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HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC

RISK IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 13, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

Serial No. 110–13

(

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

JULIA CARSON, Indiana 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

MELISSA L. BEAN, Illinois 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin, 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

TIM MAHONEY, Florida 

CHARLES WILSON, Ohio 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana 

DEBORAH PRYCE, Ohio 

MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RON PAUL, Texas 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

RICK RENZI, Arizona 

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

TOM PRICE, Georgia 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

ADAM PUTNAM, Florida 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

PETER J. ROSKAM, Illinois 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan

JEANNE M. ROSLANOWICK, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

March 13, 2007 ................................................................................................. 1

Appendix: 

March 13, 2007 ................................................................................................. 49

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 2007

Brody, Kenneth D., Co-Founder and Principal, Taconic Capital Advisors, LLC, 

and Chairman, Investment Committee, University of Maryland .................... 9

Brown, Stephen J., David S. Loeb Professor of Finance, Stern School of 

Business, New York University .......................................................................... 18

Chanos, James, Founder and President, Kynikos Associates, LP, on behalf 

of The Coalition of Private Investment Companies .......................................... 10

Corrigan, E. Gerald, Managing Director, Goldman Sachs & Company; Former 

President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ....................................... 7

Golden, Andrew K., President, Princeton University Investment Company ...... 16

Hall, George, Founder and CEO, Clinton Group, on behalf of The Managed 

Funds Association ................................................................................................ 13

Matthews, Jeffrey L., General Partner, Ram Partners, LP ................................. 14

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Bachus, Hon. Spencer ...................................................................................... 50

Castle, Hon. Michael N. ................................................................................... 52

Waters, Hon. Maxine ........................................................................................ 54

Brody, Kenneth D. ............................................................................................ 57

Brown, Stephen J. ............................................................................................ 71

Chanos, James .................................................................................................. 73

Corrigan, E. Gerald .......................................................................................... 97

Golden, Andrew K. ........................................................................................... 111

Hall, George ...................................................................................................... 119

Matthews, Jeffrey L. ........................................................................................ 135

(1)

HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC 

RISK IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2128, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Barney Frank [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Frank, Maloney, Watt, Moore of Kansas, Capuano, Clay, Lynch, Scott, Green, Cleaver, Sires, Ellison, 

Klein, Murphy, Wexler, Marshall; Bachus, Baker, Pryce, Lucas, 

Gillmor, Manzullo, Jones, Shays, Feeney, Hensarling, Garrett, 

Neugebauer, Davis of Kentucky, Campbell, Bachmann, and 

Roskam. 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Committee on Financial 

Services will come to order. 

This is the first in a series of hearings we will be having on 

hedge funds and systemic risks in the financial markets. I do want 

to make a point that may encounter some skepticism, but it will 

not be the first time I have encountered skepticism. Sometimes 

congressional committees have hearings because they want to find 

things out, but I acknowledge that is not the normal reason for 

having hearings. Usually, we have hearings to make a point, to embarrass somebody, or to reinforce a position, but there are times 

when there is a genuine acknowledgment on our part that we need 

to know more about things. 

We are now going to have a series of hearings on the linked topics of hedge funds, private equity, and the role of derivatives. Those 

are conceptually separate things; they get merged. One of the 

things I hope we will do as a result of these hearings is to help people to understand that these topics are not all the same thing, and 

we will unbundle conceptually some issues. 

We will have two hearings with people from the private sector. 

The last hearing we are currently scheduled to have will be with 

the members of the Presidential Working Group. We thought it 

made sense, they having made their report, to then have some discussion of that, and then have them come back and respond to the 

conversation. We will at that point, too, be talking to some of the 

regulators, particularly in the bank area, who are given certain responsibilities under the approach of the President’s Working 

Group. 

I just have some preliminary comments to make here. First, I believe there is strong support on the committee—it may not be 

2

unanimous and people can obviously speak for themselves—for the 

efforts the SEC has recently made in the area of investor protection. Among things we want to sort out is the question of investor 

protection versus the question of systemic risk. This hearing is 

called, ‘‘Hedge Funds and Systemic Risks,’’ not because we are assuming that there is a systemic risk, but because that is the question we intend to look at. This series of hearings is not going to 

be primarily about investor protection. The SEC has moved in that 

direction, I think, with some appropriateness. 

There is one sub-set of the investor protection issue, though, that 

we do plan to look at and that is the interaction between pension 

funds and the hedge funds. That one is not entirely within our jurisdiction, in fact, that became an issue last year when the pension 

bill was being voted on and that bill, of course, did not come to our 

committee at all, I believe, certainly not in any major way. There 

is interest in that in the Education and Labor Committee, which 

has jurisdiction over ERISA, and the Ways and Means Committee. 

Now, I will confess, and I have asked people to be looking into 

this, one of the concerns I have is the extent to which public pension funds get involved in hedge funds. It was not clear to any of 

us who exactly had jurisdiction over public pension funds. That 

may become an issue now because you have some of the States concerned about their GASB requirements regarding the accounting 

but there is some concern about public pension funds and hedge 

funds. Once you have that concern, of course even if you had it, it 

is not clear if you are going to put any protections in there, restrictions, on whom do they go? Do they go on the fund which receives 

the investment? Do they go on their investor? These are all questions that we will be examining. 

I will say from the systemic risk standpoint, it does seem to me 

that the form in which investments are made is less important by 

far than the type of investments. In particular, I think it is time 

for us to look into the question of derivatives. 

Now, I said that sometimes Members of Congress have hearings 

to try to find things out and not because there is a strong position. 

I am very proud of the level of the discussion that goes on in this 

committee. In fact, I think if people had been at the mark-up we 

recently had on the question of how to respond to the hurricane, 

they would have been very impressed with the degree of knowledge. I am not prepared to argue that if we got into a serious discussion of derivatives, that we would dazzle anybody with the 

depth of our knowledge and understanding. I have previously expressed the view, particularly with regard to accounting for derivatives when that has become an issue from time to time with Fannie 

Mae or elsewhere, that the current state of that appeared to me to 

be somewhere between alchemy and astrology. I undoubtedly do a 

lot of people an injustice when I say that, and I am prepared to 

be further educated. 

I just want to stress again that these are hearings that we are 

going to have because there is a new development in the American 

financial world to some extent, in the hedge funds, and there is 

also private equity. I should have added, I ask for just 30 more seconds. With regard to private equity, the concern here is not so 

much systemic risk as what the social implications are. In fact, our 

3

colleague from Florida, Mr. Feeney, commented the other day when 

we were having the executive compensation hearing that he worries about people going private because constituents that he represents could lose the opportunity to make good investments. That 

was an issue that the gentleman from Florida raised in terms of 

the implications of private equity. 

Many of us are also very concerned about the implications for 

private equity on the workers, and on employers. If you have in 

fact an increase in debt and the takeover of companies, what is the 

impact, short term and long term? Those are the questions that we 

want to look at. And, as I said, I personally have no pre-conceptions about this. Indeed, to be honest, in some cases I barely have 

conceptions much less pre-conceptions. It is a very important set of 

questions and it is the job of this committee to help I think both 

ourselves and our colleagues in Congress, and indeed many in the 

country to understand it. 

The gentleman from Alabama is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BACHUS. I thank the chairman. And let me reiterate what 

the chairman said: the purpose of this hearing is informational; the 

purpose of the hearing is not to legislate. I think it speaks well 

that in reading your testimony, it seems that all of the witnesses 

are pretty much in agreement, although I noticed that two of them 

want a greater level of maybe more disclosure and transparency 

and that is even a controversial subject. In executive compensation, 

one of the reasons I believe that executive compensation has grown 

as fast as it has is the SEC requirement that you disclose CEO 

pay. 

Warren Buffett, speaking last night, said that it was not greed 

that was driving executive compensation, it was envy. They see 

what each other makes and that actually that disclosure, which everybody thought was a good thing, may actually be the cause of a 

lot of the growth in executive compensation. 

One reason it is very important for the committee to understand 

the hedge fund industry and other alternative investment vehicles 

like private equity and venture capital is because of the tremendous growth we have seen in hedge funds and these other alternatives. There are over 9,000 hedge funds today. That is an explosive growth. They manage over 400 percent more assets than they 

did in just 1999—$1.4 trillion of assets under management, 60 percent of that is just in the 100 largest hedge funds. 

They also are generating an increased amount of trading volume. 

Some experts have represented that up to 50 percent of the trading 

in our markets in certain circumstances is hedge funds. The strategies employed by hedge funds vary significantly, although most of 

them hedge against down-turns in markets, which I think is good. 

The primary goal of many hedge funds is to reduce volatility and 

risk and simultaneously provide liquidity, preserve capital and deliver positive returns under all market conditions. We found that 

during our hurricanes in the past few years that it was hedge 

funds that actually provided the liquidity for insurance, property 

insurance coverage, a very positive benefit of our hedge funds. 

We all know hedge funds use complex, sophisticated strategies to 

achieve their investment goals. I suppose the first time most Americans heard of hedge funds, and many Members of Congress as 

4

well, was with the implosion of long-term capital management in 

1998. And you will recall that resulted in a bail out orchestrated 

by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department and other 

regulatory bodies, although it was a private bail out. And since 

that time the subject of systemic risks posed by the operation of 

large hedge funds has been a concern of financial regulators and 

members of this committee, and rightly so. 

Systemic risk is not theoretical, and if not properly contained 

and managed, it can threaten the stability and soundness of our financial markets. There is always the potential for a single event, 

such as a massive loss at a large complex financial institution to 

trigger a cascading effect that could impact the broader financial 

markets and ultimately the global economy. 

For this reason, and I think this is the right approach and I 

know that the witnesses have said this, last month’s announcement 

by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets of the 

Principles and Guidelines of Private Pools of Capital is a welcome 

development. The President’s Working Group appropriately focused 

on systemic risks to investor protection. Private pools of capital are 

a sophisticated investment used by sophisticated market participants. I am confident that these market participants, hedge funds 

and others, understand they must engage in constant due diligence 

and ongoing evaluation of market exposure and risks created by 

their relationship with hedge funds. 

I applaud Secretary Paulson, Chairman Cox, and other regulators who developed this guidance, and I am glad to hear the 

chairman also say that he thinks that this is the way to approach 

this, and that relies on market discipline and sound risk management techniques rather than the heavy hand of government regulation to achieve the desired objective. 

This is how I will sum up. The bottom line is that I believe an 

overly prescriptive rules-based approach to regulating these private 

pools of capital could stifle innovation and drive hedge funds and 

their capital offshore. Such an approach would not benefit the competitive standing of our capital markets, something we are very 

concerned about. 

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I would just like to make 

it clear that in regard to hedge funds, I have come to no conclusion. 

My mind is pretty open on this. 

Next, we will hear from the gentlewoman from Ohio for 2 minutes. 

Ms. PRYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing today and for the promise of continued hearings on 

private pools of capital. 

I want to take a moment to thank the panel, also. This is very 

important information for us. These are very complicated issues 

that you can help shed some light on as we start today and continue down this series of hearings. There is really no doubt that 

the hedge funds provide significant economic benefits to the market 

and the Federal Reserve Chairman has cautioned against any 

heavy-handed regulation of the $1 trillion industry. We all know 

that the President’s proactive Working Group recently took steps to 

issue guidelines for hedge fund participants. I agree with the 

5

Working Group that the regulators’ continued role must be to promote market discipline on hedge funds and to ensure that proper 

risk management is being followed. 

I think in this committee it is important that we closely examine 

why hedge funds do fail on occasion and why some failures are different than others. Why was the collapse last September of Amaranth advisors, which lost $6 billion in a matter of weeks, different 

from the failure of long term capital management in 1998 that sent 

shockwaves through the system? Is there systemic risk posed to 

our economic system today? And, if so, what are those risks? Are 

the protections that are in place adequate to provide market actors 

and regulators with the information needed to make informed decisions? Should we be doing more to protect unsophisticated investors? All are important questions that I hope we will begin to answer today and in future hearings. 

Just once again, Mr. Chairman, and our ranking member, Mr. 

Bachus, thank you for holding these hearings, I will look forward 

to all of the testimony, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlewoman again, working off the 

list that the ranking member gave me, the gentleman from Delaware is recognized for 2 minutes. Is he here? Well, the gentleman 

was not recognized. Someone was posing as him. The gentleman 

from Connecticut is recognized for 2 minutes. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing. I also thank my ranking member. I live in a district, 

in the greater New York area—we say that about 60 percent of the 

hedge funds exist and in my district there is a claim that onefourth to one-third of all assets under management are in actually 

the district I represent. I tell people that if you are from Iowa, you 

want to get on the Agriculture Committee, and if you are from 

Fairfield, Connecticut, you want to get on the Financial Services 

Committee. 

I would like to welcome all of our witnesses, but in particular a 

personal friend, Jeff Matthews, and also his wife is here, Nancy. 

Nancy is the chancellor of the diocese of Bridgeport. They are quite 

a force. Jeff is an accomplished hedge fund manager. He is an active member of his community, having served in Fairfield, Connecticut, not the county, on the board of finance and on the board 

of education. I love him for his good nature, his sharp, insightful 

mind, his candor, and his honesty. He is just a very welcome guest 

on this panel. Jeff, thank you for being here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Next, the gentleman 

from New Jersey, Mr. Garrett, is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. Thank you to the witnesses for being with us 

today. For those I have met previously, good to see you again. Also, 

I would like to thank my colleague who is not here, the gentleman, 

Congressman Castle, for his work and focus on this issue in the 

past term as well. Hedge funds, as you all know, are now at $1.2 

trillion, truly a high stakes, high-risk investment. It originally 

started out for, I guess, the super wealthy or the very wealthy and 

have now extended to the pension funds, as the chairman says, 

both public and private. And it is for that reason that it is imporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:18 Jul 11, 2007 Jkt 035405 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\35405.TXT HFIN PsN: TERRIE
6

tant, it impacts more on the middle class, millions of middle class 

Americans as well, that we have this involvement here today. 

I also would like to point out, just as a more personal point of 

view from us coming from New Jersey. My friend from the other 

side of the aisle and I, Albio and I, represent districts that have 

a strong nexus to the financial markets and so just as the gentleman behind us from Connecticut has that connection, I know we 

do as well and take this from both perspectives of our constituents 

here at home and across America as well. And, as the ranking 

member had indicated, I think it is important that we are able to 

have the benefit of the President’s Working Group on this, that 

goes all the way back I guess to 1987, the stock market crash when 

that was created to try to take a look at the financial markets and 

try to gather up all the information that they can. And since that 

time, obviously I don’t think you were talking about hedge funds 

that much back in 1987 but now we have, and they have grown in 

importance. And like the chairman, I am still trying to get my 

mind around all the issues involved, so I very much appreciate the 

testimony at this hearing today. Thank you, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman and now I will ask unanimous consent since 10 minutes has been consumed on the minority 

side to extend the time for opening statements for an additional 3 

minutes. Is there any objection? Hearing none, we will go forward. 

