Initial Benchmark Assessment Report 

July 12, 2007 

This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop 

Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 

Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the “Act”). It includes an assessment 

of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is performing in its efforts to achieve a 

series of specific benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to 

strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. This is the first of two 

reports to be submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in consultation 

with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq; 

the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander of United States Central 

Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment 

complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to the Congress and 

is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the 

future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq. 

Introduction 

Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 

Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) states that the President is 

to submit to Congress two reports assessing the status of each of the 18 benchmarks 

contained in the Act and declaring whether, in the President’s judgment, satisfactory 

progress is being achieved with respect to those 18 benchmarks. 

These benchmarks relate to Government of Iraq actions believed to be important to 

advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, to improve the security of the Iraqi 

population, to provide essential services to the population, and to promote its economic 

well-being. These efforts complement other U.S. and Iraqi collaborative actions as part 

of the New Way Forward. 

Current U.S. Strategy: New Way Forward

Current U.S. strategy -- the New Way Forward -- recognizes that the fulfillment of 

commitments by both the U.S. and Iraqi Governments will be necessary to achieving our 

common goal: a democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and be an 

ally in the War on Terror. The building of a strong strategic partnership with the Iraqi 

Government will be an important part of the effort to achieve this end state, which 
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remains a long-term goal, and requires the application of all elements of national power, 

including especially diplomatic, economic, and political power.1

 

While our overarching strategy continues to emphasize a transition of responsibility to 

the Iraqi Government and its security forces, the New Way Forward recognized that, in 

response to the upsurge in sectarian violence in 2006, it was necessary for Coalition 

Forces to temporarily play a greater role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in 

securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace Iraqi efforts to provide 

security, but to help provide the necessary time and space with which the Iraqi 

Government can continue to build its own capacity, can intensify efforts against the 

accelerants of the violence, especially al-Qaida in Iraq and some segments of the Jaysh 

al-Mahdi (JAM), and can meaningfully address the all-important issue of reconciliation 

among the various segments of Iraqi society. The strategy recognizes that the levels of 

violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling 

sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi 

Government. Amid such violence, it became significantly harder for Iraqi leaders to 

make the difficult compromises necessary to foster reconciliation. 

At the same time, we have increased our efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi 

Security Forces (ISF). Relying on lessons learned from our experience in training and 

equipping the ISF, we have significantly enhanced our training and mentoring 

commitment. We will continue this commitment through a combination of partnering 

Coalition units with Iraqi Army and Police organizations and embedding transition team 

personnel with the majority of ISF units. U.S commanders are committed to helping the 

Iraqi government expand the size of the ISF to make it a more capable counterinsurgency force. 

We are also increasing our efforts to build Iraqi governmental capacity not just at the 

national level, but at the provincial and local levels as well. Most notably, this has 

required an expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program with 

10 new civilian PRTs paired with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), and giving PRT 

leaders and BCT commanders additional authorities, resources, and personnel. These 

leaders are charged with supporting moderate elements against extremists in their areas of 

responsibility and launching projects that have an immediate impact in areas cleared of 

terrorists and insurgents. 

 

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 Over 2007 and into 2008, we are focusing on the following core objectives: 

1. Defeat al-Qaida and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq. 

2. Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and regain control over the capital. 

3. Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit destructive Iranian and Syrian activity in Iraq. 

4. Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong democratic institutions impartially serving all 

Iraqis and preventing the return of the forces of tyranny. 

5. Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation but with the Iraqi Government clearly in the lead. 

6. Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to 

the Iraqi Government. 

7. Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy, including by helping Iraq maintain and expand its export of oil to 

support Iraqi development. 

8. Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the international community. 
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Expansion of the PRT program is not yet complete, with only about half of the 

approximately 300 additional PRT personnel deployed to date. The full complement of 

“civilian surge” personnel will be completed by December 2007. In addition, economic 

assistance funds provided by Congress in the Act for Iraq have yet to be released. As 

provided for in the Act, the President has waived certain restrictions on a portion of these 

funds in a determination, which is being provided to Congress separately. 

As the President explained in January, all of these efforts, together with a new diplomatic 

offensive in the region, are designed to set the conditions for U.S. troops to begin coming 

home, without risking a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, sanctuaries for international 

terrorist networks, or a broader regional conflict that would threaten U.S. national 

security interests for generations. (The strategy is explained in greater detail at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf ) While all of those 

conditions have not yet been met, and the new strategy is still in its early stages, there are 

some encouraging signs that should, over time, point the way to a more normalized and 

sustainable level of U.S. engagement in Iraq, with a decreasing number of U.S. combat 

forces increasingly focused on a core set of missions, such as those set out by the 

bipartisan Iraq Study Group. 

Summary of Achievements and Shortfalls

This report provides, consistent with the Act, an assessment of how the Iraqi Government 

is performing on 18 specified benchmarks, rather than the effects being generated. Some 

of the benchmarks may be leading indicators, giving some sense of future trends; but 

many are more accurately characterized as lagging indicators, and will only be achieved 

after the strategy is fully underway and generates improved conditions on the ground. 

For example, local political accommodations have dramatically improved conditions in 

what had been some of Iraq’s most violent areas, and we are deploying our resources to 

help ensure that these trends continue and spread. It will take time, however, for 

improved conditions locally to translate into broader political accommodations at the 

national level; what is important is the overall trajectory, which, under our present 

strategy, has begun to stabilize, compared to the deteriorating trajectory seen over the 

course of 2006. Thus, the assessments in this report should be viewed in a larger 

context: the discussion below provides a snapshot of achievements and shortfalls that 

can round out the picture given in the detailed assessment section of this report. 

Security: The security situation in Iraq remains complex and extremely challenging. 

Iraqi and Coalition Forces continue to emphasize population security operations in 

Baghdad, its environs, and Anbar province to combat extremist networks, and create the 

space for political reconciliation and economic growth. As a result of increased offensive 

operations, Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased attacks in Iraq, 

particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. Tough fighting should be expected 

through the summer as Coalition and Iraqi Forces seek to seize the initiative from early 

gains and shape conditions for longer-term stabilization. These combined operations -- 

named Operation Phantom Thunder -- were launched on June 15, 2007, after the total 
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complement of surge forces arrived in Iraq. The full surge in this respect has only just 

begun. 

These new operations are targeting primarily al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) havens in Baghdad, 

Babil, Diyala, and Anbar provinces. While AQI may not account for most of the 

violence in Iraq, it is the organization responsible for the highest profile attacks, which 

serve as a primary accelerant to the underlying sectarian conflict. We presently assess 

that degrading AQI networks in these critical areas -- together with efforts to degrade 

Iranian-backed Shi’a extremist networks -- is a core U.S. national security interest and 

essential for Iraq’s longer-term stability. Since January of this year, AQI has proven its 

resiliency and ability to conduct high-profile, mass-casualty attacks, mostly targeting 

Shi’a population centers through suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device 

(SVBIEDs) attacks. The number of suicide and SVBIED attacks in March and April 

approached all-time highs, further exacerbating sectarian tension and making political 

deals more difficult to close. These incidents have shown a decrease in May and June, 

which may be the result of aggressive Coalition and Iraqi operations into former AQI 

havens. The surge of additional U.S. forces into these areas allows us to better combat 

AQI and other terrorists. We should expect, however, that AQI will attempt to increase 

its tempo of attacks as September approaches -- in an effort to influence U.S. domestic 

opinion about sustained U.S. engagement in Iraq. 

