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73–986 PDF 2012

A REVIEW OF AVIATION SAFETY 

IN THE UNITED STATES 

(112–83) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

AVIATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 25, 2012 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Chairman 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota, Vice Chair 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

TESTIMONY 

PANEL ONE

Hon. Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal 

Aviation Administration ...................................................................................... 12 

Hon. David Grizzle, Chief Operating Officer for Air Traffic, Federal Aviation 

Administration ..................................................................................................... 12 

Jeffrey B. Guzzetti, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and Special 

Programs, U.S. Department of Transportation ................................................. 12 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 12 

PANEL TWO

Thomas L. Hendricks, Senior Vice President for Safety, Security and Operations, Airlines for America ................................................................................ 29 

Scott Foose, Senior Vice President, Operations and Safety, Regional Airline 

Association ............................................................................................................ 29 

Captain Sean Cassidy, First Vice President, Air Line Pilots Association, International ................................................................................................................. 29 

Gary M. Fortner, Vice President of Quality Control and Engineering, Fortner 

Engineering and Manufacturing, Inc., on behalf of the Aeronautical Repair 

Station Association ............................................................................................... 29 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, of Texas ................................................................... 55 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Hon. Margaret Gilligan and Hon. David Grizzle, joint statement ...................... 57 

Jeffrey B. Guzzetti ................................................................................................... 68 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. ................................................................................... 84 

Thomas L. Hendricks .............................................................................................. 104 

Scott Foose ............................................................................................................... 106 

Captain Sean Cassidy ............................................................................................. 114 

Gary M. Fortner ....................................................................................................... 122 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Families of Continental Flight 3407, written statement ...................................... 2 

Scott Foose, Senior Vice President, Operations and Safety, Regional Airline 

Association (RAA), May 4, 2012, letter to chairman and ranking member 

of the Subcommittee on Aviation clarifying information presented during 

the hearing, and RAA member list ..................................................................... 39 

Hon. Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal 

Aviation Administration, responses to questions from Hon. Jerry F. 

Costello, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois ................... 65 

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(1) 

A REVIEW OF AVIATION SAFETY 

IN THE UNITED STATES 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Petri (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. PETRI. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Although the United States aviation system is very safe, when 

it comes to aviation safety there is always room for improvement. 

The top priority for our subcommittee is safety, and I know that 

the FAA, aviation operators industry, and passenger advocate 

groups share that priority. 

With this in mind, today we will review the FAA’s safety oversight activities, covering a broad range of issues. 

As we have noted many times in the past, the United States 

aviation system is the safest in the world. On any given day the 

FAA’s air traffic controllers will handle over 28,500 commercial 

flights. In 2011, there were no commercial passenger airline fatalities. Over the past 5 years, roughly 52 million passenger flights 

were operated safely. This high level of safety is the result of collaborative efforts by the FAA, Congress, industry and by other 

stakeholders. 

But we must not forget the one tragic fatal commercial accident 

during those 5 years. We have taken steps with the passage of the 

Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Act of 2010 to 

address the identified weaknesses that contributed to that tragedy, 

and we are accepting a statement for the record from the relatives 

of some of the victims of that airline disaster. 

[The Families of Continental Flight 3407’s prepared statement 

follows:] 

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6 

Mr. PETRI. While the U.S. aviation system enjoys a high level of 

safety, there are areas in which safety can be improved. The General Accounting Office and the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation have conducted audits and studies to assess the FAA’s safety oversight role in a variety of areas, including 

terminal area safety, operational errors, safety management system, oversight of repair stations, and rulemakings required by the 

Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010. 

Today the subcommittee will hear testimony from representatives of the Government, industry, and labor on these and other 

safety oversight issues. As we hear testimony from today’s witnesses, I would like to highlight two areas of safety oversight. 

First, we will look at the requirements included in the bipartisan 

2010 Safety Act. As stated previously, this law was enacted in response to the findings of the National Transportation Safety Board 

and other investigations of the tragic Colgan crash in February of 

2009. The reforms directed the FAA to, among other things, set 

new requirements for pilot flight and duty time and pilot training 

and directed the FAA to develop and maintain a pilot records database. 

We recognize the Colgan family members for their continued 

oversight and attention to ensuring that these requirements are 

put in place. 

I understand that the FAA has made progress on several of the 

required rules, but that significant challenges remain in terms of 

implementing other requirements. We look forward to discussing 

the steps that have been taken and what remains to be addressed 

to successfully implement the law. 

The second area that I would like to highlight is the increase in 

operational errors in recent years. According to the Inspector General, operational errors where there is a loss in required separation 

between aircraft have increased, but the FAA is not able to fully 

explain the reason for the increase. Operational errors pose a safety risk to the aviation system and need to be mitigated. 

According to the FAA, the increase in operational errors is the 

result of increased reporting through the voluntary and nonpunitive air traffic safety action program. Following the audit, the IG 

found no evidence to support this assertion. The Inspector General 

concluded that the exact cause for the rise in operational errors is 

unclear. Given this, we are interested in exploring this with the 

FAA so that we can understand the true cause of the increase in 

operational errors and fully address the safety issue. 

It is our responsibility, regardless of how safe the system is, to 

conduct oversight and address any possible safety issues that may 

be present or arise in the future. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony from the witnesses, and 

thank you again for attending this important oversight hearing. 

Finally, before I recognize Mr. Costello for his opening statement, 

I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days 

to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material 

in the record of this hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

I now recognize Mr. Costello for his opening statement. 

7 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for 

calling the hearing today to review aviation safety in the United 

States. I am pleased to see that a number of the Colgan families 

are with us here, as they have been many times for hearings over 

the past several years. 

We all know that the United States commercial aviation system 

is the safest in the world. It is the safest because of the hard work 

of many individuals and professionals over many years at the FAA, 

the National Transportation Safety Board, Government auditing 

agencies, organized labor, the airline industry and also Congress, 

and in particular this subcommittee. 

As both the chairman and ranking member of the Aviation Subcommittee, I have always made safety my top priority, and I know 

that Mr. Petri has as well. In the 110th and 111th Congresses we 

held 19 safety-related hearings and roundtables, including 2 hearings on runway safety, 4 hearings on pilot training and fatigue and 

a hearing on the FAA’s oversight of outsourced airline maintenance. 

Additionally, in response to the February 2009 Colgan Flight 

3407 crash, we worked together to enact sweeping airline safety 

and pilot training reforms, the strongest piece of airline safety legislation in decades. We will receive updates on all of these subjects 

today, and it is important that we continue to hold subsequent 

hearings on the implementation of the airline safety law. 

I am pleased that we passed and the President signed into law 

the FAA reauthorization bill, although I disagreed with the funding 

cuts in the House bill which the FAA testified would have harmed 

safety because the FAA would have had to furlough a large number 

of safety employees. Fortunately, these cuts were rejected in the 

final conference report. Nevertheless, the DOT IG will testify today 

that we will still need to keep a close eye on whether the FAA has 

an adequate number of safety inspectors. 

Likewise, we had a heated debate over an amendment accepted 

on the House floor that both the NTSB and the FAA said would 

undermine aviation safety rulemakings, including a new pilot fatigue rulemaking. I opposed this amendment, which was also opposed by the Colgan families. The amendment was dropped from 

the conference report, the fatigue rule has been finished, and the 

American public is safer now today because we won that battle. 

Looking forward, we must continue to work together to ensure 

that safety continues to be the subcommittee’s highest priority and 

that we do not enact policies that could undermine our work to improve safety. 

We should continue to be vigilant about the FAA’s oversight of 

contract repair stations. Based on a 2003 DOT IG report that identifies weaknesses in the FAA’s aircraft repair station oversight, 

some members of this subcommittee wanted to require foreign repair stations to be inspected at least twice a year. Instead, Congress adopted a primarily risk-based inspection approach in the recently enacted FAA bill. However, the DOT IG will testify that several weaknesses that they originally identified in 2003 still remain 

and that this issue still requires vigorous oversight. 

Generally speaking, I am encouraged by the progress the FAA 

has made implementing the comprehensive airline safety and pilot 

8 

training bill that we enacted in the 111th Congress. I commend 

Secretary LaHood and the acting administrator for completing a 

pilot fatigue rule and proposing a new pilot training rule that will 

dramatically increase the training standards for first officers. 

As the Colgan tragedy made very clear, aviation safety depends 

on making sure pilots have the training and experience necessary 

to deal with adverse situations. I will continue to work with the 

FAA and all interested stakeholders as this process continues to 

make sure that the FAA produces the strongest possible rule. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for calling the hearing today. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and I will have several questions for them as well. Thank you. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

I would like to ask unanimous consent that our colleague William Shuster, a member of the full committee, be permitted to participate in all of the proceedings of this subcommittee hearing. 

Mr. Duncan, do you have an opening statement? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have heard 

the opening statements that you and Ranking Member Costello 

have given, and I certainly agree with all of your remarks. And I 

salute you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Costello for the 

great work you have done in this Subcommittee on Aviation Safety. 

Certainly we all want to try to make our aviation system as safe 

as possible and do whatever we can. You can never rest on your 

laurels in any field or profession or occupation, and we shouldn’t 

rest on our laurels about aviation safety. We should always be trying to make things better and improve things that we can. 

By the same token, the American aviation system has the greatest record of almost any industry and anything. I did chair this 

subcommittee for 6 years, but I now chair the Highways and Transit Subcommittee, and it is a very unfortunate thing that we have 

about as many deaths in 31⁄2 months on the Nation’s highways as 

we have had in all U.S. aviation accidents combined since the 

Wright Brothers’ flight in 1903. 

I am concerned. I know that this hearing is supposed to look at 

aviation safety in general, and there are many different aspects of 

it. I am concerned about something though that we will get more 

into in the second panel, and I won’t be able to be here at that time 

because starting at 10 o’clock I am going to be leading a tribute on 

the floor of the House to Coach Pat Summitt, who received the top 

award of the National Alzheimer’s Association and is being honored 

by the Tennessee delegation on the floor of the House this morning. 

But there is a provision to apply these same flight crew rest requirements to cargo aircraft as passenger aircraft, and I think we 

need to be very careful before we—we need to look before we leap 

on that, because I am told that that rule, if applied to cargo airlines, would cost, according to the FAA’s own analysis, $306 million, which is about 15 times the benefits that would accrue. In addition to that, cargo pilots, I am told many cargo pilots now fly only 

31 hours a month, which seems to me is a real sweetheart deal, 

and fly about half the time that passenger pilots fly. So I just don’t 

know that we may be correcting a problem that doesn’t exist. 

I understand that there were only two crashes in the last 30 

years, or two accidents by cargo planes, and neither one of those 

9 

would have been prevented by this rule that we are talking about. 

In fact, one of them apparently came about because of personal 

problems that the pilot was having at home and not anything due 

to rest. 

So, I hope we look into that proposed legislation very, very carefully before we get into it. 

Already, because of the cost of fuel, we have been told over the 

years that each one penny increase in jet fuel costs the aviation industry as a whole $180 million to $200 million a year, a phenomenal statistic. And now because fuel has gone up so much, passenger travel is going to shoot way up, and because cargo planes 

carry almost everything, the cost of almost everything is going to 

go up. So we need to be very careful in what we do in this regard. 

I thank you very much for yielding me this time. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Shuster, would you care to make a 

statement? 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. 

I was the author of that amendment that passed on the House 

floor that was taken out in committee. I was disappointed, because 

that amendment I believe dealt directly with safety first. But looking at things based on science, not on emotion, not on knee-jerk reactions, but based on the cost-benefit analysis and looking at the 

different operations that the pilots they participate in, there is passenger and cargo. And there is a difference, as my colleague from 

Tennessee pointed out. The time that a pilot operates cargo versus 

passenger aircraft is significantly different. 

But I am very pleased that the FAA came with a final rule regarding the flight crew duty and rest requirements, and it followed, 

as did our amendment, followed the President’s Executive order. I 

don’t always agree with the President, but in this case we were on 

the same page. So, the final rule I believe does reflect the Executive order, it does reflect an amendment we tried to pass, and it 

looks at passenger versus cargo in a different way. One size doesn’t 

fit all. 

My colleague also pointed out the cost-benefit analysis, the cost 

to the industry, which is probably much higher than the FAA 

thinks it would be. As I said, once size does not fit all. There are 

a few other significant things the cargo industry has done in the 

past several years. It has reduced all accidents significantly over 

the past two decades, and since 2003, have operated over 8 million 

flight operations with no fatigue-related accidents. That is a pretty 

strong indication they are doing the right thing. 

It provides more and longer flight crewmember rest opportunities 

than passenger flights. They spent millions of dollars on sleep facilities, both in cargo hubs and on board long-range aircraft. It operates with no passengers or flight attendants, thereby allowing 

restful sleep aboard long-range aircraft. And schedule of pilots, as 

was mentioned, they fly significantly less than the passenger pilots. 

So, again, I am looking forward to the hearing. I appreciate and 

respect and support what the FAA did on this, and I will continue 

to fight to make sure we do rules and regulations in a reasonable 

way while maintaining a high level of safety. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Boswell, did you have a word you wanted to say? 

10 

Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just very briefly. I told 

you I did not, and I looked over your panels, and I just want to 

thank you for having the experts you have got before you now. But 

I am also very interested in Panel 2 that we are going to have. 

It just made me reminisce for a second. Years and years ago 

when I became a safety officer in a unit that I was in, and I found 

out when I sat down with the crews, the pilots, the people that flew 

in the aircraft and so on, is where I really put it together, and we 

had what turned out to be an excellent, very successful program. 

So I am glad to see that you have airlines and regionals and the 

Airline Pilot Association as you go down that list. 

So, thank you very much. I think that we will learn a lot and 

I look forward to what comes out of this. So I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. I recognize the chairman of the full committee, John 

Mica from Florida. 

