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THE TRUTH IN CALLER ID ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND

THE INTERNET

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H.R. 503

FEBRUARY 28, 2007

Serial No. 110–8

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

energycommerce.house.gov

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey

BART GORDON, Tennessee

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

BART STUPAK, Michigan

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland

GENE GREEN, Texas

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

Vice Chairman

LOIS CAPPS, California

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania

JANE HARMAN, California

TOM ALLEN, Maine

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

HILDA L. SOLIS, California

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas

JAY INSLEE, Washington

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

JOHN BARROW, Georgia

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

JOE BARTON, Texas

Ranking Minority Member

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois

FRED UPTON, Michigan

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING,

Mississippi

VITO FOSSELLA, New York

STEVE BUYER, Indiana

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

MARY BONO, California

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

DENNIS B. FITZGIBBONS, Chief of Staff

GREGG A. ROTHSCHILD, Chief Counsel

SHARON E. DAVIS, Chief Clerk

BUD ALBRIGHT, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania

JANE HARMAN, California

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas

JAY INSLEE, Washington

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

FRANK PALLONE, JR, New Jersey

BART GORDON, Tennessee

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

BART STUPAK, Michigan

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

GENE GREEN, Texas

LOIS CAPPS, California

HILDA L. SOLIS, California

FRED UPTON, Michigan

Ranking Minority Member

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING,

Mississippi

VITO FOSELLA, New York

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

MARY BONO, California

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey

(II)

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

H.R. 251, To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit manipulation

of caller identification information, and for other purposes. ............................ 17

Engel, Hon. Eliot, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York,

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 4

Markey, Hon. Edward J., a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, opening statement .................................................... 1

Upton, Hon. Fred, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan,

opening statement ................................................................................................ 2

WITNESSES

Knight, Allison, staff counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center ............... 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 21

Monteith, Kris, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission .................................................................................................................. 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 28

Pies, Staci, vice president, PointOne, president, Voice on the Net Coalition ..... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

(1)

THE TRUTH IN CALLER ID ACT

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS,

AND THE INTERNET,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:40 p.m., in room

2322 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward J. Markey (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Doyle, Engel, Green, Solis,

Upton, Shimkus, Walden, and Terry.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH

OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. MARKEY. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to this

panel’s first hearing. We have a very active agenda planned for the

subcommittee, and I am pleased to be sitting next to my good

friend, Fred Upton, as we begin this process. We will try to retain

the same level of comedy that existed when he was chairman. I believe that is the way the telecommunications issues should be conducted.

Today we begin with legislation that was unanimously approved

by the committee and the House in the last Congress when it was

sponsored by former Chairman Joe Barton and my committee colleague Congressman Eliot Engel from New York. They have

teamed up again this year and reintroduced the bill, and today we

hope to gather updated testimony and approve the bill through the

subcommittee.

This legislation addresses caller ID spoofing. Spoofing is when a

caller masks or changes the caller ID information on their call in

a way that disguises the true origination number of the caller. In

many instances, a call recipient may be subject to pretexting

through spoofing, which can lead to fraud, personal ID theft, harassment, or otherwise put the safety of the call recipient in danger.

It is important that we explore and analyze the use of spoofing

to commit crimes and otherwise harm the public interest. On the

other hand, lest we think that spoofing always has nefarious aims,

we must recognize that there may be circumstances when a person’s safety may be put in danger if their true and accurate call

origination information is disclosed as well. What we see seek in

caller ID policy is balance. This has been the case since we held

hearings in the early 1990’s on caller ID when this committee

2

sought to take into account emerging caller ID technology in a way

that also allowed callers to block their origination number on a per

call or per line basis. Technology also allowed call recipients to

refuse to receive calls by anyone who is blocking their caller ID information from going through.

Last year we adjusted the legislation to ensure adequately

achieved historic balance so that we look at consumer privacy and

security. For instance, Members of Congress often have direct lines

in their offices. In order to ensure that such lines do not become

generally public and therefore remain useful to us, it may be necessary to keep such direct numbers confidential and have the outgoing caller ID information indicate a different number at which

our offices can be reached to return calls. That gives the recipient

a legitimate phone number to call back but keeps confidential lines

private. There are many doctors, psychiatrists, lawyer, and other

professionals who would similarly like to keep direct, confidential

lines private in this way who have no intention of misleading anyone. In addition, there may be instances, for example, when a

woman at a shelter seeks to reach her children at home when

spoofing is important to safeguard someone’s safety. Moreover, informants to law enforcement tip lines or whistle blowers have additional reasons for why their calling information should remain private. We should not outlaw any of these practices, and if the legislation that we are now considering needed clarification, we have

now put that clarification in so that spoofing is put into context

that would address those areas where the intent is to actually defraud or harass a called party. That is the goal of the legislation.

Again I want to commend my colleagues, Joe Barton and Eliot

Engel, for their great work, and I now turn to recognize my good

friend, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Upton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. UPTON. I thank the chairman, and I too look forward to

working with you over the next 2 years before we get to get that

gavel back over here, but take care of it. You can see that we did.

In the last 12 years, a lot of chips in this thing as well worn. But

I appreciate certainly your leadership and efforts to convene today’s

hearing and then markup a little bit later when this hearing is

over. I am going to ask that my full statement be put into the

record, and I am not going to give a definition of spoofing. You did

a very good job. This is a bipartisan bill, and I will remind my colleagues that it passed by voice last year in the House on the House

floor. Sadly, the Senate did not take it up; otherwise, it would have

been a public law. And I commend Mr. Barton again and certainly

my good friend, Mr. Engel, for their continued leadership on this

very important issue.

Let me just convey a couple of different instances where spoofing

was used, which clearly shows the need for this legislation. AARP

alerted its members to a prevalence scam where spoofers get the

local courthouse phone number to appear on folks’ caller ID

screens, and then they tell the recipients of the calls that they are

judicial officials in order to get that victim’s personal information,

whether it be a Social Security number, driver’s license, et cetera.

3

Other reported case involving a swat team that surrounded an

apartment building after police received a call from a woman who

said she was being held hostage in one of those apartments. As it

turned out, it was a false alarm. Caller ID was spoofed to make it

look like it was coming from that apartment, someone’s idea of a

bad prank. In other instances, criminals are stealing credit card

numbers, getting the phone number of the actual card holder, and

then using those credit cards to get unauthorized wire transfers,

PIN numbers, a whole host of things that damage that individual’s

personal information, a real violation. And, of course, many of us

are familiar with our own credit card companies which may ask us

to call from home phones to authenticate and then activate that

new card. And if the cards are stolen out of the mail, then criminals may be able to spoof our home phone numbers and authenticate and activate that new card from the convenience from their

home or motel room or from whatever rock they might crawl under.

