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IN RE VICTOR D.*

(AC 37352)

Beach, Mullins and Bishop, Js.

Argued October 15—officially released November 20, 2015**

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
Middlesex, Child Protection Session at Middletown,

Elgo, J.)

Roger N., self-represented, the appellant (respondent father).

Tammy Nguyen-O’Dowd, assistant attorney general,

with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney

general, Gregory T. D’Auria, solicitor general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (Commissioner of Children and Families).

Isidro Rueda, for the appellee (petitioner minor

child).

Benjamin D. Hollander, guardian ad litem for the

minor child.
Opinion

BEACH, J. The respondent father1 appeals from the

judgment of the trial court terminating his parental

rights with respect to his minor child, Victor D. The

respondent essentially claims2

that (1) the court erred

when it found that the Department of Children and

Families (department) had made reasonable efforts

toward reunification and when it found that the respondent had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal

rehabilitation, (2) the court violated the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution, (3) the Commissioner of Children and Families (commissioner)

prejudiced the respondent by withdrawing her support

for reunification of the respondent with the child, and

(4) the child’s guardian ad litem was biased and had a

conflict of interest. We do not agree and affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. The child was born in May, 2010.

The mother identified the respondent as the biological

father of the child. The mother had a history of abusing

substances since 2005, and both she and the child tested

positive for cocaine and marijuana at the time of the

child’s birth. The commissioner immediately secured a

ninety-six hour hold and filed a neglect petition and an

ex parte order of temporary custody. The order was

granted and specific steps were issued for the mother

and the respondent on May 28, 2010. The respondent

was not present at this proceeding.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found the

following relevant facts. Although the respondent was

aware that the mother was pregnant, he was not notified

of the birth until June, 2010. When contacted by the

department in September, 2010, the respondent stated

that he wanted proof of his paternity. He did not participate in the September 21, 2010 neglect trial, at which

the child was adjudicated neglected and committed to

the commissioner. The respondent was determined by

paternity testing to be the biological father on October

10, 2010; the child had been in the commissioner’s custody for five months at that point. The child had ‘‘highly

specialized needs and severe developmental delays

which required a caregiver who was committed to

understanding and caring for those needs.’’ A number

of social workers and service providers proceeded to

work with the respondent to prepare him to address

the child’s complex needs.

Difficulties arose almost immediately after paternity

was established. At the time that paternity was established, the respondent lived several hours away in Massachusetts; the physical separation made visitation and

the scheduling of appointments difficult. The primary

social worker assigned to the case had ‘‘persistent concerns’’ about the respondent’s ability to care for the
child and testified that the child’s ‘‘physical safety was

consistently at risk’’ when he was in the respondent’s

care. The child’s foster parents offered to assist the

respondent in understanding the child’s special needs.

The respondent refused this support. The respondent

was inconsistent with visits and frequently missed

appointments with various service providers. He also

had difficulty working with service providers, some of

whom testified at trial that they felt that the respondent

deliberately had tried to intimidate them.

Initially, all of the respondent’s visits with the child

were supervised. During several supervised visits, the

child was injured and cried hysterically, and, though

no one actually observed the respondent hurt the child,

the primary social worker testified that she suspected

that the respondent caused these injuries.3 Additionally,

the respondent was not receptive to the support that

he was offered to improve his relationship with the

child. When the department located a family therapist

to help the respondent address his specific steps, the

respondent, claiming that he did not need counseling,

rejected the assistance. In the spring of 2011, the respondent became more consistent with visitation, but he

continued to resist the recommendations of the child’s

service providers. One provider, Birth to Three, focused

on the child’s digestive issues. The respondent was

given a list of foods that were safe for the child to eat.

The respondent repeatedly challenged these recommendations and brought inappropriate food to sessions

with the child.

On August 25, 2011, the commissioner filed a petition

to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. The

respondent made several complaints to the department

ombudsman, who conducted a very limited review of

the case. After what the trial court deemed a ‘‘profoundly flawed and incomplete assessment’’ by the

ombudsman, the local department office was directed

to withdraw the petition in April, 2012. The case was

reassigned to a new social worker.

In July, 2012, despite negative reports from the child’s

service providers and the respondent’s reported lack

of progress, the department decided to allow the

respondent unsupervised visitation with the child.

When the visits were unsupervised, the child, who was

at that point two years old, threw violent tantrums when

his service providers arrived at his foster parents’ house

to transport him to the respondent. Afterthese unsupervised visits, the child demonstrated serious distress; he

had nightmares, hit his foster parents, slammed his head

on the floor, and regressed in his bathroom habits.