And the final recognition is for the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. 

Baker, for 3 minutes. 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the courtesy. I think 

it important to recognize why we are actually here. Few people 

would trouble themselves if really wealthy people lose or make 

money, and so as long as this phenomena was relegated to a handful of sophisticated Wall Street types, there was no need for the 

Congress to be involved in this discussion. 

However, that has changed. As innovation has caused your reach 

of scope, economically and otherwise, to broaden, we are now concerned about the inadvertent consequence of a systemic-like event 

which causes pensioners, who have no idea their manager has invested in a derivatives currency arbitrage, to lose money as a result of a Russian currency crisis. I think it is not quite clear to me 

what really constitutes a hedge fund. Is that necessarily to the exclusion of private equity or venture capital or does it go more to 

the aggregation of large sums of capital, which are deployed in a 

sophisticated manner, which is not subject to the same rules as a 

public operating company, for which there could be adverse financial systemic consequences. So, one, I think we have to define who 

is it we are trying to constrain, why are we trying to do it, or what 

is it we are trying to find out about them. 

In reading through testimony, it became clear there are certain 

best practices that each of you may have suggested would be appropriate, and I think that is highly desirable as opposed to a governmentally-driven remedy for the industry to come to some conclusion as to how we should define those who are engaging in this 

practice in a professional manner. 

Beyond that, I think the valuation issue that has been referenced 

and how do we know from an investor perspective that there is 

consistency between Fund A and Fund B and the values associated 

7

with your position in that particular exposure, that is not clear to 

me either. 

Finally, the manner in which the disclosure occurs cannot be 

paper-based because by the time you get it on a piece of paper, it 

is out of date. There has to be some net-based disclosure, electronic 

disclosure, of the essentials that are determined by the industry to 

the regulator of importance and not public disclosure and certainly 

nothing proprietary. 

I only make these comments because as the chairman was talking about having reached no resolution thereon, this Congress will 

come to resolution thereon if there is an adverse event that drives 

a number of pensioners into bankruptcy because a hedge fund guy 

was fast and loose with his investment protocol. You will then get 

a ‘‘Sarb-Ox’’ like response, applicable to whatever is defined as the 

hedge fund industry, and you do not want us to do that. I think 

this is a window in which there is great opportunity for the industry to coalesce, to produce a document which is defensible, and give 

the appropriate regulator the insightful information you know he 

should have to help throw the circuit breaker when things go bad. 

Absent that, we are going to get into a policy arena that I think 

will be very difficult for the industry and not helpful to our world 

economy. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and we will now begin 

with the witnesses. And our first, just in the order in which somebody sat them, is Gerald Corrigan, formerly a very distinguished 

leader of the Federal Reserve system and someone who has been 

working closely on this issue. He is now managing director at Goldman Sachs. Mr. Corrigan, please. 

Let me say that without objection, the written statements of all 

of the witnesses will be included in the record. Mr. Corrigan, please 

go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF E. GERALD CORRIGAN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

GOLDMAN SACHS & COMPANY, AND FORMER PRESIDENT OF 

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I, 

and I think all of us, appreciate your calling this hearing and the 

timeliness with which you have done it. My statement, as the others, will be accepted into the record. 

In the interest of time, let me just highlight several of the major 

points that I tried to make in my written statement. The first part 

of the statement essentially tries to quickly trace and highlight the 

evolution of the hedge fund industry since long term capital in 

1998, and I think that is quite straightforward. The only thing I 

would want to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, is that I think it is entirely fair to say, as I do in my statement, that over recent years 

there have been very substantial improvements in business practices in the hedge fund industry in such areas as corporate governance, risk management, disclosures to investors, and operational 

infrastructure improvements. And in many cases, certainly not all, 

but in many cases, I think the capabilities in those areas within 

segments of the hedge fund community now has much in common 

with best practices across the financial system as a whole. 

8

The statement also does a little idle speculation about the future 

evolution of the hedge fund industry, which I will not go into except to say that, at least in my judgment, there is some prospect 

that the forces of competition probably will induce over time some 

further pressures on fees and therefore in my judgment the prospect of some further consolidation in the industry over time. 

I think it is very important for the committee to recognize that 

as the premium on performance intensifies what I will call the orderly attrition of under-performing funds may accelerate and inevitably a few funds will encounter serious financial problems. Such 

developments, as I see them, are a natural and healthy marketdriven phenomenon, which need not have material adverse consequences for the stability of the financial system. 

The second part of my statement traces the relationship between 

hedge funds and large integrated financial intermediaries. The substance of that discussion, while obviously summarized, I think is 

indeed very important to this whole question about systemic risk. 

And what I try to illustrate is that the relationship between large 

financial intermediaries, which are typically major banks and securities firms, all of whom are subject to some form of consolidated 

supervision, it involves two separate but related phenomena, the 

first is the so-called prime brokerage phenomenon and that essentially involves a whole range of services, including providing credit 

by prime brokers to their hedge fund clients. And I do make the 

point that a well-managed framework within which prime brokers 

provide credit to hedge funds that is secured, following the procedures that I have outlined in my statement, is a relatively, I emphasize relatively, low-risk activity. 

The second class of activities that characterize the relationships 

between hedge funds and major financial institutions is the totality 

of what I call their counter-party relationships and those counterparty relationships are very, very complex and involve a whole 

range of activities and risk taking on both the part of the intermediary and the hedge fund. I take that discussion into a little 

sidebar discussion about risk management. And I think the fundamental point that I want to stress in terms of risk management, 

whether it is at a major intermediary or at a hedge fund, is that 

the foundation for effective risk management rests on what I like 

to call a ‘‘culture’’ of sound corporate governance, collective analysis 

and decisionmaking, and above all, sound judgments by experienced business leaders. And it is in this sense, Mr. Chairman, that 

I believe that risk management is much more an art than it is a 

science. And I go on to illustrate in my statement some of the reasons why I think that is true. 

The next part of my statement talks about systemic risk. And I 

think that what I have tried to do here is in a very summary fashion try to help ensure that the committee realistically understands 

what systemic risk is and what it is not. And the characterization 

that I have used for years and years to describe systemic risk of 

a financial nature is to call it a financial shock that brings with 

it the reality or the clear and present danger of inflicting significant damage on the financial system and the real economy. And I 

draw a sharp distinction, as I have for years, between what I call 

9

‘‘financial shocks’’ and ‘‘financial disturbances,’’ the latter of which 

occur with some regularity. 

I stress the point when I began the work of the Counter-Party 

Risk Management Policy Group a year-and-a-half ago, that the 

whole effort was shaped around three threshold conclusions about 

systemic financial risk. The first was that over time the already 

low statistical probabilities of the occurrence of systemic financial 

shocks had declined further but they were still well short of zero. 

The second, and this is the one that worries me, is that while the 

probabilities of shocks are lower, the potential damage that could 

result from such shocks is greater due to the increased speed, complexity, and tighter linkages to characterized a global financial system. 

And then finally, that our collective capacity to anticipate the 

specific timing and triggers of future financial shocks is extremely 

low, if not nil. Indeed, I argue that if we could anticipate these 

things, they would not happen. 

Now in those circumstances— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Corrigan, we need you to get to a conclusion. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. The last thought, Mr. Chairman, that I have put 

emphasis on, strengthening what I call the shock absorbers of the 

system, and I do think that the President’s Working Group exercise 

on hedge funds and private pools of capital is a very constructive 

move in that direction. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Corrigan can be found on page 

97 of the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Our next witness is one who has appeared before us in other capacities when he was the head of the 

Export-Import Bank, over which this committee has jurisdiction, 

and he is now with Taconic Capital Advisors, Mr. Kenneth Brody. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH D. BRODY, CO-FOUNDER AND PRINCIPAL, TACONIC CAPITAL ADVISORS, LLC, AND CHAIRMAN, 

INVESTMENT COMMITTEE, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 

Mr. BRODY. I thank Chairman Frank and Ranking Member 

Bachus for the opportunity to testify. In my former life as a public 

servant, under the jurisdiction of this committee and Chairman 

Frank, I have learned to be brief, to the point, and succinct, so let’s 

go. I wish to address two issues, systemic risk and investor protection. The President’s Working Group and virtually all knowledgeable professionals agree that systemic risk is best controlled by regulators overseeing the providers of credit. These providers of credit 

are primarily the large financial institutions, commercial banks 

and investment banks. 

Turning to investor protection, I believe it is another story. I am 

going to take a very unusual view for an industry participant. I believe that mandatory registration is good policy. It provides for better investor protection, and I think it should come about because 

the nature of the investors have changed. It is not just wealthy individuals but it is institutions of all stripes, including pension 

funds, who are getting more and more into investing in hedge 

funds. And with pension funds, the ultimate beneficiaries are regular working people. 

10

What registration primarily provides is a self-discipline and a 

self-policing because that comes with the threat of SEC examination. In my testimony, I have included many of the elements of 

such protections that are provided by registration with the SEC. 

Having said that, a better way to do registration is to introduce a 

principles approach instead of a ‘‘tick the box’’ regime. A principle 

approach will provide better investor protection and with greater 

efficiency. 

We are registered and a substantial number of hedge fund managers are registered. We think it is good policy for all. I thank you 

again for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome the opportunity 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brody can be found on page 57 

of the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brody, for your testimony and your example of how to testify. 

[Laughter] 

The CHAIRMAN. Next, we have James Chanos, who is chairman 

of the Coalition of Private Investment Companies. And, Mr. 

Chanos, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES CHANOS, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, 

KYNIKOS ASSOCIATES, LP, ON BEHALF OF THE COALITION 

OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT COMPANIES 

Mr. CHANOS. Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and 

members of the committee, my name is Jim Chanos, and I am 

president of Kynikos Associates, an SEC-registered New York private investment management company I founded in 1985. I am appearing today on behalf of the Coalition of Private Investment 

Companies, whose members and associate managers advise more 

than $60 billion in assets. I would like to thank the chairman and 

ranking member for inviting us to participate today. 

The Coalition welcomes the attention of this committee on our industry. Rapid growth in all alternative investment funds, whether 

they call themselves hedge funds, private equity, or venture capital, has brought significant rewards to investors and the financial 

markets. But to paraphrase the great Stan Lee, ‘‘With great growth 

comes great responsibility.’’ This responsibility derives from the industry’s more prominent roles in various parts of the financial markets and perhaps most importantly the trust placed on our managers to properly invest the assets of pension funds and endowments, institutions whose ultimate beneficiaries are not themselves 

wealth individuals. Consequently, hearings such as this present a 

unique opportunity for our industry to explain the way it works, 

dispel some of the myths and misconceptions that surround it, and 

make clear our commitment to work with policymakers in the Congress and in the financial regulatory agencies in order to improve 

those areas where the system of oversight may not be keeping pace 

with the growth of the sector. 

The Coalition would like to suggest a few ideas that may be useful in thinking about the issues associated with private pooled investment vehicles. First, almost all private investment pools, 

whether a hedge fund, a venture capital fund, or private equity 

fund, share many common characteristics in terms of their discloVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:18 Jul 11, 2007 Jkt 035405 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\35405.TXT HFIN PsN: TERRIE
11

sures to their investors and counter-parties without detailed government mandates. Consequently, we would suggest that policymakers, instead of creating distinctions between these types of entities, treat all private pool investment vehicles similarly, regardless of their underlying investment strategies. Even though we may 

all use the term ‘‘hedge fund’’ in the context of today’s hearing, the 

most accurate phrase is not ‘‘hedge fund’’ but ‘‘private investment 

company. 

Second, in terms of investment activity, the buying or selling of 

securities or commodities or derivatives, hedge funds are but one 

type of many market participants engaged in the same activity. 

Again, in order to gain the most complete understanding of the 

subprime mortgage market, to use a recent example, one should 

not focus solely on a single segment of the market but should look 

at all participants engaged in that activity. Looking at mortgage 

securitizations solely through the prism of hedge funds without 

looking at banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and 

other types of dealers and investors will create a distorted picture 

of how and why that market operates as it does. 

This is not to say that hedge funds should not be included at all 

in such a distinction, quite to the contrary, we are an important 

part of the equation. But hedge funds are not nearly so significant 

in and of themselves that they should be the focus of attention to 

the exclusion of other market participants doing the same thing. A 

focus on the activity, not the actor, is more likely to yield the information desired by policymakers in assessing the appropriate level 

of oversight and regulation. 

Third, the phrase, ‘‘lightly regulated,’’ which typically is applied 

to hedge funds and other alternative investment vehicles, is somewhat misleading as it really only applies to governmental regulation of the relationship between the fund and its investors. In this 

area, sophisticated or institutional investors are deemed by the 

government to have the capacity and equal footing to obtain the 

requisite information from fund managers on their own instead of 

relying on standardized government-mandated disclosures. In almost all other aspects of the U.S. financial system, hedge funds are 

subject to the same web of statutory and regulatory requirements 

as all other institutional market participants engaged in the same 

activity. 

And even with the interaction of the fund, the manager and the 

fund investors, despite lack of regulation, does not yield a lack of 

transparency, either to investors or to the counter-parties providing 

credit and other financial support. In the case of my funds, for example, investors or their financial managers generally require us 

to provide answers to detailed questions regarding our background, 

strategies and research, personnel, returns, compliance programs, 

risk profile, and accounting and valuation practices. Prospective investors also review terms such as liquidity restrictions, management performance fees, and any applicable lock-up periods for their 

capital. Depending upon the nature of the investor, a person may 

meet an institution’s portfolio managers or compliance officers. 

Some investors also ask to speak to our lawyers, auditors, and 

prime brokers for references. The process usually also includes any 

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12

atives. The right to on-site visits continues after the investment is 

made as well as continued oral and written communication on a 

regular basis so that the investor can assure himself or herself that 

the representations that we made at the outset are being followed. 

Fourth, much of the secrecy surrounding hedge funds is frequently a consequence of both the proprietary nature of the investment strategies employed and of the mandates of the SEC itself. 

The Commission’s restrictions on general solicitation and public offerings, under which all hedge funds operate, prohibit fund managers from discussing their strategies and performance in any 

venue or in any way that could be construed as a solicitation or investment from the general public. Certainly, it means that fund 

managers must limit the content of or access to their Web site and 

limit public interviews about their funds and investment strategies 

that could be viewed as designed to attract the interest of the general public to invest in the funds. Accordingly, most fund managers 

prefer to err on the side of less public discussion rather than risk 

running afoul of the SEC. 

