United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

DEFENSE 

MANAGEMENT 

High-Level Leadership 

Commitment and 

Actions Are Needed to 

Address Corrosion 

Issues 

April 2007 

 

GAO-07-618 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2007

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 

High-Level Leadership Commitment and 

Actions Are Needed to Address 

Corrosion Issues 

Highlights of GAO-07-618, a report to 

congressional committees 

Corrosion can have a deleterious

effect on military equipment and 

infrastructure in terms of cost,

readiness, and safety. Recognizing

this concern, the Bob Stump 

National Defense Authorization Act 

of Fiscal Year 2003 required the 

Department of Defense (DOD) to

designate an official or 

organization to oversee and

coordinate efforts to prevent and

mitigate corrosion. Recently, the 

National Defense Authorization Act 

of Fiscal Year 2006 directed GAO to

examine the effectiveness of DOD’s 

corrosion prevention and

mitigation programs. In addition,

GAO evaluated the extent to which 

DOD has incorporated corrosion 

prevention planning in acquiring

weapon systems. GAO reviewed 

strategy documents, reviewed

corrosion prevention planning for 

51 recent major weapon system

acquisitions, and interviewed DOD 

and military service officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense and the Under 

Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics ensure that actions 

designed to effectively implement

DOD’s corrosion prevention

strategy are taken. In commenting 

on a draft of this report, DOD 

partially concurred with GAO’s 

four recommendations. DOD’s

actions are generally responsive to

the intent of GAO’s

recommendations. 

DOD continues to have problems that hinder progress in implementing its 

corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy. While it has created a

Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, that office lacks the ability to oversee 

and coordinate its efforts throughout DOD, as envisioned by Congress. For 

example: 

• DOD’s office does not review all of the services’ proposed funding

requests for corrosion programs, even though it is required to do so, 

because DOD has not directed the services to provide such information 

and none of the services has a designated official or office to oversee 

and coordinate servicewide corrosion activities. Without comprehensive 

reviews of the services’ corrosion-related programs and proposed 

funding requests, the office cannot fulfill its oversight and coordination 

role. 

• DOD has made some progress in identifying corrosion cost impacts, but 

it has not identified readiness and safety impacts. It recently completed 

corrosion cost impact studies for Army ground vehicles and Navy ships, 

identifying an estimated $4.5 billion in annual corrosion costs. Although 

the studies provided potentially useful data for reducing these costs, 

DOD has not developed an action plan to apply these data to developing 

corrosion prevention and mitigation strategies. Without an action plan, it 

could miss opportunities to achieve long-term cost savings. 

• DOD has not yet developed results-oriented metrics, although GAO has 

previously recommended that it do so. 

Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to address these 

issues, corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain elusive goals and 

opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid safety problems 

will be lost. 

Most of the weapon system acquisition programs GAO reviewed had not 

incorporated key elements of DOD corrosion prevention guidance. GAO 

found that only 14 of the 51 programs reviewed had both corrosion 

prevention plans and advisory teams, as encouraged in the DOD guidance. 

The primary reason most programs did not have these two elements is that 

they are not mandatory. As a result, these programs may be missing

opportunities to prevent and mitigate corrosion. 

Corrosion Prevention Planning for Major Acquisition Programs

Programs that have a corrosion

prevention and control plan 

Programs that have a corrosion

prevention advisory team

Yes No Total Yes No Total

Army 5 8 13 5 8 13 

Air 

Force 

4 9 13 5 8 13 

Navy 11 14 25 8 17 25 

Total 20 31 51 18 33 51

Source: GAO analysis of service data. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-618.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William Solis at 

(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4 

Background 5

DOD Continues to Have Problems That Hinder Progress in 

Implementing Its Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategy 7 

Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs We Reviewed Have Not 

Incorporated Key Elements of Corrosion Prevention Planning 11 

Conclusions 15

Recommendations for Executive Action 16 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17 

Appendix I Defense Science Board Recommendations 22 

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 23 

Appendix III Organizational Structure of DOD’s Corrosion 

Activities 26 

Appendix IV Corrosion Prevention Planning in Selected Major 

Defense Acquisition Programs 27 

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 29 

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34 

 

Tables 

Table 1: Corrosion Cost Segments and Estimated Completion 

Dates 10 

Page i GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Table 2: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Either a 

Corrosion Prevention and Control Plan or a Corrosion 

Prevention Advisory Team 13 

Table 3: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Both a 

Corrosion Prevention and Control Plan and a Corrosion 

Prevention Advisory Team and Programs Having Neither a 

Plan Nor a Team 13 

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Page ii GAO-07-618 Defense Management
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 30, 2007

Congressional Committees 

The Department of Defense (DOD) spends an estimated $10 billion to 

$20 billion each year on corrosion-related maintenance on weapon 

systems and infrastructure. Corrosion can affect mission readiness by 

taking critical systems out of action. It also affects safety. For example, 

since 1985, the Army has reported over 50 aircraft accidents, including 12 

fatalities, caused by corrosion. Incorporating corrosion prevention 

planning early in the acquisition process is the most effective way to 

reduce and perhaps avoid corrosion impacts in terms of costs, readiness 

and safety. 

In recognition of the harm that corrosion can cause, Congress enacted, as

part of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 

2003, legislation that requires DOD to designate a senior official or 

organization responsible for preventing and mitigating the corrosion of 

military equipment and infrastructure.1

 The authorization act requires the 

designated official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts 

throughout the department, recommend policy guidance, and review the 

corrosion prevention and mitigation programs and funding levels 

proposed by each military service that will enable them to make 

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. The authorization act also 

requires the official to provide oversight and coordination of the efforts 

within the Department to prevent or mitigate corrosion throughout the life 

cycle of military equipment and infrastructure and to monitor DOD 

acquisition practices to ensure that corrosion prevention technologies and 

treatments are fully considered during research and development phases 

of the acquisition process and are incorporated in each acquisition 

program to the extent deemed appropriate. In addition, the authorization 

act directs the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a long-term 

strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion on DOD’s 

military equipment and infrastructure. In response to this act, DOD 

created the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion Office) 

within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

 1

 Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 1067 (2002), which added § 2228 to Title 10 of the United States 

Code. 

Page 1 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Technology, and Logistics and in December 2003 developed a long-term 

strategy to reduce corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure.2

 As 

part of the strategy, DOD is developing a corrosion baseline to identify the 

effects of corrosion on cost, readiness, and safety. 

