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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

BURT HOLT, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

May 23, 2017 

v No. 330076 

Wayne Circuit Court 

AMARILD USHE and RELIABLE 

TRANSPORTATION SPECIALISTS, INC., 

LC No. 12-007202-NI 

 Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

CONTAINERPORT GROUP, INC., 

 Defendant. 

Before: TALBOT, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and BORRELLO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendants-appellants, Amarild Ushe (Ushe) and Reliable Transportation Specialists Inc. 

(Reliable), appeal by right an order denying their post-trial motions following a jury verdict in 

favor of plaintiff Burt Holt (plaintiff). Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm. 

I. BASIC FACTS 

 Plaintiff is a truck driver who was injured while at Containerport Group Inc. (CPG). 

CPG is a facility that stores, repairs and inspects equipment as it comes in and out of the depot. 

CPG has a “shed” or “canopy” at its entrance. Truck drivers are required to stop and have their 

vehicles inspected in one of two lanes. On March 3, 2011, plaintiff was at CPG in the second of 

two inspection lanes. He was out of his vehicle while CPG employees conducted an inspection 

of his rig. In lane one was Ushe’s rig. Ushe drove for Reliable and was likewise undergoing an 

inspection of his rig. After receiving his inspection papers, Ushe re-entered his truck and began 

to drive away. The rear tires of Ushe’s vehicle struck plaintiff, who was standing between the 

two trucks, causing his body to twist and plaintiff fell to the ground. Plaintiff suffered a severe 

injury to his right leg. 

 Plaintiff originally sued Ushe and Reliable, claiming that Ushe was negligent (and 

Reliable was therefore vicariously liable) in pulling the rig out of the inspection lane when Ushe 

knew or should have known that plaintiff was in the “zone of danger.” Ushe/Reliable filed a 
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notice of third-party fault, claiming that CPG was negligent in failing to properly monitor and 

control ingress and egress of the vehicles it inspected. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to 

include allegations that CPG was negligent in the manner in which it conducted inspections. 

 There was a 10-day jury trial over the course of three weeks. Plaintiff’s theory of the 

case was that Ushe was negligent when he pulled his vehicle out of the inspection without regard 

to plaintiff’s safety and that CPG placed truck drivers in a perilous position by requiring them to 

exit their vehicles during inspection without implementing or maintaining any policies or 

procedures for the protection of the drivers. Collectively, defendants argued that plaintiff was 

comparatively negligent because he was on his cell phone at the time of the accident and failed 

to use reasonable care for his own safety. They argued that plaintiff effectively placed himself in 

the path of Ushe’s vehicle. The nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries were hotly contested. 

Defendants, utilizing what plaintiff’s counsel referred to as a “fat defense,” argued that plaintiff, 

who was 5’9 and over 300 pounds at the time of the accident, suffered severe injury because he 

was particularly susceptible and because he had a number of pre-existing conditions that 

complicated his recovery. However, it must be noted that defendants presented no medical 

testimony to dispute plaintiff’s injuries other than their cross-examination of plaintiff’s medical 

experts. 

 The jury concluded that Ushe and Reliable were 50% at fault, CPG was 40% at fault and 

plaintiff was 10% at fault for the accident. It awarded plaintiff $6,000,000 in past non-economic 

loss and over $15,000,000 for future non-economic loss. On July 28, 2015, the trial court 

entered an order of judgment reflecting that plaintiff’s past and future economic damages were 

$386,360.57 and his past and future non-economic damages were $16,984,331.90 for a total 

judgment of $17,370,692.47, which was reduced by 10% to reflect plaintiff’s comparative fault. 

 The trial court denied a number of post-trial motions. Ushe and Reliable filed a claim of 

appeal on November 6, 2015. CPG also filed a claim of appeal on November 12, 2015 and the 

two appeals were originally consolidated. However, a stipulation to dismiss CPG’s appeal was 

entered on December 22, 2016. Holt v Ushe, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered 

December 22, 2016 (Docket No. 330202). 

II. REMITTITUR/NEW TRIAL BASED ON AN EXCESSIVE VERDICT 

 Ushe and Reliable argue that the trial court erred when it denied their motion for 

remittitur or new trial. We disagree. 

[T]he question of the excessiveness of a jury verdict is generally one for the trial 

court in the first instance. The trial court, having witnessed all the testimony and 

evidence as well as having had the unique opportunity to evaluate the jury’s 

reaction to the proofs and to the individual witnesses, is in the best position to 

make an informed decision regarding the excessiveness of the verdict. 

Accordingly, an appellate court must accord due deference to the trial court’s 

decision and may only disturb a grant or denial of remittitur if an abuse of 

discretion is shown. [Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527, 531; 443 NW2d 

354 (1989).] 
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“An abuse of discretion occurs when a court chooses an outcome that is outside the range of 

principled outcomes.” Heaton v Benton Const Co, 286 Mich App 528, 538; 780 NW2d 618 

(2009). 

 Ushe and Reliable challenge only the jury’s non-economic damages award. The jury 

awarded plaintiff $6,000,000 in past non-economic loss and over $15,000,000 for future noneconomic loss ($750,000 every year from 2016-2035). The trial court’s judgment reflects that 

plaintiff’s total past and future non-economic damages are $16,984,331.90, which is reduced by 

10% to reflect plaintiff’s comparative fault. CPG’s portion of the non-economic loss is 

$6,919,164.13, while Ushe/Reliable’s portion is $8,735,142.35. 

 MCR 2.611(1)(c) and (d) provides: 

(1) A new trial may be granted to all or some of the parties, on all or some of the 

issues, whenever their substantial rights are materially affected, for any of the 

following reasons: 

*** 

(c) Excessive or inadequate damages appearing to have been influenced by 

passion or prejudice. 

(d) A verdict clearly or grossly inadequate or excessive. [See also MCL 

600.6098(2)(b)(iv) and (v).] 

 “The only consideration expressly authorized by [the court rule] . . . is whether the jury 

award is supported by the evidence.” Palenkas, 432 Mich at 532. Whether an award “shocks the 

conscience” is not an appropriate consideration because it is wholly subjective. Id. While a trial 

court should consider, for example, whether bias or prejudice influenced the award, it must do so 

based only on “objective considerations relating to the actual conduct of the trial or to the 

evidence adduced.” Id. To the extent that they are objectively verifiable, a trial court may 

consider: (1) whether the award was obtained by “improper methods, prejudice, passion, 

partiality, sympathy, corruption, or mistake of law or fact”; (2) whether the award was within the 

limits of what reasonable minds would find to be just compensation for the injury; and, (3) 

whether the award is comparable to awards in similar cases. Id. 

