U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

36–091 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 109–917

FROM COALITION TO ISAF COMMAND IN AFGHANISTAN: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE

TRANSITION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Chaffe, Hon. Lincoln, U.S. Senator from Rhode Island ........................................ 23

Dodd, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut ..................................... 14

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin ..................................... 24

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska ................................................. 17

Jones, Gen. James L., Jr., USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

(SACEUR), Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium .. 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Kerry, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from Massachusetts ........................................... 20

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 1

Rubin, Barnett R., Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, New York, NY ........................... 29

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33

Sarbanes, Hon. Paul R., U.S. Senator from Maryland ......................................... 43

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio ............................................. 26

(III)

(1)

FROM COALITION TO ISAF COMMAND IN AFGHANISTAN: THE PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF

THE TRANSITION

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2006

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Voinovich, Sarbanes,

Dodd, Kerry, and Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.

SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee

is called to order.

Today the committee meets to discuss the situation in Afghanistan and the role being played by NATO’s International Security

and Assistance Force, ISAF. We are honored to welcome our good

friend, General Jim Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to

share his insights on NATO’s operations in Afghanistan. General

Jones has testified several times before our committee, most recently in February of 2006. As always, we look forward to engaging

him on a topic of critical importance to United States national security.

Recently Taliban attacks in Afghanistan have occurred with

greater frequency and coordination. They have extended well beyond the south and east, where most of the fighting has been located. Although the hunt for al-Qaeda terrorists continues, the primary threat to the stability of Afghanistan is Taliban insurgents

who are challenging NATO forces in greater numbers, sowing dissent among Afghans, cooperating with narcotics trade, and complicating security efforts in ways that inhibit the rule of law and reconstruction.

The Afghan people suffered under the Taliban. Most Afghans

have welcomed the advances in personal freedom, political participation, and educational opportunities that have come during the

last 5 years. The recent increase in violence in Afghanistan clearly

is not evidence of a popular uprising, but to the degree that there

is discontent, disillusionment, or fear among the Afghan people due

to their security situation, trust in the Afghan Government and

NATO will dissipate.

2

Insecurity stemming from insurgent activity by Taliban forces

also causes Afghans in some regions to seek the protection of tribal

leaders and warlords, which in turn undercuts the authority of the

Afghan Government and increases the risk of civil conflict between

tribal factions.

Given these dynamics, we must dispel any doubts about the

commitment of the West to Afghans’ emergence as a stable and

free society. With this in mind, it is imperative that NATO countries fulfill their commitments to Afghanistan. NATO is assuming

increasing responsibility for this difficult mission. NATO has long

provided security in the north and west of Afghanistan. Last month

ISAF added the critical southern region to its responsibilities. The

eastern sector of Afghanistan is scheduled to be turned over to

ISAF by year’s end.

However, the recent reluctance in NATO capitals to meet the requests of alliance leaders for troops and resources has complicated

this process. Following many months of intensive discussions with

allies, last week General Jones publicly called for an increase in

NATO forces in Afghanistan. His voice was echoed by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who commented, and I

quote: ‘‘I want to ask nations to do what they promised, and we’re

not there yet.’’ End of quote.

General Jones estimated that an additional 2,500 NATO troops

would be needed for ISAF. Thus far Poland’s offer of 1,000 initial

troops is the only concrete response to that appeal.

There should be no doubt that Afghanistan is a crucial test for

NATO. The September 11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan. AlQaeda still operates there and the fate of the country remains symbolic. If the most prominent and successful alliance in modern history were to fail in its first operation outside of Europe due to lack

of will by its members, the efficacy of NATO and the ability of the

international community to take joint action against the terrorist

threat would be called into question. Moreover, Afghanistan has a

legitimately elected government and a long-suffering people, both

of which deserve a chance to succeed without the threat of violent

upheaval.

The time when NATO could limit its missions to the defense of

continental Europe is far in the past. With the end of the cold war,

the gravest threats to Europe and North America originate from

other regions of the world. This requires Europeans and North

Americans to be bolder in remaking our alliances, forging new

structures and changing our thinking. We must reorient many of

our national security institutions, of which NATO is one of the

most important. To be fully relevant to the security and wellbeing

of the people of its member nations, NATO must think and act

globally.

I believe strongly that NATO is capable of meeting those challenges in Afghanistan. NATO commanders have demonstrated that

they understand the complexity of the mission. They know that

success in Afghanistan depends on the attitudes of the people, the

progress of reconstruction, and the development of the economy as

much as it depends on battlefield successes.

3

The NATO commanders must have the resources to provide security and they must have the flexibility to use troops to meet Afghanistan’s most critical security needs.

Beyond NATO, it is vital that the Afghan Compact which was

signed by 60 members of the international community and the Afghan Government be fully funded and implemented. This compact

established a relationship whereby donors would sustain support

for the Afghan Government while it implements its national development strategy.

We look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how NATO

is responding to recent Taliban tactics. We also would like to learn

how NATO forces are coordinating with independently led United

States troops and the Afghan army. What role will U.S. forces and

the coalition play when ISAF takes over the final sector? We are

also interested in how NATO is addressing the challenges of accelerating reconstruction and contending with the growing drug trade.

After the testimony of General Jones, we will hear from a second

witness, Dr. Barnard Rubin, Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. Dr. Rubin is a leading expert on Central Asia and statebuilding. Among other roles, he has served as special advisor to

Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations Special Representative of the

Security General for Afghanistan. United States Senators have had

the benefit of his counsel through the Aspen Institute program very

recently.

We welcome our witnesses. We look forward to an enlightening

discussion. I would just simply say, General Jones, we are so

pleased that you are here. We are hopeful this will not be your last

appearance as our General in charge of this situation. If it is, why,

it is a very special time. But would you please proceed. Your statement will be made a part of the record in full and please proceed

in any way that you wish.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. As you

know from our long association, this is really a personal pleasure

as well as a professional responsibility to be here. I thank you and

the committee for giving me this time to talk about NATO’s most

ambitious undertaking perhaps in the history of the alliance, certainly one of the most interesting ones and one of the most challenging ones.

Just by way of opening comments, Mr. Chairman, may I just call

your attention to the slide that I have put up there just to introduce what NATO is doing operationally in this very dynamic and

interesting new century. Out of area for NATO now means considerably more than it ever did in the past. We have 38,000 NATO

soldiers deployed today on three different continents, from the Baltics, where we do an air policing mission, to a 16,000-man unit

keeping a safe and secure environment in Kosovo under KFOR,

with three NATO headquarters elsewhere in the western Balkans,

a very—Active Endeavor, a very important mission called Active

4

Endeavor in the Mediterranean—which is NATO’s only Article 5

mission, a counterterrorism mission, very successful in keeping the

Mediterranean as free as possible from terrorist activities and

asymmetric threats that face us all; a small mission, but helpful

mission, in support of the African Union in Darfur, where we do

capacity building and strategic lift of African troops into that sad

region; a very helpful mission in Iraq, where we not only train aspiring Iraqi officers in an academy setting, but also provide a very

helpful mission in equipping the Iraqi army and helping coordinate

the education and training of and assistance to Iraqi military in

different capitals around the world in the alliance.

We also have a NATO response force that is arguably NATO’s

most transformational operational capability coming into being this

year, strategic reserve forces and operational reserve forces on

standby. This brings us full circle to ISAF in Afghanistan.

The ISAF mission, as you know, started in 2003 with our situation in the capital, a small footprint. We expanded to the northern

region in 2004, then to the west in 2005, and on 1 July of this year

we took responsibility for the southern region from the coalition. In

the not too distant future, I feel confident that NATO will also expand to the eastern region, which will complete the circle, if you

will, in a counterclockwise manner, and NATO will have responsibility for stability and security through the totality of the land

mass of Afghanistan, with a very special relationship with Operation Active Endeavor, which will be the United States-led coalition

that will keep a separate and distinct mission at the higher end of

the counterterrorist operation. While the rest, all of us in Afghanistan, have to practice counterinsurgency, the counterterrorism mission, which is more kinetic and mostly focused along the borders,

will continue under a United States-led coalition under the leadership of General John Abizaid of the United States Central Command.

I might point out that in getting to this state we have had nothing but good relations and great teamwork between NATO forces

and the United States Central Command and all of its subordinate

commands in achieving this state of affairs and the situation that

we currently find ourselves in in Afghanistan. It has been a model

of teamwork, cooperation, of comrades in arms working together to

solve very difficult problems, and I am quite confident that it will

continue that way in the future.

Over the last 60 days since the transfer of authority to NATO of

the southern region, opposing militant forces have tried to test

NATO to see if we have the will and the capability to stand and

fight, and the evidence is in. The overwhelming answer is yes. This

past weekend we concluded Operation Medusa, which was an operation that was necessary in order to not only defeat the insurgents

located in the vicinity of Kandahar, but also necessary to do so in

order to establish the conditions of reconstruction and development

activities to move forward in the province. This was a multinational operation in southern Afghanistan, involving forces from

Canada, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Romania, the

United States, Denmark, and Estonia, and Poland—I am sorry,

and Portugal. They have performed extraordinarily well.

5

We always pause to honor the ultimate sacrifice that our soldiers

make on the battlefield and this battle was no exception. There

were casualties. There were NATO soldiers wounded and killed,

and we would like to express our condolences to the families and

to the countries who provided such gallant, gallant young people

who willingly went to this distant land to try to make matters better for people who have not had much hope and not had much opportunity. Their sacrifice makes us want to redouble our efforts to

make sure that we do achieve success in Afghanistan so that their

sacrifice will have been worth it.

While we have been engaged in offensive operations in the southern region since the beginning of our responsibility there, I believe

that the reason this happened was simply because this was a region where permanent troops had never been seen before, and as

NATO has committed to put 6,000 troops on the ground and is in

the process of doing that we found that in this particular region,

which is the traditional home of the Taliban, a sector of the country where opium production, narcotic trafficking, is at the epicenter

of the effort, it is a region that was defined by criminality and lawlessness, many ineffective or corrupt national leaders at the regional level, ineffective police, and lack of presence of the Afghan

army.

In short, this was a part of the country that had not seen the

benefits of reconstruction and the people who have an appetite for

such reconstruction I think were very happy to see the force come

in. But before we could start the reconstruction we had to engage

in this test I think that NATO was subjected to, and that they

passed brilliantly and successfully.

I do believe, Mr. Chairman, as you and I have talked before, that

ultimate success in Afghanistan is not simply a military one. We

are working with the international community and the Karzai Government to make sure that our military efforts are immediately followed very quickly with reconstruction and development activities

in order to meet the expectations of the Afghan people, who have

demonstrated in two national elections, one for President and one

for parliament, that they overwhelmingly understand this effort

and they are overwhelmingly anxious to see the benefits of their

new-found freedoms and opportunities.

It is clear from the outset that progress in education, agriculture,

economic development, public services, and health has to go handin-hand with providing a stable and secure environment. The

Afghan authorities and ISAF are now focusing on the key tasks of

ensuring that reconstruction and development can take place in accordance with the priorities identified by the local authorities

themselves.

I would like to put up a third slide just to briefly capture the effort that nations are making in Afghanistan. We have 37 nations

involved in this mission, approximately 20,000 NATO troops committed. Most of it is under the command and control of NATO, with

a small percentage remaining under national control, and these

would simply be the national support elements.

But I think 37 countries, united in this manner to do this very

important mission at this particular time in NATO, is extremely

impressive, and we can only celebrate this coming together of naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:09 Jun 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT mich PsN: mich
6

tions to do this very important task. And I am quite confident that

we are going to be successful.

One of the most important aspects of the long-term security in

Afghanistan is the development of the Afghan national security

forces, both the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police. By far the Afghan national army is the most successful pillar

of our reconstruction efforts to date. I would like to move to another slide and show you essentially five of the main pillars of security sector reform and say a few words about each one if I might.

Today the Afghan national army is about 30,000 strong and playing a pivotal role in the security of Afghanistan. Our commitment

is to produce an army of approximately 70,000 soldiers. I believe,

we believe, that this is the essential goal and we are on our way

to achieving it.

NATO nations recognize the importance of this mission and have

begun fielding NATO operational, mentor, and liaison teams, or

OMLTs, that are similar to and will augment the U.S. embedded

training teams. Currently NATO has 15 such teams offered by

troop contributing nations, with 7 of them completely fielded and

17 more remaining to be fielded.

Additionally, NATO is working on a proposal to provide additional equipment and training to the Afghan national army. This

effort will be similar to our efforts in Iraq and will be an additive

to the United State’s ongoing efforts to train and equip the Afghan

national army. The more rapidly we can build a capable and sufficiently robust Afghan national army, the faster we will have conditions for success.

On this score, may I say that it is evident to me and to soldiers

in the field that the Afghan people are proud of this developing

army. They identify with it and the Afghan army has not done anything but contribute to its reputation as an emerging strong and

capable institution in Afghanistan.

The ISAF contribution to the Afghan national police training remains within means and capabilities, as detailed in our operations

plan. While we are making some progress, it is my judgment that

much more needs to be done in the training of police forces to make

sure that we bring adequate equipment, adequate training, sufficiency in numbers, adequate pay, we fight against corruption. We

need more emphasis on this very important pillar.

With regard to judicial reform, judicial reform is not a NATO

task in Afghanistan, but it is so important to everything that is

going on in Afghanistan. I must emphasize that judicial reform is

one of the pillars that needs probably the most attention in the

shortest amount of time. Some progress has been made, but the

courts and prosecution remain distrusted, overly corrupt, and resource starved. One of the problems with judicial reform is the low

pay of prosecutors, which makes them susceptible to corruption.

I recently had a meeting with the attorney general of Afghanistan, who told me that prosecutors’ average pay was $65 a month.

By comparison, an interpreter working for the United Nations

makes 500 euros a month. This is simply a situation that cannot

be allowed to stand if we are serious about judicial reform.

A top Afghan judge earns less than $100 a month and that is

less than it costs to rent an apartment in Kabul, which now averVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:09 Jun 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT mich PsN: mich
7

ages about $150 to $200 a month, considerably less than Taliban

are paying local youths to support their military operations, which

is estimated at $250 a month. With such disincentives, the temptation for corrupt practices will continue. So along with police reform

and much more effort, judicial reform to me stands out as one of

the key pillars that needs to be reenergized.

Finally, perhaps the overarching problem and the one that worries me the most is the problem of narcotics. Afghanistan does not

need to be a narcostate, but it is unfortunately well on its way. The

parts of Afghanistan which are currently producing the largest

poppy crops are not those that are traditionally known for the

growth of such a product. We need to find the right means to ensure that farmers can economically grow and sell legal produce, in

addition to developing an overarching and understandable way

ahead in the overall fight against narcotics.

Ninety percent of the narcotics products find their way to European capitals, are sold in the European markets. The money comes

back to Afghanistan and other places where terrorism is evident

and manufactures the IEDs and kills or wounds our soldiers.

U.N. estimates suggest that the crop this year will exceed previous levels by as much as 59 percent. So this is a problem and a

situation that is going in the wrong direction.

If I could make just simply one wrap-up statement, that training

the police forces, jump-starting the judicial reform, and developing

an effective counternarcotics program are hand-in-hand three of

the most important things that need to be done in Afghanistan in

the near future.

There is a need for ever-closer cooperation and coordination between NATO and the Government of Afghanistan, the other nations involved in security sector reform, as well as governmental

and nongovernmental organizations operating in the country.

President Karzai has recognized this and created a policy action

group to act as a key policy and decision making body. This body

is Afghan-led and chaired by the president. It strives to coordinate

the actions of the government, the international community, in an

effort to achieve mutual support and much greater effect than was

achieved previously.

The policy action group is designed to reach down to the provincial, district, and community level in order to provide integrated

programs to implement policy and serve the interests of the Afghan

people. We believe that this policy and this group has a good

chance of succeeding and will contribute to the enhanced cohesion

and coordination that thus far has been absent in the delivery of

international relief.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, there has been dramatic progress

throughout Afghanistan over the past 5 years. Through the efforts

of the international community, Afghans should no longer be considered a failed state, but rather a fragile state. Even with this

progress, though, efforts must be significantly increased if we are

to ensure long-term success. As NATO takes responsibility for the

security of all of Afghanistan, the leadership and resources role of

the United States remains as important as it has ever been. With

this continued support, I believe that NATO will ultimately set the

8

conditions for Afghanistan to continue in its path toward development.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks and I would be happy

to answer any questions you might have.

