Defense Science Board 

2006 Summer Study 

on 

21st Century Strategic 

Technology Vectors 

Volume I 

Main Report 

February 2007

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
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February 1, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 

21stCentury Strategic Technology Vectors (Volume I)

I am pleased to forward Volume I of the final report of the Defense Science

Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors.

Volumes 2–4, reports of the task force’s panels, will follow shortly.

The task force identified the enabling technologies for a set of capabilities 

that, taken together, are crucial to meeting the diverse set of challenging missions

our military forces will face. To a large extent, the capabilities and technologies

discussed in this report are not coupled to the major systems so important during

the Cold War. Instead the report highlights enhanced training and continuous

education, automated language processing, close-in sensor systems, the soldier as

a collector in a network, rapid extraction of information hidden in massive 

amounts of data, and non-kinetic operations. The report also points to the potential

of models from the social and behavioral sciences to better understand how

individuals, groups, societies, and nations are likely to act in response to changing

circumstances.

The task force also addressed issues associated with the continuing

globalization of technology. The report recommends ways to more effectively

incorporate a deeper understanding of technology into DOD’s strategic planning

and concept development and to promote more rapid transition of technology into

fielded capability.

I endorse all of the study’s recommendations and encourage you to forward 

the report to the Secretary of Defense.

Dr. William Schnieder, Jr.

Chairman

Defense Science Board

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21stCentury

Science and Technology Vectors (Volume I)

Unlike during the Cold War when the United States focused on one major, relatively 

slow-changing but individually formidable adversary, in the current era and for the

foreseeable future, U.S. military forces will be called upon to perform a wide range of

missions. These include major combat, counter insurgency, stability and reconstruction,

countering weapons of mass destruction, homeland defense, and disaster relief. These

varied missions present different challenges calling for highly adaptive military forces.

One common feature of these missions is the increased responsibility placed on junior

leaders and the small teams they lead.

This report of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century

Strategic Technology Vectors identifies a set of four operational capabilities and their

enabling technologies that can support the range of future military missions. In 

identifying these capabilities, the report defined technology broadly, to include tools

enabled by the social sciences as well as the physical and life sciences.

 Perhaps most central is to gain deeper understanding of how individuals,

groups, societies and nations behave and then use this information to (1)

improve the performance of U.S. forces through continuous education 

and training and (2) shape behaviors of others in pre-, intra- and postconflict situations. Key enablers include immersive gaming 

environments, automated language processing and human, social, cultural

and behavior modeling.

 The second is greatly enhanced capabilities to observe people, things, and

activities in urban and other tough terrains and to record and recall the

data. This will reduce sanctuaries where adversaries hide and draw

support for their operations, and reduce their ability as irregular forces to

“hide in plain sight.” Needed are new suites of close-in sensors and the

soldier on the ground empowered to be a powerful collector.

 The third is extracting actionable information hidden in massive data

much more rapidly than is done today. This capability would be critically

February 1, 2007
important to commanders at all levels, intelligence analysts, and soldiers

and marines on patrol.

 Last is producing effects—offensive and defensive, kinetic and nonkinetic, lethal and non-lethal—tailored rapidly to the circumstances in 

order to achieve the desired and avoid the counterproductive.

A key enabler to all of these capabilities is the availability of ubiquitous, secure,

reliable, rapid connectivity among all the sources and users of information.

Another major change from the Cold War is that the U.S. government and its

defense industry partners no longer are at the leading edge of most of the militarily

relevant technologies, having been displaced by international commercial industries and

markets. Thus the DOD must further modify its processes and practices for technology 

planning and transitioning technology into capabilities.

This report recommends ways that DOD can (1) reestablish a tighter integration 

between DOD’s user and technology communities, (2) enrich its capacity to recognize

and exploit technology opportunities, (3) establish robust processes to insert new

capabilities into ongoing operations to meet an expected long term need, and (4) cut in

half the time it nominally takes to field major systems. The report also identifies steps to 

broaden and deepen DOD’s in-house technical expertise, search globally for technologies

that may become important to DOD and/or its adversaries, provide budget flexibility,

lower barriers to commercial firms working with DOD, and revitalize internal research

and development investments in the defense industry.

We speak for the members of the task force in expressing appreciation for the

contributions of the government advisors; Beth Foster, ODDR&E, our executive

secretary; CDR Cliff Phillips, the DSB Office representative; and Brian Hughes,

Executive Director of the DSB Secretariat. Last but not least, we acknowledge the

invaluable role of Julie Evans, Barbara Bicksler, Kevin Gates, Stacy Zelenski O’Mara,

and the other the members of the staff.

____________________ _____________________

Dr. Theodore S. Gold Dr. William R. Graham

Task Force Co-Chair Task Force Co-Chair
TABLE OF CONTENTS I v

Table of Contents 

Volume I. Main Report 

Major Themes ................................................................................................vii

Summary ..........................................................................................................ix

Part I. A Set of Critical Capabilities and Enabling 

Technologies for the 21st Century 

Chapter 1. Identifying Operational Capabilities..........................................3

Chapter 2. Human Terrain Preparation .......................................................7

Chapter 3. Ubiquitous Observation and Recording................................ 15

Chapter 4. Contextual Exploitation ............................................................22

Chapter 5. Rapidly Tailored Effects............................................................29

Chapter 6. Game-Changing Technology Push..........................................37

Part II. Strategic Technology Planning and Rapid 

Technology Transition 

Chapter 7. Strategic Technology Planning.................................................41

Chapter 8. Technology Opportunities........................................................50

Chapter 9. Technology Transition to Ongoing Operations....................60

Chapter 10. Major System Acquisition.......................................................65

Chapter 11. Cross-Cutting Enablers...........................................................72

Part III. Summary of Recommendations 

Chapter 12. Summary of Recommendations.............................................81

Appendix A. Terms of Reference ...............................................................89

Appendix B. Study Membership .................................................................93

Appendix C. Presentations to the Task Force...........................................97

Appendix D. Technology Maturity.............................................................99

Appendix E. Glossary................................................................................ 102
vi I TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Additional Volumes 

Volume II. Critical Capabilities and Enabling Technologies

Volume III. Strategic Technology Planning

Volume IV. Accelerating the Transition of Technologies into U.S. 

Capabilities
MAJOR THEMES I vii

Major Themes 

This report identifies a set of four operational capabilities and their 

enabling technologies that can support the range of future military 

missions: 

 mapping the “human terrain” 

 ubiquitous observation and data recording in difficult terrain 

 rapidly extracting actionable information hidden in massive clutter 

 producing effects rapidly and tailored to the circumstances 

A tighter integration between the Department of Defense (DOD) user 

and technology communities should be reestablished so that: 

 DOD’s mission solutions are inspired by a deeper understanding of 

technology opportunities 

 DOD’s science and technology activities are more directly informed by 

DOD’s strategic goals and top-level missions 

DOD needs to enrich its capacity to recognize and exploit such 

technology opportunities through: 

 more “prospecting” of commercial, non–DOD, and foreign 

technologies for good ideas and products 

 more “speculating” through investing in truly disruptive opportunities 

 a more coherent and comprehensive approach to anticipating how 

adversaries might exploit technology 

DOD should prepare for the long-term need to insert new capabilities 

into ongoing operations by turning current improvised approaches into 

processes and practices robust enough for a long war characterized by many 

diverse conflicts, cooperative activities with individuals and groups from a wide 

range of cultures, and other actions. 

A disciplined spiral development process can allow DOD to cut in half 

the time it nominally takes to field a major system and thus avoid 

technological obsolescence and reduce risk. 

This report offers recommendations to do all of the above 
.
SUMMARY I ix

Summary 

This study had two broad tasks. The first was to identify a set of 

operational capabilities and their enabling technologies (strategic 

technology vectors) that are the successors to the Cold War’s speed; 

stealth; precision; and tactical intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR). The second was to recommend how DOD 

should conduct strategic technology planning and speed the transition 

of technology into fielded capability. 

The United States faces a complex set of security challenges with 

greater uncertainty than during the Cold War and an extraordinary pace 

of technological advance. However, there is a tendency to forget the 

uncertainties faced in the Cold War and that technology was changing 

rapidly during that war as well: in explosives, propulsion, rocketry, 

satellites, electronics, and communication. 

One feature of the security landscape has changed fundamentally. 

The DOD and its government and industry partners are no longer at 

the leading edge of most technologies. The globalization of multipurpose technology provides opportunities for U.S. adversaries to 

exploit that did not exist during the Cold War. Time to market has 

become the competitive advantage. 

Critical Capabilities and Enabling Technologies 

The Cold War strategic vectors were succinct descriptors of 

capabilities that would make a big difference in U.S. military operations. 

Precision provided a means to go from the many sorties needed to 

destroy a single target to a single sortie being able to destroy multiple 

targets. Stealth would provide the means to negate the Soviet Union’s 

massive investment in air defense and increase the element of surprise. 

Tactical ISR provided the means to see targets deep beyond the front 

lines. Speed shortened the sensor-to-shooter times so that targets could 

be engaged as they were detected. 
x I SUMMARY 

Those vectors did not operate in a vacuum. They supported a 

strategy that looked to technology to offset the numerical advantages 

held by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, and reduce NATO’s 

reliance on nuclear weapons to deter an attack. They complemented an 

evolving concept—the Air-Land Battle—that provided an operational 

context. These vectors focused on one scenario, holding at risk the 

follow-on forces of the Warsaw Pact so that any attack on NATO 

could not be sustained. 

This report offers a set of four capabilities and their enabling 

technologies that are critical to meeting the range of DOD’s 21st century 

missions. These four do not match the succinctness or transparency of 

those of the Cold War. But multiple threats now present different 

challenges and uncertainties that cannot be captured by a single scenario. 

An overarching strategic vision has not yet emerged and operational 

concepts are still relatively immature. Nevertheless, the critical capabilities 

and enabling technologies identified in this report provide a coherent 

starting point for a science and technology (S&T) strategy that will 

address 21st century security challenges. 

Methodology 

This study took a systematic, although not scenario-based or 

quantitative, approach driven by five top-level missions derived from the 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review: (1) defeating terrorist networks; (2) 

preventing acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 

(3) defending the homeland; (4) shaping nations at strategic crossroads; 

and (5) conducting stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

operations. 

Using these five missions as the basis, the task force identified 

contributing capabilities needed to accomplish these missions and, in 

turn, the technologies that enable these capabilities. The task force then 

judged the relative importance of the capabilities to these missions. All 

missions were deemed equally significant; thus capabilities and 

technologies with broad applicability were considered more critical. 

This process yielded a set of four high-level capabilities, a dozen 

enabling technology areas, and over forty constituent technologies. 

Technologies were categorized according to their relative maturity and 
SUMMARY I xi

whether progress to further mature these technologies lay within DOD 

or elsewhere. Knowledge of where the action is for a given technology 

is essential to craft an effective science and technology strategy. 

Four Critical Capabilities 

The four Cold War “vectors” remain important, but have evolved 

against the demands of today’s missions. Speed remains critical, but it 

is not about just getting there fast, but about adapting, understanding, 

deciding, and acting. Counter-stealth has supplanted stealth as a 

critical need, since it is U.S. adversaries who are able to operate 

hidden underground and hidden in plain sight among civilians. The 

capabilities needed for such counter-stealth operations are ubiquitous 

observation, recording, and archiving of difficult target data and being 

able to rapidly extract useful information hidden in massive clutter. 

Precision has expanded from “hitting what you aim at” into tailoring 

effects to the circumstance, including minimizing counterproductive 

effects. Lastly, tactical ISR—seeing deep—can be viewed now as the 

much broader challenge of mapping the human terrain, including foes, 

ourselves, and others. 

The four critical capabilities thus are: human terrain preparation, 

ubiquitous observation and recording, contextual exploitation, and 

rapidly tailored effects (with speed implicit in all). Why these four? 

Because together they constitute a capability vital for success across all the 

missions and against adaptive adversaries. In particular, they provide the 

means for U.S. forces to operate within an adversary’s decision cycle. In 

that sense, as illustrated in figure 1, they can be considered an expansion to 

an operational-level version of the tactical OODA loop: observe, orient, 

decide, and act. 
xii I SUMMARY 

Figure 1. Four Critical Capabilities—an OODA-like Loop for the 21st Century

Human terrain preparation will enable U.S. forces to better 

understand how individuals, groups, societies, and nations behave, and 

then use this information to (1) improve the performance of U.S. forces 

and (2) understand and shape behaviors of others in pre-, intra-, and 

post-conflict situations. The enabling technology areas are: 

 Rapid training and continuous learning, particularly aimed at 

junior leaders and small units whose performance is so critical to 

success across the mission space. Increasingly, they are called 

upon to make rapid decisions under duress in complex 

circumstances and when the outcome can have strategic 

consequences. Constituent technologies include high fidelity 

immersive gaming/simulation, cultural and leadership tutoring 

tools, and measurement of individual and team performance 

carried out in a continuum of activities extending from the 

classroom into actual operations and through post-action 

evaluations. Cognitive science research could lead to dramatic 

advances. Training has been a major asymmetrical advantage for 

U.S. forces. This advantage could be threatened if adversaries 

adopt new training regimes enabled by simulation technology or 

biotechnically-induced performance enhancement. 
SUMMARY I xiii

 Automated language processing (speech and text 

translation), where a vigorous technology effort will sustain 

continuous improvement in foreign-to-English translation in 

non-romance languages, speech-to-text transcription, and twoway translation devices able to convey the meaning of language 

as well as the words being used. 

 Human, social, cultural, and behavior modeling would help 

in understanding how individuals, groups, societies, and nations 

behave. One place to start is to supplement the more familiar 

physical network modeling with human and group behavioral 

models. Such models push the boundaries of DOD’s S&T 

experience. DOD needs to become more familiar with the 

theories, methods, and models from psychology, sociology, 

political science, economics, and cultural anthropology in order 

to identify those with potential to add value. Coupling these to

simulation environments and computational modeling methods 

would lead to valuable new tools. This will not happen overnight; 

it will take time to develop the skills and understanding needed. 

A major challenge is collecting relevant data. Another is 

validating that a model does in fact add value by providing insight 

into extremely complex systems. 

Ubiquitous observation and recording will help reduce sanctuaries 

where adversaries hide and draw support for their operations. 

A substantially increased ability to record, retain, and archive large 

amounts of data and extract information rapidly can have a major 

influence at tactical and operational levels across all missions. Key 

enabling technology areas are: 

 Day/night all-weather wide area surveillance in areas where 

it is not done well today (urban areas and under foliage). 

Constituent technologies include sensors (triple canopy foliage 

penetration, large format optical imaging framing, active and 

passive hyper-spectral imaging) and survivable satellite and 

unmanned platforms. 

 Close-in sensor and “tagging” systems would need a variety 

of sensors (chemical, biological, radiological, acoustic, seismic, 

optical, and infrared) with integrated command and control, 
xiv I SUMMARY 

data exfiltration links, precision delivery, and long-term energy 

sources. The tagging could be accomplished through data 

embedded in the recorded observation as well as by physical 

devices placed on an object. 

 Soldiers-as-collectors within a network require a broad range 

of sensors, efficient energy storage and power generation, bodyborne flexible displays, soldier-centric communications and 

networking technology, interactive automated debriefing tools, 

and all-domain precision geolocation. 

Contextual exploitation tools are needed to extract, much more 

rapidly than today, actionable information that is hidden in sometimes 

massive amounts of data. Potential practitioners include commanders at 

all levels, intelligence analysts, and soldiers and marines on patrol. 

Because data management and information extraction will be increasingly 

done in a networked environment, S&T research in how to assure the 

availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the data is vital. Data, 

information, and knowledge must be able to flow rapidly and securely 

from all sources to all users. Enabling technology areas are: 

 Megascale data management to link disparate information 

sources and provide robust knowledge management to support 

very short decision timelines. Constituent technologies include 

knowledge management and fusion from diverse sources, entity 

relationship and pattern recognition analysis, and multi-level 

security and accreditation.

 Situation-dependent information extraction, using Bayesian 

networks, statistical analyses, and hidden Markov models to 

extract meaning and context from complex and cluttered data 

streams drawn from very disparate sensors that are not 

temporally or spatially matched.

 Human/system collaboration that results in dramatic 

reduction in workload for operators under stress and in time to 

conduct complex analyses characterized by uncertainty and 

ambiguity. Technologies that will enable computers to assist in 

tasks that today can be done only by humans include natural 

man-machine interfaces, knowledge representation, and humanguided algorithms.
SUMMARY I xv

Advances in these areas are being driven by the commercial 

market, and fundamental transformation over 10–20 years is possible. 

Issues of privacy and potential for tension over public and political 

perceptions exist and must be addressed and mitigated as an integral 

part of the research. 

Rapidly tailored effects will result from the three capabilities 

already described and will enhance the ability of U.S. forces to act, 

apply force, and cause effects in any circumstance. Understanding the 

human terrain, ubiquitous observation, and rapid extraction and 

interpretation of data will facilitate actions that produce desired effects 

and avoid the counterproductive. The actions could be defensive as 

well as offensive, non-lethal as well as lethal. 

The study identified three areas not well covered by the current tool 

kit of action options. These are: (1) enhancing the ability of U.S. forces to 

conduct non-kinetic operations aimed at influencing the local populace, 

(2) delivering conventional strikes with great precision and timeliness 

from afar, and (3) mitigating the effects of WMD attacks. The first is in 

recognition of the growing importance of non-kinetic operations, the 

second is in order to provide new strike options when local access is 

denied, and the third is to address the most devastating attacks. 

 Influence operations. This is strategic communication at the 

operational and tactical levels—the soldier as a transmitter of 

the U.S. message through both words and deeds. DOD needs 

to be better able to predict and measure the effects of these 

operations and to anticipate the non-kinetic effects of kinetic 

actions. Technologies include non-lethal as well as lethal 

weapon employment, kinetic and non-kinetic cause-effect 

models; campaign planning/targeting/shaping tools; storytelling 

and advanced visualization technologies; and decision support 

tools to deal with complexity and uncertainty. 

 Time-critical strike from afar. Enabling technologies include 

directed energy, high-energy lasers, ballistic missile propulsion 

and guidance, scalable warheads, and hypersonic flight of either 

transport or launch vehicle. 
xvi I SUMMARY 

 WMD protection and mitigation. Technology areas include: 

rapid threat detection and exposure screening of individuals (in 

minutes) and environments (within a few hours); broad spectrum 

medical countermeasures that can be deployed within hours to 

one or two days; rapid recovery and restoration measures in the 

course of hours to a few days; standoff detection of biological, 

chemical, and nuclear materials; and nuclear survivability of 

critical military equipment and functions. 

DOD must also keep abreast of the most rapidly changing and 

emerging technologies as a necessary complement to the missiondriven perspective that is the focus of this report. Today these include 

bio-, info-, and nano-technologies. Synergistic combinations of these 

could produce truly revolutionary capabilities in human performance 

enhancement, medical treatment and prophylaxis, miniaturization, life 

extension, robotics, and machine intelligence, to name a few of the more 

promising areas for research. 

