### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Fe brua ry 14, 200 5 S es sio n GARY FLANARY, ET AL 

### . v. CARL GREG ORY DODGE O F

JOHNS ON CITY , L LC
Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Washin gton County No. 34497 G . Richard Johns on, Chan cellor

No. E2004-00620-COA- R3-CV - F ILED MAY 31, 2005

Gary Flana ry filed suit ag ainst Carl Gre g ory Dodg e of Johnson Ci ty , LL C (“the de aler ship”) and alleg ed that the de aler ship, without negotiation and w ithout his consent or knowledg e, had char g ed him a n “ a dmi nis tr a tiv e fe e ” in c on ne c tio n w ith his pu rc ha se of a ve hic le . F la na

ry c la ime d th a t th is prac tice violated, int e r a lia , the Te nn e sse e Con su me r Pro te c tio n Ac t ( “ the TCP A” ). He so ug ht c la ss action ce rtification. The deale rship filed a motion for summary judgme nt, rely ing upon the arbitration ag ree ment (“the Ag ree ment”) signe d by Flana ry to support its position t hat Fla nary was require d to arbitrate his claims. The trial court stated that it persona lly did not believe an ag ree ment to a rb itr a te un de r the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f this c a se wa s f a ir ; bu t, n e ve rthe le ss, it o pi ned that it fe lt compelled by the curr ent state of the law to hold that arbitration was mandate d by the terms of the Ag ree ment. Flana

ry appea ls the trial court’s or der r equiring him to subm it to arbitration. We affirm the jud g me nt b e low to the e xten t th e tr ia l c ou rt , a lbe it r e luc ta ntl y , h e ld that th e Ag re e me nt, on its fac e, is enfor cea

ble. Howe ver, ba sed upon our determination that there is a genuine issue of material fac t as to whether

there was mutuality with r espec t to the oblig ation to arbitrate , we va cate so much
o f t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s j u d g m e n ta s h o l d s t h a tt h e p ar t i e s e n t e r e d i n t o a c o n tr a c tt o ar

b i tr a t e
. A c c o r d i n g l y, we re ma ndfo r f

urthe r p ro c e e din g s o n F la na ry ’s c omp la int

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed in Par t; Vac ated in Par t; Case Rem anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined. H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J., fi le d a se pa rate op ini on c on c ur

ri ng in p art

a nddis se nti ng in p art

. Go rd on B a ll, Kn oxvil le , T e nn e sse e, for th e app e lla nt, Ga ry F la na ry , o n b e ha lf

of him se lf a nda ll others similarly

situated.

L inda J . Hamilton Mowles, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, for t he appellee, Carl Gre g ory Dodg e of Johnson City , L L C.
OP IN ION-2- I. On May 12, 2001, Fla nary

purcha sed a 2001 D odg e Da kota from the de aler ship. Flana ry financ ed the purcha se of the ve hicle thoug h the dealership, and, a s a part of the financ ing
arr ang ement, F lanary

was c harg ed an “ administrative fe e” of $349.

On Dec ember 14, 2001, Flana ry filed the instant action ag ainst the dea lership, alleg ing that the “ a dmi nis tr a tiv e fe e ” inc lud e d in his pu rc ha se pric e wa s d e c e pti ve a ndun fair , a nd , h e nc e , th a t it constitutes a violation of the TCPA. Flana ry seeks c lass action ce rtification, alleg ing that the deale rship had included the “administrative fee ” on hundreds of transac tions. One month later, the deale rship filed a motion for su m m ar y j udg ment, in which it stated that Fla nary had sig ned the Ag ree ment as a part of the vehicle pur chase , which Ag ree ment, acc ording to the deale rship, require d Flanaryto s u b mi t th e in s tan t matt e r to ar b it r a ti o n
. T h e A g r e e me n t s ig n e d b y F lan ar y p r o v ide s as fo llo ws :
ARBITRATION AGR EEMENT

Buy er/lesse e ac knowledg es and a g ree s that the vehicle buy er/lesse e is p ur c ha sin g or

le a sin g fr om d e a le r h a s tr a ve le d in in te rs ta te commerc e. B uy er/lesse e thus ac knowledg es that t h e vehicle and other a spects of the sale, lease or financ ing transac tion are involved in, affe ct, or ha ve a dir ect impac t upon, interstate commer ce. Buy er/lesse e and de aler

ag ree that all claims, demands, d i s p utes or c on tr ov e rs ie s o f e ve ry

kin d o r n a tur e be tw e e n th e m a ri si ng fr om, conce rning or re lating to a ny of the neg otiations invol ved in the sale , lease or financing of t he vehicle, t he terms and provisions of the sale, lease , or financ ing a g ree ments, the arr ang ements for fin ancing, the purcha se of insurance, ext ended warr anties, service contracts or othe r products purcha sed as an incident to the sale, lea se or f inancing of the vehicle, the perf

ormance o r condition of the ve hicle, or a ny other aspec ts of the vehicle and its sale, lea se, or financ ing shall be settled by binding a