Since the passage of the Defense Authorization Act of 2003, we have

issued several reports on corrosion. Among other things, we have found

that DOD and the services do not have an effective approach to prevent 

and mitigate corrosion, DOD’s long-term strategy falls short of a 

comprehensive strategic plan, and the Army is not adequately storing landbased pre-positioned equipment to protect it from corrosion.3

 In 2003, we 

recommended that DOD develop a strategic plan for corrosion prevention

and mitigation that included standardized methodologies for collecting 

and analyzing corrosion cost, readiness, and safety data; clearly defined 

goals, outcome-oriented objectives, and performance measures; 

identification of the level of resources needed to accomplish goals and 

objectives; and mechanisms to coordinate and oversee prevention and 

mitigation projects across the department. In 2004 we further 

recommended that DOD accelerate completion of its corrosion baseline, 

establish a funding mechanism to implement the corrosion strategy, and 

submit to Congress a report identifying the long-term funding and 

personnel resources needed to implement the strategy. DOD concurred 

with all of these recommendations. 

In response to a request of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, the Defense Science Board issued a report in 

October 2004 on DOD’s efforts for corrosion control, referring to “the 

importance of leadership commitment and proper incentives for ensuring 

corrosion is considered early and often in decisions” and calling for an 

increased commitment on the part of DOD to prevent and mitigate 

corrosion.4

 This report found that corrosion prevention has not been a 

 2

 Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Department of Defense, Long-Term Strategy

to Reduce Corrosion and the Effects of Corrosion on the Military Equipment and

Infrastructure of the Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: December 2003). 

3

 GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase

Readiness, GAO-03-753 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003); Defense Management: 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of DOD’s Long-Term Corrosion 

Strategy, GAO-04-640 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2004); and Defense Management: 

Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of Prepositioned Military Assets Could Achieve 

Cost Savings, GAO-06-709 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006). 

4

 Defense Science Board, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Report on Corrosion Control (Washington, D.C.: October 2004).

Page 2 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
priority across DOD, and it made 17 recommendations, most of which 

DOD concurred with. Specifically, DOD concurred on 11, partially 

concurred on 4, and did not concur on 2. Appendix I contains a complete 

list of Defense Science Board recommendations and DOD’s responses. Of 

the recommendations with which DOD concurred, it has taken actions to

incorporate some into its strategy document and to begin implementing 

some of those. According to our assessment, only minimal changes have 

been made to DOD’s corrosion strategy in response to the 

recommendations contained in the report of the Defense Science Board.

The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006 directed us to

examine the effectiveness of DOD’s corrosion prevention and mitigation 

programs.5

 Specifically, we examined the extent to which DOD has 

implemented its corrosion strategy in its oversight of funding; its 

identification of cost, readiness, and safety impacts through its corrosion 

baseline study; and its development of results-oriented metrics. In 

addition, as agreed with your offices, we evaluated the extent to which 

DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention planning in the acquisition of

major weapon systems. 

In performing our work, we used the requirements for the DOD corrosion 

strategy set forth in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of

Fiscal Year 2003, along with our previous recommendations, as a baseline 

for evaluating DOD’s corrosion prevention efforts. We reviewed DOD and 

service guidance relating to corrosion prevention, and we interviewed 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Army, the 

Air Force, and the Navy. We also gathered and reviewed information about 

corrosion prevention planning from a nonprobability sample of 51 major 

defense acquisition programs. The sample was based on the programs 

contained in DOD’s Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense Acquisition Program 

List.6

 We reviewed documents from these programs, including their 

acquisition plans and corrosion prevention plans. A detailed description of 

our scope and methodology is presented in appendix II. We conducted our 

 5

 Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 356 (2006). 

6

 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense Acquisition Program List (Washington, D.C.:

September 2006). The programs on this list were designated by the Secretary of Defense as 

major acquisition program or are estimated to require a total expenditure of more than

$365 million in research, development, test, and evaluation funds or require a total 

expenditure of more than $2.19 billion in procurement funds. 

Page 3 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
work from April 2006 through January 2007 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. 

While DOD has taken some steps toward implementing its corrosion 

prevention strategy since our 2003 and 2004 reports, its progress in 

providing oversight of funding, identifying corrosion impacts, and 

developing results-oriented metrics has been limited. For example: 

Results in Brief 

• With regard to funding, the Corrosion Office does not review all of the 

services’ proposed funding requests related to prevention and mitigation 

of corrosion, even though such reviews are required by 10 U.S.C. § 

2228(b)(3). DOD has not directed the services to provide the Corrosion 

Office with comprehensive data on their annual funding requirements for 

corrosion prevention and mitigation. Furthermore, none of the four 

services has a designated official or office to oversee and coordinate 

servicewide corrosion activities, including identifying annual funding 

requirements. Without comprehensive reviews of the services’ corrosionrelated programs and proposed funding requests, the Corrosion Office 

cannot fulfill its oversight and coordination role for the department. 

• With regard to developing a corrosion baseline, DOD has made some 

progress in identifying cost impacts but has not identified readiness and 

safety impacts. DOD has acknowledged that determining these impacts is 

critical to implementing its corrosion strategy and assessing progress. 

DOD accelerated the time frames for completing the overall cost study and 

recently completed corrosion cost impact studies for two segments of its 

corrosion baseline—Army ground vehicles and Navy ships. Although these 

two cost impact studies provide potentially useful data for reducing the 

estimated $4.5 billion in annual corrosion costs, DOD has not developed 

an action plan to apply these data toward developing corrosion prevention

and mitigation strategies. Without an action plan, DOD could miss 

opportunities for achieving long-term corrosion cost savings. DOD 

officials told us that they decided to identify cost impacts before they 

identify readiness and safety impacts because more information is 

available regarding costs and identifying cost impacts is an important step 

towards identifying readiness and safety impacts. 

• DOD has not yet developed results-oriented metrics that would provide 

the capability to measure progress toward reducing corrosion impacts, 

although we and Defense Science Board have previously recommended 

that it do so. DOD asserts that it cannot establish such metrics until it has 

first identified the corrosion impacts—yet, as stated above, DOD has made 

only minimal progress in the identification of these impacts. The lack of 

Page 4 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
results-oriented metrics impedes DOD’s ability to implement its corrosion 

strategy. 

Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to address these 

issues, corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain an elusive goal,

and opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid safety 

problems will be lost. 

