United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

MINE SAFETY 

Better Oversight and 

Coordination by 

MSHA and Other 

Federal Agencies 

Could Improve Safety 

for Underground Coal 

Miners 

May 2007 

 

GAO-07-622 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2007

MINE SAFETY

Better Oversight and Coordination by 

MSHA and Other Federal Agencies Could 

Improve Safety for Underground Coal 

Miners 

Highlights of GAO-07-622, a report to 

congressional requesters 

The Mine Safety and Health

Administration (MSHA), the 

National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health (NIOSH), the 

Federal Mine Safety and Health 

Review Commission, the

Department of Labor’s Office of the 

Solicitor, the states, and the mining

industry share responsibility for 

ensuring mine safety. 

GAO examined the challenges 

underground coal mines face in 

preparing for emergencies, how 

well MSHA oversees mine

operators’ training efforts, how 

well MSHA and NIOSH coordinate

to enhance the development and

approval of mine safety technology, 

and how civil penalties are 

assessed. To address these issues,

GAO surveyed a representative

sample of active underground coal 

mines, analyzed agency data, 

conducted site visits, and talked

with agency officials and other

experts. The survey results are 

estimated at the 95 percent

confidence level. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

to strengthen the efforts of MSHA,

Labor, NIOSH, and the Commission 

by improving mine operators’ 

access to tools to train their 

workers, strengthening MSHA’s 

oversight of training, improving the 

effectiveness of information 

sharing between MSHA and

NIOSH, and ensuring that there is

transparency in penalty appeal

determinations. Each agency

generally agreed with the 

recommendations in the report. 

Underground coal mine operators face significant challenges preparing for 

emergencies, including ensuring that miners receive realistic training and 

organizing mine rescue teams that satisfy new requirements. While mine 

operators recognize the importance of providing training in an environment 

that simulates an emergency, many of them are challenged by having limited 

access to special training facilities and meeting the cost of providing such 

training. MSHA has materials for providing specific hands-on training for 

mine emergencies, but it does not provide all mine operators with 

information and tools for training under simulated emergency conditions. 

In addition to the challenges of providing miners with realistic training, mine

operators anticipated challenges in implementing the mine rescue team

requirements in recent legislation, such as meeting the requirement to 

conduct training annually at each mine covered by a mine rescue team. 

MSHA approves mine operators’ training plans and inspects their training 

records, but its oversight of miner training is hampered by several factors. 

MSHA has general guidelines for items to be considered when approving 

new instructors, but its standards are inconsistent, and it has no continuing 

education requirements for instructors. MSHA also does not have current 

information on its instructors and does not ensure that they keep their 

knowledge and skills up to date. In addition, MSHA does not adequately 

monitor instructors or evaluate training sessions, and does not assess how 

well miners are learning the skills being taught. 

MSHA and NIOSH have a common mission to improve the safety and health 

of coal miners, but do not have a current memorandum of understanding to 

guide their coordination efforts or formally involve each other in strategic 

planning efforts. As a result, coordination between the two agencies is 

largely informal and inconsistent. Most of the coordination that occurs is 

initiated by individual staff members or by outside parties. Such informal 

coordination may not be sufficient given the pending retirements of many 

engineers and scientists and other challenges that both agencies face. 

While most of the penalties proposed by MSHA are paid by mine operators 

without opposition, a small percentage of the cases involving more serious 

and higher dollar penalties are appealed, and those appealed are reduced 

significantly. Between 1996 and 2006, MSHA proposed assessing mine

operators 506,707 penalties for violations of underground coal mine safety 

and health standards—at an average penalty amount of $234 per violation. 

MSHA uses a standard formula to propose penalties, but the other entities 

involved in the appeals process such as Labor’s Solicitor’s Office use 

considerable discretion in deciding on the final penalty amount. 

Approximately 6 percent (31,589) of the violations were appealed by mine 

operators. About half of the penalties for the appealed violations were 

reduced by an average of 49 percent, regardless of the seriousness of the 

gravity of the violation and the degree of operator’s negligence. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-622.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Daniel Bertoni 

at (202) 512-7215 or bertonid@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Underground Coal Mines Face Challenges in Preparing Mine 

Workers and Rescue Teams for Emergencies 12 

MSHA Reviews Mines’ Training Plans and Inspects Training 

Records but Does Not Adequately Monitor Instructors or 

Training 21

MSHA and NIOSH Lack a Formal Agreement to Guide Mine Safety 

Coordination 23

Most Penalties Assessed by MSHA Are Paid without Opposition, 

but Many of Those Appealed Are Reduced Substantially 32 

Conclusions 40

Recommendations for Executive Action 41 

Agency Comments 42 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 47 

Survey of Underground Coal Mines 47 

Citation and Penalty Data 50 

Appendix II Survey of Underground Coal Mines 51 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Labor 71 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Health & 

Human Services 77 

Appendix V Comments from the Federal Mine Safety and 

Health Review Commission 78 

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Acknowledgments 81 

Page i GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Tables 

Table 1: MSHA’s and NIOSH’s Complementary Roles 25 

Table 2: Key Practices for Effective Coordination 27 

Table 3: Proportion of MSHA Engineers and Scientists Eligible for 

Retirement over the Next 10 Years, as of March 2007 31 

Table 4: Average Proposed Penalty by Gravity and Negligence 

Indicators, 1996 to 2006 34 

Table 5: Example of How a Proposed Penalty Amount Could Be 

Determined Based on the Previous and Revised Standard 

Penalty Formulas 36 

Table 6: Contested Penalty Reductions by Gravity and Negligence 

Indicators, 1996 to 2006 38 

Table 7: Sample Disposition for Survey of Underground Coal Mines 48 

Figures 

Figure 1: Penalty Assessment Process for Mine Operators That Are 

Cited for Violating Safety and Health Standards 11 

Figure 2: Estimated Extent of Training Conducted with Breathing 

Devices at Mines in 2006 13 

Figure 3: Mines’ Assessment of Challenges in Preparing Workers 

for Mine Emergencies 15 

Figure 4: Mines’ Assessment of Rescue Team Challenges in 

Preparing for Mine Emergencies 18 

Page ii GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Abbreviations 

ALJ administrative law judge

APA Administrative Procedures Act 

CLR conference litigation representative

ETS Emergency Temporary Standard 

MINER Act Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response 

Act of 2006 

MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration 

MSIS MSHA Standardized Information System 

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

SCSR self-contained self-rescuer 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 16, 2007

Congressional Requesters

In January 2006, the Sago mine accident in West Virginia brought the 

nation’s attention to the perils workers face in underground coal mining 

when 12 men lost their lives after an explosion prompted them to 

barricade themselves in the mine to await rescue—an effort that took 

close to 2 days to complete. In total, 47 coal miners lost their lives in 2006, 

interrupting a 10-year trend of declining fatalities in this industry. Coal, 

which is used to produce almost 50 percent of the nation’s electricity, is 

becoming more and more important to the nation’s energy policy as the

demand for electricity increases. Mining productivity is at an all-time 

high—averaging more than 6 tons per coal miner per hour, or more than 

48 tons in an 8-hour day. As production increases, safety and the oversight

of mines’ working conditions assume even greater significance than 

before. 

In January 2006, the Sago mine accident in West Virginia brought the 

nation’s attention to the perils workers face in underground coal mining 

when 12 men lost their lives after an explosion prompted them to 

barricade themselves in the mine to await rescue—an effort that took 

close to 2 days to complete. In total, 47 coal miners lost their lives in 2006, 

interrupting a 10-year trend of declining fatalities in this industry. Coal, 

which is used to produce almost 50 percent of the nation’s electricity, is 

becoming more and more important to the nation’s energy policy as the

demand for electricity increases. Mining productivity is at an all-time 

high—averaging more than 6 tons per coal miner per hour, or more than 

48 tons in an 8-hour day. As production increases, safety and the oversight

of mines’ working conditions assume even greater significance than 

before. 

Through the Department of Labor’s (Labor) Mine Safety and Health 

Administration (MSHA), the federal government enforces the provisions of 

the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, as amended (Mine Act) 

and the recently enacted requirements of the Mine Improvement and New

Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act). Under these laws, MSHA 

is responsible for approving training programs for mine workers; 

promulgating regulations regarding training requirements for rescue 

teams; approving certain technology devices used underground; and 

inspecting underground coal mines at least four times each year, which 

can result in citations and penalties for safety and health violations. The 

Department of Health and Human Services’ National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health’s (NIOSH) Office of Mine Safety and 

Health shares some responsibilities for improving mine safety. It identifies 

the causes of work-related diseases and injuries; researches, develops, and 

tests new technologies and equipment designed to enhance mine safety 

and health; and recommends safety and health standards. In addition, 

many states maintain mine safety agencies that conduct inspections and 

require mines to adhere to state safety and health laws and regulations. 

Finally, mine operators maintain responsibility for implementing safety 

and health standards to ensure that their workers are working under safe 

conditions on a daily basis. In response to concerns about the safety of 

underground coal mines, spawned by the recent increase in fatal mine 

accidents, you asked us to review several aspects of mine safety oversight. 

Through the Department of Labor’s (Labor) Mine Safety and Health 

Administration (MSHA), the federal government enforces the provisions of 

the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, as amended (Mine Act) 

and the recently enacted requirements of the Mine Improvement and New

Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act). Under these laws, MSHA 

is responsible for approving training programs for mine workers; 

promulgating regulations regarding training requirements for rescue 

teams; approving certain technology devices used underground; and 

inspecting underground coal mines at least four times each year, which 

can result in citations and penalties for safety and health violations. The 

Department of Health and Human Services’ National Institute for 

Occupational Safety and Health’s (NIOSH) Office of Mine Safety and 

Health shares some responsibilities for improving mine safety. It identifies 

the causes of work-related diseases and injuries; researches, develops, and 

tests new technologies and equipment designed to enhance mine safety 

and health; and recommends safety and health standards. In addition, 

many states maintain mine safety agencies that conduct inspections and 

require mines to adhere to state safety and health laws and regulations. 

Finally, mine operators maintain responsibility for implementing safety 

and health standards to ensure that their workers are working under safe 

conditions on a daily basis. In response to concerns about the safety of 

underground coal mines, spawned by the recent increase in fatal mine 

accidents, you asked us to review several aspects of mine safety oversight. 

Page 1 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
We examined (1) the challenges underground coal mines face in preparing 

for mine emergencies, (2) how well MSHA oversees mine operators’ 

training efforts, (3) how well MSHA and NIOSH coordinate their efforts to 

enhance the development and approval of mine safety technology, and 

(4) how civil penalties are assessed when underground coal mine 

operators violate safety and health standards. 

To conduct our work, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations that 

govern MSHA, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 

and NIOSH, as they applied to our research. In addition, we reviewed 

relevant decisions issued by the Commission and its administrative law 

judges. We consulted with outside experts, including industry 

associations, union representatives, mine company officials, academics, a 

technology manufacturer, and other stakeholders to obtain their views on 

each topic. We also surveyed a sample of active underground coal mines

regarding the current state of mines’ operations and the challenges they

face in preparing for and responding to mine emergencies. We sent 

questionnaires to a stratified random sample of 342 of the 665 active 

underground coal mines. Our sample size was reduced because of mine 

closures; therefore, survey estimates are representative of only those 

mines open for the entire period. Ultimately, 146 mines completed 

questionnaires for a response rate of 69 percent. Our confidence in the 

precision of the results from the sample is expressed in 95 percent 

confidence intervals. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of 

the confidence intervals in this report will include the true values in the inscope population. All percentage estimates for our sample have margins of 

error—widths of confidence intervals—of plus or minus 8 percentage 

points or less, at the 95 percent confidence level.

In addition, we analyzed quantitative data from MSHA on citations and 

penalty amounts for penalties assessed from January 1996 through 

October 2006. The data provided by MSHA were assessed and found 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also visited three underground 

coal mines, spoke with MSHA officials in 6 of its 11 coal mine districts, and 

interviewed state mine agency officials in the four states that contain 

almost 90 percent of all underground coal mines in the United States—

Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. Finally, we attended a 

mine rescue competition to observe training exercises and interview 

rescue team members, and visited field locations where MSHA and NIOSH 

conduct their research and interviewed the officials responsible for these 

activities. We completed our work between June 2006 and March 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. For 

Page 2 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
an additional discussion of the scope of our work and the methods used to 

conduct it, see appendix I. 