rbitration conduc ted pursuant to the pr ovisions of the F e de ra l A rb itr a tio n A c t, 9 U. S.C. Se c tio n 1 e t se q. a nda c c or din g to the Commercial Ar

bitration R u l es of the Ame rica n Arbitration Association. Without limit ing the g ener ality of t he for eg oing, it is the inten t ion of the buy er/lesse e and the deale r to resolve by binding arbitration all disput es betwe en them concerning the vehicle, its sale, lease , or financ ing, and i ts condition, including disputes conc erning the terms and c onditions of the sale, lease or financ ing, the condition of the ve hicle, any damag e to the vehicle, the terms and me aning of any of the doc uments signe d or g iven i n co n n ec tion with the sale, lease or financing , any

repr esentations, promises or omissi ons made-3- in connec tion with neg otiations for the sale, lease , or financ ing of the vehicle, or

any terms, conditi ons, repr esentations or omissi ons made in c on ne c tio n w ith the fi na nc ing , c re dit lif e ins ur a nce, d isa

bil ity insurance , vehicle e x tended wa rra nty or s er v i ce c ontrac t or other products or service s acquir ed as an incident to the sale, l ea s e or financ ing of

the vehicle

. Either party

may demand a

rbitration by

fil i n g with the Americ an Ar bit ratio n A sso c ia tio n a wr itt e n d e ma ndfo r a rb itr a tio n a lon g wi th a statemen t of the matter

in controver sy . A copy

of the de mand for arbitration shall sim ultaneously be ser ved upon the other pa rty . The bu y e r/le sse e a ndthe dealer a g re e that th e arb itr a tio n p ro c e e din g s to resolve a ll such disputes shall be conducte d in the city wher e the deale r’s fa cility is located. Buy er/lesse e and deale r further ag ree that
a ny qu e sti on re g ard ing wh e the r a pa rt ic ula r c on tr ov e rs y

is s ub je c t to arbitration shall be decide d by the Arbitrator. This Ag ree ment is binding upon, and inure s to the benef it of, buy er/lesse e and de aler

and the of

fice rs, employ ees , agents a nd aff iliated entities of ea ch of the m. This Agr ee m ent will survive pay ment of buy er/lessee’s oblig ations and any termination,
canc ellation or per formanc e of the transa ctions betwee n buy er/lesse e and dea ler.

BU YE R/ LESSEE AN D D EA LER UNDER S TA ND T HA T THE Y AR E A G RE EIN G TO R ESOLV E THE DI SP UT ES BET WEE N THEM DES CRIBED ABOVE BY B INDING ARBITRATION, RA THER

THA N B Y L ITI G AT ION IN AN Y C OU RT
. (Capitalization, boldface ty pe and unde rlining in orig inal).

I n F e b ru ar y , 2 0 0 2 , F l a n ar y f i l e d a n a m e n d e d c o m p l a i n t , i n w h i c h h e c l ar i f i e d h i s c la ims under the TCPA and made additional alleg ations of intentional misrepre sentation and fr aud in the ind uc e me nt o f the con tr a c t, m on e y ha d a ndre c e ive d, a ndun jus t e nric hme nt, a mon g oth e r thin g s. Nine months late r, Flana

ry filed his motion in opposition to the dea lership’s motion for ar bitration, arg uing that the Ag ree ment was invalid bec ause, int e r a lia , it wa s not signed by any repr esentative of the de aler ship, nor did it invol ve anything other than intrastate c ommerce
.T he t ri al co urt t reat ed t he d eal ers h ip’s m o t i o n fo r s um m ary judgm ent as a m o t i o n t o co m p el arbi t rat i o n. 1
H o w e v e r, a s the trial c o u rt m a d e it s d e te rm ina tio n in this c a se o n the b a sis o f t h e p le a d ing s, a ffid a v it s , a n d e x h ib its
s u bmi t t ed by t h e par t i es , a n d n o t on t he bas i s of any oral t es t i mo ny , i t i s cl ear t hat t he t r i al cour t , i n or deri ng t he part i es to su b m it to a rb itra tio n , w a s d o ing so un d e r th e ru b ric o f sum m a ry j u d g m e n t.
-4- On J an u ar y 7 , 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing on the deale rship’s motion for summary judgme nt. Following a re view of the parties’ briefs a nd aff idavits, as well as he aring the 1 arg ument of the pa

rties, the tri al co u rt o rder ed the pa rties to submit t o arbitration. I n doing so, howeve r, the trial c ourt expressed g reat relucta nce, indicating that it per sonally believed the Ag ree ment to be invalid for a number of r easons, but that it was c onstrained to follow the la w.
Fo l l o wing the entry

of the trial c ourt’s orde r, F lanary filed a motion for a n interlocutory appea l, which the trial c ourt g rante d. Howeve r, we declined to g rant Flanary ’s Tenn. R. App. P. 9
app lic a tio n f

ile d w ith thi s c ou rt . F la na ry ’s app e a l of

ou r d e nia l to the Sup re me Cou rt wa s li ke wi se de nie d. On F e br

ua ry 6, 20 04 , th e tr ia l c ou rt

e nte re d a f

ina l ju dg me nt o rd e ri ng arb itr a tio n. F ro m th is jud g me nt, F la na

ry app e a ls.