Most of the weapon system acquisition programs we reviewed had not 

incorporated key elements of corrosion prevention planning. Of the 51 

recent major acquisitions we reviewed, only 14 had both corrosion 

prevention plans and advisory teams. The guidebook created by the 

Corrosion Office encourages weapon system acquisition programs to 

incorporate corrosion prevention and control plans and advisory teams in 

order to achieve viable corrosion prevention and control planning. DOD 

acquisition program officials retain broad discretion in developing 

individual approaches to corrosion prevention planning, and many 

different approaches are taken within and among the services. However, 

27 of the 51 programs we reviewed had not included either of the two key

elements of corrosion prevention planning. Most programs did not have

corrosion prevention plans or corrosion prevention advisory teams in part 

because these plans and teams are not mandatory. As a result, the 

Corrosion Office could not effectively monitor DOD acquisition practices, 

as required by 10 U.S.C. § 2228(b)(5), to ensure that corrosion prevention

technologies and techniques were being fully considered and incorporated

when deemed appropriate. Moreover, these programs may be missing 

opportunities to prevent future corrosion and therefore mitigate the 

impacts of corrosion on the costs, readiness, and safety of military 

equipment. 

We are making recommendations designed to improve DOD’s and the 

services’ efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion. In commenting on a 

draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our recommendations. 

In its response, DOD cited actions it planned to take which are generally

responsive to our recommendations. In addition, the department provided

several technical comments which we considered and incorporated where 

appropriate. DOD’s comments and our evaluation of them appear later in 

this report. 

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics has been designated DOD’s Corrosion 

Executive. The Corrosion Executive is supported by staff assigned to the 

Background 

Page 5 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Corrosion Office. The Corrosion Office was initially established in 2003 as 

an independent activity within the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, reporting directly to 

the Corrosion Executive.

7

 In 2004, the Corrosion Office was formally 

assigned to the Defense Systems Directorate. The direct chain of 

command went through the Defense Systems Directorate, which provided

management and administrative support. Following a reorganization of the 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization in 2006, the Corrosion 

Office was moved to the Systems and Software Engineering Directorate. 

The Corrosion Office no longer reports directly to the Corrosion 

Executive. Appendix III depicts DOD’s organizational structure to address 

corrosion. 

The Corrosion Office is led by the Special Assistant for Corrosion Policy 

and Oversight and works closely with the Corrosion Prevention and 

Control Integrated Product Team, which has representatives from the 

military services and other DOD organizations to accomplish the goals and 

objectives of the Corrosion Office. Several working teams have also been

established to conduct work in the seven areas making up the corrosion 

strategy: policy and requirements; impact, metrics, and sustainment; 

science and technology; communications and outreach; facilities; training 

and doctrine; and specifications, standards, and product qualification. 

The Defense Acquisition Guidebook8 contains guidance regarding the 

defense acquisition system, which exists to manage the nation’s 

investments in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to 

achieve the National Security Strategy and support the United States 

Armed Forces. This guidebook contains specific guidance regarding 

acquisition strategies, which define the approach a program manager will 

use to achieve program goals. Among other things, an effective strategy 

minimizes the time and cost required to satisfy approved capability needs. 

DOD’s directive on the defense acquisition process states that program 

managers shall consider corrosion prevention and mitigation when making 

trade-off decisions that involve cost, useful service, and effectiveness.9

 7

 Because the position of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics is currently vacant, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics is acting as DOD’s Corrosion Executive. 

8

 Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition Guidebook, v. 1.6 (Ft. Belvoir, Va.: 

July 24, 2006). 

9

 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1,The Defense Acquisition System (May 12, 2003). 

Page 6 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Moreover, on November 12, 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued a policy memorandum 

stating that corrosion prevention should be specifically addressed at the 

earliest phases of the acquisition process by decision authorities at every 

level.10

DOD has had long-standing problems in funding, identification of impacts, 

and development of metrics, and these are continuing. DOD’s 

implementation of its long-term corrosion strategy, as required under 10 

U.S.C. § 2228(c), has been hindered by weaknesses in these three critical 

areas. First, the Corrosion Office does not review the services’ corrosion 

programs or annual budget requests, even though this is required by 10 

U.S.C. § 2228(b)(3). Second, the Corrosion Office has made only minimal 

progress in identifying corrosion impacts. Third, the Corrosion Office has 

not developed results-oriented metrics, even though we have previously 

recommended that it do so. 

Although 10 U.S.C. § 2228(b)(3) requires the Corrosion Office within OSD 

to review the annual funding requests for the prevention and mitigation of 

corrosion for each military service, the Corrosion Office has not done so.

The Corrosion Office does not review comprehensive corrosion data from

the services on their programs and funding requests because (1) DOD has 

not required the services to provide budget information to the Corrosion 

Office and (2) the services lack an effective mechanism for coordinating 

with the Corrosion Office with respect to their corrosion funding requests. 

None of the four services has a designated official or office to oversee and

coordinate corrosion activities, including identifying annual servicewide 

funding requirements. Without a requirement or mechanism for reporting 

service funding information, the Corrosion Office officials said they are

unable to review the services’ complete corrosion-related funding 

information, and thus DOD is hampered in its ability to provide oversight 

of the services’ funding requests. 

The Corrosion Office currently has oversight over only a small portion of 

departmentwide corrosion spending that is provided through a separate 

DOD Continues to 

Have Problems That 

Hinder Progress in 

Implementing Its 

Corrosion Prevention 

and Mitigation 

Strategy 

DOD’s Corrosion Office 

Does Not Review All of the 

Military Services’ Funding 

Requests 

 10 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Memorandum for 

Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: Corrosion Prevention and Control, 

November 12, 2003. 

Page 7 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
appropriations account. The Corrosion Office reviews and selects for 

funding the projects that are proposed by the services based on a 

combination of criteria, including: whether a project would benefit more 

than one service, whether it is projected to be completed within 2 years of 

its initial funding, the availability of matching funds; and the return on 

investment that it offers. For fiscal year 2006, DOD and the military 

services funded about $24 million for corrosion strategy efforts. Of this 

amount, $19 million was spent on 29 corrosion-related projects and about 

$5 million on contractor support, training, outreach, and other 

administrative activities. The DOD Corrosion Office projects a combined 

average return on investment of 42.5 to 1 for the $19 million, or a projected 

savings of $809 million over the life of the projects. 

The services frequently bypass the Corrosion Office to obtain their funding

for corrosion-related efforts. We reviewed the President’s budget 

justification for fiscal year 2006 and identified more than $97 million for 

service-specific corrosion mitigation-related projects in addition to those 

reviewed by the Corrosion Office. These projects had not been submitted 

to the Corrosion Office for review, and Corrosion Office officials told us 

that they lacked any information about the $97 million and the status of 

the associated efforts. Because corrosion-related projects may be included 

under other maintenance projects or budget accounts, it is likely that there 

is more funding that we have not identified. According to recent corrosion 

cost studies conducted by DOD, the annual corrosion costs for Army 

ground vehicles and Navy ships alone were identified to be $2.019 billion 

and $2.438 billion, respectively. Without comprehensive reviews of the 

services’ corrosion-related programs and proposed funding requests, the 

Corrosion Office cannot fulfill its oversight and coordination role for the 

department. 

