MORI DocID: 1422249

Key Judgments
(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

a greatest medium-to-long-term challenge in Iraq if Saddam Elusayn were ousted
‘woul the introduction of a stable and representative political system in place of Saddam's
apparatus of oppression. The building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult, and

probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq’s tradition of

© Iraqi political culture does not foster liberalism or democracy. Iraq lacks the experience of a
loyal opposition and effective institutions for mass political participation. Saddam's brutal
methods have made a generation of [raqis distrustful of surrendering or sharing power.

«The principal positive elements in any effort at democratization would be the current relative
weakness of political Islam in Iraq and the contributions that could be made by four million
Iraqi exiles—many of whom are Westemized and well educated—and by the now-
impoverished and underemployed Iraqi middle class.

Jiraq would be unlikely to split apart, but a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply
ivi society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict
with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so.

© Sunni Arabs would face possible loss of their longstanding privileged position while Shia
‘would seek power commensurate with their majority status.

¢ Kurds could try to take advantage of Saddam's departure by seizing some of the
northem oilfields, a move that would elicit forceful responses from Sunni Arabs

* —Score-settling would occur throughout Iraq between those associated with Saddam's regime
and those who have suffered most under it.

ction less difficult than political transformation, Iraq’s economic options would remain
few and narrow, however, without forgiveness of debt, a reduction in reparations from the
previous Persian Gulf war, or something akin to a Marshall Plan.

© Iraq's economic and financial prospects would vary significantly depending on how much
damage its oil facilitics sustained in a war. If they remained relatively unscathed and any
administrative issues involving organization of Iraq’s oil industry were resolved, it would be
possible to increase oil production within three months from 2.4 million barrels per day (b/d)

to 3.1 million b/d.
a

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Regional Consequences of Regime Change in iraq,
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Dey

Discussion

Regional

Consequences of Regime
Change in Iraq

(U) Setting the Stage

(U) The ouster of Iraqi dictator Saddam
Husayn through military force would be one
of the most significant events in the Middle
East in recent years. The war itself, sudden _
political change in a major Arab state—with
the departure of a leader who startedtwo
earlier wars—and an expanded direct role in
the region for the United States all would
have repercussions beyond Iraq.
Governments, publics, and groups across the
region would react to these changes.

(U) These reactions, however, would take
place within a complex sct of pre-existing
political, economic, and social realities, most
of which would not be affected by a change of
regime in Baghdad. This regional context
would be at least as important as the removal
of Saddam in shaping behavior important to
US interests. In some respects a war against
Saddam would reinforce existing perceptions
and patterns of behavior. In other respects the
contextual factors would tend to temper or
negate what otherwise might have been a
result of Saddam's ouster.

(U) The most important aspects of the
Middle Eastern context are:

© Uniresolved conflicts and disputes
involving Middle Eastern states. The
Isracli-Palestinian conflict is the most
salient, with the greatest regional impact.

© Unpromising demographic and economic
trends, including significant youth bulges
and high unemployment in many
countries, that offer most Middle
Eastemess little promise of a more
prosperous life.

© Generally undemocratic and ineffective
political systems ruled by entrenched
elites.

© Substantial political extremism, chiefly in
the form of radical Islamist groups and
ideologies.

© Widespread popular distrust of the United
States and disappointment with US
policies in the region, primarily related to
the Arab-Israeli conflict.

(U) Popular Reactions

[_pus-ted war against Iraq would
precipitate immediate popular anti-US
demonstrations in many countries in the
region driven by perceptions that the United
States was waging a broader war against
Muslims and that Washington was driven
primarily by motives other than reducing the
security threat from Saddam Husayn. Local
security forces probably would be capable of
containing popular uprisings and have taken
measures to increase their readiness. Some
governments, however, would be more
vulnerable, especially if the focus of the
protests shifted from the United States to the
local regime or if the United States acted
unilaterally without the political cover of a
UN resolution authorizing the use of force.

wee

Page 23-0f226———



Principal nges in Post-Saddam lnaq ’.

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MORI DocID: 1422249

eer

making or at least ratifying such
accommodations.

¢ Even with a long-term political evolution,
‘sustained nurturing of democratic
institutions would be needed to minimize
the chance of drift toward the
authoritarian pattems that have dominated
Iraq's 80-year history.

Political Islam

A factor in favor of possible

lion of Iraq is the relatively low
oes of Iraqi Shiism—the country’s
majority Islamic creed—perticularly in
comparison to Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia
and the Persian variant of Shiism practiced in
Iran.. This does not mean, however, that the
trend could not take root in post-war Iraq,
particularly if economic recovery were slow
and foreign troops remained in country for a
long period. Academic research indicates that
the political vitality of Iraqi Shiism declined
throughout the 20” century.

© Since the early 20 century, the Iraqi state
has eroded the power and wealth of the
Shia religious establishment, established
clear boundaries between religion and
politics, and generally promoted a secular
vision of society.

© Inthe carly 1900s, Shia clerics were
primary motivating forces in the rebellion
of both Shia and Sunni communities
against the British. By the Shia rebellion
against Saddam in the 1990s, they no
longer played a lead role.

© Nevertheless, traditional religious elites,
particularly in the Shia south and portions
of Baghdad, have influence through such
religious institutions as the Najaf
Theological College and Husayniyas
{community worship centers) as well as
through the wlema, religious scholars.

a

‘The Sadah, descendents of the prophet,
play prominent roles in mediating
disputes.

© Islamic non-governmental organizations,
such as the al-Khoei Foundation, an
international Shia religious, charitable
institution based in London, also have
influence in the Shia community of Iraq. -

a fundamentalist trend

wil the Shia or Sunni communities
emerged under the Ba'th—possibly as a result
of the regime's repression. Travelers to Iraq
Teport that members of the younger
gencration are more attracted to
fundamentalism than their parents were—
perhaps in reaction to the failure of the Iraqi
state as well as to the same developments that
have boosted political Islam elsewhere in the
region. A more politically open society could
provide fertile ground for these nascent
fundamentalist tendencies. The ability of
fundamentalism to take hold in Iraq would
depend in large part on how quickly Iraq

recovered economically from the lingering

effects of sanctions.

Discredited Arab Nationalism
favorable factor, and an
consequence of Saddam’s rule, .

has been that one of the prime Arab
alternatives to democracy—secular
authoritarian nationalism—has been
discredited. The appeal of this variety of
authoritarianism would be likely to be
restricted to a small minority that directly
benefited from Saddam’s regime.

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MORI DocID: 1422249

Yee

only when the UN regained control of the
system.

Since July 2002, Baghdad has issued
double—and sometimes triple—food
rations to all Iraqis. This could reduce the
number of Iraqis needing food
immediately after the war. The World
Food Program estimates, however, that
4.9 million Iraqis could immediately
require food because of displacement and
the selling of food rations to eam money.

© Securing the government's food
warehouses after a war and implementing,
an efficient and equitable food distribution
system would be critical to avoiding
widespread hunger. .

© Asof December 2002, Iraq had paid for
some 5 million metric tons of foodstuffs
to be delivered for 2003 under the OFF
Program. This food, provided its delivery
is resumed after the war, plus the
upcoming spring harvest season, would
provide enough of a supply of food.
Distribution problems, access to milling

facilities, and looting could hinder getting
this food to Iraqi households.

Cline new government would require
‘significant outside assistance to help rebuild
Iraq's water and sanitation infrastructure.

© — Iraq's infrastructure already has suffered
extensive damage. Both the long-term
impact of economic sanctions and
Saddam’s manipulation of resources to
shore up his regime have reduced the
availability of spare parts and equipment.

|Currently, most of [raq’s water
plants function well below designed
capacity, resulting in shortages of potable
water, highly polluted river systems, and
increases in sanitation-related health

n-

problems. UNICEF estimates that only 4!
percent of the population in rural areas has
access to safe water, and 30 percent of the
population lacks adequate sanitary services,
Access also has declined in urban areas,
including Baghdad. Underlying causes
include unreliable electric power for water
and sewage treatment plants, deteriorating
water and sewage pipes, and shortages of
supplies and equipment, Ongoing lack of
spare parts, further damage during a war, and
shortages of experienced personnel would
make quick rebuilding of facilities difficult.

a

Page 77 of 226



APPENDIX A

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL: REGIONAL
CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ

Page 13 of 226


MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN BOND JOINED BY
SENATORS WARNER, HATCH, AND BURR

On July 9, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released
its unanimous report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, now referred to as Phase I. The Phase I
report outlined the findings of the Committee’s year long inquiry in
extensive detail, which provided needed information to the Congress, the
Administration, the Intelligence Community, and the public about how the
intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was flawed so deeply.
The report also provided conclusions which offered insights and guidance
that led the way toward needed intelligence reform. The report was a major
accomplishment, coming at a time of increasingly divisive partisan rancor
about the Iraq war and intelligence related to Iraq, yet it managed to draw
unanimous support and provided meaningful oversight. We believe that the
Committee's Phase I report was necessary, thorough and instructive for the
Intelligence Community, and we believe that it was conducted in a
completely bi-partisan fashion.

Unfortunately, the “Prewar Assessments About Postwar Iraq” report
released today as part of "Phase II" of the Committee's investigation does
not meet the standard set by the Committee’s Phase I inquiry, While we are
happy that the release of this report has put the Committee one step closer to
finally ending Phase II and to moving on to more pressing issues of
intelligence oversight, we are disappointed with the content of the report
itself. The Committee staff worked diligently in an attempt to narrow the
Committee’s differences, and both sides made numerous accommodations
and compromises in an effort to achieve an accurate and meaningful report
that both sides could support. In the end, however, producing a report that
could reflect all of the members’ views without alienating some proved too
challenging. The Phase II inquiry has become too embroiled in politics and
partisanship to meet this challenge. Unfortunately, this vindicates the views
of those of us who voted to conduct Phase II only as an accommodation to
certain Committee members but who believed that it was a bad idea to begin
with.

We firmly believe that the work of this Committee should be focused
on improving our Intelligence Community and holding it accountable so that
the American people receive the best protection possible from the myriad of
threats we face today. We do not see how the Phase II investigation is

Page 195 of 226


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Page 187 of 226


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Page 176 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

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Page 72 of 226


MORI DocID:

1422242

(U) Roles in a post-Saddam Iraq

The objective of most Middle
states regarding a post-Saddam Iraq.

Saddam's departure would offer
for enhancing relations between Iraq
and its neighbors. Some rivalries and
suspicions would linger, however, and
perhaps intensify depending on the nature of
the new government.

it | Fea immediate neighbors would
‘would be for the territorial integrity of Iraq to ve the greatest stakes in protecting their

remain intact and for a new regime to become
ncither a source of regional instability nor
dominant in the region. The posture of
various regional actors competing for
influence in Iraq would depend, in part, on
whether activities in Iraq were backed by UN
resolution and would range from constructive
involvement in such areas as humanitarian aid
and reconstruction to activities more
detrimental to US interests, including political
meddling or fomenting strife among Iraq's
ethnic and sectarian groups.

interests and would be most likely to pose
challenges for US goals in a post-Saddam

degree to which Iran would pursue policies
that either support or undermine US goals in
Iraq would depend on how Tehran viewed
specific threats to its interests and the
potential US reaction.

© Iranian officials would be concemed that
significantly increased autonomy for Iraqi
and Turkish Kurds could incite
secessionist moves by Iran's
approximately 5 million Kurds or that the
United States would encourage Iranian
Kurds to revolt,

© Some within the clerical establishment
also would worry that an autonomous
Shia entity might be created in southern
Iraq, which would be a political and
religious rival for Iran.

dget

Page 30 of 226



himself and was simply passing along what he believed was his WINPAC
colleague’s analysis of the reporting.

Throughout this time, CIA’s WINPAC analysts continued to use the
Iraq-Niger uranium reporting in intelligence assessments and approve the
use of similar language for Administration speeches and publications. From
the time the NESA analyst’s comments were sent to the British until the
President’s State of the Union speech, the CIA and National Intelligence
Council (NIC) staff had coordinated on the National Intelligence Estimate,
cleared language in six policy speeches or documents for the White House
and Department of State, and used language in four of CIA’s own
publications that all noted Iraq’s attempts to acquire uranium from Africa or
abroad.

The Committee believes that it was the initial misinterpretation of the
WINPAC analyst’s comments during coordination of the British white paper
that led to mixed and inconsistent messages being passed to senior
policymakers. While clearly this was an unintentional error, there should
have been some mechanism in place within the CIA to ensure that different
CIA analysts were not providing different assessments, to policymakers and
that assessments in finished intelligence products provided a consistent
message.

CHRISTOPHER “KIT” BOND

ORRIN G. HATCH
RICHARD BURR

Page 222 of 226


and Duri pro-Saddam tribesman or otherwise so intimately linked to the regime that their
continued existence will be incompatible with democracy,” but noted that those officers who
favor a professional military ethos or see themselves as guardians of Iraqi national values “may
play a role in the post-Saddam military.”**

(GER) The paper also noted that Shia would celebrate Saddam’s ouster and “might welcome a
preponderant US civilian and/or military role in post-Saddam Iraq” and that some Shia “may
even call for a longer US occupation, arguing that their relative lack of experience government
puts them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Sunnis.’

(HD Regarding the Sunnis, the report noted that they were the “most likely targets of score-
settling” and are “likely to perceive the United States as the enemy.” Many Sunni “will be too
stunned by their sudden loss of primacy to respond with vigor; others were Saddam’s victims;
and Sunnis exiled in the West have assimilated many democratic norms and will have an impact
on those who remained in Iraq.” It was assessed that the Kurds would be comfortable with
whatever form of occupation that emerged.*”

The CIA further developed its assessment of the Iraqi Ba’th Party in its October
31, 2002 assessment The Iraqi Ba'th Party: Inexorably Tied to Saddam. It assessed that the
status of the Ba’th Party after Saddam “would depend on the nature of regime change” (such as
natural causes, a coup) but that a US role in “removing Saddam and establishing a successor
government would create a period of political dynamism...The Ba’th Party in its current form is
unlikely to endure...because the Iraqi people would view retention of the Ba’th political
structure as an unacceptable continuation of Saddam’s legacy.’

(GERD The report emphasized that after the US removed Saddam from power,
“government ministries providing critical services will need to be retained in some form after
being purged of Saddam loyalists and restructured to eliminate the Ba’th party oversight
mechanisms.” The report continued, “Many technocrats who joined the Ba’th Party to attain *
their positions are probably not ardent supporters of Saddam and could probably remain . . .
[after having been] investigated and vetted.” The report noted, however, that the CIA did not
know much about the loyalties, party affiliation, or potential criminal activities of most Iraqi

military officers and government bureaucrats. The CIA acknowledged that little was known
about most of these Iragis
and that most individuals would have to be

investigated and vetted before being allowed to continue in their positions.”

(HID) The CIA produced an assessment of Iran as a player in post-Saddam Iraq in the October
2002 report, Jran Wary of a US Attack on Iraq. This report assessed that in the period following
Saddam’s removal “Iran probably will seek to maximize its influence in Iraq while minimizing

* Ibid, p. 1

* Ibid, p.2

* Ibid, p. i, ii.

“CIA, The Iraqi Ba'th Party: Inexorably Tied to Saddam, October 31, 2002, pp. i, i.

* Ibid, p. 2

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MORI DocID: 1422242

Page 37 of 226


Principal Challenges in Post-Sackiam iraq”
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MORT DoetD 3 1422249

er

ideology, and a desire to consolidate power,
the Ba’th used social reforms, oil wealth, and
secularist policies to bridge or paper over
many of Iraq’s ethnic and religious gaps and
engender a scnsc of “Iraqi-ness.”

e Inthe 1970s, with the help of
mushrooming oil revenues, Baghdad
invested in its human capital and
infrastructure by supporting education and
medical services throughout the country.
In 1987, UNESCO recognized Iraq as
having achieved a literacy rate of 80
percent.

© Baghdad coupled this investment with
road building, electrification, and =
provision of fresh ater in ural and urban:
areas. Although pockets of backwardness
remained, the infrastructure contributed to
‘a growing industrial sector and an
increasingly urbanized population. At the
same time, the regime cultivated rural
areas by implementing land reform and
establishing agricultural cooperatives.

© Shia actions during the Iran-Iraq War—
their defense of Iraq in the name of Iraqi
nationalism—demonstratcd the extent to
which a sense of national identity had
becn established along the Shia-Sunni
fautt line,

resources from social and educational
programs to support the war effort.

economic readjustments during
the Iran-Iraq War and the UN

sanctions following the Gulf war exacted a
substantial price. Iraq’s obstinacy in evading
its disarmament obligations has prolonged the
economic problems, reducing the general
population to a state of dependency while
giving rise to previously unseen rampant
corruption.

© In 1980, Iraq’s per capita GDP was poised
to overtake that of Greece. Now Iraq’s
GDP per capita is $2,500 while Greece's
GDP per capita is estimated at $17,900.

© Such basic services as electrification and
clean water currently reach less than half
the population. .

© UN figures indicate that literacy has
dropped to 50 to 60 percent. Although
school enrollments have risen since the
il for Food (OFF) Program began in
1996, attendance has fallen and dropout
rates have risen. A brain drain has
continued, and most of Iraq’s once
thriving middle class has been

Eroding Nascent Political Institutions
(U) Saddam’s Great Leap Backward ns policies increasingly have

(Over the last two decades, Saddam's
Thilitary adventures against Iran and Kuwait
have undermined the social, political, and
economic gains previously made under the
Ba’thists.

© At least 400,000 Iraqis died or were
‘wounded in the Iran-Iraq War. Although
the conflict spurred growth in Iraq’s
heavy industrial and military-related
economic sectors, Baghdad diverted

his own survival at the expense of
the few representative political institutions
Iraq had developed.

assuming power, Saddam gutted
ja’th Pasty of independent political power
and ideological authority and remade it into
an instrument to ensure his survival. The
Ba’th has become an instrument of internal
security and control rather than a means of
political mobilization. Saddam has

ee

Page 62 of 226



The document also lists as recipients security directors who are responsible
for controlling and distributing these documents, not reading or assessing
them. These obvious problems lead us to wonder, what else is incomplete or
misleading about this list? Who else is listed that was not an actual
consumer of these documents? Who else had left their jobs or gone on a
temporary assignment not related to issues concerning Iraq at the time these
documents were disseminated? Who was on family or medical leave at the
time these documents were disseminated? With the continual coming and
going of officials in government, the Intelligence Community does not
constantly maintain an accurate list of 81 pages of recipient names, and for
the Intelligence Community it is not the names of the individuals that is most
important, rather that Intelligence Community products are sent to particular
offices throughout the government where numerous individuals in those
offices are assigned as action officers to read, digest and summarize them to
their principals. One of the reasons we voted to strike the distribution list
from the Committee’s report was that no one has checked these names to
make sure they are an accurate representation of who actually received and
had a chance to read these two documents in January 2003. We brought this
information to the attention of the Committee arguing that at least we should
not release the list before we fact-checked it ourselves; to do so would be to
present false and/or inaccurate information to the public and would
constitute sloppy work.

We also conveyed our view to the Committee that including such a
list adds no value in assessing pre-war intelligence assessments about post-
war Iraq, which is supposedly the focus of this report. Unfortunately, the
response we received from a number of supporters of this amendment was
that Phase II is about policy makers. That simply is untrue, this report is
supposed to be about "pre-war assessments about post-war Iraq," not about
policy makers, and adding this list evidences a partisan motivation behind
the report.

It was most unfortunate that the Majority not only rejected
amendments to exclude the names of these government officials, but
furthermore by party line vote also rejected mentioning that both the Senate
and House Intelligence Committee’s received these two reports and rejected
including the names of the members of those Committees. For those who
believed that this report should be about policy makers, one would think that
including our names on this list would comport with such a position.
Amazingly, however, in a strictly party-line vote, the Committee voted

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MORI DocID:

military action against Syria, a loss of
trade with Baghdad, or the break up of
Trag. Syria also would want the United
States to push for renewed Israeli-Syrian
peace negotiations aimed at returning the
Gotan Heights to Syria,

1422242

Syria. The Syrians would view the

‘of a US-backed regime in Irag a8
threat. Syrian officials distrust Saddam but
oppose his overthrow by the United States in
part because they believe that removing
Saddam from power is part of a US plan to
change the political map of the Middle East
and encircle Syria. Damascus would prefer
an Iraqi leadership that could help counter a
perceived Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian alliance
but probably has limited ability to influence a
successor regime in the near term. Syrian
leaders would try to assert influence in a post-
Saddam Iraq to prevent the United States
from building a stable, pro-Westem
government there, although Damascus would
carefully weigh the risks of such a policy.

© Damascus would continue to deepen its.
contacts with the roughly 30 Iraqi
opposition groups represented in Syria in
an attempt to maximize its influence in a

post-Saddam Iraq.

© Syria might resist the temptation to
meddle if given US assurances that
Saddam’s ouster would not lead to

(U) Broader Security Policies and
Posture Toward the United States

|US-led regime change and u long-
presence in Iraq would provoke the
ot sigan cry police
among Iraq's immediate
aoe ae pach en and Spar would face
the challenge of accommodating US military
preeminence without subordinating their
regional interests to Washington, For US

Arab allies, the post-Saddam era would raise ©

strategic concems that Ireq remained unified
and a bulwark against Iran but also would
raise fears that the expanded US presence in

the region could spark domestic unrest in key .

Arab states.

© In the short term, governments in the
region would try to balance domestic
pressures against offending US interests.
Overt government cooperation with the
United States might suffer initially as
authorities focused on domestic threats
from jihadists who perceived new

~~

Page 33 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

oe

constituencies cutting across ethno-religious
boundaries.

© Some small “political parties” operate
inside the country (primarily in northem
Irag), but none appear to have a
sufficiently broad base of support to
assume the rcins of power following,
Saddam's departure.

© The major Kurdish political parties are
unlikely to develop any significant
support among the Arab majority in Iraq.

© The Ba'th Party, having become a
repressive instrument of Saddam’s
regime, has become discredited and is
unlikely to serve as a model.

Caran mg ion of fie and democratic
although somewhat alien, probably
would be a popular concept with the vast

majority of the Iraqi population. But the
practical implementation of democratic rule
would be difficult in a country with no
concept of loyal opposition and no history of
alternation of power. Those groups that
retained a power base following Saddam’s
removal would be reluctant to voluntarily
relinquish whatever influence they had until
they felt sufficiently secure—on a personal as
well as a group level, The experience of the
Kurdish-controlled north, where neither
Kurdish party has been prepared to concede
power to the other, is instructive (see text box
on page 16).

Although Iraqis might be enthusiastic
about casting votes, we do not know what
their perception of “democracy” is. Many
Iraqi citizens probably would continue to
rely heavily on authority figures for their
well-being and direction, The history of
strong authoritarian rule has left most
Iraqis heavily reliant on the central
government. Unicss Saddam's removal

were followed by re-establishment of a
strong and central authority, many Iraqis
would begin looking toward more
traditional regional, tribal, or religious
authorities for support and guidance.

© Some Iraqis would be quick to blame
economic problems and other difficulties
in their daily lives on a breakdown of the
previous order. There might be some
longing for the more functional aspects of
Saddam's authoritarian regime, similar to
nostalgia for an undemocratic past
observed in other states that have
undergone major loosening of their
political systems (such as South Africa
and the former Soviet Union).

Frraalh nk of ingainad democratic
is, innate distrust of other groups, and

the tendency to substitute tribal, ethnic, or
sectarian loyalties will impede the
development of a stable democracy. Initial
expressions of enthusiasm for democratic
norms and procedures—not only from
ordinary Iraqis, but from any new Iraqi
government, which would want to stay in
good graces with the US-led Western
democracies—would not reflect a sudden
alteration of that culture. A stable and
democratic Iraqi political system, if one
‘emerges, is likely to be the result of a long
evolution that supplants traditional loyalties
and practices.
Democracy or representative institutions
could provide a forum to adjudicate
competing tribal or sectarian differences.

* However, forcing short-term political
accommodations between competing
interests before new pattems of trust had
developed could be destabilizing. Iraq
lacks traditions even comparable to that of
the Joya jirga in Afghanistan, which
enables groups there to have some role in

Page 65 of 226



ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF
CHAIRMAN JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, SENATOR RON WYDEN,
SENATOR BAYH, AND SENATOR WHITEHOUSE

The Committee’s report on the Intelligence Community’s pre-war
assessments on post-war Iraq reveals that there was a steady flow of cautionary
judgments sent to senior policy officials in the Bush Administration warning that
securing the peace in Iraq would be difficult and success uncertain.

The most chilling and prescient warning from the Intelligence Community
prior to the war was that the American invasion would bring about instability in
Iraq that would be exploited by Iran and al-Qa’ida terrorists.

Iran’s role in providing lethal assistance to insurgents has directly led to the
deaths of American military personnel and Tehran continues to work behind the
scenes to undermine the Baghdad government and allied reconstruction efforts.

America’s prolonged presence in Iraq, the Intelligence Community correctly
assessed, has allowed al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups to take advantage of the
security vacuum in-country and to increase their attacks against Americans with
deadly results.

Prior to sending troops to Iraq, the Bush Administration promoted the
terrorist nexus between Iraq and al-Qa’ida (and the attacks of 9/11) as a central
part of its case to the American people that Iraq posed an imminent threat that only
military action could extinguish, despite the Intelligence Community’s view that
Iraq and al-Qa’ida viewed each other with suspicion and were not operationally
linked.

What the Administration also kept from the American people were the
sobering intelligence assessments it received at the time warning that the post-war
transition could allow al-Qa’ida to establish the presence in Iraq and opportunity
to strike at Americans it did not have prior to the invasion.

Page 188 of 226


failed to capture policymakers’ attention.”?

I am pleased that the Committee has completed this aspect of its Phase
Il investigation and will allow the public to reach their own informed
judgments on the quality and accuracy of prewar assessments on postwar
Iraq. The use of these assessments — or better put, the lack of use of them —
to determine policy in the postwar period is self-evident. It is disappointing
that the Committee did not address these issues in the underlying report.

* The DCI's Report on Intelligence Lessons Learned from Military Actions in Irag, 11 February 2005, iv.

Page 194 of 226


Washington’s sway.” The report noted that the shock within Iran over the successful US
campaign in Afghanistan had led to an internal debate between pragmatists and ideologues
within the country. The report discussed different policies Iran would take depending upon the
success or difficulties faced by the US in Iraq.”

(EEE The final report of October 2002 from CIA, Jrag Simulation Reveals Challenges for US
Post Saddam Policy, was the summary of a 3-day simulation sponsored by the CIA involving
intelligence community analysts and outside experts. The simulation was premised on the
scenario that a Sunni Republican Guard general would kill Saddam and his inner circle and sue
for peace after US and United Kingdom forces entered southern Iraq; Kurds captured Kirkuk;

; and anti-Saddam tribes captured western Iraq. The report concluded that
the simulation highlighted “the centrality of the US factor in post-Saddam Iraq and the need that
the goals of the US be transparent.” The report also assessed that the simulation revealed what
the authors believed were the “attitudes of ‘real’ Iraqis,” such as their support for an intact but
federated Iraq, and the clout of leaders “with proven influence” on the ground in Iraq in contrast
to exiled political leaders or party heads without armed followers.*!