On October 23, 2012, the respondent filed a motion

to revoke commitment. The commissioner filed a

motion to revoke commitment and modify disposition

to protective supervision on December 31, 2012. The

hearing on these motions began on April 29, 2013, and
continued through January 10, 2014. The court consolidated for hearing a motion for overnight and unsupervised visits with the motion to revoke commitment. On

January 28, 2014, the attorney for the child filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondent

and the mother. The commissioner initially joined the

respondent in opposing the petition.

On April 21, 2014, the commissioner informed the

court that she had changed her position, and she withdrew her own motion to revoke commitment. The court

continued the trial until June 2, 2014. On June 2, 2014,

the commissioner reported to the court that it supported the child’s petition to terminate the respondent’s

parental rights. In its written November 7, 2014 decision, the court denied the respondent’s motion to

revoke commitment. Thereafter, the court found by

clear and convincing evidence, as to the adjudicatory

phase, that the department had made reasonable efforts

to reunify the respondent with the child and that the

respondent had failed to rehabilitate. As to the disposition, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (2), the court found by

clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best

interest of the child that the parental rights of the

respondent and the mother be terminated. The court

concluded that the respondent’s motion for overnight

visitation and any other outstanding motions were now

moot. This appeal followed. We shall set forth additional

facts as necessary.

I

We first address the respondent’s claims regarding

the court’s conclusions terminating his parental rights.

The respondent claims that the court erred by finding,

for the purposes of General Statutes § 17a-112 (j),4

that

(1) the department had made reasonable efforts toward

reunification, and that (2) the respondent had failed to

achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation.

We shall address these claims in turn.

The principles that guide our review are as follows.

‘‘A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights

consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.

. . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds fortermination of parental rights [under § 17a-112 (j)] exists by

clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it

proceeds to the dispositional phase . . . [in which] the

trial court determines whether termination is in the

best interests of the child.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) In re Etta H., 146 Conn. App.

751, 755–56, 78 A.3d 295 (2013).

Our Supreme Court recently clarified the appropriate

standard by which to review trial courtjudgments terminating parental rights. See In re Shane M., 318 Conn.

569, 587–88, A.3d (2015). ‘‘We have historically
reviewed for clear error both the trial court’s subordinate factual findings and its determination that a parent

has failed to rehabilitate. . . . While we remain convinced that clear error review is appropriate forthe trial

court’s subordinate factual findings, we now recognize

that the trial court’s ultimate conclusion of whether a

parent has failed to rehabilitate involves a different

exercise by the trial court. A conclusion of failure to

rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court’s factual

findings and from its weighing of the facts in assessing

whether those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate

ground set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) Id. Similarly, the court’s determination as to whether the

department made reasonable efforts toward reunification is a legal conclusion drawn from the court’s subordinate factual findings. Therefore, we apply a clearly

erroneous standard of review as to the court’s underlying factual findings, and we review the court’s legal

determinations of reasonable efforts and of failure to

rehabilitate for sufficient evidence. See id.

‘‘A [subordinate factual] finding is clearly erroneous

when eitherthere is no evidence in the record to support

it, or the reviewing court is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . .

[G]reat weight is given to the judgment of the trial court

because of [the trial court’s] opportunity to observe the

parties and the evidence. . . . [An appellate court

does] not examine the record to determine whether the

trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other

than the one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable

presumption is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Keyashia C.,

120 Conn. App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied,

297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010).

A

Reasonable Efforts

The respondent claims that the court erred by

determining that the department had made reasonable

efforts toward reunification. The respondent’s argument on this point is brief; the respondent essentially

claims that the department’s efforts to reunify were

per se unreasonable because the reunification did not

occur. He argues that ‘‘[t]he [department] went through

a long and exhaustive process of court and blatantly

didn’t take the obvious next steps to reunify. Instead

they dragged the child through long legal battles when

the biological father had been meeting all expectations

and progressing to a level where they should have

moved forward in their placement.’’ We do not agree.

To terminate a parent’s parental rights, ‘‘the department is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify the

children with the parent unless the court finds that the
parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. In accordance with [§ 17a-112 (j)], the

department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made

such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable

or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3)

by a previous judicial determination that such efforts

were not appropriate. . . . The trial court’s determination of this issue will not be overturned on appeal

unless, in light of all of the evidence in the record, it

is clearly erroneous.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H., 68 Conn. App.

342, 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002).