Underground coal mine operators face significant challenges preparing for 

emergencies, including ensuring that miners receive realistic training and 

organizing mine rescue teams that satisfy new requirements. Mine 

operators recognized the importance of providing emergency training in a

simulated environment. However, on the basis of our survey results, an 

estimate of 81 percent of mine operators considered the availability of 

special training facilities for providing such training as a challenge, and 

70 percent considered the costs of providing simulated training as a 

challenge. While MSHA has some materials for providing hands-on 

training, such as guides on practicing donning and transferring emergency 

breathing devices, it does not provide all mine operators with information 

and tools for training under simulated emergency conditions. Our survey 

results also indicate that an estimate of 77 percent of mines conducted 

evacuation drills in 2006 in which miners practiced donning breathing 

devices, which were part of MSHA’s emergency temporary standards 

implemented in March 2006. However, an estimate of 44 percent of mines 

that conducted these drills did not have their miners practice inserting the 

device’s mouthpiece. Initially, MSHA permitted miners to simulate this 

activity. However, final rules issued in December 2006 require miners to 

insert the mouthpiece. In addition to the challenges of providing miners 

with realistic training, mine operators reported that they anticipated 

challenges in implementing the new mine rescue team requirements of the 

MINER Act. For example, depending on how MSHA defines the 

requirement for rescue teams to train at least annually at every mine they

serve, some states that currently provide mine rescue services reported 

that they may choose to stop providing these services because of resource 

constraints. As a result, affected mine operators will then have to identify

and train new rescue teams. To help mines train their workers under 

simulated emergency conditions, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Labor direct MSHA to publicize information and available tools for 

training mine workers under such conditions. In addition, MSHA should 

periodically review and update this information, as appropriate. 

Results in Brief 

MSHA approves mine operators’ training plans and inspects their training 

records, but its oversight of miner training is hampered by several factors, 

including (1) inconsistent instructor approval standards, (2) inaccuracies

in its database that maintains information on all instructors, (3) the lack of

continuing education requirements for instructors once they are approved,

and (4) limited agency monitoring of training sessions. MSHA has general 

guidelines for items to be considered when approving new instructors, but 

Page 3 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
allows districts to determine an instructor’s qualifications in different 

ways. For example, MSHA requires that applicants prove their experience 

in one of three ways, and the districts have the discretion to grant 

provisional approval until the instructor is designated otherwise, but this 

approach is not consistent across districts. MSHA also does not have 

continuing education requirements for instructors. In addition, MSHA does 

not have current information on its approved instructors and does not 

ensure that they keep their knowledge and skills up to date. Further, 

MSHA does not adequately monitor instructors or evaluate training 

sessions, and does not assess how well miners are learning the skills being 

taught. To help ensure that mine workers are adequately prepared for 

emergencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct MSHA to 

strengthen its monitoring of training. This monitoring should include 

• reviewing and standardizing districts’ procedures for approving new 

instructors;

• establishing continuing education requirements for instructors to 

help instructors maintain or improve their knowledge and skills; 

• improving the data in its records on approved instructors; and 

• developing a process for monitoring miner training that includes 

regularly evaluating training sessions, assessing how well learning 

objectives are being met, and providing feedback to instructors. 

Coordination between MSHA and NIOSH is primarily informal and 

inconsistent, and such coordination may not be sufficient given the 

pending retirements and other challenges both agencies face. Despite their 

complementary roles, MSHA and NIOSH lack a current memorandum of 

understanding or other formal policy to guide their agencywide 

coordination efforts. In addition, they do not regularly involve each other

in their strategic planning efforts, including planning for research. As a 

result, officials told us that coordination has primarily been at the 

initiative of some individuals at both agencies and, as such, has not always 

been consistent. MSHA and NIOSH have worked together on temporary 

projects, such as developing a new device to monitor the amount of coal 

dust and other irritants to which miners are exposed, but these efforts 

have been temporary, limited to specific issues, and not part of either 

agency’s standard operating procedures. Given the challenges the two 

agencies face, coordination based on working relationships developed 

between individual staff or temporary projects may not be sufficient. For 

example, many engineers and scientists at MSHA and NIOSH will be 

eligible to retire in the coming years, and informal coordination efforts 

may not continue after they leave. To improve the effectiveness of 

information sharing between MSHA and NIOSH, we recommend that the

Page 4 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Secretaries of Labor and Health and Human Services direct their 

respective agencies to work together to establish a formal memorandum 

of understanding to guide their coordination. In addition, the agencies 

should periodically review and update the memorandum, as appropriate. 

While most of the penalties proposed by MSHA are paid by mine operators 

without opposition, a small percentage of the cases involving more serious 

and higher-dollar penalties are appealed, and many of those appealed are 

reduced significantly. MSHA proposes penalties using a standard formula 

established in its regulations designed to assess higher penalties for more 

serious violations. Recently, MSHA finalized revisions to its standard 

formula and expects these changes to more than double the amount of all 

proposed penalties. Between 1996 and 2006, MSHA proposed assessing 

mine operators 506,707 penalties for violations of underground coal mine

safety and health standards—at an average penalty amount of $234 per 

violation. While mine operators pay most penalties without opposition 

they appealed about 6 percent of all penalties assessed by MSHA. Of those 

appealed, about half of the penalties were reduced by an average of 49 

percent, regardless of the gravity of the violation and the degree of the

operator’s negligence. The entities involved in the appeals process—the 

Department of Labor’s Office of the Solicitor (Solicitor’s Office), MSHA’s 

conference litigation representatives (CLR), and administrative law judges

(ALJ) with the independent Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 

Commission—are required by law to apply the six statutory factors 

specified in the Mine Act. However, they are not legally obligated to use 

any particular method to determine a new penalty amount when they 

determine that a reduction from MSHA’s proposed penalty is appropriate. 

As a result, they have considerable discretion in deciding on the final 

penalty amount. The recent penalty increases implemented by MSHA 

increase the likelihood that more penalties will be appealed. In order to 

ensure that there is transparency in penalty determinations, we 

recommend that the Solicitor’s Office, MSHA, and the Commission take 

steps to ensure that the specific rationale for all final penalty amounts, 

including reductions from MSHA’s proposed penalties, are adequately 

documented.

We obtained comments on a draft of this report from MSHA, Labor’s 

Office of the Solicitor, NIOSH, and the Commission. Each entity agreed 

with the recommendations. MSHA provided additional information about 

actions the agency has either begun or plans to take in response to the 

recommendations. For example, MSHA stated it will develop a Web page 

dedicated to providing information on available training resources and will 

issue an information bulletin to mine operators about this Web-based 

Page 5 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
resource. In addition, the agency provided information on its plans for 

improving oversight of miner training, including exploring the option of 

establishing continuing education requirements for approved instructors. 

However, the agency noted that this requirement may necessitate a 

regulatory change before it can be finalized. Both MSHA and NIOSH 

supported developing a memorandum of understanding to better guide 

their coordination efforts. MSHA, the Office of the Solicitor, and the 

Commission agreed with the need for transparency in the appeals process 

that includes specifying the rationale for each penalty reduction. 

Coal mining remains one of the nation’s most dangerous professions. 

The deadly explosion at the Sago mine in West Virginia brought national 

attention to the many hazards facing underground coal miners. In 

response, Congress enacted the MINER Act of 2006, which required mine 

operators and MSHA to undertake a variety of reforms, including 

enhancing mine rescue teams, developing up-to-date accident response 

plans, and instituting higher penalties—including a criminal penalty—for 

the most serious violations.1

 In March 2006, MSHA also issued an 

Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) 2 aimed at instituting immediate 

health and safety improvements.3

 Among other requirements, these 

standards required operators to provide safety training on the mine’s 

evacuation routes and provide opportunities to learn how to react in 

certain kinds of simulated emergency situations, install lifelines along 

mine escape routes, and store supplemental breathing devices

underground. The elements of the ETS became a permanent regulation in

December 2006, although the final regulations do modify and clarify some 

elements of the ETS.4

Background 

 1

Pub. L. 109-236. 

2

The Mine Act gives MSHA the authority to issue an ETS when the agency determines that 

miners are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to 

be toxic or physically harmful, or to other hazards, and that an emergency standard is

needed to protect miners from such danger. The ETS becomes effective upon publication 

in the Federal Register and remains in effect until replaced by permanent rules that go 

through the regular rule-making process, but for no longer than 9 months. 

3

30 C.F.R. Parts 48, 50, and 75, Emergency Mine Evacuation; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 12,252

(March 9, 2006). 

4

30 C.F.R. Parts 3, 48, 50, and 75, Emergency Mine Evacuation; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg.

71,430 (December 8, 2006). 

Page 6 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
The underground mining industry is highly concentrated in the 

Appalachian region, east of the Mississippi River. Approximately 

87 percent of all underground coal mines in the United States are located 

in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. Eight of MSHA’s 

11 district offices are located in these states, and MSHA’s headquarters is 

located in Arlington, Virginia. 

MSHA plays a key role in ensuring the education and training of miners, 

mine inspectors, and other industry stakeholders. MSHA’s Directorate of 

Educational Policy and Development provides technical support to mine 

operators through its Educational Field Services, which has staff located 

in many of MSHA’s district offices. The directorate also operates the 

National Mine Health and Safety Academy (Mine Academy) in West 

Virginia, which primarily serves as the training center for MSHA mine 

inspectors but is also available to federal and local government and 

industry personnel for training on a variety of mine health and safety 

topics. The Mine Academy also provides nearly all of the classroom 

training for newly hired MSHA mine inspector trainees and technical 

specialists. In addition, MSHA regulations govern the training and 

retraining of miners and mine rescue team members. Mine operators are 

required to provide at least 40 hours of training to new underground mine 

workers and at least 8 hours of annual training to experienced miners. 

The training must cover a variety of topics, such as learning the layout of 

the mine and proper safety procedures, and must be conducted by an 

MSHA-approved instructor. Miners who volunteer for mine rescue teams 

are generally required to pass a rigorous physical examination, complete 

an initial 20 hours of training on the breathing apparatus used by the team, 

and an additional 40 hours of annual training on issues such as reading 

mine maps, understanding ventilation systems, and the use of mine rescue 

equipment.5

Both MSHA and NIOSH are responsible for getting new technology into 

the mines. MSHA performs this role by certifying certain equipment used 

in a mine is safe for underground use. MSHA also provides technical 

support to mine inspectors and mine operators in a number of areas, such 

as electrical and ventilation systems, roof control, and control of coal dust.

In conducting its health and safety research and development, NIOSH 

 5

The MINER Act also imposes some new training requirements for mine rescue teams.

MSHA is required to promulgate regulations implementing these requirements within 

18 months of June 15, 2006. 30 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2).

Page 7 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
consults with a number of different entities, including MSHA and the 

mining industry. NIOSH is also responsible for developing or adapting new 

technologies for use in the mining industry. Before the passage of the Mine

Act in 1977, both mine enforcement and research were the responsibility 

of the Bureau of Mines, which was located in the Department of Interior. 

After the passage of the act, MSHA was created when the enforcement 

function was moved from the Bureau of Mines to the Department of Labor. 

In 1997, following the closure of the Bureau of Mines, mine research was 

placed under the auspices of the Department of Health and Human 

Services’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and became a part 

of NIOSH. 

The federal government’s enforcement of mine safety and health is shared 

by two independent agencies—MSHA and the Commission—in a splitenforcement model that is relatively uncommon in the federal government.

While MSHA is responsible for inspecting mines for safety and health 

violations, the Mine Act grants authority to the Commission to assess all 

civil penalties for violations found by MSHA. In practical terms, MSHA 

proposes the initial penalty based on the findings of its inspectors.6

However, these proposals are subject to review by the Commission, and 

no proposed penalty that has been contested by a mine operator can be 

settled without the approval of the Commission. The Commission includes 

five members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 

ALJs assist in carrying out the responsibilities of the Commission and are 

authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Mine Act 

to independently review MSHA’s enforcement actions. ALJ decisions are 

considered final decisions of the Commission unless it decides to review a 

case within 40 days of the ALJ decision. If MSHA or the mine operator 

disagrees with the Commission decision, either can appeal the case to the 

appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals. 

