DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Letter Report: 

TSA’s Management of Aviation Security 

Activities at the Jackson-Evers 

International Airport

OIG-07-73 August 2007
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

August 29, 2007 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Edmund “Kip” Hawley 

 Assistant Secretary

 Transportation Security Administration 

FROM: Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 

SUBJECT: TSA’s Management of Aviation Security Activities at the JacksonEvers International Airport 

Pursuant to a request from Congressman Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the House Committee 

on Homeland Security, we are conducting a review of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

(TSA) management of aviation security activities at Jackson-Evers International Airport. The 

objectives of our review are to determine: (1) whether Transportation Security Officers (TSO) at the 

Jackson-Evers International Airport received advanced notice of any covert testing; (2) whether 

TSOs report the discovery of firearms and other dangerous prohibited items as required in TSA 

policy and directives; and (3) whether existing processes, which authorize certain individuals to fly 

while armed, need strengthening. 

Our review is currently ongoing, but we have already developed findings concerning aviation 

security activities at the Jackson-Evers International Airport. Under most circumstances, we present 

findings and recommendations to senior Department of Homeland Security officials based upon 

completed fieldwork before finalizing reports. However, we want to provide you with this 

information because we expanded the scope of our review from the Chairman’s original request to 

include other airports, and the project will take more months to complete. We ask that you treat this 

information as provisional in nature, and not conclusive of our findings and recommendations. 

To date, we have reviewed TSA policies and procedures regarding covert testing, the reporting of 

incidents, and the flying armed program. We interviewed TSA headquarters officials, 

Transportation Security Operation Center employees, and Federal Air Marshal Service staff. We 

also interviewed federal law enforcement officers (LEOs) from our Office of Investigations, the U.S. 

Secret Service, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), CBP’s Office of Field Operations, CBP’s 

Office of Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), ICE’s Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations, ICE’s Office of Investigations, and ICE’s Federal Protective Service, as 

well as state and local LEOs, to gain a better understanding of LEO experiences in the flying armed 

TSA’s Management of Aviation Security Activities at the Jackson-Evers International Airport 

Page 1 
program. In addition, we contacted staff at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to obtain 

information on initial and advanced training provided to LEOs on flying armed. Finally, we 

performed a site visit of the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Virginia to obtain an 

operational perspective of TSA’s management of aviation security activities. We looked at TSA 

screening operations, commercial airline carrier and airport authority and police practices prior to 

our fieldwork. 

During the week of March 12, 2007, we conducted fieldwork at the Jackson-Evers International 

Airport in Mississippi. We performed over 38 interviews with TSA, commercial airline carrier, and 

airport authority employees and police. We interviewed all TSA management officials as well as a 

cross-section of TSOs. 

Covert Testing 

We have determined that TSOs at the Jackson-Evers International Airport received advance notice 

of covert testing conducted by TSA’s Office of Inspection on February 12, 2004. However, TSA’s 

Office of Inspection did not provide the advance notice of covert testing; rather it was TSA 

employees at the Jackson-Evers International Airport that provided the advance notice to other TSA 

employees at this airport. Our conclusion is based upon statements made by TSOs, or TSA 

management employees who communicated to other TSA employees that such testing was to occur. 

Statements made ranged from “be on our P’s and Q’s the red-team is in the area,” to the specific 

gender and race of the tester, the type of test items used, and the location of test items in checked and 

carry-on baggage, or the location of such items on the tester. We could not identify, with absolute 

certainty, where the advance information originated from, but this information was communicated to 

certain individuals at all levels of TSA personnel at the Jackson-Evers International Airport. 

We are assessing TSA’s covert testing program to determine whether the advance notice provided by 

TSA employees at Jackson-Evers International Airport was an incident isolated to that airport. In 

addition, we will determine whether additional safeguards should be in place to ensure the integrity 

of covert testing so that results are accurate and reflect actual operational capability and 

effectiveness. We will discuss our findings and recommendations in greater detail in the final report. 

Reporting Prohibited Items 

We are still conducting fieldwork to determine whether incidents that should be reported to TSA 

headquarters, such as the discovery of firearms and other dangerous prohibited items, are reported as 

required by TSA policy and directives. At this time, we have not developed specific findings or 

formulated recommendations. We will discuss the reporting of prohibited items in the final report. 

Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed 

TSA’s Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshals Service and Office of Security Operations 

have responsibility for the Law Enforcement Officers Flying Armed program. There are several 

opportunities to enhance and strengthen the flying armed program. For example, at the JacksonEvers International Airport we reviewed TSA Armed Law Enforcement Officer Sign-In Logs. A 

number of the logs did not contain requested information on the officer’s badge number, the officer’s 

TSA’s Management of Aviation Security Activities at the Jackson-Evers International Airport 

Page 2 
agency affiliation, the agency address, or flight number. Further, on August 26, 2005, Jackson, 

Mississippi’s Mayor flew armed, but the log did not include his badge number as required. Also on 

November 1, 2005, when the Mayor flew armed, the log did not contain the required initials of the 

airport law enforcement officer who verified the Mayor’s paperwork, credentials, and badge. 

In addition, whether it is permissible for a LEO to fly armed must be weighed against the need to do 

so in the official conduct of duty. Thus, the reasons for permitting a LEO to fly armed should be 

scrutinized beyond merely meeting the applicable criteria of CFR §1544.219, “Carriage of 

Accessible Weapons.” For example, when Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004, the law directed TSA to establish a LEO credentialing system that 

incorporates biometric identification technology by April 16, 2005.1 Biometric technology uses 

computerized methods to identify a person by their unique physical traits, such as fingerprints or iris 

recognition scanning. A biometric identification card would not only ensure that all LEOs flying 

armed are bona fide, but also that their agency has approved their need to fly armed through the 

issuance of this card. 

We are still reviewing documentation and performing program analysis. Our goal is to make 

recommendations that are useful for all program partners, TSA, commercial airline carriers, airport 

authorities and police, and federal, state, and local LEOs, while maintaining official conduct of duty 

requirements, and safe flight operations for officers and the flying public. Our findings and 

recommendations will be discussed in greater detail in the final report. 

Should you have any questions, please call me, or your staff may contact Carlton I. Mann, Assistant 

Inspector General for Inspections, at (202) 254-4100. 

cc: Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

General Counsel 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Chief Security Officer 

Under Secretary for Management 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Director of Operations Coordination 

DHS OIG Liaison 

TSA Audit Liaison 

1 Public Law 108-458, Title IV – Transportation Security, Subtitle B – Aviation Security, Section 4011(a)(6). 

TSA’s Management of Aviation Security Activities at the Jackson-Evers International Airport 

Page 3 
Appendix A 

Major Contributors to the Report 

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspections 

Angela Garvin, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspections 

Ryan Carr, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspections 

TSA’s Management of Aviation Security Activities at the Jackson-Evers International Airport 

Page 4 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: 

Office of Investigations – Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528 

The OIG seeks to protect the identify of each writer and caller.