Fifth, if there are gaps in the system of regulatory oversight, 

then there should be ways to address them consistent with the 

principles and guidelines recently issued by the President’s Working Group. Such deficiencies are best addressed without trying to 

shoe-horn the institutional business and the statutes that were designed primarily for the interaction of investment professionals and 

the general public. In this regard, we have some suggestions for 

consideration that may provide some commonsense approaches to 

answering at least some of these concerns without re-engaging in 

the unproductive debate from 2 years ago surrounding mandatory 

registration requirements. 

Mr. Chairman, do I have another minute to give that suggestion? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. CHANOS. As an example, the SEC in proposing the Hedge 

Fund Advisor Registration Rule hoped to gather census information 

about hedge funds. The SEC could, however, without mandatory 

registration obtain much of the information it seeks by amending 

Form D, a basic document used by issuers of private placement of 

securities to acquire some additional information if the issuer is a 

pooled investment vehicle. The form could include a variety of basic 

information that I set out further in my written testimony. The 

SEC could also require that the form be kept current or updated 

annually. With this kind of information, the Commission, and policymakers generally, would be in a better position to answer the 

question, ‘‘Who is out there?’’ 

With respect to best practices, we believe that most investors already demand practices of their funds that are equal to or exceed 

the requirements of the Investment Advisors Act. Fundamentally, 

we believe the institutional investors operate on a fairly equal footing with hedge funds and by simply taking steps to protect their 

own assets and investments produce the desired effect. However, if 

there is a belief that certain practices are so commonsense, such 

as third-party custodianship of client funds or annual outside audits, that they deserve the added strength of SEC authority behind 

them, we believe the Commission could consider using its antifraud authority under the Advisors Act to require certain measures 

13

to be taken by both registered and unregistered votes in order to 

protect fraud. 

And with that, I will make the rest of my comments in the written testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chanos can be found on page 73 

of the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chanos. We have that and of 

course, there will be questions from the members. 

Next, we have Mr. George Hall, who is testifying on behalf of the 

Managed Fund Association. Mr. Hall? 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE HALL, FOUNDER AND CEO, CLINTON 

GROUP, ON BEHALF OF THE MANAGED FUNDS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify here today. I am here on behalf 

of the Managed Funds Association, the largest U.S.-based association representing the hedge fund industry with more than 1,300 

members in the United States and around the world. In addition 

to being a director of MFA, I am the founder and chief investment 

officer of Clinton Group, an investment advisor for a diverse group 

of institutional and high net worth individual investors. We greatly 

appreciate the interest of this committee in considering public policy issues relevant to our industry and the opportunity to share our 

views with the committee. 

Hedge funds have been closely monitored and reviewed by Congress and Federal regulators in the recent years. This intense review has led to a clear recognition that hedge funds play a critical 

role in the success story of the U.S. capital markets. Hedge funds 

have helped to disburse risks, enhance market liquidity and resilience, and increase overall financial stability. With this vital market role comes important responsibilities. We agree with the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets that the hedge fund 

industry and other market participants, along with financial regulators, have a shared responsibility for maintaining the vitality, 

stability, and integrity of our capital markets. 

I would like to briefly address four points. First, the President’s 

Working Group on Financial Markets. MFA fully supports the recent agreement of the President’s Working Group issued in late 

February. The Working Group addressed both systemic risk and investor protection concerns in its agreement and concluded that, and 

I quote, ‘‘Market discipline most effectively addresses systemic 

risks posed by private pools of capital.’’ The agreement stated that 

a combination of market discipline and regulatory policies that 

limit direct investment in private pools of capital to more sophisticated investors would be the most effective way to address this 

issue. 

MFA not only agrees with the Working Group’s conclusions, but 

has been working with its members to address these issues for a 

number of years. We are committed to working closely with regulators, counter-parties, investors, and our own industry to do our 

part to remain ever vigilant. 

Second, systemic risk. MFA has worked proactively with its 

members to develop very specific risk management and internal 

control guidance set forth in Sound Practices for Hedge Fund ManVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:18 Jul 11, 2007 Jkt 035405 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\35405.TXT HFIN PsN: TERRIE
14

agers first published in 2000. Our sound practice guidance has 

been revised and enhanced to take into account market developments and is currently undergoing its third revision to be issued 

later this year. The President’s Working Group principles will be 

a guiding blueprint for this effort. MFA members have also worked 

extensively with the major derivatives dealer firms and Federal Reserve Bank of New York to improve market practices for credit derivatives and other derivatives in order to reduce systemic risk concerns. 

Third, investor protection. MFA supports increasing the accredited standard. We applaud the SEC for considering this issue and 

for its recent proposed rule. Based on all available data, hedge 

funds remain chiefly an investment vehicle for institutional investors and high net worth individuals. We support a significant increase in the financial thresholds for entry into hedge funds. 

Finally, pension plans. MFA endorses efforts to increase the understanding of hedge funds among pension plan fiduciaries and 

trustees and is committed to helping promote investor financial literacy through the development of due diligence materials. 

In conclusion, hedge funds have proven to be attractive investment vehicles for institutional investors seeking to diversify risk 

and enhance portfolio strength. They also play a key role in our 

capital markets. To assure that these benefits continue, and that 

any associated risks are fully addressed, MFA believes that the 

proactive efforts of its members to enhance market practices are 

vital. MFA pledges to continue these efforts and to work with all 

market participants, financial regulators and Congress. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall can be found on page 119 

of the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Next we have Jeffrey Matthews, previously introduced by the 

gentleman from Connecticut. Mr. Matthews is general partner at 

Ram Partners. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY L. MATTHEWS, GENERAL PARTNER, 

RAM PARTNERS, LP 

Mr. MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 

good morning, and thank you for inviting me to speak. My name 

is Jeff Matthews, and I am general partner of Ram Partners, a 

hedge fund I formed in 1994 after working at another hedge fund 

for 4 years and starting my career at Merrill Lynch in 1979. My 

fund is small relative to the others represented here and rather 

old-fashioned. We buy stocks for the long term, we hedge against 

short term market fluctuations, and we do not do any derivatives. 

Nevertheless, 18 years in the hedge fund world does make me 

something of an old timer, and I do have views on the issues that 

you have raised. 

To understand the growth in hedge funds you might ask, why do 

people start them in the first place? The answer is quite simple: 

Hedge funds are private partnerships whose investors are wealthy 

individuals and large institutions. That private structure and more 

sophisticated investor base gives us flexibility to pursue alternative 

investments, take greater risks, and reap greater rewards than a 

15

more strictly regulated mutual fund. Furthermore, as a private 

partnership, hedge fund managers can charge what their investors 

are willing to pay, including a share of the profits the business generates. 

So a successful multi-billion dollar hedge fund manager can earn 

hundreds of millions of dollars while her mutual fund counterpart 

could not. And that is why people start hedge funds and that is 

why this industry has exploded. In fact, the single biggest change 

I have witnessed since I started is size. In 1994, the biggest hedge 

fund I knew about had $6 billion in assets; $6 billion today would 

not rank in the top 50 hedge funds, and the three largest U.S. 

hedge funds now have over $30 billion each. 

Along with that explosive growth has come diversity. Hedge 

funds no longer focus mainly on stocks, bonds, and currencies but 

have branched into subprime debt, distressed securities, real estate, uranium ore, and even grain silos. In fact, there are hedge 

funds that do nothing but invest in other hedge funds. 

The flood of money has also caused many so-called hedge funds 

to no longer actively hedge against market declines because hedging has been a drag on returns during the bull market. It has been 

like paying a premium for an insurance policy you never needed. 

However, the most significant change I have witnessed in 18 

years in this business is the increased use of leverage, meaning 

borrowed money to start new hedge funds. A $400 million hedge 

fund today, for example, might actually have only $100 million of 

equity. The rest, the other $300 million, might come from a bank 

that sells a preferred class of equity that looks, acts, and smells 

like debt. That structure works fine if the value of the whole thing 

goes up, everyone makes money, and the bank gets paid back. But 

if it goes down, that equity gets wiped out, much like a house 

bought with no money down. 

What type of risks might this pose? Could the graded leverage 

cause another long term capital type catastrophe that brings the 

markets? Well, we had just such a catastrophe last year. Amaranth 

was a $10 billion hedge fund with sophisticated investors, run by 

intelligent people using computerized trading systems, and it collapsed in just 20 days after a huge complex bet on natural gas 

went wrong. 

What does that tell us? Number one, that hedge fund managers 

can do stupid things just like any money manager only in much 

bigger size. 

Number two, even sophisticated investors do not necessarily 

mind this kind of risk taking until it goes wrong and when it does, 

they pull the plug very quickly. Number three, the more exotic the 

investments, the harder it is for any outsider to know what is going 

on inside a hedge fund. After all, if Amaranth’s general partner did 

not realize his business was at risk, how would the Fed or SEC 

have seen what was coming and act to stop it? 

There is, however, a fourth and more positive lesson from Amaranth, which was not foreseen by many observers at the time, it 

is this, a $10 billion fund could evaporate in a matter of months 

and yet aside from a couple of wild weeks in the natural gas pits, 

the system did not blink. Unlike long term capital in 1998, which 

had to be bailed out by the Fed, other hedge funds stepped in, 

16

bought Amaranth’s positions at a deep discount and the firm was 

liquidated. It is true that Amaranth’s investors included public sector pension funds, and they lost a great deal of money, but the people who manage those funds should have known the risks they 

were taking. 

As I said, I run a smaller, old-fashioned fund, we do not do derivatives, and I am not defending my own business model generally 

represented here but these are my real-world observations, nor am 

I acting as a cheerleader for all hedge funds. There will be failures 

again, and they could get ugly. 

However, the presence of so many large hedge funds today, specializing in so many aspects of the world markets, means in my 

view that the systemic risk of broad failure is probably much lower 

than I have ever seen it in the last 18 years. I was there when long 

term capital blew up, I was there when Amaranth blew up, and 

luckily for us Amaranth turned out to be no long term capital. 

Thank you for inviting me to speak. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Matthews can be found on page 

135 of the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Matthews. 

Next, we have Andrew Golden, who is president of the Princeton 

University Investment Company. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW K. GOLDEN, PRESIDENT, PRINCETON 

UNIVERSITY INVESTMENT COMPANY 

Mr. GOLDEN. Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share 

my perspective today as someone who has been an institutional investor in hedge funds for almost 2 decades. For the past 12 years, 

I have been the president of Princeton University Investment Company, the university office that has responsibility for investing 

Princeton’s $14 billion endowment. With a staff of 25, we develop 

asset allocation plans, and select and monitor a roster of 140 external managers. We essentially act as a large fund of funds. 

Princeton’s hedge fund investment approach illustrates that 

taken by a number of sensible investors for whom hedge funds 

need not entail great risk. Indeed, for us hedge funds can be an important tool for reducing risk. Princeton has enjoyed success as an 

investor with annual returns during the past 10 fiscal years of 15.7 

percent versus 8.3 percent for the S&P 500. 

We have enjoyed particular success as an investor in hedge 

funds, but before going any further, let me say that all my comments today are complicated by the fact that hedge funds do not 

represent a distinctive asset class like real estate or venture capital. Rather, hedge funds are a relationship format defined by the 

nature of the contractual arrangement between an investment 

manager and his or her clients. At Princeton, we use the hedge 

fund format to pursue a broad variety of strategies across a spectrum of markets. Roughly 45 percent of the endowment is invested 

via the hedge fund format. One-third of that amount is invested in 

14 funds that pursue traditional, unleveraged, long-only investment strategies. These funds tend to walk and quack like mutual 

funds, albeit ones managed very, very, very well with superior 

track records. 

17

The hedge fund format entails a higher fee schedule than that 

of traditional institutional accounts, yet it better aligns the manager’s interest with their own, creating an environment for superior 

returns net of fees. Notably, Princeton’s hedge fund managers are 

dis-incentivized from taking inappropriate risks as all have a significant share, typically the vast majority of their personal net 

worth, invested side by side with us. 

Approximately 30 percent of the endowment is invested in 16 

hedge funds that do pursue less traditional strategies, including for 

example selling short and investing in bankrupt companies. We 

categorize these managers as independent return managers. They 

seek returns that are equity-like but with correlation to most broad 

market moves. This low correlation means that our independent return program has been particularly effective at reducing the endowment’s total risk. We do not invest with managers pursuing inherently opaque strategies. Our managers do not employ significant leverage, yet our low octane independent return program has 

generated a very strong 16.4 percent 10 year annualized return 

with half the volatility of the stock market. 

While we have some natural advantages of the hedge fund investor, our success largely reflects hard work. We spend at least 400 

person hours in our due diligence process before investing in a 

hedge fund. Post-hire we spend for each manager 70 person hours 

per year monitoring activities. 

The single most important factor behind our success, however, 

has been that we have always been guided by a simple over-arching rule: we will not invest in something we do not understand. 

Princeton requires that our hedge funds provide substantial transparency. No one has ever been forced to invest in any particular 

hedge fund. I do not believe that sophisticated investors who willingly invest in anything without assuring that they have adequate 

information and understanding deserve any sympathy, let alone 

any additional regulatory safeguards. Indeed, I believe that fiduciaries who fail to assure their own understanding of investments 

may deserve to be sued or prosecuted. 

Understanding investment, however, does not guarantee happy 

results. It is a certainty that at least some investors will suffer significant losses in their hedge fund investments. However, for perspective, it should be remembered that when the tech bubble burst, 

U.S. stock investors collectively lost almost $7 trillion. Among the 

losers were sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. The losses 

were suffered through the entire spectrum of relationship formats 

including mutual funds. The $7 trillion losses give interesting context to worries about the hedge fund industry, to which we have 

all been estimating total investor exposure is between $1- and $2 

trillion. 

I suspect that there are some hedge funds using imprudent leverage with likely unpleasant consequences for their investors at some 

point in the future. However, when I think about the important 

systemic risk facing markets today, hedge fund leverage is less of 

a concern than say mortgage or Federal debt levels. The markets 

for institutional client money provides some discipline with regard 

to what a particular hedge fund manager will flourish but then 

18

again not so much to prevent an Amaranth. However, as others 

have noted today, the resolution of Amaranth was quite orderly. 

The Chair asked that I comment on current levels of risks in the 

markets, and actually could I have one more minute to deal with 

that? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. GOLDEN. And I think you cannot refer to risk without referring to price. If prices are high, likely investors are not getting 

compensated for the risk present today but who knows if the resolution of that will be a sharp down draft or more prolonged periods 

of mediocre results? 

I was also asked to comment on market practices since the 

issuance of the CRMPG II report, and I can echo others’ comments 

that market practices have matured with much greater discipline 

in trade documentation. 

Finally, let me give my views on the appropriate role of government with regard to hedge funds, their activities and markets. 

And, basically, the bottom line there is I think the President’s 

Working Group essentially has it right. I would wonder whether or 

not the minimum wealth test should be set even higher than what 

has been anticipated. 