In assessing penalties, the Mine Act requires both the Commission and 

MSHA to consider six statutory factors: 

1. the mine operator’s history of previous violations, 

2. the appropriateness of the penalty to the size of the mine, 

 6

If the penalty proposed by MSHA is not contested by the mine operator within the time

allotted by law, it becomes a final order of the Commission. 

Page 8 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
3. whether the mine operator was negligent, 

4. the effect on the operator’s ability to continue in business, 

5. the gravity of the violation, and 

6. the demonstrated good faith of the mine operator charged in 

quickly remedying the situation after being notified of a violation. 

MSHA’s Coal Mine Safety and Health Administration is responsible for 

carrying out enforcement activities related to surface and underground 

coal mines. As of January 2007, MSHA employed approximately 

550 underground coal inspectors in its 11 coal districts. MSHA’s principal 

enforcement responsibility for underground coal mines is fulfilled by 

conducting a minimum of four comprehensive inspections of every 

underground coal mine each year.7

 When MSHA inspectors observe 

violations of federal health and safety standards, they are required to issue 

a citation to the coal mine operator.8

 However, even if an operator does 

not agree with the violation, the operator must resolve the problems 

within the time frame set by the inspector. 

Under new MSHA regulations that took effect in April 2007,9

 the amount of

a civil penalty that MSHA can assess for violation of an underground coal 

mine safety and health standard generally ranges from $112 to $60,000.

10

However, the MINER Act introduced a new “flagrant violation,” which 

carries a maximum civil penalty of $220,000.11 The MINER Act also 

 7

Mines that are recognized as more dangerous, such as those containing high levels of 

methane gas, are inspected more frequently. 

8

MSHA inspectors are authorized to issue either a citation or a withdrawal order when they

observe a health and safety violation. All withdrawal orders compel the removal of miners

from the affected work areas until the observed hazard is terminated. This, in essence, 

could halt production in a particular area of the mine. 

9

Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties; Final Rule, 72 Fed.

Reg. 13,592 (March 22, 2007) (codified at 30 C.F.R. Part 100). 

10Under its prior regulations, MSHA also used a “single penalty assessment” for violations

that were not reasonably likely to result in a reasonably serious injury or illness, and that

were abated within the time set by the inspector. The penalty for these violations was $60. 

However, the new regulations eliminate the single penalty assessment. 

11The MINER Act defines flagrant violations as those that involve “a reckless or repeated

failure to make reasonable efforts to eliminate a known violation of a mandatory health or 

safety standard that substantially and proximately caused, or reasonably could have been

expected to cause, death or serious bodily injury.” 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)(2). 

Page 9 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
established criminal penalties for certain willful or knowing violations of 

the Mine Act.12

Once a penalty is proposed, a mine operator can (1) accept the proposed 

penalty and pay it or (2) formally contest the penalty before the 

Commission (see fig. 1 for a more detailed view of the process). 

 12A mine operator’s first conviction under these criminal provisions may carry a fine of up

to $250,000 and imprisonment for up to 1 year. Subsequent convictions are punishable by 

fines of up to $500,000 and 5 years of imprisonment. 30 U.S.C. § 820(d). 

Page 10 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Figure 1: Penalty Assessment Process for Mine Operators That Are Cited for Violating Safety and Health Standards 

Source: GAO analysis.

Mine operator contests the penalty to the Commission MSHA proposes

 the penalty

MSHA issues a

violation to mine

operator

Labor Solicitor or CLR

reaches an

ALJ-approved settlement with 

mine operator 

If no settlement, ALJ 

convenes a trial 

Labor Solicitor or mine 

operator contests

ALJ decision to the 

Commission, subject to 

Commission discretion

Labor Solicitor or mine 

operator appeals

Commission decision to 

the appropriate U.S. 

Court of Appeals 

Mine operator requests

that a CLR convene an 

informal conference to 

decide if any changes

should be made to the 

violation 

Final Penalty is

assessed to mine 

operator

Operator does not

contest the penalty 

Note: If the citation or order is vacated by the Commission or the courts, no civil penalty is 

assessed. 

Page 11 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Underground coal mine operators face significant challenges preparing for 

emergencies, including ensuring that miners receive realistic training and 

organizing mine rescue teams that satisfy new requirements. Limited 

access to facilities for training miners under simulated emergency 

conditions and the cost of such training challenge many mine operators. 

While MSHA has some materials for providing hands-on training, it does 

not provide all mine operators with information and tools to assist them in 

training miners under simulated emergency conditions. In preparing mine 

rescue teams to respond to emergencies, mine operators reported costs 

and training as key challenges, and indicated that implementing new 

requirements in the MINER Act may exacerbate these challenges. 

Although new MSHA requirements instruct mine operators to conduct 

emergency preparedness training that includes realistic mine emergency 

evacuation drills, many mine operators had not implemented these 

requirements as of the end of 2006. MSHA’s ETS issued in March 2006 

required mine operators to provide hands-on training in the complete 

donning of the breathing devices miners carry with them into underground 

mines in the event that the breathable air becomes contaminated.13 On the 

basis of our survey, we estimate that 77 percent of underground coal 

mines conducted evacuation drills where most or all of their workers 

practiced donning a breathing device during the drill in 2006.14 However, 

we estimate that out of those mines, 44 percent did not have their workers 

practice inserting the mouthpiece. Although the March ETS permitted 

miners to simulate the insertion of the mouthpiece in training exercises, 

the final rule in December clarified that actual insertion is required.15

MSHA requires all miners to practice each step in the process of donning 

the device, including opening and activating the device and inserting the 

Underground Coal 

Mines Face 

Challenges in 

Preparing Mine 

Workers and Rescue 

Teams for 

Emergencies 

Emergency Preparedness 

Training of Miners Is 

Limited by Few 

Opportunities to Train 

under Simulated 

Emergency Conditions 

 13Emergency breathing devices, also known as self-contained self-rescuers (SCSR), are

closed-circuit devices containing or producing an independent supply of oxygen, enabling 

miners to breathe in the presence of hazardous or life-threatening contaminants in the

atmosphere. 

14Percentage estimates are based on the sample and are subject to sampling error. We are 

95 percent confident that the results we obtained are within plus or minus 8 percentage 

points of the true values of the in-scope population. Each sample element was

subsequently weighted in the analysis to account for all members of the in-scope 

population, including those that were not selected. 

15MSHA made this change in the final rule because it was concerned that without actually 

physically inserting the mouthpiece, a miner may not gain the skills to effectively and 

properly perform this action. 

Page 12 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
mouthpiece. The purpose of this training is to familiarize miners with the 

process of operating a breathing device and the sensations of breathing 

through it, such as resistance when breathing and the heat generated by

the unit.16 However, not all mines have trained miners in all of these steps 

(see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: Estimated Extent of Training Conducted with Breathing Devices at Mines in 2006 

23% 77%

None or some of their mine workers practiced donning breathing devices

Most or all of their mine workers practiced donning breathing devices

Activity practiced

Percentage of mines where all or most of the workers participated

0 20 40 60 80 100

Opening the breathing device

Putting on the nose clip

Activating the breathing device

Inserting the mouthpiece

96

97

86

36

Source: GAO analysis of survey data.

Based on our survey, we estimate that of the mines where most or all of 

the workers practiced donning a breathing device in 2006, only 36 percent 

practiced inserting the mouthpiece, a result that could be due to miners’ 

reluctance to share used mouthpieces. According to mine safety and 

training officials, even when the mouthpieces are sterilized between uses, 

many miners are reluctant to use them because of the fear of infection. In 

addition, the March ETS and the December regulations require that miners 

 16Although ETS requirements initially were effective immediately, the final rule issued in 

December 2006 did not include a required compliance date for training with breathing

devices because, according to MSHA, training devices that provided the sensation of

airflow resistance and heat were not available for purchase at that time. In March 2007, 

MSHA published a notice in the Federal Register informing mine operators that they must

have a purchase order for realistic SCSR training units by April 30, 2007, and that they must 

conduct training within 60 days of the receipt of the units. See Emergency Mine 

Evacuation, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,169 (March 30, 2007). 

Page 13 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
practice switching from one breathing device to another in the event that 

they have to use more than one device during an emergency, but an 

estimate of 42 percent of all mines did not conduct such exercises in 2006. 

In addition, we estimate that about half of mines had not conducted drills 

in environments that simulate actual emergency situations, and many cited 

providing such training as one of the greatest challenges they face in 

preparing workers for mine emergencies. MSHA’s new training 

requirements direct mine operators to conduct quarterly mine emergency 

evacuation drills; install directional lifelines to help miners find their way 

out of a dark mine; and instruct miners in the procedures for evacuating 

the mine in emergencies, such as those involving fires or explosions.17 On 

the basis of our survey, almost all mines conducted evacuation drills and 

installed lifelines in 2006. However, we estimate that half of the mines had 

not conducted drills in environments that simulated actual emergency 

situations. According to our survey, the greatest challenges in preparing 

miners for and responding to mine emergencies related to simulated mine 

emergency training. Specifically, the three most commonly reported 

challenges were the availability of training centers that can simulate an 

emergency situation, the availability of training in a simulated mine 

emergency situation, and the cost associated with providing simulated 

mine emergency training (see fig. 3).

 17To ensure that four major scenarios—fire, explosion, gas, and water inundation—are 

covered each year, the final rule issued in December requires that a different scenario be

used each quarter in conducting evacuation drills. 

Page 14 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Figure 3: Mines’ Assessment of Challenges in Preparing Workers for Mine Emergencies 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Challenge

Estimated percentage of mines assessing the challenge as moderate to major

Source: GAO analysis of survey data.

The availability of training centers that

can simulate an emergency situation

The availability of training in a

simulated mine emergency situation

The cost associated with

simulated mine emergency training

The amount of time needed

to train new mine workers

The availability of approved instructors who

can conduct simulated mine emergency training

The loss of experienced mine

workers due to retirements

Training mine workers in first respondertype activities such as firefighting techniques

Preparing mine workers to use

breathing devices for escape

Familiarizing mine workers with escape routes

81

70

70

62

47

46

31

26

5

Although mine operators recognized the importance of simulated 

emergency training, many mines faced challenges conducting such 

training due to their limited access to special facilities and the high cost of 

such training. We estimate that 81 percent of mines viewed the availability 

of training in a simulated mine emergency situation as a moderate to major 

challenge. According to mine training officials and experts, emergency 

training is best conducted in simulated conditions that are as close to the 

actual conditions present during an emergency as possible because it 

builds miners’ confidence and enables them to respond appropriately 

during an actual emergency. The Mine Academy in Beaver, West Virginia, 

provides some facilities for training under simulated emergency 

conditions, but it is used primarily for mine rescue training and, according 

to some mining industry officials, is often not a viable training option 

because of its limited capacity and distance from many mines. In addition, 

mine operators can use a mobile training facility developed for various 

Page 15 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
simulated emergency conditions, but it is not always available, in part 

because of limitations on instructors’ time.18 The high cost of providing 

simulated training is another challenge, particularly for smaller mines. On 

the basis of our survey, we estimated that small mines were less likely to 

have performed such drills than larger mines.19 In addition, the cost 

associated with providing simulated mine emergency training is more of a 

challenge for small mines than larger mines. According to our survey, 

small mines were more likely than larger mines to consider the cost of the

training to be a major challenge. According to MSHA officials, small mines 

are less likely than larger mines to employ a full-time safety director who 

can devote time to developing training under simulated emergency 

conditions. 

Although MSHA has materials that mine operators can use to provide 

hands-on training on specific topics, it does not provide all mine operators 

with information and tools for training under simulated emergency 

conditions. MSHA has a catalog of various training tools, including 

classroom exercises, which mine operators can obtain upon request. For 

example, to support the March ETS requirements for training with 

breathing devices, MSHA distributed a training packet to all underground 

coal mines and appropriate state grantees.20 However, MSHA does not 

provide all mine operators with examples of how to provide training in 

simulated emergency environments such as smoke-filled mines or 

information on resources available for providing such training. Mine 

operators use a number of techniques to simulate emergency conditions, 

but other mine operators may be unaware of them. One mine operator we 

interviewed reported using a maze in a garage-sized tent filled with 

artificial smoke to allow workers to safely practice evacuating a smokefilled mine, and other operators reported using darkened goggles during 

evacuation drills to simulate the limited visibility miners would experience 

in a smoke-filled mine. While MSHA has five artificial smoke machines that

mine operators may use to help train their workers in evacuating a smoke-

 18In 2006, 15 underground coal mines, mostly in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, used the

West Virginia University Mining Extension Service’s mobile training facility to provide

simulated emergency training to their workers.