Strategic Technology Planning 

Strategic technology planning encompasses how technology should 

play in the wider arena of DOD planning and should not be limited to 

just guiding S&T investments. Current DOD practices and processes 

fall short of what is needed. The substantial documentation about S&T 

goals and activities serve less to guide than to describe what is 

happening. The busy office of the Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering (DDR&E) finds little time for strategic planning. There is 

not an aggressive enough effort to identify and evaluate opportunities 

from the global technology marketplace. Future joint concepts and 

capability needs are developed without an informed understanding of 

the technological possibilities. 

The study’s recommendations in this area neither fine tune existing 

processes nor invent new ones. Instead they introduce “forcing 

functions” into existing processes to strengthen both mission pull and 

technology push. Both are needed. 
SUMMARY I xvii

DOD needs to achieve tighter integration between its user and 

technology communities so that mission solutions are inspired by a 

deeper understanding of technology opportunities (for the United 

States and its adversaries) and S&T activities are more directly informed 

by DOD’s strategic goals and top-level missions. 

Recommendation: Reestablish a mission-oriented mindset 

within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) by creating a few small, 

dedicated groups of mission-oriented portfolio strategists. Each 

group would address a top-level DOD mission, such as a long war 

against terrorists, and advise the USD (AT&L) and the Vice Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, by providing an integrated enterprise-wide view of 

technology and capability opportunities. The groups, interacting with the 

combatant commands, force providers, and technology providers, would 

lay out hedging strategies, anticipating measures and countermeasures 

from the near to far term, and develop metrics to measure progress. They 

would make investment and divestment recommendations, but not be 

responsible for preparing a detailed budget plan. Their products would 

be used both to develop a mission-oriented strategic technology plan and 

to inform concept development and capability opportunities. 

A mission-focused approach was used with considerable success in the 

1960s and 1970s within the offices of the DDR&E. Its strategic and 

tactical offices played leading roles in devising and overseeing portfolios 

based on a wide, end-to-end perspective of the whole mission in at least 

two of the major DOD missions at that time: deterrence of nuclear strikes 

by the Soviet Union and assurance of U.S. commitment to Europe. 

Technology Opportunities 

Complementing this mission-oriented mindset, DOD’s technology 

community must increase its capacity to recognize and exploit technology 

opportunities, especially those that exist outside of DOD’s domain. 

Technology can enable disruptive capabilities, developed either by the 

United States to gain asymmetrical advantage, or by its foes, to thwart U.S. 

objectives and put the United States at an asymmetrical disadvantage. The 
xviii I SUMMARY 

DOD needs to get much better at fostering the former and anticipating the 

latter. Often the very technology that can provide the United States with a 

disruptive advantage is itself disruptive to DOD’s culture and antibodies 

rapidly and reflexively form to reject it. 

Recommendation: In order to enrich DOD’s capacity to 

understand and exploit technology opportunities: 

 Create an organized function to “prospect” commercial, 

non–DOD, and foreign technologies for good ideas and 

products for use by DOD, other U.S. government agencies, and 

its international friends and partners. 

 Increase and protect the “speculators” operating on the 

frontiers, looking for the truly disruptive opportunities that the 

United States could exploit. 

 Establish a more comprehensive approach to 

“anticipating” how adversaries might exploit technology. 

This function involves increased S&T intelligence to understand 

what adversaries are doing and more red teaming and net 

assessment to anticipate what they could do. 

Rapid Transition of Technology into Capability 

Failure to speed the transition of technology into capabilities has 

severe consequences. U.S. forces do not get the capabilities they need to 

anticipate and respond to adaptive adversaries. Major systems are fielded 

with obsolete technology and unnecessarily high cost. Delay encourages 

“requirements creep,” leading to further delay. Opportunities to exploit 

disruptive and other technologies are missed. DOD’s current processes 

and practices of transitioning technology, largely a legacy of the Cold 

War, are not adequate for today’s new security challenges. 

This study addresses both (1) rapid fielding of new capabilities into 

ongoing operations and (2) major system acquisition. The challenges are 

different for each. The task force assumed there will be a continuing, 

long-term need for rapid fielding into ongoing operations and, thus, the 

challenge here is to turn the current improvised approaches into 

processes and practices robust for a long war without creating a new 
SUMMARY I xix

bureaucracy. For major system acquisition, the challenge is to transform 

long established practices into a process that will cut in half the time it 

normally takes to field a system. The reasons why it takes so long to 

field major systems are well documented by the Defense Science Board 

and other studies, as are proposed solutions.1 

Rapidly fielding new capabilities into ongoing operations was not a 

major priority during much of the Cold War. The exception was Viet 

Nam, but practices invented during that war to facilitate speedy 

introduction were abandoned when the war ended. To meet the new 

demand from war fighters, the DOD has set up a variety of 

organizations and processes. While there have been successes, the 

DOD must become much more adroit at rapid insertion, must 

constantly learn how to get better at it, and must be prepared to do it 

for a long time. It is no easy task, not the least because of the need for 

extraordinary collaboration among war fighters, trainers, technologists, 

operational analysts, systems engineers, and testers. 

Recommendation: Configure most of the current “rapid” 

programs into a new “expeditor,” a Rapid Fielding Organization 

(RFO). The RFO would provide a joint institutional focus, with 

memory and knowledge-transfer, on achieving very rapid response (less 

than two years, but as short as weeks). It would have the leadership, 

staff, authorities, and budgets to become an agile, results-oriented 

organization accountable to the joint war fighter. It would also be 

tightly coupled to testing and training, so that new materiel could be 

introduced concurrently with doctrinal adaptation to realize new 

capabilities as units prepare for deployment. Current operations are 

fostering a culture of experimentation and continuous learning in parts 

of the DOD; this opportunity to promulgate and embed such a culture 

must not be missed. 

 

1. One such study is the Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science 

and Technology, May 2002. 
xx I SUMMARY 

Recommendation: Implement a spiral development process—

to cut in half the time to field militarily useful blocks of a system 

and conduct a vigorous S&T and experimentation effort in 

parallel to create options for future block improvements.

Implementation requires: 

 considering technology and cost issues earlier in the 

requirements process, before deciding what to buy 

 assuring technology and manufacturing readiness by Milestone 

B by placing greater attention on the technology development 

phase than currently accorded 

 strengthening systems analysis and engineering in DOD and 

industry 

 controlling appetites for performance in each block and making 

timely decisions, if necessary, to relax requirements during each 

block to protect cost and schedule while still delivering a 

militarily useful system 

DOD appears to be implementing some of these steps but robust 

processes are not yet in place. 

This report also recommends additional steps to broaden and deepen 

DOD’s in-house technical expertise, provide budget flexibility, lower 

barriers to commercial firms working with DOD, revitalize internal 

research and development investments in industry, foster competition, 

and create incentives for rapid technology transition. 

Conclusion 

Our focus is technology. But the human dimensions still dominate, 

especially in the irregular challenges facing the nation today. Technology 

still can be a powerful enabler of new capabilities, but must be closely 

coupled to evolving concepts, doctrine, training, and organizational 

structures. DOD’s mastery in applying technology helped win the Cold 

War. However, the processes and practices of that era must be reshaped 

to deal with new security challenges today and in the future. 
SUMMARY I xxi

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review states the “imperative to 

work with other government agencies, allies and partners and, where 

appropriate, to help them increase their capacities and capabilities and 

the ability to work together.” One of the goals of DOD’s S&T activities 

and processes should be to provide that help. 

This report describes the findings and recommendations of the 

study in further detail. The chapters in Part I identify and describe the 

“handful” of key 21st century capabilities and enabling technologies—

those most critical to achieving DOD future missions. Part II examines 

the topics of strategic technology planning, technology transition—for 

ongoing military operations and in major system acquisition—and 

cross-cutting enablers. The report concludes, in Part III, with a 

summary of recommendations. 

More detail on all these topics is provided in three supporting 

reports, one from each of the three study panels: 

 Volume II. Critical Capabilities and Enabling Technologies

 Volume III. Strategic Technology Planning

 Volume IV. Accelerating the Transition of Technologies into 

U.S. Capabilities 
 
Part I 

A Set of Critical Capabilities and 

Enabling Technologies for the 

 21st Century 

IDENTIFYING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES I 3

Chapter 1. 

Identifying Operational Capabilities 

Methodology 

The process of identifying a set of operational capabilities and their 

enabling technologies, depicted in figure 2, began with five top-level 

missions derived from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): 

 defeating terrorist networks 

 preventing acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) 

 defending the homeland 

 shaping nations at strategic crossroads 

 conducting stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

operations 

Figure 2. Strategic Planning Framework
4 I CHAPTER 1 

With these missions as the starting point, the study identified the 

needed capabilities and the enabling technologies required to develop the 

capabilities. Next, a judgment was made as to the relative importance of 

these capabilities and technologies to achieving the missions. The study 

assumed all missions equally significant; thus, capabilities and technologies 

with broad applicability were judged more critical. 

This process yielded a set of four high-level capabilities, a dozen 

enabling technology areas, and over forty constituent technologies. These 

technologies were further categorized according to their relative maturity 

and whether or not the main action to mature the technology would be 

conducted within the Department of Defense (DOD) or elsewhere. This 

categorization helps inform a science and technology strategy. 

The set of four capabilities are: 

 Human terrain preparation to gain better understanding of 

how individuals, groups, societies and nations behave in order 

to improve the performance of U.S. forces and to understand 

and shape behaviors of adversaries and others in pre-, intra-, 

and post-conflict situations. 

 Ubiquitous observation, recording, and long-term 

archiving of data to reduce sanctuaries where adversaries hide 

and operate and to understand the patterns of their activities. 

 Contextual exploitation to extract, much more rapidly than 

today, actionable information hidden in sometimes massive 

amounts of data. 

 Rapidly tailored effects, achieving the desirable and avoiding 

the counterproductive.

Data, information, and knowledge must be able to flow rapidly and 

securely from all sources to all users. See the companion Defense Science 

Board 2006 Summer Study on Information Management for Net-Centric Operations

for an in-depth discussion of this subject. 

Collectively, these capabilities provide the means for U.S. forces to 

operate within an adversary’s decision cycle across the range of 

missions and circumstances. In a sense, as illustrated in figure 3, they 
IDENTIFYING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES I 5

can be considered an expansion, to an operational-level, of the tactical 

OODA loop: observe, orient, decide, and act. 

Figure 3. Four Critical Capabilities: An OODA-like Loop for the 21st Century

The aim of the study, in identifying a small set of capabilities, was to 

avoid the tendency to generate large lists without prioritization. The 

2005 National Defense Strategy, for example, identifies eight desired 

operational capabilities not unlike the ones presented in this report. On 

the other hand, the QDR lists more than 50 desired capabilities. In 

addition, there are 22 tier one joint capability areas and over 100 tier 

two joint capability areas. 

The next four chapters will describe in more detail these four 

capabilities and associated technology area enablers, an overview of 

which is shown in table 1. For each of these 12 technology area 

enablers, the report identifies a set of constituent technologies, which 

are discussed in more detail in Volume II. Appendix D contains an 

assessment of the relative maturity of these technologies. 
6 I CHAPTER 1 

Table 1. Twelve Key Technology Area Enablers 

Critical Capability Technology Area

• Rapid Training and Continuous Learning 

• Automated Language Processing 

Human Terrain Preparation

• Human, Social, Cultural, and Behavior Modeling 

• Day/Night All-weather Wide Area Surveillance 

• Close-in Sensors and Tagging Systems 

Ubiquitous Observation 

and Recording

• Soldier as a Collector 

• Mega-scale Data Management 

• Situation-dependent Information Extraction 

Contextual Exploitation

• Human/System Collaboration 

• Influence Operations 

• Time-critical Conventional Strike 

Rapidly Tailored Effects

• WMD Protection and Mitigation 

 

 
HUMAN TERRAIN PREPARATION I 7

Chapter 2. 

Human Terrain Preparation 

U.S. forces need to be better prepared to operate in new battlefields 

where knowing the local cultural, societal, religious, ethnic, tribal, and 

other related dimensions is essential. The goals for this critical capability 

are to better understand how individuals, groups, societies, and nations 

behave, including adversaries, allies, others, and even the United States 

itself. This understanding can then be used to improve the performance 

of U.S. forces (individuals, as well as small and large units) and to 

understand and shape behaviors of adversaries, allies, and others in 

pre-, intra-, and post-conflict situations. 

Three technology areas enabling this capability are highlighted in this 

chapter: rapid training and continuous learning; automated language and 

content translation for both speech and text; and human, social, cultural, 

and behavior modeling. 

Rapid Training and Continuous Learning 

Training and continuous learning are core enablers for every joint 

war fighting capability and are most successful when tools and methods 

embrace the cognitive complexities of how people learn. The training 

and continuous learning enhancements should pay special attention to 

the needs of junior leaders (officers and noncommissioned officers) and 

small units. Increasingly, these leaders and the soldiers they lead are 

called upon to make rapid decisions, in complex circumstances, under 

duress, and when the outcome can have strategic consequences. Thus, a 

major goal of the learning tools and methods is to recognize and 

accelerate the development of critical thinking and decision-making 

skills in such circumstances. Enabling technologies include high fidelity 

immersive gaming and simulation, cultural and leadership tutoring 

tools, and measurement of individual and team performance. Research 

in the cognitive sciences could lead to dramatic advances. 
8 I CHAPTER 2 

High-fidelity, immersive games and training, and mission-rehearsal 

tools should serve as one of the cornerstones of a flexible, user-tailored 

training and learning program. Design should integrate the most 

advanced displays and techniques from the gaming industry, Hollywood, 

and academia while incorporating natural language dialogue, cognitive 

models, and learner models to maximize the learning opportunity and 

determine a learner’s progress. Authoring tools that allow users to rapidly 

manipulate relevant scenarios are an important and necessary 

characteristic of future tools. The proliferation of massive, multi-player 

games suggests promise in this area. 

Language, culture, and leadership tutoring tools are an integral 

dimension of training. Technologies that will more rapidly prepare 

junior leaders and small units for the unique cultural dimensions of the 

future battle space will help speed the learning process. Training and 

learning tools must adequately represent culture and language nuances 

and must provide trainees with an opportunity to experience the second 

and third order effects associated with decision making in this fluid 

environment. Intelligent tutors designed into immersive training tools 

should reduce the need for personal mentors and allow for more 

immediate and tailored feedback to the trainee, thereby expediting the 

learning process. 

Human and team performance measurement represents an important 

dimension of effective learning tools and methods. After-action reviews 

currently provide a level of feedback to trainees on performance, but 

often lack metrics that could clearly define future individual training 

needs. Measuring performance, particularly in high stress environments 

experienced on the battlefield, including the complex urban environment 

and stability and support operations, requires additional study. 

Several current programs and research efforts offer promise in 

achieving these goals. Examples include: 

 The Army’s Combat Leader’s Environment tool recently 

underwent a proof of concept. This virtual simulation tool 

placed battalion and brigade level leaders in an immersive 

environment designed from live experiences. It provides each 

learner with an opportunity to “think about how they think” in 

a cognitively authentic context. 
HUMAN TERRAIN PREPARATION I 9

 Another tool under development is Learning with Adaptive 

Simulation and Training. This tool seeks to deliver effective and 

engaging training simulations that incorporate realistic 

political/cultural effects of the environment and behaviors of 

an adaptive, asymmetrical enemy force. 

 The Enhanced Learning Environment with Creative 

Technologies incorporates techniques of Hollywood and the 

gaming industry. It seeks to combine enhanced interactive 

simulation technology in training with a better understanding of 

the learner model and cognitive readiness on soldier 

performance to increase soldier engagement in the training 

experience, thereby increasing retention and decreasing the 

burden of re-training. 

 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has 

developed a training tool—DARWARS Ambush—using a multipayer commercial computer game that allows the user to make 

changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures. This flexible 

training tool, originally created to deal with attacks on convoys, is 

being used for a wider range of training missions. There are plans 

to expand DARWARS into non-kinetic training to hone trainee 

mental agility, interpersonal communication, and cultural acumen. 

 Another game-based training tool, the Adaptive Thinking and 

Leadership Training application, has been in use at the JFK 

Special Warfare Center and School for special forces, civil 

affairs, and psychological operations soldiers. It was designed to 

hone trainee critical thinking, negotiation, adaptability, and 

cultural awareness. This multi-user training system supports 

players connecting from laptops with roles for host nationals, 

soldiers, and observer controllers. 

Training has been a major asymmetrical advantage for U.S. forces. 

This advantage could be threatened if adversaries adopt new training 

regimes enabled by simulation technology or drug-induced performance 

enhancement. 
10 I CHAPTER 2 

Automated Language Processing 

Foreign language speech and text are indispensable sources of 

intelligence, but only a small fraction of the massive amount of available 

data is examined, in part due to the labor-intensive nature of the task. 

Success in many missions will depend on the ability of U.S. forces to 

communicate effectively with the local populace. New and powerful 

foreign language technology is needed to allow English-speaking analysts 

to exploit and understand vastly more foreign speech and text than is 

currently possible today. A vigorous technology effort is needed to 

sustain continuous improvement in foreign-to-English translation 

(especially in the non-romance languages), in speech-to-text transcription, 

and in two-way translation devices. 

The enabling technologies, in addition to foreign-to-English 

translation and speech-to-text transcription, include information 

management and text processing. The goals are very ambitious: to allow 

automated processes and English-speaking users to examine and analyze 

all multi-lingual speech/text that is available in the information space; 

allow any user—whether tactical, operational, strategic planner, analyst, 

or decision maker—to acquire basic language proficiency (for any 

language) in days and expert language proficiency in months and to 

continue improvements in word error rate, precision and recall, and 

usability measures such as effectiveness, efficiency, and user satisfaction. 

Pursuit of these ambitious goals should not detract from the need for the 

department to enlarge and sustain a skilled workforce of translators and 

listeners in key languages and lingua franca 

Foreign-to-English translation seeks to provide high accuracy 

machine translation and structural metadata annotation from 

multilingual text document and speech transcription input at all stages 

of processing and across multiple sources (such as the Web, news, 

blogs, signals intelligence, and databases). Challenges include resolving 

semantic differences, duplications, inconsistencies, and ambiguities 

across words, passages, and documents; providing enriched translation 

output that is clear and meaningful to decision-makers; and eliminating 

the need for human intervention. 
HUMAN TERRAIN PREPARATION I 11

Automatic speech-to-text transcription attempts to produce rich, 

readable transcripts of foreign news broadcasts and conversations despite 

widely-varying pronunciations, speaking styles, and subject matter. There 

are two basic approaches to speech-to-text transcription: differing in 

whether their vocabularies are constrained.2 Challenges include extracting 

“meaning” out of spoken language by resolving jargon, slang, codespeak, cultural nuances, and language ambiguities; and dynamically 

adapting to (noisy) acoustics, speakers, topics, new names, speakingstyles, and dialects. Recent achievements (2004) include word error rates 

of about 20–25 percent at processing speeds of 7 to 8 times slower than 

real-time on Arabic and Chinese news broadcasts. 

Information management and text processing involves many 

techniques, including information retrieval, entity extraction, the much 

more difficult relationship extraction, summarization, graphical 

representations, link discovery, and pattern learning. A recent DARPA 

experiment used a multi-lingual information retrieval front-end system 

comprised of various information management and text processing 

technologies to “automatically” ingest, transform, and translate massive 

amounts of open-source text data. Then model-relevant data is extracted 

and used to auto-populate a back-end analytical human, social, cultural, 

behavior model of the type discussed later in this report. The data—

drawn from over 1.2 million English and foreign documents—were 

analyzed in less than one man year (the bulk of which is a one-time cost) 

using the automated system, as compared to the 117 man years it would 

have taken for a human to perform the same task. 