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence in

the record to support the court’s conclusion that the

department’s efforts to reunify were reasonable. The

court, in its lengthy November 7, 2014 written decision,

recounted the efforts made by the department. The

court found that these efforts began when the respondent’s paternity was established. The primary department social worker assigned to the child’s case ‘‘made

extraordinary efforts to facilitate visitation, coordinate

providers, and implore [the respondent] to take advantage of Birth to Three Services and medical visits so

that he could better understand [the child’s] needs.’’

The respondent had an inflexible schedule, and the

department accommodated his scheduling requests.

The department sought to facilitate a constructive relationship between the respondent and the child’s foster

parents, who offered to help the respondent to understand the child’s needs and the special care that he

required. The department accommodated the respondent when it reimbursed him for mileage on the occasions that he visited the child, located a single provider

who could work with the respondent on several of the

specific steps in one session, made referrals to providers, and coordinated the respondent’s visits to Connecticut with the child’s appointments with various service

providers to enable the respondent to attend.

The court found that the department had made reasonable efforts—indeed, that it went ‘‘above and

beyond what would be considered reasonable

efforts’’—after evidence showed that the department

made significant efforts to include the respondent in

and to provide the respondent with myriad appropriate

services5 and that department social workers diligently

tried to accommodate the respondent’s scheduling conflicts and financial needs. On occasions when the

respondent canceled or missed visits with the child or

his service providers—and such occasions were frequent—the department urged providers to rearrange

their schedules to fit the respondent’s availability. The

department also sent monthly e-mails to the respondent

to ensure that his schedule was accommodated appropriately; the respondent often did not reply to these

e-mails, but the department persistently followed up
with him to confirm appointments and visits. Notwithstanding these efforts, the respondent complained

about his case to the department ombudsman. After

what the court labeled a ‘‘profoundly flawed and incomplete assessment of the case’’ by the ombudsman, the

department assigned a new social worker to the case.

The court found that after this change of assignment,

the department continued to accommodate the respondent by ‘‘approv[ing] [the respondent’s] request for an

overnight stay in a hotel every week starting in July,

2012, so that [the respondent] could have visits twice

a week. By October, 2012, [the department] increased

the length of visits and included an unsupervised component. [The department] [e]nsured that all services

were paid for, including individual therapy . . . .’’

The record indicates, and the court found, that the

department ensured that the respondent and the child

received services intended to effectuate reunification.

In light of these findings, the respondent’s argument

that, because reunification ultimately did not occur, the

department’s efforts toward that end were unreasonable is without merit.

We conclude, therefore, that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s determination, which was made by clear and convincing evidence,

that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify

the respondent with the child.

B

Personal Rehabilitation

The respondent next claims that the court erred by

concluding that he had not rehabilitated within the

meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). The thrust of the

respondent’s appeal is that the court improperly

weighed the evidence before it and ignored testimony

from the witnesses favorable to the respondent’s position. We do not agree.

Our statute provides for the termination of parental

rights when a child ‘‘has been found by the [trial court]

. . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior

proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been

provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return

of the child to the parent . . . and has failed to achieve

such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering

the age and needs of the child, such parent could

assume a responsible position in the life of the child

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i); see In

re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 506, 78 A.3d 797 (2013)

(‘‘[t]he prior provision of specific steps is required in

any case in which the commissioner seeks to terminate

parental rights on the ground of a parent’s failure to

rehabilitate, regardless of whether the petition is filed

pursuant to § 17a-112 [j] [3] [B] [i] or [ii]’’ [emphasis

in original]).
We previously have explained that the standard for

rehabilitation is set by the ‘‘expectations following the

adjudication and disposition of the prior neglect [proceeding].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Shane M., 148 Conn. App. 308, 319–20, 84 A.3d 1265

(2014), aff’d, 318 Conn. 568, A.3d (2015). ‘‘In other

words, whether a parent has rehabilitated under the

statute depends on whether he has met the expectations

giving rise to the specific steps.’’6

Id.

The completion of the specific steps, however, does

not guarantee reunification. See In re Vincent D., 65

Conn. App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001). ‘‘Although a

parent may have participated in the programs recommended pursuant to the specific steps ordered, a court

may properly find that the parent has failed to achieve

rehabilitation.’’ In re Destiny R., 134 Conn. App. 625,

627, 39 A.3d 727, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d

660 (2012). ‘‘The ultimate issue the court must evaluate

is whether the parent has gained the insight and ability

to care for his or her child given the age and needs of

the child within a reasonable time.’’ Id.; see In re Eden

F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied,

251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999).

The court found by clear and convincing evidence,

in accordance with § 17a-112 (j)(3)(B), that the respondent had ‘‘failed to rehabilitate within a reasonable

period of time, given the age and needs of [the child].’’