II.

I n d e c idi ng wh e the r a g rant of su mma ry jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pria te , c ou rt s a

re to d e te rm ine “ if the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a n d admi ssions on file, toge ther with the
a ff ida vit s, if a ny , s ho w that the re is no g e nu ine iss ue a s to a ny ma te ri a l f a c t a ndthat th e mov ing pa rt y is e nti tle d to a

jud g me nt a s a

ma tte r o f l a w. ” Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4. Cou rt s “ mus t ta ke the str on g e st le g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e in favo r of the no nmo vin g pa rt y , all ow a ll re a so na

ble inf e re nc e s in favor of that party , and discard all counter vailing evidenc e.” By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210-11 (T e nn
. 19 93 ) (c itatio ns omi tte d)

. Sum mary jud g me nt sh ou ld be g rante d on ly “ wh e n bo th the fa c ts and the c onclusions to be draw n from the fac t s permit a re asonable person to re ach only one conclusion.” C

a r v e l l v . B o t t o ms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995) (citation omitted). I n Evco Corp.
v . Ro ss , 5 28 S.W. 2d

20 , 2 5 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) , th e Sup re me Cou rt ob se rv e d a s f

oll ow s:
Where ther e does e x ist a dispute as t o fa ct s which ar e dee med materia l by the trial court, however , or whe re the re is unce rtainty as to w he the r the re ma y

be su c h a dis pu te , th e du ty

of the tr ia l c ou rt

is clea r. [I t] is to overrule a ny

motion f o r s u mmary

judgme nt in such
c a se s, becaus e su mma

ry jud g me nt p ro c e e din g s a

re no t in a ny

se ns e to b e vie we d a s a

su bs titute fo r a

tr ia l of dis pu te d f

a c tua l is su e s.
Sin c e a mot ion fo r sum mary jud g me nt p re se nts a

pu re qu e sti on of

la w, ou r r e vie w i s de novo wi th
no presumption of correc tness as to the trial court’s judgme nt. Gonzales v. Alm an Con str. Co. , 857 S.W .2d 42, 44-45 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1993).-5- III

. A.

Flana ry raises f ive issues for our

consideration:
(1 ) D id F la na

ry ’s pu rc has e of

the ve hic le inv olv e int e rs ta te commerc e, ther eb y

g iving rise to the Fe dera l Arbitration Act ( “the FAA ”)? (2) I s the Ag ree ment unconsciona ble, there by

rende ring it invalid?
(3 ) A re F la na

ry ’s c la ims g e ne ra lly

arb itr able c la ims ? (4) Does the Agre ement constitute an unknow ing w aiver of F lanary ’s statut ory a ndc on sti tut ion a l r ig hts ? ( 5 ) D i d t h e A g r e e m e n ti n v o l v e a l a c k o f m u t u a l i t y?

As se t fo rth la te r in thi s op ini on , we a g re e wi th F la na ry ’s arg ume nt that th e failu re of the de a le rs hip to show its assent to the Ag ree ment by signing it or otherwise a ccep ting it re nders the A g ree ment unenfor cea

ble as to F lanary . Howeve r, bef ore r each i n g t h i s issue, we will first addr ess Fla nary ’s other issues. We do so bec ause of the emphasis plac ed upon them by the parties in the ir brief

s and beca use of their

obvious importance to F lanary ’s desire for c lass action ce rtification.

B.

F la na ry c on te nd s th a t hi s v e hicle pu rc ha se didno t in vo lve int e rs ta te c omm e rc e , a ndthat, conseque ntly , it does not come under the FA A.

Th e F AA pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
A written p ro vision in any maritime transa ction or a contract evide ncing a transaction involving comme rce to settle by arbitration a contr oversy

there afte r arising out of such contra ct or tra nsaction, or the re fusal to per form the whole or any part ther eof, or an agreem ent in writ ing to submit to arbitration an existing controve rsy arising out of suc h a contract , transac tion, or ref usal, shall be valid, irre vocable , a nde nf or c e able , s a ve up on su c h g ro un ds a s e xist at la w o r i n e qu ity fo r the re vo c a tio n o f any

c on tr a c t. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999) (empha sis added). T h e T en n es s ee Supre me Court has pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has he ld that “invo l v i n g comm erc e” is the f unctional equivale nt ofT en n. Su p
. C t

. R

. 4 (D ) p ro vid es a s fo l l o w s: 2

If

an ap p l i cat i o n fo r perm i ss i o n to a p p e a l is f i l ed and de ni ed wi t h t he
reco m m end at i o n t hat t he i nt erm ed i at e ap p el l at e co urt op i ni o n b e p ub l i shed, t he
a u tho r o f t h e inte rm e d ia te a p p e llate c o u rt o p inio n sh a ll e n s u r e t h a t t h e o p inio n is p ub l i shed i n t he o f

f i ci al repo rt er. -6- “ a ff e c ti ng com me rc e ,” wh ic h is the ph ra se or din ari ly us e d b y Con g re ss t o in vo ke its po we r t o reg ulate interstate commerc e. See Fri zze ll Co nstr