[EDITORS NOTE.—The slides mentioned were not reproducible in

this hearing but will be maintained in the committee’s permanent

record.]

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, SUPREME ALLIED

COMMANDER EUROPE (SACEUR), SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, MONS, BELGIUM

Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the committee, thank

you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today in order to provide

you with an update on NATO’s role and mission in Afghanistan.

Before I begin my remarks on NATO’s current operations in Afghanistan, I would

like to highlight several major operations in which the alliance is currently involved

and in doing so, provide you with the strategic context and background against

which all of our efforts in Afghanistan are balanced. Today the alliance is engaged

with some 38,000 troops deployed in missions and operations on three continents.

NATO OPERATIONS

NATO continues its mission in the Balkans, notably in Kosovo, where we expect

the United Nations Status Talks to produce recommendations in the future. We retain strong and capable forces (16,000) in the province in order to ensure we maintain a safe and secure environment during these potentially volatile political negotiations.

Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s only Article 5 mission, is our primary

antiterrorism operation in the Mediterranean. This operation aims to disrupt, deter,

and defend against terrorism on the high seas, and over the past 4 years, it has

proven a credible deterrent. This week, NATO achieved the historic integration,

under NATO command and control, of the Russian Federation warship Pitliviy into

NATO’s maritime operations.

In Iraq, NATO continues its training and equipping mission in support of Iraqi

Security Forces. Our main effort remains the training of army officers inside Iraq.

From the basic officer commissioning course to War College classes, NATO is engaged in training the future leaders of the Iraqi armed forces. The second aspect

of our mission in Iraq is to assist in the equipping of the armed forces and to date,

NATO nations have provided arms and equipment ranging from small arms ammunition to T–72 tanks. Finally, the alliance continues to provide training opportunities for Iraqi security force personnel outside of Iraq at national training facilities

or NATO institutions such as the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO

school at Oberammergau, Germany.

In Africa, we retain a small training mission in support of the African Union in

Ethiopia in order to build capacity among African forces headquartered in Addis

Ababa and Darfur. NATO will continue to provide strategic lift into and out of

Darfur for the nations committing forces to the African Union mission in Sudan.

Finally, we continue the development of the NATO response force, which is unquestionably the most transformational, operational capability we have in the alliance. In preparation for the NATO response force’s full operational capability, we

recently completed a major deployment exercise to the Cape Verde Islands off the

west coast of Africa as a proof of concept that NATO can rapidly deploy and execute

operations in austere conditions at strategic distances. While we have made great

strides in transforming the forces assigned to the NATO response force, long-term

force generation for the NRF has not been fully resourced by the alliance. As such,

we may not be able to declare full operational capability by 01 October as envisaged

at the Prague Summit in 2002.

Turning to Afghanistan, NATO’s International Stabilization Assistance Force

(ISAF) is the main effort of the alliance, and is composed of 19,500 soldiers from

37 nations (26 NATO and 11 non-NATO nations). Today, approximately 1,300

personnel assigned to ISAF are from the United States. This number will grow significantly when the final stage of ISAF expansion—stage 4—is complete. Multinationality is a key characteristic and strength in ISAF and partner nations are a

significant presence and bring considerable experience.

9

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF)

As previously discussed with this committee, NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan

is not new. Beginning in 2003, with NATO’s assumption of responsibility for Kabul,

NATO has assisted the Afghan Government in the maintenance of security; facilitated the development of government structures and extension of its control; and assisted the Government of Afghanistan with reconstruction and humanitarian efforts.

LTG David Richards (U.K. Army) is currently the commander, ISAF (COMISAF)

and the senior NATO military commander on the ground. COMISAF is responsible

for commanding all of the NATO forces in Afghanistan and works very closely with

the Afghan Minister of Defense, the Afghan national army and, to a lesser extent,

the Afghan national police. The position of COMISAF is scheduled to rotate in February 2007 to the United States lead.

The NATO senior civilian representative in Afghanistan is the NATO secretary

general’s personal representative. The SCR’s role in working with the Government

of Afghanistan and the international community to ensure adequate attention is

being given to nonsecurity issues. Both COMISAF and the SCR play a very close

role in coordinating with the international community, including the United Nations, European Union, and non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) OPERATIONS

As NATO has expanded throughout Afghanistan, we have established regional

commands, forward support bases, and the provincial reconstruction teams or PRTs

throughout the country. These teams enable NATO to increase ISAF presence and

operate primarily on a permissive basis, concentrating on stabilization through the

provision of a secure environment, allowing the international community (IC) to reconstruct areas that might otherwise be inaccessible to them. The Government of

Afghanistan has welcomed ISAF expansion and the tangible stability and reconstruction the PRTs bring to provinces.

Since I last appeared before the committee, NATO has assumed responsibility for

the southern region. Aware of the volatile security conditions in the southern region,

NATO nations moved into this region with robust rules of engagement and more

forces than had previously been present under the coalition.

With the transition of authority for Region South at the end of July, NATO’s efforts have shifted from the primarily reconstruction and development-oriented activities as found in northern and western Afghanistan to operations focused on

counterinsurgency operations. Over the last 60 days, the opposing militant forces

appear to be testing NATO to see if it has the will and the capability to stand and

fight, and the evidence so far is that the answer is overwhelmingly ‘‘yes.’’ This past

weekend, NATO concluded Operation MEDUSA, an operation designed to defeat insurgents located in Kandahar Province in order to establish the conditions for reconstruction and development activities to move forward in the Province. The countries

involved in operations in southern Afghanistan (Canada, the Netherlands, the

United Kingdom, Romania, the United States, Denmark, Estonia, and Portugal)

have performed extraordinarily well.

While we have been engaged in offensive operations almost continuously since assuming responsibility for Region South, I am convinced that the solution in Afghanistan is not a military one. We are working with the international community and

the Karzai Government to make sure that our military efforts are matched very

quickly with reconstruction and development activities in order to meet the expectations of the Afghan people. It has been clear from the outset that progress in education, agriculture, economic development, public services, and health care has to

go hand-in-hand with providing a stable, secure environment. The Afghan authorities and ISAF are now focusing on the key task of ensuring that reconstruction and

development can take place, in accordance with the priorities identified by the local

authorities themselves.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY/AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE

One of the most important aspects of long-term security is the development of Afghan national security forces—both the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police.

The Afghan national army (ANA) is about 30,000 strong and is playing a vital

role in the security of Afghanistan. The U.S. commitment to produce 50,000–70,000

ANA is essential. NATO nations recognize the importance of this mission and have

begun fielding NATO operational mentor and liaison teams or ‘‘OMLTs’’ that are

similar to and will replace U.S. embedded training teams (ETTs).

10

Currently, 15 NATO OMLTs have been offered by troop contributing nations

(TCNs) with 7 completely fielded. Additionally, NATO is working on a proposal to

provide additional equipment and training to the ANA. This effort will be similar

to our efforts in Iraq and will be in addition to the United States’ ongoing efforts

to train and equip the ANA. The more rapidly we can build a capable and sufficiently robust ANA, the faster we will set the conditions for success.

ISAF’s contribution to Afghan national police training remains within means and

capabilities as cited in our operations plan. Progress continues to be made on ANP

pay. A trial ANP salary payment program seems to have been a success; with all

police officers being paid 100 percent of their salary at an Afghan-operated banking

facility. The intention is to expand the program where the banking capacity exists.

This has, in our opinion, had a positive impact on the ANP.

JUDICIAL REFORM

Closely linked to ANP development is judicial reform. While judicial reform is not

an ISAF task, ISAF cannot be successful unless the rule of law is seen as working

effectively and swiftly. Although some progress has been made in judicial reform,

the courts and prosecution remain distrusted, corrupt, and resource-starved. One of

the problems with judicial reform is the low pay of prosecutors, which make them

susceptible to corruption. Currently, a top and considerably less than the Taliban

are paying local youths to support their military operations. With such disincentives, the temptations for corrupt practice will continue.

COUNTER NARCOTICS

Finally, we must tackle the problem of narcotics. Afghanistan need not be a narcostate. The parts of Afghanistan currently producing the largest poppy crops are

those that traditionally did not grow poppies. We need to find the means to ensure

farmers can economically grow and sell legal produce.

Preliminary results of the 5-year counter-narcotics program for the 2005–2006

growing season indicate a dramatic increase in opium production and hectares

under cultivation. The headline figures show a rapidly deteriorating situation, particularly in the southern provinces. The figures produced by the U.N. support warnings from 12 months ago that the drug trade in the south, and particularly in

Helmand, was increasingly aligning itself to the insurgency.

As well as being able to use the opium issue as a means of gaining support from

farming communities, there was a clear financial imperative for the insurgency. Potential revenues will have given their cause a considerable boost, considering that

indications show that money is the primary motivation for their fighters and allows

the insurgents to purchase arms and ammunition.

The Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MoCN) has established five counter narcotics

(CN) working groups in an attempt to ‘‘operationalize’’ the Afghan National Drugs

Control Strategy (NDCS). Headquarters ISAF staff is represented on four of these

working groups. While the National Drug Control Strategy is aligned with the

Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), is clear that the Government of Afghanistan must do better in combating drugs. The Alternative Livelihoods (AL) program should go hand-in-hand with the efforts in eradication and the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP). Although many programs are ongoing, farmers complain of

inadequate compensation which undermines the program’s credibility. More ‘‘cash

for work’’ projects must be started, new agriculture techniques should be implemented, and infrastructure for irrigation must be available, together with material

resources. For the counter-narcotics initiative to succeed the Alternative Livelihoods

program must be connected to the wider development efforts in support of the

ANDS and given greater priority. Simply replacing one crop for another may not

be sufficient to give a previously narcotics-based local economy the support structure

needed to fully develop or even survive without extensive assistance.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

There is a need for ever-closer cooperation and coordination between ISAF, the

Government of Afghanistan, the other nations involved security sector reform, as

well as governmental and nongovernmental organizations operating in the country.

President Karzai has recognized this and created a small policy action group

(PAG) to act as a key policy and decision making body. This body is Afghan-led and

chaired by the President. The PAG strives to coordinate the actions of the government/international community to achieve mutual support and much greater effect

than could be achieved independently. The PAG is designed to reach down to the

provincial, district, and community level in order to provide integrated programs to

implement policy and serve the interests of the Afghan people. We believe that with

11

the full and active support of the international community, this initiative can have

a positive and long-lasting effect.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion there has been dramatic progress throughout Afghanistan over the

past 5 years. Through the efforts of the international community, Afghanistan

should no longer be considered a failed state but rather a fragile state. Even with

this progress, efforts must be significantly increased if we are to ensure long-term

success. As NATO takes responsibility for the security of all of Afghanistan, the

leadership role and the resourcing role of the United States remains as important

as it has ever been. With this continued support, I believe that NATO will ultimately set the conditions for Afghanistan to continue its development.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Jones.

We will now have questioning by members. We will have a 10-

minute question period for each one of us. Let me begin the questioning by noting, as you pointed out, the overall poverty of the

people of Afghanistan, which I suspect is recognized by most Americans as we think about the country, but perhaps not in the same

way that you have so graphically illustrated. For instance, the salaries of the prosecutors and the judges, the problems of substitution

for narcotics that really have not worked very well.

Let me just ask, as all of this is sketched out and members read

more and more about Afghanistan, the problems become so

daunting that there is a feeling, not of confusion or frustration, but

almost of general despair as to how all of these objectives are ever

to be met in an area of the world that has not seen much peace,

with conflict forces, not just Afghans but other powers.

What I would like for you to try to describe just organizationally

is, granted that progress has been made—you noted a 30,000-man

army, progress being made on police—at the same time most critics

of the whole situation would say on the development front the ability of people to find jobs, find legitimate income, is really suffering.

This is due in part, some critics would say, to our own contribution

to this. Appropriations have been much less than was required

from what we saw. But they likewise have not led to a great deal

of other generous donors, for what would appear to be a very, very

expensive project.

If there were a business plan for Afghanistan, for example, the

question is who would fund it? And, I suppose, second—who would

administer it at this point, given the problems of the central government and its outreach? It is obviously the cross-section of security, in which the aid of the warlords is sought and some would

even say the aid of the Taliban is sought, as opposed to there being

anarchy or wholesale criminality in various areas.

In other words, who is in charge of some comprehensive way in

which more income comes, more development? If there is to be substitution for the drugs, who really provides the planning for this

and the execution of the plans? Finally, what level of generosity or

development funds should we expect that we are going to need,

over what period of time, if this is not to be a situation in which

people finally say, well, we gave it a try and in essence people are

better off, but on the other hand we have many other objectives,

we have got to move on, and there are lots of other people in need?

We heard, for instance, in the Lebanese situation in this committee last week, an estimate by a very well-informed witness that

12

$5 billion might be required simply to repair the country after the

damages of the recent war, with $230 million coming from our

country, but some of that reprogrammed, even a hint that some of

the reprogramming might be coming out of Afghanistan.

We are trying to organize our thoughts as to how this is going

to get done at the development level as well as the security level

and how much money it is going to cost and what kind of anticipation should we have for support.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. I am

a little bit at a disadvantage because my NATO role is to oversee

the efforts to stabilize and provide the environment under which

reconstruction can begin. NATO does not have, beyond the administering of provincial reconstruction teams, of which we have 14,

the coalition has 9, 23 total in the country, the reconstruction and

aid package from nations is actually funneled through the United

Nations Afghanistan mission.

If you would look at that slide and imagine the blue top to those

pillars as being a U.N. organization, U.N.-led, that is the overarching coordination body that is designed to coordinate and direct

the international relief aid.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that also judicial reform, that the United Nations does that in addition to the economic reconstruction?

General JONES. Yes, sir. You will see in the pillars there under

‘‘Counternarcotics,’’ United Kingdom lead; ‘‘Judicial Reform,’’ Italy;

‘‘Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,’’ Japan; ‘‘Training the Afghan National Army,’’ United States; and ‘‘Training the

Police Force’’ is Germany.

These countries have agreed to be the lead nations. That does

not mean that they do it all by themselves, and I have a feeling

that sometimes, particularly in the area of counternarcotics reform,

such a comprehensive and complex problem, that there has been a

tendency to kind of say, well, that is the United Kingdom’s problem. It is not and it cannot be solved by any one nation.

In my opening remarks I tried to illustrate where those five pillars are. The roof on the pillars seems to indicate stability in the

pillars, but actually the only pillar that is really doing well in my

view is training the Afghan national army. No. 2, I think, is the

Japan-led DDR pillar, which is doing reasonably well. I would say

that the other three are in need of strong support and should be

producing more than they are producing or more than they have

produced to date.

The CHAIRMAN. Who at the U.N., then, is coordinating these five

situations? Who is in charge at the top of this?

General JONES. Well, there is a representative of the Secretary

General of the United Nations who runs the UNAMA, United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, and he is the titular head of the U.N.

and provides the overall framework for nations and nongovernmental organizations and relations with the Karzai Government to

coordinate the international aid and relief effort in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how do we gain some responsibility from

him? In other words, who is he accountable to? We probably cannot

call him before a committee like this, but on the other hand we

probably should. As you point out modestly, the United States is

leading the way in training an army, but there are five pillars. As

13

you say, you get the impression that this roof is held up, but if

three or four pillars are almost nonexistent or faltering the whole

thing collapses.

So this is, I think, not well understood by any of us. That is why

I am trying to draw this organizationally. Who is responsible and

how do we bring some accountability to this whole process? Absent

that, the contributions by other nations are likely to continue to

falter and their general interest in any of this likewise is going to

be negligible in some cases; the British particularly with the narcotics. One would say, my goodness, were you born yesterday; half

of the GNP is in this; how do you expect us to resolve this?

And as you say, it is not just the British. Others ought to be

helping them on counternarcotics. They are the lead group. But

who pushes anybody to help the British? Who in the U.N. is in

charge, so that we finally get some cohesion in all of this?

General JONES. Well, Mr. Chairman, you put your finger on it.

I think the structures are generally there and we simply need to

find the ways to make sure that, No. 1, there is sufficiency in the

aid. The estimate, the Afghan estimate over what is required for

5 years, I am told is about $27 billion over a 5-year period. To date

$13 billion has been accounted for and committed and $11 billion

has been disbursed. About 30 percent of that is U.S. donations.

So in terms of the requirement of $27 billion, the money raised

is about $13 billion, so we are about halfway there. So clearly you

cannot, at this rate you cannot do everything that you want. It

does not mean that you cannot do some really good things.

