NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

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No. 21-2674

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

FREDERICK H. BANKS

 Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 2-15-cr-00168-001

Chief District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1 (a)

March 3, 2022

Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 21, 2022)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent.
2

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Frederick Banks appeals from the District Court’s order denying his motion 

for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). For the reasons that 

follow, we will affirm.

I

A jury found Banks guilty of both wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. 

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1028A. The District Court sentenced Banks to 104 months’ 

imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. It is projected that he 

will be released in February 2023. 

In July 2021, Banks filed his fourth motion seeking compassionate release. 

Seven days later, and before the Government had an opportunity to respond, the 

District Court denied the motion. This pro se appeal followed.1

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The District Court’s order was entered on July 30, 2021. According to the 

Certificate of Filing set out at the bottom of Banks’ Notice of Appeal, Banks “served 

and filed a true and correct copy on 8/5/21 . . . by handing a copy to the corrections

officer addressed to the Clerk.” GAppx1. As a result, under the prison-mailbox 

rule, Banks’ pro se appeal was timely filed on August 5, 2021. See Houston v. Lack, 

487 U.S. 266, 275 (1988) (establishing “bright-line rule” that the date on which a 

pro se prisoner files his Notice of Appeal is the date he delivers the Notice to the 

prison authorities to mail on his behalf).

Yet the appeal was not docketed until September 7, 2021. The Government 

highlights this latter date and asserts that the Notice of Appeal is untimely because 

Banks did not comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c). It faults Banks 

for failing to specify if a “legal mail” system was used, and whether first-class 

postage was prepaid. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1) and (c)(1)(A)(ii). While the 
3

II.

A District Court “may reduce [a federal inmate’s] term of imprisonment . . . 

if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). If an inmate demonstrates that extraordinary and 

compelling reasons exist, then the District Court must consider the sentencing 

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to the extent that they are applicable.” Id. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 2020). 

Before an inmate may move for compassionate release, however, he “must at least 

ask the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to do so on [his] behalf and give BOP thirty days 

to respond.” United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 595 (3d Cir. 2020).2

As the Government points out, Banks did not comply with this exhaustion 

requirement. Although he alleged, without providing any supporting documentation,

that he “exhausted all available remedies before filing” his fourth compassionate 

Certificate of Filing could have been more precise, we conclude that the Notice of 

Appeal sufficiently complies with Rule 4(c). The Certificate was made under 

“penalty of perjury,” specifies the date it was handed to the correctional officer, 

which implicitly suggests there is a system for legal mail, and the hand-written 

addressed envelope that contained the Notice of Appeal had a “Forever” postage 

stamp affixed. 

2 We review a District Court’s denial of a compassionate release motion for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021)

(citing Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330). We will uphold a District Court’s decision 

unless “we are left with a ‘definite and firm conviction that [it] committed a clear 

error of judgment.’” Id. at 262 (quoting Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330).
4

release motion,

3 GAppx81, it is clear that he did not wait the requisite 30-day period.

Banks explained in his motion, which was dated July 17, 2021, that he had been 

transferred to Fort Dix FCI “a week ago.” GAppx78. Accordingly, at most, only 17 

of the 30 days had elapsed when Banks handed his motion to the correctional officer.

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is generally considered a 

“mandatory claim-processing rule.” United States v. Sanford, 986 F.3d 779, 782 (7th 

Cir. 2021) (agreeing with several of its sister circuits regarding the nature of the 

requirement and citing, inter alia, Raia, 954 F.3d at 597). As a result, the 

Government’s invocation of the rule on its first opportunity to do so here on appeal 

requires that we enforce it. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 

138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017) (instructing that “mandatory claim-processing rules must 

be enforced” if properly invoked). 

Even if we were to reach the merits, we would conclude that the District Court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Banks’ motion for compassionate release.

Having considered three previous motions, the District Court was fully aware of his

circumstances and medical conditions. When Banks alleged that relief should be 

3 In a supplemental appendix, Banks provided a copy of a request to Warden David 

Ortiz at Fort Dix FCI, presumably to show he satisfied the requirement of asking the 

BOP to move for compassionate release on his behalf. That request, however, is 

dated September 2, 2021. Inasmuch as that request was made two months after 

Banks’ fourth motion was filed in the District Court, it cannot satisfy the exhaustion 

requirement.
5

granted because he was vomiting blood and not receiving proper medical care, the 

District Court directed that the Government provide his medical records. The Court 

concluded that the records did not substantiate his claim of vomiting blood. Our own 

review confirms as much. The Court permissibly concluded that he had failed, again,

to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting release.

4

In sum, Banks’ pro se appeal fails on both procedural and substantive grounds. 

We will affirm the District Court’s order denying compassionate release.

4 In the absence of extraordinary and compelling circumstances, the District Court 

did not need to proceed to the next step of analyzing the § 3553(a) factors. See 

Andrews, 12 F.4th at 262.