None of the four services has a designated official or office to oversee and

coordinate corrosion activities, despite a recommendation by the Defense 

Science Board that they do so. Currently, multiple offices in the services 

are responsible for corrosion programs and related budgets. For example, 

several Air Force offices are responsible for corrosion-related matters: 

maintenance issues belong to the Air Force Corrosion Prevention and 

Control Office, corrosion policy for weapon systems is managed by an 

office within the Air Force Maintenance Directorate, and corrosion policy 

for infrastructure is handled by the Air Force Civil Engineering 

Directorate. None of these offices has comprehensive knowledge about

corrosion activities throughout the Air Force. Without a designated official 

or office for corrosion, the services do not have the mechanism or 

Page 8 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
capability to fully identify their annual servicewide corrosion funding 

requirements. 

DOD has acknowledged since 2002 that the identification of cost, 

readiness, and safety impacts is critical to the implementation of its 

corrosion strategy. We recommended in 2003 that DOD complete a study 

to identify these impacts, and further recommended in 2004 that DOD 

accelerate its efforts in order to complete the baseline prior to its original

estimated date of 2011. According to DOD, the purpose of the study is to 

document where corrosion problems exist, identify their causes, and 

prioritize them for funding according to their relative severity in terms of 

their impact on DOD costs, readiness, and safety. 

In August 2004, after developing a cost-estimating methodology, a DOD 

contractor began a study to determine the total cost of corrosion for 

military equipment and facilities across the services. DOD currently plans 

to complete this cost study by 2009, 2 years earlier than originally planned. 

The study uses fiscal year 2004 costs as a measurement baseline and 

consists of several segments, to be completed sequentially. To date, it has 

made some progress in identifying corrosion cost impacts. For example, in 

April 2006, DOD completed the Army ground vehicle and Navy ship 

corrosion segments of this study.11 Several segments remain to be 

completed, including Army and Marine Corps aviation. Corrosion Office 

officials told us that progress has been slower than expected, primarily 

because of a lack of corrosion data. Table 1 shows the corrosion cost 

segments included in the study and their planned completion dates. 

Progress in Identifying 

Corrosion Impacts Has 

Been Minimal 

 11 LMI Government Consulting, The Annual Cost of Corrosion for Army Ground Vehicles 

and Navy Ships (McLean, Va.: April 2006). 

Page 9 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Table 1: Corrosion Cost Segments and Estimated Completion Dates 

Corrosion cost segments Estimated completion date 

Army ground vehicles 2006 (actual) 

Navy ships 2006 (actual) 

DOD facilities 2007 (planned)

Army aviation and missiles 2007 (planned)

USMC ground vehicles 2007 (planned)

Navy and USMC aviation 2008 

Coast Guard aviation and ships 2008 

Air Force aviation and missiles 2009 

Source: LMI Government Consulting. 

The two completed studies generated data that could be potentially useful 

for developing initiatives aimed at reducing long-term corrosion costs, but 

DOD lacks an action plan for using these data. For example, the studies 

estimate the annual corrosion costs for Army ground vehicles and Navy 

ships at $2.019 billion and $2.438 billion, respectively. Costs are segregated 

in multiple ways, such as costs incurred at the depot, organizational, and 

intermediate maintenance levels; costs incurred while addressing a 

corrosion problem (corrective); costs incurred while addressing a 

potential problem (preventive); and direct costs incurred on end items or 

removable parts. However, the Corrosion Office has not developed an 

action plan on how it will use these data, or the data expected from future 

cost studies, to develop corrosion prevention and mitigation strategies. 

Without an action plan, DOD could miss opportunities for achieving longterm corrosion cost savings. 

Finally, although it acknowledges the importance of identifying corrosion 

impacts related to readiness and safety, DOD has made virtually no 

progress in assessing these impacts. DOD officials told us that they 

decided to identify cost impacts before they identify readiness and safety 

impacts because more information is available regarding costs, and 

identifying cost impacts is an important step towards identifying readiness

and safety impacts. They said that some of their efforts will shift to 

readiness and safety as the cost impact study approaches completion. 

In June 2004, we reported that DOD lacked results-oriented metrics in its 

corrosion strategy and, as a result, could not effectively monitor progress 

toward achieving the goals of the corrosion strategy. In May 2005, DOD 

updated its November 2004 long-term corrosion strategy, but the update

DOD Has Not Yet 

Developed ResultsOriented Corrosion 

Metrics 

Page 10 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
still does not contain results-oriented metrics for measuring progress 

toward targeted, quantifiable goals. In the strategy update, DOD has 

catalogued the aspects of corrosion prevention cost, readiness, and safety

impacts that will need to be measured, but it has not quantified them or 

linked them with targets for improvement. For example, on a table entitled 

“Potential Revised Metrics Set”, under the column of safety impacts, the 

“facilities incidents” entry is linked with the description “events over time 

related to corrosion.” No measurable outcomes are associated with either 

the designated impact or the description. In addition, DOD officials told us 

that they cannot establish quantifiable goals regarding corrosion costs 

until they have completed the corrosion cost baseline, which, as noted 

earlier, DOD plans to complete sometime in 2009. These officials said that 

metrics for readiness and safety will likely take several additional years to 

complete because less information is available regarding readiness and 

safety impacts than information regarding cost impacts. They told us that

the accompanying definitions and procedures will also take several years 

to complete. 

The Corrosion Prevention and Control Planning Guidebook encourages 

the establishment of corrosion prevention and control plans and corrosion 

prevention advisory teams as early as possible in the acquisition process. 

However, only 14 of the 51 programs we reviewed actually had both plans 

and advisory teams. DOD acquisition program officials have taken diverse 

approaches to corrosion prevention planning. We found that one reason 

why most programs did not have corrosion prevention plans or corrosion 

prevention advisory teams is that while they are strongly suggested, these 

elements are not mandatory. 

The guidebook developed by the Corrosion Office is intended to assist 

acquisition program managers in developing and implementing effective

corrosion prevention and control programs for military equipment and 

infrastructure.12 According to the Corrosion Prevention and Control 

Guidebook, the corrosion prevention and control plan and the corrosion 

prevention advisory team should be established as early as possible in the 

acquisition process. DOD officials told us that establishing both a plan and 

Most Major Defense 

Acquisition Programs 

We Reviewed Have 

Not Incorporated Key 

Elements of 

Corrosion Prevention 

Planning 

DOD Guidance 

Encourages Corrosion 

Prevention Plans and 

Advisory Teams 

 12 Department of Defense, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Corrosion Prevention and Control Planning Guidebook 

(Washington, D.C.: July 2004). 