Unfortunately, spoofing does appear to be growing, and there is

no law that protects the American public from it. This legislation,

the Truth in Caller ID Act, would make it illegal. More specifically,

it would make it unlawful for any person to cause any caller identification service to transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud or cause harm. The

unfortunate reality is that our age of information has resulted in

an explosion of identify theft. And while new technologies have provided us with tremendous advancements and benefits, technology

has also provided greater opportunities to criminals as well.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and for the

markup, and I would like to think that we could move this to the

House floor soon with the leadership of the gentleman from Massachusetts . I yield back my time.

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Pittsburgh.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this bill has been

well introduced, so in my first official action as vice chairman of

your subcommittee, I will——

Mr. MARKEY. By the way, I would like to make that public announcement to all the members, that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Doyle, is going to serve as a supremely competent and

knowledgeable vice-chairman of this committee.

Mr. DOYLE. Well said, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you.

Mr. DOYLE. I am going to follow your lead from earlier this morning, Mr. Chairman, and waive my opening statement so we can get

to our speakers.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. Let me then recognize the gentleman

from New York, the author of this legislation, Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will submit

my statement to the record, but I just want to make a couple of

comments.

First, thank you. I am truly honored that you are taking this bill

at our first hearing and markup, and I really appreciate it. When

it became clear to me about the problems of spoofing, I went over

to then Chairman Barton and asked him if we could do this bill.

And so we submitted the bill in the last Congress as the BartonVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:37 Jun 04, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-8 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
4

Engel bill, but due to the changes, I like the way it is submitted

in this Congress as the Engel-Barton bill. And I thank my good

friend for cosponsoring it again this year as well as Chairman

Upton for supporting it.

We held hearings on this bill last year, and the statement that

you made, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Upton’s statements really capsulize what the hearings told us. The fact that there are instances

where we may not want the real number to show and that there

are many horror stories that we know and it can go, on and on in

terms of political campaigns and trickery where people from one

campaign can pretend they are calling from the opposition’s campaign and do all kinds of things to get voters angry at the opposition.

So this is truly a bill whose time has come, and I am very grateful that we have tremendous consensus. And I am going to submit

this, and I look forward to hearing the testimony and doing the

markup with you. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Engel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ELIOT ENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for quickly scheduling this hearing. The bill

before us today is a good bill and one that I was happy to re-introduce in this Congress with my friend and ranking member, Mr. Barton.

For years now, I have been working with my colleagues on issues of privacy and

identity theft. Each and every time we plug one hole, crafty criminals come up with

another way to commit fraud.

Currently, it is easy, cheap, and legal to spoof caller ID. These services can be

used for many malicious purposes. A criminal can make a call that appears to be

originating from the recipient’s neighborhood bank, his credit card company, or the

Social Security Administration.

I’ve read news reports that criminals are using these technologies to get people

to give out private information they would never give out except that they think

they are receiving a legitimate call from their bank or even local court house.

I also have read about some of our colleagues being victims in their capacity as

Members of the House. At that point, it became apparent to me there are people

who seek to use these technologies to strike at the heart of our democracy.

Leaving fake messages that are insulting or incendiary on a person’s voicemail

that identifies the caller as an elected official or candidate for public office threatens

the very nature of our electoral process.

The Truth in Caller ID Act will give us another tool to combat identity theft and

even election fraud.

I thank the chairman for his attention to this matter, look forward to hearing

from the witnesses, and yield back.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. And, yes, this is the 20th anniversary,

this month, of my becoming chairman of this subcommittee 20

years ago. So it is an honor for me to have this bill be the first bill

on the 20th anniversary that we will be processing. The gentleman

from Illinois.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations, and I

am glad you brought up that there are some beneficial uses. I kind

of forgot about when people call us on our cell phones, member to

member, it is a different number that pops up on our cell phones,

even in this system. So we all want to go after the bad actors, but

there are some credible positive uses, and we want to maintain

that balance. I think you will try to do that. I appreciate your efforts, and I yield back my time.

Mr. MARKEY. The gentle lady from California.

5

Ms. SOLIS. Thank you, and congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, and also for bringing this very timely piece of legislation forward. I want to tell you that, as a longtime advocate on domestic

violence issues, I am pleased to see that the legislation helps to

clarify that law to protect those victims. So thank you very much,

and I will submit my statement for the record.

Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I actually thought when

I saw something about spoofing on our list today that it had more

to do with the full committee chairman’s comment about DTB yesterday and maybe changing the date. But since it is on this, I really don’t have an opening statement. I supported this bill last time,

and I will look forward to supporting it again.

Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. TERRY. I will waive. Happy anniversary, by the way.

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you so much. I was a young man once ago.

So let us now turn to our incredibly impressive panel of witnesses. That would be Ms. Allison Knight, staff attorney from the

Electronic Privacy Information Center. She is staff counsel at that

organization, a graduate of the University of Western Ontario. She

has written extensively on this subject, and we appreciate very

much her being here.

We have Ms. Staci Pies, who is vice-president and Point One

president, testifying on behalf of the VON Coalition. She has 15

years of experience in communications, legal and regulatory experience, and she also served at the FCC as deputy division chief in

a network services division, and senior attorney in the FCC’s common carrier bureau.

And Ms. Kris Monteith, chief of the FCC enforcement bureau.

She is the chief of that bureau. She has held numerous jobs in the

FCC including overseeing the commission’s interaction with local,

state, and tribal governments. She has also served as the chief of

policy for the wireless telecommunications bureau and deputy chief

of the Farmer Common Carrier Bureau’s competitive pricing division.

So I think what we will do is we will recognize the witnesses in

the order that I introduced them, and then we will finish up with

the FCC giving us their summary view of this issue. So, Ms.

Knight, you have 5 minutes. Please begin.

STATEMENT OF ALLISON KNIGHT, STAFF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR OF PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT AT THE

ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER

Ms. KNIGHT. Good afternoon. Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Upton, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the

opportunity to testify today on caller ID spoofing and H.R.251, The

Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007.

My name is Allison Knight, and I am staff counsel and director

of privacy and human rights project at the Electronic Privacy Information Center. EPIC is a nonpartisan research organization based

on Washington that seeks to focus public attention on the emerging

civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment,

and constitutional values.

6

I would like to discuss two separate and important privacy interests related to the issue of caller ID spoofing. The first is the right

of callers to limit the disclosure of their phone numbers in order

to protect their privacy and, in some cases, their safety. The second

is the right for call recipients to be free from pretexting and other

fraud that can lead to the loss of their privacy and the threats of

stalking, identify theft, and harassment.

Before caller ID services were offered, telephone customers generally had the ability to control the circumstances under which

their phone numbers were disclosed to others. Many individuals

have legitimate reasons to report a different number than the one

presented on caller ID, as was remarked in the opening comments.

For example, a person may wish to keep their direct line private

when making phone calls from within an organization. And in

some circumstances, disclosure of a person’s telephone number may

also put his or her safety at risk. Domestic violence survivors, shelters, and other safe homes need to preserve their confidentiality of

their phone numbers. They may need to contact abusers without

exposing their location in order to arrange custody or other legitimate matters. They also may need to contact other third parties,

such as businesses, that may have very permissive privacy policies

and would then share collected telephone numbers with lists or

data brokers. In all of these situations, preserving anonymity is

necessary for their safety.

