates at least 11 

homeland security networks. The 

department reported that in fiscal 

years 2005 and 2006, these

investments cost $611.8 million to 

develop, operate, and maintain. 

 

In view of the significance of

information sharing for protecting

homeland security, GAO was asked 

to testify on the department’s 

efforts to coordinate its 

development and use of HSIN with

two key state and local initiatives

under the Regional Information 

Sharing Systems—a nationwide 

information-sharing program 

operated and managed by state and 

local officials.

This testimony is based on a recent 

GAO report that addresses, among 

other things, DHS’s homeland 

security networks and HSIN. In

performing the work for that 

report, GAO analyzed

documentation on HSIN and state 

and local initiatives, compared it 

against the requirements of the 

Homeland Security Act and federal 

guidance and best practices, and 

interviewed DHS officials and state 

and local officials. 

In developing HSIN, its key homeland security information-sharing 

application, DHS did not work effectively with two key Regional Information 

Sharing Systems program initiatives. This program, which is operated and 

managed by state and local officials nationwide, provides services to law 

enforcement, emergency responders, and other public safety officials. 

However, DHS did not coordinate with the program to fully develop joint 

strategies and policies, procedures, and other means to operate across 

agency boundaries, which are key practices for effective coordination and 

collaboration and a means to enhance information sharing and avoid 

duplication of effort. For example, DHS did not engage the program in 

ongoing dialogue to determine how resources could be leveraged to meet 

mutual needs. 

A major factor contributing to this limited coordination was that the 

department rushed to deploy HSIN after the events of September 11, 2001. In 

its haste, it did not develop a comprehensive inventory of key state and local 

information-sharing initiatives, and it did not achieve a full understanding of 

the relevance of the Regional Information Sharing Systems program to 

homeland security information sharing. 

As a result, DHS faces the risk that effective information sharing is not 

occurring and that HSIN may be duplicating state and local capabilities. 

Specifically, both HSIN and one of the Regional Information Sharing Systems 

initiatives target similar user groups, such as emergency management 

agencies, and all have similar features, such as electronic bulletin boards, 

“chat” tools, and document libraries. 

The department has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination 

and collaboration, including developing an integration strategy to allow 

other applications and networks to connect with HSIN, so that organizations 

can continue to use their preferred information-sharing applications and 

networks. In addition, it has agreed to implement recommendations made by 

GAO to take specific steps to (1) improve coordination, including developing 

a comprehensive inventory of state and local initiatives, and (2) ensure that 

similar coordination and duplication issues do not arise with other federal 

homeland security networks, systems, and applications. Until DHS 

completes these efforts, including developing an inventory of key state and 

local initiatives and fully implementing and institutionalizing key practices 

for effective coordination and collaboration, the department will continue to 

be at risk that information is not being effectively shared and that the 

department is duplicating state and local capabilities. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-822T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David Powner 

at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 
Madame Chair and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss challenges 

facing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in coordinating 

efforts on its Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) with

state and local governments and other parties involved in the 

mission of keeping our nation secure. As you know, DHS is 

responsible for coordinating the federal government’s homeland 

security communications with all levels of government—including 

state and local. In support of this mission, the department developed 

HSIN as part of its goal to establish an infrastructure for sharing 

homeland security information.1

 Besides HSIN, an Internet-based 

application, DHS also operates at least 11 other networks in support 

of its homeland security mission. The department reported that in 

fiscal years 2005 and 2006, these investments cost $611.8 million to 

develop, operate, and maintain. 

As agreed, in my remarks today I will discuss the department’s 

efforts to coordinate its development and use of HSIN with key state 

and local information-sharing initiatives. These remarks are based 

on our recent report on homeland security networks and 

applications.

2

 That report focused on two key initiatives under the 

Regional Information Sharing Systems program. This nationwide 

program, operated and managed by state and local officials, 

provides services (including information sharing) to support law 

enforcement and criminal justice agencies. Its information-sharing 

efforts also include emergency responders and public safety 

officials. 

In performing the work for the report, we analyzed descriptive data 

(e.g., type of network, estimated costs) on major networks and 

Internet-based systems identified by DHS as supporting its 

 1

 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directed DHS to establish communications to share

homeland security information with federal agencies, state and local governments, and 

other specified groups. 

2

 GAO, Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support Homeland

Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Information Sharing 

Initiatives, GAO-07-455 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007). 

