United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

MILITARY BASE 

CLOSURES 

Projected Savings 

from Fleet Readiness 

Centers Likely 

Overstated and 

Actions Needed to 

Track Actual Savings 

and Overcome Certain 

Challenges 

June 2007 

 

GAO-07-304 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2007

MILTARY BASE CLOSURES 

Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness 

Centers Likely Overstated and Actions 

Needed to Track Actual Savings and 

Overcome Certain Challenges 

Highlights of GAO-07-304, a report to 

congressional committees 

The 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAC) recommendation 

to establish fleet readiness centers 

was expected to yield more savings

than any other of the 2005 BRAC 

recommendations. To achieve 

these savings the Navy plans to

integrate civilian depot personnel

to complete some repairs at 

intermediate maintenance

departments to reduce aviation 

maintenance costs. This report,

prepared under the Comptroller 

General authority to conduct 

evaluations on his own initiative, is 

one in a series of reports related to 

the 2005 BRAC recommendations. 

GAO’s objectives were to

(1) analyze the reasons for changes

in costs and savings estimates

since the recommendation was 

approved, and (2) identify

challenges in implementing this 

BRAC recommendation. GAO 

analyzed Navy and BRAC 

Commission costs and savings 

estimates and interviewed officials 

at the Naval Air Systems Command 

and at three fleet readiness centers. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

for the Navy to adjust its business 

plan to include only savings

directly related to implementing

this BRAC recommendation and to 

monitor actual savings realized as 

the recommendation is 

implemented. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendations. 

The Navy has increased onetime costs, decreased onetime savings and 

increased annual recurring savings expected from the fleet readiness centers 

recommendation, but GAO believes the savings are likely overstated. In 

preparing a detailed business plan for implementing the recommendation, 

the Navy increased onetime costs by $31 million or 96 percent because of 

costs associated with relocating employees and inflation. The Navy also 

decreased expected onetime savings from reduced inventory levels by $594

million or 92 percent because Navy officials believed earlier estimates were

too optimistic. GAO’s analysis of inventory levels for a sample of aviation 

items indicates that the majority of the revised savings estimate will not 

occur during the 6-year BRAC implementation period and the amount of 

such savings are uncertain at this time. GAO believes the annual recurring 

savings are overstated by about $53 million or 15 percent because the Navy’s 

estimate includes $28 million in savings from eliminating military personnel, 

which may be assigned elsewhere rather than taken out of the force 

structure, and $25 million in onetime savings that was erroneously reported 

as recurring savings. While projected savings would remain substantial, they 

are still subject to some uncertainties and further efforts will be required to 

assess actual savings as this recommendation is implemented. 

Change in Projected Cost and Savings Estimates (in millions) 

Difference 

Category 

BRAC 

Commissiona

Navy Business

Planb

Amount Percent

Onetime costs $34 $65 $31 96

Onetime savings 648 54 (594) (92)

Annual recurring savings 250 311 61 25

Source: DOD. 

a

In fiscal year 2005 constant dollars. 

b

In then-year current dollars. 

The Navy faces challenges in ensuring projected savings are realized and 

faces some workforce challenges in implementing the recommendation. 

Since the Navy has already included projected BRAC savings in its budget 

for fiscal years 2007 through 2011, it will be important for the Navy to 

monitor the extent to which these savings are actually achieved to prevent 

adverse affects on naval aviation readiness or the need for additional 

funding. The Navy also faces workforce challenges, such as identifying and 

moving about 150 depot artisans with the right skills to various intermediate

maintenance departments and integrating a primarily civilian depot 

workforce with the military intermediate department workforce. This mixing 

of diverse cultures could pose some challenges in implementation but 

should help develop a better trained and more productive workforce. The 

Navy will need sustained leadership to successfully establish the fleet 

readiness centers.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-304.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Brian Lepore at

(202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results In Brief 3 

Background 5

Estimated Savings Likely Overstated 10 

Challenges to Realizing Savings from Establishing Fleet Readiness 

Centers 15

Conclusions 21

Recommendations for Executive Action 21 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 25 

Appendix II Fleet Readiness Centers Recommendation 27 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 33 

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 35 

 

Tables 

Table 1: Comparison of Projected Costs and Savings Estimates 10 

Table 2: Time Frames for Reducing Aviation Component Inventory 

Requirements to Yield Savings 13 

Figures 

Figure 1: Planned Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC) and Affiliated 

Sites 6

Figure 2: Aviation Components Repair Cycle 8 

Page i GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
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Page ii GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

June 29, 2007 

Congressional Committees 

On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) made public its 

recommendations to realign and close bases. DOD projected these actions 

would yield nearly $50 billion in net savings over a 20-year period. The 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission1

 evaluated DOD’s 

recommendations and recommended reducing the estimated 20-year net 

savings by about $12 billion over a 20-year period. The BRAC Commission 

recommendations were accepted by the President and the Congress, and 

became effective on November 9, 2005. The recommendation to establish 

six fleet readiness centers reengineers naval air maintenance, which 

blends some civilian depot employees with military personnel to complete 

repairs at intermediate maintenance departments. The intent behind this 

action was to avoid some redundant maintenance procedures and supply 

overhead charges and reduce aviation maintenance costs. DOD initially 

estimated this recommendation would yield about $4.7 billion in net 

savings over 20 years including onetime savings2

 of about $648 million. 

In July 2005,3

 we reported some uncertainty regarding the magnitude of 

the expected savings from the recommendation to establish fleet readiness 

centers because the estimates were based on assumptions that had 

undergone limited testing, and were also dependent on transformation of 

the Navy supply system. In addition, after performing its own analysis, the 

BRAC Commission believed the Navy overestimated the savings that may 

be achieved from business process reengineering efforts. The BRAC 

Commission approved the recommendation to establish fleet readiness 

centers with an estimated 20-year net savings of $3.7 billion. Of the large 

number of 2005 BRAC recommendations, this recommendation is 

 1

The BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-107, 

Title XXX) provided for an independent Commission to review the Secretary of Defense’s 

realignment and closure recommendations, and present its findings and conclusions on the 

Secretary’s recommendations, along with its own recommendations to the President. 

2

Onetime savings are estimated savings to be realized during the 2006–2011 implementation

period. Onetime savings are nonrecurring savings that stop at the end of implementation in 

2011. 

3

GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations 

for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785 (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
projected to produce the most dollar savings, based on DOD’s total BRAC 

savings projections. 

Once the recommendation became effective, the Navy became responsible 

for executing the recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers. The 

Office of the Secretary of Defense required the Navy to submit a detailed 

business plan for implementing the recommendation, to update estimated 

costs and savings, and to provide a schedule for implementing the 

recommendation. The fleet readiness center plan was approved by the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense on August 1, 2006. 

This report is one in a series of reports that detail the progress DOD has 

made in implementing the base closures and realignments included in the

2005 BRAC round. We performed our work on the basis of the authority of 

the Comptroller General to initiate reviews4

 and are reporting the results 

to you in order to facilitate your oversight of DOD’s infrastructure and 

BRAC initiative. In this report, we address the Navy’s efforts to implement 

the BRAC recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers. Our 

specific objectives were to (1) analyze the reasons for changes to the costs 

and savings estimates since the recommendation to establish fleet 

readiness centers was amended and approved as part of the 2005 BRAC 

round; and (2) identify the challenges the Navy faces in successfully 

implementing this BRAC recommendation. 