Caller ID blocking may seem like a viable means for allowing

callers to protect their anonymity while not misleading recipients.

However, caller ID blocking is not a complete solution. A caller can

be identified through other means, such as the automatic number

identification system, and some recipients prevent receiving

blocked calls. And indications are that numbers of individuals who

are doing this is growing. In the case of a domestic violence survivor, attempting to safely reach a required phone number, an individual would have to use spoofing for the innocent purpose of preserving the confidentiality of his or her number.

We also can’t ignore the privacy interest of those who decline to

accept calls from unknown numbers. If an individual has habitually received harassment calls from a caller ID blocked number,

we should not permit the harasser to use spoofing as a means to

circumvent the individual’s screening.

Caller ID spoofing can also create privacy risks. Last year, EPIC

brought to Congress’s attention the problem of pretexting consumers’ phone records. Pretexting is a technique by which a bad actor

can obtain an individual’s personal information by impersonating a

trusted entity. For these reasons, the practice of spoofing for the

purpose of fraud or harm should be curtailed. Preventing spoofing

for harmful reasons will also hold illegitimate spoofers accountable.

Spoofing caller ID numbers can create a real risk to individuals

who might be defrauded or harmed by illegitimate uses of the technology. At the same time, it is important not to punish those who

have a legitimate reason to conceal their actual telephone numbers.

EPIC supports H.R.251 as currently drafted because including an

intent requirement, The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007 distinguishes between appropriate and inappropriate caller ID spoofing

and also preserves legitimate law enforcement techniques. Finally,

7

we would also like to call the subcommittee’s attention to our ongoing concern about the revelation that the National Security Agency

may have constructed a massive database of telephone records of

American consumers. We again ask members to support EPIC’s

recommendation that the FCC undertake an investigation of the

possibly improper disclosure telephone records by telephone companies that are subject to the privacy obligations contained in the

Communications Act. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Knight appears at the conclusion

of the hearing.]

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. Ms. Pies.

STATEMENT OF STACI PIES, VICE PRESIDENT, POINT ONE,

AND PRESIDENT, THE VOICE ON THE NET COALITION

Ms. PIES. Thank you, Chairman Markey, Vice Chair Doyle,

Ranking Member Upton, and members of the subcommittee. My

name is Staci Pies. I am vice president of Point One, a VoIP provider, and president of the Voice on the Net or VON Coalition, the

voice for the VoIP industry.

Misleading people through the misuse of caller ID, whether for

a prank, a scam, or worse, is unacceptable. And on behalf of the

VON Coalition, I thank the committee for its leadership in addressing this issue.

VoIP is burgeoning in popularity with businesses and consumers

because it can do so much more than plain old telephone service.

VoIP allows consumers to take control over the communications experience, to manage how they use those services, and to decide

when and where they receive calls. Lower costs coupled with a

seemingly endless list of new possibilities are making VoIP one of

the hottest Internet and broadband technologies today. Today’s

VoIP services are simply a means to have a conversation. They are

portals to a world of information that enriches the communications

experience and adds new dimensions to the idea of a conversation.

Studies have shown that with the right policy framework and

continued advancement, VoIP-driven competition has the potential

to save consumers more than $100 billion over the next 5 years.

For businesses, VoIP is lowering costs, increasing mobility, enabling collaboration, integrating voice and data in entirely new

ways, boosting productivity, and giving companies and competitive

advantage, and the best is yet ahead.

Many of the great benefits of VoIP to consumers and business

users depends on accurate and non-misleading identification of the

calling party. If I program my VoIP service to ensure that calls

from my son’s school are simultaneously rung on all of my phones,

I don’t want to answer it and find out that some telemarketer has

spoofed the number to fool me into believing it is a priority call.

To protect the usefulness of their services, VoIP providers have

a strong interest in having caller ID be accurate and non-misleading. The VON Coalition has been at the forefront of promoting best

practices to enable consumers to protect their personal data, moving early to adopt and post consumer guidelines for protecting billing records. Since then, businesses that control personal data, consumers, and the IP industry have taken significant steps to selfpolice fraudulent access to personal data. The VON Coalition

8

agrees with previously presented congressional testimony that caller ID fraud perpetrators must be penalized. Law enforcement

should have the tools to protect U.S. citizens from individuals that

fraudulently manipulate phone numbers to commit a crime against

a person or a crime against property. Spoofing to defraud or harass

or for unlawful commercial gain cannot and should not ever be condoned or tolerated. Congress is right to focus its attention on those

who would do so.

As this committee addresses deceptive spoofing, we urge you to

continue to carefully balance to goal of thwarting criminal behavior

with the public interest imperative to ensure that innovation flourishes and that applications and services delivered over broadband

are available to all Americans. As Chairman Markey so eloquently

described in his opening statement, the ability to consumers to control various aspects of their communication experience presents exciting opportunities for the disabled, offers unsurpassed privacy

protection, and enables businesses and consumers to communicate

in increasingly efficient and powerful ways.

The Truth in Caller ID Act, with the focus on the intent to commit fraud or other crimes, effectively balances these two important

objectives by facilitating prosecution while not thwarting or prohibiting innovative tools that have legitimate consumer empowering

benefits. The bill recognizes that caller identification information

may be modified for telemarketers to comply with the TCPA. This

is not the only legitimate need to change caller ID.

I would like to share five examples. First VoIP services offer tremendous potential for persons with disabilities to communicate

more effectively. One recent Web application permits users to call

any phone number in the U.S. or Canada, and the service reads to

the called party the message that the originating user inputs into

a Web-based form. Users of the application who are speech impaired can now send voice messages. Similarly, blind users can now

take advantage of instant messaging services, where previously

they would have been precluded from doing so because of sight limitations.

Second, one of the benefits of VoIP is to help consumers better

protect their own privacy. For instance, Web sites that allow consumers to post solicitations for lawful commercial purposes may

also permit consumers to provide a temporary callback number

that is different from their assigned number. One service explains

the application in this way. The desire to communicate cannot be

crippled by privacy. The application unleashes the true potential of

the global community by making it a safer place.

Third, as recognized by Chairman Markey and Ms. Knight, there

are some situations in which caller ID information can actually endanger individual safety. The classic situation is the battered

spouse. In some instances, blocking the delivery of caller ID information might be sufficient; however, because technological innovations also facilitate the unblocking of caller ID, any legislation

should be careful about presuming that blocking will always be

adequate protection.

Four, certain new communication services do not organically generate or transmit caller ID, but in order to connect to the public

telephone network, the service may need to insert something that

9

looks like a traditional phone number. Many of these innovative

services, which offer tremendous ways to communicate, do not utilize the same numbering and labeling practices as yesterday’s

phone services and should not be deemed illegitimate because of

this.