My observation after almost 4 years of watching this problem is

that we need more focus and we need to find ways, for example,

to make sure that the government that we are trying to help is also

doing what it can, is also doing what it can to, for instance, attack

corruption, to begin to put a plan in place, that has to be Afghanled, but to fight the narcotics problem.

The international community has to support this and has to get

behind it. But when we figure out how to do that, when we get

more cohesion and we get the international aid focus to do the four

or five really important things that need to be done, then I think

the road to success in Afghanistan will be clear.

I deeply believe that this is not a military problem and there is

not a military solution here. The military plays an important role,

just as we did in the south just recently to establish the conditions.

But there has to be an immediate effect of the fight to show the

people of Afghanistan that they are—we can deliver on the promises, the government is going to be able to have outreach throughout the country.

Strategic communications from the government to the people in

my view should be enhanced and we should to better. I believe that

we should, to the extent that we can, provide guidance and advice

to the young ministries that support this government. In some

cases, in terms of their department of defense, we are doing reasonably well. In some others we are not.

But it is the cohesion of the effort that I think needs to be enhanced. I am hopeful that this policy action group and the development of Afghan development zones, which is another effort to focus

14

the aid to where it does the most good at the right time, at the

right place, will be successful.

But I guess to the extent that there is good news, this is doable

in my view. It is achievable. It is not about more troops, it is not

about raising armies. I think the troop levels are satisfactory and

if we can fix some of these basic problems and focus the international aid effort and have some metrics by which we measure

our progress each year, instead of having to come in and report

that we are losing grounds in the war on narcotics every year,

which is the Achilles heel in my view of the reconstruction, overall

reconstruction effort in this country, then I think we can make

some progress.

So I am optimistic these are solvable and I am sure that people

are working on it right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Let me just mention that the General will need to leave us at

11 o’clock. There is ample time for each one of us at this point, although sometimes folks join us during the course of that time. But

we will do the best we can.

Senator Dodd.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER DODD, U.S. SENATOR

FROM CONNECTICUT

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am going

to ask consent to have an opening set of comments be made a part

of the record if that is appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record.

Senator DODD. General, it is good to see you. I am a fan of General Jones. We have known him and worked with him on a number

of issues over the years and we are fortunate indeed to have you

doing the job you are doing. So I thank you for your efforts.

I want to thank the chairman again. These are very valuable and

important hearings and I thank the chairman immensely for giving

us the chance to raise some of these issues.

Let me if I can, General, sort of tie this in. I was looking at the

numbers in Europe, the support for NATO. There has been some

decline of popular, public support for the institution. I know the requests are outstanding for some additional troops that you have

made and I want to raise that with you as well. We are watching,

obviously, a significant, at least maybe, if you would use the word,

significant upsurge in insurgence, Taliban insurgent activity this

year, and a lot of at least similarities between the kinds of activities we are watching now in Afghanistan that we have witnessed

in Iraq.

The question I want to raise with you, because I think it is impossible to stovepipe these issues in the sense of sort of separating

out what is the reaction, why are we not getting more support, and

to what extent do you attribute the difficulties in Iraq we are experiencing with what you are encountering in Afghanistan? Share

with us, because you are dealing with your colleagues all the time

in the European community, who I presume are sharing some of

the attitudes and reflections? And I suspect that what you are getting in reaction to what our requests are with regard to AfghaniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:09 Jun 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT mich PsN: mich
15

stan is reflected by what is occurring in Iraq, the lack of the kind

of support that we have seen there.

Could you share with us, how is that going on and to what extent

is there any linkage between what is happening in the activities in

Afghanistan and Iraq?

General JONES. I think there is genuine support, political support across the 37 countries that find themselves in Afghanistan.

That support for Afghanistan has existed almost from the outset.

So in that sense it is a little bit different than the difficulty we

went through internationally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the debate with regard to Iraq.

I think one of the things that makes it difficult for countries is

the fact that during the last 4 or 5 years, as the political appetite

to do more has gone up, to do more in Afghanistan, to start a mission in Iraq, to maintain the Kosovo troop levels at 16,000, to embark on Operation Active Endeavor, to train and equip and NATO

response force—all that has been very good and symbolic of a

NATO that is developing and changing and growing.

At the same time, it has been accompanied by a corresponding

decrease in the budgets of many of the countries in NATO, budgets

for national security. The average budget in NATO percentage of

GDP for national security is now 1.7 percent of GDP across the 26

nations. The agreed-upon target, the minimum that was agreed

upon at the Prague Summit in 2002 was 2 percent of GDP. So we

are actually going the wrong way. We have more missions and less

resources.

The Afghanistan situation or the Afghanistan development is interesting because it does have some strong points in terms of unity.

The question of the generation of troops actually has taken a turn

for the worse—I am sorry, for the better—since the last couple of

weeks with Poland’s announcement of sending the battalion and

special forces. The Romanians have let us use an operational reserve battalion. The Canadians are going to augment their forces.

We are looking to lift some of the national restrictions on the

troops that are in Afghanistan, which restricts the commander’s

ability to use the troops the way he would like to. We have a few

other nations that I cannot, I am not at liberty to mention yet because they have not made the national decision, but we have others

that are coming on line.

So in the last 10 days or so we have been moving in a very positive direction. But I think that the countries that are providing

their forces and their money want obviously to see that it is going

for the right thing, and they want to see reconstruction, they want

to see development, they want to see the promises that were made

to the people come to pass. I think there will be support for this

mission in Afghanistan for quite a while within the alliance. As a

matter of fact, we still have one more section to bring in under

NATO, the eastern section of the country, which will happen in the

not too distant future.

But if we can focus our energies on the things that absolutely

need to be done, then I think the investment in Afghanistan will

pay off quicker and we will be there for a shorter period of time.

Senator DODD. Let me try this again. I am curious as to whether

or not there is any spillage in terms of political reaction, whether

16

or not there is any correlation you see at all between the kind of

activities that have increased with the Taliban in Afghanistan and

the kind of activities we have watched for a longer period of time

in Iraq. Is there some relationship there?

While I have asked that question, let me also—I know there are

some differences about the rules of engagement and some of our allies are requesting, I gather, certain rules of engagement regarding

their troops in Afghanistan. To what extent is that posing a difficulty?

But I want to come back to this Iraq-Afghanistan issue, because

my sense is these numbers in Europe of popular support for the

role of NATO declining has some correlation between the attitudes

about Iraq, and I am curious whether or not you agree with that.

General JONES. It would be hard for me to make the correlation.

I think if there is a correlation it is simply because of the amount

of money that is going to support both missions, plus national missions. So I think the publics are a little bit unclear as to what

NATO is and what it is doing. We have not done a good job of explaining ourselves.

I do not know that there is a political spillover between the two.

My belief is that Afghanistan is well understood and well supported.

You had another—oh, the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement for Afghanistan are very clear, very adequate, agreed to

by all 26 countries. So that is not an issue. What is an issue for

me sometimes and for commanders is nations provide their forces,

but they also have a list of restrictions on how we can use those

forces. We call them caveats. I think caveats are very limiting. I

think they actually make our problems more difficult and they actually contribute to—countries whose troops have excessive number

of caveats project weakness and make them more vulnerable. So I

am fighting to remove as many caveats as possible.

Senator DODD. I should have mentioned, by the way, and I apologize for not doing so, how deeply all of us, how appreciative we are

of the role that U.S. forces are playing there and the sacrifices they

are enduring. None of us are unmindful of the fact that about 340

of our fellow citizens have lost their lives in Afghanistan and many

more injured in the process. I think any discussion should always

begin by thanking these troops for the tremendous sacrifice that

they paid.

Tell me about the Taliban. Is there any correlation between what

is going on in Afghanistan and Iraq in terms of the military activities? They look like there are some very—are these copycats or is

there some connection between what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan? Is there some connection that we ought to be aware of?

General JONES. I think there might be some copycat connection,

but I think the reason, part of the reason for the uptick in violence,

particularly in the south, is because until recently we have never

had any permanent forces in that part of the country. When the

coalition led—the U.S.-led coalition was operating in the country,

these operations in the south were mostly short-term duration special forces, very kinetic, and we did not have the mass to simply

occupy a part of that territory.

17

This time, with 6,000 NATO troops there who come into these

provinces and are going to stay there and they are going to do the

reconstruction that is worthwhile, it is the first time we have had

that permanent presence. What has happened I think, particularly

in the south, is the home of the Taliban traditionally, the home, the

epicenter of the narcotics production, there has been criminality,

there has been corrupt governance, lack of police. This is the first

time that we have had a permanent presence.

So we have gone through the tough period here, at least in this

part of the province. We have been successful fighting the Taliban,

causing him to retreat. Actually the Taliban adopted tactics we had

not seen. They actually chose to stand and fight in a conventional

way. They paid a huge price for that. I do not think we will see

them trying that again.

But it was a major turning point, at least—I will not say in

terms of Afghanistan, but in terms of that particular region. A

major statement was answered, and we are going to get on with

it.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.

Senator Hagel.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM

NEBRASKA

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General Jones. I suspect this may be your last formal

appearance as our NATO commander before this committee and I,

I am sure as well as all my colleagues, want to express our deep

appreciation for your service, your leadership. You are one of the

preeminent military leaders of our time, but your reach is far beyond the military dynamic of our geopolitical interest in the world,

and for your wide-lens understanding of the issues we appreciate

it. You have made us a far stronger country and you have made

NATO a much better institution because of your leadership. Please

convey our thanks to your colleagues, some seated behind you, but

also as well in Brussels and across the scope of NATO’s reach.

Thank you, General Jones.

I would like to go to the eastern border of Afghanistan and if you

could explain what role Pakistan is playing in supporting ISAF’s

efforts, in particular along the eastern border, and then I want to

go a little deeper into that as well.

General JONES. Senator Hagel, I just returned from a visit to

Islamabad, my second one as the NATO commander, and had a

good opportunity to talk with the senior military of the Pakistani

armed forces. They explained to me in detail their assessment of

the recently completed arrangements with the tribal regions. If the

words that they used actually come to pass, then things could be

much better along the borders. The tribal authorities have decided

that they would expel foreigners, for example, limit cross-border

crossings, respect the territorial integrity of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the border itself.

If all of those words are backed up and agreed to, then we should

see a positive development. I intend to go back in about 30 days

18

to Islamabad. We are watching very closely to see what happens

along the border over these next—this next month, and then we

will have another discussion when I return on what we see on the

Afghan side.

I must say that I was impressed by the willingness of the Pakistani military authorities to want to have a more developed and

heightened relationship with NATO, particularly on border issues.

Pakistan is a member of the Tripartite Commission along with Afghanistan and NATO and COC-Alpha to discuss military matters

affecting the border. So we are building the network between the

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and now NATO to better know each other

and to better understand exactly what it is that needs to be done

on both sides of the border.

So my initial meeting was encouraging. The words I heard were

good and now we need to see if we can back up the words with

demonstrated performance.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Do you agree with the assessment of some that the Taliban headquarters is somewhere in the region of Quetta?

General JONES. That is generally accepted, yes, sir.

Senator HAGEL. Give us a little bit of your response to the assessment, of the recent agreement that Pakistan has signed with

the tribes in that part of Pakistan, and specifically the Waziristan

region?

General JONES. Well, as I said, my assessment is that if all the

elements of the agreement are in fact lived up to by the signatories, then the situation on the border should improve. The question

is now, is to observe. What we are doing now is observing, watching, recording, so that when we go back in 30 days to Islamabad

we can have a more focused discussion as to what we see in fact

on the ground.

This is measurable. You can tell what is going on on the borders.

You can tell by what is going on in Afghanistan whether there is

any change. We will be able to observe that. We will be able to

have some dialog with the Pakistani authorities, and then we can

take it from there.

Senator HAGEL. Would you consider this agreement by the Pakistani Government as significant in regard to the commitments that

were accompanied in that agreement, especially commitments to

NATO and to our efforts to deal with the Taliban?

General JONES. Well, I think the words are significant in the

agreement. For example, the tribes have agreed that there will be

no foreign troops in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, there

will be no cross-border operations, they will not challenge the Pakistani Government’s authority, they recognize the territories—the

territorial boundary of Pakistan, and there will be no

Talibanization of the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas. They

also have agreed that, as I mentioned, no foreign troops—by that

I mean foreigners—will be expelled.

If they are able to live up to the terms of those agreements, the

border should be a much quieter region. We are in the process now

of observing very closely what is going on and what the effect is

on the Afghani side of the border, and we will know that in probably the next month or so.

19

Senator HAGEL. Included in your graphic here that you have presented, and you engaged each of the five pillars in your testimony—the fifth, train police forces, led by Germany, you did not

spend a lot of time on that issue. You were, if I interpret your comments correctly, rather positive in your analysis and assessment of

the training of the Afghan army. There are, as you know, significant reports about corruption, the inability or unwillingness of the

Afghan police to do their jobs, not unlike the same problems we are

facing in Iraq in trying to build the police forces there.

I would appreciate your assessment of that effort, if we are going

to be required to put more resources into that effort. How would

you assess it? Obviously that is a significant problem that we are

going to continue to face, not unlike again what I said is happening

in Iraq.

General JONES. Yes, sir. I think the three pillars that need much

more energy than they already have is the police reform and training, judicial reform, and counternarcotics. The three are somewhat

linked. The counternarcotics and the dependency of Afghanistan on

the opium trade fuels all of the problems elsewhere in the society,

from corruption of the judicial process, corruption of the police

force, corruption at the highest levels in the society, in addition to

fueling the insurgency with cash.

So that is clearly—those three pillars are clearly important and

worthy of the international community’s attention as a matter of

the highest priority. Failure to address those three pillars will

mean that we will be in Afghanistan for a much longer period of

time than is necessary.

The United States has contributed a lot of money to training the

police pillar to assist the German-led efforts there. Much more

needs to be done. There is not an adequate number of policemen,

and there is even quite a substantial portion of the police force that

is underpaid and cannot compete with the $250 or so that the

Taliban is willing to pay to offset their numbers and to compensate

them for the money they do not have to support their families.

Senator HAGEL. Do you believe, General, that the Afghan Government is going to have to be far more aggressive in prosecuting

drug dealers, others who it is my understanding that the government is looking the other way and allowing a lot of this to happen?

It is obviously risky. But unless the Afghan Government is willing

to do more—or is that interpretation correct?

General JONES. I think it is a correct interpretation. I think the

Afghan—the new government has to show that, on corruption, that

it is uncompromising and that it is willing to go after the narcotics

cartels and to prosecute and convict those who are guilty and to be

severe with the punishment they award. That is something that

has got to be hand-in-hand accompany—that has got to hand-inhand accompany any infusion of effort that the international community comes up with to institute those reforms.

The Karzai Government does have a prominent role to play and

that message, when they start doing it on a regular basis, will go

a long way toward signaling to the people that this is—we are serious about this. But until we start it, it is not going to be recognized

as serious. Words are hollow in this particular, in these particular

efforts right now. We need action.

20

Senator HAGEL. General, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

I am pleased that we have been joined by more Senators as you

have been continuing your testimony. Our predicament for Senators who have joined us is that the General has travel assignments and he will need to leave by 11 o’clock. So I hope I will not

infringe on anyone’s right in suggesting maybe an 8-minute limit

for the four Senators that we have remaining. If you need more

time, why, please proceed. But for the moment, why, do the best

you can.

Senator Kerry.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, thanks. Welcome. Thanks for the job you are doing and

thank you also for the time to visit the other day on the telephone.

I appreciate it very, very much. I see the five pillars here and it

is part of the public testimony.

I have always felt that Afghanistan is the real center of the war

on terror, not Iraq. And it is troubling to me that we have seven

times the numbers of troops in Iraq that we do in Afghanistan and

that suicide, suicide attempts I think are up triple. Roadside bombs

are up double. You yourself have said, General, that narcotics is at

the core of everything that can go wrong in Afghanistan if not

properly tackled. But we are not making progress. We are losing

ground.

President Karzai has said that our approach to narcotics, counternarcotics, has failed, and the U.N.’s top counternarcotics official

said yesterday that NATO forces have to somehow help the Afghan

army to fight the opium trade.

When I was in Afghanistan and met with President Karzai earlier in the year, I asked him about the narco situation and whether

or not Afghanistan is now a narcoeconomy, and he said yes, he

agreed. I think our experts agree. I think you would agree, it is a

narcoeconomy.

At what point does it become a narco state? And if our efforts

have currently failed and that is the center of everything that can

go wrong, what is going to change?