 “The power of remittitur should be exercised with restraint.” Silberstein v Pro-Golf of 

Am, Inc, 278 Mich App 446, 462; 750 NW2d 615 (2008). “When deciding whether to grant a 

motion for remittitur, the trial court must examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party to determine whether the evidence supported the jury’s award.” Taylor v 

Kent Radiology, 286 Mich App 490, 522; 780 NW2d 900 (2009). Where, as here, “a jury verdict 

is based in part upon pain and suffering, a trial court must balance all of the factors involved 

against the general principle that there is no absolute mathematical formula or standard by which 

pain and suffering can be measured; thus, the amount allowed for pain and suffering must 

ordinarily rest in the sound judgment of the jury.” Palenkas, 432 Mich at 556. “If the award for 

economic damages falls reasonably within the range of the evidence and within the limits of 

what reasonable minds would deem just compensation, the jury award should not be disturbed.” 

Silberstein, 278 Mich App at 462. 
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 Ushe and Reliable cite Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749, 765; 685 NW2d 

391 (2004): 

 When a verdict is procured through improper methods of advocacy, 

misleading argument, or other factors that confound the jury’s quantification of a 

party’s injuries, that amount is inherently unreliable and unlikely to be a fair 

estimate of the injured party’s losses. Likewise, when a verdict is unsupported by 

the record or entirely inconsistent with verdicts rendered in similar cases, a 

reviewing court may fairly conclude that the verdict exceeds the amount required 

to compensate the injured party. [Id. at 765.] 

They rely on this passage and focus solely on the third prong of the Palenkas test – whether the 

amount actually awarded was comparable to awards in similar cases. In so doing, they 

effectively ignore the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Instead, Ushe and Reliable spend 

an inordinate amount of time setting forth a general survey of Michigan personal injury verdicts 

as well as a survey of reported verdicts for automobile negligence cases to demonstrate that the 

award in this case was “far outside the realm of what reasonable minds would deem just 

compensation for the kind of injuries Holt sustained.” However, “[t]he only consideration 

expressly authorized by [the court rule] . . . is whether the jury award is supported by the 

evidence.” Palenkas, 432 Mich at 532. “There may be some cases in which it is possible to 

determine objectively that a compensatory award is or is not supported by the record.” Gilbert, 

470 Mich at 767. How an award compares with other cases is only one consideration; the 

starting point and the primary focus should be on the evidence produced at trial. 

 Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff’s injuries include not 

only the original ankle injury, which has never properly healed, and a traumatic brain injury, but 

also numerous other injuries stemming from complications of recovery, such as knee, shoulder, 

and back problems. By all accounts at trial, plaintiff was an active individual with a robust work 

habit prior to the accident, which had debilitating and permanent consequences. Plaintiff 

testified regarding the effect of these injuries on his life. He was unable to care for himself and 

was placed in a residential assisted living facility after being released from the hospital. At that 

time, plaintiff was basically an “invalid” and felt “worthless.” It took five months before 

plaintiff was able to live on his own. In the meantime he was “sitting there. Wasn’t nothing to 

do” but try and heal. 

 Plaintiff testified that he wears sunglasses all of the time because his eyes are “messed 

up.” He sees floaters and spots. He has chronic headaches. These problems started near the 

time plaintiff suffered from the pulmonary emboli. Plaintiff was doing his best to get better but 

it felt like “a waste of time,” and plaintiff had been in pain every day since the March 2011 

accident. Plaintiff was trying to make the best out of it but there was little he could do but sit 

around. He only had transportation for doctors’ appointments. It was hard for plaintiff to get 

around and he was on a long list of medications. He took a narcotic for pain, but it was “like 

taking a baby aspirin.” The pain at night would often interfere with his sleep. 

 The physicians who treated and evaluated plaintiff confirmed that he continued to live 

with pain. Dr. Rahoul Vaidya saw plaintiff every two or three months. Vaidya testified that 

plaintiff continued to experience pain and discomfort from his injuries and the pain was chronic. 
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Vaidya explained that trauma can take three to five years to recover from, but that plaintiff did 

not seem to be making any progress and “it’s probably not going to improve dramatically, maybe 

a little bit.” Dr. Mary Miller had treated plaintiff for a significant time at the rehabilitation 

center. She noted that plaintiff suffered from chronic pain and depression, which was a common 

side effect of chronic pain. In fact, plaintiff’s depressive symptoms were so severe that Miller 

referred plaintiff to Dr. Daniel Rataj to evaluate whether plaintiff had a traumatic brain injury. 

Miller testified that plaintiff would likely suffer ongoing pain and disability from his injuries 

every single day for the rest of his life and that it was unlikely that plaintiff would ever recover. 

He would need ongoing medical care and medications and faced a number of future surgeries 

depending on how his joints held up. Rataj found plaintiff’s depression to be “striking” and 

obvious at their first meeting. Plaintiff appeared socially withdrawn and extremely sad. Rataj 

noted that plaintiff’s injuries changed plaintiff’s life. He went from being very motivated and a 

high achiever but now lacked the energy to function at the same level. Plaintiff suffered 

headaches, dizziness, sensitivity to sound and light, depression, and anxiety; he suffered from 

anhedonia, which was the inability to experience pleasure. Plaintiff also had thoughts about 

killing himself. Rataj agreed that it was unlikely plaintiff would ever recover. He was also at a 

greater risk of developing dementia. Dr. Gerald Shiener agreed that plaintiff suffered from 

chronic pain and depression. He had trouble sleeping and the lack of restorative sleep caused 

him to lose initiative. Chronic pain also caused negative thinking and general misery – “You 

can’t see that you’ll ever feel any better.” Plaintiff had poor memory, poor concentration, 

irritability, and social withdrawal. He was extremely frustrated with himself. Every aspect of 

plaintiff’s life was affected by the accident. Finally, Dr. Antoine Geffrard testified that there was 

no doubt plaintiff continued to suffer irretractable pain without interruption. 

 The evidence at trial provided objective support for the jury’s ultimate award. There is 

no indication that the jury’s verdict was the result of passion or bias. 