Mr. MICA. Well, thank you. And as Elizabeth Taylor said to her 

sixth husband, I don’t intend to keep you long. I will try to be as 

brief as possible, like Mr. Boswell. 

Well, first of all, I have to say thank you to Mr. Petri and Mr. 

Costello. This is a very important hearing and a very important responsibility of this subcommittee, and that is our aviation industry 

and passenger service safety and oversight of that. 

Let me just say here we have been so fortunate. We have had 

some great leadership working together. We did pass finally FAA 

legislation that was 5 years overdue, 23 extensions. In the interim 

we worked together. 

The large commercial aircraft have had an incredible safety 

record. We saw some problems with commuter, and through the 

Colgan families and others everyone was determined to make certain tat commuter passengers are just as safe as those on a large 

commercial aircraft. We lost lives there. We put some reforms in 

place, and actually last year’s record was incredible. 

But let me tell you this. Mark this in the record. We will have 

a horrible incident involving passenger aircraft. Why do I say that? 

Because the odds are just totally stacked against us. You can only 

go so long when you have so many human beings involved, when 

you have technology that sometimes fails. And people are going to 

come back and say well, what did they do to make certain that this 

didn’t happen? And this hearing is one of them. And we have 

missed the mark. 

I just got through talking to an aviation group, and I cited 

NextGen. NextGen provides us not only a better way to get our 

planes around, environmentally more friendly, shorter points, 

knowing where the planes are in the air, on the ground, changing 

out of a post-World War II radar-based system to a satellite based 

system, all of that. But that program is 2 years behind. It is at half 

a billion dollars. Some of the technical components, for example 

ERAM, 2 years behind, half a billion dollars behind. And this needs 

to come out. 

We have had FAA in turmoil, because I remember Babbitt coming to me and people say why did you push to move this bill forward? Because Randy Babbitt told me that his operations were in 

a state of confusion. These 2-month, 2-week extensions, were costing millions of dollars and keeping the agency in turmoil. Now we 

11 

have him departed. We have had an FAA with no administrator at 

some times, now an acting administrator and an under-siege administrator. And it is difficult to get things done in that atmosphere. Then you don’t have the blueprint, which is the Federal law 

which we now have in place. 

So this is an opportunity to get it back in place. I am hoping that 

we don’t have what I described that we are long overdue for, and 

that is going to be, unfortunately, again there are just so many 

human beings, so much technology in place. 

You have got to have two things that I think are important. One, 

you have to have the personnel, and you have to have the technology. I talked about that for a second. That is behind schedule, 

over budget and not acceptable. 

The second thing is personnel. We have some great air traffic 

controllers, and thank goodness in the most recent months we have 

not had another incident of somebody sleeping on the job or not 

paying attention on the job or lax on the job. Most of the incidents, 

and every one of them the staff will tell you, every incident I try 

to investigation, was this a rookie air traffic controller or was this 

somebody experienced. Most of the incidents, unfortunately, have 

been with people who have been experienced. 

So we have met, and we have got to redouble our effort, guys, 

to make certain that the air traffic controllers, and we are changing many of them out because of their age and retirement. So you 

have to have a program to make certain that they are the best 

trained and also the best prepared, best to go to work rested and 

all of these things. 

And some of the conditions where air traffic controllers actually 

in the United States stink, they need to be improved. I have seen 

pets accommodated better than some of our air traffic controllers, 

and that needs to be changed out and I am going to work with 

folks to do that. We saw some of the accommodations in Canada 

that were just outstanding workplaces and conducive to putting a 

rested, alert well-trained air traffic controller on the job. So we 

have got to improve that part of the equation, which is the human 

equation. 

So I guess that is my little longer than I should talk, but this 

is very important. Again, I commend you and we will stay on it 

with you and work with the agencies. I want to hear from the witnesses. Thank you, I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Now we turn to our panel. The Honorable 

Margaret Gilligan, who is the associate administrator for Aviation 

Safety of FAA; the Honorable David Grizzle, the chief operating officer, Air Traffic Organization at the FAA; Jeffrey B. Guzzetti, who 

is the assistant inspector general for aviation and special programs 

of the Department of Transportation; and the person who assists 

us on many of these occasions, Dr. Gerald Dillingham, director, 

physical infrastructure issues, Government Accountability Office. 

Ma’am and gentleman, thank you very much for joining us. As 

you know, we thank you for your prepared statements and would 

invite you to summarize them in approximately 5 minutes, beginning with Ms. Gilligan. 

12 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MARGARET GILLIGAN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL 

AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; THE HONORABLE DAVID GRIZZLE, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER FOR AIR TRAFFIC, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; JEFFREY B. GUZZETTI, 

ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AVIATION AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; 

AND GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Chairman Petri, Congressman Costello and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting us here today to 

review aviation safety in the United States. I would like to update 

you on the progress we have made to implement the Airline Safety 

and FAA Extension Act of 2010. But as mentioned in your opening 

statements, we know there is a lot of interest in air traffic control 

as well, so I am joined today by my colleague David Grizzle, the 

chief operating officer for the Air Traffic Organization, who will be 

here to answer any questions you may have on air traffic management. 

Several provisions in the 2010 act helped facilitate major safety 

advancements, such as the new flight duty and rest requirements 

for pilots and a proposal to require air carriers to implement safety 

management systems. Although some of the provisions have taken 

longer than Congress anticipated under the provisions of the act, 

we have made significant strides in accomplishing many of the objectives. 

In the area of pilot fatigue, which was identified as a top priority 

in the FAA’s 2009 call to action, we completed the final rule, which 

uses the latest fatigue science to establish flight schedules that 

mitigate and manage fatigue. Flight duty periods under the new 

rules are more comprehensive and include flight-related activities 

such as time spent in training and standing by on call for flights 

at an airport. These duties are part of the workday, they contribute 

to fatigue, and they must be counted as part of the core job of flying the airplane. 

We also took into account that off duty activities, such as recreational activities or commuting, have an impact on fatigue. To 

address this, the final rule establishes new fitness for duty requirements that serve as a reminder to both the airlines and the pilots 

of their professional responsibilities to ensure that rest periods are 

used for what they are intended, and that is to rest. 

We met the statutory deadline in the 2010 act to issue a proposal 

requiring air carriers to develop and implement safety management systems. The FAA and industry recognize SMS as a holistic 

approach to safety that allows for trend spotting to help identify 

possible safety problems and correct them before they lead to accidents or incidents. 

We have initiated two rulemaking projects to address the pilot 

training and experience requirements highlighted in the act. The 

first project is a comprehensive proposal to revise the current qualification and training requirements not just for pilots, but for flight 

attendants and aircraft dispatchers. 

13 

Although we had initiated this project before the tragic Colgan 

accidents, in order to fully consider the comments we received on 

the proposal, to address many NTSB recommendations that resulted from the investigation of that accident, and to incorporate 

the mandates of the 2010 act, we issued a supplemental proposal 

in May 2011. The comment period closed in September and we are 

working on the comments to develop a final rule to address these 

training enhancements. 

We have also proposed a rule to require first officers to hold an 

airline transport pilot’s certificate requiring 1,500 hours of pilot 

flight time in most cases. We appreciate that in the act Congress 

acknowledged the measurement of pilot experience is not limited 

solely to the number of hours flown, so our proposal would allow 

a restricted airline transport pilot’s certificate in two instances. 

First, graduates of a 4-year aviation degree program who receive 

their commercial pilot’s certificate and instrument rating while 

studying at the school would need only 1,000 hours of flight time. 

Former military pilots would require only 750 hours of flight time. 

The comment period on this proposal will close April 30th. 

There are, as you have noted, a few areas of the 2010 act that 

have presented some challenge to the FAA. The first concerns the 

area of pilot professionalism. We in industry recognize the need to 

continuously improve professional standards to improve flight deck 

discipline. We have drafted a proposal that is currently in executive review as we continue to work on balancing the regulatory 

burden and the effectiveness of the proposal. 

Another challenging area is the development of a centralized 

database of pilot records. We are working to define the scope of the 

records to be reported and how to integrate thousands of records 

kept on all forms of media from paper to microfiche to various 

automated systems. We do have several major milestones in place 

and we do anticipate a database proof of concept test this summer. 

All of these initiatives have been very complicated and in some 

cases very expensive. As the rulemakings progress, we are constantly evaluating how these provisions may best be leveraged to 

improve safety while ensuring the benefits justify the costs. We remain committed to addressing these safety enhancements while 

continuing with our daily oversight responsibilities, and now while 

satisfying the requirements recently set forth in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. 

Chairman Petri, Mr. Costello, members of the subcommittee, this 

concludes our prepared remarks and we are prepared to answer 

questions. Thank you. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Grizzle. 

Mr. GRIZZLE. Sir, I do not have a statement separate from Ms. 

Gilligan’s. 

Mr. PETRI. All right. Mr. Guzzetti. 

Mr. GUZZETTI. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member Costello, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the state of aviation safety and FAA’s oversight of the 

National Airspace System. 

As you know, FAA does operate the world’s safest transportation 

system, largely due to the dedication of its workforce. FAA has implemented many initiatives to enhance safety, such as its recent acVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:38 Jul 06, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\AV\4-25-1~1\73986.TXT JEAN
14 

tions in response to the 2010 Airline Safety and FAA Extension 

Act. However, to realize the full benefits of the programs it has in 

place, FAA must address challenges in three key areas. 

First, FAA needs to improve the way it collects, counts and uses 

data regarding incidents where aircraft come too close together in 

the air and on the ground. Over the past few years, FAA has encouraged controllers to voluntarily report errors through the Air 

Traffic Safety Action Program, or ATSAP. However, FAA does not 

count all ATSAP reported errors in its yearly totals. As a result, 

it is unclear whether the 53-percent rise we saw in reported controller errors between fiscal years 2009 and 2010 is due to more errors, improved reporting, or both. 

According to FAA, the increase is likely due to more errors being 

reported through ATSAP, but our work does not support this assertion. The agency’s en route centers which have had systems in 

place for years to automatically detect separation losses saw a 39- 

percent increase in errors during that same period. This would indicate that the increase is due at least in part to more actual errors 

occurring. 

It is clear that FAA can better leverage existing data to investigate incidents, identify trends and root causes and mitigate their 

risks. Currently FAA does not effectively analyze data captured 

through ATSAP or through its automated detection tool recently installed at terminal facilities. 

With runway incursions, FAA has made progress in reducing the 

most serious ones. Serious incidents declined over the past decade 

from 53 in fiscal year 2001 down to only 7 in fiscal year 2011. However, the number of serious incursions reported so far this fiscal 

year is already up to 12, which is nearly double last year’s events. 

To sustain the progress made in past years, executive level oversight and accountability will be needed. This is going to remain a 

watch item for our office. 

Second, FAA needs to improve its risk-based oversight of the 

aviation industry. In particular, oversight at repair stations has 

been a longstanding challenge for FAA and one we have reported 

on since 2003. While FAA established a risk-based system in 2007 

for improved surveillance, our ongoing work indicates there are 

still problems. For example, the system is not applied consistently 

and it does not permit trend analyses needed to better target repair stations with the greatest risks. Our work has also shown that 

FAA needs to strengthen its risk-based oversight of aircraft manufacturers under its relatively new delegated authority program 

known as ODA. We issued a report on ODA last year and FAA has 

responded positively to our recommendations. 

Because FAA may never have enough inspectors to oversee every 

aspect of aviation, it is critical that it target its inspector workforce 

to areas with the highest risk. A 2006 study mandated by this subcommittee found that FAA wasn’t effectively allocating its inspector 

workforce and they recommended a new approach. FAA introduced 

a new staffing model in 2009 and we are currently evaluating it. 

Thus far, however, it appears that FAA needs to further refine the 

model to obtain reliable staffing projections. 

Finally, FAA needs to continue its focus on implementing key 

provisions of the Airline Safety Act. FAA has made progress on 

15 

many of the Act’s provisions, such as updating pilot rest requirements. However, the agency has been challenged to implement 

other key measures, as Ms. Gilligan mentioned. For example, the 

new rest rules do not require carriers to identify pilots who commute hundreds or thousands of miles to their duty location. FAA 

is also several months behind on issuing rules to improve pilot 

training and implement pilot mentoring programs. All of these 

issues were seen in the tragic 2009 Colgan crash. 

FAA is also behind in its efforts to enhance pilot qualifications. 

The agency expects to issue a rule by August 2013, a year after the 

mandated deadline. Due to the increase in flight hours the rule will 

require, FAA has met opposition from airlines who feel the quality 

and type of training should be weighted more heavily than the actual number of hours. Airlines are also concerned that entry level 

pilots will have difficulty meeting the new flight time mandates. 

FAA also faces challenges in developing a centralized pilot 

records database for carriers to use when hiring pilots. These challenges include determining what records should be captured, maintaining the flow of information during that transition, and addressing concerns with the National Driver Register data. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate that FAA has overcome many challenges and continues to take important steps to 

oversee aviation safety. We will continue to monitor FAA’s progress 

to address these issues and we will keep this subcommittee apprised of our work. 

This concludes my statement. I will be happy to address any of 

the questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Dillingham. 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Costello, Mr. Duncan and other members of the committee. As you 

have heard from previous witnesses, FAA regulates one of the 

safest aviation systems in the world, and to its credit FAA continues to strive for even higher levels of safety through a shift to 

a more data-driven, risk-based safety oversight approach. This shift 

means that FAA needs safety data that is accurate, complete, and 

gives it the capability to identify systemwide trends and manage 

emerging risks. 

My testimony this morning focuses on three key aspects of FAA’s 

implementation of its new approach. First is how FAA uses data 

to manage safety risk; second is how FAA ensures the quality of 

its safety data; and third are the several challenges the agency 

must address in using data to better manage aviation safety. 