Intelligence Assessments in August 2002

In August 2002, the CIA produced three analytic products on postwar Iraq. One
product examined the experience of the United States in Germany and Japan after World War II
and compared this with the conditions likely to be faced by the US in Iraq. This product, The
Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq, analyzed issues of
importance in the post-World War II occupation of Germany and Japan such as: the extent of the
US international mandate and regional support; the use of local authorities and institutions; the
administration of the occupation through a limited staff backed by the presence of hundreds of
thousands of occupation troops; the fact that atrocities had been committed against foreign or
marginalized groups and not the populations of Germany and Japan as a whole; and the unifying
symbols and traditions that were present in Germany and Japan after World War II.

iz The report observed that the US began the occupations of Germany and Japan with
goals for sweeping political, social, and economic change that were “rapidly rolled back” to
reflect changing US policy goals due to the start of the Cold War. The report also pointed out
that postwar occupation planning for Germany and Japan started in 1942, almost as soon as the
United States entered the war, and that the occupations of Germany and Japan were implemented
in the context of defeated populations relieved to see the end of war. The report noted that in
both countries the seven-year occupation “merely laid the foundation for success” and that
“solidifying political gains required generational change.” *

(GER) (he Postwar Occupations report contrasted these factors found in Germany and Japan
with the existing and historical conditions in Iraq. The report noted that “the religious and

cultural gap between occupying Western forces and the Iraqi population” would be wider than
what was the case in Germany or even Japan. The report noted that atrocities in Iraq had been

a CIA, fran Wary of a US Attack on Iraq, October 25, 2002, pp. 7 - 10.
5" CIA, Iraq Simulation Reveals Challenges for US Post-Saddam Policy, October 10, 2002.
CIA, The Postwar Occupations of Germany and Japan: Implications for Iraq, August 7, 2002.

Page 102 of 226


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Page 124 of 226


1422242

MORI DocID:

a

within that country than events elsewhere in
the region. Regardless of how positively
regional leaders viewed their relations with
the United States and might want to
accommodate US goals of political openness,
the Middle East will remain a difficult
environment in which to advance democracy
and liberalism,

@ The concepts of democracy and
Tepresentative government are alien to
most Arab Middle Eastern political
cultures—grounded in histories that
derive mainly from subjugation to larger
empires and then to European colonial
rule.

© Many states lack such important
components of democracy as the concept
of a loyal opposition, vibrant civil society
institutions, respect for rule of law,
transparency, and a strong middle class.

Many rulers in the region recognize

ial role of reform in economic
expansion but fear a spillover into politics, In
response to pressure to allow more public
participation, some Arab leaders have taken a
few tentative steps in the past decade to open
their political systems. Some states have
consultative councils that serve primarily as
safety valves with no practical authority.
‘These councils would be unlikely to evolve
into true power-sharing bodies unless
supported by regime elites,

Even if leaders were convinced that
Political reform were necessary, they
would face such obstacles as entrenched
interests of the sccular and religious clites.

The closed and unreformed political
‘systems in many Arab countries also reflect
complex sets of deals, understandings, and
patron-client relationships that are based on
long-standing ethnic, sectarian, or tribal

identities. Oi) wealth has enabled some
autocratic regimes to buy off their populations
with a social contract that provides for the
basic needs of the populace in return for
maintaining the political status quo.

© Most regimes in the region so far have
responded successfully to pressures to
renegotiate fraying social contracts by the
deeply ingrained habit of incremen-
talism—reforming and restructuring just
enough to get by—and would be unlikely
to break this habit easily,

Cams Many leaders also have ong cord
pulling back popular reforms—often by

force—when they appear to empower groups
beyond the traditional ruling elites: As long
as radical Islamist sentiment remained strong
in the region and secular, liberal alternatives
remained weak, the possibility of Islamists
winning free elections—as happened in
Algeria a decade ago—would give some
governments strong pause about opening up
their political systems.

In the near-term, the use of US

force against Iraq may be more likely
to stifle than nurture democratic movements
in some regional states because governments
would use political repression to quell violent
public opposition to the war and perhaps to
the local government's indirect association
with it.

¢ After a conflict, the long-term presence of
US forces in Iraq also could fuel

a

Page 43 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

we

against meddling by one or more of these
neighbors in conflicts inside Irag.

¢ Turkey would be a concer for a post-
Saddam Iragi regi

© Unless there is some movement on a
tripartite agreement, relations between
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria could become
increasingly fractious because of water
shortages in Syria and Iraq emanating
from the Southeast Anatolian
Development Project.

¢ Rivalry with Iran would be a continuing
reality for Iraq. The two states are, by
virtue of population and petroleum
resources, the main contenders for
military dominance in the Persian Gulf.
‘Centuries-old enmity between Persian and
Arab would remain, as would distrust over
the status and exploitation of Iraqi Shia.
The territorial and navigational issues that
underlay the Iran-Iraq war would
continue, as well as issues left by the war
itself (unrepatriated prisoners and genera!
Tancor from eight years of combat). For
the near term, Iran would be a concem to
a new Iraqi regime in terms of internal

meddling more than military intervention.
Sunni Iraqis would be wary about
‘Tehran's attempts to curry favor with, and ©
perhaps dissension in, the Iraqi Shia
community. Over the longer term, Iran’s
‘WMD programs would be of high concem
to Baghdad, particularly if Iraq’s own
WMD programs were destroyed and its
conventional forces weakened by combat
with Coalition forces and subsequent
occupation,

A new government in Iraq would be less
concerned about Syria than about either
Turkey or Iran. The potential for
interference is less, there would be
continued mutual dependence on Syrian-
Araqi trade, and a collapse of the Iraqi
Ba’th Party might reduce some of the
Tragi-Syrian tensions that have involved
differing claims to Ba’ thist orthodoxy.
Both Baghdad and Damascus might be
interested in developing a bilateral
relationship that would help to counter a
perceived Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian
alliance.

‘The traditionally close ties between Iraq
and Jordan probably would remain
strong, although the makeup of a new
regime in Baghdad would determine how
far the relationship would develop.

A new regime in Baghdad likely would
renounce Saddam's carlier claims on
Kuwait to gamer international political
and economic support over the near term.
In the longer teem, traditional Iraqi
designs on Kuwaiti territory could
resurface. Unsettled territorial issues
would be a source of potential friction in
the future. Iraqi complaints about the UN
demarcated border—which regime

steerer J]

Page 85 of 226



CONCLUSIONS

@® Democracy

® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that
establishing a stable democratic government in postwar Iraq would be a long,
difficult and probably turbulent challenge. In January 2003, the Intelligence
Community assessed that building “an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult
and probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq’s tradition
of authoritarianism.”'* The greatest medium-to-long term challenge in Iraq would
be the “introduction of a stable and representative political system.”'® The
Intelligence Community noted that Iraqi political culture did “not foster liberalism
or democracy”! and was “largely bereft of the social underpinnings that directly
support development of broad-based participatory democracy.”'® Although the
idea of free and democratic elections probably would be a popular concept with the
vast majority of the Iraqi population, “the practical implementation of democratic
tule would be difficult in a country with no concept of loyal opposition and no
history of alternation of power.”””

QD The Intelligence Community noted factors that favored the development
of democracy: “the relatively low politicization of Iraqi Shiism” and “discredited”
secular authoritarian nationalism.”” This did “not mean, however, that the trend
[political Islam] could not take root in postwar Iraq, particularly if economic
recovery were slow and foreign troops remained in the country for a long
period.””! In addition, the Intelligence Community cited “the contributions that
could be made by four million Iraqi exiles — many of whom are Westernized and
well educated — and by the now impoverished and underemployed Iraqi middle
class,” ”* but noted that opposition parties did “not have the popular, political or
military capabilities to play a leading role After Saddam’s departure without
significant and prolonged external economic, political and military support.””

'S NIC: Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, p. 5
‘© NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5

‘7NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5

'* NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 13

'' NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 14

?°NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 15

| NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 15

” NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5

3 NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 17



TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .... 1... ett t ete eeeee 1
A. Methodology ©... 0060s 1
B. Background ....0 000 cnet tees 2
C. Previous Reviews of Prewar Intelligence about Postwar Iraq ....... 3
D. Other Intelligence Assessments on Postwar Iraq ................. 5
CONCLUSIONS 2.0.0.0 intent e tents 6

APPENDIX A: National Intelligence Council: Regional
Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq .. 0.0.0... 0.00 13

APPENDIX B: National Intelligence Council: Principal
Challenges In Post-Saddam Iraq ........6000 00000 cece cece 52

APPENDIX C: Overview of Other Intelligence Assessments On
Postwar [1aq . 1.006 cent e eee n ee 92

APPENDIX D: Distribution Lists For Principal Challenges In
Post-Saddam Iraq and Regional Consequences of Regime

Change in Traq oo. cc ccc cece ccc nee n teen e nent e tenet eeenees 107
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator Ron Wyden,
Senator Evan Bayh, and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse ................ 188

Senator Dianne Feinstein

MINORITY VIEWS
Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond, Senator John Warner, ............ 195
Senator Orrin Hatch, and Senator Richard Burr

Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond, Senator Orrin Hatch,............. 205
and Senator Richard Burr

Senator Saxby Chambliss, Senator Orrin Hatch, ...............000005 223
and Senator Richard Burr

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Page 148 of 226



1422242

MORI DocID:

a

Palestinians and is pessimistic the United
States would pressure Sharon into meaningful
talks. As a result, Arafat—who feels his
personal preeminence in Palestinian politics is
unchallenged—probably would be content to

let the security situation remain cheotic.

Palestinian views toward negotiating
With Israel also might be affected by the
degree to which they perceived that they
continued to have support from other actors
with the capability to pressure Ssrael—
Hizballah, Iran, and Syria, for example.

Regarding Syria, an unambiguous
‘commitment to satisfy Palestinian national
aspirations and revive Israeli-Syrian
negotiations on the basis of the Madrid
framework and UN resolutions would help.

case Syrian suspicion toward the United
States

(U) Economic Consequences

The ouster of Saddam Husayn would
jave mostly negative but variable economic
effects in the region, including potential
decreases in oi! revenues and non-vil trade,
declines in tourism, and increased refugee
flows.

dee

‘orld oil prices probably would

‘at least $40 per barre) during—and in
the run-up to and immediate aftermath of —a
war because of the uncertainty associated.
with a cutoff in traq’s oil exports of roughly
2 million barrels per day (b/d). The impact on
prices would depend on the level of damage
to Iraq’s oil infrastructure, industry
expectations about the length of the
disruption, the use of government-owned
strategic stocks by consuming nations, and
whether Venezuela’s oj] output remained
disrupted by oil worker strikes. OPEC
members would have the surplus capacity to
offset fost Iraqi exports and have consistently
pledged to compensate for Iraqi disruptions to
stabilize the market, but a simultaneous loss
of Venezuelan and Iraqi output'would exceed.
their surplus capacity.

e OPEC ministers fear a prolonged period
of high oil prices would harm the global
economy, boost non-OPEC investment,
and spur the development of alternative
energy sources. OPEC producers with
spare capacity also would be tempted to
increase production to reap the windfall
revenues from a spike in prices.

© Saudi Arabia's willingness to raise output
would be crucial because Riyadh
maintains more than half of global spare
capacity—nearly 2 million b/d—and has
strong influence over other Gulf
exporters, which together hold another 1.2
million b/d.

© Prospects for a speedy resumption of
Venezuelan output are unclear, and
overlapping Iraqi and Venezuelan
disruptions could remove a combined 5
Million b/d from thé world market, about
equal to the disruption caused by the
1990-91 Gulf War and surpassing the 3
million b/d of surplus capacity in other
OPEC producers.

Page 40 of 226



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Page 159 of 226

|



Dee:

favoritism—and those who have been its
victims. The desire among many of the latter
for reprisals against the former would be
strong.

if responsibility for intemal security

passed from an occupying force to
an Iraqi government, such a government
would have to walk a fine line between
dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam's
police, security, and intelligence forces and
Tetaining the capability to enforce nationwide
peace. Those elements most closely
associated with Saddam would have to be
protected against immediate reprisals if they
were to face s judicial process rather than
vigilante violence. The Special Republican
Guards, Special Security Organization, Iraqi
Intelligence Service, Saddam Fedayeen, and
Directorate of General Security are all
associated with internal repression and
surveillance. Local police and the Regular’
Army are less tainted by association with
Saddam's cule and could assist in law
enforcement.

© In the immediate aftermath of Saddam's
removal, those Iraqi forces capable of
putting down unrest and restoring order
would tend to employ, if not otherwise
checked, the familiar tactics used under
the Saddam regime, meaning quick and
possibly brutal repression.

© Over the longer term, the police and
security forces would need to be rebuilt
and restructured if they were to gain the
trust of the Inagi people and avoid the
excesses similar to those under Saddam’s
nuk.

© The Regular Army has been relatively
unpoliticized below the command level
and, once purged of the security and
intelligence officers embedded within it,
could be used for security and law

MORI DocID: 1422249

{_

enforcement until police or a local
gendarme force is established.

| Sree
‘or the most part, Iraqi Shia and
anni lived peacefully together and do

not have a legacy of sectarian strife.
Nevertheless, the threat of Shia reprisals for
the oppression they have suffered under
Saddam's rule is a major concern to the Sunni
elite and could erupt if not prevented by an
occupying force. The underlying causes for
violence involve political reprisals more than
ethnic or sectarian divisions.

¢ broader Ireqi Sunni Arab_

does.not publicize its views
regarding a redistribution of power in Iraq.
Anecdotal reporting indicates that some
elements of Sunni society would oppose a
regime that did not allow the Sunnis to
continue to prevail in the military, security
services, and goverment. Other Sunni
Arabs, especially ones having extensive
interaction with Shia in daily urban life, might
view power less starkly in sectarian terms and
be open to 2 more representative political
system. In any event, creation of a
government that was both stable and more
representative would require Sunni
acceptance of an end to their longstanding
domination of Iraqi politics,

© A decentralized or federal democracy with
minority protections might better protect
the Sunnis’ interests but would still mean
Joss of their privileged status.

ajor sectarian fighting would be
y Sunnis retained their political
dominance in Baghdad and most of central
Irag but neither they nor # foreign power
controlled the south,

20

Page 71 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

Page 80 of 226


AUTHENTICATED 7g
7)

JOHN 0, ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN,
CHRISTOPHER $. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA JOHN WARNER, VIRGINA
CHUCK HAGEL.

|WYDEN, OREGON "NEBRASKA
EVAN BAYH, INDIANA ‘SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA

Aicbenroencoowecowsn LIMP SoHE MAE WPnited States Senate
sitelsou now SOURS samen OLN
oe en ° ‘SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
san neo neyAdA x orc
‘MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY. EX OFFICIO WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475,

ANDREW W. JOHNSON, STAFF DIRECTOR
(ORITY

LOU ATMEEN. MCGEE OME LENE May 25, 2007

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
President Pro Tempore

United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of all members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, we are
filing the Committee’s report on the “Prewar Intelligence Assessments About
Postwar Iraq.” The report was approved by a majority vote of the Committee at a
meeting held on May 8, 2007.

Senate Resolution 400 of the 94" Congress (1976) charges the Committee
with the duty to oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities
and programs of the United States Government, and to report to the Senate
concerning those activities. Pursuant to this charge, the Committee undertook a
multi-faceted review in February 2004 of issues related to intelligence produced
prior to the Iraq war.

The report is in both classified and unclassified form. The classified report
is available to members in the Committee’s secure spaces. The classified report is
also being provided to appropriately cleared officials of the Executive Branch. The
unclassified report, which we are hereby transmitting, includes the Committee’s
conclusions and the additional views of Committee members.

Sincerely,

Cae Yr

John D. Rockefeller IV Christopher S. Bond
Chairman Vice Chairman


reconstruction[,] Managing rising expectations and nationalist backlash[,] Rebuilding the
military to assure security.”*

(HEED The second briefing also outlined that potential post-war challenges that included,
“preventing Kurdish separation, eradicating terrorists in Ansar area, managing inter-ethnic/tribal
violence, gaining contro! of the regime’s geographic power base, and accounting for WMD.”

Ibid
© Ibid

Page 106 of 226


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Page 180 of 226



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* Page 157 of 226





The tragic consequences of the Administration’s unwillingness to heed the
pre-war judgments of the Intelligence Community are not limited to the borders of
Iraq. Intelligence assessments that a U.S.-led defeat and occupation of Iraq would
fuel anti-Western Islamist extremism and be used by terrorist groups as a
propaganda tool to engender support and build their ranks have been proven out.
So too has the following January 2003 Intelligence Community judgment:

AlJ-Qa’ida — which has not given up its fight in Afghanistan — probably
would try to step up its efforts to re-establish its presence there while the
United States was diverted with concerns in postwar Iraq.

The wide-distribution of these pre-war Intelligence Community assessments
within the White House, the Office of the Vice President, the National Security
Council, and the Departments of Defense and State (Appendix D of the report)
removes any doubt that these warnings were received at the highest levels of the
Administration.

The Committee is unable to answer the question as to whether the President
personally was presented with the Intelligence Community’s informed judgments
about the factors that could prevent success from being achieved in Iraq. What
can be said with greater certainty is that these pre-war cautions were marginalized
if not ignored by an Administration set on going to war.

In doing so, the Bush Administration once again demonstrated its practice
of cherry-picking intelligence reports and assessments that supported policy
objectives and denigrating or dismissing those which did not.

This practice of misusing intelligence is not an academic matter. It is a
matter of life, death, and the security of our Nation. These and other missteps of
the Bush Administration have led to increased violence in Iraq, a resurgent al-
Qa’ida in Afghanistan, and a worsening spread of anti-American extremism
around the world.

Page 189 of 226


Additional information also supports the Committee’s finding that
Mrs. Wilson is the one who originally suggested Ambassador Wilson to look
into the Iraq-Niger uranium matter. Page 39 of the Committee’s Phase I
report noted that a CLA/CPD reports officer told the Committee staff that
Mrs. Wilson “offered up” her husband’s name. In Ambassador Wilson’s
letter to the Committee he claims that “the reports officer has a different
conclusion about Valerie’s role than the one offered in the “additional
views.” In recent public testimony before the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, Mrs. Wilson has also claimed that a
memorandum from the reports officer written after he read the Committee’s
report “absolutely” contradicts the report, that he sought to be reinterviewed
by the Committee, and that his words has been “twisted and distorted” by
the Committee. None of these claims are true.

Committee staff had the opportunity to review the reports officers’
“memorandum” (actually a letter addressed to Mrs. Wilson but apparently
never sent) which says only that the reports officer’s remarks about
Ambassador Wilson’s trip were “truncated” in the Committee’s report. He
cited two specific issues that the Committee did not include: his comments
that he believed Mrs. Wilson had acted appropriately and that the reports
officer “pushed for the trip” himself. The reports officer’s letter does not
say that the Committee twisted or distorted his words, does not contradict
the Committee’s finding that Mrs. Wilson is the one who suggested her
husband, does not retract his comments to the Committee that she “offered
up” her husband’s name, and does not state that he would like to be re-
interviewed by the Committee. Based on information and documents made
available to the Committee, we have no reason to believe that the reports
officer sought to be re-interviewed or that CIA prevented him from being re-
interviewed.

The Committee interviewed nearly 300 people for the Phase I report
and most interviews averaged between one to two hours. The Committee
staff interviewed this reports officer for nearly an hour and a half.
Obviously not all of his remarks, nor the entirety of the remarks of the other
several hundred interviewees, could or needed to be included in the report.
The Committee believed, as we still do, that the comment quoted in the
report in response to a question about any substantive role Mrs. Wilson
played in her husband’s trip to Niger in 2002 accurately summarized his
remarks. The reports officer’s full remarks about the issue were:

Page 209 of 226


APPENDIX D
DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES IN POST-

SADDAM IRAQ AND REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME
CHANGE IN IRAQ

Page 107 of 226


me

@ Iraq itsclf still might not be one of al-
Qa’ida’s favored locations for attacks,
given the group's greater operational
presence elsewhere.

¢ Al Qa'ida, nonetheless, probably would
try to exploit any postwar transition in
Iraq by replicating the tactics it has used
in Afghanistan during the past year to
mount hit-and-run operations against US
Personnel. Support for these operations
would come from its network on the
Arabian Peninsula and its Kurdish
associates in northeastern Iraq.

© Al-Qa’ida—which has not given up its
fight in Afghanistan—probably would try
to step up its efforts to re-establish its
presence there while the United States
was diverted with concerns in postwar
Iraq.

'o the extent that a new Iraqi
government effectively controlled its territory,
especially in northern Iraq, and was friendlier
to US interests and backed by US military
powcr, al-Qa’ida’s freedom of movement
inside Iraq almost centainly would be
hampered.

© If al-Qa'ida mobilized significant
. fesources to combat a US presence in
Traq, it could, at least in the near term,
reduce its overall) capability to strike
elsewhere.

|The lines between al-Qa'ida and
terrorist groups around the world,

especially local militants, increasingly could
become blurred in the wake of a US attack
and counterattacks by al-Qa'ida and jihadists.
‘The targeting by less capable groups and
planners operating on short notice would
mean that such softer targets as US citizens
overseas would become more inviting for
terrorists.

@ Attacks could come not only from al-
Qa’ ida and other organized Sunni and
Shia extremist groups but also unaffiliated
Muslims as well as left-wing and anti-
imperialist groups.

© In Turkey, the leftist Revolutionary
People's Liberation Party/Front
(DHKPIC, formerly Dev Sol), although
weakened over the past decade, could
target US interests as it did during the
1990-91 war with Iraq.

threat from terrorism resulting

‘a war with Iraq, after an initial spike,
probably would decline slowly over the next
three to five years. If effective
counterterrorist operations continued,
democratization and economic reform began
to take hold in Iraq and elsewhere in the
region, and Arab-Israeli tensions eased, the
terrorist and Islamist appeal most likely
would decrease, These developments would
depend, however, on how quickly political .
and economic reforms were translated into
tangible improvements in the daily lives of

* people.

© Terrorists probably would feel

against the United States began to subside
and political and economic opportunities
increased in Iraq or elsewhere in the
region, These fears might lead to
increased terrorism in the short-term as
terrorists attempt “last-gasp” displays of
strength to bolster support.

(U) Palestinian Groups—aA Special Case
-gime change in Iraq would be

wi ly to affect Palestinian terrorism

significantly. The effects that a US-led war in

Iraq would have on support for extremist

causcs in the rest of the Arab and Muslim

worlds, however, also would be felt among

_ the Palestinians.

de

Page 28 of 226



available to the Committee indicates that this information came from Mrs.
Wilson’s own testimony to the CIA Inspector General.

Yet, Mrs. Wilson testified before the House Committee on
Government Oversight and Reform on March 16, 2007 that, “I did not
recommend him. I did not suggest him.” Mrs. Wilson told the House
Committee that a young junior officer in CIA/CPD received a phone call
from someone in the Office of the Vice President asking about the alleged
sale of uranium from Niger to Iraq. Mrs. Wilson testified that while she was
talking to the junior officer, another officer heard this and suggested, “well,
why don’t we send Joe?”

This testimony was of great interest to us because during a nearly hour
long interview with Mrs. Wilson in which Committee staff asked
specifically what led CIA/CPD to think about sending someone to Niger and
how it was that her husband’s name came up, Mrs. Wilson never provided
the story she provided to the House Committee. Rather, Mrs. Wilson told
the Committee staff, “I honestly do not recall if I suggested it or my boss,
who knew my husband and what he had done for us previously, my boss at
the time being the head of the whole task force, during a brainstorming
session suggested well, what about your husband, Ambassador Wilson,
would he be willing to consider this.” When asked specifically if she
remembered whether she suggested her husband’s name, she said “I honestly
do not.”

Mrs. Wilson told the CIA Inspector General that she suggested her
husband for the trip, she told our Committee staff that she could not
remember whether she did or her boss did, and told the House Committee,
emphatically, that she did not suggest him.

Mrs. Wilson’s role in her husband’s trip was not limited merely to
suggesting him. Notes from a State INR analyst, who participated in a
February 19, 2002 meeting to discuss CIA/CPD’s proposal to send Wilson
to Niger, state that the meeting was “apparently convened by Valerie
Wilson, a CLA WMD managerial type and the wife of Amb. Joe Wilson,
with the idea that the agency and the larger USG could dispatch Joe to
Niger.” While Mrs. Wilson stayed at the meeting only long enough to
introduce her husband, a CIA operations cable confirms the INR notes that
she did convene the meeting. The cable, inviting Intelligence Community
participants to the meeting, says that the “meeting was facilitated by [Mrs.

Page 211 of 226


‘© Long-term foreign monitoring and
inspections likely would be necessary to
ensure that Iraq’s WMD infrastructure
was dismantled and destroyed.

© Aftemative occupations for scientists and
technicians involved in WMD
would reduce their availability for a re-
established program as well as reduce

MORI DocID: 1422249

their willingness to market their technical
expertise or materials to others.

lraq’s interest in WMD capabilities

largely a result of the security
environment as well as Saddam's
megalomania. Unless guaranteed a security
umbrella against its strategic rivals, future
Iraqi leaders would likely have a continued

© Limited US military‘iavo
with a loose confederation

I

I.

Page 87 of 226


trusting your judgment on such things as those of us who are intelligence
analysts have for trusting ours.” We agree, and believe that this principle
also extends to other disciplines relevant to post-war Iraq, such as military
and economic matters.

We also believe that the structure of the report is inadequate. The
report is composed of a five page introduction, followed by six pages of
conclusions, with several appendices. None of the sections, not even the
conclusions, offer any investigative insights. Rather, they merely restate
select portions of the Intelligence Community’s analysis in two of the
Intelligence Community’s assessments about postwar Iraq. Since the
“conclusions” are immediately followed in the report by the two
assessments, which were largely declassified, it is unclear what purpose the
conclusions serve.

We requested that the conclusions provide some value to the reader by
offering the Committee’s judgments regarding whether the Intelligence
Community’s assessments were accurate or inaccurate. We proposed that
each conclusion discuss the accuracy of the Intelligence Community’s
judgments and proposed the following introductory conclusion:

The Intelligence Community outlined a range of potential
challenges an occupying force would likely face in postwar Iraq
and in the region, many of which have occurred in Iraq. Some
assessed challenges did not occur or occurred in ways that
differed from the assessments. For some assessments, even five
years into the Iraq conflict, it remains too early to determine the
ultimate end result. The Intelligence Community faced a
challenging task in attempting to assess likely events in postwar Iraq,
events that would depend, in part, on the events of the war itself that
would be driven by the actions of the US military and 26 million
Iraqis. The Intelligence Community also lacked intelligence reporting
on postwar Iraq and based its analysis, therefore, on the regional and
country expertise of Intelligence Community analysts and outside
experts. Considering these factors, analysts performed well in
outlining a range of potential postwar challenges, many of which have
occurred in postwar Iraq. Some assessed challenges did not occur or
occurred in ways that differed from the assessments and some
challenges were not predicted. It is important to note that, although
this report treats the removal of Saddam Hussein from power as the

Page 197 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422249

Page 82 of 226


Community assessed that “some elements in the Iranian government could decide
to try to counter aggressively the U.S. presence in Iraq or challenge U.S. goals
following the fall of Saddam by attempting to use their contacts in Kurdish and
Shia communities to sow dissent against the US presence and complicate the
formation of a new, pro-US Iraqi government.””” The Intelligence Community
noted that elements in the regime also could “employ their own operatives against
US personnel, although this approach would be hard to conceal.”

(® The Intelligence Community assessed that “guaranteeing Iran a role in
the negotiations on the fate of post-Saddam Iraq might persuade some Iranian

officials to pursue an overt and constructive means to influence reconstruction in
ia 049 as

When possible, the establishment of “a mechanism for US and Iranian officials to

communicate on the i in ae could facilitate es

@® WMD

@® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that military
action to eliminate Iraqi WMD would not cause other regional states to
abandon their WMD programs, or their desire to develop such programs.
The Intelligence Community assessed that for many countries in the Middle East
and South Asia, WMD programs “would continue to be viewed as necessary and
integral components of an overall national security posture.” The Intelligence
Community cited several reasons that other regional states would not give up
WMD, including the need “to survive in a dangerous neighborhood, enhance
regional prestige, compensate for conventional military deficiencies, and deter
threats from superior adversaries.”* The Intelligence Community said “states also
would be driven to acquire WMD capabilities or accelerate programs already in
train with the hope of developing deterrent capabilities before the programs could
be destroyed preemptively.”*

“NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18
“NIC: Regional Consequences, p.18
* NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18
NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18
5! NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18
NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 7
: Regional Consequences, p. 7
* NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 26



The Kerr study group also told Committee staff that the PDB question
logs were only one channel of communication between policymakers and
the IC. For example, one of the study group members told Committee staff
that:

. .. we don’t know how people reacted to each of these documents.
And it’s important again to realize that we looked at the written,
finished product, not telephone calls to CENTCOM and not [the
DCI’s] briefings to the President, and not somebody’s briefing, what
they actually said to the Secretary of Defense that day on that piece of
information. Unless there was something written about it, we didn’t
see it.