A final exciting new application is the ability for consumers to

make click-to-dial calls while viewing broadband-based content.

Utilizing such an application, a viewer can click a single button on

her standard remote and pull up a menu that offers a variety of

products and services, including contacting her local member of

Congress. The constituent can locate the contact information for

the member’s office and then click on a button that enables her to

reach the office through a VoIP connection.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Pies appears at the conclusion of

the hearing.]

Mr. MARKEY. Excellent job. Thank you. I appreciate it. I wanted

you to get through all five of those. Ms. Monteith.

STATEMENT OF KRIS MONTIETH, CHIEF, ENFORCEMENT

BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Ms. MONTEITH. Good afternoon, Chairman Markey, Ranking

Member Upton, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for

the opportunity to speak with you about the problem of caller identification spoofing.

As you know, caller ID services let customers identify who is calling them by displaying the caller’s telephone number or other information on the customer’s equipment before the customer picks

up the phone. Caller ID spoofing refers to a practice in which the

caller ID information transmitted with the telephone call is manipulated in a manner that misleads the call recipient about the identity of the caller.

The commission is deeply concerned about reports that caller ID

information is being manipulated for fraudulent or other deceptive

purposes, and the impact of those practices on the public trust and

confidence in the telecommunications industry. We are particularly

concerned about how this practice may affect consumers as well as

public safety and law enforcement communities. As a technical

matter, caller ID spoofing happens by manipulating the data elements that travel with the phone call. Phone calls on the public

switch telephone network, or the PSTN, are routed to their destinations by means of a specialized protocol called the signaling system

seven, or SS7. SS7 conveys information associated with a call, such

as the telephone number of the caller. The SS7 information for a

call is provided by the carrier that the caller uses to place the call.

Caller ID then displays that caller’s number to the called party.

Caller ID spoofing is accomplished by manipulating the SS7 information associated with the call.

The commission addressed caller ID on the PSTN in 1995 with

rule 64.1601, which generally requires all carriers using SS7 to

transmit the calling party number associated with an interstate

call to interconnecting carriers. The same commission rule also requires telemarketers to transmit accurate caller ID information.

The development of Internet and IP technologies has made caller

ID spoofing easier than it used to be. Now, entities using IP techVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:37 Jun 04, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-8 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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nology can generate false calling party information and pass it into

the PSTN via SS7.

Caller ID spoofing can potentially threaten our public safety. For

example, spoofers can fabricate emergency calls and call as local

law enforcement and public safety agencies to deploy their resources needlessly. Caller ID spoofing also can potentially threaten

consumers. Spoofing can be used, for example, by the unscrupulous

to defraud consumers by making calls appear as if they are from

legitimate businesses or government offices.

The commission’s enforcement bureau has been actively investigating the issue of caller ID spoofing since the summer of 2005,

when information regarding junk fax spoofing came to our attention. To date, the bureau has initiated investigations of 12 companies engaged in the marketing and selling of caller ID spoofing

services to customers. One investigation resulted in a citation

against a telemarketer, Intelligent Alternatives, for rule violations,

including violations of the caller ID rules under section 64.1601.

We have sent formal letters of inquiry to the other companies and

at the same time, served most of them with subpoenas to compel

them to respond to our inquiries. In some cases, we have issued

subsequent letters of inquiry to uncover additional evidence of possible violations of the Communications Act. Our inquiry letter seek

information about the company’s alleged spoofing methods, including detailed technical explanations and the types of technologies

utilized, the identities of other companies that assist in providing

the spoofing services, the purposes for the services, and information

about subscribers, and whether the offered services can be used to

spoof emergency services information or otherwise affect those critical first responders.

We continue to seek relevant information to assist us in fully understanding these issues and whether violations of the Communications Act or our rules have occurred. But our enforcement options

may be limited by some of these entities who are not directly regulated by the commission. At the same time, we have held meetings

with numerous industry representatives, including wire line, wireless, and voiceover Internet protocol based companies to determine

the impact of caller ID spoofing on their consumers and networks.

In addition, we have coordinated closely with state agencies, the

Federal Trade Commission, and other interested organizations,

such as the National Emergency Number Association, regarding

their efforts to address and identify solutions to this problem. The

enforcement bureau is committed to continuing to gather and analyze information about these companies’ practices, their networks,

their businesses, their customers, and other germane information.

In conclusion, the intentional manipulation of caller ID information, especially for the purpose of fraud or deception, is a troubling

development in the telecommunications industry. The commission

looks forward to working with Congress, this committee, to ensure

that the public maintains its confidence in the telecommunications

industry. Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Montieth appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

11

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. We thank each of the witnesses. That

now concludes the time for testimony by our witnesses, and now

the chair will recognize himself for a question of the witnesses.

Ms. Knight, do you feel that the changes that have been made

in the legislation take into account the context of the call so that

now the bill goes after the bad actors without hindering legitimate

uses of technology?

Ms. KNIGHT. Yes, the intent either to defraud or to cause harm

adequately and rightly covers the illegitimate uses and still protects the legitimate uses of caller ID spoofing.

Mr. MARKEY. OK, great. I have no other questions. Mr. Upton.

Mr. UPTON. Do you think it addresses everything that we should

in this bill?

Ms. MONTEITH. Yes, I think what would be important with respect to intent is that Congress and the committee provide as much

in the way of legislative history as possible to inform the commission of the applicable standard under the intent standard.

Mr. UPTON. I have no further questions. Thank you.

Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Monteith,

in your testimony, you mentioned that the commission has coordinated with state agencies regarding the efforts of the state agencies

to identify solutions to this problem. Can you give some examples

of what the states are doing to solve the problem?

Ms. MONTEITH. I know we have worked closely with the Florida

attorney general’s office and I believe with members of the

Nayrook. I don’t have any specific examples. We do participate

with the Nayrook members on a monthly call that is aimed at addressing consumer protection types of issues. But I would be happy

to get specific details to respond to your question.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I appreciate that. Ms. Pies, you gave a

line of good examples of the new technology, the VoIP providers.

It is really exciting, and obviously many people use these things.

My kids can tell you more about them than I can, but there is no

standard, is that true, for VoIP providers when it comes to caller

ID?

Ms. PIES. If I understand the question, you are asking whether

there is an industry-wide accepted technical standard for transmission of caller ID.

Mr. ENGEL. Yes.

Ms. PIES. There are several different protocols that are used to

provide VoIP services. Really depends on the type of service that

is being provided, the type of network, whether or not it is connecting to the PSTN. And there are practices that some providers use.

As Kris explained in her testimony, if you are connecting with the

PSTN, there are different requirements in order to be able to pass.

If you are utilizing SS7 base signaling, there is different information that has to be passed. Some providers where calls originate IP,

rather than originating on the PSTN, as I described in my testimony, the networks do not organically generate caller ID that is

what we think of in the traditional plain old telephone service

world. So they may, for instance, insert a number such as 0001234

in order to allow the call to connect, but that call does not have

a traditional phone number associated with it.