Regarding how FAA uses data to manage safety, FAA collects accident data and uses various voluntary reporting programs to collect incident data, such as for runway incursions and operational 

errors. FAA also collects data through its inspection and certification program. 

For decades, FAA, NTSB, and the aviation industry have used 

data primarily in a reactive fashion; that is, after an accident, to 

identify the causes and take action to prevent their reoccurrence. 

FAA’s new use of safety data combines this approach and a 

proactive approach in which data are used to identify emerging 

risks and strategies to reduce the likelihood of accidents before 

they occur. 

16 

FAA also plans to use data proactively to identify risks that 

might emerge with the introduction of NextGen capabilities into 

the NAS. In 2010, GAO examined how FAA ensures the quality of 

that data. We found that the agency had a variety of processes in 

place that we consider good practices to help ensure data quality. 

However, we did identify some vulnerabilities in FAA’s processes 

that could potentially limit the usefulness of its data for both safety 

analysis and for conducting oversight through safety management 

systems. We made several recommendations to FAA to help improve and expand on this capability to use data. 

Mr. Chairman, although FAA has put in place various quality 

controls for its data, it continues to experience data challenges, 

some of which may hinder the agency’s ability to assess and manage risks. Similar to the IG’s findings, it is unclear if the recent 

increase in operational error reports is due to more actual reporting or an actual increase in errors. FAA also lacks data in some 

areas that are important for monitoring safety risks. For example, 

the lack of ramp incident data means that FAA is unable to assess 

the risk of safety events in that area. 

Another challenge is in what some industry stakeholders have 

identified as the number one air transportation safety issue. That 

is runway safety. According to FAA, there are three runway incursions that occur each day at towered airports in the United States, 

and research has also shown that runway excursions can be just 

as dangerous as incursions. 

Our October 2011 study found that FAA does not have a process 

in place to track and evaluate runway excursions. The absence of 

such a process inhibits FAA’s capability to address the risks of 

these time of safety events. Similarly, the lack of complete data for 

inspections of pilot training schools and pilot examiners makes it 

difficult for FAA to ensure that the training standards are being 

met for the initial training of pilots. In response to our recommendation or on its own volition, for each of the challenges I 

have identified, as well as others that are listed in our written 

statement, FAA has efforts planned or underway to address them. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, given FAA’s forecast of significant increases in aviation traffic, we would urge that all stakeholders not 

become complacent with the extraordinary aviation safety record 

that has been achieved to date and continue to do what will be necessary to make a safe system even safer. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PETRI. Well, thank you. I thank you all for your summaries. 

I have a couple of questions. 

Ms. Gilligan, if you have looked at this, it is indicated the FAA 

safety management pilot program, there is a difference in the participation between the larger airlines and smaller airlines. I think 

the information I have is that 14 of the 15 smaller air carriers, 

those with 20 planes or less, are not participating in the program, 

and the point was made that it might not be scalable for smaller 

airplanes. Is that true or is that something that is of concern or 

is that being addressed? Could you discuss that? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. As you know, we 

do have a pilot program, because, before we put the rule in place, 

we wanted to learn ourselves what was the best way to frame the 

17 

regulation for the safety management system. The pilot program 

has been very helpful in helping us better understand what the 

necessary elements are, and specifically to your question, how can 

we assure that the rule allows it to be appropriate to the size of 

the operation. 

This is something we have been aware of for a long time. I believe former Administrator Babbitt testified to this committee that 

in an airline with two airplanes and a small number of crew, written records may be sufficient, whereas at the newly merged United 

Airlines, for example, clearly automated systems that know how to 

collect and analyze data will be necessary to be successful. We are 

taking that all into account as we look at finalizing our rule to assure that the rule is sufficiently flexible to allow all of the operators to make the most use out of a safety management system effectively and efficiently. So we will be watching closely to be able 

to scale it to the size of the operation. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. I think this was mentioned by Mr. 

Guzzetti, but I wonder if you could respond. The people in the repair station industry argue that the oversight by the FAA is often 

inconsistent between FAA offices and even within FAA offices. Do 

you recognize that problem or is it being dealt with or is there an 

explanation for that situation? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes. Again, Mr. Chairman, we certainly have 

heard the criticism of inconsistency among FAA offices. We are a 

large organization with over 125 offices across the country and 

around the world, and individuals who come to work intending to 

do the best they know how to do every day can sometimes disagree. 

So we are constantly looking for ways to document what the proper 

processes and procedures are so that our staff is well informed and 

well trained. 

We do have processes in place for any of our certificate holders 

to raise questions if they believe that they have gotten an inaccurate or an incorrect determination from one of our inspectors, 

and we are really building a culture that allows for that exchange 

of professional disagreement, because we think that is healthy. 

Folks in the industry are smart. FAA doesn’t have the corner on 

the market on how to interpret all of the rules and regulations. We 

need to work together to make sure that we have the right safety 

outcome. 

So we believe with those kinds of programs in place, where people can ask questions, we will all get to the best safety outcome. 

But it is a criticism we are constantly working to improve. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. There has been some discussion, Mr. 

Grizzle, of the increase in reported incidences of operational errors 

and then some speculation as to the reason, whether it is better reporting or more actual errors or whatever. Could you shed any 

light on that situation? 

Mr. GRIZZLE. Mr. Chairman, we have been in the process of making a substantial change to the culture within the Air Traffic Organization to encourage the voluntary reporting of operational incidents. We have also been changing our entire program for data acquisition of events that do occur. We are confident that because of 

these cultural changes, the reporting of incidents has increased. 

But we are not able to tell which part of the increase is the result 

18 

of greater reporting and which part of the increase is the result of 

more incidents in fact occurring. 

However, as you know, the occurrence of incidents is extremely 

rare and that is the reason that we have paid a great deal of attention to making sure that we are able to harvest as much information as we possibly can from every incident so that we can turn 

that data into information which then becomes risk managing 

changes of procedures, and we have done a very good job in that 

regard. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Costello. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, just to put things in perspective, if I may, to follow up on Mr. Grizzle’s comments, I think it is noteworthy to take 

a look at how many operations take place a year versus how many 

operational errors there have been reported. And as the chairman 

said earlier and a number of other Members have said, one incident of operational error is too many and we need to do everything 

we can to reduce the number of errors. 

But when you take a look at the ATC operations, how many operations they handled in fiscal year 2009, there were 120.3 million 

and there were 1,234 operational errors, which is 0.001 percent of 

the total operations that year. The number of flight operations that 

the air traffic system handled in fiscal year 2010, there were 118.9 

million operations and there were 1,187 operational errors, which 

is 0.0016 of the total in that year. So it comes down to in fiscal 

year 2009 about 1 error reported either by someone in the system, 

including a pilot, to 1 error per 100,000 flight operations and 1.5 

percent errors per 100,000 flight operations in fiscal year 2010. So 

I think it is worth noting. The purpose of this hearing is to make 

certain that we reduce to zero, so there are zero operational errors. 

With that being said, Dr. Dillingham, let me ask you, in an October GAO report, the report, and I quote, says, ‘‘We found evidence 

to suggest that changes to reporting policies and processes have 

likely contributed to the increased number of incidents reported 

into the ATQA, the official data base for operational errors.’’ 

Would you explain some of the evidence that you reviewed, the 

GAO reviewed, in order to reach that conclusion? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Costello. We looked at some of 

the data that you in fact have just provided to us and we also 

looked at other situations where new policies and procedures were 

put in place at the same time as technology was put in place. And 

what we found in terms of evidence is we found an association 

wherein we could see that there were more operational errors being 

reported at the same time that these various other activities were 

taking place, but we could not establish a causal relationship and 

sort out the factors that might be having the most effect on this 

reporting. And until that kind of analysis is done, until that kind 

of statistical analysis is done, as Mr. Grizzle said, it is an unknown, logically it fits, but sometimes logic goes out when you actually do the statistical analysis to ensure that what you are seeing 

logically is in fact real. 

Mr. COSTELLO. A followup question. In talking about the series 

of recent policy changes that Mr. Grizzle referred to and you referred to as well, the FAA is reporting processes that include makVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:38 Jul 06, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\AV\4-25-1~1\73986.TXT JEAN
19 

ing incident reports less punitive, removal of facility incident targets, implementation of new technology and a shifting to a riskbased system. 

Would you explain for the record some of these changes and 

whether or not you believe that there is a correlation between 

these changes and the increase in reporting of operational errors? 

You touched on that in answer to my first question, but everything 

that I have read I have to conclude that there is a correlation. You 

have no reason to doubt that there is a correlation, is that correct? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I don’t have any reason to doubt there is a correlation. I would be hesitant to use that statistical term of correlation. But understanding what you mean and that there is in fact 

some kind of likely association, all of the things that you mentioned 

as policy changes would contribute to having people feel more free 

to in fact report incidences that they were aware of. 

Mr. COSTELLO. For the record, could you explain just a few of the 

policy changes that the FAA has been dealing with at the same 

time taking into account these operational error reports? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. You mentioned one, the removal of the 

limits that were in place for the number of operational errors that 

could be reported by a facility. When that limit was removed, it 

meant that supervisors were not as concerned about going over 

that limit and anything that might result, any kind of discipline or 

negative association that would result from reporting as many 

operational errors as occurred. 

There is also a de-identification of the controllers who are in fact 

making those kinds of reports, so that again the anonymous nature 

of it made controllers feel a lot safer or freer in making those kinds 

of reports. 

So all of those things together were contributing factors as far as 

we can determine at this point. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. Mr. Grizzle, would you explain what 

not-to-exceed targets were and whether or not you agree with the 

GAO’s assessment? 

Mr. GRIZZLE. We do agree with the GAO’s assessment. Our centers have had automatic incident detection technology for quite a 

while. We took our ATO total of incidents that we were expecting 

and we allocated that to facilities so that each facility, in effect, 

had a quota that they were not to exceed. Unlike the new error detection technology that we are implementing now, which is referred 

to as TARP, the technology that was in place in the centers involved evaluation and characterization of the incidents in the facilities. And so there was an opportunity for facility managers to characterize the events as errors or not. Consequently, with the ‘‘notto-exceed’’ requirement in place, this was in fact an incentive and 

a capability to manage down the number of incidents that had been 

reported with the automatic detection technology. 

Mr. COSTELLO. A final question, and then I will probably come 

back and have a few more after the first round. What if any role 

did the TARP program, the Traffic Analysis and Review Program, 

and the implementation of the radar voice replay technologies play 

with regard to the increase in the operation error? 

Mr. GRIZZLE. It certainly has an impact. The TARP is in the 

process of being implemented. It is currently in place in all of our 

20 

terminal facilities, but the data is only being analyzed currently at 

37 of the facilities. By the end of this fiscal year, the data from all 

of our terminal facilities will be analyzed for 24/7 operations, and 

at that point we believe it will have a substantial impact on our 

reportable incident numbers. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Guzzetti, would you care to comment? 

Mr. GUZZETTI. Yes. To piggyback on Mr. Grizzle’s comments 

about the implementation of TARP, FAA estimates that the number of reported operational errors will increase greatly, perhaps by 

as many as 600 to 900 additional losses of separation each day. But 

again, not all losses of separation are operational errors. In fact, 

just a small percentage. But even if you take a small percentage 

of the amount of losses of separation that will be recorded automatically every day by TARP, the number is going to jump up. We 

don’t know how much. But it is imperative that a baseline is generated after TARP has been implemented and settles down so that 

we get an idea of just what is the norm, what is the baseline for 

the total number of yearly operational errors. And only then do I 

think we can use that as a performance measure. 

Mr. COSTELLO. My last question for you, Mr. Guzzetti. You cited 

that in 2010 there was a misinterpretation of arrival waivers in 

Southern California TRACON as a factor in contributing to the statistical spike in operational errors. Can you explain what actually 

happened and how it impacted the operational error statistic? 

Mr. GUZZETTI. Yes, Congressman Costello. In early 2010 in the 

Los Angeles region the controllers there, Southern California 

TRACON, were bringing airplanes into LAX as well as Hawthorne. 

Hawthorne had a runway that was close to LAX and they were 

kind of treating it as three parallel runways in terms of routing 

these airplanes in there. 

The Southern California TRACON was using this procedure for 

many years. They felt it was safe. However, FAA’s AOV ATC oversight organization came in and said, ‘‘You know what? We don’t 

think this is safe. We think there is a loss of separation here.’’ And 

they made them go back 45 days, which is how long they keep recorded radar data, and they found that 147 losses of separation as 

a result of this approach procedure should be deemed to be operational errors and they added that to the count. That accounted for 

about 23 percent of that spike that I alluded to between 2009 and 

2010. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Coble. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had two conflicting 

meetings, so I missed much of the testimony, but I appreciate the 

witnesses’ contribution. 

Ms. Gilligan, I am told that the FAA is behind in issuing the 

final rule for pilot qualifications. What is the status of this rulemaking effort? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, Congressman. We did issue that rule. It is 

currently out for comment. The comment period will close at the 

end of this month and then we will work very quickly to try to get 

this to final rule. As you know, under the statute, the requirement 

for 1,500 hours and for all pilots to have an ATP will go into effect 

21 

in August of 2013, so we want our rule to be in place by that same 

time. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you. Furthermore, I am told that the FAA is 

working to refine its inspector staffing model to more effectively 

identify the number of inspectors needed and where they should be 

placed to address the greatest safety risks. What is the status of 

this effort, Ms. Gilligan? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. That model, sir, has been in use actually over the 

last two budget cycles, so we have been making some use of the 

model. But we are trying to refine the data that goes into it. The 

way we set up the model originally, we collected data from subject 

matter experts, inspectors out in the field, about what they do and 

how often they do it. But we do think there can be some refinement 

brought to that. So with each year we are learning more about how 

to really try to calculate what our future need will be based on our 

past experience, which is really how we have set up the model. 