Page 11 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
a team is critical to effective corrosion prevention planning, and they 

strongly recommend that corrosion prevention planning begin at the start

of the technology development phase of acquisition (Milestone A), when 

the effort is made to determine the appropriate set of technologies to be 

integrated into the weapon system. They said it should certainly occur no

later than the system development and demonstration phase (Milestone 

B), when the first system and long lead procurement for follow-on systems 

may be authorized. According to the guidebook, a corrosion prevention 

and control plan should address a number of things, including system 

design, including materials and processes to be used for corrosion 

prevention and control, and should define the membership and 

organization of the corrosion prevention advisory team. The team should 

be actively involved in the review of design considerations, material 

selections, costs, and any documentation that may affect corrosion 

prevention and control throughout the life cycle of the system or facility.

Members should include representatives from the contractors and DOD. In 

addition to this DOD guidance, the individual services have issued 

guidance that also calls for incorporating corrosion prevention planning 

during acquisition of weapon system programs.13

Most of the acquisition programs we reviewed did not have either plans or 

advisory teams for corrosion prevention and control. We reviewed a 

nonprobability sample of 51 major defense acquisition programs from the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force and found that only 14 of them had both 

corrosion prevention and control plans and corrosion prevention advisory

teams.14 A total of 20 programs had developed corrosion prevention and 

control plans, and 18 had established advisory teams. Of the 51 programs, 

27 had neither a plan nor an advisory team. Tables 2 and 3 list, by service,

the number of programs we reviewed that had developed corrosion 

prevention and control plans and established corrosion prevention 

advisory teams. Appendix IV contains information on specific programs 

that we reviewed. 

Few Programs Have Both 

Corrosion Plans and 

Teams 

 13 For example, The Air Force’s Aircraft Structural Integrity Program requires the creation 

of a corrosion prevention and control plan and corrosion prevention advisory board. 

14 We reviewed 13 Army programs, 13 Air Force programs, and 25 Navy programs based on

a nonprobability sample from the Fiscal Year 2006 Major Defense Acquisition Program List.

Page 12 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Table 2: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Either a Corrosion

Prevention and Control Plan or a Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team 

Programs that have a corrosion

prevention and control plan

Programs that have a corrosion

prevention advisory team

Yes No Total Yes No Total

Army 5 8 13 5 8 13

Air Force 4 9 13 5 8 13

Navy 11 14 25 8 17 25

Total 20 31 51 18 33 51

Source: GAO analysis of service data. 

Table 3: Number of Major Acquisition Programs Having Both a Corrosion

Prevention and Control Plan and a Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team and

Programs Having Neither a Plan Nor a Team 

Programs having both a corrosion

prevention and control plan and a 

corrosion prevention advisory 

team 

Programs having neither a

corrosion prevention and control 

plan or corrosion prevention

advisory team

Army 4 7

Air Force 4 8

Navy 6 12

Total 14 27

Source: GAO analysis of service data. 

Service acquisition officials told us that they retain broad discretion in 

developing individual approaches to corrosion prevention planning. We 

found that planning is inconsistently performed, and that so many 

different approaches are taken within and among the services that DOD is

unable to maintain the oversight needed to ensure that corrosion 

prevention is being effectively conducted. For example, the degree to 

which corrosion prevention planning is performed depends on the 

initiative of the respective acquisition program offices. The Air Force’s C17A Globemaster program had a corrosion prevention plan and corrosion 

prevention team in place early in the acquisition process, several months 

before it obtained approval to proceed with full-scale development. C-17 

officials told us that they took a proactive approach to avoid the corrosion 

problems experienced by the C-5 and KC-135 programs. In contrast, the 

Javelin program managed by the Army has not established a corrosion 

prevention plan or corrosion prevention team, even though the system 

Service Acquisition 

Officials Cite Diverse 

Approaches Taken to 

Corrosion Prevention 

Planning 

Page 13 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
development and most of its production objectives have been completed.

Javelin program officials told us that they have extensive corrosion 

prevention requirements in the system development specification and have

obtained the advice of corrosion prevention experts located at the 

Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center. 

Further, some program officials told us that specific corrosion prevention

plans and corrosion advisory teams were not needed because other 

documents and processes provide the same function. The Navy’s SSN 774

Class submarine program did not have a specific corrosion prevention 

plan or corrosion prevention advisory team because the program relied 

heavily on detailed specifications and technical documents and on the 

experience of similarly designed submarines.15

Officials from some programs said it was too early in the acquisition 

process for them to have a plan or team, while those from other programs 

claimed it was too late. The Air Force KC-135 Replacement program 

officials told us they do not have a corrosion prevention plan or team 

because their system is still in the early development phase and they have 

yet to establish firm dates for their program design reviews. In contrast, 

Army High Mobility Artillery Rocket System program officials said that it 

is not sensible to have a corrosion prevention plan or team at this time 

because their program is currently in full rate production. 

Some programs we reviewed did not have a corrosion prevention plan or

team because program officials told us that upgrades to existing weapon 

systems may be covered by an existing corrosion prevention plan or team. 

On the one hand, the Airborne Warning and Control System Block 40/45 

upgrade program is a modification to the prime mission equipment of the 

E-3 aircraft. This program does not have its own corrosion prevention and 

control team or corrosion prevention advisory team, but rather is covered 

by the existing plan and team for the E-3 aircraft. On the other hand, a 

different Air Force program we reviewed represents an upgrade to the 

avionics system of the existing C-5 aircraft, and its officials told us that 

corrosion prevention issues are more appropriately addressed at the C-5 

aircraft program level. These officials told us that while the C-5 program 

has an existing corrosion prevention advisory team, it does not currently 

 15 Such specifications and documents include a corrosion prevention and control design 

manual, submarine class building specifications, and material selection requirement 

documents. 

Page 14 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
have a current corrosion prevention plan, though one is under 

development and expected to be completed at the end of May 2007. 

We found that one reason most programs have not prepared corrosion 

prevention plans or established corrosion prevention advisory teams is 

that these elements are not mandatory. Major acquisition programs 

perform corrosion prevention planning at their discretion, and that may or

may not include having a corrosion prevention plan, a corrosion 

prevention advisory team, or both. Further, these programs are not 

required to provide the Corrosion Office information regarding corrosion 

prevention planning. As a result, the Corrosion Office could not effectively 

monitor DOD acquisition practices to ensure that corrosion prevention 

technologies and techniques are being fully considered and incorporated 

when appropriate. Moreover, these programs may be missing 

opportunities to prevent future corrosion and thereby mitigate the impacts 

of corrosion on the costs, readiness, and safety of military equipment. 

More than 4 years have passed since Congress enacted legislation 

requiring DOD to establish a corrosion prevention and mitigation program, 

yet DOD has not met Congress’s expectations. Since the passage of this 

legislation, we have issued several reports on corrosion and made 

numerous recommendations to strengthen DOD’s ability to combat 

corrosion. Further, the Defense Science Board has called for an increased 

commitment on the part of DOD to prevent and mitigate corrosion, 

referring to “the importance of leadership commitment and proper 

incentives for ensuring corrosion is considered early and often in 

decisions.”16

DOD’s progress in implementing its corrosion strategy has been stymied 

by critical weaknesses. These include the absence of DOD guidance 

directing the services to provide the Corrosion Office with comprehensive 

data about their annual funding requirements for corrosion prevention and 

mitigation, the absence of a designated corrosion official or corrosion 

office within each of the services, and the absence of a DOD action plan to

guide use of data in the corrosion cost study to achieve long-term cost 

savings. Furthermore, the lack of a DOD requirement for all major defense 

acquisition programs to have both a corrosion prevention plan and a 

Conclusions 

 16 Defense Science Board, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Report on Corrosion Control (Washington, D.C.: October 2004).

Page 15 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
corrosion prevention team could lead to inadequate corrosion prevention

and, consequently, long-term corrosion problems throughout the life cycle 

of weapon systems. These and other weaknesses that we have raised in 

our previous reports severely hinder DOD’s ability to combat corrosion. 

Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to addressing these 

issues, corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain an elusive goal and 

opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid safety 

problems will be lost. 

To effectively implement DOD’s corrosion strategy and meet

congressional expectations expeditiously, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics provide the necessary leadership and 

commitment to take the following four actions. 

To ensure that DOD’s Corrosion Office provides oversight and 

coordination of the services’ proposed funding requests for corrosion 

prevention and mitigation programs, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics to require the military services to provide comprehensive data

about their annual funding requirements for corrosion prevention and 

mitigation efforts to the DOD Corrosion Office, before annual funding 

requests are sent to Congress. 

• Direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to designate a 

corrosion official or a corrosion office within each service that is 

responsible for corrosion prevention and mitigation, and that the 

responsibilities of this official or office include identifying the annual 

funding requirements for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts 

throughout the service. 

To ensure that DOD does not miss opportunities for achieving long-term 

corrosion cost savings, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense: 

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics to develop an action plan for using the information contained in

the Army ground vehicle and Navy ship segments of DOD’s cost impact 

study. This plan should be completed as expeditiously as possible and be 

updated in time to support the fiscal year 2009 budget request. This plan 

should include information on corrosion cost areas having the highest 

Page 16 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
priority and a strategy for reducing these costs. DOD should develop

comparable action plans for the information to be derived from cost 

segments completed in the future. 

To improve DOD’s ability to avoid or limit corrosion problems 

experienced by weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense: 

• Require major defense acquisition programs to prepare a corrosion 

prevention plan and establish a corrosion prevention advisory team as 

early as possible in the acquisition process. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 

with each of our four recommendations. In its response, DOD cited 

actions it planned to take which are generally responsive to our 

recommendations. In addition, the department provided several technical

comments which we considered and incorporated where appropriate. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix V. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the military 

services to provide comprehensive data about their annual funding 

requirements for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts to the DOD 

Corrosion Office before annual funding requests are sent to Congress. 

DOD stated that a draft Corrosion Prevention and Control Department of 

Defense Instruction will require the military departments during the 

annual internal DOD budget process to submit information on the 

proposed corrosion programs and funding levels to the DOD Corrosion 

Executive. We believe this action is long overdue and is a step in the right 

direction if implemented. However, it remains uncertain when the 

instruction will be approved and what it will look like when finalized. 

Although the instruction was expected to be approved in November 2006, 

according to DOD officials, it is still undergoing revision. In addition, the 

draft instruction, as it is currently written, does not provide enough detail

regarding the identification and submission of comprehensive data for 

funding associated with all corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts 

throughout DOD. For example, the draft instruction does not specify the 

type of funding information that is to be obtained by the services and 

reported to the DOD Corrosion Office. DOD also commented that 

corrosion prevention and mitigation activities are funded through many 

different sources, no program elements exist in the military departments 

that directly tie to corrosion, and many activities are funded to complete 

corrosion-related work but are not identified as such in budget documents. 

However, as we stated in our report, we reviewed the President’s budget 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 17 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
justification for fiscal year 2006 and were able to readily identify more 

than $97 million for service-specific corrosion mitigation-related projects 

for which the Corrosion Office lacked any information. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretaries of 

the Army, Navy, and Air Force designate a corrosion official or a corrosion 

office within each service to be responsible for corrosion prevention and 

mitigation, and that the responsibilities of this official or office should 

include identifying the annual funding requirements for corrosion 

prevention and mitigation efforts throughout the service. DOD stated that 

the same draft DOD Instruction cited in response to the first 

recommendation also specifies that the heads of DOD components shall 

designate a senior individual or office for oversight of corrosion matters, 

and it directs the Secretaries of the military departments to support this 

individual or office. DOD stated that the Air Force has already designated 

such an official. The draft instruction as it pertains to each service having

a corrosion executive or a corrosion office responsible for corrosion 

prevention and mitigation is responsive to our recommendation if 

implemented. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop an action 

plan for using the information contained in the Army ground vehicle and 

Navy ship segments of DOD’s cost impact study. In response, DOD stated 

that it would be impractical to develop an action plan in time to be used 

for the 2008 budget cycle. While our recommendation was intended for 

DOD to develop an action plan as soon as possible to support near-term 

funding decisions for corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts, we 

agree that DOD can not do this in time to be used for the 2008 budget

cycle. Therefore, we have modified our recommendation to say that DOD 

develop an action plan as expeditiously as possible and revise the plan in 

time to support the fiscal year 2009 budget request. DOD also stated that 

the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan already 

includes a requirement to select and fund corrosion research projects and

integrated product team activities to enhance and improve corrosion 

prevention and mitigation throughout DOD. DOD further stated that the 

Military Departments assess and make priorities regarding corrosion 

based, in part, on funding for the “Top Ten” high cost of corrosionvulnerable systems. While these efforts may have merit, we still believe

that an action plan would provide additional benefits as we recommend. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require every major 

defense acquisition program to prepare a corrosion prevention plan and

establish a corrosion prevention advisory team as early as possible in the 

Page 18 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
acquisition process. DOD stated that a corrosion prevention control plan 

will be developed for all ACAT I programs before preliminary design 

review and implementation will be reviewed at each milestone. DOD noted 

that the establishment of a separate, formal Corrosion Prevention 

Advisory Team may not be necessary for all program levels, though such a 

team will be established for all ACAT I programs. DOD’s response is 

essentially responsive to our recommendation if carried out. In subsequent 

discussions DOD officials told us that they partially concurred because the 

response in some respects goes beyond our recommendation by requiring 

that all ACAT I programs have a corrosion prevention control plan and

corrosion prevention advisory team. 