The Kerr study group also told Committee staff that in producing this
report, they did not conduct any interviews, and like the Committee’s report,
they did not examine any of the raw intelligence reports underlying the
finished assessments.

Another report that alleged that policymakers “ignored” intelligence
assessments was the February 11, 2005 report to Congress titled, The DCI’s
Report on Intelligence Lessons Learned from Military Actions in Iraq. The
authors of this report also based their judgment on the lack of feedback from
policymakers on the Intelligence Community products that discussed
postwar Iraq. When asked specifically what policymakers the report was
referring to, one of the authors said “virtually everyone” and noted
specifically that neither the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence nor the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence provided any feedback
or asked any questions about these documents. Does this mean that the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence “ignored” intelligence assessments that things
were going to be difficult in postwar Iraq?

While we certainly dispute the authors’ contention that simply
because the Committee members did not formally provide questions about
these documents that we “ignored” them, such an accusation makes the
Committee’s refusal to include our own names in the distribution list all the
more ironic. This vote, more than any other vote, unfortunately confirmed
nagging suspicions concerning the partisan nature of the Committee's Phase
II reports which appear to be aimed at assaulting the current Administration.
It is our contention that our Committee would do well to put the partisan

Page 203 of 226


APPENDIX B

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL: PRINCIPAL
CHALLENGES IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

Page 52 of 226


- Principal Challeriges in Post-Saddam freq

JOHN A, RIZZO . ,
‘SENIOR DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL

" JOHNL HELQERBON

. INBPECTOR GENERAL TpOWOIG)

WALUAM R. HARLOW

DIRECTOR, PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Page 169 of 226



less for the Shia, given the “climate of fear” in Iraq and the even “greater repression” under
which the Shia lived.”

(HEM) The report catalogued the political agendas of each of the three groups. The report
suggested the Kurds would want to make “the most of their gains” since 1991." The first instinct
of many Shia Arabs “will be to commit acts of vengeance against hated officials, [Shia]
collaborators, and symbols of the regime.” ° The report assessed that the Shia would probably be
attracted to leaders who “promise to redress the imbalance of political power in their favor.”
The report also assessed most Sunnis would be glad to see the end of Saddam’s regime, and
while apprehensive about their future status, they may be receptive to democratic reforms.'°

(GERM) The report stated that the degree to which Islam “will become a political factor among
the Shia after Saddam’s demise is unclear.” The report further noted that “Islam has emmerged
as a more prominent factor in the lives of ordinary Iraqi Sunnis amid the hardships of the last
decade . . .but the trend does not necessarily equate to openness to radical Islamic activism.”
The degree to which radical Islam becomes a “growing or diminishing political force in post-
Saddam Iraq is not clear.”""

(HEBD With respect to civil war, another text box indicated: “the risk of civil strife following
the demise of Saddam’s regime will be high, but the possibility of full-scale civil war between
major ethnoreligious sectors or other interest blocs will be much lower, although the possibility
cannot be excluded.” The assessment noted that geographic separation of the various groups in
most of Iraq “will mitigate the prospects for civil war” although it assessed “the greatest chances
for sectarian and ethnic strife” exist in cities like Baghdad or in the Kirkuk-Mosul area.

(GHEE) The report noted that besides ethnoreligious groups, Iraq has “other, sometimes
overlapping major interest sectors” such as externally based oppositionists and military officers,
and examined them in turn. With respect to regime intelligence and security personnel, the
report noted that “former security officials . .. may seek to emerge as respectable businessmen,
but others may cross over into organized criminal or clandestine opposition activity.”

(GHEE The CIA published an intelligence assessment on the civilian police force and judicial
system and another on the senior officer corps of Iraq in March 2003. The report on the police
force and judicial system, Iraq’s Civilian Police Force and Judicial System, provided a general
description of the police force and judicial system, but highlighted the lack of information held
by the US with respect to officials at the local level, including their identities, loyalties, or the
involvement in regime brutality of individual police officers. The scope note stated “Our
understanding of Iraq’s civilian police force and criminal justice system is limited by a lower

; DIA, Attitudes of Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis in a Post-Saddam Iraq, March 2003, p. 2
Ibid, p. 3

° Ibid, p. 3-4

"° Ibid, p. 5

"'Toid, p. 3-4

” Ibid, p. 5

* Ibid, p. 3

Page 94 of 226


. * ROOM 6G80, OHS

ROOM 4020, ONS

feo. af re er ee ee ee 2


ay

Page 168 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

ae

© Spontaneous uprisings in 1991 showed
that civil unrest in the south could quickly
spin out of the control of local authorities
and open the way to a bloodbath among
stranded security and Ba'th Party officials
and government troops. While Saddam
was able to maintain control during Shia
rioting in 1999, demonstrations in the
capital illustrated Baghdad’s vulnerability,
which would be heightened if Iraqi
security services were weakened after a
change of regime. :

© Rather than resulting in the
dismemberment of Iraq, Shia revolts
could lead to brutal Sunni military
operations to reassert control over Shia-
controlled areas, if Iraqi military elements
retained the capacity to reassert control.

© Asseverely crippled Iraqi military might
not be able to muster a forceful response,
notwithstanding the galvanizing effect of
8 Shia uprising on Sunnis in central
provinces.

© Oil facilities and export terminals in
southern Iraq would be vulnerable to
seizure by Shias.

moms Groups might try to seize some
‘OMOMic assets, but they would be unlikely
to stake a territorial claim on any specific
portion of Iraq with the aim of establishing a
separate “Shia state.” To thc contrary,
‘statements by major Shia opposition groups
with strong ties to the Iraqi Shia population
Suggest the Shias prefer to assert control over
the state through majority rule or, at a
minimum, to play an integral part in its
governance.

Kurdish Options
[though the Kurds have
consistently reiterated their commitment to
the territorial integrity of Iraq under a

ee)

federated system, they could choose to take
advantage of a military confrontation, or
confusion in the immediate aftermath of
Saddam's demise, to wrest control of key
areas in order to increase their own leverage
within Iraq.

© If not prevented from doing so by an
‘occupying force, the Kurds might try to
take advantage of military action, Sunni-
Shia strife, or a weak post-Saddam
government—as they did in March
1991—by seizing key territory and
economic facilities, In particular, Kurds
could attempt to seize key oil facilities
around Kirkuk and/or Mosul—which
constitute nearly one third of Iraq's oil

then seck to have them,

included in an autonomy agreement with a
new regime, Mosul and Kirkuk have been
major sticking points in previous
negotiations between the Iraqi Kurds and
the central government.

© Property disputes will erupt as Kurds and
Turkomen try to reclaim from Arab
residents homes lost during Baghdad’s
decades-old Arabization campaign. Large
numbers of Arabs could be displaced in
any violence that was allowed to break
out, especially in the regions stretching
from Mosul in the north, southeast
through Kirkuk, to Khanagin on the
Iranian border.

© Kurdish parties, despite their efforts at
rapprochement, still harbor political,
territorial, and personal resentments and
distrust of one another that could erupt
Into intemecine fighting over how to deal
with a new regime and/or over control
over key territory.

e Armed Kurdish factions control

territory
and the smuggling of goods and people
across the borders with Turkey and Iran.

22

Page 73 of 226



providing the Prime Minister’s comment that “buyers like Iraq” would pay
more for Niger’s uranium. The second cable did not address the alleged Iraq
deal at all.

When Ambassador Wilson returned from Niger, the information he
reported also did nothing to resolve the question of whether Iraq was seeking
uranium from Niger, despite his claims to the contrary. The Committee
interviewed every analyst involved in the analysis of this issue. These
analysts told the Committee that the information from his report, if anything,
merely reinforced their existing views, whatever those views were. The
analysts consistently told Committee staff that they did not think the report
outlining Ambassador Wilson’s findings clarified the story or added a great
deal of new information. For most analysts, the report lent more credibility,
not less, to the reporter Niger-Iraq uranium deal. These analysts said that
they were not surprised to read that Nigerien officials denied discussing
uranium sales with Iraq because they had no expectation that they would
admit to such discussions. These analysts did find it interesting that the
former Nigerien Prime Minister acknowledged that an Iraqi delegation has
visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales, according to
the Committee’s report.

In addition to these comments from analysts, a CIA memorandum
released during the Scooter Libby trial supports the Committee’s findings,
noting that “no definitiveness could be assigned to the [Wilson] report.”

The Committee stated on page 46 of our report that because CIA
analysts did not believe that the report added any new information to clarify
the issue, they did not use the report to produce any further analytical
products or highlight the report for policymakers. For the same reason, the
Vice President’s CIA briefer did not brief the Vice President about the
report. The CIA Inspector General confirmed this account in testimony
before the Committee in which he stated:

His [the Vice President’s] briefer has told us that what was
learned on this subject simply didn’t rise to a level where it met
the threshold that they would go back and give him an account
even of what little was known. There being no news, they
didn’t take his time with it.

Page 216 of 226


wef

opportunities for helping to bring about
Islamic governments.

© Over the longer ran, an outcome that
installed a credible Iraqi regime and
visibly improved Iraqi living conditions
would increase the willingness of regional
governments to cooperate with the United
States.

| pepo adjusting regional ties,
if states would be likely to have

a strategic interest in forging new global
political and security relationships as
counterweights to US regional preeminence.
Europe's longstanding bid for trade and
investment ties in the region, support for
Palestinian nationalist aspirations, and pursuit
of regional policies that often are independent
of Washington would provide Arab states and
Iran ample ground for expanded relations
with the European Union. Similarly, China’s
potential future stake in Middle Easter
energy resources, drive toward expanded
military capabilities, and traditional arms
relationships with key regional states would
make Beijing newly attractive to regimes
unwilling to accede to indefinite and
unbridled US regional influence. Russia's
influence in energy markets and its status as a
major arma supplier and member of the
quartet on the Arab-Israeli peace process
could be reasons that regional states would
seek closer ties to Moscow. Within the
region, Arab states and Iran would have
added reason to expand relations with each
other, although longstanding suspicion of
Iranian intentions would limit such relations.

© Regimes might be even more willing to
consider new policies if Israel were
involved in the conflict because many in
the region would view such involvement
‘as coordinated with Washington to
increase Israeli dominance in the region.

ran. A protonged US military
presence in a post-Saddam Iraq would further
increase Tehran’s perception that the United
States is a threat.

. Pee hone neneangy”
Tehran would become ii
convinced that the United States was bent
on encircling Iran and that [ran could
become a target of US military operations.

. Iran would increase the tempo of its
intelligence gathering against US interests
in Iraq to Jeam more about US intentions
toward Iran.

C peeveh ts suspicions of US intentions,

would not preclude attempts to
engage Washington more closely to enhance
Iran’s sense of regional security.

Page 34 of 226



 DIRECTORWINPAC

* 5 DEPUTY DIRECTORVORFICE OF TERRORIDM AMALYSISCTC

‘
ROOM 1D4107, NHB '

ce i
1

'
. : 2 |

Page 179 of 226


internal memorandum for the DCI which said, “since learning that the Iraq-
Niger uranium deal was based on false documents earlier this spring, we no
longer believe that there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq
pursued uranium from abroad.” That was June 2003, not March 2002 as
Ambassador Wilson would have you believe.

We consider most aspects of the Niger-Iraq uranium matter closed —
Mrs. Wilson clearly suggested her husband for the trip to Niger, neither
Ambassador Wilson’s report, nor the reports from Ambassador Owens-
Kirkpatrick resolved the Niger-Iraq uranium reporting, the Vice President
was never briefed on Ambassador Wilson’s findings because CIA believed
the findings did not clarify the issue, and the Niger-Iraq uranium reporting
was cleared, by the CIA, for use in the President’s State of the Union
address.

One area of inquiry which now seems to be unresolved is why Mrs.
Wilson provided different testimony to the CIA Inspector General, our
Committee staff, and the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform. The account of a discussion among three colleagues about a phone
call from the Vice President is new to us, and apparently new to the CIA
which has been unable to find the alleged participants. Still, it is a story
worth exploring. For that reason, Senator Bond has written to the CIA
seeking interviews with the individuals involved, including a re-interview
with Mrs. Wilson. We hope that these witnesses will enable us to tie up
these loose ends once and for all.

In the meantime, because so much confusion remains about these
issues and because most of the Committee’s conclusions in its July 2004
report, including several conclusions that may alleviate some of this
confusion, were never fully declassified, we believe it is important to submit
some of those conclusions for declassification now. The three conclusions,
unanimously adopted by the full Committee, which explain: the lack of
impact that Ambassador Wilson’s findings had on Intelligence Community
judgments; the fact that the CIA never informed the Vice President about
Ambassador Wilson’s findings; and the misunderstanding within the CIA
that led the DCI to suggesting striking the Niger-Iraq uranium information
from the President’s Cincinnati speech, are reprinted below. We intend to

the Union. This is not correct. The April 2003 paper cited here is the only one prepared by the Africa NIO,
according to the CIA. The only other NIC products disseminated prior to April 2003 said Iraq was
“vigorously pursuing uranium from Africa.”

Page 218 of 226


—

MORI DocID:

1422242

33

Page 46 of 226



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ICA 2003-

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Page 115 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422242

Page 51 of 226


against adding the names of our Members to the list. It is astounding to me
that the Committee would vote to conceal effectively the names of the
members of this Committee from an allegedly exhaustive list of the
distribution of the ICAs. What possible reason could there be for concealing
the names of the Members of Congress? We believe this vote is one of the
most hypocritical measures we have witnessed in our time on the
Committee. If the Committee is releasing a lengthy list with the perception
that it is exhaustive, then our names should appear on this list too since we
received these documents.

Furthermore, what purpose does the inclusion of 81 pages of names in
the Committee’s report serve? Is it because Scooter Libby is on page one?
Or is it because Douglas Feith is on page 15? It seems clear to us that our
colleagues who voted to include the distribution list want to suggest that
everyone on this list read and ignored the judgments that things were going
to difficult in postwar Iraq. If the Committee members believed it was so
important to know whether certain policymakers read these reports and what
actions they took based on them, they should have asked for interviews.

We assume instead that they will make accusations that certain policymakers
“ignored” these assessments without affording those individuals the
opportunity to defend themselves.

Such a practice reminds us of an unclassified article titled Collection
and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the US Intelligence Community, published
on July 29, 2004 by the “Kerr study group,” where the group claimed that IC
analysis of postwar Iraq “rested on little hard information, was informed
largely by strong regional and country expertise developed over time, and
yet was on the mark. Intelligence projections in this area, however, although
largely accurate, had little or no impact on policy deliberations.” When
interviewed by Committee staff, however, the Kerr group said they had no
specific knowledge of prewar policy deliberations concerning postwar Iraq.
The said they came to their conclusions about the impact of intelligence
assessments on policy deliberations solely by reviewing the logs of
questions that the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) team sent back to the
Central Intelligence Agency. The Kerr study group members stated that the
lack of questions could also indicate that policy makers read and accepted its
judgments without having to ask questions. The Kerr study group members
also noted that the log only captures questions that the briefers thought were
important or those that could not be answered on the spot by the briefer.

Page 202 of 226


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Page 136 of 226


MORI DocID: 2242

Page 47 of 226


intelligence officer” who support Wilson’s account that his wife did not
propose him for the trip. We have been on this Committee long enough to
know that leaks from CIA sources and unnamed senior officials do not
represent CIA’s official position and are certainly not the definitive word
from the CIA. Furthermore, our Committee did seek an official response
from the CIA. The response after conferring with CIA/CPD was “we do not
recall specifically who surfaced [Ambassador Wilson’s] name.” Our
Committee wisely chose to use the findings of the CIA Inspector General,
our own interviews, and a thorough review of documents for our fact base to
determine what CIA/CPD could not.

Ambassador Wilson’s letter also took issue with the conclusion in the
additional views of Chairman Roberts and Senators Hatch and Bond which
said:

Rather than speaking publicly about his actual experiences
during his inquiry of the Niger issue, the former
ambassador seems to have included information he learned
from press accounts and from his beliefs about how the
Intelligence Community would have or should have handled
the information he provided.

The Committee report included several examples including his
comments in a June 12, 2003 Washington Post story? by Walter Pincus
which said, “among the envoy’s conclusions was that the documents may
have been forged because ‘the dates were wrong and the names were
wrong;”” his comments asserting that the Vice President had been briefed on
his findings; and press stories, for which he appeared to be an anonymous
source, that claimed his findings “debunked” the Niger-Iraq uranium story.

In his letter to the Committee, Ambassador Wilson took issue with
this conclusion and asserted that his first “public statement” was in his New
York Times op-ed on July 6, 2003.’ He says that in this and his other public
comments, he stated clearly that he never saw the documents, that he
claimed “only that the transaction described in the documents that turned out
to be forgeries could not have occurred and did not occur,” and that he

? Pincus, Walter, “CIA Did Not Share Doubt on {raq Data; Bush Used Report of Uranium Bid,” The
Washington Post, June 12, 2003.
* Wilson, Joseph, “What I Didn't Find In Africa,” The New York Times, July 6, 2003.

Page 213 of 226


SECREF
12 February 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: [Redacted]

FROM: [Valerie Wilson]

OFFICE: DO/CP/[office 1]

SUBJECT: lrag-related Nuclear Report Makes a
Splash

REFERENCE:

The report forwarded below has prompted me to send this on to
you and request your comments and opinion. Briefly, it seems that
Niger has signed a contract with Iraq to sell them uranium. The IC is
getting spun up about this for obvious reasons. The Embassy in
Niamey has taken the position that this report can’t be true — they
have such cozy relations with the GON that they would know if
something like this transpired.

So, where do | fit in? As you may recall [redacted] of CP/[office
2] recently [2001] approached my husband to possibly use his
contacts in Niger to investigate
[a separate Niger matter]. After many fits and starts, [redacted] finally
advised that the Station wished to pursue this with liaison. My
husband is willing to help if it makes sense, but no problem if not. End
of story.

Now, with this report, it is clear that the IC is still wondering
what is going on... my husband has good relationships with both the
PM and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French
contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of
activity. To be frank with you, | was somewhat embarrassed by the
Agency's sloppy work last go round and | am hesitant to suggest
anything again. However, [my husband] may be in a position to
assist. Therefore, request your thoughts on what, if anything to
pursue here. Thank you for your time on this.

SECRET
(end memo)

Page 207 of 226


“never claimed to have ‘debunked’ the allegation that Iraq was seeking
uranium from Africa.”

Yet, Ambassador Wilson acknowledged to our Committee staff that
he was the source of the June 12, 2003 Washington Post story in which he
also claimed that the documents may have been forged and that the names
and dates were wrong. In addition, a May 6, 2003 New York Times opinion
piece by Nicolas Kristoff, in which Ambassador Wilson appears to be the
source, says that the “envoy reported to the CIA and State Department that
the information was unequivocally wrong and that the documents had been
forged.”* Kristoff added that the “envoy’s debunking of the forgery was
passed around the administration.” Perhaps Mr. Kristoff and Mr. Pincus
misunderstood the Ambassador’s comments, or perhaps Ambassador Wilson
is making a distinction between speaking out under his own name and
speaking out as an anonymous source to the Washington Post and the New
York Times with circulations of several million readers.

As for Ambassador Wilson’s claim that he stated clearly in his New
York Times op-ed that he did not have access to the actual memorandum that
discussed the Niger-Iraq uranium deal, this is true, but not surprising. This
admission came only after our Committee staff interviewed him and
confronted him about the inconsistencies in his previous comments to
reporters. It was during this interview with Committee staff that
Ambassador Wilson asserted that he may have been confused about his own
recollections after the International Atomic Energy Agency reported in
March 2003 that the names and dates on the documents on the documents
were wrong. We agree that Ambassador Wilson is confused.

Ambassador Wilson’s letter also comments on two reports
disseminated in the Intelligence Community by then-Ambassador to Niger
Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick. One report was based on her own meeting with
Nigerien officials and another based on a meeting between General Carlton
Fulford, who was accompanied by the Ambassador, and the Nigerien
president. Ambassador Wilson has claimed in his book and in numerous
public appearances that these reports indicated that there was nothing to the
Niger-Iraq uranium story. Mrs. Wilson also said this in her testimony to the
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. This too is
untrue.

* Kristoff, Nicholas, “Missing in Action: Truth,” New York Times, May 6, 2003.

Page 214 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422249

eI

(U) Humanitarian Issues

humanitarian situation in Iraq
improved since

implementation of the OFF Program in 1996,
but most Iraqis remain vulnerable to
disruptions in basic services, particularly food
and potable water supplies. The impact on
humanitarian needs of a new war would
depend on its length and severity. A
prolonged struggle to depose Seddam and
install a new regime would be likely to cause
more flight of refugees and internally
displaced persons and to disrupt severely the
distribution of food and health services.

tation Displacement
| Fone 1 million people are displaced
in Trag—700,000 Iraqis are internally

displaced, and 230,000 Palcstinians, stateless
Bidoons, Iranians, and Turks are refugees in
Iraq. In the northern region, many of the
internally displaced have been moved a
number of times as a result of Baghdad’s
Arabization campaign and have suffered
arbitrary detention, expropriation of property,
and destruction of their villages. They
depend to some degree on international
assistance, and many live in camps where
their movement is restricted and they are not
permitted to work.

UN High Commissioner for

igces (UNHCR) expects a Baghdad-
centered military operation would displace
another some 900,000 persons internally and
create 1.45 million more refugees. If Saddam
withdrew his forces into major cities in an
attempt to use the populace as “human
shields,” both civilian casualties and civilian
flight could be much larger. These numbers
would vary considerably depending on the
geographic concentration of the war and its
duration.

© Under the UNHCR's worst-case scenario
some 50,000 Iraqis might flee to Kuwait,
20,000 to Saudi Arabia, 60,000 to Syria,
50,000 to Jordan, 270,000 to Turkey, and
‘as many as 900,000 to Iran.

© Repatriation of refugees and internally
displaced persons would stretch further
Iraq’s already strained food and medical
supplies.

@  Iraq’s neighbors could try to influence the
political dynamics in Iraq by forcing
refugees back into Iraq, or threatening to
do so in order to pressure the new
government.

internal security situation would
humanitarian challenge. Civil strife
would cause disruptions in electricity and
water purification or distribution if
generators, pumps, or plants became
damaged, seized, or looted. Food stored in
warehouses under the OFF Program would be

a prime target for looters, and distribution

would become paralyzed by fighting, refugee

flows, criminal activity, or hoarding by the
military.

Food and Water
Ce ets epee te son
istributed by the government makes

the populace extremely vulnerable to the
disruptions in supply. About 60 percent of
Iraqis use the food basket as their primary
source of food. The average Iraqi does not
have the reserve food stocks or financial
resources to cope with the panic buying, price
gouging, and hoarding that would accompany
a breakdown in the food distribution system.

© Revitalization of the food ration
distribution system would be critical in
the aftermath of war. UN officials have
said that the OFF Program would be
suspended during the war and reinstated

rw

Page 76 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

officials argue restricts Iraq’s coastal
access—could become an issue with a
new government. Iraq has long argued
that access to international waters is
essential to its national security and future
Iraqi regimes could seek enhanced access,

"s foreign rivalries extend
its immediate neighbors. Foremost
among the perceived threats that will worry

Iraqis is Israel, A new Iraqi regime almost
certainly would stay in the Arab mainstream
in voicing strong support for Palestinian
statchood and criticism of Israeli actions
against the Palestinians. At the same time,
the Israeli destruction of Iraq’s Osirak nuckear
reactor in 1981 remains a humiliating

memory for most Iraqis, who have an abiding:
and deep distrust of Israel.

a of relations with a variety
1 powers would be another likely
theme of post-Saddam Iraqi foreign policy,
partly to try to minimize the influence of any
single power. This objective would become
increasingly important to the extent that the
United States were perceived as having
gained overriding influence in a postwar Iraq.
Baghdad probably would welcome enhanced
political ties with Russia and the European
Union—and perhaps also with Asian powers
such as India and Chins—building on
commercial relationships.

Implications for Iraqi
Security Policy

lew Iraqi leaders would understand

‘would have to bend to the will of the

international community at least as much on -
military and security matters as on any other

aspect of policy, given the nature of the threat
Saddam's regime has posed. Nonetheless, as
with aspects of broader foreign policy, there

a

would be significant elements of continuity in .

ji perspectives and ambitions. A
con bination of crushing deft, disgust with
the path on which Saddam had taken Iraq, and
inspired new leadership could move Iraq in a
markedly less militarist direction, somewhat
like Japan after World War Il. We believe it
more likely, however, that any future

in Irag would retain interest in

rebuilding the Iraqi military, for several
reasons:

+ © Tocounter the potential threats that Iraqis

would continuc to sce from its neighbors,

© To ensure intemal security and provide
domestic jobs.

© To restore the pride in Iraq’s historical
and regional importance that most Iraqis
probably share; Iraqis would consider a
significant military capability to be an
essential component.

A security guarantee involving a long-term
foreign military presence might partially
assuage the first two concems but not the
third,

‘Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
issue of weapons of mass
would not go away, even if
Saddam’s WMD programs were destroyed,
Any successor regime probably would be
cooperative on disarmament issues in the near
term, however, to maintain international
support.

* An immediate challenge in post-Saddam
Iraq will be accounting for all of the
WMD. The that some material
would be siphoned off by military,
security, or scientific elements to be used
Jater against Coalition interests will be of
immediate concern.

Page 86 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422242

Pee

Crag Overt longer em ol pees cov © Trade with Iraq, including under the UN
and

fall to about $15 per barrel if Oil-For-Food program, accounted for
Iraqi oil production and exports expand and about 20 percent of Jordan's GDP in 2001
Venezuela retums to normal, other OPEC and roughly 13 percent of its foreign
producers were unwilling to surrender market exchange. Jordan and Syria both depend
share to Baghdad, and global economic on their “special” relationship with Iraq to
performance remains modest. Sustained low trade their goods and services, which ma:
prices probably would lead to worsening - not compete well in other markets.'

economic and political conditions for some
key OPEC producers, who would see growing
budgetary pressures in an environment of
lower oil prices and volumes and a need to cut
fuel and other subsidies to their people duc to
lost revenues, All of Iraq's neighbors would © Egypt relies on expatriate remittances

‘want assurances that the Lraqi oil sector would from workers in Gulf states, which could
be managed to protect their interests and that be curtailed because of a war, to help its
. Baghdad would quickly reintegrate into the balance of payments. In addition, tourism
+ | xs OPEC quota system. traditionally is Cairo's largest source of
. foreign exchange and accounts for about
© A quick retum of oi] output to or near 11 percent of GDP and some 15 percent
Baghdad's current capacity of 3.1 million of total employment, :
b/d would put downward pressure on oil

Prices that could set off a battle for market = © Jordan, Iran, and Turkey—already
share among Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other burdened by significant refugee

OPEC members, possibly leading to a populations—would be hardest hit

price collapse and splits in OPEC's influx of new refugees.\ .
cohesion. The risk of a market share
battle would grow if OPEC members
believed Iraq was going to aggressively
expand its capacity.

© Jordan, Syria, and Turkey would stand to
lose critical spending power, jobs, and
trade in non-oil goods made possible by
the millions of dollars these countries
saved annually from heavily discounted
oil exports from Iraq.

© If Saddam carried out his threats to ignite
{ ‘Throughout the region, disruptions in oil wells or destroy dams or if a WMD
‘and tourism plus flows of tens, if not catastrophe occurs, the resulting
hundreds, of thousands of refugees almost humanitarian crisis could affect millions
certainly would cause a slowdown in of Iraqis in addition to Coalition troops on
economic activity. Worker remiuances, a key the ground in some areas. These potential
source of revenue for many countries, scenarios, as well as the possibility of
probably also would fall. extended combat operations in major Iraqi

cities, would cost the international

dee

Page 41 of 226


regional Consequences of Regime Change in iraq

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Page 127 of 226


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Page 120 of 226


The report mentioned in the opening sentence was a February 5, 2002
CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) intelligence report describing “verbatim
text” of a reported Iraq-Niger uranium agreement. The report was
forwarded in an e-mail from a CIA reports officer to Mrs. Wilson and a
number of other recipients which said that the DO had received a number of
calls from the Intelligence Community about the Iraq-Niger uranium report,
citing the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR),
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and SOCOM, specifically. This
likely prompted Mrs. Wilson’s comment that “the IC is getting spun up
about this for obvious reasons.” There was no mention in either the reports
officer’s e-mail or in Ms. Wilson’s memo (also sent via e-mail) of a request
from the Vice President about this matter.