So, again, we have used it as we have developed our budget requests for the last couple of fiscal years, but we are just trying to 

make it as tight as we can. 

Mr. COBLE. I thank you. 

Mr. Guzzetti, you may have touched on this, but let me ask Dr. 

Dillingham a question. Doctor, what are the causes of runway incursions and what has the FAA done to mitigate incursion risks? 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Coble. We have looked at it 

over the last decade, and there are three principal causes for runway incursions. One is failure to comply with ATC instructions. 

Another one is what is referred to as lack of situational awareness. 

Oftentimes if a pilot is unfamiliar with the aircraft or with the airport in fact, you can in fact lose your place and cause a runway 

incursion. And then the other one, the other factor is just not conforming to standard operating procedures. 

So those are the three factors. And FAA has taken a myriad of 

actions to address this issue, including updating the taxiway and 

runway markings, putting in technologies like runway lights to indicate when a runway is in use. They have done a number of 

things in terms of training of pilots, controllers. 

So they have done, as I said, a myriad of things to address these 

things, but they still occur, and part of it is it is a learning experience, and also the human element in it means that you are not 

going to get all of them out down to zero. But the effort is being 

made. 

Mr. COBLE. Thank you, sir. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen for 

being with us. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Capuano, any questions? 

Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I was a little late. I had other things I had to do so I didn’t hear your testimony. I have reviewed it. And also, I am kind of a simple guy. The 

chairman and the ranking member do a great job on the details 

and the technicalities. I am a pretty simple guy. I flew down here, 

flying home hopefully Friday. My wife and her family are currently 

on a plane. 

22 

I just want to know a really simple thing. I think really what 

America wants to know is just one simple thing, and I would like 

to hear from each of you. 

Ms. Gilligan, is it safe to fly? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Mr. Capuano, I can assure you that everyone at 

FAA and everyone in this industry works every day to assure that 

it is as safe as it can be. I think our record demonstrates that we 

have made that commitment, and that we are continuing to meet 

it. I think as the chairman and Mr. Costello identified early on, we 

are not resting on those laurels though. 

Mr. CAPUANO. No, I respect everybody’s attempt to get to zero. 

We all—everybody wants to do that. But basically, you fly, you 

family flies? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Of course. 

Mr. CAPUANO. You recommend to everybody you know that flying 

is safe. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. We wish you could fly to the supermarket because 

it is safer than lots of other modes of transportation. 

Mr. CAPUANO. I could carry more groceries, too. Mr. Grizzle, is 

it safe to fly? Do you recommend? Do you recommend to your family to? 

Mr. GRIZZLE. Sir, it is extremely safe. In fact, when people ask 

me what is the safest airport to fly out of, I say the one closest to 

your home. Because once you get on the airplane you are in one 

of the safest spots you can be in your entire day. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you. Mr. Guzzetti? 

Mr. GUZZETTI. I would concur that it is safe to fly. As we have 

all indicated in our testimony, the United States has the safest air 

transportation system in the world. However, there is always room 

for improvement. I am a pilot myself. I fly airplanes myself, as well 

as take my family on airplanes. But I also recognize as a former 

accident investigator and as an aeronautical engineer, that there is 

always room for improvement and the key to improvement is constantly remaining vigilant and collecting data. 

Mr. CAPUANO. Mr. Dillingham, the same question. 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, I concur that it is safe to fly. Some aspects 

of flying are safer than others. I think there is beginning to be a 

consensus that the most dangerous part of the flight is when the 

wheels are still on the ground. 

Mr. CAPUANO. And I thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Now, obviously, I agree with that, but you are the professionals. You are the 

experts. I am not. And the truth is, most Americans, they don’t understand half of the acronyms you use. I struggle to keep up with 

some of them myself. And the truth is, I understand some—I also 

understand that accidents happen, you know, sometimes they are 

mechanical, and sometimes they are human error, and it happens. 

And I really, I will tell you unequivocally, that I really respect the 

job that all of you do to try to get that to zero. You are pretty darn 

close to zero, if you want the truth, from everything I know, and 

as a flying person myself, I want to thank you for that, and thank 

you for your testimony today. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Shuster. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here today. I appreciate the line of questioning of my colleague 

23 

from Massachusetts, because I have been telling my children for 

the last 15 years when we go to fly somewhere, they are concerned 

about flying and safety, and I always tell them the most dangerous 

part of the trip is getting to the airport. So I appreciate that. My 

20-year-old son, I will take the testimony back and he will finally 

believe they me that I know something—what I am talking about. 

Ms. Gilligan, I want to commend you on the ruling. I think it 

was the absolutely the right way to go, taking into what you took 

into consideration, and the question I have is, isn’t it—isn’t it true 

that cargo carriers and passengers are vastly different models the 

systems operate under? Although the fatigue can have the same reaction, the fact is they operate differently. Can you talk a little bit 

about that, what you went through and what you found as you 

came up to make the ruling? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Sure. Yes, Congressman, it is accurate that the 

model for cargo is very different from the passenger carrying 

model. Having said that though, as you point out, fatigue affects 

all of us the same way. So we do think that there are elements in 

our new rule that could be very beneficial to the cargo industry. In 

fact, we did take into account in the rule that oftentimes pilots are 

given rests after they have flown into a hub airport, while boxes 

are being moved they are given an opportunity for rest, and we 

would allow cargo operators to take credit for that additional rest, 

for example, under the new rule. We also have—— 

Mr. SHUSTER. How long a time could that last? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. I believe in the rule it was credit for up to a 4- 

hour rest period, and it would be 3 to 4 hours of credit, so for additional flight time after that rest period. 

Mr. SHUSTER. So a pretty significant nap? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, because that is really how the industry works 

right now. As I think you know, the model is the aircraft fly into 

a hub location, packages are sorted for quite a period of time, and 

then the flights are taken out. The pilots, during that in-between 

time, can get a substantial amount of rest that can allow them 

then to continue to fly for a longer period of time after that rest. 

So we did try to accommodate that in the new rule. And that is 

why the administrator and the secretary have really encouraged 

cargo operators to opt into the new rule, although we do did not 

require that they be covered by the rule. 

Mr. SHUSTER. And in your analysis, it failed the cost-benefit 

analysis, as you went through. Can you talk a little bit about that? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. As you mentioned in your opening statement, we look at the cost benefit for the full proposal, but we do 

look at it as it would affect particular segments of the industry, 

which is required through the Executive order. When we looked at 

the immediate impacts or the cost impacts for the cargo operators, 

the cost for implementing the new flight duty and rest rules was 

substantially higher than the benefits that we could quantify. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Right. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. We do believe there is value in reducing fatigue, 

but it is sometimes hard to quantify that, and for those reasons we 

did not keep the cargo community in the rule. 

24 

Mr. SHUSTER. All right, so in your view, your expert opinion, has 

safety been compromised in any way, shape, or form under this 

rule? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. The framework that we currently have in place 

that the cargo operators will continue to operate under we believe 

sets an appropriate level of safety. We do think improvements will 

be made for those that will move into the new rule, and we will 

continue to work with the cargo operators as they implement their 

fatigue risk management plans to make sure they are analyzing 

their own schedules to see if there is risk and to see that they mitigate it. 

Mr. SHUSTER. All right. Well, thank you very much and I yield 

back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Boswell, do you have any questions? Ms. Johnson? 

Ms. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me apologize for being late. This committee meeting started 

while I was in another meeting. Let me preface my remarks by 

simply—my questions by simply thanking the witnesses, and 

thanking them for being a part of the safety, and I want to especially thank Dr. Dillingham, who I have seen come before this committee year after year after year, and his opinions and findings 

have never been questioned. And I think that speaks well for his 

work. 

I truly believe that the airline industry is safe. For 20 years I 

have gone back and forth almost every weekend. And even though 

I have landed places other than where I was supposed to land, it 

was safe, and that is much appreciated. What I would like to pose 

for the witnesses is, what is it we need to do to keep it safe? Where 

are we in NextGen? Where are we in technology, and what may be 

the threats? 

I am sorry I didn’t hear your testimony earlier. 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Congresswoman, actually, where we are focused, 

working with industry, is on trying to understand what are mistakes that may be happening in the system today that haven’t 

manifested themselves as an incident or an accident, but where we 

can intervene in time to change training or procedures or processes 

so that those mistakes are what we call captured so they don’t 

cause real risk in the system. 

And that is really, I think where as an industry we are focused, 

on trying to understand what can we learn from everyday operations that let us make the system constantly safer. I think we are 

making good progress in understanding how to analyze the data, 

identify risks, and put in place mitigations. 

Mr. GRIZZLE. And let me speak to the NextGen implications on 

safety. It does, in fact, have a significant impact on improving safety. Let me identify three ways, recognizing that most of our safety 

issues are, in fact, human error issues. NextGen provides more 

data to both controllers and pilots so they will have more information for making the decisions that they need to make. 

There are also tools that substantially reduce the opportunity for 

human error, for example, in communicating route changes which 

will be done in the fully implemented NextGen world completely 

digitally and without having to rely upon voice communications. 

25 

The third area is that, because NextGen expedites the route of 

flight of aircraft, it causes fewer route changes that need to be done 

in the first place. And so in those three areas, particularly, it will 

be very beneficial. 

Mr. GUZZETTI. Congresswoman Johnson, the Inspector General’s 

office, our office, believes that there are several areas that FAA 

could continue to work to improve safety. One of them is the issue 

of what we have been discussing in regards to operational errors. 

The risk of loss of life when two airplanes collide on the ground or 

in the air is low, but if it does occur, there will be a catastrophic 

loss of life. So that is why there is a lot of concern about tracking 

these near misses. 

Secondly, the inspector workforce, the risk-based approach, is a 

positive step, but it is a work in progress. There are some problems 

with the fact that it is not being—it is not robust enough at this 

point. 

And lastly, the things that came out of the tragic Colgan accident 

in regards to human elements in aviation, the pilot training, knowing which pilots airlines are hiring and how they are being trained, 

we have identified issues in that regard which is contained in our 

testimony. 

And then I would like to also mention that our office has a large 

body of work in regards to NextGen, and I would agree with Mr. 

Grizzle that the potential for NextGen to make things more efficient and more safe is absolutely there. However, NextGen is experiencing some management problems, contracting problems, and 

delay problems. This is a new technology and the transition will be 

key to ensure that things are being kept safe. 

Ms. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you. 

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Congresswoman Johnson, for the 

kind words, and I will take that back to my staff as well. I think 

what the FAA representative said, we agree with that, that 

NextGen is going to be a positive in terms of improving safety. I 

think the risk management that FAA is doing now is also going to 

be a positive. And as you said, there is always going to be the 

human element involved in this. But if we look from the late 1990s 

to where we are now in our aviation safety record, people keep saying it over and over again, that we indeed have the safest system 

in the world. I think FAA recognizes, and we will be monitoring to 

ensure that they recognize where the issues are, and they are 

about the business of dealing with those issues each and every day. 

So we would recommend that they in fact do expedite the technology as well as keep up the education and the regulatory oversight that they currently undertake. 

Ms. JOHNSON OF TEXAS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Let’s see. Mr. Cravaack, do you have a 

question? 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, sorry. I appreciate the 

testimony today on obviously something that is near and dear to 

my heart. And I would have to, as an airline pilot with many 

hours, I believe we do have fantastic safe skies and professionals 

that want to make sure that our skies remain safe and will do everything to do that. 

26 

But I if I would, I would just like to ask a couple of questions. 

Ms. Gilligan, if you could tell me, how did the carve-out for cargo 

pilots actually occur, because going up to the President, everything 

is, you know, is one level of duty time, flight-time, duty-time rules. 

And then there was a carve-out for cargo pilots. How did that actually occur? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Congressman, as you point out, the initial proposal applied to all aspects of the industry. One of the things we 

were looking to accomplish was to have a single framework for 

flight duty and rest to replace three or four models that we have 

now, which have come into place over many years as industry grew 

and as the capabilities and distances airplanes could fly increased. 

So we did have a single proposal. But as I said in response to Congressman Shuster, we are also required to do an analysis of the 

cost and benefits in different elements of the community, and when 

we looked at the cost for the cargo community, the costs were quite 

high and the quantifiable benefits were substantially lower than 

those costs. And so we always look to try to assure that we are getting a comparable level of societal benefits to the costs that any 

rulemaking would drive, and in this case we could not reach that 

balance. Rather than hold up the whole rule to try to come up with 

a new proposal, the rule would go forward for the passenger carrying flights because we could demonstrate strong societal benefits 

from those costs, that we would not include cargo at this time but 

that we would work separately, as the Secretary indicated, to encourage the cargo operators to opt into the new framework which 

is based on the science of fatigue in a way that our other rules really don’t reflect. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. So basically it was a financial decision, correct? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Part of the rulemaking analysis is to look at the 

cost and benefit that the requirement will have. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. So the data associated with the extricating 

rhythm of the pilots and flying and things like that was set aside 

for the financial aspect of it? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Well, no, sir. The way we look at determining the 

benefits is to look at past accidents and incidents and what contributed to them. What the data indicated was that at this point the 

cargo accident rate does not demonstrate fatigue at a level that required us to change the standards. That is kind of the easiest way 

to describe it. As has been—— 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Were you looking at it as a percentage because 

there is a lot less cargo aircraft in the air than there are passenger 

aircraft? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. It actually has to do with the econometric model 

that is used which takes a cost for what society is willing to pay 

to protect a life. And there are many more passengers, or lives involved in a passenger aircraft than in a cargo aircraft. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Could you repeat what you just said? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. That the econometric model that is used by all 

agencies that do regulations is to look at what society is willing to 

pay to protect the value of life. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. That is what I thought you said. OK. Thank you. 

I appreciate that testimony. A little chilling, but I appreciate it. 