Page 1 GAO-07-822T
homeland security mission, including information sharing. We also 

reviewed documentation on HSIN and state and local initiatives; 

compared it against the requirements of the Homeland Security Act, 

federal guidance, and related best practices; and interviewed DHS 

officials and state and local officials. This work was performed in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief 

In developing HSIN, DHS did not effectively coordinate with key 

state and local initiatives that are part of the Regional Information 

Sharing Systems program. Specifically, the department did not fully 

develop joint strategies and coordinated policies, procedures, and 

other means to operate across agency boundaries and meet mutual 

needs, which are key practices for effective coordination and 

collaboration and are a means to enhance information sharing and 

avoid duplication of effort. For example, DHS did not engage the 

program in ongoing dialogue to determine how resources could be 

leveraged to meet mutual needs or work through technical issues 

and differences in what each organization considers to be terrorism 

information. 

A major factor contributing to the limited coordination was that 

after September 11, 2001, the department expedited its schedule for 

deploying HSIN. In its haste, it did not develop a comprehensive 

inventory of key state and local information-sharing initiatives. 

Consequently, DHS faces the risk that effective information sharing 

is not occurring. It also faces the risk that the HSIN system may be 

duplicating state and local capabilities. Specifically, both HSIN and 

one of the key initiatives target similar user groups, such as 

emergency management agencies, and all have similar features, 

such as Web portals,3

 electronic bulletin boards, “chat” tools, and 

document libraries. 

 3

 A Web portal is generally a site that offers several resources or services, such as search 

engines, news articles, forums, and other tools.

Page 2 GAO-07-822T
The department has efforts planned and under way to improve 

coordination and collaboration. For example, it is forming an HSIN 

Mission Coordinating Committee and an HSIN Advisory Committee 

to help ensure that HSIN meets the information-sharing needs of 

DHS and other users. However, these activities have either just 

begun or are being planned, with implementation milestones yet to

be defined. In addition to the planned improvements, DHS has 

agreed to implement our recommendations to take steps to ensure 

that HSIN is effectively coordinated with key state and local 

government information-sharing initiatives, which include 

identifying and inventorying such initiatives. We also recommended 

that DHS determine whether there are coordination and duplication 

issues with its other homeland security networks and associated 

systems and applications. Until DHS completes these activities, 

including developing an inventory of key state and local initiatives, 

and fully implementing and institutionalizing key practices and 

guidance for effective coordination and collaboration, it will 

continue to be at risk of not effectively sharing information with 

other key state and local information initiatives and duplicating 

state and local capabilities. 

Background 

DHS is the lead department involved in securing our nation’s 

homeland. Its mission includes, among other things, leading the 

unified national effort to secure the United States, preventing and 

deterring terrorist attacks, and protecting against and responding to 

threats and hazards to the nation. As part of its mission and as 

required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002,4

 the department is 

also responsible for coordinating efforts across all levels of 

government and throughout the nation, including with federal, state, 

tribal, local, and private sector homeland security resources. 

 4

 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002). 

Page 3 GAO-07-822T
As we have previously reported, DHS relies extensively on 

information technology (IT), such as networks and associated 

system applications, to carry out its mission.5

 Specifically, in our 

recent report, we reported that the department identified 11 major 

networks it uses to support its homeland security functions, 

including sharing information with state and local governments.6

Examples of such DHS networks include the Homeland Secure Data 

Network, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Network, and 

the Customs and Border Protection Network. In addition, the 

department has deployed HSIN, a homeland security informationsharing application that operates on the public Internet. As shown in 

table 1, of the 11 networks, 1 is categorized as Top Secret, 1 is 

Secret, 8 are Sensitive but Unclassified, and 1 is unclassified. HSIN 

is considered Sensitive but Unclassified. 