General JONES. I do not know what the tipover point is, but

when 50 percent, over 50 percent of your economy is tied to the

narcotrafficking portion of it, you are well on your way. I do not

know exactly when you become a narco state by definition. But it

is clear that the influence of narcotics on all organs of Afghan society, emerging Afghan society, is there. It fuels the insurgency, it

contributes to the corruption. It is omnipresent and it is something

that, frankly, the family of nations ought to be worried about.

I think one of the things I mentioned to you in our conversation

was that 90 percent of the products are sold in European capitals.

Senator KERRY. Well, with all of the troop level that we have

there, what is the problem in engaging in a massive crop destruction effort? Are they afraid of the instability that will occur in the

population, so they are in a sense locked?

21

General JONES. It is a vicious circle, because I think what is

needed is a comprehensive international plan that everybody signs

up to that is multifaceted. If we simply focus on crop eradication,

then you are affecting the livelihood of a significant portion of the

country. So you have to have crop substitution. You have to have

means of getting alternate crops to the markets, which means you

have to build roads that may not exist.

There is a whole series of dominoes that line up. But absent a

clearly defined, well thought out, agreed upon, financed and

resourced plan, you wind up doing a little bit of everything and

nothing very well.

Senator KERRY. That is what really concerns me, General. Here

we are, President Karzai said, quote: ‘‘The same enemies that blew

up themselves’’—that is his quote—‘‘in the Twin Towers in America

are still around.’’ The plot against these airliners that was stopped

in London was hatched in Afghanistan. Yet the center of changing

this is to have economic success and reform success. And yet 40

percent of the Afghan population is unemployed right now, before

you even do crop destruction.

Ninety percent lack regular electricity. And yet this administration has appropriated nearly four times more in reconstruction

funds for Iraq than Afghanistan, and in fact aid money was cut by

30 percent this year. So I would assume that greater construction

efforts and greater focus in pulling together this comprehensive

eradication or substitution plan would significantly bolster your efforts of our troops on the ground.

General JONES. I completely agree. I think that the military aspect of what we are doing is important, but the long-term reconstruction is tied to how well we do in those pillars.

Senator KERRY. So if the stakes are as high as everybody says,

if the President says this is a battle for civilization and so forth,

why are we not doing this?

General JONES. I think that—I think we are doing, we are doing

quite a bit. Just to put a positive spin on this, we have 6 million

Afghan children that are going to school today. Two million of them

are girls. We have rebuilt over 3,000 kilometers of roads. Now, 80

percent of the Afghan people have access to some form of health

care. There are interesting measures of progress out there.

Senator KERRY. Can I just interrupt for one second. I do not

mean to cut you off at all, but the time is limited. I agree and I

want to pay tribute to that. I think you and efforts on the ground

have really been quite remarkable in a lot of respects. But what

you are telling us, what President Karzai is telling us, what experts are telling us on the ground, is that all of that—and it is

good—is at huge risk because of what is happening with the three

pillars of the five that are affected by the narcotics, by the criminality, by the lack of judicial reform, the lack of competency within

the police force.

I think you said you have something like, is it, 40,000 troops

now?

General JONES. There is 20,000 NATO troops and——

Senator KERRY. No, of the Afghan army, trained.

General JONES. Oh, I am sorry. About 30,000, yes, sir.

22

Senator KERRY. So 30,000 now. That is not going to be able to

do what is necessary if your economy is lost to this other effort, correct?

General JONES. That is correct. I think you do need an Afghan

army. I think you need the internal police force. That has got to

be fixed. Judicial reform, you have got to be able to prosecute the

people who are causing these difficulties in the narcotics. To me,

I think that talking about this is important. I think it will have the

effect in the international community to focus those people whose

jobs it is to bring this about.

I appear today as a NATO commander. My NATO responsibilities stop at stability and security and the management of the provincial reconstruction teams. There is an entire other sector that

I talk about, but I do not have an assigned mission, in for instance,

judicial reform. But I know that if we do not have judicial reform

the security of the country is going to be jeopardized. So we have

to talk about it, and I think we have to bring more international

focus and energy to it.

I must say that if we do that I am optimistic that this will be

a success story. So I am optimistic about where Afghanistan can

be in a few years.

Senator KERRY. If we do this now?

General JONES. If we do this, if we do this, and if we are successful at doing this. If we are not successful——

Senator KERRY. What about the effort on Osama bin Laden? The

Waziristan deal seems really troubling and a lot of people seem

troubled by it, and most believe that, while some things are stated

about what will happen, the expectations are considerably lower

than that.

Are you satisfied that you are able to do everything that you

want to do, would like to do, believe is necessary to do to capture

or kill Osama bin Laden?

General JONES. This is the delicate part of my appearance here.

As a NATO commander, my mission from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to assist the Government of Afghanistan in providing a safe and secure environment for reconstruction.

Senator KERRY. I know CENTCOM is doing that.

General JONES. And that is why I need to make that distinction,

that the ISAF mission and the Operation Enduring Freedom mission, led by CENTCOM, that is the one that has the kinetic, the

more kinetic counterterrorist mission. So I am not involved in the

active border participations. NATO’s focus is more on security, stability, and reconstruction, which is not to say that if we ever came

across Mr. bin Laden that we would not apprehend him. We would.

If we had indications that he might be in one of our areas, would

we go try to get him? We probably would.

Senator KERRY. And you do not want to venture to share with

the committee just from your experience and judgment whether or

not you think we are able to do all that is necessary or we would

like to do?

General JONES. Well, I can tell you that I know John Abizaid,

General Abizaid, has spent a considerable amount of time working

with the Pakistani authorities. We have large numbers of troops up

in the border areas and we have done everything we can to—I

23

think we are doing everything we can to locate him and locate

other leaders and to discourage the border from being a sieve

through which Taliban fighters come across to Afghanistan and

contribute to the problems that we have there.

So I think that over the next 30 to 60 days, while we give the

Pakistani authorities a chance to test their new agreements in the

border regions, I think the next 30 to 60 days will be interesting

to see how effective we are going to be.

Senator KERRY. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kerry.

Senator Chafee.

STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM

RHODE ISLAND

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

General Jones, thank you for your testimony. I associate myself

with Senator Hagel’s praise and gratitude for your service.

Following up on the narcotics issue, you testified that the poppy

growing is in areas where it has not grown before, particularly the

southern regions. Why is that?

General JONES. Simply it is the cash crop of choice. Our lack of

ability right now to discourage the producers, to alter the behavior

of the cartels, is indicative. Until we meet with more success and

find alternate means of people earning a livelihood and find a way

in which we can turn the economic situation around in some parts

of the country, this is going to continue to be a problem.

Senator CHAFEE. Why has it changed, that the south did not

grow poppies, now they are? Is there any particular reason?

General JONES. I think it is simply, simply a function of demand

and the ability of these farmers to get money in advance of the

planting season from the cartels, for example. And until we find

the means to discourage that, punish it, prosecute it, limit it—and

I think beyond the borders of Afghanistan, by the way, I think the

European markets, which is the destination point, should be very

concerned about the amount that is actually getting onto the

streets of European capitals.

But until we find the international solutions to bring this to, not

a stop immediately, but to start reversing the trend, I think we are

going to continue to have difficulties.

Senator CHAFEE. I am just curious as to—I understand the big

problem, but why the south? Is it more conducive to lawlessness or

more Taliban in the south?

General JONES. Well, I think the south, the southern part of the

country, has been one of the parts of the country where we have

not had a permanent presence of any large number of troops. Most

of our activities there have been small, temporary, special forcestype activities. This is the first time that roughly 6,000 troops have

moved into the area, with more to come. The Afghan army is down

there now. We are cleaning out the corrupt governance. We are trying to get good police chiefs. We are going to start reconstruction

with an impressive amount, starting virtually as we speak.

So this is a part of the country that did not have a lot of presence. So as a result the narcotics had a safe haven, just as the

24

Taliban was able to live there quietly, and now they cannot. So we

are going through this period of tension. We are doing quite well

in terms of asserting ourselves and our authority. So I hope that

good things will start happening in the south.

Senator CHAFEE. Is there an issue that this is, the Pashtuns are

more conducive to the Taliban as opposed to the north might be,

the Tajiks are less?

General JONES. This is more of a traditional home of the Taliban

than other parts of the country, and the infiltration routes come to

this area.

Senator CHAFEE. To go to another subject, is there any influence

of Iran in anything that is happening in Afghanistan?

General JONES. The Iranian influence in Afghanistan has mostly

been along the border and is mostly economic. Most of the contacts

that have been had along the border have to do with economic

issues and actually an expression on the part of the Iranian border

guards concerning the drug trade. Of course, one of the major drug

routes goes through Iran, but it also goes up in other directions as

well. So it is a problem for all of the countries surrounding Iran—

I am sorry, surrounding Afghanistan. So there are some common

problems here that could be worked on.

But it is an economic relationship in the west, notably around

Herat.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR

FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important hearing.

General Jones, thank you for appearing in front of the committee

and for your tremendous service. I know you are busy, so let me

get to a couple of comments.

First, I would like to second Senator Dodd’s comments and take

a moment to express how thankful I am and we are for the dedication and professionalism of the many Americans serving in Afghanistan. We have some of our best men and women serving in the

U.S. military and the State, NATO, USAID, DEA, and other critical departments and agencies that, I agree, are trying to make and

are in many cases making a true difference. I hope you will pass

that message along to them.

I have some questions, but first I would like to note the fact that

I think we are getting two very different pictures from Afghanistan

right now. We are seeing signs of progress, important political developments that include a new parliament and a new role for

women in government, and an exponential increase in the number

of children attending schools, which you mentioned.

But we are also seeing some very troubling trends: The comeback

of the Taliban and the destabilizing of southern Afghanistan.

Opium production levels are up to the highest levels ever, despite

significant efforts to reduce them, and violence is creeping back

25

into Kabul, as we saw with the deadly car bomb very close to the

United States embassy last week.

These recent developments are disturbing. I believe we need to

reevaluate our current strategy in Afghanistan and reassess the

level of resources needed to invest there to achieve long-term stability and security. As we all know, Afghanistan does have the potential for being a flagship success in the international fight

against terrorist networks. It could also easily become, I am afraid,

another long-term engagement in which the U.S. Government has

no discernible strategy for success. We absolutely have to avoid

that, as I know you agree.

But General, I want to ask you a couple of questions that sort

of relate to the five pillars here that you have established and try

to connect up the reconstruction with the security situation. Senator Chafee was getting at this. I am particularly interested in

learning from you what has and has not been effective in our reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, particularly in the south.

The United States and the international community have provided a significant amount of development and humanitarian, economic, and other forms of assistance there for the last few years.

But what does the resurgence of the Taliban in the south suggest

about the actual effectiveness of our reconstruction efforts? What

is working and what is not?

General JONES. The southern region, Senator, has been one of

the regions where we have had the least amount of presence and

therefore the least amount of reconstruction. It is a region that has

been, not only been characterized by the absence of permanent security forces, but also poor governance, corruption, ineffective police forces, and generally a presence of Taliban or Taliban sympathizers, until a few months ago when NATO put in, is starting to

put in a force that will total about 6,000–7,000 troops.

This is the first time we have done that in this part of the country and, not surprisingly, we met with some resistance. Operation

Medusa, which recently concluded successfully for NATO, was the

first almost conventional ground combat mission that NATO has

been involved in in many, many years. The Taliban chose to stand

and fight and paid a high price for that tactical error.

We are now following up really in the south with a very comprehensive package of reconstruction. Between May and September

of this year in the south we will have spent—we have 85 projects

in many sectors of reform, from agriculture to capacity-building,

education, energy, environment, governance, health, security, completion—working on the ring road, $62 million scheduled for that,

over $100 million going into another section of the road and a dam

construction.

But before we get on with things like that, we have to set the

conditions under which they can be successful, and that is what

this recent upsurge in fighting was about, to establish without

question that we have the capability of doing this and that we are

going to get on with making reconstruction reach this part of the

country as well.

Compared to the other parts of the country, this has been lagging. We are now there to try to jump start it.

26

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate your mentioning some of the reconstruction efforts. I just wanted to follow up by kind of looking

at it the other way around, the way in which reconstruction, one

would hope, would help stability, as opposed to the other way

around. So I am wondering, are our reconstruction efforts being

evaluated for their overall effectiveness in reducing stability?

If you take one metric that you and I both have talked about

here—the number of Taliban attacks in the south—it seems that

things are not going so well in terms of that. Is it fair to connect

these two things and what are we doing to reorient or redesign our

efforts, or is it simply a question of having enough troops to create

a scenario where that can work?

General JONES. I think you cannot have, in this case, you cannot

have security without reconstruction. You cannot have reconstruction without security. So in our theology with the NATO forces the

two go hand-in-hand.

In the south we had to establish the security and now we can

have reconstruction and we can start. But this section of the country does lag behind the others in terms of economic investment for

the reasons I tried to mention, the fact that it is an area where we

have not visited and we have not been. We are there now. With the

expansion of the Afghan army, if we can get the police force up and

operating, if we can conduct judicial reform and attack the narcotics problem, I think you are going to see a very quick turnaround in how people will perceive who is going to win this battle.

I think somewhere along the line there are maybe 60 or 70 percent of the people of Afghanistan just simply trying to eke out an

existence and want, they genuinely want peace and an opportunity

for their children to lead a better life than they did. They are going

to go with whatever side they perceive is going to win, and I think

that this is still winnable. We are not losing this, but there are

some things that I think we could do in the international reconstruction effort with more focus, more clarity, more dedication, and

more rapidly which will allow us to have an exit strategy that will

become more visible quicker.

Senator FEINGOLD. I really appreciated your comments about

this. I noticed your call for additional troops. I want you to know

that I support that. I saw that there was some announcement

today with regard to this. I also just want it noted for the record

that no one that I know of has called for a timetable to withdraw

our troops from this place, as I have done with regard to Iraq, because I do believe this is a situation that can succeed and we need

to do what we can to make it succeed.

I thank you, General.

General JONES. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Voinovich.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR

FROM OHIO

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General.

General JONES. Thank you, Senator.

27

Senator VOINOVICH. I recall that when we met in Brussels we

talked about lots of things and one of them, as you know, that is

on my heart and mind is what is happening in Kosovo. From the

information that I have received, there are militia, Serbian militia,

gathering in the north, in Mitrovica and the northern towns, and

have said that if Kosovo is declared independent that they are

going to secede from Kosovo. We are concerned that we could have

an outbreak there. Also there is some concern about some of the

enclaves in the southern part, where they are concerned that they

may be the victims of some extremists on the Kosovar side.

I would hope that you are looking at that and making sure that

we have the troops that are necessary so everyone knows that if

you try and do something in this regard it is going to be put down

immediately. I have also talked with Secretary Rumsfeld about it

in terms of the Defense Department’s commitment to it. So that is

one thing.

Second, we are going to be getting together here in November

with the NATO interparliamentary group, and I think it would be

really helpful to us if we got an appraisal from you of where we

stand in terms of their participation in their GDP—you have mentioned it already, but other things that we ought to be doing in

NATO that are not being done, so that we can fulfil our obligations.

So often what happens is the ministerials never talk to the parliamentarians, and the parliamentarians really are the ones that

are charged with the budgets and doing some of these things. So

it would be really good if we can get that information to these

folks.

The other thing that I was impressed with is your approach to

dealing with this new enemy that we have out that flies under no

flag. In other words, we have an unconventional enemy, and your

concept of thinking outside of the box and how to deal with this

enemy. I have to say, at least from my perspective, and I know

other Members of the Senate, we are uneasy about whether or not

we are fighting this war in the correct way.

If I recall, when we talked, it was about a question of allocation

of resources, about getting the Defense Department, the State Department, USAID, and all of these together to think about some

kind of a strategy on how we can be more effective that may be

unlike some of the things that we have done in the past.

I note that you have these provisional reconstruction teams now

in Afghanistan and I would be very interested to have you share

with us how effective they are and how that fits in with this concept of maybe doing things differently. If you look at the chart

here, we are talking about counternarcotics, we are talking about

judicial reform. Japan has disarmament, demobilization, reintegration. A lot of these things have got nothing to do with armament.

They have got to do with some other things. I would be interested

in your sharing with us how you think they are coming along and

how we can enhance that approach.

General JONES. Senator, thank you very much. A quick word on

Kosovo. We have 55 maneuver companies deployed in all of Kosovo,

16,000 troops in total. I believe that this force is much better

trained, much better equipped, fewer number of caveats than ever

before. We have troops north of the Ivar. We are talking all of the

28

time with not only the Kosovar Serbs but the Albanians as well.