In addition to providing comments to our recommendations, DOD 

commented about our statement that the development of metrics for 

readiness and safety will likely take several additional years to complete 

because DOD officials have placed a higher priority on completing the cost 

impact studies. DOD commented that this is an inaccurate and dangerous 

assertion and implies that the department holds safety and readiness, the 

two linchpins of the operation military mind-set, in lower esteem than 

cost. In subsequent discussions, DOD officials told us that they decided to

identify cost impacts before they identify readiness and safety impacts 

because more information is available regarding costs, and identifying cost 

impacts is an important step towards identifying readiness and safety 

impacts. We have modified our report by incorporating this statement. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and 

interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available 

to others upon request. This report will also be available at no charge on

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 19 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix VI. 

William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 20 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
List of Committees 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 21 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix I: Defense Science Board Appendix I: Defense Science Board Recommendations 

Recommendations 

Defense Science Board recommendation DOD response 

Create an independent team of corrosion experts to review all programs coming to the Defense Acquisition 

Board and all maintenance plans to provide the expertise necessary to decision makers. 

Partially concur

Develop incentive structures to ensure corrosion and life cycle cost considerations in all designs and 

manufacturing.

Concur 

Mandate corrosion testing and reporting at all stages of development. Concur 

Issue directive to require that all major weapon system corrosion prevention advisory team members complete 

a Defense Acquisition University-developed course on corrosion control. 

Concur 

Accelerate the introduction of activity based cost accounting to ensure future visibility into actual life cycle cost 

and cost of corrosion. 

Concur 

Contract for support in developing standard definitions, metrics, etc. to be completed and promulgated within a 

year. 

Partially concur

Direct the services to conform with these standards and to enable capture of complete and accurate 

organizational, intermediate, and depot-level corrosion man-hour, material, and cost data. 

Concur 

Use these data to make fact-based decisions regarding corrosion and corrosion cost and to track progress of 

platform material improvement efforts. 

Concur 

Provide a separate funding line to support annual assessment teams, to provide the means and expertise to 

manage ongoing maintenance efforts, and to support organizational level training and maintenance. 

Partially concur

Implement well-defined maintenance programs that included continuous corrosion performance improvement 

and continuing assessment and reporting. 

Concur 

Require each service to contract and execute its part. Concur 

Have all results reported to a common database for analysis and to support the development of a joint strategy 

for corrosion maintenance that accommodates the unique factors associated with each service and system. 

Concur 

Extend assessment database to capture existing aircraft and ship corrosion data. Concur 

Direct that services establish best practices maintenance plans, benchmarking and providing adequate training 

to all involved personnel at operator, intermediate, and depot levels. 

Nonconcur 

Establish a corrosion executive for each service with responsibility for oversight and reporting and full authority 

over corrosion-specific funding and a strong voice in corrosion-related funding. 

Concur 

Refocus and reinvigorate corrosion science and technology portfolio. Triple the effective funding in this area 

with particular emphasis on development of a materials-corrosion tool set that emphasizes science-based

modeling and simulation; fundamental mechanistic understandings of corrosion phenomena as well as 

accelerated testing; substitutes for effective corrosion prevention materials which are being withdrawn because 

of environmental and safety considerations; newly developed materials; and nondestructive corrosion sensing 

and measurement in the field as feedback to prognostic and condition-based maintenance tools. 

Partially concur

Divide the responsibilities for the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s corrosion effort between three separate 

organizations: Defense Systems; Logistics, Materiel, and Readiness; and Installations and Engineering.

Nonconcur 

Source: DOD. 

Note: Of the 17 total recommendations made by the Defense Science Board, DOD concurred on 11,

partially concurred on 4, and did not concur on 2. 

Page 22 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to implement its 

corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy, including the oversight of 

funding; identification of cost, readiness, and safety impacts; and the 

development of results-oriented metrics, we reviewed DOD’s funding and 

progress for corrosion-related projects that it initiated during fiscal years 

2005 and 2006. We reviewed the President’s budget justification for fiscal

year 2006 for corrosion-related efforts and met with DOD officials within 

the Comptroller’s Office regarding their oversight of the Corrosion Policy

and Oversight Office’s budget. We also met with DOD officials within the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics to assess their oversight of programs and funding levels of the 

military services during the annual budget reviews as well as their 

monitoring of the services’ acquisition practices. In particular, we met with 

officials with the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office responsible for 

managing, directing, and reviewing corrosion prevention and mitigation 

initiatives. We met with DOD officials involved with developing DOD’s 

long-term strategy to prevent and control corrosion. We obtained their 

assessments and perspectives on corrosion prevention and mitigation 

programs and strategies; obtained and reviewed DOD policies, procedures, 

guidelines, and draft instructions for prevention and mitigation of 

corrosion on DOD military equipment and infrastructure; and discussed 

additional actions that could be taken to further prevent and mitigate 

corrosion. We reviewed DOD’s funding requirements for fiscal years 2005 

through 2007 and future year projections. 

To assess the extent to which the military services’ have incorporated 

corrosion prevention planning in the acquisition of major weapon systems, 

we conducted a review of 51 major defense acquisition programs from the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force. These 51 programs were selected based on a 

nonprobability sample of acquisition programs from the Fiscal Year 2006 

Major Defense Acquisition Program List approved by the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Navy programs 

were about half of the programs on the list. A program is designated a 

major acquisition program either by the Secretary of Defense, or because

it is estimated to require a total expenditure of more than $365 million in 

research, development, test, and evaluation funds or require a total 

expenditure of more than $2.19 billion in procurement funds. Our program 

selection represented the functional capability areas for battle space 

awareness, focused logistics, force application, force protection, and joint 

training and included air, ground, and sea weapon systems. In particular, 

we selected and reviewed 13 Army programs, 25 Navy programs, and 13 

Air Force programs. We met with officials responsible for managing the 

acquisition programs and with officials having primary responsibility for 

Page 23 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

overseeing corrosion prevention and mitigation within the respective

services. We obtained and reviewed military service policies and 

instructions that establish corrosion prevention and control program 

requirements. For the acquisition programs we selected, we obtained and 

reviewed documents, including the acquisition strategy, acquisition plan, 

and corrosion prevention and control plans, as well as related information 

establishing corrosion prevention advisory teams and other reports used 

for tracking and monitoring corrosion-related design initiatives and 

corrections. In particular, we discussed the barriers that exist to more 

effectively employing corrosion control at program initiation and 

acquisition.

We also reviewed the recommendations of the Defense Science Board 

report on corrosion control issued in October 2004, and obtained DOD’s 

related responses and actions taken to better address its strategy for 

corrosion prevention and mitigation. We met with Corrosion Policy and

Oversight Office officials regarding their concurrence and the related 

actions taken to date. 

We conducted our work from April 2006 through January 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We 

did not validate the data provided by DOD. However, we reviewed 

available data for inconsistencies and discussed the data with DOD. We 

determined that the data used for our review were sufficiently reliable for 

our purposes. 

We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following 

locations:1

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Corrosion Policy and Oversight 

Office 

• Army 

• U.S. Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 

• U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 

 1

 Unless otherwise noted, the officials listed in this appendix have their offices in the

Pentagon or at locations in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. 

Page 24 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 

• Navy 

• Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland 

• Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard 

• Air Force, Aeronautical Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, 

Dayton, Ohio 

Page 25 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix III: Org

DOD’s

anizational Structure of 

 Corrosion Activities 

Page 26 GAO-07-618

Appendix III: Organizational Structure of 

DOD’s Corrosion Activities 

Note: DUSD = Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

a

Currently filled by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Communication 

and Outreach Facilities Training and 

Certification

Specifications/Standards

and Qualification Process

  Marine Corps

  Army Corps of Engineers

  Joint Council for Aging Aircraft

  National Aeronautics and Space Administration  United States Coast Guard

 OSD

 JointStaff/J-4

 Army

 Navy  Air Force

Special Assistant for Corrosion Policy and Oversight 

DOD Corrosion Prevention and Control 

Integrated Product Team

Policy and 

Requirements

Science and 

Technology

Metrics, Impact and 

Sustainment

Integrated Product Teams

DUSD, Aquistion and 

Technology

Director, A&T,Systems and 

Software Engineering

Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering DUSD, 

Science and Technology

DUSD, Logistics and Materiel

Readiness

Source: DOD.

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defensea

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

DOD Corrosion Executive

DUSD, Installations and 

Environment

Integrated Product Team member representatives

Defense Management
Appendix IV: Corrosion Prevention Planning

in Selected Major Defense Acquisition 

Programs 

Service and program 

Corrosion prevention and 

control plan

Corrosion prevention advisory 

team 

Army 

AB3, Apache Block III Yes No 

UH-60M Blackhawk Upgrade, Utility Helicopter Upgrade 

Program 

Yes Yes

Light Utility Helicopter No No 

CH-47F Cargo Helicopter No No 

Joint Cargo Aircraft No No 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Program Yes Yes 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles No No 

Stryker, Armored Vehicle Yes Yes 

Bradley Upgrade, Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Upgrade No Yes 

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System No No 

Javelin, Advanced Anti-tank Weapon System No No 

Land Warrior, Integrated Soldier Fighting System No No 

Future Combat Systems Yes Yes 

Navy 

CVN 21, Next Generation Nuclear Aircraft Carrier No Yes 

DDG 1000, Zumwalt Class Destroyer No Yes 

LHA Replacement New Amphibious Assault Ship Yes No 

Littoral Combat Ship Yes No 

Cobra Judy Replacement, Ship-based Radar System No No 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) No No 

T-AKE, Lewis and Clark Class of Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ships No No 

CG(X), Next Generation Cruiser No No 

CVN 68, Nimitz Class Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier No No 

DDG 51, Guided Missile Destroyer Yes Yes 

LPD 17, Amphibious Transport Dock No No 

SSGN, Ohio Class Conversion No No 

SSN 774, Virginia Class Submarine No No 

SSDS, Ship Self Defense System Program No No 

E-2C Reproduction, Hawkeye Carrier-Based Early Warning 

Aircraft 

No No

E-2D AHE, Advanced Hawkeye No No 

Vertical Takeoff and Land Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicle Yes No 

MH-60S, Utility Helicopter to Replace Existing CH-46D, HH60H, SH-3 & UH1N HelicoptersYes Yes

Appendix IV: Corrosion Prevention Planning 

in Selected Major Defense Acquisition 

Programs 

Page 27 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix IV: Corrosion Prevention Planning

in Selected Major Defense Acquisition 

Programs 

Service and program 

Corrosion prevention and 

control plan

Corrosion prevention advisory 

team 

CH-53K, Heavy Lift Replacement Program Yes No 

F/A-18E/F, Hornet Naval Strike Fighter Yes Yes 

H-1 Upgrades, U.S. Marine Corps Mid-life Upgrade to AH-1W

Attack Helicopter and UH-1N Utility Helicopter 

No No

MH-60R, Multi-Mission Helicopter Upgrade Yes Yes 

P-8A, Multi-Mssion Maritime Aircraft Program Yes No 

V-22, Osprey Joint Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Yes Yes 

VH-71, Presidential Helicopter Fleet Replacement Program Yes Yes 

Air Force 

AWACS Upgrade, Airborne Warning and Control System 

Block 40/45 Upgrade Program

No No

Global Hawk, High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Aircraft 

System 

No Yes

C-130 Aircraft Avionics Modernization Program No No 

C-130J, Hercules Cargo Aircraft Program No No 

C-17A, Globemaster III Advanced Cargo Aircraft Program Yes Yes 

C-5 Aircraft Avionics Modernization Program No No 

C-5 RERP, Aircraft Reliability Enhancement and 

Reengineering Program 

No No

B-2 RMP, Radar Modernization Program No No 

F-22A, Advanced Tactical Fighter Yes Yes 

F-35, Joint Strike Fighter Program Yes Yes 

Joint Primary Aircraft Training System Yes Yes 

KC-135 Replacement No No 

Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle No No 

Source: GAO analysis of service data. 

Page 28 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of

Appendix V Defense : Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 29 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of

Defense 

Page 30 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of

Defense 

Page 31 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of

Defense 

Page 32 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of

Defense 

Page 33 GAO-07-618 Defense Management
Appendix VI: 

St

GAO Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 34 GAO-07-618

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

William M. Solis (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Harold Reich, Assistant 

Director; Leslie Bharadwaja; Larry Bridges; Tom Gosling; K. Nicole Harms; 

Charles Perdue; Cheryl Weissman; and Allen Westheimer made key 

contributions to this report. 

Defense Management

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350825) 
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Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

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