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Mr. ENGEL. Do most programs let someone manually enter any

caller ID info they want?

Ms. PIES. I can’t answer whether most do or do not. What VoIP

does that is so empowering for businesses and consumers is it essentially moves functionality that used to be in the hands of the

large companies. So, for instance, setting up a PBX system. I can

now download software and set up a PBX system from my home,

and I can serve a small business straight from my home. I do not

have to contract through Verizon. So the ability to do that also enables me to control some of the functionalities that the phone company would have controlled in the past, such as establishing the

caller ID. I know that there are a number of consumer residential

VoIP services that ask the consumer to select a phone number and

fix that selection from the get-go, and the caller does not have the

ability to manipulate it as they go on.

Mr. ENGEL. Is the industry working towards any standard that

you know on how to handle things so that things would be uniform?

Ms. PIES. The industry is, as far as I know, and there are technical organizations and engineers that may be working on issues

that I am not aware of. Establishing a caller ID so that calls look

like plain old telephone service is probably not high on the priority

list. Most of the industry standards that are being worked on allow

the old network to communicate with the next generation network.

And sort of making up a caller ID parameter so that it looks like

an old phone call does not serve any beneficial purpose when the

networks can talk to each other without that.

Mr. ENGEL. OK, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to follow up

on this range. There is always unintended consequences when we

move legislation, and it has struck me that we have defined that

there is legitimate reasons to spoof for protection. We have been involved a lot with the 911 issue and enhanced 911 and identification

of location. Is there a concern, especially VoIP, which is we are not

totally deployed. We are still having issues with how someone uses

the VoIP service. And they call 911. How do we know where they

are at? And we are trying to push that out. Let us take someone

who is spoofing legitimately to protect their location. What if they

then try to make an emergency service call? Are they in the system, or are they not? Can they be identified, or can they not be

identified either using traditional land line, cellular or VoIP? Is

this something we need to talk through, or am I not technologically

knowledgeable enough to say it is not an issue?

Ms. PIES. I would like to answer.

Mr. MARKEY. Yes.

Ms. PIES. That is a very good question, and actually the way that

a VoIP caller or a cellular caller contacts the right PSAP, the correct PSAP for the location where the person is located, is there is

a system called PANI or Pseudo Automatic Number Identification.

And that number is input into a database or a server so that when

my calls go in, for instance, I have a 202 number in my office in

Maryland. My call will go into the 911 system, and because we

have a very old 911 system that actually does not work very parVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:37 Jun 04, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-8 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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ticularly efficiently, you have to fool the system to letting it believe

that the call is coming from the right geographic location. So there

is a Pseudo ANI that is associated then with my call that tells the

PSAP that I am in Maryland as opposed to DC. So in fact, that is

a legitimate spoofing capability that needs to be protected to enable

the 911 call to go to the right PSAP. It is not something that needs

to be prevented because both mobile calls or VoIP calls, any type

of service that can be used from a different location from what a

traditional phone service would be used, needs to have that sort of

pseudo phone number to be able to tell the PSAP where to go and

which PSAP to answer.

Mr. SHIMKUS. So no matter what number you change it to or the

identification of the Pseudo ANI number will direct you to the location?

Ms. PIES. Correct.

Mr. SHIMKUS. Great. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I yield

back.

Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Monteith, first of all,

it looks like this bill we have here in the subcommittee is a slamdunk, and we appreciate your help in the process. I just thought

while we have you here, I would like to have you tell us how an

enforcement action happens. Walk us through it. And do you start

it? Does the chairman’s office start it? Tell us how it works.

Ms. MONTEITH. Sure. An enforcement action can be initiated

through a number of different procedures. One may be that we

would investigate an issue that comes to our attention that is troubling and may be a violation of the Communications Act. Secondly,

we certainly could be asked by the chairman, other commissioners,

to help to investigate issues. And thirdly, we are very often complaint-driven. A complaint is filed with the commission alleging a

violation of the Communications Act, and we investigate to ensure

that there is not or to determine that there is.

Once we initiate an investigation, our general fact finding process is to send letters of inquiry to the subject of our investigation,

asking them to provide us with information concerning the underlying issues. They are compelled to respond. If they are a non-regulated entity, we sometimes serve a subpoena as well as issuing the

formal letter of inquiry to ensure that they will respond to our inquiry. From there, if our investigation reveals that there has been

a violation of the Communications Act, our general process with respect to a regulated entity is to issue what we call a notice of apparent liability. That is a finding that we believe there has been

a violation, and we propose, in many instances, a forfeiture along

with that finding. The entity then has an opportunity to respond

to us and indicate to us that either factually or legally we do not

understand the case or the facts before us, the law before us. From

there, we go to a forfeiture order that may be—if we are dealing

with a non-regulated entity or a entity that does not have an application or an application or a license or a permit from the commission, before we can go to the notice of apparent liability stage, we

are required by statute to issue a citation. And before we could

then go to the notice of apparent liability stage and impose a forfeiture or a fine, we would have to find a repeat violation by that

14

same entity of the same underlying Communications Act provision

or our rules. So that is in essence the process.

Mr. DOYLE. When would the chairman or other commissioners

get involved in an enforcement action, or do they ever?

Ms. MONTEITH. Involved with respect to asking us to investigate

or involved in the investigation?

Mr. DOYLE. In the investigation.

Ms. MONTEITH. The bureau, of course, would coordinate with the

chairman’s office and with the commissioners to share information

about our investigations. And depending upon whether the investigation is something that the bureau could handle on delegated

authority or whether we had to present the item for the commission’s full consideration, the commissioners may be more or less involved in the investigation.

Certainly if it is an item that is being presented to the commission for vote, the bureau would be responding to the commissioners

and the chairman and the kinds of questions that they may have

to assure themselves that they are, and they fully understand the

facts and the laws surrounding the investigation.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really don’t have any

questions. I think they have been well addressed and look forward

to moving into the markup.

Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. TERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only have one question.

It is the same one that I asked last time, and I think we made sure

that this appropriate use was protected, and that is within our

teleservices industry. Two of the top three of which are

headquartered in my district. So I just want to ask Kris if you

could verify that from your reading that a teleservices company

that uses their client’s name and number as the caller ID number

is an accepted practice and is not one that would be considered defrauding or harming.

Ms. MONTEITH. Yes, I believe that is correct under our rules.

Mr. TERRY. That would be our intent. Thank you.

Mr. MARKEY. With the gentleman yielding back, the time for

questions by the members of the subcommittee has expired. That

concludes the hearing. All members have 10 days, if they wish, to

submit questions to the witnesses, and the committee clerk will notify the members as to how that process works. And without objection, this subcommittee is now adjourned. And we will now have

the meeting once again. OK, so all the witnesses, if you would like,

we thank you so much for your excellent testimony. And we will

take a 1-minute break. We will recognize the gentleman from

Texas, Mr. Green.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy. Again,

I apologize. I was just down the hall. I am actually trying to work

with the Ecuador ambassador with an energy company, so you understand that, Mr. Chairman. But I just have some questions for

Ms. Monteith. Commercial telemarketers are required to transmit

accurate caller ID information that applies whether the calls are

made in person or whether they are using automated calls. Is that

correct?