 Ushe and Reliable complain that plaintiff’s comments during closing argument urged the 

jury to do more than simply compensate plaintiff for his injuries. However, we have examined 

the record and can determine nothing inappropriate about counsel’s arguments. Moreover, the 

fact that the jury awarded less than what plaintiff’s counsel requested indicates that the jury 

deliberated the issue appropriately and was not influenced by passion or prejudice. 

 Next, Ushe and Reliable argued that the award was the culmination of errors and 

irregularities at trial but, as discussed below, there were either no errors or errors that were 

harmless. There is no support for the claim that irregularities resulted in an excessive award. 

 Finally, Ushe and Reliable make a constitutional argument, arguing that a grossly 

excessive award for pain and suffering may violate a defendant’s due process rights. Again, they 

rely on a footnote from Gilbert: 

 There is also an overarching constitutional issue to consider. In State Farm 

Mut Automobile Ins. Co v Campbell, 538 US 408, 416; 123 S Ct 1513; 155 L Ed 

2d 585 (2003), the United States Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he Due 

Process Clause of the [United States Constitution’s] Fourteenth Amendment 

prohibits imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a 

tortfeasor.” While State Farm dealt with punitive damage awards, the due process 
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concerns articulated in State Farm are arguably at play regardless of the label 

given to damage awards. A grossly excessive award for pain and suffering may 

violate the Due Process Clause even if it is not labeled “punitive.” In this case, 

however, there is no need to reach this constitutional question, given the necessity 

of reversal on other grounds. [Gilbert, 470 Mich at 765 n 22.] 

Unlike other cases where a panel of this court is tasked with determining whether language in an 

opinion constitutes dicta, the plain language of the foregoing passage makes clear that “there is 

no need to reach this constitutional question.” “Stare decisis does not arise from a point 

addressed in obiter dictum.” Griswold Properties, LLC v Lexington Ins Co, 276 Mich App 551, 

563; 741 NW2d 549 (2007). Moreover, the facts in Gilbert are not on point with the case at bar. 

Our Supreme Court in Gilbert determined that the plaintiff’s $20 million award for noneconomic damages was excessive because “[n]ot only does the verdict exceed verdicts in similar 

cases by leaps and bounds, but, as shown in this opinion, it was awarded by a jury inflamed by 

hyperbolic rhetoric, prejudice-baiting argument, and unscientific expert testimony.” Gilbert, 470 

Mich at 770. For example, the plaintiff’s attorney in Gilbert engaged in “inflammatory rhetoric” 

by deliberately trying to “provoke the jury by supplanting law, fact, and reason with prejudice, 

misleading arguments, and repeated ad hominem attacks against defendant based on its corporate 

status” and by comparing the plaintiff to victims of the Holocaust. Id. at 770-771. Here, 

plaintiff’s attorney did not ask the jury to suspend reason and award plaintiff a large verdict in 

order to punish defendants; instead, counsel asked the jury to consider the nature and extent of 

plaintiff’s injuries and the lifelong effect those injuries would have. After a thorough 

examination of the lower court record, there is nothing objectionable about counsel’s behavior. 

III. EVIDENCE OF AN INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT AND THE NOTICE OF NONPARTY FAULT 

 Ushe and Reliable argue that the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding the 

meaning of an alleged indemnity agreement between CPG and Reliable and that the trial court 

also erred in allowing plaintiff to admit the notice of non-party fault into evidence. We conclude 

that there was nothing erroneous regarding the indemnification testimony and, while we agree 

with Ushe and Reliable that the notice of non-party fault should not have been admitted into 

evidence, such error was harmless. 

 “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion.” Edry v Adelman, 486 Mich 634, 639; 786 NW2d 567 (2010). “A court necessarily

abuses its discretion when it admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. However, 

any error in the admission or exclusion of evidence will not warrant appellate relief unless 

refusal to take this action appears inconsistent with substantial justice, or affects a substantial 

right of the opposing party.” Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 76; 684 NW2d 296 (2004) 

(footnotes omitted). MCR 2.613(A) provides: 

 An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling 

or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the 

parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for 

vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to 

take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
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The test is whether the error was harmless. Chastain v Gen Motors Corp, 467 Mich 888; 654 

NW2d 326 (2002). 

 Plaintiff’s attorney, responding to the so-called “fat defense,” argued that Ushe and 

Reliable and CPG had previously blamed one another for the accident and then changed course 

and placed all of the blame on plaintiff. Counsel noted that in the notice of non-party fault, Ushe 

and Reliable claimed that CPG was negligent for failing to properly manage the ingress and 

egress of vehicles in its facility but that it had abandoned that claim at trial, likely due to the fact 

that Reliable would be responsible for all damages under an indemnification agreement. 

Contrary to Ushe and Reliable’s position on appeal, plaintiff’s intent was not to argue for an 

inflated jury award by implying that Reliable would not have to pay the judgment; instead, 

counsel was merely trying to demonstrate how and why the defendants took the positions they 

did. 

 “Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is not. Evidence 

is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the 

action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Morales v State 

Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 279 Mich App 720, 729–730; 761 NW2d 454 (2008), citing MRE 402 

and 401. 

Relevance divides into two components: materiality and probative value. Material 

evidence relates to a fact of consequence to the action. A material fact need not be 

an element of a crime or cause of action or defense but it must, at least, be in issue 

in the sense that it is within the range of litigated matters in controversy. 

Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions that the evidence is 

offered to prove and the issues in the case. If the evidence is offered to help prove 

a proposition that is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial. [Hardrick v 

Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 294 Mich App 651, 667; 819 NW2d 28, 37 (2011) (citations 

and quotation marks omitted).] 

“Evidence bearing on a witness’s credibility is always relevant.” In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App 

684, 696; 847 NW2d 514 (2014); see also Powell v St John Hosp, 241 Mich App 64, 73; 614 

NW2d 666 (2000). However, MRE 403 provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded 

“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence.” 