27 

Mr. Grizzle, if you don’t mind, both the IG and the GAO have 

indicated an improved reporting process that cannot alone explain 

the increase of operational errors. What does the FAA believe are 

the other contributing factors to increase how the FAA is addressing those factors? 

Mr. GRIZZLE. The most important action we are taking, sir, is 

making sure that we harvest all of the information from the voluntary disclosures in order to identify safety risk and then be sure 

that we convert that information into actionable items. Through 

this data we have identified 5 top risk areas, and to address those 

5 top risk areas, we have developed 22 separate risk mitigating 

procedures that we are in the process of implementing and intend 

to have implemented by the end of this year. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK, if I can go back to you, Ms. Gilligan, real 

quick. Segments of the industry are very concerned about the public disclosure of the safety management system that is being collected and protecting that data. How do you propose to address this 

problem? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Well, Congressman, actually the reauthorization 

bill will give us some additional authority to be certain that safety 

data is protected and only used to improve the safety of the system. 

So again, as we go forward with our safety management system 

rule, we will be looking to put in place those kinds of protections 

very much based on the work of this committee, which provided the 

basis for that in the reauthorization. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I think one of the most valuable inputs that you 

have are pilots, you know, and air traffic controllers need to voluntarily submit suggestions without any fear of retribution, because 

that is where the answers are going to come from. 

I am over my time, sir, and I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Costello. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. One final question for 

Ms. Gilligan. As you know, in the 2010 Safety Act, for good reason, 

I believe, we put in a requirement for a database for centralized 

pilot records. You mentioned in your written testimony that there 

are several technical challenges associated with implementing that 

section of the act. Can you detail those for us for the record? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Yes, sir. As we mentioned in the testimony, there 

are some issues around exactly what records need to be collected 

and so we are trying to get common understanding throughout the 

industry of who and what we should be saving and what we should 

be collecting. 

Secondly, there are two big challenges. One is the IT system required, getting the database actually put together, and we are trying to prototype that this summer which will go a long way to helping us understand how the technology of it would work. 

But I think the biggest challenge for us will be the actual ability 

to integrate records that are in paper, on microfiche, on mimeograph, some of them automated in the last more recent years, but 

for pilot historic records. There are pilots who have been in the 

FAA system for 20, 30, 40 years, and there are a tremendous number of records, most of them starkly paper, that will all have to be 

somehow incorporated into the system. So now we are trying to understand how we can do that effectively and efficiently. 

28 

Mr. COSTELLO. So what can we expect from a planning standpoint? Is there a plan to do this? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. We do have some milestones. Unfortunately, we 

have such a demand in our rulemaking program right now that because of the challenges technically, we aren’t really ready to start 

the rulemaking process. Again, we are hopeful with the prototyping 

this summer that we will better really understand what we are up 

against, and based on that, we will be able to come up with a more 

realistic schedule. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And again, I thank our 

witnesses for being here and I especially thank the Colgan families 

for being here as well. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. I have one question. I don’t know quite 

who to address it to, but we have been talking about a nearly perfect record of safety, but arise in some reported incidents though 

at a very small level. Everyone is aware, I think who follows it, 

that the aviation industry has traditionally for many years and 

continues to be, aspects of it, under financial pressure. American 

Airlines is in bankruptcy right now, Pinnacle that owned Colgan, 

which did have an accident, is in bankruptcy. 

Is there any correlation or relationship at all or are there safeguards to protect from people cutting corners because of their financial situation? 

Ms. GILLIGAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may start. I am sure others 

will have opinions. I think that it is clear throughout the industry 

that an investment in safety is an important business investment. 

I think there is broad understanding that a fatal accident has a 

tremendously negative impact, not just on the operator involved 

but throughout the industry. So what we see from the FAA is continued investment in safety systems, like the safety management 

system, like data systems, so that carriers understand what is happening within their system. 

At the same time, within FAA, we have always had a program 

where inspectors enhance their oversight when there are financial 

problems. So as we went through mergers we had the two teams 

that continued to oversee, for example, United and Continental, as 

they operated, and a third team that monitored and managed the 

merger so that we had good eyes on everything that was happening 

because there is some risk, obviously, that some misstep or some 

human error can occur while you are making those kinds of 

changes. The same with bankruptcy. As soon as a carrier announces that they are going into bankruptcy, we enhance our oversight system to focus on evaluating the changes they will have to 

make as they downsize or as they furlough, or whatever the effects 

of bankruptcy may be. And I think those two sides, the industry’s 

commitment to aviation safety as a good business practice with 

heightened FAA oversight when there is financial problems, gives 

as you good balance to assure the levels of safety continue. 

Mr. GUZZETTI. Chairman Petri, if I may, our office is completing 

an audit in regards to code share that I believe the subcommittee 

requested, and one of the aspects of the three things we are looking 

at is whether safety is handled any differently with mainline carriers as opposed to the code-sharing partners. And you are correct 

about the economic situation. I think most of the code-share airVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:38 Jul 06, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\AV\4-25-1~1\73986.TXT JEAN
29 

lines’ revenues are from the mainline carrier which they utilize to 

feed the main lines. But yet our audit is finding that FAA really 

doesn’t have a requirement to look at those code-share agreements. 

And perhaps there could be some incentives in those agreements, 

or aspects that could impact safety. That is one of the things our 

audit is looking at. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Again, thank you all for your statements, 

and for your conscientious response to the questions we have 

asked. This concludes the first panel, and we will now turn to the 

second panel. And as it is taking its place, as they are taking their 

places, let me introduce them to you. The panel consists Mr. Tom 

Hendricks, who is the senior vice president for safety, security and 

operations, Airlines for America; Mr. Scott Foose, who is senior vice 

president, operations and safety, Regional Airline Association; Captain Sean Cassidy, first vice president of the Air Line Pilots Association; and Mr. Gary M. Fortner, who is vice president of quality 

control and engineering, Fortner Engineering, on behalf of the 

Aeronautical Repair Station Association. 

I would like to express all of our thanks for you gentlemen joining us today and participating in this panel, and for the effort that 

you and your associates have exerted to prepare the statements 

that you have submitted. 

And as you know, we would invite you to summarize those, in 

approximately 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Hendricks. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS L. HENDRICKS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR SAFETY, SECURITY AND OPERATIONS, AIRLINES 

FOR AMERICA; SCOTT FOOSE, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS AND SAFETY, REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION; 

CAPTAIN SEAN CASSIDY, FIRST VICE PRESIDENT, AIR LINE 

PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; AND GARY M. 

FORTNER, VICE PRESIDENT OF QUALITY CONTROL AND ENGINEERING, FORTNER ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE AERONAUTICAL REPAIR 

STATION ASSOCIATION 

Mr. HENDRICKS. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member Costello, 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting A4A to appear at this important and timely hearing. At the outset, I want 

to express our thanks to the committee for its leadership in aviation safety and its support of the initiatives that I will discuss this 

morning, many of which were addressed in the recently enacted 

FAA Modernization Reform Act of 2012. 

Of course, we also appreciate the efforts of the Federal Aviation 

Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board. 

Safety underpins every aspect of airline operations. The remarkable safety record of airlines that are members of A4A, demonstrates their unflagging commitment to fulfilling that responsibility. As a former airline captain I have repeatedly witnessed that 

commitment. 

The results are extraordinary. This is the safest era in our history. We are the safest form of transportation on the planet, bar 

none. This safety record is neither random nor unintended. We 

have achieved levels of aviation safety that other industries and 

foreign civil aviation authorities envy. While our commitment to 

30 

safety is unchanging, the way we pursue safety has evolved and 

transformed over time as our understanding of human factors has 

grown, technology has advanced and our ability to capture and utilize data has expanded. This transformation has been indispensable in producing our extraordinary safety record. In simplest 

terms, we operate at a higher level of safety because we have become much better at identifying and managing risk. 

We haven’t conquered risk. No one can promise that in aviation, 

but airlines have introduced throughout their operations very potent data-driven risk assessment systems. These systems are tailored to an airline’s operations. However, there is a common methodology to them. Hazards are identified and rigorously analyzed, 

and risk mitigation measures are carefully thought out and implemented. 

Risk assessment has been used in aviation for many years. What 

has changed since the 1990s is the volume and accessibility of operational data that can be applied to safety issues. Airline safety professionals work in an information-rich environment. That means 

that we now rely on data-driven analysis, which frequently involves 

the combined scrutiny of the FAA, employees and management. 

This yields a high-definition picture, if you will, of operating environments and transient events and thus more refined risk assessments. And as the subcommittee knows, some of the most effective 

of these safety data programs are voluntary. They are very tangible 

manifestations of the industry’s willingness to explore new means 

and develop new relationships within the aviation community to 

improve safety. 

In short, a cultural shift has occurred that promotes and enables 

a higher level of safety. Data-based programs enable us to identify 

emerging patterns and properly deploy focused resources, and 

when that action is taken also has changed over the years. Today, 

unlike in past decades, there has been increasing emphasis on initiating change rather than simply reacting to events. That is 

proactive safety. This disciplined approach, going where the data 

take us and acting accordingly, has significantly advanced safety. 

It produces the most responsive and effective results, and it facilitates the most efficient deployment of finite resources in making 

necessary changes. That discipline gives us the confidence to undertake change when warranted, but it also gives us the ability to 

recognize when change is uncalled for and to challenge assumptions no matter how widely they may be embraced. Not every new 

idea is an improvement or free from unintended consequences. 

The FAA’s proposed rule on pilot certification and qualification 

requirements, for example, concerns us for these reasons. 

I want to inject some words of caution. All who are involved in 

aviation safety need to realize the importance of sticking to the disciplined approach that I have outlined. We must resist the temptation to tinker with the safety system lest we disturb what we have 

accomplished and the benefits of that to our passengers and crewmembers. 

Expertise and rigor should guide us. Going forward, we have the 

tools to foster safety enhancements. That is because today’s airline 

safety culture in the United States is characterized by, first, a common understanding that safety is the foundation of our business, 

31 

second, robust communication within airlines, including with employees and among industry and Government stakeholders based 

on mutual trust, and finally, a recognition that safety issue precursors can be identified and effective preventative actions taken. 

When we look beyond our borders, the situation appears more 

mixed. Many foreign airlines and civil aviation authorities have 

adopted data-driven approaches to safety. The maturity of those 

systems, however, can vary. Because of that we urge the U.S. Government to continue its efforts at the International Civil Aviation 

Organization and in other venues to expand use of safety data systems worldwide. This advocacy helps not only foreign airlines, but 

also American citizens who fly on them. 

We look forward to continuing to work with the subcommittee on 

these matters, and I would be happy to answer any questions you 

might have. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Foose. 

Mr. FOOSE. Good morning. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member 

Costello, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify at this hearing. Three years ago RAA testified before 

your committee after a fatal accident in order to discuss our members’ commitment to safety. At that time, we outlined several important safety initiatives already in place. We shared our plans to 

go even further. Today I am here to talk to you about what we 

have been doing since then. 

While our safety work has been both broad and deep and is discussed more fully in our written statement, I will focus my testimony on four areas in particular: Safety information sharing, voluntary safety programs, pilot fatigue, first officer qualifications. 

All of our members participate in safety committees established 

by code-sharing airline families. They are also active participants 

in the InfoShare Program cosponsored by the FAA and the airlines. 

In fact, at our recent InfoShare meetings half of the attendees and 

briefings were from regional airlines. Safety information is being 

shared by many means that now transcend many boundaries. Regional airlines are not only committed participants, but they are 

also taking leadership roles. 

RAA members have been also active, achieved extremely high 

participation levels, in a list of gold standard voluntary safety programs. In fact, RAA members have the highest levels of participation among all of part 121 carriers in each of the key FAA-supported voluntary safety programs, including ASAP, FOQA, AQP 

and safety management systems. 

The majority of carriers transitioning to advance qualification 

programs for pilot training were regionals. While carriers of small 

fleets cannot be expected to participate in AQP, RAA’s members 

have made the transition in significant numbers. While 25 percent 

of all 121 carriers trained their pilots under AQP, 66 percent of 

RAA members have that program. 

Also, the large majority of RAA’s part 121 members have flight 

operations quality assurance programs in place. This is all the 

more impressive knowing that RAA’s members have significant 

data collection equipment obstacles to overcome in order to participate. 

32 

I want to express my appreciation to our pilots and air associations. They have been key partners and share the credit in this accomplishment. 

Another significant milestone for the airline industry was 

marked when the flight and duty time final rule was published in 

December. For the first time we will use science to avoid and mitigate fatigue in the cockpit. In 2009, industry recognized there was 

a gap in the available science with regard to workload fatigue. RAA 

took action, initiating an independent ground-breaking research 

study to fill this gap. The goal of this study is simple. We want to 

better understand the fatiguing effects of multisegment operations 

on pilots so we can incorporate what we have learned into our 

training, our procedures, and our culture. RAA has taken a leading 

role in fatigue research and will continue to work hard to ensure 

the highest levels of safety in this area. 

Finally, I would like to briefly discuss the proposed pilot qualifications rule. But first I want to address a recent allegation that 

regional airlines have no plan in place to comply. This is far from 

the case. In fact, RAA members have been very busy developing 

their transition programs. Several programs have been approved 

and members have begun to transition their first officers. We are 

preparing our public comments in which we will urge the FAA to 

consider the valuable conclusions reached by the First Officer 

Qualifications Aviation Rulemaking Committee in formulating the 

rule. We also express our concern that unless the new rule recognizes the value and experience that structured training programs 

provide, the burden will now shift to tomorrow’s pilots. 

The implication here is not diminished safety, but diminished incentive for students to pursue training and diminished service to 

smaller communities. The potential availability of new pilots could 

jeopardize scheduled service to dozens of communities. It is estimated that an annual shortfall of approximately 2,300 pilots could 

translate to a loss of service to 75 communities. If we do not take 

advantage of this opportunity, we will be encouraging the next generation of pilots to merely build hours, when what we really need 

is experience in our cockpits. 

