United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

MILITARY BASE 

CLOSURES 

Management Strategy 

Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve 

Communication to Help 

Ensure Timely 

Implementation of Air 

National Guard 

Recommendations 

May 2007 

GAO-07-641 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2007

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES 

Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve Communication 

to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of 

Air National Guard Recommendations 

Highlights of GAO-07-641, a report to 

congressional committees 

The 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAC) recommendations 

affected 62 percent of the flying

units in the Air National Guard

(ANG) with 14 units losing their 

flying mission, and others

converting from one type of

aircraft to another, or increasing or 

decreasing assigned aircraft. To

implement the recommendations, 

ANG must relocate hundreds of

aircraft and retrain or recruit about 

15,000 personnel by 2011. In this 

report, GAO addresses the status of

efforts to implement the ANG

BRAC actions. GAO’s objectives 

were to determine (1) the process 

to provide replacement missions to 

units losing flying missions, (2) the 

progress and challenges in

implementing the BRAC actions, 

and (3) changes to the cost and

savings estimates. This report,

prepared under the Comptroller 

General’s authority to conduct 

evaluations on his own initiative, is 

one in a series of reports related to 

2005 BRAC recommendations. 

GAO conducted its work at the Air 

Force, ANG headquarters, and in 11

states affected by BRAC 2005. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Department of Defense develop a 

strategy to address challenges, 

enhance communication, and 

provide more transparent cost

reporting. DOD partially concurred 

with the recommendations on 

strategy and communication, but 

did not concur with the 

recommendation on cost reporting. 

Through a consultative process that involved key stakeholders, the Air 

Force identified and ANG assigned 30 replacement missions for affected 

units that supported either the future force structure or the National 

Guard goal to maximize flying missions. On the basis of consultation with 

its major commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force 

developed a prioritized list of potential mission areas for ANG, but let 

ANG, with input from state leadership, decide which missions to assign 

to specific units. ANG assigned affected units 23 missions from the 

prioritized list. ANG also assigned 7 new flying missions to affected units

on the basis of its leadership goal to have at least 1 flying mission per 

state and to maximize the number of flying missions where possible. 

ANG is making progress in planning to implement the BRAC 

recommendations, but lacks a strategy to address implementation 

challenges. Without such a strategy, several challenges could delay when 

some units are able to perform their new missions. ANG has developed 

programming plans for the BRAC-related actions affecting the ANG and a 

plan to move hundreds of aircraft. However, ANG faces challenges in 

managing the timing and sequencing of many actions required to 

implement BRAC, such as developing manning documents that provide 

the specific skill mixes required, and in ensuring there is sufficient space 

in Air Force schools to accommodate personnel requiring training. For 

example, ANG projects that about 3,000 personnel need to be trained for

intelligence missions, but the school can currently accommodate only a 

portion of this requirement. ANG has worked with the Air Force to 

develop potential solutions, but these have yet to be fully implemented. 

There may also be delays in obtaining security clearances for personnel 

due to the lengthy clearance process. Further, bridge missions have not 

been identified for some units that will face a gap between old and new 

missions. ANG also faces possible delays in obtaining required funding 

for new equipment, construction, and training. Finally, some ANG units 

believe there has been insufficient communication with ANG 

headquarters about new mission requirements, which impacts their 

ability to recruit and train personnel. 

GAO’s analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there will be 

annual recurring costs of $53 million rather than estimated $26 million 

annual recurring savings for the ANG related actions. Further, the Air 

Force is not using BRAC funds for over $300 million for military 

construction, training, and equipment to establish replacement missions 

for units losing their flying mission. However, because these costs are 

not included in the Air Force BRAC budget submission, Congress does 

not have full visibility over BRAC-related implementation costs. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-641.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Brian Lepore at

(202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 6

Air Force Involved Key Stakeholders in the Process to Identify and 

Assign Replacement Missions 9 

ANG Has Made Progress in Planning, but Faces Challenges That 

Are Likely to Delay When Units Are Able to Perform Their 

Missions 12

No Annual Recurring Savings Will Be Achieved for ANG BRAC 

Recommendations and Congress Has Not Been Given Full 

Visibility over All BRAC-Related ANG Costs 25 

Conclusions 29

Recommendations for Executive Action 30 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36 

Appendix II Replacement Missions Assigned to Units That Lost 

Their Flying Mission as a Result of BRAC 2005 40 

Appendix III Comparison of Estimated Annual Recurring Savings 

between the 2005 BRAC Commission Report and 

Current Air Force Estimates, for ANG–Related 

Recommendations 42 

Appendix IV Current One-Time Cost Estimates for BRAC 

Recommendations Affecting ANG 44 

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 46 

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 50 

 

Page i GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Tables 

Table 1: BRAC Commission Recommendation’s Impact on ANG 

Flying Units and Personnel 7 

Table 2: Priority Level of Replacement Missions for ANG Units 10 

Table 3: Changes in One-Time Implementation Costs 27 

Table 4: Estimates of One-Time Costs Being Funded Outside of the 

BRAC Account 28 

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Page ii GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

May 16, 2007

Congressional Committees 

On May 13, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) made public its 

recommendations to realign and close bases, which it projected would 

yield nearly $50 billion in net savings over 20 years. Although Air National 

Guard (ANG) units were affected by 37 of the 42 Air Force 

recommendations, these actions were aimed primarily at transforming 

ANG to better support the future force structure rather than producing 

significant savings. In July 2005, we reported that DOD’s proposed 

recommendations affected 56 ANG installations with 22 units potentially

losing their flying mission.1

 We also observed that the Air Force had not 

identified new missions for many of those units. Air Force officials said at 

the time that they planned to use positions in these units for emerging 

missions to support the future force structure in such areas such as 

homeland defense, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and intelligence, 

which they expected to further refine as part of the Quadrennial Defense 

Review. After performing its own analysis, the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment (BRAC) Commission2

 made substantial changes to the 

recommendations published in its September 8, 2005 report. The BRAC 

recommendations affected 56 (62 percent) of ANG flying units with 14 

units losing their flying mission, 4 units reducing their flying mission, 5 

units converting from one type of aircraft to another, 4 units associating3

with another unit, and 29 units receiving an increase in the number of 

aircraft assigned to them. The BRAC Commission estimated that the Air 

Force recommendations would result in an annual recurring savings of 

about $1.1 billion and those affecting ANG would be about $26 million of 

the Air Force projected annual recurring savings. The BRAC Commission

 1

GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for

Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785 (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005). 

2

The BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-107, 

Title XXX) provides for an independent Commission to review the Secretary of Defense’s 

realignment and closure recommendations and present its findings and conclusions on the

Secretary’s recommendations, along with its own recommendations to the President. 

3

In an associate unit, a unit from one component (i.e., active, guard, or reserve) of the Air 

Force operates and maintains equipment that it shares with a unit from another 

component. By sharing equipment, the Air Force seeks to train more people and make

more efficient use of the equipment. 

Page 1 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
recommendations were accepted by the President and Congress and 

became effective on November 9, 2005. 

Once the recommendations became effective, the Air Force became 

responsible for implementing recommendations affecting ANG. The 

Office of the Secretary of Defense required the Air Force to submit a 

detailed business plan for each recommendation that included a schedule

for any personnel, equipment, or aircraft movements between installations 

and updated costs and savings estimates. All the plans affecting ANG were 

approved by the Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group between 

April and October 2006. In accordance with BRAC statutory authority, 

DOD must complete closure and realignment actions by September 15, 

2011.

4

This report is one in a series of reports that detail progress DOD has made

in implementing the base closures and realignments included in the 2005 

BRAC round. We performed our work under the Comptroller General’s 

authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative5

 and are reporting 

the results to you in order to facilitate your oversight role of DOD’s 

infrastructure and BRAC initiatives. In this report, we address the Air 

Force’s efforts to implement the BRAC recommendations affecting ANG. 

Our specific objectives were to determine (1) the process the Air Force 

used to identify and assign new missions to ANG units who will lose flying 

missions as a result of BRAC 2005, (2) the progress the Air Force has made 

and the challenges it faces in implementing the BRAC recommendations, 

and (3) changes to the estimated cost and savings associated with 

implementation of recommendations affecting ANG since the BRAC 

recommendations became effective. 

To accomplish these objectives, we performed our work at the Air Force

headquarters, including the Total Force Integration office6 and the BRAC 

Project Management Office; and ANG Directorate of the National Guard 

Bureau,7

 in Washington, D.C. We also interviewed ANG officials in 

 4

Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2904, as amended (1990). 

5

31 U.S.C. §717. 

6

The Air Force Total Force Integration Office (A8F) was previously known as the Future 

Total Force Office. 

7

The ANG Directorate of the National Guard Bureau is hereafter referred to as ANG 

headquarters. 

Page 2 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
11 states that were affected by the 2005 BRAC recommendations.8

 During 

these meetings, we interviewed key officials involved in implementing the 

recommendations to understand the process used to identify and assign 

new missions to ANG units as well as the role that Air Force and ANG 

headquarters, the state adjutants general, and affected units played in the 

process and to identify the challenges the Air Force faces in implementing 

the recommendations. Finally, we analyzed the changes to the costs and

savings estimates between the approved BRAC Commission 

recommendations and the business plans developed by the Air Force and

approved by the Secretary of Defense. On the basis of our assessments, we 

believe the DOD data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. We conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Further details on the scope and methodology are described in appendix I.

Through an evolutionary and consultative process involving all key 

stakeholders, the Air Force identified and ANG headquarters assigned 

replacement missions for affected units that supported either the future 

force structure or the National Guard goal to maximize the number of 

ANG flying missions. On the basis of consultation with its major 

commands and the combatant commanders, the Air Force identified 

potential missions for ANG, which it then categorized into a prioritized list 

based on mission significance. The Air Force then let ANG headquarters, 

with input from state leadership, decide which of those missions to assign 

to specific units. Our analysis indicated that 23 of the 30 missions 

assigned were on the prioritized list. In addition to the prioritized list, 

ANG leadership sought to ensure that each state had at least one flying

mission and to assign additional flying missions where possible. Our 

analysis shows that the remaining 7 missions assigned were new flying 

missions based on this premise. For example, Connecticut was assigned a 

new flying mission because it no longer had one, and additional flying

missions were assigned in Missouri, Tennessee, Mississippi, and two in 

Ohio. 