In Baghdad, an overall decrease in sectarian violence is due in part to intensified Iraqi 

and Coalition operations focused on population security. An apparent decision earlier 

this year by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia to largely stand down its operations 

appeared to have a temporary effect, but a breakdown in Muqtada al Sadr’s ability to 

control JAM -- or elements thereof -- coinciding with the return of JAM fighters from 

Iran after receiving training in combat and explosives has spawned a recent increase in 

attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces. Iran continues to train, fund, and equip extremist 

groups, both Shi’a and Sunni, that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces in and around 

Baghdad and the provinces in southern Iraq. JAM “secret cells” are a major recipient of 

that assistance -- and are responsible for some of the most sophisticated attacks on Iraqi 

and Coalition Forces. As stated in the President’s January 10, 2007, speech announcing 

the New Way Forward: “We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran. And we will 

seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our 

enemies in Iraq.” Operations against these networks are ongoing and will continue. 

In Anbar province, the local population is turning against AQI and seeking support from 

the Coalition. At the same time, U.S. military operations and cooperation with local 

tribal leaders have created openings for local political compromise and more effective 

civilian assistance. To reinforce these early signs of success, the President ordered 

additional U.S. military and civilian resources to Anbar. The trends have remained 

positive. The provincial government -- for the first time in a year -- is now able to meet 

in the province and recently approved a comprehensive provincial budget that 

appropriates virtually all of its $107 million allocation for capital expenditures. Attack 

levels have reached a 2-year low and some families that had fled Anbar are beginning to 

return. These developments have been noted in other primarily Sunni areas of Iraq, such 
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as Salah ad-Din province, and areas around Baquba, in Diyala province, where efforts are 

underway to build on the Anbar experience. 

The ISF continues to show slow progress. ISF capability is increasing, but further ISF 

proficiency, improved logistics, and expanded forces are needed in order to assume more 

responsibility from Coalition Forces. Comprehensive data and statistics on the ISF -- 

including its projected growth -- can be found in the report Measuring Stability and 

Security in Iraq, submitted quarterly to Congress by the Department of Defense, pursuant 

to Section 9010 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 

109-289). It should be noted that Iraqi Security Forces bear the brunt of attacks from 

insurgents and terrorists. Despite casualty rates two to three times that of Coalition 

Forces, Iraqi Security Forces continue to fight bravely for their country. 

Political Reconciliation: Moving key legislation depends on deal-making among major 

players in a society deeply divided along sectarian, ethnic, and other lines. Meaningful 

and lasting progress on national reconciliation may also require a sustained period of 

reduced violence in order to build trust. For this reason, most of the major political 

benchmarks identified in the legislation -- i.e., final passage of monumental pieces of 

legislation through Iraq’s Council of Representatives by consensus -- are lagging 

indicators of whether or not the strategy is succeeding or is going to be successful. 

As demonstrated by our PRT initiatives and moving resources outside of Baghdad and 

into the provinces, our strategy envisions “bottom-up” reconciliation to be as important, 

if not more important, than top-down reconciliation. Bottom-up reconciliation involves 

working at the local and provincial level, seeking local political accommodations and 

getting more Iraqis to invest in the future of a united and democratic Iraq. Bottom-up 

reconciliation can take many forms: in Anbar, we have seen greater involvement of tribal 

groups; in Salah ad Din, it is involving local and provincial leaders taking greater 

responsibility for their political and economic future; in Baghdad, it has involved local 

neighborhood councils working with newly deployed Coalition and Iraqi units to identify 

and isolate extremists. All of the new resources devoted to this strategy -- the arrival of 

military reinforcements, the expansion of PRTs, and the diplomatic surge -- can be 

leveraged to produce bottom-up reconciliation. Over time, we expect bottom-up 

reconciliation to be reflected in, and latch up with, progress on top-down measures. 

Effective steps toward national reconciliation will require national leadership from all 

communities and expression of a common national political will, or “vision,” that has so 

far been lacking. The consensus nature of Iraqi politics, and the checks and balances 

built into the Iraqi governance structure, inhibit Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s ability to 

govern effectively -- and would pose obstacles to any prime minister. These inhibitors 

slow progress on high-priority legislative benchmarks, although they are designed to 

create a decision-making process through which all major communities have a voice and 

a stake. The increasing concern among Iraqi political leaders that the United States may 

not have a long-term commitment to Iraq has also served in recent months to reinforce 

hedging behaviors and made the hardest political bargains even more difficult to close. 
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Nonetheless, there have been recent events that provide hope for the ability of the 

Government of Iraq to overcome these inhibitors. For example, the response to the 

June 13, 2007, bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra was a well orchestrated 

unison of statements of condemnation and calls for calm by Prime Minister Maliki, 

President Jalal Talabani, Vice President Tariq Hashimi, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, 

and other leaders. This indicates that when necessary, the Government of Iraq and major 

political figures can overcome the dynamics that otherwise inhibit effectiveness. Iraq’s 

Council of Representatives on July 8 voted to extend its present term through July 31, 

and for working sessions to last 6 days a week from July 16 through July 31 (taking only 

Fridays off). We will be working closely with Iraqi leaders and members of the Council 

of Representatives to move important pieces of legislation forward during this time frame 

-- taking account of the extended legal process mandated by Iraq’s constitution for 

moving a law to final passage. 

Diplomatic Engagement: Iran and Syria have continued to foster instability in Iraq. As 

noted, Iran funds extremist groups to promote attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces, 

and the Iraqi Government. We see little change in Iran’s policy of seeking U.S. defeat 

through direct financial and material support for attacks against U.S. military and 

civilians in Iraq. Iran is engaging in similar activities in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, 

foreign fighters (especially suicide bombers) continue to use Syrian territory as their main 

transit route to Iraq. The Syrian Government also allows major insurgent organizers and 

financiers to operate in Damascus. We continue to assess that nearly 80 percent of 

suicide bombers are foreign fighters -- with the vast majority traveling to Iraq through 

Syria -- and to Syria from their home countries by air travel to Damascus. This Syriabased network is able to supply some 50 to 80 suicide bombers to AQI per month. Since 

January, there have been nearly 280 suicide events in Iraq, accounting for nearly 5,500 

casualties, mostly innocent Iraqis going about their daily lives. Syria can and must do 

more to shut down these networks. 

 

The signing of the International Compact with Iraq, an initiative jointly sponsored by the 

United Nations and the Iraqi Government, and the Expanded Neighbors ministerial 

conference, with attendance by the Permanent Five members of the U.N. Security 

Council, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the G-8, on 

May 3 - 4 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, helped provide more public international and 

regional support for Iraq. Compact implementation, including debt relief, will be our 

near-term focus. The Neighbors Process energy working group had a successful meeting 

in Istanbul, Turkey, last month, and the other two working groups are planning to meet 

later this summer. We expect the next Expanded Neighbors ministerial to be held later 

this summer or early fall in Istanbul. 

