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LIMITING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT 

OF TITLE VII OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS AND 

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 8, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 112–100 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York 

JAMES B. RENACCI, Ohio 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

FRANCISCO ‘‘QUICO’’ CANSECO, Texas 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Member 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

JAMES H. CLINGER, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey, Chairman 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona, Vice 

Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

AL GREEN, Texas 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

February 8, 2012 .............................................................................................. 1 

Appendix: 

February 8, 2012 .............................................................................................. 29 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2012 

Allen, Chris, Managing Director, Barclays Capital .............................................. 8 

Brummer, Chris, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center ........... 9 

Thompson, Don, Managing Director and Associate General Counsel, 

JPMorgan Chase & Company ............................................................................. 11 

Zubrod, Luke, Director, Chatham Financial ......................................................... 13 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Allen, Chris ....................................................................................................... 30 

Brummer, Chris ................................................................................................ 43 

Thompson, Don ................................................................................................. 56 

Zubrod, Luke ..................................................................................................... 62 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Garrett, Hon. Scott: 

Written statement of The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation .......... 66 

Letter from the Institute of International Bankers dated February 7, 

2012 ................................................................................................................ 70 

Letter from the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., 

dated February 6, 2012 ................................................................................ 72 

Letter to Representative Himes from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association dated February 7, 2012 ...................................... 74 

Letter to Treasury Secretary Geithner, CFTC Chairman Gensler, Federal 

Reserve Chairman Bernanke, and SEC Chairman Schapiro from the 

New Democrat Coalition dated April 15, 2011 ........................................... 76 

Letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, CFTC Chairman Gensler, 

FDIC Chairman Bair, and Acting OCC Comptroller Walsh from various 

Members of Congress dated May 17, 2011 ................................................. 80 

Letter to FDIC Chairman Bair, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, 

CFTC Chairman Gensler, Acting OCC Comptroller Walsh, SEC Chairman Schapiro, FHFA Acting Director DeMarco, and Hon. Leland Strom 

from Senator Stabenow and Representative Lucas dated June 20, 2011 83 

Letter to Treasury Secretary Geithner from Chairman Bachus dated August 2, 2011 ................................................................................................... 87 

Letter to CFTC Chairman Gensler, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, 

SEC Chairman Schapiro, and FDIC Acting Chairman Gruenberg from 

Senator Johnson and Representative Frank dated October 4, 2011 ........ 90 

Letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, SEC Chairman Schapiro, 

FDIC Acting Chairman Gruenberg, CFTC Chairman Gensler, and Acting OCC Comptroller Walsh from Senators Johanns, Vitter, Crapo, 

and Toomey dated October 17, 2011 ........................................................... 92 

Himes, Hon. James: 

Written statement of the ABA Securities Association (ABASA) .................. 94 

Written statement of Representative Gwen Moore ....................................... 97 

(1) 

LIMITING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL 

IMPACT OF TITLE VII OF THE 

DODD-FRANK ACT 

Wednesday, February 8, 2012 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS AND

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Scott Garrett [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Garrett, Schweikert, Royce, 

Biggert, Hensarling, Neugebauer, Pearce, Posey, Hayworth, Hurt, 

Grimm, Stivers, Dold; Waters, Sherman, Hinojosa, Lynch, Maloney, 

Moore, Perlmutter, Carson, Himes, Peters, and Green. 

Chairman GARRETT. The Subcommittee on Capital Markets and 

Government Sponsored Enterprises is called to order. Today’s hearing is titled, ‘‘Limiting the Extraterritorial Impact of Title VII of 

the Dodd-Frank Act.’’ 

I welcome the witnesses to the witness table. We will begin our 

opening statements. I will recognize myself for 3 minutes, and then 

move to the Minority side. So, good morning to the entire panel. 

I look forward, as always, to the testimony on this important topic. 

And today’s hearing is important. Why? Because it gets to a broader issue that some of us on both sides of the aisle, quite frankly, 

have expressed concerns with regarding the Dodd-Frank Act and 

the issue of uncertainty. Uncertainty hurts growth, and it stifles 

investment. 

In this case, companies are uncertain how to respond to the litany of new rules proposed under Title VII because of the lack of 

clarity regarding the extent to which U.S. regulators intend to 

apply Title VII to entities in foreign jurisdictions. So while exact 

intentions are uncertain, there are indications that the U.S. regulators intend to have some matter of extraterritorial application of 

these rules. 

The legislation that Congressman Himes and I introduced, H.R. 

3283, the Swap Jurisdiction Certainty Act, attempts to not only 

provide certainty on the application of the Dodd-Frank Act Title 

VII rules, but also aims to avoid the negative consequences that result if Title VII is applied too broadly. The concerns are not only 

confined to these shores. Foreign regulators have concerns as well. 

The following is a direct quote from the lead of a Reuters story 

2 

published earlier this week: ‘‘The United States is coming to be 

seen as a global threat, acting unilaterally and aggressively, with 

new market rules that critics say will hurt U.S. firms, foreign 

banks, and international markets in one fell swoop.’’ 

Indeed, the list of negative consequences is long if these issues 

aren’t handled carefully and appropriately. First, depending on how 

this extraterritoriality is applied, the global competitiveness of U.S. 

firms could be impacted. Non-U.S. firms may determine it is just 

too costly to serve customers and markets. So the overall health 

and liquidity of global markets therefore may suffer. 

Dual and contradictory regulations will add additional costs or 

make it impossible to comply with all the jurisdictional rules that 

are out there. Additional costs will be passed on to whom? The endusers, of course. And that is the real economy at the end of the day. 

The sovereignty of foreign countries may be inappropriately infringed upon. It might in turn invite regulatory retaliation. Concerns in this area are bipartisan in nature. Several of my colleagues across the aisle have joined me in cosponsoring this bill. In 

addition, the ranking member of the full Financial Services Committee joined the Senate Banking Committee chairman in sending 

a letter to regulators last October directly addressing these issues. 

In part, the letter reads, ‘‘Congress generally limited the territorial scope of Title VII to activities within the United States. The 

general rules should not be swallowed by the law’s exception which 

calls for extraterritorial application only when particular international activities of U.S. firms have a direct and significant connection with the effect on U.S. commerce or are designed to evade 

U.S. rules. We are concerned that the proposed imposition of margin requirements, in addition to provisions relating to clearing, 

trading, registration, and the treatment of foreign subsidies of U.S. 

institutions, all raise questions about consistency with congressional intent.’’ 

So, H.R. 3283 seeks to answer these questions through clear statutory language in order to provide certainty to market participants 

and international regulators as well. 

Once again, I look forward to the testimony today, and I also look 

forward to the comments and questions of the sponsor of this legislation as well, who is taking, obviously, a lead interest in this 

issue, and I look to his leadership on this matter as we go forward. 

With that, I yield back my time, and I yield 3 minutes to Mr. 

Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to thank 

the witnesses for their willingness to help the committee with its 

work. I must say I have grave concerns about the legislation before 

us today. This bill before us exempts an alarmingly large portion 

of the swaps market from many of the important requirements of 

Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, which deals with the over-thecounter derivatives market. 

H.R. 3283 would exempt swaps between a U.S. company and a 

non-U.S. company or an affiliate from almost all transaction-level 

requirements in Title VII, including margin, clearing, and execution requirements intended to make swaps transactions safer and 

more secure. 

3 

If you need an example of how this bill would increase systemic 

risk to the American economy, look no further than AIG. AIG Financial Products, which almost single-handedly crashed the American economy, was a non-U.S. affiliate of a U.S. company that entered into subprime mortgage credit default swap transactions with 

a variety of American and international companies. When these 

subprime bonds tanked and it became clear that AIG could not 

honor margin calls required by these contracts, its imminent failure put the entire American economy in mortal peril. As a result, 

the American taxpayer pumped $85 billion into AIG to keep it 

afloat. 

Under this bill before the committee, the same transactions that 

doomed AIG would receive less oversight—not more—and create 

more systemic risk. Even for the standards of this committee, this 

is an especially bad idea. Moreover, the sponsors of this bill argue 

that exempting these swaps from Title VII’s margin, clearing, and 

execution provisions will increase America’s competitiveness. That 

is far from the truth. I believe it will have the opposite effect, by 

encouraging U.S. companies to move their swap business into an 

overseas affiliate or subsidiary where they can fully enjoy the loopholes that this bill creates. This is a major and unwarranted exception to the carefully crafted Dodd-Frank reforms, and it creates the 

possibility of regulatory arbitrage. 