One research and development (R&D) program that integrates the 

automated language processing constituent technologies is DARPA’s 

GALE (Global Autonomous Language Exploitation) program. The 

GALE program is developing and applying computer software 

technologies to absorb, analyze, and interpret huge volumes of speech 

and text in multiple languages, eliminating the need for linguists and 

analysts. It is also developing the ability to automatically provide 

relevant, distilled, actionable information to military command and 

personnel in a timely fashion. Automatic processing "engines" convert 

 

2. The Phraselator is an example of a vocabulary constrained speech translator. 
12 I CHAPTER 2 

and distill the data, delivering pertinent, consolidated information in 

easy-to-understand forms to military personnel and monolingual 

English-speaking analysts in response to direct or implicit requests. 

Human, Social, Cultural, and Behavior Modeling 

The third of the human terrain enabling technology areas—human, 

social, cultural, and behavior (HSCB) modeling—is the one that pushes 

the boundaries of DOD’s comfort zone the farthest. However, it is an 

area that DOD cannot afford to ignore. The DOD needs to become 

much more familiar with the theories, methods, and models from 

psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, cognitive science, political 

science, and economics in order to be able to identify those with real 

potential to add value to DOD’s tool kit. Coupling these to quantitative 

and computational modeling and simulation techniques from 

mathematics, physics, statistics, operations research, and computer 

science could lead to powerful new tools that represent complex human 

and social systems and will better enable U.S. forces to understand, 

assess, anticipate, and shape new battlefields. 

One promising starting point for the application of HSCB models is 

to complement the more familiar physical network modeling with 

human/group behavioral models. 

For purposes of this report, HSCB modeling refers to tools to 

investigate human social phenomena (cognition, conflict, decision 

making, cooperation) at various levels of data aggregation (individual, 

group, societal, global). There are numerous computer-based tools and 

models in academia and industry today that have shown varying degrees 

of promise and utility for social applications and artificial societal 

environments at small and large scales. Examples of limited but 

promising successes in coupling social science methods with 

quantitative/computational techniques have emerged in marketing 

research to project sales of consumer goods, and in politics to forecast 

election results based on polling and other data. 

HSCB models are designed to help understand the structure, 

interconnections, dependencies, behavior, and trends associated with 

organizational entities. Macro HSCB models address nation states, 
HUMAN TERRAIN PREPARATION I 13

socio-cultural regions, economies, and political systems. Micro HSCB 

models deal with religious and ethnic tribes, militias, insurgent and 

terrorist networks, and military units at the tactical level. Integrated 

models try to tie together the macro and micro models. A formidable 

challenge in modeling social and behavioral phenomena is to integrate 

and make coherent micro-macro models at multiple levels of data, 

granularity, and analysis, and across multiple disciplines of the social 

sciences, and to acquire and structure data that can be used to guide and 

test the models. An example of integrated micro-macro HSCB 

modeling is found in the work done at the Center for Army Analysis to 

forecast country instability. 

The challenges in developing practical HSCB models are formidable. 

They include: (1) advancing the accuracy and reliability of HSCB models 

for assessment, prediction, and forecasting purposes (while recognizing 

the limits to HSCB modeling for prediction and forecasting); (2) 

collecting reliable data at the “right” level and unit of analysis (e.g., tribal, 

provincial, district, regional, transnational); (3) creating controlled 

experiments, and defining associated metrics, for which HSCB models 

can be validated with extensive human-subject trials; and (4) utilizing 

legitimate approaches to validate HSCB models that may in fact be 

different from the methods used in the physical sciences, and getting the 

DOD science and technology (S&T) community to recognize that, 

absent such rigor, these models are still valuable in provoking thought. 

Recommendations: Human Terrain Preparation _______________________ 

Increase the priority and accelerate the creation of a continuous 

learning environment for training and professional military 

education. It is especially needed when the operational tempo is high 

and the traditional reliance on attendance at institutions for training and 

professional military education is most strained. Steps include the 

following: 

 more exploitation of commercially developed distance learning 

tools and more experiments on alternative approaches 

 creating a DOD program linking Service efforts to design 

training tools and processes to develop cognitive decision 

making skills in junior leaders 
14 I CHAPTER 2 

 rewarding service members for pursuing less structured but 

equally compelling professional military programs of study that 

develop their skills in human terrain preparation 

 assigning higher priority and more resources to the development 

of immersive games, simulators, training, and mission rehearsal 

tools to develop multi-cultural interpersonal skills supporting 

small unit operations 

Plan to sustain a long-term commitment and robust effort to 

develop and adapt automated language processing technologies. 

This will involve tapping into and leveraging commercial R&D work 

and investments, but will also require focused investments for those 

particular languages and dialects to which the military may be uniquely 

exposed.

Develop an S&T roadmap for HSCB in response to the Director 

of Defense Research and Engineering’s (DDR&E) Strategic 

Planning Guidance (FY08–13) and create an S&T portfolio for 

such modeling that would 

 attract the best and brightest from the HSCB community to work 

on DOD problems; this could involve expanding the Defense 

Science Study Group program to include social scientists 

 establish HSCB modeling benchmarks, metrics, 

experimentation, and validation techniques 

 be closely connected to the combatant commands and other 

potential users 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION I 15

Chapter 3. Ubiquitous Observation 

and Recording 

This capability is not about pursuing the fantasy of eliminating the 

fog of war. Rather, it is about reducing significantly the sanctuaries 

where adversaries can hide and operate. The emerging new threat 

environment has fundamentally challenged U.S. traditional surveillance 

systems’ ability to detect, track, and identify adversaries. The tanks, 

submarines, and aircraft of previous conflicts are being augmented or 

replaced with small and dispersed teams and individuals. Adversaries 

are employing what might be considered the ultimate of stealth: 

individuals hiding in plain sight. Today’s surveillance systems often 

provide either episodic observation with exquisite detail or very course 

resolution with higher temporal sampling rates. 

To counter these new threats, technology exists, or could be 

developed, to provide new levels of spatial, temporal, and spectral 

resolution and diversity. Furthermore, the ability to record terabyte and 

larger databases will provide an omnipresent knowledge of the present 

and the past that can be used to rewind battle space observations in 

TiVo-like fashion and to run recorded time backwards to help identify 

and locate even low-level enemy forces. For example, after a car bomb 

detonates, one would have the ability to play high-resolution data 

backward in time to follow the vehicle back to the source, and then use 

that knowledge to focus collection and gain additional information by 

organizing and searching through archived data. 

An integrated system of diverse sensors and platforms could provide 

both surveillance of large areas and close-access surveillance of 

individuals and small groups. Such systems would include VHF imaging 

radars that can penetrate foliage; high-frequency radars that can provide 

high-resolution day/night images and moving-target tracking in all 

weather conditions; and optical systems that can detect, locate, and track 

systems with very high resolution in very low light conditions. These 

persistent sensors will be complemented with prolific use of handemplaced or autonomously-delivered unattended networked sensors and 
16 I CHAPTER 3 

tags. The sensors and tags will enable detailed quantitative tracking and 

measurement of individuals, vehicles, small groups, and other dispersed 

assets of value to the enemy. A vital element in an integrated system will 

be the information collected by the soldiers and Marines on the ground 

in intimate contact with both the enemy and noncombatant population. 

Thus, the task force identified three key technology areas: day/night 

all-weather wide area surveillance where it is not done well today 

(namely in urban areas and under foliage); close-in sensor and tagging 

systems; and soldiers-as-collectors within a network. 

Day/Night All-weather Wide Area Surveillance 

Ubiquitous observation starts with broad area surveillance and 

“birth-to-death” tracking and identification of critical targets. Surveillance 

is provided over the entire field of operations or smaller areas of 

particular interest to forces in close contact. The outputs from this 

system will target regions of interest for examination by systems with 

higher resolution in both space and time and by mid-tier sensors capable 

of target identification. 

The goals are to cover regions of tens of thousands of square 

kilometers with constant surveillance that can detect and track moving 

targets and image stationary targets at resolutions measured in feet to 

meters. In addition, temporal sampling, measured in tens of seconds, 

will be coupled to a capability to focus on areas of hundreds of square 

kilometers continuously at a resolution of less than a meter and a 

sampling time of one second. 

The elements that will enable such broad area video surveillance 

capability would include arrays of small, low cost unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs) for under-the-clouds optical surveillance and tracking; 

ultra long-endurance, high altitude UAVs, whose endurance is 

measured in weeks for large focus areas; and space-based radar 

surveillance systems to provide a broad synoptic integrating view. 

Enabling technologies to achieve this capability include: hydrogen 

fuel-based light-weight power for long endurance UAVs; ultra-light 

weight sensor systems (radar, infrared, and optical); light weight optics; 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION I 17

large area (one billion pixel) focal plane sensors; active and passive 

hyper-spectral imaging sensors with on-board compression and 

automatic target recognition; triple canopy foliage penetration sensors; 

radiation-hard digital electronics for space transmit and receive 

modules; and 50 percent efficient space solar power. Advances in radar 

technology will also be needed to provide both high update rates with 

high resolution and, at the same time, provide wide area coverage. 

Future collection concepts, like ultra high 2-D spatial resolution and 

vector measurement of target velocity via multi-static range-range 

bilateration of ground moving target radar data from two separate 

platforms, offer potential enhancements to target location and 

identification.3

 These new system collection opportunities will require 

the ability to task both airborne and space-based sensors in a tightly 

integrated manner. 

Close-in Sensors and Tagging Systems 

Today’s national intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

systems were developed largely to provide indications and warning 

against the military forces of a peer competitor. In the past, the critical 

threats to the United States and its allies were ballistic missiles, 

submarines, and massed conventional military forces. The threats 

described in the QDR are different. The diffuse nature and low 

signature of future threats make close-in ISR increasingly important. 

Close-in sensing will include traditional human intelligence as well as a 

new set of sensors positioned very close to the target. 

The task force envisions a broad spectrum of such sensors (chemical, 

biological, radiation, acoustic, seismic, optical, and infrared, for example) 

with integrated command and control (tasking) and data exfiltration links. 

Their small size and innovative camouflage/deception for the sensors 

and their means of communication will make detection difficult. The size 

could be smaller than a shirt button or as large as a soda can (with < 1 

 

3. The use of different, synchronous views from multiple platforms allows for much higher 

target resolution and tracking prediction of moving targets on the ground. 
18 I CHAPTER 3 

cm3 as a nominal goal). Precision delivery is needed as well as energy 

sources to permit the sensors to operate for weeks to months. 

A variety of technologies can support this vision. There have been 

dramatic advances in high-density electronic packaging, largely driven by 

the handheld consumer electronics industry. This same industry has also 

fostered advances in some sensor technologies such as microphones and 

video cameras. However, DOD cannot rely on industry to produce other 

military-specific sensors, in particular chemical, biological, and radiation 

sensors. A continuing effort is needed to build on recent DOD progress 

in this area. 

High-performance and efficient signal processors are needed to 

process sensor data and reduce data bandwidth prior to data 

exfiltration. Bandwidth compression helps to reduce detectability as 

well as to conserve power for the communications hardware. The need 

for extremely low-power signal processors (1-10 mW desirable) 

warrants continued DOD interest in following the development of 

commercial low-power signal processors. 

The energy source and communications system antenna make it 

difficult to reduce the observability of close-in sensors. Battery 

technology has advanced substantially in recent years. However, a further 

10 to 100 fold increase in energy storage density could be critically 

important to realizing the potential of close-access sensor systems.4

Specialty materials (that morph, change color, or have unusual visual or 

electronic properties) for antennas, energy sources, and structures will 

also be needed. Another challenge is stealthy emplacement of the sensors 

which could be by low-observable, autonomous, air, land, and sea 

vehicles specifically designed for precision (<1 meter circular error of 

probability) sensor emplacement across a broad region. 

Additional emphasis needs to be directed toward exfiltration of data 

from remote locations and autonomous control of sensors, including 

 

4. Energy scavenging systems could increase battery lifetimes by supplementing the power 

supply with environmental energy, such as solar, thermal, kinetic, and vibration energy. 

These energy sources may eventually play a role, but with the exception of solar cells, are 

not likely within the next decade. 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION I 19

movement based on sensed information. S&T investment increases 

currently planned in this area should be supported, with potentially 

added funding as the projects demonstrate progress. DOD and the 

intelligence community should also support efforts to maintain 

awareness of non–U.S. research and development in these areas and 

potential threats to U.S. forces and critical national infrastructure. 

Current R&D programs for clandestine tagging, tracking, and 

locating should be enhanced to provide capability to deploy and use tags, 

taggants, and sensors for close observation in areas where access is 

dangerous, difficult, or denied. Nanotechnology, in particular, offers 

potential for devices that can endure for very long periods of time in 

close proximity to targets of interest and that can be delivered by 

clandestine means. Biology and chemistry can be exploited to enable the 

ability to track and identify people and materiel that move from locations 

of interest to other locations. A combination of nanotechnology, biology, 

and chemistry promises to provide significant increases in capability to 

conduct pervasive surveillance on a global basis—with minimized 

personnel exposure and minimized probability that deployed assets will 

be compromised. 

Soldier as a Collector 

In the new missions, much of the needed intelligence is only available 

to the soldier on the ground. The challenge is to train and outfit soldiers to 

be more comprehensive and discerning intelligence collectors without 

unduly affecting their other tasks. The vision here is to create networks of 

sensors using the individual troop both as the sensors itself and as a 

platform to carry and/or distribute sensor systems. The goal is to create 

networks of soldiers who are capable of collecting information within their 

sphere of influence and who can share this information with other 

members of the net in a timely fashion. Such information, collected at the 

tactical (and even interpersonal) level, will contribute to better operational 

decisions at all levels. 

A variety of sensor technologies (many of them similar or identical 

to those discussed in the previous section) have size, weight, power, 

and other logistics attributes that make them suitable for employment 

on the soldier without adding a significant burden. 
20 I CHAPTER 3 

Several technologies must be developed and/or integrated to achieve 

the goal of a seamlessly integrated network of sensors capable of 

collecting and recording data that is in each soldier’s sphere of influence. 

Many front-end sensors (especially small digital/video cameras, audio 

recorders, and Global Positioning System [GPS] receivers) are already 

ready for integration. The consumer electronics industry has driven these 

technologies to an attractive regime of size, weight, power, performance, 

and cost. 

Other sensor technologies are at lower readiness levels and will 

require development to make them compatible with being soldierborne. Examples of these technologies include chemical and biological 

detectors, small multispectral sensors, mobile ad hoc communication 

networks, and geo-location systems that will work in GPS-denied 

areas (such as in buildings). There are also some interesting 

technologies under development that can aid soldiers when interacting 

with local civilians. These include automatic language translators and 

technologies to automatically detect intentional deception of people 

being interviewed by soldiers. 

Automated and interactive debriefing tools will also be needed. These 

tools will allow the soldier to quickly and efficiently collect personal 

observations and deliver them to the network with minimal effort. 

Energy sources will also be a key enabling technology. Batteries 

appear to be the only currently viable source of energy for soldier-borne 

equipment. As with close-in emplaced sensors, a 10-fold improvement 

in current energy storage per unit of weight would be extremely useful. 

Although industry is pushing these technologies hard, the extreme 

needs of DOD users warrant continued R&D monitoring and possibly 

investment in ultra-high-density energy storage technologies. 

Observations and Recommendations: 

Ubiquitous Observation and Recording___________________________ 

Outside of energy storage technologies, which are today being 

driven largely by commercial electronics, the priority technologies for 

ubiquitous observation and recording are more specialized for DOD 

and intelligence community purposes, and will therefore require both 
UBIQUITOUS OBSERVATION I 21

sustained investment and monitoring commercial technologies to 

advance. Such has been the case for hyperspectral and foliage 

penetration sensors. These particular technologies are ready for 

operational fielding. More speculative domains such as microsensors, 

bio-inspired and bio-electronic tags and sensors, devices in the micro to 

nano domains, molecular-scaled taggants, and micro delivery platforms, 

deserve investment. 

The vision for ubiquitous observation cross-cuts combatant 

commands, military services, defense agencies, and the intelligence 

community. As such, cross-cutting programming, management, and 

oversight are needed to achieve substantial progress toward this vision. 

Recommendations are as follows: 

 The Army, Marines and DARPA should partner in an effort 

to accelerate the maturation of the “soldier-as-sensor” 

concept. The program should also include monitoring and 

developing relevant miniature sensor technologies and automated 

debriefing tools. 

 A sustained series of advanced technology demonstrations 

(ATDs) and advanced concept technology demonstrations 

(ACTDs) should be supported through DARPA and 

DDR&E to develop and demonstrate the ability to task and 

integrate local collection with wide area assets. U.S Strategic 

Command and U.S. Southern Command should be major 

participants in these activities because of their global ISR 

responsibilities. 

 DARPA and related R&D agencies should sustain a 

focused program to develop energy efficient microsensors 

and the platforms to deliver them, along with development 

of the systems network concepts to enable close-in sensing. 
22 I CHAPTER 4 

Chapter 4. 

Contextual Exploitation 

A new set of information-rich exploitation and collaboration tools 

are needed to bridge the functional capabilities of ubiquitous observation 

and rapidly tailored delivery of scaled effects. Three enabling technology 

areas are mega-scale data management, situation-dependent information 

extraction, and human/system collaboration. 

The combination of these technologies will open new opportunities to 

automate the intersection of apparently independent events, actions, 

things, or people, masked by military and civilian clutter. These tools will 

be used to extract related features, to enable time-critical targeting and 

intent recognition of evolving threats. Their development is being driven 

by the commercial sector and fueled by rapid innovations in underlying 

technologies such as computation, data storage, and software architecture. 

Fundamental transformation over 10–20 years is possible, with 

significant investments in architecture development coupled with 

increasing computation and data storage capabilities, and advances in 

cognitive science. There are also issues of privacy and potential for 

tension over public and political perceptions. 

Because the data management and information extraction will be 

increasingly done in a networked environment, science and technology 

investment in how to assure the availability, confidentiality, and 

integrity of the data is vital. Data integrity is especially important, not 

only due to the damage done by the use of deliberately corrupted data, 

but from the loss of trust in the network. Networks are covered in 

more detail in the companion Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on

Information Management for Net-Centric Operations. 
CONTEXTUAL EXPLOITATION I 23

Mega-scale Data Management 

As the threat base evolves, there will be greater dependence on 

integrated multiple-domain sensors with much greater dynamic range, 

spatial reach, sample rate, and temporal history. Mega-scale data 

management implies integrated, federated, and scaleable data frameworks 

to link disparate information sources and provide robust knowledge 

management to permit conclusions based on contextual relationships. 

The goals are to archive, organize, search, and use exabytes of data at 

transfer rates of terabytes per second with decision timelines in seconds 

to minutes. 

Enabling technologies include knowledge management (including 

data storage and transport) and fusion from diverse sources, entity 

relationship and pattern recognition analysis, and multi-level security 

and accreditation. 