. Co . v . G atl inb urg , L .L .C. , 9 S.W .3d 79, 82-83 (T en n
. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g Alli ed-Bruce Te rm inix C os. v. Dobson , 513 U.S. 265, 274, 115 S.C t. 834, 130 L .E d. 2d75 3 ( 19 95 )) . A c c or din g ly , “ c omm e rc e ,” a s tha t wor d is us ed in 9 U .S. C. § 2, re fe rs to “interstate ” commer ce.
I n th e ins ta nt c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt op ine d th a t F la na ry ’s pu rc ha se ha d n o e ff

e c t on int e rs ta te commerc e. On appeal, both parties present extensive arg ument as to how interstatecommerc e wa s or w a s n o t a f

f e c t e d b y F l a n ar y ’ s tr a n s a c t i o n w i t h t h e d e a l e r s h i p
. I n t h i s c a s e , w e do no t ha ve to resolve the parties’ “interstate commerc e” dispute. This is because we ha ve pre viouslyheld that the FAAwill gove rn e ith e r “ ( 1 ) w h e r e t h e p ar t i e s c o n s e n t e d i n t h e a g r e e m e n t t h a t t h e F A A w o u l d ap p l y, or (2) whe re the court de termines that the c o ntrac t ‘involv[ es] [ interestate ] commerce.’ ” Guffy v

. Toll Bros. R eal Estate, Inc. , N o. M2 00 3- 01 81 0- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 4 WL 24 12 62 7, a t *3 (T e nn . Ct

. App. E.S., filed Octobe r 27, 2004) ( no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application file d ) (empha sis added). B e c a us e the Ag re e me nt en te re d into be tw e e n Fl a na ry a nd the de a le rs hip pr ov ide d, in n o u nc e rt a in terms, that the F AA would g overn “all claims, demands, disputes or c ontroversie s of eve ry kind or nature ” arising out of eve ry aspec t of the purc hase of the vehicle , the parties consented to the application of the FAA

. There fore , there is no need for us to decide w hether Flana ry ’s purc hase of the vehicle did or did not involve interstate commer ce.
C.
Next, Flanary

arg ues t h at the Ag ree ment is unconscionable, the reby rende ring it invalid. Specifica lly , Flana

ry contends that the Ag ree ment is a n unenfor cea ble adhesion contra ct; that there is nothing to indicate that F lanar y ever rea d the Ag ree ment or had it explained to him; and that the costs of ar

bitration are prohibitive.

I n addre ssing this issue, as well as Flana ry ’s next two issues, we find controlling prec edent in the case of Pyburn v

. Bill Heard Chevrolet , 63 S.W .3d 351 (Tenn. 2001) , perm. app. de nied and publ’n recom mende d , November 19, 2001, a ca se that is clea rly applicable to the bulk of the issues
raise d b y F la na ry . In a n atte mpt

to p re va il o n th is a

pp e a l, F la na

ry ur g e s u s to re vis it a ndov e rr ule our dec ision in Py bur

n . Howeve r, g uided by

the doctrine of sta re de c isi s , and particularly mindful of the Supre m e C o u rt ’s view of Py bur n as re flec ted by

that court’s “ rec ommendation” that our opinion in that case be published, see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4( D) , we decline Flana ry ’s invitation and 2
rea ffirm our holding in Py bur n
.-7-

I n Py bur n , the plaint i ff fi led a suit ag ainst the defe ndant dea lership see king c lass action
c e rt if ic a tio n, a lle g ing that th e de fe nd a nt w a s c ha rg ing a “ se c re tly inf la te d” int e re st r a te to i ts customers who obta ined financ ing thr oug h the dealership, and that the def endant wa s later r ece iving a kickba ck o n t he intere st rate f rom the financ ing c ompany
. Py bur n , 63 S.W .3d at 353. The plaintiff alleg ed violations of the TCPA, and made additional claims of unj ust enrichment, money had and r ece ived, and intentional misrepr esentation, among othe rs. Id. at 354. The de fenda nt filed a motion to compel arbitration, relying upon the ar bitration ag ree ment signe d by the plaintiff at the time he purc hased his vehic le. Id. at 355. The arbitration ag ree ment involved in Py bur n is v irtua lly identical to the Ag ree ment in the instant case. Id. at 354-55.