Economics and Essential Services: The economic picture is uneven. Key economic 

indicators paint a modestly improved picture -- unemployment has eased slightly and 

inflation is currently abating. Government revenue is steady due to high oil prices, but 

the Iraqi Government has not yet made needed investments to increase oil and refining 

output. Private-sector activity is picking up in some areas, notably the more than $1 

billion that have been invested in wireless telecoms, but investors remain wary due to 
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poor security and the continuing need for a stronger legal framework. The Iraqi 

Government has begun to show resolve in initiating budget execution and capital 

investment to restore services, but citizens nationwide complain about government 

corruption and the lack of essential services, such as electricity, fuel supply, sewer, water, 

health, and sanitation. 

At the provincial level, the economic governance picture is a patchwork, with some 

provinces performing better than others. Security conditions, ethnic and sectarian 

divisions, political dynamics, corruption, and leadership qualities of key political actors 

vary significantly by province. As a result, provincial governments vary greatly in the 

effectiveness of using their central government budget allocation to provide services for 

citizens. Where security is improving, such as in Anbar province, we see positive trends 

in governance, delivery of government services, and the efficacy of U.S. assistance. 

The International Compact with Iraq provides the framework through which the Iraqi 

Government will reform its governance, budget execution, and fiscal management, as 

well as improve service delivery. The Compact sets out the roadmap of reforms Iraq will 

need to implement over the next 5 years to be economically self-sufficient. Iraq’s IMF 

Stand-by Arrangement is on track and has been extended to September 2007. For a 

follow-on IMF program, Iraq will need to continue increasing fuel prices. 

Congressional Benchmarks

This background discussion provides a context for assessing the performance of the Iraqi 

Government with respect to the 18 benchmarks. The Iraqi leaders face a challenging 

situation, and they and their families run great risks on a daily basis. We continue to 

encourage and press them to achieve the established benchmarks, since we believe that 

those efforts will contribute to Iraq’s stability, its ability to provide for its own security, 

and to the international effort to counter violent extremism. Nonetheless, our efforts in 

Iraq extend far beyond these benchmarks. Every day, our Embassy and military officials 

are working with Iraqis to encourage stability and reconciliation in ways that are not 

easily measured by these benchmarks. As Congress has requested, in September General 

Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will report on these efforts and provide a more 

comprehensive assessment of the situation in Iraq, including an assessment of the 18 

benchmarks measured herein. This assessment will provide a clearer picture of how the 

new strategy is unfolding, and what if any adjustments should be made. 

Standard of Measurement: Section 1314(b)(2)(A) states: “The President shall submit an 

initial report to Congress, not later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the 

specific benchmarks established above, and declaring, in his judgment, whether 

satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is not, being 

achieved.” In order to make this judgment (e.g., whether “satisfactory progress . . . is, or 

is not, being achieved”), we have carefully examined all the facts and circumstances with 

respect to each of the 18 benchmarks and asked the following question: As measured 

from a January 2007 baseline, do we assess that present trend data demonstrates a 

positive trajectory, which is tracking toward satisfactory accomplishment in the near 
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term? If the answer is yes, we have provided a “Satisfactory” assessment; if the answer 

is no, the assessment is “Unsatisfactory.” For those benchmarks receiving the latter 

assessment, we have explained what, if any, strategic adjustments may be required to 

improve the present trajectory. The present analysis and assessment of these 18 

benchmarks follows. 
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Assessment of the Benchmarks 

Section 1314 (b)(2)(A) The President shall submit an initial report, in classified and 

unclassified format, to the Congress, not later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of 

each of the specific benchmarks...and declaring, in his judgment, whether satisfactory 

progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved. 

Section 1314 (b)(2)(C) If the President’s assessment of any of the specific benchmarks 

established above is unsatisfactory, the President shall include in that report a 

description of such revisions to the political, economic, regional, and military 

components of the strategy, as announced by the President on January 10, 2007. In 

addition, the President shall include in the report the advisability of implementing such 

aspects of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, as he deems appropriate. 

Section 1314 (b)(1)(A) The United States Strategy in Iraq, hereafter, shall be 

conditioned on the Iraqi Government meeting benchmarks . . . including: 

(i) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the 

constitutional review. 

The Council of Representatives (COR) formed the Constitutional Review Committee 

(CRC) on November 15, 2006. The Constitutional Review is now underway. The CRC 

presented a partial list of recommendations on May 23, 2007, in an interim report and 

received an extension from the COR until the end of August to resolve outstanding issues 

concerning: (i) Presidential powers, (ii) the powers of the regions vs. the central 

government, and (iii) the status of Kirkuk (Article 140 of the Constitution). The political 

blocs still need to reach an accommodation on these difficult political issues. 

The Embassy will continue to discuss with the CRC Chairmen and the COR Speaker and 

Deputy Speakers the need to develop a well-defined plan for the COR debate of the 

report. The Embassy is also continuing to discuss with the United Nations Assistance 

Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) the necessary preparatory steps for a public referendum on 

proposed constitutional revisions. As noted in the Iraq Study Group Report 

Recommendation 26, there is a role for UNAMI in the constitutional review process. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward 

forming a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) and then completing the 

constitutional review. The CRC has been formed, and, while difficult issues remain, 

significant progress has been made on many substantive issues and technical details 

involved in the constitutional review process. The CRC has requested an extension to 

resolve remaining issues, and its Chairman remains committed to moving the process 

forward. While the progress on this benchmark has been satisfactory, the achievement 

of the desired reconciliation effect depends on progress with respect to several other 

benchmarks as well as this one. 
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(ii) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification reform. 

De-Ba’athification reform is among the most sensitive pieces of legislation being 

considered as it involves competing conceptions of justice, accountability, reconciliation, 

and economic compensation. Senior Iraqi political leaders remain at odds over some of 

the most fundamental aspects of de-Ba’athification reform, including over which 

categories of former Ba’ath party members would be proscribed by the law. For 

example, there is division among political and ethnic groups regarding what rank of 

ex-Ba’athists should be allowed to return to civic life. While leaders have been 

discussing the law, a public discussion on the accommodations that different parts of 

Iraqi society will have to make with each other is not yet underway. An inflexible 

timeline on this issue could be detrimental, as a bad law would not improve prospects for 

reconciliation. 

Reintegration of former Ba’athists who have not committed crimes has already begun; 

however, a sweeping, government-led, legislated, and institutionalized reform program 

over time would send a positive signal in favor of reconciliation. Alternatively, allowing 

former Ba’athists who do not accept a democratic Iraq into the government or security 

services could undermine the Iraqi government and embolden the insurgency. Many 

Iraqis are understandably frightened by the prospect of their former Ba’athist tormentors 

replaying their previous rise to power by subverting the government from within. 