In the 3 years since we last testified before this committee, our 

60,000 regional airline employees have operated nearly 15 million 

flights at a pace of 13,000 flights each day. In fact, today is the 

safest period of time in commercial history. It is our hope that our 

deeds which have gone well beyond the rules demonstrate to you, 

to each of the passengers that we are fully committed to safe operation of each and every flight each day. 

This concludes my statement. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Captain Cassidy. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Costello, and members of the subcommittee. I am Captain Sean 

Cassidy, first vice president of the Air Line Pilots Association, 

International, and I am also its national safety coordinator. I represent more than 53,000 professional airline pilots who fly for 37 

airlines both in the United States and Canada. ALPA is not only 

the world’s largest pilot union, We are also the world’s largest nongovernmental aviation safety organization. I am honored to be here 

and would like to offer our perspective on where the U.S. airline 

33 

industry stands, where we need to go in four critical areas of aviation safety. 

First, although ALPA believes our industry has made good 

progress in taking on pilot fatigue, critical work remains to be done 

to achieve one level of safety for all airline operations, a concept 

that has formed the foundation of ALPA’s safety work for many 

years. All pilots are human and we experience fatigue in the same 

way regardless of whether we are passengers or we have cargo in 

our aircraft. Despite this, new science-based fatigue regulations 

apply only to pilots who fly passengers and not those who fly cargo. 

Leaving all cargo pilots out of the regulations is a serious safety 

concern. 

ALPA thanks your colleagues, Representative Chip Cravaack and 

Representative Tim Bishop, for introducing the Safe Skies Act of 

2012, which would apply the fatigue rules to all airline operations. 

We urge all members of this committee to cosponsor H.R. 4350 and 

to swiftly report out the Safe Skies Act of 2012 to help achieve one 

level of safety across the industry. 

I would also like to applaud the families from Colgan 3407 who 

not only have been staunch supporters for H.R. 5900, but also the 

Safe Skies Act as well. 

Second, the screening, selection, training, qualification, and continued professional development of a pilot are also key components 

of maintaining the highest levels of safety. While ALPA is encouraged by the rulemaking proposals both for revising training standards and requirements for new first officers and for implementing 

safety management systems at airlines, the job is clearly not finished. Of particular concern to airline pilots is the new regulations 

which seek to ensure that relevant experiences obtained before pilots begin airline service, they must not set the stage for unintended consequences of rendering an active airline line pilot suddenly ineligible to continue his or her employment. Fairness and 

common sense dictate that efforts to ensure relevant experience 

should not inadvertently take that experience out of the cockpit. 

New regulations must include a clear path to follow so currently 

employed airline pilots can continue to fly and are able to achieve 

full compliance with requirements that were created after their employment began. In addition, ALPA has long emphasized the value 

of professional development, command training, and mentoring. As 

the U.S. airline industry has evolved, opportunities have diminished for new pilots to gain experience through years of flying 

under the command of more seasoned aviators. As a result, the 

mentoring command training of professional development that once 

occurred organically must be replaced with formal mechanisms to 

develop these skills. 

In the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Act of 

2010, Congress rightly identified the need for airlines to provide 

specific command training courses for new captains. We advocate 

that new captains receive training to reinforce effective communication, leadership, and conflict resolution. 

On a related issue, while mentoring does not replace proficiency 

training, it provides an excellent supplement to it. While informal 

mentoring can often take place if an airline safety culture fosters 

the opportunity, mentoring should also be formalized as a standard 

34 

part of a pilot’s professional development. In all of these areas, 

mentoring, leadership, and professional development, the changes 

will take time to fully implement and mature. Our industry must 

act now to make these enhancements a reality. 

Third, safety management systems which provide the NextGen 

blueprint for aviation safety, both on the ground and in the air, 

have already proven to be extremely effective as demonstrated by 

our Canadian neighbors. A key principle of SMS is to all members 

of an organization to identify hazards without fear of retribution. 

The ability to capitalize on frontline employees’ firsthand knowledge is a critical element in maintaining safest possible operations. 

ALPA is encouraged that the Federal Aviation Administration appears to be on schedule to publish a final SMS rule this summer. 

Finally, and especially important in the context of SMS is the absolute priority that our industry must place on the protection of 

safety data. The proven success of voluntary safety programs 

hinges on the strength of the data collected. Individuals provide 

this data based on the expectation that he or she will be respected 

as acting to enhance safety and that information will not be misused. Legislation should be considered to make certain this information is only used as intended and that is to advance safety. 

The pilots of ALPA commend the U.S. Aviation House Subcommittee for holding this hearing and allowing us to underscore 

the importance of continuing to pursue the highest standards in 

safe air transportation. Thank you. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you, Captain. Mr. Fortner. 

Mr. FORTNER. Thank you. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member 

Costello, and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the invitation to testify this morning. 

Incorporated in 1952, Fortner Engineering is a third-generation 

family-owned company with 45 workers. My company is an FAA 

certificated repair station that specializes in the repair and overhaul of hydraulic aircraft components. I am testifying in my capacity as the senior vice president of the Aeronautical Repair Association, also known as ARSA. The efforts of ARSA’s members facilitate 

the safe operation of aircraft worldwide by providing expert maintenance services for general and commercial aircraft. Overall, these 

services generate over $39 billion of economic activity in the United 

States and employ more than 274,000 workers in all 50 States. 

North America is a major net exporter of aviation maintenance 

services, enjoying a $2.4 billion positive trail balance of trade. I 

would like to use my time this morning to highlight four main 

points: First, for ARSA members around the world, good safety is 

good business. The basic nature of the aviation industry demands 

that safety and security be the top priority for our member companies. Operators and airlines will not do business with companies 

that put their passengers and valuable business assets at risk. 

Aviation safety does not begin and end with the FAA or any 

other regulatory body. Safety is the responsibility of every aviation 

maintenance employee performing work on behalf of an owner or 

operator, a certificated repair station, air carrier, or other aviation 

business. Government inspectors will never be able to oversee each 

mechanic at every facility at all times. The industry has the ultimate obligation, responsibility, and authority to ensure that the 

35 

civil aviation system is safe and repair stations are filling that responsibility despite the FAA’s limited oversight resources. 

My second point is that foreign repair stations are an essential 

element of the global aviation system to help ensure the safety of 

travelers worldwide. FAA certificated foreign repair stations are 

subject to the same safety centers as FAA domestic part 145 certificate holders. The International Convention of Civil Aviation of 

1944 and ICAO standards require that the country in which the 

aircraft is registered oversee the maintenance performed on that 

aircraft and all related components regardless of whether work was 

performed. Consequently, maintenance on a U.S. registered aircraft 

must be performed by an FAA certificated maintenance provider. 

Similarly, when an aircraft of foreign registry requires maintenance, only a repair station certificated or validated by that aircraft’s civil aviation authority or registry may perform that work. 

As far as other countries are concerned, U.S. repair stations are 

also foreign repair stations. My company has an EASA approval 

that allows us to perform work for EU registered aircraft. Consequently, Fortner Engineering has to ensure comply not only with 

the civil aviation authority of this country, but additional and different requirements of EASA. Any efforts to limit the ability of U.S. 

carriers to use foreign repair stations will inevitably lead to retaliation from foreign governments that will hurt hundreds of U.S. companies like mine that serve an international clientele. 

Thirdly, the long-term threat to the aviation maintenance industry is over-regulation and Government intrusion. Vision 100, an 

FAA reauthorization law enacted in 2003, required the TSA to 

issue security rules for all aviation repair stations by August 2004. 

When TSA failed to meet that deadline, lawmakers demanded that 

security regulations be completed by August of 2008. The penalty 

for failure to comply was the FAA would be prohibited from issuing 

new foreign repair station certificates. 

Nearly 4 years later, the TSA has still failed to issue final repair 

station security regulations, and the FAA is currently banned from 

issuing new foreign repair station certificates. TSA’s failure to finalize repair station security rules is preventing aviation companies from tapping into rapidly expanding overseas markets, hindering job creation and growth at home. 

My final point is that the lack of standardization across FAA regional offices can significantly impact repair stations across the 

country. A situation of Fortner Engineering detailed in my written 

testimony demonstrates how overzealous regulators and inconsistent application of regulations impede repair stations with no 

benefit to flight safety. 

ARSA members are routinely plagued by FAA’s widespread varying application of regulations across the country. Inconsistent interpretation and enforcement is frequently cited by ARSA members as 

a major problem and small businesses are particularly impacted by 

a lack of regulatory standardization across regions. 

In conclusion, repair stations have long been and continue to be 

a vital part of the aviation industry in our Nation’s economy. It is 

no coincidence that the increased use of contract maintenance has 

coincided with the safest period in commercial aviation history. In 

the end, no governmental agency can guarantee aviation safety. 

36 

Safety is a business of aviation industry companies and their employees. ARSA looks forward to working with Congress to ensure 

that legislation and regulations are based on our one common goal, 

safety. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Thank you all again. Mr. Hendricks, in 

your prepared statement, you talked about some of the modern 

techniques for analyzing data and improvements that were being 

made, and you cautioned against, quote/unquote, ‘‘tinkering’’ with 

the safety system. And we are always looking for improvements, 

but we are not looking for mindless tinkering. I guess—so could 

you discuss what it is that you would fear from what—expand on 

the word ‘‘tinkering’’ and the consequences of that? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. Sure. Certainly. As I tried to reflect in my statement, the results we have been able to achieve are extraordinary 

and unprecedented and we have largely done this through these 

very robust voluntary reporting mechanisms that are very much a 

partnership between airlines, our regulator the FAA, and our employees, and it provides us with an amount of data that 10 years 

ago was unthinkable. We are able to do very deep analysis of this 

data that has been protected by the Congress from intrusion, and 

we are able to do analysis that frankly is very deep, and very compelling in terms of what actions we should take to enable further 

improvements in safety. 

I sit on the executive committee of the Commercial Aviation 

Safety Team which Ms. Gilligan co-chairs with Mr, Ken Hylander 

from Delta Airlines, and we routinely participate in directed studies, look at safety threats. We go where the data take us. And we 

are convinced that this path we are on will lead to further improvements and is the correct path to assure that we will stay on this 

journey that we are taking to a phenomenally safe system that we 

are currently operating. 

So we want to ensure that we stay true to the data, and while 

we will always try to determine ways to improve the system further, we want to ensure that we make any of those decisions 

grounded on these facts that we are able to uncover through this 

intense and very focused analysis of the data that we are receiving. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Foose, I think I know the answer to 

this, but in your testimony you talked about how you had to take 

into account experience versus flight hours. 

Mr. FOOSE. Correct. 

Mr. PETRI. And could you explain what you—and so not just 

looking for hours. I suspect you are talking about the number of 

maneuvers you are doing, rather than just flying, well, it is on auto 

pilot hours, but could you expand on that? 

Mr. FOOSE. That is correct. The proposed pilot certification rule 

focuses on two areas I wanted to talk about. One is the additional 

training that is required, and we support that. We think there is 

lots of good steps that are proposed in there that actually in many 

ways have already been incorporated into our training programs. 

Our biggest concern is that the—we know that the Public Law of 

course requires 1,500 hours and an ATP. Our members have already taken a significant step forward and will meet that. All of 

our pilots will meet that requirement by August of 2013. But the 

FAA in their rulemaking activity has proposed an academic system 

37 

that accommodates only 4-year aviation degrees and also military 

as well, but our experience with the airlines, and we obviously 

have lots of experience, qualifying thousands and thousands of pilots that are in service today and doing so very safely. And what 

that experience tell us is that the quality of training is really what 

tell us whether that pilot really will have the skills and the knowledge to do his job appropriately. And when the time comes and he 

is faced with an abnormal situation, he will be better prepared to 

do that. The flight time does not necessarily do that, and of course 

in our written testimony we offered and example of how that occurs. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Captain Cassidy, one area of some controversy has been the different treatment of freighter pilots as opposed to passenger pilots, and we are told one explanation is that 

cargo pilots—actually, the data shows actually—fly significantly 

less than passenger pilots. Could you comment on that? Does that 

difference, in fact, exist, or do you know about anything about that? 

Mr. CASSIDY. Yes, sir. Well, scheduling differences exist relative 

to the operation. You have long-haul cargo operations that fly tremendous distance and extended crew days with augmented crews 

and they fly intercontinental. You also have cargo operations that 

fly stage links which are just sometimes as little as 100 miles. So 

there is a tremendous variety of flying that gets done both on passenger and in cargo operations. I can speak to you from a little bit 

of a vantage of somebody who has done both, because the airline 

I am currently employed by, we actually have stand-alone cargo operations as well as passenger operations. And I think the important 

point is that with regard to crew fatigue issues, with regard to the 

stressors that affect you, many times I have actually had higher 

workload situations flying cargo operations rather than passenger 

ones because of the lack of additional crewmembers. You know, 

from my vantage as an airline pilot, fatigue is fatigue is fatigue. 

I know a little bit about it, as does Congressman Cravaack, who 

we both share a background both in military, passenger, and cargo 

operations, and I honestly cannot distinguish why there should be 

a difference in the way that you are treated based upon what resides behind the flight deck door. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Costello. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Foose, you have 

testified that the regional airlines are making a lot of progress in 

developing plans to implement the ATP requirement, although the 

Inspector General, you have heard his testimony that their investigators visited two regional carriers and found out that 75 percent 

of their first officers do not have ATP certificates. 

Mr. FOOSE. Correct. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And they also found out that in both cases that 

neither carrier had developed a plan to ensure that the first officers would meet the ATP requirement by the deadline of August 

2013. 

So my question is, how many of your carrier members have developed a plan to ensure that the first officer meets the ATP certificates and will be able to meet the enhanced safety requirements 

by August of 2013? 