15

Ms. MONTEITH. Yes, I believe so.

Mr. GREEN. OK, if a nonprofit, such as a political action committee or a political party or a 571 organization makes automated calls

to voters, does the current FCC rules prohibit them from using inaccurate caller ID info if it is nonprofits or political campaigns?

Ms. MONTEITH. I don’t believe exempt organizations are covered

under our rules.

Mr. GREEN. OK, the committee memo agrees with that and says

that there is no broad mandate however to the correct caller ID information be transmitted for non-commercial calls. That is the only

thing. The draft bill we have today prohibits the sending of inaccurate caller ID info with the intent to defraud or cause harm.

Does this language prohibit automated political calls with inaccurate caller ID info? Does that definition of with intent to defraud

or cause harm, would that apply to non-profits or political campaigns?

Ms. MONTEITH. I would prefer to, if you don’t mind, with all due

respect, look at the question before I answer.

Mr. GREEN. OK, we will be glad to submit that.

Ms. MONTEITH. Thank you. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman,

generally intent to defraud is relatively clear for a standard, but

when you add to it intent to cause harm, it is less clear. And I

would hope that the FCC would interpret that standard, which

causes harm, how much intent is needed to qualify? And so that

is an open-ended, but we will submit that to you. And I know we

have a markup set for this bill, and I have an amendment that will

address it. But I will hold to the full committee, but I think there

is some concern about that. And I want to make sure we don’t have

a loophole that can be done by non-profits or even political campaigns because our constituents can get mad when that caller ID

is false. And whether it is me calling them or the Democratic Party

or some non-profit group. And your organization has been very

helpful in identifying some justified reasons for allowing callers to

withhold and hide caller ID info, such as people making anonymous tips to newspapers and legitimate investigations, and also

women’s shelters, for example. We now have an intent standard in

the bill, and I am concerned that organizations making deceptive

political calls using fake caller ID information would not be covered. Is it your understanding this bill would include non-profit or

political organizations?

Ms. MONTEITH. Well, I think that the standard deception is different than either fraud or to cause harm, and I think that the

standard that has been articulated in the bill does clearly delineate

between legitimate and illegitimate uses of spoofing.

Mr. GREEN. OK, can you think of any legitimate reason someone

or some group that is making hundreds or even thousands of calls

on an automated system would use a false caller ID? And this is

open to anyone. I guess because I think the bill is a great bill. In

fact, I know it has been both my colleague counsel Eliot and ranking member Barton, I just worry that we are leaving maybe a loophole here that we are not going to address. And we will have to

come back at some future time.

Ms. MONTEITH. Well, again I think that the focus rightly is on

the intent.

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Mr. GREEN. OK, and not the causes harm?

Ms. MONTEITH. Well, either the intent to defraud or to cause

harm.

Mr. GREEN. OK, so the intent to defraud would be the primary,

and then to cause harm is actually in addition to it. You don’t have

to meet both tests.

Ms. MONTEITH. Right, the wording of the bill has an or. I would

see to defraud as being more traditional fraud where there would

be a calculable monetary damage that would be associated with it,

whereas harm, I think, would be more along the lines of a physical

harm to deal with some of the issues that I have read about in

terms of safety.

Mr. GREEN. OK. Well, I guess the fraud issue, because if again

for example, the Democratic Party is only calling Republican primary voters, what would you think that would be? Would that be

intent to defraud with their caller ID not showing it is the Democratic Party?

Ms. MONTEITH. Well, again, I think that deception and fraud are

two different standards. I won’t try to make any kind of judgment

on how the bill will eventually be interpreted; however.

Mr. GREEN. We don’t want anybody to interpret it. We want to

put it in the language so they don’t have to.

Ms. MONTEITH. I mean I need further details on this.

Mr. GREEN. OK.

Ms. MONTEITH. At a later date, if you would like. Again, I would

like to restate that EPIC does support the language either intent

to defraud or to cause harm. We think that adequately makes a

distinction between different uses.

Mr. GREEN. But again someone could still be using local calls

just to deceive, and because defraud they are not, I mean except

for maybe selling them an idea instead of a product——

Ms. MONTEITH. Well, again if that doesn’t meet the language either to defraud or to cause harm, then it wouldn’t be caught within

the bill. And it would therefore be a legitimate use.

Ms. GREEN. OK, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again.

Mr. MARKEY. OK, and we look forward to working with the gentleman from Texas between the subcommittee and the full committee on his concerns. With that, the gentleman’s time has expired.

And again all time for questions by members of the subcommittee

has expired, and this portion of the hearing has concluded. And we

once again thank the witnesses for their excellent testimony, and

we will recess for a minute while the witnesses clear the table. And

our staff counsel can move into place so that we can begin a markup of this legislation.

[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded to other

business.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

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STATEMENT OF KRIS ANNE MONTEITH

Good morning, Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Upton, and members of the

Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak about the problem of caller

identification (caller ID) spoofing.

As you know, caller ID services let customers identify who is calling them before

they answer a call by displaying the caller’s telephone number or other information—such as a name or business name—on the customer’s equipment before the

customer picks up the phone. ‘‘Caller ID spoofing’’ refers to a practice in which the

caller ID information transmitted with a telephone call is manipulated in a manner

that misleads the call recipient about the identity of the caller. The use of Internet

technology to make phone calls has apparently made caller ID spoofing even easier.

The Commission is deeply concerned about reports that caller ID information is

being manipulated for fraudulent or other deceptive purposes and the impact of

those practices on the public trust and confidence in the telecommunications industry. We are particularly concerned about how this practice may affect consumers as

well as public safety and law enforcement communities.

In my testimony, I will first provide a brief technical background on caller ID

spoofing. Then, I will describe the Commission’s rules addressing caller ID services

and the steps the Commission is taking to make sure that providers are fully meeting their obligations under the Communications Act and the Commission’s rules and

orders.

As a technical matter, caller ID spoofing happens by manipulating the data elements that travel with a phone call. Phone calls on the public switched telephone

network, or PSTN, are routed to their destinations by means of a specialized protocol called the Signaling System 7, or SS7. SS7 conveys information associated with

a call such as the telephone number of the caller. The SS7 information for a call

is provided by the carrier that the caller uses to place the call. Caller ID then displays that caller’s number to the called party. Caller ID spoofing is accomplished

by manipulating the SS7 information associated with the call.

The Commission addressed caller ID on the PSTN in 1995 with rule 64.1601,

which generally requires all carriers using SS7 to transmit the calling party number

associated with an interstate call to interconnecting carriers. The same Commission

rule also requires telemarketers to transmit accurate caller ID information.