Table 1: DHS Information-Sharing Networks and HSIN Application 

Reported cost per fiscal 

year (dollars in millions) 

Name Categories Users outside DHS 2005 2006 Total

C Local Area Network (C-LAN) Top Secret — (a) (a) —

Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) Secret Other federal, state, 

local 

$46.2 $32.6 $78.8

Coast Guard Data Network Plus (CGDN+) Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal 15.0 15.0 30.0

Critical Infrastructure Warning Information 

Network (CWIN) 

Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal, state 12.1 12.0 24.1

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Network Sensitive but Unclassified — 58.7 63.0 121.7

DHS Core Network (DCN) Sensitive but Unclassified — 13.4 10.3 23.7

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal, state,

local 

11.9 20.5 32.4

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Network 

(ICENet) 

Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal, state,

local 

14.4 19.2 33.6

ONENet Sensitive but Unclassified — 34.6 40.0 74.6

Secret Service Wide Area Network (WAN) Sensitive but Unclassified — 2.8 3.1 5.9

 5

 See, for example, GAO, Information Technology: Major Federal Networks That Support 

Homeland Security Functions, GAO-04-375 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2004) and 

Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Define and Implement Policies and

Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments, GAO-07-424 (Washington, D.C.: April 

27, 2007). 

6 GAO-07-455. 

Page 4 GAO-07-822T
Reported cost per fiscal 

year (dollars in millions) 

Name Categories Users outside DHS 2005 2006 Total

Transportation Security Administration Network 

(TSANet) 

Sensitive but Unclassified Other federal 70.0 105.0 175.0

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

Switched Network 

Unclassified — 6.0 6.0 12.0

Total

a

$285.1 $326.7 $611.8

Source: GAO analysis of agency data. 

a Costs for C-LAN are not included, as the information is not publicly available. 

As the table shows, some of these networks are used solely within 

DHS, while others are also used by other federal agencies, as well as 

state and local governments. In addition, the total cost to develop, 

operate, and maintain these networks and HSIN in fiscal years 2005 

and 2006, as reported by DHS, was $611.8 million. Of this total, the 

networks accounted for the vast majority of the cost: $579.4 million.

DHS Established HSIN to Provide Information-Sharing Capabilities 

DHS considers HSIN to be its primary communication application 

for transmitting sensitive but unclassified information. According to 

DHS, this network is an encrypted, unclassified, Web-based 

communications application that serves as DHS’s primary 

nationwide information-sharing and collaboration tool. It is intended 

to offer both real-time chat and instant messaging capability, as well 

as a document library that contains reports from multiple federal, 

state, and local sources. Available through the application are 

suspicious incident and pre-incident information and analysis of 

terrorist threats, tactics, and weapons. The application is managed 

within DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination. 

HSIN includes over 35 communities of interest, such as emergency 

management, law enforcement, counterterrorism, individual states, 

and private sector communities. Each community of interest has 

Web pages that are tailored for the community and contain general 

and community-specific news articles, links, and contact 

information. The community Web pages also provide access to other 

resources, such as the following: 

● Document library. Users can search the entire document library 

within the communities they have access to.

Page 5 GAO-07-822T
● Discussion threads. HSIN has a discussion thread (or bulletin 

board) feature that allows users to post information that other users 

should know about and post requests for information that other 

users might have. Community administrators can also post and 

track tasks assigned to users during an incident. 

● Chat tool. HSIN’s chat tool, known as Jabber, is similar to other 

instant message and chat tools—with the addition of security. Users 

can customize lists of their coworkers and send messages 

individually or set up chat rooms for more users. Other features 

include chat logs (which allow users to review conversations), 

timestamps, and user profiles. 

State and Local Governments Have Also Established Similar Initiatives 

State and local governments have similar IT initiatives to carry out 

their homeland security missions, including sharing information. A 

key state and local-based initiative is the Regional Information 

Sharing Systems (RISS) program. 

The RISS program helps state and local jurisdictions to, among 

other things, share information in support of their homeland 

security missions. This nationwide program, operated and managed 

by state and local officials, was established in 1974 to address crime 

that operates across jurisdictional lines. The program consists of six 

regional information analysis centers that serve as regional hubs 

across the country. These centers offer services to RISS members in 

their regions, including information sharing and research, analytical 

products, case investigation support, funding, equipment loans, and 

training. Funding for the RISS program is administered through a 

grant from the Department of Justice. 

As part of its information-sharing efforts, the RISS program operates 

two key initiatives (among others): the RISS Secure Intranet 

(RISSNET) and the Automated Trusted Information Exchange7

(RISS ATIX): 

 7

 Formerly called the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange.

Page 6 GAO-07-822T
● Created in 1996, RISSNET is intended as a secure network serving 

member law enforcement agencies throughout the United States 

and other countries. Through this network, RISS offers services 

such as secure e-mail, document libraries, intelligence databases, 

Web pages, bulletin boards, and a chat tool. 