38 

Mr. FOOSE. Excuse me, that is a good question and thank you for 

that. I am not sure which carriers they spoke to. In my conversations with our operations executive of carriers, we, as far as I 

know, all the carriers have either developed a plan or have completed development and submitted that to the FAA office. At this 

point in time, we have three carriers that have approved programs, 

and they have begun to transition their first officers. 

Given the August 2013 deadline, we would expect that all airlines will have their programs approved and in place and being executed as of July or August of this year. At that point all of the 

pilots should be—start the program, be complete by August of 

2013. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So three carriers have approved plans? 

Mr. FOOSE. Correct. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And how many members do you have in your association? 

Mr. FOOSE. Twenty-seven, 24 of which are part 121 carriers. 

Mr. COSTELLO. So 3 of the 27 have approved plans. 

Mr. FOOSE. That is correct. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Let me ask you. Is Pinnacle one of those companies, which of course is the parent company for Colgan Air? 

Mr. FOOSE. Yes. 

Mr. COSTELLO. And they are one of your members and do they 

have an approved plan? 

Mr. FOOSE. I do not know that, sir. I can get back to you on that. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Why wouldn’t you know that? Why wouldn’t you 

know—if you have 27 members and you were coming here today, 

why wouldn’t you have found out from your members which ones 

have approved plans, which ones do not, and which ones do not 

have even a plan in place? 

Mr. FOOSE. That is a good question. I, as of last week, when we 

polled our members we had three approved, but I do not know. I 

have not talked to Pinnacle since then, so I don’t know if they have 

been approved since. 

Mr. COSTELLO. How long would it take you to get a list to this 

subcommittee of the 27 members, how many have plans in place 

right now? 

Mr. FOOSE. We could do that very quickly, sir. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Well, I would request that you would submit that 

to us as soon as possible. 

Mr. FOOSE. I would be glad to do that. 

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Mr. COSTELLO. Captain Cassidy, you have heard the regionals 

say that the proposed rule for pilot qualifications could affect the 

supply of airline pilots. You have heard that previously and that 

is the position of the regionals. How do you respond to that? 

Mr. CASSIDY. Our association’s motto is: Schedule with safety. 

And I think the determinant on whether or not there is going to 

be an excess amount of eligible pilots to fill the flight decks in the 

commercial aircraft is really dependent on the industry’s efforts to 

recruit, attract, and retain qualified pilots. I think that taking one 

step beyond that, regardless if there exists a paucity or a surplus 

of pilots, I think that our core concern is ensuring that they are 

as well-trained, as safe, as experienced, and as proficient as possible, which is why we are so much in favor of the recent legislation helping with mentoring leadership, and as well as stepped-up 

hourly qualifications. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Graves, do you have—oh, Mr. Shuster. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Captain 

Cassidy, you said you have serious safety concerns with this new 

ruling, and again, based upon the evidence that has been put forth 

over the last several years, cargo has been extremely safe, and in 

fact there has been no increase with incidents with fatigue. You 

know, so where is the concern there if you have got an industry 

that continues to improve? 

Mr. CASSIDY. You are correct, sir. The industry—we have—basically, I have the pleasure of working in the transportation system, 

which is the safest in the history of the world for the last 10 years, 

and the previous 10 years preceding that was the next safest era 

of operations. So in one respect, this is a very high-class problem 

to have because we are talking about a very, very safe system or 

an even safer one. 

Now, with regard to fatigue issues and cargo, I think that those 

same issues that would serve as precursors for higher safety risk 

for cargo are identical to passenger situation. And I think we are 

just looking at the tip of the iceberg because we are now finally 

getting into scientifically based data collection which really determines the precursors to fatigue in a way that we have not done in 

years past. 

I was sitting right next to Secretary LaHood on December 21st 

when he made the announcement of the flight-time/duty-time regulation, and although cargo was placed in a different category than 

passenger operations under part 117, you know, I think I was pretty clear when I heard him say very emphatically that even that 

cargo is not regulated on the side of 117 with the passengers, nevertheless it is absolutely the right thing to do. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, look, I agree 100 percent with the passenger 

side of it, but, you know, you made the comment that you shouldn’t 

be treated differently because of what is behind the flight deck 

door. But in reality, it is not just about what the cargo is, whether 

it is with passengers or if it is cargo, it is the operations are significantly different, the hours that the pilots are flying are significantly different. And so I believe fully that that is the difference. 

And would you agree that the facilities for cargo—or let me ask you 

this way. Are the facilities on the plane, or on the ground, are they 

45 

the same for passenger as they are for cargo, or is there a difference? 

Mr. CASSIDY. There is different rest facilities that are provided 

on planes that help to give crews the prescribed rest and augmented rest and they really vary pretty dramatically from completely separated cabins that only the flight crew can access to basically a seat back with the passengers. So there is a tremendous 

variety. Cargo as well. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Cargo and passenger, is cargo significantly different facilities than with passenger? 

Mr. FOOSE. I think that in many cases the answer is yes. As Ms. 

Gilligan referred to before, you know, I think we can use like 

FedEx or one of the big long-haul cargo carriers as an example 

where they actually have separate rest facilities so the crews can 

go in and get prescribed rest while they are doing the sort function. 

Mr. SHUSTER. But what about the number of hours flown. Is that 

a significant difference in fatigue, where you have roughly 30 hours 

where a cargo pilot on average is flying and over 50 a passenger. 

Does that have a significant difference in a fatigue? Would you 

agree with that, or not? 

Mr. CASSIDY. It is a difficult question to answer because of the 

tremendous complexity and scale of the different operations. You 

can have somebody who only flew 30–40 hours during that month 

and be placed in a situation where they are more fatigued than 

somebody who flew 70 because of the way that the crew rest matrix 

works and prescribed rest requirements. 

Mr. SHUSTER. All right. Well, that brings me down to if we want 

to do one-size-fits-all, then we are going to get to some point I believe if we continue down this road where we are going to have to 

look at the individual. I know Sam Graves is a pilot and I know 

Mr. Cravaack is a pilot, and maybe he operates well on 6 hours of 

sleep and Mr. Cravaack needs 8 or 10 hours. We are going to get 

to a level where—is that where we are headed? I have been dealing 

with this sleep issue, whether it is for the railroads or truck drivers. It really comes down to the individual, how an individual operates and if those people are getting the right amount of rest. I 

mean, we are going to end up having sleep or rest police or cameras in your room. 

So, again, I just disagree fundamentally that these are two different operations. And fatigue is fatigue, but fatigue for Mr. Graves 

and fatigue for Mr. Cravaack ends up at a different threshold. So 

I think we really have to look at cargo and passenger differently 

and, again, look at what is available to the cargo passengers. 

Again, you have said a couple of things that I have asked you. The 

facilities are different, the flight duty is different for the different 

industries. 

So I know you are not agreeing with me, but you sound like you 

are agreeing with some of the principles that I have come to believe 

with, and that is why I have come to the difference. Is that accurate? 

Mr. CASSIDY. Well, I agree fatigue is fatigue is fatigue regardless 

of who we are discussing. I also think that the regulation is very 

sane and safe in that it provides me, if I have a trip, you know, 

flying a passenger trip, multiple legs, I have the assurance that 

46 

when I shut that hotel room door that I have 8 hours of prescribed 

rest time, period. 

And the other thing which I think is important to emphasize, you 

know, I have the privilege of representing both cargo pilots as well 

as passenger pilots at the Air Line Pilots Association, and I have 

a tremendous amount of faith in every single one of those members’ 

ability to ensure that they are adequately fit and rested to fly regardless of what the regulation says, because the other notable 

achievement with some of this new regs is that it empowers companies to ensure that crewmembers are put in a situation where they 

can determine that they are fit to fly and not face any disciplinary 

issues if they identify, for whatever reason, the ice maker next 

door, the hotel elevator going up and down, that for whatever reason they just are not in a position where they feel safe to fly because of fatigue issues. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question. I wonder 

if I might ask it and I will also address it to Mr. Cassidy and Mr. 

Hendricks. 

Mr. Hendricks, you are a former airline pilot, is that accurate? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The new regs, the new rule, limits the number of 

consecutive nights that a pilot may fly to 3 nights. Is that your understanding? That would be for passengers? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Would that force the carriers into scheduling 

greater numbers of shorter rotations for pilots? 

Mr. CASSIDY. It might, and it really depends on the system operations for the airline. For instance, I fly for Alaska Airlines. Once 

upon a time we predominantly flew up and down the West Coast. 

Now we do a lot more transcontinental operations as well. So when 

you look at the complexity of a scheduling operation, a lot of times 

they can have mitigating strategies which allow them to best utilize a crewmember so it doesn’t really affect efficiency that much 

of the operation by scheduling practices. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Hendricks? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. Congressman, A4A has engaged a group of leading sleep scientists to help answer these types of questions, and we 

thank you for posing it today. 

We will say that with regard to the consecutive nights of operation, many times that will in fact impose more fatigue on pilots, 

because flying on the back side of the clock, if you are a cargo pilot 

or you are a long-haul international pilot, that first night is the 

most challenging in terms of managing your alertness, and we 

want to limit the amount of first nights of flying that this rule may 

impose upon the system. So we are studying that more closely, and 

we do have some concerns in that regard. 

Mr. SHUSTER. So quite possibly applying this new FAA rule to 

cargo could make it less safe for cargo pilots, if you are going to 

increase the number of first night flights. Would that be a concern? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. Well, I would agree with Captain Cassidy that 

our crewmembers are all highly professional. We rely on them to 

make assessments of themselves and their fitness to fly. And along 

the lines that Captain Cassidy also mentioned, most airlines have 

completely non-punitive policies in place when pilots exercise their 

47 

prerogative to say that they are too fatigued to operate the aircraft. 

So we support that. There is still more study that is required, but 

we are concerned about the increased exposure that pilots may 

have to this first night of night flying. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, I appreciate all four of you being here, especially Captain Cassidy and Mr. Hendricks. And thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for indulging me. I think this is an issue that we have 

got to continue to look at. As I said, I want to make sure. Across 

this Government we do one-size-fits-all in far too many things, and 

I just don’t think, and in this case there is evidence, significant evidence, that says we have to look at this a little differently. So I appreciate your being here. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Lipinski. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank Chairman Petri 

and Ranking Member Costello for your leadership and for holding 

this morning’s oversight hearing on safety. We all know that America has the aviation system that is the finest and safest in the 

world, but while we have an impressive safety record, we know 

that errors do happen in rare instances and the consequences are 

often very severe. 

I have Midway Airport in my district, also close to Chicago’s 

O’Hare Airport, and I know that safety has to be our top priority. 

So I really just wanted to follow up a little bit on what Chairman 

Petri’s original question, first question was with Mr. Hendricks. I 

in a previous time before I was in Congress did systems analysis. 

I worked for Swiss Air, although I didn’t do this kind of risk assessments there. 

But I was just wondering, Mr. Hendricks, you talked about in 

your answer to Mr. Petri and your testimony about data. We know 

that data is the core of safety. I just wanted to get a better sense 

of what kind of data are we talking about? What do you look at 

in your risk assessment? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. Thank you very much. Many different types of 

data. We have a flight ops quality assurance program. It is actually 

a separate digital recorder on the aircraft that records parameters 

different than the digital flight data recorder in many cases. 

We have voluntary reporting systems that our pilots provide us, 

not only pilots, air traffic controllers in the ATSAP program. Some 

airlines have implemented this with the professionals that plan the 

loads on the aircraft. And we take into account also the surveillance data from our radars, from ADSB in some cases. And all of 

this is collected and fused by the MITRE Corporation, which operates under this umbrella of protection that the Congress has granted us to do a de-identified, deep dive into all of this data, not specific instances, but looking for systemic risk. And that is where we 

have been able to achieve success, because the data is protected, 

it is rich, and it has proven to be very reliable in terms of what 

it is telling us and what mitigations we can then put in place to 

address what we are seeing in the data. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Are there any examples that you can give about 

things that have been learned? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. Well, certainly. The Commercial Aviation Safety 

Team has had numerous directed studies. In fact, 3 years ago they 

48 

were awarded the Collier Trophy. As you know, it is one of the 

most distinguished aviation awards in the United States because 

of this work. 

So they have done directed studies on control flight and terrain. 

We are currently looking at navigating on the runway into the area 

navigation, NextGen type procedures on departure. We are looking 

at other systems such as upset prevention. 

What we have been allowed to do, because we brought down the 

fatal accident rate to such a low level right now, is we are able to 

look at other things we simply didn’t have the luxury of looking at 

because there were other pressing matters. 

But I would like to reemphasize the points I made earlier, which 

are the data is guiding us on what we should look at. We have a 

very formal process on the Commercial Aviation Safety Team to 

identify these risks, and then we focus our resources in these directed studies to go out and mitigate those risks throughout the 

system. The FAA is providing great leadership in this regard. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Do you do any international sharing of data or 

findings? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. That is expanding currently. We are in dialogue 

with the European equivalent of the Commercial Aviation Safety 

Team. There are regional aviation groups throughout the world. 

One of the newer ones and more robust safety systems is in the 

Latin American region. 

I was just last week at a Latin American operations conference 

and the results they are seeing are pretty phenomenal. They have 

a very young fleet. They are collecting this data. We are showing 

them the way in many regards and we are learning things that 

when we operate in that region that perhaps we didn’t see because 

we didn’t have as much data. So we are starting down that path. 

We need to ensure that we protect that data as well as we do in 

the United States. But other regions of the world are starting to 

see that this is the path forward for success. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Cravaack. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate everybody 

being here today because everybody here is on the same page. We 

all want safe flights, safe airlines, to be able to get our passengers 

to and from where they want to go as safely as possible and bring 

cargo to the places that really need it. In some ports even in our 

own country we have to rely on cargo aircraft to just bring the sustenance to some different cities. So we are all working on the same 

page, let’s just put it like that. 

