GLD

- 016 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 1 2

- 2118

___________ AARON MICHAEL JONES , a/k/a Michael John Aaron Jones

v. OFFICER BRADLEY MERMON, Robinson Township Police ; CHIEF DALE VIETME IER, Robinson Township Police; TROOPER ANDREW BRUGGMAN, Pennsylvania State Police; ALLEGHENY GENERAL HOSPITAL, and doctors and nurses in my medical record; ROBINSON TOWNSHIP EMS SERVICE; MR. GAGE, F.C.C. Coleman Medium’s Case Manager Unit B

- 2; MS. CATHY LA NE, F.C.C. Coleman Medium’s Case Manager Coordinator; MR. TRACY DAVIS, F.C.C. Coleman Medium’s Counselor Unit B

- 2; CYNDI SANTIAGO, F.C.C. Coleman Medium’s

Records Officer; MR. JAMES M. ECKER, Attorney

AARON MICHAEL JONES, Appellant

____________________________________ On A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania ( W .D. Pa. C i v . No. 2

- 11

- cv - 0 0 361 ) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Maureen P. Kelly

____________________________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional De fect, Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) , or Summary Action Pursuant to Third C ircuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 October 18 , 2012 Before: FUENTES, FISHER and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : December 21, 2012 )_________ OPINION

______ ___ PER CURIAM
I n 2010, Appellant Aaron Michael Jones was the subject of a high speed police chase that ended in a collision that killed Jones’ girlfriend and the occupants of another vehicle. According to the state court docket, Jones pleaded guilty t o involuntary manslaughter and other offenses related to the tragic event. In 2011, Jones filed a complaint and amended complaint against parties involved in the chase and its aftermath, including several police officers, his attorney, a hospital, and an emergency medical service. 1 The lawsuit, construed as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged false arrest, kidnapping under false pretenses, medical malpractice, violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act , and various constitu tional violations . Among other things, Jones sought $75,000 in damages from each Defendant

. The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) , and a ll but one of the Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint . T he Magistrate Judge granted their motions , and Jones appeal ed fr om that order. Shortly thereafter, t he remaining Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. While that motion was pending, Jones moved to “withdraw his entire complaint.” The M agistrate Judge granted the motion to withdraw as to the remaining Defendant, and the case was subsequently closed.

1 Although Jones originally named a number of prison employees as defendants, JonesOur Clerk ordered Jones to inform this Court of whether he wished to withdraw

his appeal or, if he wished to proceed, whether the appeal i s moot given his desire to withdraw the complaint. Jones r esponded by asking this Court to hold the appeal in abeyance until a decision i s rendered on his appeal of the dismissal of his state petition for post

- conviction relief. Because this appeal has n o merit, we will decline to hold i t in abeyance ; rather, we will summarily affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order granting the Defendants’ motions to dismis s . 2
W e may summarily affirm on any ground supported by the record if the appeal does not present a sub stantial question

. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6; Tourscher v. McCullough , 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). We exercise plenary review over the decision to grant the motions to dismiss

. Allah v. Seiverling , 229 F.3d 220 , 223 (3d Cir.
2000 ). When c onsidering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must view the factual allegations as true and dismiss only if the complaint does not allege “enough facts to state a claim t o relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Jones alleged that t he two Defendants from the Robinson Township Police Department , Officer Mermon and Chief Vietmeier, filed a false complaint against him and falsely a rrested him when their “initial plan” to apprehend him resulted in the deadly

voluntarily withdrew his claims against them earlier in the litigation. 2 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We note that Jones’ notice of appeal was premature because it was filed while claims against one Defe ndant remained pending. The notice of appeal ripened when the District Court granted Jones’ motion to withdraw the complaint as to that Defendant. See Cape May Greene, Inc., v. Warren , 698 F. 2d 184

- 85 (3d Cir. 1983).collision. He further allege d that Officer Mermon violated his Fourth Amendment rights

by using deadly force to stop him, and that Chief Vietmeier made a false public statement about him. Jones also made a general allegation that his First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated, that he had been kidnapped under false pretenses, and that the Defendants had violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. Th e Magistrate Judge granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, concluding that Jones had failed to allege any facts that would suggest that Defendants Mermon and Vietmeier had violated Jones’ constitutional rights or any federal laws. 3 We agr ee. Although Jones apparently based his claims on the chase and collision, the only relevant factual allegation made was that a deadly, high speed police pursuit and collision occurred. Jones did not allege how the high speed pursuit started, why he was being pursued, what happened during the chase , or how the collision occurred and who was involved . Th is complete lack of facts regarding the chase and collision renders Jones’ pleadings insufficient to raise a claim under the Fourth Amendment that the Def endants engaged in the unreasonable use of deadly force , as suggested by Jones’ reference to
Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1 , 11 (1985)

. Jones similarly failed to allege any facts whatsoever about the false public statement he claimed Defendant Vietmeier made, or any other facts that would suggest that the Defendants otherwise violated federal law or Jones’ constitutional rights.
I n addition to being unsupported by any facts, the false cr iminal complaint and

3 Defendants Mermon and Vietmeier o stensibly moved to dismiss under Rule 12(e), butfalse arrest claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If a prisoner seeks

damages in a § 1983 suit, as Jones has done, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Jones’ allegation that the criminal complaint against him and his ar rest were false implicate s the validity of his conviction, but he has not demonstrated that his conviction has been invalidated. On the contrary, Jones’ response to the Clerk’s order indicates that he is still seeking relief from his conviction.
Accordin gly, his false complaint and false arrest claims we re properly dismissed. Jones’ claims against his attorney, Defendant Ecker, are similarly barred under
Heck . Jones alleged that his attorney conspired with the prosecution to coerce him into a guilty plea. Th i s allegation , if decided in Jones’ favor, would call his conviction into question. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge approp riately dismissed the c omplaint as to Defendant Ecker

. That leaves Jones’ allegations against the emergency medical servic e team that treated the victims at the crash site, Defendant EMS Service, and the hospital where Jones was later treated, Defendant Allegheny General Hospital. Jones alleged that he
asked th e emergency medical team numerous times to treat his girlfriend f irst. When told that they were concerned that he was armed, Jones handcuffed himself and told the team to let him die. The team, however, pulled Jones from the wreckage first and his girlfriend
the Magistrate Judge properly construed the motion as one made under Rule 12(b)(6).subsequently died. That is the extent of Jones’ allegations against Defendant EMS

Service . T he Magistrate Judge appropriately determined that the se allegations are insufficient to indicate what federal or constitutional right s were implicated by the Defendant’s conduct , let alone that the Defendant violated those rights. At best, it appears that Jones was alleging negligence in the medical treatment of his girlfriend. He does not , however, have standing to bring that claim due to the general prohibition against litigating another person’s legal rights. See Fre eman v. Corzine , 629 F.3d 146, 154 (3d Cir. 2010) (setting forth the requirements of prudential standing). Finally, Jones alleged that he was given improper care for his broken wrist at Allegheny General Hospital , that his medical records did not list his injuries or the painkillers administered to him , and that his family was misled about visiting him. As with his allegations against Defendant EMS Service, these allegations do not indicate what federal law s or constitutional right s Defendant Allegheny Ge neral Hospital violated and are best construed as medical malpractice claims under state law

. The Magistrate
J udge declin ed to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims because all of Jones’ claims over which the District Court had orig inal jurisdiction had been dismissed

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). There was no abuse of discretion in this decision. See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp. , 142 F.3d 151, 157

- 58 (3d Cir. 1998). For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge properly granted the Defendants’ motion s to dismiss

. There being no substantial question presented by this appeal, we will summarily affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order

. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.