Finally, this bill creates a regulatory race to the bottom by preventing U.S. regulators from acting until foreign jurisdictions act 

first. But of course, as we know, foreign regulators are similarly 

afraid to act unless the United States goes first. America should be 

the leader in financial regulation, and not allow a ‘‘you first’’ mentality to put Americans’ financial security in jeopardy yet again. 

Again, this is a bad idea. And I think we are replanting the seeds 

that caused this economic crisis in the first place. For these reasons, I oppose the bill under consideration today, and I would urge 

my colleagues to do the same. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Schweikert is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to our witnesses, I appreciate you being here. I am hoping, actually—and I 

have been looking forward to this hearing—we are about to have 

a discussion of the law of unintended consequences. And as witnesses, as you are speaking, I am hoping I will hear you touch on 

everything from jobs to capital availability to competitiveness. Also, 

I would love for you to touch on, as we just heard, AIG, because 

my understanding is OTS is gone, and under the regulatory framework we are under right now doesn’t happen, and that we are living in a very, very different world, and that actually a problem crisis now has already been dealt with. 

The other thing I would also love you to touch on is if the rules 

stay the way they are, and we see much of our swaps and derivative markets move away from us, move to Europe and other places, 

are we really systemically that much safer in the future? 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back. 

4 

Mr. Himes, the sponsor of the legislation, is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. HIMES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this hearing and for the comity with which we have worked together on this legislation. I am looking forward to hearing from our 

witnesses today on what is a very complicated and technical topic. 

I do want to remind all of us that what we are talking about here 

is actually pretty esoteric. I suspect my co-author on this bill would 

disagree with that statement, but I actually think Title VII and the 

dragging of the heretofore unregulated derivatives market into a 

regulated environment is a significant achievement of Dodd-Frank. 

The notion that derivatives will clear through clearinghouses, 

trade on an exchange when possible, be subject to margin requirements, be subject to capital requirements, are very, very powerful 

remedies to what we saw happen with AIG. This particular bill 

does not touch on any of those issues. And I want to be very clear 

that this bill is designed really to do two things. First, perfectly 

consistent with the congressional intent of Dodd-Frank, to provide 

some certainty about which regulatory regimes apply when you are 

talking about multiple countries. Section 722(d) of Dodd-Frank took 

a crack at that, at saying that these laws would only apply where 

there was a direct and significant connection with activities in the 

United States. 

Second, this legislation is important, very important for competitiveness. I will give an example. If prudence would dictate that a 

particular swap should have a 5 percent margin against it, and the 

United States believes that, and Germany believes that, we should 

have a 5 percent margin on that transaction, not 10 percent. Because if both jurisdictions impose 5 percent margins and you have 

10 percent, that swap is not getting done. As in so many things related to derivatives, there is an awful lot more discussion than 

there is understanding. 

With all due respect to my friend from Massachusetts, this has 

absolutely nothing to do with AIG. This bill would preserve all of 

the entity protections imposed by Title VII, ensuring that the 

manifest irresponsibility that was shown by AIG would not happen 

again. Capital requirements for the entity, specific supervisory obligations, and of course the kinds of oversight provided because, presumably, AIG would have been deemed to be systemically important, all that stays in place. 

Again, there is an awful lot of misunderstanding here. An organization I usually appreciate, Americans for Financial Reform, says 

that capital requirements would be eliminated for certain entities 

abroad. That is not true. Capital requirements would, in nations 

that are Basel signatories, defer to the capital requirements in that 

nation. 

So in conclusion, I would just say this is about competitiveness, 

about making sure that banks and nonbanks understand what jurisdiction they are subject to, and in no way weakens Title VII, the 

regulation of the derivatives industry, or is an effort to roll back 

Dodd-Frank, something I think would be a significant mistake. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back. 

5 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hensarling, is now recognized for 

2 minutes. 

Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is the second 

hearing of the Capital Markets Subcommittee dealing with regulatory overreach and its adverse consequences on jobs and economic 

growth. Again, another data point: When you yield unprecedented, 

unfettered, historic discretionary powers to the unelected bureaucracy, they will indeed use it. 

Ultimately, we all know, notwithstanding a good jobs report last 

month, that there are still almost 13 million of our fellow countrymen who remain unemployed. Millions more have simply given up 

and dropped out of the labor force, which is why jobs and economic 

growth continue to be the number one issue for the American people. So we have to look very carefully at the subject of regulatory 

overreach. 

Allow me to engage in the time-honored tradition of this committee of quoting the Chairman of the Federal Reserve when he 

agrees with me, and ignoring him when he doesn’t: ‘‘If those margin rules for foreign operations are maintained, and Europeans and 

other foreign jurisdictions do not match it, that would be a significant competitive disadvantage.’’ That is a quote from Fed Chairman Bernanke. 

We know that prudential oversight already exists for bank overseas swap activities by the Fed, and by the OCC. So again, we 

don’t have any evidence now that international regulators will 

adopt the more controversial provisions of Title VII, putting us at 

a competitive disadvantage. We know that prudential regulation already exists, so we must question just what benefit is to be derived 

from what is arguably duplicative and inconsistent regulations. 

Significant sectors of the U.S. economy, including manufacturing, 

health care, and technology use these derivatives as a tool to manage risk and compete globally. Regulations that miss the mark will 

have a negative impact on jobs and the economy. 

I appreciate the chairman calling this hearing, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses. I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Royce is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There were three principles put forward in the Pittsburgh G-20 communique in September of 2009: ‘‘All standardized OTC derivative contracts should 

be traded on exchanges and cleared through central counterparties. 

OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. 

And noncentrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.’’ So that is what the G-20 countries agreed to. 

My concern is with the regulatory crusade undertaken by the 

CFTC, which is not one geared toward making our markets safer, 

but rather an effort to fit an ideological narrative. The effort led 

by the CFTC goes against the very idea of international coordination on this. An overly expansive and aggressive implementation of 

Title VII will make our markets less competitive, and, problematically, they are going to provide justification for retaliation overseas. 

This approach has to be taken in tandem with our allies, not 

through a shot across the bow. 

6 

Attempting to regulate the global markets from the CFTC headquarters on 21st Street is not a solution that is going to work with 

our allies. So I think the Himes-Garrett legislation here is the right 

approach. It brings much needed balance back into the process. 

And I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentlelady from California is recognized for 2 minutes. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As it turns 

out, we are getting some complaints from some in the industry who 

are alerting us to changes that could take place that were unanticipated. I don’t know, and I have not decided about this or any other 

legislation. So I want to hear from the witnesses today. I want to 

hear what they have to tell us. And so, I am going to yield back 

the balance of my time. 

Chairman GARRETT. I appreciate that. 

Mrs. Biggert is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have many concerns 

about the unintended consequences of U.S. regulators steamrolling 

ahead with the Dodd-Frank Title VII regulations. Will these regulations introduce more risk into our financial system, particularly 

for U.S. insurance companies? Will these regulations create an 

unlevel playing field for U.S. financial institutions with international subsidiaries, putting U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage in the global economy? And what will the impact of 

these regulations be on our U.S. economy? All these issues must be 

thoroughly vetted before the Federal regulators take action. 

I hope that today’s hearing will shed light on the need for an 

internationally agreed upon regulatory regime, especially with our 

U.S. trading partners. I yield back. 

Chairman GARRETT. And the gentlelady yields back. 

Mr. Grimm is now recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. GRIMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you calling 

this hearing to examine the efforts and clarify the reach of the derivatives title of Dodd-Frank and what it will do to business conducted outside the United States. I think at a time of both increased global competition and growing regulation, it is imperative 

that we ensure that new rules being implemented under DoddFrank do not subject American firms to double, and, in many cases, 

redundant regulations on overseas transactions. These 

redundancies will serve no purpose but to put U.S. firms at an 

enormous disadvantage in the global marketplace, and possibly encourage regulatory arbitrage, which could put the worldwide financial system at risk. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ thoughts on the legislation before us, and I truly hope that our regulators are paying attention to the discussions that we are having here today, and take 

it into account as they move forward with their rulemaking. With 

that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman GARRETT. Mr. Perlmutter is recognized for 2 minutes. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sympathetic 

to the issues raised by Mr. Himes and the chairman. And I am glad 

we are highlighting these issues at today’s hearing, although legislating, at this point, may be premature. It is important that we do 

not competitively disadvantage or penalize U.S. financial instituVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:11 Aug 02, 2012 Jkt 075072 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75072.TXT TERRIE
7 

tions just because the United States is further along in financial 

reform than others in Europe and Asia. Our rules should be constructed so foreign businesses still want to conduct business with 

U.S. financial institutions abroad. 