We are working very closely with developing the human rapport

that we need on the ground to try to minimize any outbreak of violence.

All I can say is that I think we are as prepared as we can be

and we are trying to do those things that we can do as KFOR to

minimize that possibility of violence. So I think we are in as good

a position as we can be and we continue to work this problem every

day.

I would be very, very happy to do anything to support the interparliamentary group. I think it is extremely important that parliamentarians understand not only what NATO is doing, but what the

new NATO is like, what it does, what it stands for, and why should

our publics be as interested in the NATO in the 21st century as

it was in the 20th century.

I believe that NATO is a very healthy, growing organization that

is only going to become more important in time. There are certain

things that I think we should do to help NATO in its transformation. There is no question in my mind that one of the things

that we must do better than we are doing is to explain the value

of NATO to our people on both sides of the Atlantic, because it is

a unique organization and it deserves to be supported.

With the question of the new enemy and how to combat the new

enemy, I think that one of the premiums in terms of shaping and

affecting the areas where we wish to see a certain outcome has to

do with the integration of essentially the interagency, that the solution set against these enemies is not just a military solution, but

it is actually how well do we bring all instruments of national

power to focus simultaneously in an orchestrated way to bring

about the desired effects.

One of the examples of a success story I think is the United

States’ PRTs in Afghanistan—provincial reconstruction teams.

What makes these reconstruction teams so effective is that they

are empowered. These commanders of these PRTs, usually at the

rank of lieutenant colonel, have money, have the independent authority as to how to allocate that money, and they bring about immediate effects in the region to build a bridge, open a school, dig

a well, turn on some electricity, pave a road, coordinate local government officials, help the training of the local police, and give a

sense of comfort and reassurance out in the hinterlands where

some day the government will be able to get out there and replace

the PRTs.

We will know we are reaching a success point in Afghanistan

when the government says we do not think this PRT is necessary

any more—we have got it. But until that day happens, those PRTs

and those commanders and those people that are working out

there, sometimes at significant risk, are really worth—I think a

PRT is worth a battalion. Those 60 to 80 to 100 people that are

working out there are worth 5,000 troops.

Proactive engagement is always cheaper than reactive engagement. I would rather have 100 people dedicated, doing a certain

thing every single day for 365 days, than 10,000 troops for 60 days.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to say thank you very

much for your service. I know that you are going to be tipping your

29

hat one of these days and I would like to say to you, General, that

I hope—I am sure that you have been working within the system

to get your thoughts across about how we deal with this new

enemy, but I would hope that once you leave that you are not reluctant to speak out and perhaps do some white papers to try and

get your message across to Members of Congress and to the American public, because I think it is really needed at this time.

Thank you, thank you, thank you for your service.

The CHAIRMAN. I join my colleague, Senator Voinovich, once

again, General, in thanking you. I just have to recall—and I hope

you are not embarrassed by the recollection—that we toured Europe together in the early 1980s. You were then a major, not a

four-star general. I was a very young Senator. We are a bit older

now, but your service has been just remarkable and we just so

much appreciate your coming today.

We thank you for your comment that our hearing might in a

small way provide a conversation that others might listen to, including folks at the United Nations, people in other countries, people in our own government who are trying to coordinate. That was

our purpose in asking you and Mr. Barnett to come today, so we

could have this focus and have a wider audience through C–SPAN

and other media efforts that will also engage in the topic.

General JONES. Senator, if I could also thank you for not only our

long-term relationship, but also just for the energy that you have

brought to NATO as well with your personal commitment to reexplaining NATO and getting people to understand why NATO is,

although a different organization in this new century, is one that

potentially can make just as great a contribution as it did in the

21st century. Your voice has been very supportive and very helpful.

It is felt on both sides of the Atlantic and we definitely appreciate

the support you have given us. It has meant a lot and we thank

you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for that encouragement.

We will now let you head off in your travel plans with best wishes.

We welcome now Dr. Barnett Rubin. Dr. Rubin is the author of

the Council on Foreign Relations special report entitled ‘‘Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition From Turmoil to Normalcy,’’ which was

published in March of this year. He has recently revisited Afghanistan, July 29 through August 8, to supplement information from

that report and hopefully to supplement our information today

about this very important country and our mission and the mission

of other countries.

Dr. Rubin, we welcome you. Your statement is a remarkable document and will be made a part of the record in full, and you may

proceed however you would like to, either in summary or in delivering portions of the statement.

STATEMENT OF BARNETT R. RUBIN, DIRECTOR OF STUDIES

AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this

hearing and for inviting me to take part. I appreciate it. I will

make some remarks on a few themes that I would like to highlight,

30

and as I was listening to the exchange with General Jones I also

made a note of a few points that were raised by the Senators here

and by him that I could elaborate on some.

First, let me say that, while my statement and my summary here

are full of somewhat somber prognostications and analyses, none of

this is meant to denigrate the accomplishments that have occurred

and the sacrifices made, I should note, not only by soldiers, but

also by civilians who have given their lives in this effort, both Afghan and international.

In fact, one of the people I saw on my trip, Governor Hakim

Taniwa of Paktia, was assassinated by a suicide bomb just about

10 days ago, and I wrote an article about that that appeared in the

Washington Post last Sunday, quoting him primarily.

I think the point is that, rather than asking whether a glass is

half full or half empty, we should be concerned first about how stable the table is on which it is standing. While we have accomplished a lot, at the moment the base in Afghanistan is extremely

weak. Partly that is because of some of the effects of Iraq, partly

it is for other reasons which I will discuss.

First, overall people in the region, both those who would like to

work with us to some extent and those who are working against

us, make an evaluation of how serious and committed we are, that

the United States is. Overall most people in Afghanistan and

around the region in my estimation do not believe that succeeding

in Afghanistan is a very high priority of the United States. The

basis for that is not what we say, but what we do. It is based on

their observation that we have put 10 times as much effort into the

war on Iraq, that we have undercut—that we have very much

underspent on Afghanistan, that, as General Jones said, we did not

put troops into the very areas that were the heartland of the

Taliban, and in general indicated that we were not committed

there. They have acted as a result of that analysis.

Second, I wanted to emphasize what also came up, that Afghanistan is extremely poor. But let me—I think perhaps we do not appreciate how poor Afghanistan is. Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world except for a handful of countries in sub-Saharan

Africa, like Burundi and Sierra Leone. Now, when I mention those

two countries that indicates how such extreme poverty leads to violent conflict.

The fact that the country is so extremely poor translates into an

extremely weak government. The total revenues of the Government

of Afghanistan are approximately 5 percent of its minuscule legal

GDP. Therefore, when we talk about the Government of Afghanistan taking strong measures to do something or other, like arresting some of the most powerful people in the country, we must bear

in mind what resources it has and how little assistance we have

given it in doing that.

When we talk about the Government of Afghanistan, for instance, not taking strong measures against drug traffickers, we

must bear in mind that many of those drug traffickers were empowered by the United States, who provided them with assistance

to come into effective power, and that even in cases when President

Karzai wanted to remove some of them from power his hand was

stayed by some agencies of the United States Government who still

31

found those people useful. So there is more of a picture than sometimes is presented.

The next point is this problem in Afghanistan—I cannot emphasize this too much—is not a problem in Afghanistan, besides the

fact that of course it is connected to global terrorism. It is a joint

problem of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The global center of terrorism now is in Pakistan. That is where the plot in Britain was

hatched. That is where Osama bin Laden is.

I would also draw your attention to something very important

that General Jones said very briefly in response to a question by

Senator Hagel. Senator Hagel asked him, is it true that the headquarters of the Taliban is in Quetta. General Jones said that is

generally accepted. Now, what does that mean? It means the headquarters of the Taliban is in the capital city of one of the four provinces of Pakistan. The headquarters of the Taliban is not in a

mountain cave somewhere. It is not along the border. It is in the

capital of one of Pakistan’s provinces, and the Government of Pakistan, according to the unified assessment of the security agencies,

Afghan and international, in Kabul, is that the Government of

Pakistan has done virtually nothing to disrupt the command and

control of the Taliban, which is based in Pakistan.

Now, I recently received, in anticipation of this testimony, a message from a very senior diplomat from a NATO troop contributing

country who is in Kabul. He said the following to me. As you know,

next week President Bush is going to meet with President

Musharraf and President Karzai together. President Musharraf I

believe is in Washington today.

Now, this diplomat wrote to me: ‘‘All eyes are now on the 27 September meeting in Washington and the bilateral talks that will

precede it. Without the use of overwhelming diplomatic force by the

U.S. President against President Musharraf, little progress can be

expected. There needs to be rapid arrests of the top 50 Taliban

commanders in and around Quetta, full stop. Anything less will not

do. Pakistani protests that they lack the capacity are spurious.

‘‘The Iran issue and Pakistani domestic politics argue against the

United States using the big diplomatic stick, but we need it now.

Otherwise, a slide’’—meaning the slide in security and stability in

Afghanistan—‘‘will continue.’’

Mr. Chairman, the fact that the Taliban have their headquarters

and command and control in Pakistan and a safe haven there is

not the only reason there is an insurgency in Afghanistan. There

are massive failings on the part of the Government of Afghanistan,

as is only to be expected since it is the weakest government in the

world. But no insurgency has been defeated when it has a safe

haven abroad. So shutting down this safe haven is the key to addressing those massive internal problems in Afghanistan.

On internal security, I fully endorse what General Jones said

about the importance of the rule of law, police, and judiciary. If I

may note, there is a general problem in U.S. policy with regard to

post-conflict nation-building or state-building which transcends this

administration, though perhaps it is more serious in this administration, which is we tend to focus on democratization, that is on

elections, a constitution, and so on. We very much neglect the

32

building of state institutions which are needed to make that relevant.

It does not matter, if you freely elect your legislators, if there are

no institutions to enforce the laws that they pass or through whom

the executive can assure that those laws are faithfully carried out.

So without police, judiciary, and so on, democracy is a hollow and

meaningless shell, and that increasingly is how people in Afghanistan perceive it.

Next, on narcotics. I would like—sometimes when people call for

a stronger counternarcotics policy, which I fully endorse, they focus

on crop eradication as if crop eradication were the central point of

counternarcotics. I would submit that that is an error. First, we

have to be clear about what is the goal of our counternarcotics policy in Afghanistan, where does the harm come from. We are not

trying to or we should not be trying to solve the world’s problem

of drug addiction in Afghanistan. If we, with all our capacity, cannot stop drug addiction in the United States, we are certainly not

going to use law enforcement successfully to eliminate half the

economy of the poorest and best armed country in the world.

Therefore we must focus on the real harm which comes from

drug money. Now, 80 percent of the drug money inside Afghanistan, regardless of the—90 percent of the total income from drugs

goes outside of Afghanistan. Inside Afghanistan, 80 percent of the

drug money is in the hands of traffickers and warlords, not farmers. When we eradicate crops, the price of poppy goes up and the

traffickers who have stocks become richer.

Therefore we should be focusing on the warlords and traffickers,

on interdiction and so on, while we are helping the poor farmers.

That is also consistent with our efforts, with our political interests

of winning the farmers over and isolating those that are against us.

Furthermore, it is a mistake to consider the drug problem in Afghanistan as something that is isolated in the major poppy-growing

areas. For instance, now there is fighting in Helmand Province,

which is the major poppy producing area in the world. Because you

cannot—because there is fighting going on, it is not possible to implement a counternarcotics strategy in Helmand. We need to implement rural development throughout Afghanistan, especially in the

areas where there is no poppy, in order to show people what is possible and build an alternative economy.

Finally, a word about Iran. Iran, of all the countries around Afghanistan, is making the strongest counternarcotics effort. We have

a very strong common interest with Iran in making that counternarcotics effort. That, among other things in Afghanistan, are areas

where we have common interests with Iran, which I submit we

should be pursuing just as we simultaneously pursue those areas

where we have conflict of interest with Iran.

If I may issue a warning, anyone who tries to sell you intelligence reports that Iran is destabilizing Afghanistan is misrepresenting the facts. The destabilization of Afghanistan insofar as it

is coming from abroad is coming from Pakistan, regardless of the

fact that President Musharraf speaks good English, wears a suit,

and says things that we like to hear.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rubin follows:]

33

1 A. Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan, National Directorate of Security, Kabul Afghanistan, May 2006. I obtained a copy of this document from a U.S. source in

Washington, DC. 2 Hekmat Karzai and Seth Jones, ‘‘How to curb suicide terrorism in Afghanistan,’’ Christian

Science Monitor, July 18, 2006. 3The accident occurred in Khairkhana, an area of Kabul largely populated by Tajiks from regions north of the capital.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. BARNETT R. RUBIN, DIRECTOR OF STUDIES AND SENIOR

FELLOW, CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, NEW

YORK, NY

‘‘The pyramid of Afghanistan government’s legitimacy should not be brought down

due to our inefficiency in knowing the enemy, knowing ourselves and applying resources effectively.’’—Saleh, 2006.1

In the past 6 months, a number of events have raised the stakes in Afghanistan

and further threatened the international effort there. The handover of command

from the United States-led coalition to NATO means that Afghanistan is now not

only the first battleground of the so-called ‘‘war on terror,’’ but a testing ground for

the future of the Atlantic alliance. The Taliban-led insurgency based in Pakistan

has shown new capabilities in the south and east, challenging both the United

States and NATO, while suicide bombings, unknown in Afghanistan before their

successful use by the Iraqi insurgents, have sown terror in Kabul and other areas

as well.2 A particularly daring attack on a Coalition convoy killed 16 people, including two United States soldiers, close to the United States embassy, in one of the

most heavily defended areas of Kabul on September 8.

On May 29, in Kabul, an accidental crash of a United States military vehicle that

killed an Afghan sparked a riot in which 17 people were killed. Rioters, who chanted

slogans against the United States, President Karzai, and foreigners in general, attacked NGOs, diplomatic residences, brothels, hotels and restaurants where they

thought alcohol was served, media offices, businesses, and the parliament. These

riots exposed the incapacity of the police, many of whom disappeared, and the vulnerability of the government to mass violence, even in the capital. This event exacerbated ethno-factional tensions within the governing elite, as the President accused

opposition leaders of exploiting acts of violence by demonstrators largely from

Panjsher, home of the leading group of the Northern alliance, charges that

Panjsheri leaders denied.3 The riots showed violent opposition to the government

and the United States, not from the Taliban, but also from members of a group that

had led the resistance to the Taliban.

With many trends pointing in the wrong direction, it is time to rethink strategy

and significantly increase both the level of resources available and the effectiveness

of their use. As the largest troop contributor and aid donor, the United States has

to lead this transformation. For decades United States policy makers of all administrations, however, have underestimated the stakes for the United States and the

world in Afghanistan, and they continue to do so today.

Contrary to the analysis of the Bush administration, whose response to September

11 wandered off to Iraq and dreams of a ‘‘New Middle East,’’ the main center of

global terrorism is in Pakistan, especially the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

In the words of one military commander, ‘‘Until we transform the tribal belt, the

United States is at risk.’’ Far from achieving this objective, in 2001 the United

States-led coalition pushed the core leadership of al-Qaida and the Taliban out of

Afghanistan into Pakistan without a strategy for consolidating this tactical victory.

Thereafter, while the Bush administration focused on unrelated or overblown

threats elsewhere, it failed to provide those Taliban who did not want to fight for

al-Qaida with a way back to Afghanistan, instead adopting a policy of incommunicado detention in Guantanamo, Bagram, and ‘‘black sites,’’ making refuge in Pakistan a more attractive option. Drawing in part on such fugitives and in part on

newly minted recruits from militant madrasas and training camps that continued

to operate without impediment, the Taliban reconstituted their command structure,

recruitment networks, and support bases in Pakistan, while Afghans waited in vain

for the major reconstruction effort they expected to build their state and improve

their lives. As a result, a cross-border insurgency is now exploiting the weaknesses

of an impoverished society and an ineffective government to threaten the achievements of the last 5 years.

The frustration of those on the ground is palpable.

