United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

INSPECTORS 

GENERAL 

Activities of the 

Department of State 

Office of Inspector 

General 

March 2007 

 

GAO-07-138 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2007

INSPECTORS GENERAL 

Activities of the Department of State 

Highlights of GAO-07-138, a report to the Office of Inspector General 

Chairman and Ranking Member, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the 

Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., 

House of Representatives. 

GAO was asked to review the 

Department of State Office of

Inspector General (State IG) 

including its (1) organization, 

budget levels, and 

accomplishments; (2) audit and 

inspection coverage of the 

department; (3) role of inspections

in the oversight of the department; 

(4) quality assurance process 

including assurance of 

independence; and (5) coordination 

of State IG investigations with the 

State Department’s Bureau of

Diplomatic Security. GAO obtained

information from State IG reports,

interviews, and documentation for 

a sample of inspections. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five

recommendations for the State IG

to (1) reassess the proper mix of 

audits and inspections to ensure 

appropriate oversight, (2) include 

reviews of information technology 

inspections in its internal quality

review process, (3) develop a 

succession planning policy that 

specifies appropriate personnel to 

serve in an acting IG capacity, (4) 

provide staffing alternatives for 

identifying those who lead 

inspections, and (5) develop a 

formal agreement to coordinate

internal department investigations

with the Bureau of Diplomatic

Security. 

In comments on a draft of the 

report, the State IG agreed with 

two recommendations, partially 

agreed with one, and disagreed 

with two.

The State IG provides oversight of the State Department, the Broadcasting

Board of Governors, and the foreign affairs community, including the 

approximately 260 bureaus and posts around the world, through financial 

and performance audits, inspections, and investigations. Over fiscal years

2001 through 2005, in terms of constant dollars, the State IG’s budget has 

increased by 1 percent while the State Department’s overall budget has 

increased by 50 percent. This represents a relative decrease when comparing 

State IG with other agencies’ ratios of IG budget to total agency budget. 

The State IG provides oversight coverage of the areas designated as high-risk

by GAO and management challenges identified by the IG, with a heavy 

emphasis on inspections. The State IG covers the high-risk areas of human 

resources, counterterrorism, public diplomacy, and information security,

almost exclusively through inspections. In fiscal year 2005, the State IG’s 

ratio of inspections to audits was over two to one, while the federal statutory 

IGs had a combined ratio of one inspection to every ten audits. 

There are fundamental differences between inspections and audits. By 

design, audits performed under Government Auditing Standards are 

subject to more in-depth requirements for the levels of evidence and the 

documentation supporting the findings than are inspections performed 

under inspection standards. Due to the significance of the high-risk areas 

covered largely by inspections, the State IG would benefit by reassessing the 

mix of audit and inspection coverage of those areas. 

The State IG’s audit and investigative functions both had recent peer reviews 

of quality assurance that resulted in “clean opinions.” There is no 

requirement for a peer review of inspections; however, during our audit the 

State IG began an internal quality review process for inspections but did not 

include reviews of information technology inspections. 

Independence is critical to the quality and credibility of all the work of the 

State IG. Two areas of continuing concern that we have with the 

independence of the State IG involve (1) the temporary appointment of State 

Department management personnel to head the State IG office in an acting 

IG capacity and who subsequently return to management positions, and (2) 

the rotation of Foreign Service staff to lead IG inspections, including many 

who, along with other IG staff, move to positions in department management 

offices. Such staffing arrangements represent potential impairments to 

independence and the appearance of independence under professional 

standards applicable to the IGs. 

Both the State IG and the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

pursue allegations of fraud by department employees. There is no functional 

written agreement in place to help ensure the independence of internal 

departmental investigations and preclude the duplication of efforts. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-138.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jeanette 

Franzel, (202) 512-9471, franzelj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Scope and Methodology 7 

Background 8

State IG Organization, Budgets, and Reported Accomplishments 12 

State IG Audit and Inspection Coverage of High-Risk Areas and 

Management Challenges 16 

Fundamental Differences between Audits and Inspections 19 

State IG Quality Assurance Process, Including Assurance over

Independence 20

IG Coordination with State Department Investigations 25 

Conclusions 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 28 

Agency Comments and Our Response 29 

Appendix I A Comparison of Fiscal Year 2001 Budgetary 

Resources for Selected Inspectors General and 

Agencies 32 

Appendix II A Comparison of Fiscal Year 2005 Budgetary 

Resources for Selected Inspectors General and 

Agencies 34 

Appendix III Comments from the Inspector General, Department 

of State 36 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43 

Tables 

Table 1: State IG Audit and Inspection Coverage of High-Risk Areas 

and Management Challenges for Fiscal Years 2004 through 

2005 18 

Page i GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Table 2: State Department Positions Held by Management Officials 

before and after Serving in an Acting State IG Capacity 

from January 24, 2003, through May 2, 2005 24 

Figures 

Figure 1: State IG Organization 13 

Figure 2: Selected State Department and State IG Resources for 

Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 14 

Figure 3: Distribution of State IG Onboard Staff, September 30, 

2005 15

Abbreviations 

DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

ECIE Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency 

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 

FTE Full-time-equivalent 

IG Inspector General 

IG Act Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended 

IRS CI Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation 

IT information technology 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PCIE President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency 

State IG Department of State Office of Inspector General 

TIGTA Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 

TVA Tennessee Valley Authority 

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Page ii GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 23, 2007 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Ranking Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

House of Representatives 

This report responds to your request that we review the operations and 

activities of the Department of State Office of Inspector General (State 

IG), including the audit, inspection, and investigative functions of the 

office. The State IG was established by section 413 of the Omnibus 

Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,1 which amended the 

Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act),2

 to include an independent office 

within the Department of State with a mission to prevent and detect waste,

fraud, abuse and mismanagement, and to improve the efficiency, 

effectiveness, economy, integrity, and accountability of the department. 

The IG Act created independent and objective Offices of Inspectors 

General to conduct and supervise audits and investigations. 

This report responds to your request that we review the operations and 

activities of the Department of State Office of Inspector General (State 

IG), including the audit, inspection, and investigative functions of the 

office. The State IG was established by section 413 of the Omnibus 

Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,1 which amended the 

Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act),2

 to include an independent office 

within the Department of State with a mission to prevent and detect waste,

fraud, abuse and mismanagement, and to improve the efficiency, 

effectiveness, economy, integrity, and accountability of the department. 

The IG Act created independent and objective Offices of Inspectors 

General to conduct and supervise audits and investigations. 

The State IG provides oversight of the Department of State, the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the foreign affairs community 

through audits, inspections, and investigations. The State IG performs 

financial and performance audits that cover a wide range of the 

department’s operations, financial management, contracts and grants, 

property management, and procurement. The State IG also performs 

inspections of the department’s approximately 260 bureaus and posts 

around the world to evaluate whether policy goals and objectives are 

being achieved, U.S. interests are effectively represented, posts are 

operating in accordance with U.S. foreign policy, and security

vulnerabilities are identified that could compromise national security and 

threaten the safety and well-being of U.S. personnel and facilities 

The State IG provides oversight of the Department of State, the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the foreign affairs community 

through audits, inspections, and investigations. The State IG performs 

financial and performance audits that cover a wide range of the 

department’s operations, financial management, contracts and grants, 

property management, and procurement. The State IG also performs 

inspections of the department’s approximately 260 bureaus and posts 

around the world to evaluate whether policy goals and objectives are 

being achieved, U.S. interests are effectively represented, posts are 

operating in accordance with U.S. foreign policy, and security

vulnerabilities are identified that could compromise national security and 

threaten the safety and well-being of U.S. personnel and facilities 

Activities of the S ties of the State IG

 1

Pub. L. No. 99-399, Title IV, § 413, 100 Stat. 853, 867-68 (Aug. 27, 1986). 

2

Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (Oct. 12, 1978), codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. 

Page 1 GAO-07-138
domestically and abroad. Also, specific allegations or other information 

indicating possible violations of law or regulation are investigated by IG 

investigators, supported by experts from other IG offices. 

To review the activities of the State IG, our specific objectives were to 

provide information regarding (1) organization, budget levels, and 

reported accomplishments; (2) audit and inspection coverage of the 

department; (3) the role of inspections in the State IG’s oversight of the 

department; (4) the quality assurance process used by the State IG, 

including assurance over independence; and (5) the coordination of the 

State IG’s investigative activity with the department’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security. We obtained information about the State IG’s budget 

and staffing levels by analyzing budget data reported by the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), and information regarding reported 

accomplishments in the State IG’s semiannual reports to the Congress. We 

conducted interviews with State IG officials and reviewed internal 

documents to obtain an understanding of the State IG’s allocation of 

resources and its quality assurance processes. We also reviewed the State 

IG’s documentation for a sample of inspection reports. 

Over fiscal years 2001 through 2005, the State IG’s budget has increased 

from $29 million to $32 million, which, when adjusted for inflation, 

represents an increase of approximately 1 percent in constant dollars. 