Undoubtedly, imposing strict margin requirements on certain 

trades done abroad that only apply to U.S. financial institutions 

would place the U.S. institutions at a disadvantage because foreign 

businesses will choose to transact business with foreign institutions, where their rules don’t apply. 

But I feel like there has been some amnesia reflected on the committee because I still have nightmares surrounding the events of 

2008 and the financial crisis. I do not want to legislate broad exemptions or carveouts that could potentially bring down our financial system and the economy. If our financial institutions are going 

to stand behind the trades conducted by their foreign subsidiaries, 

we must ensure that they are adequately capitalized and protected 

so taxpayers, depositors, and shareholders are not at risk. With 

that, I yield back to the Chair. 

Chairman GARRETT. I thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman yields back. Mr. Dold is recognized for the final 

1 minute. 

Mr. DOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly thank you 

for calling this important hearing. In listening to my colleague from 

Colorado, I want to agree that we don’t want to have unintended 

consequences jeopardize American financial institutions abroad. 

And when we look at the global marketplace today, it is probably 

flatter than it has ever been. Certainly what we don’t need is to 

make sure that U.S. financial institutions are operating from a disadvantage. 

What I can tell you is that when we look at a 2,400-page bill, 

inevitably in those 2,400 pages there are going to be mistakes that 

are made, couple with the idea that we are going to have literally 

thousands of pages of regulation on top of it trying to interpret that 

law. Inevitably, there are going to be mistakes that will be made. 

The task that we have is to try to make sure that we rectify 

some of those mistakes so that we aren’t putting American institutions at a disadvantage. And certainly the CFTC, in terms of its 

interpretations, may simply be doing that. 

So I want to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle 

for this bipartisan piece of legislation and for their leadership, and 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

Now, we will turn to our panel. And as we turn to the panel, you 

will see that you have a piece of bipartisan legislation before you. 

And you can see from the opening statements today some supportive positions, but also some concerned positions, and also some 

open minds as we begin to look into something that is, as Mr. 

Himes said, a fairly technical piece of legislation before us. 

So with that, we will turn to our first witness. And of course, the 

entire written testimony of all of the witnesses will be made a part 

of the record. We are looking to you for 5 minutes of testimony. 

And the first will be Mr. Chris Allen, managing director over at 

Barclays. Good afternoon, Mr. Allen. 

8 

STATEMENT OF CHRIS ALLEN, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

BARCLAYS CAPITAL 

Mr. ALLEN. Good afternoon, Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member 

Waters, and members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Chris Allen, and I am managing director of Barclays Bank PLC based in London. I head the 

global markets legal group for the U.K. and Europe, and have been 

actively involved in Barclays’ implementation of global regulatory 

reform. I would like to start off by thanking the committee for the 

leadership they have shown in trying to get this right. 

We strongly support the proposed bill, and believe the objectives 

of Title VII would be best served if this measure is enacted. As 

U.S. financial reform regulations are being finalized, there is concern that U.S. regulators are considering applying Dodd-Frank’s 

swap dealer and other substantive requirements to non-U.S. aspects of a firm’s global businesses. If these reforms are not modified, they will subject foreign firms and non-U.S. affiliates of U.S. 

firms to duplicative, inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory regulatory requirements. 

This is best illustrated by example. A firm may be required to 

execute a trade via a swap execution facility in the United States 

while simultaneously being under an obligation to execute the 

same trade via the European concept of an organized trading facility. The European rules are at an early stage of development. But 

to the extent that the rules end up looking different, firms may be 

presented with the dilemma of not being able to comply with both 

sets of regulations at the same time. 

Also concerning, an overly expansive application of Title VII 

could place global firms at material competitive disadvantage. If a 

firm which is conducting business from for example, Asia, with a 

client also based in Asia, is required to apply U.S. rules such as 

the clearing rules, while local competitors are under no such obligation by virtue of not being U.S. registrants, then the firm subjected 

to the U.S. rules will struggle to compete successfully. 

Many global firms transact across the world using a single entity 

structure; i.e., one company throughout the world. U.S. 

extraterritorial overreach will cause firms to have to reconsider the 

viability of that model in favor of local subsidiaries in order to 

avoid regulatory overlap. 

Why does that matter? First, it is likely to create hurdles for 

U.S. end-users seeking direct access to overseas markets, since 

firms may be concerned with establishing a U.S. connection which 

would bring them within the scope of Title VII. Also, there would 

be an increased likelihood of back-to-back transactions within firms 

offering access to those overseas markets, making such access more 

expensive for end-users. It is also unlikely that such an approach 

would enhance global consolidated supervision of firms and their 

swaps businesses. 

We also note that the CFTC is likely to require firms to register 

as swap dealers prior to finalizing its extraterritoriality guidance; 

i.e., firms will be registering without knowing the global impact of 

that registration. 

Turning to the proposed bill, we believe that it appropriately reflects the jurisdictional intent of the Dodd-Frank statute and serves 

9 

the effective and transparent oversight of the global swaps market 

without having unnecessary negative impact. Specifically, we support the bill’s aim of dividing the substantive Dodd-Frank requirements into entity-level requirements, such as those relating to capital or risk management requirements, and then transaction-level 

requirements such as clearing or public reporting. 

Where comparable home company country entity-level requirements exist, such as in relation to capital, compliance with those 

requirements should satisfy Dodd-Frank. U.S. transaction-level requirements would apply to trades with U.S. customers, but local 

foreign requirements would apply to trades between foreign entities. 

That brings me briefly to the Volcker Rule. In our view, the proposed limitations on proprietary trading and the fund activities go 

beyond what is required by the statute and would have severe 

extraterritorial consequences that were not intended by Congress. 

The various exceptions in Volcker are, in our opinion, insufficient 

to avoid extraterritorial overreach. 

This is not just a case of the rest of the world playing catch-up. 

In the U.K., the Independent Commission on Banking released a 

proposal that specifically studied and determined that the Volcker 

Rule, as passed in the Dodd-Frank Act, was not necessary when 

evaluated in light of other systemic risk management measures the 

U.K. is instituting. Without revisions, the Volcker Rule is likely to 

decrease foreign investments in the United States, reduce investment opportunities for U.S. pension funds, reduce liquidity and 

market opportunity for issuing companies, and reduce the willingness of international financial institutions to trade with U.S. 

counterparties. All of this risks encouraging alternative financial 

centers to develop outside of the United States, and ultimately results in jobs and transactions moving overseas. 

In conclusion, Barclays appreciates the opportunity to testify 

today and your attention to these important issues under DoddFrank. We encourage you to continue to work with the CFTC, the 

SEC, and prudential regulators to ensure that Dodd-Frank is implemented in a balanced and orderly manner, making efficient use 

of supervisory resources and promoting international comity. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen can be found on page 30 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman GARRETT. And I thank you. 

Next, from Georgetown, we have Dr. Brummer. 

STATEMENT OF CHRIS BRUMMER, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 

Mr. BRUMMER. Chairman Garrett, members of the subcommittee, 

my name is Chris Brummer, and I am a professor at Georgetown 

Law School, where I teach international finance— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Pull that microphone closer. 

Mr. BRUMMER. It is very rare that a law professor is ever asked 

to speak louder or to speak more. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. We are older than most of your students. 

Mr. BRUMMER. Indeed. Indeed. My name is Chris Brummer, and 

I am a law professor at Georgetown. And I teach international fiVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:11 Aug 02, 2012 Jkt 075072 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75072.TXT TERRIE
10 

nance and securities regulation. I have worked in London with 

Cravath, Swaine & Moore, and I serve periodically on NASDAQ 

delisting panels, as well as at the Milken Institute’s Center for Financial Market Understanding. But this is the first time I have 

had the honor, as can you tell, to talk to you today. And thank you 

for the invitation. 

Each great failure of 2008, whether it be Fannie Mae, Freddie 

Mac, Lehman Brothers, or Countrywide held important lessons for 

the country, and AIG was no exception. Its tragic downfall illustrated, perhaps above all else, just what happens when complex or 

opaque transactions fall through the regulatory cracks, even when 

they take place in far-flung parts of the world. 

Regulated by a weak and underfunded OTS, and escaping meaningful oversight in London and France, the insurance giant’s affiliates were able to create and write credit default swaps that, when 

combined with poor lending practices, ultimately toppled the international conglomerate when its bets went wrong, and at a cost of 

$85 billion for taxpayers. 

To plug these gaps made apparent by AIG and other bailed-out 

institutions, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which sought to 

enhance not only entity-level, but also transaction-level credit quality in an effort to help prevent future financial crises. Two key elements of these efforts were: one, to regulate some of the, up to 

then, largely unregulated derivatives transactions which had 

caused and contributed to the crisis; and two, to direct supervisory 

agencies most familiar with the transactions, in this case the SEC 

and the CFTC, to take a more active role alongside traditional prudential regulators in the oversight of such instruments. 