The development of Internet and IP technologies has made caller ID spoofing easier than it used to be. Now, entities using IP technology can generate false calling

party information and pass it into the PSTN via SS7. Caller ID spoofing can potentially threaten our public safety. For example, spoofers can fabricate emergency

calls and cause local law enforcement and public safety agencies to deploy their resources needlessly. Caller ID spoofing can potentially threaten consumers. For example, spoofing can be used by the unscrupulous to defraud consumers by making

calls appear as if they are from legitimate businesses or government offices.

The Commission’s Enforcement Bureau (Bureau) has been actively investigating

the issue of caller ID spoofing since the summer of 2005 when information regarding

junk fax spoofing came to our attention. To date, the Bureau has initiated investigations of twelve companies engaged in the marketing and selling of caller ID spoofing

services to customers. One investigation resulted in a citation against a telemarketer, Intelligent Alternatives, for rule violations, including violations of the

caller ID rules under section 64.1601. We have sent formal letters of inquiry to the

other companies and, at the same time, served most of them subpoenas to compel

them to respond to our inquiries. In some cases, we have issued subsequent letters

of inquiry to uncover additional evidence of possible violations of the Communications Act.

Our inquiry letters seek information about the companies’ alleged spoofing methods, including detailed technical explanations and the types of technology utilized,

the identity of other companies that assist in providing the spoofing services, the

purpose for the services and information about subscribers, and whether the offered

services can be used to spoof emergency services information or otherwise affect

those critical first responders. We continue to seek relevant information to assist us

in fully understanding these issues and whether violations of the Communications

Act or our rules have occurred, but our enforcement options may be limited as some

of these entities are not directly regulated by the Commission.

At the same time, we have held meetings with numerous industry representatives, including wireline, wireless, and voice over Internet protocol (VoIP)-based

companies, to determine the impact of caller ID spoofing on their consumers and

networks. In addition, we have coordinately closely with state agencies, the Federal

Trade Commission and other interested organizations, such as the National EmerVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:37 Jun 04, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-8 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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gency Number Association, regarding their efforts to address and identify solutions

to this problem.

The Enforcement Bureau is committed to continuing to gather and analyze information about these companies’ practices, their networks, their businesses, their customers, and other germane information. In addition, as the Commission indicated

to some members of this Committee last year, the Commission may not have sufficient authority to fully address this issue. Thus, legislation that clarified the Commission’s authority in this area would be helpful.

In conclusion, the intentional manipulation of caller ID information, especially for

the purpose of fraud or deception, is a troubling development in the telecommunications industry. The Commission looks forward to working with this Committee,

and other Members of Congress, to ensure the public maintains its confidence in the

telecommunications industry. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you

today.

STATEMENT OF STACI L. PIES

Thank you, Chairman Markey, Vice Chair Doyle, Ranking Member Upton, and

members of the subcommittee. My name is Staci Pies. I am Vice President, Governmental and

Regulatory Affairs of Point One, a VoIP provider, and President of the Voice on

The Net or VON Coalition—the voice for the VoIP industry. On behalf of the VON

Coalition, I thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify about this important issue. Misleading people through the misuse of caller ID, whether for a prank,

a scam, or worse, is unacceptable, and we thank the Committee for its leadership

in addressing the issue. VoIP is burgeoning in popularity with consumers because

it can do so much more than Plain Old Telephone Service. VoIP allows consumers

to take control over their communications experience, to manage how they use those

services and to decide when and where they want to receive calls. Lower costs, coupled with a seemingly endless list of new possibilities are making VoIP one of the

hottest Internet and broadband technologies today. Internet voice communications

is changing the way we communicate, stay connected to our friends, family and colleagues, and how we live. Today’s VoIP services aren’t simply a means to have a

conversation; they’re portals to a world of information that enriches the communications experience and adds new dimensions to the idea of ‘‘conversation.’’

Studies have shown that with the right policy framework and continued advancement, VoIP driven competition has the potential to save consumers more than $100

billion over the next 5 years. Families are gaining unprecedented independence as

well as new flexibility and features not possible in yesterday’s telephone network.

Features such as choosing your area code, and the ability to use a VoIP service

through any broadband connection are just some of the ways that consumers are

benefiting. At the same time, connectivity, quality and reliability have improved to

equal if not surpass that of the legacy phone network. For businesses, VoIP is lowering costs, increasing mobility, enabling collaboration, integrating voice and data in

entirely new ways, boosting productivity by as much as 15 percent, and giving companies a competitive advantage.

And the best is yet ahead. The next wave of VoIP driven benefits promises to facilitate revolutionary improvements in the way we communicate. Soon a voice component can be added to any type of device, application or service that uses a microprocessor or touches the Internet. Already, making a call can be just a click away.

Consumers can pay less, but get more. Communication is no longer tethered to a

specific device or location. Workers can take their work phone home to spend more

time with loved ones. Our armed forces can video conference with families back

home—no longer having to choose between serving their families or serving their

country. Free downloadable software keeps far-flung families connected, and enables

children to learn a foreign language and doctors the latest medical procedures from

experts around the globe. By disconnecting voice from the underlying infrastructure,

voice innovation can now take place at Internet speed.

Many of the great benefits of VoIP to consumers and business users depend on

accurate and non-misleading identification of the calling party. If I program my

VoIP service to ensure that calls from my son’s school are simultaneously rung on

all of my phones, I don’t want to answer it and find out that some telemarketer has

spoofed the number to fool me into believing it is a priority call. And businesses that

use caller ID to call up a customer’s account record so that it is immediately available to the customer service representative won’t find the record very useful if it

is the wrong record because the caller ID has been spoofed. To protect the usefulVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:37 Jun 04, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-8 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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ness of their services, VoIP providers have a strong interest in having caller ID be

accurate and nonmisleading.

The VON Coalition has been at the forefront of promoting best practices to enable

consumers to protect their personal data. For instance, the Coalition moved early

to adopt and post consumer guidelines for protecting billing records. Since then,

businesses that control personal data, consumers, and the IP industry have taken

significant steps to self police fraudulent access to personal data.

The VON Coalition agrees with previously presented Congressional testimony

that callerID fraud perpetrators must be penalized. Strong action must be taken

against those that intentionally spoof caller ID with the intent to commit fraud, deceive, harass or otherwise create threats to life and limb. Law enforcement should

have the tools to protect U.S. citizens from criminals fraudulently manipulating

phone numbers to engage in identity theft to commit financial crimes. Similarly,

criminals that modify caller ID to commit other crimes, such as harassing or stalking victims, should be prosecuted swiftly and effectively. Spoofing to defraud or harass, or for unlawful commercial gain cannot and should not ever be condoned or tolerated.

Congress is right to focus its attention on those who would do so. As Congress

addresses deceptive spoofing, we urge you to keep in mind that the ability to change

caller ID information—where the purpose is not to fraudulently mislead or deceive—

has the potential to offer consumers a transformative communications experience.

Policy makers

must carefully balance the goal of thwarting harmful behavior with the public interest imperative to ensure that innovation flourishes and applications and services

delivered over broadband are available to all Americans. The ability of consumers

to control various aspects of their communications experience presents exciting opportunities for the disabled, offers unsurpassed privacy protection, and enables businesses and consumers to communicate in increasingly efficient and powerful ways.

The ‘‘Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007’’ as written, effectively balances these two important objectives—by facilitating prosecution of the fraud, while not thwarting or

prohibiting innovative tools that have legitimate consumer empowering benefits.

The bill recognizes, for example, that law enforcement may need to mask the true

identity of an originating telephone number. This is not the only legitimate need

to change caller ID information. I’d like to share five examples: • First, VoIP services offer tremendous potential for persons with disabilities to

communicate more effectively. VoIP integrates the phone, voice mail, audio conferencing, e-mail, instant messaging, and Web applications on one secure, seamless

network. Workers can use their PC, laptop, or handheld as a VoIP phone from virtually anywhere, with the same phone number, which benefits telecommuters, including those whose mobility is impaired and must work from home. One recent

Web-based application permits users to call any phone number in the US or Canada

and the service reads to the called party the message that the originating user inputs into the Web-based form. Users of the application who are speech impaired can

now send voice messages simply by providing a phone number to dial and their own

caller ID. Similarly, blind users can now take advantage of instant messaging services where previously they would have been precluded from doing so because of

sight limitations. Importantly, the user can input her home, mobile, or office phone

number, regardless of where the user is located (or where the call originates) when

she sends the message, something that would be prohibited by legislation that criminalizes any change in caller ID without a reference to intent.

• Second, one of the benefits of VoIP is that it can help a consumer better protect

his own privacy and manage which of his personal information he presents to the

world, irrespective of which communications device he utilizes to initiate a call. Consumers may want to direct return calls to a home or business landline, rather than

a wireless number, for example. Calls for different purposes (personal versus business) may merit different telephonic return addresses, as one might do with ordinary mail. For instance, Web sites that allow consumers to post solicitations for lawful commercial purposes may also permit consumers to provide a temporary call

back number that is different from their assigned caller ID. This beneficial privacy

service may require a legitimate change in caller ID. One service explains the application in this way: ‘‘The desire to communicate can not be crippled by concerns

about privacy. [This application] unleashes the true potential of a global community

by making it a safer place.’’ While these applications manipulate caller ID, they do

so for privacy protection and security. The VON Coalition does not sanction

masquerading as another for fraudulent or deceitful purposes.

• Third, there are some situations in which caller ID information can endanger

individual safety. The classic situation is the battered spouse. In some instances,

blocking the delivery of caller ID information might be sufficient. However, because

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technological innovations permit users to ‘‘unblock’’ caller ID, any legislation, as well

as law enforcement authorities, should be careful about presuming that blocking

will always be adequate. • Fourth, certain new communication services do not organically generate or

transmit a traditional caller ID, but in order to connect to the public telephone network, the service may need to insert something that looks like a traditional phone

number. Many of these innovative services, which offer tremendous new ways to

communicate, do not utilize the same numbering and labeling practices as yesterday’s phone services and should not be deemed illegitimate simply because the technology permits the caller ID to be changed. Users without traditional telephone

numbers, users with several numbers, users wanting to move numbers to their calling device and network of choice—these users are all potentially affected by technology that decouples devices from the caller ID that effectively used to be the address of the phone, and such users do not intend to defraud or cause harm. H.R.

251 appropriately focuses on the right class of services. • A final, exciting application that I will share with you today is the ability for

consumers to make click to dial calls while viewing broadband-based content such

as IP-TV. Utilizing such an application, a viewer can click a single button on his

standard TV remote control and pull up a menu that offers a variety of products

and services—ranging from news, games, fantasy sports scores, traffic, shopping,

and entertainment, to billing applications. From there, the viewer can locate a business of interest in the area and can then click on a button that enables the viewer

to speak to the local business through a VoIP connection. Although the call technically originates through the VoIP service provider, the viewer can input his own

caller ID for call-back purposes. Such innovative and rich communications experiences should not be eliminated through overly broad legislation or regulation.

I’d like to close with three additional thoughts. First, spoofing of caller ID is not

new. Tools have been widely available for years to spoof caller ID on traditional networks. One method, sometimes referred to as Orangeboxing, offers the ability to

spoof caller ID using a downloadable sound and a common tape recorder. Moreover,

many large businesses operating a PBX system have, for quite some time, ‘‘spoofed’’

caller ID so that it appears as if all calls originating on the PBX come from the

same central number. Second, fighting fraudulent and deceptive changes in caller

ID is only part of the solution. Companies handling sensitive customer information

must also make sure they are handling that information with care. While caller ID

can help a business retrieve a customer’s account record, as long as caller ID can

technically be spoofed (which will be the case even with new legislation) the business needs to handle disclosure of those records with the utmost care—making consumer privacy their top priority. One security expert explained the technology is not

to blame for the fraudulent use. Society is. Society has grown far too reliant on caller ID as a form of identification. Both individuals and corporate America use caller

ID to decide whom to trust. Unfortunately, too many individuals have suffered because of this misplaced trust. As Chairman Dingell and Ranking Member Barton

recognized in introducing ‘‘The Prevention of Fraudulent Access to Phone Records

Act’’ to prohibit pretexting of phone records and to enhance security requirements

for customer proprietary network information, it is incumbent upon companies that

are entrusted with personal information to do more to protect the privacy and security of their customers.

Third, misleading people through the misuse of caller ID, whether for a prank,

a scam, or worse, is unacceptable. This committee is right to focus on those who

intend to mislead. At the same time, though, legislation should not impose liability

on traditional carriers and VoIP services providers who merely transmit what may

turn out to be fraudulently altered caller ID information. Policy makers should not

be mislead into believing that technology innovators are to blame for criminal behavior. Networks and network service providers may be unable and should not be

required to become ‘‘content police’’ or to discern legitimate and illegitimate uses of

network services. Instead, service providers are best able to assist in the efforts to

fight spoofing by keeping accurate records and making those records available, as

appropriate, to proper authorities.

In focusing on those few people who would abuse caller ID technology, Congress

can address the very real problem of deceptive spoofing effectively, in a cost-efficient

manner that protects the proper use of this technology, and enables competitive and

transformative innovation. VoIP service providers, who have made real strides in

leveraging the power of the Internet and caller ID to provide robust services to consumers, fully support measures to protect the integrity of caller ID functionality. Together with this Committee’s efforts, the proliferation of VoIP services will create

unsurpassed opportunities for consumers and even greater growth in broadband

services. The VON Coalition believes that VoIP is positioned to help make commuVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:37 Jun 04, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-8 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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nicating more affordable, businesses more productive, jobs more plentiful, the Internet more valuable, and Americans more safe and secure.

Thank you very much. I am happy to answer any questions.

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