With respect to the regulation of hedge fund activity in the markets, I think the PWG again has it right, to assure fair markets 

and control systemic risks, it makes most sense to focus regulatory 

and private oversight bandwidth on large financial institutions that 

act as counter-parties and lenders. Perhaps we should accept guidance from the bank—and direct our activities to where they keep 

the money. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Golden can be found on page 111 

of the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Our final witness is Stephen J. Brown, who is a David S. Loeb 

professor of finance at the NYU Stern School of Business. 

We have appropriately thanked all the donors here, the Loebs 

and the Sterns. They all have their names in it. 

Please go ahead, Mr. Brown. 

By the way, the business schools practice what they preach. Most 

medical schools and law schools are not named for people. Every 

business school is. They do understand marketing and put it into 

practice. 

[Laughter] 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN J. BROWN, DAVID S. LOEB PROFESSOR OF FINANCE, STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, NEW 

YORK UNIVERSITY 

Mr. BROWN. Absolutely. I agree 100 percent. 

It is a very distinct honor to be invited to testify before this committee, and I really thank Chairman Frank and Ranking Member 

Bachus for this honor. 

The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets tells us 

that private pools of capital bring significant benefits to the financial markets. 

19

What are these benefits? Some would tell us that their only objective is to enrich themselves and their rich clients. 

The industry needs to show that these benefits outweigh any 

problems they might cause. A premise of the PWG is that hedge 

funds do not pose a systemic risk for the financial markets. 

What is a ‘‘hedge fund?’’ The term actually comes from Carol 

Loomis, a Fortune journalist writing in 1966 about the strategy of 

AW Jones who invested in under valued companies financed in 

part by short positions in companies he felt were over valued. In 

this sense, the investment was ‘‘hedged’’ against general market 

movements. 

The term ‘‘hedge fund’’ was a stretch even for AW Jones, as his 

short positions never equalled in size or economic significance of 

his long positions. Subsequent funds adopted the regulatory form 

of AW Jones but not his investment philosophy. Indeed, the term 

‘‘hedge fund’’ belies their considerable risk. 

Sophisticated investors ought to be allowed to do as they please, 

provided they not hurt innocent bystanders. Unfortunately, the industry interprets the general solicitation ban as limiting all kinds 

of public disclosure. Indeed, some view the lack of transparency as 

part of the business model the very reason for their success. 

I argue that it is this lack of information, this lack of transparency, at an industry level, that is of greatest concern. Absent industry-wide disclosure, the only reliable information we have is a 

purely voluntary disclosure to data vendors, such as Lipper TASS. 

According to their numbers, U.S. domiciled funds have grown from close to $20 billion under management in December 1995 to 

$131 billion today, although the growth has leveled off recently. 

I should add that the trillion dollar number that people cite includes both domestic and foreign funds. 

The data show remarkable diversity of styles of management 

under the ‘‘hedge fund’’ banner. The AW Jones long/short strategy 

captures about 30 to 40 percent of the business. 

The style mix has been fairly stable, although there has been a 

dramatic rise in assets managed by funds of funds. These diversified portfolios of hedge funds are attractive to an ever increasing 

institutional clientele, which a decade ago did not exist, but now 

is about 52 percent of the total. 

Event driven funds focusing on private equity, mergers and acquisitions and such, have risen in market share from 19 to 25 percent over the past decade, while the global macro style popularized 

by Soros has actually fallen from 19 to 3 percent. 

There is a concern of the committee about the role of hedge funds 

in the credit derivatives and CDO markets. How big is this issue? 

We do not know since the industry is not required to tell us, but 

based on TASS, fixed income arbitrage, which involves these kinds 

of strategies, is just 4 percent of the business. 

I think the industry should make the case that entering this 

market, their ‘‘rich clients’’ are taking on significant risk, which 

would otherwise fall on the banking system. They are thus reducing systemic risk, not increasing it. 

What about leverage? According to TASS, the fraction of funds 

that use leverage has fallen from 69 percent in 2002 to 57 percent 

today. In addition, there are vast differences in degree of leverage 

20

across funds. Strategies that report the highest degree of leverage 

have quite small market share. 

More information would certainly help. Does this detract from 

due diligence of sophisticated investors? With colleagues, I studied 

the recent controversial and ultimately unsuccessful SEC attempt 

to increase hedge fund disclosure. 

We examined disclosures filed by many hedge funds in February 

2006. Leverage and ownership structures as of the previous December suggest that lenders and hedge fund equity investors were already aware of hedge fund operational risk revealed in these forms. 

However, operational risk does not mediate the naive tendency 

of investors to chase past returns. Investors either lack this information or regard it as immaterial. 

What is the role of government? Perhaps Congress needs to revisit the 1940 Act. The ‘‘sophisticated investor’’ exemption seems 

quaint these days. 

Industry argues that the ban on direct solicitation inhibits disclosure, and perhaps it does. However, Congress can mandate any 

level of selective disclosure necessary for 3C1 or 3C7 exemption. 

There is no need to know proprietary trading information. 

However, by being just a little bit more forthcoming, the industry 

could allay public concern about systemic risk and operational risk. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown can be found on page 71 

of the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I thank all the witnesses. I think 

many of us will be reading in detail particularly what you have 

submitted. 

Let me begin with Mr. Corrigan. Obviously, our job is to think 

about whether or not there is any public policy implications. 

You talked about the need or the desirability of increasing the 

shock absorbers. What would they be and would we have any role 

in trying to do that? That would seem to me to be what we ought 

to be focusing on to the extent that there was something for us to 

do. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Certainly, to answer your last question first, I 

think your oversight role is very important. As to the shock absorber concept that I have used, I have tended to put my favorite 

shock absorbers, if you will, into basically six categories. 

One is corporate governance. I cannot begin to underscore how 

important the details of what corporate governance really means is 

for this purpose. It is a lot more than having a few independent 

directors. The second is risk management and risk monitoring. The 

third is what I call financial infrastructure, and these are some of 

the problems that we encounter with backlogs of derivatives and so 

on and so forth. The fourth is better understanding in managing 

these highly complex products. The fifth is a multiple four legged 

table of enhanced disclosure, and the sixth is what I like to call 

reputational risk management. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go to the one that may potentially involve 

us, number five, the disclosure. Would you change the disclosure 

regime that we now have? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Most of the time when we talk about disclosure, 

we are thinking about public disclosure. One of the issues that I 

21

raised in my statement in terms of suggesting some enhancements 

to the President’s Working Group approach is to better recognize 

that in the context of financial stability issues. 

Disclosure is a four legged table. The first has to do with disclosure of a bilateral confidential nature say between a hedge fund 

and its prime broker. 

The second has to do with disclosures that are made by hedge 

funds or private equity funds to their investors or prospective investors. 

The third has to do, and this is very important, with what I like 

to call voluntary informal exchanges of largely confidential information between hedge funds or private equity funds and regulated 

institutions with the regulatory community. The last is public disclosure. 

I firmly believe, Mr. Chairman, that again, in the context of 

shock absorbers and financial stability, there is more pay dirt in 

those first three legs than there is the last, in part because public 

disclosure is suffering from a very chronic information overload 

problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. I accept that. Is there a role for the government? 

Again, I ask this without any preconception. 

‘‘Public’’ can mean two things. It can mean public in that it is 

to some extent compelled by public agencies, and it can also mean 

that the actual information is made public. 

Is there a role for the government in increasing the flow of information in the first three categories? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Yes, there is. Again, one of the suggestions in my 

statement, Mr. Chairman, was that in the context of the so-called 

systemic risk principles of the President’s Working Group, I suggest in my statement that one thing I would like to see happen 

would be an effort to quickly develop best practices, make them 

public, so that we have benchmarks, including in this area of transparency— 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you recommend that any public agency 

have the responsibility to monitor whether or not the best practices 

were being followed? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. I would expect in this context that the supervisory authorities would indeed do that. I believe, if I take as a 

point of reference the recommendations of our risk management 

policy group, that has happened. 

The CHAIRMAN. That would be the supervising authorities obviously for the depository institutions. Would that also mean by anybody for the hedge funds themselves? I understand on the 

counterparties. 

Would you recommend there be any governmental responsibility 

to monitor whether best practices were being followed by the investment entities themselves? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. I think that it is in the best interest of the hedge 

funds themselves to put themselves in a position in which they voluntarily make their practices public. 

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Every time people tell me something would be good if it was done voluntarily—if everybody did everything voluntarily, I would be out of a job. Maybe that would be 

a good thing. We are in the involuntary part of this. 

22

If people do not do it, should somebody at least be checking to 

see who does and who does not do it voluntarily? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. I think that will happen; yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Bachus. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. Let me ask all the panelists. We have 

talked about the President’s Working Group and they are going to 

come up with some recommendations. 

Would your advice to us be to wait on their final recommendations before we considered any action? 

I will start with Mr. Corrigan. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Yes. I would suggest, and I don’t think that is 

going to take all that long. I think there is enough in the pipeline 

right now that the committee, in my judgment, should continue to 

exercise its oversight function as it is doing today. 

I do not see the need for anything beyond the continued effective 

exercise of that oversight function. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Brody? 

Mr. BRODY. I guess it would depend upon how long it takes. If 

it is done in a sensible and timely way, I think it is absolutely appropriate for the committee to wait. 

If it takes an extensive period of time, then it is probably proper 

to move without it. 

Mr. BACHUS. All right. Mr. Chanos? 

Mr. CHANOS. I would echo Mr. Brody’s comments on that. I think 

if we are looking at a long process, I think it would behoove the 

committee to keep moving at all due speed. I suspect the report 

will be out relatively soon. 

Mr. BACHUS. Is 6 months a reasonable amount of time? 

Mr. CHANOS. If there are no financial hiccups, I would say yes, 

6 months seems reasonable. 

Mr. BACHUS. We probably would not know until after the hiccup, 

I guess. By ‘‘hiccup,’’ you do not mean a failure of a hedge fund. 

You mean? 

Mr. CHANOS. A broader market problem that would include but 

not be exclusive to hedge funds, that would move things quicker. 

Mr. BACHUS. Some of the things that have been advised still 

would not prevent that, would it? 

Mr. CHANOS. Absolutely not. I am a realist as well as an idealist. 

I understand, as one of the members said earlier, that the industry 

will come under greater scrutiny should there be such a hiccup. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Hall? 

Mr. HALL. I would agree with that, that the committee should 

wait for the President’s Working Group. We believe they are on the 

right track. They have identified what we think are the important 

issues, and they have also identified what the potential failures 

could be of aggressive regulation. 

I think, as Mr. Baker pointed out, overreaction based on a hiccup 

is in the long run not going to serve the industry or the economy 

as well either. We need to be very careful and hopefully they will 

move quickly and get it taken care of. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Matthews? 

Mr. MATTHEWS. I agree with my colleagues. 

Mr. BACHUS. To wait? 

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. 

23

Mr. BACHUS. A reasonable amount of time? 

Mr. MATTHEWS. Yes. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Golden? 

Mr. GOLDEN. There is a downside to being on this end of the 

table. It’s all been said before. 

Mr. BROWN. I agree also. 

Mr. BACHUS. Thank you. Mr. Brody, you mentioned registration 

with the SEC. What does that mean? In your mind, what is registration with the SEC? 

Mr. BRODY. It gives oversight by the SEC. Let me just tick off 

some of the things that are required in registration, realizing that 

I would have the SEC go to a principles-based approach. 

Some of the things they do now is they require a chief compliance officer. They require a set of written compliance policies and 

procedures. They require a code of ethics. They require a filing of 

a public information form. They require independent custodian requirements, which leads to a financial audit, and they do on-site 

inspections and examinations, and they require retention of books 

and records. 

There are obviously more things, but those are key elements of 

registration that give protection to the more unsophisticated investors. 

Mr. BACHUS. Some of you mentioned the traditional hedge fund 

and then the ones that are private equity, and then the ones that 

are leveraged that are borrowing a lot of their money from financial institutions. 

One thing that should be happening right now at the Federal Reserve, Mr. Corrigan, you were on it, is that the Federal Reserve 

should be looking at our financial institutions and seeing their investments. In that regard, that is already a regulated part of the 

process, is it not? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. It is. That is correct. 

One of the very constructive things that has happened just in the 

recent past that I might add is consistent with this whole notion 

of principles based oversight is that the Federal Reserve, in cooperation with the SEC, and interestingly with the U.K. FSA, went 

through an exercise, again, in a largely principles-based approach. 

They spent a very substantial amount of time with each of the 

major banks and securities firms that have prime brokerage activities, in an effort to systematically review and understand the nature of those relationships, out of which they will be developing a 

statement of best practices to be used prospectively in order for 

them to be able to better judge how individual institutions perform 

this function. 

This, to me, is a terrific example of adapting the approach to prudential oversight to the real world in which we live, and I think 

it is enormously constructive. I think it provides a framework for 

the future that can be applied in other areas as well. 

Mr. BACHUS. My final question, if I can, Fortress Investment 

Group, which is the first IPO of a hedge fund, at the New York 

Stock Exchange, that is an example of a hedge fund that is being 

basically offered to anyone. 

Should there be maybe a different rule for that, or would you depend on the New York Stock Exchange? 

24

Mr. CORRIGAN. Others, I am sure, will want to comment. It is important to keep in mind that in the Fortress case where there is 

an IPO, by definition, as part of the IPO process. Fortress and the 

new public entity is subject to a whole further raft of regulations 

that apply to listed companies in general. 

Not only do they have the regulations that others talked about 

earlier, but in addition, they now are subject to all of those regulatory requirements as well. 

Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Brody? 

Mr. BRODY. There is an important distinction to make between 

a public offering of the fund and the public offering of the management company. In the Fortress case, it was a public offering of the 

management company. That is the entity that is responsible for advising the funds. 

I think, so far in the United States, we have not had significant, 

or even any, public offerings of hedge funds. In Europe, there have 

been. 

Mr. BACHUS. This was the management company, not the participating hedge fund. 

Mrs. MALONEY. [presiding] The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Thank you, and I thank all of the witnesses. Coming from New 

York, I certainly appreciate the significant role that hedge funds 

have come to play in our markets and our economy. 

I want to thank the chairman for holding this hearing to review 

the growth in hedge fund activity and whether that growth needs 

additional transparency or constraints. 

Certainly, hedge funds operate in a regulatory scheme that has 

not been adjusted much to reflect their new activity. Many of you 

testified to the tremendous growth in hedge funds, the change in 

leverage, and this may well be out of date. 

The SEC is taking a few small steps to tweak the rules, such as 

raising the threshold for individual investors, but such investors 

are only a very small part of the hedge fund market, so these are 

very minor adjustments. 

I would like to go back to Mr. Brody’s statement and support of 

requiring all hedge funds to register as investment advisors. I 

would like to go down the panel and see if you support this idea, 

yes or no. 

Would you support that, having Mr. Brody’s strong statement in 

support of having them registered as investment advisors? 