Title VII is an important part of the overall reform package. Essentially, it is designed to move the United States toward a new 

system of regulation, with margin requirements to enhance the 

credit quality of swap transactions and provide a buffer against 

losses. It includes a push towards centralized clearinghouses to reduce counterparty default risk, and to allocate losses and reduce 

the likelihood of bailouts, and to ensure that credit risk is supported by realtime mark-to-market benchmarking. It also includes 

a move from over-the-counter trading to centralized exchanges in 

order to facilitate standardization, ensure price discovery, and increase competition. 

And these efforts have not been made in a vacuum. In the wake 

of 2008, G-20 countries, of course, have directed their attention to 

the task of reforming the international regulatory system and committed to a variety of goals including increased standardization and 

trading of over-the-counter derivatives, exchange and electronic 

platform trading, capital requirements, and reporting to trade repositories. However, up to this point even now, relatively few prescriptive standards have been articulated at the international level. 

The Dodd-Frank Act represents an effort to lead by example, but 

its approach has been in certain notable regards unilateral. We 

have sought to lead by example, but we have also exported, or at 

least sought to export, our own regulatory preferences by 

leveraging our own formidable capital markets. 

From the standpoint of financial diplomacy, this particular approach can serve an important purpose, both as a means of crossVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:11 Aug 02, 2012 Jkt 075072 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75072.TXT TERRIE
11 

border negotiation and to help get the ball rolling on international 

standards-setting that, as we have all seen, can be quite protracted. 

But unilateralism carries risks that have only grown as financial 

markets have become more globalized. Regulated entities may seek 

to avoid your shores, creating competitive disadvantages, as I am 

sure we will hear even more about momentarily. Foreign regulators 

can, if not retaliate, at least use your own unilateralism as a kind 

of precedent in their own territorially-based regulation. And in the 

future, collaborative efforts between regulators can be undermined. 

So a balance has to be met between financial stability, comity, and 

pragmatism. 

The particular approach in this bill carries the promise of 

rationalizing internationally the transactions between banks, but it 

carries the danger of rolling back all of the transaction-based 

progress that I had mentioned before. 

For that reason, in my written testimony I had expressed my 

own confidence in a more thoughtful and calibrated mutual recognition regime that is in the legislation standards for capital. I 

think a blanket carte blanche allows an offshore financial center in 

the future, or a country from Bangalore to Syria to open up its own 

haven for low-level regulation, and in doing so creates certain 

kinds of risks that could, unfortunately, bring us back to 2008. I 

think we do need to engage our international counterparts. It is essential. But we have to do so in a thoughtful way. And part of the 

bill, I think, moves us in the right direction, and quite frankly, part 

of the bill does not. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brummer can be found on page 

43 of the appendix.] 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you, Professor. 

Mr. Thompson is welcomed back and recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DON THOMPSON, MANAGING DIRECTOR AND 

ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL, JPMORGAN CHASE & COMPANY 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Chairman Garrett. My name is Don 

Thompson. As the head of the derivatives legal team at JPMorgan 

Chase, I am responsible for leading the firm’s implementation efforts of Title VII. I would like to thank the committee for inviting 

me to testify today on the extraterritorial application of Title VII. 

And I look forward to addressing the concerns addressed by Congressman Lynch and others about AIG. 

This is an issue of the highest priority to our firm and to the 

competitiveness of the American banks internationally. Section 722 

of Dodd-Frank states that Title VII should not apply outside the 

United States unless foreign activity has a direct and significant 

connection with activities and/or effects on commerce of the United 

States. The interpretation of this phrase is crucial because swap 

markets are global. 

Since Dodd-Frank passed, bipartisan letters from numerous 

Members of Congress have clarified that the intent of Congress is 

to not apply Title VII extraterritorially absent extraordinary circumstances. Notwithstanding these expressions of congressional inVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:11 Aug 02, 2012 Jkt 075072 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75072.TXT TERRIE
12 

tent, there are reasons for concern based upon the current state of 

the regulatory discussion. 

Today, I will focus on three important points related to this debate. First, the extraterritorial application of Title VII would create 

competitive disadvantages for U.S. firms. U.S. banking regulation 

has long recognized and preserved the ability of U.S. firms to compete on a level playing field in the international markets. If Title 

VII applies to our overseas operations serving European or Asian 

clients, but not to our European or Asian competitors, U.S. banks 

will lose much of this business. This ultimately will have a negative effect on the competitiveness of U.S. banks, U.S. job creation, 

and economic growth. Significantly, losing many of our non-U.S. 

customers would also deprive us of valuable diversification in our 

credit exposures. This would actually be risk-increasing to our firm 

rather than risk-reducing. 

Second, global harmonization is not the answer to this competitive disadvantage problem. We are aware that regulators are attempting to harmonize derivatives rules globally. These efforts are 

important to ensure against arbitrage and adverse competitive impact, but practical impediments to harmonization make this an unreliable solution to the competitiveness problem. Putting aside for 

a moment the fact that perfect harmonization will probably never 

be achieved, even with European regulators, it is reasonable to expect that there will be severe differences in the approach to derivatives regulation in Asia, Latin America, and other important markets around the globe. The timing of harmonization is also a problem. Europe is on a much longer timetable than the United States, 

and the rest of the world is even further behind. Applying Title VII 

extraterritorially would put U.S. firms at a significant disadvantage while the rest of the world catches up, and many customer relationships will be damaged or lost in the gap period. 

Third, it is important to note that a prudential supervisory 

framework with respect to U.S. banks already exists and is effective. The stated rationale for an aggressive, expansive application 

of Title VII to the foreign swap activity of U.S. banks with their 

foreign clients is the potential to import excessive risk back into 

the United States. Proponents of this view cite the overseas swap 

activities of AIG, but this rationale no longer holds true for a number of reasons. 

First, the activities of U.S. banks outside the United States, including their swap activities, are already subject to a robust prudential supervisory regime that is administered by the Fed and the 

OCC. It is important to note that virtually all U.S. swap dealers 

are banks, or affiliates of banks, or bank holding companies, and 

are thus subject to this regime. 

Second, the regulatory regime for swaps has changed dramatically since 2008 and AIG. Major participants in the market now, 

because of Title VII, are required to register as swap dealers or 

major swap participants. This requires them to comply with requirements for sound risk management practices, minimum capital 

standards, and full regulatory transparency. Under these mandates, AIG would have been subject to this regulatory regime, and 

would not have been able to incur the exposures that led to the 

13 

firm’s demise. As such, an overreaching application of Title VII is 

not necessary to protect the U.S. financial system. 

Finally, I would like to mention the Himes-Garrett bill. We believe the Himes-Garrett bill is a sensible and workable solution to 

these problems. By maintaining the tough entity-level regulatory 

framework for all swap dealer activity, even that outside the 

United States, it achieves the dual goal of providing important 

safeguards for the U.S. financial system while ensuring that U.S. 

firms can compete on a level playing field in the global marketplace. 

JPMorgan is committed to working with Congress, regulators, 

and industry participants to ensure that Title VII is implemented 

appropriately. I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thompson can be found on page 

56 of the appendix.] 

Chairman GARRETT. All right. Thank you. 

From Chatham Financial, Mr. Zubrod, you are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF LUKE ZUBROD, DIRECTOR, CHATHAM 

FINANCIAL 

Mr. ZUBROD. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Garrett, and 

members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to 

testify today as the subcommittee considers legislation to limit the 

extraterritorial impact of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. 

My name is Luke Zubrod, and I am a director at Chatham Financial. Today, Chatham speaks on behalf of the Coalition for Derivatives End-Users. The Coalition represents thousands of companies across the United States that utilize over-the-counter derivatives to manage day-to-day business risks. Chatham is an independent service provider to businesses that use derivatives to manage interest rate, foreign currency, and commodity risks. A global 

firm based in Pennsylvania, Chatham serves as a trusted adviser 

to over a thousand end-user clients ranging from Fortune 100 companies to small businesses. Our clients are located in 46 States, including every State represented by the members of this subcommittee. Many of them operate globally. And we serve them 

from offices in the United States, Europe, and Asia. The Coalition 

has long supported the efforts of this subcommittee to mitigate systemic risk and increase transparency in the derivatives market. 