In Recommendation 27, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the need for United States 

Government support of reintegration of former Ba’athists and Arab nationalists into civic 

life. The New Way Forward strategy makes de-Ba’athification reform an integral part of 

the United States Government’s Iraq policy. The Embassy has pressed hard on all 

political elements to move forward. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward 

enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification reform. This is among 

the most divisive political issues for Iraq, and compromise will be extremely difficult. 

Given the lack of satisfactory progress, we have not achieved the desired reconciliation 

effect that meaningful and broadly accepted de-Ba’athification reform might bring about. 

This does not, however, necessitate a revision to the current plan and strategy. DeBa’athification remains a core priority of U.S. political engagement, and pushing reforms 

too fast or in a manner that results in a poor law could be detrimental to our overall 

reconciliation objectives. 

(iii) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of 

hydrocarbon resources to the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity 

of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy 

resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens 

in an equitable manner. 
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The final draft of the Revenue Management Law must be approved by the Council of 

Ministers (COM) and vetted by the Iraqi Government’s legal office before submission to 

the COR. The United States has provided technical advice to the Iraqi Government and 

is actively engaged in encouraging both sides to expeditiously approve the draft law in 

the COM and move it to the COR. Prime Minister Maliki intends to submit the Revenue 

Management Law to the COM soon, for subsequent consideration by the COR along with 

the framework Hydrocarbon law. 

Assessment: The current status is unsatisfactory, but it is too early to tell whether 

the Government of Iraq will enact and implement legislation to ensure the equitable 

distribution of hydrocarbon resources to all Iraqis. The Government of Iraq has not 

met its self-imposed goal of May 31 for submitting the framework hydrocarbon and 

revenue-sharing laws to the COR. Although the KRG and the Shi’a parties have agreed 

to the text of the Revenue Management Law, Council of Ministers’ approval has been 

delayed by a Sunni party boycott. The effect of limited progress toward this benchmark 

has been to reduce the perceived confidence in, and effectiveness of, the Iraqi 

Government. This does not, however, necessitate a revision to our current plan and 

strategy, under which we have assigned a high priority to this subject, and the process 

overall has continued to move forward. 

(iv) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous 

regions. 

The COR enacted a law in October 2006 that establishes procedures to form regions. 

Under the Iraqi constitution, regions have certain powers, such as control over regional 

security forces, that provinces do not. The law will come into effect 18 months after 

being passed, which means no steps can be taken to form regions before April 2008. 

The United States Government encouraged Iraqi political parties to reach a compromise 

on this law and believes that the 18-month delay in implementation is in the interests of 

Iraq and the United States, given current political conditions in Iraq. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward 

enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous 

regions. The regions law has been passed. Implementation of this legislation should 

take place after provincial elections are held and after the passage of an updated elections 

law. The procedures are in place, but whether establishment of additional regions (in 

addition to the already-recognized KRG) is desirable depends on a number of factors, 

including the outcome of efforts at constitutional reform. The progress toward this 

benchmark has been satisfactory, and the effect is that this potentially contentious issue 

has not been a source of discord. 

(v) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High 

Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a 

date for provincial elections. 
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On January 23, 2007, the COR passed the Independent High Electoral Commission 

(IHEC) Law, which the Presidency Council (the President and two Deputy Presidents) 

approved on February 27, 2007. On April 28, 2007, the COR appointed the nine IHEC 

Commissioners in a process that the U.N. deemed fair and transparent. The 

Commissioners have completed appropriate training and are in the process of selecting 

representatives to oversee elections in the provinces. A Provincial Powers Law that 

defines the authorities and structures of local governments has been read twice in the 

COR, but changes are being considered, particularly related to the powers of the governor 

and the reach of the central government at the local level. 

At the highest levels, the Embassy is urging the Iraqi Government to take the legislative 

and administrative action necessary to ensure timely and fair elections. The Embassy is 

intensively engaged with the GOI and the COR at all levels to expedite legislation or 

amendments to existing legislation that will allow provincial elections to take place. New 

legislation or amendments to the existing law are required to set a date and secure 

funding for elections, as well as to establish the electoral system to be used for the vote, 

among other issues. 

In cooperation with the U.N., the United States Government is providing program 

support to the new IHEC in three areas: (i) building immediate IHEC staff capacity, 

particularly in public outreach and internal organization; (ii) building database capacity 

that will support the new voter registry; and (iii) standing up provincial, district, and 

precinct-level election bodies. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are monitoring 

political and security conditions in provinces that may affect elections. 

In Recommendation 29, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the need for provincial 

elections at the earliest possible date. The United States Government and UNAMI are 

working closely with the Iraqi Government to accelerate the drafting and passage of the 

Provincial Powers Law and set a date for provincial elections. Additionally, the 

United States Government is working with Iraq Security Forces to ensure that they are 

adequately prepared to provide security for free and fair elections. 

Assessment: There are multiple components to this benchmark, each deserving its own 

assessment: 

• Establishing the IHEC Commission: The Government of Iraq has made 

satisfactory progress toward establishing an IHEC Commission. The 

Commission has been established.

• Elections Law: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress 

toward establishing a provincial elections law. Drafting of the law has just begun. 

• Provincial Council Authorities: The Government of Iraq has not made 

satisfactory progress toward establishing provincial council authorities. The 

COR is working on legislation, which has had its second reading; however, the COR 

committee continues to work on revisions to the draft law, and it remains unclear 

when the legislation will come to a third and final vote by the full COR. 
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• Provincial Elections Date: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory 

progress toward establishing a date for provincial elections. Legislation required 

for setting the date has not been enacted. 

The effect is that there is still no mechanism in place to address the under-representation 

of Sunnis in provincial councils that was caused by past Sunni election boycotts. 

However, at this time, this does not necessitate a revision to our current plan and strategy, 

under which we regard movement on this issue as one of the highest priorities, and have 

seen progress in key areas – particularly with respect to the IHEC, which is a critical 

building block to holding genuine and credible local elections with U.N. assistance and 

support. 

 

(vi) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty. 

There is little progress toward legislation establishing amnesty for those who fought 

against the government since 2003 or who committed crimes in the name of the Iraqi 

Government. Neither the GOI nor the COR are pressing forward the passage of amnesty 

legislation. 

At some point, Iraq’s process of reconciliation would benefit from an amnesty that 

recognizes the need to avoid criminal prosecution of certain acts of a military nature 

committed since 2003. However, a general amnesty program would be 

counterproductive in the current environment. As long as violence remains extensive and 

no major armed group has signaled a willingness to cooperate with the Iraqi Government 

and renounce violence, there is no group for which amnesty would be appropriate. 

Opportunities to offer amnesty locally, to specific populations and individuals, may 

appear quickly and will require Iraqi Government legislation or programs to exploit the 

willingness of fighters to abandon violence. Such actions could serve as a model for a 

wider amnesty program. United States officials have made clear to Iraqi leaders that any 

amnesty, when it comes, should not distinguish between acts against Coalition Forces and 

acts against Iraqis. 