To accomplish these objectives, we performed our work at the Naval Air

Systems Command headquarters, Patuxent River, Maryland; the aviation 

intermediate maintenance departments at North Island, San Diego, 

California; Mayport, Florida; and Whidbey Island, Oak Harbor, 

Washington; and the naval aviation depots at North Island, San Diego, 

California, and Jacksonville, Florida. We analyzed the changes to the costs 

and savings estimates between the BRAC Commission’s amended and 

approved recommendation and the Navy’s approved business plan and 

interviewed key Navy officials to identify the reasons for changes and the

challenges they face in implementing the recommendation. To assess the 

reliability of data used to generate costs and savings estimates, we 

reviewed Navy regulations and instructions for reporting aviation 

maintenance data and interviewed officials at the Navy Air Systems 

Command, Naval Aviation Depots, and Commander, Naval Air Forces, 

about the data and assumptions underlying the estimates. Based on these 

 4

31 U.S.C. § 717. 

Page 2 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
discussions and observations and review of the Navy’s calculations, we 

believe the DOD data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. We conducted our work between February and December 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Further details on the scope and methodology are described in appendix I.

In comparison to the BRAC Commission estimates, the Navy has increased 

onetime costs, decreased one-time savings, and increased annual recurring 

savings expected from the fleet readiness centers recommendation.5

 While 

the Navy has started to implement the recommendation and achieve

savings, we believe the amount of onetime savings are uncertain at this 

time and projected net annual recurring savings are overstated. The 

savings consist primarily of onetime savings from projected decreases in 

the inventory of aircraft component and replacement parts, and annual 

recurring savings6

 from reduced depot labor and overhead charges and 

personnel reductions. In preparing its business plan, the Navy reduced 

expected one-time savings from lower inventory levels by 92 percent (from 

$648 million to $54 million) because Navy officials believed their initial 

estimates were too optimistic. Even though the Navy reduced its estimated 

onetime savings, our analysis of inventory levels for a sample of aviation 

items concluded that the majority of the revised savings estimate will not 

occur during the 6-year BRAC implementation period, and the amount of 

such savings over time are uncertain. While the Navy projects annual 

recurring savings of about $311 million, we believe they are likely 

overstated by $53 million. The Navy’s estimate includes $28 million in 

savings from eliminating military personnel, which may be assigned 

elsewhere rather than taken out of the force structure, and $25 million in 

onetime savings that were erroneously reported as recurring savings. 

While projected savings remain substantial, they are still subject to some 

uncertainties and additional efforts will be required to assess actual 

savings over time as this recommendation is implemented. 

Results in Brief 

 5

DOD did not accept the final BRAC Commission estimate because it was based on actual 

versus authorized positions. 

6

Annual recurring savings are expected to occur annually after the costs of implementing a

BRAC action have been offset by the savings. 

Page 3 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
The Navy faces challenges in ensuring projected savings from 

implementing its fleet readiness center recommendation are realized even

as it also faces some workforce challenges in implementing the 

recommendation. Since the Navy has already included projected BRAC 

savings in its budget plans for fiscal years 2007 through 2011, the Navy will 

need to monitor the extent to which these savings are achieved. Therefore,

if savings are not realized, the Navy may have to take funds from other 

Navy programs or request additional funds to offset unrealized savings or 

be unable to repair aviation components in a timely manner which could 

affect readiness. The Navy has developed an interim method for tracking 

aviation maintenance repair costs and calculating the BRAC savings from 

establishing fleet readiness centers, but follow through will be important 

to validate savings over time. In addition, the Navy faces workforce 

challenges, such as potentially moving over 150 depot artisans with the 

right skills to various intermediate maintenance departments and 

integrating a primarily civilian depot workforce with the military 

intermediate department workforce. This mixing of diverse cultures could 

pose some challenges in implementation but could result in a bettertrained and more-productive workforce. The Navy faces other challenges,

such as the need for sustained leadership and communication to 

successfully establish the fleet readiness centers. Furthermore, the Navy 

needs to ensure that depot maintenance performed at intermediate 

departments is accurately recorded and reported to satisfy congressional 

reporting requirements. The Navy has recognized many of these challenges

and outlined steps to be taken to address them. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the 

Secretary of the Navy to update the business plan to include only savings 

that are directly related to implementing the BRAC recommendation and 

monitor and update savings as implementation progresses. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our recommendations. DOD 

noted that it considers military personnel reductions attributable to a 

BRAC recommendation as real savings. It noted that while the department 

may not reduce end strength, these reductions allow the department to 

reapply these military personnel to support new capabilities. We believe 

the department counting of savings from eliminating military personnel 

positions, without corresponding reductions in end strength, creates a 

false sense of savings available for other purposes because they do not 

represent dollar savings that can be readily reallocated outside the military 

personnel accounts. We do agree that assigning these positions to other 

areas may enhance capabilities. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in

appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have 

incorporated into this report as appropriate. 

Page 4 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
The Navy has three levels of naval aviation maintenance—organizational, 

intermediate, and depot—to support naval aviation.7

 Organizational 

maintenance is performed by sailors on the flight line and generally items 

are repaired on the aircraft, whether at sea or at a naval station. The 

intermediate maintenance activity is generally performed by sailors at the 

Navy’s aviation intermediate maintenance departments, which focus on 

item repairs in close proximity to the flight line but off-aircraft. Depot 

maintenance activities, generally performed by civilian aviation depot 

artisans, provide a comprehensive combination of major repair, overhaul, 

and modifications to weapons systems and components, assemblies, and

subassemblies in off-flight-line maintenance. The current aviation 

maintenance process generally flows as follows: when the organizational 

maintenance crews cannot fix a broken aircraft component or item, it is 

sent to the intermediate department; if the intermediate maintenance 

department cannot repair an item, it declares that the item is beyond its 

capability of maintenance. The broken item is then turned over to the 

supply system in exchange for a replacement part; and the broken item is 

shipped to the depot for further repairs or overhaul. 

Background 

The recommendation to establish fleet readiness centers affects the 

intermediate department and depot maintenance levels, but not the 

organizational level. It involves moving about 150 artisans from the depots 

to the intermediate departments to perform aviation repairs. In addition,

six fleet readiness centers will be established to transform naval aviation 

maintenance at the intermediate departments and depots as seen in 

figure 1. 

 7

The Navy and Marine Corps currently operate 20 aviation intermediate maintenance

departments including the Presidential Helicopter support at Quantico, 11 Marine aviation 

logistics squadrons, and three Naval Aviation Depot maintenance activities in the United

States. 

Page 5 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Figure 1: Planned Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC) and Affiliated Sites 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Navy data.