This is significant because the CIA originally told the Committee, and
Ambassador and Mrs. Wilson have stated publicly, that it was a question
from the Vice President that prompted CIA’s Counterproliferation Division
(CIA/CPD) to discuss ways to obtain additional information about the
reporting. However, the Committee now knows, based on information
released during the Scooter Libby trial, that the Vice President had not even
asked about the Iraq-Niger uranium deal until the following day.

Evidence from the Libby trial, numbered exhibit DX66.2, includes a
tasking from the Vice President to his CIA briefer which indicates that after
being shown a DIA assessment about the February 5, 2002 DO report, the
Vice President asked for CIA’s assessment (nb: not an investigation) of the
matter. The date of the briefing is noted as February 13, 2002, the day after
Mrs. Wilson’s memo to her superiors.

While it may be possible that the Vice President’s query is what led to
the ultimate decision to use Ambassador Wilson to attempt to uncover
additional information about the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal, it is clear
from the dates of these two documents that CIA/CPD was discussing ways
to seek additional information, including the possibility of using
Ambassador Wilson to look into the deal, before the Vice President asked
about the reporting.

Page 208 of 226


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Page 125 of 226


or Africa fifteen times prior to the President’s State of the Union speech and
four more times following the speech.

Conclusion 14, The Central Intelligence Agency should have told the
Vice President and other senior policymakers that it had sent someone
to Niger to look into the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal and should
have briefed the Vice President on the former ambassador’s findings.

In February 2002, after the Vice President and officials in the
Departments of State and Defense raised questions about Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports of alleged Iraqi efforts to purchase
uranium from Niger, the CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO) made an
effort to respond by sending a former ambassador to Niger to look into the
issue. The agency did not tell these senior policymakers that the former
ambassador had been sent. Following the trip, the DO notified analysts
within the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) of the former ambassador’s
findings. Although the Vice President had asked his CIA morning briefer
twice for additional information about this issue prior to the trip, and the
CIA had noted in its assessment to the Vice President and others that the
agency was working to clarify and corroborate information on the issue, the
CIA never briefed the Vice President on the former ambassador’s findings or
told the Vice President that such a trip had been undertaken. Because of the
level of policymaker interest in this issue, such information should have
been passed along, regardless of the DI analysts’ assessments of the
substance or utility of the information.

Conclusion 20. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) comments and
assessments about the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting were inconsistent
and, at times contradictory. These inconsistencies were based in part on
a misunderstanding of a CIA Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation,
and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) Iraq analyst’s assessment of the
reporting. The CIA should have had a mechanism in place to ensure
that agency assessments and information passed to policymakers were
consistent.

At a video teleconference (VTC) with the British, the CIA WINPAC
Iraq analyst suggested that the British not use the information on Iraqi
attempts to procure uranium from Africa in their white paper because he
believed there were better examples of Iraq’s efforts to reconstitute its
nuclear program and because the reports were unconfirmed. Following the

Page 220 of 226


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Page 153 of 226


110th Congress S. Report
1st Session 110-76

REPORT

on

PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT POSTWAR IRAQ

together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

May 31, 2007.—-Ordered to be printed

Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate
of May 25, 2007

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

United States Senate
110th Congress

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA

RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA

EVAN BAYH, INDIANA SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA
BARBARA A, MIKULSKI, MARYLAND ORRIN HATCH, UTAH

RUSSELL D, FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, MAINE

BILL NELSON, FLORIDA RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND

HARRY REID, NEVADA, EX OFFICIO
MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCRY, EX OFFICIO
CARL LEVIN, MICIDGAN, EX OFFICIO
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2007


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Page 143 of 226


(HEED) The report assessed that, “In theory, Iraq should be better placed than its current dire
economic statistics and dictatorial government suggest to recuperate lost ground and forge a
more modern society once Saddam is toppled. It is also possible, however, that Saddam’s rule
has damaged the Iraqi body politic and set back Iraqi socio-economic development in more
severe ways that will require many more years to overcome. We simply cannot know until the
dictator is gone.” *

(GERD) The third CIA intelligence assessment from August 2002 was also produced in
response to tasking by the National Security Council. This report, The Perfect Storm: Planning
for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq, was intended to set forth worst-case scenarios that
might emerge from US-led regime change in Iraq. The scope note stated that the “spirit of the
paper reaches beyond what we normally would assess as plausible” and that the report was
intended to “look at a number of situations that, when taken separately or together, could
complicate US efforts in a campaign against Iraq.” The negative consequences highlighted in
the paper were: anarchy and territorial breakup in Iraq; instability in key Arab states; a surge of
global terrorism and deepening Islamic antipathy toward the United States; major oil supply
disruptions; and severe strains in the Atlantic alliance.

(QR) The CIA’s Perfect Storm report analyzed negative consequences before US
military action, during initial US ground operations and during later phases of the US campaign
and occupation. For the later phases, the report discussed scenarios, including: a Kurdish
declaration of independence that provokes a military response first from ee Tran;
Saddam survives the US invasion and retreats with Tikriti loyalists; al Qaeda operatives take
advantage of a destabilized Iraq to establish secure safe havens from which they can continue
their operations; Iran works to install a regime friendly to or tolerant of Iranian policies;
European confidence in US leadership plummets and NATO loses much of its effectiveness as a
major security institution; Afghanistan tips into civil strife as UN and other coalition forces are
unable or unwilling to replace US military resources; and Pakistan is destabilized by violent
demonstrations over Islamabad’s support for the US. °

(ERD The assessment noted that “in spite of the volatility and randomness of many of
these scenarios and the ability of one event to spur unpredictable negative consequences for US
interests, Washington retains the political leverage and military clout in the region to better the
odds.” The assessment provided a list of “near-term tactical moves” that the US could take to
minimize the chances of negative consequences for US interests. These “possible options”
included: *

= Provide “concrete diplomatic steps toward Arab-Israeli peace;”

" “Public softening of US statements on Iran and back-channel assurances to Tehran on the

duration and extent of US force deployments;”
* Major political and economic aid to Turkey and financial assistance to Jordan;
= Public guarantees to counter the Iraqi missile threat to Israeli territory.

* CIA, Can fraq Ever Become a Democracy?, August 8, 2002, pp. i - iv.
© CIA, The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences in Iraq, August 13, 2002, pp. i- it.

* Ibid, pp. i - ii.

Page 104 of 226


MORI DocID:

emphasized the need to recruit younger
members to the party, but real influence

remains in the hands of a limited inner circle,

and new recruits appear to view the Ba’th as
an avenue for landing a job or even obtaining
aration card. Indeed, tactics
used to increase the power base of the Ba’th
Party have generated strong resentment
toward the party in many sectors of society.
‘The party probably would collapse with the
Tegime, although some of its original ideals
could find expression through former party
members who might form networks for overt
or covert political activity.

[saddam has manipulated and
rearranged other Iraqi centers of power and
politica! institutions, subordinating them to
military/security organizations and to
revitalized tribal structures.

© The degradation of Iraq’s socio-economic
structure, coupled with the reemergence
of regional and tribal power bases since
the Gulf war, has intensified traditional
tribal, religious, and ethnic differences,
undermining the progress made in forging
a national identity. Rather than erase
these fissures, Saddain has exploited them
to solidify further his hold on power by
nurturing the belief that only he can hold

Iraq together.

» Although Irag had a large, well-trained
and competent cadre of technocrats and
civil leaders, Saddam has tried to
climinate all those he suspects of
nurturing a personal following in the
military or in the civil sector,

(U) Iraq’s Political Culture:

Implications for Democracy
undemocratic nature of Iraq’s
polit ‘culture means that any development

of stable democracy there would be a long.

and probably difficult process. Saddam’s
brutal regime has left its mark on the Iraqi
psyche. In addition to fostering pervasive
fear throughout the society, the strong distrust
between Iraqi groups is unlikely to dissipate
quickly. The culture of brute power has direct
implications for the forging of a democratic
political system. In Saddam's Iraq, the
surrendering of power leads to brutal
subjugation. Once power is held in iraq, it is
rarely relinquished peacefully. When Saddam
Jeaves the scene, any new authority will need
to demonstrate and eam sufficient trust for
Iraqis with any degree of power to become
convinced they can safely hand it over or
share it.

"s political culture fargely is

social underpinnings that directly
support development of broad-based
participatory democracy. The
Political elite has largely disappeared through
exile or death. More than 70 percent of the
population has been bom or reached
adulthood since Operation Desert Storm and
know only war, sanctions, deprivation, and
Saddam's rule. Few Iraqis have any firsthand
experience with pre-Saddam Iraq.

Came Poclonment of a new political

Tore conducive to democracy would
require building upon the now-impoverished
but still talented oat middle class. Despite
their economic straits, many members of this
social stratum—at least those who were adults
before deprivations began during the Iran-Iraq
War in the 1980s—may retain attitudes
similar to those of liberal bourgeoisie in
developed democracies. The political
attitudes of their offspring could be more
problematic.

[ keable democracy in Iraq would
tequire development of a new system of
political parties with nationwide

Se

Page 64 of 226

1422249



MORI DocID:

ne

The National Intelligence Council

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages the Intelligence
Community’s estimative process, incorporating the best available
expertise inside and outside the government. It reports to the
Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity ss bead of the US
‘Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive
issues for the Community as a whole.

Acting Chairman Stuart A. Coben
Vice Chairman for Evaluation Mark Lowenthal
Acting Director, Senior Review, William R. Heaton

Production, and Analysis
National Intelipense Oi

Africa Robert Houdek
At-Large Stuart A. Cohen

Conventional Military tssues John Landry

Bast Asin Anbur Brows

Economics & Global Issues Karen Monaghan,
Acting

Europe Mark Schwendler,
Acting

Latin America Fukon T. Armstrong

Near East and South Asia Paal R. Pillar

Russia und Eurasia George Kolt

Science & Technology Lawrence K. Genhwin

Strategic & Nuclear Programs Robert D Walpole
Warning Robert Vickers

Unclassified

1422242

Page 50 of 226



Page 171 of 226



Intelligence Assessments in November 2002
= By the end of 2002, CIA had published additional intelligence reports on Iraq’s

opposition groups, nationalist forces, and demographic pressures. In mid-November, CIA also
began to disseminate intelligence reports on the condition of Iraq’s basic infrastructure. This
effort continued into early 2003. Some of these assessments reported on contemporaneous issues,
but had relevance for post-Saddam conditions in Iraq. For instance, the report on Iraq’s
neglected water works began: “Iraq’s water and sewage infrastructures are in poor condition and
vulnerable to collateral damage during wartime activities. Since the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq’s water
supply and sewage systems have deteriorated due to neglect, a lack of spare parts, and a shortage
of trained staff. Unreliable electricity and frequent power outages further stress water treatment
facilities.”** Another intelligence assessment noted that, “Two decades of war and repression in
Iraq have decimated a once relatively robust medical system.”

ry Likewise in November 2002, Jrag: Opposition Positioning for Regime Change
discussed current intelligence on the prewar positioning of opposition groups inside and outside
Traq that had relevance for post-Saddam challenges in Iraq. The report noted that the efforts of
the various Iraqi opposition groups to form alliances had “resulted in little definitive cooperation,
confluence of political agendas, or lessening of longstanding competition between key leaders.”
The report also pointed out that Saddam’s departure “would remove the one factor that has
driven all past cooperation — hatred of the dictator and his regime.””” The report discussed ways
in which opposition elements could be helpful “in hashing out politically important issues” in
post-Saddam Iraq but pointed out that “longstanding tensions, personal rivalries, and mutual
suspicions remain close to the surface and are likely to flare as groups vie for positions of
importance in key areas such as infrastructure — including oil and energy development — and
politically influential subjects such as foreign and national security policy.”** The report
emphasized that “nevertheless, some opposition elements could prove to be helpful in advancing
dialogue on key issues that will need to be addressed in a post-Saddam Iraq.””

Intelligence Assessments in October 2002
rT In October 2002, the National Intelligence Council

published a 78 page NIE, entitled Saddam's Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities.
While the NIE focused on at issues related to Saddam’s near-term military objectives, strategy,
and capabilities against the US and Coalition forces, one section of its judgments had
implications for post-Saddam challenges in Iraq. The NIE assessed that “Even before the end of
a war, US and Coalition forces will face enormous requirements to meet the humanitarian needs
of Iraqi civilians. If Saddam adopted a scorched earth policy — and some intelligence reporting
suggests he will ~ advancing forces will be confronted with large-scale destruction of oil and

° CIA, Iraq: Neglected Waterworks, Flood Warfare Raise Humanitarian Stakes, January 2003
°° CIA, Iraq: Poor Medical Infrastructure Offers Post-War Opportunity for US to Improve its Image in the Region,
November, 2002
a CIA, Iraq: Opposition Positioning for Regime Change, November 18, 2002, p.i
Ibid, p. i
* Tid, p. i

Page 99 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422242

we

Recent polling data from many countries casualties but milder in response to a
In the region reveal strong opposition to a quicker and less bloody conflict.

US war in Iraq, increased anti-American

sentiment, and a widespread belief that the

United States is anti-Muslim.

Most governments would allow some

open opposition to the war as a safety _GEaBSTS GF Hash civition cahealtine

valve to deflect pressure but would act to i civilian casualties attributed
prevent attacks against US assets or to US operations, public revelations about
interests, Many regimes also would adjust operational or logistical support for US forces
their public postures to appear attuned to in Iraq, an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian

the opinion of the “street” and avoid being _violence, or the perceived failure of the local
labeled US “puppets.” goverament to resist alleged US “hegemonic”

intentions would increase the likelihood of

violent protests J

© Unrest would be more severe in response

to a longer war with numerous civilian

{

Page 24 of 226


Mikulski - aye; Senator Feingold — aye; Senator Nelson — aye; Senator
Whitehouse — aye; Vice Chairman Bond — no; Senator Warner — no; Senator
Hagel — aye; Senator Chambliss — no; Senator Hatch — no; Senator Snowe —
aye; Senator Burr — no.

Page 226 of 226


* Increased popular Islamist sentiment would bolster both extremist groups and, in some
countries, Islamic political parties that seek to gain power peacefully.

«  Al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups would try to exploit the war and the anti-American
sentiments expressed during and after the conflict by accelerating their anti-US operations,
and al-Qa’ida would try to take advantage of US attention on post-war Iraq to reestablish its
presence in Afghanistan.

» The direct effect of regime change in Iraq on al-Qa’ida’s operational opportunities inside Iraq
would depend on the degree to which a new Iraqi goverhment established control over its
territory.

(S//NF) Neighboring states would jockey for influence in the new Iraq, with activities
ranging from humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to fomenting strife among Iraq’s
ethnic and sectarian groups.

f- ‘ "| Some elements in Iran could try to use

their contacts in the Kurdish and Shia communities to sow dissentay
and complicate the formation of a new, pro-US Iraqi government. * .
° 7 .

‘a7 : ]

(S/(NF) Governments in the region would adjust their foreign and security policies to
accommodate US military preeminence without appearing to subordinate their policies to.
Washington.

« The defeat of Iraq probably would encourage some government
to continue close security relations with the United States and would
enhance fy strong US ties with other statesf J

* Over the long run, an outcome that installed a credible Iraqi regime and visibly improved
Iraqi living conditions would increase the willingness of regional governments to cooperate
with the United States.

* Much would depend, however, gn how domestic populations in the region viewed the US
tole in Iraq. Some governments .
political reasons would de-emphasize public forms of cooperation with the United States
even if they were willing to cooperate privately.

* Middle Eastern states would have increased interest in forging new political and security
relationships as counterweights to strong US influence. The European Union, Russia, and

6 Page 20 of 226



committed against the population as a whole; the existing Iraqi bureaucracy is “not inclined to
respond to local and ethnic minorities’ demands for greater control and inclusion;” and “the
transformation of Iraq to a true democracy could require a US role lasting a generation.” The
paper discussed many implications for the US occupation of Iraq, among them the importance of
“obtaining an international mandate and regional support” and “the ability of the occupation
forces to control the security situation.”*

(GERM At the request of the National Security Council, the CIA further examined issues
associated with the transition to a new Iraqi government after the fall of Saddam in the August
2002 report, Can Irag Ever Become A Democracy? In the report’s scope note, the CIA stated
that:
“This assessment fully accepts that traditional Iraqi political culture has been inhospitable
to democracy. Nevertheless, we feel it is appropriate to explore, in a necessarily initial
and speculative fashion, to what extent post-Saddam Iraq might possess some democratic
building blocks, and under what circumstances these blocks might be used to construct a
democratic government in post-Saddam Iraq.”*

(HEED Within the context of the scope note, the report stated that, “On the surface, Iraq
currently appears to lack both the socio-economic and politico-cultural prerequisites that political
scientists generally regard as necessary to nurture democracy. Nevertheless, we believe that Iraq
has several advantages that, if buttressed by the West, could foster democracy in post-Saddam
Iraq.”*° The advantages cited by the report included the return of exiled elites, a weak tradition
of political Islam, near-universal revulsion against Saddam’s dictatorship, and economic
resources. The report emphasized that “None of these factors should be seen as minimizing the
obstacles to democratization in Iraq after Saddam.”**

(HM) The CIA also pointed to Iraqi Kurdistan as a potential model for democratic
development in the rest of Iraq. The report noted, for example, that “Iraqi Kurdistan has become
one of the more democratic regions in the Middle East. In 1991 it was as badly off—both
economically and from the viewpoint of political culture and history—as the rest of Iraq would
likely be should Saddam be defeated.”*”

(HID The report noted such “words of caution” as “we are uncertain how rapidly Iraq. . .can
recover from the massive socio-economic and political damage inflicted by Saddam, especially
since 1991.” The report assessed that without “long-term, active US/Western military, political,
and economic involvement with the country” the chance of achieving even “the partial
democratic successes of, for example, Iraqi Kurdistan to be poor.” *

* In October, 2002, the DCI Red Cell, an organization devoted to alternative analysis, produced an analytic piece
entitled, “Occupied Iraq” - Thinking about Post-Saddam Governance, The Red Cell highlighted the “vast
differences in culture and contexts” between the conditions in postwar Germany and Japan and the likely conditions
in post-Saddam Iraq.
Cia, Can Iraq Ever Become a Democracy?, August 8, 2002, pp. i - iv.

Ibid, p. i
* Ibid, p. ii
5 Ibid, p. i
* Ibid, pp. 6

Page 103 of 226


Principal Challoriges in Post-Saddam iraq

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Page 167 of 226



© Greater autonomy for either of these
groups, in Tehran's view, would increase
their reliance on the United States at the
expense of Iranian influence.

|The more that Iranian leaders—
ists and hardliners alike—perceived
that Washington's aims in Iraq did not
challenge Tehran's interests or threaten Iran
directly, the better the chance they. would
cooperate in the post-war period—or at least
not actively undermine US goals.

© Guaranteeing Iran a'role in the
negotiations on the fate of post-Saddam
Irag—as it had at the Bonn conference for
Afghanistan—might persuade some
Iranian officjals to pursue an overt and
constructive means to influence
reconstruction in Irag. Giving Iran a say
in this process also could give Tehran a
stake in its success,

MORI DocID: 1422242

Orme lemens nthe in
t could decide to try to counter

‘aggressively the US presence in Iraq or
challenge US goals following the fall of
Saddam by attempting to use contacts in the
Kurdish and Shia communities to sow dissent
against the US presence and complicate the
formation of a new, pro-US government.

© Elements in the regime also could employ
their own operatives against US

© The establishment—when possible—of a
mechanism for US and Iranian officials to
communicate on the ground in Iraq could

s

Page 32 of 226



Page (73 of 226



Regional Consequences of Regine Change in iraq
1A 2003-

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Page 113 of 226


WMD (wrong). It is thus important to note that the prewar assessments on
postwar Iraq, which were done during the same period as the disastrous
October 2002 Iraq NIE, were generally good and right.

This conclusion is shared by the “Kerr Study Group,” named for its
head, former Deputy CIA Director Kerr. The Group’s report noted,
“Intelligence produced prior to the war on a wide range of other issues [other
than WMD] accurately addressed such topics .... Indeed, intelligence
assessments on post-Saddam issues were particularly insightful. These and
many other topics were thoroughly examined in a variety of intelligence
products that have proven to be largely accurate.”!

I would draw readers’ attention to the conclusions in the Committee’s
report, each of which summarizes the IC’s assessments on a particular topic
prior to the war. Even though the assessments were not informed by
intelligence collection, the IC’s judgments on democracy, terrorism,
domestic conflict, political Islam, Iran’s views and actions (both as they
pertain to Iraq and to WMD), and security have been borne out by events.

The most important judgment was exactly right — that building “an
Traqi democracy would be a long, difficult and probably turbulent process.”

In short, the Intelligence Community presented a reasonable and
compelling picture of the host of difficulties the U.S. would face after
deposing Saddam Hussein. This point should not be left unstated.

Use of Intelligence

A more troubling aspect of prewar assessments on postwar Iraq was
the extent to which they were ignored by policymakers. Again, this area
stands in marked contrast to the prewar experience on Iraq WMD. The
President, Vice President, and Cabinet leaders pored through the intelligence
on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and regularly used the intelligence to
support public statements. In the rare occasion that Administration officials
addressed the postwar environment, their statements tended to ignore or
directly contradict the IC’s views.

' Studies in Intelligence, on July 29, 2004, 48. (Richard Kerr, et al, Collection and. Analysis on Iraq: Issues
Sor the US Intelligence Community, July 29, 2004, Vol. 49, No. 3.)

Page 192 of 226


MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR CHAMBLISS JOINED BY SENATORS HATCH
AND BURR

The Vice Chairman’s additional views accurately describe many of
my concerns with the nature and structure of this report. For these reasons, I
join in his views. However, unlike the Vice Chairman, I would not have set
aside some of my concerns with this report merely for the sake of
compromise. When conducting an investigation, I believe the Committee
has an obligation to provide meaningful conclusions after a thorough review.
I do not believe this was accomplished here. In no case should this
obligation be compromised merely for the sake of consensus. Regrettably,
this report does not provide meaningful conclusions nor is it the fruits of a
thorough review.

As the Vice Chairman articulates, this report offers no investigative
insight. The “conclusions” offered are merely restatements of selected text
from two Intelligence Community Assessment’s (ICA), Principal
Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq and Regional Consequences of Regime
Change in Iraq. Without making judgments about the accuracy or
reasonableness of the ICA’s, the Committee’s “conclusions” are no better
then a summary of the reports. Although, even a summary usually includes
the main points of a document. Here, the Committee selected the points it
wished to highlight, and not necessarily the main points. These reports, fully
unclassified, are included in Appendices A and B of this report. Anyone
reading this report may review the primary documents. It is meaningless for
the Committee to selectively highlight some text from these reports since
they are included in full in appendices. Like the Vice Chairman, I do not see
that these “conclusions” provide any value to the reader.

As the Vice Chairman also points out, the lack of a unique
intelligence fact base behind the Intelligence Community’s assessments in
these reports means that they were no more authoritative or insightful then
many other educated opinions, including those of Members of Congress.
For the Committee to review these papers and highlight only those portions
of the text that reflect issues that have arisen since the start of the conflict in
Iraq, is misleading. Again, I support the Vice Chairman’s comments on this
point.

In addition, I supported the Vice Chairman’s amendment to include
the members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House

Page 223 of 226


Regional Consequences of Regime Change in iraq
ICA 2003-

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Page 175 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422249

Contents
Poge
(U) Scope Note 1
(Ww) Key Judgments 5
(U) Discussion 9
(U) The Historical Legacy 9
(U) Saddam’s Great Leap Backward ie
Eroding Nascent Political Institutions 2]
(U) Iraq's Political Culture: Implications for Democracy . 13
Political Islam 15
Discredited Arab Nationalism is
Opposition in Exile 7
(U) Domestic Divisions and Conflict 19
Shia-Sunni Strife 20
Kurdish Options 2
Inter-Tribal Conflict 24
(U) Humanitarian Issues 25
Population Displacement 25
Food and Water 25
Health Care and Sanitation 28
Existing Infrastructure 30
(U) Financial Strains and Economic Opportunities 30
(WU) Immutable Foreign Policy Interests 34
(U) Lmplications for Iraqi Security 36
‘Weapons of Mass Destruction 36
Terrorism 38

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Page 56 of 226



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Page 110 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422249



MORI DocID: 1422242

S| OE

a defeat and occupation at the
the United States would deliver to

the Middle East one of the largest political-
psychological shocks the region has seen
since the Arab defeats by Israel in 1948 and

1967. Just as those events contributed in
following years to the rise of radical regimes
in the region and the growth of such social
and political movements as Nasserism and
Islamic extremism, US actions in Iraq
probably would have similarly wide-ranging
but largely unpredictable consequences.

12

Seger

Page 26 of 226



APPENDIX C

OVERVIEW OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON
POSTWAR IRAQ

Page 92 of 226


@® Terrorism

WD The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that al
Qa’ida probably would see an opportunity to accelerate its operational tempo
and increase terrorist attacks during and after a US-Iraq war. In January
2003, the Intelligence Community stated that al-Qa’ida “probably would try to
exploit any postwar transition in Iraq by replicating the tactics it has used in
Afghanistan during the past year to mount hit-and-run operations against US
personnel.”* According to the Intelligence Community, “some militant Islamists
in Iraq might benefit from increases in funding and popular support and could
choose to conduct terrorist attacks against US forces in Iraq.” * The Intelligence
Community assessed that, “If Baghdad were unable to exert control over the Iraqi
countryside, al-Qai’da or other terrorist groups could operate from remote areas.””*
The Intelligence Community assessed that “To the extent that a new Iraqi
government effectively controlled its territory, especially in northern Iraq, and was
friendlier to US interests and backed by US military power, al-Qa’ida’s freedom of
movement inside Iraq almost certainly would be hampered. If al-Qa’ida mobilized
significant resources to combat a US presence in Iraq, it could, at least in the near
term, reduce its overall capability to strike elsewhere.”” The Intelligence
Community noted that “Use of violence by competing factions in Iraq against each
other or the United States Sunni against Shia; Kurd against Kurd; Kurd against
Arab; any against the United States—probably also would encourage terrorist
groups to take advantage of a volatile security environment to launch attacks
within Iraq.”* Additionally, rogue ex-regime elements “could forge an alliance
with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerilla warfare
against the new government or Coalition forces.”””

(® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that a
heightened terrorist threat resulting from a war with Iraq, after an initial
spike, probably would decline slowly over the subsequent three to five years.
The Intelligence Community assessed that al-Qa’ida probably would see an
opportunity to “accelerate its operational tempo and increase terrorist attacks
during and after a US-Iraq war.””° The lines between al-Qa’ida and other terrorist
groups around the world “could become blurred” in the wake of a US attack and
counter attacks by al-Qa’ida and jihadists.” “The targeting by less capable groups

* NIC: Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, p.14
5 NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13

© NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 6

77 NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14

7° NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13

NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 38

NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13

! NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14


MORI DocID: 1422249

Seer

Their ties to a range of illicit activities and
groups provide them with extensive
revenues, Many of these groups almost
certainly will resist being disarmed and
being put under the rule of law by a post-
Saddam administration.

L__

Inter-Tribal Conflicts

most basic, a tribe is a
trace their origin toa

Ithough many Iraqi tribes affiliate

with Saddam, for most the ties are
based on self-interest. Almost all tribes
probably would distance themselves from him
‘as soon as they assessed his demise was
inevitable and alternatives were available.
‘Some tribes that remained opposed to Saddam
might seek reprisals against those who
supported him.