Captain Cassidy, if I could just talk—I wish my colleague was 

still here in regards to hear some of this testimony you are about 

to give here. The studies that were done were data-based studies, 

correct? 

Mr. CASSIDY. Correct. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. I mean, they took a look at a lot of—a plethora 

of different fatigues that happen to a pilot on a normal basis. The 

thing is we are not just talking about flight times here. We are 

talking about crossing time zones, going from JFK to Tokyo and 

being on the back side of the clock, your circadian rhythm is completely maladjusted, and then being on a 12-day trip and coming 

49 

back home. So one of the things that we want to talk about when 

you talk about when cargo guys do that, long-haul cargo guys, we 

want to make sure that they get the proper rest and ensuring that 

occurs. 

Now, one of the things that my colleague brought up to me, and 

he says well, you know, cargo guys, they can rest while the aircraft 

is being—you are smiling—you know, pilots can rest 4 hours while 

cargo is being taken off and placed back on. I was a wrench on a 

flight on a 747 and I can guarantee you that while that cargo was 

going off and on, I wasn’t resting. I was making sure where the 

cargo was going, making sure it was tied down correctly, preflight 

planning. 

When you talk about flight time, it is when the cockpit door is 

shut and when the cockpit door opens again. It doesn’t account for 

the preflight of the aircraft, the flight planning and things like 

that. I wanted to make sure they brought that up as well. 

So, you know, in understanding the effect, can you please describe to me why fatigue in your opinion as a professional pilot is 

so dangerous to aviation? 

Mr. CASSIDY. Well, thank you for that question, and I appreciate 

the leadup to that. I think that the reason fatigue is is because it 

affects every bit of our function, our ability to process information, 

our cognitive function, our judgment, our ability to execute a critical, timely—make critical and timely choices, especially when you 

get faced with abnormal situations. 

Now, fortunately, 99 percent of the time that we are flying we 

don’t get placed in a situation where you have to react in a nanosecond. However, there are times, both on the ground and in the 

air, I think it has been pointed out very clearly that a lot of our 

concern, risk factors, exist with runway incursions, excursions, 

ground-ops as well, and you have to be on your game. And unfortunately, discussing—you know, having a prescribed rest facility 

while they are doing the cargo operation, there is a couple of issues 

at play. 

First of all is just the responsibility, especially the pilot command, to make sure the load is done properly, center of gravity, 

that you understand what the manifest of goods are on the airplane, hazardous materials, et cetera, et cetera. But even if you did 

have that rest facility, if your body clock was such that it just was 

telling itself it is just simply not time to sleep, you may be in that 

rest facility but you will probably be staring at the ceiling for 4 

hours just begging your body to sleep, otherwise known as window 

of circadian high and low. Your body travels in certain sleep cycles. 

Data speaks to the fact that a prescribed matrix which takes into 

account your start time for the day, the finish time for the day, the 

number of time zones that you skip, and as well as the number of 

operations that you have, are all very important in factoring in 

what the safest, sanest way to deal with rest requirements are. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Captain. 

Mr. Fortner, I am sorry, did I say that correctly? I am an old 

wrench on a 747 and coming out of Singapore on our way to Bangkok we had a number four engine fire uncontrollable, and the reason why is because the mechanic in Singapore put a wrong starter 

on the engine. Foreign repair facilities are a big concern of mine 

50 

to make sure that we have proper maintenance going on in foreign 

repair facilities. 

What is your main comment on that and making sure that we 

have the right mechanics doing the right things? 

Mr. FORTNER. Well, when it comes to an end registered aircraft, 

a U.S. registered aircraft, regardless of where the maintenance is 

being done, it is being done with the same rules, regulations, maintenance practices and data no matter where it is at. So along the 

lines of the differencesbetween a foreign and domestic repair station, there should not be any difference. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. Who makes sure, I know I am over, but who 

makes sure that that is in fact occurring? Who is spot checking? 

The people that are spot checking, do they have the people available to ensure that that occurs? 

Mr. FORTNER. Again, being just a simple small U.S. domestic repair station, I am speaking a little bit out of my full realm of 

knowledge. But that being said, I do have full faith that with the 

training that is being done over there and that is required by U.S. 

law, that they undergo the same training that we do here. The 

oversight is the same. 

That is not to say that maintenance mistakes don’t happen, but 

I don’t believe that they are any more likely here versus there. 

That is part of the reason why we have so many redundancies and 

checks. 

Mr. CRAVAACK. OK. Great. Super. I appreciate that testimony. 

Thank you very much. I appreciate the chair’s indulgence, and I 

yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Lankford. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. I actually want to pick up on what 

Chip Cravaack was just talking about just now about foreign repair 

stations as well. 

What percentage do you think, and anyone can answer this, but 

obviously, Mr. Fortner, I think this would be closer to the center 

of your wheelhouse on it. What percentage do you think of maintenance that we have, that is scheduled maintenance, not just a, hey, 

the aircraft is parked here for a few minutes. Let’s check this out 

while we are here transition. We have got a problem before we before we take the next leg scheduled, maintenance and repair is 

done internationally versus domestically at this point for our domestic airlines? 

Mr. FORTNER. I will be honest with you, I really do not have an 

answer to that question. It is beyond my scope of knowledge. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Does anyone have a perspective on that or a 

guess? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. Congressman, I am not sure I can answer directly, but I can say that the example that Congressman Cravaack 

gave about 747s, there are no facilities in the United States that 

can perform heavy maintenance on 747s. We must take these aircraft overseas to have this type of maintenance action performed 

on them. These are very expensive capital assets that our airlines 

own and they are very highly motivated to assure that the quality 

of the repairs and the overhauls is very high. 

Speaking about foreign repair station ratios, if you will, I would 

say that it is a net positive trade balance with repair stations, comVerDate Aug 31 2005 13:38 Jul 06, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\AV\4-25-1~1\73986.TXT JEAN
51 

paring what we bring into the U.S. compared to what we conduct 

outside the U.S., to the tune of over $2 billion. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Right, because of the sale of our aircraft, the initial construction and sale of the aircraft going out now obviously 

to be repaired. Why is it, why do we have, for instance, no facilities 

domestically for the heavy-duty repair for a 747? 

Mr. HENDRICKS. I don’t have a good answer for you. I am not 

sure if it was economically driven or just facility driven. But I can 

say based on my experience in the airline industry, the quality of 

this work that is being done is very high and very robust, and that 

is why airlines continue to do this. 

Mr. LANKFORD. OK. Other comments on that? Mr. Fortner. 

Mr. FORTNER. Again, as purely a domestic repair station, I would 

have to agree that when I go to other repair stations, including 

some foreign ones, the equipment and facilities they have over 

there and the training and personnel that I have seen and talked 

to are on par with anything you would see here in the United 

States. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Mr. Fortner, in your testimony you had stated 

that it has been 4 years since the TSA has given a final repair station security regulation. Do you have any perspective on why, what 

the delay is on getting that final regulation out there? 

Mr. FORTNER. Sure. Actually it is only 4 since they were actually 

mandated to do it with penalties to the FAA. It really has been 9 

years since they were first asked to do it. And, again, I don’t work 

for the TSA, but, again, from speaking with the TSA, my feeling 

is that it is just a matter of priorities. They were a new governmental agency tasked with a lot of issues, and I think that—— 

Mr. LANKFORD. So 9 years is not enough time to get that done? 

Mr. FORTNER. I think that they had—I think they had more important things. And I agree with them. I honestly don’t believe that 

the issues that they are trying to solve are there. It is really a solution looking for a problem. I mean, most people, they look at a repair station, I think that most public and probably much of Congress thinks of a repair station as a place where you land an airplane and you pull it up to the hangar and they do work on the 

airplane. 

The reality is that most of the repair stations out there are just 

like mine, which is I am 6 miles from the closest airport. Everything comes to me via UPS and FedEx. The parts come in. They 

fail on an airplane. They come in, we take them apart, we evaluate 

them, repair them, put them back together, test them and send 

them back. 

So long lines of security for a facility like ours that has 45 employees, I don’t think it is what Congress envisioned that they were 

looking at when they mandated this rule. So, again, I think the 

TSA simply had better things to do. 

Mr. LANKFORD. OK. So your perception, again, obviously you are 

not inside TSA, but your perception is they look at it and say this 

is a silly rule. We have got other things. We will just continue 

pushing this down. 

Do you think it has any impact in the industry, in the repair 

side, to not have that final rule out there? Just let us do our business, we are going to do a good job? 

52 

Mr. FORTNER. I think the only real impact is the fact that you 

can apply for and receive a foreign repair station certificate. It is 

kind of ironic that right now industry and the association are pushing for a rule that we don’t want, not for the rule itself but to get 

rid of the penalties that have been imposed. 

Mr. LANKFORD. OK. So you can’t get a foreign repair certification, is that what you are saying right now, without that? 

Mr. FORTNER. That is correct. 

Mr. LANKFORD. But more than ever, we are doing repairs internationally? 

Mr. FORTNER. Yes. 

Mr. LANKFORD. But we just can’t add new places. You have preexisting. So basically this limits competition internationally, that 

you can’t add new places. The existing ones just pay the penalty. 

How does that work? 

Mr. FORTNER. You cannot add existing foreign repair stations, 

but the U.S. regulated certificated foreign repair stations can continue to do business. Does that answer your question? 

Mr. LANKFORD. I think. Do you want to try to clarify that a little 

more? So we are not adding new entities, we just have the same 

existing ones. 

Mr. FORTNER. That is correct 

Mr. LANKFORD. At this point. So if we had the rule, then we can 

increase competition for this. If we don’t add the rule, then it stays 

as it is? 

Mr. FORTNER. Well, I think that competition is—you know it is 

a global market right now. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Sure. 

Mr. FORTNER. I think that I wouldn’t—again, as a purely domestic repair station, I don’t look at this as competition as much as 

equalizing the playing field for everybody. I think that there is a 

lot of companies out there that are U.S. that would like the ability 

to open a foreign repair station facility, because there is a demand 

and there is a market for it. That does not necessarily mean that 

you going to be taking work from a domestic carrier here. There 

is just work over there to be had. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. 

Mr. Fortner, as long as you are here, before we adjourn, it is my 

understanding that the U.S. repair station industry does not have 

a high public visibility, but it does employ some nearly 300,000, 

275,000 people in the United States and contributes nearly $40 billion a year to our economy. 

We have been talking in this hearing about safety. How do you 

strike the right balance or could you comment on any advice on 

how we could strike the right balance between appropriate safety 

regulations and oversight and over regulation that could end up 

being detrimental to people who are employed by this industry and 

who benefit from it? 

Mr. FORTNER. I think probably first and foremost, new regulation 

are not always good and not always bad. The security rule is a 

good example of one where it is not necessarily a bad regulation 

as much as I think it is an unneeded regulation. 

53 

Personally, what I would prefer to see is more resources put into 

what we already have, more inspectors, FAA inspectors out there 

to be able to do their jobs. What we see more than anything else 

is the lack of resources given to the people to do their job currently. 

I think that is one of the biggest issues that we face right now 

along the lines of safety and security for the repair station side. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Mr. Costello has one comment. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I really don’t have a question, but 

my friend from Oklahoma, in asking the question about foreign repair stations, we have, members of this subcommittee have visited 

a number of foreign repair stations as well as domestic repair stations and my personal observation is some are better than others. 

But one of the things that concerns me the most is we had—when 

Mr. Sabatini testified before this subcommittee a few years ago, I 

asked him the question, how many safety inspectors do we have 

working at the FAA in all of Asia and Europe to inspect the foreign 

repair stations? And he said we had eight at the time. And I said 

how many repair stations do we have? And he gave us the number 

of repair stations. And I asked him the question, can you attest to 

the fact that these inspectors actually physically go in and inspect 

the repair stations once a year? And he said no. And I said once 

every 2 or 3 years? And he said he couldn’t really tell us that. 

So I would agree that we need to put more resources into safety 

inspectors, both domestically and also internationally. And I would 

also say to the gentleman from Oklahoma, as he knows, because 

I think he has been to the American Airlines repair facility, they 

run an excellent repair facility. 

But the bottom line is the bottom line, and it comes down to 

money. In many cases where if you have an airline, a domestic airline in the United States flying empty airplanes to San Salvador 

to have them repaired and to bring them back empty, then you 

know that they are paying less to have them repaired in San Salvador than they are in the United States. So that is my personal 

conclusion. 

But I would agree with you that we should have more resources 

going to inspectors to make certain that we have the highest level 

of inspections and safety, both at domestic and international repair 

stations. 

With that, Mr. Chairman—— 

Mr. LANKFORD. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. COSTELLO. I would be happy to yield. 

Mr. LANKFORD. And that is my concern as well. My question was 

really about if there is something that we have done, as you said, 

a regulation in search of a problem, if there is some regulation that 

has been added, if there is some system that has been put in place 

that is outdated and outmoded, that is pushing this essential business overseas. 

We do have an excellent maintenance facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma, that deals with American Airlines. There are a lot of great 

people that work there, that work very hard, are very diligent and 

very particular about their aircraft. I am sure there are people 

internationally that are also particular about their aircraft as well. 

I am not doubting that, just to say this can be done domestically. 

If there is something that we are doing that is encouraging it to 

54 

go domestic, that would be helpful for us to know. Because it would 

help us with jobs and progressing with the industry and the relationships with the airlines to the local communities if they would 

do it locally. 

There is no substitute to having a worker that lives in the district for having a tenacious commitment to the airline as well. That 

is different when the work is done internationally, and it is separate from it. 

Thank you for that. I yield back. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I thank the gentleman and thank our witnesses 

and yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. It is my understanding our colleague Mr. 

Shuster has some additional questions, but we will ask him to submit them for the record and that you respond and we will hold the 

record open for that. 

Thank you all very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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