Situation-dependent information extraction will use advanced 

algorithms to support situation-associative processing and improved 

human systems collaboration. Advanced automated decision tools will 

increase the war fighter’s ability to make timely decisions with an 

explicit evidential basis and reduce the level of information overload 

often experienced in answering prioritized information requests. Userdefined knowledge sharing minimizes catastrophic errors due to 

cognitive biases and other limitations. 

Within DOD, efforts to manage and exploit large data sets, and 

conduct mission planning and contingency management, have had 

limited success. These technologies have been applied with considerable 

success in the commercial world, in applications such as marketing 

analysis, energy exploration, and financial forecasting. 

Situation-dependent Information Extraction 

Contemporary and projected operational environments are 

characterized by extraordinarily complex and demanding terrains: of 

geography; social and cultural identity; state and non-state political 

association; interweaving adversary activity with everyday commerce 
24 I CHAPTER 4 

and civil life; communications; and much-increased expectation of 

mission effectiveness and avoidance of collateral damage. Additionally, 

target identification and location and decision-making remain central 

elements of combat. The concept of “target” has expanded and now 

includes complex and often ambiguous entities, such as subsets of 

indigenous populations. In this increasingly demanding operating 

environment, the war fighter needs target-discrimination tools that 

provide effects that are rapid, accurate, and contextually relevant. 

Intelligence analysts need to be able to find the needles of 

actionable intelligence buried in massive haystacks of data. Joint 

commanders need to be able to discern patterns of adversary behavior 

from the increasing amount of ISR output now available. Tactical 

commanders need to be able to identify time-critical targets. Soldiers in 

the street need to be able to recognize linkages among actions and 

people from the bits and pieces of information they gather. Technology 

can help all of them. 

Tools are needed to go beyond static data filtering and template 

matching. Early work has shown that Bayesian networks, statistical 

analysis, and hidden Markov models can be used to extract meaning and 

context from complex and cluttered data streams.5

 Application of these 

techniques for very disparate sensors that are not temporally or spatially 

matched will enable DOD to detect, discern, analyze, and understand the 

actions of stealthy adversaries embedded in complex domains. 

Effective implementation and utilization of these tools and 

improved understanding of the operational environment and adversary 

activities will improve performance of U.S. forces across the decisionmaking spectrum, from tactical to strategic. It will provide a new ability 

to shape the behaviors of adversaries and potential adversaries, and will 

be useful before conflict, during combat, and post-conflict to achieve 

 

5. A Bayesian network represents “beliefs” or relationships of principal actors (or nodes) in 

a model and connects them in pairs that reflect how common the belief is held between the 

two actors of the pair. The network is then built using these pairings, allowing a complex 

system to be modeled and its behavior analyzed based on testing the simple relationship 

between the pairs. Hidden Markov models extend this idea in ways that let the analyst 

discover relationships among the nodes that are not readily evident. 
CONTEXTUAL EXPLOITATION I 25

national objectives. It will improve link analysis and intent inference, 

resulting in faster and more complete understanding of options leading 

to better decisions. 

Human/System Collaboration 

The current state of the art for humans interacting with computer 

systems is largely characterized by data filtering and graphical user 

interfaces. The long-term objective in this technology area is to transform 

the interactions between humans and systems from an “interface” to true 

“collaboration.” By creating the capability for computers to assist in tasks 

that today can be done only by humans, the goals are at least an order of 

magnitude reduction in workload for operators under stress and two or 

more orders of magnitude reduction in time for complex analyses 

characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity. Three constituent 

technologies—natural man-machine interfaces, knowledge representation, and human-guided algorithms—are briefly discussed below. 

Natural Man-Machine Interfaces 

Effective interfaces between the user/operator and the computer is 

needed whether it is for a soldier in combat or an analyst confronted 

with a “haystack” of data within which he/she is searching for the 

proverbial “needle.” An understanding of how humans interpret and 

understand data to create useful information in both time-pressured 

and life-threatening environments is essential for progress. The 

interface should be transparent and intuitive to the human and be 

supported by context-sensitive cues or some other reach-back 

knowledge management capability so that only the most relevant and 

timely data are presented. The modalities for interaction will expand 

beyond the visual, to include voice and speech, tactical, and other 

concepts (e.g., psychophysical context or physiological measurements 

of operator “state”). Thus, the mode of interaction could be keyed in 

part by the physiological state. There is significant activity outside 

DOD in gaming, weather forecasting, financial analysis, and energy 

exploration that can contribute to developing these interfaces. 
26 I CHAPTER 4 

Knowledge Representation 

To allow the human and computer to truly collaborate, it is necessary 

to improve the ability to represent human knowledge in a manner that a 

computer can both store and use. Knowledge representation has been 

recognized for decades as a key enabler for the tractability of machine 

reasoning including decision-making, data mining, hypothesis 

generation/affirmation/negation, and search. There has been significant 

research in this area for a number of years, largely directed at trying to 

model/replicate human cognitive tasks in computer hardware. The field 

of artificial intelligence has been one of the prime drivers. There is still 

much to be done, and, as with the man-machine interface area, there is 

significant activity outside the DOD. For military applications, 

knowledge representation challenges include representing commander’s 

intent and tactics and representing political, military, economic, cultural, 

and religious characteristics of an operational environment and the 

relationships among them. 

Human-Guided Algorithms 

Automated (purely algorithmic) solutions to complex, large-scale 

problems such as image analysis and understanding for exploitation, 

connecting the dots for higher levels of fusion, and generating real-time 

plans for command and control applications (including tasking 

exploitation resources) often fall short. The primary reasons are (1) the 

inability of algorithm designers to build-in the broad set of models 

required to capture the richness of real-world problems, and (2) the 

heuristics required to trim the huge search spaces involved.6

 

A traditional approach to addressing these shortcomings has been 

to model the way that operators (humans) solve these problems 

through cognitive task analysis and to build software that embodies 

and/or supports those human-centric approaches. This approach often 

falls short due to the difficulty of building software that mimics 

complex human decision-making strategies. 

 

6. Heuristics are the “rules of thumb” that can be applied to a data set based on what the 

operator is looking for and the nature of the database (s). 
CONTEXTUAL EXPLOITATION I 27

An alternative approach—referred to here as “human-guided 

algorithms”—is to augment algorithmic approaches with operator 

insight into models and heuristics that are highly context-dependent. 

That is, in developing algorithmic approaches it is nearly impossible for 

the algorithm designer to anticipate and build in models and heuristics 

for all possible contexts—though designers are often able to build 

many that are broadly applicable across contexts and to build-in a finite 

set of context-specific algorithms. 

Human-guided algorithms—that is, algorithms that can adjust based 

on human operator requests—have “hooks” built in and associated 

human-system interface (aka GUI) mechanisms that allow operators to 

participate in decision-making. The software for these solutions must 

be designed to accommodate these interactions. Furthermore, the 

solution must be “instrumented” with additional data structures to tag 

the solution in order to indicate which models and heuristics were 

employed in developing the solution. This information will give the 

operator insight as to why and how a specific solution was developed. 

This area is in the very early stages of development and falls into 

the high-risk category. However, success with this technology is likely 

to pay significant dividends in reducing analysis and decision times in 

uncertain and ambiguous circumstances. 

Observations and Recommendations: 

 Contextual Exploitation ______________________________________ 

More so than any of the other capabilities, contextual exploitation 

will benefit from advances in the commercial sector. Current networking 

technology will continue to evolve rapidly based on market demands and 

worldwide competition. Development of business intelligence and 

network-searching algorithms will continue to respond to marketplace 

demands. The imminent appearance (in the 2010 timeframe) of key 

technologies opens many new paths. Exabyte storage will enable 

collection of data approaching that of the human brain. Terabyte-persecond data transport rates will enable rapid collection of data to support 

new algorithms and advanced analysis. Petabyte processing will enable 

rapid computation and association of disparate data. 
28 I CHAPTER 4 

The current programming and management of contextual 

exploitation within DOD are not well focused despite the many, but 

scattered efforts in the military services and defense agencies. There 

exists no structured governance or coherent planning across the 

department. One formidable challenge is how to account for and 

address issues of protecting privacy and other civil rights. Also, the 

potential for new threats based on technology surprise is significant, 

especially since adversaries can operate in an environment where they 

are less constrained by legal or moral scruples yet enjoy wide access to 

advanced information technologies. 

Rapid improvement requires establishing effective new connections 

between communities that do not easily communicate—the soldier and 

a new discipline of scientist. A related challenge is how to identify 

quality practitioners and deliver the potential their expertise can bring 

to the effort. 

Recommendations to DOD include the following: 

 Conduct a major review of ongoing efforts to prioritize, integrate 

as necessary, and identify areas where additional funding can 

accelerate maturation of key technologies. 

 Establish goals and metrics to monitor progress; such as exabyte 

storage, terabyte-per-second data transfer, seconds-to-minutes 

analysis/decision cycle time. 

 Relax restrictive rules for obtaining access to new sources of 

technology coming from outside DOD and often outside of the 

United States. 

 Recruit non–DOD partners—the Departments of Health and 

Human Services, Homeland Security, Transportation, Justice, 

State, and Commerce, as well as private entities—as sources, 

developers, and users. 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 29

Chapter 5. 

Rapidly Tailored Effects 

The three capabilities already described will enhance the ability of 

U.S. forces in the coming years to act, apply force, and cause effects in 

nearly any circumstance. Understanding the human terrain, ubiquitous 

observation, and rapid extraction and interpretation of data will 

facilitate actions that will produce desired effects and avoid the 

counterproductive. The actions could be defensive as well as offensive, 

non-lethal as well as lethal. 

During the Cold War, DOD focused on a “greatest threat” capability 

directed against a well-known adversary. To address the emergence of an 

expanded class of adversary, and the challenges of asymmetric warfare, 

DOD is currently in the fledgling stages of building a broader range of 

action options applicable to an uncertain future. 

The complexities of the 21st century and the challenges in countering 

a wide range of adversaries operating within an equally wide range of 

societal and political environments demands an extensive “tool kit” of 

action options. The desired, enriched set of options should be 

instantaneously deliverable, scalable in scope and effect, applicable from 

tactical to strategic, useable by a broad range of friendly forces, and 

feasible and affordable in a long war environment (from pre- through 

post-conflict). 

The study identified three areas not well covered by the current 

toolkit of action options. These are (1) enhancing the ability of U.S. 

forces to conduct non-kinetic operations aimed at influencing the local 

populace, (2) delivering conventional strikes with great precision and 

timeliness from afar, and (3) mitigating the effects of WMD attacks. The 

first is in recognition of the growing importance of non-kinetic 

operations, the second is in order to provide new strike options when 

local access is denied, and the third is to address the most potentially 

devastating attacks. 
30 I CHAPTER 5 

Influence Operations 

U.S. military forces (and other U.S. government agencies) must 

become more proficient in the so-called non-kinetic operations, and 

integrate these with the more traditional combat operations. Non-kinetic 

operations include information operations, defined as “The integrated 

employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare, Computer 

Network Operations, Psychological Operations, Military Deception, and 

Operations Security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human 

and automated decision-making while protecting our own.”7

 This 

definition, and the definition found in the Joint Information Operations 

Publication 3-13, both focus on operations directed against the adversary. 

However, non-kinetic operations involve much more than 

operations directed at the adversary. To a great extent they are aimed at 

the indigenous population at large in the theater of operations. The 

intent is to win respect and trust, and eventually hearts and minds, in 

order to isolate the adversary from the populace. In conducting these 

non-kinetic operations, U.S. forces on the ground are the face of 

America to the local populace, serving multiple and diverse roles such 

as policemen, health and civil service providers, trainers, negotiators, 

consensus builders, mayors, intelligence collectors, and spokespersons. 

In this sense, these non-kinetic operations (called influence operations 

in this report) can be considered strategic communications at the 

tactical and operational levels. DOD should be working very closely 

with other U.S. government agencies and allies in this area. 

Training and continuous learning at all levels, as discussed in 

chapter 2, is critically important in order to make each soldier a 

“transmitter” of the desired messages, through both words and deeds. 

While the tools that are normally part of psychological operations 

(pamphlets, loud speakers, press releases) are likely to support future 

influence operations, new tools are needed. Goals are to be better able 

to predict and measure the effects of these operations and to anticipate 

the non-kinetic effects of kinetic actions. 

 

7. Department of Defense Information Operations Roadmap, 30 October 2003. 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 31

An ensemble of methods and models must be integrated within a 

decision support framework to help commanders at all levels plan for, 

conduct, and assess the results of these influence operations. 

Technologies include kinetic and non-kinetic cause-effect models; 

campaign planning/targeting/shaping tools; storytelling, gisting and 

advanced visualization technologies; and decision support tools to deal 

with complexity and uncertainty 

Time-critical Conventional Strike 

The challenges of anti-terrorism, counter insurgency, shaping the 

choices of emerging powers, and countering the acquisition or use of 

WMD drive the need to quickly deliver a conventional strike against 

time-critical targets. In many cases this need may arise when U.S. forces 

are not deployed to any significant degree in the required area of 

operations, thus adding the requirement that such a strike has to be able 

to be delivered from afar, while still maintaining the required timeline and 

precision. What is required is the ability to reach out with a rapidly 

delivered, precise conventional strike against a person, vehicle, building, 

or facility when allied forces may not be in the region of interest or when 

entry has been denied. Useful metrics for such a capability would be: 

 response time of less than a half hour (total time to impact, 

including decision time) 

 standoff range greater than 1,000 kilometers 

 delivery accuracy in meters or less 

 no local support requirements 

 highly discriminating control and minimization of 

counterproductive effects 

Response options include land- or sea-based ballistic missiles, airor surface-launched hypervelocity cruise missiles, space- or terrestrialbased directed energy, and long-range (intercontinental) guns. In some 

cases the technology is mature (ballistic missiles) and in others more 

development is needed (hypervelocity and directed energy). 
32 I CHAPTER 5 

Enabling technologies include directed energy, high energy lasers, 

ballistic missile propulsion and guidance, scalable warheads, and 

hypersonic flight of either transport or launch vehicle. 

If the timeliness of the weapon is going to be useful, then the 

timeliness of decision-making also needs to be addressed. The use of 

technology to aid in difficult decision-making in complex multidimensional situations must accompany any effort to develop the 

weapon component of rapid conventional strike. 

WMD Protection and Mitigation 

The accelerating global proliferation of WMD and associated 

delivery technologies requires a comprehensive approach to war fighter 

and system protection, consequence management, and continuity of 

operations. Proficiency in these areas contributes to deterring 

adversaries, and can also be applied in responses to natural catastrophes 

for which DOD has a critical supporting role. 

The task force’s assessments of critical constituent technologies 

benefited from the comprehensive Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study 

on Reducing Vulnerability to Weapons of Mass Destruction. One of that report’s 

conclusions was that effective and rapid restoration and recovery are the 

cross-cutting capabilities needed with respect to all four modalities of 

attack addressed in the study (chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear). Another concern, which has emerged in other recent studies, is 

the possibility of massive disruption of communication and other 

functions caused by an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Attaining the 

needed capabilities will require the development of rapid diagnostics 

and environmental assessment, the application of broad-spectrum 

medical countermeasures (for pre- and post-exposure), rapid 

decontamination protocols, and a renewed focus on maintaining or 

restoring functionality after a nuclear attack. 

Rapid Diagnostic and Environmental Monitoring Tools 

 Effective crisis management during a WMD attack requires 

knowledge of the nature and extent of the attack. Needed are methods 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 33

and procedures for rapid, minimally invasive screening of biological, 

chemical, or radiological exposure. The performance goals are to have 

test results from individuals available within minutes and of the 

environment within hours. Furthermore, such screening should be 

simple enough to be performed by non-professionals. 

Broad Spectrum Medical Countermeasures 

As illustrated by the anthrax attack of 2001, post-event treatment for 

a biological attack currently requires weeks to months of active medical 

intervention for each victim. The goal is to substantially shorten the time 

to respond with medical countermeasures—to hours and days. Broadspectrum, active, and passive countermeasures (drugs and vaccines) for 

protection from exposure to chemical and biological agents are needed, 

but in many cases the fundamental knowledge is lacking. 

Technological and process advances are needed in the areas of drug 

testing, approval, simulation, and modeling tools to speed and better 

inform scientific investigations. Future progress will depend on active 

collaboration with researchers in academia and the biomedical industry. It 

may also be possible to develop countermeasures that reduce radiation 

exposure deaths substantially. Preliminary medical science investigations 

have shown some promise. 

Rapid Decontamination 

Restoring operations in a timely and safe manner is crucial to 

minimizing the impact of a WMD event or similar crisis. Directed research, 

development, and technology transition should aim to improve 

decontamination activities to reconstitute operations within 15 minutes to 

one hour, with 99 percent assurance. In using a layered approach to rapid 

reconstitution, methods and procedures should include isolation through 

early warning as well as integrated design features to actively and passively 

protect and/or decontaminate areas, people, systems, surfaces, and 

infrastructures. Decontamination processes are different for chemical or 

biological exposures than for radiological or nuclear exposure. There is a 

pressing need for additional work to define standards and processes for 

cleanup for each modality using currently available technologies. 
34 I CHAPTER 5 

Maintaining or Restoring Functionality after a Nuclear Attack 

A nuclear attack has the capacity to inflict substantially greater 

damage than other means of attack. Potential and declared nation state 

adversaries have an incentive to pursue nuclear weapons in order to 

counter U.S. conventional military superiority, much the same as the 

United States had during the Cold War to counter the Soviet Union. 

The destructiveness of a nuclear weapon places a high premium on 

detecting nuclear weapons and material from a distance so that they can 

be intercepted and disarmed before they detonate. While such detection 

is challenging, nuclear materials have unique properties that can be 

exploited for remote detection. 

Mitigation and recovery of the effects of a nuclear attack were 

studied during the Cold War, but much of that expertise has been lost. 

Since the end of the Cold War, inadequate attention has been paid to 

nuclear and electromagnetic radiation hardening and operational 

workarounds. Over the past decade, investments at the Department of 

Energy have advanced the state-of-the-art in simulating both a nuclear 

event and the impact on critical electronics important to U.S. nuclear 

weapons capabilities. However, the expert community and the 

supporting test facilities in this area are proving unsustainable because 

of the lack of “user pull.” 

Both the Congressionally mandated Electromagnetic Pulse 

Commission8

 and a recent Defense Science Board (DSB) study9 have taken 

DOD to task for its neglect of nuclear survivability. Recommendations for 

remedying the situation have been made and some concurring actions 

regarding EMP have recently been initiated by the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense. But the spectrum of concerns extends beyond EMP and needs 

to be addressed more thoroughly. 

 

8. Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States of Electromagnetic 

Pulse (EMP) Attack, July 2004. 

9. Nuclear Weapon Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation, Defense Science Board 

Report, April 2005 
RAPIDLY TAILORED EFFECTS I 35

Recommendations: Rapidly Tailored Effects ___________________________ 

The task force’s recommendations for influence operations are 

closely related to those in chapter 2. Specifically: 

 DOD should undertake a major research and tool 

development effort to understand and enhance the training and 

execution (including assessing results) of influence and related 

non-kinetic operations. This should include developing credible 

“cause-effect” models. 

 DARPA and the service laboratories, working with U.S. 

Strategic Command and other combatant commanders, 

should expand emphasis for dealing with uncertainty and 

ambiguity in decision support tool development and for 

providing credible “cause-effect” models. Good use should 

be made of advances in the commercial sector. 