In a token of progress, an amnesty workshop was conducted on May 12, 2007, in 

Baghdad. Political-party representatives and academics gathered to discuss amnesty 

concepts. From this small workshop, 10 recommendations were developed and 

forwarded to various government representatives for comment, thus beginning a dialogue 

on amnesty. 

In Recommendations 31 and 37, the Iraq Study Group advised three elements for any 

amnesty legislation: 1) it must be far-reaching, 2) it must involve reconciliation by those 

in government with their enemies, and 3) the legislative and executive branches of the 

United States Government must not undercut it. However, the Study also notes, as 

mentioned in the assessment above, that “there are many armed groups within Iraq, and 

very little will to lay down arms.” 
14 

Assessment: The prerequisites for a successful general amnesty are not present; 

however, in the current security environment, it is not clear that such action should 

be a near-term Iraqi goal. The Government of Iraq has established a high-level 

Government of Iraq Reconciliation Committee to support and oversee efforts of groups 

that want to oppose AQI and other extremist elements -- working with a joint U.S. 

Embassy/MNF-I group that is facilitating such actions in coordination with units on the 

ground. These efforts are more relevant at this point than are general amnesty initiatives. 

Nonetheless, the Government of Iraq should develop amnesty programs later in the year, 

so they are ready to be implemented if opportunities arise. Given the absence of the 

necessary conditions for amnesty, the absence of amnesty legislation has had no effect. 

The current plan and strategy calls for the passage of such legislation when the necessary 

conditions are present. 

(vii) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia 

disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to 

the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq. 

The COR included $150 million in its 2007 budget for Disarmament, Demobilization, 

and Reintegration (DDR), but the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is waiting to release the 

funds pending development of a Government of Iraq plan for DDR. However, the COR 

has not moved toward passage of legislation to establish a disarmament program, nor are 

senior Iraqi officials or political-party leaders focused on passing such a law. There is 

disagreement among Iraqi experts as to whether new or additional legislation is necessary 

as militia and other illegal armed-group activity is already against Iraqi law. Although 

the Iraqi Government has formed a DDR Committee, there is no momentum in the 

Government of Iraq toward developing and implementing a comprehensive disarmament 

program for militia members. No armed group has yet committed to disarmament. The 

necessary preconditions for a DDR program, such as political reconciliation and security 

provided by the government, do not yet exist despite considerable efforts by the Iraqi 

Government, MNF-I, and the Embassy. 

The resources and personnel currently dedicated to the DDR effort would be better used 

elsewhere in the process of reconciliation that will ultimately lead armed groups to lay 

down arms. In the meantime, other measures to give young men alternatives to 

committing violence, such as a vigorous vocational-training program, micro-financing 

opportunities, education programs within the theater detention system, and jobs creation 

programs, should and are being pursued. Improved use of these tools to take advantage 

of localized security gains will require further planning by the Iraqi Government. 

In Recommendation 38 and 39, the Iraq Study Group proposes that neutral international 

experts act as advisors to the Iraqi Government and that the United States Government 

fund and support a single office to provide assistance to these experts. The study also 

notes “...solving the problem of militias requires national reconciliation” and states that, 

as a party in the conflict, the United States Government should not be directly involved in 

a DDR program’s implementation. 
15 

Assessment: The prerequisites for a successful militia disarmament program are 

not present. In fact, international experts, including the U.N., have expressed 

reservations to advancing this proposal at the present time. The U.N. DDR Advisory 

Mission to Baghdad Report (April 25 - May 2, 2007) stated, “The Iraq environment 

makes it most unlikely that traditional DDR can take place, and planning should take this 

into account.” Likewise, a State Department internal review has shown that the timing is 

not right for a full-scale DDR program in Iraq. Given the absence of the necessary 

conditions for DDR, the absence of legislation on militia disarmament has had no effect. 

The current plan and strategy calls for the passage of such legislation when the necessary 

conditions are present 

(viii) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in 

support of the Baghdad Security Plan. 

As part of Operation Fardh Al-Qanun (FAQ), the Iraqi Government established an 

Executive Steering Committee (ESC) to better coordinate and synchronize the 

non-kinetic aspects of FAQ with security operations. The ESC is chaired by the 

Prime Minister and meets weekly to discuss appropriate issues. In support of the ESC, 

six sub-committees have been formed to address topics of economics, services, political 

issues, media, popular mobilization, and security. These subcommittees are chaired by 

Iraqi Government leaders and are supported by United States Government officials. 

Additionally, the Iraqi National Security Advisor is responsible for the ESC secretariat 

and coordinates weekly planning meetings with the subcommittees. While the secretariat 

and subcommittees vary in their effectiveness, the overall level of coordination and focus 

on non-kinetic aspects is significantly higher than previous efforts. 

While establishing political, media, economic, and services committees is important, it is 

even more vital that the Iraqi Government steadily increase its relevance to Iraqis outside 

the International Zone through proper provision of services, security, and offering a 

viable alternative to militias. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward 

establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in 

support of the Baghdad Security Plan. The establishment of the ESC and related 

subcommittees meets the requirement of the benchmark. Nevertheless, both the 

U.S. Mission and MNF-I will remain intensively engaged with the ESC to continue to 

improve its effectiveness and ensure that the subcommittees fulfill the purpose for which 

they were created as their contribution to date has not been adequate. Progress toward 

achieving this benchmark has been satisfactory, and we will continue to monitor and 

engage with the committees to produce a satisfactory effect over the next 60 days. 

(ix) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad 

operations. 

The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) had difficulty deploying three additional full 

Iraqi Army (IA) brigades at sufficient strength to Baghdad, but compensated by pulling 
16 

units from a variety of IA divisions to provide the equivalent additional force. Since the 

initial deployment, the IGFC has continued to generate the required additional forces by 

first extending a brigade from 1 IA Division and battalions from 4 IA Division in 

Baghdad and then identifying and deploying a replacement brigade from 1 IA Division 

and battalions from 4 IA division to relieve other units by mid-June 2007. Manning 

levels for deploying units continue to be of concern. However, MNF-I is working with 

the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) to implement policies to improve present-for-duty 

numbers, and in the current 30-day period, for example, over 10,000 soldiers will have 

completed basic training and been assigned to units. 

Iraq Study Group Recommendations 20 and 21 call for the Iraqi Government to shoulder 

a greater share of the security mission in Iraq, and ultimately take it over. Iraq Study 

Group Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi Government to establish milestones for 

reconciliation and improve security. Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to 

support Baghdad operations reflects implementation of these recommendations. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward 

providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations. 

While manning levels for the deployed Iraqi units continue to be of concern, the Iraqi 

Government has provided the equivalent of three additional brigades to Baghdad and has 

made provisions to sustain this level of effort and to address manning issues -- in addition 

to steadily increasing the strengths of Iraqi units already deployed in Baghdad. The 

progress toward this benchmark has been satisfactory, and the effect is satisfactory in 

that the three brigades are operating in support of Baghdad operations. 

(x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to 

make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders 

without political intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists 

including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. 

The Prime Minister has given Iraqi (and MNF-I) commanders the necessary authority to 

conduct security operations and has taken initial steps to reduce political interference in 

decisions on military actions. Coalition military leaders work closely with their Iraqi 

counterparts to plan and carry out security operations. Coalition military forces also 

contribute to the operation of joint security stations and provide the embedded transition 

teams that mentor Iraqi military and police counterparts. New Rules of Engagement for 

the Baghdad Operational Command have come into effect. There have been no reported 

instances of political interference in operations that U.S. commanders have recommended 

against Sunni Arab insurgents or AQI since the start of Operation Fardh al-Qanun. There 

have been concerns, however, about political interference (though not at the Prime 

Minister’s level) in some operations to target Shi’a extremist networks, especially JAM. 

In recent engagements, particularly in some areas in southern Iraq, Iraqi forces were 

called upon to quell JAM-fueled violence and performed admirably. The Iraqi Army 

continues to be a more nationally oriented institution than the Iraqi National Police or 

local police forces. 
17 

ISF forces are currently fighting alongside Coalition Forces and jointly manning Joint 

Security Stations (JSS) throughout Iraq. In most cases, tactical commanders act on 

mission orders issued by their chain of command or coordinated locally with MNF-I 

forces. In addition, the ISF has done a reasonably good job policing its own ranks by 

reporting infractions and removing guilty parties. 

 

There continues to be evidence of sectarian bias in the appointment of senior military and 

police commanders, which in turn gives rise to suspicions that political considerations 

may be behind Iraqi commanders’ decisions on which operations to undertake or support. 

Prime Minister Maliki is willing to take action when evidence of this is clear. Seven of 

nine National Police Brigade Commanders and 16 battalion commanders have been 

relieved in the past 7 months due to concerns over sectarian activities; however, 

sectarian-based decisions continue to be evident through intelligence channels. There is 

evidence of target lists emanating from the Office of the Commander in Chief that 

bypassed operational commanders and directed lower-level intelligence officers and 

commanders to make arrests, primarily of Sunnis. Authority to make tactical and 

operational decisions without political interference is an issue of trust. 

Iraq Study Group Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi Government to establish 

milestones for reconciliation and to improve security. This benchmark helps establish the 

conditions for reconciliation by pursuing non-sectarian security policies without political 

intervention, in line with this recommendation. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward 

providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make 

tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders without 

political intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists including 

Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Iraqi and coalition forces have been given 

authorities to go after insurgents and militias, but there remains a negative political 

influence at a variety of levels with evidence of sectarian behavior. Thus, while there has 

been progress, it has been too uneven to warrant a satisfactory judgment at this time. 

MNF-I and the Embassy continue to monitor developments for evidence on the 

transparency of security decision-making and the degree of political or sectarian 

influence on security operations. We have observed a mix of positive and negative 

examples of civil-military relations with the current surge in operations, due largely to 

increased overwatch and partnering relations. While progress toward this benchmark at 

this time is unsatisfactory, and the resultant effect has been negative in terms of overall 

perceptions of performance, this does not necessitate a revision to our current plan and 

strategy, under which we continue to improve Iraqi command and control capabilities, 

and expand our embedding and partnership with Iraqi units. 

(xi) Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of 

the law. 

Left on their own, many ISF units still tend to gravitate to old habits of sectarianism 

when applying the law. The good news is that individual units have demonstrated the 
18 

ability to act as responsible partners when employed with Coalition influence, and some 

Iraqi commanders have demonstrated clearly that they are Iraqis first. Some Sunni 

residents of Baghdad continue to believe that Shi’a-dominated National Police units and, 

to a lesser degree, Iraqi Army units are biased against them. There have been inadequate 

efforts to detain some senior Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials believed responsible for 

human rights abuses, although 7 National Police Brigade Commanders and 16 National 

Police Battalion Commanders have been replaced, along with both Division 

Commanders. Some senior officials responsible for abuse continue to hold positions of 

responsibility. At lower levels, experience shows that even-handedness across the ISF is 

patchy with various units displaying differing degrees of even-handedness; however, a 

number of extremely capable and non-sectarian senior military and police leaders have 

emerged and are making a difference with their units. 

The expansion of partnered units and embedded-training teams has increased the 

Coalition’s ability to monitor the actions of the ISF. In Baghdad, for example, Coalition 

Forces and ISF have established 30 JSSs to provide an extensive permanent security 

presence throughout Baghdad’s neighborhoods. These JSSs allow greater oversight of 

the ISF by Coalition Forces, which maintain 24-hour coverage throughout Baghdad in an 

effort to protect the city’s population. An expanded use of embedded U.S. military and 

police advisor teams has also ensured that the ISF now receive greater exposure to 

modern policing techniques that are both more effective and in compliance with 

international human rights standards. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not at this time made satisfactory 

progress in ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed 

enforcement of the law; however, there has been significant progress in achieving 

increased even-handedness through the use of coalition partnering and embeddedtransition teams with Iraqi Security Force units. The presence of Coalition Forces in 

JSSs and Combat Outposts (COPs) has had a positive effect on ensuring a more evenhanded approach, and Iraqi officials continue to communicate the importance that all 

terrorist organizations be targeted, regardless of their affiliation or ethnic background. 

ISF performance has generally been adequate, particularly when partnered with Coalition 

Forces. Because we are holding the ISF to a high standard, however, the overall 

judgment at this time remains unsatisfactory. This does not necessitate a revision to 

our current plan and strategy, under which we continue to press the Government of Iraq 

on these issues, improve command and control capabilities, and expand our embedding 

and partnership with Iraqi units. 

 

(xii) Ensuring that, as Prime Minister Maliki was quoted by President Bush as 

saying, “the Baghdad Security Plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, 

regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.” 

The United States has surged more than 30,000 military personnel into Iraq. These forces 

support Operation Fardh al-Qanun in Baghdad, Anbar, and in the regions to the north and 

south of the capital. As noted above, Coalition Forces, in conjunction with ISF, have 

established and staffed JSSs in all sectors of Baghdad and are conducting joint operations 
19 

in once contentious neighborhoods, such as the Shi’a dominated Sadr City and Sunnidominated Mansour District. There is currently only one JSS in Sadr City, though more 

are planned and operations have been conducted throughout Sadr City on a near-daily 

basis. The completion of additional JSSs throughout Baghdad should significantly 

increase the success of this effort. 

Operations in some parts of Baghdad remain a significant challenge, though there are 

currently no areas of Baghdad where Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces are not 

allowed to conduct operations. The Government of Iraq has supported operations by 

Iraqi and Coalition Forces targeting insurgents, militias, and terrorists across Iraq. 

United States diplomatic and military personnel have engaged the Iraqi Government at 

the highest levels to stress the importance of aggressively targeting all violent groups, 

regardless of sect or affiliation. The Iraqi Government has shown increased willingness 

to target and conduct actions against extremist groups and militias, such as Jaysh 

al-Mahdi Secret Cells, in order to establish a more secure environment in Baghdad. 