Mr. Corrigan, would you support that or not? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. I would not. At this juncture, I would not. 

Mrs. MALONEY. You would not. Why would you not support that? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Because I think that the central thrust of the approach suggested by the President’s Working Group can achieve 

what we really need to achieve. 

Many of the witnesses have suggested this idea that hedge funds 

are unregulated, and it is a bit misguided. There is a lot of regulation. 

I do not see any need at this point to go that distance, and I 

would emphasize, Congresswoman Maloney, that I have debated 

this thing with myself for years. What always stops me from going 

there is the so-called moral hazard problem, the danger that by 

going to that place, we effectively encourage people to believe that 

25

the government will protect these organizations, even in very dire 

circumstances. Philosophically, I am just not ready. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. Mr. Chanos, yes or no? 

Mr. CHANOS. No. I believe that through— 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. Mr. Hall, yes or no? 

Mr. HALL. No. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Matthews, yes or no? 

Mr. MATTHEWS. I think if you take public pension money, you 

should. If you do not, why should you. You are no different than 

a partnership that invests in a shopping mall, and those are not 

regulated. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. Mr. Golden? 

Mr. GOLDEN. No, I would say no. I would note that we do the 

same extensive due diligence on registered advisors as nonregistered’s. It gives no real protection. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Brown? 

Mr. BROWN. I would say no in the current way the registration 

works because my research shows that sophisticated investors already understand what is in those forms. Unsophisticated investors 

either did not know or did not care. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. I would like to ask anyone on the 

panel, starting with Mr. Brody, about the credit derivatives, the 

credit default swaps. They have been criticized as unduly risky and 

have raised issues of systemic risk, which regulators worked to resolve in the 2005 Novation Protocol. 

Maybe these credit default swaps are the canaries in the mine 

of the subprime lending which we are reading about in the Tsunami Daily as it unravels. 

A few months ago, the ABX Index that tracks the credit default 

swaps suggested that the subprime market was headed for a fall 

and now we have seen that is now taking place. 

Do you think the CDS investments can soften the impact on the 

markets of events such as the subprime challenge or crisis that we 

are seeing today, or do they inherently aggravate market swings, 

or are they neutral in their impact? 

Mr. BRODY. Let me first make a comment on derivatives, CDS’ 

and hedge funds. The reality is that these instruments are used 

throughout the investment community. They are used substantially 

by investment banks. They are used substantially by commercial 

banks. In general, these instruments serve the laudable purpose of 

dispersing risk, putting risk in many hands. 

However, that dispersion of risk does not prevent failure. We are 

seeing right now in the subprime market some degree of failure. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Anyone else? 

Mr. HALL. I would be happy to comment. I agree their purpose 

is to disperse risk. I think they are really no more risky than the 

underlying investment. If you can buy the underlying investment, 

the derivative is a more efficient way to take advantage of that. 

It can be used as a hedging instrument and as you pointed out 

with the ABX Index, it can lead to price discovery that might not 

as readily be seen in the underlying prices of illiquid bonds. 

I think they are an important risk mitigator in the system. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Would anyone else like to comment? 

26

Mr. BROWN. The hedge funds are actually taking the risk away 

from the financial system. They are giving it to the high net worth 

individuals who are in the best position of society to afford that 

risk. 

The other thing is that they are such a small part of this business. There is a real problem, I think, in the public perception of 

seeing all the hedge funds as the same, that the danger is that the 

sins of the few will be visited upon the many, and if there is a 

problem in that little section of the market, it may affect public 

perception of the whole market. 

No. The whole purpose is to take risk away from them. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chanos? 

Mr. CHANOS. I would like to make two points on that. The derivative swap market, which has grown dramatically, has not only 

dispersed risk but it has given us new informational content. 

Over and over again, we see the credit default swap market show 

us prices ahead of the rating agencies, pointing out risks that the 

market may not have completely understood. 

I would also point out that hedge funds themselves, through 

their effort of shorting the ABX market, were sending an important 

signal back in the fall that the subprime market was headed for 

problems. 

Again, this was more information, not less, for those who wanted 

to look at it and draw the proper conclusions. 

Thank you. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. Yes, sir? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. One thing I would want to emphasize is that 

there have been several comments earlier about leverage. Most of 

those comments deal with what I think I would consider to be balance sheet leverage, equity to asset ratio’s and things like that. 

Credit default swaps are in the family of what I would consider 

to be fairly complex financial instruments. One of the reasons why 

they are complex is that depending upon market conditions, they 

can have the characteristics of what I like to call ‘‘embedded leverage.’’ Embedded leverage is different than balance sheet leverage 

because it is a measure of how a given instrument, like a credit default swap, can change in value based on a shock. 

When we talk about these complex instruments, we have to recognize the distinction between balance sheet leverage on the one 

hand and so-called embedded leverage on the other. 

Having said that, I want to emphasize credit default swaps have 

been a tremendously constructive innovation for the financial markets generally. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Louisiana. 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hall, I am going to address my sort of series of questions to 

you, since you are representing an association. 

Generally, what happens within a fund, and I am not even going 

to call it a ‘‘hedge,’’ I am just going to say a private investment opportunity company, is of no concern to anyone as long as it is operating in an expected and anticipated way. 

We are dealing with a circumstance where there is an unanticipated loss that brings about consequences that are adverse financially to other parties. That is the focus of what we are about. 

27

If you limit those who participate in that activity, that is one 

way to stem the scope of adverse consequences. It has been mentioned by several that the current definition of sophisticated or 

qualified investors does seem inadequate. 

My observation is that a dollar figure does not necessarily equal 

sophistication, as in a young person who is the beneficiary of a substantial trust. They will be relying upon a third party to make investment decisions on their behalf, whether hedge fund or otherwise. 

The suitability of that person in conducting that financial or fiduciary responsibility is pivotal in this case. That goes to the pension 

fund question and whether the school bus driver ought to be exposed to some derivative transaction with embedded leverage. 

Beyond the question of who gets in, it is the elements that constitute the organizational activity of that fund itself, going to the 

question of leverage defined broadly. 

Someone in a sophisticated regulatory position needs to understand that leverage position so we do not have an LTCM like event, 

and I do not mean that somebody loses money. 

I mean when people showed up in the work out room, everybody 

was surprised by who was at the table, that there is some sense 

of systemic scope of what that hedge fund is engaged in, and that 

gets you to the counterparty risk. 

Although there is a counterparty risk management policy group 

that Chairman Bernanke referenced in recent testimony, and generally speaking, if we are going to constrain the hedge fund activities by limiting their access to capital, which is not true equity, 

then we really begin to sit heavily around the neck of these operations and potentially minimize the systemic risk potential that everyone seems to express concern about. 

Is there anything inconsistent with your view of market function 

about those areas of focus? Who gets in a regulatory responsibility 

to understand leverage, embedded or otherwise, and counterparty 

risk management tools to watch? 

In my judgment, registration does not work. All that does is just 

say you have a label on your door and you can still be a bad actor. 

Mr. HALL. I appreciate your comments and I thank you for addressing the question to me. I am happy to discuss this. 

I think you have isolated two very important points. Effectively, 

what is it that lawmakers have to worry about? You pointed out 

investor protection, who loses the money, and is it okay if it is 

wealthy people or retail investors. 

You make a very good point. An example that I use many times 

is that finance professors probably would not be able to pass the 

net worth test, even though they are qualified to invest in these instruments. 

Mr. BAKER. For some folks, you could move their Bentley and 

they would not be able to find it. 

Mr. HALL. That is true. There are other wealthy people who 

should not be investing. 

I think ultimately the link between sophistication and wealth is 

really not the basis for this, even though many times people say 

that. 

28

The real link is who can afford to lose it. If you have a Bentley, 

you probably also have a Rolls Royce. If you lose the Bentley, you 

are still going to be okay. 

It is not the best system for determining who is sophisticated 

enough, but it is really the best we have to prevent things from 

coming across your desk that you need to worry about. 

The second issue, aside from investor protection, is the systemic 

risk. I firmly believe the President’s Working Group believes is best 

handled at the counterparty level, through the banking system, the 

brokerage system. 

Mr. BAKER. Excuse me for interrupting. Does that not necessitate 

a more standardized methodology of disclosure and a disclosure of 

values to that counterparty for them to be able to make appropriate judgments about risk? 

Mr. HALL. I think that already happens. I think the relationship 

between hedge funds or private investment pools and their prime 

brokers, if they are borrowing money, the prime brokers and the 

counterparties demand an enormous amount of information and 

transparency. 

Mr. BAKER. What I am getting to is that methodology for oversight will vary from practitioner to practitioner. There is not some 

kind of standard boilerplate. If I am at Bank ‘‘X’’ which is generally 

viewed as a good management team, but their practices are a little 

weak in this arena, is there any advisability, not in Congress but 

in a regulatory overview of the consistency of those practices? 

That is what bothers me, not just from hedge fund to hedge fund, 

but from bank to bank. How capable are those folks in asking the 

right questions? 

Mr. HALL. My own experience is it is relatively consistent across 

the sophisticated brokerage firms and banks. The most important 

shock absorber, I think, for the system is capital. The capital 

charge against these types of loans that banks and brokers would 

make is in the regulations, and ultimately they will evaluate 

whether making a loan gets them the appropriate return on capital. 

I think there is a reasonably consistent methodology that has 

been put in place by the capital charges. 

Long term capital comes up a lot. Prior to Amaranth, that was 

the last big blow up in a hedge fund. We have had more blow up’s 

in the stock market since then. 

The President’s Working Group of 1999 pointed out that long 

term capital had enormous amounts of leverage relative to their 

peer group. They were on a plateau of their own in terms of their 

ability to get leverage, and frankly, I think the message is that 

even the banking and brokerage community overextended themselves to long term capital. 

Mr. BAKER. My point exactly. Thank you. 

Mr. HALL. If I have answered your question, I am finished. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me focus, if I can, on two areas. One of the witnesses raised 

the question of whether the Working Group’s proposal about who 

29

qualifies as an accredited investor is or is not the appropriate definition. I cannot remember which witness it was. Maybe Mr. Brown, 

Dr. Brown. 

I wanted to follow up on Mr. Baker’s question and be a little bit 

more pointed on that issue. Is that the appropriate level or should 

it be a different level? 

Dr. Brown, was it you who made that point? 

Mr. BROWN. I made it, as well as another gentleman. 

Mr. WATT. Let’s start with you and get the perspective of the 

other gentlemen on the panel. 

Mr. BROWN. When I teach, I often have aggressive students who 

say, you know, if you are so smart, why are you not rich. The temptation is always to say well, how do you know I am not rich. 

Another possible response is you know, if you are so rich, why 

are you so stupid. Wealth and intelligence, particularly in investment matters, is not at all related. 

I can point to many anecdotes and many cases. 

Mr. WATT. I think I did accept the proposition that the monetary 

figure is appropriate as opposed to—how are you ever going to 

evaluate somebody’s sophistication and evaluate their financial 

well being or worth or ability to lose. 

Mr. BROWN. That is right. You have exactly the point. 

Mr. WATT. It is the monetary figure that I am zeroing in on more 

than the sophistication issue that Mr. Baker was zeroing in on. 

Is the net worth figure an appropriate figure? 

Mr. BROWN. I have various thoughts about this. For a high net 

worth individual, they know what they are doing and there is no 

real business for us to be too concerned about what they do. 

I must confess to some concern about the level of involvement of 

pension funds and the ability of the pension benefit guarantee corporation and absorbing any potential losses that come through investing in these vehicles. 

The issue is really to look at risk, I think, and to understand 

what the financial resources are of the sponsoring organization of 

the pension, any defined benefit pension plans. 

I am concerned about that. 

Mr. WATT. Let’s start with Mr. Golden and go all the way down. 

What do you say in response to the question I asked, and to Dr. 

Brown’s comments? 

Mr. GOLDEN. I commented earlier that I think the capital test 

should be raised. I do not know how high they should go. That is 

something that I think could be derived through a lot of conversations with the participants. 

I do wonder about this issue of assuring that people can afford 

to lose money in this. I am not convinced that any particular hedge 

fund investment is any more risky than a single stock investment 

in a single company. We do not have the same kind of concerns 

about people losing money in those particular investments. 

Mr. WATT. You are not advocating to lower the threshold? 

Mr. GOLDEN. Absolutely not. I think it should be raised. The fact 

of the matter is people—we need to make the bite size with which 

they invest to be small enough that they can weather the storm. 

The diversified portfolio is a really important measure of protection. 

30

Mr. WATT. You all may need to speed up your responses if I am 

going to get all the way down the panel. 

Mr. Matthews, Mr. Hall, Mr. Chanos. 

Mr. MATTHEWS. Personally, my feeling is that the question is, 

can you afford to lose it? That is the question that should be asked. 

I do not know what that means in terms of the level you set. 

Mr. HALL. That is correct. It is an issue of net worth. It is an 

issue of income. It is an issue of investing experience. I think actually some of my colleagues at the MFA have done some work and 

we would be happy to present you with some more definitive information on our recommendations. 

Mr. WATT. That is consistent with the Working Group or different from the Working Group? 

Mr. HALL. Consistent with the Working Group. 

Mr. CHANOS. I would echo most of these comments with the one 

exception that we do have members in our Coalition who make the 

very good point that, for example, the people who were made very 

wealthy by a man named Warren Buffett, who ran his partnership 

as a hedge fund for 20 years, would not have been accredited investors under the standard. 

It is a good point. We have to understand that these numbers are 

arbitrarily policy driven numbers, not economic numbers. The industry and the proper authorities have to coalesce around figures 

that broadly represent the ability of investors to shoulder the risk, 

as my colleague said. 

Mr. WATT. Mr. Brody? 

Mr. BRODY. It is probably not a bad number. It is hard to determine what it should be. I think nobody has great wisdom on this 

score. The number serves as an imperfect proxy for understanding, 

and the reality, as has been mentioned earlier, is hedge funds in 

general are not riskier than most other investments. 

Mr. WATT. Mr. Corrigan? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. I would raise the limit to at least what is being 

contemplated by the SEC’s current proposals. These standards are 

not perfect, but they are easy to understand. We have standards 

like that in a lot of places. That is probably the best we can do. 

Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I do have to interject for 

30 seconds, as we talk about the level at which we protect people. 

I am going to propose with regard to the bill that we passed last 

year that prevents anybody from betting on blackjack, that maybe 

if you can invest in a hedge fund, we will at least let you gamble. 

This committee decided that we would protect people from gambling at all; maybe we can link the two. 

The gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate you calling this hearing. It is an important hearing. Clearly, 

I think the committee has identified several areas of legitimate 

concern. 

First, are investors possibly being misled? Do we have the proper 

level of transparency? Second, is there a legitimate issue of systemic risk? Third, as the gentleman from Louisiana has pointed 

out, we certainly have a concern about the institutional investor 

represented by pensions, and what could happen to individual penVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:18 Jul 11, 2007 Jkt 035405 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\35405.TXT HFIN PsN: TERRIE
31

sioners, much less the American taxpayer who might have to bail 

out the PBCG. 