For time-critical conventional strike the next step is for DOD to 

develop a comprehensive plan to evolve this capability. The plan 

should encompass both nearer term options and radically new potential 

capabilities that could result from R&D in directed energy or other 

technologies. The plan should be supported by a careful systems 

analysis of the various options, using quantitative measures of 

effectiveness and spanning all of the critical issues including the 

requisite real-time decision-making. 

The task force recommends the following for improving WMD 

protection and mitigation: 

 Building on the modalities panel report in Volume II of the 

Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities 

to Weapons of Mass Destruction (which provides more detail on 

each recommendation), DOD, in partnership with other key 

federal agencies, should: 

- Increase medical surge capabilities through coordinating 

existing assets, broadening the cadre of trained personnel, 

and developing rapid diagnostics and broad spectrum 

treatments. 
36 I CHAPTER 5 

- Increase preparedness for crisis communications by 

preplanning content and improving regional communication 

systems. 

- Institute multi-level planning to prepare regional response 

assets and enable rapid integration of federal support. 

- Reassess restoration processes and cleanup standards

for a range of WMD attack scenarios. 

 DOD leadership should re-instate nuclear survivability as 

a security requirement in critical war fighting and support 

functions. 
TECHNOLOGY PUSH I 37

Chapter 6. 

Game-Changing Technology Push 

The history of advances in military capabilities is filled with 

examples of technical “game changers” whose impact was not—and 

most often, could not be—anticipated. The fission bomb produced an 

increase of about 103 in explosive yield compared with the largest 

conventional bombs at the time. The fusion secondary produced 

another increase of 103

 beyond fission bombs. Each of those increases 

was large enough to change the existing strategic military paradigm. 

Over the last three decades, the capital cost per computer operation 

per second has decreased by something on the order of 109

, as has the 

cost per bit of data storage, while the speed of operations has increased 

by at least 103

. These increases in computing performance will eventually 

lead to paradigm-changing uses of computers. But as yet, computers are 

still being used largely as substitutes for existing capabilities, and only just 

starting to be used for entirely new capabilities. 

Thus, a balanced S&T strategy should maintain a healthy 

“technology push” component, as well as the operational or capability 

pull. A focus on technology push can discover game-changing 

capabilities enabled by technology advances—both to exploit new 

technology opportunities for use by U.S. forces and, equally important, 

to assure that the United States is not surprised by its adversaries. 

As a necessary complement to the mission-driven perspective that 

is the focus of this report, DOD must keep abreast of the most rapidly 

changing and emerging technologies. Today these technologies include 

biology (where DOD also lags behind other government organizations 

and the private sector), nanotechnology, and information technology 

(that continues to expand in spite of decades of advances). Synergistic 

combinations of these technologies might someday produce truly 

revolutionary capabilities, in areas such as human performance 

enhancement, medical treatment and prophylaxis, miniaturization, life 

extension, robotics, and machine intelligence. 
38 I CHAPTER 6 

Figure 4 provides an example of the bio-nano-info opportunity 

space. The rectangles indicate the individual technology area with an 

example military capability that might be developed using that particular 

technology. The ovals represent capabilities that derive from the 

synergy of two or three of these high-rate-of-change technologies. 

Figure 4. “Technology Push” Examples in the Bio-Nano-Info Nexus 
Part II 

Strategic Technology Planning and 

Rapid Technology Transition 

STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY PLANNING I 41

Chapter 7. 

Strategic Technology Planning 

 bringing technologists and users closer together

This study interpreted strategic technology planning broadly, not 

limiting this function merely to developing a plan to guide S&T 

investments. Rather, it encompasses how technology should play in the 

wider arena of DOD planning. Today, DOD has numerous processes 

in place to shepherd the S&T process, but current practices and 

processes are not adequate to meet 21st century operational challenges. 

Problems and concerns include the following: 

The Secretary of Defense has stated a goal of “technological 

superiority and no technical surprises,” but there is no supporting 

vision for technology developed below this top-most 

conceptualization. 

There is relevant and valuable S&T activity, but no over-arching 

DOD-wide strategic technology plan with assigned responsibility, 

accountability, and metrics. 

There is a plethora of published DOD guidance and documentation 

of S&T goals and activities, but they serve less to guide than merely 

to catalog underway S&T activities. 

There is recognition of the significance (to us and our enemies) of 

the commercial and global technology marketplace, but no effective 

processes and incentives to identify and evaluate commercial 

technology to meet DOD needs or inform new opportunities. 

There are emerging activities to understand better how our 

adversaries might exploit technology, but not the comprehensive 

effort needed to stay ahead of adaptive adversaries. 
42 I CHAPTER 7 

The DOD S&T enterprise has not yet adapted to the post–Cold 

War and post–9/11 challenges posed by multiple and diverse 

adversaries exploiting and adapting to rapidly changing 

technological and operational opportunities. 

The technology community is responsive to defined capability 

needs, but future joint concepts and capability needs are not 

developed with an informed understanding of the technological 

possibilities. 

The current DDR&E organization works hard to deal with 

process reviews, oversight, and day-to-day emergencies, but has 

little time left for strategic thinking and planning. 

DARPA remains a source of technological innovation and risk 

taking, but a “fear of failure” culture in much of the rest of 

DOD’s S&T community is not conducive to the informed risk 

taking necessary to meet the new security challenges. 

DOD is responding to the urgent need of applying technology to 

the challenges faced by war fighters in today’s operations, but not 

enough planning is conducted to apply lessons learned through 

these experiences and institutionalize a robust capability to more 

rapidly insert technology into ongoing operations that could be 

sustained for the long haul (decades). 

What is Needed? 

DOD’s mission solutions—new operational concepts and the 

vision of longer-term desired capabilities—should be inspired by a 

deeper understanding of (1) what technology can do for U.S. military 

capabilities and (2) how adversaries can exploit global technologies for 

their own advantage. Otherwise, opportunities are missed and 

“unpleasant” surprises are more likely. 

Concurrently, DOD’s S&T activities and investments should be 

more directly informed by DOD’s strategic goals and top-level 

missions. To be so informed will require DOD’s technology 

community to think about solutions at the major mission level and not 

just respond to specified requirements or identified capability needs. 
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY PLANNING I 43

The missions referred to here are the capital “M” missions—a long war 

against terrorists, dealing with rogue states with weapons of mass 

destruction, or defending the homeland, for example. 

This study offers two sets of recommendations to accomplish these 

objectives—one set recommending the creation of portfolio strategists 

and a second set addressing how to enrich DOD’s capacity to identify, 

understand, and exploit technology opportunities, especially those that 

exist outside of DOD’s domain. The first set is described in this 

chapter, the second in chapter 8. 

These recommendations neither fine tune the details of existing 

processes nor invent totally new ones. Instead they introduce new 

“forcing functions” into existing processes to strengthen mission pull 

and technology push—both of which are needed. 

At the heart of these recommendations is a central theme—

the Department of Defense can meet the strategic challenges of 

the 21st century only with a closer coupling of technologists and 

users (including requirements and capabilities developers). 

Such collaboration can engender strategic, horizontally-integrating 

technology visions that are informed by concept and capability 

development and that inform strategy as well. Without an overarching 

strategic technology context, DOD will be unable to choose wisely 

among competing technological vectors and identify needed capabilities 

and enablers. 

Accomplishing this vision entails returning to an earlier successful 

model of inserting DOD’s technology community as front-end peer 

collaborators in the concept development and requirements processes. 

This collaboration can be enabled by creating a top-level missionoriented mindset within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]). 
44 I CHAPTER 7 

Mission-Focused Portfolios 

The emerging partnership between the USD (AT&L) and the Vice 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), to link future requirements to 

capabilities across the DOD enterprise, would be significantly enhanced 

with the addition of a dedicated capacity to: 

 anticipate the technological possibilities across a range of 

domains, time-horizons, and challenges, for the United States, 

its allies and partners, and its potential adversaries 

 identify those technological possibilities that could create new 

capabilities key to meeting the broad challenges 

 identify any disconnects between desired capabilities and 

technology availability 

 propose investment strategies, cutting across the DOD 

enterprise, balancing risk and reward, to secure the technologies 

needed over time 

 shape decisions for investment and disinvestment driven by 

available resources, shifting strategies, or outdated or flawed 

concepts 

These functions could be provided by a few sets of top-level, 

mission-oriented, portfolio strategists. This mission-focused approach 

was used with considerable success in the 1960s and 1970s within the 

offices of the DDR&E (when that job had roughly the scope of the 

current USD [AT&L]). Its strategic and tactical offices played leading 

roles in devising and overseeing portfolios based on a wide, end-to-end 

perspective of a major mission—deterring nuclear strikes by the Soviet 

Union and assuring the U.S. commitment to Europe. 

Consider deterring nuclear strikes by the Soviet Union as an 

example. This mission relied largely on the development and 

deployment of strategic nuclear retaliatory forces, to include specialized 

intelligence collection, global communication means, and command 

arrangements. This high dependence upon relatively novel technical 

means led to a central role in requirements decision-making by technical 

leaders in the Department of Defense and those national laboratories 
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY PLANNING I 45

engaged in nuclear weapons development. Those leaders routinely 

discussed problems, progress, and choices with those in the 

requirements generation chain of command, including the Secretary of 

Defense, and with the President of the United States as well. The home 

office of the head of the U.S. arms control negotiating team was located 

within the offices of the DDR&E. 

Aircraft equipped to deliver nuclear weapons were acquired through 

existing organizations. However, the nuclear-capable missile programs 

in all three military services were executed through newly-established, 

special-purpose acquisition organizations. Similarly, ballistic missile 

defense programs were conducted by dedicated organizations, largely in 

the Army. All of these special acquisition teams were, to varying 

degrees, monitored and controlled directly by the portfolio strategists of 

the DDR&E Strategic Office. 

In addition to these hardware acquisition teams, there were many 

dedicated teams of technical personnel that devoted intense study to 

identifying unsuspected difficulties in executing retaliatory strikes and to 

devising solutions to suspected problems. DARPA was established in 

1958 in response to the “technical surprise” of the Soviet Sputnik 

satellite program. In its early days DARPA focused on ballistic missile 

defense and directed energy—both of which are just now becoming 

fielded weapons. 

Moreover, several specialized S&T execution agents were 

established or modified to bolster specific technical aspects of the 

strategic mission capability. Two examples within DOD were the 

Defense Nuclear Agency that performed S&T on nuclear weapons 

effects and the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) Security Program 

that performed S&T on those aspects of anti-submarine warfare related 

to the SSBN force, to assure its survivability. In both cases, the 

Strategic Office of DD&RE exercised direct technical direction as well 

as funding and policy oversight. Moreover, the DDR&E Strategic 

Office received the knowledge generated by this specialized S&T and 

used it to inform decisions on major weapons programs. 
46 I CHAPTER 7 

However, since the mid 1980s, the organization of the USD (AT&L) 

changed from a mission-oriented to a function-oriented basis. Reestablishing such a mission-orientation would be of great benefit to DOD, 

but the study recognizes that it will require staffing and cultural change. 

Recommendation: Mission-Focused Portfolios __________________________ 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should 

create a small set (no more than five) of mission-focused portfolio 

activities. 

Purpose and Products 

The small set of mission-focused portfolio activities should cover 

all major missions. Each portfolio would focus on a top-level DOD 

mission/challenge. The portfolio strategists would advise the USD 

(AT&L) and the VCJCS by providing a long-term, integrated 

enterprise-wide view of technology and capability opportunities in their 

specific mission area. 

These portfolio strategists would lay out a hedging strategy, 

anticipating measures and countermeasures from the near- to far-term. 

They would identify synergies, opportunities, and threats, some of which 

may be missed within the more formal top-down processes. They would 

sponsor analyses, red teaming, and technical net assessment and would 

have support from federally funded research and development centers. 

They would recommend experiments to understand risks and reduce 

uncertainty. They would develop metrics to measure progress. They 

would make investment and divestment recommendations and need to 

be empowered to have influence on funding. 

Their products would be used to develop and update a missionoriented strategic technology plan, inform concept development, and 

help drive doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and 

education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). 
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY PLANNING I 47

Staffing and Organization 

The strategy for each mission would be created and sustained by a 

small staff, reporting to the USD (AT&L). They would have no direct 

authority, nor any direct fiscal control, over the S&T budget, except as 

provided thru the USD (AT&L) under current rules and regulations. 

The cadre would be staffed with permanent spaces under the USD 

(AT&L) of AT&L civilians and uniformed personnel identified by the 

VCJCS. 

The cadre would establish a day-to-day working relationship with 

the combatant commanders, military services, Joint Staff, and others 

who are engaged in the business of developing mission operational 

strategies and mission functional capabilities. Strategic technology 

portfolio members would need to develop domain experience and a 

working knowledge of the mission operational strategy. At the same 

time, they will be required to have the technology expertise necessary to 

relate to the AT&L side of the organization. 

Using the Portfolios to Derive a DOD Strategic Technology 

Plan 

One of the products of the portfolio teams would be an overall 

strategic technology plan, which should: 

 establish the state of DOD’s current technology base as it 

relates to the major mission areas 

 derive the projected technology needs identified over time 

across the missions 

 enumerate the resulting technology gaps and the resources 

(time, money, people) and partnerships with others, necessary 

to close these gaps and create opportunities 

 identify the metrics necessary to track closure of the gaps 

Implied in this process is the need to anticipate technology 

advances and to anticipate how potential adversaries will adapt to these 

advances. This task is dynamic, as is the task of tracking metrics and 

continually updating the plan. 
48 I CHAPTER 7 

In order to translate the mission portfolio work into a strategic 

technology plan, cross-mission analyses will have to be undertaken, 

looking for cross-mission gaps and overlaps in technology, over a 20 

year time span. In addition, input from the “prospecting” and 

“speculating” functions of the technology development enterprise 

(described in the following chapter) should identify new technology 

thrusts capable of enabling entirely new capabilities, not identified via 

the mission perspective. As a product of the USD (AT&L) and VCJCS 

mission portfolio analysis, this plan will have a well-grounded mission 

context and be informed by operational requirements and technological 

possibilities—much more than just an amalgamation of the services’ 

strategic technology plans. 

An important element of the plan should be to describe the role of 

DOD’s S&T community in meeting the following imperative stated in 

the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review: “to work with other government 

agencies, allies, and partners and, where appropriate, to help them 

increase their capacities and capabilities and the ability to work together.” 

Benefits 

Adopting a mission-portfolio approach and establishing a cadre of 

mission-portfolio strategists will create an environment where the user 

and technology communities can integrate viewpoints. It would 

strengthen the emerging USD (AT&L) and VCJCS partnership that is 

working to better connect future requirements to capabilities to 

technologies across the DOD enterprise. 

As the mission-portfolio strategists accomplish their tasks, it will 

foster interaction with the combatant commanders, the force providers, 

the technology developers, the Joint Staff, and other elements of the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. It would inform and motivate 

national strategy by suggesting strategic and tactical opportunities 

derived from their newly identified technology thrusts. It will inform 

the requirements community when a particular operational construct is 

better replaced by an emerging alternative. Additionally, it would help 

inform choices to be made by the Secretary of Defense on resource 

constrained strategic priorities by providing a coherent and strategically 

relevant technology framework. 
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY PLANNING I 49

Challenges 

The major challenge will be assembling the right leaders and staff. 

They should be handpicked by the USD (AT&L) and VCJCS and drawn 

broadly from the DOD community, including technologists, futurists, 

strategic planners, operators, and analysts. In any job of this scope, 

stabilized tours of several years in order to master the complexities are 

needed for success. These strategy groups will have little impact unless 

the USD (AT&L) values their products and empowers them. 

The major mission focus advocated in this report is not the only way 

to organize portfolios. However, the task force argues that it is the best 

way to accomplish the twin goals of (1) having concept and capability 

development more informed by technology opportunity and (2) having 

technology activities more directly influenced by the department’s major 

challenges. These mission-oriented portfolios could coexist profitably 

with functionally-focused portfolios within a matrix environment. 
50 I CHAPTER 8 

Chapter 8. 

Technology Opportunities 

  expanding the number of technology opportunities 

The previous chapter described the importance of bringing 

technologists and users closer together through the establishment of 

portfolio strategists, whose activities ultimately lead to a department-wide 

strategic technology plan. A necessary complement to these activities is to 

increase DOD’s capacity to identify, understand, and exploit the 

operational potential of technology. This cannot be obtained by focusing 

on DOD’s S&T program alone. Where once the department had 

numerous technology development institutions that covered most of the 

relevant technology domains, today gaps have emerged for several reasons, 

including the growth of the commercial technology market place. 

Thus, a second theme of this study is this: DOD’s technology 

community must increase its capacity to understand and exploit 

technology opportunities, especially those that exist outside of 

DOD’s domain. 

This study characterizes six types of contributors to such a capacity: 

 Developer. Responds to requirements. There are many of these, 

mostly within the military services and also in the defense 

agencies. 

 Innovator. Pursues the demonstration of new, technically 

challenging high payoff capabilities, in response to current or 

anticipated needs. DARPA is the prime example. 

 Speculator. Funds “bottoms-up” discovery to create disruptive 

breakthroughs in DOD areas; not directly requirements driven; 

often high risk; and typically requiring sustained investments 

over substantial time horizons. DARPA does some of this; 

more is needed DOD-wide. 

 Prospector. Finds U.S. and foreign commercial solutions to 

address current needs; informs funding agents of what’s 
TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITIES I 51

available now. Although this capability currently exists on an 

occasional and hoc basis throughout DOD and the intelligence 

community, it does not exist on a permanent basis and with an 

enterprise-wide perspective.10 

 Worrier/Anticipator. Explores how foes could use technology 

to field capabilities disruptive to U.S. goals. This function 

involves S&T intelligence to help understand what adversaries 

are doing, red teaming to identify what adversaries could do, 

and net assessments to understand the consequences. This 

activity needs to be connected to decision makers so its 

products can inform major program and operational decisions, 

as well as shape intelligence collection. Current efforts in this 

area are far short of what is needed. 

 Expeditor. Enables very rapid (less than two years but could be 

as short as weeks and months) fielding of capabilities to meet 

needs of ongoing operations. A numbers of such activities have 

been created recently to meet demands of current operations, 

but these largely ad hoc enterprises do not appear to be robust 

enough to sustain a rapid fielding capability over the long term. 

 The DOD is well positioned with two of these functions—

developer and innovator. The other four need to be either enhanced or 

created. This chapter describes ways to enhance the speculator, 

prospector, and anticipator functions at DOD. The expeditor function 

is discussed in chapter 9.11

 

10. As an example of this function, the Navy has a group of globally-based individuals 

tasked to monitor relevant foreign technologies. 

11. Further discussion of these functions can be found in Volumes III and IV of this study. 
52 I CHAPTER 8 

Speculator: Developing Potentially Disruptive 

Technologies 

Technology can enable disruptive capabilities, developed either by 

the United States to gain asymmetrical advantage or by its foes to 

thwart U.S. objectives. The DOD needs to get much better at fostering 

the former and anticipating the latter. Often the very technology that 

can provide the United States with a disruptive advantage is itself 

disruptive to DOD’s culture and antibodies form to reject it. 

History shows that creative risk-taking is important in achieving 

disruptive breakthroughs, which in turn are necessary for providing the 

unexpected technology opportunities that enable new, unforeseen war 

fighting capability. Where innovators, such as DARPA, select their 

technology investments based on directly supporting military capability, 

the “speculator” mechanism is meant to fund “bottoms-up” discovery 

in those areas important to DOD but without clear commercial 

application. There is some of this activity going on in the department 

today, but not nearly enough. 

The dictionary defines “disruptive” as the adjective form of the 

verb disrupts, which means to interrupt, separate forcefully, or shatter. 

In application to defense systems, “stealth” could be described as an 

enabling platform and force to “shatter” the cohesiveness of integrated 

air defense and early warning systems. Further, it has the ability to 

“separate forcefully” essential linked capabilities that enable surface-toair missile systems to engage stealth platforms. To continue the 

examples, large-scale integrated circuits could be regarded as disruptive 

when they are employed to “shatter” the cost barriers that limit 

advances in pervasive and large-scale networks and processing. 

A more general discussion of “disruptive” technologies and/or 

capabilities is found in the work of Harvard Business School Professor 

Clayton Christenson.12 Such technologies are either “disruptive” to 

 

12. Clayton M. Christenson, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause 

Great Firms to Fail, Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1997. 
TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITIES I 53

current organizations and cultures and/or are “game changers” in their 

application—an example of which is the case of personal computers 

and multiple, redundant servers replacing mainframes. 

Examples in the world of defense systems include the Global 

Positioning System, cruise missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, 

remotely piloted vehicles, ballistic missile defense, and nuclear weapons. 

Each of these systems made a major change in war fighting capability, 

but was also highly “disruptive” to existing organizations and cultures. 

Unmanned systems versus piloted aircraft and cruise missiles versus 

penetrating bombers are two such examples. 

As would be expected for such counter-cultural cases, the obstacles 

to funding and developing such systems are much greater than those 

encountered in fielding the next generation of a traditional system. 

These obstacles include a lack of understanding, on the part of senior 

leaders, of the game-changing potential of such technologies, along with 

the effects of cultural resistance. Often it takes a fielded prototype in 

the right setting—sometimes in war—to break through the cultural 

barrier and get a well-understood message “up the chain of command.” 

Because of their crucial importance, disruptive technologies and/or 

capabilities require senior leadership attention. In almost all cases, to get 

a “disruptive” capability deployed requires very strong, high-level 

support, as well as an ability to overcome the institutional “systems”—

which, as expected, will fight to resist the cultural change. 

Thus, DOD needs to create an environment to expand, strengthen, 

and protect “speculators” operating on the frontiers, looking for the 

truly disruptive solutions. Critical to success is overcoming the fear-offailure that tends to dominate the development and acquisition culture. 
54 I CHAPTER 8 

Recommendation: Speculator_______________________________________ 

The Secretary of Defense and other senior DOD leadership 

should receive frequent updates on the disruptive potential of 

threats as well as the potential for, and status of, fielding U.S. 

disruptive innovations. 

The DDR&E should make disruptive potential a priority area of 

activity and be the department-wide focal point. 

Working with the military services, defense agencies, and other 

U.S. government S&T communities, the DDR&E should commit 

an additional $200 million per year to this crucial area. The 

DDR&E should also collaborate with the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency and National Nuclear Security Administration experts in the 

areas of nuclear and weapons of mass destruction matters.

Prospector: Technology Reach 

In the new global technology environment, identifying the “lowhanging fruit” that can be acquired or adapted for DOD needs is a 

critically needed capability. The DOD enterprise needs a “prospector” 

capacity designed to find solutions to current needs that are available in 

the non-DOD world. 

Technology is becoming a greater necessity for business competition 

worldwide and international investment in technology is growing. 

Although about half of the world’s investment in research and 

development is still performed in the United States, this percentage is 

getting smaller. Twenty seven percent of U.S. research and development 

is funded by the federal government and less than half of that is funded 

by DOD. About five percent of the scientists and engineers in the United 

States are directly employed by the government. Federal R&D funding 

has been relatively flat for the past 30 years as a percentage of the gross 

domestic product and has decreased from a peak in 1997. 

In recent years, there has been a shift in U.S. DOD R&D 

investments from research into development. The long-term security of 

the nation still depends on DOD being at the leading edge of applying 
TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITIES I 55

the newest in science and technology. In the past, such leading-edge 

technologies came largely from the U.S. government. That has not been 

the case for quite some time and, as indicated in figure 5, much of it is 

now international. 

In contrast to DOD, commercial industry research, until recently, 

has been steadily increasing in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries. The only industry group that receives the 

majority of its S&T funds from the government is the aerospace sector, 

which is relatively less militarily important today than it was during the 

Cold War. In the biological and social sciences, which are of growing 

military importance, the DOD investment is extremely small. 

Source: “International Science and Technology Trends,” Pocket Databook 2000, National Science Foundation 

Figure 5. Science and Technology Investment

The DOD has reduced its oversight of defense industry independent 

research and development (IR&D), requiring no descriptive brochures or 

on-site reviews, making it more difficult to have awareness of what is 

going on, even in DOD-related industry. DOD has less visibility into 

technology developments in commercial industry; one reason being that 

acquisition regulations, intended to prevent corruption, make doing 

business with the DOD very difficult. The use of “other transaction 

authority” can enable commercial firms to more easily undertake business 
56 I CHAPTER 8 

with the DOD.13 However, to acquire foreign technology the DOD must 

also overcome other difficulties. 

Export controls are intended to prevent proliferation of dual-use 

technology but they impede the integration of foreign technology and 

cooperation, and hinder U.S. firms from obtaining economies of scale. 

The “Buy America Act” intended to protect U.S. business, forestall offshoring, and assure trusted sources restricts the use of foreign 

technology and hinders the development of techniques to overcome 

risks of buying offshore. The 1999 DSB report on globalization and 

security contains recommendations that remain valid today and are 

covered in Volume IV of this study. 

In order to again become the leader in using technology, DOD 

must become much more adept at finding and using globally available 

resources, whether funded by U.S. and international industry, academia, 

DOD, or other government agencies. Thus, the department needs to 

create an organized function that can “prospect” commercial, nonDOD, and foreign technologies for good ideas and products. 

Recommendations: Prospector ______________________________________ 

Establish and fund a DDR&E Center for the Application of 

Commercial and Foreign Technology, with a substantial travel 

budget, manned with experienced DOD scientists and engineers with 

foreign language skills and motivated to improve scientific collaboration. 

Re-establish the 1498 database so that DOD S&T activities and 

their associated key personnel can be identified. Locate it at the 

Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and make it available 

online to all DOD scientists and engineers.14 

 

13. The “other transaction authority” allows DOD to enter into contractual arrangements 

called "other transactions" with private sector research and development partners. Other 

transaction agreements are characterized by enhanced flexibility and reduced administrative 

burden when compared with the typical government procurement contract. While initially 

authorized for use by DARPA, this authority has been extended to other DOD organizations. 

14. No longer in use, the DD Form 1498 was generated by DOD principle investigators 

when making internal or contracted research and development investments. The collected 
TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITIES I 57

Expand the use of “other transaction authority” and other means 

to enable commercial firms to undertake business with the DOD. 

Annually, the USD (AT&L) should provide an award to the contracting 

agency that has done the best job of reaching out to commercial and 

international business, similar to the Packard Award. 

Anticipator: Understanding Adversary 

Capabilities 

In addition to developing stronger speculating and prospecting 

functions, the department needs to better understand how foes of the 

United States can exploit the global technology market. The innovative 

integration of widely available technologies is just as worrisome for the 

United States, and potentially just as powerful, as the use of new 

technologies. 

Due to the availability of technology on the global market, U.S. 

adversaries have opportunities to exploit the same technologies as 

DOD. Further, countermeasures to U.S. systems are likely to be 

leveraged off the same global technology base. As more and more 

commercial products are integrated into military systems, these 

conditions are likely to worsen. 

Current adversaries have shown the ability to respond to U.S. 

capabilities and act on their strategic advantage to deploy globallyavailable military systems and technologies in fast, low-cost, and 

innovative ways. Integrative innovation has become commonplace as a 

means to quickly achieve new capabilities without using exotic 

technologies. In addition, the global access to knowledge and quality 

education has made adversaries smarter in areas that directly enhance 

their ability to engineer new solutions. 

 

data, maintained by DTIC, described the objective, approach, and progress of each project 

as well as contact information for those participating in the activity. The database provided 

visibility into R&D efforts throughout DOD. 
58 I CHAPTER 8 

The issue of how adversaries can much more rapidly adapt technology 

into capabilities, as compared to the traditional acquisition cycle in the 

Department of Defense, is one aspect of this environment that must be 

addressed, and is discussed in the next chapter. But even more important is 

the need for DOD to have far better visibility into how adversaries are 

exploiting the rapidly changing technology domain in order to better 

counter these advances and reduce the potential for surprise. 

Success in this area will require deliberate focus on “anticipating” 

how adversaries might exploit technology. Such information gathering 

cannot be conducted in a vacuum within DOD, and certainly cannot be 

done in the common organizational environment that is hostile to any 

disruption of the status quo. Success will require collaboration with the 

intelligence community, as well as with experts outside of the DOD 

community, who can bring insights to red teaming activities and net 

assessments of capabilities and countermeasures. 

The major concern of this study is not the absence of people with 

the foresight and creativeness to anticipate possible threats. The 

problem is the lack of a DOD-wide coherent and comprehensive 

process that (1) identifies and organizes these potential threats in a 

manner that illuminates their relative danger and likelihood and (2) 

presents these results in a way that facilitates senior decision-making 

regarding programs, plans, and intelligence collection. 

There are current activities that can be built upon and learned from. 

The Army has established the University of Foreign Military and Cultural 

Studies at Fort Leavenworth to foster red teaming competence. The 

Navy has a Deep Red project that conducts net assessments for its 

leadership. DDR&E and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

(USD [I]) cosponsor a scientific and technical net assessment program to 

help identify future technology enabled threats to U.S. capabilities. These 

activities should be protected, encouraged, and fully engaged. 
TECHNOLOGY OPPORTUNITIES I 59

Recommendations: Anticipator_____________________________________ 

Establish a much more comprehensive approach to “anticipating” 

how adversaries might exploit technology. This requires increasing 

S&T intelligence to understand what adversaries are doing; conducting 

more and higher quality red teaming to identify what adversaries could 

do; performing net assessments to understand the consequences and 

providing senior-level decision makers access to the results. A first step is 

to assign higher priority and expand the current DDR&E and USD (I) 

Scientific and Technical Net Assessment Program. 
60 I CHAPTER 9 

Chapter 9. Technology Transition to 

Ongoing Operations 

 speeding the transition of technology into fielded capability 

Failure to speed the transition of technology into fielded capabilities 

has consequences. U.S. military forces are not provided what they need to 

anticipate and respond to adaptive adversaries in ongoing operations. 

Major systems enter the field with obsolete technology, reduced quantities, 

and unnecessarily high cost. The high cost destabilizes other programs. 

Delay encourages “requirements creep,” which leads to more delay. The 

department misses opportunities to exploit disruptive technologies. 

The security threats the nation now faces present discontinuities to its 

established science and technology processes, policies, and procedures.15

These processes need to transform from sequential, task-based, and 

budget-cycle-based to ones that are capable of parallel, opportunistic and 

adaptive operations. The “clock speed” of technology transition must 

more closely match that of technology innovation and the cycle time of 

new and emerging multilateral threats on the global battlefield.16

This study addressed the issues of transitioning technology into 

capabilities in two time dimensions: (1) very rapid insertion of new 

capabilities into ongoing operations, which is discussed in this chapter 

and (2) major system acquisition (chapter 10). 

 

15. In The Age of Discontinuity, Peter Drucker forecast the accelerating pace of change faced 

by firms in the 21st century. Those that assume continuity are likely to find keeping up with 

markets difficult or impossible as they are constrained by rules and mental models that no 

longer work. Charles Handy, in the “Age of Unreason,” also makes some interesting related 

comments. The Department of Defense is finding it difficult to meet the “market” needs of the 

war fighter vis-à-vis the threats they face in the global war on terrorism. 

16. In Clock Speed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, Charles Fine 

discusses the varying process speeds of industries. Industries that do not recognize the “clock 

speeds” of the industry/market segments they are in will fail. His concepts are useful in thinking 

about current technology transition processes and the “market” they serve. 
TRANSITION TO ONGOING OPERATIONS I 61

The challenges are different for each. For rapid insertion into 

ongoing operations the challenge is to turn the current improvised and 

temporary approaches into processes and practices robust for the long 

term. For major system acquisition it is to transform long-established 

practices into a process that will cut in half the time it nominally takes 

to field a system. 

Expeditor: Inserting Technology-Enabled 

Capabilities into Ongoing Operations 

The need for rapid technology insertion was not a major concern 

during much of the Cold War, with the exception of the Viet Nam war 

era. But processes and practices created during that war, to facilitate 

speedy introduction of new capabilities, were discarded when the war 

ended and there was a return to business as usual. 

U.S. military forces face new circumstances and adapting adversaries 

every day. Clearly, the need for rapid fielding into ongoing operations has 

become critical. This study assumes it will be a continuing need as the 

nation fights a long war on terrorism and meets other challenges. Thus, 

DOD needs to be able to rapidly insert capabilities over the long haul 

(decades) by establishing processes and practices tailored to this challenge. 

Success will require extraordinary collaboration among war fighters, 

trainers, technologists, operational analysts, systems engineers, and testers. 

To provide a rapid insertion capability today, DOD has created many 

ad hoc “rapid acquisition” programs and initiatives. “Rapid,” in this 

context, means as short as weeks or months, but in any case less than 

two years. These programs, which total over $3 billion per year, include 

service science and technology programs, the Joint Rapid Acquisition 

Cell, the Quick Reaction Special Projects, and the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization, to name a few.17 The products 

from these programs focus on purchasing or integrating existing 

technologies, with minimal, if any, technology development. The main 

 

17. Volume IV contains a description of these and other rapid acquisition programs. 
62 I CHAPTER 9 

challenge is technology integration (components, software, subsystems) 

with doctrine and training to produce new and improved capabilities. 

Not surprisingly, given the challenges, these processes have yielded 

mixed results to date. The successes have engendered a mindset 

oriented toward developing innovative solutions and processes less 

compliant to the structured, “formulaic” approach that underlies the 

traditional acquisition process. 

However, these fragmented processes do not appear robust for the 

long war. A lull in operations will precipitate a back-to-business-as-usual 

(and much more leisurely) approach. Attempts by the traditional 

acquisition community to provide oversight is slowing “rapid acquisition” 

to “faster traditional acquisition” by burdening it with formal 

requirements and approval processes. Prudent oversight is subsumed by 

overly rigid control. 

With the exception of large-scale initiatives such as robotics, most 

rapid reaction solutions are either left in theater or not reused by units in 

other missions. Lessons learned are not widely enough shared. The effect 

is large numbers of solutions to common problems, resulting in duplicative 

efforts and the need for significant “after the fact” integration. 

Other obstacles for current rapid acquisition efforts are fiscal 

resources and overall governance. No joint lead is designated or 

empowered to budget for, oversee, or execute joint rapid acquisition 

programs. Almost by definition, these programs exist outside the 

planning, programming, budgeting, and execution cycle, and can never 

meet its long-lead-time forecasting cycles. As a result, most survive on 

funding supplements to the defense budget. 

Even with adequate funding, most current rapid acquisition 

programs do little beyond purchasing and delivering equipment. 

Training support for rapidly generated solutions is normally confined to 

initial user familiarity with little follow-on or sustainment training. 
TRANSITION TO ONGOING OPERATIONS I 63

Recommendation: Expeditor_______________________________________ 

Create a Rapid Fielding Organization (RFO) to satisfy the growing 

list of war fighter-required needs, over what is anticipated to be an 

extended period of “long war.” Combine most of the current “rapid” 

and “agile” programs into the RFO, leaving some programs 

remaining within the services, but coordinated with the RFO. 

The RFO will be established with a high-level mandate and full 

program and budget authority. Using direct authority from the Secretary 

of Defense, through the USD (AT&L), the RFO will rapidly provide 

combatant commanders with capabilities necessary to conduct joint 

operations. It will field systems and solutions with associated equipping, 

manning and training. Perhaps most importantly, the RFO will provide 

joint institutional focus on achieving rapid response, with memory and 

knowledge-transfer. 

The RFO will be non-conformist in its mode of operation. It will 

be extricated from the complex bureaucracy that encumbers today’s 

traditional acquisition process, including the voluminous requirements 

and extended lead times for study, review, and approval. Keeping such 

an organization as ad hoc as possible will help to achieve this goal.18 

The people required for such an elite organization should be handpicked from among the best in government, the services, the private 

sector, and academia. Experimental Personnel Authority will allow the 

RFO to hire expert program managers from industry at competitive 

salaries and faster-than-normal civil service rules. 

RFO processes will be driven by clear, concise, requirement 

statements provided to the RFO director by the combatant commanders. 

The short review and approval processes will enable quick action. 

 

18. According to a recent study by the Army-DARPA Senior Advisory Group, success of such 

an organization will require the following: (1) adequate and flexible funding, (2) monolithic 

leadership—a single point of decision, (3) strong top cover at the highest level, (4) buy-in by 

the user chain of command, and (5) involvement of the test community at the outset. Source: 

Personal correspondence with L. Lynn based on Transition of Technology Workshop of the 

Army-DARPA Senior Advisory Group. 
64 I CHAPTER 9 

The RFO’s annual appropriated budget should cover development, 

deployment, and training. It also should cover sustainment for only a 

few years, either until the relevant service provides resources for longterm support in the budget, the capability transitions to a program of 

record, or it is divested. However, the RFO will be responsible for 

producing the plans for longer-term sustainment. Such sustainment will 

not always be needed, as “throw away” capabilities will be a feature of 

support of ongoing operations.19

The RFO will have an especially close and continuous relationship 

with its customers, the combatant commanders. In-theater development 

and testing will be required at times. The goal however, will be to insert 

new capabilities into units as they prepare and train for assignment. This 

is the ideal time, as new systems can be coupled with evolving doctrine 

that is constantly driven by operational experience. Such an approach will 

foster continuous learning and entail more use of prototypes and 

surrogates in testing. The essence of this concept is illustrated in figure 6. 

Figure 6. Inserting New Capabilities Rapidly

 

19. Some solutions to immediate war fighter needs will be designed for temporary use and 

will be left in the field. As such, these systems will not need a plan for long-term 

sustainment. 
MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION I 65

Chapter 10. 

Major System Acquisition 

Simply put, traditional DOD acquisition programs take too long. 

Cycle times for new programs have, over the 1996 to 1999 period, 

averaged well over 10 years (the time between Milestone B and initial 

operational capability). 

The causes are well documented: overly ambitious initial 

requirements often exacerbated by requirements growth during 

development; over optimistic cost and schedule estimates; immature 

technology; lack of flexibility to adjust requirements when problems 

arise; funding instability; and lack of consideration of affordability, 

producibility, or sustainability during early development. 

Rapid cycle times are impeded when bureaucracy and process 

substitute for executive leadership. Conflicting lines of authority, 

accountability, and responsibility for committed outcomes contribute to 

a lack of speed and agility in fielding capabilities with new technologies. 

Cultures also tend to resist disruptive technologies in favor of near-term 

and familiar approaches. 

Further challenges include the decline in technical and program 

management expertise in the DOD and, to some degree, in the defense 

industry. Government and industry’s ability to execute complex system 

development programs will be challenged with marginal supply chains, 

quality of workforce issues, and S&T funding pressure in the absence of 

an annual supplemental to the defense budget. 

DOD must become more disciplined and agile in its ability to 

provide timely insertion of technology into major systems. More 

discipline will enable the department to cut in half the time it takes to 

field militarily useful blocks (versions) of a system (to five or six years for 
66 I CHAPTER 10 

block one and five years or fewer between blocks).20 With more agility, 

new technology options can be exploited in subsequent versions to meet 

changing operational challenges. This approach requires the following: 

 bringing issues of cost, technology, manufacturing, and 

integration readiness in early, before deciding what to buy 

 assuring technology readiness by Milestone B 

 controlling appetites for performance in each block 

 relaxing requirements if appropriate during each block to 

protect cost and schedule 

 conducting a vigorous S&T and experimentation effort in 

parallel to create options for new capabilities in future blocks 

Managing “Requirements” 

Issues involving cost, schedule, and risk are not considered early 

enough in the requirements setting process.21 Too often, emphasis is 

placed on performance, with insufficient attention to schedule, 

affordability, supportability, and risk. DOD can adjust its practices and 

processes, as shown pictorially in figure 7, to perform the needed systems 

analysis and systems engineering. Cost, performance, risk, and schedule 

would be addressed within a defined trade space, using modeling, 

simulation, technology demonstrations, and prototyping, as appropriate. 

 

20. The most recent review of the traditional acquisition process was the Defense Acquisition 

Performance Assessment, January 2006. The findings and recommendations from this 

assessment provide a sound basis for improvements. They include: (1) planning the time from 

Milestone B to initial operational capability (IOC) to be no greater than 6 years; (2) greater 

user involvement in the acquisition process; (3) budget flexibility to accelerate programs and 

later spirals; (4) greater visibility by the department leadership into technology maturity; and 

(5) the use of “spiral development” as the norm. 

21. At least two recent Defense Science Board Studies (Report of the Defense Science 

Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National 

Security Space Programs, May 2003 and the Defense Science Board Summer Study on 

Transformation: A Progress Assessment, February 2006) have pointed out deficiencies in the 

“requirements process” as it affects efficient and effective development of military systems. 
MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION I 67

Figure 7. Incorporating Systems Engineering Early in System Development

The need to make informed tradeoffs extends beyond the initial 

requirements setting stage. In the development of military systems, 

unforeseen problems can arise that lead to cost and schedule overruns. 

What is lacking is a process that provides timely decisions to relax 

requirements, including key performance parameters, if necessary to meet 

cost and schedule commitments while still providing a cost-effective and 

militarily-useful system. Hence, there is a tendency to strive to meet key 

performance parameters at the expense of cost and schedule, leading to 

overruns and delays in fielding. 

Recommendation: Managing Requirements ___________________________ 

Milestone Decision Authority must assure that a rigorous systems 

engineering/analysis process underpins input to the requirements 

process. This process includes development planning that relates 

candidate technologies and systems development processes to war fighter 

needs as well as to costs and technology readiness. This approach would 

involve modifying or replacing aspects of the current Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System process.
68 I CHAPTER 10 

Create and enforce a process allowing program managers to 

receive timely decisions on requirements relief during the program 

execution phase for each block, without having to go back to the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). 

Technology Readiness 

To date, Milestone A has been “optional” and infrequently held. 

Thus, DOD’s attention is not adequately focused on the technology 

development phase (from Milestone A to Milestone B). As a result, 

opportunities are lost to provide early risk reduction or to accelerate 

technology development and meet war fighter needs sooner. DOD is 

not following the principles described in the Defense Acquisition 

Guidebook: “...the S&T Program is uniquely positioned to reduce the 

risk of promising technologies before they are assumed in the 

acquisition process.”22 

One consequence is that most DOD systems (platforms, weapons, 

networks, systems-of-systems) start Milestone B with immature 

technologies (below Technology Readiness Level [TRL] 6). These 

programs offer some form of risk mitigation intended to enhance 

performance to TRL 6 after Milestone B approval, but the result typically 

is large schedule slips and significant cost overruns. 

Congress demonstrated its concerns about cost and schedule growth 

in DOD programs through the 2006 Defense Authorization Act, Section 

801. This act requires the USD (AT&L) to certify that needed 

technologies are at TRL 6 or higher, prior to Milestone B. This 

requirement gives the department a new tool in reducing the risk of 

program delay or failure. This same legislation does allow waivers but 

requires that the Milestone Decision Authority notify Congress within 30 

days of the waiver approval. 

 

22 See the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Manufacturing 

Technology Program: A Key to Affordably Equipping the Future Force, February 2006. 
MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION I 69

Recommendation: Technology Readiness _____________________________ 

Make Milestone A mandatory for major systems acquisition. 

A favorable Milestone A decision would not imply the initiation of 

a new acquisition program; a Milestone B decision would still be 

required. 

Plan and execute multiple technology demonstrations to generate 

more options and minimize single points of failure. (These 

demonstrations will require added up-front resources). Address 

affordability, producibility, and supportability to surface potential “cost 

killers” and create concurrent manufacturing and supportability plans and 

cost estimates. Establish a strong partnership and accountability among 

the user (or user representative), the program executive officer, and the 

component S&T executive through a memorandum of agreement at 

Milestone A. Use independent red teams to judge technology readiness; 

manufacturing and integration readiness; and the likelihood of meeting 

performance, cost, and schedule goals. 

Spiral Development 

Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2 defines spiral development 

as a process where “a desired capability is identified, but the end-state 

requirements are not known at program initiation.” Those requirements 

are refined through demonstration and risk management; there is 

continuous user feedback; and each increment provides the user an 

important new capability. The characteristics of future increments depend 

on feedback from users, changes in the security environment, the results of 

experiments, and technology maturation. 

Figure 8 illustrates spiral development. The initial increment or block 

is designed to provide a militarily useful capability quickly and with low 

risk. Its key performance parameters are based on essentially-proven 

technology (TRL 6 or better). Research and development to support 

future blocks is ongoing, and, when ready, milestones for development 

(and subsequently production) of future blocks are conducted. It is a 

process agile enough to accommodate changing operational needs and 

adopt new technology opportunities into future versions. Adequate 
70 I CHAPTER 10 

funding must be provided for research, development, and procurement 

of all blocks. Experimentation plays an important role throughout and 

early involvement of the operational test community is vital. 

Figure 8. Spiral Development

The spiral-development approach is common in industry and not 

new to DOD. Development of surface launched ballistic missiles and 

inter-continental ballistic missiles, which began in the 1950s, had these 

characteristics as did later developments, particularly in aircraft. DOD 

needs to regain this art. Practice and process changes will be required, 

including in budgeting, requirements setting, experimentation, test and 

evaluation, logistics, training, and operational planning. Increased user 

involvement is essential. 
MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION I 71

Recommendation: Spiral Development _______________________________ 

USD (AT&L) direct the following for “traditional” acquisition 

programs: 

Mandate the use of spiral development, entering system design and 

development (SDD) of each block, with mature technology, 

manufacturing, and integration readiness levels—TRL 6, Manufacturing 

Readiness Level 6, and an equivalent level of integration readiness. Plan 

the program to provide the initial operational capability of each block 

within 5 years of the initiation of SDD of that block.

Design programs for minimum schedule. Do not start a program 

until funding consistent with that schedule is available.

Provide program stability in funding, an experienced workforce, 

and program management through a predefined phase of the 

program. 

Provide adequate resources for up-front R&D on future blocks, 

running concurrently with the development of prior blocks. 

Use a modular, open-system approach, so that capability can be 

readily added to the basic system. If future improvements are 

known in advance, program for pre-planned upgrades. More generally, 

be prepared to incorporate spiral upgrades as dictated by 

demonstrations of necessary technologies, changing operational needs, 

and availability of funding (will require a Congressionally-approved 

wedge for application to future spiral upgrades).

Use truly independent, expert review teams for sanity checks. 
72 I CHAPTER 11 

Chapter 11. 

Cross-Cutting Enablers 

This study identified a number of cross-cutting enablers, essential to 

all aspects of technology execution. Without attention to these enablers, 

it will be very difficult for the department to sustain the transformation 

needed in S&T planning and execution. These enablers fit into the 

following areas: 

 Human resources. In-house technical expertise needs to be 

revitalized in order to ensure technological superiority over the 

long-term. 

 Systems engineering. DOD needs to strengthen its systems 

engineering capabilities to oversee the development of complex 

systems-of-systems. 

 Budgets. Budget flexibility is needed to enable an agile process 

that can respond rapidly to new challenges and opportunities. 

 Industrial base. Steps are needed to revitalize internal research 

and development in industry and foster competition. 

 Incentives. Competition, accountability, and earned award fees 

provide incentives to value innovation, speed, agility, and 

prudent risk taking. 

 Ubiquitous connectivity and security. Data, information, and 

knowledge must be able to flow rapidly and securely from all 

sources to all users. 

Human Resources 

Concerns about the state of the K-12 education system in the United 

States have been raised in many studies.23 In its 2001 report, the Hart-

 

23. Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter 

Future. National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of 

Medicine of the National Academies. October, 2005. National Defense Education and
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 73

Rudman Commission raises the problem to the status of a national security 

crisis. The report states: “Second only to a weapon of mass destruction 

detonating in an American city, we see nothing more dangerous than 

failure to properly manage science, technology, and education ... The 

inadequacies of our systems of research and education pose a greater threat 

to our national security ... than any conventional war.”24

The problem is most severe in math and science. As observed in a 

recent National Academies report: “The scientific and technical building 

blocks of our economic leadership are eroding at a time when many 

other nations are gathering strength ... This nation must prepare with 

great urgency to preserve its strategic and economic security.”25 

DOD is among the institutions most vulnerable to the impending 

shortage of highly trained engineers and scientists. The DOD civilian 

corps is particularly vulnerable due to an aging workforce, outsourcing of 

research, and non-competitive pay. There is little career development or 

education (as opposed to training) available for civil servants. On the 

military side, the situation for the acquisition workforce is similar. (In the 

late 1960s, the Air Force ran a Blue Room, focused on the officer corps, 

to ensure the best talent was available for that service’s programs.) 

Skill sets in which there is inadequate supply in DOD include 

systems engineering, including the broader disciplines of systems analysis 

and system-of-systems engineering; biological science; and the broad 

subset of social sciences that deals with organized human behaviors. 

 

Innovation Initiative: Meeting America’s Economic and Security Challenges in the 21st 

Century, American Association of Universities, January 2006. Losing the Competitive 

Advantage? The Challenge for Science and Technology in the United States, AEA, August 

2006. 

24. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report of the U.S. 

Commission on National Security/21st Century. February 15, 2001. 

25. Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter 

Future. 
74 I CHAPTER 11 

Recommendation: Human Resources _________________________________ 

Institute a dedicated career development organization for DOD’s 

technical workforce—military and, especially, civilian—to develop 

and sustain the existing workforce as well as develop and execute 

recruitment strategies to add highly-qualified scientists and 

engineers.26

The Science, Math, and Research for Transformation (SMART) 

National Defense Education Program (NDEP), mandated by 

Congress in 2005, should be protected, expanded, and targeted to 

the most critical DOD needs. 

Expand internship opportunities to foster early institutional ties 

through personal mentoring. Sponsor programs beginning at the 

high-school level, with the goal of reaching 50,000 to 100,000 students 

per year—an investment of $150 million per year.

Systems Engineering 

Systems engineering is the process responsible for managing the tradeoffs necessary to develop and field a system that is affordable, sustainable, 

delivered on schedule, satisfies users’ needs, and minimizes risk The field 

of system engineering, as used in this broad sense, incorporates the 

following as sub-fields: system analysis, system architecture, system test, 

verification and validation, risk mitigation and management, virtual (system 

modeling and simulation driven) engineering, and product development. 

DOD system engineering capability has declined over the past 10 

years.27 Factors contributing to this decline include manpower ceilings 

that were placed on the acquisition workforce following the collapse of 

the Soviet Union, an increase in government outsourcing, and various 

 

26.The Air Force Blue Room activity, used in the late 1960s, is a model, and is described in 

Volume IV. 

27. Supporting references include the Defense Acquisition Personnel Assessment Report, 

March 21, 2006 and Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task 

Force on the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, May 2003. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 75

acquisition reforms. Market forces played a role as well. As senior, 

experienced DOD system engineers retired, or left the field through 

transfers, the vacuum was not filled. 

Recommendations: Systems Engineering______________________________ 

Re-establish the program-level position of chief system engineer, 

properly resourced, and reporting at a senior program level. This 

individual would be responsible and accountable for life cycle tradespace management and all system engineering decisions and actions. 

Re-build the system engineering workforce in government and 

industry. Within DOD, this involves managing system engineering 

careers including: higher pay grades and opportunities for advancement; 

participation in quality professional societies and activities; and research 

and training in state-of-the-art system engineering tools. 

Fund competitive research in industry and academia to develop 

improved system engineering tools and practices; use truly 

independent red teams to assure the quality of systems engineering 

applied to major programs and activities. 

Budgets 

Lack of funding flexibility and inadequate fiscal planning impede the 

acceleration of technology into fielded capability. Currently, two-year 

budget cycles and the inadequate level of R&D reprogramming authority 

inhibit the pursuit of technology options that could support agile 

acquisition. Senior managers need more flexibility to terminate less 

promising technology efforts and reprogram funds to support technology 

options with higher potential payoff. 

Options for subsequent blocks in a spiral development process 

depend on the knowledge gained from research and development and 

experimentation. Adequate S&T investment is a key to providing 

technology options for future military systems. Of particular importance 

here is the support for basic and applied research. Over the past 30 years, 

basic and applied research has declined as a percentage of the overall 

science and technology budget from about 78 to 49 percent. 
76 I CHAPTER 11 

Recommendations: Budgets ________________________________________ 

For acquisition programs, restore the practice of establishing 

management reserves within that budget to handle unforeseen 

problems while maintaining schedule and cost baselines. 

Budget funding for research, development, test, and engineering 

for future spirals through the future years’ defense plan. 

Sustain S&T funding at the real level of the fiscal year 2007 

budget in order to maintain technological superiority. 

The Industrial Base 

This study raises two concerns: (1) reduction of IR&D within the 

defense industry and (2) reduced opportunities for competition due to 

defense industry consolidation. 

The short-term focus of the defense industry has resulted in 

emphasis on bid and proposal to the detriment of IR&D. Causes 

include DOD’s permitting contractors to merge IR&D and bid and 

proposal in their allowable overhead. As a result, industry has shifted its 

investments toward product sustainment rather than new technology 

development for future products. 

The defense industry consolidation of prime and integrating 

contractors has been accompanied by vertical integration in the residual 

primes and integrators. They now have internal incentives to select 

products and subsystems from divisions of their company. This tendency 

shuts out 2nd and 3rd tier suppliers, and withers the industrial base. 

The DOD can take steps to foster more competition and 

innovation in industry and thus help ensure technological superiority 

for the war fighter. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 77

Recommendations: The Industrial Base ______________________________ 

DOD should: 

Reinvigorate IR&D by requiring separate reporting for IR&D and 

bid and proposal. This can be implemented with a DOD regulatory 

change. Further, DOD should ask industry to set a corporate average as 

3 percent of sales for the DOD-related IR&D budget.

Enforce full and open competition for 2nd and 3rd tier contractors 

by the prime and integrators in order to foster a vigorous 

industrial base. Prime contractors will need to establish formal and 

open make-or-buy decision processes, with DOD reviewing the plans 

and monitoring the execution. 

Fund competitive, alternative sources of R&D to foster continued 

innovation (in performance, cost, etc.), and provide an alternative if the 

incumbent does not perform, as well as a competitor for the next spiral. 

Incentives 

Incentives play an important role in transforming the culture of an 

enterprise to value innovation, speed, agility, and prudent risk taking. The 

sound of the guns is a most powerful incentive and large parts of the 

DOD enterprise are making that transformation. One challenge is to 

migrate that culture into DOD’s technology transition and acquisition 

processes. Proper incentives needs to be created and disincentives 

eliminated. The economic relationship between the government and the 

defense industrial base is an important component. Profit and other 

economic incentives can drive speedy technology transition for new 

capabilities and improvement to in-service systems. 

Accountability and competition are potent incentive tools. The 

operational user has the greatest incentive to get capabilities to the field 

much more rapidly, but has had little influence on the process. Holding 

professionals in the government acquisition business accountable for 

system outcomes and using the outcomes as the basis for rewards and 

penalties would help to create an environment where speed and agility 

are valued. 
78 I CHAPTER 11 

Recommendations: Incentives ______________________________________ 

For industry, more closely align consequences (award fees, follow 

on contracts) to performance than is done today. 

Hold professionals in the government acquisition business 

accountable for system outcomes and use the outcomes as the basis for 

rewards and penalties. With the shorter acquisition cycle it will be easier 

for individuals to directly be associated with program success or failure. 

Give the combatant commands (the ultimate users) more influence 

in the requirements process and shaping the future force. The 

Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Transformation: A Progress 

Assessment describes a way to accomplish this. 

Ubiquitous Connectivity and Security 

Data, information, and knowledge must be able to flow rapidly and 

securely from all sources to all users. Specific recommendations are 

provided in the report of the companion Defense Science Board 2006 

Summer Study on Information Management for Net-Centric Operations. 
Part III

Summary of Recommendations 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS I 81

Chapter 12. 

Summary of Recommendations 

This study had two major tasks: 

 identify a set of 21st century operational capabilities and their 

enabling technologies 

 recommend how DOD should conduct strategic technology 

planning and speed the transition of technology into fielded 

capability 

This chapter concludes the report with a summary of key findings 

and recommendations. 

Critical Capabilities and Enabling Technologies 

Based on missions identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review, 

the study identified four critical capabilities that support the full range 

of future military missions 

 mapping the human terrain 

 ubiquitous observation and data recording in difficult terrain 

 contextual exploitation: rapidly extracting actionable 

information hidden in massive clutter 

 rapidly producing effects tailored to the circumstances 

The set of capability vectors and enabling technologies identified in 

this study are expected to spur debate, further analysis, and 

prioritization. They provide a focus to inform DOD science and 

technology planning, to redistribute S&T investments, and to forge new 

partnerships and relationships. They will not be the ultimate word on 

the subject. Although this set of capabilities was crafted to a great 

extent to deal with uncertainty, the evolving U.S. strategy and 

uncertainty about the future security environment will continue to 
82 I CHAPTER 12 

foster new thinking about critical needs. A major challenge will be to 

avoid the tendency to generate large lists without prioritization. 

The overarching recommendation is that DOD refocus its S&T 

priorities and investments to emphasize technology development 

in these four areas. Some specific recommendations are summarized 

below. More detail is provided in Volume II of the report. 

Recommendations: Human Terrain Preparation 

Increase the priority and accelerate the creation of a continuous learning 

environment for training and professional military education to include: 

 more exploitation of commercially developed distance learning 

tools and more experiments on alternative approaches 

 creating a DOD program linking service efforts to design 

training tools and processes to develop cognitive decision 

making skills in junior leaders 

 rewarding service members for pursuing less structured but 

equally compelling professional military programs of study that 

develop their skills in human terrain preparation 

 assigning higher priority and more resources to the development 

of immersive games, simulators, training, and mission-rehearsal 

tools to develop multi-cultural interpersonal skills supporting 

small unit operations 

Sustain a long-term commitment and robust effort to develop and 

adapt automated language processing technologies. 

Develop an S&T roadmap for human, social, cultural, and behavior 

(HSCB) modeling and create an S&T portfolio for such modeling that 

would 

 attract the best and brightest from the HSCB community to work 

DOD problems (this could involve expanding the Defense 

Science Study Group program to include social scientists) 

 establish HSCB modeling benchmarks, metrics, 

experimentation, and validation techniques 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS I 83

 be closely connected to the combatant commands and other 

potential users 

Recommendation: Ubiquitous Observation and Recording 

 The Army, Marines, and DARPA should partner in an effort to 

accelerate the maturation of the “soldier-as-sensor” concept. 

The program should also include the development of relevant 

miniature sensor technologies and automated debriefing tools. 

 A sustained series of ATDs and ACTDS should be supported 

through DARPA and DDR&E to develop and demonstrate the 

ability to task and integrate local collection with wide area 

assets. U.S Strategic Command and U.S. Southern Command 

should be major participants in these activities because of their 

global ISR responsibilities. 

 DARPA and related R&D agencies should sustain a focused 

program to develop energy-efficient microsensors and the 

platforms to deliver them, along with development of the 

systems network concepts to enable close-in sensing. 

Recommendations: Contextual Exploitation 

 Conduct a major review of ongoing efforts to prioritize, 

integrate, as necessary, and identify areas where additional 

funding can accelerate maturation of key technologies. 

 Establish goals and metrics to monitor progress; such as 

exabyte storage, terabyte-per-second data transfer, seconds-tominutes analysis and decision cycle time. 

 Relax restrictive rules for obtaining access to new sources of 

technology coming from outside DOD and often outside of the 

United States. 

 Recruit non–DOD partners—the Departments of Health and 

Human Services, Homeland Security, Transportation, Justice, 

State, and Commerce, as well as private entities—as sources, 

developers, and users. 
84 I CHAPTER 12 

Recommendations: Rapidly Tailored Effects 

For influence operations: 

 DOD should undertake a major research and tool development 

effort to understand and enhance the training and execution 

(including assessing results) of influence and related non-kinetic 

operations. This effort should include developing credible 

“cause-effect” models. 

 DARPA and the service laboratories, working with U.S. Strategic 

Command and other combatant commanders, should expand 

emphasis for dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity in decision 

support tool development and for providing credible “causeeffect” models. Good use should be made of advances in the 

commercial sector. 

For time-critical conventional strike: 

 DOD should develop a comprehensive plan to evolve this 

capability. The plan should encompass both nearer term options 

and radically new potential capabilities that could result from R&D 

in directed energy or other technologies. The plan should be 

supported by a careful systems analysis of the various options, 

using quantitative measures of effectiveness, and spanning all of 

the critical issues including the requisite real-time decision-making. 

For WMD protection and mitigation: 

 Increase medical surge capabilities by developing rapid 

diagnostics and broad spectrum treatments and broadening the 

cadre of trained personnel. 

 Increase preparedness for crisis communications by preplanning 

content and improving regional communication systems. 

 Institute multi-level planning to prepare regional response assets 

and enable rapid integration of federal support. 

 Reassess restoration processes and cleanup standards for a 

range of WMD attack scenarios. 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS I 85

 DOD leadership should re-instate nuclear survivability as a 

security requirement in critical war fighting and support 

functions. 

Strategic Technology Planning and 

Technology Transition 

Three themes shaped the study’s recommendations in these areas: 

1. The Department of Defense can meet the strategic 

challenges of the 21st century only with a tighter coupling of the 

user and technology communities. 

Recommendations: Strategic Technology Planning 

 The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

should create a small set (no more than five) of mission-focused 

portfolio activities. 

 Integrate the output of these activities into a department-wide 

strategic technology plan. 

 The plan should include working with other government 

agencies, allies, and partners and helping them increase their 

capacities and capabilities and the ability to work together. 

2. DOD’s technology community must increase its capacity to 

understand and exploit technology opportunities, especially those 

that exist outside of DOD’s domain. 

Recommendations: Technology Opportunities 

 Promote more “bottom-up” discovery to create disruptive 

capabilities. The DDR&E should make disruptive potential a 

priority area of S&T activity and be the department-wide focal 

point. Working with the services, defense agencies, and other 

U.S. government S&T communities, the DDR&E should 

commit an additional $200 million per year to fund initiatives 

with disruptive potential. 
86 I CHAPTER 12 

 Foster greater understanding and exploitation of commercially 

available technology by establishing a DDR&E Center for the 

Application of Commercial and Foreign Technology, and 

expanding the use of “other transaction authority” and other 

means to enable commercial firms to undertake business with 

the DOD. 

 Establish a much more comprehensive approach to anticipate 

how adversaries might exploit technology by increasing S&T 

intelligence to understand what adversaries are doing, enhancing 

red teaming to identify what adversaries could do, and 

conducting net assessments to understand the consequences. 

Expand and assign higher priority to the current DDR&E and 

USD (I) Scientific and Technical Net Assessment Program. 

3. Transitioning technology rapidly into fielded products is a 

key to meeting the national security challenges of the 21st century.

 The study addressed two dimensions of technology transition: 

inserting technology solutions into ongoing operations and the need for 

more agile, rapid major systems acquisition. 

Recommendation: Expeditor 

 Create a Rapid Fielding Organization to satisfy the growing list 

of war-fighter-related needs, over what is anticipated to be an 

extended period of “long war.” Combine most of the current 

“rapid” and “agile” programs into the RFO, leaving some 

programs remaining within the services, but coordinated with 

the RFO. 

Recommendations: Major Systems Acquisition 

 Assure that rigorous systems engineering/analysis; accounting 

for cost; and technology, manufacturing, and integration 

readiness underpins input to the requirements process. 

 Provide timely decisions on requirements relief during the 

program execution phase. 

 Make Milestone A mandatory for major systems acquisition. 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS I 87

 Plan multiple technology demonstrations to generate more 

options and minimize single points of failure. 

 Mandate the use of spiral development to provide the initial 

operational capability of each block within five years of the 

initiation of SDD of that block. Conduct, in parallel, robust 

R&D and experimentation to provide options for future blocks. 

Improved capabilities in several cross-cutting areas will be essential 

to achieve such a broad transformation in S&T planning and execution. 

Recommendations: Cross-cutting Enablers 

 Technical expertise. Institute a dedicated career development 

organization for DOD’s technical workforce. Protect and 

expand the Science, Math, and Research for Transformation

NDEP program. Expand internship opportunities. 

 Systems engineering. Rebuild the system engineering 

workforce and re-establish the program-level position of chief 

systems engineer. 

 Budget flexibility. Restore practice of establishing 

management reserves within acquisition programs. Sustain S&T 

funding at the real level of the fiscal year 2007 budget. 

 Industrial base. Reinvigorate IR&D by requiring separate 

reporting for IR&D and bid and proposal; enforce full and open 

competition for 2nd and 3rd tier contractors by the prime and 

integrators; and fund competitive, alternative sources of R&D. 

 Incentives. For industry, more closely align consequences 

(award fees, follow on contracts) to performance than is done 

today. Hold professionals in the government acquisition 

business accountable for program successes and failures. Give 

the combatant commands (the ultimate users) more influence in 

the requirements process and shaping the future force. 
88 I CHAPTER 12 

 Ubiquitous connectivity and security. Data, information, and 

knowledge must be able to flow rapidly and securely from all 

sources to all users. Specific recommendations are provided in 

the report of the companion Defense Science Board 2006 Summer 

Study on Information Management for Net-Centric Operations.

The processes and practices in DOD today—that largely 

evolved during the Cold War—must be shaped to deal with new 

security challenges. The recommendations presented in this report 

will enable such a transformation—infusing the knowledge, agility, 

flexibility, and speed that are essential to future success. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE I 89

Appendix A. 

Terms of Reference 



TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP I 93

Appendix B. 

Study Membership 

CHAIRMEN 

Name Affiliation

Theodore Gold Private Consultant 

William Graham Private Consultant 

SENIOR ADVISORS 

Craig Fields Private Consultant 

John Foster Private Consultant 

GEN Bill Hartzog, USA (Ret) Burdeshaw Associates 

George Heilmeier Private Consultant 

Robert Hermann Private Consultant 

Paul Kaminski Technovation, Inc. 

Larry Lynn Private Consultant 

Walter Morrow Massachusetts Institute of Technology/ 

Lincoln Laboratory 

Gen Larry Welch, USAF (Ret) Institute for Defense Analyses 

STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY PANEL 

Mike Bayer (Chair) Private Consultant 

Amy Alving SAIC 

Russ Barber Raytheon 

Pierre Chao Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Paul Davis RAND 

Jim Kurtz Institute for Defense Analyses 

Darren McKnight SAIC 

Art Money Private Consultant 

Wick Murray Institute for Defense Analyses 

Alan Schwartz Private Consultant 
94 I APPENDIX B 

Dick Urban Draper Laboratory 

Charlie Wasaff National Capital Companies, LLC 

Maj Gen Jasper Welch, USAF (Ret) Private Consultant 

FUTURE CAPABILITIES AND ENABLING TECHNOLOGY PANEL 

Mim John (Co-Chair) Sandia National Laboratory 

Gen Mike Williams, USMC (Ret) (Co-Chair) LMI 

Matt Ganz HRL 

VADM Kevin Green, USN (Ret) IBM 

Maj Gen Ken Israel, USAF (Ret) Lockheed Martin 

Lt Gen Richard Kelly, USMC (Ret) LMI 

Zach Lemnios Massachusetts Institute of Technology/ 

Lincoln Laboratory 

Bob Popp Aptima 

MG Robert Scales, USA (Ret.) Private Consultant 

Jim Shields Draper Laboratory 

Ann Marie Skalka Fox-Chase Cancer Research Center 

RADM Tom Steffens, USN (Ret) ANTEON Company 

Bob Stein Private Consultant 

Rich Wagner Los Alamos National Laboratory 

David Whelan Boeing 

TURNING TECHNOLOGY INTO CAPABILITY PANEL 

Jacques Gansler (Co-Chair) University of Maryland 

William Ballhaus (Co-Chair) Aerospace Corporation 

Mike Andrews L-3 

Elliot Axelband RAND 

Joe Braddock Private Consultant 

Joe Eash Private Consultant 

William Howard Private Consultant 

Bruce Jette Synovision Solutions 

Donald Latham Private Consultant 

Mark Lister Chairman, Naval Research Advisory Committee 
TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP I 95

Robert Mansfield Lockheed Martin 

Mark Mykityshyn The White Oak Group, Inc. 

Al Romig Sandia National Laboratory 

George Schneiter Private Consultant 

Jim Silk Institute for Defense Analyses 

Robert Soule Institute for Defense Analyses 

Stephen Squires Private Consultant 

Mike Yarymovych Private Consultant 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

Beth Foster Office of the Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE 

CDR Cliff Phillips, USN Defense Science Board Office 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS 

CDR Alan Boyer, USN NWC 

COL Kevin Brown, USA U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

Col Ed Byrd, USAF Headquarters, U.S. Air Force/A5X 

Col Donnie Davis, USAF U.S. Joint Forces Command, J-8 

Shane Diechman U.S. Joint Forces Command 

Anh Duong Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Mary Margaret Evans Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Christina Filarowski-Sheaks Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy 

Dan Flynn Central Intelligence Agency 

Robert Foster BioSystems, OSD 

Brendan Godfrey Air Force Office of Scientific Research 

Joanna Ingraham Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

LTC Todd Key, USA Joint Staff, J-8 

COL Robert Morris, USA U.S. Joint Forces Command 

Carolyn Nash Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, for 

Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 
96 I APPENDIX B 

Lt Col Dave Pere, USMC U.S. Marine Corps 

Jonathan Porter Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air 

Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering 

Terry Pudas Force Transformation Office, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense 

Dennis Schmidt Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, for 

Acquisition, Logistics and Technology 

CAPT Dennis Sorensen, USN ACNR 

Mike Sottung U.S. Joint Forces Command 

Col Mark Stephen, USAF Air Force Office of Scientific Research 

Dr. David Stoudt Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

Maj Gen Mike Worden, USAF Headquarters U.S. Air Force/A5X 

STAFF 

Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Sarah Canna Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Amy Cauffman Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Tim Cullen Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Kevin Gates Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Grace Johnson Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Brad Smith Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Stacy Zelenski Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE I 97

Appendix C. 

Presentations to the Task Force 

Name Topic

FEBRUARY 1516, 2006 

Honorable John J. Young, Jr. 

Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

Research and Engineering Perspective 

Major General David Fastabend, USA 

Deputy Director/Chief of Staff, Futures 

Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command 

Future Warfare...The Next Big Thing 

Brigadier General Thomas Waldhauser, 

USMC, Deputy Commanding General, 

Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command 

How the Marine Corps Sees the Future of 

Warfighting 

Dr. Timothy Stearns, Associate Professor, 

Departments of Biological Sciences and 

Genetics, Stanford University 

The Threat of Biotechnology 

Major General Michael Vane, USA 

Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources 

and Assessment, J-8 

Delivering Joint Capabilities to the Warfighter 

Dr. Craig Fields What is Technology Strategy? 

Colonel Patrick Kelly Quadrennial Defense Review Strategy 

Mr. Jeff Green 

DOD Office of the General Counsel 

Standards of Conduct 

MARCH 13, 2006 

Mr. Kevin Woods 

Institute for Defense Analyses 

The Iraqi Perspectives Project 

Mr. Michael Vickers, RAND Technology Implications of the 2005 Quadrennial 

Defense Review 

Major General Mike Worden, USAF 

Dr. Thomas Cruse 

Defense Technology Challenges—An Air Force 

Perspective 
98 I APPENDIX C 

APRIL 20, 2006 

Philip Anton, RAND Technology Revolution 2020: 

Bio/Nano/Materials/Information Trends, 

Drivers, Barriers, and Social Implications 

Report 

MAY 1516, 2006 

Mr. Dan Flynn 

Director, Long-range Military-security 

Program, Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence 

Foreign Perspectives on Future War: 

Emerging Disruptive Challenges 

Honorable John J. Young, Jr. 

Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

Discussion 

ADM Michael Mullen 

USN Chief of Naval Operations 

Discussion 

JUNE 7, 2006 

ADM Edmund Giambastiani, USN 

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Discussion 

Mr. Alan Shaffer 

Office of the Director, Defense Research 

and Engineering 

DOD Science and Technology Program 

Ms. Monica Shephard and Col Bob Morris 

Joint Forces Command 

Discussion 
TECHNOLOGY MATURITY I 99

Appendix D. 

Technology Maturity 

The Future Capabilities and Enabling Technologies panel judged 

each constituent technology with respect to its development maturity 

and uniqueness to the Department of Defense. This analysis led to a 

simple categorization scheme, shown in the following set of tables, one 

for each of the four critical capabilities. 

Table D-1. Human Terrain Preparation 

Technology 

Areas

Promising 

but Immature

Under 

Development 

Showing Progress

Leverage 

Commercial 

Developments

Mature 

in DOD

Rapid training 

and 

continuous 

learning 

Human/team 

performance 

measurement 

Language/culture/ 

leadership 

tutoring tools 

High-fidelity 

immersive games, 

training and 

mission rehearsal 

(GTMR) tools 

Automated 

language 

processing

Foreign-to-English 

translation 

Speech-to-text 

transcription 

Information 

management and 

text processing 

Human, 

social, 

cultural, and 

behavior 

(HSCB) 

modeling

Macro HSCB models 

Micro HSCB models 

Integrated micromacro models 
100 I APPENDIX D 

Table D- 2. Ubiquitous Observation and Recording 

Technology 

Areas

Promising 

but Immature

Under 

Development 

Showing Progress

Leverage 

Commercial 

Developments Mature in DOD

Day/night allweather wide 

area 

surveillance 

High altitude, long 

endurance 

platforms 

Giga-pixel optical 

imaging 

Space based 

GMTI/SAR 

 Active/ 

passive 

hyperspectral 

sensors 

Foliage 

penetration 

sensors 

Close-in 

sensor and 

tagging 

systems 

Stealthy, precision 

delivery platforms 

Microsensor 

technologies 

High performance, 

high efficiency 

signal 

processing 

Ultra high density 

packaging for 

millimeter-scale 

sensors and tags 

Native signature 

recognition at 

long ranges 

(human and 

object) 

Efficient energy 

storage 

technology 

Miniature sensor 

and tag 

technology 

High-density 

packaging for 

centimeterscale devices 

 

Soldier as a 

collector 

Miniature sensor 

technology 

Interactive automated 

debriefing 

All-domain precision 

geolocation 

Soldier centric 

communications 

and networking 

technology 

Body borne flexible 

displays 

Efficient energy 

storage 

technology 

 
TECHNOLOGY MATURITY I 101

Table D-3. Contextual Exploitation

Table IV-4. Rapidly Tailored Effects 

Technology 

Areas

Promising 

but Immature

Under 

Development 

Showing 

Progress

Leverage 

Commercial 

Developments

Mature in 

DOD

Influence 

operations 

Kinetic and non-kinetic 

cause/ 

effect models 

Decision support 

tools 

incorporating 

complexity 

and 

ambiguity 

Storytelling, 

gisting, and 

advanced 

visualization 

Gaming 

technology 

for campaign 

planning, 

targeting, 

shaping 

Time-critical 

conventional 

strike 

Directed energy weapons 

Hypersonic delivery 

vehicles 

 Ballistic 

missile 

technology 

WMD 

protection 

and 

mitigation 

Rapid diagnostics and 

environmental 

monitoring, including 

standoff biological and 

radiation detection 

Broad spectrum medical 

counter-measures 

Decontamination 

technologies 

Nuclear 

weapons 

effects 

prediction, 

mitigation 

 

Technology 

Areas

Promising 

but Immature

Under 

Development Showing 

Progress

Leverage 

Commercial 

Developments

Mature in 

DOD

Mega-scale 

data 

management

Multi-level security 

and accreditation 

Data management 

and fusion from 

very diverse 

sensors 

Situation 

dependent 

information 

extraction

Contextual analysis 

and intent recognition 

Entity, relationship 

and pattern analysis 

Data-to-information 

-to- target recognition 

Information retrieval 

and knowledge 

discovery 

Human/ 

system 

collaboration

Human-guided 

algorithms 

Natural man-machine

interface 

Knowledge 

representation 
102 I APPENDIX E 

Appendix E. 

Glossary 

ATD advanced technology demonstration 

ACTD advanced concept technology demonstration 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DDR&E Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and education, 

personnel and facilities 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DTIC Defense Technical Information Center 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

GALE Global Autonomous Language Exploitation 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HSCB human, social, cultural, and behavior 

IR&D independent research and development 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

NDEP National Defense Education Program 

OODA observe, orient, decide, act 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

R&D research and development 

RFO Rapid Fielding Organization 

S&T science and technology 

SDD system design and development 

SMART Science, Math, and Research for Transformation 

SSBN ballistic missile submarine (nuclear) 

TRL technology readiness level 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

USD (I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

VCJCS Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

WMD weapons of mass destruction