 Ushe and Reliable first argue that the indemnification was inadmissible under MCL 

500.3030 and MRE 411. To be clear, there was no evidence of an actual indemnification 

between Reliable and CPG, as seems to be implied by the parties on appeal. Daniel Davis, 

CPG’s safety and risk management officer, testified that he believed that Reliable, in order to 

have access to the equipment at CPG, would have to be a party to a contract called the Uniform 

Intermodal Interchange Agreement (UIIA). The agreement would have been between Reliable 

and the Intermodal Association of North America; there was no direct agreement between the 

parties. The agreement outlines the relationship between motor carriers like Reliable and 

equipment providers like CPG. MCL 500.3030 provides: 
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In the original action brought by the injured person, or his or her personal 

representative in case death results from the accident, as mentioned in section 

3006, the insurer shall not be made or joined as a party defendant, nor, except as 

otherwise provided by law, shall any reference whatever be made to such insurer 

or to the question of carrying of such insurance during the course of trial. 

[Footnote omitted.] 

MRE 411 provides: 

Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible 

upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This 

rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when 

offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, if 

controverted, or bias or prejudice of a witness. 

At issue is whether an indemnification agreement is the same as insurance under the rule and 

statute. 

 Ushe and Reliable cite Garvin v Detroit Bd of Ed, unpublished opinion per curiam of the 

Court of Appeals, issued June 16, 2015 (Docket No. 319557), in support of their position that 

indemnification agreements are treated the same as insurance. In Garvin, a panel of this Court 

held: 

 Although the remainder of the issues raised by defendants are rendered 

moot by our ruling, we will address one argument posed by defendants to avoid 

error in the new trial. Evidence that the individual defendants might be 

indemnified for any judgment entered against them is not admissible, just as 

evidence of the existence or nonexistence of liability insurance is not admissible 

under MRE 411. The issue of indemnification, like the issue of liability insurance, 

is irrelevant because it “ ‘tends to influence and prejudice jurors by imparting to 

them the information that whatever verdict they may render will be immaterial to 

the defendant, since he will not have to pay for it.’ ” Id. at 521–522, quoting 29 

Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 404, p. 458. See Felsner v McDonald Rent–A–Car, Inc,

173 Mich App 518; 434 NW2d 178 (1988). If a party raises an objection to 

another party’s attempt to question a witness about indemnification, the 

appropriate remedy is a curative instruction advising the jury that the question of 

indemnification has no bearing on any issue in the case and that it must refrain 

from any inference, speculation, or discussion about indemnification. [Id. at slip 

op, p 6 (footnote omitted.] 

Garvin, as an unpublished opinion, has no precedential value. MCR 7.215(C)(1). The panel’s 

one-paragraph analysis flies in the face of the plain language of MRE 411. An appellate court 

“uses the principles of statutory construction when interpreting a Michigan court rule. We begin 

by considering the plain language of the court rule in order to ascertain its meaning.” Henry v 

Dow Chem Co, 484 Mich 483, 495; 772 NW2d 301 (2009). 
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The primary goal when interpreting a statute is to discern the intent of the 

Legislature by focusing on the most reliable evidence of that intent, the language 

of the statute itself. When legislative intent is clear from the language, no further 

construction is required or permitted. [Fairley v Dep’t of Corrections, 497 Mich 

290, 296–297; 871 NW2d 129, recon den 498 Mich 864 (2015).] 

The plain language of the rule does not reference indemnification. 

 Moreover, Garvin is distinguishable from the case at bar. Evidence of a party’s liability 

insurance is inadmissible because such evidence may result in large verdicts if the jury believes 

the defendants are not on the hook for the judgment. Here, evidence of an indemnification 

agreement was not admitted to inform the jury that CPG would not have to pay for any judgment 

nor was it used to show that a party acted negligently or wrongfully. Instead, plaintiff used the 

indemnification agreement to demonstrate how the various defendants were connected and how 

their theories of liability had shifted. This was proper to show Davis’s bias as a witness. Davis 

testified that Ushe was not negligent under the circumstances. An indemnification agreement 

might explain why Ushe and Reliable’s accident reconstructionist did not take into account 

CPG’s conduct and, likewise, why CPG’s accident reconstructionist did not factor in Ushe’s 

conduct. Because there is no controlling case law that provides an indemnification agreement is 

the same as insurance under MRE 411 and because evidence of an indemnification agreement 

was used for a proper purpose, the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding references to 

an indemnification agreement. 

 More problematic is the trial court’s decision to allow the notice of non-party fault to be 

admitted into evidence as a “pleading.” Ushe and Reliable filed the notice as a means of 

allocating fault under Michigan’s tort reform. At trial, plaintiff sought to use the notice of nonparty fault as an admission under MRE 801(d)(2). “[U]nder MRE 801(d)(2), statements in 

pleadings may be treated as admissions.” Hunt v CHAD Enterprises, Inc, 183 Mich App 59, 63; 

454 NW2d 188 (1990). However, MCR 2.110, which defines what a pleading is, is silent on a 

notice of non-party fault. The rule provides: 

(A) Definition of “Pleading.” The term “pleading” includes only: 

(1) a complaint, 

(2) a cross-claim, 

(3) a counterclaim, 

(4) a third-party complaint, 

(5) an answer to a complaint, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, 

and 

(6) a reply to an answer. 

No other form of pleading is allowed. (Emphasis added.) 
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Therefore, the trial court erred when it concluded that the notice of non-party fault was 

admissible as a pleading. 

 Plaintiff concedes that the notice of non-party fault was not a pleading under MCR 2.110, 

but still maintains that it was “tantamount to a pleading” for which MRE 801(d)(2) applied. We 

disagree. There is a difference between a statement of fact or admission to which the rule applies 

and a mere allegation or alternative theory. Larion v City of Detroit, 149 Mich App 402, 406-

407; 386 NW2d 199 (1986). Alternative pleadings are generally accepted and “a party should 

not be placed in the position of having to forego a claim at the risk of having inconsistent 

allegations treated as admissions.” Id. at 407. The Court in Larion explained: 

 Our decision is in accord with the trend described in McCormick on 

Evidence (3d ed, 1984), § 265, pp. 780-782: 

“An important exception to the use of the pleadings in the case as 

admissions must be noted. A basic problem which attends the use of 

written pleadings is uncertainty whether the evidence as it actually unfolds 

at trial will prove the case described in the pleadings. Traditionally a 

failure in this respect, i.e., a variance between pleading and proof, could 

bring disaster to the pleader’s case. As a safeguard against developments 

of this kind, the common law evolved the use of counts, each a complete 

separate statement of a different version of the same basic claim, 

combined in the same declaration, to take care of variance possibilities. 