During the same period, the overall State Department budget has 

increased from $13.7 billion to $22.4 billion, an increase of approximately 

50 percent in constant dollars adjusted for inflation. When compared with 

other federal IG budgets, State IG’s relative ranking has declined in terms 

of its ratio of budgetary resources as a percentage of agency budget 

resources between fiscal years 2001 and 2005. During these same years, 

the State IG’s authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing level went 

from 289 to 314, with staff on board at 191 at the end of fiscal year 2005. In

distributing its resources, the State IG’s greatest use of staff during fiscal

year 2005 was in performing inspections, which involved 38 percent of 

total staff, with audits representing 28 percent of staff, and investigations 

representing 9 percent. The remaining 25 percent of staff provided 

administrative, personnel and legal support, and other specialized 

services. The State IG’s reported accomplishments over fiscal years 2001 

through 2005 include the issuance of 461 inspection reports and 210 audit

reports, and the closing of 252 investigative cases. The State IG also 

reported $75 million in financial accomplishments and $58.6 million in 

judicial recoveries and court-ordered fines and restitutions during that 

same period. 

Results in Brief 

Page 2 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
The State IG provides oversight coverage of the areas designated as highrisk by GAO and of the significant management challenges identified by

the IG through a combination of audits and inspections, with a heavy 

emphasis on inspections and to a lesser extent on audits. To illustrate, the 

State IG relies almost exclusively on inspections to provide coverage for 

the following four areas identified both as high-risk areas and as 

management challenges: human resources, counterterrorism, public 

diplomacy, and information security. In the high-risk areas and 

management challenges of physical security the State IG provides 

coverage mostly through inspections, but includes audits that address 

specific contracts and procurements for the purchase of equipment and 

services. The high-risk areas and management challenges of financial 

management are covered by the State IG’s financial audits and by a related 

component in each post inspection. As a comparison with other IG offices, 

in fiscal year 2005, the State IG’s ratio of inspections to audits was over 

two to one, while the statutory IGs across the federal government had a 

combined ratio of one inspection to every ten audits. Due to the 

significance of the high-risk areas covered largely by inspections, the State 

IG would benefit by reassessing the mix of audit and inspection coverage 

of those areas. 

There are fundamental differences between inspections and audits. For 

example, inspections and audits are typically conducted under separate 

standards with different basic requirements. IGs are required by the IG Act 

to follow Government Auditing Standards when performing audits.3

 In 

contrast, there are no statutorily mandated standards for inspections, 

although IGs are encouraged by the President’s Council on Integrity and

Efficiency (PCIE) and the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency 

(ECIE)4

 to follow the councils’ jointly created standards, Quality 

Standards for Inspections, when conducting inspections. By design, 

audits performed under Government Auditing Standards are subject to 

more in-depth requirements for levels of evidence and documentation 

supporting the findings than are inspections performed under the Quality 

Standards for Inspections. Also, auditing standards require external 

quality reviews of 

 3

5 U.S.C. App. § 4(b)(1). 

4

The PCIE is composed principally of the presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed 

IGs, and the ECIE is composed principally of IGs appointed by the heads of designated 

federal entities defined by the IG Act. Both were established by Executive Order to 

coordinate and enhance the work of the IGs. 

Page 3 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
audits, or peer reviews, on a 3-year cycle, while inspection standards do 

not call for any such external reviews. 

The State IG has distinct quality assurance processes that cover, in varying

degrees, its three major lines of work: audits, inspections, and 

investigations. The State IG has received “clean” opinions on its audit 

practice from the two external peer reviews it has received since 2001. The 

State IG has also implemented regular internal reviews of its audit process. 

For investigations, the State IG obtained the results of its first external 

quality review in November 2005. The results included a conclusion that 

the State IG’s investigative function was in full compliance with PCIE 

Quality Standards for Investigations and the Attorney General 

Guidelines For Offices Of Inspector General With Statutory Law 

Enforcement Authority. The external review also suggested 

improvements, which are being addressed by the IG. An external quality 

review, or peer review, of the State IG’s inspections is not required under 

the inspection standards. However, during our audit, the State IG 

established an internal program to review the quality of the inspection 

practice to determine whether that work was done in accordance with the 

PCIE and ECIE inspection standards. The internal review did not include 

information technology (IT) inspections, and a report of the internal 

review results was not yet available at the time we completed our work. 

Independence is an overarching element critical to the quality and 

credibility of all the work of the State IG and is at the heart of Government 

Auditing Standards and the IG Act. In addition, the Quality Standards 

for Federal Offices of Inspector General issued by the PCIE and ECIE to 

provide an overall quality framework for all the activities of the IG offices 

states that independence is a critical element of an IG’s obligation to be 

objective and free of conflicts of interest whether factual or perceived. 

Likewise, inspection standards also require that the inspection 

organization and each individual inspector be free both in fact and 

appearance from impairments to independence. The above standards 

recognize that personal impairments to independence can result from 

having responsibility for managing an entity or decision making that could 

affect operations of the entity or program being reviewed. 

Two continuing areas of concern that we have with the independence of

the State IG involve (1) the temporary appointment of State Department 

management personnel to head the State IG office in an acting IG capacity 

and who subsequently return to management positions, and (2) the 

rotation of Foreign Service staff to lead IG inspections, including many 

who, along with other IG staff, move to positions in department 

Page 4 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
management offices. For example, Foreign Service officials with the rank 

of ambassador or at the ambassador level typically lead the inspections 

work in accordance with the State IG’s policy. Such staffing arrangements 

represent potential impairments to independence and to the appearance of

independence under all applicable professional standards. We raised 

concerns about these independence issues in reports as far back as 19785

and 1982.6

The IG Act established an independent and objective Office of Inspector 

General to conduct and supervise audits and investigations to prevent and

detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in the State Department.7

In addition to the State IG, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) of the 

State Department’s Office of Management performs investigations for the 

department as part of its worldwide law enforcement functions and 

security mission. However, there is no functional agreement between DS 

and the State IG for coordinating their investigative activities. Both the 

State IG and DS investigators have responsibility for pursuing cases of 

passport and visa fraud that may involve State Department employees. 

Other agencies with investigative functions apart from their IGs, such as at 

the U.S. Postal Service and the Internal Revenue Service, have formal 

arrangements between the agency and the IG generally making the IG 

responsible for internal investigations of agency employees to help ensure

not only the independence of the investigations, but also to prevent 

duplicative reviews. The State IG does not have such an agreement with 

DS regarding its internal investigations of department employees. Such an

agreement could help to provide independent investigations of fraud with 

regard to State Department personnel, promote an efficient use of limited 

resources, and prevent duplication of efforts. 

Due to the risk and significance of the areas of the State Department’s 

operations that are largely being covered by inspections, and in light of the 

increasing level of funding provided to the department, we recommend in 

this report that the State IG reassess the proper mix of audit and 

inspection coverage with input from key stakeholders in the department 

and the Congress. In addition, to provide for a more complete quality 

 5

GAO, State Department’s Office of Inspector General, Foreign Service, Needs to Improve

Its Internal Evaluation Process, ID-78-19 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 1978). 

6

GAO, State Department’s Office of Inspector General Should Be More Independent and 

Effective, AFMD-83-56 (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1982).

7

5 U.S.C. App. § 2.

Page 5 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
review, we recommend that the State IG include inspections performed by 

the State IG’s Office of Information Technology (IT) in its quality review 

process. Also, to address our concerns regarding independence, we 

recommend that the State IG work with the Secretary of State to develop a

succession planning policy that would prohibit career Foreign Service 

officers or other department management staff from heading the State IG 

office in an acting IG capacity, and would remove reliance on career 

Foreign Service staff, and others who routinely rotate to management 

offices, to lead inspections. We also recommend that the State IG work 

with DS, the State Department Office of Management, and the Secretary of 

State to develop a formal written agreement to help ensure the 

independence and coordination of internal department investigations. 

In comments on a draft of this report the State IG agreed to include all IG

inspections, including inspections performed by IT, in its quality review 

process and to work with DS and others to develop a written agreement 

delineating the areas of responsibility for department investigations. The 

State IG disagreed with our recommendation to reassess the mix of audit 

and inspection coverage and stated that little can be accomplished by 

reassessment if there are not more auditors and more resources to 

perform audits. In addition, the State IG does not disagree with our 

concerns about Foreign Service officers temporarily heading the IG office

in an acting capacity, but believes that our recommendation goes too far

by limiting the pool of eligible candidates to personnel without State 

Department management careers. Also, the State IG believes that 

ambassadors who serve as team leaders for inspections raise a concern 

about the appearance of independence but that this concern is 

significantly outweighed by the overriding need for people with the 

experience and expertise of ambassadors to lead inspections. 