Additionally, we have appreciated the bipartisan efforts of this 

subcommittee to ensure that end-users of derivatives are not unnecessarily burdened by new regulation. Throughout the legislative 

and regulatory debates, end-users have expressed concerns to Congress and to regulators about a number of issues, most notably, the 

imposition of government-mandated margin requirements on enduser transactions and the regulation of an end-users inter-affiliate 

transactions. 

In addition to these regulatory requirements that would directly 

burden end-users, the Coalition has raised concerns about regulatory actions that could indirectly burden end-users by making 

risk management more expensive. 

We have, for example, expressed concerns that certain derivatives-related proposals by the Basel Committee on Banking SuperVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:11 Aug 02, 2012 Jkt 075072 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75072.TXT TERRIE
14 

vision could deter end-users from managing their risks or could 

make it materially less efficient to do so. 

Today, we add to these concerns by highlighting the ways in 

which an expansive extraterritorial application of Title VII could 

adversely impact end-users. Global companies often manage risks 

arising from their foreign operations by executing hedges out of the 

foreign subsidiaries that are actually exposed to those risks. Such 

entities often have relationships with both foreign and U.S. banks. 

Having a robust pool of bank counterparties enables end-users to 

enjoy numerous benefits, including achieving efficient market pricing and diversifying counterparty exposure. 

Importantly, and as I elaborate upon in my written testimony, 

the transactions end-users execute abroad are not designed to 

evade U.S. law; they are so executed for important business, legal, 

and strategic reasons. Because it is practically infeasible to perfectly align U.S. and foreign rules, expansive extraterritorial application of Title VII could create structural disincentives for endusers to transact with counterparties that are subject to U.S. law. 

Such disincentives could lead foreign end-users or the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. end-users to transact with a smaller potential pool 

of counterparties, thus reducing competition and liquidity, increasing pricing, and concentrating counterparty exposure. Measures 

banks may take to limit competitive disadvantages that result from 

expansive extraterritorial application of Title VII would inevitably 

increase costs for end-users. 

Additionally, the expansive application of these same requirements to foreign banks operating in the United States could further impact U.S. end-users operating domestically. U.S. end-users 

presently transact with a wide array of banking partners, including 

both U.S. and foreign banks. In order to avoid the duplicative application of U.S. and home-country law to transactions executed 

with non-U.S. end-users, foreign banks have incentives to spin off 

their U.S. operations into separately capitalized subsidiaries. This 

would adversely impact the end-users in numerous ways, which I 

elaborate upon in my written testimony. In essence, it would likely 

make hedging risk more expensive and more burdensome. In effect, 

expansive extraterritorial application of Title VII could undermine 

end-users’ ability to manage risk efficiently, both when they transact domestically and abroad. 

We therefore appreciate this subcommittee’s consideration of legislation that would clarify the territorial scope of U.S. law. Proposals such as the Himes-Garrett bill will increase certainty for 

market participants and resolve inevitable conflicts that would result from overlapping regulations in foreign jurisdictions. 

We acknowledge the complexity of the task before policymakers 

in considering the appropriate boundaries of U.S. law, and believe 

the Himes-Garrett bill thoughtfully recognizes the need to defer entity-level regulations to home-country regulators, while clarifying 

U.S. transaction-level requirements apply only in circumstances in 

which there is a U.S. counterparty. 

We appreciate your attention to these concerns, and look forward 

to continuing to support the subcommittee’s efforts to ensure that 

the derivatives markets are both safe and efficient. 

15 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. And I am happy 

to address any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zubrod can be found on page 62 

of the appendix.] 

Chairman GARRETT. Great. I appreciate your testimony. 

I have just been advised that we are going to have votes in a little while, so I am going to try to keep everybody right to their 5- 

minute time limit so that everybody here gets the best chance possible on their time for questioning. So I will recognize myself, and 

also abide by the 5 minutes. 

Running down the line, thanks, Mr. Zubrod, on this point. You 

said that companies, investment companies would invest overseas 

for strategic reasons, and not to avoid foreign law, or in this case 

U.S. law, right? 

Mr. ZUBROD. That is right. 

Chairman GARRETT. Okay. They do that now. But your argument 

would be that if you did have an onerous anticompetitive position, 

would that change, that they might change from strategic purposes 

of investment to trying to avoid U.S. law in the future? 

Mr. ZUBROD. I think if the law is applied expansively abroad, it 

would ultimately be a cost issue for end-users. 

Chairman GARRETT. So that is part of the strategic decision then 

at that point. It is cheaper to do it over here than to comply is part 

of the strategic—okay. A second question on that would be—and 

anybody else on the panel can chime in on this—when they do do 

that, without the expansiveness of the regulation, to advocate for 

a minute for that position, when they do make that strategic position, does that potentially have a direct and significant impact on 

the United States? 

Mr. ZUBROD. I think it does not. I think when end-users transact 

abroad with, for example, the foreign branches of U.S. banks, those 

foreign branches of U.S. banks, of course the key concern here is 

could that activity potentially transmit risk back to the United 

States? And I think there you have to look at the entity-level requirements that are imposed on that foreign branch. 

Chairman GARRETT. Okay. 

Mr. ZUBROD. And I think you would look and say those are robust. 

Chairman GARRETT. So maybe just moving down, Mr. Thompson, 

following along that line of thinking then, or that discussion, part 

of the seminal question is to define—or the understanding of what 

that term ‘‘direct and significant impact’’ would be, I guess, right, 

under Dodd-Frank? How would you define that? Would it require 

that you have a material impact upon the U.S. financial markets, 

a material impact upon the U.S. economy to fall under that definition? Is that appropriate? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Unfortunately, the direct and significant test has 

no direct analog in any other statute that we have been able to 

identify. There are some which are similar, but none uses the exact 

language. So we don’t have the benefit of court cases to interpret 

it. 

In my mind, though, it implies something other than a U.S. firm 

losing money on a particular swap with a particular client because 

there is no margin associated with that particular transaction. I 

16 

think it needs to be something that rises to the level where it affects not just the creditworthiness of a particular institution, but 

there are ripple effects for the financial system as a whole. 

Chairman GARRETT. Okay. Great. Dr. Brummer or Mr. Allen, 

would you like to chime in on that? Dr. Brummer? 

Mr. BRUMMER. Sure. It is absolutely true that we don’t have any 

direct analog. However, effects-based regulation, effectively Congress regulating internationally when certain activities have an impact here, that is, at least under international law, quite common. 

I would say that in this particular instance where you have a parent company perhaps guaranteeing the swaps of a foreign entity, 

and where those swaps—when bets, quite frankly, go wrong on 

those swaps and could imperil the financial health of Parentco here 

in the United States, it is hard for me to imagine a situation where 

that is not having a direct effect in the United States. 

I think it is worthwhile to think about whether or not, in the absence of Title VII’s transactional requirements, what we have here 

in the United States for Parentco would be sufficient under, say, 

just Regulation K or the OCC, many of which—where you have 

under Regulation K, sure, you have capital requirements, but even 

those capital requirements under Reg K were originally envisioned 

in a world which, if you go through Reg K and 210 and other provisions, there are no references made to, say, derivatives activities. 

When you look at the permitted activities of a foreign— 

Chairman GARRETT. And I am going to have to cut you short 

since I am going to abide by my own rule. 

Mr. Allen, do you want to comment on this? And if there is uncertainty, as we hear from the panel so far as to that terminology, 

what have you—what is the cost, legal, operational, or otherwise, 

to that uncertainty for firms such as yours not knowing as far as 

whether the swap is going to be subject to it or not then? 

Mr. ALLEN. I think in order to answer the question, it is useful 

to go to the issue of the entity-level versus the transactional-level 

basis of regulation. The reason I say that is that when one looks 

at the question of the safety and soundness body of regulation embodied most notably through capital, I don’t think there is any suggestion under the bill, or more generally, that there should be deference or deferring to overseas regulators in circumstances where 

those regulations are less robust. And in fact, I have heard members comment that the European regulatory agenda, for example, 

is somewhat behind the United States in terms of implementation 

of those reforms. That is not necessarily the case. 

In fact, I don’t think that is the case at all in relation to capital. 

When it comes to the transaction-level regulation, I think it is absolutely right that to the extent that there is a U.S. nexus, derived 

by virtue of the fact that, for example, the one client is based in 

the United States, then absolutely the CFTC or the SEC rules, as 

appropriate, should be the ones that apply. But I think the point 

is that they shouldn’t apply in circumstances where the activity is 

exclusively outside the United States. 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. Gotcha. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Lynch is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you Mr. Chairman. If I listened closely 

enough, it seems to me what people are saying is that in order to 

17 

remove the uncertainty in the regulatory process that Dodd-Frank 

Title VII, Section 722 creates, in order to remove that uncertainty 

we are just going to exempt all the stuff from regulation, so there 

won’t be any uncertainty because none of it will apply. That is the 

solution here. And that exception that you are creating swallows 

the rule entirely. 