The same was done with defenses. Inconsistency between counts or 

between defenses was not prohibited; in fact it was essential to the 

successful use of the system. Also essential to the success of the system 

was a prohibition against using allegations in one count or defense as 

admissions to prove or disprove allegations in another. For a time, under 

the influence of the Field Code of 1848, the view prevailed that in a given 

case there could exist only one set of facts and that inconsistent statements 

and defenses were therefore not allowable. Nevertheless, uncertainty has 

persisted as to how a case will in fact develop at trial, and some procedure 

is needed for dealing with problems of variance. The modern equivalent of 

the common law system is the use of alternative and hypothetical forms of 

statement of claims and defenses, regardless of consistency. It can readily 

be appreciated that pleadings of this nature are directed primarily to 

giving notice and lack the essential character of an admission. To allow 

them to operate as admissions would render their use ineffective and 

frustrate their underlying purpose. Hence the decisions with seeming 

unanimity deny them status as judicial admissions, and generally disallow 

them as evidential admissions. 

“The trend is to expand the application of the exception described above to 

the general rule of admissibility to include, not only the common law 

practice and modern hypothetical and alternative allegations, but in 

addition situations in which a more skillful pleader would have avoided 

the pitfalls of admissions by resorting to one of those techniques. * * *. 
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The same trend is evident in cases involving separate actions against 

different defendants to recover for the same injury. The trend is consistent 

with the prevailing view that the primary purpose of pleadings is to give 

notice and that alternative or hypothetical allegations are not usable as 

admissions, but the extent to which it will prevail is difficult to estimate.” 

(Footnotes omitted; emphasis added.) 

[Larion, 149 Mich App at 408–400.] 

Defense counsel states it best in her appellate brief: “[T]he purpose of the non-party fault 

procedures is to provide a plaintiff with notice that another party may be at fault, not to lock a 

defendant into one position, preclude that defendant from any inconsistent allegations throughout 

the course of the proceedings, and deprive that defendant of its right to devise its own trial 

strategy.” 

 However, although the trial court erred in allowing plaintiff to introduce the notice of 

non-party fault into evidence, the error was harmless because Ushe testified to the exact 

allegations contained within the notice: 

Q. In paragraph one [of the notice of nonparty at fault] here’s what is [sic] 

says, [CPG] is a nonparty at fault for failure to properly and adequately monitor 

the ingress and egress of vehicular traffic within the inspection area of CPG 

resulting in the accident that give [sic] rise to plaintiff’s original complaint. Did I 

read that right? 

A. Yes. 

Q. You just told the jury you agreed with that. You think the way in 

which CPG had this whole thing set up caused and/or contributed to my client’s 

accident and injury; don’t you? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Wherefore, defendants; Amarild Ushe; that’s you? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And Reliable Transportation Services, LLC respectfully request that 

this Honorable Court instruct the jury at the time of trial that they are to assess a 

percentage of fault attributable to the nonparty . . . You agree with that, don’t 

you? 

A. Yes. 

* * *

Q. You agree with this statement by [the attorney] on your behalf that this 

accident in part is because of CPG and what they did wrong. 
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A. I don’t write this. 

Q. I know, but you agree. You already told me three times; agreed? 

A. Yes. 

Q. So you’re not backing off that in this trial, are you? 

A. No. 

Even without the direct reference to the notice of non-party fault, Ushe’s testimony confirms that 

he believed the situation at CPG was at least partially to blame for the accident. Any error was 

harmless. 

IV. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Ushe and Reliable argue that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the 

evidence and that plaintiff was at fault for the accident. They note that (1) plaintiff was on his 

cell phone at the time of the accident; (2) plaintiff was not wearing a reflective vest; (3) plaintiff 

should have been able to see Ushe’s cab move; (4) plaintiff stood directly in the line of travel of 

Ushe’s rear wheels; (5) plaintiff failed to appreciate the sound of Ushe starting his truck and 

releasing the air brake; and, (6) plaintiff had been to CPG on numerous occasions and knew that 

adjacent trucks moved forward once cleared by inspection. Ushe and Reliable contend that the 

jury was likely improperly influenced by impermissible expert testimony and that the jury was 

erroneously instructed regarding memory loss. We disagree with each of these claims. 

 Ushe and Reliable first argue that they were entitled to a directed verdict because the 

jury’s comparative negligence finding was against the great weight of the “undisputed” evidence. 

We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s denial of a motion for new 

trial. When a party challenges a jury’s verdict as against the great weight of the 

evidence, this Court must give substantial deference to the judgment of the trier of 

fact. If there is any competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we must 

defer our judgment regarding the credibility of the witnesses. [Allard v State 

Farm Ins Co, 271 Mich App 394, 406–407; 722 NW2d 268 (2006) (footnotes 

omitted).] 

 MCR 2.611(1)(e) provides that a new trial may be granted if the verdict is against the 

great weight of the evidence or contrary to law. “But a jury’s verdict should not be set aside if 

there is competent evidence to support it,” which requires a review of “the whole body of 

proofs.” Dawe v Bar-Levav & Assoc (On Remand), 289 Mich App 380, 401; 808 NW2d 240 

(2010). 

 Ushe and Reliable cite Modzel v Norwalk Truck Lines, 325 Mich 693; 39 NW2d 226 

(1949) in support of their claim that plaintiff placed himself in danger. However, Modzel was 

decided under the old contributory negligence standard, which has been replaced by the 

comparative negligence standard. Placek v City of Sterling Hts, 405 Mich 638, 650; 275 NW2d 

511, 514 (1979) (“We hold, in the interest of justice for all litigants in this state, that the doctrine 
-13- 

of comparative negligence hereby replaces the doctrine of contributory negligence . . .”). Thus, 

while the plaintiff’s contributory negligence acted as a complete bar, plaintiff’s alleged 

comparative negligence in this case was considered and properly apportioned. 

 Defendants then discuss the evidence at trial, claiming that even plaintiff’s own experts 

believed that plaintiff placed himself in the path of danger. Defendants claim that plaintiff’s 

biomedical engineer expert, Dr. Jamie Williams, testified that plaintiff was the one who put 

himself in the position of standing within the path of Ushe’s tires. But defendants provide an 

incomplete reference to Williams’s testimony. On re-direct, she also testified: 

Q. He’s only in the path if the truck moves. 

A. Correct. 

Q. If the truck stops because he’s close enough because you see him in 

the rearview mirror, because he’s anywhere near the rear wheel, the accident 

doesn’t happen. 