FRC Northwest

Whidbey

FRC West

Lemoore

FRC Southwest

North Island

FRC Mid-Atlantic

Oceana

FRC East

Cherry Point

FRC Southeast

Jacksonville

New Orleans

Fallon

Forth Worth

Quantico

New River

Beaufort

Robins

Key West

Pendleton

Point Mugu

Yuma

Miramar

Fleet readiness centers (FRC)

Affiliated sites

Patuxent River

FRC Mid-Atlantic,

Oceana

Naval Air Facility

Washington D.C.

Stewart

Norfolk

China Lake

FRC Mid-Atlantic

Mayport

McGuire

Page 6 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
According to this BRAC recommendation, relocating depot artisans to 

intermediate departments is expected to reduce the number of items that 

are declared to be beyond the capability of maintenance at the 

intermediate departments and therefore, will not require some items to be 

sent to the depot for repair. As a result, repeated and duplicated 

maintenance procedures are projected to be avoided and turnaround times 

projected to be reduced. More specifically, prior to implementing this 

recommendation, when an item is being repaired by military personnel at 

the intermediate department, they perform diagnostics, disassemble the 

item, and attempt to repair it. When they determine it cannot be repaired 

and declare that it is beyond their capability of maintenance, the item is 

reassembled, repackaged, and shipped to the depot for repair. Upon 

arrival at the depot, the artisans must perform similar diagnostics, and 

repeat the processes of disassembly and repair that have already been 

performed at the intermediate department. According to Navy officials, 

after fleet readiness centers are established, the depot artisans positioned 

at the intermediate departments are expected to be able to complete more 

repairs there, which will reduce or eliminate some packaging, shipping, 

and administrative costs as seen in figure 2. 

Page 7 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Figure 2: Aviation Components Repair Cycle

Intermediate Dept.

Intermediate Dept.

Depot

Broken 

component

Present repair process

New repair process

Depot

Broken 

component

Repair 

performed 

at Intermediate 

Department

Source: GAO analysis.

Components 

beyond 

capability of 

maintenance

Additional charges 

assessed

Admin. overhead

and inventory

Additional charges 

assessed

Admin. overhead

and inventory

-

$

$

 Scheduled

 workload 

Additional charges 

assesed

Admin. overhead

and inventory

$

Components 

repaired by 

Intermediate 

Department

Repaired component

placed on inventory shelf

Repaired component

placed on inventory shelf

 Scheduled workload 

 and fewer 

 components 

 beyond capability of 

 maintenance 

Components repaired by 

Intermediate Department

Page 8 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
At the time DOD originally submitted its recommendations to the BRAC 

Commission, it estimated this recommendation would yield $341 million in 

annual recurring savings, or $4.7 billion net savings over 20 years. The 

preponderance of the annual recurring savings was expected to come 

from fewer items being sent to the depots for repair, thus reducing per 

item maintenance costs. DOD also expected to achieve significant onetime

savings by reducing existing inventory levels of aircraft component parts. 

In July 2005, we reported that while there is potential for significant 

savings, there is some uncertainty over the full magnitude of savings.8

 Our 

report noted that the Navy used assumptions that had undergone limited 

testing, and the full savings realization depends upon the transformation of 

the Navy’s supply system to achieve organizational efficiencies. Moreover, 

we pointed out that realizing the full extent of the savings would depend 

on actual implementation of the recommended actions. 

The BRAC Commission also believed DOD’s overall estimated savings 

were overstated because savings were derived from overhead efficiencies

that had not been validated. The commission projected annual recurring 

savings of about $248 million a year or $3.7 billion9

 net present value 

savings over a 20-year period—about $1 billion less than the DOD’s 

estimate. Also, the commission reduced the estimated savings because it

eliminated the proposed realignment of workload from the Naval Support 

Activity in Crane, Indiana, to Whidbey Island, Washington, since the Navy 

planned to phase out the aircraft associated with the proposed workload 

transfer in 10 to 15 years regardless of BRAC. In addition, the commission 

found errors in DOD’s estimation of construction costs and the savings 

projections based on eliminated personnel. 

The President and the Congress accepted the BRAC Commission 

recommendations, which became effective on November 9, 2005. Once the 

recommendations became effective, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

designated one of the military services or defense agencies as the business 

manager responsible for implementing each recommendation. The Navy is

responsible for establishing the six fleet readiness centers. The Office of 

the Secretary of Defense also required the Navy to submit a detailed 

business plan to update estimated costs and savings and identify a 

schedule for implementing the recommendation. The Navy’s detailed 

 8

GAO-05-785. 

9

The $3.7 billion is the 20-year net present value of the projected savings in fiscal year 2005 

constant dollars. 

Page 9 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
business plan was approved to implement the recommendation to 

establish fleet readiness centers on August 1, 2006. However, the Office of

the Secretary of Defense has requested that the Navy resubmit its plan to 

accurately reflect the savings realized based on the Navy’s current 

implementation of this BRAC recommendation. The Navy’s plan was still 

in-process as of March 15, 2007. 

In addition, the Navy must comply with Title 10, Section 2466 of the United

States Code (U.S.C.), which provides that not more than 50 percent of the 

funds made available in a fiscal year to the Navy for depot maintenance 

and repair workload may be used to pay for work performed by private 

contractors. The statute also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a 

report to Congress (known as the “50/50” report) by April 1 annually, on

public-private depot maintenance funding distributions. The 50/50 report 

notes the percentage of depot maintenance funding between the public 

and private sectors during the preceding fiscal year, the projected 

distribution for the current fiscal year, and the ensuing fiscal year. 

In comparing the Navy’s business plan with the BRAC Commission 

estimates of costs and savings, the Navy’s business plans shows an 

increase in one-time costs, a decrease in one-time savings, and an increase 

in annual recurring savings as seen in table 1 below. 

Estimated Savings 

Likely Overstated 

Table 1: Comparison of Projected Costs and Savings Estimates 

Dollars in millions 

Difference 

Category 

BRAC 

Commission 

approveda 

Navy business 

 planb Amount Percent

Onetime costs $34 $65 $31 96

Onetime savings 648 54 (594) (92)

Annual recurring savings 250 311 61 25

Source: DOD data. 

Notes: DOD did not accept the final BRAC Commission estimate because it was based on actual 

versus authorized positions. 

a

In constant fiscal year 2005 dollars. 

b

In then year or current dollars. 

 

While the Navy has started to implement the recommendation and achieve 

savings, we believe the latest savings estimates are still overstated and 

uncertain. The majority of the savings consist of onetime savings from 

Page 10 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
projected decreases in the inventory of aircraft components and 

replacement parts, and annual recurring savings from reduced depot labor 

and overhead charges and reductions in military personnel. While savings 

from lower inventory levels may be possible, our analysis of a judgmental 

sample of items targeted for inventory reduction concluded that the 

majority of these savings would not occur during the 6-year 

implementation period of this BRAC recommendation.10 Further, we 

believe the Navy’s estimated annual recurring savings remain overstated

because they included savings from eliminating military personnel that are 

not expected to result in a reduction to its overall service force structure 

and included onetime savings erroneously reported as recurring savings. 