19For purposes of our survey, small mines are defined as those with 36 employees or fewer,

whereas larger mines are those with more than 36 employees. 

20The packet contained a DVD on the protocol for how to transfer from one breathing 

device to another, training manuals on six types of breathing devices, an article on how to 

disinfect the devices, and other related information. 

Page 16 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
filled environment, many mine operators may not know about them 

because MSHA does not list them in its catalog of training products or 

communicate their existence to all mine operators. Based on our survey, 

we estimate that about half of the mines received no assistance from 

MSHA in preparing for a mine emergency, such as help developing drills in 

simulated emergency environments. In addition, several mine operators 

commented that they viewed MSHA as enforcing safety regulations rather

than serving as a resource for developing or providing training. 

Mine Operators Face 

Challenges Funding and 

Training Rescue Teams 

and Anticipate Further 

Challenges Implementing 

New Requirements 

Mine operators reported costs and training as key challenges in preparing 

rescue teams to respond to mine emergencies, and indicated that 

implementing new requirements in the MINER Act may exacerbate these 

challenges. According to our survey, cost concerns and opportunities to 

conduct simulated training with all stakeholders are the greatest 

challenges in preparing rescue teams for mine emergencies (see fig. 4). 

Page 17 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Figure 4: Mines’ Assessment of Rescue Team Challenges in Preparing for Mine Emergencies 

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Factor

Estimated percentage of mines assessing the factor as a moderate to major challenge

Source: GAO analysis of survey data.

The funding required to equip mine rescue teams

The opportunity to conduct simulated activities that include

all stakeholders that would be involved in an emergency

Amount of time needed to train

and prepare new team members

The funding required to train mine rescue teams

The number of mine workers available

to participate on mine rescue teams

The availability of up-to-date mine

rescue technology and equipment

The legal liability associated with assisting

mines other than one’s own during emergencies

The opportunity to participate in training

exercises that simulate a real emergency situation

The opportunity to participate in mine rescue

competitions that simulate a real emergency situation

Loss of experienced team

members due to retirements

Access to practice facilities

The number of mine rescue teams available

to assist in the event of a mine emergency

68

66

63

58

57

55

52

31

50

46

46

35

An estimate of 68 percent of mines considered the funding required to 

equip mine rescue teams as a moderate to major challenge in their ability 

to prepare them for emergencies. For example, mine rescue teams need 

special breathing devices, gas detectors, and communication equipment. 

According to a 2006 industry study, the cost of equipping a typical new 

mine rescue team is over $90,000, which may be expensive for some mine 

operators.21 In addition, all equipment must be maintained to ensure that it 

 21Bituminous Coal Operators' Association and National Mining Association, Mine Rescue 

Handbook: Emergency Response Procedures, Practices and Responsibilities, January 

2007. 

Page 18 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
is ready to be used, and therefore must be inspected every 30 days, 

according to MSHA regulations. 

Limited opportunity to conduct training in simulated emergency 

environments with each stakeholder who could be involved in an 

emergency response effort is a moderate to major challenge for an 

estimated two-thirds of mines. When a mine emergency occurs, several 

entities take an active role in the decision-making process that requires 

quick action and familiarity with the procedures and actions of the other 

players. For example, the mine command center set up at the beginning of 

the response to a mine emergency includes officials from the affected 

mine, a representative of the miners, and MSHA and state officials who are 

responsible for overseeing the rescue efforts and communicating with the 

rescue team members underground. In 1995, a panel of mine experts 

recommended that rescue teams, labor unions, state agencies, and federal 

agencies join together to participate in mine emergency response 

exercises. However, MSHA officials told us that while they have developed 

a process for conducting these exercises, few are carried out at mines 

each year.22

The time required to train and prepare new mine rescue team members 

was also cited as a significant challenge by many mines. We estimate that 

two-thirds of mines considered the time required to train and prepare new 

mine rescue team members a major or moderate challenge in 

implementing the requirements of the MINER Act. Under current 

regulations, before serving on a mine rescue team, each member must 

complete 20 hours of instruction in the use and maintenance of the types 

of breathing apparatus and other equipment used by the team. In addition,

mine rescue team members must have at least 40 hours of refresher 

training each year, which includes, among other things, all team members 

donning breathing devices for at least 2 hours every 2 months and at least 

one underground training session every 6 months. Because many mines 

rely on mine workers to constitute their designated mine rescue teams and 

because such training can conflict with employees’ regular work, some 

mine operators may feel that it lowers productivity. 

 22MSHA’s Managerial Emergency Responsiveness Development Program (MERD) utilizes 

interview and survey feedback techniques, emergency situations and role playing, 

assessment center methods with feedback, tutorials, and knowledge tests to improve and 

develop emergency management capabilities. It was designed specifically for MSHA 

managers, but has been used by other organizations such as individual mines. 

Page 19 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
In addition to these challenges, mine operators reported that they 

anticipated further challenges stemming from new requirements in the 

MINER Act. We estimate that half of underground coal mines anticipate

changing the composition of at least one of their designated mine rescue 

teams as a result of the MINER Act. Of the provisions related to mine 

rescue, the one that mine operators most anticipated necessitating 

significant change is the requirement that teams train at least annually in 

the mines they are responsible for covering. In part, this change is 

attributed to the way mine rescue services are provided to many mines in

several key coal mining states. According to respective state officials, all 

mines in Kentucky and many in Virginia and Pennsylvania rely on the state 

to provide or arrange for mine rescue services. In Kentucky, for example, 

mines receive rescue services from state teams composed of state mine 

inspectors whose primary duties are to inspect coal mines. According to a 

state official, a Kentucky team would be required to conduct 120 training 

exercises annually under the MINER Act, compared to the 12 exercises it 

currently conducts. Depending on the final regulations developed by 

MSHA to implement the requirements of the MINER Act, officials in 

Kentucky said they might stop offering mine rescue services because of 

the amount of time that will be needed to meet the training requirements 

outlined in the MINER Act. Similarly, according to state mine safety 

officials and rescue teams in Virginia, the state will probably have to stop 

contracting with larger mines to provide rescue team services for many 

small mines in the state because of the amount of time that teams would 

be required to train at each mine. According to state mining officials in 

Pennsylvania, smaller mines would be most affected if the state stops 

providing rescue teams because, unlike larger mines, they tend not to have

their own mine rescue teams. 

Some mine operators have started making changes to their mine rescue 

teams based on the MINER Act, while others are taking a cautious 

approach, given the costs to train and equip new rescue teams. For 

example, one company operating multiple mines reported that it was 

creating new backup mine rescue teams that will satisfy the new 1-hour 

travel time requirement of the act. In other cases, however, according to 

mine and industry officials, mines were waiting to see how MSHA 

implements the new mine rescue requirements before changing their team

designations.

23 For example, the extent of the required training at each 

 23MSHA has not yet determined how the mine rescue team requirements in the MINER Act 

will be implemented. MSHA officials said they plan to hold public hearings on the 

requirements of the act before publishing final rules. The final rule is due December 2007. 

Page 20 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
mine could affect how mine operators designate rescue teams. According 

to state mining officials, this requirement might involve the entire team 

training underground and activating breathing devices at each mine or 

something less resource-intensive, such as training aboveground at each 

mine. Some state mining officials and mine operators told us they feared 

that mines that create new rescue teams will staff them with less 

experienced people who may not be able to adequately protect miners 

during an emergency. However, officials with the United Mine Workers of 

America, the coal miners’ union, told us that MSHA should move forward 

in requiring mines to meet the requirements of the act more quickly, 

including establishing mine rescue teams at each mine without waiting for 

the regulations to be finalized. They said they believed that the 

requirements of the act are clear. 

MSHA has the authority to oversee certain aspects of miner training to 

help ensure that miners work safely and are prepared for potential 

emergencies, but its oversight of training is hindered by several factors, 

including having inconsistent instructor approval standards. As part of its 

oversight role, MSHA reviews and approves the training plans that mine 

operators are required to prepare and inspects training records. As part of 

its stated mission, MSHA’s Educational Field Services office helps develop

mine operators’ training plans and evaluates instructors and training 

programs. Educational Field Services staff also provide input to district 

managers who are responsible for approving new instructors. 

MSHA Reviews Mines’ 

Training Plans and 

Inspects Training 

Records but Does Not 

Adequately Monitor 

Instructors or 

Training

MSHA has general guidelines for items to be considered when approving 

new instructors, but allows districts to determine an instructor’s 

qualifications in different ways. To become an approved instructor, MSHA 

requires that an applicant prove his or her mining and teaching experience 

in one of three ways: by (1) submitting written qualifications, (2) attending 

new instructor training, or (3) teaching a class monitored by MSHA under 

provisional approval from an MSHA district manager. MSHA suggests 

factors that district managers may use in determining an applicant’s skills, 

but it does not have firm criteria that new instructors must meet. For 

example, to assess an applicant’s mining qualifications, the district 

manager may consider, among other factors, the applicant’s work 

experience, state certifications, and completion of MSHA courses. To 

assess an applicant’s teaching skills, a district manager may consider prior 

teaching experiences and evaluations from teaching sessions at MSHA’s 

instructor training course. In addition, approval procedures are not 

standardized across MSHA’s 11 coal districts, according to MSHA officials. 

For example, some districts grant provisional approval whereby 

Page 21 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
individuals are allowed to teach specific courses subject to subsequent 

approval based on MSHA’s monitoring of their teaching skills. However, 

according to MSHA officials, some of these districts may not monitor these 

instructors’ teaching skills. In other districts, provisional authority is only 

granted to new instructors if they can be monitored by MSHA staff. 

According to MSHA officials, staff resources limit districts’ ability to 

monitor applicants’ teaching skills. 

Another factor that hampers MSHA’s ability to monitor training is the fact

that it does not have current information on all of its instructors. MSHA 

maintains a database of approved instructors that includes contact 

information for each instructor, the courses they are approved to teach, 

and whether they have full or provisional authority to teach the courses. 

But according to MSHA officials, the database contains outdated contact 

information because some instructors move without notifying MSHA. 

Without accurate information on its instructors, MSHA cannot ensure that 

instructors receive training policy updates and cannot determine whether 

there are enough qualified instructors to meet mine operators’ needs. 

In addition, MSHA does not have continuing education requirements for its 

instructors. Once instructors are approved, according to an MSHA official, 

they are not required to demonstrate that they are staying current on 

emerging mining issues. As a result, MSHA cannot ensure that instructors 

are keeping their mining knowledge and skills up to date, including their 

knowledge of emerging safety and health issues and new training tools. 

For example, although MSHA did send its new training guides on 

transferring and donning emergency breathing devices to all underground 

coal mines, it did not send them to the instructors who conduct the 

training. 

MSHA also does not adequately monitor instructors or evaluate training

sessions and does not assess whether miners are learning what is being 

taught in training sessions. According to MSHA guidance, Educational 

Field Services and district inspection staff should monitor as many 

training sessions as resources permit. MSHA’s guidance includes an 

instructor evaluation form and a list of steps that staff should take in 

monitoring instructors, but according to MSHA officials, the agency

monitors few miner training sessions relative to the number conducted.

According to mine operators and trainers, MSHA rarely oversees training 

and monitors sessions primarily for enforcement purposes rather than in 

an attempt to enhance instructors’ knowledge and abilities. According to 

MSHA officials, instructor evaluations occur on an ad hoc basis by MSHA 

inspectors who happen to be present or by Educational Field Services 

Page 22 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
staff who attend in response to a specific request. In addition, many of the 

training sessions occur on the weekends, when MSHA staff do not work, 

limiting their ability to monitor training. MSHA does not collect or analyze 

training evaluations obtained from miners to help gauge whether learning 

objectives are taught effectively, and an estimate of 80 percent of mines do 

not elicit feedback on training sessions from their workers. Because 

MSHA does not regularly monitor training and because most mines do not 

elicit feedback, MSHA cannot determine how well miners are learning the 

skills taught by MSHA-approved trainers and recommend corrective 

measures as necessary. 