Having said all of that, although I am not a physician, I am reminded of the Hippocratic Oath; first, do no harm. It should also 

apply to Members of Congress. 

I recently came across a couple of statements of our present and 

former Fed Chairman, and apparently Chairman Greenspan said it 

would be counterproductive to directly regulate hedge funds. 

I know that Chairman Bernanke has been quoted as saying that 

direct regulation of hedge funds would impose costs in the form of 

moral hazard and the likely loss of private market discipline, and 

possible limits on funds’ ability to provide market liquidity. 

My first question, which is kind of tossing the ball up in the air 

for anybody who wants to take a strike at it, is if we do not get 

the regulation right, what harm might we do, and particularly if 

you could comment on Chairman Bernanke’s statement about possible moral hazard. 

Dr. Brown, it looked like you were reaching for the button first. 

Mr. BROWN. There is an issue with the tendency of the industry 

to be more expanded overseas than it is here. I have different 

views on this. 

I do not hold with the view that industry is going to disappear 

any time soon. The plain fact is that other jurisdictions have a 

much more significant regulatory environment than we do here. I 

do not think there is any danger of this industry going anywhere 

very soon. 

Mr. HENSARLING. Anybody else care to comment? 

Mr. HALL. The one thing to be cognizant of is if there is regulation that keeps hedge funds from doing their business, which is out 

of the ordinary. 

One of the great things about what I think private pools of capital do is they do things that are out of the mainstream, like investing in insurance risk after the hurricanes. 

If there is regulation and it is inappropriate regulation or if it 

overly restricts the ability to make these types of one off investments or out of the mainstream investments, then the economy will 

overall suffer from that. 

Mr. HENSARLING. The investment capital represented by the 

hedge fund industry, just how fluid is it? Some of us have been concerned about certain provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that might be 

helping drive capital to overseas markets, the number of IPOs that 

have taken place on domestic markets versus international markets. 

Just how easy is it to locate these investment vehicles overseas 

and if it is easy, is that something that Congress should be concerned about? 

Mr. Chanos? 

Mr. CHANOS. I can speak personally to that, because I set up an 

operation in London a few years ago to complement our New York 

office. 

There is a lot of concern about capital moving overseas. We hear 

about this. Capital can move overseas at the flick of a button and 

does so all day long all around the world. Capital moves around. 

32

The bigger issue, I believe, and have told my New York political 

friends this, is the human capital that moves. 

When I set up an office in London, I am now paying people overseas. All of those effects of economy are benefitting the U.K. directly and not the United States. 

I am more worried about that and losing our competitiveness of 

keeping good people and keeping our financial primacy in the 

United States from the human side and the organizational side 

than the capital side. Capital flows very freely across borders all 

day long, 365 days a year. 

Mr. HENSARLING. If I could hit the risk issue again. I certainly 

hold myself up to be no expert, but for a couple of years in the 

early 1990’s, I was actually an officer in a hedge fund. 

It basically ran a very classic AW Jones kind of operation, classic 

stock pickers, long, short, they levered it up 2:1. 

I was able to invest in the fund as an officer, and during the time 

I was there, I discovered that our investment fund, number one, 

gave a greater rate of return to my family than my alternative investments at a low correlation to the market and had less volatility. 

I am kind of asking the question, what is wrong with this picture? Is there anything inherently risky, since I think it was Mr. 

Golden who said that hedge funds are not a distinctive asset class, 

it is more of a structure, is there anything about the structure of 

having a private investment vehicle that has a performance fee 

that leads these investments to be more risky than alternative investments that might be found in the mutual fund industry? 

Mr. Matthews? 

Mr. MATTHEWS. Absolutely. It is the 20 percent performance fee. 

If you can make 20 percent on $50 million that you earned for your 

investors, that is pretty good. If you can make 20 percent on $50 

billion, that is even way better. 

The inclination is to take on more investors, more leverage, and 

greater risk to try to hit the jackpot. That is why hedge funds occasionally do fail, and mutual funds never fail. Mutual funds do not 

take the leverage but a hedge fund does. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. We get a little bit bogged down here because we 

use this term ‘‘hedge fund.’’ There is an enormous dispersion in 

terms of the behavioral characteristics of hedge funds, and in particular, the extent to which individual hedge funds take more risk, 

have higher risk profiles than other hedge funds. 

I think it is fair to say that if you look at the universe as a 

whole, the characterizations that have been made by several of the 

other witnesses are correct. It is not so true that to the extent one 

or more individual hedge funds are reaching for extraordinary returns, by definition, they have to be taking extraordinary risk. 

That is where the dilemma lies. How do you square the circle in 

terms of performance in general with outliers? 

I want to add, if I could, very quickly, Mr. Chairman, a point 

about Amaranth. Several people have noted that Amaranth worked 

itself out in a very, very successful fashion, and it did. I, like others, take a lot of comfort from that. 

In my statement, I have identified several factors associated with 

the Amaranth event which I think warrant a fairly high degree of 

33

caution as to how one should judge the Amaranth episode in a vacuum compared to a similar type of episode under different circumstances in the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will go to the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to 

thank you and the ranking member for having this hearing, and 

also thank the panelists for helping us with our work. 

To begin with, I think that we all take the position that the best 

regulation is self-regulation. As the chairman indicated before, it 

actually allows us to focus on some other things. 

Given the size of these hedge funds and the possibility that at 

least in the currency exchanges, there is a possibility of hedge 

funds working in concert, not necessarily deliberately, but their impact could be multiplied, and the sort of mercenary strategy, it 

could be good mercenaries, but it is definitely geared strictly to the 

investor, and the OPIC nature of these hedge funds, the secretive 

way in which they operate, it does raise some concerns in a number 

of areas. 

The chairman mentioned in his opening remarks the situation 

with our pension funds, and while the Amaranth work out might 

have been suitable for some, I am not sure that the pensioners who 

were affected would come to the same conclusion. 

I know that Mr. Matthews raised the possibility that it might be 

good to look at some limits, not necessarily on hedge funds, but on 

pension funds that would invest in a hedge fund, and maybe put 

some limits on either a percentage or based on their unfunded liabilities, their exposure. We might do that. 

The other area I am concerned about, and this goes to the mortgage issue and somewhat the subprime market, but in the area of 

mortgage backed securities held by hedge funds and what could 

happen if a hedge fund dumps those securities back into the market, putting downward pressure on those securities, what could 

happen to the distribution of capital available for housing. 

That is an essential good in terms of affordable housing, that I 

am concerned about. 

The last dimension of this that concerns me is I also wear another hat sort of ancillary to my work on this committee, and that 

is as the chairman of the Taskforce on Anti-Terrorist Financing. I 

work a lot with Treasury. I work a lot with FinCen and a number 

of our counterterrorist organizations. 

They say that it is very difficult to track and to scrutinize these 

hedge funds to make sure that the proper anti-money laundering 

and anti-terrorist financing protocols are in place. 

That concerns me greatly, given the amount of money that is 

flowing here. I will just let the panelists take a crack at what 

might we do, with your cooperation, rather than acting upon the 

hedge fund industry, what can you give us? We would rather have 

the suggestions come from you as to ways to address these concerns rather than us trying to do it from whole cloth from this side 

of the table. 

Mr. Brown? 

Mr. BROWN. I think first of all, you have to understand the international nature of this business. This body cannot even in principle 

examine the very important issues you raise about terrorist financVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:18 Jul 11, 2007 Jkt 035405 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\35405.TXT HFIN PsN: TERRIE
34

ing through vehicles of this kind because the international business 

is far greater than the national business, the U.S. domiciled business— 

Mr. LYNCH. I am not talking about just us. We are working with 

the Egmont Group, which is made up of FIUs from all over the 

globe, 94 countries. I would not suggest us doing it alone; we would 

work with our international counterparts. 

Mr. BROWN. Okay, great. I am also a little concerned about the 

anecdotal evidence on systemic risk that you referred to. 

My own research, for example, for the most obvious example is 

the Asia currency crisis in 1997, and the allegation that Mahathir 

Mohamad, the Prime Minister from Malaysia, made that George 

Soros had engineered the whole affair for his benefit. 

I looked at the numbers, and it turned out that the hedge funds 

actually were very risk adverse during that period and had pulled 

out of the markets, and in fact, George Soros had lost 10 percent, 

hemorrhaging 10 percent right through that period. 

The anecdotal evidence of massive systemic risk, I would argue, 

is just not there. Yet, a lot of central banks, in particular, the Australian Central Bank, were trying to get actively involved. 

Mr. LYNCH. I appreciate that remark. If you could focus on the 

question, the pension funds. Two, mortgage backed securities. 

Three, anti-money laundering protocols that are not in place right 

now with hedge funds. If you could just address that question. 

Mr. BROWN. I am sorry. The pension funds, I do agree there is 

an issue there and we have to examine the amount or the at-risk 

status of pension funds with regard to any kind of high-risk investment, in particular, hedge funds, and we may have to look at 

ERISA to do that. 

On mortgage backed securities, I am less concerned because that 

is not a huge amount of this business. The hedge funds are only 

involved in about 4 percent of that business. It is not a big thing. 

That is about all I have to say. 

Mr. HALL. If I may. 

Mr. LYNCH. Sure, Mr. Hall. 

Mr. HALL. In this hearing, we have talked about Amaranth in 

2007, and long term capital in 1998, two high profile blow up’s that 

were terrible for a lot of investors. 

We really have not talked at all about the fundamental risk of 

the stock market. If you look at the 2001 crash of the stock market, 

and you look at the fact that it was only recently that the S&P actually recovered all the losses over the last 6 years, ultimately, it 

has not made much money in the last 5 or 6 years, whereas hedge 

funds have actually generated positive returns, with much less volatility than the stock market. 

In terms of investments in hedge funds, if we look at the pension 

market, which you asked about, no one disagrees, or very few disagree, that pension funds should not be investing in common equities. 

Unfortunately, I think the reality is—I should not say unfortunately—I think the reality is that common equities in most cases 

may be more risky than the overall hedge fund market. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to have to wrap this up. 

35

Mr. HALL. In terms of the housing issue, I will address it quickly. 

I think it will probably be if a hedge fund blows out, as you point 

out, of securities, it will be another hedge fund. It has the flexibility to enhance their leverage and buy these assets and provide 

that shock absorber for any liquidations that will occur. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Shays of Connecticut. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank 

you for holding this hearing, and I thank the ranking member, as 

well. 

Long term capital and Amaranth were both from the Fourth 

Congressional District, one from Greenwich and one from Westport. 

I wrestle with memories of savings and loans, and I wrestle with 

memories of when we changed the tax laws, what happened to real 

estate, and it kind of stared us in the face, and we all kind of knew 

it was going to happen. I think all of us are just trying to look for 

assurances that you will not just see another day like that. 

What I wrestle with is long term capital basically was dealt with 

with a proactive—as you point out, Mr. Matthews—effort on the 

part of the Fed. 

How did Amaranth resolve itself, Mr. Matthews? What took 

place and why would I feel comfortable that would happen again? 

In other words, that people would buy a lesser position? What happened? 

Mr. MATTHEWS. The prime broker for Amaranth, J.P. Morgan, 

the prime creditor, that had the most at stake, took over the natural gas portfolio and re-sold it. They made a low ball bid that Amaranth was forced to take because Amaranth needed to liquidate 

and pay back other creditors. 

J.P. Morgan turned around and re-sold the same positions to 

other hedge funds. Those other hedge funds provided the liquidity 

that caused it to not spread. 

Mr. SHAYS. The question I have, and I would ask all of you, is 

when that happens again, and it will happen again because there 

will be foolish mistakes done by foolish people or very smart people 

who do foolish mistakes, which model is most likely to occur, the 

long capital or Amaranth? Tell me what model is likely to occur in 

the future. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. I will take a stab at that. The answer is we do 

not know. I think one can argue about probabilities, but we do not 

know. 

As I said before, if you look at Amaranth and you contrast it 

with long term capital, the world of long term capital does not exist 

any more, in terms of the way that fund was run and the mesmerizing effect— 

Mr. SHAYS. Then let me ask you this. What is the likelihood 

then, instead of one company going under, and evidently, I guess 

they both were from Greenwich, not Westport, but what is the likelihood that instead of one, you would have three, four, or five? 

What would be the kind of circumstance that would create it 

happening for more than one company? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Let’s look at the characteristics of Amaranth for 

a minute in terms of why that worked out as well as it did. 

There are a couple of things that I think are very important. 

One, the instruments that were used to construct those natural gas 

36

trades, by today’s standards, were relatively simple and straightforward. 

Mr. SHAYS. I need you to give me as short an answer as you can, 

because I have another question. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. The short answer is I cannot tell you the probability—low, but not zero. 

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you this. Are any of you concerned that 

you could have three or four companies go down at the same time 

and then would we still see the Amaranth model working out or 

would the Fed or someone else have to step in, if you had two or 

three companies go down at once? 

Mr. BROWN. I think the important thing you have to note is the 

incredible diversity of the fund business. I think the industry is not 

doing itself a service in really explaining this to the world, and the 

fact that we have so focused on Amaranth and long term capital 

management and assume this is the whole industry— 

Mr. SHAYS. One answer is just diversity? 

Mr. BROWN. Diversity. Incredible diversity of this business is a 

great protection, I think. 

Mr. SHAYS. Can anyone else give another reason or diversity 

would be the biggest? 

Mr. MATTHEWS. Diversity and size of capital. As I point out in 

my testimony, there are three hedge funds in the United States 

alone with $30 billion or more in assets. That did not exist in Amaranth and long term capital’s day. It just did not exist. 

Mr. SHAYS. One of my friends owns a hedge fund and they had 

three partners. They bought out one because one partner wanted 

to keep expanding and they were happy making millions and millions of dollars, but they did not want to keep adding because they 

did not think they could service their clients as well. 

I frankly thought it was remarkable. Obviously, he makes about $10 million a year, each of them do. It is not like they are suffering. 

They had a chance of making more, but they honestly could not 

service their customers as well the larger they became. 

Why is it the larger you become sometimes you cannot get as 

good a return? I do not understand that. 

Mr. HALL. If I may, the answer to that is an important part of 

the distinction between the classic mutual fund long only business 

and hedge funds. Hedge funds, because they have an incentive fee, 

they look at the opportunity set and they have no interest in increasing assets under management unless it is in fact going to 

yield an appropriate marginal return. When that marginal return 

decreases, they have no incentive. 

Hedge funds for years and years have been giving back money, 

closing, not taking any new money. If you contrast that to the long 

only business, frankly, they are asset gatherers, in my view, and 

they pretty much take as much money as they can because as they 

take new money, it is greater fees, but not necessarily greater marginal opportunities to invest in. 