A Western diplomat who has been in Afghanistan for 3 years opened our meeting

with an outburst: ‘‘I have never been so depressed. The insurgency is triumphant,’’

he said, accusing the United States and the entire international community in AfVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:09 Jun 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT mich PsN: mich
34

4 I would like to thank Hamed Wardak for organizing meetings with elders through his movement, Fidayini Sulh (Sacrificers for Peace). Wardak did not attend the meetings and bears no

responsibility for the views expressed.

ghanistan of ‘‘appeasement’’ of Pakistan, from where Taliban leaders direct the insurgency and terrorist attacks. ‘‘Things are looking very dark,’’ wrote an AfghanAmerican woman who is risking her life working in one of the most dangerous areas

of southern Afghanistan, where the burgeoning opium trade supports insurgency,

criminality, and lawlessness. An elder from Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan

said that government efforts against the insurgency are weak because communities

will not share information with the authorities: ‘‘The people don’t trust any of the

people in government offices.’’ An unemployed engineer who lives in Kabul and an

elder from the northern province of Baghlan echoed the sentiment: ‘‘The people have

totally lost trust in the government,’’ said the former; ‘‘the people have no hope for

this government now,’’ said the latter. ‘‘There is a big distance between the current

system and Islamic virtues,’’ said an elder from Paktia in eastern Afghanistan, citing the bribery of judges.4

A former minister, now a leader in the parliament, commented, ‘‘The conditions

in Afghanistan are ripe for fundamentalism. Our situation was not resolved before

Iraq started. Iraq has not been resolved, and now there is fighting in Palestine and

Lebanon. Then maybe Iran. . . . We pay the price for all of it.’’ ‘‘So many people

have left the country recently,’’ recounted a U.N. official, ‘‘that the government has

run out of passports.’’ An elder from the southern province of Uruzgan, who had

sheltered Hamid Karzai when he was working underground against the Taliban,

told how he was later arrested by Americans who placed a hood on his head,

whisked him away, and then released him. He shrugged off the indignity: ‘‘I understand that in this country if you do good, you will receive evil in return. This is

our tradition.’’ He added, however, ‘‘What we have realized is that the foreigners

are not really helping us. We think that the foreigners do not want Afghanistan to

be rebuilt.’’

Yet no one advocated giving up. The same elders who expressed frustration with

the corruption of the government and its distance from the people also said, ‘‘We

have been with the Taliban and have seen their cruelty. People don’t want them

back.’’ Fruit traders from Qandahar who complained that, ‘‘The Taliban beat us and

ask for food, and then the government beats us for helping the Taliban,’’ also said

that President Karzai was the country’s best leader in 30 years—a modest endorsement, given the competition, but still significant. One military leader opined, ‘‘My

working assumption is that the international community needs to double its resources. We can’t do it on the margins. We have no hedge against domestic and regional counter-forces.’’ But, he concluded, ‘‘It’s still ours to lose.’’

INTENSIFIED THREATS

With access to a safe haven for its leadership, training, supplies, funding, and recruitment in Pakistan, with additional funding from Arab donors in the Persian

Gulf, the Taliban-led insurgency has increased its effectiveness and both broadened

and deepened its presence. The government and international forces have prevailed

in virtually all tactical engagements. The weakness of the government and the reconstruction effort, however, has often prevented consolidation of tactical gains,

while the failure to deny the insurgency its safe haven in Pakistan has blocked strategic victory. The invasion of Iraq under false premises and the United States’

unstinting support for Israel’s staggering reprisals against Lebanon have handed

the insurgency additional propaganda victories, further weakening the United

States’ allies in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The increased tempo of suicide

bombings and attacks on school buildings even outside the insurgency’s main area

of operation has spread insecurity into Kabul itself. One suicide bomber was stopped

in Kabul by police during my visit; and a major attack on September 8 killed 16

people in the most secure area of the city.

The Taliban’s recent offensives were partly responses to changes initiated by the

international forces. The United States-led coalition has handed off command of the

southern region of Afghanistan to NATO, which was already in charge in the north

and west. The NATO force has deployed to areas, notably Helmand province, where

the coalition had neither ousted the Taliban nor made substantive efforts to stem

the drug trade (Helmand now produces about half of the world’s total supply of

opium). The Taliban offensives in the south have aimed to press public opinion in

the principal non-United States NATO troop contributing countries (the United

Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands) to force a withdrawal. This is NATO’s first

military operation, the success of which is essential to the future of the alliance; as

35

5 Carlotta Gall, ‘‘Pakistani Leader Admits Taliban Cross Into Afghanistan,’’ New York Times,

September 7, 2006. 6Seth Jones, Averting failure in Afghanistan, Survival, Spring 2006.

one United States official put it, ‘‘The failure of NATO in Afghanistan is not an option.’’

The Taliban have increased the size of their units, their maneuverability, and

their intelligence capabilities to establish a large and resilient presence in the rural

areas of the south. The resiliency of their presence, the effectiveness of some of their

institutions, and their ruthless retribution against those charged with collaboration

has neutralized much of the population. They have established a parallel administration in some areas and they occasionally take control of outlying districts.

Though some of their officials (such as provincial governors) are based in Pakistan,

people are increasingly patronizing Taliban courts, seen as more effective and fair

than the corrupt official system.

International military officials in Afghanistan state that intelligence confirms that

the Pakistani Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is providing aid to the

Quetta shura (council), the main center of Taliban strategic command and control

in southern Afghanistan. Quetta is the capital of the province of Baluchistan, where

Pakistani military dealt a blow to a Baluch ethnic nationalist insurgency and killed

one of its key political leaders, the 79-year-old former Governor Nawab Akbar Bugti,

while leaving the Taliban command center untouched.

In Kabul on September 7, General Musharraf virtually admitted these charges.

According to the New York Times, ‘‘General Musharraf said that his government

had rounded up al-Qaeda supporters in Pakistan’s cities and had pursued foreign

fighters in the frontier tribal areas, but he said the focus has now shifted to dealing

with the Taliban. . . . ‘We have to see where their command structure is, who is

their commander, and we must destroy the command structure’,’’ [said General

Musharraf].5

Another Taliban shura, directing operations in eastern Afghanistan, is based in

the Pakistani tribal agencies of north and south Waziristan. It has consolidated its

alliance with Pakistani Taliban, as well as foreign jihadi fighters from Uzbekistan

and elsewhere. Just one day before Musharraf’s statement in Kabul, Pakistani authorities signed a peace deal with the local Taliban in north Waziristan. The

Taliban are expected not to cross over into Afghanistan to attack United States and

Afghan forces and refrain from killing local tribal leaders, while the foreign militants (Uzbeks, Chechens, and Arabs affiliated with al-Qaida) are expected to either

live peacefully or leave the region in peace. Within hours of the signing ceremony,

a legislator from the region told media that there never were any foreign militants

in the region. In neighboring south Waziristan tribal district, similar peace deals

in 2004 empowered the Taliban to the extent that they now control the region. The

agreement was widely perceived as a confession of failure by the Pakistani military

that conceded the Taliban a haven in return for a face-saving agreement that will

not be implemented.

Further north, veteran Islamist leader, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a favorite of the

ISI since 1973, operates from Peshawar and the Bajaur and Momand tribal agencies

adjacent to northeast Afghanistan.

The insurgency cannot be explained solely by its sanctuary in Pakistan, but few

insurgencies with safe havens abroad have ever been defeated.6 While bad governance and corruption are indeed rampant in southern and eastern Afghanistan, conditions are no better in northern and western Afghanistan, where poverty, narcotics,

corruption, and criminality have bred insecurity and violent clashes over resources,

but not an anti-government insurgency.

While ending foreign sanctuary for the Taliban is necessary, it will not be sufficient to stabilize Afghanistan. The state and economy need urgent reform and assistance. While no statistics are available, people in Kabul and throughout the country complain that crime is increasing, and that the police are the main criminals.

The formation of the Afghan National Army, a professional force now approaching

35,000 men, has been one of the success stories of the past 5 years. One reason for

the army’s professionalism has been that nearly all infantry are fresh recruits.

Many of the over 60,000 men who have been demobilized from militias have joined

the police, private security firms, or organized crime, and sometimes all three. One

former mujahidin commander who became a general in the ministry of the interior

is widely reported (including by his former mujahidin colleagues) to be a major figure in organized crime, who was responsible for the murder of a cabinet minister

in February 2002. He is also a partner in the local branch of a U.S.-based firm,

which provides many international offices with security guards, most of them fightVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:09 Jun 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT mich PsN: mich
36

7Some of the rioters, who appeared to be mainly from Panjsher, carried pictures of the late

Ahmed Shah Massoud and chanted anti-Karzai slogans. Qanuni firmly denies any involvement

and states that the rioters also tried to attack the parliament. The new appointees, while previously allied with Massoud, came from the Shamali plain between Panjsher and Kabul and assured Karzai of their loyalty during the riots.

ers from this commander’s militia and subsequently his employees in the ministry

of the interior.

Researchers on narcotics trafficking report that, as commanders demobilized from

the ministry of defense have found positions in the ministry of the interior, the latter became the main body providing protection to drug traffickers. Positions as police chief in poppy-producing districts are sold to the highest bidder; the going rate

was reported to be $100,000 for a 6-month appointment to a position with a salary

of $60 per month.

Such a corrupt police force, which also lacks training and basic equipment (batons, tear gas, water cannons, plastic shields, secure communications) utterly failed

when confronted with a few hundred rioters. In combination with his continuing

contention with the chairman of the lower house of parliament, Muhammad Yunus

Qanuni, a major figure from the leading faction of the Northern alliance whom

President Karzai suspected of exploiting the riots, the President appointed members

of a rival Northern alliance group to key police positions, including police chief of

Kabul.7 In order to do so, the president overrode the ranking of candidates based

on merit that the new process of MOI reform required for high-level police appointees. He did so with the assent of U.S. officials, who claim that they needed to

gain approval of others on the list in order to improve security in insurgency-affected areas of the south and that they lacked information on the new appointees.

President Karzai argues that he is forced into such unpalatable balancing acts because the international community failed for years to respond to his requests for

adequate resources for the police. Whatever the reasons, many Afghans interpret

the appointment of Amanullah Guzar as police chief of Kabul and Basir Salangi as

police commander of Nangarhar, as placing organized crime in charge of both the

security of Kabul and the capital’s key supply route from Pakistan.

Afghan traders and elders reported several kidnappings of rich businessmen or

their sons, in some cases leading to the payment of large ransoms, and in other

cases ending in the murder of the captive. Most report that the kidnappers wore

police uniforms and used vehicles with blackened windows like those used by officials. On August 24, robbers wearing police uniforms robbed a bank van of $60,000

in cash within easy walking distance of the MOI headquarters in Central Kabul.

Such incidents have led to the departure of Afghan investors, contributing to an economic slowdown that is aggravating unemployment and discontent.

One difference between Iraq and Afghanistan has been that, while Iraq has suffered an economic collapse as a result of the United States invasion, Afghanistan

averaged real non-drug annual growth rates over 15 percent. The country was so

poor (the world’s poorest country outside of sub-Saharan Africa) that the expenditures of foreign forces and organizations combined with the end of a drought, a relatively small amount of aid, and narcotics profits could power a recovery from a 23-

year war.

But as a World Bank official put it, ‘‘It has not been reliable, sustainable growth.’’

Afghans emphasized how unemployment feeds conflict: ‘‘Those Afghans who are

fighting, it is all because of unemployment,’’ said a fruit trader from Qandahar. And

this year the bubble economy has been punctured. Real estate prices and rents are

dropping in Kabul, and occupancy rates are down. Fruit and vegetable sellers report

a decline in demand of about 20 percent. Construction workers and members of the

building trades in Kabul reported a decline in employment, leading to a drop in

wages by about 20 percent. A drought in some parts of the country has also led to

displacement and a decline in agricultural employment, for which the record opium

poppy crop only partially compensated.

A major economic issue that is aggravating relations between Afghans and the

international community is the supply of electricity to Kabul. In the past 5 years,

no major power projects have been completed. A plan to bring power to Kabul from

Central Asia is 2–3 years from completion. As the city’s population expands toward

5 million (up from 2.3 million 5 years ago), Kabulis today have less electricity than

they did 5 years ago. While foreigners and the rich power air conditioners, hot water

heaters, high-speed Internet, and satellite TV with private generators, average

Kabulis are now ending a summer without fans, and fearing a winter without heaters.

For the past 2 years, Kabul got through the winter with power supplied by diesel

generators, whose fuel was purchased by the United States. This year the United

37

8 Carlotta Gall, ‘‘Opium harvest at record level in Afghanistan,’’ New York Times, September

2, 2006. 9 Barnett R. Rubin, Road to Ruin—Afghanistan’s booming opium industry, Center on International Cooperation and Center for American Progress, October 7, 2004. 10 Ron Synovitz, ‘‘Afghanistan: U.S. Reports ‘Breakthrough’ on Afghan-Pakistan Security Cooperation,’’ RFE/RL, August 25, 2006. 11Fisnik Abrashi, ‘‘Abizaid; Pakistan not aiding Taliban,’’ The Associated Press, August 27,

2006.

States made no such allocation, claiming that Afghanistan did not ask for it. Regardless of who is at fault, without the purchase of diesel, Kabul will have even less

power in the next 2 years than in the past.

The narcotics economy, however, is booming. According to the U.N. Office of

Drugs and Crime (UNODC), production of opium poppy with a record crop of 6,100

metric tons this year surpassed last year’s by 49 percent, overtaking the previous

record crop of 1999, before the Taliban ban.8 This massive increase in production

belies the claims of progress made on the basis of a 5 percent decrease last year.

The Taliban exploited the counterproductive policy of crop eradication pressed on an

unwilling Afghan Government by the United States. They gained the support of

farmers in Helmand and elsewhere by providing protection against eradication. As

I have argued elsewhere, eradication before significant economic development is ineffective and counterproductive.9 While the Taliban protect small farmers and

sharecroppers from eradication, not a single high government official has been prosecuted for drug-related corruption, though many known traffickers occupy high office.

RECOMMENDATIONS

For several years, the United States responded to President Karzai’s repeated

warnings about the Taliban’s sanctuary in Pakistan by assuring him that Pakistan

was cooperating, that public statements were counterproductive, and that the

United States would soon take care of the problem. Assurances that the United

States would soon mop up the ‘‘remnants’’ of the Taliban and al-Qaida have proved

false. Nor did the United States or others respond with adequate resources or programs to strengthen the Afghan state and its relations to the communities in a way

that would make Afghanistan more resistant to the Taliban. President Karzai’s

strategy of temporizing with corrupt and abusive power-holders has also weakened

the state building effort, but he claims he has had inadequate support and resources

to undertake a stronger policy. New approaches and more resources are required on

both fronts.

ENDING SANCTUARY IN PAKISTAN

Western and Afghan officials differ over the extent to which Pakistan’s aid to the

Taliban is ordered or tolerated by the highest levels of the military, but they have

reached a consensus, in the words of one senior military leader, that Pakistani leaders ‘‘could disrupt the senior levels of [Taliban] command and control,’’ but that they

do not do so. President Musharraf virtually admitted in Kabul that they had not

even tried. Disruption of command and control is the key to strategic victory, not

control over infiltration, a tactical issue to which Pakistan consistently tries to divert discussion. A recent agreement by Afghanistan and Pakistan to conduct joint

patrols on the Durand Line (which Afghanistan does not recognize as a border) to

combat infiltration may help build the relationship, but it will not end the sanctuary

in Pakistan.10

The failure by Pakistan even to try to disrupt the Taliban’s command and control

in Quetta is a major threat to international peace and security. But pressure to stop

these activities is not enough. The Pakistani military’s alliance with Islamist militant groups is a response to perceived threats, a way of managing an outmoded border regime, and the basis of the domestic legitimacy of the state.

To confront the immediate threat requires serious pressure. The first condition for

serious pressure is to convey a consistent message. There is no need to berate Pakistan in public, but United States officials should at least stop congratulating

Islamabad for something it has not done. CENTCOM Combatant Commander General John Abizaid, for instance, stated in Kabul on August 27 that he ‘‘absolutely

does not believe’’ that Pakistan is helping the Taliban.11

Efforts are already under way by the four troop contributors in southern Afghanistan (the United States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada) and by

NATO as a whole, to devise a common demarche. This effort should be expanded

to include Russia and China as well. The central message of this demarche should

be that failure to take forceful action against the Taliban command in Baluchistan—

38

12 Rubin and Siddique, ‘‘Ending the Afghanistan-Pakistan Stalemate,’’ USIP Special Report,

September 2006.

at least as strong as the action taken against the Baluch ethnic insurgency, which

led to the killing of former Governor Nawab Akbar Bugti—constitutes a threat to

international peace and security as defined in the U.N. Charter. Pakistan, whose

leaders seek parity with their rival, India, in part by acting as a full participant

in the international community through contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations and the fight against al-Qaida, will seek to avoid such a designation, with

the various consequences that might flow from it. Pakistan should not benefit from

United States military assistance and international aid and debt relief while it fails

even to try to dismantle the command structure of the Taliban.