MSHA and NIOSH have a common mission to improve the safety and 

health of coal miners, but do not have a formal agreement, such as a 

memorandum of understanding, to guide agencywide coordination efforts 

or formally involve each other in their strategic planning efforts. As a 

result, coordination between the two agencies is largely informal and 

inconsistent. Most of the coordination that occurs is initiated by individual 

staff members or by outside parties, such as labor unions. Such informal 

coordination may not be sufficient given the pending retirements of 

engineers and scientists and other challenges that both agencies face. 

MSHA and NIOSH have complementary roles in improving the safety and 

health of coal miners, but coordination between the two agencies is 

largely informal and inconsistent due to a lack of a formal agreement or 

policies to guide their efforts. MSHA is primarily involved in setting health 

and safety standards and enforcing them through mine inspections that 

can result in citations and penalties, whereas NIOSH’s mining program is 

focused on research into the causes of and ways to prevent the safety and 

health hazards miners face.24 While MSHA and NIOSH have different 

functions, their roles are complementary in a number of respects. Both are

involved in providing training and technical assistance for mine inspectors 

and operators. For example, officials told us that NIOSH researchers help

develop training modules and products on a variety of safety and health

topics that MSHA makes available to mine operators and inspectors 

MSHA and NIOSH 

Lack a Formal 

Agreement to Guide 

Mine Safety 

Coordination 

Despite Complementary 

Roles, Coordination 

between MSHA and NIOSH 

Is Primarily Staff-Initiated 

and Inconsistent 

 24According to a top NIOSH official, most of NIOSH’s mining program activities now fall 

under the Office of Mine Safety and Health, a new office established by the MINER Act.

According to this official, the office primarily makes permanent a more informal structure

that existed in NIOSH for mining research and expands NIOSH’s focus on safety 

technology development. 

Page 23 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
through the Mine Academy. In addition, NIOSH may recommend that 

MSHA issue new safety and health standards based on research findings.

Further, MSHA and NIOSH are both responsible for getting new safety 

technology into the mines. After determining a need for a new safety 

technology, NIOSH either works directly with manufacturers to develop a 

new product or to adapt one used in another industry to the mining 

environment, or develops a market-ready technology and encourages 

manufacturers to produce it on a larger scale. For certain kinds of mining 

products, the manufacturer must get MSHA’s approval before the 

technology can be used in mines. Before approving it, MSHA’s technical 

experts evaluate and test products to ensure that they will not cause a fire 

or explode in an underground coal environment. See table 1 for an 

illustration of MSHA’s and NIOSH’s complementary roles. 

Page 24 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Table 1: MSHA’s and NIOSH’s Complementary Roles 

MSHA’s key activities NIOSH’s key activities 

Inspect mines and investigate mine 

accidents and complaints 

Enumerate hazards in the workplace 

Identify the causes of work-related 

diseases and injuries 

Create ways to control hazards

Develop mandatory safety and health 

standards 

Recommend occupational safety and 

health standards 

Assess and collect penalties for violations 

of mine safety and health standards 

Review for approval mine operators’ health 

and safety training plans 

Maintain Mine Academy to train MSHA 

personnel, including inspectors, and others 

Train safety and health professionals 

Evaluate the hazards of new technologies 

and work practices 

Approve and certify certain products for 

use in underground coal mines to ensure 

they do not cause a fire or explosion Research, develop, and test new 

technologies and equipment designed to 

enhance mine safety and health 

Provide technical assistance to mine 

operators to meet the requirements of the 

Mine Act 

Cooperate with states in the development 

of their mine safety and health programs 

Make grants to states in which mining 

takes place 

Oversee rescue and recovery operations 

Source: GAO analysis of agency documents.

Given their roles, MSHA and NIOSH have different perspectives that can 

inform each other’s work. Through inspections, its role in reviewing and 

approving miner training, and the technical assistance it provides to mine 

operators, MSHA officials told us the agency has knowledge of the day-today workings of a mine that can help inform NIOSH research. MSHA 

officials also told us that NIOSH, under the Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention, has the capacity to conduct longer-term scientific 

research and benefits from the perspective of the wider occupational 

safety and health community. 

However, MSHA and NIOSH do not have a current formal agreement, such 

as a memorandum of understanding or other policy, to guide their 

Page 25 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
coordination efforts, a practice we have identified as effective in prior 

work.25 In 1978, NIOSH’s predecessor in the Bureau of Mines and MSHA 

had a signed memorandum of understanding that specified how they 

would coordinate to ensure the full and effective use of the Bureau of 

Mines’ research capabilities and MSHA’s resources and assistance to 

ensure that technology resulting from mine safety research would be used 

to the fullest extent.26 The memorandum embodied many of the key 

practices we have identified in prior work that can help federal agencies 

enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts, such as defining roles and

responsibilities and developing joint strategies. For example, the 

memorandum stated that the Bureau of Mines would provide overall 

coordination for the mine safety and health research programs, and MSHA 

would provide advice and assistance on issues such as health and safety 

standards and participate through the life cycle of research projects. In 

addition, the two agencies would develop a joint research strategy for 

short, intermediate, and long-term objectives, as well as hold regular 

meetings between staff designated as coordinators for both agencies. The 

agreement was developed following the move of MSHA from the Bureau of 

Mines into the Department of Labor. However, the memorandum is no 

longer used, and MSHA officials were unaware of a plan to update the 

document. (See table 2 for key coordination practices GAO has identified.) 

 25We have reported that agencies can strengthen their commitment to work collaboratively 

by articulating their agreements in formal documents, such as a memorandum of

understanding, interagency guidance, or an interagency planning document, signed by 

senior officials in the respective agencies. See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: 

Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, 

GAO-06-15, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

26This agreement was originally executed between MSHA’s predecessor in the Department 

of Interior, the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA) and NIOSH’s 

predecessor, the Division of Mining Research – Health and Safety in the Bureau of Mines in 

1976. The agreement was updated in 1978 after MESA was transferred to the Department of

Labor and renamed MSHA. 

Page 26 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Table 2: Key Practices for Effective Coordination

Define and articulate a common federal outcome or purpose they are seeking to 

achieve that is consistent with their respective agency goals and missions. Developing 

such a common outcome takes place over time and requires sustained resources and 

commitment. 

Establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to achieve the outcome. Such 

strategies help align the agencies’ activities, core processes, and resources to 

accomplish the common outcome. 

Identify and address needs by leveraging resources (human, information technology, 

physical, and financial resources). Agencies can obtain additional benefits that would not 

be available if they were working separately.

Agree upon agency roles and responsibilities. In doing so, agencies can clarify who 

will do what, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making. 

Committed leadership from all levels of the organization is also important. 

Establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across

agency boundaries. Frequent communication is another means to facilitate working

across agency boundaries and prevent misunderstanding. 

Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of collaborative 

efforts. Doing so can help key decision makers within the agencies, as well as clients 

and stakeholders, obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational 

effectiveness. 

Reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans 

and reports. Federal programs contributing to the same or similar results should 

collaborate to ensure that goals expressed in strategic and annual performance plans 

are consistent and, as appropriate, program efforts are mutually reinforcinga

Reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through agency 

performance management systems. Agencies can do so by, for example, holding 

agency senior executives accountable for collaboration and teamwork across 

organizational boundaries to help achieve goals. 

Source: GAO.

a

The purpose of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) is to establish 

strategic planning and performance measurements for federal agencies. Under GPRA, federal 

agencies are required to develop strategic plans, set program goals and measure performance 

against them, and publicly report on their progress to the President and Congress (Pub. L. 103-62). 

In addition, MSHA and NIOSH do not regularly involve each other in their 

strategic planning efforts, including planning for research, as required by 

the Government Performance and Results Act.27 NIOSH uses a 

comprehensive framework to gain input from more than 500 stakeholders 

on its research agenda, but MSHA officials contend that their agency

should have a higher priority among NIOSH’s stakeholders for planning its 

 27When developing strategic plans, GPRA requires agencies to, among other things, solicit 

and consider the views and suggestions of those entities potentially affected by or 

interested in such a plan. 5 U.S.C. § 306(d). 

Page 27 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
research. While mine safety and enforcement is MSHA’s primary focus, 

mine research is only one part of NIOSH’s much broader worker safety 

agenda, which includes preventing and reducing occupational disease, 

injury, and death in a number of fields such as agriculture, health care, 

emergency response, and mining. An MSHA headquarters official told us 

that the agency does not know much about NIOSH’s research outside of 

the few partnerships in which the two agencies are engaged. A top NIOSH 

official told us that the agency generally does not involve MSHA in 

planning its research unless doing so could involve a change in 

regulations. Officials from both agencies told us that when both agencies 

were under the Bureau of Mines, MSHA had a greater influence on 

NIOSH’s research agenda. 

For their part, NIOSH officials expressed a desire for more input into 

MSHA’s rulemaking process. The head of one of NIOSH’s research 

branches suggested that MSHA should allow NIOSH and other key 

stakeholders, such as the labor unions and the mining industry, to 

comment on a proposed rule before it is published for public comment in 

the Federal Register.

28 He noted that MSHA recently solicited NIOSH’s 

input on the proposed personal dust monitor regulations. Another official 

expressed concern that MSHA sometimes issues new safety and health 

regulations or standards without fully considering the research that should 

be conducted before implementing them, requiring NIOSH to dedicate 

resources to unplanned research. For example, MSHA issued a stricter 

regulation for noise levels in the mines to prevent hearing loss in 1999, 

causing NIOSH to make changes in its staffing and funding to make 

research into technology to control noise and efforts to educate mine 

workers a higher priority. 

A recent National Academy of Sciences review of NIOSH’s hearing loss 

research program found that the mechanisms through which NIOSH 

anticipates the early research needs of MSHA and other regulatory 

partners are not sufficiently consistent and systematic and that there did 

not seem to be an effective joint planning process for regulatory activities. 

The academy recommended that the program establish regular means of 

conferring with its partners to better anticipate their research needs 

relevant to regulatory decision making. Anticipating research needs is 

 28In commenting on our draft report, MSHA noted that it believes NIOSH provides input

into MSHA’s rule-making process through research, peer-reviewed studies, comments on

rule-makings, and participation as a valued member in discussions on technical issues

during MSHA rule-making panels. 

Page 28 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
particularly important given that MSHA and NIOSH operate under 

different time frames.29 MSHA must quickly respond to safety hazards 

identified in the mines, whereas NIOSH typically requires 3 to 5 years to 

conduct its research, according to officials from both agencies.

30 The 1978 

memorandum between NIOSH’s predecessor and MSHA provided for such 

consultation, requiring MSHA to advise the Bureau of Mines of its plan for 

developing and revising standards in order to allow sufficient opportunity 

for technical consultation prior to publishing proposed regulations. 

Similarly, the bureau would advise MSHA of research results that could 

affect existing or proposed regulations. 

As a result of not having a formal agreement or policies to guide their 

activities, coordination between MSHA and NIOSH is primarily driven by

informal relationships between staff at both agencies. Officials from both 

agencies and labor union representatives told us that coordination has 

been primarily at the initiative of individuals at both agencies and, as such

has not always been consistent across the agencies. For example, some 

heads of research divisions at MSHA and NIOSH said that the staff from 

both agencies will contact each other on an informal basis if they have a 

question or need additional information on a current project. However, 

other division heads at MSHA reported less frequent communication and a 

NIOSH official confirmed that some divisions work together better than 

others. 

Communication between MSHA and NIOSH has improved in recent years, 

in part due to several partnerships, but these efforts are temporary, limited 

to specific issues, and not part of either agency’s standard operating 

procedures. Further, officials acknowledged that most of these 

partnerships were initiated by outside parties, such as the mining industry 

or the labor unions, rather than by the agencies themselves. For example, 

in 1999 an industry group asked NIOSH to work with MSHA, 

manufacturers, and a labor union to develop a personal dust monitor, a 

device miners can wear to monitor in real time the amount of coal dust or

other irritants that they are being exposed to as they work. Final testing of

the monitors has been completed, but MSHA has not yet proposed new 

 29In commenting on our draft report, MSHA noted that its rule-making priorities are 

published in the Department of Labor’s semiannual Regulatory Agenda, which provides

milestones for MSHA rule-making for the years ahead.

