# C_2015150EN.01001001.xml

| 7.5.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 150/10 |
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7.5.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 150/10

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

of 17 October 2014

in Case E-28/13

LBI hf. v Merrill Lynch International Ltd

v

(Article 30(1) of Directive 2001/24/EC — Winding up of credit institutions — Applicable law — Voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts — Acts governed by the law of another EEA State)

(2015/C 150/10)

In Case E-28/13, LBI hf. v Merrill Lynch International Ltd – REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice from Reykjavík District Court (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur) concerning the interpretation of Article 30(1) of Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions, the Court, composed of Carl Baudenbacher, President, Per Christiansen (Judge-Rapporteur) and Páll Hreinsson, Judges, gave judgment on 17 October 2014, the operative part of which is as follows:

Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur

| 1. | The expression ‘voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts’ in Article 30(1) of Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions also refers to rescission in bankruptcy law on the basis of avoidance rules, such as those included in Chapter XX of the Icelandic Bankruptcy Act No 21/1991. |
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1.

The expression ‘voidness, voidability or unenforceability of legal acts’ in Article 30(1) of Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions also refers to rescission in bankruptcy law on the basis of avoidance rules, such as those included in Chapter XX of the Icelandic Bankruptcy Act No 21/1991.

| 2. | Under the second indent of Article 30(1) of Directive 2001/24/EC the beneficiary must prove that, whether for substantive or procedural reasons, under the law governing the act detrimental to the creditors as a whole, there is no possibility, or no longer a possibility, to challenge the act in question.
  A concrete assessment of the specific act in question must be undertaken. Consequently, even if the act can in principle be challenged under the law of the EEA State governing it, it is sufficient that the beneficiary proves that the requirements for such a challenge are not fulfilled in the case at hand.
  It must be assessed according to the rules of the home EEA State whether or not the beneficiary has proved that the law applicable to the act does not allow any means of challenge. |
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2.

Under the second indent of Article 30(1) of Directive 2001/24/EC the beneficiary must prove that, whether for substantive or procedural reasons, under the law governing the act detrimental to the creditors as a whole, there is no possibility, or no longer a possibility, to challenge the act in question.

A concrete assessment of the specific act in question must be undertaken. Consequently, even if the act can in principle be challenged under the law of the EEA State governing it, it is sufficient that the beneficiary proves that the requirements for such a challenge are not fulfilled in the case at hand.

It must be assessed according to the rules of the home EEA State whether or not the beneficiary has proved that the law applicable to the act does not allow any means of challenge.

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