The trial c ourt in Py bur

n denied the defe ndant’s mot ion to compel arbitration. Id

. at 355. I t f ound that the ar

bitration ag ree ment was une nforc eable

. Id . at 356. This court re verse d the trial court. Id. at 354. One of the plaint i ff ’s m an y i s s ues on appe al addr essed whe ther the a rbitration ag ree ment was a n unenfor cea ble adhe sion contrac t. Id. at 358. Our S upreme Court has define d an
a dh e sio n c on tr a c t a s f

oll ow s: [A] standardized contr act f orm offe red to c onsu m er s of g oods and service s on essentially

a ‘take it or l eave it’ basis, without affor ding the consumer

a re alistic opportunity

to barg ain and u n der suc h conditions that the consumer c annot obtain t he desire d product or
se rv ic e e xce pt b y

a c qu ie sc ing to the fo rm

of the c on tr a c t.
Bura czy nsk i v . Ey ring , 919 S.W .2d 314, 320 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 40 (6 th ed. 1990)) . The Py bur

n court, re ly ing on the Bura czy nsk i definition, noted that the ar bitration ag ree ment signe d by

the plaintiff wa s a “s ep ar at e, one pag e docume nt”and that the w ords “ARB I TRATI ON AGREEMEN T” a ppear ed at the top of the document in ca pital letters, bold type, and lar g e font. Py bur

n , 63 S.W .3d at 359. Wit h respe ct to whether the plaintiff re ad the a

rbitration ag ree ment befor e signing it, the court stated that the re cord w as uncle ar. Id. Ho we ve r, re g ard le ss o f whe ther the pla intiff rea d the ag ree ment or not, we he ld in Py bur n th a t s u c h a n in q uirywas imm a te ri a l:

I f [the plaintiff] di d rea d it, there is no proof in th e re cord that he

made a ny objections to its contents or that h e ac t u ally was told he
mus t si g n th e Ag re e me nt b e fo re he c ou ld p ur c ha se the va n. I f h e did
no t r e a d it , th e n h e c a nn ot h e he ardto c omp la in a bo ut i ts c on te nts

. I f, wi tho ut b e ing the vic tim of fr a ud , a pa rt y
fails to re a d the c on tr a c t or oth e rw ise to learn i ts contents, he signs the same at his peril and is estopped to deny his obligation, will be conclusively presumed to know the contents of the c ontrac t, and must suffer the conse quence s of his own neg lige nce.-8- Giles v. Allstate Ins uran ce Co. , 8 71 S .W .2 d 154 , 1 56 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1993). I n Giles , this Cou rt no te d tha t to a llo w a pa rt y to a dmi t he sig ned a contrac t, but deny it ex presse s the ag ree ment he made , or to a ll ow hi m to a dmi t he sig ne d it bu t di d n ot r e a d it

or kn ow its stipulations “would ab s o l u t elydestroy the value of

all contra cts.” Giles , 871 S.W .2d at 157 (c itations omi tted).
Id. (additional interna l citations omit ted).

As to the pl aintiff’s arg ument in Py bur n that the arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt w a s p re se nte d to him on a “ta ke it or leave it” basis, this court had dete rmined that there was nothing to indicate that the plaint if f h a d e ve r qu e sti on e d the de fe nd a nt abo ut the a g re e me nt’ s c on te nts or e xpre sse d th a t he did not unde rstand the meaning of the a g ree ment. Id. I n addition, we pointed out that the plaintiff wa s fr e e to p ur c ha se a va n e lse wh e re if he c ho se no t to a g re e to the te rm s o f the arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt. Id. at 359-360.

The Py bur

n co u rt , ci t i n g Buraczynski , stated that adhe sion contrac ts “which a re oppr essive to the wea

ker pa rty or which se rve to limit the obligations a nd liability of the strong er pa rty will not be enf orce d.” Py bur

n , 63 S.W .3d at 360. We then held that the arbitration ag ree ment signe d by the plaintiff did not “limit the liability or obligations of [t he defe ndant],” but r ather , it c lear ly set out the
so rt s o f c la ims that th e pa rt ie s a g re e d w ou ld b e su bje c t to arb itrati on ; it boun d b othpa rt ie s to arbitration; and it contained no burie d terms. Id. We conclude d that the ar bitration ag ree ment was not an unenf

orce able a dhesion contra ct. Id.

Th e fa c ts i n th e ins ta nt c a se be ari ng up on thi s is su e are e sse nti a lly ide nti c a l to tho se in Py bur n . The A gre ement sig ned by Flana ry was a separ ate, one pag e docume nt, with the words “ARB I TRATI ON AGREEMEN T” in bold and in a ll c apital letters ac ross the top of the pa g e. As the plaint if

f s ig ne d th e a g re e me nt, he c a nn ot no w be he ard to c omp la in that he didno t r e a d it , d id
no t un de rs ta ndit, or

didno t ha ve it explaine d to him, be c a us e , in the abs e nc e of fr a ud , a p art y wi ll
no t be pe rm itt ed to d isa vo w a c on tr a c t si g ne d b y

him ba se d u po n a ny

of the se a sse rt e d g ro un ds

. Whil e thefo rm e r g e ne ra l ma na g e r of the de a le rs hip state d in his de po sit ion that th e de a le rs hip wo uld not ha ve sold the vehicle to F lanary had he ref used to sig n the Ag ree ment, that does not cha ng e the fac t that Flana

ry was fr ee to pur chase a vehic le elsew here . Finally , t h e t erms of the arbitration ag ree ment bound both Flana ry and the de aler ship to arbitration a nd contained no buried or hidde n terms. J ust as in Py bur n , there is nothing to indicate t h at t h e Ag ree ment constituted an
un e nf or c e able a dh e sio n c on tr a c t.
As to the alleg ed prohibitive costs of arbitrat i o n , t he Py bur n court a ddresse d this iss ue as we ll:

I n the [arbitration ag ree ment], t h e parties ag ree d to utili ze the

Commercial R ules of the Ame rica n Arbitration Association (“A AA”) . As noted by

Plaintiff in his brief filed in this appea l, the-9- Trial Court prope rly

took judicial notice of the Commercial Rules of the AAA. We likewise take jud i ci al notice of those Commerc ial Rules of th e AA A a s r e fe re nc e d b y the Tria l Co urt in its Memorandum Opinion. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(c)

. Whil e a n in iti a l f

ili ng fee may

ha ve to b e a dv a nc e d b y

a plaint if f i n a cla im involvi ng a small consumer transac t i o n , Rule R-45 of the Commercial Rules allows the arbitrator to assess fe es, expenses, and compensation of the arbitrator in a manner deemed appropriate by the arbitrator. A succ essful plaintiff, ther efor e, could ha ve a l l o f the “potentially

pro h i b i t i ve” c osts shifted to the defe ndant. Rule R-45 also p e r mi ts th e ar

b it r a to r to a w ar d a tt o r n e y ’ s f

e e s to a s u c c e s sful plaintiff who arbitrates a TCPA c laim be cause an awa rd of attorney ’s fee s is authorized b y l aw. See T.C.A. § 47-18-109( e)( 1). The arbitrator can also assess costs as he or she se es fit for e x penses of the
arb itr a tio n, inc lud ing the arb itr ator a ndwi tne sse s. Rul e R- 52 . F or a ll prac tical purposes, a n awa rd of costs, expenses, and attorney s fee s are on the same f

ooting in this case reg ardle ss of whethe r the pa rties arbitrate the claim or proce ed in a court of law. E v en i f t he Commercial Rules of the A AA spec ifically did not allow a suc cessf

ul plaintiff to rec over c osts, etc., t hese items could ne verthe less be
re c ov e re d b y

Pla in ti ff in arb itr a tio n b e c a us e the y are pa rt of his statutory claim pursuant to the TCPA. See T.C.A. § 47-18-109( e)( 1) (authorizing an awa

rd of c osts and attorney ’s fe es to a succ essful plaintiff).

I n Gree n Tree Fin ancial Corp.- Alabam a v. Randolph , 531 U.S. 79, 12 1 S. Ct. 51 3, 14 8 L .E d. 2d 37 3 ( 20 00 ), the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Cou rt de c ide d whet he r an a g re e me nt t o a rb itr a te is u ne nf

or c e able beca use it say s nothing a

bout the cost s of ar

bitration. Whi le the Cou rt re c og nize d that the e xiste nc e of larg e arb itr a tio n c os ts co uld prec lude a litigant from vindicating a statut o ry ri ght in a arbitra l forum, the plaintiff in Randol ph had not met her

burden of

proving that she would have to be ar such costs if she we n t t o arbitration. R a n dolph , 1 2 1 S. Ct

. a t 5 2 2

. Wh e n “ a p ar ty s e e k s to in v a lidate an arbitration ag ree ment on the g round that ar bitration would be prohibitively

expensive, that party

bear s the b u rd en of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.” Id. I n the pre sent ca se, Plaintiff has fa ile d to meet this burden. While the initial fili ng fee for arbitration may

indeed be highe r to Plaintiff, this in and of itself is not
su ff ic ie nt t o ma

ke uti lizatio n o f the a g re e d upo n for um i mpr a c tic able in l ig ht o f the fact th at th is c os t c a n b e fu lly re c ou pe d if

Pla int if f i s succ essful. Our c onclusion might be diff ere nt had the Ag ree mentW e a re no t sur e o f wh a t t h e p la intiff m e a n s b y the m o d ifi e r “u n ifo rm .” 3

W e are advis ed by t he A p p el l at e C o urt C l erk’ s o f f i ce t hat p erm i ss i o n t o ap p eal was gr ant ed i n t hi s case by t he 4 Su pr eme Cour t on Ja n u ar y 18, 2000, bu t t h at t h e appe al wa s s u bs equ en t l y di s mi s s ed by t h e H i g h Cour t w i t h ou t opi n i on
on J u n e 30, 2000.
-10-

p ro h i b i t ed s h i ft i n g o f t h es e c o s t s o r c o n t ai n ed s o m e l an gu age requiring Plaintiff to be re sponsible for all or a disproportionate shar e of the c os ts o f a

rb itr a tio n, bu t th a t is no t th e situatio n h e re . T he re is
no proof that the cost of arbitration in this case would be any g reater than the cost of liti gat i o n i n a court, notwithst anding the fa ct that Plaintiff’s claims may

be re latively

small.
Id. at 362-63 (internal footnote omitted).