30NIOSH officials told us they can complete a project in less time in the case of an 

emergency. 

Page 29 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
changes to the rule requiring mines to use them. In response to the MINER 

Act, NIOSH and MSHA are involved in another partnership with states, 

industry and labor groups, and others to develop, evaluate, and implement 

technology to help workers in mines communicate with personnel on the 

surface after an accident. The MINER Act requires mine operators to have 

two-way emergency communications systems within 3 years after passage 

of the act,

31 but the harsh underground mine environment makes it difficult

to adapt existing communications systems for this purpose. In 2006, 

Congress provided NIOSH with $10 million in emergency supplemental 

funds to be used by the end of fiscal year 2007 to support research to 

develop mine safety technology, such as communication devices. The 

funds, which NIOSH is awarding competitively, are targeted to 

communications and other technologies that could be available for use in 

mines within 24 to 36 months. These partnerships, while good, have 

provided only a temporary and limited avenue for coordination between 

MSHA and NIOSH. 

Informal Coordination May 

Be Insufficient Given 

Impending Retirements 

and Other Challenges 

MSHA and NIOSH Face 

NIOSH and MSHA face a potentially large workforce turnover in coming

years, and informal coordination based on working relationships between 

staff members may not continue when the individuals leave. Like many 

federal agencies, a large proportion of engineers and scientists at MSHA 

and NIOSH are eligible to retire within the coming years. MSHA provided 

us with data showing that more than 50 percent of its 140 engineers and 

scientists will be eligible for retirement within the next 10 years, with 31 

percent eligible within 5 years (see table 3).32

 31If, however, a mine operator is unable to comply with this requirement, its accident 

response plan must set forth the alternative means of compliance, which shall 

approximate, as closely as possible, the degree of functional utility and safety protection 

provided by a wireless two-way communications device. 

32MSHA faces similar shortages in its inspector workforce in coming years. See GAO,

MSHA's Revised Hiring Process Has Improved the Agency's Recruiting Efforts, But Its

Human Capital Strategic Plan Does Not Adequately Project or Address Its Future

Workforce Needs, GAO-07-704R (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007). 

Page 30 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Table 3: Proportion of MSHA Engineers and Scientists Eligible for Retirement over 

the Next 10 Years, as of March 2007 

Time of eligibility Number of engineers Number of scientists

Currently eligible 14 5

Eligible in 5 years 18 6

Eligible in 10 years 24 4

Total eligible within 10 years 56 15

Total workforce 114 26

Percentage eligible within 10 

years 

49% 58%

Source: MSHA. 

Similarly, about half of NIOSH’s employees—most of whom are scientists 

and engineers—are eligible to retire in the next 5 years. Although current 

informal coordination may provide researchers with the information they 

want, new staff replacing those who retire may not continue existing 

coordination practices without a formal agency policy guiding them to 

do so. 

In addition, MSHA and NIOSH face other challenges that require them to 

work more closely together, particularly in developing and approving 

safety technologies. An influx of new and inexperienced miners brought 

on by the increased demand for coal and the aging of the workforce, rising 

dangers as miners go deeper underground to mine coal, and recent mine 

disasters have heightened interest in getting promising new safety 

technology into the mines quickly. The MINER Act addresses some of 

these issues, and underscores NIOSH’s and MSHA’s roles in developing 

and approving safety technologies. For example, the act requires NIOSH to 

establish a permanent Office of Mine Safety and Health in order to 

enhance the development of new mine safety technology and speed the

use of such technology in the mines, some of which requires MSHA’s 

approval. The act also requires NIOSH to study the use of refuge chambers 

for miners that are unable to escape a mine during a disaster and requires

MSHA to review the results to determine what actions, such as making 

regulatory changes, are appropriate in light of NIOSH’s findings. NIOSH 

and MSHA are now working together to fulfill their responsibilities within 

Page 31 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
the time frame required by the act.33 NIOSH also must establish an 

interagency working group made up of representatives of other federal 

agencies selected by NIOSH to share technology research and 

developments that could enhance mine safety and accident response. 

The group is to recommend technologies for further development to the 

Director of NIOSH and issue a report on safety technologies and 

equipment that have been studied, tested, and certified for use in the 

past year. 

Most of the penalties proposed by MSHA are paid by mine operators 

without opposition. However, a small percentage of more serious and 

higher-dollar penalties are appealed, and many of those appealed are 

reduced substantially. MSHA uses a standard formula to propose 

penalties, but the entities involved in the appeals process reported using 

more subjective methods to assess penalties. MSHA proposes penalties 

using a standard formula established in its regulations designed to assess 

higher penalties for more serious violations. However, the entities 

involved in the appeals process —Labor’s Office of the Solicitor, MSHA’s 

conference litigation representatives, 34 and the Commission’s 

administrative law judges—recognize that their methods for determining 

penalty amounts are more subjective than MSHA’s standard formula. As a 

result, while MSHA’s standard formula and the proposed penalties it 

calculates using the formula are transparent, it is sometimes more difficult 

to determine how final penalty amounts were determined through the 

appeals process. 

Most Penalties 

Assessed by MSHA 

Are Paid without 

Opposition, but Many 

of Those Appealed 

Are Reduced 

Substantially 

 33NIOSH is required to report out on its work within 18 months after the enactment of the 

MINER Act. MSHA then has 180 days after receiving the report from NIOSH to determine

what actions it intends to take.

34CLRs are MSHA enforcement staff and are located in every MSHA coal district. They have 

been provided with specialized legal training and are authorized by the agency to negotiate 

settlements for penalties that are no higher than $350 and are limited in legal complexity. 

The CLRs also oversee conferences requested by mine operators following the issuance of

citations to attempt an informal resolution to the disputed violation. 

Page 32 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Through the regulatory process, MSHA has developed a standard formula 

to calculate proposed civil penalties. In order to determine the amount of a 

proposed penalty, the agency uses a standard formula that assigns point 

values to each of the six broad factors outlined in the Mine Act.35 Through 

this formula, two of the six factors—whether the operator was negligent 

and the gravity of the violation—carry the greatest weight in deciding the 

amount of the proposed penalty. MSHA inspectors are responsible for 

identifying the magnitude of these two elements during their inspections.36

To determine negligence, the inspector must rate the operator’s failure to 

provide adequate care to ensure the safety of miners on a scale from “no 

negligence” to “reckless disregard.” To determine the gravity of the 

violation, the inspector must determine (1) the likelihood of harm that 

could come to miners, (2) the severity of any possible or actual injury or 

illness, and (3) the potential or actual number of miners that could be 

affected. 

MSHA Uses a Standard 

Formula to Calculate 

Penalties, and Recent 

Changes Are Expected to 

Increase Them 

After an inspector issues a citation and makes an initial finding regarding

the levels of gravity and negligence involved in the violation, MSHA’s 

Office of Assessments determines the magnitude of the remaining four 

factors and tallies the points for each of the six factors to determine the 

proposed penalty amount. Because MSHA’s standard formula assigns 

greater points to gravity and negligence than the other four statutory 

factors, the application of the formula generally results in larger penalties 

being proposed for violations involving higher levels of gravity and 

negligence. Between 1996 and 2006, MSHA proposed 506,707 penalties for 

 35Under regulations effective as of April 23, 2007, MSHA’s penalties are assessed in two 

different penalty categories: regular and special. Prior to the recent regulatory changes, 

MSHA issued a third type of penalty called the single penalty. The single penalty was a flat 

$60 penalty for violations that are unlikely to cause injury or illness. This type of penalty 

accounted for approximately 60 percent of the penalties issued between 1996 and 2006. 

MSHA’s new regulations eliminate the single penalty. A regular assessment is the agency’s 

general penalty and ranges from $112 to $60,000. Special assessments are reserved for 

violations in which MSHA elects to waive the regular assessment and set another penalty 

consistent with the six statutory factors. For example, special assessments may be used 

when an operator fails to correct certain violations or notify MSHA of certain kinds of

accidents. A special assessment can be as high as $220,000, but this is for the new flagrant

violation established under the MINER Act; the maximum for most special assessments is

also $60,000. Eligibility guidelines and assessment formulas for special and regular 

assessments are outlined in MSHA regulations and agency policies. 

36MSHA inspectors also determine whether mine operators have made good faith efforts to 

correct the violation, which results in a 10 percent reduction in the proposed penalty. 

Under regulations that were in effect through April 22, 2007, the good faith reduction was 

30 percent. 

Page 33 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
safety and health violations, and the average penalty was $234 per 

violation. Table 4 details the range of average penalties, by degree of 

gravity and negligence, proposed by MSHA from 1996 through 2006. 

Table 4: Average Proposed Penalty by Gravity and Negligence Indicators, 1996 to 2006 

Elements of gravity and negligence Percentage of citations issued Average proposed penalty 

Gravity of violationa

Likelihood of accident 

Accident occurred 0.2% $12,324

Highly likely to occur 0.9% $2,362

Reasonably likely to occur 38.6% $367

Unlikely to occur 55.5% $74

No likelihood 2.4% $168

Total 97.6%b

Potential injury or illness 

Fatal 3.5% $1,185

Permanent injury 7.4% $569

Lost days 62.4% $202

No lost work days 24.4% $77

Total 97.7%b

Number of miners affected 

0-1 miners 82% c

 2-5 miners 10.8% c

 6-9 miners 4.5% c

 10 or more miners 2.7% c

Total 100.0%

Negligence by mine operator 

Reckless 0.1% $8,458

High 3.5% $1,757

Moderate 84.3% $179

Low 9.4% $91

None 0.3% $454

Total 97.6%b

Source: GAO analysis of data MSHA penalty and violation data. 

Note: These data represent the points accumulated under the former assessment process. MSHA 

expects its new regulations to result in higher proposed penalty amounts for each of these categories. 

a

Each subelement of gravity is an exclusive category. 

Page 34 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
b

Percentage does not add to 100 due to a small amount of missing data. 

c

We did not calculate the average proposed penalty for the number of miners, because most 

(75 percent) of the violations involved only one miner. 

MSHA recently changed its regulations governing civil penalty 

assessments to update them and increase proposed penalty amounts, and 

to implement the new civil penalty requirement of the MINER Act. The 

new regulations increase the points for most of the six statutory factors, 

and MSHA officials predicted that the new penalty structure will increase 

total penalty assessments by 234 percent. For example, these changes will 

increase the maximum points allotted for gravity from 30 to 88 points. 

MSHA officials asserted that these changes will likely lead to greater rates 

of compliance and subsequently a safer working environment for the 

nation’s miners. As required by the rule-making process, MSHA conducted 

an economic analysis to measure the costs and benefits of the new 

regulations. In its analysis, MSHA estimated that if these changes had been 

in effect in 2005, the total violations for all mine types would have declined

by 20 percent, from 116,673 to 93,422 violations.37 See table 5 for an 

example of how MSHA would determine the penalty for a certain violation 

based on the six statutory factors under the previous and new penalty 

formulas. 

 37Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties; Final Rule, 72 Fed.

Reg. 13,592, 13,629 (March 22, 2007) (codified at 30 C.F.R. Part 100). 

Page 35 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Table 5: Example of How a Proposed Penalty Amount Could Be Determined Based 

on the Previous and Revised Standard Penalty Formulas 

Statutory factor

Points under 

previous

formula

Points under 

new formula

Operator’s history of previous violations 

Mine had an average of about one violation per 

inspection day 

8 10

Mine had 10 repeat violations in prior 15 months 

and averaged 0.04 repeat violations per inspection 

day 

a

5

Operator’s size 

Mine produced over 2 million tons of coal per year 10 15

Company owning mine produced over 10 million 

tons of coal per year 

5 10

Negligence 

Moderate 15 20

Gravity 

Likelihood of accident 

Highly likely to occur 7 40

Severity of injury or illness 

Lost work days 3 5

Number of miners affected 

2 miners 2 2

Total points under previous and new formula 50 107

Total penalty under previous and new formula $878 $4,810

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

Note: This example assumes that the penalty will not affect the operator’s ability to remain in 

business, and therefore does not account for a reduction for this factor. In addition, this example 

assumes the mine operator does not get a good faith reduction in the penalty. 

a

MSHA’s new regulations added this as an additional element of the factor for the operator’s history of 

previous violations. 