Under H.R. 3283, its provision would exempt foreign affiliates of 

U.S. banks from basically all the major protections against derivative risk contained in Title VII. It doesn’t eliminate registration, albeit, but margin, capital requirements, clearing requirements, all 

that is gone. 

What bothers me is looking at the Fed filings, first of all, five 

U.S. banks control 95 percent of all the derivatives trading that is 

going on. So it is concentrated in five banks. You look at the filings 

of these five banks, let’s just take right off the top Goldman Sachs, 

they have 62 percent of their derivatives books in foreign affiliates 

or subsidiaries for international banking. That is about $134 billion 

in fair value. 

Let’s look at Morgan Stanley. They have 77 percent of their de- rivatives book, $101 billion, in non-U.S. operations. So if you do 

this, if you say, okay, these—because you have these foreign subsidiaries, if you do your business through them, you can do an endaround of all this regulation. That is what you are doing here. This 

is a big end-around. This is recklessness. I understand there is a 

danger here in uncertainty, and we would like to, if not harmonize, 

using Mr. Thompson’s term, if not harmonize, certainly reconcile 

the regulatory framework between our country and the countries of 

Europe and Asia. But what you are suggesting here is getting rid 

of—giving a huge escape hatch for these firms so they don’t have 

to do any of the things that Dodd-Frank has required to minimize 

the risk. And by doing so, you are again planting the seeds for the 

next crisis, the next collapse. 

This is a return back to the bad old days. That is what is going 

on here. Dr. Brummer, tell me I am wrong. Tell me that this is not 

what they are trying to do. 

Mr. BRUMMER. Certainly, when you see that most of the derivatives transactions that are currently— 

Mr. LYNCH. I am sorry, could you pull your microphone closer? 

Thank you. 

Mr. BRUMMER. Certainly when you see that most derivatives 

transactions are occurring overseas, this would effectively exempt 

those transactions. And I think it is an overstatement to say that 

in the absence of Title VII, the protections that will exist for the 

U.S. part of the company are going to be robust. I will say that the 

G-20 process is slowly grinding along. 

Mr. LYNCH. Very slowly, right? Facially they have set a deadline 

of 2012, but do you think that is going to happen? 

Mr. BRUMMER. No. It is not going to happen in 2012. And even 

with the capital requirements, you see Germany and France trying 

to slow down certain parts of Basel III. But my personal concern 

is not merely that this encourages a kind of regulatory arbitrage 

or opportunity, but the way in which the bill is drafted, you can 

go anywhere. You can go to Syria, you can go to Iran, you can go 

wherever you want to go, right, set up a financial center. And if 

18 

you are a country looking to attract transactions that are lowly regulated, at least as I interpret the bill, you can set up that financial 

center in order to evade—or to appeal to firms seeking to avoid the 

protections that were fought for under Title VII. And I personally 

don’t understand why one would want that to happen. 

I do understand and respect the fact that we want to keep our 

financial centers here very strong. But it seems like there are better ways to go about engaging our international counterparts. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Brummer. I appreciate 

that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Might I have a moment, Chairman Garrett? 

Chairman GARRETT. I am going to come back to you for that response if we get through this circle. So hold that thought. 

We will now turn to the gentleman from Arizona. But before we 

do, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record some documents with regard to this issue of intent. They are letters from 

Senator Schumer pointing out, as we said in the opening statement, with regard to their concerns about inconsistencies with the 

congressional intent on this matter; a letter from Senator Johnson 

and Representative Frank with regard to the same concern about 

unintended consequences from the proposed regulations; a letter 

from the New Democrat Coalition on this point; and a letter from 

the chairman of the Financial Services Committee, Chairman 

Bachus, as well. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Now, to the gentleman from Arizona. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we are going 

to do some bouncing around, so we will get a chance for that. 

Mr. Zubrod, help me, just because I want to make sure I am 

doing the flow. If this portion of Volcker goes forward, how different would a transaction look? Do you have to find a flat in London? What happens here? 

Mr. ZUBROD. You said ‘‘Volcker,’’ I assume you mean the derivatives? 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. The derivatives portion, I am sorry. 

Mr. ZUBROD. I think, again, it is a matter of cost. If there is a 

foreign firm or a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. firm transacting in 

Europe, and these requirements have the effect of limiting the 

number of counterparties who are effectively available to bid on a 

transaction, that is going to impact my price because I have a 

smaller, less liquid pool of counterparties. So I think it ultimately 

just burdens end-users with additional and unnecessary costs. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Zubrod. Do you end up moving 

the book of business somewhere else to execute? What do you do? 

Mr. ZUBROD. No, I don’t think so. I think you pay a higher price. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Thompson, same question. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Sure. I think this talk of being able to move 

around like you are on a chessboard to evade these requirements 

is wildly overstated, the example that Dr. Brummer gave of Syria. 

The reality is we are international because that is where our clients are. That is why we are in London. That is why we are in 

Paris. That is why we are in Hong Kong. That is why we are in 

Singapore. That is why we are in Tokyo. We are not going to, and 

we are not capable of picking up shop and moving to Syria or Iraq, 

or some other light-touch regulatory jurisdiction, because you don’t 

19 

have the facilities there, you don’t have the infrastructure there. In 

our derivatives trading businesses, every front office person is supported by seven or eight back office and support people. You can’t 

find those people in light-touch jurisdictions. It is simply not possible. 

I will also add that the CFTC and the SEC under Title VII have 

broad anti-evasion authority to impose Title VII requirements upon 

any registrant who structures his business in a way to avoid the 

Title VII requirements. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. You hit on something. You are one of the big 

shops, correct? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, we are. We are a major dealer in all of the 

asset classes. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Just for a reference point, how many employees do you have who actually do interest rate hedging compared to 

how many employees you have on the regulatory compliance? 

Mr. THOMPSON. We are seeing—and this trend is increasing, generally speaking—as I said, the number of front office people who 

actually do the business are dwarfed by the number of support people, the people who process payments, the people who deal with 

documents, the people who do regulatory reporting. And our compliance effort around this is vastly increasing. We have a whole 

Title VII implementation infrastructure in JPMorgan now, and 

that is between 350 and 400 people. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. So you have 350, 400, and how many interest 

rate hedgers? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Our number of front office people, certainly in 

New York, where most of them are, is probably 40 to 50. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Okay. So an interesting ratio there. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Right. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Just tell us and make sure, because I think it 

is worth an expansion because some of the emails and things that 

I have gotten keep referring to this as sort of, you are going to 

allow AIG to happen again. And I am going to ask you, Mr. Thompson, because you started, and then I will ask some solicitation of 

other people whether they agree or see a hole in your argument, 

why won’t AIG happen again? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Great. So there are three reasons why AIG won’t 

happen again under the current regulatory framework. The first is 

that, as Congressman Lynch noted, the derivatives business in the 

United States is vastly concentrated among five or six large bank 

holding companies. All of these entities are subject to a full and robust system of prudential regulation globally where the Fed and 

the OCC have ample oversight authority on a safety and soundness 

basis to examine our foreign branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates. 

That is a robust regime. It is ongoing, and it is quite— 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Forgive me, I want to live up to my chairman’s 

expectation of having only 30 seconds left. 

Does anyone on the panel disagree with that as sort of an explanation? Could I start with Mr. Allen in just the last couple of seconds that we have? When you see what is coming up, particularly 

in the rules being written and we are moving under Dodd-Frank, 

do you believe that the regulators are following the way the statute 

was intended? 

20 

Mr. ALLEN. No. It is my belief that they are adopting a very expansive approach to what is written in the statute. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you. 

Dr. Brummer? 

Mr. BRUMMER. All of the examples in Mr. Thompson’s testimony 

were not prudential, but were disclosure-based, and so I would disagree with the idea that our system is robust enough to deal with 

derivatives transactions. 

Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you. And I am over my time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GARRETT. And the gentleman yields back. 

And before I yield to the gentleman who just came to the panel, 

also without objection, I would like to offer a statement into the 

record which was submitted to us by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation—that is the DTTC, of course—which has written 

to us with regard to an important issue dealing with indemnification, which, by the way, I will just add as an aside, is an issue that 

the regulators have also chimed in on. Last week, Congress got a 

report from the CFTC and the FTC which stated that a legislative 

amendment to the indemnification provision is appropriate. So 

without objection, that letter will also be added to the record. 

