Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15‒8022 

IN RE MANUEL R. SUÁREZ-JIMÉNEZ, 

Respondent. 

ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY RECIPROCAL 

DISCIPLINE SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED 

Before 

Torruella, Thompson, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

Manuel R. Suárez-Jiménez pro se. 

December 20, 2016 

 
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Per Curiam. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 

indefinitely suspended respondent Manuel R. Suárez-Jiménez 

("Suárez") from the practice of law, prompting this court to issue 

an order to show cause why it should not impose reciprocal 

discipline. Having carefully considered the arguments Suárez 

advanced in his brief and during his hearing before our 

disciplinary panel, we now order that Suárez be indefinitely 

suspended from practice before this court. 

On December 17, 2014, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 

ordered the indefinite suspension of Suárez based on his violations 

of the Puerto Rico Professional Ethics Code. In re Suárez Jiménez, 

2014 TSPR 143 (P.R. 2014) (per curiam). Those violations occurred 

in the course of Suárez's representation of the plaintiffs in a 

lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the District 

of Puerto Rico, captioned Rivera-Carmona v. American Airlines, No. 

09-CV-1062 (D.P.R. 2009). After the plaintiffs initiated that 

lawsuit, the defendant achieved a transfer of venue to the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami 

Division. The transfer created an immediate problem for Suárez--he 

was not licensed in Florida, and not otherwise permitted to appear 

by himself in that United States District Court. Rather than doing 

what any reasonable lawyer would do in such a situation (notify 

the court that some time was needed for his clients to secure local 

Florida counsel), Suárez informed the court and his clients that 
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he intended to file a motion for remand, which he likely could not 

do on his own. Worse yet, he then did nothing to preserve his 

clients' lawsuit, which the district court in Florida eventually 

dismissed without prejudice in April of 2010. 

Nine months later, one of the plaintiffs swore a 

grievance before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. According to 

the grievance, Suárez told the plaintiffs he would "do everything 

possible to remand the case again to Puerto Rico since he was not 

knowledgeable of Miami laws," but then informed the plaintiffs 

that "the case was dismissed because he was unable to appear in 

the state of Florida." The grievance stated that the plaintiffs 

did not know the status of their case--including whether Suárez 

appealed the dismissal as promised--due to "poor communication" by 

Suárez. It requested a copy of the case file and concluded, "We 

want to know if he is following up on the case because he does not 

answer calls nor emails." 

The grievance prompted an investigation by the Office of 

the Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, which found that the evidence 

collected in its investigation substantiated the grievance. That 

office issued a report to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on 

March 9, 2012, stating that Suárez may have violated four ethical 

canons: the duty to render competent service and diligent 

representation (Canon 18); the duties upon withdrawal from 

representation (Canon 20); the duty of candor toward clients and 
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colleagues (Canon 35); and the duty to uphold the dignity and honor 

of the legal profession (Canon 38). The Supreme Court of Puerto 

Rico, after evaluating the report, ordered the Solicitor General 

to present a complaint with formal charges for those violations. 

That court then appointed a Special Commissioner to review the 

materials and make a recommendation on the charges. 

In 2014, the Special Commissioner issued a report 

concluding that clear and convincing evidence supported all four 

charges in the complaint. The report recommended indefinite 

suspension. After conducting a searching review of the report and 

recommendation, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico found violations 

of the four canons outlined above. With respect to Canons 18 and 

20, the court found that Suárez's inaction post-transfer--and 

resulting violations of local rules and court orders--caused 

dismissal of the plaintiffs' lawsuit. It rejected his arguments 

that the retainer agreement limiting his services to litigation in 

the District of Puerto Rico, or his inability to receive electronic 

notices in the Southern District of Florida, excused his 

inaction--particularly because he never informed the court or his 

opposing counsel that he was unable to practice in the latter forum 

and conducted himself in a manner suggesting he was able to 

practice there. The court also rejected his argument that, because 

the dismissal was without prejudice, he did not violate his ethical 

duties. With respect to Canon 35, the court found that Suárez's 
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inconsistent statements and actions confused his clients, opposing 

counsel, and the court regarding his ability to practice in the 

Southern District of Florida and his efforts to transfer the case 

back to the District of Puerto Rico. And finally, with respect to 

Canon 38, the court found that the totality of Suárez's conduct 

did not "exalt the honor nor the dignity of the profession" due to 

"serious deviations from the ethical rules." The court imposed an 

immediate and indefinite suspension, and denied two subsequent 

motions by Suárez for reconsideration. 

Upon receiving the Supreme Court's order, this court 

initiated disciplinary proceedings through an order to show cause. 

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 

did the same and imposed reciprocal discipline by order dated 

October 8, 2015. It agreed with the findings of the Supreme Court 

and further held that Suárez violated the rules of professional 

conduct applicable to attorneys admitted to practice in the 

district court. An appeal of that order is not presently before 

this panel. Instead, our inquiry is limited to the appropriateness 

of imposing reciprocal discipline in this court. 

"Our standards for imposing reciprocal discipline are 

clear and are set forth in In re Williams, 398 F.3d 116 (1st Cir. 

2005) (per curiam)." In re Oliveras López De Victoria, 561 F.3d 

1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009). We impose substantially similar discipline 

to that imposed in the state court unless the respondent persuades 
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us 

1. that the procedure used by the other court was so 

lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to 

constitute a deprivation of due process; or 

2. that there was such an infirmity of proof establishing 

the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction 

that this Court could not, consistent with its duty, 

accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or 

3. that the imposition of substantially similar 

discipline by this Court would result in grave 

injustice; or 

4. that the misconduct established is deemed by the Court 

to warrant different discipline. 

In re Williams, 398 F.3d at 116 (quoting 1st Cir. R. Att'y Discip. 

Enf. (Discip. R.) II.C)); see also Fed. R. App. P. 46(b)(1)(A). 

The respondent bears the burden to demonstrate "by clear and 

convincing evidence . . . that the imposition of substantially 

similar discipline is unwarranted." In re Barach, 540 F.3d 82, 85 

(1st Cir. 2008). "Given the limited nature of our inquiry, the 

norm will be for this court to impose discipline which is 

substantially similar to that imposed by the state court." In re 

Williams, 398 F.3d at 119 (citing In re Hoare, 155 F.3d 937, 940 

(8th Cir. 1998)). 

In his lengthy response to the show cause order, Suárez 

appears to argue that all four grounds for declining to impose 

reciprocal discipline apply here. We address each in turn. In 

doing so, we "treat the state court's factual findings with a high 

degree of respect," In re Barach, 540 F.3d at 84 (citing In re 

Williams, 398 F.3d at 118), even as we "fully consider the state 
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record" in determining whether reciprocal discipline is warranted, 

id. (citing Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917)). 

First, we see no defect so severe as to constitute a 

deprivation of due process in the notice and opportunity to be 

heard that Suárez received before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. 

See In re Williams, 398 F.3d at 119‒20; Discip. R. II.C(1). Many 

of Suárez's due process arguments exceed the scope of protections 

afforded to the respondent in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. 

See In re Cordova-Gonzalez, 996 F.2d 1334, 1336 (1st Cir. 1993) 

(noting that the due process rights of the respondent "do not 

extend so far as to guarantee the full panoply of rights afforded 

to an accused in a criminal case" (quoting Razatos v. Colo. Supreme 

Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th Cir. 1984))). Furthermore, his 

argument that he received insufficient notice of the charges 

against him relies upon an overly narrow reading of the grievance, 

and an unduly broad application of In re Ruffalo, where the United 

States Supreme Court found a violation of the respondent's due 

process rights because the respondent did not receive notice of a 

new charge, nowhere referenced in the formal complaint, until after 

the investigation into that complaint concluded. See 390 U.S. 

544, 549‒52 (1968). Unlike Ruffalo, Suárez received a grievance 

that alerted him to the misconduct at issue, and a formal complaint 

that charged each of the four violations later found by the Supreme 

Court of Puerto Rico. 
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Second, there is no infirmity of proof that instills in 

us a clear conviction that we cannot accept the Supreme Court of 

Puerto Rico's conclusion as final. See In re Williams, 398 F.3d 

at 119; Discip. R. II.C(2). Suárez's contention that there was 

"no evidence whatsoever to support any of the four charges" 

(emphasis omitted) is specious. He attempts to discredit the 

grieving party based upon alleged inconsistencies among his 

grievance, another plaintiff's statements suggesting limited 

awareness about the status of the case, and cellular phone records 

indicating minimal contact between the grieving party and Suárez. 

His attempts fall short, however, because even the evidence he 

marshals evinces confusion among the plaintiffs about the status 

of the case--confusion that the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico found 

Suárez sowed through infrequent communications and inconsistent 

messages. Additionally, evidence of four brief phone calls between 

the grieving party and Suárez, none lasting more than five minutes, 

and altogether totaling only sixteen minutes, hardly defeats the 

grievance's assertion of poor communication--particularly where 

the phone calls came approximately eight months after dismissal of 

the plaintiffs' action.

Suárez also disputes that he knowingly or recklessly 

deceived his clients because promises he made to them were sincere 

when made, becoming untruthful only after legal research suggested 

there were no grounds to do what he promised. Our task is not to 
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consider these defenses de novo. Rather, we ask only whether the 

excuses and justifications that Suárez provides produce a clear 

conviction that we could not accept as final the Supreme Court of 

Puerto Rico's conclusions. In context, it is not unreasonable to 

think that, if Suárez's plans were tentative, he could and should 

have signaled that. And if he discovered that legal rules or 

ethical obligations prevented him from doing what he committed, he 

promptly should have told those involved. 

Third, we reject out of hand Suárez's claim that the 

imposition of reciprocal discipline would occasion grave 

injustice. See In re Williams, 398 F.3d at 119; Discip. R. 

II.C(3). This claim was not developed by Suárez and, in any event, 

lacks merit. 

Finally, we do not agree that Suárez's misconduct merits 

different discipline in this court. The suspension is indefinite, 

not permanent, and we see nothing preventing Suárez from returning 

to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to seek a lifting of the 

suspension. 

We therefore impose upon Suárez an indefinite suspension 

from the bar of this court. If and when the Supreme Court of 

Puerto Rico reinstates Suárez to the practice of law or otherwise 

modifies his indefinite suspension, Suárez may seek reinstatement 

in this court. 

So ordered.