We continue to recommend that the State IG reassess the mix of audits 

and inspections as a way for the IG to define the appropriate level of 

oversight, reallocate current resources as appropriate, and justify any 

additional resources that may be necessary. In addition, we continue to 

recommend that the State IG better safeguard the independence 

requirements of his office through succession planning that excludes 

career department management officials from consideration for acting 

State IG positions. We also continue to recommend that the State IG 

inspections not be led by career Foreign Service officials, ambassadors, or 

other staff who could impair the independence of the inspection team or 

create the appearance of impaired independence. As team members rather 

than team leaders, such staff could provide the benefits of their experience 

and expertise without jeopardizing the inspection team’s independence. 

Page 6 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
We obtained the budget authority and the staffing levels at the State IG 

office and the budget authority of the State Department for fiscal years 

2001 through 2005 by analyzing OMB budget data for those years. 

Additional information on staff levels and resource distribution were 

obtained from the State IG to identify trends over this period. We 

identified audit, inspection, and investigative accomplishments reported 

by the State IG in semiannual reports to the Congress for fiscal years 2001 

through 2005. We did not audit or otherwise verify the dollar amounts of 

the financial accomplishments reported by the State IG. 

Scope and 

Methodology 

To review the IG’s audit and inspection oversight coverage of the State

Department, we compared the contents of the audits and inspections 

completed by the State IG in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 with the high-risk 

areas designated by GAO and with the management and performance 

challenges identified by the State IG. To review the investigative coverage,

we used the investigative accomplishments reported by the State IG to 

show the level of investigative activity. 

To obtain information about the quality control process used by the State 

IG, we obtained an understanding of the internal quality review process 

used by the IG. We also obtained reports of the most recent external 

quality peer reviews of the State IG’s audit and investigative activities 

performed by other IG offices. Due to the lack of a peer review 

requirement for inspections, we compared the State IG’s inspections with 

relevant standards related to independence, quality control, and evidence 

from the PCIE and ECIE Quality Standards for Inspections, 2005

revision, as well as the State IG’s implementing policies and procedures 

for these standards. We also compared relevant inspection standards with 

Government Auditing Standards, and compared additional activities of 

the State IG related to independence with PCIE and ECIE Quality 

Standards for Offices of Inspector General, revised in October 2003.

Specifically, we gained an understanding of the types of documentation 

and evidence supporting inspection recommendations through a 

judgmental sample of 10 inspection reports selected from a total of 112 

inspection reports issued over fiscal years 2004 through 2005 that were not 

classified for national security purposes, and that did not include 

inspections of the Board of Broadcasting Governors. We did not test the 

reasonableness of the inspection recommendations or otherwise reperform the inspections. Our sample covered different months, various 

team leaders, and different State Department locations. 

Due to the concerns of the State IG about the confidentiality of

information sources used to complete the IG’s inspections, we agreed to 

Page 7 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
limit the types of documentation subject to our review. Officials for the IG

stated that the documents not provided for our review were 

memorandums with information from confidential sources. We base our

conclusions on the documents and information that we reviewed related 

to our sample of inspection reports. In those examples where inspection 

report recommendations lacked documented support, we verified that this 

was not due to any such limitation to our review. 

To review the coordination of the State IG with DS, we obtained the 

annual reports issued by DS and additional information on cases of visa 

fraud that were investigated during fiscal years 2004 through 2005 from DS 

reports and a prior GAO report.8

 We also compared the coordination of 

investigations at the State Department with the practices of other IG 

offices at the U.S. Postal Service and the Internal Revenue Service. 

We obtained comments on a draft of this report from the State IG which 

are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. A summary of the State IG’s

written comments and our response are presented on page 29. We 

performed our audit from November 2005 through October 2006, in 

accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The inspection function within the State Department originated in 1906, 

when the Congress statutorily created a consular inspection corps of five 

officers to inspect the activities of the U.S. consulates at least once every 2

years.9

 In 1924, the Congress established the Foreign Service to replace the 

Diplomatic and Consular Service, and required the officers of the newly 

created Foreign Service to inspect diplomatic and consular branches, as 

provided under the 1906 Act.10 The provisions of the 1906 and 1924 acts 

were repealed by the Foreign Service Act of 1946,

11 which required the 

Secretary of State to assign Foreign Service officers to inspect the 

diplomatic and consular establishments of the United States at least once

every 2 years. In 1957, the State Department established an Inspector 

General of Foreign Service, which carried out the inspections of 

Background 

 8

GAO, Border Security: More Emphasis on State’s Consular Safeguards Could Mitigate 

Visa Malfeasance Risks, GAO-06-115 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2005). 

9

Pub. L. No. 83, ch. 1366, § 4, 34 Stat. 99, 100 (Apr. 5, 1906). 

10Pub. L. No. 135, ch. 182, § 10, 43 Stat. 140, 142 (May 24, 1924). 

11Pub. L. No. 724, ch. 957, § 681, 60 Stat. 999, 1018 (Aug. 13, 1946). 

Page 8 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
diplomatic and consular offices for the State Department. In 1961, the 

Congress created a statutory Inspector General in the State Department 

with duties separate from that of the Inspector General of Foreign Service, 

which had been established by the State Department. The new inspector 

general had the statutory responsibility to conduct reviews, inspections, 

and audits of State Department economic and military assistance 

programs and the activities of the Peace Corps.12 Effective July 1, 1978, the 

statutory IG office created in 1961 was abolished by law and all of the 

duties of that office were statutorily transferred to the Inspector General 

of Foreign Service.13 The newly designated Inspector General of Foreign 

Service was tasked with carrying out the foreign assistance program 

review function and the inspections of diplomatic and consular offices 

that had previously been conducted by the two separate offices. 

In 1978, GAO reviewed the operations of the Inspector General of Foreign

Service and determined that the IG’s inspection reports lacked substance 

because of the legal requirement for biennial inspections and the 

exceedingly broad scope and thin coverage of each inspection.14 GAO 

recommended that the Congress substitute the requirement for an 

inspection of each diplomatic and consular post at least every 2 years with 

a more flexible review schedule. GAO also questioned the independence of 

Foreign Service officers who were temporarily detailed to the IG’s office 

and recommended the elimination of this requirement provided by the 

Foreign Service Act of 1946. 

In 1980, the Congress again established a statutory IG, this time to act as a 

centralized unit within the State Department to include the functions of 

the previous IG of Foreign Service and to perform all audits, inspections, 

and investigations. Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980

established the Inspector General of the Department of State and Foreign 

Service and outlined the authority and functions of that position in specific 

terms.15 Section 209 patterned the State Department IG office after similar 

 12Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 624, 75 Stat. 424, 447 (Sept. 4, 1961). 

13Pub. L. No. 95-88, § 124, 91 Stat. 533, 541-42 (Aug. 3, 1977). Section 124 authorized the

President to assign to the Inspector General of Foreign Service all of the duties and 

responsibilities of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance, which he did by Executive 

Order 12066, June 29, 1978. 

14ID-78-19. 

15Pub. L. No. 96-465, Title I, ch. 2, § 209, 94 Stat. 2071, 2080 (Oct. 17, 1980). 

Page 9 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
offices in other agencies under the IG Act, but added functions from the 

Foreign Service Act of 1946 specific to the State Department. With regard

to inspections, the Congress directed the IG to “periodically (at least every 

5 years) inspect and audit the administration of activities and operations 

of each Foreign Service post and each bureau and other operating units of

the Department of State.” 

In 1982, we reviewed the operations of the Inspector General for the 

Department of State and Foreign Service.16 In that report, we compared the 

differences between the Foreign Service Act and the IG Act and noted that 

the 5-year inspection cycle required by the Foreign Service Act led to 

problems with the IG’s effectiveness by limiting the ability to do other 

work. In addition, our report expressed our persistent concerns about 

independence. These concerns were due, in part, to the IG’s continued use 

of temporarily assigned Foreign Service officers and other persons from 

operational units within the department to staff the IG office. Our report 

also noted that the IG had not established a quality review system to help 

ensure that the work of the office complied with professional standards, 

and that the IG used staff from the State Department’s Office of Security, a 

unit of management, to conduct investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse. 

We recommended that the Secretary of State work with the IG to establish 

a permanent IG staff and discontinue its reliance on temporary staff who 

rotate back to assignments in the Foreign Service or management 

positions. We also recommended that the Secretary and the IG establish an

investigative capability within the IG office to enable it to conduct its own 

investigations, and to transfer qualified investigators from the Office of 

Security to the IG for this work. 

Reacting to concerns similar to those expressed in our 1982 report, the 

Congress established an IG for the Department of State through 

amendments to the IG Act in both 198517 and 1986.18 These amendments 

designated the State Department as an agency requiring an IG under the IG

Act and abolished the previous Office of Inspector General of State and

Foreign Service, which was created under section 209 of the Foreign 

Service Act of 1980. The 1986 Act authorized the State IG to perform all 

duties and responsibilities, and to exercise the authorities, stated in 

 16AFMD-83-56. 

17Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 150, 99 Stat. 405, 427 (Aug. 16, 1985). 

18Pub. L. No. 99-399, Title IV, § 413. 