Mr. Hinojosa is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HINOJOSA. Thank you, Chairman Garrett. I commend you for 

holding today’s hearing on limiting the extraterritorial impact of 

Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. I believe this bill represents an 

accomplishment in bipartisanship, and I thank Chairman Garrett 

and Congressman Himes for their efforts on behalf of this legislation. 

If there is any financial market that begs for clarity, it is the derivatives market. These financial tools can be used to hedge 

against risk, or, as we have seen in the subprime lending crisis, 

they can be used to obscure risk. I believe this market is now 

transparent, much more transparent than it has ever been, thanks 

to the Dodd-Frank Act and its implementation by U.S. regulatory 

agencies. 

At this point, U.S. financial firms are asking for clarity in return 

from this body and from the regulatory agencies. While the DoddFrank Act sought to ensure the soundness and transparency of the 

derivatives markets, its intent was never to overextend its reach in 

a way that might harm the competitiveness of U.S. financial firms 

on the global stage. There has been unneeded confusion over the 

extraterritorial reach of the regulations set forth regarding swaps 

markets. Regulatory agencies should recognize the intent of this 

body with regards to Title VII of Dodd-Frank. While I commend the 

efforts of the CFTC in implementing this Dodd-Frank Act, I also 

would encourage them to limit the scope of their rules to the 

United States. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time. 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. 

The gentleman yields back his time. 

Mr. Stivers is now recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. And I 

appreciate the witnesses’ testimony today. 

21 

And obviously, we all want to make sure that we don’t drive jobs 

out of America and we don’t make it harder for companies that 

need to manage their risk to do so. And I want all of you to be able 

to serve your customers wherever they are, obviously. 

So I guess I would like to start by asking a couple of questions 

about the big nature of Title VII. Do you think that Title VII is, 

as written—if the regulators would implement it the way it was 

written by Congress, would cause a problem for—I will start with 

Mr. Allen—for firms like yours that are foreign based, but doing 

business here in America? 

Mr. ALLEN. I believe the answer is no, not as written by Congress, and not as we interpret the relevant sections of the Act, 

principally Sections 722 and 772. I see those sections as fundamentally limiting the extraterritorial scope of the Act subject to, obviously, the well-known caveats from that. Our concern is that a regulatory approach which takes a different view and views those provisions as the foundational basis for an expansive application of 

regulation is where the problem starts to arise. 

Mr. STIVERS. Right. And so you have answered the second part 

of the question. Obviously, those regulators have extended their 

reach beyond what Congress intended. 

What do you think the choices for you will be you, Mr. Allen, in 

the long run for Barclays and firms like yourselves that are foreign 

based if that extraterritoriality continues and expands? What will 

your choice be for jobs in the United States? 

Mr. ALLEN. It is important to stress that Barclays is very much 

in favor of an enhanced and enriched regulatory marketplace, regulatory-enforced marketplace, but the concern is where we find ourselves faced with regulations which we cannot comply with, as a 

matter of, say, U.S. regulation on the one hand and European, or 

specifically U.K., regulation on the other, but forces us into the position of potentially having to walk away from that business because, of course, we cannot be noncompliant with CFTC rules on 

the one hand, U.K. FSA rules on the other. 

Mr. STIVERS. Right. And what does that mean for jobs in America? 

Mr. ALLEN. It means that we have to look at our U.S. businesses 

and consider whether or not we need to try and insulate that business in some way. The United States is a very important market 

for Barclays, and Barclays has no intention of walking away from 

that business. It is a core part of our business. 

Mr. STIVERS. But it is bad for jobs in America. Is it good or bad? 

Mr. ALLEN. It makes it more difficult for us to do that business. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. I really just wanted it that simple. 

And, Mr. Thompson, you have the other extreme. You are an 

American company trying to compete with foreign companies and 

trying to follow your customers and clients around the world. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Correct. 

Mr. STIVERS. Tell me about how extraterritoriality would complicate American firms, and what it means for your ability to serve 

your clients and compete internationally with those that might not 

have to have the same regulations. 

Mr. THOMPSON. In the worst case, it severely disadvantages our 

overseas business because we would have to apply Title VII reVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:11 Aug 02, 2012 Jkt 075072 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75072.TXT TERRIE
22 

quirements to business with our non-U.S. customers out of our nonU.S. operations in a way that our competitors would not have to 

do so. 

It is important to note that this affects not just our derivatives 

business, but a lot of our other businesses, such as investment 

banking, debt underwriting, and equity underwriting, also have a 

symbiotic relationship with our derivatives business, so being unable to compete with respect to the derivative has an adverse impact on your entire investment-banking franchise. 

Mr. STIVERS. And as your competitiveness, Mr. Thompson, decreases internationally, what does that do to your profits of, obviously, an American company that you might be able to repatriate 

some of those profits? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. It would be a significant impact to our revenues. We are a very international firm. It varies from quarter to 

quarter, but in some quarters we derive more revenue from our investment-banking business overseas than we do in the United 

States. 

I would also point out that it would have a perverse effect on the 

ability—and regulators are united on this, and we believe that by 

and large it is true—the industry needs to become better capitalized. Especially in the current environment for bank equity, the 

only way for banks to add capital is through retained earnings. So 

impairing our ability to earn significant revenue from our European and Asian and Latin American franchises will hinder our effort to build our capital cushion. 

Mr. STIVERS. Thank you. 

So the bottom line for jobs and profits— 

Mr. THOMPSON. Simply phrased, it would be bad. 

Mr. STIVERS. If the bill is not passed, it is bad. Kind of simple, 

getting to the point. 

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GARRETT. Thank you. 

The gentleman yields back, and before I yield back, without objection, I have three other letters to enter into the record. 

Again, these are in support of the underlying legislation, and 

also raise the question of the uncertainty under the proposed rules. 

They are from SIFMA and ISDA, and the last one is from the Institute of International Bankers. And the reason why I left that for 

last is because I just want to make one point, and this goes to what 

Dr. Brummer was saying before. They raise the point, the fact that 

this can be satisfied for those countries that are signatories to the 

Basel Capital Accords, which is, in other words, their protection in 

that area. And when we have more time, I will probably allow Dr. 

Brummer to address that. 

But with that, Mr. Carson is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, witnesses, for appearing before us. 

This question is for Professor Brummer. The CFTC has indicated 

that it plans to work on clarifying guidance on this issue by April. 

It is not clear whether this will be a formal regulatory proposal, or 

if they will utilize a less formal guidance procedure. 

Please give me, Professor, your assessment of the need for legislative action now versus waiting to review the guidance we anticiVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:11 Aug 02, 2012 Jkt 075072 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\75072.TXT TERRIE
23 

pate from the regulators. Do you think more legislative action now 

could make the regulators’ work more difficult? Or do you think it 

will be more timely and even useful in some instances? 

Mr. BRUMMER. Yes, that question, is in part very difficult, because it is not just a question of the CFTC, it is also a question 

as to what our European counterparts are doing and the schedule 

with which they are moving with reforms. 

Certainly we are ahead of time, and particularly with regards to 

our implementation of something like the Volcker Rule, that is a 

question that has to be addressed sooner, quite frankly, rather 

than later. But I think that we certainly have the time for most 

of the Title VII, as opposed to Title VI Volcker Rule, to—we have 

the luxury to see whether or not—see precisely what the CFTC and 

their Office of International Affairs and other folks are doing with 

regard to accommodating other regulatory programs in other parts 

of the world. 

Mr. CARSON. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Hurt is recognized. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just kind of a general 

question, and I, first of all, thank the witnesses, and I apologize 

that I wasn’t able to hear your statements, but I have reviewed 

them. And again, thank you for your appearance. 

I come from Virginia’s Fifth District, which is a rural southern 

Virginia district, and over the years we have—over the last 10, 20, 

30 years, we have been really hit hard by the loss of our manufacturing sector, textiles and furniture in particular. As you look at 

the loss of jobs in our area, one can’t help but be struck by the fact 

that our inability to compete in the global marketplace has contributed a lot to the decline of those sectors. And when you look at the 

barriers that we in Washington over the years have put up to make 

it more and more difficult for American companies to succeed, I 

think that we have to be extremely sensitive to the issue that we 

are discussing today. 

When you think about the Tax Code, when you think about the 

environmental regulations and the labor regulations, all of the litigation, and the accounting that has to go along with all of the different regulations, I think that our American companies have a 

steep challenge. And I hope that, whether we as a Congress or the 

regulators that are implementing our legislation, it seems to me 

that it is more important than ever that we be sensitive to those 

challenges and those—and, frankly, those burdens that we put on 

our American companies. 