Iraq Study Group Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi Government to establish 

milestones for reconciliation and to improve security. This benchmark helps establish the 

conditions for reconciliation by denying safe havens, regardless of sectarian or political 

affiliation, in line with this recommendation. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress in ensuring 

the Baghdad Security Plan does not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless 

of their sectarian or political affiliations. United States commanders report overall 

satisfaction with their ability to target any and all extremist groups. United States 

diplomatic and military personnel continue to engage the Iraqi Government at the highest 

levels to stress the importance of aggressively targeting all violent groups, regardless of 

sect or affiliation. Tribal elements in Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah ad Din are seeking 

support for tribal initiatives similar to those that have shown success in al-Anbar against 

AQI. Cache-finds averaging over three times last year’s levels result from civilians 

increasingly providing intelligence leading to these discoveries, indicating an erosion of 

insurgent safe havens. The Government of Iraq has supported operations by Iraqi and 

Coalition Security forces targeting extremists across Iraq, including in Sadr City and the 

outer belts of Baghdad. Coalition Forces operate in these areas almost every night, 

though there remains one individual that Prime Minister Maliki has made the decision to 

delay targeting. The progress toward this benchmark has been satisfactory, and the 

effect is that the Coalition and the ISF are able to continue clearing and securing areas in 

and around Baghdad from which the enemy had been operating. 

(xiii) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control 

of local security. 

Though precise measurements of sectarian violence vary, trends data supplied over time 

by MNF-I demonstrate a decrease in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, since 

the beginning of Operation Fardh al-Qanun. Militia activity initially decreased but staged 

a resurgence in mid-May before falling again in June to the lowest level in a year. 
20 

Similar trends have been observed throughout Iraq; however, it is too early to determine 

how sustainable they will prove to be. As part of Operation Fardh al-Qanun, Coalition 

Forces have established over 30 JSSs and almost 30 COPs, throughout Baghdad. These 

stations bring security forces into the neighborhoods and provide the Iraqi populace with 

a means to deliver valuable information to security forces in order to target groups that 

incite sectarian violence. Similar outposts have been established throughout cities and 

rural areas of Iraq. 

The United States Government is supporting a Ministry of Interior initiative to inspect all 

47 Baghdad police stations to verify station police are performing their duties to standard. 

This action, coupled with the expanded use of embedded U.S. military and police advisor 

teams, helps ensure that Iraqi Security Forces are exposed on a daily basis to modern 

policing techniques that are more effective and in compliance with international human 

rights standards. Nonetheless, the police remain the element in which progress has been 

slowest and in which improvement is most needed. 

Militia presence is still strong and reaches into the security services of a number of 

ministries. Despite some progress, militias are still a dominant force in parts of Baghdad, 

Basrah, and many provinces in Iraq -- and will likely remain so until the security situation 

begins to stabilize over time. (See pages 14-15, above.) 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq -- with substantial Coalition assistance -- has 

made satisfactory progress toward reducing sectarian violence but has shown 

unsatisfactory progress towards eliminating militia control of local security. 

Furthermore, though sectarian violence has been reduced, it is not yet reduced to a level 

the Coalition judges acceptable. The effect of unsatisfactory progress toward 

eliminating militia control of local security has been negative in terms of perceptions of 

the authority and fairness of the Government of Iraq. However, this does not necessitate 

a revision to our current plan and strategy, under which we continue to press the 

Government of Iraq on these issues and are conducting aggressive operations with Iraqi 

forces to uproot the command and control of the most violent and destabilizing militia 

elements in Iraq. 

(xiv) Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across 

Baghdad. 

Many of the planned JSS, U.S. Combat Outposts, and other patrol bases have been 

established across Baghdad and the surrounding area. Over 60 of these stations are 

located within Baghdad, and 30 more are planned. Joint Security Stations provide an 

around-the-clock security presence in most of Baghdad and JSSs are particularly 

effective as they merge Coalition technology and resolve with Iraqi presence and calming 

influence. There are numerous examples where Iraqi presence has facilitated a lower 

application of force. This increased interaction with the local population should directly 

contribute to reducing crime and sectarian violence, such as murders and executions. 
21 

Other stations are being established in outlying areas where interaction with the local 

people can have a direct impact on the reduction of violence within the city. As security 

conditions on the ground warrant review of the location and quantity of these stations, 

Coalition leaders will consult with the Baghdad Operational Commander, LTG Abboud, 

to determine future emplacements and additions. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq -- with substantial Coalition assistance -- has 

made satisfactory progress toward establishing the planned JSSs in Baghdad. As of 

June 16, Multinational Division-Baghdad reports 32 JSSs have achieved initial 

operational capability and 36 COPs have achieved initial or full operational capability. 

This benchmark is on track for completion at the required time. The progress toward this 

benchmark has been satisfactory, and the effects are increased control and security in the 

areas where these JSSs have been established. 

(xv) Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating 

independently. 

Coalition Forces continue the Train-and-Equip program for the Iraqi Security Forces and 

field advisors to the Ministries of Interior and Defense in order to build Iraqi capacity to 

manage and sustain forces in the field. To advance the development of the fledgling Iraqi 

bureaucratic processes for committing funds, we have obtained the Iraqi Government’s 

approval to pursue many of its procurement and logistical requirements through the U.S. 

Foreign Military Sales program. The United States is also negotiating an Acquisition 

Cross Service Agreement (ACSA) with the Iraqi Government. As the security ministries 

increase their capacity to support and sustain Iraqi forces, Iraqi units will become more 

capable of operating independently. Iraq earlier this year invested $7.3 billion for the 

training and equipping of its own security forces -- an impressive investment that will 

need time to have an impact on the ground. 

There are 9 Iraqi Army divisions, 31 Brigades, and 95 battalions in the operational lead

for their area of responsibility. For an Iraqi unit to be designated capable of independent

operations, it must achieve an Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 1 status. 

There has been a slight reduction in units assessed as capable of independent operations 

since January 2007. This reduction is due to a 20 percent increase in unit authorization 

levels (meaning the equipment numbers against which the unit is measured are higher), a 

fixed number of equipment sets and training seats, a lack of officers and NCOs (with 

some provided to less capable units to help stand them up), combat losses, and the 

sustainment challenges that come with these dynamics. In addition, there are more Iraqi 

units in the field and more being moved around the battlefield. This of course increases 

the logistics, services, and combat multiplier (close air support and artillery support) 

requirements exponentially. 

Ministry of Interior capacity requires continued development. The Fiscal Year 2007 

Department of Defense supplemental funding request focused on key shortfalls, 

particularly in MOI equipment maintenance. Because the MOD is only partially 
22 

effective at managing ministry functions, the Coalition continues to assist with fielded 

Iraqi Army forces. 

Assessment: The Iraqi Government has made unsatisfactory progress toward 

increasing the number of Iraqi Security Forces units capable of operating 

independently. Development of ISF capabilities continues to grow while the ISF 

increases operational tempo for Operation Fardh al-Qanun. Readiness assessments for 

the National Police continue to show slow but steady improvement, but we continue to 

have concerns about the sectarian leaning of some national police units. The effect is that 

the presence of Coalition partners and support remains necessary for ISF operations. 