A. Correct. 

 Ushe and Reliable also contend that plaintiff’s accident reconstructionist, Timoth Abbo, 

testified that plaintiff placed himself in the path of the rear chassis tires. But, again, this is not a 

fair representation of Abbo’s testimony. Abbo testified that the fact that Ushe was moving 

forward at the time of the accident indicated that plaintiff was positioned in front of the wheel 

before the truck moved and, therefore, was there to be seen if Ushe had checked his mirror. The 

mirrors were designed to look down the sides of the vehicle. If Ushe had actually looked, he 

would have seen plaintiff. There was no evidence that plaintiff walked into the wheel. 

 Ushe and Reliable’s arguments regarding plaintiff’s comparative fault is essentially a 

request that this Court usurp the jury’s role in deciding matters of witness credibility. Even if 

plaintiff was negligent in all of the ways that they claim, there was ample evidence to support the 

jury’s allocation of fault. 

 Ushe and Reliable next argue that the jury’s comparative negligence finding was 

influenced by the trial court erroneously giving M Civ JI 10.09 regarding memory loss. Claims 

of instructional error are generally reviewed de novo. Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 211; 

670 NW2d 675 (2003). “MCR 2.516(D)(2) states that the trial court must give a jury instruction 

if a party requests such instruction, and it is applicable to the case. We review for abuse of 

discretion the trial court’s determination whether a standard jury instruction is applicable and 

accurate.” Lewis, 258 Mich App at 211. 

 The trial court gave this standard instruction: 

 It is alleged that the plaintiff has a loss of memory concerning the facts of 

this case and it was caused by the occurrence. If you determine that the plaintiff 

had a loss of memory that was caused by the occurrence, you may infer that the 

plaintiff was not negligent, however, you should weight [sic] all the evidence in 

determining whether the plaintiff was or was not negligent. 
-14- 

There is nothing objectionable about this standard instruction, which advises the jury that if it 

believes that plaintiff suffered from memory loss as a result of the accident, it may infer that 

plaintiff was not negligent, but that the jury should still weigh all the evidence in determining 

plaintiff’s comparative negligence. 

 Finally, Ushe and Reliable complain that the jury was improperly influenced by 

impermissible expert testimony. “[T]he qualification of a witness as an expert and the 

admissibility of the testimony of the witness are in the trial court’s discretion and we will not 

reverse on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.” Surman v Surman, 277 Mich App 287, 

304–305; 745 NW2d 802 (2007). 

 Ushe and Reliable complain that Abbo did not investigate the accident himself and did 

not perform any tests or obtain measurements. Instead, he simply observed CPG and relied on 

witnesses’ testimony. However, these things were explored during cross-examination and the 

jury was made aware of any alleged deficiencies in Abbo’s analysis. Issues of credibility, 

including evaluating expert testimony, “should be left for the fact-finder.” Dawe, 289 Mich App 

at 401. It appears that, at least on appeal, Ushe and Reliable do not challenge Abbo’s 

qualifications, only his opinions. Instead, Ushe and Reliable complain that the trial court 

impermissibly allowed Abbo to testify that defendants were liable while plaintiff was not. Abbo 

testified that plaintiff was not at fault for the accident. The trial court denied defendants’ request 

for a curative instruction noting that the jury “can disregard his opinion.” 

 Citing, O’Dowd v Linehan, 385 Mich 491; 189 NW2d 333 (1971), Ushe and Reliable 

argue that it was error to allow an accident reconstruction expert to testify as to the parties’ fault. 

However, O’Dowd has been subsequently clarified. 

 Waste Management argues that prejudice resulted because the accident 

reconstructionist improperly testified in such a way so as to fix fault or identify 

who was negligent. We disagree. 

 Waste Management relies primarily on O’Dowd v Linehan, 385 Mich 491, 

189 NW2d 333 (1971). We first note that O’Dowd was decided before the 

adoption of MRE 704, which states that “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or 

inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an 

ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Moreover, O’Dowd was one of 

the early cases dealing with accident reconstruction testimony and, as shown by 

the concurrence by Justice Williams, there was concern about the reliability and 

method of the expert in that case. The crucial issue in O’Dowd was which of two 

cars was in the wrong lane when the collision occurred, id. at 510, 189 NW2d 

333, and the expert’s attempt to describe the positions of the cars and his 

determination which driver had been in the wrong lane was what the Court 

viewed to be an attempt to “fix the blame” for the accident. Id. at 513, 189 NW 2d 

333. Such testimony as to accident causation has become routine since the 

adoption of MRE 704 and we do not believe that O’Dowd should be read to bar 

an accident reconstructionist from testifying about what and whose actions caused 

the accident. See Ruddock v Lodise, 413 Mich 499; 320 NW2d 663 (1982) (expert 

testimony that the trial court improperly concluded, relying on O’Dowd, should 
-15- 

have been excluded because it embraced the ultimate issue to be decided by the 

jury was permissible under MRE 704 where the testimony could aid the jury in 

determining whether the defendant failed to maintain the road in a reasonably safe 

condition); see also Portelli v IR Constr Products Co, Inc, 218 Mich App 591, 

602, 554 NW 2d 591 (1996) (“Plaintiff’s expert found fault . . .”). Accordingly, 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the accident 

reconstructionists to opine as to fault. [Freed v Salas, 286 Mich App 300, 337–

338; 780 NW2d 844 (2009).] 

 The jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence, was not the result of 

improper instructions, and was not the result of inappropriate expert testimony. 

V. INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPARATIVE FAULT RELATIVE TO PLAINTIFF’S 

DAMAGES 

 Ushe and Reliable argue that the jury verdict form and the instructions unduly 

emphasized that plaintiff’s damages would be reduced by his comparative fault. This issue is 

unpreserved. “To preserve an instructional issue for appeal, a party must request the instruction 

before instructions are given and must object on the record before the jury retires to deliberate.” 

Heaton v Benton Const Co, 286 Mich App 528, 537; 780 NW2d 618 (2009). “The failure to 

timely and specifically object precludes appellate review absent manifest injustice.” Id.