So, I guess my question would be when you—and this would be 

for everyone. I would love to start with Mr. Allen and then just go 

down the line. When you look at the importance of harmonizing our 

regulatory and legislative structure as it relates to other countries, 

can you think of examples that jump out where we have done that 

successfully, and can you think of examples, the worst-case scenario, where we haven’t done that successfully? I would think that 

certainly manufacturing might be one of those, but if you could 

speak just generally to that topic, because at the end of the day, 

as my colleague from Ohio Mr. Stivers said, at the end of the day, 

this is about jobs for us. 

24 

Mr. ALLEN. If I may cite an example which actually resides within Title VII itself, if we think about the position that Europe is currently heading in regarding the clearing of derivatives, the proposals there are substantially the same as those that we see under 

Title VII. There is a timing question there, there is a timing delay, 

that is unquestionably the case, but there has already been a pretty much arrived-at political consensus in Europe as to what the 

shape of that statute should look like. And it is intended that that 

statute be on the statute books by the end of 2012 of this year. 

When one looks at the substantive regulation that sits in that 

clearing framework, it is very substantially aligned to what we see 

in the United States. There are other areas where that is not the 

case, admittedly, potentially around execution through SEFs and 

things of that nature, as I mentioned before. But clearing is a good 

example of where there is a reasonable—reasonably high prospects 

of a degree of international harmonization and convergence around 

how that is going to work, which, of course, should not be surprising given that it is embedded within the G-20 commitments articulated at Pittsburgh. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you. 

Mr. BRUMMER. I would agree. 

Mr. HURT. Mr. Thompson? 

Mr. THOMPSON. There clearly are some areas where harmonization is working, and I agree that clearing is one of them, but it 

is important to note that there are many where harmonization does 

not seem to be working. I will give a couple of examples. 

The swaps push-out rule of Section 716, which is a feature of 

Title VII, no other jurisdiction of commercial importance has indicated any interest in adopting it soever. 

A second example with respect to the margin rules for uncleared 

swaps, the U.S. approach is very proscriptive and significantly varies from current market practice. The indications of the approach 

in Europe will be quite different, and that you can deal with the 

risk relating to uncleared swaps by either capital or margin, but 

not both, as is in the case in the United States. 

Finally, the approach to the execution mandate on electronic 

trading platforms will probably be quite different in Europe as opposed to the United States. 

So it is important to note that although there are some successes 

on the harmonization front, there are many areas where the global 

regulatory framework will not harmonize. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you. 

Mr. Zubrod? 

Mr. ZUBROD. I would echo some of those comments. In particular, 

among the most salient aspects of regulation that will impact endusers, both financial and nonfinancial, is the imposition of margin 

requirements. The U.S. prudential regulator’s rule on margin does 

impose margin requirements on all market participants, albeit to 

varying degrees, depending on the type of participant. It is not 

clear that the world will follow that approach. Indeed, that approach isn’t aligned with congressional intent here in the United 

States, but even globally foreign regulators have given signals that 

they have questions about the U.S. approach and whether or not 

capital requirements are sufficient to address the risks associated 

25 

with noncleared swaps. And I think that whether or not harmonization is possible on that front is a question that will be answered 

in time. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman who sponsored the legislation is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. HIMES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to start, I would like 

to seek unanimous consent to submit two statements for the 

record, one from my colleague Gwen Moore, and one from the 

ABASA. Thank you. 

Chairman GARRETT. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. HIMES. I guess I would like to explore—I hear two criticisms 

of the bill that the chairman and I have written. One is the whole 

AIG thing, which I think is faulty, to say the least, and if I have 

time, I will come back to that. But I would also like to explore the 

concept that this bill would lead to a race to the bottom. And to 

do that, I guess I am very interested in currently. 

My understanding is that the vast bulk of the swaps market occurs within the G-20, and, in fact, specifically trades largely in 

New York, London, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Germany. Can somebody just ballpark for me what percentage of the swaps market 

happens in those five jurisdictions? 

Mr. THOMPSON. I will give you my guess. I would say north of 

90 percent, probably closer to 95. 

Mr. HIMES. Okay. So just for shorthand, let me say that all of 

the trading in these instruments happens in those five or six jurisdictions. If I listen to some of my friends on the other side, and 

some of my friends in the banking industry, I would hear that the 

efforts that were made to address the financial meltdown, whether 

it was Dodd-Frank, or transaction taxes being discussed in Europe, 

compensation limits imposed in the U.K., that we have unleashed 

the four horsemen of the apocalypse on the industry. And I wonder, 

in these last 3 years in which we have done this, how much of the 

swaps market has migrated away from these five or six entities to 

low regulation—Dr. Brummer talks about Syria and Iran. How 

much of that market, in the face of this assault on the industry, 

has migrated away from those jurisdictions? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Certainly at JPMorgan the answer is zero, and 

the reason is we are in those jurisdictions because that is where 

the clients are, that is where the business is, that is where the infrastructure is. 

As a practical matter, we can’t pick up and move to Syria. Even 

aside from the anti-evasion authority that the CFTC has under the 

statute, we simply can’t do it as a practical matter. 

Mr. HIMES. So my colleague from Massachusetts says that if we 

enact this, that effectively we will lift all regulations on the transactions. Do any of these jurisdictions, London, Hong Kong, Tokyo, 

Germany, that effectively are all of the swaps market—do any of 

the witnesses want to characterize the transactional level requirements in those jurisdictions in which all of these transactions 

occur? And I am talking about margin, registration, reporting. Does 

anybody want to characterize the regulations in those markets 

where these transactions occur as lax? 

Yes, Dr. Brummer? 

26 

Mr. BRUMMER. I would certainly not characterize them as lax, in 

part because we don’t really know what they are. And they are yet 

on the books yet, which creates its own problems. 

Mr. HIMES. But in each of those markets, there are currently 

clear regulations subject to evolution. 

Mr. BRUMMER. We have proposals, right. And I would also want 

to emphasize, as I said in my report, when you look at the European Union—and I would agree with Mr. Allen—that there are 

some broad levels of consensus. We are different countries with different histories; we are going to come up with different approaches. 

I am not for trying to find a way to accommodate those differences. 

Mr. HIMES. But if I could just interrupt you there. Regulations 

exist currently in those jurisdictions. It is probably fair to assume 

that they will get through Basel III or through other mechanisms 

probably more regulatory, probably fair to assume that. So, again, 

I just—my question is is the status quo in any of those jurisdictions 

currently—can you characterize the status quo as lax? 

Mr. BRUMMER. I don’t think so. 

Mr. HIMES. Okay. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman GARRETT. The gentleman yields back, and the gentleman from California is recognized for 1 minute, and then we will 

close since we have votes that were already called. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Brummer, given the sizable derivative exposures of foreign 

branches of some of our major U.S. banks, how can we ensure that 

such exposures do not contribute to the systemic risk here in the 

United States? And is it typical for the U.S.-based corporate entity 

to guarantee or otherwise expose themselves to the risk of these 

foreign branches? 

Mr. ALLEN. If I may— 

Mr. SHERMAN. I guess, Dr. Brummer, although— 

Mr. ALLEN. My apologies, of course. 

I was just going to say that when it comes to the safety and 

soundness regulation which underpins the prudential approach to 

the activities of the non-U.S. branches of the U.S. firms, and this 

is true internationally as well, they are subject to considerable regulatory oversight—in the case of the United States, by the Federal 

Reserve, and in the case of the U.K., by the likes of the FSA— 

which goes to the safety and soundness of the activities which 

those institutions undertake. 

Much of what we are talking about around Title VII relates far 

more to the transactional level-type regulation, where there is more 

of a fragmentation in terms of the international approach to the 

regulation of those issues, but far less the case when it comes to 

fundamental principles of prudential safety and soundness. 

Mr. BRUMMER. I agree. That is certainly the case. But it is also 

useful to understand that many of our prudential regulations are 

created with certain expectations as to what kinds of activities our 

entities are permitted to do. So therefore, if you have capital requirements, say, under Reg K that is not necessarily anticipating 

foreign banking organizations from engaging heavily in derivatives 

and swaps transactions, and if you also have, say, under DoddFrank provisions that say we are not going to bail out dealers in 

derivatives and swaps, then you have to think very hard about 

27 

whether or not preexisting capital standards sufficiently account 

for the additional risk not only at the entity-level, but also at the 

transactional level. 

Chairman GARRETT. I thank the gentleman for his answers. I 

thank the sponsor and all of the members of the subcommittee. I 

thank the panel as well. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for the panel which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 30 days 

for Members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to 

place their response in the record. 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. Again, thanks to the 

panel. 

[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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