This does not necessitate a revision to the current plan and strategy, however, because the 

plan and strategy emphasize the importance of embedded trainers and the partnering of 

Iraqi and Coalition units. ISF performance has generally been adequate, particularly 

when units are partnered with Coalition Forces. 

(xvi) Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are 

protected. 

Article 37 of the Iraq constitution guarantees all Iraqis freedom to form and join 

associations and political parties. Minorities are guaranteed equal access to and 

participation in elections for the COR. The COR elected in December 2005 includes 

representatives from the Shi’a, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, and 

Yazidi communities. The Rules of Procedure for the COR guarantee the ability of its 

members to express their opinions, regardless of political party or affiliation, helping to 

ensure the full participation of all its members. COR rules permit groups as small as 10 

members out of 275 to propose legislation. 

The electoral system used to elect the current COR -- provincial proportional 

representation -- was chosen by the previous Iraqi parliament in 2005 to balance a 

number of factors, including the ability of women and of small minority parties to gain a 

share of representation. Iraqi parliamentarians and political parties are considering 

changes to the electoral laws, but there appears to be no effort that would adversely affect 

the rights of minorities. 

The U.S. Mission is fully engaged with the Iraqi parliament to ensure appreciation for the 

concern attached by the United States to representation of women and minorities and a 

role for minority parties. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward 

ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are 

protected. Minority political parties in the COR participate in COR activities in a 

manner consistent with minority parties in other parliamentary democracies. Women 

COR members work closely with each other, often across party lines. We anticipate a 

continued role for minorities and women in the parliament. 
23 

(xvii) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction 

projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. 

In 2006, the Iraqi Government managed to execute only 22 percent of its capital budget 

(an estimated $1.35 billion of $6.2 billion budgeted). It is worth noting that 

implementation and expenditure of the budget were slowed by the fact that the permanent 

government was not established until June 2006. A significant improvement in 

performance is necessary to make satisfactory progress on the 2007 benchmark. The 

benchmark would be fully achieved by allocating and obligating $10 billion of 

investment capital during this calendar year, along with satisfactory progress on contract 

disbursements. As is normal in any capital budget, a portion of the funds will disburse in 

future years based on contract progress. While it is too soon to tell how much 

improvement will take place by the end of 2007, many of the problems from 2006 are 

being overcome. Most critical to the effort is the performance of the Ministry of Oil, 

with nearly 25 percent of the total capital budget; it remains unclear whether the Ministry 

has made any real effort to expend those funds. 

True success lies not only in the percentage of the capital budget actually spent in 2007, 

but in the effects of spending, as the Iraqi Government seeks to establish its credibility 

with citizens though improved delivery of public services and tangible economic 

development. Moreover, adherence to and improved familiarity with the decentralized 

and accountable fiduciary structures introduced since the fall of Saddam will give Iraqi 

citizens added confidence in and a reason to support their local, regional, and national 

governments. The effects of this new emphasis and these new procedures are already 

being felt, albeit unevenly, across the country. Some ministries have developed and are 

implementing aggressive spending plans (such as the Ministry of Education), and several 

provinces (Anbar, in particular) are demonstrating their empowerment through their new 

spending programs. Should these successes spread across Iraq, this would mark the 

beginning of a new relationship between citizens and their government. 

The most important change in 2007 is that all parties and all levels of Iraqi Government, 

from central to provincial to local, share an acute and unifying emphasis on budget 

execution. Unlike last year, the budget passed in February 2007 included detailed capital 

budgets. The Government of Iraq has established a senior-level budget execution task 

force (led by a Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of 

Planning and Development Cooperation) to spur spending and improve communications 

between the central and provincial governments. New procedures have been enacted to 

expedite spending processes, such as revised procurement regulations and a rescission 

clause in the 2007 budget law. Budget execution officials have been provided with 

additional training and resources. Improvements are still needed in tracking budget 

performance; audited figures are generally available only 3 or more months after the end 

of any given spending period. 

These changes have nearly tripled the ministries’ rates of allocation when compared to 

last year at this time, though efforts must continue accelerating to make sufficient 

progress on this benchmark. Ministerial spending is moving ahead. The Ministry of 
24 

Finance has moved more than 21 percent of the overall ministerial capital budget to the 

individual ministries’ capital investment accounts, which enables them to award contracts 

and request additional releases based on contract schedules. With respect to provinces, a 

majority of the 2006 budget funding was released late in December. Provinces continue 

to apply those funds to improving services and advancing local reconstruction priorities, 

while at the same time processing their 2007 budgets. Most provinces are making 

significant progress in capital spending, but those with security challenges are lagging. 

Importantly, provincial budget allocations were calculated based on population statistics, 

which supports the constitution’s concerns with equality. 

Assessment: The Iraqi Government is making satisfactory progress in allocating 

funds to ministries and provinces, but even if the full $10 billion capital budget is 

allocated, spending units will not be able to spend all these funds by the end of 2007. 

Execution of the complete 2007 capital budget is a very aggressive target for the 

Government of Iraq, which expects significant increases in 2007 spending following 

major initiatives to improve its budget execution processes. Although the trend to date is 

positive, sustaining progress through September to meet this benchmark at year-end 

requires accelerated spending and procurement activity, which are challenging tasks in 

the face of capacity constraints and security problems. 

(xviii) Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making 

false accusations against members of the ISF. 

Iraqi authorities continue to undermine and make false accusations against ISF members. 

There are still several reports each month of allegations of wrongdoing against ISF 

members believed to be non-sectarian in their approach to security. In most cases, we are 

unable to assess the validity of these allegations but believe them to be untrue. It appears 

from anecdotal evidence that Iraqi political authorities may not be pursuing allegations 

even-handedly. Trumped up charges by the de-Ba’athification Commission have been 

used in the past to cleanse Sunni officers from formations. Questionable judicial 

warrants by the Office of the Commander in Chief are a more recent technique to target 

Sunni commanders while influential sectarian actors linked to security ministries 

continue to degrade formal command structures. Similarly, some Sunni politicians have 

made baseless claims against ISF officials, suggesting that unsubstantiated claims of 

sectarians can cut both ways. 

Some members of the COR and Council of Ministers have publicly supported ISF leaders 

while behind the scenes they continue to turn a blind eye to sectarian activities. United 

States military and diplomatic personnel continue to engage Iraqi Government officials at 

the highest levels to stress the need for Iraqi political authorities to cease making baseless 

accusations against ISF leaders for sectarian and political gain. 

Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made unsatisfactory progress in ensuring 

that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations 

against members of the ISF. Accusations that undermine the independence and nonsectarianism of the ISF occur and are not adequately addressed by the Government of 
25 

Iraq. The effect is at times to deny the ISF the services of qualified officers or to 

discourage them from operating in a professional non-sectarian manner. However, this 

does not necessitate a revision to the current plan and strategy, under which we continue 

to monitor the situation by means of our close involvement with the ISF and to press Iraqi 

political leaders to refrain from this behavior.