Page 10 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
section 209 of the Foreign Service Act and in the IG Act. The 1986 Act also

prohibited a career member of the Foreign Service from being appointed 

as the State IG. 

Since 1996, the Congress, through Department of State appropriations 

acts, annually waives the language in section 209(a) of the Foreign Service 

Act that calls for every post to be inspected every 5 years. The State IG 

continues to inspect the department’s approximately 260 posts and 

bureaus, and international broadcasting installations throughout the world 

by applying a risk-based approach. To illustrate, the State IG completed 

inspections at 223 bureaus and posts over the 5-year period of fiscal years 

2001 through 2005. These inspections encompass a wide range of 

objectives, which include reviewing whether department policy goals are 

being achieved and whether the interests of the United States are being

represented and advanced effectively. In addition, the State IG performs 

specialized security inspections and audits in support of the department’s 

mission to provide effective protection to its personnel, facilities, and 

sensitive intelligence information. Therefore, while there is no

requirement as a result of the annual waiver that inspections be 

performed, the State IG continues to conduct inspections as part of its 

plan for oversight of the department, using a risk-based approach to 

identify locations for inspections rather than the 5-year requirement. 

Inspections are defined by the PCIE and ECIE19 as a process that 

evaluates, reviews, studies, and analyzes the programs and activities of an

agency for the purposes of providing information to managers for decision

making; making recommendations for improvements to programs, polices, 

or procedures; and identifying where administrative action may be 

necessary. Inspections may be used to provide factual and analytical

information; monitor compliance; measure performance; assess the 

efficiency and effectiveness of programs and operations; share best 

practices; and inquire into allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and 

mismanagement. 

The IG Act requires the IGs to recommend policies, and to conduct, 

supervise, or coordinate other activities, in addition to audits and 

investigations, carried out by the department for the purpose of promoting 

economy and efficiency, and preventing fraud and abuse in its programs 

 19The PCIE and ECIE make no distinction between inspections and evaluations and include 

both in their definition. 

Page 11 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
and operations.20 These requirements of the IG Act are broad enough to 

cover inspections, which are widely used by the IG community. According 

to the IG community, inspections provide the benefits of a flexible 

mechanism for optimizing resources, expanding agency coverage, and 

using alternative review methods and techniques. In fiscal year 2005, 

across the federal government, the statutory IGs issued a total of 443

inspection reports compared to a total of 4,354 audit reports, a ratio of 

inspections to audits of about 1 to 10. As a comparison, the State IG issued 

99 inspection reports and 44 audit reports during fiscal year 2005, or a 

ratio of inspections to audits of over 2 to 1. 

The State IG currently provides oversight of the Department of State, the

Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the foreign affairs community 

through audits, inspections, and investigations. This work is led by the 

State Department Inspector General, Deputy Inspector General, Assistant 

Inspectors General for Audits; Inspections; Management, Policy, and 

Planning; and Investigations, and a Director for Information Technology.

In addition, the State IG has four advisory and support offices, which are 

the Office of Counsel, Congressional and Public Affairs, Senior Advisor for 

Security and Intelligence, and Coordinator for Iraq and Afghanistan. (See 

fig. 1.) 

State IG Organization, 

Budgets, and 

Reported 

Accomplishments 

 205 U.S.C. App. § 4(a)(3).

Page 12 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Figure 1: State IG Organization 

From fiscal year 2001 through 2005, the State IG’s overall budget authority 

went from $29 million to $32 million, which, when expressed in constant 

dollars,21 is an increase of approximately 1 percent. (See fig. 2.) Over the 

same period of time, the State Department’s overall budget authority 

increased from $13.7 billion in fiscal year 2001 to $22.4 billion in fiscal year 

2005, an increase of approximately 50 percent in constant dollars. When 

compared with other federal IG budgets, the State IG’s ranking in terms of 

percentage of total agency budgetary resources decreased from eighth 

(0.21 percent of total agency budgetary resources) to twelfth (0.14 percent

of total agency budgetary resources) between fiscal years 2001 and 2005.

(See apps. I and II.) The department’s budgetary increases reflect, in part, 

initiatives in transformational diplomacy, particularly in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, and substantial increases in programs for counter narcotics, 

counterterrorism, embassy construction and security, and IT. During the 

same time period, the State IG’s authorized FTE staff increased from 289 

in fiscal year 2001 to 314 in fiscal year 2005; however, during 2005, the IG 

 21We adjusted for inflation using the OMB Gross Domestic Product (GDP) inflator. 

Page 13 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
limited the actual onboard staffing to 191 of the 314 authorized FTEs due 

to budgetary constraints. This represents a 16 percent reduction of 

onboard staff when compared to the fiscal year onboard staffing level of 

227 in fiscal year 2001. The State IG has reported that its limited resources 

are further strained by the significant growth in the number of department 

programs and grants with mandated IG oversight and requests for joint 

activities with other departments, agencies, and IG offices. 

Figure 2: Selected State Department and State IG Resources for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 

Source: OMB, State IG.

Fiscal year

Department

budgetary

resources

Department budgetary

resources (in

constant dollars)

IG office

budgetary

resources

IG budgetary

resources (in

constant dollars)

2001 $13,679 $14,958 $29 $32

State Department and State IG total budgetary

resources for fiscal years 2001–2005 (in millions)

IG staff full-time-equivalent (FTE)

and actual staff

From fiscal year 2001 through 2005 the State IG’s overall budgetary resources went from $29 

million to $32 million which, expressed in constant dollars, is an increase of approximately 1 percent. 

Over the same period of time the State Department’s overall budgetary resources increased from 

$13.7 billion to $22.4 billion for an increase of approximately 50 percent in constant dollars. 

0

+50

+100

Percent change (fiscal years 2001–2005)

State IG

(+1%)

State Dept.

(+50%)

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

2002 $16,266 $17,453 $29 $31

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

2003 $16,311 $17,162 $29 $31

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

2004 $18,235 $18,737 $32 $33

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

2005 $22,371 $22,371 $32 $32

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Authorized FTEs

Actual staff

Authorized FTEs

Actual staff

Authorized FTEs

Actual staff

Authorized FTEs

Actual staff

Authorized FTEs

Actual staff

289

227

314

229

314

219

314

214

314

191

For fiscal year 2005, the State IG Office distributed its 191 onboard staff as 

follows: 38 percent of the staff performing inspections in the Office of 

Inspections and in the Office of Information Technology, 28 percent in the

Office of Audits, 9 percent in the Office of Investigations, and the 

remaining 25 percent in support positions to address administrative, 

Page 14 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
personnel, legal and other specialized issues. (See fig. 3.) This distribution 

shows the significant emphasis that the State IG places on inspections in 

relation to either audits or investigations. 

Figure 3: Distribution of State IG Onboard Staff, September 30, 2005 

6%

32%

9%

28%

25%

Source: State IG.

Staff used to perform inspections

Other staff

Office of information technology (11 FTEs)

Office of inspections (62 FTEs)

Office of investigations (17 FTEs)

Office of audits (54 FTEs)

Support functions (47 FTEs)

Statutory IGs, including the State IG, are required by the IG Act to 

summarize the activities and accomplishments of their offices and include

this information in semiannual reports provided for the Congress.22 The 

information includes the number of audit reports issued and the dollar 

amount of questioned costs, unsupported costs, and funds to be put to 

better use. As defined by the IG Act, questioned costs include alleged

violations of laws, regulations, contracts, grants, or agreements; costs not 

supported by adequate documentation; or the expenditure of funds for an 

intended purpose that was unnecessary or unreasonable. In addition, 

unsupported costs are defined as costs that do not have adequate 

documentation, and funds to be put to better use are defined as 

 225 U.S.C. App. § 5.

Page 15 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
inefficiencies in the use of agency funds identified by the IG. As an 

illustration of funds to be put to better use, the State IG identified 

weaknesses in the department’s purchase card program that resulted in 

untimely purchase card payments that precluded the department from 

earning rebates from the purchase card provider.23

During fiscal years 2001 through 2005 the State IG reported that it issued a 

total of 210 audit reports with total financial accomplishments of 

approximately $75 million. This included $37.1 million in questioned costs 

of which $17.9 million were unsupported costs, and $38 million in funds to 

be put to better use. The investigative activity reported over the same 5-

year period included 252 cases closed and financial accomplishments of 

$29.4 million in judicial recoveries, $17.6 million in court-ordered fines, 

and $11.5 million in court-ordered restitutions. In addition, the State IG 

reported that its investigations resulted in 92 prosecutorial referrals, 53 

indictments, 52 convictions, and 42 criminal sentences. 

Over the same 5-year period the State IG reported that it had issued 461 

inspection reports. The State IG’s semiannual reports include summarized 

results of its inspection activity even though this information is not 

specifically required by the IG Act. The results vary from identification of 

weaknesses in operations to recommendations for proper implementation 

of State Department policies. There were no significant monetary results 

reported from the State IG’s inspections. 

The State IG provides oversight coverage of the department primarily 

through a combination of audits and inspections, with, as shown earlier, a 

heavier emphasis on inspections. Although the Congress annually waives

the requirement to conduct inspections under section 209(a) of the 

Foreign Service Act, State IG officials told us that State Department 

management encourages the IG inspections and have found the results 

very significant and useful. Therefore, the IG continues to plan for 

inspections on a cyclical basis using a risk-based approach. As a result, 

over the 5-year period of fiscal years 2001 through 2005, the IG completed 

inspections at 223 of the 260 department bureaus and posts. 

State IG Audit and 

Inspection Coverage 

of High-Risk Areas 

and Management 

Challenges 

 23State IG, Review of the Department of State’s Overseas Purchase Card Program, 

AUD/PPA-05-01 (Washington, D.C.: December 2004).

Page 16 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
We also analyzed the State IG’s coverage of the areas designated as high 

risk by GAO and the significant management challenges identified by the 

State IG. Since 1990, we have periodically reported on government 

operations, including those of the State Department that we have 

designated as high risk because of their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, 

waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In addition, the IGs began the 

identification of management challenges in 1997 at the request of 

congressional members who asked the IGs to identify the most serious 

management problems in their respective agencies. This began a yearly 

process that continues as a result of the Reports Consolidation Act of 

2000.

24 The act requires executive agencies, including the State 

Department, to include their IGs’ lists of significant management 

challenges in their annual performance and accountability reports to the 

President, OMB, and the Congress. 

In our most recent reports of government high-risk areas issued in January

200325 and January 2005,26 we identified seven such areas at the State 

Department. These high-risk areas were also included in management 

challenges identified by the State IG. (See table 1.) Each year the State IG’s

Office of Inspections includes the management challenges identified by

the IG as areas of emphasis in inspections of the department’s bureaus or 

missions. Some areas of emphasis may be applicable only to embassies 

and other missions, while other areas of emphasis may be applicable only 

to domestic entities such as bureaus, offices, and other units. 

In our review of the issues addressed by the State IG’s audit and 

inspection reports for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, we determined that the

State IG had provided oversight of all identified high-risk areas and 

management challenges largely through inspections. The State IG 

inspectors use a questionnaire during each inspection to compile the 

information regarding the areas of emphasis including management 

challenges identified by the IG. Each questionnaire can cover numerous 

areas of emphasis, including several management challenges. Therefore, 

while the State IG issued a total of 203 inspection reports over fiscal years 

2004 through 2005, these inspections addressed 605 management 

challenges in the various posts, bureaus, and offices reviewed. In addition, 

 24Pub. L. No. 106-531, 114 Stat. 2537 (Nov. 22, 2000). 

25GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

26GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005). 

Page 17 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
the State IG relies almost exclusively on the results of inspections, as 

compared to audits, to cover the four high-risk areas and management 

challenges related to human resources, counterterrorism, public 

diplomacy and information security. (See table 1.) 

Table 1: State IG Audit and Inspection Coverage of High-Risk Areas and Management Challenges for Fiscal Years 2004 

through 2005 

Fiscal year 2004 State IG

reportsc

Fiscal year 2005 State IG

reportsd

GAO high-risk areasa

Management challenges identified

by the State IGb

Audits Inspections Audits Inspections

Physical security and 

management of U.S. facilities 

overseas 

Protection of people and facilities 27 98 21 92

Enhance information Information security 1 6 0 7

technology and security, 

strengthen financial 

management, improve 

performance planninge

Financial management 10 0f16 0f

Continue to right-size embassy 

staffing levels 

50 

Better manage human capital 

strategies 

Human resources 1 0 53

Strengthen the visa process 

through issuance of policies 

and procedures as an 

antiterrorism tool 

Counterterrorism and border security 0 98 2 92

Improve the management of 

public diplomacy programs 

Public diplomacy 1 50 1 53

Manage the large-scale 

reconstruction and nationbuilding programs 

Postconflict stabilization and 

reconstruction

4 0 4 6

Total high-risk areas and management challenges addressed by

audit and inspection reports 

44 302 44 303

Total audit and inspection reports issued 44 104 44 99

Source: GAO.

a

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: January 2005) and GAO, HighRisk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

b

Department of State, FY 2005 Performance and Accountability Report. 

c

State IG semiannual reports to the Congress for the periods ending March 31 and September 30, 

2004. 

d

State IG semiannual reports to the Congress for the periods ending March 31 and September 30, 

2005. 

e

Strategic and performance planning were removed in recognition of the State Department’s 

considerable progress in addressing that challenge. 

Page 18 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
f

Post inspections include a selected financial management component. 

To illustrate, for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 combined, the State IG covered

human resource issues with 1 audit and 103 inspections, counterterrorism 

and border security with 2 audits and 190 inspections, public diplomacy 

with 2 audits and 103 inspections, and information security with 1 audit 

and 13 inspections. (See table 1.) In contrast, over the same 2-year period, 

the State IG issued 88 audit reports and each addressed a single 

management challenge. For example, in the high-risk areas and 

management challenges of physical security, the State IG provides 

coverage mostly through inspections but includes audits that address 

specific contracts and procurements for the purchase of equipment and 

services. Also, while the State IG’s inspections obtain financial information 

at the department’s bureaus and posts, the high-risk areas and

management challenges of financial management are covered almost 

exclusively by the State IG’s financial audits. Due to the significance of the 

high-risk areas covered largely by inspections, the State IG would benefit 

by reassessing the mix of audit and inspection coverage for those areas. 

There are fundamental differences between inspections and audits. The 

PCIE and ECIE developed Quality Standards for Inspections in 1993, and 

revised them in 2005, to provide a framework for performing inspections.

There are similarities between these inspection standards and the 

Government Auditing Standards required by the IG Act for audits; but 

there are fundamental differences as well. Both standards require that 

(1) staff be independent, (2) evidence for reported results be documented,

and (3) the elements of a finding—criteria, condition, cause, and effect—

be included with the reported results. A fundamental difference between 

audits and inspections is the level of detail and requirements in the areas 

of sufficient, appropriate evidence to support findings and conclusions, 

and the levels of documentation of evidence needed to support findings, 

conclusions, and recommendations. Audits performed under Government 

Auditing Standards, by design, are subject to more depth in the 

requirements for levels of evidence and documentation supporting the 

findings than inspections performed under the inspection standards. In 

addition, while auditing standards require external quality reviews of 

auditing practices, or peer reviews, on a 3-year cycle by reviewers 

independent of the State IG’s office, neither the inspection standards nor 

the State IG’s policies and procedures require such external reviews of 

inspections. 

Fundamental 

Differences between 

Audits and 

Inspections 

Page 19 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
We reviewed the documentation for 10 inspections to gain an

understanding of the extent of documented evidence in the inspectors’ 

working papers to support each report’s recommendations. The 10 

inspections were taken from a total of 112 inspections, completed over 

fiscal years 2004 and 2005 that were not classified for national security 

purposes, and for which we had access. The reports for the 10 inspections 

included a total of 183 recommendations. We found that the inspectors 

relied heavily on questionnaires completed by the staff at each bureau or 

post that was inspected, official State Department documents, 

correspondence and electronic mail, internal department memos including 

those from the Secretary, interview memorandums, and the inspectors’ 

review summaries. We did not find additional testing of evidence or 

sampling of agency responses to test for the relevance, validity, and 

reliability of the evidence as would be required under auditing standards. 

We also found that for 43 of the 183 recommendations contained in the 10

inspections we reviewed, the related inspection files did not contain 

documented support beyond written summaries of the findings and 

recommendations. While the State IG’s inspection policies for 

implementing the PCIE and ECIE inspection standards require that 

supporting documentation be attached to the written summaries, the 

summaries indicated that there was no additional supporting 

documentation. 

The State IG has quality assurance processes that cover its three main 

lines of work: (1) audits, (2) investigations, and (3) inspections. 

Independence is a key element that should permeate all of the IG’s major 

lines of work. For audits, Government Auditing Standards requires an 

appropriate internal quality control system and an external peer review of

audit quality every 3 years. These standards specify that quality control 

systems should include procedures for monitoring, on an ongoing basis, 

whether the policies and procedures related to the standards are suitably 

designed and are being effectively applied. For investigations, the 

Homeland Security Act of 200227 amended the IG Act to require that each 

IG office with investigative or law enforcement authority under the act

have its investigative function reviewed periodically by another IG office 

and that the results be communicated in writing to the IG and to the 

Attorney General. For inspections, PCIE and ECIE inspection standards 

State IG Quality 

Assurance Process, 

Including Assurance 

over Independence 

 27Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 812, 116 Stat. 2135, 2223 (Nov. 25, 2002). 

Page 20 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
provide guidance for quality control and include a requirement for ongoing

internal quality inspection, but they do not contain a requirement for an 

external quality review, or peer review. 

Following is a summary of recent quality reviews of the State IG’s audit, 

inspection, and investigative work: 

Audits. Peer reviews provide an independent opinion on the quality 

control system related to audits. The State IG has obtained two external 

peer reviews of its audit practice from other IG offices since the beginning 

of fiscal year 2001 and obtained an unqualified, or “clean,” opinion in each

review. Both peer reviews concluded that the State IG’s quality control 

system for the audit function had been designed in accordance with 

professional auditing standards. In addition, the most recent peer review 

completed by the Department of the Interior IG in 2004, provided useful 

suggestions for improvement. The most significant suggestion was for the 

State IG to establish ongoing internal quality reviews of the audit function

as required by professional auditing standards. While the State IG did 

conduct internal quality reviews for its audit practice that were completed

in May 2001 and March 2003, the Interior IG found that the reviews were 

not the result of an ongoing process. To address the peer review’s 

suggestion, the State IG established the Policy, Planning, and Quality 

Assurance Division in November 2005 under the Assistant IG for Audits, to 

conduct internal reviews and provide summary reports on a semiannual 

basis, which we view as a very positive action to help ensure ongoing audit 

quality. 

Investigations. The State IG obtained the results of the first external 

quality review of its investigations from the Tennessee Valley Authority 

(TVA) IG on November 16, 2005. The TVA IG used the PCIE Quality 

Standards for Investigations, the Quality Assessment Review guidelines 

established by the PCIE, and the Attorney General Guidelines For Offices 

Of Inspector General With Statutory Law Enforcement Authority to 

review the quality of the State IG’s investigations. The TVA IG concluded 

that the State IG’s system of internal safeguards and management 

procedures for the investigative function was in full compliance with 

quality standards established by the PCIE and the Attorney General’s 

guidelines, and provides reasonable assurance of conforming with 

professional standards. The reviewers also suggested improvements for 

the State IG and these are currently being addressed by the Assistant IG 

for Investigations. 

Page 21 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Inspections. An external quality review, or peer review, of the State IG’s

inspections is not required under the inspection standards. During our 

review, the State IG implemented a plan for conducting an internal quality 

review of inspections as called for by the PCIE and ECIE inspection 

standards. The first such review was currently being conducted at the time 

of our audit, but the report on inspection quality had not yet been 

completed. This review includes a sample of completed inspections to 

determine whether they meet the PCIE and ECIE quality inspection 

standards. Currently, the State IG’s quality review does not include 

inspections by the Office of Information Technology, and at the time of 

our review there was no internal quality review process for IT inspections. 

Because the inspection work of the IG’s IT office is used, at least in part,

by the department to ensure its compliance with the requirements of the 

Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)28 for 

effective information security controls, the quality of the IT inspections is 

critical to the department for providing overall assurance of FISMA 

compliance. Inspection quality is critical also because of the State IG’s 

almost exclusive reliance on inspections to cover the information security

area, which has been identified by GAO as high-risk and by the State IG as

a management challenge for the department. 

Independence. Independence is an overarching element that is critical to

quality and credibility across all of the work of the State IG and is 

fundamental to Government Auditing Standards and the IG Act. Quality 

Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General, updated by the PCIE

and ECIE in October 2003, also addresses independence in its quality 

standards for the management, operations, and conduct of federal IG 

offices. Both sets of standards recognize that IG independence is a critical

element of the IG’s obligation to be objective, impartial, intellectually 

honest, and free of conflicts of interest. Also, consistent with Government

Auditing Standards, the IG quality standards for IG offices state that 

without independence both in fact and in appearance, objectivity is 

impaired. In addition, the PCIE and ECIE Quality Standards for 

Inspections require that the inspections organization and each individual

inspector to be free both in fact and appearance from impairments to 

independence. 

 28Title III, E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 2946 (Dec. 17, 

2002). 

Page 22 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Two areas of continuing concern regarding independence are (1) the 

temporary appointment of management personnel with various titles such 

as Deputy IG, Acting IG, or Acting Deputy IG, to head the State IG office; 

and (2) the use of Foreign Service staff to lead State IG inspections. For 

example, between the last two presidentially appointed IGs—covering a

period of over 2 years from January 24, 2003, until May 2, 2005—all four of

those heading the State IG office in an acting IG capacity were selected 

from State Department management staff and temporarily employed in the 

State IG office. These individuals had served in the Foreign Service in

prior management positions, including as U.S. ambassadors to foreign 

countries. In addition, three of these individuals returned to significant 

management positions within the State Department after heading the State 

IG office. Table 2 shows prior and subsequent positions held by those 

heading the State IG office for a recent 27-month period until the current 

IG was confirmed on May 2, 2005. This use of temporarily assigned State 

Department management staff to head the State IG office can affect the

perceived independence of the entire office in its reviews of department 

operations, and the practice is not consistent with (1) independence 

requirements of Government Auditing Standards, (2) other professional 

standards followed by the IGs, and (3) the purpose of the IG Act. Career 

members of the Foreign Service are prohibited by statute from being 

appointed as State IG.29 This exclusion of career Foreign Service staff from

consideration when appointing the State IG avoids the personal 

impairments to independence that could result when reviewing the 

bureaus and posts of fellow Foreign Service officers and diplomats. The 

same concern with independence arises when career Foreign Service 

officers and diplomats temporarily head the State IG office in an acting IG

capacity. 

 2922 U.S.C. § 4861(d). 

Page 23 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Table 2: State Department Positions Held by Management Officials before and after Serving in an Acting State IG Capacity 

from January 24, 2003, through May 2, 2005 

Department positions prior to 

serving as acting State IG

Department positions after

serving as acting State IG

Beginning dates of service as 

acting State IG

Period of time serving as the 

acting State IG

Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Retired from government 

service 

January 24, 2003 8 months 

Ambassador to Columbia Deputy and Acting Permanent

Representative at the U.S. 

Mission to the United Nationsa

September 28, 2003 10 months

Deputy Global AIDS 

Coordinator 

Special Representative on

Avian and Pandemic Influenza 

August 3, 2004 1 month 

Ambassador to South Africa Chargé d’Affaires, Khartoum, 

Sudan 

August 23, 2004 8 months 

Source: State IG. 

a

Currently the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

In addition to the potential independence impairment of acting IGs, the 

State IG can impair its independence with its reliance on staff in the 

Foreign Service temporarily employed by the IG office to lead inspections. 

As a condition of their employment, Foreign Service staff are expected to

help formulate, implement, and defend government policy, which severely 

limits the appearance of objectivity when reviewing department activities 

that may require them to question official policies. 

The State IG’s inspection policy is for Foreign Service staff with the rank 

of ambassador, or other staff who serve at the ambassador level, to lead

inspections. Long-serving State IG officials told us that the program 

knowledge of these State Department officials is important when 

reviewing the department’s bureaus and posts. In the 112 inspections 

completed during fiscal years 2004 and 2005 for which we had access, 79 

had team leaders who held the rank of ambassador or served at the 

ambassador level. Foreign Service staff on these inspections often move 

through the State IG office on rotational assignments to serve again in

Foreign Service positions for the department after working for the State 

IG. For example, 9 of the 22 Foreign Service officials who were assigned to 

these 112 inspections as either staff or team leaders had transferred or 

returned to management offices in the State Department by December 

2005. 

The State IG’s use of career Foreign Service staff and others at the 

ambassador level to lead inspections provides a potential impairment to 

independence. In both our 1978 and 1982 reports we reported concerns 

Page 24 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
about the independence of inspection staff reassigned to and from 

management offices within the department. In these prior reports, we 

stated that the desire of State IG staff to receive favorable assignments 

after their State IG tours could influence their objectivity. While they may

offer valuable insights from their experience in the department, we believe

that there is considerable risk that independence could be impaired, 

resulting in a detrimental effect on the quality of State IG inspections and 

the effectiveness of the State Department, and that it is important that 

officials not sacrifice independence, in fact or appearance, for other 

factors in the staffing and leadership of the IG’s office. As an alternative,

such staff could provide the benefits of their experience and expertise as 

team members rather than team leaders without impairing the inspection 

team’s independence. 

The IG Act established the State IG to conduct and supervise independent 

audits and investigations that prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and 

mismanagement in the State Department.30 The Bureau of Diplomatic 

Security (DS)—as part of its worldwide responsibilities for law 

enforcement and security operations—also performs investigations of 

passport and visa fraud both externally and within the department.31

Currently, there is no functional written agreement or other formal 

mechanism in place between DS and the State IG to coordinate their 

investigative activities. 

IG Coordination with 

State Department 

Investigations 

DS assigns special agents to U.S. diplomatic missions overseas and to field 

offices throughout the United States. The special agents conduct passport 

and visa fraud investigations and are responsible for security at 285 

diplomatic facilities around the world. This effort currently entails a global 

force of approximately 32,000 special agents, security specialists, and 

other professionals who make up the security and law enforcement arm of 

the State Department. In fiscal year 2004, DS reported that it opened 5,275 

new criminal investigations and made 538 arrests for passport fraud, 123 

for visa fraud, and 54 for other offenses. For fiscal year 2005, DS reported 

1,150 arrests combined for passport and visa fraud. 

Both the State IG and DS pursue allegations of passport and visa fraud by 

State Department employees. State IG officials stated that they were 

 305 U.S.C. App. § 2.

3122 U.S.C. § 4807. 

Page 25 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
aware of DS investigations in these areas that were not coordinated with 

the State IG. Without a formal agreement to outline the responsibilities of 

both DS and the State IG regarding these investigations, there is

inadequate assurance that this work will be coordinated to avoid 

duplication or that independent investigations of department personnel 

will be performed. Also, because DS reports to the State Department’s 

Undersecretary for Management, DS investigations of department 

employees, especially when management officials are the subjects of the 

allegations, can result in management investigating itself. 

In other agencies where significant law enforcement functions like those 

at DS exist alongside their inspectors general, the division of investigative 

functions between the agency and the IG is established through written 

agreements. For example, the U.S. Postal Service has the Postal IG 

established by the IG Act and the Chief Postal Inspector who is head of the 

U.S. Postal Inspection Service with jurisdiction in criminal matters 

affecting the integrity and security of the mail. Postal inspectors 

investigate postal crimes and provide security for the protection of postal 

employees at 37,000 postal facilities throughout the country. In 2006, a 

memorandum was signed by the Chairman of the Board of Governors and 

the Postmaster General announcing the completion of the transfer of 

investigative jurisdiction for postal employees from the Postal Inspection 

Service to the Office of Inspector General. The Postal IG was recognized 

as having full responsibility for the investigation of internal crimes, 

whereas the Postal Inspection Service is responsible for security and the 

investigation of external crimes. This agreement also included a shift of 

resources between both organizations to cover their responsibilities. 

In another example, the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation

(IRS CI) and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 

(TIGTA) have signed a memorandum of understanding that recognizes IRS 

CI’s responsibility to investigate criminal violations of the tax code while 

TIGTA has the responsibility to protect the IRS against attempts to corrupt 

or threaten IRS employees, and to investigate violations by IRS employees. 

This agreement includes the coordination of investigative activities 

between these offices and recognizes TIGTA as the final authority to 

investigate IRS Criminal Investigation employees. Agreements such as 

those crafted by the U.S. Postal Service and the IRS can serve as models 

for a formal agreement between DS and the State IG. 

Page 26 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
The State IG relies heavily on inspections instead of audits for oversight of

high-risk areas and management challenges. Areas such as human 

resources, counterterrorism, public diplomacy, and information security, 

are almost exclusively covered through inspections. By design, inspections 

are conducted under less in-depth requirements than audits performed 

under Government Auditing Standards in terms of levels of evidence and 

documentation to support findings and recommendations. Federal IGs use 

inspections as an important oversight tool along with audits and 

investigations, which are specifically required by the IG Act. However, the 

State IG conducts a much greater proportion of inspections to audits than 

the federal statutory IG community as a whole. Due to the risk and 

significance of the high-risk areas being covered largely by inspections, the 

State IG would benefit from reassessing risk and its heavy reliance on

inspections in those areas to determine whether the current mix of audits 

and inspections provides the amount and type of oversight coverage 

needed. Given the important role that inspections currently play in the 

State IG’s oversight of the department, assurance of inspection quality is 

also important. The State IG is currently conducting its first internal 

review of inspections, but the results are not yet reported and the review 

does not include IT inspections. 

Conclusions 

Independence is a critical element to the quality and credibility of an IG’s

work under the IG Act and is fundamental to Government Auditing 

Standards and professional standards issued by the PCIE and ECIE. 

Based on our current concerns and those from our past reports, we 

believe that the State IG would benefit from additional policies and revised 

structures in order to avoid situations that raise concerns about 

independence, such as State Department management officials appointed 

to head the State IG office in an acting IG capacity, and State Department 

career Foreign Service staff and others who transfer from or return to 

department management offices leading IG inspections. Such policies and 

structures would be geared toward (1) providing for independent acting IG

coverage in the event of delays between IG appointments and (2) assuring 

that State IG inspections are not led by career Foreign Service or other 

staff who move to assignments within State Department management. 

With regard to ambassadors, Foreign Service officers, and other rotational

staff leading inspections, approaches could range from the State IG 

limiting its inspection activities to a level that is supportable without 

reliance on staff that routinely rotate to management offices, to

permanently transferring or hiring additional staff, or FTEs, along with 

associated resources for the State IG office to eliminate the need to rely on

Foreign Service and other rotational staff to conduct inspections. In 

addition, the State IG’s inspection teams could include experienced 

Page 27 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
ambassadors and Foreign Service officers at the ambassador level as team 

members rather than team leaders to help mitigate concerns regarding the

lack of an appearance of independence caused by the State IG’s current 

practice. 

Finally, there is a need for a formal agreement between the State IG and

the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security to coordinate their 

investigative activities to help ensure the independence of investigations 

of the State Department’s management staff and to prevent duplication. 

To help ensure that the State IG provides the appropriate breadth and

depth of oversight of the State Department’s high-risk areas and 

management challenges, we recommend that the State IG reassess the 

proper mix of audit and inspection coverage for those areas. This 

reassessment should include input from key stakeholders in the State 

Department and the Congress and also entail an analysis of an appropriate

level of resources needed to provide adequate IG coverage of high-risk and 

other areas in light of the increasing level of funding provided to the State

Department. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

To provide for more complete internal quality reviews of inspections we 

recommend that the State IG include inspections performed by the State 

IG’s Office of Information Technology in its internal quality review 

process. 

To help ensure the independence of the IG office, we recommend that the 

State IG work with the Secretary of State to take the following actions: 

• Develop a succession planning policy for the appointment of individuals to

head the State IG office in an acting IG capacity that is consistent with the 

IG Act regarding State IG appointment and provides for independent 

coverage in the event of delays between IG appointments. The policy 

should prohibit career Foreign Service officers from heading the State IG 

office in an acting IG capacity and specify within the IG’s own succession 

order that acting IG vacancies are to be filled by eligible personnel without 

State Department management careers. 

• Develop options to ensure that State IG inspections are not led by career 

Foreign Service officials or other staff who rotate to assignments within 

State Department management. Approaches could range from the State IG

limiting its inspection activities to a level that is supportable without 

reliance on staff who routinely rotate to management offices, to

Page 28 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
permanently transferring or hiring additional staff, or FTEs, along with 

associated resources for the State IG office to eliminate the need to rely on

Foreign Service and other rotational staff to lead inspections.

In order to provide for independent investigations of State Department 

management and to prevent duplicative investigations, we recommend 

that the State IG work with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Office

of Management, and the Secretary of State to develop a formal written 

agreement that delineates the areas of responsibility for State Department 

investigations. Such an agreement would, for example, address the 

coordination of investigative activities to help ensure the independence of

internal departmental investigations and preclude the duplication of 

efforts. 

In comments on a draft of this report the State IG provided additional 

clarifying information and acknowledged that our review helped identify 

areas for improvement. With respect to our five recommendations in the 

draft report, the State IG agreed with two recommendations, partially 

agreed with one, and disagreed with two others. We are reaffirming our 

recommendations and provide our reasons below. 

With respect to the two recommendations for which there is agreement, 

the State IG agreed with our recommendations to (1) include all IG 

inspections, including inspections performed by the Office of Information 

Technology, in the internal quality review process and (2) work with DS 

and others to develop a written agreement delineating the areas of 

responsibility for department investigations. 

The State IG disagreed with our recommendation to reassess the mix of 

audit and inspection coverage stating that “simply reassessing the mix of 

audit and inspection coverage will accomplish little if there are not more 

auditors and more resources available to perform audits.” Our 

recommendation provides the IG with a way to define the appropriate 

level of oversight of the department, reallocate current resources as 

appropriate, and justify any additional resources that may be necessary. 

This reassessment is especially important given the increased

appropriations provided to the State Department and in light of the fact 

that the current mix of audits and inspections has evolved over a number 

of years when State Department management personnel served as acting 

IGs. By achieving a proper mix of audits and inspections the State IG can

help maximize the use of the department’s resources through more 

effective oversight. In addition, the State IG’s comments do not recognize 

Agency Comments 

and Our Response 

Page 29 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
the potential for reallocating inspection staff to an audit role. Under 

Government Auditing Standards, the current inspection staff may also 

conduct performance audits in order to provide both a forward-looking 

analysis and a review of historical performance. Redesigning some 

inspections as performance audits to be performed by the current 

inspection staff could meet the needs of management for inspection 

results at the department’s bureaus and posts and also provide the level of

objectivity and evidence needed to assess high-risk areas and management 

challenges. Thus, for all the above stated reasons we continue to 

recommend that the State IG reassess the mix of audit and inspection 

coverage. 