● RISS ATIX offers services similar to those offered by RISSNET to 

agencies beyond the law enforcement community, including 

executives and officials from governmental and nongovernmental 

agencies and organizations that have public safety responsibilities. 

RISS ATIX is partitioned into 39 communities of interest, such as 

critical infrastructure, emergency management, public health, and 

government officials. Members of each community of interest 

contribute information to be made available within each community. 

According to RISS officials, the RISS ATIX application was 

developed in response to the events of September 11, 2001; it was 

initiated in 2002 as an application to provide tools for information 

sharing and collaboration among public safety stakeholders, such as 

first responders and schools. As of July 2006, RISS ATIX supported 

1,922 users beyond the traditional users of RISSNET. 

RISS ATIX uses the technology of RISSNET to offer services 

through its Web pages. The pages are tailored for each community 

of interest and contain community-specific news articles, links, and 

contact information. The pages also provide access to the following

features: 

● Document library. Participants can store and search relevant 

documents within their community of interest. 

● Bulletin board. The RISS ATIX bulletin board allows users to post 

timely threat information in discussion forums and to view and 

respond to posted information. Users can post documents, images, 

and information related to terrorism and homeland security, as well 

as receive DHS information, advisories, and warnings. According to 

RISS officials, the bulletin boards are monitored by a RISS 

moderator to relay any information that might be useful for other 

communities of interest. 

Page 7 GAO-07-822T
● Chat tool. ATIXLive is an online, real-time, collaborative 

communications information-sharing tool for the exchange of 

information by community members. Through this tool, users can 

post timely threat information and view and respond to messages 

posted. 

● Secure e-mail. RISS ATIX participants have access to e-mail that 

can be used to provide alerts and related information. According to 

RISS, this is done in a secure environment. 

GAO Has Designated Information Sharing as High Risk 

The need to improve information sharing as part of a national effort 

to improve homeland security and preparedness has been widely 

recognized, not only to improve our ability to anticipate and respond 

to threats and emergencies, but to avoid unnecessary expenditure of 

scarce resources. In January 2005, 8 and more recently in January 

2007,9

 we identified establishing appropriate and effective 

information-sharing mechanisms to improve homeland security as a 

high-risk area. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 

also issued guidance that stresses the importance of information 

sharing and avoiding duplication of effort.10 Nonetheless, although 

this area has received increased attention, the federal government 

faces formidable challenges in sharing information among 

stakeholders in an appropriate and timely manner. 

As we concluded in October 2005, agencies can help address these 

challenges by adopting and implementing key practices, related to 

OMB’s guidance, to improve collaboration, such as establishing joint 

strategies and addressing needs by leveraging resources and 

developing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to 

operate across agency boundaries.11 Based on our research and 

 8

 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

9

 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007). 

10 For example, Office of Management and Budget, Management of Federal Information 

Resources, Circular A-130 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2000) and Preparation, Submission, 

and Execution of the Budget, Circular A-11 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006). 

11 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005). 

Page 8 GAO-07-822T
experience, these practices are also relevant for collaboration 

between federal agencies and other levels of government (e.g., state, 

local). Until these coordination and collaboration practices are 

implemented, agencies face the risk that effective information 

sharing will not occur. 

Congress and the Administration have made several efforts to 

address the challenges associated with information sharing. In 

particular, as we reported in March 2006, the President initiated an 

effort to establish an Information Sharing Environment that is to 

combine policies, procedures, and networks and other technologies 

that link people, systems, and information among all appropriate 

federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector.12 In 

November 2006, in response to congressional direction, the 

Administration issued a plan for implementing this environment and 

described actions that the federal government intends—in 

coordination with state, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign 

partners—to carry out over the next 3 years. 

Efforts to Coordinate HSIN with Key State and Local InformationSharing Initiatives Have Been Limited 

DHS did not fully adhere to the previously mentioned key practices 

in coordinating its efforts on HSIN with key state and local 

information-sharing initiatives. The department’s limited use of 

these practices is attributable to a number of factors: in particular, 

after the events of September 11, 2001, the department expedited its 

schedule to deploy HSIN capabilities, and in doing so, it did not 

develop an inventory of key state and local information initiatives. 

Until the department fully implements key coordination and 

collaboration practices and guidance, it faces, among other things, 

the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring. DHS has 

efforts planned and under way to improve coordination and 

 12 GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and 

Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information, 

GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

Page 9 GAO-07-822T
collaboration, including implementing the recommendations in our 

recent report.13

Key Practices Were Not Effectively Implemented 

In developing HSIN, DHS did not fully adhere to the practices 

related to OMB’s guidance. First, although DHS officials met with 

RISS program officials to discuss exchanging terrorism-related 

documents, joint strategies for meeting mutual needs by leveraging 

resources have not been fully developed. DHS did not engage the 

RISS program to determine how resources could be leveraged to 

meet mutual needs. According to RISS program officials, they met 

with DHS twice (on September 25, 2003, and January 7, 2004) to 

demonstrate that their RISS ATIX application could be used by DHS 

for sharing homeland security information. However, 

communication from DHS on this topic stopped after these 

meetings, without explanation. According to DHS officials, they did 

not remember the meetings, which they attributed to the departure 

from DHS of the staff who had attended. 

In addition, although DHS initially pursued a limited strategy of 

exchanging selected terrorism-related documents with the RISS 

program, the strategy was impeded by technical issues and by 

differences in what each organization considers to be terrorism 

information. For example, the exchange of documents between 

HSIN and the RISS program stopped on August 1, 2006, because of 

technical problems with HSIN’s upgrade to a new infrastructure. As 

of May 3, 2007, the exchange of terrorism-related documents had 

not yet resumed, according to HSIN’s program manager. This official 

also stated that the program is currently working to fix the issue 

with the goal of having it resolved by June 2007. 

Finally, DHS has yet to fully develop coordination policies, 

procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries 

with the RISS program. DHS has not fully developed such means to 

operate with the RISS program and leverage its available 

technological resources. Although an operating agreement was 

 13 GAO-07-455. 

Page 10 GAO-07-822T
established to govern the exchange of terrorism-related documents, 

according to RISS officials, it did not cover the full range of 

information available through the RISS program. 

DHS’s Expedited Schedule Was Major Cause for Limited Coordination, Increasing the 

Risk of Ineffective Information Sharing and Duplication 

The extent of DHS’s adherence to key practices (and the resulting 

limited coordination) is attributable to DHS’s expedited schedule to 

deploy an information-sharing application that could be used across 

the federal government in the wake of the September 11 attacks; in 

its haste, DHS did not develop a complete inventory of key state and 

local information initiatives. According to DHS officials, they still do

not have a complete inventory of key state and local informationsharing initiatives. DHS’s Office of Inspector General also reported 

that DHS developed HSIN in a rapid and ad hoc manner, and among 

other things, did not adequately identify existing federal, state, and 

local resources, such as RISSNET, that it could have leveraged.14

Further, DHS did not fully understand the RISS program. 

Specifically, DHS officials did not acknowledge the RISS program as 

a state and local based program with which to partner, but instead 

considered it to be one of many vendors providing a tool for 

information sharing. In addition, DHS officials believed that the 

RISS program was solely focused on law enforcement information

and did not capture the broader terrorism-related or other 

information of interest to the department. 

Because of this limited coordination and collaboration, DHS is at 

increased risk that effective information sharing is not occurring. 

The department also faces the risk that it is developing and 

deploying capabilities on HSIN that duplicate those being 

established by state and local agencies. There is evidence that this 

has occurred with respect to the RISS program. Specifically: 

 14 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of Information 

Technology, HSIN Could Support Information Sharing More Effectively, DHS/OIG-06-38

(Washington, D.C.: June 2006).

Page 11 GAO-07-822T
● HSIN and RISS ATIX currently target similar user groups. DHS and 

the RISS program are independently striving to make their 

applications available to user communities involved in the 

prevention of, response to, mitigation of, and recovery from 

terrorism and disasters across the country. For example, HSIN and 

RISS ATIX are being used and marketed for use at state fusion 

centers15 and other state organizations, such as emergency 

management agencies across the country. 

● HSIN and RISS applications have similar approaches for sharing 

information with their users. For example, on each application, 

users from a particular community—such as emergency 

management—have access to a portal or community area tailored to 

the user’s information needs. The community-based portals have 

similar features focused on user communities. Both applications 

provide each community with the following features:16

● Web pages. Tailored for communities of interest (e.g., law 

enforcement, emergency management, critical infrastructure 

sectors), these pages contain general and community-specific 

news articles, links, and contact information.

● Bulletin boards. Participants can post and discuss information. 

● Chat tool. Each community has its own online, real-time, 

interactive collaboration application. 

● Document library. Participants can store and search relevant 

documents. 

 15 A fusion center is defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide

resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability 

to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.” 

16 Beyond the collaboration tools listed, RISSNET also provides access to other law

enforcement resources, such as analytical criminal data-visualization tools and criminal 

intelligence databases. 

Page 12 GAO-07-822T
DHS Has Improvements Planned and Under Way, Including Implementing Our Recent 

Recommendations

According to DHS officials, including the HSIN program manager, 

the department has efforts planned and under way to improve 

coordination. For example, the department is in the process of 

developing an integration strategy that is to include enhancing HSIN 

so that other applications and networks can interact with it. This 

would promote integration by allowing other federal agencies and 

state and local governments to use their preferred applications and 

networks—such as RISSNET and RISS ATIX—while allowing DHS 

to continue to use HSIN. 

Other examples of improvements either begun or planned include 

the following: 

● The formation of an HSIN Mission Coordinating Committee, whose 

roles and responsibilities are to be defined in a management 

directive. It is expected to ensure that all HSIN users are 

coordinated in information-sharing relationships of mutual value. 

● The recent development of engagement, communications, and 

feedback strategies for better coordination and communication with 

HSIN, including, for example, enhancing user awareness of 

applicable HSIN contact points and changes to the system. 

● The reorganization of the HSIN program management office to help 

the department better meet user needs. According to the program 

manager, this reorganization has included the use of integrated 

process teams to better support DHS’s operational mission priorities 

as well as the establishment of a strategic framework and 

implementation plan for meeting the office’s key activities and 

vision. 

● The establishment of a HSIN Advisory Committee to advise the 

department on how the HSIN program can better meet user needs, 

examine DHS’s processes for deploying HSIN to the states, assess 

state resources, and determine how HSIN can coordinate with these 

resources. 

Page 13 GAO-07-822T
In addition to these planned improvements, DHS has agreed to 

implement the recommendations in our recent report. Specifically, 

we recommended that the department ensure that HSIN is 

effectively coordinated with key state and local government 

information-sharing initiatives. We also recommended that this 

include (1) identifying and inventorying such initiatives to determine 

whether there are opportunities to improve information sharing and 

avoid duplication, (2) adopting and institutionalizing key practices 

related to OMB’s guidance on enhancing and sustaining agency 

coordination and collaboration, and (3) ensuring that the 

department’s coordination efforts are consistent with the 

Administration’s recently issued Information Sharing Environment 

plan.17 In response to these recommendations, DHS described 

actions it was taking to implement them. (The full recommendations 

and DHS’s written response to them are in the report.) 

In closing, DHS has not effectively coordinated its primary 

information-sharing system with two key state and local initiatives. 

Largely because of the department’s hasty approach to delivering 

needed information-sharing capabilities, it did not follow key 

coordination and collaboration practices and guidance or invest the 

time to inventory and fully understand how it could leverage state 

and local approaches. Consequently, the department faces the risk 

that effective information sharing is not occurring and that its HSIN 

application may be duplicating existing state and local capabilities. 

This also raises the issue of whether similar coordination and 

duplication issues exist with the other federal homeland security 

networks and associated systems and applications under the 

department’s purview. 

DHS recognizes these risks and has improvements planned and 

under way to address them, including stated plans to implement our 

recommendations. These are positive steps and should help address 

 17 As mentioned earlier, this plan is aimed at establishing, in 3 years, the networks and

other technologies that link people, systems, and information among all appropriate federal 

state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector. 

Page 14 GAO-07-822T
shortfalls in the department’s coordination practices on HSIN. 

However, these actions have either just begun or are planned, with 

milestones for implementation yet to be defined. Until all the key 

coordination and collaboration practices are fully implemented and 

institutionalized, DHS will continue to be at risk that the 

effectiveness of its information sharing is not where it needs to be to 

adequately protect the homeland and that its efforts are 

unnecessarily duplicating state and local initiatives. 

Madame Chair, this concludes my testimony today. I would be 

happy to answer any questions you or other members of the 

subcommittee may have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgements 

If you have any questions concerning this testimony, please contact 

David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management 

Issues, at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. Other individuals 

who made key contributions include Gary Mountjoy, Assistant 

Director; Barbara Collier; Joseph Cruz; Matthew Grote; and Lori 

Martinez.

(310845) Page 15 GAO-07-822T
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