The Navy’s business plan shows onetime costs increased by 96 percent 

(from $34 million to $65 million) as compared to the BRAC Commission’s 

estimates, which was primarily due to increased costs associated with 

relocating depot employees to the intermediate level, other miscellaneous 

program management actions, and inflation.11 For example, Navy officials 

stated that they need to add more equipment or specialized workbenches 

to support depot artisans relocated to the intermediate departments. The 

program management costs are primarily for information technology 

upgrades. For example, Navy officials stated the need for an interim 

logistics tracking and accounting mechanism, using its current Naval 

Aviation Logistics Command/Management Information System to track 

depot maintenance repairs at the intermediate departments. While 

onetime costs have nearly doubled, they have limited effect on the longterm recurring savings expected from establishing fleet readiness centers

once those savings offset implementation costs. 

While the Navy has reduced the projected onetime savings from lower 

levels of inventory, our analysis of a sample of aviation inventory items 

targeted for reduction concludes that the majority of these savings would 

not occur during the 6-year implementation period, and the amount of 

such savings over time is uncertain. In preparing the business plan, the

Navy reduced its onetime savings by 92 percent (from $648 million to 

$54 million) mostly by lowering the estimated savings from reducing 

Onetime Costs Increased 

Onetime Savings Have 

Been Reduced, but 

Uncertainty Exists about 

When They Will be 

Achieved 

 10The Department of Defense has 6 years (2006–2011) to implement the BRAC 2005 

recommendations. 

11Of the approximate $31 million difference, about $4 million is inflation. 

Page 11 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
inventory of aircraft components and replacement parts. According to 

Navy officials, the initial inventory savings estimate was overly optimistic. 

In addition, the lower estimate was based on the BRAC Commission’s 

determination that the Navy’s projected savings were overstated because

the commission found errors in the Navy’s savings estimates. Additionally, 

our July 2005 report stated that the magnitude of the expected savings for 

the fleet readiness centers is in part dependent upon transformation of the 

Navy’s supply system, such as eliminating unneeded management 

structures and duplicate layers of inventory in the supply system.12

DOD’s original submission to the BRAC Commission assumed that the 

dollar value of the inventory of aircraft components and replacement parts 

could be reduced by 15 percent. According to Navy officials, the 

15 percent savings factor was based on the professional judgment of the 

Industrial Joint Cross Service Group members. They expected savings 

because fewer items would need to be kept in the shore-based aviation

consolidated inventory because items would be getting repaired more 

quickly and returned to the inventory faster.13 However, the Navy officials 

stated that they did not have time during the BRAC process to discuss the 

estimated inventory and supply savings with officials from the Navy 

Supply Command to validate the estimate. Navy officials stated that they 

estimated the onetime savings from inventory reductions ($648 million) by 

multiplying the 15 percent factor times the total dollar value of the 

inventory and supply of aircraft components and replacement parts in 

fiscal year 2003.14

In developing the business plan, the Navy reduced the inventory and 

supply savings factor from 15 percent to less than 4 percent based on 

discussions with Naval Supply Command officials and a better 

understanding of how other BRAC recommendations affected DOD’s and 

Navy’s supply system. Specifically, two other recommendations involved 

significant savings projections from reengineering DOD’s inventory and 

supply system and the reconfiguration of supply, storage, and distribution 

 12GAO-05-785. 

13The shore-based aviation consolidated allowance list inventory is a consolidated list of 

components, repair parts, and consumable items and depot- and field-level repairable items 

required to support planned operational and maintenance missions at designated naval and 

Marine Corps air stations. 

14In fiscal year 2003, the inventory and supply of aircraft components and replacement 

parts had a value of about $4.3 billion.

Page 12 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
management. After considering how these other BRAC recommendations 

could affect the Navy’s projected inventory and supply savings estimates, 

Navy officials concluded there would be a greater potential overlap of 

savings with the fleet readiness center BRAC recommendation. However, 

the Navy could not provide us documentation to support the lower 

inventory savings estimate. 

While savings from lower inventory may be possible, our analysis of a 

judgmental sample of 99 items targeted for inventory reduction concludes 

that the majority of these savings will not occur during the 6-year 

implementation period of this BRAC recommendation as the Navy 

originally projected. Our analysis shows that for 83 percent of the items 

sampled, the Navy will take more than the implementation period to 

achieve lower inventory levels because the majority of replacement items 

on-hand is sufficient to provide many years worth of supply, and the rate 

of replacement for that inventory will not be a factor contributing to 

savings, as seen in table 2. 

Table 2: Time Frames for Reducing Aviation Component Inventory Requirements to

Yield Savings

Fiscal year Number of items Percent

2006–2011 17 17

2012–2020 22 27

Beyond 2021 60 56

Total 99 100

Source: GAO analysis.

Since the Navy has not yet identified all of the inventory items that could 

be affected by the fleet readiness centers recommendation, we could not 

estimate the effect of delayed inventory savings reductions on the Navy’s 

estimated onetime savings or the total amount of savings likely to be 

realized. 

Annual Recurring Savings 

Likely Remain Overstated 

The Navy increased the annual recurring savings estimate by 25 percent 

(from about $250 million to $311 million) primarily by increasing projected

savings from military personnel eliminations and inflation. These increases 

were offset to some degree by decreases in projected savings from 

maintaining facilities. However, we believe the Navy’s revised annual 

recurring savings estimates are still overstated by approximately $53 

million because they include $28 million in savings from eliminating 

Page 13 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
military personnel, which may be assigned elsewhere rather than taken 

out of the force structure, and $25 million that should have been reported 

as onetime, and not recurring, savings. In addition, we estimate that 

projected annual recurring savings increased by approximately $42 million 

due to inflation.15

The BRAC Commission projected annual recurring savings of about 

$10 million from eliminating about 120 military positions, while the Navy 

business plan includes about $28 million in annual recurring savings from 

eliminating about 290 military positions as originally planned. Regardless 

of the number of military personnel affected by the recommendations, as 

we reported in July 2005, the projected net annual recurring savings 

associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel could 

create a false sense of savings available for other purposes because they

do not represent dollar savings that can be readily reallocated outside the 

military personnel accounts. Rather than reduce end strength, these 

positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may 

enhance capabilities but also limit dollar savings available for other uses.16

The Navy incorrectly reported onetime savings as annual recurring savings 

in its business plan. Navy officials stated that $25 million onetime savings 

were incorrectly categorized as annual recurring savings in its business 

plan. These onetime savings included reductions in aviation depot level 

repair charges, decreased spare parts inventory, and reduced materials to 

repair aviation components. As a result of the fleet readiness center 

implementation to date, Navy has begun to reduce its current spare parts 

inventory, which translates into less physical space needed to store the 

inventory and fewer sailors needed to manage it. However, GAO believes 

that the Navy’s business plan should correctly report the 

$25 million as onetime savings and not annual recurring savings. 

Increases in the Navy’s annual recurring savings estimates were offset to 

some degree by decreases in projected savings expected from reduced 

facility costs. According to the Navy officials, the projected reductions in 

personnel should result in reducing floor space for numerous work shops, 

but they will not free up enough space to allow the Navy to vacate any 

buildings at this time. Since no buildings will be vacated, the Navy reduced 

 15DOD assumed the cumulative inflation over the 2006- 2011 time period was 15.37 percent.