L ike the plaintiff in Py bur n , Flana ry has failed to show that he is likelyto incur sig nificant costs. Acc ording ly , we de cline to hold the Ag ree ment unconsciona ble on the basis of prohibitive
c os ts.

D.

F la na ry ne xt as se rt s th a t hi s c la ims a g a ins t th e de a le rs hip are no t g e ne ra lly arb itr able c la ims

. Th e se c la ims – v iol a tio n o f the TCP A, e ng a g ing in the un a uth orize d b us ine ss o f l aw, “ un if orm” 3 intentional misreprese ntation, fraud in the ind u ce m en t of contra ct, and c ommon law claims for
mon e y ha d an d r e c e i v e d , a n d u n j u s te n r i c h m e n t–ar e , a c c o r d i n g t o F l a n a r y , “ e i t h e r

n o tb a s e d in contra ct or a

re unr elated to the c ontrac t,” and that, a s such, “they are not subject to arbitration.” Flana ry premises his entire arg ument on our unpublished opinion in the case of Brown v. KareMor Int’l, In c. , N o
. 0 1 A 0 1

- 9 8 0 7

- CH

- 0 0 3 6 8 , 1 9 9 9 WL 2 2 1 7 9 9 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. M

. S. , f il e d A pril 19, 1999). 4 The plaintiff in Py bur n simil arly

attempted to re ly

upon KareMor to support his theory that T C P A c l ai m s ar e n o tam en ab l e t o arb i tra t i o n
. I n h o l d i n g o t h er wi s e, we s t at ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:
I n KareMor , th is C ou rt

c on c lud e d th a t th e plaint if f’ s T CPA c la im was not subject to a

rbitration bec ause it wa s not within t he scope of the ar bitration ag ree ment. I n other wor ds, the parties ha d not ag ree d to a rbitrate that claim. We did not hold that TCPA claims cannot be arbitrated. The a g ree ment to arbitrate in th i s ca s e is much broa der than the one in KareMor , a nd the c la ims a sse rt e d by Pla int if f h e re in
are u n q u es tionably

contained w ithin the scope of what the parties
a g re e d to arb itr a te . Pl a int if f a g re e d to arb itr a te , a mon g oth e r thin g s, “all cla ims, demands, disputes, or controve rsies of e very kind or nature that may

arise be tween the m conce rni ng any of the neg ot i ati ons leading to the sale, lea se or f inancing of the ve hicle,-11- te rm s andpr ov isi on s o f the sa le , le a se or fi na nc ing a g re e me nt, arr a ng e me nts fo r f

inanc ing

. . . .” Th e c la ims a sse rt e d b y Pla int if f a ll cente r ar ound the financ ing a g ree ment and its terms and, ther efor e, he
a g re e d to arb itr a te the c la ims wh ic h a re a sse rt e d in the Complaint

. To the extent the TCPA pr ohibits arbitration because it is an unlawful
wa ive r o f P la int if

f’s ri ght to p ro c e e d in a

jud ic ia l f or um, the TCP A is preempted by

the FA A. Py bur n , 63 S.W .3d at 362.

I n the instant case , the pertinent lang uag e fr om the Ag ree ment is virtually identi cal to that of the a rbitration ag ree ment in Py bur n : the parties ag ree d to arbitrate “all cla ims, demands, disputes or controve rsies of e very

kind or nature betwee n them arising from, conc erning or re lating to a ny of the neg otiations invol ved in the sale, lease or financ ing of the vehicle , the terms and pr ovisions of the s ale, lea se, or f

inancing ag ree ments, the arr ang ements for financ ing, . . . .” J ust as in Py bur n , Flana ry ’s claims ag ainst the dea lership all revolve around the financ ing of the vehicle. Mor eover , in a ddition to Flana

ry ’s TCPA claim, his claims of unjust enrichment, money had and r ece ived, and i n t en t i o n al misrepre sentation wer e all cla ims raised by the plaintiff in Py bur

n . As in Py bur

n , F la na ry a g re e d to arb itr a te a ll of his c la ims un de r the te rm s of the Ag re e me nt. Ac c or din g ly , we ho ld that F la na ry ’s arg ume nt that th e c la ims he a sse rt e d a re no t g e ne ra lly

arb itr able is w ith ou t me ri t.

E.
Next, Flanary

contends that the A g ree ment constitutes an unknowing waiver of his statutory
a ndc on sti tut ion a l r ig hts . T his se lf -p ro c la ime d pub lic po lic y arg ume nt c e nte rs aro un d tw o b e lie fs : (1) “ that a statutory

claim, bec ause of

the third party

and public interests involved, is not suitable for
arb itr a tio n a nd sh ou ld be de c ide d by a c ou rt , n ot an a rb itr a tor ,” a nd(2 ) “ that th e arb itr a tio n p ro c e ss is n o t c ap ab le o f

r e s o lv in g th e s e d is p u te s in a c c o r d a n c e w ith th e la w o r p r o te c ti n g th e in te r e s ts of the consumer .”