© Saddam's ruling clite is drawn largely
from a handful of Sunni tribes.

jumerous tribe-based coup plots
fe occurred since 1991, suggesting that
powerful Sunni or Shia tribes would seek to
play a role in determining a successor regime.

© While some anti-regime tribal elements
have joined the Iraqi opposition, some
tribes could take unilateral actions aimed
at shoring up their strategic positions
within Iraq when Saddam leaves the

© Key tribes could attempt to wrest control
of economic targets—key oil facilities,
dams, or other economic assets—cither as
bargaining chips or as assets that could be
sold off. In 1991, Kurdish tribes inthe
north made sizable profits by selling to the
{ranians machinery confiscated at various
jams,

Lrg Ott eestor regime had
‘consoli power, the tribes probably would

seek accommodation with it. As in the past,
tribal leaders could be expected to negotiate
with a new regime for their own advantage.

‘The tribes would offer a social structure that
could be a stabilizing influence in some parts
of the country.

Page 75 of 226



reel

e Civil unrest would threaten the continued
presence of few UN or NGO workers who.
play key roles in humanitarian and
medical programs in Iraq. This would be

in addition to whatever suspension of
outside assistance resulted from a military
conflict.

© Iraqi aid workers would be unable to fill
the gap of depasting international
humanitarian workers in the short term. _
They would not have sufficient training
and supplies to carry out the work and in
some cases would themselves become
refugees or would flee possible reprisals

* due to their affiliation with the old regime.

Ceol already high incidence of
Id likely be exacerbated by the
further degradation of infrastructure.

¢ If populations were displaced into
overcrowded and unsanitary living
conditions in cities or camps, epidemics of
waterborne and respiratory diseases would
be likely and would significantly
complicate the ability of post-Saddam
authorities to return calm to Ireq.

e Fatality rates would be highest in children
under age five. Interruptions in routine
UN-supplied childhood vaccine deliveries
would increase the death toll,

Existing Infrastructure
long-term disintegration of the

ic infrastructure to meet human needs
is not inevitable. The military confrontations
that have hurt Iraq’s infrastructure over the
past decade, coupled with long experience
battling domestic insurgencies, have provided
Iraqi technicians with considerable expertise
in repairing damaged cquipment with few
resources,

¢ A surviving remnant of Iraq’s civil
authority could move quickly to repair
damaged infrastructure, especially if

© The UN humanitarian presence in Iraq
under OFF has helped to establish and
streamline distribution plans and rationing
systems that could provide a measure of
continuity during the transition period for
anew regime.

© Members of the Iraqi opposition and Iraqi
expatriates have been studying the Iraqi
infrastructure and examining what the
most pressing needs of a new regime
might be. Return of many of these
expatriates and application of the Hie
expertise they have acquired in the West
would be a valuable addition to meeting
Iraq's humanitarian needs.

Ceeomliname! Strains and
onomic Opportunities

combined effects of the Iran-Iraq

‘wars resulted in the destruction of
important Iraqi economic assets, Baghdad
has made some progress rebuilding Iraq’s
economic infrastructure, especially in the
Sunni heartland, but it still functions below
pre-Gulf war levels. Moreover, Iraq’s longer-
term financial prospects are clouded by the
need to use oil and limited non-oil export
revenues to pay reparations to victims of the
invasion of Kuwait, finance high import and
reconstruction costs, and service a large
foreign debt load.

© Multiple studies from worst case to best
case put Iraq’s oil export earnings at $8-
37 billion annually in the first year or. two
after sanctions are lifted, depending on the
price of oi! and potential damage to Iraq's
oil infrastructure during conflict. If Iraq
cemains bound by the UN-mandated

mee

Page 81 of 226

MORI DocID: 1422249



COMMITTEE ACTION
Amendments to draft report, Prewar Intelligence About Postwar Iraq

On May 8, 2007, by a vote of 5 ayes and 10 noes, the Committee
rejected an amendment by Vice Chairman Bond to strike Appendix D. The
votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller — no;
Senator Feinstein — no; Senator Wyden — no; Senator Bayh — no; Senator
Mikulski — no; Senator Feingold — no; Senator Nelson — no; Senator
Whitehouse — no; Vice Chairman Bond — aye; Senator Warner — aye;
Senator Hagel — no; Senator Chambliss — aye; Senator Hatch — aye; Senator
Snowe — no; Senator Burr — aye.

On May 8, 2007, by a vote of 7 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee
rejected an amendment by Vice Chairman Bond to add to Appendix D a list
of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence members in January 2003. The votes in person
or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller — no; Senator Feinstein —
no; Senator Wyden — no; Senator Bayh — no; Senator Mikulski — no; Senator
Feingold — no; Senator Nelson — no; Senator Whitehouse — no; Vice
Chairman Bond — aye; Senator Warner — aye; Senator Hagel — aye; Senator
Chambliss — aye; Senator Hatch — aye; Senator Snowe — aye; Senator Burr —
aye.

On May 8, 2007, by a vote of 5 ayes and 10 noes, the Committee
rejected an amendment by Vice Chairman Bond to insert a new conclusion
that the Intelligence Community did not highlight an insurgency as a likely
challenge for an occupying force in Iraq. The votes in person or by proxy
were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller — no; Senator Feinstein — no; Senator
Wyden — no; Senator Bayh — no; Senator Mikulski — no; Senator Feingold —
no; Senator Nelson — no; Senator Whitehouse — no; Vice Chairman Bond ~
aye; Senator Warner — aye; Senator Hagel — no; Senator Chambliss — aye;
Senator Hatch ~ aye; Senator Snowe — no; Senator Burr — aye.

Adoption of the report on Prewar Intelligence About Postwar Iraq.

On May 8, 2007, by a vote of 10 ayes and 5 noes, the Committee
agreed to adopt the report on Prewar Intelligence About Postwar Iraq. The
votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller — aye;
Senator Feinstein — aye; Senator Wyden — aye; Senator Bayh — aye; Senator

Page 225 of 226


and security issues inside Iraq unfolded would “depend heavily on the events
leading to Saddam’s removal.” The effects of Saddam’s ouster through Coalition
military action “could vary significantly according to the duration of the war, the
damage it caused, and such other factors as the size and cohesiveness of the
Coalition.”

Previous Reviews of Prewar Intelligence about Postwar Iraq

Two previous evaluations initiated by the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) reviewed the Intelligence Community’s performance on Iraq, which
included intelligence regarding the postwar situation.

(® One study, known as the Kerr Study Group report, was conducted by four
retired senior intelligence officers in two phases. The group evaluated CIA and
NIC assessments produced during 18 months prior to the war. The first phase
reviewed national intelligence on the key questions related to Iraq up to the
moment the war began. The second phase, published in 2004, compared that
intelligence to new information in the aftermath of the war.’

® The second evaluation, The DCI’s Report on Intelligence Lessons Learned
from Military Actions in Iraq, reviewed the support provided by the Intelligence
Community as a whole to policy and military decision-makers in the lead up to and
during the active combat phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom.®

® In order to acquire background on the issue, Committee staff interviewed the
principal authors of the Kerr Study Group and the Lessons Learned review.

(® The conclusions reached by the Committee are independent of the findings by
the Kerr and DCI Lessons Learned studies.

Prewar Assessments Coordinated Across the Intelligence Community

@® in January 2003, the NIC produced and disseminated two Intelligence
Community Assessments (ICAs) focused exclusively on the issue of the postwar
environment in Iraq. Like National Intelligence Estimates, the ICAs summarize in
one document the coordinated views of the Intelligence Community as a whole.
The two ICAs were widely disseminated among senior policymakers and within
the Intelligence Community. The distribution lists for each report are included in

© NIC, Principal Challenges, p. 1

7 Studies in Intelligence, July 29, 2004. (Richard Kerr, et al, Collection and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the US
Intelligence Community, July 29, 2004, Vol. 49, No. 3.)
The DCI’s Report on Intelligence Lessons Learned from Military Actions in Iraq, 11 February 2005.


Regional of Regine Change In freq
CA 2008-

ISLAMIC OUTREACH AND SOUTHWEST ASIA RTATIVES:
ROOM 351, EZOS: .

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FOR PROLIFERATION STRATEGY! COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND
HOMELAND DEFENSE .

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(Or OR, MIGHELIE D. DUNNE.
DIRECTOR FOR EQYPT AND NORTH AFRICAN APRAIRS .
ROOM 351, FEDS

‘GARY A. EDSON
DEPUTY ASST TO THEE PRESIDENT FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS AND DEPUTY WATIONAL SEECUPITY ADVISOR,

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ROOM 210, EOS

‘AMG. DANIEL FREED .

‘SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PREGIOENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
FOR EUROPE AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS.

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GEN. JOHNA GORDON

DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PREERIOENTT NATIONAL DIRECTOR AND
OBPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FOR OFFICE FOR
COMBATTING TERRORISM

‘ROOM 308, EBOS

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Principal Chatiengas in Post...

Page 109 of 226



‘own people and Coalition fore
Iraq} oll facitities and dams-elther te
attack or deny the benefits to

MORI DocID: 1422249

and 2 years would be necessary to restore and
fully rehabilitate existing Iraqi hospitals to
pre-1991 condition. The current Iraqi medical
system is not structured to handle civilian
wartime mass casualty trauma and public
health problems,

© A few, primarily private, hospitals in
larger towns and government and private
outpatient facilities in smaller towns have
closed because they lack supplies,
Personnel, and equipment. Medicines and
medical equipment obtained through OFF
have not been disseminated widely.

Public health and preventive medicine
currently are inadequate and will
deteriorate during war. Sanitation-related
diseases including diarrhea, typhoid fever,
and cholera have increased along with the
insect transmitted diseases malaria and
leishmaniasis. Childhood vaccine

"|The already poor civilian healthcare
‘situation probably would be severely

(U) Health and Sanitation
pits large infusions of

umanitarian supplies under OFF, regime
mismanagement, corruption, and misguided
priorities have caused an overall decline in
Iraq's healthcare delivery and sanitation
infrastructure. According to the lraqi
Ministry of Health, an estimated $2 billion

damaged by the war and widespread civil
strife. Cuts in electricity or looting of
distribution networks could have a cascading
disastrous impact on hospitals at a time wher
casualty rates are likely to be high. During
hostilities, distribution of medical supplies
and imports—already scant—will be cut off.

© Iraq's three main pharmaceutical
manufacturing facilities—Samarra Drug
Industries, Al-Kindi, and Amiriyah Serum
and Vaccino—rely heavily on imported
materials that would cease within days of
the onset of hostilities. If these facilities
were destroyed as suspected dual use BW
sites, Iraq would require additional
imports of the critical medicines and
animal vaccines that they provide in the
aftermath of the war.

a

Page 79 of 226



Page 186 of 226


In discussing the possibility of Iraq using chemical, biological or radiological
(“dirty” bomb) weapons against US troops, the paper noted that “radiological and certain
biological weapons can make an area uninhabitable for years.”

Intelligence Assessments from Spring, 2002
® Starting in the spring of 2002, the Intelligence Community began to produce reports

premised on the possibility of a US-led effort to topple Saddam. These reports dealt directly
with the conditions that might exist in Iraq following the removal of Saddam by a US-led
coalition of forces. The few assessments of post-Saddam Iraq produced prior to 2002 focused on
the removal of Saddam by a coup d'etat initiated either by the Iraqi military or oppositionists
inside and outside of Iraq.

(HEM) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced two briefing presentations in April 2002 that
discussed the challenges that could arise for US military and coalition forces in the Phase IV
post-combat phase of the war plan for Iraq. Both briefings identified key challenges in the
longer term, including:”
e Baath Party resurgence
« “Cana viable consensus on Post-Saddam governance be formed?”
¢ “Desire to minimize US force presence could be at odds with desire for dramatic
transformation of the political system” . . .
¢ “US effort to enable key players may be resented and opposed”
« “US occupation will stir nationalist and Islamic sentiments”
« “How to purge the government of Saddamists and hard-line Ba’this without destabilizing
the regime? ...
« Will ex-regime officials seek a comeback?
-- “launch a terror campaign or coup 6-12 months later?”
* “Will ex-regime officials become involved in organized crime?”

(HEED The first DIA briefing assessed that it was “too soon to know exactly what conditions
will exist in Phase IV.” It assessed that the Iraqi Baath Party “will attempt to return by any
means necessary” that “large portions of the population will remain intimidated,” and that the
“Iraqi populace will adopt an ambivalent attitude toward liberation.” The briefing also assessed
that “Significant force protection threats will emerge from the Baathists, the Jihadists and Arab
nationalists who oppose any US occupation of Iraq.”"**

(GREED) The second DIA briefing noted that “managing rivalries will be a major challenge to the
new regime.” DIA assessed that most seams and fissures will remain, but should be manageable
and noted that most rivalries are intra-communal, not between ethnic or religious groups.” It
summarized its assessment of post-Saddam challenges in three areas: “Economic

e ool The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences in Iraq, August 13, 2002, pp. i - ii. , pp. i- ii.
a ® DIA, Knowledge of. Iraqi Society: Policymaker Need for Insight and Looking at Post-Saddam Iraq, April 2002.
Ibid

Page 105 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422249

National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Information available as of Janusry 2003 was used in
the preparation of this Intelligence Community Assessment

‘The following intelligence organizations participated

in the preparation of this Asscasment:

‘The Central Intelligence Agency

‘The Defense Intelligence Agency

The National Security Agency

Nationa) Imagery and Mapping Agency

‘The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of,State

‘The Office of Intelligence, toon
Department of Energy

also participating:

‘The Nationa! Infrastructure Protection Center,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

‘The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy

The Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,
Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
Marine Corps

Diseemination Contre
Abbreviations

‘All materia! on this page is Unclassified.

oo ofthis document arc wvailsble from pewwicmuomesal |

Page 90 of 226


“ee” ALANA FOLEY

[Principal Challenges in Post...

Page 178 of 228


ne

Peincipal Challongos in PockSaddam iraq:

ROOM 21017, BTRATEDIG PLANS 8 POUOY 5-6, PENTAGON

(AMES L PAVITT .

‘STEVEN R.KAPPES

Prinoipel Challenges in Post.

Page 181 of 226 .



MORI DocID: 1422

Deer

© A less oil-dependent economy with a strong private sector would be required to generate the
more than 240,000 new jobs needed each year to accommodate the rapidly growing labor
force. .

| Major outside assistance would be required to meet humanitarian needs. Increased
Tumbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, combined with civil strife, would strain
Iraq's already inadequate healthcare services, food distribution networks, and supplies of potable

© Most Iraqis depend on government food rations and are not equipped to deal with hoarding,
looting, or price gouging. Rapid reconstitution of the distribution system would be critical to

avoiding widespread health problems.

© Iragis have restored their physical infrastructure quickly after previous wars. The difficulty
of restoring such services as water and electricity after a new war would depend chiefly on
how much destruction was caused by urban combat.

foreign and security policies of a new Iraqi government necessarily would defer
ivily in the near term to the interests of the United States, United Nations, or an intemational
Coalition but also would reflect many continuing Iragi perceptions and interests. Those
perception: Id
Fperecing() SREP WTA POMCTES as Ingy RSS Whe epee ——

. These thet perceptions, along with a prideful sense of lraqs place asa regional power,
probably would sustain Iraq’s interest in rebuilding its military. Unless gunrantecd a sovurity
umbrella against its strategic rivals, [raq’s interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction
would eventually revive.

e A new Iraqi goverment would have little interest in supporting terrorism, although strong
traqi sympathy for the Palestinians would continue. If Baghdad were unable to exert contro!
over the Iraqi countryside, al-Q' aida or other terrorists groups could operate from remote
areas.

249

Page 58 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

Dewy

National
Intelligence
Council

(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

Co pPespared under the merce of Pau R Pilar,
Intaltigence Officer for the Near East and South Asia,
Inquiries may be directed to the NIO on

January 2003

Page 54 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422242

(U) Middle East and South Asia

India

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wer

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Raeplonal Conwequelioes of Regine Change in tag

(CA 2003-
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Regional Consequences of Regine Change in iraq,
ICA 2003- -

i!


@® Security

(® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that the
Iraqi government would have to walk a fine line between dismantling the
worst aspects of Saddam’s police, security, and intelligence forces and
retaining the capability to enforce nationwide peace. In January 2003, the
Intelligence Community assessed that “if responsibility for internal security had
been passed from an occupying force to an Iraqi government, such a government
would have to walk a fine line between dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam’s
police, security and intelligence forces and retaining the capability to enforce
nationwide peace.”** The Iraqi Regular Army “has been relatively unpoliticized
below the command level and, once purged of the security and intelligence officers
embedded within it, could be used for security and law enforcement until police or
a local gendarme force is established.”** Over the longer term, the police and
security forces “would need to be rebuilt and restructured if they were to gain the
trust of the Iraqi people and avoid the excesses similar to those under Saddam’s
rule.”

@® Oil

(® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that Traq’s
large petroleum resources would make economic reconstruction a less difficult
challenge than political transformation, but that postwar Iraq would
nonetheless face significant economic challenges. Intelligence assessments prior
to the war differed on the likelihood that the Iraqi oil system would contribute to
reconstruction efforts in the short-term. The Intelligence Community, for example,
noted that “if Iraq’s oil facilities were relatively undamaged by a war, Baghdad
could increase crude oil production from 2.4 million barrels a day (b/d) to about
3.1 million b/d within several months of the end of hostilities.”* Assessments
noted that while Iraq could draw on its own oil resources for economic
reconstruction, political transformation lacked an equivalent domestic resource.
The Intelligence Community also assessed that aside from oil, Iraq’s economic
options would remain “few and narrow without forgiveness of debt, a reduction in
reparations from the previous Gulf War, or something akin to a Marshall Plan.””

@® Humanitarian Issues

® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that major
outside assistance would be required to meet humanitarian needs. In January

SNIC: ipal Challenges, p. 20
*°NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20
*7 NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20
“® NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 33
°° NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5



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MORI DocID: 1422249

Intelligence Community Assessment

(U) Principal Challenges in
Post-Saddam Iraq

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: APR 2007

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EO 12958 1.4(c)<25yrs
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ICA 2003-04
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Page 172 of 226



accomplishing these goals. Due to the partisan nature of Phase II, we
believe that the Committee should quickly conclude this nearly four year
investigation which has bogged us down and move on to more pressing
matters of intelligence oversight. Our enemies will not wait while we take
time to use subjective arguments based on cherry-picked intelligence for
political gain. In the case of this report, it was near completion in November
of last year when with the change in majority of the Committee placed the
report on hold. The Committee then rewrote and significantly abridged the
report, and now seven months later we are releasing it. There are still two
remaining reports that the Committee has not acted on, and we urge the
Committee to complete them or to deem them completed (particularly in
regard to those matters being investigated extensively in open forum by
other Senate Committees), as soon as possible so that we can return to
meaningful and productive intelligence oversight.

We had many concerns about this report, some of which we were
willing to set aside in the spirit of compromise. One of our concerns, for
example, was that we believe this report exaggerates the significance of the
Intelligence Community’s prewar assessments about postwar Iraq. Because
collected intelligence reporting did not play a significant role in developing
these assessments, they were based largely on the regional and country
expertise of intelligence analysts and outside experts. As a member of the
Kerr study group described it, “it’s speculation based on informed analysis.”
While the Intelligence Community’s assessments on post-war Iraq likely
served as useful tools for policy makers and military planners, it was only
one of several useful tools available to them. Other tools included outside
academics and experts, media reports, and policy makers’ and military
planners’ own education and experience. The lack of a unique intelligence
fact base behind the Intelligence Community’s assessments means they were
no more authoritative than the many other educated opinions that were
available in the same time frame.

The chief author of the two Intelligence Community Assessments
(ICAs), Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq and Regional
Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq (contained in Appendices A and B
of this report), testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee in October
2002 that when it came to predicting the development of democracy in Iraq,
the lack of intelligence reporting meant that the members of the Senate
Intelligence Committee “who know from first-hand experience what it takes
to make our democracy work, probably have at least as much basis for

Page 196 of 226


seek declassification of the remaining Niger conclusions and the rest of the
conclusions from the Committee’s Phase I report separately.

Conclusion 13. The report on the former ambassador’s trip to Niger,
disseminated in March 2002, did not change any analysts’ assessments
of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. For most analysts, the information in
the report lent more credibility to the original Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) reports on the uranium deal, but State Department
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) analysts believed that the
report supported their assessment that Niger was unlikely to be willing
or able to sell uranium to Iraq.

The report on the former ambassador’s trip to Niger did not change
any analysts’ assessments of the Iraq-Niger uranium deal. Those who
assessed the Iraq-Niger uranium deal was credible prior to the former
ambassador’s report, continued to believe it was credible. Analysts who
assessed the deal was unlikely, continued to believe it was unlikely. While
INR analysts believed that the report corroborated their position that Niger
was unlikely to be willing or able to sell uranium to Iraq, most analysts
thought the information in the report lent more credibility to the original
intelligence reports on the alleged uranium deal. In particular, analysts
highlighted a meeting request by a Nigerien-Algerian businessman on behalf
of an Iraqi delegation. The businessman told a former Nigerien Prime
Minister that the Iraqi delegation wished to discuss “expanding commercial
relations” with Niger. The former Prime Minister interpreted this request to
mean that the delegation was interested in purchasing uranium. The report
noted that “although the meeting took place, the [Prime Minister] let the
matter drop due to the United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq.” Although
the report lacked important details, such as who participated in the meeting
and what was actually discussed at the meeting, the report added to most
Intelligence Community analysts’ concerns about Iraqi interest in uranium
from Niger. These analysts told Committee staff that they did not expect the
former Nigerien officials to admit to entering into a uranium deal with rogue
nations so they were not surprised that the report said the former Nigerien
officials were unaware of any uranium contracts that had been signed with
rogue nations.

After the report on the former ambassador’s trip was disseminated,

Intelligence Community agencies wrote intelligence products or cleared
language indicating that Iraq was attempting to acquire uranium from Niger

Page 219 of 226


‘Principal Challenges in Post-Saddem iraq > -
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» Page 161 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249 __

ees

tumber of groups that do not operate
under INC auspices.

less of what political role the

ition parties assumed, the
return of individual exiles could aid the
development of political institutions and civil
society. The US Committee for Refugees
estimates that four million Iraqis live outside
frag. At Icast a quarter of them have left Iraq
in the last ten years.

© Scattered reporting suggests that a
relatively high proportion of these
expatriates arc middle class professionals
or businessmen. Many of them reside in
the West, where they have been exposed
to democratic norms and values and
possibly would bring those values back to
Iraq.

© The more skilled exiles would be able to
play significant roles in rebuilding Iraq.
In so doing they could over time
constitute a constituency for democracy.

(U) Domestic Divisions and Conflict

Corerad tt nem athrity in ing would
jace'a Country with societal fractures and

significant potential for violent conflict
among domestic groups if not prevented by an
occupying force, Some of the domestic
divisions are cmotion-laden but less visceral
and extreme than in some countries in which
ethnic conflict has been the basis for
genocide,

ae principal division is the three-
‘Way Split among Sunni Arab, Shia, and Kurd,
which is based on ethnicity and religion but to
some extent involves a geographic
concentration of cach group in the central,
“southem, and northem regions of Iraq
respectively. The geographic pattem is least
distinct with the Shia, especially in Baghdad

and other urban areas, where many Shia live
alongside Sunnis. Other societal divisions,
including ones based on tribal identities,
would add to the challenge of maintaining
domestic peace and stability.

© These divisions have not
constant civil war during Saddam's tenure
largely because of the de facto secession
of the Kurdish north—protected by the
northern no-fly zone—and severe
repression by the regime. This
suppression includes past use of chemical
weapons against Kurds and draining of
marshes in the south to help subjugate the
predominantly Shia marsh Arabs. The
lifting of the repression and the restoration
of Iraq's territorial integrity would open
the way for heightened competition for
power among the different groups and
new suspicions about what grabs for
power other groups were making.

© Saddam has widened societal splits by
exacerbating hostilities and suspicions
among ethnic, tribal, and religious groups
in an effort to co-opt some and subjugate
others.

Crard pi thee societal fissures, aq
‘woul unlikely to split apart. Most Iraqis

have national identity and pride in being Iraqi
that transcends their ethnic and religious

differences. More signifi ), the
alternatives are not attractive,

harshness of the Saddam
me's methods would form the basis for
another split: between those associated with
the old regime—and its brutality and

19

|

Page 70 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422242

bee[
CF ghint-Seddam seatimenthigh in many
ld not necessarily correlate with

favorable popular attitudes toward the United
States.

© Public anger probably would dissipate if
the Iraqi people were seen as welcoming
the US presence,

© Reduced Isracli-Palestinian violence,
greater US engagement toward a
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
the establishment of a Palestinian state
also would calm restive publics and lessen
the influence of Baghdad's portrayal of
Saddam as a champion of the Palestinian

* cause.

Crag lie ong-em presen of US woape
icularly if the result of US

unilateral action—and elsewhere in the region

probably would be a subject for future
potentially violent demonstrations fucled by
perceptions that the United States was secking
to dominate the region and its resources and
was fundamentally hostile to Arab and
Muslim interests.

© Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq is part of the
Arab core, and the use of US military
force against a fellow Arab Muslim
country—absent a clear provocation—
probably would be viewed with
widespread antipathy.

Page 25 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

@ in Exile
(fie ema opposition does not
ve Ure popular, political, or military

capabilities necessary to play a leading role
after Saddam’s departure without significant
and prolonged external economic, political,
and military support.

ae Iraqi opposition groups
ve limited progress in submerging

their differences and developing a unified
front. In 2002, several Iraqi external
Opposition parties held conferences designed
to forge unity. At the meeting in December
2002, they called for a democratic and federal
Iraq, formed an advisory committee of 65
members, and unanimously opposed a US-
imposed post-Saddam political solution.
They remained unsure, however, what their
role would be in post-Saddam Iraq.

¢ The conferences could have done little
without high-level US input. Inter-
personal and organizational problems
persist, and many oppositionists worry the
US presence will make it difficult for
them to gain traction with the Iraqi public.

Internal divisions and inability to come to
agreement led to a postponement of their
scheduled mid-January 2003 meeting.

lost opposition parties are
along geographical or ethnic lines,
undercutting their ability to attract a
widespread political base within Iraq and
undermining attempts to forge a united
opposition. Some Iraqi Sunni oppositionists
criticize the West for compounding that

—

tendency by supporting Kurds and Shia to the
perceived exclusion of Sunni Arabs. ©

© The Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in fraq (SCIRI)—an Iranian-
backed Shia Arab opposition group—has
some following in the Shia tribal areas.

© Atthe December 2002 meeting, the al-
Khoej Foundation played a pivotal
peacemaking role between Shia factions.
The al-Khoei Foundation, which has a
large following in Iraq, promotes the
separation of religion from politics.

© The two major Kurdish opposition parties,
the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have .
extensive support within their respective

opposition has made scattered
to unite various factions and groups.
Such efforts seem to work only when they are
formed as a counter to another political party
orethnic group. The Iraqi National Congress
(INC) has claimed to be an umbrella group
for all opposition groups but the December
conference made it clear that it can no fonger
claim that role,

© Although they are technically part of the
INC, the PUK, KDP, SCIRI, and the Iraqi
‘National Accord—an Iraqi nationalist
group of former military and security
officers—formed the Group of Four to
meet informally outside the framework of
the INC.

The various Assyrian oppositionists have
coalesced under a US-based umbrella
group, group, ostensibly to protect their minority

interests. Turkomen are represented by &

Page 68 of 226



Regionst Consequences of Regime Change in rag

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Page 144 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422249

Page 61 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422242

a

Contents

() Scope Note

(U) Key Judgments

(U) Discussion

(U) Setting the Stage

(U) Popular Reactions

(U) Terrorism and Islamic Extremism
(U) Fueling Political Islam
(U) How Terrorists Might React
(U) Palestinian Groups—A Special Case
(U) State Sponsors of Terrorism

(U) Roles in a Post Saddam Iraq

(U) Broader Security Policies and Posture Toward the United States

19

(U) Weapons of Mass Destruction

(U) Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict

(U) Economic Consequences

27

(U) Prospects for Democratic Reform

29

Page 18 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422242

Page 35 of 226


- ICTR PRIFERATION AFFAIRS BUREAL!OF

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prada uni ora
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, “aunanw orn ares sri oy

138 ‘AB: WALLIAM JOSEPH GUTH : .
: ASSISTANT QECRIETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
(ROOM 6242, MAIN STATE. :

ag
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Principal Challenges in Post...