It ranged from 2.1 percent to 2.6 percent per year. 

16GAO-05-785. 

Page 14 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
the annual recurring savings expected from facilities maintenance by 

about $3 million. Navy officials indicated that as fleet readiness center 

implementation progresses, there may be opportunities to combine similar 

work shops at some sites, which may result in entire buildings being 

vacated, and produce savings in the funding for facilities maintenance. If 

this occurs, a Navy official noted the business plan would be updated to 

reflect these savings. 

In addition, Navy’s implementation efforts are beginning to show savings. 

The Navy reported savings of $19 million from October 2006 to April 2007 

at the 6 fleet readiness centers. These savings are from repairing selected

aviation items at the fleet readiness centers instead of sending them to the 

depots for repair. 

The Navy faces challenges in ensuring that projected savings are realized 

from implementing the fleet readiness center recommendation in addition

to some workforce challenges in implementing the recommendation. Since 

the Navy has already included projected BRAC savings in its budget for 

fiscal years 2007 through 2011, the Navy will need to monitor the extent to 

which these savings are achieved. If savings are not realized, the Navy may 

need to get funds from another Navy program or request additional funds 

to offset unrealized savings or be unable to repair aviation components in 

a timely manner, which could impact readiness. Accordingly, the Navy has 

developed an interim method for tracking aviation maintenance repair 

costs and calculating the BRAC savings from establishing fleet readiness 

centers, which addresses our prior recommendation to DOD to update and 

track savings. In addition, the Navy acknowledges that other challenges 

remain, such as identifying and moving necessary depot artisans with the 

right skills to various intermediate maintenance departments and 

integrating a primarily civilian depot workforce with the military 

intermediate department workforce. Navy officials recognize that this 

mixing of workforces could create some cultural tension in the workforce, 

but this blending may facilitate the development of a better-trained and 

more-productive workforce. The Navy has recognized many of these 

challenges and outlined steps to be taken to address them. Our prior work 

has shown that strong and sustained executive leadership is needed if 

reform efforts are to succeed.17 Furthermore, our prior work has raised 

Challenges to 

Realizing Savings 

from Establishing 

Fleet Readiness 

Centers 

 17GAO, DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires Sound

Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership, GAO-05-520T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13,

2005). 

Page 15 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
questions about the reasonableness and consistency of depot maintenance 

workload data submitted to the Congress.18 Therefore, the Navy will need 

to ensure that depot maintenance work performed at intermediate 

departments is accurately reported to satisfy congressional reporting 

requirements. 

Planned Short-Term 

Monitoring Will Need to Be 

Extended 

The Navy has developed an interim method for tracking aviation 

maintenance repair costs and calculating the BRAC savings from 

establishing fleet readiness centers, but it will be important to ensure this 

effort continues over time to validate savings. Navy officials noted that if 

the expected savings are not realized, this decrease in savings could 

adversely affect the Navy’s ability to perform its mission within budgeted 

funds. Furthermore, inadequate implementation could affect readiness, 

and the Navy may need to request additional funds to offset unrealized 

savings. Our previous work has raised concerns with prior DOD efforts to 

reduce related operating budgets in advance of actual savings being 

realized.19

The Navy reduced its aviation maintenance budget for fiscal years 2007

through 2011 by the estimated BRAC savings it projects will result from 

establishing fleet readiness centers. Navy officials recognized its 

challenges in achieving these estimated savings as well as the importance 

of monitoring and tracking the actual and realized BRAC savings. The 

Navy has developed an interim method for calculating the BRAC savings 

realized at the newly established fleet readiness centers during the 

implementation time frame. This interim method utilizes information from

two separate logistic systems, one at the depots and the other at the 

intermediate departments, to allow Navy officials to evaluate each fleet 

readiness center’s performance in meeting its BRAC savings targets. 

However, this short-term solution for tracking BRAC savings is not 

designed to go beyond 2011 or address long-standing business and 

financial system challenges. 

 18GAO, Depot Maintenance: Management Attention Required to Further Improve 

Workload Allocation Data, GAO-02-95 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2001) and GAO, Depot 

Maintenance: DOD’s 50-50 Reporting Should Be Streamlined, GAO-03-1023 (Washington,

D.C.: Sept. 15, 2003). 

19GAO-05-785. 

Page 16 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
To achieve desired savings, the Navy has begun identifying which items 

currently repaired at the depots could be repaired at the former 

intermediate departments (now fleet readiness centers/sites). The Navy 

originally calculated about 38,000 items that were beyond the capability of 

maintenance of the intermediate departments, which could be repaired by 

potentially moving about 150 depot artisans to the intermediate 

departments. As of November 2006, the Navy has identified about 1,800 

items that can be repaired at intermediate departments. Twenty-five depot 

artisans have already begun to repair 127 of these items at the 

intermediate departments. The number of items ultimately selected will 

dictate the number of personnel needed and savings to be realized. Our 

prior work on strategic workforce planning highlighted the need for 

organizations to identify the right number of staff with the right skills and 

competencies in the right locations to fulfill their missions and goals.20

Based on the items identified for repair, the Navy will determine the skill 

sets required for depot artisans to perform repairs at the intermediate 

departments. Consequently, the Navy will request depot artisan volunteers

to relocate to the intermediate departments. If artisans do not volunteer to

relocate to the intermediate departments or if artisans with the necessary 

skill sets have retired or stopped working through normal attrition, the 

Navy plans to hire or contract for the necessary skill sets. Navy officials 

stated that intermediate departments are located in heavily industrialized 

areas that may enable them to hire people with the necessary skill sets. 

As the Navy establishes the fleet readiness centers, the Navy will relocate 

some civilian depot artisans to work alongside military personnel at the 

intermediate maintenance departments, which has the potential to create 

cultural challenges within the workforce. Navy officials recognized that 

this mixing of civilian and military workforces with their differences in 

working environments could create some cultural tension, but this 

blending may facilitate the development of a better-trained and moreproductive workforce. The Navy’s civilian depot artisans work under a 

collective bargaining agreement which specifies employee work hours, 

maximum allowable excess work hours, and the number and duration of 

an artisan’s guaranteed breaks. At the intermediate maintenance 

departments, the military personnel are required to work according to 

Workforce Challenges 

Identifying Maintenance Items 

and Critical Skills 

Introducing Civilian Depot 

Artisans at Intermediate 

Departments 

 20GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

Page 17 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
mission needs, which may exceed normal work hours and disallow breaks, 

if necessary. Navy officials stated that they do not foresee any labor 

problems when the Navy establishes fleet readiness centers. Our prior 

work recognizes that certain organizational and environmental differences

cause stresses that may affect an agency’s ability to attain its strategic 

goals. Certain key human capital practices can be employed to overcome

such differences, such as developing policies and procedures to allow for 

the flexible use of the workforce to ensure consistency, equity, 

transparency, and address employee concerns.21

While this mixing of diverse cultures could pose some challenges in 

implementation, it could also help in developing a better-trained and moreproductive workforce if properly managed. As implementation of this 

BRAC recommendation begins, the Navy will temporarily assign civilian

artisans to predominately military intermediate maintenance departments 

to perform repairs. As fleet readiness centers are established, the 

temporary assignments will become permanent. As the artisans and 

military personnel become accustomed to working side-by-side, the Navy 

may combine similar shops that have existed separately at depots and 

intermediate maintenance departments to assure efficient use of 

personnel, equipment, and facilities. This effort to determine if shops can 

be combined will begin over the next several years. According to Navy 

officials, when depot artisans begin to work with military personnel, the 

artisans will provide on-the-job training as a means to increase the military 

personnel ability to perform aviation repairs and improve aviation 

maintenance efficiency. However, Navy officials stated that some 

workforce members are concerned about the long-term effect of these 

changes. For example, it is unclear whether shops that are comprised of 

military and civilian workforce members will be managed by military or 

civilian leadership. In addition, these combined shops may have an effect 

on the career paths of aviation maintenance officers and civilian 

managers. 