Many Contested Penalties 

Are Reduced Substantially 

Regardless of the Gravity 

of the Violation and the 

Degree of the Operator’s

Negligence 

Many of the proposed penalties contested by mine operators are reduced

substantially through the appeals process, despite the initially determined 

gravity of the violation and the initially determined degree of the 

operator’s negligence contributing to the violation. Between 1996 and 

2006, approximately 6 percent (31,589) of the penalties proposed by MSHA 

for violations of underground coal mine safety and health standards were 

contested by mine operators. Our analysis of MSHA’s penalty data showed 

that over the last 10 years, the amounts of the proposed penalties 

Page 36 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
contested by mine operators were typically much larger than those not 

contested and involved more serious health and safety violations. For 

example, the average amount of a contested penalty was $1,107, compared 

to an average of $176 for a noncontested penalty, and more than half of all

contested penalties were for the most serious violations.38

Almost half of all penalties contested by underground coal mine operators 

are reduced through the appeals process, even those involving the highest 

levels of gravity and negligence. From 1996 to 2006, 47 percent of all 

contested penalties (14,723 penalties) were decreased from the amount 

originally proposed by MSHA. On average, these penalties were reduced

by about half of the amount initially proposed by MSHA using its standard 

formula. In addition, regardless of the levels of gravity and negligence

found by MSHA’s inspectors, penalties were reduced, on average, between 

47 percent and 66 percent. Proposed penalties assessed by MSHA based on 

the highest and lowest levels of gravity and negligence found by MSHA 

inspectors were reduced by the greatest amounts (see table 6). 

 38Sixty-three percent of contested penalties are considered “significant and substantial,” or 

“S&S,” violations. An inspector designates violations as S&S if they are deemed at least 

reasonably likely to cause an injury that results in lost work days. This designation can

trigger more serious sanctions, such as closing a portion of a mine or closing an entire 

mine. 

Page 37 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Table 6: Contested Penalty Reductions by Gravity and Negligence Indicators, 1996 to 2006 

Elements of gravity and negligencea

Percentage of contested

penalties that were reduced Average percentage reduction

Gravity of violation

Likelihood of accidentb

Accident occurred 63.5% 59%

Highly likely to occur 65.5% 49%

Reasonably likely to occur 51.3% 47%

Unlikely to occur 32.4% 54%

No likelihood 45.7% 66%

Potential injury or illnessb

Fatal 59.4% 52%

Permanent injury 57.4% 47%

Lost days 46.5% 48%

No lost work days 31.2% 57%

Number of miners affectedb

0-1 miners c c

2-9 miners c c

10 or more miners c c

Negligence by mine operatorb

Reckless 68.8% 55%

High 61.4% 50%

Moderate 43.6% 48%

Low 50.9% 49%

None 55.8% 57%

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

a

Initial penalty proposals are based on the findings from mine inspections and are calculated using 

MSHA’s standard formula. The entities involved in the appeals process may have altered the 

inspectors’ findings, which could lead to a reduction in the penalty amount. 

b

Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding or a small amount of missing data.

c

We did not calculate the average proposed penalty for the number of miners, because most 

(75 percent) of the violations involved only one miner. 

Page 38 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
While all of the entities involved in the appeals process—Labor’s 

Solicitor’s Office, MSHA’s CLRs, and the Commission’s ALJs—are required 

by law to apply the six statutory factors specified in the Mine Act, they are 

not legally obligated to use any particular method to set a final penalty 

amount when they determine that a reduction from MSHA’s proposed 

penalty is appropriate. As a result, they have considerable discretion in 

deciding on the final penalty amount. Prior decisions by the Commission 

require ALJ decisions to be sufficiently explained.39 However, in some 

cases we reviewed, while the reasons supporting a reduction from MSHA’s 

proposed penalty are clearly explained, the rationale for the final penalty 

amount is not always well documented. 

Entities Involved in the 

Appeals Process Apply the 

Statutory Factors to 

Determine Penalty 

Amounts, but Exercise 

Considerable Discretion 

Officials from all three of the entities involved in the appeals process told 

us that, in determining the size of a final penalty, they apply the six 

statutory factors on a case-by-case basis and use their professional 

judgment. For example, officials from the Solicitor’s Office and CLRs told 

us that, when appropriate, the Department of Labor generally views 

penalty settlements as being in the best interest of both the agency and the 

mine operators because settlements allow them to avoid costly litigation.

40

Attorneys from the Solicitor’s Office also told us that they analyze the 

evidence presented by MSHA inspectors and mine operators and assess 

their chances of winning the case in deciding whether to settle a penalty or

go to trial. For example, one attorney told us that many of the penalty 

amounts contained in settlement agreements are generally the result of 

negotiations between the Solicitor’s Office and the mine operator. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, MSHA and the Solicitor’s Office said 

that CLRs and attorneys may concede somewhat on the penalty amount in

 39In August 2006, the Commission reminded ALJs of the importance of adequately 

documenting penalty decisions. Specifically, the Commission wrote “When . . . it is

determined that penalties are appropriate which substantially diverge from those originally 

proposed, it behooves the Commission and its judges to provide a sufficient explanation of

the bases underlying the penalties assessed by the Commission. If a sufficient explanation 

for the divergence is not provided, the credibility of the administrative scheme providing 

for the increase or lowering of penalties after contest may be jeopardized by an appearance

of arbitrariness.” Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 28 FMSHRC 579, 606-07 (August 2006) (citing 

Sellersburg Stone Co., 5 FMSHRC 287, 293 (March 1983)). 

40In addition to the general costs of litigation, in some cases, the Equal Access to Justice 

Act requires that the Department of Labor pay a mine operator’s fees and expenses, 

including reasonable attorneys’ fees, if the ALJ finds that the agency’s position was not 

substantially justified, such as when an MSHA-proposed penalty is lowered significantly in 

formal proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 29 C.F.R. Part 2704.

Page 39 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
some settlement cases as long as future compliance with the standard, or 

another valid enforcement objective, is agreed to by the mine operator. 

Labor officials told us that, when the CLR program was created, CLRs 

were expected to handle approximately 30 percent of all contested cases. 

However, our analysis of the CLRs’ caseloads indicated that, as of January 

2006, they were assigned only 14 percent of all open cases contested by 

mine operators. According to the CLRs, they generally take a similar 

approach to that taken by attorneys with the Labor Solicitor’s Office in 

negotiating settlements. Both CLRs and Solicitor’s Office staff told us that 

they are encouraged to use MSHA’s standard formula to assess penalty 

amounts but using the formula is not required and is not standard practice.

When the Solicitor’s Office or a CLR is unable to negotiate a settlement or 

determines that it would not be appropriate to settle, the case goes to trial 

and an ALJ determines the final penalty amount. Several ALJs told us that 

they review the evidence provided by MSHA but the process for 

determining the final penalty amount relies greatly on their experience and 

expertise. 

In general, while the reasons supporting a reduction from MSHA’s 

proposed penalty are clearly explained in ALJ decisions, the rationale for

the final penalty amount is not always well documented. For example, in 

one case decided in October 2005, the ALJ reduced MSHA’s proposed 

penalty from $50,000 to $10,000.

41 Although the judge concluded that the 

gravity of the violation was less than MSHA had originally found, thereby 

supporting a penalty reduction, he appeared to agree with MSHA’s 

assessment regarding the other five statutory factors, including MSHA’s 

finding that the operator’s degree of negligence was high.42

The risky conditions in underground coal mines were brought to the 

nation’s attention early in 2006, and the sad consequences have become a

reality for many Americans. As MSHA embarks on the reforms outlined in

the MINER Act and other internal efforts to improve the safety of mines, it 

faces hurdles that will need to be overcome in order to assist the mining 

industry as it bears the daily responsibility for the safety and health of 

America’s miners. The mining industry is changing: production continues 

Conclusions 

 41Wabash Mine Holding Co., 27 FMSHRC 672 (October 2005). 

42See also Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 28 FMSHRC 1068 (December 2006) and Jim Walter 

Resources, Inc., 28 FMSRC 579 (August 2006). 

Page 40 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
to increase, technologies are evolving, and new workers are entering the 

mines to replace their experienced colleagues who are retiring. These 

changes call for a greater attention to safety from all entities involved—

federal and state officials, mine operators, miners, and their 

representatives. Without adequate training, including practice using safety

devices in simulated emergency conditions, miners may be unable to 

safely and confidently escape a mine. Further, absent adequate monitoring 

of instructors who provide this training, MSHA cannot determine whether 

all of its instructors are properly qualified or whether it has enough 

instructors to meet its needs. Perhaps most important, MSHA is unable to 

determine whether miners receive timely and appropriate training. 

The social, economic, and technological changes in the mining industry 

present challenges that will be difficult, if not impossible, for MSHA to 

address alone. MSHA and NIOSH have complementary roles, particularly 

in developing and approving technologies to help improve mine safety, and 

face similar challenges such as high rates of retirements. Yet, without 

having a more structured method of coordination, their shared knowledge 

base and research cannot be used to effectively speed the implementation

of new safety technology in mines. 

Finally, given the trends over the past 10 years for penalties contested by 

mine operators, the higher proposed penalties under MSHA’s new penalty 

structure will likely lead more operators to appeal. This reaction is also 

likely to increase the number of cases that are settled by Labor’s Solicitor’s 

Office, MSHA’s CLRs, and the ALJs at the Commission using methods to 

determine final penalty amounts that are more subjective than penalties 

proposed using MSHA’s standard formula. As a result, it is important that 

penalty decisions are transparent and contain the necessary information to 

understand how final penalty amounts are set. Without such information, 

it will be difficult to monitor their decisions over time to ensure that all of 

the entities involved in the appeals process are appropriately and 

consistently applying the six statutory factors in altering penalty amounts 

and that the impact of penalties in protecting miners’ safety through 

greater compliance by mine operators is not diminished. 

To help mines train their workers under simulated emergency conditions, 

the Secretary of Labor should direct MSHA to publicize information and 

available tools for training mine workers under such conditions. In 

addition, MSHA should periodically review and update this information, as 

appropriate.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 41 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
To help ensure that mine workers are adequately prepared for 

emergencies, MSHA should strengthen its monitoring of training. This 

monitoring should include 

• reviewing and standardizing districts’ procedures for approving new 

instructors;

• establishing continuing education requirements for instructors to 

help instructors maintain or improve their knowledge and skills; 

• improving the data in its records on approved instructors; and 

• developing a process for monitoring miner training that includes 

regularly evaluating training sessions, assessing how well learning 

objectives are being met, and providing feedback to instructors. 

To improve the effectiveness of information sharing between MSHA and 

NIOSH, we recommend that the Secretaries of Labor and Health and 

Human Services direct their respective agencies to work together to 

establish a formal memorandum of understanding to guide their 

coordination. In addition, the agencies should periodically review and 

update the memorandum, as appropriate. 

In order to ensure that there is transparency in penalty determinations, we 

recommend that the Department of Labor’s Office of the Solicitor, MSHA, 

and the Commission take steps to ensure that the specific rationale for all 

final penalty amounts, including reductions from MSHA’s proposed 

penalties, are adequately documented. 

We obtained comments on a draft of this report from MSHA, the 

Department of Labor’s Office of the Solicitor, the Department of Health 

and Human Services, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 

Commission. Their comments are reproduced in appendixes III, IV, and V. 

MSHA and the Solicitor also provided technical clarifications, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. 

Agency Comments 

MSHA, the Office of the Solicitor, the Department of Health and Human 

Services, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 

agreed with the recommendations addressed to each of their

organizations. In addition, MSHA noted actions it has either begun or plans 

to take in implementing the recommendations. We commend MSHA for 

starting work to improve its oversight of the safety of underground coal 

mines. 