Results in Brief 

ANG is making progress toward implementing the 2005 BRAC 

recommendations, but some related challenges remain that could delay 

 8

We visited state ANG and unit officials in Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, 

New Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. We also held video conferences with state 

ANG officials in Oklahoma and Ohio and received written responses to questions from 

state ANG officials in Mississippi. 

Page 3 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
when some units are able to be mission capable. The Air Force has 

developed business plans that have been approved by the Secretary of 

Defense, created 59 programming plans, developed a plan for the 

movement of aircraft, and assigned missions to all affected units. 

However, ANG headquarters faces challenges in managing the timing and

sequencing of many actions required to implement the BRAC 

recommendations. First, ANG headquarters faces challenges in 

developing the large number of unit manning documents and requirements 

templates that provide the specific skill mixes required for replacement 

missions. ANG headquarters also does not know the specific skill sets 

needed for all missions because some of these missions are new and the 

skill sets are still being defined. Second, ANG headquarters faces 

challenges in ensuring that there is sufficient space in Air Force training

schools for all the personnel requiring training. For example, ANG 

headquarters projects they need to train about 3,000 personnel for 

intelligence-related replacement missions, but the intelligence school 

currently cannot fully accommodate this requirement in a timely manner. 

The Air Force is working on potential solutions, such as increasing the 

number of instructors and shortening the required curriculum for one 

intelligence specialty, but these solutions have yet to be fully implemented 

and may add to ANG costs. Third, ANG officials are concerned there 

could be delays in obtaining security clearances for some of the personnel 

assigned new missions due to the time required to process a clearance

application. Fourth, ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions 

for all units that will face a delay between the removal of their old mission

and the startup of their replacement mission. Fifth, ANG faces possible 

delays in obtaining required funding for new equipment, construction, and 

training due to residual impacts of the continuing resolutions for fiscal 

year 2007 and requirements that were not included in the budget. Finally, 

according to some state and ANG unit commanders,9

 communication with 

ANG headquarters is limited and insufficient to meet the needs of the 

units, and they are not receiving key information—such as new mission 

requirements and the new personnel skill mix that each unit will 

require—which impacts units’ ability to recruit and train personnel. These 

challenges generally affect both the implementation of the BRAC 

recommendations and the establishment of replacement missions. 

 9

In conducting our work, we spoke with senior state and ANG unit commanders, including 

adjutants general and assistant adjutants general, as well as the wing commanders and

some deputy wing commanders of affected units. 

Page 4 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Without a strategy to deal with these related challenges, some units may 

face delays in when they are able to be mission capable. 

In comparison to the BRAC Commission estimates, our analysis of current 

Air Force estimates indicates that no annual recurring savings will be 

achieved as a result of the recommendations related to ANG, ANG onetime implementation costs are projected to increase, and Congress has not 

been given full visibility over ANG BRAC-related implementation costs. 

Specifically, our analysis indicates that implementing the ANG related 

recommendations is expected to result in annual recurring costs of 

$53 million dollars rather than annual recurring savings of $26 million 

estimated by the BRAC Commission. The $79 million per year difference 

occurred primarily due to language in the Commission’s report that 

prevents ANG from reducing its current end strength in some states. Also, 

our analysis shows one-time implementation cost estimates are projected

to increase $68 million dollars (13.5 percent; from $504 million to 

$572 million) primarily due to additional military construction 

requirements and inflation.10 Further, the Air Force decided to fund over 

$300 million to establish replacement missions for units that lost their 

flying missions outside the BRAC account and did not report these costs in 

their BRAC budget submission. Therefore, Congress does not have full 

visibility over ANG BRAC-related implementation costs. 

We are making recommendations to ensure the challenges we identified

are addressed, to improve communication between ANG headquarters and 

the affected units, and to increase cost transparency. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our 

recommendations regarding ensuring the challenges we identified are 

addressed and improving communication between ANG headquarters and 

the affected units and did not concur with our recommendation regarding

increasing cost transparency. DOD does not believe these costs are 

BRAC-related because establishment of replacement missions was not 

part of the BRAC recommendations. Although the Commission did not 

direct specific replacement missions for the affected units, the BRAC 

Commission recommended that DOD provide replacement missions, 

retain all personnel in affected units, and where appropriate, retrain 

 10BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005 dollars, whereas 

budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars, which includes inflation. Over the

2006 through 2011 implementation period, the cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 

15 percent. The actual impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are incurred. 

Page 5 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
personnel in skills relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we believe 

the costs to establish the new missions are BRAC-related and should be 

reported in the Air Force’s annual BRAC budget submission. DOD’s 

written comments are reprinted in appendix V. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated into this report as 

appropriate. 

ANG is a reserve component of the United States Air Force. It performs 

both federal and state missions, consists of about 107,000 members, and 

makes up about 20 percent of the total Air Force. ANG provides 100 

percent of the air sovereignty missions and plays a key role in the Air 

Force’s Aerospace Expeditionary Force,11 including 49 percent of theater 

airlifts and 45 percent of tanker missions. In their state role, ANG units 

report to the governor of their respective state or territory (Puerto Rico, 

Guam, Virgin Islands) or the commanding general of the District of 

Columbia National Guard and participate in emergency relief support 

during natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, and forest fires; 

search and rescue operations; support to civil authorities; maintenance of

vital public services; and counter-drug operations. For example, ANG was 

involved in the relief effort following Hurricane Katrina in September 2005. 

Background 

The Air Force, its major commands, and the National Guard Bureau each

have a role in the management of ANG. The Air Force and its major 

commands play a key role in determining ANG’s force structure, approving 

new missions, and equipping ANG to perform its missions. The National 

Guard Bureau administers the federal functions of ANG and works with 

the Air Force Air Staff to develop and coordinate programs that directly 

affect ANG. The Bureau also formulates and administers programs for 

training, development, and maintenance of ANG units. The National 

Guard Bureau also acts as the channel of communication between the Air 

Force and the 54 states and territories where National Guard units are 

located.12

 11The Air Force Aerospace Expeditionary Force (also referred to as the Air and Space

Expeditionary Force) combines the active, reserve, and Guard into one component that

trains, deploys, and operates together. This force is comprised of fighters, bombers, 

tankers, and tactical air lifters. 

1210 U.S.C. § 10501. 

Page 6 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Prior to this round of BRAC, ANG had 91 units with flying missions. As 

part of DOD’s BRAC report, the Air Force proposed actions that would 

have affected 56 of these units with 22 units losing their flying mission. In 

July 2005, we reported that many of the personnel positions associated 

with the units losing a flying mission did not have a new mission 

identified. Air Force officials stated they planned to use these positions 

for emerging missions in such areas as homeland defense, UAVs, and 

intelligence, which they expect to further refine as part of the 2004 

Quadrennial Defense Review. After examining these proposals, the BRAC 

Commission made substantial changes to the recommendations affecting 

ANG with 14 units losing their flying mission, other units reducing or 

converting aircraft, and others increasing the number of aircraft. Table 1

summarizes the BRAC Commission recommendations affecting ANG 

flying units. 

Table 1: BRAC Commission Recommendation’s Impact on ANG Flying Units and 

Personnel 

Number of 

Type of action Units Personnel

a 

Ceasing flying mission 14 6,000

Converting aircraft typeb5 1,000

Increasing assigned aircraft 29 3,900

Associating with another unitc4 1,100

Reducing assigned aircraft 4 700

Total 56 12,700

ANG (end strength/flying units) 91 106,800

Percentage affected 62% 12%

Source: ANG. 

a

Rounded to the nearest 100. 

b

Units that lost one aircraft type and gained another due to BRAC recommendations. 

c

Units that lost their aircraft and are directed to share the aircraft of an active or reserve unit due to 

BRAC recommendations. 

While the BRAC Commission directed the removal of aircraft from 14 

units, it did not identify replacement missions for these units. Instead, the 

Commission recommended that the affected units would assume a new 

mission that would integrate the unit into the Future Total Force such as 

air mobility; engineering; flight training; or UAVs, if the state agreed to 

change the organization, composition, and location of the affected unit. 

Future Total Force transformational missions, also known as Total Force 

Page 7 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Integration missions, are managed through a new directorate established 

by the Air Force in March 2005, called the Total Force Integration office.

13 

In addition, the Commission recommended that the loss of a flying unit not 

change the authorized end strength of ANG in each affected state. 

The President and Congress approved the BRAC Commission 

recommendations, which became effective on November 9, 2005. Once 

the recommendations became effective, the Secretary of Defense 

designated one of the military services or defense agencies as the 

executive agent responsible for implementing each recommendation. The 

Air Force is the executive agent for the recommendations involving ANG.14 

The Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group required the executive 

agent to submit detailed business plans to update estimated costs and 

savings and identify a schedule for implementing each recommendation. 

The Air Force BRAC Project Management office prepared the business 

plans for the recommendations affecting ANG. The business plans to 

implement ANG recommendations were approved between April and 

October 2006 by the Infrastructure Steering Group, an office chaired by 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

that oversees BRAC implementation. 

While planning to implement the 2005 BRAC recommendations, ANG 

headquarters had to manage several other issues that affected its end 

strength. ANG headquarters identified that unit manning documents 

guardwide included about 3,500 positions more than permitted by 

authorized ANG end strength. ANG headquarters had to identify and 

remove these excess positions across various states and units.

Furthermore, in December 2005, the Secretary of Defense directed ANG to 

eliminate about 14,000 positions between fiscal years 2007 and 2011.15 

After several months of planning for these reductions, in May 2006, ANG 

reduced its budget in other areas by $1.8 billion rather than reduce its end 

strength. As a result, the new mission plan for each state had to be altered

and was not completed until October 2006. 

 13The directorate is staffed with representatives from stakeholder organizations including

the Air Staff, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, and several states. 

14The Navy is the executive agent for one recommendation affecting ANG. 

15Program Budget Decision 720. 

Page 8 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
The Air Force and ANG headquarters identified and assigned new 

missions to units that will lose flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005 

through an evolutionary and consultative process that involved key 

stakeholders such as its major commands and individual units. A best 

practice we have identified in previous work indicates that during major 

organizational transformations it is important to involve stakeholders to 

obtain their ideas and to gain their ownership of the transformation. 

Further, stakeholder involvement helps to increase stakeholder 

understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and objectives, and

gain ownership for new policies and procedures. In addition to basing 

decisions on a prioritized list of possible missions, ANG headquarters also 

sought replacement missions that supported the future force structure of 

the Air Force and tried to maximize flying missions wherever possible. 

Air Force Involved 

Key Stakeholders in 

the Process to 

Identify and Assign 

Replacement Missions 

The process to identify new relevant missions for ANG units took place in

phases. In June 2005, the Air Force Total Force Integration office 

prioritized mission ideas provided by ANG using working groups that 

included staff at different levels as well as key stakeholders from all 

components of the Air Force, state adjutants general, and major 

commands. The Total Force Integration office developed a prioritized list 

of potential missions by grouping them into one of the following four 

bands: 

• Band 1—the highest priority, missions the Air Force “must do” to satisfy 

congressional mandates and existing laws. 

• Band 2—missions that are considered “mission critical” to the Air Force 

achieving its objectives. 

• Band 3—missions that are “mission significant,” meaning that failing to 

perform the tasks could negatively affect overall effectiveness. 

• Band 4—missions that are “mission enhancing,” meaning that they would

be nice to do if resources are available. 

The Air Force Total Force Integration office sent the banded mission list 

to ANG headquarters,16 which used the list to assign replacement missions 

to units based on a number of variables. These included the existing skill 

 16ANG headquarters also used the banded list to assign missions to units affected by other 

force structure changes that were occurring outside of BRAC.

Page 9 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
sets in the affected units, recruiting trends in the affected unit’s state, the 

states’ expressed desires, and the mission requirements. According to 

ANG officials, they wanted to assign missions that were consistent with 

the preexisting mission or capitalize on the strengths of the states to 

minimize transition challenges. Subsequent to the development of the 

banded list, the Air Force identified some flying missions that could be 

assigned to ANG. According to ANG officials, these flying missions were 

assigned to units instead of other missions on the banded list. Most of the 

replacement missions ANG headquarters assigned were either in the top 

two bands or were flying missions. Our analysis indicated that 23 of the 30 

missions assigned were on the banded list and the remaining 7 missions 

assigned were new flying missions, as shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Priority Level of Replacement Missions for ANG Units 

Missions Positions affected

Source Number Percentage Number Percentage

Replacement flying mission 7 23 1,875 29

Band I 12 40 3,410 53

Band II 6 20 472 7

Band III 1 3 65 1

Band IV 4 13 616 10

Total 30 100a6,438 100

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data.

a

Numbers do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding. 

As shown in table 2, about 83 percent of the missions assigned and 89

percent of their personnel were band I or II missions or a new flying 

mission (see app. II for the unit assignments and their respective priority 

level). Although the missions assigned in bands III and IV constitute 5 of 

the 30 missions assigned (about 16 percent), they require about 681 

positions, which is approximately 11 percent of the total affected positions 

of all positions in replacement missions. The one band III replacement 

mission is an intelligence instructor mission assigned to the ANG unit at 

Ellington, Texas. Many new positions in ANG replacement missions are in 

the intelligence career field. Anticipating the increased intelligence

training requirement, this mission is designed to augment the instructor 

staff at the Air Force intelligence training school at Goodfellow Air Force 

Base in Texas. The four band IV missions assigned consist of two 

engineering missions assigned to Mansfield, Ohio, and Willow Grove, 

Pennsylvania, an intelligence production mission assigned to Nashville, 

Page 10 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Tennessee, and a classified mission assigned to Nashville. According to 

Air Force officials, ANG headquarters assigned the engineering missions to 

Ohio and Pennsylvania based on the ANG desire to distribute homeland 

defense assets regionally. 

In phases subsequent to the development of the banded list, flying 

missions were assigned with direct involvement of senior leadership from 

the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau, and ANG. Throughout the 

process to replace missions for affected ANG units there was an effort to 

assign replacement flying missions to the greatest extent possible. 

According to ANG officials, if any flying missions became available, ANG 

headquarters would match those missions to units instead of other 

missions on the banded list. The replacement flying missions are the joint 

cargo aircraft,17 a B-2 association with an active wing, and an F-16 foreign

military sales training mission. The joint cargo aircraft mission was 

assigned to ANG units at Bradley, Connecticut; Kellogg, Michigan; 

Mansfield, Ohio; Key Field, Mississippi; and Nashville, Tennessee. 

According to ANG officials, Bradley received the joint cargo aircraft 

mission because it was in the only state that did not have a flying mission, 

while units in Michigan, Ohio, Mississippi, and Tennessee were selected 

based on the ANG desire to distribute homeland defense assets regionally. 

Additionally, two18 of the five joint cargo aircraft mission assignments 

were made to units that currently fly the C-130, another airlift aircraft, and 

one assignment was made to a unit that currently flies the KC-135 tanker, 

which ANG headquarters officials believe will minimize transition costs. 

According to ANG officials, the Air Combat Command identified the 

potential for the ANG unit in St. Louis, Missouri, to associate with the B-2 

mission at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. The two bases are in the 

same state and it provides an opportunity for an ANG unit to associate 

with an active Air Force mission using an aircraft that is new for ANG and 

relevant for the future of the Air Force. Finally, the unit in Springfield, 

Ohio, was assigned an F-16 foreign military sales training mission because 

this unit currently is an F-16 training unit. 

 17The Joint Cargo Aircraft will be a new, small airlift aircraft the Air Force plans to acquire. 

18Units assigned the joint cargo aircraft as a replacement mission that previously flew the 

C-130 are Mansfield, Ohio, and Nashville, Tennessee. The ANG unit at Key Field, 

Mississippi, previously flew the KC-135 air tanker and the ANG unit at Kellogg, Michigan, 

previously flew the A-10. 

Page 11 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
ANG headquarters has completed some key planning tasks for the 

implementation of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, but we believe that 

challenges remain that could delay when some units may be able to 

become mission capable.

19 To date, ANG headquarters has completed 

programming plans, an aircraft movement schedule, and a state-by state

new mission plan. However, ANG headquarters faces challenges in 

completing manning documents, potentially insufficient training school 

capacity, obtaining security clearances for many personnel in a prompt 

manner, ensuring that personnel at affected units have a mission to 

perform when their old mission is removed, and funding delays. Further, 

some ANG unit commanders state that communication with ANG 

headquarters is ad hoc and inadequate to meet their needs. These 

challenges generally affect both the implementation of the BRAC 

recommendations and the establishment of replacement missions. ANG 

officials have stated these challenges could delay when some units are 

mission capable. A strategy for managing these challenges and improved 

communication between ANG headquarters and affected ANG units will 

be required to help minimize delays. 

The Air Force has created a business plan for each recommendation that 

will be used as planning tools for BRAC implementation. These plans 

include a description of the actions required including an aircraft 

movement schedule, financial plans, and construction required for each 

recommendation. These plans have been approved by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense, and will be updated as implementation details 

change. 

ANG headquarters completed 59 BRAC-related programming plans 

between December 2006 and January 2007. According to an ANG official, 

these plans provide guidance from the major commands to units on how 

to implement changes to unit structures and missions. Specifically, each 

plan identifies the key organizations involved, lists key milestones and 

ANG Has Made 

Progress in Planning, 

but Faces Challenges 

That Are Likely to 

Delay When Units Are 

Able to Perform Their 

Missions 

Some Key Planning Tasks 

Completed 

 19ANG has planned for two phases of mission capability for units converting to a new

mission: Initial Operational Capability, and Full Operational Capability. According to ANG 

officials, Initial Operational Capability is a variable term that can apply to any 

predetermined level of partial capability, depending on the unit and mission, while Full 

Operational Capability is achieved when unit commanders report that the unit is ready to 

perform its mission. ANG officials stated that the conversion process typically takes 

approximately 4 years to complete. 

Page 12 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
objectives for specific actions, and assigns primary responsibility to the 

offices that will assist with the implementation. 

ANG headquarters has also completed a plan to manage the movement of 

hundreds of aircraft that will relocate into or out of 56 ANG units. This 

plan provides a schedule that identifies when aircraft will move around the 

country by fiscal quarter, through 2011. According to an ANG official, this 

movement schedule was in part designed to ensure that units losing their 

aircraft are not left without a mission by implementing a replacement 

mission before the aircraft depart, and to ensure that existing homeland 

defense missions are continued.20 

ANG headquarters has also produced a state-by-state new mission plan 

that identifies all the changes to ANG units that are occurring within each 

state. This plan includes BRAC actions, new missions assigned through 

the Total Force Integration process,21 the ANG headquarters review of 

each unit manning document (UMD) to remove excess personnel, and

standardizing squadron size so that units conducting the same missions 

are uniform in size. Specifically, the new mission plan identifies the 

general number of people that will be assigned to each mission; unit 

commanders can use this information as a basic guide to plan for required

internal manpower changes. For example, if the new mission plan 

identifies that one mission is ceasing and losing 150 positions and a new 

mission is starting in the same unit or state that requires 150 new 

positions, unit commanders can begin to approach the personnel in the 

ceasing mission to determine if they are willing and able to qualify for the 

new mission. 

ANG headquarters may face challenges in managing the timing and 

sequencing of many actions required to implement the BRAC 

recommendations and to complete the conversion process for units taking 

on a new mission. First, ANG headquarters faces difficulties in completing 

the UMDs that units require to determine retraining or recruitment 

Challenges in Managing 

Many Sequential 

Implementation Actions 

and Communicating with 

Units 

 20One of the missions that ANG units perform is the homeland defense Air Sovereignty 

Alert mission, where fighter aircraft stationed around the country are always ready and

available to intercept potentially hostile aircraft. 

21In addition to the replacement missions assigned to the 14 units losing their flying 

mission, ANG also assigned new Total Force Integration missions to nearly every U.S. state 

and territory in a simultaneous process unrelated to BRAC. 

Page 13 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
requirements. Second, ANG may also have difficulty in securing training 

at technical and flight schools for all personnel in time to perform their 

new missions as scheduled. Third, there may be delays in getting security

clearances for individuals who require one for their new mission. Fourth, 

there are some units that will require a temporary bridge mission to carry 

them over until their new mission is available. Fifth, delays in funding for 

equipment and facilities could delay when units are able to perform their 

replacement missions. Sixth, according to some ANG units, 

communication with ANG headquarters is limited and insufficient to meet

the needs of the units, such as new mission requirements. Though ANG 

headquarters officials are aware of these challenges and developing some 

solutions at the working level, they lack an overarching strategy to manage

and mitigate these implementation challenges and any potential domino 

effects and to communicate solutions to the affected units, which 

increases the risk that ANG headquarters will face delays in establishing 

replacement missions and could result in decreased readiness and 

potentially inefficiently utilized personnel. 

ANG headquarters is behind schedule in completing some UMDs and at 

the time we had completed our audit work an ANG official projected that 

they may not be able to meet current stated internal deadlines as a result. 

ANG headquarters must develop new UMDs for all converting ANG units, 

which includes units receiving a replacement mission, converting aircraft 

type, or forming an association with another unit. Additionally, UMD 

changes are required for units gaining or losing some aircraft or personnel. 

A UMD allows unit commanders to recruit and train new personnel or 

identify existing personnel who require training for a new mission. 

According to an ANG official, they have to complete many UMDs this year, 

and over 100 in order to implement BRAC and replacement missions. 

Although, according to an ANG official, Air Force regulations require 

UMDs to be issued to units 6 months before the units are supposed to 

begin their assigned mission, ANG officials have stated that their goal is to

get a UMD to units up to 1 year prior. An ANG official stated that they had

hoped to complete all UMDs for units that are supposed to begin 

conversion by the first quarter of fiscal year 2008 by March 31, 2007, but at 

the time we had completed our audit work another ANG official stated 

that they may be unable to meet this deadline because of delays in major 

commands approving the draft UMDs. 

Completing Manpower 

Documents 

Page 14 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
According to ANG headquarters, all UMDs have to be approved by the 

major commands before they can be completed and issued.22 According to 

an ANG official, they have been waiting for approval for 2 to 3 months, and 

the process typically takes 30 days to complete. One ANG official stated 

that these delays may in part prevent ANG from meeting its March 31, 

2007, UMD issuance deadline, which could cause delays at some affected 

units. 

Though required issuance deadlines have not been missed, ANG 

headquarters faces challenges in completing the UMDs required for those 

units that are transforming in the coming year. For example, ANG 

headquarters has yet to complete the UMD for its Distributed Ground 

System, an intelligence mission assigned to Terre Haute, Indiana, though

the Initial Operational Capability date for this unit is scheduled for the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2008. Of the 11 state ANG commanders we 

interviewed, none have a final UMD for their new missions. Missing 

internal deadlines for completing UMDs increases the risk that ANG 

headquarters will miss other deadlines or the Air Force requirement to 

issue UMDs 6 months prior to the start of new missions. These delays 

could affect the sequencing of other actions, which could in turn delay the 

establishment of replacement missions. 

ANG officials stated that they are working on a solution that will provide 

unit commanders with information about their new manpower 

requirements through a document called a requirements template. 

According to ANG officials, the templates will inform each unit 

commander of the personnel requirements for their new mission, and 

would permit some initial actions, such as sending existing personnel to 

training. However, ANG officials stated these templates cannot be used as 

a funding authorization for recruiting new personnel. According to ANG 

documentation, all existing flying mission templates, including those for 

F-15, F-22, A-10, and C-5, have been completed, but they are still working 

to complete the templates for the joint cargo aircraft, the Component 

Numbered Air Force mission, support staff at all units including wing 

command elements and administrative personnel, and units that are 

associating with an active or reserve unit. According to ANG officials, 

templates for the support staff were to be done after those for existing 

flying missions in part to ensure that individuals requiring flight training or

 22Major commands identified by ANG headquarters include Air Force Air Combat 

Command and Air Mobility Command. 

Page 15 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
other lengthy technical training could have time to reserve seats in flight 

schools, while support personnel will likely not require further training. 

ANG unit commanders state that they require the templates for support 

missions so they can determine their new command structures. For 

example, Indiana ANG commanders stated that they will not know if the 

command staff for the fighter wing at Terre Haute will be responsible for 

commanding the new Distributed Ground System and Air Support 

Operations Squadron missions assigned to that unit, or if these will be 

assigned to a new command staff. ANG officials stated that they had

hoped to have requirements templates issued to all units by December 31, 

2006. However, as of February, 2007, ANG headquarters had not issued 

templates to some of the units we interviewed that were also assigned new 

missions, including Texas, Mississippi, and Ohio. 

According to ANG officials, the challenge in completing the UMDs and 

requirements templates is due to the volume of work required. According 

to ANG officials, nearly every ANG unit will require a new or modified 

UMD as a result of BRAC, the Total Force Integration process, and 

standardizing unit sizes. Completing the UMDs for some units may be 

more difficult than for others. For example, completing the UMD for a 

unit that is increasing or decreasing its allotted number of aircraft by two 

or three is easier than completing a UMD for a unit that is taking on an

entirely new mission or converting from one mission or aircraft to 

another. As a result of BRAC and the Total Force Integration process, 

ANG headquarters has to complete many complicated conversion UMDs, 

which is more time consuming; specifically, the ANG manpower office is 

typically only required to complete five unit conversion UMDs per year, 

but in order to implement the BRAC recommendations, it will have to 

complete hundreds of conversion UMDs. The Director, ANG, stated that 

ANG in general was not adequately structured to complete the volume of 

work required by BRAC. Recognizing that it does not have sufficient staff, 

according to state officials, the ANG manpower office requested 

assistance from the units. However, ANG headquarters is still expected to

miss internal deadlines while receiving this support from the field. 

Without significant augmentation to the manpower office or some other 

change in the UMDs creation process, delays in meeting sequential 

deadlines may continue, which increases the risk that ANG headquarters 

will not be able to complete UMDs in the time frames required. An ANG 

official also indicated that ANG switched to a new manpower planning 

computer program at around the same time as BRAC implementation, 

which delayed initial manpower planning actions. Further, some of the 

replacement missions, such as the still to be acquired joint cargo aircraft, 

are new and thus still have undefined requirements. 

Page 16 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
ANG will have to train many individuals to qualify to fly a new aircraft or 

to perform a new mission. According to ANG officials, these requirements 

will create a surge of personnel needing training for the coming years, and 

there may not be enough space in some training schools to accommodate 

this demand. ANG officials have identified shortfalls spanning from 2008 

through 2012 for A-10 and F-15 pilot training schools.23 For example, ANG 

officials stated that ANG typically requires only 8 seats in the initial 

qualification courses per year, but as a result of BRAC it will require 30 or 

more seats in initial qualification courses per year. Without adjustments, it 

will be difficult for some schools to incorporate the additional 

requirements; for example, the only A-10 school is currently operating at

100 percent capacity. An ANG official stated that without an increase in 

available school seats, some pilot training delays may stretch through 

2014. 

Some ANG pilots who need to qualify to fly a new aircraft as a result of the 

BRAC recommendations may face delays when they are qualified for their

new mission. The projected shortfall may delay when some flying units 

will achieve mission capability, and impact ANG readiness. Specifically, 

the following units will be converting to an F-15 mission or increasing 

their number of F-15 aircraft within the BRAC implementation period: 

Great Falls, Montana; Portland, Oregon; New Orleans, Louisiana; 

Jacksonville, Florida; and Barnes, Massachusetts. Additionally, the 

following units will be converting to an A-10 mission or increasing their 

number of A-10 aircraft within this time period: Boise, Idaho; Fort Smith, 

Arkansas; Selfridge, Michigan; and Martin State, Maryland. Some 

solutions to mitigate the shortfall in space at flight schools have been 

discussed by ANG headquarters officials, but to date none have been 

implemented. Some potential solutions that ANG officials mentioned 

include increasing flight simulator training, sending pilots to training early 

to avoid later delays,24 and establishing ANG-owned flight schools. 

According to ANG officials, this training shortfall could not only delay 

Initial and Full Operational Capability for some units, but could also have 

an impact on warfighting capabilities. ANG officials also identified that 

Potential Training Capacity 

Shortfall 

 23Though these school shortfalls may not be caused by implementation of the BRAC 

recommendations, they may be exacerbated by the number of pilots converting to a new

airframe as a result of the BRAC recommendations. 

24ANG officials stated that this solution may require pilots to temporarily relocate to 

another unit if their home unit does not yet have the new aircraft on the ground. This 

process results in increased costs for ANG.

Page 17 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
converting units will face a period of time while their newly-trained 

personnel are gaining the on-the-job experience required before the units 

can achieve a Full Operational Capability. Without this on-the-job 

experience, newly converted units potentially face decreased readiness 

and capability. 

An increase in personnel requiring training is projected for some nonflight 

technical schools as well. For example, ANG headquarters and Air Force 

officials have stated that some missions--such as the Predator UAV 

mission—will have a high demand for personnel trained in intelligence 

skills. ANG officials have estimated that the ANG is increasing the total

number of intelligence-related positions by approximately 3,000 positions

(200 percent) with an increase from 1,500 to 4,500. ANG and the Air Force

realized that there would be a high demand for the limited number of seats 

at the Air Force intelligence training facility at Goodfellow Air Force Base 

in Texas. The Air Force and ANG headquarters developed two solutions 

to limit the impacts of this shortfall. First, ANG headquarters is increasing

the number of instructors available to teach at the school by assigning a 

new intelligence training mission to the Texas ANG. However, Texas ANG 

officials stated that they did not know if they would be able to staff this 

mission on time since the mission requires trained intelligence instructors, 

and stated that late 2008 would be the earliest practical date that this 

mission could be fully operational. Second, the Air Force is decreasing the 

length of some courses. Specifically, ANG headquarters and the Air Force

arranged to decrease the training course for personnel assigned to the 

UAV sensor operator specialty from 6 to 3 months because they

recognized that these personnel did not initially require all the skills 

provided in the full-length course. Instead, ANG headquarters and the Air 

Force will allow personnel in these positions to delay part of their initial 

training until later in their careers, thus allowing them to report to their 

units faster while freeing up seats in the schools. According to ANG 

officials, these solutions should greatly reduce the strain on the 

intelligence training school and should increase the throughput capability, 

though the increased demand has yet to reach the school to test the 

efficacy of these solutions. If these solutions do not increase the capacity

of the school to required levels, there could be personnel who are unable 

to attend training as scheduled, resulting in a potentially inefficient use of

personnel and units that are unable to fully perform their mission due to 

insufficient numbers of trained personnel, which subsequently impacts 

unit readiness. 

All of the approximately 3,000 individuals who will be converting to a new 

intelligence mission, such as a Predator UAV mission, will require a 

Lengthy Security Clearance 

Process 

Page 18 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
security clearance, as will some personnel in communications positions 

supporting an intelligence unit. According to ANG headquarters officials 

and some unit commanders, there is a concern that the length of time 

required to obtain a top secret clearance, estimated by ANG officials as 

1-1 1⁄2 years, could delay when some personnel are able to perform their 

mission. As we have previously reported, there are long-standing delays 

and other problems with DOD’s personnel security clearance program, 

and this area remains on our high-risk list.25 If affected units do not 

receive personnel requirements that state the number of personnel 

requiring a clearance for their new missions, some or all personnel may 

not have a clearance in time. As a result, some personnel may be unable 

to perform their mission until they obtain their clearance. For example, 

the unit commander at the Otis, Massachusetts, ANG base does not have a 

requirements template or a UMD for either of the two intelligence 

missions that were assigned to Otis. One mission has an initial operational

capability date in the third quarter of fiscal year 2008; Massachusetts ANG 

officials estimate that it will take several years to establish the new 

mission, in part due to the time required to get personnel top secret 

security clearances. 

ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for some units that 

will require one, which could leave personnel without a mission to 

perform and waste resources. Some units may face a period of time when 

they have no mission to perform because their original mission was 

removed and their new mission lacks required resources or is scheduled to

begin later. In order to prevent the inefficient use of personnel who 

otherwise may have no mission to perform, these units will require ANG 

headquarters to assign them a bridge mission that would temporarily give 

personnel a mission to perform until they can transition to their new 

mission. ANG headquarters has planned for bridge missions for some 

locations, such as assigning C-21 light cargo aircraft to some locations 

awaiting the joint cargo aircraft. An ANG official has also stated that in 

some locations they may keep their currently assigned aircraft in place 

past the planned removal date in order to provide a mission for unit 

personnel. However, delaying the movement of aircraft may further delay 

implementation at other locations that are waiting to receive these 

aircraft. Alternatively, if the aircraft that are departing are destined to be 

retired, there will be additional costs to ANG to keep these aircraft in 

service. 

Identifying Bridge Missions 

 25GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007). 

Page 19 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
ANG headquarters has not identified bridge missions for several units that 

will have a mission gap. For example, ANG headquarters timelines 

identify that Massachusetts loses its aircraft at Otis in the fourth quarter of 

2008, and Massachusetts ANG officials stated that they will face a gap 

between missions and that they have not been given a bridge mission. If 

no bridge mission is identified, personnel may have no mission for almost 

2 years until the new mission is established. According to Massachusetts 

state commanders, ANG headquarters has not given them any information 

about a potential bridge mission nor is one identified in an ANG 

headquarters BRAC implementation tracking database. Similarly, Ohio 

ANG officials expressed concern that the C-130s based at Mansfield are 

leaving in 2010 but that the replacement joint cargo aircraft mission has no 

solid implementation date since the aircraft is yet to be acquired. No 

bridge mission for Ohio has been identified by ANG headquarters, nor is 

one listed in an ANG headquarters BRAC implementation tracking 

database. The Director, ANG, estimates the deployment date for the joint

cargo aircraft between 2012 and 2015. The DOD Budget Justification 

books state that requirements are still being defined and predict initial Air 

Force procurement in fiscal year 2010. Further, the Director, ANG, 

identified that there will be a gap at Syracuse, New York; Tucson, Arizona; 

Fargo, North Dakota; and Ellington, Texas, due to delays in procuring new 

UAVs. Without a bridge mission, personnel at these locations and any 

others that face a gap due to implementation delays will be unable to 

perform a mission, resulting in an inefficient use of personnel and a 

reduction in ANG readiness. 

According to ANG documentation, there may be delays in funding for 

required training, equipment, and construction projects that may impact 

some units converting to a new mission in fiscal year 2008. Specifically, 

ANG has identified $127 million in funding shortfalls in 2008 for personnel, 

equipment, construction, and operations and maintenance requirements to 

establish replacement missions. According to an Air Force official, these 

costs were not included in the budget due to internal Air Force 

prioritization and there are unfunded requirements every year. According 

to ANG, these unfunded requirements could result in delays in when some 

missions will be capable of converting and performing their missions. For 

example, according to an ANG official, residual impacts of the fiscal year 

2007 continuing resolutions may limit the funding available for some 

Delays in Funding 

Page 20 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
construction projects in fiscal year 2007.26 For example, significant 

construction was planned for Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and 

Barnes Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, but funding delays due in

part to impacts from the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions may 

postpone this construction.27 Construction at Barnes is scheduled to begin 

in July 2007 and be completed by July 2009; construction at Elmendorf is 

scheduled to begin in July 2007 and be completed by August 2011. The 

schedule for construction at Elmendorf—which is already constrained by 

the short construction season in Alaska —leaves little margin for error if 

construction delays develop. An ANG official has stated that construction 

may not begin by the scheduled dates because of funding delays. If 

required construction activity at Barnes or Elmendorf is not completed as 

scheduled, these units may not receive their new aircraft as scheduled, 

which could delay other implementation actions. 

Shortfalls in training funding may also delay implementation of some 

missions: Indiana ANG officials stated that they need to send 

approximately 100-200 people to training for one of their new missions 

that is scheduled to reach an Initial Operational Capability in the 1st 

quarter 2008, but so far they have only been able to send 2 people to 

training due to an insufficient training budget. Similarly, Texas ANG 

officials stated that they had their Initial Operational Capability date for 

their Predator mission postponed for almost 2 years because there was not 

adequate funding to send personnel to training. The Comptroller of ANG 

stated that the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolutions constituted a large 

reduction in available funds that will be hard to manage, and another ANG 

official stated that residual impacts from the continuing resolutions may 

cause a major slip in milestones. ANG officials have stated that they may 

need to take steps, such as obtaining a supplemental appropriation or 

reallocating funds internally, in order to ensure that required equipment, 

construction, and personnel funds are available in order to achieve fiscal

year 2008 actions on schedule and to avoid potentially cascading 

implementation delays. For example, the Air Force has developed 

 26DOD did not receive a permanent appropriation for military construction until Congress 

replaced the continuing resolutions with a permanent appropriation for fiscal year 2007, 

Pub. L. No. 110-05, February 15, 2007. 

27The ANG base at Kulis, Alaska, is required by BRAC to close; all personnel and aircraft 

from the 176th wing will relocate to the Air Force base at Elmendorf, which will require 

significant construction in order to accommodate the equipment. Barnes is directed to

take the Air Sovereignty Alert mission from Otis, Massachusetts, which will require

construction of an alert facility and other additional buildings. 

Page 21 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
workaround solutions for some affected units, such as using temporary 

facilities in lieu of actual construction, but these solutions may be less 

efficient and more costly in the long term. 

Communications at the headquarters level within ANG offices and 

between ANG headquarters and the Air Force appear to be regular and 

adequate, but it is inadequate between ANG headquarters and ANG units, 

according to units we visited. Specifically, ANG headquarters and Air 

Force officials stated that they work together to identify potential 

implementation challenges and create potential solutions. However, 

according to senior leadership at ANG units we spoke with, including 

adjutants general, assistant adjutants general, wing commanders, deputy 

wing commanders, and one chief executive officer, communication 

between the units in the field and ANG headquarters is ad hoc and the 

information they are provided by ANG headquarters is not adequate to 

meet their needs. For example, ANG headquarters developed an Internetaccessible database that would provide information and milestones to the 

units, but did not make this system available until 10 months after it was 

created. One state ANG official said information received is often due to 

their contacting or traveling to ANG headquarters rather than through 

headquarters-initiated communication. The Director, ANG, acknowledged 

that there are challenges in communicating with the units and that some 

unit commanders may not have the information that they feel they need to

implement the BRAC recommendations and their new missions. To 

address this challenge, the Director, ANG, has started quarterly visits to 

affected units. 

Unit commanders and state adjutants general want details of the skill mix 

required to perform their new missions as soon as possible so they can 

determine how to best fit individual guardsmen in the new missions and 

avoid retention problems. Several ANG units that we interviewed stated 

that they were able to get in contact with ANG headquarters offices, but 

that the information they received in response to questions was not 

sufficient to meet their requirements. One of the ANG units attributed the 

communications deficiencies to the high workload that ANG headquarters 

is undertaking. State- and unit-level ANG commanders identified the 

following examples of challenges in communicating with ANG 

headquarters: 

Communication between ANG 

Headquarters and Units Has 

Been Inadequate 

• Texas ANG officials stated that they do not know how many jobs will 

accompany their Predator UAV mission, or if they will even be receiving 

any Predator aircraft as part of the mission or rather flying UAVs 

belonging to other units instead. This has led to retention issues among 

Page 22 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
guardsmen who fear losing their jobs, with 50 percent of their 

maintenance personnel planning to leave the unit. 

• Virginia ANG officials stated that they find it difficult to communicate 

with ANG headquarters because they do not have a single point of contact

at headquarters to approach with concerns. 

• Missouri and Ohio ANG officials are concerned that there may not be 

funding available to send their guardsmen to required training and they 

cannot get assurances from ANG headquarters that there will be adequate 

funding or other solutions. 

• South Carolina officials told us that they did not know the date of their 

expected Initial Operational Capability, and consequently cannot 

adequately plan for the transition even though they already have some new 

aircraft on the ground. 

• Massachusetts and Texas ANG officials stated that they cannot get any 

information or assurances from ANG headquarters that there will be 

“bridge missions” for their personnel until the new mission arrives. 

Consequently, unit personnel may be underutilized. 

Though ANG headquarters created an information-sharing system for the 

BRAC implementation process, it did not promptly make this system 

available to the units, which resulted in unit commanders not having 

important information about their unit conversions. ANG headquarters 

developed the computer-based information-sharing system in June 2006 to

facilitate frequent communication and to provide updates on the status of 

implementation and requirements for each unit. However, ANG 

headquarters only provided access to this system on March 9, 2007, 

approximately 10 months after it was created.28 The system, informally 

called “dashboard,” lists all actions related to BRAC and Total Force 

Integration by state and unit and provides dates for key implementation 

milestones and requirements for each unit. According to the Director, 

ANG, the release was delayed until the President’s budget was finalized. 

 28The Air Force Total Force Integration office has a similar Web-based database that 

provides details for all the Total Force Integration missions that is accessible to the state 

leadership and unit commanders. However, one field commander that we spoke with 

stated that the system is of limited utility due to frequently changing information. 

Additionally, this system does not discuss any of the BRAC changes or how timing of all 

actions will occur. 

Page 23 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Our prior work has identified that a best practice for organizations 

undergoing a major transformation includes establishing a communication 

strategy specific to the transformational action that communicates 

progress and expectations. Importantly, we have identified that such a 

strategy should include means for providing specific information to meet 

the needs of stakeholders, and that the strategy should identify the 

importance of communicating early and often to build trust with 

stakeholders. Furthermore, we have found that promoting two-way 

communication is important for major transformations to ensure the 

transformation’s successful completion.29 

ANG headquarters has recently created a draft Strategic Communication 

Plan, but we found this plan to be general in scope and not specific to 

BRAC implementation. Specifically, this plan identifies key stakeholders 

and general tools for communicating information to the public and ANG 

stakeholders, but it focuses more on managing the ANG “brand” through 

specific talking points for use in external communications. Airmen, unit 

commanders, and state adjutants general are identified as being target 

audiences, but there is no specific discussion of how ANG headquarters 

will provide information to them. For example, although the purpose of 

the plan is to improve trust between all stakeholders by delivering 

consistent, frequent, and relevant communications, it does not identify 

exactly what specific tools ANG headquarters will use to communicate 

information to each affected unit. Instead, the plan generally discusses the 

use of news media and the ANG Web site to promote the ANG brand, 

messages, and initiatives. ANG headquarters also has a section in the 

instruction document they use to guide the unit conversion process that 

assigns responsibilities for communications during the unit conversion 

process to the communications and information directorate, but this 

section does not discuss communicating any information to the affected 

units.30 

 29GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

30Air National Guard Instruction 10-406, March 10, 2006. 

Page 24 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Compared to cost estimates contained in the BRAC Commission’s report, 

our analysis of the Air Force’s current estimates to implement ANG-related 

BRAC actions indicates that there will be net annual recurring costs rather 

than net annual recurring savings, and one-time costs are projected to 

increase by $68 million (13.5 percent). Furthermore, Congress has not 

been given full visibility over all BRAC-related implementation costs 

because some BRAC-related implementation costs funded outside of the 

BRAC account are not being reported as BRAC-related costs. Air Force 

budget submissions have not provided complete and transparent 

information on the costs to implement BRAC-related actions because the 

Air Force decided to fund some costs required to establish replacement 

missions outside of the BRAC account and did not report these costs in its 

annual BRAC budget. 

Although the BRAC Commission projected that the recommendations 

affecting ANG would result in estimated annual recurring savings of 

$26 million, our analysis of current Air Force estimates indicates that there 

will be annual recurring costs of $53 million instead (see app. III).31

However, Air Force officials still expect to realize annual recurring savings 

overall as a result of other BRAC actions affecting the active and reserve 

components. 

The change in estimates occurred primarily due to language in the 

Commission’s report that prevents the Air Force from reducing its current 

end strength in some states.32 For example, annual recurring savings 

decreased an estimated $33 million from BRAC Commission projections in 

the recommendation to realign ANG units at Otis, Massachusetts; St. 

Louis, Missouri; and Atlantic City, New Jersey.33 These projections were 

based on the elimination of about 240 positions. Furthermore, annual 

No Annual Recurring 

Savings Will Be 

Achieved for ANG 

BRAC 

Recommendations 

and Congress Has Not 

Been Given Full 

Visibility over All 

BRAC-Related ANG 

Costs 

Current Estimates Indicate 

Annual Recurring Costs 

Rather Than Annual 

Recurring Savings for ANG 

Recommendations 

 31The estimates of the annual recurring savings associated with 24 of the 30 

recommendations affecting ANG decreased by a total of $114 million and the estimated 

annual recurring savings for 4 increased by a total of $35 million. 

32The language affected Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 

Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, 

Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 

33The projected $33 million decrease in annual recurring savings was primarily due to the

elimination of personnel and facilities maintenance savings. 

Page 25 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
recurring savings decreased an estimated $55 million in seven 

recommendations34 from BRAC Commission projections. According to Air 

Force officials, these BRAC Commission projections were based on the 

assumption that additional positions would be eliminated in the seven 

recommendations to realign other ANG units. However, since no 

positions could be eliminated from those states as a result of BRAC—and,

overall, ANG headquarters reassigned affected positions elsewhere rather 

than reducing end strength—those projected savings will not materialize. 

Thus, in preparing the business plans the Air Force had to reduce the

projected savings for these recommendations. 

In addition, our analysis revealed that the BRAC Commission’s projected 

savings related to facilities maintenance are not likely to be realized. DOD 

facilities’ maintenance costs35 are partly tied to the number of personnel 

positions and the mission assigned at a particular facility. Since there will

be no personnel eliminations and limited facility eliminations across ANG, 

the associated facility maintenance savings that would have occurred as a 

result of personnel eliminations will not be realized. Air Force BRAC 

project management officials concurred with our analysis. For example, 

savings estimates included in the BRAC Commission report in the 

recommendation affecting ANG units at Otis, St. Louis, and Atlantic City 

would have saved about $11 million annually. In its updated estimates for 

this recommendation, the Air Force projects an annual cost of about 

$1 million in facilities maintenance for these installations. 

The estimated one-time costs to implement 2005 BRAC recommendations 

affecting ANG are also projected to increase. One-time implementation 

costs include military construction costs and other costs associated with 

moving personnel and equipment. In comparison to the BRAC 

Commission estimates, our analysis of current Air Force estimated 

implementation costs (see app. IV) indicates that one-time implementation

cost estimates for recommendations affecting ANG have increased by a

ANG One-Time 

Implementation Cost 

Estimates Have Increased 

 34These seven recommendations affected ANG units at (1) Great Falls, Montana; (2) Martin 

State, Maryland; (3) Andrews, Maryland; Will Rogers and Tinker, Oklahoma; and Randolph, 

Texas; (4) Mansfield, Ohio; (5) March, California; (6) co-located miscellaneous Air Force 

leased locations and National Guard headquarters leased locations; and (7) Boise, Idaho. 

35Facilities maintenance costs include sustainment, recapitalization, and base operating 

support costs. 

Page 26 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
net of $68 million (13.5 percent) primarily due to updated construction 

requirements and inflation,36 as seen in table 3. 

Table 3: Changes in One-Time Implementation Costs 

Dollars in millions 

Cost 

BRAC Commission 

estimate

Current Air Force 

estimate Difference

Military construction $247 $366 $119

Othera257 206 (51)

Total $504 $572 $68

Source: GAO Analysis of BRAC Commission and Air Force data. 

a

Other includes costs associated with moving personnel and equipment. 

Although updated site surveys that clarified requirements for mission 

changes resulted in decreased cost estimates for some activities, the 

survey process revealed an estimated $119 million in additional military 

construction requirements, causing the overall estimate of one-time costs 

to increase.37 For example, estimated military construction costs to close 

Kulis, Air Guard Station, Alaska, and transfer the mission to Elmendorf, 

Air Force Base, Alaska, increased by $87 million. Air Force officials 

determined that there was inadequate utility capacity within the proposed 

development area to support new missions, and that an engineer training 

complex, an upgraded fuel cell maintenance hangar, and an upgraded 

helicopter maintenance hangar were required. Likewise, estimated 

military construction costs in the recommendation to realign ANG units at

Otis, St. Louis, and Atlantic City increased by $46 million after site surveys 

at those locations determined the existing squadron operations facilities 

were too small to support the new mission requirements, and the affected 

ANG units did not have facilities to meet the Air Sovereignty Alert mission

requirement. In addition, other one-time cost estimates decreased by a net 

 36BRAC Commission estimates are expressed in constant-year 2005 dollars, whereas 

budgets are expressed in then-year or nominal dollars, which include inflation. Over the

2006 through 2011 implementation period, the cumulative inflation is estimated to be about 

15 percent. The actual impact of inflation depends on the year the costs are incurred. 

37There were 25 recommendations in which there was a change in estimated military 

construction costs. In 14 recommendations estimated military construction costs 

increased by a total of $168 million and in 11 recommendations estimated military 

construction costs decreased by a total of $49 million.

Page 27 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
of $51 million.38 According to Air Force officials, these estimates decreased 

primarily due to the Commission language that retained personnel at the 

realigning bases. The greatest decreases were in training and civilian 

personnel severance and relocation costs that were not required because 

positions were not realigned. For example, estimated other one-time costs 

to realign Springfield Air Guard Station, Ohio, decreased by $14 million. 

Congress has not been given full visibility over all ANG BRAC-related 

implementation costs because some BRAC-related implementation costs 

funded outside of the BRAC account are not being reported as BRACrelated costs. The Air Force is funding about $309 million for military 

construction, equipment, and training to establish replacement missions 

for 14 ANG units who lost their flying missions outside the BRAC account, 

as shown in table 4. 

Table 4: Estimates of One-Time Costs Being Funded Outside of the BRAC Account 

Congress Has Not Been 

Given Full Visibility over 

All ANG BRAC-Related 

Implementation Costs 

Dollars in millions 

Category Estimated cost a

Military construction $136

Equipmentb101

Training 68

Other 4

Total $309 

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data. 

a

Air Force officials stated that the process of developing these cost estimates is ongoing and may 

understate the ultimate actual costs. 

b

We did not include the equipment costs for three Predator replacement missions with a combined 

estimated equipment cost of about $400 million because the equipment is an Air Force-controlled 

asset and not under the direct control of ANG. We also did not include military construction or

equipment costs for five joint cargo aircraft missions because the Air Force cannot determine these 

costs until the aircraft is selected. 

The Air Force estimates are based on combined costs to replace 30

missions for the 14 affected units. For example, the estimate of 

$136 million for military construction includes about $23 million for major 

 38There were 31 recommendations in which there was a change in estimated one-time 

costs. In 19 recommendations, estimated other one-time costs decreased by a total of 

$121 million and in 12 recommendations estimated other one-time costs increased by a 

total of $70 million.

Page 28 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
renovations and new facilities for the Predator mission at March Air 

Reserve Base in California. The projected cost of $101 million for new 

equipment includes $64 million for equipment associated with the 

Distributed Ground System missions assigned to units in Indiana, Kansas,

and Massachusetts. The estimated training costs include $27 million to 

recruit and train approximately 440 operations and maintenance personnel 

in a St. Louis ANG unit that will associate with the active B-2 wing at 

Whiteman Air Force Base. 

None of these costs are reported in the section of the Air Force’s BRAC 

budget submission that would identify one-time costs funded outside of 

the BRAC account. Air Force officials informed us that the BRAC Closure 

Executive Group decided to fund all costs to establish replacement 

missions for the units losing their flying mission outside of the BRAC 

account. Additionally, Air Force officials told us that the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics 

decided not to report replacement mission costs as BRAC-related costs 

because the Commission did not direct a specific replacement mission for 

the affected units. Nevertheless, the BRAC Commission report 

recommended that personnel in affected units should remain in place, 

assume a new mission, and where appropriate be retrained in skills 

relevant to the emerging mission. Although the Commission did not direct 

specific replacement missions, the language in the report requires DOD to 

provide replacement missions. Therefore, any costs associated with 

establishing replacement missions are BRAC-related. 

The successful implementation of the BRAC recommendations and 

establishment of new missions depend on the ability of ANG headquarters 

to execute hundreds of sequential actions in a very tight sequence with 

little room for delays. While ANG headquarters has developed various 

implementation plans, challenges remain that could delay when units are 

fully capable of performing their new mission. Furthermore, any delay or

change in schedule could have a domino effect and impact other planned 

actions. The absence of a strategy that addresses mitigation of these and

other challenges that may arise and is shared with all stakeholders 

increases the risk that delays will occur. Effective development of such a 

strategy for the BRAC implementation process would enable ANG 

headquarters to measure progress towards their goals; determine 

strategies and resources needed to effectively meet these goals; and 

identify strategies to meet goals that were not met due to implementation 

challenges. Further, improved communication between ANG 

headquarters and the affected units is essential to provide unit 

Conclusions 

Page 29 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
commanders with timely information to ensure they can train and recruit 

personnel to perform their new missions as planned. The lack of a 

communication strategy, specific to the BRAC implementation, period that 

addresses how ANG headquarters will provide frequently changing 

information as required by the units to carry out BRAC implementation 

increases the risk that implementation actions may not occur as 

scheduled. 

It is important for congressional decision makers to have complete 

information on the costs to implement BRAC-related actions as they 

deliberate the budget. The Air Force is providing incomplete cost 

information by not including the costs to establish replacement missions 

for units that lost their flying mission in its annual budget submission. 

Including these costs in the BRAC budget would provide Congress with 

more complete and transparent information to implement BRAC and assist 

it in evaluating BRAC budget appropriation requests. 

In order to ensure management of BRAC implementation challenges, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief, National Guard 

Bureau, to task the Director, Air National Guard, with the following. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that 

anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation challenges. 

At a minimum, this strategy should include time frames for actions and 

responsibilities for each challenge, and facilitate the ability of ANG 

headquarters officials to act to mitigate potential delays in interim 

milestones. 

• Expand the Strategic Communication Plan to include how ANG 

headquarters will provide the affected ANG units with the information 

needed to implement the BRAC-related actions. 

In order to provide more complete and transparent ANG BRAC cost 

information, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Air Force to report in the Air Force annual BRAC budget 

submission the costs and source of funding required to establish 

replacement missions for ANG units that will lose their flying missions as a 

result of BRAC 2005. 

Page 30 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 

with two recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation. 

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. 

DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into 

this report as appropriate 

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the Secretary 

of Defense direct the Director, Air National Guard, to develop a mitigation 

strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that anticipates, identifies, and 

addresses related implementation challenges throughout the BRAC 

implementation process. DOD suggested that we modify the 

recommendation to reflect that the Director, Air National Guard, is 

normally tasked by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. We changed the 

recommendation to reflect DOD’s position because it clarifies 

accountability and respects the chain of command while still 

implementing the substance of our recommendation. DOD also stated that 

mitigation plans cannot be released until they have been thoroughly vetted

with all of the key stakeholders. At the same time, however, it is 

important to note that BRAC recommendations are required by law to be 

completed by September 15, 2011, and the limited time available coupled 

with the complexity of implementation actions led us to make this 

recommendation. Therefore, while we agree that the mitigation plans 

should be vetted with all of the key stakeholders, it will be important to do 

this in a timely manner. Further, we believe that affected state adjutants 

general are key stakeholders and as such should be included in the 

process to vet these plans. 

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the 

Director, Air National Guard, expand the Strategic Communication Plan to 

include how ANG headquarters will provide the affected ANG units with

the information needed to implement the BRAC-related actions. DOD 

stated that it is incumbent upon ANG and all affected units to maximize 

established chains of leadership and communication to effectively manage

and execute BRAC actions. We agree. Our report points out that units are 

using the existing established chains of leadership and communication to 

ANG headquarters but the communication from ANG headquarters is 

nonetheless ad hoc and not adequate to meet their needs. Further, the 

Director, ANG, acknowledges that there are challenges in communicating 

with the units and that some unit commanders may not have the 

information that they feel they need to implement the BRAC 

recommendations and their new missions. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 31 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Air Force provide 

more complete and transparent cost information by including in its annual 

BRAC budget submission the costs required to establish replacement 

missions for ANG units that will lose their flying mission as a result of 

BRAC 2005. DOD does not believe these costs are BRAC-related because 

establishment of replacement missions was not part of the BRAC 

recommendations. Although the Commission did not direct specific 

replacement missions for the affected units, the BRAC Commission 

recommended that DOD provide replacement missions, retain all 

personnel in affected units, and where appropriate retrain personnel in 

skills relevant to the emerging mission. Therefore, we believe the costs to

establish the new missions are BRAC-related and should be reported in the 

Air Force’s annual BRAC budget submission. DOD also stated that BRAC 

funds cannot be used to establish these missions and that the costs in 

question have been appropriately programmed and budgeted in the Air 

Force’s regular military construction account. In making our 

recommendation, it was not our intent to prescribe which funds should be 

used to establish replacement missions but rather to recommend that DOD 

provide more complete and transparent cost reporting about these BRAC 

related costs. DOD said it was willing to caveat the BRAC budget 

documentation to annotate these costs. As a result, we modified our 

recommendation to include that DOD identify the source of funding for 

these costs in its BRAC budget documentation. Further, we continue to 

believe that the annual BRAC budget documentation would be the most 

complete and transparent place for DOD to report the costs to establish 

replacement missions because this documentation is used in evaluating 

BRAC implementation costs. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; the Director, 

National Guard; the Director, ANG; and the Director, Office of

Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://wwww.gao.gov. 

Page 32 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Additional contacts and staff acknowledgements are 

provided in appendix VI.

Brian Lepore, Acting Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 33 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tim Johnson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction, 

Veterans Affairs, 

and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Chairman 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 34 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
The Honorable Chet Edwards 

Chairman 

The Honorable Roger F. Wicker 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans 

Affairs, and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

 

Page 35 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We performed our work at the Air Force Base Realignment and Closure 

(BRAC) Office, Air National Guard (ANG) headquarters, and in various 

states which had ANG units affected by the BRAC 2005 recommendations. 

We selected states to visit that had BRAC actions scheduled early in the 

6-year implementation period and also had units that were going to lose, 

reduce, convert, or increase their flying mission or associate with another 

unit as a result of the 2005 BRAC recommendations. We visited state ANG 

and unit officials in Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New 

Jersey, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. We also held video 

conferences with state ANG officials in Oklahoma and Ohio and received 

written responses to questions from state ANG officials in Mississippi. At 

all states except Indiana and Virginia we spoke with either the adjutant

general, assistant adjutant general, or both; at every unit we spoke with 

the wing commanders or the deputy wing commanders of affected units. 

In Indiana, we spoke with the wing commanders and the deputy wing 

commanders, and in Virginia we spoke with the Virginia ANG chief 

executive officer. 

To assess the process the Air Force used to assign new missions to units 

that lost their flying mission, we interviewed all stakeholders to the 

process. These stakeholders included officials in the Total Force 

Integration Office, Headquarters Air Force; the Office of Transformation, 

ANG, and the aforementioned state ANG officials to determine how new 

flying missions were assigned to ANG units. In addition, we compared the 

banded list of potential missions developed by Air Force headquarters to

the missions assigned by ANG headquarters to the affected units. 

To determine the progress that ANG headquarters has made in 

implementing the 2005 BRAC recommendations, we reviewed the BRAC 

business plans, the ANG aircraft movement plan, and the new mission plan 

by state for ANG units affected by BRAC. We interviewed officials in ANG 

headquarters, including the Director, ANG, and interviewed or obtained 

written responses from ANG officials in 11 states regarding these plans 

and to identity any challenges the Air Force faces in implementing the 

BRAC recommendations. We reviewed Air Force Instructions and Policy 

documents regarding Unit Manning Documents (UMD) and interviewed 

ANG headquarters manpower officials to obtain information on their plan

for developing the unit manning documents and requirements templates 

for the affected units. We also reviewed documentation pertaining to the 

training requirements for new missions and for pilots converting to a new 

aircraft, and compared these requirements to the allocation of seats in 

pilot training schools for ANG for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 to 

determine the likelihood of adequate pilot training seats being available. 

Page 36 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We interviewed officials in the Air Force Office of Total Force Integration 

and ANG training officials on their plans to address and mitigate these 

training shortfalls, and spoke with ANG officials in Texas about the 

training mission assigned to Ellington. To determine the impact of funding 

delays, we spoke with ANG officials including the Comptroller of ANG, 

and reviewed ANG documentation pertaining to funding delays. To assess 

the degree to which the states were aware of 2005 BRAC-related changes 

that were required for their units, we conducted interviews or field visits 

with or obtained written responses from senior ANG leadership and wing 

commanders from 11 states that had units that were impacted by BRAC. 

We asked these officials their perspective on communications with ANG 

headquarters, and to describe any challenges that they faced in BRAC 

implementation. We also met with ANG headquarters officials that were 

responsible for communicating 2005 BRAC changes with the states, 

including the A/8 Office of Transformation and the A/1 Manpower Office. 

We were briefed on the internal interface system called “dashboard” that 

ANG headquarters had developed for an eventual “roll out” to the states 

and units that would provide the affected units with transformation 

updates, and reviewed the information available on this system. 

To assess changes to projected costs and savings, we compared DOD’s 

current estimates to the estimates in the BRAC 2005 Commission report. 

BRAC Commission estimates are based on DOD’s quantitative model, 

known as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA). DOD has used 

the COBRA model in each of the previous BRAC rounds and, over time, 

has improved upon its design to provide better estimating capability. In 

our past and current reviews of the COBRA model, we found it to be a 

generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and savings 

among various BRAC options. Air Force estimates did not segregate the 

ANG- related costs and annual recurring savings of the Air Force 

recommendations. Therefore, ANG officials provided us with the current

estimated implementation costs from a Web-based tool, BRAC 

Management Tool (BMT). On the basis of that information, we were able 

to extract the estimated ANG related costs and savings of the BRAC 2005 

Commission report, as well as the current estimated annual recurring 

costs. The Air Force BRAC Project Management Office identified a 

number of issues with our results. After reviewing their issues, we 

updated the data accordingly and satisfied their concerns. To determine 

the reasons why DOD’s current estimates changed compared to the 

Commission’s estimates, we interviewed officials at the Air Force BRAC

Project Management Office, ANG headquarters, and reviewed

explanations documented in the Air Force business plans and decision 

memorandums. Finally, to identify costs being funded outside of the 

Page 37 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

BRAC account, we reviewed Air Force budget submissions for fiscal years

2007 and 2008, as well as obtained data from the Air Force Total Force 

Integration office on the estimated funding for equipment, military 

construction, and training to establish the cost of replacement missions 

for units that lost their flying mission due to the BRAC recommendations. 

We assessed the reliability of the Air Force Total Force Integration and 

BRAC Management Tool data by interviewing knowledgeable officials and 

determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report. 

We conducted our work from September 2006 through March 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 38 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

(This page is left intentionally blank)

Page 39 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned 

to Units That Lost Their Flying Mission as a Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned Result of BRAC 2005 

to Units That Lost Their Flying Mission as a 

Result of BRAC 2005 

Replacement missions

Affected units Band 1 Band 2 Band 3 Band 4 Flying mission 

March, CA Predator Joint Space 

Operations Centera

Bradley, CT Component 

Numbered 

Air Force 

(CNAF)b

Joint Cargo Aircraft c

Capital, IL CNAF

Terre Haute, IN Distributed 

Ground System

(DGS)d

Air Support 

Operations 

Squadron 

(ASOS)e

McConnell, KS DGS ASOS 

Otis, MA DGS, 

CNAF 

Kellogg, MI CNAF Joint Cargo Aircraft 

St Louis, MO CNAF B2 Association with 

Whiteman AFBf

Key Field, MS CNAF Joint Cargo Aircraft 

Mansfield, OH Rapid Engineer

Deployable Heavy 

Operational 

Repair Squadron 

Engineers (Red

Horse)g

 

Joint Cargo Aircraft 

Springfield, OH Measurement & 

Signatures 

Intelligenceh

F-16 training unit i

Willow Grove, PA CNAF ASOS Red Horse 

Nashville, TN Classified, 

Intelligence 

Production 

Joint Cargo Aircraft 

Ellington, TX Predator ASOS Intelligence 

Trainingj

Total 12 6 1 4 7

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force and ANG data.

a

A Joint Space Operations Center integrates various joint-space capabilities to provide 

shared situational awareness to commanders and troops on the ground. 

b A Component Numbered Air Force is a combination of up to three separate missions, including an 

Air Operations Center (AOC, which includes Operations, Planning, Strategy, Intelligence, and 

Surveillance and Reconnaissance components), an Air Mobility Division (AMD), and an Air Force 

Forces group (AFFOR). 

Page 40 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix II: Replacement Missions Assigned 

to Units That Lost Their Flying Mission as a

Result of BRAC 2005 

c

The Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) will be a new, small, tactical airlift aircraft that has not yet been 

procured by the Air Force. According to senior ANG leadership, the JCA may not be ready for 

deployment until between 2012 to 2015. 

d

A Distributed Ground System processes intelligence information. 

e

An Air Support Operations Squadron provides support to ground forces by facilitating Air Force air 

strikes. 

f

ANG personnel will operate B-2s at Whiteman in conjunction with active-duty Air Force personnel. 

g

A Red Horse, Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers, 

supports contingency and special operations missions with mobile, self-sufficient civil 

engineers. 

h Measurement & Signatures Intelligence units employ a variety of intelligence gathering techniques

including advanced radar, electro-optical/ infrared, and materials sensing. 

i

The Foreign Military Sales—F-16s unit is a school for foreign countries that acquire F-16s and require 

training. The FMS school at Springfield will train Dutch pilots. 

j

This intelligence training unit will provide additional intelligence instructors for the school at 

Goodfellow, Texas. 

Page 41 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated 

Annual Recurring Savings between the 2005 

BRAC Commission Report and Current Air 

Force Estimates, for ANG–Related 

Recommendations 

Dollars in millions 

Recommendations affecting ANG units

BRAC Commission savings 

estimates

(savings) / costs

Current estimated

savings Difference

Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and Atlantic City, NJ $(27.875) $5.399 $33.274 

Great Falls, MT 0.050 12.735 12.685 

Martin State, MD (8.597) 0.117 8.714 

Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and Tinker, OK, and Randolph, 

TX 

(6.339) 0.505 6.844

Mansfield, OH (6.708) 0.107 6.815 

March, CA (4.045) 2.749 6.794

Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air Force Leased Locations & 

National Guard Headquarters Leased Locationsa

17.008 23.461 6.453

Boise, ID (6.291) 0.000 6.291

Grand Forks, ND 17.177 20.905 3.728 

Richmond, VA and Des Moines, IA (4.923) (1.642) 3.281 

Springfield, OH (2.524) 0.005 2.529 

Nashville, TN (0.880) 1.568 2.448 

Capital, IL and Hulman, IN (2.003) 0.070 2.073 

Niagara Falls, NY (0.258) 1.504 1.762 

Kulis and Elmendorf, AK (10.779) (9.059) 1.720 

Kellogg, MI (1.480) 0.042 1.522

Mountain Home, ID, Nellis, NV, and Elmendorf, AK 9.072 10.547 1.475 

Portland, OR (7.004) (5.658) 1.346 

Hector, ND (1.016) 0.023 1.039

Key Field, MS (0.939) 0.010 0.949 

Fairchild, WA (0.925) (0.153) 0.772 

Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA, Selfridge, MI, Shaw, SC, and 

Martin State, MD 

(0.508) 0.237 0.745

Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated Annual 

Recurring Savings between the 2005 BRAC 

Commission Report and Current Air Force 

Estimates, for ANG–Related Recommendations 

Page 42 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix III: Comparison of Estimated 

Annual Recurring Savings between the 2005 

BRAC Commission Report and Current Air 

Force Estimates, for ANG–Related 

Recommendations 

Dollars in millions 

Recommendations affecting ANG units

BRAC Commission savings 

estimates

(savings) / costs

Current estimated

savings Difference

Ellington, TX (0.327) (0.090) 0.237 

New Orleans, LA—F100 Engine Centralized Intermediate 

Repair Facilities 

0.140 0.151 0.011

Willow Grove and Cambria, PAa(14.923) (14.923) 0.000

Robins, GA 0.000 0.000 0.000

Lackland, TX (2.902) (3.640) (0.738)

Selfridge, MI and Beale, CA 12.808 4.536 (8.272)

Fort Smith, AR and Luke, AZ 12.674 3.613 (9.061)

Cannon, NM 16.425 0.000 (16.425)

Total $(25.892) $53.119 $79.011

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data (as of Nov. 24, 2006).

a

Non-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National Guard. 

Page 43 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost Estimates 

for BRAC Recommendations Affecting ANG

Dollars in millions

Recommendations affecting ANG units

Military 

construction

Other

costsa 

Total one-time

implementation costs

Kulis And Elmendorf, AK 174.569 7.249 181.818 

Otis, MA, St. Louis, MO, and Atlantic City, NJ 66.340 27.718 94.058 

Co-Locate Miscellaneous Air Force Leased Locations & National 

Guard Headquarters Leased Locationsb

55.320 3.431 58.751

Bradley, CT, Barnes, MA, Selfridge, MI, Shaw, SC, and Martin State, 

MD 

11.931 23.456 35.387

Capital, IL, and Hulman, IN 6.104 9.750 15.854 

March, CA 0.000 15.821 15.821

Andrews, MD, Will Rogers and Tinker, OK, and Randolph, TX 5.014 10.542 15.556 

Mansfield, OH 3.479 10.885 14.364

Selfridge, MI, and Beale, CA 4.360 9.196 13.556 

Grand Forks, ND 5.232 6.207 11.439 

Fairchild, WA 6.104 4.091 10.195

Richmond, VA and Des Moines, IA 0.061 9.935 9.996 

Hector, ND 0.000 8.950 8.950

Ellington, TX 2.884 5.544 8.428

Lackland, TX 7.303 1.056 8.359

Great Falls, MT 0.000 7.999 7.999 

Program Management, Various Locationsc0.000 7.730 7.730

New Orleans, LA F100 Engine Centralized Intermediate Repair 

Facilities 

7.185 0.004 7.189

Portland, OR 1.299 5.648 6.947

Mountain Home, ID, Nellis, NV, and Elmendorf, AK 0.000 4.763 4.763 

Kellogg, MI 2.066 2.682 4.748

Niagara Falls, NY 0.000 4.430 4.430 

Cannon, NM 0.000 3.918 3.918

Robins, GA 2.812 0.721 3.533

Martin State, MD 2.344 0.938 3.282 

Key Field, MS 1.255 1.968 3.223

Springfield, OH 0.000 3.120 3.120 

Willow Grove and Cambria, PAb0.000 2.495 2.495

Boise, ID 0.000 2.053 2.053

Nashville, TN 0.000 1.979 1.979

Fort Smith, AR And Luke, AZ 0.000 1.660 1.660 

Total $365.662 $205.939 $571.601

Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost 

Estimates for BRAC Recommendations 

Affecting ANG 

Page 44 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix IV: Current One-Time Cost Estimates 

for BRAC Recommendations Affecting ANG

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data (as of Nov. 24, 2006).

a Other costs include costs associated with moving personnel and equipment. 

b

Non-Air Force recommendations that affected the Air National Guard. 

c

Our analysis indicated that Program Management Costs (if any) were included in each recommendation. 

On the basis of the information we received from Air Force officials, Program Management Costs were 

calculated separately for the current estimates of one-time costs. 

Page 45 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

 Page 46 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense 

 Page 47 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense 

 Page 48 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense 

 Page 49 GAO-07-641 Military Base Closures
Appendix VI: 

St

GAO Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 50 GAO-07-641

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Brian Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Michael Kennedy, Assistant 

Director; Ronald Bergman; Susan Ditto; James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake; 

James Madar; Julie Matta; and Charles Perdue made key contributions to 

this report. 

Military Base Closures

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350913) 
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