Communicating the mission and goals of the fleet readiness centers is 

critical to implementing this BRAC recommendation. To address this 

challenge, the Navy has focused on developing a communication plan to 

mitigate the risk of inaccurate or inconsistent information and address 

workforce fears. The communication plan goal is to maximize stakeholder 

ownership and involvement with the implementation of the fleet readiness 

Navy’s Communication 

Strategy to Promote Goals of 

Fleet Readiness Centers 

 21GAO-04-39. 

Page 18 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
centers to minimize uncertainty and anxiety inherent with organizational 

change. In our prior report,22 we stated that strategic workforce planning is

most effective when an agency’s goals, approach, and results are 

communicated early, clearly, and often. Navy officials said that early 

communication is critical to mitigate rumors and speculation about 

potential workforce changes at the intermediate departments and depot 

maintenance facilities. Accordingly, the Navy has developed a detailed 

communication plan to describe the challenges associated with 

implementing this BRAC recommendation. This plan details the approach 

that will be used to establish fleet readiness centers, the goals they are 

expected to achieve, and the results that are desired from introducing 

depot artisans into the intermediate workforce. The Navy expects to 

evaluate the success of the communication plan using several methods 

including monthly key stakeholder feedback reports; postbriefing and

post–town hall audience surveys; circulation or number of memos and 

number of people who actually saw the message; and other surveys to 

determine changes in awareness (knowledge), attitudes (opinions) or 

respondent’s reports of past or anticipated/intended actions (behaviors). 

As part of the Navy’s communications strategy, the Commander, Aviation

Depots, Naval Air Systems Command has traveled in excess of 200 days 

during the past year in order to communicate the fleet readiness center 

concept to the entire aviation maintenance workforce. He stated he will 

meet or exceed that travel schedule during the implementation phase to 

ensure that all workforce members have heard his message. During a 

portion of his travel time, he plans to conduct “town hall” meetings with 

the aviation maintenance workforce members at fleet readiness center 

locations and affiliated sites. Following these meetings, the commander 

will send teams to each newly established fleet readiness center to 

introduce the concepts and the expected changes in establishing the 

centers to the workforce. These teams will also provide information with 

regard to procedural changes that will be necessary to assure that costs 

and savings are properly tracked at each fleet readiness center and 

affiliated site. According to Navy officials, as the implementation 

proceeds, efforts will be undertaken to apply lessons learned as fleet 

readiness centers are established. 

 22GAO-04-39. 

Page 19 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Generally, commanding officers in the Navy change commands every 

2 years, which can make sustained leadership in a reorganization effort 

challenging, and there is no guarantee that leadership will remain in place 

throughout the implementation of this BRAC recommendation. Our prior 

work on strategic workforce planning states that sustained leadership and 

succession planning is necessary to achieve workforce reorganizations 

and agency goals.23 Navy officials stated that they expect to achieve the 

largest change in naval aviation maintenance since 1959 in only 3 to 

5 years and the Commander, Aviation Depots, Naval Air Systems 

Command, expects his assignment to continue until fleet readiness center 

implementation is complete. The Navy has 26 Naval Aviation Maintenance 

duty captains, which comprise a cadre of officers available for selecting 

successive commanding officers to oversee the implementation of the 

recommendation to establish and manage fleet readiness centers. In 

addition to top-level leadership, the Navy plans to utilize the Navy’s chief 

petty officers, the Marine Corps’ senior noncommissioned officers, and 

seasoned civilian maintainers as key enablers of the implementation 

process. Navy officials feel that these individuals can reinforce the 

communications of senior Navy leadership and clarify the intent of 

establishing fleet readiness centers to sailors, marines, and the civilian 

workforce. 

Providing Sustained Leadership 

Navy officials noted another challenge may exist after fleet readiness 

centers are established that involves accurately recording and reporting 

depot maintenance performed at intermediate departments. Under 10 

U.S.C. § 2466, the military departments and defense agencies can use no 

more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding for work 

performed by private-sector contractors. In fiscal year 2006, the Navy 

reported that 52 percent of naval aviation depot work was performed by 

civilian depot artisans and 48 percent was performed by private 

contractors. As depot artisans begin to work in intermediate maintenance 

departments, adequate systems and management commitment for 

verifying the amount of public-sector depot maintenance is necessary to 

comply with 50/50 requirements. We previously reported that the Navy did 

not maintain documentation to support the amounts in its 50/50 report and 

no formal training on procedural requirements or Navy guidance to 

develop and report the 50/50 data was provided to the personnel 

responsible for compiling the data. Our report noted that persistent 

deficiencies limit the accuracy and usefulness of DOD’s funding allocation

Reporting Depot Maintenance 

Funding between the Public 

and Private Sectors 

 23GAO-04-39. 

Page 20 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
data reported to the Congress, and further, that it is difficult to project outyear data due to factors such as changing depot maintenance requirements 

and the ongoing consolidation of maintenance facilities. When the fleet

readiness centers are implemented, depot artisans will be stationed at the 

intermediate departments and must document the depot maintenance 

performed, which is used for entry into the depot accounting system and 

the Naval Aviation Logistics Command/Management Information System. 

The Navy has drafted a handbook that provides procedures and quality 

assurance for the required details of documentation by the artisans. For 

example, all maintenance documentation goes through layers of quality 

assurance such as validation specifications within the Naval Aviation 

Logistics Command/Management Information System, production controls 

that approve each component before moving it back into the supply 

system, database administrator screening, and a final reality check by the 

fleet readiness center command subject matter experts. 

Although projected savings from establishing fleet readiness center remain

significant, it appears likely that the majority of onetime savings from 

reduced inventory levels may not occur as expected during the BRAC 

implementation period, and projected long-term savings are likely 

overstated. To accurately account for and report BRAC savings, the Navy 

business plan to establish fleet readiness centers should include onetime 

savings that will be achieved during the implementation period and longterm savings that are directly attributed to implementing the 

recommendation. While the Navy has recognized the need to assess 

progress against goals and track savings, our prior work has shown that 

sustained leadership and follow-through will be important to ensure the 

recommendation is successfully implemented. 

To improve the reporting of savings projected from BRAC 2005 

recommendations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Navy to

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• update the business plan for the fleet readiness centers (1) to reflect only 

savings that are directly related to implementing the recommendation, and

(2) update projected onetime savings when data are available; and 

• monitor implementation of the recommendation to determine the extent 

that savings already taken from the Navy budget are actually achieved. 