In its assessment of the respondent’s rehabilitation, the

court noted that the respondent struggled with the

child’s service providers. ‘‘From the outset, and in a

pattern that has persisted throughout this case, the

[respondent] has blamed others for his own deficiencies. . . . [The respondent] has not been able to demonstrate a genuine ability to work with providers with

whom he does not agree . . . .’’ The court described

the respondent as controlling and manipulative and

referred to specific instances in which the respondent

made misrepresentations to the department and to the

child’s various service providers.

The court also doubted the respondent’s ability to

care adequately for his son. Despite years of working

with the child’s service providers, ‘‘the manifestations

of [the respondent’s] inability and/or refusal to meet

[the child’s] need to grow and thrive with respect to

his emotional, psychological, and/or physical need for

safety and security and with respect to his emerging

and ever evolving need for independence are many

. . . .’’ The court could not ‘‘reconcile how [the respondent] could safely or appropriately care for [the child]

when, even in January 2013, the simplest of instructions,

such as being sure to hold [the child’s] hand or be close

when he attempts to walk down the stairs, was ignored

or required repeated assertions and reminders over several weeks’ time.’’ On another occasion, in April, 2013,

a service provider testified that she observed the
respondent order the child to keep food in his mouth

for up to fifteen minutes when the child was unable to

finish his meals, despite her insistence that the respondent should not force the child to eat when he was

not hungry.

Given what the court termed the respondent’s ‘‘longstanding persistent issues with controlling behaviors,’’

it was troubled by a series of injuries that the child

sustained while spending time with the respondent.

Beginning in 2012, a series of marks and bruises

appeared on the child. The court noted that, although

some of these injuries may have been the result of

normal toddler activity, one service provider testified

that the respondent’s explanations for how these injuries occurred were confusing and illogical. The child’s

foster parents increasingly were concerned with marks

and bruises located in unusual places; for example, the

foster parents reported that the child had bruises on

his forearm that resembled a handprint. The child

reported to his foster parents that ‘‘Daddy Roger’’ was

‘‘mean’’ to him and hit him.

Finally, the court cited the child’s need for permanency and security as an overriding concern in its

assessment of the respondent’s rehabilitation. See In

re Zion R., 116 Conn. App. 723, 739, 977 A.2d 247 (2009)

(holding that it was proper to consider child’s young

age and need for permanency in finding thatrespondent

had not achieved rehabilitation). The court was ‘‘convinced that [the respondent] cannot and will not handle

[the child’s extreme physical reactions and behaviors]

appropriately and that [the child] will be at extreme

risk if ever in [the respondent’s] exclusive care.’’

The court then listed specific reasons why it did not

find that the respondent had sufficiently rehabilitated,

including the respondent’s: ‘‘(1) . . . inability to tune

into and/or understand [the child’s] needs, both specialized needs and the ordinary developmental needs of the

child, (2) . . . resistance to and aggression in receiving

support and training services from various providers

to help him understand and address the child’s ever

evolving needs, and (3) . . . refusal to accept that individuals who are highly trained and/or experienced child

care professionals . . . have far greater, superior and

invaluable information, insights and understanding of

[the child’s] needs which [the respondent] also required

in order for the child to successfully transition into

his care.’’

The respondent essentially disputes the court’s determination of credibility; however, it was within the province of the trial court to credit or to discredit testimony

as it deemed fit. The respondent claims that the court

did not properly credit the testimony of Ralph Balducci,

a court-appointed psychologist, Bruce Freedman, the

respondent’s psychotherapist, and Collette Smith, a parent coach. He also claims that the court ignored por-
tions of the testimony of parent coach Kimberley Browe

that indicated that he had achieved rehabilitation. Our

function is to determine whether the court’s findings

were factually supported. It is not within our purview

to ‘‘retry the case or pass upon the credibility of the

witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re

Jason M., 140 Conn. App. 708, 719, 59 A.3d 902, cert.

denied, 308 Conn. 931, 64 A.3d 330, cert. denied, U.S.

, 134 S. Ct. 701, 187 L. Ed. 2d 564 (2013). ‘‘It is well

established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the

trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony.

. . . The credibility and the weight of expert testimony

is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is

privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably

believes to be credible. . . . The trier may accept or

reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert

offered by one party or the other.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 129 Conn. App. 746,

772–73, 23 A.3d 18 (2011), aff’d, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d

334 (2012). The respondent has pointed to no part of

the record that indicates that the court acted clearly

erroneously in evaluating the credibility of witnesses

and weight to be accorded their opinions. We will not

second-guess the court’s opinion of these witnesses.