Threats, explicit or implicit, are not enough. A realistic assessment of Pakistan’s

role does not require moving Pakistan from the ‘‘with us’’ to the ‘‘against us’’ column

in the war on terror account books, but recognizing that Pakistan’s policy derives

from its leaders’ perceptions, interests, and capabilities, not from ours. The haven

and support the Taliban receives in Pakistan derive in part from the hostility that

has characterized relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan for as long as both

have existed. That hostility, in turn, is partly driven by century-long grievances of

Afghanistan, the threat that Pakistan perceives from India, and the precarious nature of Pakistan’s national unity, especially the dissidence of the Pashtun and

Baluch, which Afghanistan has often supported.12

The unified front that all major powers must show to Pakistan in opposition to

its harboring of the Taliban command centers must be matched by offers to recognize the country’s international status in return for accountability for past nuclear

proliferation, and to address its conflicts with its neighbors. The United States,

NATO, and others should encourage the Afghan Government to initiate a dialog

over the domestically sensitive issue of recognition of the Durand Line between the

countries as a border, in return for secure trade and transport corridors to Pakistani

ports. Transforming the border region into a frontier of cooperation rather than conflict will require political reforms and development efforts in the tribal territories,

which will require further assistance, but, to repeat one United States senior leader’s words, ‘‘Until we transform the tribal belt, the United States is at risk.’’ The

United States should also weigh in with India and Afghanistan to assure that they

make extra efforts to assure Pakistan that their bilateral relations will not threaten

Islamabad.

Such a shift in United States policy toward Pakistan requires a transformation

from supporting President Musharraf to supporting democracy. Pakistan’s people

have shown in all national elections that they support centrist parties, not the

Islamist parties on which the military has relied. The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti

by the army has sparked revulsion throughout the political spectrum, weakening

the military’s position and strengthening calls within Pakistan to resolve internal

and external disputes through political means, rather than violence. The reassertion

of the civilian political center, as well as of Pakistan’s business class, which is profiting from the reconstruction of Afghanistan, provides an opportunity to move beyond the United States’ history of reliance on military rulers toward a more stable

relationship with a Pakistani nation moving toward peace with its neighbors and

with itself.

STRENGTHENING THE STATE

Creating a reasonably effective state in Afghanistan is a long-term project that

will also require an end to major armed conflict, economic development, and the

gradual replacement of narcotics by other economic activities. Recent crises, however, have exposed internal weaknesses that require both long-term programs and

transitional measures.

The two fatal weak points in Afghanistan’s Government today are the ministry

of the interior and the judiciary. Both are pervaded by corruption and lack basic

skills, equipment, and resources. Without effective and honest administrators, police, or judges, the state can do little to provide internal security.

Within the last year, Coalition military forces have devised a plan for the thoroughgoing reform of the MOI. The Coalition estimates that this plan is 3 years behind the similar program for the ministry of defense, and that it will take at least

a year before Afghans see any effects on the ground.

In Afghanistan, the president and minister of interior appoint all administrative

and police officials throughout the country. The Afghanistan Compact requires the

government to establish, by the end of September, a mechanism to vet such appointments for competence and integrity. Finding competent people willing to risk their

39

lives in a rural district for $60–$70 a month will remain difficult, but such a mechanism should help avoid appointments such as those hastily made in June.

Government officials have identified the biggest gap in the administration as the

district level. Elders (community leaders) from over 10 provinces agreed, repeatedly

complaining that the government never consults them. Some ministers have proposed paying 5 to 10 elders and ulama (learned clergy) in each district to act as

the eyes and ears of government, to be brought to meet governors and the president,

to have authority over small projects, and influence what is preached in the

mosques. They estimate the cost of such a program at about $5 million per year.

These leaders could also help recruit 200 young men from each district to serve

as auxiliary police. They would receive basic police training and equipment to serve

under a police commander who has gone through the reform process. Unlike militias, auxiliary policeman would be paid individually, and the commander would be

a professional from outside the district. The elders would be answerable for their

behavior.

Courts, too, may require some temporary auxiliary institutions. Community leaders complained constantly about judicial corruption. Many demanded the implementation of shari’a law, which they contrasted not to secular law, but to corruption.

As an elder from Paktia said, ‘‘Islam says that if you find a thief, he has to be punished. If a murderer is arrested, he has to be tried and executed. In our country,

if a murderer is put in prison, after 6 months he bribes the judge and escapes. If

a member of parliament is killed, as in Laghman, his murderer is released after 3–

4 months in prison because of bribery.’’

Lack of law enforcement undermines the basic legitimacy of the government. Enforcement by the government of the decisions of Islamic courts has always constituted a basic pillar of the state’s legitimacy in Afghanistan, and failure to do so

brands a government as un-Islamic.

The August 5 swearing in of a new Supreme Court, which administers the entire

judicial system, will make judicial reform possible, but training a corps of prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers will take years. The only capacities for dispute resolution and law enforcement that actually exist in much of the country consist of

informal village or tribal councils and mullahs who administer a crude interpretation of shari’a. During the years required for reform, the only genuine alternatives

before Afghan society will be enforcement of such customary or Islamic law, or no

law. The Afghan Government and its international supporters will therefore have

to find transitional ways to incorporate such procedures into the legal system by recognizing them and subjecting them to judicial or administrative review. Such a program would also put more local Islamic leaders—over 1,200 of whom have been

dropped from the government payroll this year—back under government supervision.

Attempts to inject aid into the government have met a major bottleneck: Last year

the government managed to spend only 44 percent of money it received for development projects. The ministry of rural rehabilitation and development accounted for

nearly half of the government’s development spending, while key ministries like agriculture, energy and water, and public works could not execute their budgets. According to the ministry of finance, donor countries spent about $500 million on poorly designed and uncoordinated technical assistance, to little effect. The World Bank

is designing a facility that will enable the government to hire the technical advisors

it needs, rather than trying to coordinate advisors sent by donors in accord with

their own priorities and domestic constituencies. The United States should support

this initiative as well as a major crash program to increase the implementation capacity of line ministries.

THE ECONOMY AND NARCOTICS

Afghanistan is the poorest country in the world except for a handful of countries

in sub-Saharan Africa. Policy makers focusing on ‘‘killing terrorists’’ or ‘‘holding

democratic elections’’ too often ignore this fundamental fact, which affects everything we try to do there. As numerous studies have documented over the years, Afghanistan has never received the investment of resources needed to stabilize it.

International military commanders, who confront the results of this poverty every

day, estimate that we need to ‘‘double’’ our resources. Doubling the economic resources going to Afghanistan would still leave it far behind Iraq, and such aid would

be far more productive in Afghanistan. Major needs are accelerated road building,

purchase of diesel for immediate power production, expansion of cross-border electricity purchase including deals with Pakistan for the south and east, investment

in major water projects to improve the productivity of agriculture, development of

40

the infrastructure needed for mineral exploitation, and a massive program of skills

building for both the public and private sector.

Afghanistan desperately needs to take on the threat from its narcotics economy

in a way consistent with its overall struggle for security and stability. United States

policy consisted first of aiding all commanders who fought the Taliban, regardless

of their involvement in drug trafficking, and then, when the domestic war on drugs

lobby raised the issue, to pressure the Afghan Government to engage in crop eradication. To Afghans this policy looks like rewarding rich drug dealers and punishing

poor farmers, a perception skillfully exploited by the Taliban.

The international drug control regime, which criminalizes narcotics, does not reduce drug use, but it does produce huge profits for criminals and the armed groups

and corrupt officials who protect them. Our drug policy grants huge subsidies to our

enemies. As long as we maintain our ideological commitment to a policy that funds

our enemies, however, the second-best option in Afghanistan is to treat narcotics as

a security and development issue. The total export value of opiates produced in Afghanistan has ranged in recent years from 30 to 50 percent of the legal economy.

Such an industry cannot be abolished by law enforcement. The immediate priorities

are massive rural development in both poppy-growing and nonpoppy-growing areas,

including roads and cold storage to make other products marketable; programs for

employment creation through rural industries; and thoroughgoing reform of the

ministry of the interior and other government agencies to root out the major figures

involved with narcotics, regardless of political or family connections.

News of this year’s record crop is likely to increase pressure from the U.S. Congress for eradication, including aerial spraying. Such a program would be disastrously self-defeating. If we want to succeed in Afghanistan, we have to help the

rural poor (which is almost everyone) and isolate the leading traffickers and the corrupt officials who support them.

IS THE GLASS HALF-FULL?

Some policy makers and observers claim that critics of the effort in Afghanistan

have excessive expectations and focus on challenges rather than achievements. They

want to talk about how the glass is half-full, not half-empty. As this analysis shows,

the glass is much less than half full. In any case, it does not matter how full the

glass is, if someone manages to tip it over or pull out the table on which it is resting.

The Afghan intelligence analysis quoted at the head of this report referred implicitly to the saying of Sun Tzu: ‘‘Know your enemy, know yourself; One hundred battles, one hundred victories.’’

United States policy makers have misjudged Afghanistan and misjudged Pakistan; most of all, they have misjudged their own capacity to carry out major strategic changes on the cheap in an area they do not understand. While the Bush administration has sown war and strengthened Iran while claiming to create a ‘‘New

Middle East,’’ it has failed to transform the region where the global terrorist threat

began and persists. If the United States wants to succeed, we need to focus on this

core task. To repeat once again, ‘‘Until we transform the tribal belt, the United

States is at risk.’’

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Rubin.

We will have once again a 10-minute period of questioning by

Senators who are present.

Let me just say at the outset that you have placed a high focus,

and deliberately so, on Pakistan and the thought that there may

be as many as 50 leaders that are in that area that might be apprehended according to the communication that you receive. What

is the basis of your intelligence or other reports that would lead

you to believe that Quetta, in fact, is the headquarters, that there

are that many persons of authority who act as a basis for destabilization of the neighboring country?

Dr. RUBIN. The statement I read to you is not my analysis. It is

a statement of a senior western analyst from a NATO troop contributing country that has access to all intelligence reports of all

agencies. Without—I cannot divulge some confidential communications that I have had with people in Kabul. Let me just say that

while I was in Afghanistan I met with President Karzai, the comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:09 Jun 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT mich PsN: mich
41

mander of the coalition, the commander of NATO, the head of the

NATO intelligence agency, the U.S. ambassador, the U.N. special

representative of the Secretary General, and many other people,

and I did not find anyone who disagreed with that assessment.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you mention in your paper that even if—

and this is a big if—the destabilization created by this nexus of alQaeda in Pakistan could be eradicated or even controlled, then you

move to the basic point you made, that Afghanistan is one of the

poorest countries in the world, rivaling at the bottom in per capita

income only in some sub-Saharan African countries. Then as a part

of that, I think you said only 5 percent of the gross national product, which is a very small figure, is apparently utilized by the government. That is the budget that President Karzai and his legislature have. Is that correct?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, their actual budget for expenditure is somewhat

larger because of foreign assistance. But basically, out of their own

resources they have enough money to buy everybody in the country

a case of Coca-Cola and then there is nothing left for schools, defense, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. So there really is a huge dependency upon these

foreign funds, from whichever sources they may come. We have

talked a little bit with General Jones about the insufficiency of

those contributions, although he mentioned a $27 billion budget request to the international community over a 5-year period of time,

indicating maybe $13 billion of that has been identified, maybe

even $11 billion already expended.

I raise this point because it seems to me most Americans taking

a look at Afghanistan would not know just off the top of the head

how poor the country is, how limited are the resources of this democracy that is now charged with providing services, and how dependent upon the international community, which we found in our

previous testimony has rather fractionated chains of command.

This is not meant to be terribly confusing because it arose from

Enduring Freedom, the military operation of the United States.

That continues. Now we have the ISAF operation of NATO involving the 37 countries that General Jones mentioned. But then also,

as he pointed out in his chart, this overall ceiling and roof which

is the United Nations command, has apparently administrative responsibility for each of the five pillars, only one of which the

United States has a major responsibility over, although we contribute to each of the others.

But there are at least three different situations there with which

this Government in Afghanistan must cooperate or contend, as the

case may be. Because of deficiencies in the training of police or security, as you say, it is very hard to eradicate drugs in an area in

which conflict is proceeding, with maybe a reliance of some Afghans upon, if not Taliban, others, warlords or what have you, that

provide security that the legitimate forces are not providing.

Into all of this then, in your paper you mention that there is a

severe shortage of electricity. This has been mentioned in Iraq frequently as very, very demoralizing.

But describe, if you can, just that factor alone, keeping the lights

on in the country?

42

Dr. RUBIN. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, if you like I can provide

a little bit more background on the general reconstruction situation

very briefly.

The CHAIRMAN. Good.

Dr. RUBIN. First, the figures—let me clarify the figures that I had passed to General Jones. The estimate of $27.6 billion is the

estimate of the Government of Afghanistan, aided by international

financial institutions, for its reconstruction needs looking forward

for the next 5 years.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Dr. RUBIN. There are some pledges for that. The $13 billion is

the amount of funds that have been committed, that is contracts

signed, since the government of President Karzai came to power.

That is looking backward. So far, $11 billion of that has actually

been disbursed.

Now, much of that, first of all, was not spent on reconstruction.

Much of it was spent on postwar humanitarian operations. That is

the reason that we have had no new power plants, that we have

very late start of road construction, relatively few road constructions, no major water projects in a country where water is the most

scarce input into agriculture, which is the major economic activity,

and so on. That is, the reconstruction funds are inadequate.

Second is the efficiency of the way those reconstruction funds are

used is very poor. Part of that I have to say is due to U.S. legislation which requires that our aid funds be spent on U.S. contractors,

and that tremendously inflates the cost because U.S. contractors

are not really able to operate in Afghanistan. So they spend a lot

of money on overhead and then they just do subcontracting.

As far as coordination is concerned, I will not go into some technical details. There is a fund through the World Bank to provide

a trust fund—budgetary support—for the Afghan Government. As

you know as members of our national legislature, one of your most

important functions is passing the budget and oversight of public

expenditure. That is your basic function actually. When a public

expenditure is appropriated and carried out by foreigners, the legislature has very little to do actually.

So it is important that, even if it is being funded by foreign aid,

to the extent possible it be put through the budgetary mechanism

so they can develop accountability and the capability of implementation. Again, some of our legislation prevents us from appropriating funds in that direction. We have made an international

commitment in the Afghanistan Compact to try to move more in

that direction and I hope we will do that.

As far as electricity is concerned—oh, let me just say also, the

model for coordinating this now, it is not under U.N. administration. Since the Government of Afghanistan is now fully established

and has a constitutional structure and all three branches operating, if not particularly well, they are now in charge and there is

a joint international Afghan body called the Joint Coordination and

Monitoring Board, which is in charge of all this theoretically.

Now, on electricity, there is a severe shortage of electricity. Some

of the major cities purchase it from abroad, Herat from Iran,

Mazar-e Sharif from Uzbekistan. On the one hand, Kabul city, the

capital, which is the real political problem, will according to plan

43

get electricity in 2 or 3 years via transfer from Central Asia, where

there is a lot of hydropower. In the period until then, the only way

to keep the lights on will be to continue to purchase diesel to run

some very inefficient power plants.

The United States was doing that. We have cut back on that this

year. We have to get that money there this month or there will not

be fuel for this winter. I do not have up-to-date information on

where that stands, but that is key. There were riots in Kabul May

29. If there is no electricity this winter there could be much more

severe riots.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have clarified a little bit the chain of

command. But with this government plus the coordinating group,

say from the U.N., is there some overall business plan for how

these five pillars General Jones described and that you have

touched upon are to be administered? Is there some way in terms

of our oversight that we could understand who is supposed to do

what?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, the Afghan Government—and I actually worked

on this project as an advisor—has issued its interim Afghan national development strategy——

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Dr. RUBIN [continuing]. Which was submitted to the London conference last January. That is available online. I can assist you in

seeing that, and there is an implementation strategy attached to

that. It still needs to be much better developed, but it is there for

you to look at.