Page 21 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy; and the Director, 

Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 

recommendations. DOD noted that it considers military personnel 

reductions attributable to a BRAC recommendation as real savings. It 

noted that while the department may not reduce end strength, these 

reductions allow the department to reapply these military personnel to 

support new capabilities. We believe the department counting of savings 

from eliminating military personnel positions, without corresponding 

reductions in end strength, creates a false sense of savings available for 

other purposes because they do not represent dollar savings that can be 

readily reallocated outside the military personnel accounts. We do agree 

that assigning these positions to other areas may enhance capabilities. 

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report as 

appropriate.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Additional contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

provided in appendix IV.

Brian J. Lepore, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 22 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
List of Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tim Johnson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans’ Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr. 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 23 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
The Honorable Chet Edwards 

Chairman 

The Honorable Roger F. Wicker 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

 Veterans’ Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 24 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We performed our work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

office the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Naval Air Systems Command, 

Patuxent River, Maryland; the Naval Aviation Depots in Coronado, 

California, and Jacksonville, Florida, as well as the Aviation Intermediate 

Maintenance Departments located at Oak Harbor, Washington; Coronado, 

California; and Mayport, Florida. 

To determine the extent to which estimated costs and savings have 

changed, we compared the Navy’s business plan approved in August 2006 

to the recommendation approved by the Base Realignment and Closure 

(BRAC) Commission. We focused on the major factors that affected 

projected onetime costs, onetime savings, and annual recurring savings. 

We determined the reasonableness of these estimates by reviewing and 

analyzing source data and the methodology used to generate savings 

estimates and interviewing Navy officials who prepared these estimates. 

We discussed the reasons for variances in costs and savings estimates 

between the BRAC Commission and the approved business plan with Navy 

officials. To analyze projected onetime savings from reduced levels of 

aircraft component inventory, we took a judgmental sample of 99 items 

targeted for inventory reduction. We calculated the years of supply for 

each item using its required inventory level, inventory on-hand, excess onhand inventory, condition, and recurring and nonrecurring demands. Our 

analysis was reviewed by Navy Supply System officials. We analyzed the 

business plan to identify the major elements that contributed to projected 

annual recurring savings. Our analysis indicated that the business plan 

included savings from an initiative to reduce aviation maintenance costs 

referred to as AirSpeed. We interviewed Navy officials to determine the 

relationship of AirSpeed to the BRAC recommendation. To assess the 

reliability of the data used to generate estimates of costs and savings and 

the validity of underlying assumptions used to generate cost and savings 

estimates, we reviewed Navy regulations and instructions for reporting 

aviation maintenance data and interviewed officials at Navy Air Systems 

Command, Navy Aviation depots, Navy Aviation Intermediate Maintenance 

Departments, and Naval Supply Systems Command knowledgeable about 

the data and the assumptions underlying estimated costs and savings. 

Based on this, we believe that the assumptions underlying estimated costs 

and savings are generally valid, and that the data used were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. 

To determine the challenges to successfully implement the fleet readiness 

centers, we analyzed pertinent documents and reports and interviewed 

officials responsible for developing the original proposal and the business 

plan. We also interviewed Navy officials at the Aircraft Intermediate 

Page 25 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Maintenance Departments at Whidbey Island, Washington; North Island, 

California; and Mayport, Florida; and at Naval Aviation Depots at North 

Island, California, and Jacksonville, Florida. In addition, we also reviewed 

statutes related to continuing congressional oversight of annual depot 

maintenance funding, related reports, and court cases involving depot 

personnel. 

We conducted our work from February 2006 to March 2007 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 26 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix II: Fleet Readiness Centers Appendix II: Fleet Readiness Centers Recommendation 

Recommendation 

165. FLEET READINESS CENTERS (IND 19) 

a. Realign Naval Air Station Oceana, VA, by disestablishing the Aircraft 

Intermediate Maintenance Department Oceana, the Naval Air Depot 

Cherry Point Detachment, and the Naval Air Depot Jacksonville 

Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic, Naval Air 

Station Oceana, VA; and transferring all intermediate maintenance 

workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic, Naval Air 

Station Oceana, VA. 

b. Realign Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD, by disestablishing the 

Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department at Naval Air Warfare 

Center Aircraft Division; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic 

Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, MD; and 

transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet 

Readiness Center Mid Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station 

Patuxent River, MD. 

c. Realign Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA, by disestablishing the Aircraft 

Intermediate Maintenance Department Norfolk VA, the Naval Air Depot 

Jacksonville Detachment, and Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division 

Lakehurst Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic 

Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA; and transferring all 

intermediate and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet 

Readiness Center Mid Atlantic Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA. 

d. Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA, by 

disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, 

establishing Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic Site New Orleans, Naval

Air Station Joint Reserve Base New Orleans, LA; and transfer all 

intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness 

Center Mid Atlantic Site New Orleans, Naval Air Station Joint Reserve 

Base New Orleans, LA. 

e. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC, as follows: 

disestablish Naval Air Depot Cherry Point; establish Fleet Readiness 

Center East, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC; relocate depot 

maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics 

Components (approximately 39 K DLHs) [direct labor hours], Aircraft 

Hydraulic Components (approximately 69 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear 

Components (approximately 8 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components 

(approximately 23 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components 

(approximately 126 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid Atlantic, Naval

Page 27 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix II: Fleet Readiness Centers 

Recommendation 

Air Station Oceana, VA; relocate depot maintenance workload and 

capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 11 

K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 19 K DLHs), 

Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft 

Structural Components (approximately 35 K DLHs), and Aircraft Other 

Components (approximately 6 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center Mid 

Atlantic Site Norfolk, Naval Air Station Norfolk, VA; relocate depot 

maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics 

Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components 

(approximately 10 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components 

(approximately 1 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 3 K 

DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 18 K DLHs) to 

FleetReadiness Center Mid Atlantic Site Patuxent River, Naval Air Station 

Patuxent River, MD; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity

for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 2 K DLHs), 

Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft 

Landing Gear Components (approximately 0.4K DLHs), Aircraft Other 

Components (approximately 1 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural 

Components (approximately 6 K DLHs) to FRC Mid Atlantic Site New 

Orleans, Naval Air Station JRB New Orleans, LA.; relocate depot 

maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics 

Components (approximately 9 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components 

(approximately 16 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components 

(approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 6 K 

DLHs) and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 30 K DLHs) to 

the Fleet Readiness Center East Site Beaufort, hereby established at 

Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC; relocate depot maintenance 

workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components 

(approximately 11 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components 

(approximately 20 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components 

(approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 6 K 

DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 36 K DLHs), 

Aircraft Rotary (approximately 1 K DLHs), Aircraft VSTOL (approximately 

2 K DLHs), Aircraft Cargo/Tanker (approximately 0.02K DLHs,), Aircraft 

Other (approximately 18 K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components 

(approximately 0.001K DLHs), Calibration (approximately 0.15 K DLHs) 

and “Other” Commodity (approximately 0.3 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness 

Center East Site New River, hereby established at Marine Corps Air 

Station New River, Camp Lejeune, NC; and transfer all remaining depot 

maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center East, 

Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC. 