Wit h respe ct to the ar g ument that a statutory claim is not suitable for ar bit ra t i o n, we ha ve pr e vio us ly

qu ote d at le ng th f

ro m Py bur

n as to w hy a statutory claim under the TCPA is suitable for arbitration. Furthermore , as t o the claim that arbitration cannot ade quately resolve disputes suc h as Flana ry ’s in acc ordanc e with the law or in acc ordanc e with the consume r’s rig hts, we know of no rea son why

such cla ims cannot be fairly arbitrated.

F. Finally , Flana

ry arg ues that the Ag ree ment is i n v ali d due to a lac k of mutuality . Flana ry as s er t s t h at a l ac k

o f m u t u al i t y

i s ex h i b i t ed b y t h e d ea l er s h i p ’s fa i l u re t o h av e a r ep re s en t at i v e s i gn the Ag re e me nt. B e c a us e the Ag re e me nt wa s sig ne d only by F la na ry , he arg ue s th a t th e de a le rs hip would be fr ee to de ny

that it had ever

executed t h e Agr ee m ent. This lack of mutuality , so the
arg ume nt g oe s, inv a lid a te s th e e nti re Ag re e me nt.Fo r t he b enef i t of t he read er, we had at t ached a co p y of t he A greem ent as an ap p end i x t o t hi s o p i ni o n. 5

-12- I t is we ll- se ttl e d tha t a c on tr a c t, i n o rd e r t o b e e nf or c e able , mu st, a mon g oth e r thin g s, “ re su lt from a me eting of t h e minds and must be suffic iently definite to be e nforc ed.” Jam estowne on Sign al, Inc. v. First F ed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n , 807 S.W .2d 559, 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) ( citations omitted). I n the typical ca se, asse nt to a contra ct is shown by the s ignature of the parties. How ever , there are exceptions to thi s conce pt. “When a contract between two parties which is conte mplated to be sig ned by

both is reduc ed to w riting and signe d by only one of the m, but acce pted by the other, it becomes in contemplation of the law, a w ritten binding c ontrac t on both.” Budd y Le e Attr ac tio ns, Inc. v. William Morris Agency , Inc. , 13 S.W .3d 343, 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ( citations omitt ed); see also Stau bach Retail S ervs.- Sout heast, LLC v. H.G. Hill R ealty Co. , — S. W. 3 d

— , 2 0 0 5 WL 646719, at *3 (Te nn., filed Mar ch 22, 2005) ( “When a pa rty who has not s i gned a c ontrac t de mon str a te s it s a sse nt b y pe rf ormin g pu rs ua nt to the c on tr a c t a ndmakin g pa y me nts c on fo rm ing to the contra ct’s terms, that party is estopped from de ny ing the binding e ffe ct of the c ontrac t.”).

I n attacking Flana

ry ’s lack of

mutualityarg ument, the deale rship relies upon the a ffidavit of its ge nera l manag er:

The A r b it r a ti o n A g r e e me n t i n th is c a s e w a s p r e p ar e d b y [t he de a le rs hip ], or at its re qu e st, a ndwa s p re se nte d to [F la na ry ] as a ma te ri a l po rt ion of

the sa le . T he de a le rs hip int e nd e d to be b ou ndto the [A] g ree ment and believe s that it is curren t l y b o und by the [A] g ree ment and that it must arbitrate a ny cover ed dispute.
(Para g raph numbe ring in orig inal omitted).

Unlike Buddy Lee , we f

ind no evidence in the rec ord that, prior to the f iling of the instant
s u i t , th e r e w a s a n y c on du c t evidenc ing the deale rship’s assent to the terms of the Ag ree ment. The aff i d avit of the de aler ship’s g ener al manag er is nothing more than a post-commence ment of litigation statement that the de aler ship considers itself bound by t h e Agr eeme nt. This does not amount to evide nce of the concept of acc eptanc e as a ddresse d in Buddy Lee a ndthe re c e nt S up re me Court decision in Stau bach . Acc ording ly , in this summary judgme nt analy sis, we ar e lef t with an ag ree ment to arbitrate signe d by one party but not by the other. The ref

ore, on the fac e of the rec ord now bef o re u s , we c onclude that ther e is a g enuine issue of materia l fac t as to whether there was mutualitywith respec t to the obligation to ar bit ra t e in the Ag ree ment. We conclude that the deale rship, there fore , is not entitl ed to summary judgme nt with respe ct t o its position that Flana ry mus t arb itr a te his c la ims pu rs ua nt t o th e Ag re e me nt’ s te rm s. 5

I V.

Th e jud g me nt o f the c ha nc e ry c ou rt is a ff ir me d in part andva c a te d in pa rt . T his ma tte r i s rema nded to the trial c ourt for f urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opin i o n
. E x er cising our dis c re tio n, we ta x the c os ts o n a pp e a l to the app e lle e , Ca

rl Gr e g ory

Do dg e of John so n Ci ty , L

L C.-13- _______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE