Opinion filed August 25 , 2016



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ 

### No. 11

- 1 4

- 00 2 2 3

- C R

__________


### MICHAEL ALLAN DODSON , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 104 th District Court

Taylor County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 19110 B

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Th e tr ial court convicted Michael Alla n Dodson of securing execution of a document by deception. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 32.46 (West Supp. 2016 ).
The trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for a term of six months in
the State Jail Division of the Texas D epartment of Criminal Justice. However, the trial court suspended the imposition of Appellant’s punishment by placing him on community supervision for a term of three years. The trial court also ordered2

Appellant to pay restituti on in the amount of $11,717.04. In a single issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm. Background Facts Appellant filed an application in January 2011 seeking financial assistance
from the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. He testified that he was primarily seeking assistance with medical bills he had recently incu rred as a result of an injury. I n answering “household information” questions on the initial written application, Appellant listed himself as the o nly occupant of his household.
Sharon Chance
, an employee of the Commission
, subsequently interviewed Ap pellant about his application. She testified , “ I explained to him that, in order for him to qualify for any type of medical assistance through the State of Texas, he
would have to have a dependent child under the age of 18 living in the home. ” She further stated that, when she gave Appella nt this information, “ he told me he did have a dependent child living in the house and that he did not add him to the application at that time because he did not know that he needed to. ” Chance testified
that she asked Appellant about the child’s informat ion and that she explained to him that he would have to cooperate with the Texas Attorney General’s O ffice if he
obtained Medicaid. The TIERS case report that Chance generated from her interview of Appellant listed Appellant’s grandson, J.D., as a member of his household and contained information concerning J.D.’s date of bir th and social security number. Chance testified that she would not have approved Appellant for
Medicaid benefits if he had not told her tha t his grandson lived with him. The Commission approved both Appellant and J.D. for Medicaid benefits
, and it paid over $10,000 for Appellant’s past med ical expenses.
The State call ed J.D.’s mother as a witness. She testified that J.D. had never lived with Appellant and that he lived with her at the time Appellant applied for
Medicaid benefits. She testified that she learned that J.D. had Medicaid benefits3

through her empl oyment for a medical provider. She further testified that child support payments that she was supposed to be rece iving from J.D.’s father (Appellant’s son) through the Texas Attorney General’s Office were diverted to Appellant because its records indicated t hat J.D. lived with Appellant. Appellant testified that he never told Ch ance that J.D. lived with him. To the contrary, he testified that she asked him if he had a ny grand children and that he answered truthfully. Appellant relied upon the information that he wrote on his written application as the information that he provided to the Commission about the
members o f his household. Analysis In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intentionally and knowingly defrauded the State of benefits. We review a sufficiency of the evidence issue under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State , 337 S.W.3d 286, 288

– 89 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2010, pet. ref’ d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson , 443 U.S. a t 319; Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State , 393 S.W.3d
76 3, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 07). We defer to the factfinder’ s role as the sole judge of the witnesses ’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at
899. This stand ard accounts for the factfinder’ s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts4

to ultimate facts. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the
record su pports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the
conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778. Section 32.46(a)(1) of the Penal Code provides that “[a] pe rson commits an offense if, with the intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by deception

. . . causes another to sign or execute any document affecting property or service or the

pe cuniary interest of any person. ” The indictment tracked the language of the statute by alleging that
, with intent to defraud and harm the Commission, Appellant intentionally and knowingly caused Chance, an employee of the Commission, to sign and execute a document affecting the pecuniary interest of the State
, by deception
, b y reporting that J.D. lived in his household. Appellant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he intended to defraud the State of benefits. Under S ection 32.46, the “forbidden conduct” is deception. Mills v. State , 722 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986);
Goldstein v. State , 803 S.W.2d 777, 789 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1 991, pet. ref’ d)

. The conduct must be perpetrated with the specif ic intent to defraud or harm a person and must cause another to sign or execut e a document. Mills , 722 S.W.2d at 415

– 16;
Goldstein , 803 S.W.3d at 789. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt

. Appellant testified that he primarily sought benefits from the Commission in order to get financial assistance for his medical bills. Chance testified that, after Appellant initially submitted his written application, she told him
that he could not be covered by Medicaid unless a m inor dependent lived with him and that Appellant told her at that time that J.D. lived with him . Appellant then provided her with information about J.D. in support of the requested benefits.5

Afterward , the Commission notified Appellant in writing that both he and J.D. were

a pproved for Medicaid benefits. The question of whether Appellant intended to obtain Medicaid benefits by deception, when he told Chance that J.D. lived in his household, was inherently a credibility question for the trial court to resolve between the conflicting accounts that Appellant and Chance provided at trial. As noted previously, the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility

. See Brooks
, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We defer to the factfinder’ s resolu tion of the conflicts in the testimony. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton , 235 S.W.3d at 778. We overrule Appellant’ s sole issue. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
JUSTICE

August 25, 2016 Do not publish. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: W right , C.J., Willson, J. , and Bailey, J.