Page 28 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix II: Fleet Readiness Centers 

Recommendation 

f. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC, by disestablishing Naval 

Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment Beaufort and transferring all depot 

maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center East Site 

Beaufort, Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC. 

g. Realign Naval Air Station Jacksonville, FL, as follows: disestablish Naval 

Air Depot Jacksonville, Naval Air Depot Jacksonville Detachment 

Jacksonville, and Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department 

Jacksonville; establish Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, Naval Air 

Station, Jacksonville, FL; relocate depot maintenance workload and 

capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 8 K 

DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft 

Landing Gear Components (approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Other 

Components (approximately 27 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural 

Components (approximately 9 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center 

Southeast Site Mayport, hereby established at Naval Air Station, Mayport, 

FL; transfer all remaining intermediate and depot maintenance workload 

and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, Naval Air Station 

Jacksonville, FL. 

h. Realign Naval Air Station Mayport, FL, by disestablishing Aircraft 

Intermediate Maintenance Department, Naval Air Depot Jacksonville 

Detachment Mayport, and Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division 

Lakehurst Voyage Repair Team Detachment Mayport and transferring all 

intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness 

Center Southeast Site Mayport, Naval Air Station Mayport, FL. 

i. Realign Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA, by disestablishing Aircraft 

Intermediate Maintenance Department Lemoore and Naval Air Depot 

North Island Detachment; establishing Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval

Air Station Lemoore, CA; and transferring all intermediate and depot 

maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West, Naval 

Air Station Lemoore, CA. 

j. Realign Naval Air Station Fallon, NV, by disestablishing the Aircraft 

Intermediate Maintenance Department Fallon and the Naval Air Depot 

North Island Detachment Fallon; establishing Fleet Readiness Center West 

Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV; and transferring all intermediate 

and depot maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center 

West Site Fallon, Naval Air Station Fallon, NV. 

k. Realign Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division China Lake, CA, by

disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and 

Page 29 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix II: Fleet Readiness Centers 

Recommendation 

relocating its maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft 

(approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Components (approximately 45 K 

DLHs), Fabrication & Manufacturing (approximately 6 K DLHs) and 

Support Equipment (approximately 16 K DLHs) to Fleet Readiness Center 

West, Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA. 

l. Realign Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX, by 

disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, 

establishing Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth, Naval Air 

Station Fort Worth, TX, and transferring all intermediate maintenance 

workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center West Site Fort Worth, 

Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX. 

m. Realign Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA, by disestablishing the 

Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department, establishing Fleet 

Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA, and 

transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet 

Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA. 

n.1

 (Deleted)

o. Realign Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA, as 

follows: disestablish Naval Air Depot North Island, 

COMSEACONWINGPAC (AIMD), and NADEP North Island Detachment 

North Island; establish Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, Naval Air 

Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA; relocate depot 

maintenance workload and capacity for aircraft Avionics/Electronics 

Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components 

(approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components 

(approximately 3 K DLHs), aircraft Other Components (approximately 13 

K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 4 K DLHs) 

from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest 

Site Point Mugu, hereby established at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval 

Base Ventura, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and capacity for 

Aircraft avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 26 K DLHs), 

Aircraft Hydraulic Component (approximately 8 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing 

Gear Components (approximately 13 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components 

 1

By Motion 165-3A, the Commission struck paragraph “n”, which read “Realign Naval 

Support Activity Crane, IN, by relocating the depot maintenance workload and capacity for

ALQ-99 Electronic Warfare to Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station 

Whidbey Island, WA.” 

Page 30 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix II: Fleet Readiness Centers 

Recommendation 

(approximately 55 K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components 

(approximately 16 K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet 

Readiness Center Southwest Site Miramar, hereby established at Marine 

Corps Air Station Miramar, CA; relocate depot maintenance workload and 

capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 8 K 

DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft 

Landing Gear Components (approximately 4 K DLHs), Aircraft Other 

Components (approximately 17 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural 

Components (approximately 5 K DLHs) from Naval Air Depot North Island 

to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Pendleton, hereby established at 

Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA; relocate depot 

maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics 

Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components 

(approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components 

(approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 12 

K DLHs), Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 3 K DLHs) from

Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Southwest Site Yuma, 

hereby established at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ; relocate depot 

maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics 

Components (approximately 6 K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components 

(approximately 2 K DLHs), Aircraft Landing Gear Components 

(approximately 3 K DLHs), Aircraft Other Components (approximately 12 

K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural Components (approximately 3 K DLHs) 

from Naval Air Depot North Island to Fleet Readiness Center West Site 

Fort Worth, Fort Worth TX; relocate depot maintenance workload and 

capacity for Aircraft Avionics/Electronics Components (approximately 25 

K DLHs), Aircraft Hydraulic Components (approximately 8 K DLHs), 

Aircraft Landing Gear Components (approximately 13 K DLHs), Aircraft 

Other Components (approximately 53 K DLHs), and Aircraft Structural 

Components (approximately 15 K DLHs), from Naval Air Depot North 

Island to Fleet Readiness Center Northwest, Naval Air Station Whidbey 

Island, WA; and transfer all remaining intermediate and depot

maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, 

Naval Air Station North Island, Naval Base Coronado, CA. 

p. Realign Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA, by 

disestablishing the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department and 

transferring all intermediate maintenance workload and capacity to Fleet 

Readiness Center Southwest Site Point Mugu, Naval Base Ventura, CA. 

q. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, CA, by transferring depot 

maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Other (approximately 28 

K DLHs) and Aircraft Fighter/Attack (approximately 39 K DLHs) and 

Page 31 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix II: Fleet Readiness Centers 

Recommendation 

intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft 

Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing and Support

Equipment from Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS)-11 and 16 to

Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Miramar, Marine Corps Air Station 

Miramar, CA.

r. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA, by transferring 

depot maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Other 

(approximately 22 K DLHs) and Aircraft Rotary (approximately 102 K 

DLHs) and intermediate maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft 

Components, Aircraft Engines, Fabrication & Manufacturing and Support

Equipment from MALS-39 to Fleet Readiness Center Southwest Site Camp 

Pendleton, Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, CA. 

s. Realign Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ, by transferring depot 

maintenance workload and capacity for Aircraft Fighter/Attack, Aircraft 

Other and Aircraft Rotary and intermediate maintenance workload and 

capacity for Aircraft Components, Aircraft Engines, 

Communication/Electronics Equipment, Ordnance Weapons & Missiles, 

Software and Support Equipment from MALS-13 to Fleet Readiness Center 

Southwest Site Yuma, Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ. 

Page 32 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-07-304 Military Base Closures
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contacts and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 35 GAO-07-304

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov 

In addition to the person named above, Michael Kennedy, Assistant 

Director; Avrum I. Ashery; Pat L Bohan; Grace A. Coleman; Julia C. Matta; 

Charles W. Perdue; Maria-Alaina I. Rambus; and John E. Trubey also made 

major contributions to this report. 

Military Base Closures

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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