Although we acknowledge the respondent’s efforts

to satisfy the specific steps, the court’s conclusion that

the respondent did not achieve rehabilitation sufficient

to warrant reunification is amply supported by factual

findings in the record and meticulously explained in

the court’s memorandum of decision. Thus, the court’s

determination that the respondent did not rehabilitate

sufficiently for the purposes of § 17-112 (j) (3) (B) was

supported by sufficient evidence.

II

We next address the respondent’s claim that the court

violated the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution by permitting the same witnesses who had

testified at a 2012 hearing on a motion to revoke commitment to testify again at the trial resulting in termination. This claim is without merit. ‘‘It is well settled

that prosecutions or convictions for double jeopardy

purposes arise only from proceedings that are essentially criminal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Burnell, 290 Conn. 634, 645, 966 A.2d 168 (2009).

Our Supreme Court has made it clear that the double

jeopardy clause does not apply to termination of parental rights cases. Cookson v. Cookson, 201 Conn. 229,

237, 514 A.2d 323 (1986) (stating that ‘‘parents do not

have a ‘double jeopardy’ defense against repeated state

termination efforts’’). Thus, this claim is without merit.

III

The respondent also claims that he suffered ‘‘extreme

prejudice’’ as a result of the commissioner’s change in
her position of support for reunification to a position

of support for the termination of parental rights. The

respondent argues that the commissioner changed her

position only because she learned of an investigation

into allegations of the respondent’s abuse of a younger

son in Massachusetts.7 A change in the commissioner’s

position, however, is not a basis to overturn judgment

rendered by a court after it weighed the totality of

evidence presented at trial.

Moreover, the trial court’s decision in this case was

not premised on any finding by the Massachusetts

Department of Children and Families; the courtreferred

to the finding as ‘‘cumulative evidence.’’ Furthermore,

the commissioner was free to change her position for

whatever reason. For these reasons, this claim is without merit.

IV

Finally, the respondent claims that the child’s guardian ad litem had a conflict of interest and was biased

against the respondent. The respondent did not raise

this issue before the trial court; therefore, we decline

to review it. See Practice Book § 60-5 (‘‘[t]he court shall

not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly

raised at the trial or arose subsequently to the trial’’);

see also In re Anna Lee M., 104 Conn. App. 121, 124

n.2, 931 A.2d 949, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 939, 937 A.2d

696 (2007).

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in terminating

the respondent’s parental rights.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** November 20, 2015, the date that this decision was released as a slip

opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 We refer in this opinion to the respondent father as the respondent and

to the respondent mother as the mother. The mother did not appeal from

the judgment terminating her parental rights.

2 The respondent also claims that the court erroneously declined to decide

various motions, including a motion for overnight visitation. The court did

not rule on these motions, but, rather, found them moot. ‘‘Having terminated

[the respondent’s] parental rights, the motion for overnight visitation and

any outstanding motions relative to visitation are now moot.’’ Because we

affirm the court’s termination of the respondent’s parental rights, we agree

with the court that these motions are moot.

3 The court explained the apparent inconsistency between the supervised

nature of the visits and the fact that the child was injured: ‘‘[The primary

social worker] credibly described . . . how she could not see what actually

happened to [the child] because on two occasions, [the respondent] positioned himself so he could not be fully seen. This court has no difficulty,

therefore, making a reasonable inference that [the respondent] was responsible for hurting [the child].’’

4 General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part that the court

‘‘may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and

convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has

made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with

the parent . . . unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is
unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . . (2) termination

is in the best interest of the child, and . . . (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has

been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been

neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent

of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return

of the child to the parent . . . and has failed to achieve such degree of

personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could

assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . . .’’

5 The services that the department provided to the respondent and the

child included individual therapy, family therapy, physical therapy with

multiple providers to address different issues, speech therapy, feeding therapy, parent coaching, one-to-one parenting services, and other parent education services. These services were intended either as direct support for the

respondent or for the child. The respondent was encouraged to partake of

the services that were directed at the child’s care and treatment of his

special needs.

6 The respondent was provided with specific steps. These steps included:

(1) cooperate with recommended service providers for substance abuse

treatment, (2) attend all appointments set by the department, (3) avoid

further involvement with the criminal justice system, (4) apprise the department of his whereabouts, (5) secure and maintain adequate housing and

legal income, (6) participate in counseling and make progress toward the

identified parenting and individual treatment goals, and (7) visit with the

child as often as permitted.

7 According to the respondent, these allegations later were determined to

be without a reasonable basis. Apparently that determination was made too

late to be presented to the trial court in the present case, and, in any event,

the court apparently was not aware of later determinations in Massachusetts.