The CHAIRMAN. And funded, so we have some idea.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes. It has been costed approximately. But I should

note that it is difficult to estimate the costs because the cost depends on the mechanism of delivery. A school built by USAID costs

$125,000. A school built by the Afghan Government costs $40,000

to $50,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Sarbanes.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL R. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM

MARYLAND

Senator SARBANES. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Rubin, we are very pleased to have you here. I have long

held the view that we diverted our attention and resources away

from Afghanistan far too early and that we are increasingly paying

a price for that. It seems to me that they have put a government

into place. They have chosen a leader through a constitutional

process, which commands some credibility, and we need to provide

stronger and continuing support in order to try to make a success

out of it, and I am very much worried about what is taking place.

Let me ask you, to what do you attribute the significant upsurge

in Taliban insurgent activity that we have seen in recent times?

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you, Senator.

The Taliban were not defeated; they were displaced, and they

went to Pakistan. In Pakistan, they have reorganized themselves

with very little hindrance, both in the tribal territories and in the

areas they originally organized themselves. The Taliban were always a joint Afghan-Pakistani operation. As General Musharraf

44

said in Kabul last week, the Government of Pakistan supported the

Taliban. They helped create them and fund them. Their base—and

in fact they have more political support in Pakistan than they do

in Afghanistan.

In addition—and of course, the United States focused solely on

a narrowly defined, or mainly on a narrowly defined counterterrorism mission, namely looking from time to time for the top

leaders of al-Qaeda, did not hold Pakistan’s feet to the fire about

harboring the Taliban.

Now, in addition, the war in Iraq has created a new terrorist safe

haven, a new proving ground and testing ground for tactics and

strategy, and we have seen, even in news reports, as well as people

tell me in intelligence reports, that there has been an exchange of

information and knowledge between the two fronts, which has resulted in the use of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan,

the astronomical increase in them and of suicide attacks, and also

the strategic objective of attacking non-American NATO troop contributors in order to weaken their political will, which worked to

some extent in Iraq because of the lack of support, but is not working in Afghanistan.

Senator SARBANES. Well, if you were put in charge of the Afghan

policy of our government, what would be your five-point plan to try

to address this situation? What should we be moving to do to address this situation, which I think is of growing dimensions and

growing concern?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, first I should say that I believe that the war in

Iraq is not related to the war—has no relationship to the attack on

us on September 11. I am mentioning this because the fact that our

government has projected it as part of the war has unfortunately

had a contaminating second order effect on the real theater in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in that unfortunately it has radicalized

the Taliban and pushed them closer to global jihadis, with whom

they had a troubled, somewhat troubled relationship in the past.

So first I would try to refocus on the real politically, militarily,

and in every way on the true source of global terrorism, which is

in that region, and change our policies in the Middle East. That

would have an effect in the area there.

Second, within the theater itself I would confidentially—so perhaps I should not say it here—but I would confidentially explain

to Pakistan that it is very difficult for us to continue to give them

military assistance and debt relief while they are harboring the

people who are killing our troops, and that they have to be at least

as active in taking down the Quetta shura as they were in combatting the insurgency, the Baluch nationalist insurgency in the same

province, which resulted in their killing of a respected civilian leader, Nowab Akbar Bukti.

I would overall at least double the amount of resources that we

are spending on reconstruction in Afghanistan and explore how we

could put more of those through the government budget.

Third, I would—and here I want to commend the coalition for

now having developed a coherent plan for reform of the police, but

that will take several years before effects are really seen on the

ground. I would develop an interim plan for both strengthening the

police and strengthening the judiciary on an emergency basis by

45

using as a transitional basis certain community institutions in Afghanistan, which would require a relatively small amount of funding—I spell this out in my paper—in order to support the creation

of community policing and community-based dispute resolution and

other kinds of justice mechanisms, which could then be linked to

the judicial system.

Fifth, fourth, I would focus on—I would work with the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime to develop an internationally accepted list

of drug kingpins and major drug traffickers in Afghanistan, have

that adopted by the U.N. Security Council, and issue sanctions

against them, combined with a political initiative within Afghanistan offering a conditional amnesty if they will bring their money

into legitimate investment and make some kind of restitution, in

a way analogous to transitional justice measures after a period of

war on conflict when you do not seek to punish every crime, but

have some kind of measures of reconciliation and restitution.

Then finally, I would focus a great deal of the increased reconstruction assistance on the basic elements of infrastructure for employment creation and rural development.

Senator SARBANES. That all suggests to me that in your judgment the structures that are there to try to remedy the situation

are acceptable or workable, because you have talked about moving

more resources through the Government of Afghanistan, the coalition effort, and so forth. Is that a correct perception on my part?

Dr. RUBIN. In part. Of course, you limited me to five points. Of

course all of those, in particular the Afghan Government requires

major reform measures. I might note there is a document, the Afghanistan Compact, which the United States played a very important role in drafting and agreeing to, as well as the United Nations

and 60 other countries and institutions, which lays out a program

for the next 5 years, including detailed benchmarks on this reform.

So the overall chapeau, the overall theme, I would say, is implementing the Afghanistan Compact. But obviously there are some

things that need to be prioritized and those are the ones in my

opinion that I mentioned.

Senator SARBANES. What is your reading on the coalition forces

and how they are proceeding and their capabilities?

Dr. RUBIN. Of course I am not a military analyst. In my view,

while we made serious errors in the beginning, analogous in a way

to errors made in Iraq of not having enough forces and also not

having the right mandate—we had no mandate—no force had the

mandate to provide security for Afghans afterward. That has

changed, I think largely due to the initiative of our commanders on

the ground, who came to understand the situation better than some

people in this town.

At the moment, the coalition has shifted to a more appropriate

type of footing, and of course is also handing off to NATO. I think

both the coalition and NATO commanders would agree, and I think

General Jones said this, that at this point the major task is not a

military one. It is political and economic. The military can help

create some of the conditions for that, but if the civilian and diplomatic efforts are not there to follow through then the tactical victories of which he spoke recently will not be translated into strategic success.

46

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From a strategic point of view, would you have delayed going

into Iraq, understanding that it might take the attention away

from Afghanistan? In other words, if we had a decision to make,

we could have gone any time we wanted to, the WMD came along,

people got hyperventilated, we got to go in there, we got to do the

job—as I look at it, if you step back, that could have been done

some other time.

So, in your opinion, was that a mistake to go in there, because

it dissipated our resources and took the focus off of Afghanistan?

Dr. RUBIN. First, of course, I do not have a vote on the record

to document what I thought at the time, but I believed that containment was working and there was no need to invade Iraq at any

time, nor was there a legitimate reason to do so. I believe that

when you are waging a war in which your national security is at

stake you must identify your enemies very carefully.

When we were attacked by Japan in 1941, we did not declare

general war against totalitarianism and attack the Soviet Union at

the same time. We were allied with the Soviet Union, which was

not a particularly nice or democratic regime.

Senator VOINOVICH. The answer to that is that you would not

have done it under either WMD reasons or under change of regime.

Okay.

Dr. RUBIN. May I add one other point?

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes.

Dr. RUBIN. Which is, we are engaged in a political battle for our

legitimacy as the leader of the world, and part of what has weakened us and has undermined for instance success in NATO is that

our prestige and credibility is now at an all-time low. That is particularly the case in the Muslim world, where at the moment

Osama bin Laden is more popular than our President in, for instance, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Now, that means that—and part of the reason for that is many

people, including Muslims, accepted that we had a legitimate right

to attack, to counterattack against the people who attacked us, but

when we then attacked a country that had nothing to do with September 11, but that had a lot of oil and that was in a sense a strategic opponent of us on some political issues, in a sense we were

carrying out, we were implementing the image of us that al-Qaeda

was trying to project, and that caused us to lose a great deal of

credibility and, frankly, it makes the administration’s rhetoric

about what we are trying to accomplish in the world not credible

to the overwhelming majority of people in the Muslim world and

elsewhere.

Senator VOINOVICH. Second, you made it very clear that if we are

going to be successful against the Taliban that President

Musharraf and the Pakistanis are really going to have to cooperate

with us and get serious. What argues against their not doing that?

In other words, is Musharraf fearful that if he really gets in and

does the job against the Taliban that he is going to jeopardize his

life or his future, political future, on the one hand? On the other

47

is, what incentive does he have to go in there and do what we want

him to do?

Dr. RUBIN. I thank you for asking that question, because I would

not like to, under the pressure of time, leave the impression that

I am broadly against Pakistan or against President Musharraf. I

believe that President Musharraf is personally courageous and he

is not influenced by fears of what might happen to him personally.

But Pakistan’s national interest is much more complicated than

sometimes we understand.

Pakistan has been, ever since its inception, locked in a conflict

with India, a country which is eight times larger and more economically dynamic and also a fellow owner of nuclear weapons. In

addition, Afghanistan has never recognized the line separating Afghanistan from Pakistan and there has always been a hostile relationship between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Even the Taliban refuse to recognize that border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s key internal problem has been integrating the ethnic

minorities that live along the border with Afghanistan, the Baluch

and the Pashtuns, and it fears that—and Afghanistan has at times

in the past, sometimes with Soviet assistance, stirred up trouble in

that area.

For all of these reasons, Pakistan has used the funding and support of mujahedin, jihadi groups, and what we call terrorists as an

instrument, as a force multiplier. They have managed to keep

700,000 Indian troops tied down in Kashmir, away from the border

with Punjab, at a very low cost by use of these groups. Similarly,

they imposed a high cost on the Soviet Union and so on.

Therefore this is something that has become very well integrated

into their foreign policy because of some real security concerns that

they have. We have to help them address those security concerns

with regard to both India and Afghanistan.

Senator VOINOVICH. I take it from what you have said that you

feel that the resources that are really needed coming from the

United States ought to be redoubled in terms of reconstruction to

indicate a real seriousness about really making a difference in Afghanistan.

Then, how important is it to our allies—I am pleased that they

have been able to join us there and send their troops, but how urgent is it for them in terms of their own economic or their own security interests to be there and that it be successful? Or is this just

something they are doing to show their colors and they are not as

committed to seeing that Afghanistan be successful?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, I appreciate that question as well because it enables me to clarify something. What I actually meant is the total

international resources devoted to Afghanistan should be doubled.

That would mean doubling our contribution, but it would mean

doubling everyone else’s as well, not just ours.

I think if you look at the overall foreign policy commitments of

many of our allies there, you will see that it is a much higher priority for them than it is for us, relative to other things. For instance, Afghanistan is by far the largest international commitment

of the Government of Canada, both in terms of foreign assistance

and in terms of troops. The same is true for the Netherlands. The

48

same is true for the United Kingdom with the exception of Iraq. I

believe it may also be true to some extent for Germany. Certainly

it is one of the largest military operations that they have, though

it is small. So it is important for them.

Senator VOINOVICH. It is important. And why is it important for

them?

Dr. RUBIN. I think mainly it is important to them because of

their relationship with us, because they see that—they believe that

a secure United States is essential to their own security. And despite the very strong disagreements that many of them have over

Iraq and other aspects of our policy, they really very much do want

to stand with the United States whenever they can.

Some of them also have been attacked, of course.

Senator VOINOVICH. Also they—do you think that they are going

to stay at the wheel on this when they start encountering deaths

and so forth? Some of them I think thought they were going over

there and do a little peacekeeping and now they are in areas where

this is real serious and they are losing troops there. Do you think

they are going to have the willpower, the staying power, to say we

are going to stay in there in spite of the fact that we are losing

people and maybe back home it might be unpopular?

Dr. RUBIN. Certainly there is controversy over it in some countries. But—and I have traveled to many of these countries. I should

also say Spain, it is very important for them. The governments in

these countries are making very serious efforts to explain the importance of this to their people. That is why President Karzai is addressing the Canadian parliament today.

My impression is that, while I cannot predict exactly what will

happen, that the governments and the majorities there are firmly—

the governments are very firmly committed to doing this. The people do not always understand exactly the reasons for it, but the

governments are making efforts to explain it because it is an important commitment to them.

Senator VOINOVICH. I will be interested. As I mentioned, we will

be at that NATO parliamentary meeting. It might be good to look

at an aspect of which countries are there and talk to their parliamentarians and try to get a feel for how committed they are to this

and do they understand the importance to their respective countries.

Dr. RUBIN. Well, I have addressed the NATO interparliamentary

assembly actually on two occasions, and I have found that there

was a rather high level of commitment, though they had a number

of questions quite similar to the ones that you have posed today.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you very much.

Dr. RUBIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Voinovich,

for your questions, and likewise for your service on the interparliamentary work with NATO. I would add that, as we all know,

there will be a summit of NATO nations in Riga in the latter part

of November in which my understanding is this is likely to be a

part of the agenda. We have been having some informal meetings

to try to think through what ought to happen at that meeting.

But one thing that will happen, I suspect, is the discussion that

General Jones alluded to this morning, and that is that the miliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 16:09 Jun 20, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\AFGHAN.TXT mich PsN: mich
49

tary budgets total of many of our NATO allies have continued to

diminish as a percentage of their gross national product, and that

is not a new factor. This has been adrift for a while. So even when

there is commitment to do some things, the resources, particularly

with expeditionary forces that can go outside the borders of the

country, are still very, very limited. This is a predicament for

NATO as an organization, quite apart from its commitment in Afghanistan.

But I appreciate the point you have made in response, because

it is a very important one in terms of the continuity. The thing that

keeps running through my mind as I listen to this, and I do not

want to be adhering simply to the budget, is that it is the most important aspect, but the needs are so tremendous here in terms of

money and, as you have said, beyond that, how the money is spent

organizationally, how it actually hits the ground in Afghanistan,

how it buttresses the self-government of that country and its fledgling democracy and the sophistication of that distribution.

You have mentioned an overall plan coming from the Government itself, of Afghanistan, which you have referenced today. But

it would seem to me this is going to be a very important aspect of

our continuing debate. Otherwise we are likely to have debate on

the floor or hearings in which we lament certain parts of what we

have talked about today—lack of training of police or security people, why the warlords are still playing such a role, whatever happened to the al-Qaeda, and so forth. These are very, very important

items, but underlying all of this has to be the institution-building

that is going to require money, and from a country, as you started

out with, that is extremely poor and that has from its own resources so little to deal with, although we all hope that will grow.

I think in your paper you mention you can have exponentially large

rises in the percentage of GNP in a country when the base is that

small. So that is an encouraging factor.

But I thank you very much for your paper and your testimony.

They have been most informative and helpful to us.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask one last

thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course.

Senator VOINOVICH. You alluded to the issue of the drug problem

in the United States and I got the impression that some of these

drugs are coming into the United States.

Dr. RUBIN. Well, I perhaps should have said the developed world.

I believe actually the bulk of the narcotics produced in Afghanistan

are consumed in Iran and Pakistan.

Senator VOINOVICH. So that is why the Iranians are so interested

in making sure it stops.

Dr. RUBIN. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. The reason I bring it up is I just had our

local FBI director visit with me from Cincinnati and he said, ‘‘Senator, the issue of terrorism is one that we are gravely concerned

about.’’ But he said, ‘‘The biggest issue that we have got here in

the United States that we are not paying attention to is the drug

problem, and that our resources are being kind of spread out and

we really have got to look at that.’’ It is still there and we need

to deal with it and we are not directing our attention to it.

50

I think you remember the other hearing we had a year or so ago

where we had the folks in here and they were talking about how

active the Russian mafia is in the United States and seemed to be

doing about whatever they wanted to do because we do not have

the resources to deal with that problem.

So from my perspective you are saying the biggest market is in

those countries you just mentioned.

Dr. RUBIN. That is in physical quantity. The biggest market in

money is in Europe and of course in the United States.

If I may add, if you do not mind my mentioning something that

I heard in the other house yesterday, Dr. Walt, a Republican from

Texas, mentioned at the hearing yesterday that in his view we had

failed to learn the lessons of Prohibition, which of course provided

the startup capital for organized crime in the United States, and

that in effect by turning drug use into a crime we are funding organized crime and insurgency around the world, and it may be that

we need to look at other methods of regulation and treatment.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Voinovich. It is a fascinating

thought that you just imparted, that although the bulk of the drugs

may be utilized by Iran and Pakistan, that the greatest value for

those that are not imbibed by these countries comes from Europe

and the United States. Why? Because the people surely do not receive it for free, but what is the distribution? Why are Pakistan

and Iran so afflicted by drugs?

Dr. RUBIN. Well, they are closer. Basically, the price—the cost of

production is a negligible portion of the price of narcotics.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is transportation.

Dr. RUBIN. No, no. It is risk because it is illegal. If it were not

illegal it would not be—it would be worth hardly anything. It is

only its illegality that makes it so valuable.

The CHAIRMAN. Another fascinating topic.

Well, we thank you again for your helpfulness, Dr. Rubin.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

Æ