Page 42 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
In response to our recommendation that MSHA publicize and periodically

update information on training mine workers under simulated emergency 

conditions, MSHA agreed, and stated that it will develop a Web page for 

this purpose and will issue an information bulletin to mine operators about 

this Web-based resource. To provide mine operators with additional 

options, MSHA noted that it has asked NIOSH to examine methods of 

providing simulated emergency training and to consider the cost of these 

methods. 

In response to our recommendation that MSHA strengthen its monitoring

of miner training, MSHA generally agreed and indicated that it will develop

and implement standardized procedures for approving new instructors. In 

addition, it will develop an instructor evaluation plan to use in determining 

the effectiveness of training provided to miners. Regarding establishing 

continuing education requirements for approved instructors, MSHA 

indicated that it has asked NIOSH to review the effectiveness of such 

requirements. MSHA noted that this action may require regulatory 

changes. MSHA also explained that there are other avenues that 

instructors can use to stay current on mining issues, such as attending an

annual conference dedicated to training resources for the industry. MSHA 

also recognized the need to improve the data it maintains on instructors 

and noted that it has plans to improve its tracking and dissemination of upto-date information on approved instructors. 

In response to our recommendation that MSHA and NIOSH develop a 

memorandum of understanding, both agencies concurred with the need 

for a formal agreement and stated that such an agreement will help 

strengthen their coordination activities. MSHA noted that both agencies 

started the process of developing a memorandum of understanding in 2002 

and stated that it will work with NIOSH to revitalize this effort and 

complete the process. 

MSHA, Labor’s Office of the Solicitor, and the Commission agreed with 

our recommendation for improving the penalty appeals process. Each of 

them agreed that there needs to be transparency in penalty determinations 

and that the specific rationale need to be provided when penalties are 

reduced from the levels originally proposed. MSHA and the Solicitor agree 

that transparency is essential to ensure public confidence that the 

purposes of the Mine Act are fulfilled and that administration of the Mine 

Act is fair. They commented that they would formally remind CLRs and 

attorneys to ensure that the rationale for each civil penalty agreement is 

adequately documented in settlement agreements and case file notes. They 

Page 43 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
also commented that internal audits of the CLR program have emphasized 

the need for adequate documentation to support settlement agreements. 

In respect to our characterization of the Washbash Mine Holding Co. case,

the Commission disagreed with GAO’s conclusions. We agree with the 

Commission that the reasons supporting the reduction are clearly 

explained. However, we continue to believe that the rationale for the final

penalty amount was not well documented. In our analysis, we could not

discern the specific reasons why the judge determined that $10,000 was 

the appropriate fine. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Labor and Health

and Human Services, the Chief Commissioner of the Federal Mine Safety 

and Health Review Commission, relevant congressional committees, and 

other interested parties. Copies will be made available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512-7215 if you 

or your staff have any questions about this report. Other major 

contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Daniel Bertoni 

Director, Education, Workforce, 

and Income Security Issues 

Page 44 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
List of Congressional Requesters 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

Chairman 

Committee on Appropriations 

U. S. Senate 

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy 

Chairman 

The Honorable Michael B. Enzi 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

U. S. Senate 

The Honorable Tom Harkin 

Chairman 

The Honorable Arlen Specter 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and 

 Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

U. S. Senate 

The Honorable Patty Murray 

Chair 

The Honorable Johnny Isakson 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Employment and Workplace Safety 

Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

U. S. Senate 

The Honorable George Miller 

Chairman 

Committee on Education and Labor

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV 

U. S. Senate 

The Honorable Shelley Moore Capito 

House of Representatives 

Page 45 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
The Honorable Alan B. Mollohan 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Nick Rahall 

House of Representatives 

Page 46 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 47 GAO-07-622

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To conduct this work, we reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, policy 

documents, decisions issued by the Commission and its administrative law 

judges (ALJ), and other materials. We spoke with Mine Safety and Health 

Administration (MSHA) officials in 6 of the 11 districts, including 

inspectors, conference litigation representatives (CLR), and district 

managers; and officials from the headquarters office, the National Mine 

Health and Safety Academy, Educational Policy and Development, the 

Educational Field Services, and certified trainers. We met with 

representatives from the Office of the Solicitor, including officials in the 

headquarters and regional offices, and interviewed the Chairman of the 

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, its Chief ALJ, and 

other Commission officials. Finally, we spoke with officials from 

universities, a technology manufacturer, the United Mine Workers of 

America, the National Mining Association, and the Joseph A. Holmes 

Safety Association. 

We visited three states to obtain more detailed and qualitative information 

regarding the experiences of state mine safety agencies, mine operators, 

and MSHA district offices in our research objectives. We conducted visits

in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia. In Kentucky, we met with state 

and MSHA district officials. In addition, we observed a mine rescue 

competition where we conducted interviews with mine rescue team 

members. In Virginia and West Virginia, we met with state and MSHA 

district officials. In addition, we visited three underground coal mines to 

observe mining operations and to talk with mine managers, mine rescue 

team members, and mine workers. We also spoke with state officials in

Pennsylvania. These four states contain almost 90 percent of all 

underground coal mines in the United States. Finally, we met with 

researchers and other officials at the technical research centers operated 

by MSHA and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 

(NIOSH). 

To determine the current state of underground coal mines’ operations and 

challenges in preparing for and responding to mine emergencies, we 

surveyed a stratified random probability sample of 342 underground coal 

mines from a study population of 665 underground coal mines identified

by MSHA as being active at the end of calendar year 2005. We selected our

Survey of 

Underground Coal 

Mines 

Study Population and 

Sampling Design 

Mine Safety
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

sample by five strata defined by the number of mine employees and the

number of mines under the responsibility of a single contact. We included 

the last stratum in an attempt to ease the burden on the survey

respondents. Close to 40 percent of the mines selected in the sample were 

out of scope for analysis due to closure by the time our survey fieldwork 

ended. Information on the coal mine population, the sample selected, outof-scope mines, and the respondents across the five strata can be found in 

table 7. Ultimately, we received 146 completed, in-scope surveys, for an 

adjusted response rate of 69 percent.

Table 7: Sample Disposition for Survey of Underground Coal Mines 

Stratum

number Stratum description 

Total

population size

Total

sample size

Number in 

sample that 

were out of

scope

Number of 

respondents

Adjusted

response rate

for in-scope

mines 

(percent)

1 Mine employs between 1 and 16 workers 180 88 48 26 65

2 Mine employs between 17 and 36 

workers 

152 82 38 30 68

3 Mine employs between 37 and 199 

workers 

147 78 25 36 68

4 Mine employs 200 or more workers 49 49 6 34 79

5 Mine shares contact point with at least 

four other mines

137 45 16 20 69

Total 665 342 133 146 69a

Source: GAO analysis of MSHA data. 

a

Total adjusted response rate is an average based on each stratum’s response rate weighted by its 

in-scope population. 

Survey Development To inform the design of the survey questions, we consulted with mine 

officials, industry and labor organizations, and federal and state officials. 

In addition, we used documents and research about miner training and 

mine rescue. Finally, we referred to the recent mine evacuation 

regulations developed by MSHA and the Mine Improvement and New 

Emergency Response Act of 2006 to ensure we were collecting timely 

information on the operations at underground coal mines. A copy of the 

survey questionnaire can be found in appendix II.

To verify the clarity, length of time of administration, and suitability of the 

questions, we pretested the questionnaire with mine safety officials at 

Page 48 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

three mines. We revised the instrument based on the results of the pretests

and the feedback we received. 

We used a self-administered mail-out questionnaire that was in the field 

between November 2006 and February 2007. We conducted several followup efforts to encourage a higher response rate: a reminder letter, a second

mailing that included another copy of the questionnaire, and two efforts to

contact nonrespondents by telephone. We ended data collection in 

February 2007. 

The practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, 

commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties 

such as how a particular question was interpreted or in the sources of 

information that are available to respondents can introduce unwanted 

variability into the survey results. We took steps in the development of the 

questionnaire, the data collection, and the data analysis to minimize these 

nonsampling errors. 

In addition to pretesting the questionnaire with relevant individuals to 

ensure questions were interpreted in a consistent manner, we edited all

the surveys for consistency before they were sent for keypunching. All 

questionnaire responses were entered into our database and a random 

sample of the questionnaires was further verified for completeness and 

accuracy. In addition to the steps taken during the development of the 

survey and its administration, we performed computer analyses to identify 

inconsistencies and other indicators of errors. We established parameters 

for addressing inconsistent responses that included calling the respondent 

for clarification or treating the data as missing. In addition, all the 

computer syntax was peer-reviewed and verified by separate programmers 

to ensure that it was written and executed correctly. 

Estimates in this report are for the population of underground coal mines

in the United States that were in operation at the end of 2005 and 

remained open during the course of the survey. Due to mine closure, some

mines are not represented in these results. We found that smaller mines 

were more likely to have ceased operation than larger mines. Therefore, it

is possible that different safety practices and challenges may exist for 

mines that closed. 

Administration of the 

Survey 

Nonsampling Error and 

Data Quality 

Estimates 

Page 49 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

The results of random samples like ours are subject to sampling errors 

that reflect the differences between the results obtained from the samples 

and the results that would have been obtained from a survey of the entire 

population under consideration. Because we surveyed a sample of 

underground coal mines, our results are estimates of the characteristics of 

this population and thus are subject to the sampling errors associated with 

samples of this size and type. 

Measurements of sampling errors are stated at a certain level of statistical 

confidence. GAO used the weighted results to make estimates about the 

entire population of underground coal mines. Our confidence in the 

precision of the results from this sample is expressed in 95 percent 

confidence intervals, which are intervals that are expected to contain the

actual population values for 95 percent of the samples we could have 

drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence

intervals in this report will include the true values in the in-scope 

population. All percentage estimates for our sample have margins of 

error—widths of confidence intervals—of plus or minus 8 percentage 

points or less, at the 95 percent confidence level.

To determine the average of proposed penalty amounts, the number of 

penalties contested, and the amount of the final penalties assessed on 

mine operators, as well as other violation information, we obtained data

from the Mine Safety and Health Administration. We used data maintained 

in the MSHA Standardized Information System (MSIS). The data represent 

violations issued to mine operators and the associated actions taken on 

those violations (such as the proposed penalty, if the operator contested 

the violation, and if the final penalty was reduced) between January 1996 

and October 2006. 

Sampling Errors 

Citation and Penalty 

Data 

To assess the reliability of the data, we (1) performed electronic testing of 

the relevant data elements, (2) reviewed related documentation, and 

(3) interviewed and worked closely with officials knowledgeable about the 

data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. 

Page 50 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal Mines 

Mines 

Page 51 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 52 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 53 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 54 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 55 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 56 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 57 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 58 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 59 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 60 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 61 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 62 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 63 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 64 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 65 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 66 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 67 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 68 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 69 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix II: Survey of Underground Coal

Mines 

Page 70 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Labor 

Department of Labor 

Page 71 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Labor 

Page 72 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Labor 

Page 73 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Labor 

Page 74 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Labor 

Page 75 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Labor 

Page 76 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV of Health & Human Services : Comments from the 

Department of Health & Human Services 

Page 77 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix V: Comments from the Federal Mine Appendix V Safety and Health Review Commission : Comments from the Federal 

Mine Safety and Health Review Commission 

Page 78 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix V: Comments from the Federal Mine 

Safety and Health Review Commission 

Page 79 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix V: Comments from the Federal Mine 

Safety and Health Review Commission 

Page 80 GAO-07-622 Mine Safety
Appendix VI: 

A

GAO Contact and 

cknowledgments 

Page 81 GAO-07-622

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

Daniel Bertoni, Director, (202) 512-7215, bertonid@gao.gov

Revae E. Moran, Assistant Director, and Sara L. Schibanoff, Analyst-inCharge, managed this assignment. Other staff who made key contributions 

throughout the assignment are Joel A. Green, Jeremie C. Greer, 

Gillian M. Martin, Mary Roy, and Rachael C. Valliere. Sheila R. McCoy 

provided legal assistance. Cindy K. Gilbert, Nancy A. Hess, 

Catherine M. Hurley, and Shana B. Wallace assisted with the methodology 

and statistical analysis. 

Mine Safety

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(130552) 
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