Mr. BROWN. I can address that issue as well. The evidence does 

show that there is some economies of scale that hedge funds face. 

Interestingly enough, if you look at funds of funds, there is actually 

economies of scale, because of the important due diligence function 

37

that they serve in vetting out the funds under their management, 

and the funds that have the greatest amount of assets under management are the ones that can afford to do the greatest amount of 

due diligence on behalf of the institutional clients they serve. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a fascinating hearing on the evolving topic of hedge funds. 

My understanding of hedge funds, I want to make sure I am 

right on this, and if I am not, you all correct me, is that they are 

massive unregulated investment pools that are typically invested 

in only by institutional investors or wealthy individuals, that try 

to hedge the value of assets it holds and provides returns to investors that are not correlated to those of traditional stock or bond 

markets. 

Is that a fairly good assessment there? 

Mr. MATTHEWS. My only correction would be they are not necessarily all massive. It is like the retail business. You have WalMart, Target, and Home Depot, but you also have a lot of local 

mom and pop’s, like myself. 

Mr. SCOTT. I am very glad that you said that, because that leads 

into my question in terms of the retail. As many of the particularly 

retail industry giants move closer to departure from this traditional 

form of long-standing traditional industry practices, it has somewhat created an interest and an apprehension for what is on the 

horizon for some of these companies. 

Let me give an example of what I am talking about. If we take 

Sears, for example, Sears is now being classified as more of a hedge 

fund over its traditional role. Granted, Mr. Lambert, who was the 

chairman of Sears, has done a great job for the company as far as 

investments and the like. 

Are you worried that more and more of our Nation’s stores, especially retailers, will turn more to hedge funds and unrelated investment strategies to survive, and do you believe that more and more 

corporations whose sales are hurting will move in this same direction? 

Do you believe we have a worrisome trend here? This is kind of 

a lead in to that. Is there a concern that the more unpredictable 

ventures like hedge funds may lead to yet other problematic issues 

in corporations? Should they stick to what they were formed to do 

and work on inventive and further creative ways of bringing in the 

customers instead of focusing more on unrelated investments like 

hedge funds? 

Are they counting more primarily on these hedge fund investments over store performance, as sales decline, stores lose customers, and those customers are finding other places that address 

their needs or the prices. 

This way of doing business is good for shareholders, but what 

about retailers? Do you believe this will further become the ongoing 

trend, retailers taking their focus off the classic focus of same store 

growth, market share, and store spending, and substantial losses 

in the long run? 

What I am asking is the impact of this trend on some of our retail giants, like Sears. 

38

Mr. Brody or Mr. Chanos or Mr. Hall? 

Mr. BRODY. I will give it a quick try. The rationalization of businesses really has little to do with hedge funds. What we see over 

time is that some businesses are successful and some businesses 

are not successful. Some retailers are successful and some retailers 

are not successful. 

When a retailer has ‘‘X’’ number of stores and a bunch of them 

are not successful, if the retailer is to survive, it needs to rationalize itself, get out of some stores, and change its merchandising. 

We have seen that in the retailing business and we have seen that 

in many, many industries in the United States. 

I guess what I would say is that sound management is needed 

for all businesses and it has little to do with hedge funds. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you believe that down the road, some sort of reform will need to take place to address hedge funds with respect 

to their size and scope? 

Mr. BRODY. Let me just make a comment on size. Many of the 

top 10 hedge funds by assets are terrific performers, and I think 

it just depends upon hedge fund by hedge fund, their management, 

the activities that they invest in, and each, in my view, in our capital system, should be free to make the economic choices that they 

do. 

Mr. SCOTT. Am I being over cautious or overreacting in my concern that a lack of transparency in the current hedge fund market 

could lead to volatility down the road? 

Am I seeing something that is not there? Is there anything to 

worry about with this move towards hedge funds? 

Mr. BRODY. I think there are always plenty of things to worry 

about, not just with hedge funds, but probably everything else in 

life. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is there volatility? 

Mr. BRODY. The hedge fund world actually has less volatility in 

the aggregate than the stock market world does, and Mr. Corrigan 

went through a very useful notion of transparency and transparency to whom, to the regulators, to the prime brokers, to those 

who are lending you money, to the institutions that are investing 

in you, and to the general public. 

I think the major point is that where the transparency is needed, 

it exists. 

Mr. SCOTT. Was it hedge funds that—my final question, my mind 

is foggy. Did hedge funds play a role in the situation regarding 

Fannie Mae? 

Mr. BRODY. No. 

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman will yield to me, I think Fannie 

Mae got in trouble over their own accounting for derivatives. It was 

their own derivative investments and the dispute over the accounting standard that was the last straw. 

The gentleman from Illinois. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Mr. Chairman, can I just see if I can help a little 

bit. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. I am one of the world’s great worriers. I worry 

about those things, too. If you look at the size of hedge funds, the 

threat of retailers going amuck via financial activities, those risks 

39

really are very, very small. I appreciate your concern. There are 

more important things I think in this area to worry about than 

those. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois. 

Mr. ROSKAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to follow up briefly on what Mr. Shays was bringing up and to put it in a context. I apologize. I went out for three 

constituent meetings in the hallway that started with your testimony, Mr. Corrigan, and I came in, Mr. Brown, as you were clearing your throat at the end basically. I missed all your good stuff. 

That being said, could you comment—I will just open it up for 

anybody who has anything interesting and insightful to say—could 

you comment on the characterization of long term capital management, the environment where the Fed obviously came in and intervened, the Amaranth situation—which I think the best phrase 

today, by the way, was that it worked itself out. I just thought that 

was a brilliant nice use of language, that it sort of worked itself 

out. 

What is different today in terms of the sophistication in the marketplace so that we do not have to have that sort of intervention 

that we saw in the late 1990’s? 

I think, Mr. Matthews, you mentioned diversification, and then 

you also referenced the size of several funds. 

Could you go further on that? I did not follow what you meant 

by that. 

Mr. MATTHEWS. It is those two issues, diversification and size. 

Back when long term capital blew up, I think they lost $4.5 billion. 

I think that was the number. 

There were no other $4.5 billion funds around that either could 

or had the ability to or wanted to step in and help. They could not 

do it. You needed the Fed to step in. 

Today, we have three funds alone that have $30 billion each in 

the United States. There is one in London that has $60 billion, I 

believe. 

There is tons of capital around. They do a lot of different things. 

They have branched into all kinds and all different classes of financial instruments and commodities and markets around the world. 

It is simply not at all the kind of environment that long term 

capital was. They were the biggest and there was nobody out there 

who could rescue them. 

Mr. ROSKAM. The old notion of being too big to fail is really the 

marketplace has matured since then, and now there are others who 

would be big enough to assume that market share? 

Mr. MATTHEWS. It has. There is an issue that gets back to Mr. 

Scott’s question about are they not too big or can they get too big. 

There is a very Darwinian factor to our business model. The person who runs the management firm gets 20 percent of the profits. 

The investors know this. They are paying that money. If they are 

not getting a return on that investment, they are out of there very 

quickly. 

A fund cannot keep growing forever just for the heck of it. The 

investors have to be satisfied or the money will go elsewhere. It is 

a very efficient marketplace. 

40

Mr. ROSKAM. Could someone comment on the failure of hedge 

funds? I assume it is the natural thing, right? Some flourish. Some 

diminish. They do well and they stumble, like normal, and we 

ought not overreact to hedge fund failures? 

Mr. HALL. One of the things that I think the President’s Working 

Group points out is that there is responsibility on the part of investors themselves. 

I think there was clearly a failure in the long term capital situation on the part of the counterparties, but it was not a system wide 

failure. There is clearly long term capital, I think, arrangements 

that were extended credit that other people did not get, so it was 

not a systemwide problem. 

The Amaranth problem is strictly investors losing money. I do 

not think there was any threat to the system. Ultimately, due diligence is important and investors have to focus on due diligence, 

and keep in mind that Amaranth advertised and achieved extraordinarily high returns in the years subsequent to that. 

You get higher returns from taking high risk. Investors knew 

that going in, I would assume. If they did not know, then we really 

need to focus on the due diligence aspect. 

It is really going to be difficult to regulate the due diligence process, and the MFA is doing the best it can with creating standardized due diligence forms and processes. 

Mr. ROSKAM. Mr. Chanos? 

Mr. CHANOS. I would like to point out that hedge funds actually 

are very fragile vehicles. I would like to amplify what Mr. Matthews said; 10 to 20 percent of all hedge funds go out of business 

every year. It is a very large number. They do not because of stupendous losses, but for the very Darwinian thing that he mentioned, investors are constantly looking for the best return in this 

area, even though the evidence is exactly the opposite, that returns 

have been relatively high with less risk in aggregate. 

However, investors are shopping for the best returns in a very 

high fee world and tend to move very quickly out of something that 

is not performing, and therefore, keeping the market disciplined in 

that way. 

Mr. ROSKAM. Thank you. 

Mr. BRODY. I think an important thing is to make sure that the 

investors get a fair shake. I think that is what registration does, 

it surely does not guarantee investors that they cannot lose their 

money. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Just very quickly on long term capital. We should 

not forget the circumstances in which long term capital happened. 

Long term capital was horribly mismanaged, the fact of the matter 

is that coming off the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis, that combination of circumstances in 1998 made long term capital a hell of 

a lot harder to deal with than it would have been had it happened 

in a more tranquil environment. 

The CHAIRMAN. We should make sure that there are no hedge 

funds around when we have a crisis? 

[Laughter] 

Mr. CORRIGAN. We are not going to be that lucky. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas. 

41

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for 

your testimony. Our friends, it seems to me that every failsafe system is failsafe until it fails to be safe. And before long-term capital, 

there was no long-term capital. And my suspicion is that there is 

something else out there that we cannot prognosticate currently 

that may manifest itself, and then that will be the pariah paradigm 

that we’ll have hearings about and talk about. 

So, it seems to me that we do have to concern ourselves with the 

taxpayers in this paradigm, because the taxpayers are at the very 

foundation of the payout, because we now have the commingling of 

sophisticated and unsophisticated capital, and that occurs through 

the pension funds. 

The sophisticated investor, as Mr. Golden said, is one that you 

may have little sympathy for. But I have a great deal of sympathy 

for the pension fund that happens to have pensioners who are unsophisticated investors who happen to be a part of this system that 

necessitates sophistication. 

And I might add also that sophisticated investors make some 

very unsophisticated decisions, and I think we have to be mindful 

of this. So, if the—just to take us through it, if the sophisticated 

investor puts his money in the hedge fund, that’s great. The pension is in the hedge fund. At some point, the pension fails. And at 

this point, the person who receives his benefits from the pension 

then relies on the taxpayer, perhaps through some sort of social 

program. 

So in the final analysis, the taxpayers have a vested interest in 

what happens with funds that are supposed to be entirely supported by sophisticated investors. So the question for me becomes 

this, that I’d like to have each of you address. Do you agree, each 

of you, that something must be done about the commingling of sophisticated and unsophisticated funds? And I’ll start with Mr. 

Brown. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you. 

Mr. GREEN. If you could start with a yes or a no. And I say this 

only because sometimes when folks finish, I don’t know whether 

they’ve said yes or no. 

Mr. BROWN. I think there is an issue, and I think that there are 

a lot of hedge fund salespeople out there who will tell you about 

S&P returns and Treasury bill risk and that you need to be sophisticated in terms of your ability to understand the markets, although— 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Brown, if I may, would you then say yes is the 

answer, that there should be something done about this commingling of sophisticated and unsophisticated funds? 

Mr. BROWN. I’m concerned about it, but I’m not sure what to do. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. In a world where something can be done, 

would you do something? 

Mr. BROWN. I think I probably would. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Mr. Golden? 

Mr. GOLDEN. I’m not entirely sure I understand the question. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, it gets to the pensions. The pensions. The guy 

who happens to be a pipefitter who happens to have his pension 

fund invested in the hedge fund, he, by definition, may not be a 

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42

ticated investor. So, he’s not a sophisticated investor. What about 

him? What about the fact that the taxpayer eventually picks up the 

tab if that pension fund loses money and he then has to have some 

sort of social benefit that taxpayers cover? 

Mr. GOLDEN. I think the answer is no. I think it’s definitely no 

at the level of the hedge fund. I think we have concerns about the 

safety of pension funds, and we should be focusing attention on 

those who manage the pension funds, and seeing whether or not 

they are operating in a prudent fashion, using proper elements of 

diversification. 

Mr. GREEN. But your answer is that we should not do anything 

with reference to the commingling of the sophisticated and unsophisticated money? 

Mr. GOLDEN. I guess I’m not sure that the pension fund money 

is unsophisticated, because there is a fiduciary involved at that 

point. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, the guy who manages the pension fund, we’re 

going to assume that he’s sophisticated. But the guy who benefits, 

the person who receives the pension, I think we all agree that the 

overwhelming majority of them would not be classified as sophisticated investors, correct? 

Mr. GOLDEN. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. All right. So they’re the people who lose. And then 

the taxpayers pick up the tab. Should we do something to avoid 

that type of occurrence? And your position is you’d do it with the 

manager as opposed to with the fund itself? 

Mr. GOLDEN. Right. Right. I agree with that. The manager of the 

San Diego pension fund that invested in Amaranth made a bad decision. They put too much money in Amaranth. Something people 

should be asking—the pipefitter should be asking the pension fund 

manager for San Diego why did you do that? And I— 

Mr. GREEN. I agree with you, sir, that the pipefitter should pose 

this question, but the problem becomes the pipefitter still needs the 

social services. He has a family; he has children, and they need the 

social services that we, the taxpayers, seem to provide. So we still 

get back to the taxpayer having a vested interest in what happens 

to the pipefitter who had a manager who made an unsophisticated 

decision who is a sophisticated investor. 

Mr. GOLDEN. So—and I understand completely, and I think the 

regulation should—the concern you should have is who is running 

these funds? If they’re making bad decisions regularly, that’s a real 

problem. The hedge fund is just doing its job, and I don’t know if 

you can regulate that. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, tell me this. How would you manage the managers such that we can do exactly what you’re talking about? 

Mr. GOLDEN. It’s a great question. Off the top of my head, I don’t 

know. 

Mr. GREEN. Does anybody have an answer? Yes, sir? 

Mr. CHANOS. Aren’t we really talking about an ERISA issue 

here? 

Mr. GREEN. Say again? 

Mr. CHANOS. Aren’t we really talking about an ERISA issue here, 

which is the way in which pension funds are managed and how 

those pension funds are advised? For example, self-directed pension 

43

plans and 401(k)s, which we be more direct to what you’re saying, 

aren’t investing in hedge funds. 