Page 158 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

“wae

|At the request of the Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, this
Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) examines the interna! dynamics of Iraq that will
frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the regime of Saddam Husayn. It
discusses the main political, economic, humanitarian, and security issues inside Iraq that are
likely to demand attention during approximately the first three to five years after Saddam
departs. In particular, it looks at the prospects for representative government in Iraq and at the
ethnic, tribal, and religious forces that will affect its development.

Scope Note

How these issues unfold would depend heavily on the events leading to Saddam's

. The effects of his ouster through the invasion of Iraq by a Coalition military force
could vary significantly according to the duration of the war, the damage it caused, and such
other factors as the size and cohesiveness of the Coalition. Subsequent occupation by a Coalition
force obviously would make that force the dominant influence on events in Iraq in the immediate
aftermath of the invasion. This assessment makes no projections about specific wartime
scenarios or the policics of an occupying force. Nor does it focus primarily on the immediate
humanitarian demands or need to locate weapons of mass destruction that would be handled by
the Coalition military forces in the first days after a war. Instead, it identifies and analyzes the
medium- to long-term challenges that any post-Saddam authority in Iraq necessarily would face.

[The ICA was reviewed in draft by three prominent experts in the history, politics, and
Tegional dynamics of the Middle East-{

Le comments were taken into consideration in the preparation of this paper.

[ |The regional repercussions of an ouster of Saddam, includ of neighboring
yard a post-Saddam Iraq, are addressed in ICA 2003-0: gional
Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq january 2003.

Page 55 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422242

Pee)

China would be potential partners. Within the region, Arab states and Iran would have added
reason to expand relations with each other{ ]

i= J

states would maintain their current interests in weapons of mass
(WMD) and programs for developing such weapons, despite worries about
poasible future US military action,

© Some Id continue to view
‘WMD programs as necessary ‘anor ‘security strategy for numerous ~

reasons, including surviving in a dangerous neighborhood, enhancing regional prestige and

influence, compenssting for conventional military deficiencies, and deterring perceived

threats from such stronger adversaries as Israel ]
the United States.

© States with developmental WMD programs would try to increase the secrecy and pace of
those programs with the hope of developing deterrent capabilities before they could be pre-
empted.

in the Middle East would expect the United States to build on its victory
over by taking a more active role in resolving the Isreeli-Palestinian impasse. The
willingness of regimes to cooperate with Washington on many issues would depend
significantly on whether those expectations were met.

Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would continue to depend on the willingness of
both sides to make basic compromises and on outside help in initiating and sustaining a
viable peace process.

impact on regional economies would be mostly negative but variable, with
OF the effect depending on how much damage the Iraqi oilfields sustained during the

war,

° il prices probably would spike to at least $40 per barre! during—and in the run-up to and
immediate aftermath of—a war because of uncertainty regarding the disposition of Iraq’s oil
resources, Prices could go substantially higher if a war overlaps with the strikes in
Venezuela's oil sector, which have disrupted about 2.7 million b/d of exports. A quick return
of Iraq's output to something near its current capacity of 3.1 million b/d, however, would put
downward pressure on prices and could set off a battle for market share among Saudi Arabia
and other OPEC members, possibly leading to a collapse both of prices and of OPEC's

wwe

Page 21 of 226



= SS
- Cot
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interest in WMD. Baghdad might become
‘one of the more vocal proponents of region-
wide arms control. Without effective nuclear
arms control, concerns about the WMD

ilities of other i
woul
‘a Toture Traqi regime to consider how to

rebuild the country’s WMD programs.

Terrorism
new Iraqi regime would be less
‘Saddam to support terrorism,
although traditional sympathy for the
Palestinians could mean continued ties to
some Palestinian organizations. Sponsorship
of terrorism would not be seen as fulfilling
national pride or meeting regional security
concems in the same way:that a strong army

or WMD program might.
am ability of al-Qa'ida or other
groups to maintain a presence in

northern Iraq (or, more clandestinely,
elsewhere) would depend largely on whether
a new regime were able to exert effective
security control over the entire country, In
addition, rogue ex-regime elements could
forge an alliance with existing terrorist
organizations or act independently to wage
gucrilla warfare against the new government
or Coalition forces.

MORI DocID: 1422249

Page 88 of 226



ornce or wurhe sven (omni)

a)

- Principal: in Post-Saddam Wreq

dove uaa oO
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

CHARLES E. ALLEN

[ABEISTANT OIRGOTOR FOR CENTRAL

"(STUART A COHEN
deTeay uaa saTONN. wu COUN ‘

ROOM 7882, CHB,
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ovewz003 - ”

* Page 170 of 226 *



MORI DocID: 1422242

community several billion dollars in
reconstruction and humanitarian aid.

[ ]Regional perceptions of the
‘Geonomic uncertainties associated with a post-
Saddam Iraq probably would lead many states
to seek US assurances that their losses would
be compensated and to request billions in US

economic assistance including cash, civilian
and military goods, debt relief, and increased
access to US markets. US support for key
political goals also could be sought.

.

(U) Prospects for Democratic
Reform

‘The exemplar of a more politically
probably would not, by itself, be a

catalyst for more wide-ranging political and
economic change throughout the region,
although it could raise expectations in the
small numbers of reformers in the region for
greater political liberalization. Reform in any
Muslim country, however, would be more the
result of conditions, events, and debates

el

Page 42 of 226



SENS RRR |

MORI DocID: 1422249

—

compensation fund requiring that 25
percent of Iraqi oil revenues go to war St : a3
reparations from Saddam's invasion of Arad *. #
Kuwait and if claimants—primarily FORaiariged by w'wrats ,
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—do not waive i oti oa
their claims, Iraq would have $6-27.8 a about ; =|
billion in revenue.

te
=

© The international community's response et
to Iraqi foreign debt will be critical to é
Iraq’s ability to reconstruct its economy.
We estimate that iraq's total official anew
foreign debt is about $120 billion,
including about $40 billion owed to fn i
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for loans during ¢ i &
the Iran-Iraq war. Depending on .
refinancing terms, Baghdad may have to
pay as much as $12 billion annually just
to service the debt.

© Resolution of Iraq's foreign debt issues 2
will be critical to attracting necessary a
foreign investment.

ithout debt forgiveness, a ttES16:
ion in the war reparations ratio, or sate
something akin to a Marshall Plan, Iraq’s i
economic options are likely to remain few and }
narrow. Faced with the prospect of laboring ; if i
under a vicious cycle of deficits and debt for M YG
years to come, a new regime almost certainly .
would ask the intemational community for
debt forgiveness and economic assistance.

© Financial burdens of the magnitudes
detailed above, if unrelicved, could impel
@ more promising successor government
toward using repression, out of necessity

to quell economically-driven unrest.

© Alternately, a successor government could
exploit the economic strains to increase
the resentment of the populace against the
United States and the West portraying
both as attempting to destroy Iraq.

Page 83 of 226


"ROBERT D.VCKERS
251,088 ;
| ROBERT D. WALPOLE

Principal Chatdzigoe in Poet-Saddam iraq _

Pincha! Contergse Pom.

Page 174 of 226



Let me speak to what I know of where she is substantively
involved, She offered up his name as a possibility, because we
were — we didn’t have much in the way of other resources to try
and get at this problem, to the best of my knowledge. And so
whenever she offered up his name it seemed like a logical thing
to do. I didn’t make the decision to send him, but I certainly
agreed with it, | recommended that he should go.

He later added:

T’'d like to state emphatically that, from what I’ve seen, Val
Wilson has been the consummate professional through all this.
From the very start, whenever she mentioned to me and some
others that her husband had experience and was willing to travel
but that she would have to step away from the operation
because she couldn’t be involved in the decisionmaking to send
him, in [his] debriefing, [in] dissem[inating] the report and
those kinds of things, because it could appear as a conflict of
interest.

The Committee report never stated or implied that Mrs. Wilson’s
suggestion to her colleagues that her husband may be able to look into the
Iraq-Niger uranium matter was inappropriate in any way, obviating the need
to include the reports officer’s comments that her role was “professional.”
In fact, a conclusion on page 25 of the Phase I report noted that “the
Committee does not fault the CIA for exploiting the access enjoyed by the
spouse of a CIA employee traveling to Niger. The Committee believes,
however, that it is unfortunate, considering the significant resources
available to the CIA, that this was the only option available.”

In addition, the Committee report noted that it was a CIA/CPD
decision ultimately to send Ambassador Wilson to Niger. The Committee
report never claimed that Mrs. Wilson made the decision to send him, only
that she suggested him.

In addition to the memo and reports officer’s testimony described
above, the Committee considered Mrs. Wilson’s testimony to the CIA
Inspector General. The Inspector General testified before our Committee
that Mrs. Wilson “made the suggestion” that Ambassador Wilson could look
into the Iraq-Niger uranium matter. Additional information recently made

Page 210 of 226


Devices (IEDs) against coalition troops after the war. There was also no
discussion of the large number of ammunition dumps in Iraq and the
monumental volume of artillery shells that they contained, and how these
shells might be used as IEDs against our troops. Similarly, in the prewar
assessments discussion of possible al Qa’ida attacks or sectarian tensions,
there is no discussion or warning of how spectacular attacks by al Qa’ida on
targets like markets or the Samara Mosque might be used to spark and fuel
sectarian conflict.

Again, our interest in highlighting these issues is not to suggest that
the Intelligence Community failed or that these threats were necessarily
foreseeable, rather it was to ensure that the Committee did not distort the
picture of what was presented to policymakers in 2003.

ICA Distribution List

Our second major concern was the last minute inclusion of 81 pages
of named individuals to whom the ICAs were distributed (Appendix D), a
troubling departure from past Committee practice. In past reports, both
Phase I and Phase II, the Committee chose wisely to leave out the names of
individuals who were not department heads or cabinet level officials. Even
in cases when the individual had a very public role in certain events, the
Committee referred to individuals by title only. This prevented either side
from engaging in the temptation to use individuals’ names to score political
or personal points. The inclusion of Appendix D in the Committee's report
without adequate, contextual comment is misleading, because the names on
such lists are typically either the principals, staff heads or security managers
of a governmental office and there is no way to ensure whether the
individuals named on the distribution list actually read the documents sent to
their office. Most offices receive thousands of documents and the individual
listed as the recipient rarely sees, reads, or even knows about a number of
documents sent to them, therefore we cannot infer that because one's name
appears on the distribution list that the named individual personally received
and/or read the document.

More importantly, a cursory review of the 81 pages of names on these
two distribution lists reveals significant errors and misleading information.
For example, one intelligence official who is listed as a recipient of the two
January 2003 ICAs had left that position five months before the ICA’s were
published, while another individual is listed as serving in the wrong office.

Page 200 of 226


a

Discussion

(U) Principal Challenges
in Post-Saddam Iraq

ouster of Iraqi dictator Saddam

lusayn would pose a variety of significant
policy challenges for whoever assumes
responsibility for governing Iraq. These
include political transformation, controlling.
internal strife, solving economic and
humanitarian challenges, and dealing with
Persistent foreign policy and security
concerns. The greatest medium-to-long-term
challenge would be in fashioning an even
partially liberal, democratic, and stable polity
in place of the system of oppression that
transformation is the task in which the
underlying problems are most deeply rooted
in Iraq’s history and culture and least
susceptible to outside intervention and
management.

(U) The Historical Legacy

iraq’s experience with democratio—
tive—political institutions
has been limited. Its experiments in pluralism
ended long ago, and the socio-economic
foundations for a more open political system
that were laid in the 1960s and 1970s have
collapsed,

* —Iraq’s most promising experiment with
representative institutions took place
under the Hashemite monarchy (1920-
1958), when political parties operated
more frecly than at any other time in the
country’s history. Although personal ties,
traditional patron-client relationships, and
management by the regime greatly

influenced the political process, the Iraqi

MORI DocID: 1422249

Chamber of Deputies was 8 somewhat
representative body.

© Formal suffrage requirements in Iraq were
comparatively liberal during the
monarchy. However, low levels of
-education and literacy, the absence of
transportation and media networks, and
the overweaning influence of tribal
shaykhs in the countryside meant that,
outside the cities or among rural elites,
voting rates were low and the integrity of
the ballot was questionable.

© Modern participatory mass politics was
only beginning to emerge when the
monarchy was overthrown in a military
coup in 1958.

iraq’s leaders have struggled to

‘an Iraqi national identity since the
country was created following World War I
out of three former provinces of the Ottoman
Empire, The Sunni Arab minority has
provided most of Iraq’s leaders, continuing a
traditional leadership arrangement established
during Ottoman rule and sustained through
the British mandate. Individual Kurds and
Shias, as well as Christians and Jews, have
held influential positions, but such exceptions
were not indicative of Sunni power-sharing.
Prior to 1968, the merchant class, the wlema,
and some tribal shaykhs were influential in
government and within their own
communities.

Despite its dictatorial rule over the
years, the Ba’th Party initially made
progress in developing institutions that might
have supported the growth of democracy.
Motivated by a pan-Arabist, socialist

9

der

Page 60 of 226



MORI DocID: 1422249

eee

[Hite successor authority in Baghdad
‘were perceived by investors as both
politically and economically stable, Iraq's
massive proven oil reserves—second only to
Saudi Arabia—could be a significam lure to
foreign investment. This could permit
Baghdad to expand its oi] output rapidly—by
an average of 500,000 barrels per day (b/d)
per year for several consccutive years—
tivaling the recent pace of expansion in ,
Russia and making Iraq the second largest oi]
exporter in the world after Saudi Arabia as
early as 2005,

© The biggest prizes of the Iraqi oil patch
are the “giant” oilfields with recoverable
reserves of more than one billion barrels
cach. International oil companies have
expressed interest in developing seven of
these fields and have signed contracts for
two.

Even with the attractiveness of the

‘sector, Iraq would need a stable
central government and would have to refrain
from unreasonable demands on foreign oil
‘companics to realize its full potential as an oil
exporter. Iraq would be capable of
maintaining current production capacity of
about 3.1 million b/d almost indefinitely with
its indigenous resources and could even
expand it slowly with help from oilfield
service companies. Without extensive forcign
investment, however, Baghdad would be
unlikely to have the financial and technical
resources to reach its announced goal of 6
million b/d in capacity,

post-Saddam government also
‘would need to focus on developing a strong
Private sector to set the stage for a less oil-
dependent economy. A new government
would need to stress fundamentals, such as
developing a common currency, providing
clear legal protection for private property,
revitalizing the domestic financial sector to

provide credit to fuel investment, and
developing tax and trade policies that would
encourage private commerce.

government. Iraq will need to create more
than 240,000 new jobs each year for the next
five years to accommodate the growing labor
force—e difficult task for a country where
currently as much as 50 percent of the labor
force is unemployed or underemployed. Any
significant demobilization of Iraqi military
personnel would add to this already high rate
of unemployment.

ed Foreign Policy

Ihe departure of Saddam Husayn—
been a major cause of regional

instability and enmity by twice launching
wars of aggression against his neighbors—
would offer the prospect of enhancing and
stabilizing Iraq's relations with other states in
the region. Dependence of a new Iraqi
government on the United States, the United
Nations, or an international Coalition that
overthrew Saddam would heavily affect that
government's foreign policies. Nonetheless,
substantial elements of continuity in Iraqi
foreign policy perspectives would remain.
fraqis would continue to perceive threats

growing out of tensions that are grounded in
more than Saddam’s aggressive behavior and
would seek assurance that these perceived
threats were being countered. A government
in Baghdad also would attempt to build on the _
relatively stable modus vivendi that Seddam
has achieved with his neighbors over the past
ten years.

ghdad’s primary foreign policy
focus would be on the states that border Iraq.
‘The main Iraqi concer would be in guarding

Deer

Page 84 of 226



i
uNoan TARY POR SCONOIRG BUGAUISS & ADRICULTURAL AFRAINB®E)
‘ AME. ALAN. LARGON
LUNDERGBCAETARY FOR BOONCRED, SUSMIERS AND
ABRICUTURAL AFPNRS.
(ROOM 7908, MAIN STATE.

(UNDER SRORITARY FOR POLITICAL APFAIRSE)

wi 7% mua Loncement :
, UNDER SECRETARY OF BTATE POR POUTICAL.
ROOM 7240, MAIN STATIC

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aa ‘EXEC. ASSISTANT TO THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POUTICAL AFFAIRS:
(ROOMS 7200, MARS STATE

‘183 OR. JACK DYER CROUCH, It

Page 119 of 226


Moreover, major policy decisions, including the number of troops
needed after the initial combat phase and the extent of de-Baathification in
the government and security forces, flatly ignored the assessments and
recommendations of intelligence officials. Similarly, intelligence
recommendations to actively engage Iraq’s neighbors, especially Iran, in the
postwar period were dismissed. These are the basis for the second
conclusion I propose:

Additional Conclusion 2: Use of Intelligence

The Committee has seen no evidence that government officials and
decisionmakers appropriately considered and prepared for the difficulties in
the postwar environment that were predicted by the Intelligence Community.
The failure to act on this intelligence is a key contributing factor to the
current situation in Iraq.

In the absence of Committee discussion on this matter, I wish to
associate myself with the findings of the two “internal” reviews of prewar
intelligence:

First, the Kerr Study Group wrote that “Intelligence projections in this
area [analysis of post-Saddam Iraq], however, although largely accurate, had
little or no impact on policy deliberation.”

Second, the report from the DCI-directed study of lessons learned
noted that “Intelligence assessments on postwar political, security, and
economic issues were not effectively exploited. Analysts deferred some
needed work on irregular Iraqi units and in-depth study of some postwar
challenges due to lack of personnel. Assessments that indicated that the
war’s aftermath could be difficult or costly were largely ignored.”

The DCI Lessons Learned report went on to say that “Intelligence
Community assessments and recommendations on problematic postwar
issues had little impact on transition planning. A variety of interagency
discussions and Intelligence Community assessments during 2002-03
identified potential postwar problems in Iraq. However, these assessments

? Studies in Intelligence, on July 29, 2004, 48. (Richard Kerr, et al, Collection and Analysis on Iraq: Issues
Sor the US Intelligence Community, July 29, 2004, Vol. 49, No. 3.)

Page 193 of 226


Regional Consequences of Ragine Change in iraq
ICA 2008-

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Page 122 of 226


Peer[

© Iraq has increased its financial support
and training for Palestinian terrorist
groups over the past year, and some Iraqi

payments to Palestinian groups have gone

to the families of members of HAMAS,
the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. These payments
appear not to have had a significant effect
‘on suicide bombings and other violent

Palestinian terrorist capabilities and
popularity would depend more on Israeli
actions than on what happens in Iraq.

unless they believed US attacks on them were
imminent.

© A favorable political and economic .
outcome in Iraq in combination with
visible US engagement in a functioning
peace process could, however, reduce
both recruits and money for Palestinian
terrorism over the longer term.

(U) State Sponsors of Terrorism ~

quick US victory over Iraq would
increasc the fears of Syria and Iran that they
would become targets of future US military
operations. Neither regime would be
persuaded to end its support for terrorism,
although Damascus would feel increased
Pressure to clamp down on Palestinian
terrorist groups based in Syria. Damascus
and Tehran probably would avoid sponsoring
terrorist attacks against the United States

Set

Tehran's longstanding view of Israel as a
threat to Iranian interests, as well as
continued ideological opposition to
Israe!’s existence among many of Iran’s
clergy, would not change as a result of
Saddam's ouster, leading Iran to sustain
its funding of Hizballah and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In addition,
some Iranian leaders might continue this
support in order to preserve their ability to
influence events in the Levant and the
peace process and also maintain a
contingency capability to attack US
interests through surrogates.

For the Syrians, Hizballah would remain
its most important lever in pressuring
Isracl for the return of the Golan Heights.

Page 29 of 226

MORI DocID: 1422242 Ss



wo.

ar

Page 154 of 226



om.

Principal Challenges in Post-Sacidem ing

VAUGHN F. BIBHOP
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Page 177 of 226



government is established with a gradual devolution to Iraqi self-governance
during the five-year timeframe.””

Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

(® The second Intelligence Community Assessment of January 2003, Principal
Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, examined “the internal dynamics of Iraq that will
frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the regime of Saddam
Husayn.””

(® According to the scope note, the assessment was not focused primarily on the
“immediate humanitarian demands or need to locate weapons of mass destruction
that would be handled by the Coalition military forces in the first days after a war.”
Instead, the assessment discussed challenges that would “demand attention during
approximately the first three to five years after Saddam departs.” Accordingly, the
scope note also stated that the ICA made no projections about specific wartime
scenarios or the policies of “an occupying force” in postwar Iraq. “

Other Intelligence Assessments on Postwar Iraq

(® In addition to the Intelligence Community Assessments (see Appendices A
and B), individual agencies within the Intelligence Community produced dozens of
more narrowly focused assessments about postwar Iraq throughout 2002 and early
2003. The Committee briefly summarized those assessments in Appendix C.

NIC, Regional Consequences
® NIC, Principal Challenges
‘NIC, Principal Challenges


chapter of using intelligence oversight for politics behind us, and move
forward to the pressing, and numerous, issues that are facing the Intelligence
Community and our nation today. The stakes are too high to spin our wheels
in political endeavors. We look forward to joining our colleagues in
engaging in the serious issues facing our country today, and we trust that
soon enough we can focus the full resources of this Committee back on such
issues in bi-partisan fashion. The country deserves no less from us.

CHRISTOPHER “KIT” BOND
JOHN WARNER

ORRIN G, HATCH
RICHARD BURR

Page 204 of 226


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MORI DocID: 1422242

perceptions that the United States was
there to reshape the region as part of a
larger war against Arabs and Muslims.
Such perceptions might heighten calls for
more radical Islamic s: of

{ —
to clamp even harder on

© Some regi
inet continue to cite —

Arab-Israeli violence as the reason to
continue repressive policies and delay
reforms.

manner in which a new .
government emerged in Baghdad, including «. .
involvement by the UN, and the relative
success of policies such a government
adopted would be important determinants of
how it would be perceived by regional leaders
and publics.

e A perception that democracy was
“imposed” on Iraq would resurrect
entrenched fears of colonialism and lessen
further the likelihood that Iraq could serve
a8 a model for political liberalization in
the region.

© Confronted with a more liberal
government in Iraq that was perceived as
not imposed and as having improved the
living standard for most Iraqis, an
increasing number of Arabs probably
would look inward at their own political
culture and the reasons why it is
dysfunctional, perhaps sparking more
public debate about democratization.
Lingering suspicion of the US role in the
region, however, would tend to reinforce
perceptions that the new Iraqi government
was primarily a US creation.

den

Page 44 of 226



and from public comments and testimony from Ambassador Wilson and his
wife, Valerie Wilson, asserting that the Committee’s report contained errors
and distortions. We take these charges seriously and believe it is important
to outline information, new and old, that explains some of the key issues and
supports the Committee’s findings.

In July 2004, Ambassador Wilson sent a letter to the Committee in
which he declared “not true” a conclusion in additional views of the
Chairman and Senators Bond and Hatch that:

The plan to send the former ambassador to Niger was
suggested by the former ambassador’s wife, a CIA
employee.

In his letter to the Committee, Ambassador Wilson took issue with
this conclusion although similar text was included in the body of the
Committee’s unanimous report. (p. 39.) Ambassador Wilson asserted that
the Committee’s finding appeared to be based on a quoted portion of a
memo sent from his wife to her superior that says “My husband has good
relations with the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines
(not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed
light on this sort of activity” (p. 39 of the Committee’s report.) Ambassador
Wilson claims in his letter that this memo shows no suggestion that he be
sent on the trip and is “little more than a recitation of his contacts and bona
fides.” This is not true. The Committee did not release the full text of the
document, thinking it was unnecessary in light of the other evidence we
provided in the report, but considering the controversy surrounding this
document, making the full text available now seems prudent.

Page 206 of 226


Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the list of recipients of the
two ICAs. I was disappointed to see my colleagues vote against such a non-
partisan issue. I support fully the Vice Chairman’s additional comments
regarding the appropriateness and hypocrisy of this action by the Committee.
Members of Congress are policymakers and are privy to the Intelligence
Community’s analysis when making policy decisions—such as the decision
to authorize the President to use force against Iraq. If anyone is being
accused of making policy decisions in a vacuum based on receiving but
disregarding these two ICAs, then Congress should be held to the same
standard. Effective oversight requires Congress to hold ourselves to the
same standards that we demand from the Executive branch.

Aside from my concerns with this report, I believe that much of the
Committee’s Phase II investigation is a fruitless effort. Any investigation
that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) conducts should be
done with the intention of improving the Intelligence Community and
enhancing our national security. This Committee did just that in July of
2004, when the Committee unanimously adopted its report on the U.S.
Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. This
report led to much needed reform in the Intelligence Community and
increased Congressional oversight. Regrettably, the present report neither
improves our Intelligence Community nor enhances our national security.

I voted, along with the rest of the Committee, to authorize Phase II of
this Committee’s inquiry regarding the prewar intelligence on Iraq. My vote
was based primarily on being able to vote out and approve a large portion,
proving so far to be the only substantive portion, of the inquiry with the
Committee’s Phase I report while satisfying the further concerns of some
members of this Committee. As Phase II continues, I see the Committee’s
resources wasted on an examination of past events meant to point fingers
rather then improve our Intelligence Community.

SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

SENATOR ORRIN G. HATCH
SENATOR RICHARD BURR

Page 224 of 226


Appendix D. The ICAs were produced in the same manner as an NIE, but their
release did not require approval by the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the
Director of Central Intelligence.

(D The scope notes of both reports said they were prepared “at the request of the
Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for the Near East and South Asia.” The NIO
told Committee staff that he actually suggested the assessments to State and took
the initiative to produce them on the basis of a positive reaction from State’s Policy
Planning Staff to his suggestion.’

(BD One ICA, entitled Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, identified and
analyzed the medium- to long-term challenges that any post-Saddam authority in
Iraq would necessarily face."" The second ICA, Regional Consequences of Regime
Change in Iraq, addressed the regional impact of a US invasion of Iraq."

(® The Committee devoted particular attention to January 2003 ICAs because
they were fully-coordinated across the Intelligence Community prior to their
publication. Thus, the Committee believes that the ICAs represent the best
available “baseline” of prewar intelligence assessments on postwar Iraq.

(BD The Committee’s conclusions are based primarily on the two ICAs. In an
effort to further inform the public debate on the role of intelligence assessments in
the prewar period, the Committee requested that the Director of National
Intelligence declassify both of the ICAs in their entirety. These declassified
documents appear in Appendices A and B.

Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq

(® In Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, the Intelligence
Community analyzed the “most important political, economic, and social
consequences of regime change in Iraq — in the context of current conditions in the
Middle East and South Asia — for the surrounding region over a five-year period.”

® The analysis was based on assumptions laid out in the paper’s scope note.
These included: “Saddam and key regime supporters are ousted as the result of a
UN-sanctioned Coalition military campaign...; Iraqi territorial integrity remains
intact and Iraq retains a defensive capability against its neighbors. ..; a US-backed

° SSCI Committee Staff Interview with NIO for Near East and South Asia.
'° NIC, Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, January 2003.
"NIC, Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq, January 2003.


MORI DocID: 1422242

(U) Weapons of Mass Destruction

[ [The elimination of Iraq’s WMD
‘capabilities probably would not cause other
regional states to abandon either their existing
WMD programs or their desire to develop
‘such programs. For many of the Arab
countries of the Middle Bast, Iran, and South
Asia, WMD programs would continue to be
viewed as necessary and integral components
of an overall national security posture for
several reasons, including to survive in a
dangerous neighborhood, enhance regional
prestige, compensate for conventional
military deficiencies, and deter threats from

superior adversaries, particularly Isracl} =|

Page 38 of 226


coprcra

Regional Consequences of Regime Change in aq
ICA 2003-
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Page 118 of 226


Wilson.]” According to her testimony before the House Committee, she did
not tell the analysts who attended the meeting that she was under cover
stating that she “believed they would have assumed as such.” Apparently
they did not “assume” she was under cover because the INR notes did not
mark her name with a (C) as would be required to indicate that her
association with the CIA was classified.

In addition, Mrs. Wilson drafted a cable that was sent overseas
requesting concurrence with Ambassador Wilson’s travel to Niger. While
Ambassador Wilson suggested in his letter to the Committee and in his book
that the question of him traveling to Niger was first broached during the
February 19, 2002 meeting, the cable drafted by Mrs. Wilson was sent
nearly a week earlier, on February 13, only one day after Mrs. Wilson’s
memo suggesting that her husband might be willing to look into the Niger
matter. Interestingly the cable states that “both State and DOD have
requested additional clarification [of the Niger-Iraq uranium report] and
indeed, the Vice President’s office just asked for background information
....” The cable was dated and time stamped 132142Z Feb 02, which is
February 13, 2002 at 3:42 pm DC time. If the Vice President’s office “just
asked’ it could not have been before Mrs. Wilson’s e-mailed memo to her
superior suggesting her husband for the Niger inquiry which was sent
February 12, 2002.

Ambassador Wilson’s implicit claim that the question of him traveling
to Niger arose first at the February 19, 2002 meeting is also refuted by an
intelligence memorandum provided to the Vice President on February 14,
2002 that stated that CIA had tasked a clandestine source with ties to the
Nigerien government to seek additional information on the contract. Unless
the CIA provided false information to the Vice President, CIA had already
tasked Ambassador Wilson, the only source the CIA had other than the
foreign liaison service, by the morning of February 14, 2002. In addition,
Mrs. Wilson’s own testimony to the Committee states that she went home
and asked her husband if he would be consider looking into the Niger
reporting. Contrary to Ambassador Wilson’s allegations, the idea of sending
him to Niger had been discussed in and among CIA officers for nearly a
week before the February 19, 2002 meeting.

Ambassador Wilson’s letter to the Committee stated that it is

unfortunate that the Committee failed to include the CIA’s position on this
matter, citing press comments from “a senior CIA official” and “a senior

Page 212 of 226


MORI DocID: 142

ayy

2242

Scope Note
—arrgahtite eames ofthe Director of Policy Planing at the Deparieat of Sate, this

igence Community Assessment (ICA) analyzes the most important political, economic, and

social consequences of regime change in Lraq—in the context of current conditions in the Middle
East and South Asia—for the surrounding region over a five-year period. The region considered
includes Isracl, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Turkey, Syria, fran, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India, and the Arabian Peninsula countries, Sub-state actors are included where
relevant to specific issues. The ICA also puts expected developments in the context of broader,
strategic implications for the United States,

-The analysis is besed on a main scenario incorporating the assumptions below. Insofar
vel from this scenario would create significant altemmate consequences, those effects

are noted throughout the assessment. Some judgments reflect the immediate impact of a war
itself—particularly for regional stability and terrorism—but most deal with longer, post-war
effects,

Saddam Husayn and key regime supporters are ousted as the result of a UN-sanctioned
Coalition military campaign led by the United States in which Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) are eliminated. Israeli military forces do not become overtly involved in

the conflict,

Jraqi territorial integrity remains intact and Iraq retains a defensive capability against its
neighbors, at first through the US presence and then through the recreation of a credible
conventional military force.

A US-backed government is established with a gradual devolution to Iraqi self-governance
during the five-year timeframe. Beginning with a US-led military occupation for at least the
first year, the United States maintains a long-term but declining military presence in Iraq to
ensure stability, assist humanitarian efforts, and aid the development of functioning political
institutions,

UN sanctions are lifted but with some residual Oil-For:Food mechanisms intact to facilitate
aid distribution.

ICA was reviewed in draft by three prominent experts on the history, politics, and

ics of the Middle

consideration in the preparation of this paper.
a ad developments within Iraq following a removal of Saddam are addressed in

04, Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

a

{Their comments were taken into

Page 17 of 226



2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that a prolonged struggle to depose
Saddam and install a new regime would be likely to cause more flight of refugees
and internally displaced persons and to disrupt severely the distribution of food and
health services. The Intelligence Community assessed that the “internal security
situation would affect the humanitarian challenge” and that the impact on
humanitarian needs of a war “would depend on its length and severity.”® On the
topic of refugees, the Intelligence Community reported that a Baghdad-centered
military operation would displace 900,000 persons internally and create 1.45
million refugees.“ Assessments emphasized that the Iraqi population depended
heavily on the rations distributed by the government, and that securing the
government’s food warehouses after the war and implementing a food distribution
system “would be critical to avoiding widespread hunger.”® The civilian
healthcare situation probably “would be severely damaged by the war and
widespread civil strife.”

& Infrastructure

® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that the new
Iraqi government would require significant outside assistance to rebuild
Iraq’s water and sanitation infrastructure. The Intelligence Community
reported that such basic services as electricity and clean water reached less than
half the population prior to the war. The Intelligence Community assessed that the
“difficulty of restoring such services as water and electricity after a war would
depend chiefly on how much destruction was caused by urban combat.”
Assessments noted that “civil strife would cause disruptions in electricity and
water purification or distribution if generators, pumps or plants became damaged,
seized or looted.”* The Intelligence Community noted that “cuts in electricity or
looting of distribution networks could have a cascading disastrous impact on
hospitals at a time when casualty rates are likely to be high.“ Although Iraq’s
infrastructure already had suffered extensive degradation, the Intelligence
Community reported that Iraqis had restored their physical infrastructure quickly
after previous wars.”

NIC: | Challenges, p. 25
NIC: | Challenges, p. 25
@ NIC: ipal Challenges, p. 26
® NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 28
“NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 6

NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 25
“NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 28
* NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 6

a Page 12 of 226


PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT POSTWAR IRAQ

Introduction

(® On February 12, 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
unanimously agreed to expand its inquiry into prewar intelligence with regard to
Iraq. Among the additional areas the Committee agreed to investigate was “prewar
intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq.”' This is the Committee’s report on
that aspect of its inquiry.

(B® This report describes the Committee’s methodology for reviewing prewar
assessments about postwar Iraq, provides brief background on the production of
two principal prewar assessments published in January 2003, summarizes other
intelligence assessments from 2002-2003, and provides the Committee’s
conclusions about the Intelligence Community’s prewar assessments about postwar
Iraq.

Methodology

(BD The Committee reviewed written intelligence assessments concerning
conditions in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein that were published
between April 19, 1999 (shortly after enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act of
1998) and March 19, 2003, the beginning of US combat operations in Iraq. For
purposes of this report, the Committee considered the postwar period to begin with
the removal of Saddam from power in April 2003.

(® Documents provided to the Committee by the Intelligence Community from
this period represented a variety of intelligence assessments. They ranged from
short articles included in the daily publications produced by Intelligence
Community agencies for senior executives, to hard-copy slides from briefing
presentations made by Department of Defense analysts, to fully coordinated, inter-
agency intelligence assessments that were widely disseminated throughout the
federal government. The Intelligence Community provided the Committee with
Bj all-source assessments.

' See press release from U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2004,


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Page 108 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422249

Page 67 of 226


MINORITY VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN BOND
JOINED BY
SENATORS HATCH AND BURR

While not directly related to the subject of the report released today, it
is appropriate here to discuss some additional information that has come to
light about an earlier prewar inquiry report by the Committee in July 2004
called “Phase I” that deals with the Iraq-Niger uranium intelligence. This
section of the Committee report remains one of the most thoroughly
investigated and detailed descriptions of the events and intelligence
surrounding the Iraq-Niger uranium issue. The Committee devoted nearly
50 pages of the report to this section alone, in order to provide all of the
details of the Intelligence Community’s handling of this issue — from
October 2001 when the Intelligence Community produced the first
intelligence report on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal to July 2003 when the
CIA finally produced an assessment that said, “we no longer believe that
there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued uranium from
abroad.”

The vast majority of the Committee’s findings were declassified and
released in the July 2004 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on
the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.
It is important to note that while the Committee’s report was over 500 pages
and covered many issues, the content was reviewed by all members of the
Committee in great detail and was voted out unanimously. Nonetheless,
nearly three years after the report’s release it is apparent that some “experts”
and commentators still seem to misunderstand, or choose to ignore, the basic
facts surrounding this case. Additional information that became public
during the Special Prosecutor’s investigation of the Valerie Wilson leak
case, some of which had not been provided to the Committee during its
investigation, has only reinforced the Committee’s findings.

Part of the continuing public and media misunderstanding of this case
stems, we believe, from a letter sent to the Committee by former
Ambassador Joseph Wilson in July 2004 and subsequently released publicly,

' There are two areas of the Iraq-Niger uranium story which were not covered in the Committee’s inquiry.
The first area was the source of the forged Iraq-Niger uranium deal documents passed to the US
government in October 2002. This issue was being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at
the request of then-Vice Chairman Rockefeller. The second area was the exposure of Valerie Wilson’s
affiliation with the CIA, which was investigated by a special prosecutor.

Page 205 of 226


MORI DocID: 1422242

a

© Syria, Jordan, end Turkey would lose critical spending power, jobs, and trade in non-oil
goods made possible by their current heavily discounted oil imports from Iraq

[ J
. Ree a aera naman OF ges te oes in a lowe

activity throughout the region.

value Ireq would have as a democratic exemplar would rest on the i
‘and success of a new Iraqi government and on the degree to which democracy in
Iraq were seen as developing from within rather than imposed by an outside power.

© The strength of the Iraq example would depend heavily on US success in ensuring that a new
Iraqi government was not'seen in the region as primarily a US creation.

On balance, however, political and economic reform in other regional states would continue
to face significant obstacles and would continue to be influenced as much by conditions,
events, and debates within each country as by the example set by a more liberal and
democratic Iraq.

Page 22 of 226


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Page 141 of 226


and planners operating on short notice would mean that such softer targets as US
citizens overseas would become more inviting for terrorists.”** The Intelligence
Community also noted that al-Qa’ida “would try to take advantage of US attention
on postwar Iraq to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan.”*? The Intelligence
Community assessed that “if al-Qa’ida mobilized significant resources to combat a
US presence in Iraq, it could --at least in the near term-- reduce al-Qa’ida’s overall
capability to strike elsewhere.”TM*

@® Domestic Conflict

® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that Iraq
was a deeply divided society that likely would engage in violent conflict unless
an occupying power prevented it. In January 2003, the Intelligence Community
assessed that “a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a
significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each
other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so.”*> The threat of
Shia reprisals for their oppression under Saddam was a “major concern to the
Sunni elite and could erupt if not prevented by an occupying force.”*® Sunni Arabs
would face possible loss of their longstanding privileged position while Shia would
seek increased power. Although some Sunni who had extensive contact with Shia
in urban life might be open to a representative political system, some reporting
indicated that elements of Sunni society would oppose a regime that did not allow
the Sunnis to continue to prevail in the military security services and government.”
Kurds could try to take advantage of Saddam’s departure by seizing some of the
large northern oilfields, a move that would elicit a forceful response from Sunni
Arabs.* According to the Intelligence Community, “score settling would occur
throughout Iraq between those associated with Saddam’s regime and those who
have suffered the most under it.”” The Intelligence Community assessed that
“underlying causes for violence involve political reprisals more than ethnic or
sectarian division.” *°

* NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14
* NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14
* NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 14
?5 NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5

*® NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20
57NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20

%* NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5

»° NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 5
“NIC: Principal Challenges, p. 20



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CS

(U) Fueling Political Istars
US-led defeat and occupation of

rag, probably would boost proponcnts
of political Islam. Amid feelings of
confusion, despair, and a renewed sense of
victimization, calls by Islamists for the people
of the region to unite and build up defenses
against the West probably would resonate
widely even though Saddam had little popular
support.

© An Iraqi defeat would highlight in the
public mind the incapacity of current Arab
regimes either to challenge the United
States or to cnact meaningful reforms.

¢ Islamists could point to secular Iraq's
downfall as an example of the “mistake”
of straying from Islam. .

© Fear of US domination and a widespread
belief that the US secret agenda was to
make the region safe for Israel probably
would attract more angry young recruits
to political activism and the extremist
ranks.

In some countries, an increase in Islamist
sentiment also probably would take the
form of greater support for Islamic
political parties that seek to come to
power through legitimate means.

(U) How Terrorists Might React

a Iraqi defeat probably would

jighten popular sympathy for some terrorist
objectives in the near-term, increasing the
threat against US officials, facilities, and
businesses that were closely associated with
America and its allies—especially Israel.

® US action in Iraq against one of Islam's
most oil-rich countries would tend to
substantiate in some minds one of al-
Qa’ida’s most effective messages—that
the United States is out to enrich itself at

13

MORI DocID: 1422242

the expense of Muslims. Al-Qa’ida
almost certainly would attempt to portray
the war as pot just against al-Qa'ida or
Saddam but also against Islam as a whole.

e Funds for terrorist groups probably would
increase as a result of Muslim outrage
over US action. Besides direct
contributions, more money would flow
into Istamic charities that could be
skimmed off for terrorist purposes.

© Some militant Islamists in Iraq might
benefit from increases in funding and
popular support and could choose to
conduct terrorist attacks against US forces
in Traq. :
Lone
© Israeli involvement in a war against iraq
would be a lightning rod for increased
terrorist attacks against both Isracl and
Israeli and US interests worldwide.

© Use of violence by competing factions in
Iraq against each other or the United
States—Sunni against Shia; Kurd against
Kurd; Kurd against Arab; any against the
United States—probably also would
encourage terrorist groups to take
advantage of a volatile security
environment to launch attacks within Iraq.

Qa’ida probably would see an

to accelerate its operational
tempo and increase terrorist attacks during
and after a US-Iraq war. The group would be
Jooking for conflict with Iraq and its
aftermath—as with previous wars or crises—
to divert US attention and resources from
counterterrorist efforts; for US ard allied
security measures, particularly around “soft”
targets, to suffer; and for many countries—
including some US allies—to slacken efforts
to hunt down al-Qa’ida and its associates
within their borders.

Page 27 of 226. ____J


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= Pockets of Saddam loyalists will exist throughout the area which will provide safehaven
for senior regime officials and where civil unrest is possible.

= Sunni-Shia conflict/potential breakdown of law and order. Very high potential for Sunni-
Shia violence in Baghdad. Retribution against former regime officials, security forces,
and/or symbols of the former regime.”

The Phase IV IPB briefing assessed that Iraqi Sunnis were not a monolithic
block and that elements of some Sunni tribes had been alienated and marginalized by Saddam.
In discussing Iran’s influence in southern Iraq, the briefing also assessed that this “threat is
probably overstated” and noted that Iraqi Shia are “strongly nationalistic” and “believe in a
single Iraq.”?!

(GERD he Phase IV IPB noted the potential for a breakdown of law and order in
each geographic region of Iraq, that there were large mixed Sunni-Shia populations in Baghdad,
Ramadi, Samarra, and Baqubah, and that "widespread conflict in Baghdad could incite/provoke
violence in other areas" of Iraq. 7

The summary of the Phase IV IPB noted that “numerous HUMINT reports
from credible Iraqis and other Arab sources state that US military or civilian control of the Iraq
government will not be palatable to the population” and that “military occupation will not
sell...”** The summary also highlighted that the “requirement to create and sustain a safe, secure
and stable environment to support reconstruction must be received within the Iraqi population as
legitimate...”

The summary of the Phase IV IPB included several conclusions which
outlined “dos” and “don’ts” including:
Do:
= Obtain an international mandate that delivers a message of legitimacy to Iraqi population;
= Have Iraqi representation as soon as possible;
«Preserve and reform Iraq’s governmental ministries;
--Screen out Ba’ath Party leadership
* Establish internal security and safe borders and institute the rule of law;
= Rapidly engage the Iraqi military in the reconstruction effort;
= Leverage well-rooted police and judiciary systems, which could promote good
governance once stripped of their Ba'athist leadership.
"Build a central representative government that empowers local ethnic, tribal and religious
leaders while encouraging them to support Baghdad’s authorities.
" Be extremely sensitive to Shia holy sites in Karbala and Najaf.

20 iid, pp. 42
TM Ibid, p. 49

22 Ibid, p. 39

3 Ibid, p. 53

* Tid, p. 54

* Tid, p. 57-58

Page 96 of 226


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Page 138 of 226


MORI DocID:

Bose]

‘The National Intelligence Council

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages the Intelligence
Community's estimative process, incorporating the best available
expertise inside and outside the government. It reports to the
Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the US
Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive
issues for the Community as a whole.

Acting Chairman Stuart A. Cohen

Vice Chairman for Evaluation Mark Lowenthal

Acting Director, Senios Review, Willlam R. Heston

Production, and Analysis

ation

Atica Robert Houdek

At-Large Stuart A. Cohen

Conventional Military Issues John Landry

East Asia ‘Asthar Brown

Economics & Global Issues Karen Monaghan,
Acting

Furope Mark Schwendler,
Acting

Latin America Fukon T. Armstrong,

Near East and South Asia Paul R. Pillar

Russia and Eurasia George Kot

Science & Technology Lawrence K. Gershwin

Strategic & Nuclear Programs Robert D Walpole

Warning Robert Vickers

Unclassified

1422249

Page 89 of 226



In his letter to the Committee, Ambassador Wilson cited several
examples from the Committee’s report which he said contradict a conclusion
on the additional views that, for most intelligence analysts, his findings lent
more credibility, not less, to the original Niger-Iraq uranium reporting.
While nearly all of the citations in his letter are correctly noted as instances
in which the CIA did not use the uranium reporting or said the reporting was
not key to Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, Ambassador Wilson is wrong in two
respects. First, the conclusion that his findings lent more credibility to the
Niger-Iraq uranium reporting was a unanimous conclusion of the entire
Committee, not just in Republican additional views. Second, he is mistaken
in ascribing a correlation between these instances and his own findings. In
fact, none of these instances had anything to do with Ambassador Wilson’s
findings in Niger. The INR analysts he cited believed the Niger-Iraq
uranium reporting was unlikely to be true before Ambassador Wilson went
on this trip. The CIA NESA analysts were not the CIA’s primary Iraq
WMD analysts and knew very little about the Niger reporting at all. Their
assessments did not discount the reporting, they simply did not include it.
Most of the other instances Ambassador Wilson cited, including CIA
testimony to Congress and the DCI’s caution against the President using the
information in the Cincinnati speech, were based on a misunderstanding
within the CIA. This misunderstanding was explained in the Committee’s
unanimous conclusions.

Ambassador Wilson also neglected to mention in his letter that the
Intelligence Community used or cleared the Niger-Iraq uranium intelligence
fifteen times before the President’s State of the Union address and four times
after, saying in several papers that Iraq was “vigorously pursuing uranium
from Africa.” As late as March 2003, even after the IAEA found that the
documents themselves were “not authentic,” and while noting that the CIA
had questions about some specific claims in the original intelligence
reporting, the CIA still reported that, “we are concerned that these reports
may indicate Baghdad has attempted to secure an unreported source of
uranium yellowcake for a nuclear weapons program.”

It was not until April 5, 2003 that the National Intelligence Council
issued an Intelligence Community assessment finally saying, “we judge it
highly unlikely that Niamey has sold uranium yellowcake to Baghdad in
recent years.” It was not until June 17, 2003 that the CIA produced an

* Several press stories have claimed that similar language appeared in a National Intelligence Council
(NIC) assessment, from the Africa National Intelligence Officer (NIO) in January 2003 prior to the State of

Page 217 of 226


I am troubled that, even after analysis was removed from the report in
an effort to forge unanimous support, a significant portion of the
Committee’s members did not support the final product.

Quality and Accuracy of Intelligence

In the 26 months since its February 12, 2004 decision to write this
report, the Committee has reviewed scores of prewar assessments on
postwar Iraq and conducted numerous interviews with intelligence officials,
analysts, and customers. Separately, elements of the IC have produced
hundreds, if not thousands, of reports on the security and stability of post-
war Iraq. In short, the Committee has ample information available to draw
upon in order to make conclusions about the quality and accuracy of the
prewar assessments about postwar Iraq.

Therefore, the first conclusion I submit in these additional views has
to do with the accuracy of prewar assessments and the quality of the
underlying intelligence tradecraft.

Additional Conclusion 1: Quality and Accuracy of Analysis

The Intelligence Community produced and disseminated numerous
assessments and predictions on the postwar environment prior to Operation
Iraqi Freedom, both in response to requests from across the U.S.
Government and at its own initiative. These prewar assessments generally
followed sound tradecraft and provided important and timely warnings about
the difficulties in the postwar period of establishing a cohesive, democratic
government and of avoiding significant levels of violence in Iraqi society.
To a large extent, these assessments were borne out in actual postwar
developments, as described by the December 2006 Iraq Study Group Report
and the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate — in striking contrast to
what the Committee found when comparing prewar analysis of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction with postwar findings.

I fully agreed with the Committee’s first Iraq intelligence report, in
which we found that the WMD intelligence was both bad and wrong. That
is, it was the result of flawed intelligence analytic tradecraft (bad) and also
reached the wrong conclusions — that Saddam had and was developing

Page 191 of 226


(BD Political Islam

® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that the
United States’ defeat and occupation of Iraq probably would result in a surge
of political Islam and increased funding for terrorist groups. In January 2003,
the Intelligence Community assessed that a “US-led defeat and occupation of Arab
Iraq probably would boost proponents of political Islam”! and would result in
“calls from Islamists for the people of the region to unite and build up defenses
against the West.” Assessments concluded that “funds for terrorist groups
probably would increase as a result of Muslim outrage over US action.” The
Intelligence Community also underscored that “in some countries an increase in
Islamist sentiment also probably would take the form of greater support for Islamic
political parties that seek to come to power through legitimate means.”

@® Influence of Iraq’s Neighbors

The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that Iraq’s
neighbors would jockey for influence in Iraq, with activities ranging from
humanitarian reconstruction assistance to fomenting strife among Iraq’s
ethnic and sectarian groups. In January 2003, the Intelligence Community
assessed that the objective of most Middle Eastern states regarding a post-Saddam
Iraq would be for the territorial integrity of Iraq to remain intact and for a new
regime to become neither a source of regional instability nor dominant in the
region. The Intelligence Community assessed that Iraq’s immediate neighbors
would have the greatest stakes in protecting their interests and would be most
likely to pose challenges for US goals in post-Saddam Iraq.

@® The Intelligence Community assessed prior to the war that Iranian
leaders would try to influence the shape of post-Saddam Iraq to preserve
Iranian security and demonstrate that Iran is an important regional actor. In
January 2003, the Intelligence Community assessed that “the degree to which Iran
would pursue policies that either support or undermine U.S. goals in Iraq would
depend on how Tehran viewed specific threats to its interests and the potential US
reaction.”* The Intelligence Community assessed that the “more that Iranian
leaders perceived that Washington’s aims did not challenge Tehran’s interests or
threaten Iran directly, the better the chance that they would cooperate in the post-
war period, or at least not actively undermine US goals.” The Intelligence

“'NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
an gional Consequences, p. 13
“ NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
“NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 13
“NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 16
“NIC: Regional Consequences, p. 18



intelligence collection priority compared to more prominent issues such as Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction, conventional military capabilities, and leadership dynamics.”"*

(HEED The lengthy March 2003 CIA report on the senior military officer corps, The Iraqi
Senior Officer Corps: Shaped by Pride, Prejudice, Patrimony, and Fear, discussed the Sunni
Arab dominance of the Iraqi officer corps and an extensive security oversight system that
“traditionally emphasizes loyalty over competence.” It assessed that these factors “limit military
effectiveness and pose challenges for rebuilding the military after Saddam.” The report also
assessed that “reforming the officer corps and restructuring the armed forces into a force for
national cohesion will be key to the stability of a post-Saddam Iraq.” The report included
thumbnail biographies f [Eq Iraqi senior officers s

(HE On March 18, 2003, the Joint Intelligence Task Force - Combating Terrorism (JITF-
CT) released a Special Analysis, Jran: Prospects for a Post-Saddam Iraq, that assessed that
“Tehran seeks to influence future developments in a post-Saddam Iraq and accepts the short-term
benefits of OPLAN 1003, namely, the ousting of President Saddam Hussein. However, the
Iranians will not hesitate to turn against a long-term US presence [in Iraq] by encouraging
surrogate elements to launch terrorist operations against US and/or coalition forces in Iraq.”’°

On March 1, 2003, the intelligence
organization for US Central Command produced a briefing presentation entitled Phase IV IPB."”
The intelligence briefing consisted of 59 slides, which provided analysis on the demographics
and government bureaucracy of Iraq, the status of the infrastructure, sources of potential conflict
and regional views."*

The Phase IV IPB briefing juxtaposed
intelligence assessments with Coalition military plans. For example, a briefing slide entitled
“Challenges to Rebuilding Infrastructure” noted that “coalition forces will not target civilian
infrastructure such as electric power, medical, dams, roads/bridges and water control” and
assessed that the Iraqi civilian and industrial sectors had suffered twelve years of neglect.”

(RD Whe Phase 1V IPB briefing included a slide explaining “What to Expect
After Regime Change” in the Baghdad area which noted the following:
= Continued armed opposition to Coalition forces unlikely once Saddam flees or is
captured/killed.
= Most loyal tribesman will cease fighting for the regime once the outcome becomes
apparent.

'* CIA, Iraq's Civilian Police Force and Judicial System, February 25, 2003, pp. i- ii.

'° CIA, Iraqi Senior Officer Corps: Shaped by Pride, Prejudice, Patrimony, and Fear, 18 March 2003, p. iii.

'S DIA/JITF-CT, Iran: Prospects for a Post-Saddam Iraq, March 13, 2003. p. 1

‘7 “IPB” is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as “intelligence preparation of the battlespace” in Joint
Publication 1-02 “DOD Dictionary and Associated Terms.”

'® United States Central Command, Phase IV IPB, as of March 1, 2003.

? Ibid, pp. 12

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Page 185 of 226


power facilities, the contamination of food supplies and other potential environmental
devastation.”

® Another NIE produced in October 2002, Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass
Destruction, also did not address the postwar period, but assessments concerning stockpiles of
biological and chemical weapons had relevance to the postwar period.

(HEED) Also in October 2002, the CIA produced three intelligence assessments and a summary
of a simulation exercise on challenges for post-Saddam US policy. On October 18, 2002, the
CIA disseminated, Iraq: The Day After. The report was intended to be “a first look at the
possible broad contours of the Iraqi domestic, political, and regional scene in the immediate
aftermath of a military overthrow of Saddam Husayn.”' The report noted that there were
numerous political scenarios for post-Saddam Iraq and that what scenario prevailed would
“depend largely on US decisions and actions,” The authors stated “we have chosen to focus on
the prime concerns of the major players — both Iraqi and external — which will endure under any
post-Saddam scenario.” *

(GRD The report discussed the attitudes of Iraqi internal and external players in the context of
issues that included: the ouster of Saddam by the US or a Sunni coup; score-settling and war
crimes trials; not possessing a dominant role in the new political order and seeing the external
opposition obtain one; maintaining the territorial unity of Iraq; the introduction of democracy;
the removal of weapons of mass destruction and compliance with UN Security Council
resolutions; military reorganization; and short-term economic goals and expectations. The report
assessed that: the Sunnis would have the most to lose with Saddam’s ouster; the Shia would
celebrate Saddam’s ouster as an opportunity to right what they see as a grave historical injustice;
most Shia would conclude that a secular and democratic Iraq served their interests and the Kurds
would seek to formalize their autonomy, freedom and relative prosperity.””

(iy With respect to the role of the Ba’th Party in post-Saddam Iraq, the CIA’s Irag: The
Day After report assessed that because “it has lost its power base and stands for little else than
‘Saddamism,’ we expect the Ba’th party to collapse with the regime.” The report also assessed
that “Despite the improbability that Ba’th ideology will persist after Saddam, much of the
infrastructure of the party within civilian sectors, such as professional and civil associations, may
survive to facilitate a restoration of government services.” The report noted that “most Iraqis
join [the Ba’th party] to get ahead” and the party “lacks ideological coherence or organizational
autonomy.’”*

(HE) In rag: The Day After, the CIA discussed the various Iraqi military and security services
and noted that “many troops must be quickly disarmed and demobilized to remove a potential
focal point for Sunni coup plotting.” The report said “certain units are so dominated by Tikriti

“° NIC, Saddam’s Preparations for War: Intentions and Capabilities, October 2002, p i
“CIA: Iraq: The Day After, October 18, 2002, p. i, ii.

*® Ibid, p.i

* Yhid, p. i, ii.

* Ibid, p. |

Page 100 of 226


VTC, another analyst from the CIA’s Office of Near East and South Asia
(NESA) prepared consolidated agency comments on the white paper to send
to the British. Based on his understanding of the WINPAC analyst’s
comments, the NESA analyst wrote “recommend deleting sentence on
‘compelling evidence that Iraq has sought the supply of uranium from
Africa’. .. we don’t view this reporting as credible.” The WINPAC analyst
told Committee staff, however, that these were never his comments.
Documentation also shows that immediately after these comments were
passed to the British, the WINPAC analyst denied saying that the Iraq-Niger
reporting was not credible. The analyst said he suggested that the British not
include the reporting on the Niger deal because it was unconfirmed and was
not the strongest evidence of reconstitution.

The Committee believes that in attempting to summarize the
WINPAC analyst’s comments, the NESA analyst said the reporting was not
viewed as credible, but that this was a misinterpretation of the WINPAC
analyst’s comments. Neither this analyst nor any other CIA Iraq analysts
who had analyzed the Niger uranium reporting told Committee staff that at
the time they coordinated the British white paper they viewed the reporting
as not credible. In fact, each of these analysts told Committee staff that until
at least March 2003 they believed that Iraq was seeking uranium from
Africa.

The misinterpretation of the WINPAC analyst’s comments led to
inconsistencies in the CIA’s message to policymakers on the Iraq-Niger
uranium issue throughout the fall of 2002 and into early 2003. Intelligence
Community officials who were provided with information from the NESA
analyst told policymakers that the reporting was not credible. For example,
at a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on October 2, 2002 the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence testified that “the one thing where I
think [the British] stretched a little bit beyond where we would stretch is on
the points about Iraq seeking uranium from various African locations.
We've looked at those reports and we don’t think they are very credible.”
The NESA analyst who misinterpreted the WINPAC analyst’s comments
prepared the DDCI for the hearing. The CIA told the Committee that this
analyst believes he was also the analyst who raised concerns about the Iraq-
Niger uranium reporting being used in the President’s Cincinnati speech and
that it was his comments that led the DCI to call the National Security
Council (NSC) and suggest that the uranium reference be removed. This
analyst had not performed an analysis of the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting

Page 221 of 226


select certain judgments from the two ICAs to discuss in the conclusions, it
was equally important to discuss any issues that the Intelligence Community
did not highlight as a potential challenge in postwar Iraq. The insurgency is
one such issue. Considering that an insurgency has become a major
development in post-war Iraq, it was important to note the scarcity of its
appearance in pre-war assessments.

While the last line on the last page of the Intelligence assessment,
Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, noted that “rogue ex-regime
elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act
independently to wage guerilla warfare against the new government or
Coalition forces,” this was not discussed in any further detail, was not
highlighted in either ICA and was not included among the six pages of key
judgments in the two papers. If the Intelligence Community had meant to
foreshadow or point to an insurgency anywhere near the scale of what we
observe today in Iraq, then not only would they have included this point as a
key judgment, they would have highlighted it as the first key judgment.

Our interest in a conclusion outlining this issue was not to suggest that
the Intelligence Community failed or that an insurgency was even
foreseeable, rather it was to ensure that the Committee not did distort the
picture of what was presented to policymakers in 2003 by highlighting only
those Intelligence Community assessments that have occurred in postwar
Traq.

To the extent that Intelligence Community assessments concerning
post-war Iraq were accurate, they were certainly not a “crystal ball.” Many
of the warnings lacked detail or specificity that would have guided
policymakers and military planners. For example, in terms of how Iraqis
would react to a coalition invasion of Iraq, the Intelligence Community’s
assessments ranged from judgments stating that segments of Iraqi society
(particularly the Shia) would welcome the intervention, to ambivalence, to
non-violent opposition, to some level of violent opposition. Most
assessments warned that a “long” or “prolonged” occupation of Iraq would
have a negative effect on Iraqi attitudes toward the Coalition, but few of
them defined even broadly what "long" or "prolonged" meant.

It is also important to keep in mind those Intelligence Community

assessments produced before the war which did not discuss or warn. No
assessments described the possibility of the use of Improvised Explosive

Page 199 of 226


Additional Views of Senator Dianne Feinstein

I voted to support the Phase II report, “Prewar intelligence
assessments about postwar Iraq” for what it contains. Unfortunately, what
the report does not contain is even more important. | believe that the report
could have, and should have, been much stronger and more direct on the
quality and use of prewar intelligence.

In particular, the report should have included a conclusion that the
quality of the prewar assessments was generally high and that many of the
predictions made by the Intelligence Community (IC) about postwar Iraq
proved to be correct. There should also have been a conclusion that
although policymakers had access to these assessments — as well as
additional assessments conducted during the combat phase of the war and
immediate aftermath — they failed to take steps to prevent or lessen postwar
challenges.

What the Report Says

The primary value that this report adds is that it releases declassified
versions of the two coordinated intelligence assessments conducted before
the March 19, 2003, invasion of Iraq (these Intelligence Community
Assessments, or ICAs, are Appendices A and B to the Committee’s report).
Readers will be able to determine for themselves whether the Intelligence
Community provided reasonable and accurate predictions of the postwar
situation and, more importantly, warnings about the challenges that lay
ahead. Coupled with the distribution lists for the ICAs, contained in
Appendix D, the public will be able to understand how policymakers at the
White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department who received the
ICAs incorporated (or failed to incorporate) the intelligence into their
postwar plans.

The “conclusions” presented in the report only serve to summarize the
judgments made in the two ICAs. The Committee, in fact, has not done any
analysis or concluded anything. This is in stark contrast to the July 2004
“Phase I” report and the two prior Phase II reports in which the Committee
studied the facts and rendered its own judgments.

Page 190 of 226


Regional Consequences of Riepime Change in aq t
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MORI DocID: 1422249

Dees

jraq: Comparative Social Indicators Table

Cy 20
Popuiation growth rate, 1991-2001 (average annual 20 oy) 10 ast
Dercent)
Urban population, 2000 (percent of total population) 7 2 45 98 n
‘Total tertiity rate, 2001 (births per woman) 48 20 at 32 24
Life expectancy at birth, 2001 (years) oo” oe” 7] 78 7
Infant mortality, 2001 (per 1,000 live births) a sz 60 1 7
Literacy rate, 2000 (percent) Ww 55 82 100
Enrollment rates (percern)? aM
Primary 88 98 104 7 102
‘Secondary a 7 73 w
Post-secondary 12 8 20 9 8
bin siotad (8
‘GDP per capita, 2001 (thousand US §}* 2475 | 6,904 | 3,621 | 14,708 | 35,100

“Figure ia average for 1996-2001.

“Estimate,

$1000 Sgure as reported tothe UN by the Stataical Center of ran,

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208 group which corresponds to a specific level of education. Data vary rom 1996 t0 1967.
12000 purchesing power party rates.

‘Sources: US Census Bureau and the UN, encept as noted.

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MORI DocID: 1422249

Page 69 of 226



“end” of the war, in reality, the war is not over and events in Iraq, as
well as our understanding of those events, continue to evolve. It will
likely be many years before we know the end result of several of these
issues.

We were also concerned that the conclusions highlighted only certain
issues from two ICAs, Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq and
Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq. By selecting only those
issues for the conclusions that seem to be important now, the conclusions
distort the picture of what was presented to policymakers in 2003, creating
the impression that the issues in the conclusions were the exact issues which
policymakers should have focused on in the prewar period. In reality,
policymakers would have had to sift through many Intelligence Community
assessments that now seem irrelevant to pick out what we now know is
important. We believe Roberta Wohlstetter’s account of Pearl Harbor offers
insight into this analogous post-war intelligence assessing when she writes:

“It is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the
irrelevant signals. After the event, of course, a signal is always crystal
clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling since the disaster
has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with
conflicting meanings. It comes to the observer embedded in an
atmosphere of ‘noise,’ i.e., in the company of all sorts of information
that is useless and irrelevant for predicting the particular disaster.”
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 387.

While we knew that finding areas of agreement on such conclusions
would be difficult, we believed that the Committee had an obligation to
work to find areas in which we could offer something meaningful. Although
we attempted to accommodate the majority as much as possible in order to
ultimately vote for this report, enough of what we communicated as our
"redline" issues were not adequately addressed to the point of our being able
to vote in support of the report. Two of the more significant issues are as
follows:

Insurgency
The Committee refused to include a conclusion that said the

Intelligence Community did not highlight an insurgency as a potential
challenge in postwar Iraq. We believe that if the Committee intended to

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MORI

Intelligence Community Assessment

Regional Consequences

of Regime Change in Iraq

DocID: 1422242

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BO 12958 1.4(c)<25¥rs
ZO 12958 1.4(d)<25¥rs

ICA 2003-03
January 2003

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2007

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Don’t: 6

= Accept an end state that removes Saddam and leaves other Bathists in power;

= Devolve power based exclusively on ethnicity, tribe or religion as it will undoubtedly fuel
separatist movements and ethnic violence;

= Create any appearance of occupying Iraq.

Intelligence Assessments of Jan 2003
= On January 28, 2003, the CIA disseminated a report on Iraq military reconstruction. The

report, /raq: Salvaging Sovereignty, Security, and Honor, An Iraqi View of Rebuilding the Post-
Saddam Military, while focused on issues such as “force structure, demobilization, force
integration, and rearmament issues,” discussed the “nationalist or communal sentiments” that
would underlie “strongly independent” Iraqi views on these issues. According to the report,
these military reconstruction issues “will pose significant challenges because of differences
among the Iraqis and between the Iraqis and the United States.” The report found “Iraqis are
likely to resort to obstructionism, resistance, and armed opposition if they perceive Washington
is attempting to keep them dependent on the West.’””

fy In January 2003, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department
published a short summary of a seminar attended by one of its analysts on the Iraqi Shia with a
Middle East historian and a “fairly independent” Iraqi oppositionist. According to INR, the two
discussed that “although the first few weeks of conflict may go well militarily, there will be
many pitfalls after that — for which the United States can expect to be blamed.”*

(HD) In January 2003, the CIA assembled a panel of non-government experts to address
issues pertaining to democratization in Iraq and summarized their views in Boosting Prospects
for Iraqi Democracy. According to the experts, prospects for “democratic stability in post-
Saddam Iraq are limited for the next two years, but a US-led coalition could lay the groundwork
for a consolidated democracy in five to 10 years out,” and “Iraq has a skilled technical cadre,
viable institutions, oil reserves, and other resources for an effective and legitimate government.”
The panel noted that Iraqis would accept help from the United States, United Nations, and
European Union, but would view Arab, Turkish, and Iranian involvement as a threat. The
experts noted that establishing internal security and safe borders would allay Iraqi fears that the
country will plunge into chaos.”

Intelligence Assessments in December 2002
= The December report, Jraq Demographic Pressures Challenge Post-Saddam Stability,

took the long view on Iraq’s ethnic and religious divisions. The report noted that Iraq’s greatest
tisks for sudden and violent conflict existed “where Kurd and Arab areas meet, and in southern
Iraq, including Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad, where long-repressed Shia citizens could lash

* Ibid, p. 59-60

*" CIA, Salvaging Sovereignty, Security, and Honor, An Iraqi View of Rebuilding the Post-Saddam Military, January
28, 2003, pp. i- ii,

25 INR, Iraq: Thoughts on the Shia...and Other Issues, January 24, 2003

CIA, Boosting Prospects for Iraqi Democracy, January 30, 2003, p. i

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MORI DocID: 1422242

Key Judgments

Regional Consequences of Regime
Change in Iraq

repercussions within the Middle East and South Asia of ousting Saddam
through military force would depend not only on the length and course of the war
post-war developments within Iraq but also on pre-existing conditions in the region.
‘These conditions include generally closed political systems, unfavorable economic and
demographic trends, significant support for radical Islamist groups and ideologies, and
widespread opposition to US policies particularly regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict—and
suspicion of US motives in the region.

Ceeamalh US-ed war sgainat Iraq wonld precipitate immediate popalar ant-US
in many countries in the region, but local security forces probably
be able to contain such disturbances. . se

© A drawn-out war with numerous civilian casualties probably would produce more severe
unrest than a quick and less bloody conflict.

© The long-term presence of US troops in Iraq would be a target of future potentially violent
demonstrations, fueled by perceptions that the United States was seeking to dominate the
region and its resources and was hostile to Arab and Mustim interests.

@ Although Saddam is unpopular with many Arabs, most do not wish to see a US niilitary
campaign against Iraq. Clear evidence that the Iraqi people welcomed the United States as a
liberator, however, would help to dissipate public anger in the region, as would reduced
Isracli-Palestinian violence and greater US engagement toward a resolution of the Arab-
Isracli conflict,

Creal Used war against and occupation of Iraq woukd boost political ntam and
popular sympathy for some terrorist objectives, at least in the short term.

© A heightened terrorist threat resulting from a war with Iraq, after an initial spike, probably
would decline slowly over the subsequent three to five years. Regime change in Iraq would
be unlikely to affect Palestinian terrorism significantly.

¢ For many Arabs and Muslims, however, an Iraqi defeat would be a jarring event that would
highlight the inability of existing regimes to stand up to US power.

del

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— -_ —— SS

MORI DocID: 1422242

Cerca 20m democratic regime in Iraq |A post-Saddam Iraq also might serve

‘Could encourage civil society activists in ‘a5 a haven for dissident Shia clerics opposed

Syria but also probably would stiffen regime to the principle of clerical rule. Najaf and |
resistance to reform. The Asad regime Karbala in Iraq are traditional seats of Shia

probably would view the example of a Islamic scholarship to which dissident [ranian

democratic regime in Iraq as a potential threat =—_clerics could move—as did Ayatollah

to authoritarian rule in Syria, Syrian officials Khomeini prior to the 1979 revolution—to
Privately would be concemed that removing continue teaching and organizing outside Iran.
Saddam could lead to instability in Iraq and
increased demands for autonomy from
minority groups in neighboring states,
including the Kurds in Syria.

The country where regime change in

‘Would have the best chance to tip the
political balance in favor of reform is Iran as
both reformers and hardliners would probe for

advantages.

© A quick and decisive Coalition victory in
Trag most likely would strengthen the
hand of reformers favoring engagement
and democracy-building at home as the
most effective way to forestall a US
attack.

© A prolonged and destructive war in Iraq
Probably would intensify the Iranian
political divide, Hardliners could use the
pretext of a potential US invasion to crack
down and impose a state of emergency,
tightening theocratic rule.

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APPENDIX C: Overview of Other Intelligence Assessments on Postwar Iraq

{U) In addition to the Intelligence Community Assessments (Appendices A and B), individual
agencies within the Intelligence Community produced more narrowly focused assessments in
2002 and early 2003 about postwar Iraq. This section of the report briefly summarizes the
assessments and briefing presentations.

Intelligence Assessments in February and March 2003

= In February and March 2003, the CIA published two reports examining the issues of
rapid military success in Iraq and the post-Saddam consequences for US military forces. The
first, rag: Potential Risks and Burdens in Coalition Rear Areas, Issues for US Forces Operating
Behind Lead US Maneuver Elements, assessed that “civil unrest, humanitarian burdens, and
lingering military threats could pose challenges for the relatively small US military forces
initially available in southern Iraq as the US main effort focuses on reaching Baghdad.”

(GED Humanitarian problems “would be exacerbated by the extent to which a power and
security vacuum develops in the south.”? These could include “looting, banditry, and difficulties
in providing food, water, medical assistance, and other services.”? The report also pointed out
“up to 4.5 million urban dwellers — about half the population of the south, probably would need
food and water beginning after about one month [after US forces began operating in Iraq]” and
that these and other humanitarian problems “could contribute to a severe economic breakdown in
Southern Iraq.”*

(GRR) The CIA retumed to these issues in the March 2003 report entitled, rag:
Consequences of a Rapid Coalition Victory, that assessed that a quick collapse of Saddam’s
regime “might prompt Iraqis to question the need — or justification ~ for a US occupation.” The
report pointed out that rapid military victory “especially in the case of regime collapse rather
than defeat” would probably leave Sunni control of major Iraqi institutions in place. Despite a
shortened conflict, “humanitarian conditions in many parts of Iraq could rapidly deteriorate in a
matter of days.” The report assessed that “many Iraqis probably would not understand that the
coalition wartime logistic pipeline requires time to reorient its mission to humanitarian aid.”>

HEM) The DIA issued a lengthy report, Astitudes of Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis in a Post-Saddam
Iraq, in March 2003 that discussed how “assessing the basic attitudes of the three main
ethnoreligious sectors in Iraq is fundamental to understanding the Iraqi political landscape
following a successful overthrow of Saddam Husayn’s regime.” At the beginning of the report, a
separate text box noted intelligence gaps on Iraqi attitudes. It stated that while a large body of
information was available about Kurdish views, little information was available for Sunnis and

iA: Jraq: Potential Risks and Burdens in Coalition Rear Areas, February 3, 2003, p. i
Ibid, p. i

* Ibid, p. i

* Thid, p. 2, 4.

5 CIA, frag: Consequences of a Rapid Coalition Victory, March 10, 2003, p. 1 - 2.

§ DIA, Attitudes of Kurds, Shia, and Sunnis in a Post-Saddam Iraq, March 2003, pp. 1 - 2

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MORI DocID: 1422242

) Kurdish-Inhabited Areas

Tr Coreg Corner TEEMAN (RIND) FD

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National
Intelligence
Council

ICA 2003-03

| Regional Consequences
of Regime Change in Iraq

C rrperes under the exspices of Paul R. Pillar,
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia.

canna ening

a

MORI DocID: 1422242

January 2003

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MORI DocID: 1422249

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Contrary to these claims, then-Ambassador to Niger Barbro Owens-
Kirkpatrick wrote a cable to State Department headquarters which said that
the CIA report of a Niger-Iraq uranium deal “provides sufficient details to
warrant another hard look at Niger’s uranium sales.” The cable reported that
the Ambassador sought an unequivocal assurance from the Nigerien
government that Niger would not sell uranium to rogue states. The cable
noted that in September 2001 the Nigerien Prime Minister told embassy
officials that “there were buyers like Iraq who would pay more for Niger’s
uranium than France,” but added “of course Niger cannot sell to them.” The
Ambassador told the prime minister that such a sale would be wrong and
disastrous for Niger’s relations with the US. The cable said in a meeting on
the 19", Nigerien officials did not raise the issue or provide the requested
assurances. The cable concluded by noting that despite past assurances from
the Nigerien president that no uranium would be sold to rogue nations, “we
should not dismiss out of hand the possibility that some scheme could be, or
has been, underway to supply Iraq with yellowcake from here" (p. 40). The
cable said that while “it would seem politically suicidal for [the Prime
Minister] to embark on a risky venture like uranium sales to Iraq” and
“would seem out of character” for the Nigerien president, “we must make
sure.”

General Fulford did not undertake an inquiry into the Iraq-Niger
uranium matter at all. He was encouraged by Ambassador Owens-
Kirkpatrick to use a previously scheduled refueling stop to raise the general
issue of ensuring the peaceful use of Niger’s uranium with the Nigerien
President. The embassy reported on February 24, 2002, that at a meeting the
same day, the Nigerien President told the Ambassador and General Fulford
that Niger’s goal was to keep its uranium in safe hands. General Fulford
extended an offer on behalf of the US government to work with Niger to
ensure its uranium was used for peaceful purposes only and did not fall into
the wrong hands. The Nigerien President told General Fulford that “Niger’s
uranium is secure for the moment” and asked for unspecified US help to
ensure its safety.

Neither of these reports resolved the question of whether Iraq was
seeking uranium from Niger and neither discounted the reporting. In fact,
Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick’s first cable raises, more than discounts,
concern about the potential deal noting that “we should not dismiss out of
hand the possibility that some scheme could be, or has been, underway” and

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(® In addition to reviewing written intelligence reports, Committee staff also
interviewed members of the Intelligence Community, and officials in the State
Department, Defense Department, and Coalition Provisional Authority.

Background

® The Intelligence Community faced a challenging task in attempting to assess
likely trends, challenges and events in post-war Iraq for three primary reasons.
First, the requirement for intelligence assessments about the postwar environment
represented a relatively small portion of the work on Iraq produced by Intelligence
Community analysts during 2002 and 2003. The majority of assessments relating
to Iraq focused on Saddam’s connections to terrorism, the threat from weapons of
mass destruction, and the capabilities of the Iraqi military. The National
Intelligence Council (NIC), for example, produced a significant National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in October 2002 in response to a request from the
Director of Central Intelligence for an examination of Saddam’s near-term military
objectives, strategy, and capabilities in a war against the US and Coalition forces.?
The NIC also produced an NIE about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. The
CIA’s Iraq analysts, according to one study, responded to “an average of 300
policymaker tasks per month in the lead up to and during” major offensive military
operations.’

(® Second, the predictive nature of the assessments about postwar Iraq meant that
analysts had little intelligence collection upon which to base their judgments.
Current and former intelligence officials told the Committee that intelligence
reporting did not play a significant role in developing assessments about postwar
Iraq because it was not an issue that was well-suited to intelligence collection.
Accordingly, most prewar assessments cite relatively few intelligence sources.
Analysts based their judgments primarily on regional and country expertise,
historical evidence and analytic tradecraft.* Overall, the assessments appropriately
qualified the scope and basis for their judgments.

WD Third, analysts recognized that the policies and actions implemented on the
ground in Iraq would make US and Coalition forces the “dominant influence” on
the postwar environment in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the invasion.’
Essentially, the task of assessing the postwar environment in Iraq was complicated
by the fact that the manner in which the main political, economic, humanitarian,

NIC: Saddam's Preparation for War: Intentions and Capabilities, October 2002,

? Memo to the Director of Central Intelligence, Lessons Learned, {from Military Operations in Iraq, February 1, 2005.
* This report does not examine the quantity or quality of the intelligence sources underlying the intelligence
assessments on postwar Iraq.

*NIC: Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, January 2003, Scope Note.


MORI DocID:

1422249

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ee]

MORI DocID: 1422242 -_———

|syria. ‘The installation of a US-

Tegime in Baghdad probably would
cause Syria to reassess but not significantly
alter its core security policies and posture
toward the United States, President Bashar
al-Asad might moderate Syrian foreign policy
somewhat if he assessed that such a change
would help his regime retain power and make
gains vis-&-vis the United States and Israel.

© Damascus probably would step up
cooperation with Iran to enhance its
ability to influence events in Iraq and
maintain pressure on Israel from Lebanon
as a reminder to Washington that it
retained options if Syria perceived no
movement on its regional objectives,
especially the return of the Golan.

© Syria’s cooperation with the United States
against al-Qa'ida probably would
continue, Syria views the counter-terror
relationship as an important means of
garncring US goodwill and would seek to
preserve this avenue of communication
unless Damascus concluded that it might
become a target of US military operations.

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out against governmental, Ba’th Party, and security officials.” It noted that “Iraq’s origins have
led to a country composed of competing and often mutually antagonistic ethnic, religious, and
tribal groups” and assessed that these “crosscutting ethnic and religious cleavages are likely to
lead to violence as Saddam Husyan’s regime begins to fall, challenging the administration of a
post-Saddam Traq.”? '

(GD The report noted that “an unknown and possibly sizable portion of the population may
be hostile to the United States and its allies and would resist suggestions for restructuring the
government” 2 because more than 70 percent of the country had been born or reached adulthood
since the first Gulf War, and had been inundated with anti-American propaganda. The report
assessed that Iraq, with unemployment or underemployment reported at 50 percent, would need
to create 240,000 new jobs each year for five years to accommodate the growing labor force.

(HERBS In mid-December 2002, the NIC, the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OSD-SOLIC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff/J5/Strategy,
Plans and Policy sponsored a conference and workshop on post-Saddam Iraq. The participants
addressed possible security challenges, ethnic/religious violence, threats from terrorism and
militant Islam, the problems of rehabilitating the Iraqi security services and accounting for and
destroying WMD. *

iy The day-long gathering was an effort to consolidate in one place what was known,
suspected and speculated about in the postwar environment in Iraq. The conference sponsors
published and distributed conclusions, including the following:
= “One key challenge to stability is long-term ethnic and tribal violence.”
= “Terrorism and the influence of militant Islam must be prevented from coming into Iraq
from across the borders.”
= The United States will have to “focus immediately on security needs and will probably
have to work with many of the local authorities and elements of the Iraqi regular army.”
= The “use of some Iraqi personnel, authorities, bureaucracy, and military would be
necessary.”
= The military should be “de-Baathized, de-politicized, de-ethnicized and de-tribalized.”
» “Any perception of US acquisition or control of this [oil] resource could be especially
damaging.”
= “Tt is important not to overestimate the capacity of Iraqi oil fields for the short-term .”
= “Suggestions that restoration and enhancement of the Iraqi oil industry can be self
financed are optimistic at best.”

* CIA, Iraq: Demographic Pressures Challenge Post-Saddam Stability, December 3, 2002, p. 1

Ibid, p. i
* Ibid, p. ii
* NIC: Alternative Outcomes in a War Against Iraq: Assessing Civil-Military Requirements in a Post-Saddam
Security Environment, December 19, 2002
**NIC: Alternative Outcomes in a War Against Iraq: Assessing Civil-Military Requirements in a Post-Saddam
Security Environment, December 19, 2002

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MORI DocID: 1422242

Ce Stis ato would be driven to
‘acquire D capabilities or accelerate

programs ulready in train with the hope of
developing deterrent capabilities before the
programs could be destroyed preemptively.

(U) Impact on the Arab-Israeli
Conflict ‘

Cs in the Middle East would

‘expect the United Statcs to build on its victory
over Iraq by taking a more active role in
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. The
willingness of regimes to cooperate with
‘Washington on many issues would depend
significantly on whether the United States met
those expectations.

change of regime in Iraq alone
‘would have little impact on the course of the
Isracli-Palestinian conflict, which would
depend morc on the political leadership on
both sides and outside—primarily US—help
in resurrecting a peace process. Most
Palestinians view Saddam's rhetoric and
actions championing the Palestinian cause as
primarily symbolic and self-serving, but they
applaud him anyway, especially because they
‘tec the actions of most other Arab leaders
only as rhetorical.

2 In addition to his payments to the families
of Palestinian suicide bombers, Saddam
has established a volunteer militia to
“liberate” Jerusalem, given speeches
calling on Israel's neighbors to step up

and defend the Palestinians, and moved
military forces to Iraq's western region.in
2000 ostensibly to deter Isracli military
actions,

© Palestinians would continue to view such

rejectionist groups as HAMAS and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which do not
rely on Iraq, as more effective than
Baghdad in pressuring Israel.

© If Israel became militarily involved in Iraq
or used the conflict as a reason to take
harsher action against the Palestinians or
move militarily against Hizballah, Syria,
or Lebanon, anti-Israeli sentiment would
rise in the region, making renewed peace
negotiations even more difficult.

Regime change in Iraq probably

not have a major impact on Yassir
Arafat's current policy vis-A-vis the United
States. Arafat in the last two years has not
made a serious and sustained effort to stop
Palestinian violence primarily because he
perceives that the risks of such an undertaking
would not merit the domestic political capital
he believes he would need to expend,
according to various sensitive reports. Arafat
dogs not believe Israeli Prime Minister
Sharon will ever negotiate seriously with the

a

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