 Ushe and Reliable do not claim that there was an inaccurate statement of law; instead, 

they argue that the cumulative nature of the instructions and the verdict form unduly emphasized 

the issue of comparative fault and the resultant effect on a possible jury award. “[E]rror may 

result where the instructions to the jury are unnecessarily repetitive and argumentative.” Thon v 

Saginaw Paint Mfg Co, 120 Mich App 745, 748; 327 NW2d 551 (1982). The Thon Court cited 

Mack v Precast Industries, Inc, 369 Mich 439; 120 NW2d 225 (1963), wherein the trial court 

instructed the jury 16 times that the plaintiff would be precluded from recovery if her decedent 

were guilty of contributory negligence, “however slight.” The repetitious instruction was 

erroneous, not simply because it was repeated so frequently, but because the language “however 

slight” unduly emphasized the plaintiff’s contributory negligence as it related to the defendants’ 

negligence. Here, the instructions were legally correct and in keeping with the standard 

instructions. Moreover, “[j]ury instructions should be reviewed in their entirety, not extracted 

piecemeal to establish error in isolated portions.” Bachman v Swan Harbour Ass’n, 252 Mich 

App 400, 424; 653 NW2d 415 (2002). Although Ushe and Reliable make it appear as though the 

trial court unnecessarily repeated comparative negligence instructions, it is clear upon reviewing 

the record that these instructions were properly given in light of the complexity of trial and the 

fact that there were multiple defendants and multiple theories of liability. Finally, even when 

there is instructional error, reversal is not warranted “if, on balance, the theories of the parties 

and the applicable law were adequately and fairly presented to the jury.” Murdock v Higgins, 

454 Mich 46, 59; 559 NW2d 639 (1997). 

 We decline Ushe and Reliable’s request to find the standard instructions prejudicial as a 

matter of law because “the jury does not need the information imparted” where “the effect of a 

jury’s comparative negligence finding is implemented by the trial judge, not the jury.” Although 

jury instructions do not carry the force of law, Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 255 Mich App 339, 
-16- 

350 n 8; 660 NW2d 361 (2003), Ushe and Reliable seem to claim that the trial court should have 

sua sponte invalidated the standard instructions. This novel argument was not raised in the trial 

court. 

VI. INSTRUCTIONS ON MITIGATION, EGGSHELL PLAINTIFFS, AND AGGRAVATION 

OF PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS 

 Ushe and Reliable first argue that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury 

on plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages. We disagree. 

 M Civ JI 53.05 provides: 

A person has a duty to use ordinary care to minimize his or her damages after [he 

or she / his or her property] has been [injured / damaged]. It is for you to decide 

whether plaintiff failed to use such ordinary care and, if so, whether any damage 

resulted from such failure. You must not compensate the plaintiff for any portion 

of [his / her] damages which resulted from [his / her] failure to use such care. [M 

Civ JI 53.05 Mitigation of Damages--Failure to Exercise Ordinary Care.] 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give the mitigation instruction 

where there was no record support for such an instruction. Plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon, Dr. 

Vaidya, testified that plaintiff was attempting to do what was asked of him. Plaintiff attended his 

visits and it was not as though “he didn’t show up.” Vaidya explained that trauma can take three 

to five years to recover from, but that plaintiff did not seem to be making any progress and “it’s 

probably not going to improve dramatically, maybe a little bit.” Again, it was not for lack of 

trying – “He seems to try very hard.” Geffrard testified that plaintiff suffered from depression, 

which resulted in “difficulty applying himself in therapy. He was difficult to talk to so he didn’t 

listen real well in terms of physician instruction because he didn’t feel there was hope.” 

However, Geffrard testified that it was not as though plaintiff was non-compliant or just did not 

want to apply himself. The fact was that he was in significant pain. Plaintiff did not 

intentionally block his recovery, nor did he exaggerate his symptoms. He appeared to be “trying 

as best he could.” The trial court did not err in declining to give the requested instruction. 

 Ushe and Reliable next argue that the trial court erred in giving the so-called “eggshell 

plaintiff” instruction found in M Civ JI 50.10, as well as the measure of damages found in M Civ 

JI 50.01 and the aggravation of pre-existing conditions in M Civ JI 50.04. However, the record 

supports the instruction. 

 Geffrard testified that plaintiff was not unusually susceptible to the syndesmosis injury 

because of his weight in the context of the mechanism of plaintiff’s original injury. At trial, 

defendants implied that plaintiff’s recovery was hampered by his excessive weight. Plaintiff’s 

attorney responded by presenting testimony that plaintiff’s size had nothing to do with it. The 

physicians agreed that plaintiff’s problems all stemmed from, or were exacerbated by, the 

accident. Vaidya acknowledged that plaintiff had previous complaints of back pain but plaintiff 

was not disabled at the time and did not miss work. In spite of his prior complaints, plaintiff 

never had back surgery and appeared to be able to continue to work. Plaintiff’s poor prognosis 

could occur in someone who was not obese. Geffrard testified that plaintiff’s recovery was also 
-17- 

hampered by the progression of his degenerative back problems and his gait disturbance, which 

caused problems with other joints such as his hips. He also had issues with his shoulder. The 

rotator cuff injury was either caused by the accident or a result of the accident. All of these 

issues contributed to plaintiff’s lack of mobility. Therefore, contrary to Ushe and Reliable’s 

claims, there was record evidence to support plaintiff’s theories of susceptibility to injury, 

aggravation of pre-existing injury, and indivisible damages. Again, other than cross-examining 

plaintiff’s witnesses, defendants presented no medical testimony to refute the extent and nature 

of plaintiff’s injuries. 

VII. JURY VERDICT FORM 

 Ushe and Reliable argue that listing plaintiff’s contested injuries as conceded on the 

verdict form and in the jury instructions unduly and prejudicially influenced the verdict. We 

disagree. 

 

 The verdict form provided: 

NON-ECONOMIC LOSS 

11. What is the total amount of Holt’s damages for past non-economic 

loss for injuries to his right ankle and leg, left shoulder, lumbar disc 

herniation, four surgeries, traumatic brain injury, chronic pain, scars, 

physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, etc., from the date he was 

injured to the present? 

*** 

12. If you find that Holt will sustain damages in the future of noneconomic loss for injuries to his right ankle and leg, left shoulder, lumbar 

disc herniation, four surgeries, traumatic brain injury, chronic pain, scars, 

physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, etc., give the total amount for 

each year in which he will sustain damages. 