The State IG does not disagree with our concerns about Foreign Service 

officers temporarily heading the IG office in an acting capacity, but 

believes that the recommendation goes too far by limiting the pool of 

eligible candidates to personnel without State Department management 

careers. We disagree with the IG’s comments due to the importance of 

independence which is the most critical element for IG effectiveness and 

success. To preserve IG independence, the IG Act requires that the IG not 

report to or be subject to supervision by any other officer other than the 

Secretary, or if delegated, the Deputy Secretary. Appointing career 

department managers as acting State IGs would effectively have the IG 

office subject to supervision by a management official other than the 

Secretary or Deputy Secretary. Therefore, we continue to recommend that 

the State IG exclude from consideration in the succession planning of his 

office department officials with management careers due to possible 

conflicts of interest and resulting independence issues. As alternatives, the 

State IG could consider PCIE recommendations for personnel to fill future 

acting IG positions, as well as IG staff with proven ability from other 

agencies. In addition, we have revised the recommendation in our report 

to clarify that the intended action is directed to the succession planning 

activities of the State IG’s office in order to avoid any unintended conflict

with the Vacancies Act,32 which gives the President wide authority to 

appoint personnel to acting positions throughout the executive branch of 

the federal government. 

The State IG acknowledged that ambassadors who serve as team leaders 

for inspections raise a concern about the appearance of independence. 

The State IG also believes that this concern is significantly outweighed by 

 325 U.S.C. §§ 3345-3349(d). 

Page 30 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
the overriding need for people with the experience and expertise of 

ambassadors to lead inspections. We disagree with putting independence 

second to experience and expertise and believe that the State IG can 

achieve both objectives with the proper staffing and structuring of its 

inspections. Our position remains that the State IG’s inspection teams 

should not be led by career Foreign Service officers and ambassadors, but 

could include experienced ambassadors and staff at the ambassador level 

as team members rather than team leaders to help mitigate concerns about 

the appearance of independence caused by the State IG’s current practice. 

Therefore, we continue to recommend that the State IG work with the 

Secretary of State to develop options to ensure that the IG’s inspections 

are not led by career Foreign Service officials, including ambassadors or 

other staff who rotate from State Department management. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 30 days from its date. At 

that time we will send copies of the report to the Secretary of State, the 

State Department IG, the State Department Undersecretary for

Management, the State Department Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic 

Security, the OMB Deputy Director for Management, the Chairman and 

Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, other 

congressional committees, and interested parties. This report will also be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you 

have any questions or would like to discuss this report please contact me 

at (202) 512-9471 or by e-mail at franzelj@gao.gov. Major contributors to 

this report are listed in appendix IV.

Jeanette M. Franzel 

Director 

Financial Management and Assurance 

Page 31 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix I: A Comparison of Fiscal Year 2001 

Budgetary Resources for Selected Inspectors Appendix I: A Comparison of Fiscal Y General and Agencies ear 2001 

Budgetary Resources for Selected Inspectors 

General and Agencies 

Source: GAO analysis of OMB data. 

Notes: The agencies presented are those with presidentially appointed inspectors general (IG). 

Dollars in millions 

Rank Federal departments and agencies 

IG total

budgetary 

resources

Agency total 

budgetary 

resources 

IG budgetary 

resources as a 

percentage of

agency budgetary 

resources

1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7 546 1.28

2 Small Business Administration 15 2,580 0.58

3 Environmental Protection Agency 56 11,577 0.48

4 Corporation for National and Community Service 6 1,265 0.47

5 Agency for International Development 35 9,269a0.38

6 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 127 39,937 0.32

7 Department of Commerce 21 8,632 0.24

8 Department of State 29 13,679b 0.21

9 Department of Justice 60 31,780 0.19

10 Department of the Interior 31 19,871 0.16

11 General Services Administration 36 23,115 0.16

12 National Aeronautics and Space Administration 24 15.807 0.15

13 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 8c7,016 0.11

14 Department of Energy 34 30,638 0.11

15 Department of Housing and Urban Development 95 83,063 0.11

16 Department of Labor 69 65,489 0.11

17 Department of Veterans Affairs 50 57,391 0.09

18 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 43 47,967 0.09

19 Department of Agriculture 78 106,365 0.07

20 Railroad Retirement Board 6d9,201 0.07

21 Department of Education 37 55,858 0.07

22 Department of Transportation 55 85,399 0.06

23 Department of Health and Human Services 231e555,621 0.04

24 Department of Defense—Military 156 453,875 0.03

25 Office of Personnel Management 12 126,224 0.01

26 Social Security Administration 70 498,918 0.01

27 Department of the Treasury 35 366,620f0.01

28 Department of Homeland Securitygn.a. n.a. n.a.

29 Central Intelligence Agencygn.a. n.a. n.a.

Page 32 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix I: A Comparison of Fiscal Year 2001 

Budgetary Resources for Selected Inspectors 

General and Agencies 

a

Total budgetary resources appearing in Agency for International Development’s FY 2001 

Performance and Accountability Report. 

b

State Department budget does not include amounts for the Broadcasting Board of Governors. 

c

Amount for TVA IG is from fiscal year 2002 PCIE profile data. 

d

Amount for Railroad Retirement Board IG is from fiscal year 2002 PCIE profile data.

e

Includes budget authority to combat Medicare fraud. 

f

Treasury’s total budget authority excludes amounts for IRS. 

g

Information not available. 

Page 33 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix II: A Comparison of Fiscal Year 

2005 Budgetary Resources for Selected Appendix II: A Comparison of Fiscal Y Inspectors General and Agencies ear 

2005 Budgetary Resources for Selected 

Inspectors General and Agencies 

Dollars in millions 

Rank Federal departments and agencies 

IG total

budgetary 

resources

Agency total 

budgetary 

resources 

IG budgetary resources 

as a percentage of

agency budgetary 

resources

1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 723 1.24

2 Corporation for National and Community Service 9 1,190 0.76

3 Environmental Protection Agency 64 13,153 0.49

4 Agency for International Development 49 14,822a0.33

5 Small Business Administration 14 4,855 0.29

6 Department of Justice 80 31,073 0.26

7 Department of Commerce 22 10,179 0.22

8 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 131 66,338 0.20

9 General Services Administration 46 26,378 0.17

10 National Aeronautics and Space Administration 31 19,045 0.16

11 Department of Interior 42 26,890 0.16

12 Department of State 32 22,371b0.14

13 Department of Housing and Urban Development 103 83,359 0.12

14 Department of Energy 42 34,728 0.12

15 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 9c8,027 0.11

16 Department of Homeland Security 117 121,830 0.10

17 Department of Labor 69 72,893 0.09

18 Department of Veterans Affairs 74 83,656 0.09

19 Railroad Retirement Board 7d10,849 0.06

20 Department of Agriculture 84 135,903 0.06

21 Department of Education 48 84,359 0.06

22 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 28 50,612 0.06

23 Department of Transportation 65 117,707 0.06

24 Department of Health and Human Services 437e789,041 0.06

25 Department of Defense—Military 205 716,702 0.03

26 Social Security Administration 91 605,134 0.02

27 Office of Personnel Management 18 160,759 0.01

28 Department of the Treasury 20 329,345f0.01

29 Central Intelligence Agencygn.a. n.a. n.a.

Source: GAO analysis of OMB data. 

Notes: The agencies presented are those with presidentially appointed inspectors general (IG). 

a

Total budgetary resources appearing in Agency for International Development’s FY 2005 

Performance and Accountability Report. 

Page 34 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix II: A Comparison of Fiscal Year 

2005 Budgetary Resources for Selected

Inspectors General and Agencies 

b

State Department budget does not include amounts for the Broadcasting Board of Governors. 

c

Amount for TVA IG is from fiscal year 2005 PCIE profile data. 

d

Amount for Railroad Retirement Board IG is from fiscal year 2005 PCIE profile data.

e

Includes budget authority to combat Medicare fraud. 

f

Treasury’s total budget authority excludes amount for IRS. 

g

Information not available. 

Page 35 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix III: Comments from the Inspector Appendix III: Comments from the Inspector General, Department of State 

General, Department of State 

Page 36 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix III: Comments from the Inspector 

General, Department of State 

Page 37 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix III: Comments from the Inspector 

General, Department of State 

Page 38 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix III: Comments from the Inspector 

General, Department of State 

Page 39 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix III: Comments from the Inspector 

General, Department of State 

Page 40 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix III: Comments from the Inspector 

General, Department of State 

Page 41 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix III: Comments from the Inspector 

General, Department of State 

(194564) Page 42 GAO-07-138 Activities of the State IG
Appendix IV: 

St

GAO Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 43 GAO-07-138

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Jeanette M. Franzel, (202) 512-9471 or franzelj@gao.gov

Financial Management and Assurance 

Jackson W. Hufnagle, Assistant Director 

Clarence A. Whitt, Analyst-in-Charge 

Office of the General Counsel 

Francis Dymond, Assistant General Counsel 

Jacquelyn Hamilton, Deputy Assistant General Counsel 

Amy Bowser, Attorney 

Activities of the State IG

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(194564) 
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