So really, that pipefitter is getting advice, or should be under 

ERISA, getting fiduciary responsible advice from an advisor, and 

that’s always the case, for example, in our fund. We never talk to 

the underlying investor directly. There’s always an advisor. That is 

where the nexus of this concern should be, and I think it is a really 

good question. But I think we’re looking at it from the wrong side 

of the telescope. 

Mr. GREEN. Do you really think that the majority of people who 

are pension investors, they have money in pension plans, do you 

really think that the majority of these persons are receiving the 

level of advice that they need in terms of what a sophisticated investor is and how that impacts their investments? 

Mr. CHANOS. Well, if they’re in a defined benefit plan, generally, 

yes, they are. I don’t know of any pension, large pension funds that 

have failed due to one hedge fund investment. 

Mr. GREEN. But we’re not talking about the ones that have. 

We’re looking to the future. Eventually we’ll have that discussion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I would also note, one of our concerns is the 

public pension funds, so that you don’t have the ERISA rules, and 

that is something we’ll be looking at. Mr. Campbell? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Matthews and 

Dr. Brown, both of you in your presentations talked about leverage 

in hedge funds, and I don’t mean the leverage in the investments, 

Mr. Corrigan, but the actual leverage in the fund investment itself. 

Is the degree and amount of that leverage transparent to the investors? 

Mr. BROWN. To the informed investor, there’s a whole industry 

out there for people to investigate and do due diligence. And if I 

were investing—I’m not a qualified investor—if I were investing a 

substantial portion of my wealth, I would certainly investigate. And 

the investor has every right to demand any kind of information 

they need to make an informed decision. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. So I guess my question is that’s not information 

that is readily available to an investor so an investor could be, I 

think Mr. Matthews had talked about a three to one leverage fund. 

Mr. BROWN. Right. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. So someone investing in that might not know—

a sophisticated investor, I realize, or pension fund? 

Mr. BROWN. My evidence is that sophisticated investors, as indicated by people who grant the leverage, the counterparties, they 

know and they have access to that information already, and it’s 

evidenced by the fact that if you look at the ADV filings, and I’ve 

looked at 2,270 of them, that the sophisticated investors lending 

money already knew of the operational risk characteristics that 

were revealed in those forms. So they’ve done their homework, and 

the people who are lending money, and that’s really the systemic 

risk concern that we have is what effect this is going to have on 

the financial system as a whole. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Does anyone else want to comment? I mean, just 

from my perspective, obviously, we’re talking about multiplying the 

risk— 

44

Mr. BROWN. Right. 

Mr. CAMPBELL.—dramatically when you take what hedge funds 

invest in and add to that degrees of leverage. Yes, Mr. Brody? 

Mr. BRODY. There’s a wide range of sophistication among investors, and some will have a very good idea of what they’re getting 

into and what the leverage is, and some will not. My view on the 

proper kind of registration is that a principles-based registration 

would require the disclosure of the important items to all investors, 

and that kind of disclosure then would benefit the unsophisticated— 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Do any of you disagree with that? 

Mr. HALL. Well, I’d put that in perspective. I think ‘‘leverage’’ is 

too simple a term to really have a whole lot of meaning. If you leverage Treasury bills or if you leverage Internet stocks, you have—

or Internet stocks without leverage can be significantly more risky. 

So I’d be concerned about providing rules-based disclosure as opposed to principle-based regulation that makes people feel comfortable but they’re really not. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Do any of you believe there’s a proprietary issue 

there? I mean, part of the reasons that hedge funds don’t disclose, 

as you said, is because they’re using oftentimes proprietary methods. Yes, Mr. Chanos. 

Mr. CHANOS. I think there’s a big proprietary issue at work here, 

and we need to make the distinction between disclosure of leverage 

and positions to our investors and our counterparties and our 

custodians, and disclosure of positions to the general public. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Right. 

Mr. CHANOS. And I think that’s an important distinction, and I 

think that the committee understands, but I want to emphasize it. 

But quite frankly, and I know a number of people in the written 

testimony have touched upon this, I run a fund in addition to being 

an industry person, and our investors all have on-site inspection 

ability, and they take advantage of it. 

They routinely come in, look at our books, look at our positions, 

query us over and over and over again. Talk to our counterparties, 

talk to our prime brokers. This type of due diligence is done all the 

time and increasingly so both from high net worth individuals, public and private pension funds. These people are doing their work. 

When we have these blow-ups, they are very much the exception 

to the rule. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Okay. The second question is about accredited investor. Do any of you, and anybody, you can answer this. Should 

that be changed? Is it right? Do you support the SEC’s proposal to 

change the threshold? Anybody want to take that? 

Mr. HALL. Well, I would support it. On behalf of the MFA, we 

would support it. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. You support the SEC’s proposal? 

Mr. HALL. Yes. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Anybody else? I mean, do we have the right definition of accredited investor, or should it be changed? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. I think the definition is as good as it’s going to 

get. There’s no way to perfectly define these things. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. And the threshold is okay? 

45

Mr. CORRIGAN. The threshold proposed by the SEC is a big improvement. I actually might go a little bit further, but that’s another story. 

Mr. BROWN. As one of the members said, it’s not an issue of intelligence about such matters, it’s about the degree to which you 

can afford any losses that you may incur. And that’s the reason for 

that standard. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Okay. And then one last question. 

Mr. GOLDEN. Can I just add? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Sorry. 

Mr. GOLDEN. I’d like to see the threshold raised as high as is politically feasible, at least as high as the SEC’s. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. And one last little question for Mr. Chanos. We 

talked about this fortress company that went public and you said 

it was the management of the hedge fund. I’m just curious. People 

access the public markets for capital. Why would a manager of a 

hedge fund require capital? 

Mr. CHANOS. Well, I think that it’s not only for requiring capital 

but to possibly use their stock as currency for possible acquisitions, 

or to incentivize their senior and mid-level people perhaps through 

stock options. There are all kinds of reasons why companies go 

public that don’t necessarily need the capital, so I think that’s sort 

of a broader issue, perhaps beyond the purview of this panel. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. All right. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I did just want to add one thing to 

Dr. Brown and the very useful and interesting questions Mr. 

Campbell is asking about what people know. Did I read you correctly as basically saying that even if you tell them, they don’t pay 

any attention, they just chase returns? I mean, is that an accurate 

statement? 

Mr. BROWN. That’s an accurate statement. 

The CHAIRMAN. So that you tell them that, but they don’t—even 

the sophisticated ones, don’t factor into account and just, as you 

say, chase returns? 

Mr. BROWN. That’s what the evidence seems to suggest. Either 

they don’t know the information and they can’t have access to it, 

which I find rather unusual, or they do have access to it and it’s 

immaterial. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one question for the entire panel. Mr. Chanos, you earlier brought up Warren Buffett and his hedge fund history. He’s fond of using the 

adage in describing hedge funds if a man with money proposes a 

deal to a man with experience, the man with money ends up with 

the experience and the man with the experience ends up with his 

money. 

That’s kind of the theme of what’s been going on, and Mr. Buffett 

has become very critical of the hedge fund fee arrangements, as 

you may or may not know, and he calls the managers the 2 and 

20 crowd. And I frankly think that he raises some very pertinent 

issues. How would you characterize the fairness and the accuracy 

of Mr. Buffett’s comments? 

Mr. CHANOS. Well, I don’t want to put words in Mr. Buffett’s 

mouth, but I— 

46

Mr. CLEAVER. No, I’d like to give an exact quote. Hold on just 

a second. ‘‘It is a lopsided system whereby 2 percent of your principal is paid each year to the manager even if he accomplishes 

nothing, or for that matter, loses you a bundle and additionally, 20 

percent of your profit is paid to him if he succeeds, even if his success is due simply to a rising tide.’’ 

Mr. CHANOS. All right. Well, I think those, while factually accurate, and he’s entitled to his opinion, I would point out Mr. Buffett 

ran a hedge fund for 20 years, just about. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it takes one to know one. 

[Laughter] 

Mr. CHANOS. So, again, perhaps he’s speaking from personal experience, I don’t know. But every hedge fund is different. Every 

business is different. Everything should be judged on the merits of 

its management team, its performance, and its fee structure, and 

to make blanket statements about every single hedge fund, something like that seems to me to be a bit strong. It’s like saying, well, 

all of corporate America is not performing well for its shareholders, 

or every corporate executive is making too much money. 

I mean, these are individual cases, and I think that while there’s 

plenty of examples of hedge funds that aren’t probably doing a good 

job and are charging fees that are too high, as one of my panelists 

said here that this market is pretty Darwinian, and it weeds out 

those people pretty quickly. If you’re not performing, you don’t tend 

to keep those assets very long. 

Mr. CLEAVER. So the 2 and 20 crowd is actually a small crowd? 

Mr. CHANOS. It’s not a small crowd. In fact, it’s a growing crowd. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Or is it the in crowd? 

Mr. CHANOS. But there’s a reason it’s growing, Mr. Cleaver, in 

that there is a reason. No one here has asked the question, why 

are we having this—because of the growth of the industry, obviously something must be happening here where relatively sophisticated investors want to put more money with these managers. It’s 

not because simply they’re hanging out a shingle in front of their 

house. There is good performance being done with less risk. That’s 

why it’s attractive in the aggregate. But individually and specifically, there will always be, as one of our members said, the fools 

and the frauds are going to make things difficult for most of the 

good actors. 

Mr. HALL. If I may, it’s important in my view, a semantic issue 

about the 2 percent of the 2 and 20 is on capital. And that doesn’t, 

if you look at—if someone manages $100 million and takes a smaller fee, but 90 percent of their fund is coincident with the index, 

then they’re really—their marginal benefit is only on a small portion of that $100 million, $100 billion. 

So a hedge fund may manage a smaller amount of capital and 

charge a higher fee on a smaller amount of capital, then they also 

manage leverage, they manage short positions, they manage 

hedges. So, you really have to look at the services that one is providing for that fee, and percentage of fee on capital is not necessarily what the manager is ultimately getting compensated for. 

Mr. BROWN. I need to make one clarification point on the 2 and 

20 issue. You only earn the 20 once you’ve won back any losses 

47

that you’ve incurred in the past. It’s called a high water mark provision. 

It’s that high water mark provision that really enforces the Darwinian aspect of it, and, in fact, hedge funds are like radioactive 

substances. They have a half-life of 21⁄2 years, typically, because, 

you know, you lose, you lose, you die in this world very quickly because you just aren’t earning any returns. 

Mr. CLEAVER. I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Let me just ask two quick questions. 

One, we will be talking next time about—we were talking about 

how these things should run and do run in general. There are always aberrations with anything. The insider trading issue is one 

of the issues that we will be looking at next time, the SEC has 

been involved in. 

One of the questions is, record retention for entities that are otherwise unregulated. Is that an issue? Should we look at that? That 

is, over and above everything else, there is an argument for record 

retention to be able to help law enforcement for the aberrant cases. 

I’d be interested in any comments. 

Would there be objections to some kind of record retention requirement that for those—and I realize a lot of them already have 

them, because they’re otherwise regulated. But would there be any 

objection to a generalized sort of record retention requirement for 

entities that otherwise didn’t have them? Mr. Chanos? 

Mr. CHANOS. I don’t think our members would have—we have 

not canvassed them, but I don’t think our members would have a 

problem with that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hall? 

Mr. HALL. I think we would have no objection. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I’m quitting while I’m ahead. The next 

question is one of the ones that some of the staff have suggested, 

and that is on the counterparty issue, the—who’s in charge of the 

aggregates? I mean, obviously, you have each individual 

counterparty, but is anybody looking at the aggregate counterparty 

responsibility, and is that something that somebody should be looking at? Mr. Corrigan? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. That—the short answer to that is no, because— 

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody’s looking at it or nobody should look at 

it? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. Well, we should look at it, and we are making efforts through the regulatory process to better look at it through the 

regulated institutions, yes. But it’s not easy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Again, would there be objection if there was a 

way to do that that did not impinge on proprietary concerns? 

Mr. BROWN. I would agree with that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chanos? Yes? 

Mr. CHANOS. Let me just point out. We could look across the 

pond to our financial cousins in the United Kingdom who have a 

very interesting process through their FSA. Their FSA, it’s my understanding, occasionally canvasses all of its major prime brokers 

and then canvasses them separately in relation to their specific 

hedge fund exposure and looks for cross— 

The CHAIRMAN. So that would be a good thing to do? 

Mr. CHANOS. I think it would be— 

48

The CHAIRMAN. Well, good. If the FSA is— Mr. Corrigan? 

Mr. CORRIGAN.—here, too, right now. 

The CHAIRMAN. What’s that, Mr. Corrigan? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. We do that right now here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we might want to improve on that. These 

days if the FSA is doing it, one of the great passionate love affairs 

in the world today is between the American financial community 

and the FSA, except where it comes to executive compensation. 

I understand no love affair is perfect, and the lover may have a 

blemish. And in fact, McCarthy was here the other day and said, 

yes, he is enjoying being the flavor of the month through the FSA. 

So both of those are areas I think we would pursue. 

If you’ll indulge us, the gentleman from Louisiana had one last 

question. 

Mr. BAKER. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Corrigan, I went 

back and looked at the written statement relative to Amaranth, 

and what I drew from your comments was had Amaranth occurred 

in an illiquid market, or where there was a crowded trade going 

on, the unwinding of it all may have been less pretty. 

Mr. CORRIGAN. That’s correct. 

Mr. BAKER. And so the cautionary tale was, although we escaped 

it, let’s not assume our system is functioning exactly as we would 

like to that end. I just wanted to do a quick wrap-up of sort of the 

elements I’ve drawn from this. Limitation on who gets in needs to 

be reviewed whether it’s the individual’s net worth standard, or 

whether it’s pension fund management capability. And I’m adding 

one to the list which I don’t think I’ve heard, and that is limitations more restrained on the fund of funds, the $25,000 entry fee 

into that, I think, is highly inappropriate in today’s world. 

Then establishing a benchmark of best practices, not only for the 

private investment company side, but—and I’m asking here—but 

shouldn’t we do that as well on the counterparty side with the 

broker-dealer community, financials, insurance, whoever is playing 

with these guys needs to be required. And then last would be some 

sort of formal and/or informal exchange. For example, I’m not clear 

today, if I’m the counterparty and I see something that I think is 

ill-advised, when am I obligated to notify my regulator as to the 

hedge fund conduct, not my conduct, which I think is a lower 

standard of responsibility? 

If we were to address those issues, do you feel that is an appropriate litany of steps to take in light of the relatively low systemic 

risk potential we think is likely to be in the near term? 

Mr. CORRIGAN. I think the list is approximately right, and so 

long as we do it in a way that honors this more principles based 

as opposed to checking boxes approach, I think that’s right. 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you. Anybody want to comment? Mr. Hall? 

Mr. HALL. I would agree with that. 

Mr. BAKER. Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you all. This is very useful in advancing 

our understanding, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(49)

A P P E N D I X

March 13, 2007

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