 Once again Ushe and Reliable never objected to any of the foregoing instructions. In 

fact, at trial Ushe and Reliable indicated that they had reviewed plaintiff’s proposed verdict form 

and “[t]here’s going to be some objections to some of the verbiage within there that we need to 

discuss and the court will need to rule on in terms of the verdict form,” but there is no discussion 

beyond that. Citing to a Nebraska case, Nguyen v Rezac, 256 Neb 458; 590 NW2d 375 (1999), 

Ushe and Reliable argue that the verdict form was misleading and confusing because the form 

makes it appear as though plaintiff’s injuries were conceded when, in fact, they were hotly 

contested. However, there is nothing objectionable about the verdict form, which was based on 

the model instructions in M Civ JI 50.21. Contrary to Ushe and Reliable’s assertions, the verdict 

form did not indicate that plaintiff’s injuries were conceded. 

VIII. CUMULATIVE ERROR 
-18- 

 Finally, although Ushe and Reliable indicate that the cumulative error at trial mandates 

reversal, 1 their real claim is that plaintiff’s counsel’s behavior deprived them of a fair trial. 

When reviewing an appeal asserting improper conduct of an attorney, the 

appellate court should first determine whether or not the claimed error was in fact 

error, and, if so, whether it was harmless. If the claimed error was not harmless, 

the court must then ask if the error was properly preserved by objection and 

request for instruction or motion for mistrial. If the error is so preserved, then 

there is a right to appellate review; if not, the court must still make one further 

inquiry. It must decide whether a new trial should nevertheless be ordered 

because what occurred may have caused the result or played too large a part and 

may have denied a party a fair trial. If the court cannot say that the result was not 

affected, then a new trial may be granted. Tainted verdicts need not be allowed to 

stand simply because a lawyer or judge or both failed to protect the interests of 

the prejudiced party by timely action. [Reetz v Kinsman Marine Transit Co, 416 

Mich 97, 102-103; 330 NW2d 638 (1982) (footnotes omitted).] 

“An attorney’s comments usually will not be cause for reversal unless they indicate a deliberate 

course of conduct aimed at preventing a fair and impartial trial.” Hunt v Freeman, 217 Mich 

App 92, 95; 550 NW2d 817 (1996). “Reversal is required only where the prejudicial statements 

of an attorney reflect a studied purpose to inflame or prejudice a jury or deflect the jury’s 

attention from the issues involved.” Id. Stated differently, “[r]eversal is required only where the 

prejudicial statements reveal a deliberate attempt to inflame or otherwise prejudice the jury, or to 

deflect the jury’s attention from the issues involved.” Zaremba Equip, Inc v Harco Nat Ins Co, 

302 Mich App 7, 21; 837 NW2d 686 (2013). 

 In arguing that plaintiff’s counsel’s behavior deprived them of a fair trial, Ushe and 

Reliable point to this Court’s decision in Badalamenti v William Beaumont Hosp-Troy, 237 Mich 

App 278; 602 NW2d 854 (1999). In that case, we concluded that the plaintiff’s attorney’s 

behavior at trial was “truly egregious” and “far excee[ed] permissible bounds.” Id. at 289. The 

attorney “completely tainted the proceedings” by repeatedly and without basis in fact accusing 

the witnesses of engaging in conspiracy and collusion, and fabricating evidence. Id. at 290. He 

repeatedly belittled the witnesses and suggested that they suppressed and destroyed evidence. Id.

at 291. The attorney even accused one of the defendants of abandoning the plaintiff to engage in 

a sexual tryst with a nurse, while emphasizing the defendant’s corporate power, and improperly 

appealing to the jurors’ self-interest as taxpayers. Id. We also noted the trial court’s failure to 

properly restrain the attorney from behaving in such a manner. Id. at 293. 

 

1

 “In order for cumulative evidentiary error to mandate reversal, consequential errors must result 

in substantial prejudice that denied the aggrieved party a fair trial.” Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich 

App 175, 200; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). “[A]ctual errors must combine to cause substantial 

prejudice to the aggrieved party so that failing to reverse would deny the party substantial 

justice.” Id. at 201 
-19- 

 Plaintiff’s attorney’s conduct in this case is far different from what occurred in 

Badalamenti. As discussed at length above, counsel questioned witnesses regarding the notice of 

non-party fault and the indemnification agreement as a means of attacking credibility, not in an 

effort to show that “Reliable and CPG had nefariously colluded against Holt” as defendants 

argue. While Ushe and Reliable complain that they never called plaintiff or any other witness a 

“liar,” they did accuse plaintiff of purposefully lying about his health in the years leading up to 

the accident. Counsel did nothing improper by arguing that CPG’s accident reconstructionist 

was not fully credible because she did not consider Ushe’s accidents when rendering her opinion. 

Nor did counsel “launch a tirade” against the forensic accounting expert who used average 

trucking information when formulating his opinion; instead, counsel argued that, in light of 

evidence that plaintiff was building a fleet, plaintiff should not have been considered an average 

trucker. There was nothing wrong with counsel arguing that defendants’ fat defense was 

reprehensible. 

 There was no effort to divert the jury’s attention from the actual merits of plaintiff’s case. 

In fact, a review of the record as a whole reveals that counsel’s comments were supported by the 

facts elicited at trial. None of counsel’s “objections, speeches, comments, and arguments qualify 

as inflammatory, extreme, or deliberately misleading. Zaremba, 302 Mich App at 22. 

 Finally, Ushe and Reliable seem to imply that counsel’s behavior was especially 

egregious where Ushe had “language impediments which prevented him from understanding the 

questions being asked of him at trial.” MCR 1.111(B)(1) provides: 

If a person requests a foreign language interpreter and the court determines such 

services are necessary for the person to meaningfully participate in the case or 

court proceeding, or on the court's own determination that foreign language 

interpreter services are necessary for a person to meaningfully participate in the 

case or court proceeding, the court shall appoint a foreign language interpreter for 

that person if the person is a witness testifying in a civil or criminal case or court 

proceeding or is a party. 

However, neither Ushe nor his attorney nor counsel for CPG ever requested an interpreter and 

the record does not support any inability of Ushe to understand and answer the questions posed 

to him. 

 Affirmed. As the prevailing party, plaintiff may tax costs. MCR 7.219. 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello