UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-6316

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner - Appellee,

v.

CORNELL M. TAYLOR,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior 

District Judge. (5:06-hc-02196-BR)

Argued: January 29, 2013 Decided: March 5, 2013

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Diana Helene Pereira, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer Dee 

Dannels, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal 

Public Defender, Joseph B. Gilbert, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States 

Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorney, David T. Huband, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. 
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Cornell M. Taylor (“Appellant”) appeals the district 

court’s order continuing his civil commitment pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 4246. Appellant argues that the district court erred 

in concluding he continues to suffer from a mental disease or 

defect such that his release would create a substantial risk of 

bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the 

property of another. In so doing, Appellant asserts that his 

recent good behavior justifies his release, offering only his 

own testimony in support. The evidence presented below, 

including an expert report from Appellant’s treating physician 

and a psychologist, testimony from the treating physician, and 

an additional expert report authored by a court-appointed 

independent physician, convincingly demonstrates that

Appellant’s continued commitment is warranted. For these 

reasons and as set forth below, we affirm.

I.

On February 1, 2006, the District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois found Appellant incompetent to 

stand trial for the charge of threatening a federal official. 

Thereafter, on July 10, 2006, the Illinois district court 

ordered Appellant evaluated for civil commitment pursuant to 18 
4

U.S.C. § 4246.1 On November 3, 2006, the Government then filed a 

certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness in the 

District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.2 On 

January 9, 2007, the district court held a § 4246 hearing. Upon 

finding by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant suffered 

from a mental disease or defect, as a result of which his 

release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to 

another person or serious damage to property of another, the 

district court committed him under § 4246(d) in an order dated 

January 10, 2007.

 1 “Section 4246 applies to individuals who are due for 

release from federal custody either because they have been found 

not competent to stand trial, because the charges against them 

have been dropped solely because of mental illness, or because 

they have completely served their sentences of imprisonment.” 

United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 840 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995).

2 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a), the director of the 

facility in which a person found incompetent to stand trial is 

hospitalized may certify that the person

is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect 

as a result of which his release would create a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or 

serious damage to property of another, and that 

suitable arrangements for State custody and care of 

the person are not available, [and the director] shall 

transmit the certificate to the clerk of the court for 

the district in which the person is confined.

18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). Because Appellant was then-hospitalized at 

the Mental Health Division at the Federal Medical Center in 

Butler, North Carolina, the warden filed the certificate in the 

District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
5

On September 27, 2007, the district court ordered 

Appellant’s conditional release to reside at a community home 

for adults in Springfield, Illinois.3 The district court

ultimately revoked his release on April 7, 2008.4 Appellant was 

then returned to the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North 

Carolina (“Butner”).

On March 28, 2011, mental health staff at Butner filed 

an annual report with the district court in accordance with 18 

U.S.C. § 4247(e)(1)(B) concerning the mental condition of 

Appellant and the need for his continued commitment. The annual 

report, authored by Dr. Robert G. Lucking, M.D., and Dr. Angela 

Walden Weaver, Ph.D., indicated Appellant had been prescribed a 

combination of drugs, including Haloperidol Decanoate (an antipsychotic medication), for treatment of his schizoaffective

disorder. Against the advice of his primary clinician, 

Appellant refused to take the Haloperidol Decanoate. Due to 

Appellant’s refusal to take the prescribed medication necessary 

to control his mental illness, the mental health staff concluded

 3 Neither the briefs nor the record indicate the precise 

grounds for Appellant’s conditional release.

4 The probation officer was informed that Appellant violated 

the conditions of his release by returning to the community home 

facility under the influence of alcohol and in possession of a 

bottle of alcohol. In addition, the probation officer reported 

experiencing problems supervising Appellant in the placement 

facility.
6

that Appellant was not suitable for conditional release and 

recommended continued commitment.

On November 9, 2011, Appellant moved the district 

court for a hearing to determine whether he still met criteria 

for commitment under § 4246. The next day, the district court 

set a hearing for February 6, 2012, to determine whether 

Appellant continued to meet the criteria for commitment. In 

connection with the hearing, the district court appointed an 

independent mental health examiner to evaluate Appellant.5 The 

independent examiner, Dr. Katayoun Tabrizi, M.D., completed a 

forensic psychiatry report, which contained Appellant’s relevant 

medical, psychiatric, and social background; a mental health 

diagnosis; and a risk assessment pursuant to § 4246.

Dr. Tabrizi examined Appellant on January 12, 2012, 

and diagnosed him as suffering from schizoaffective disorder, 

bipolar type; alcohol abuse, in a controlled environment; and 

adult antisocial behavior (provisional). She reported that 

Appellant was then presently prescribed anti-psychotic 

medication for his mental illness but was refusing to take it. 

She stated that Appellant showed limited insight into his mental 

illness and need for treatment. Appellant’s symptoms, which 

 5 Appellant requested the appointment of an independent 

psychiatrist in his November 9, 2011 motion.
7

were active at the time of his evaluation, included irritable 

affect, argumentativeness, and paranoia. Dr. Tabrizi further 

reported that treatment with anti-psychotic medication, which 

Appellant was refusing, is the only effective treatment for his 

psychotic symptoms.

Dr. Tabrizi also concluded that Appellant exhibited 

several risk factors shown to be associated with an increased 

risk of violent/aggressive behavior, including a psychotic 

mental illness with persecutory delusions, poor insight into his 

mental illness, refusal of anti-psychotic medications, history 

of alcohol abuse while subject to release conditions, history of 

aggression and threats due to his psychiatric symptoms, history 

of gun possession, inadequate social support, and an extensive 

juvenile and criminal history. Based on these factors, Dr. 

Tabrizi opined that as a result of Appellant’s mental disease or 

defect, his release would create substantial risk for bodily 

injury and damage to the property of another. She concluded,

“[f]or as long as [Appellant] is refusing to accept 

antipsychotic medications, he is not a suitable candidate for 

conditional release to a community-based program.” J.A. 44.6

 6 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed 

by the parties in this appeal.
8

On February 6, 2012, the district court convened the

hearing to determine whether Appellant continued to meet the 

criteria for commitment under § 4246. Appellant’s treating 

psychiatrist, Dr. Lucking, testified that he had been treating 

Appellant since his admission to Butner in 2006. Dr. Lucking 

further stated that Appellant suffered from schizoaffective 

disorder and was then demonstrating

significant re-emergence of psychotic symptoms with 

evidence of paranoid delusional symptoms involving 

Judge Britt, myself, his attorney Ms. Pereira, 

thinking we’re conspiring to keep him locked up in 

this facility. He has some significant anger and 

hostility and aggression, which I don't think you can 

attribute specifically to either or [sic] the 

affective or psychotic symptoms. It’s probably a 

combination of both of them. So he’s angry, hostile, 

uncooperative.

J.A. 17. He also opined that Appellant’s refusal to take his 

prescribed medication had attributed to the reemergence of his 

psychotic symptoms and “a progressive decline into psychosis.” 

Id. 18. Dr. Lucking further stated that Appellant had, in 2006, 

threatened to kill himself and staff and engaged in aggressive 

behavior by throwing and breaking food trays. Dr. Lucking 

concluded that, without medication, he expected Appellant to 

decline into further psychosis and to engage in the behaviors he 
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exhibited in 2006.7 Appellant’s sole offer of support of his 

motion was his own testimony. 

The district court concluded that Appellant continued 

to meet criteria for care and treatment under § 4246 and ordered 

Appellant’s continued commitment.

Appellant now appeals that order, arguing the district 

court’s determination supporting his continued commitment 

constitutes reversible error.

II.

We review the district court’s factual findings for 

clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See United 

States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992) (“The trial 

court’s ruling denying [the committed person’s] unconditional 

release . . . is a factual determination that will be overturned 

by this court only if clearly erroneous.”); United States v. 

Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012) (“On appeal, we review 

 7 Dr. Tabrizi did not testify at the hearing, though Dr. 

Lucking confirmed that she held the same view. See J.A. 19 

(“[Dr. Tabrizi’s] opinion was similar. She believed that 

[Appellant] met the criteria for commitment and should not be 

released unless he was placed on treatment with an antipsychotic.”). Likewise, staff psychologist Angela Walden Waver, 

Ph.D., did not testify but joined in the annual report with Dr. 

Lucking.
10

the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

legal conclusions de novo.”).

III.

A.

A person committed under § 4246 may, through his 

counsel or legal guardian, file a motion for a hearing to 

determine whether he should be released. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 4247(h). The court that ordered the commitment may discharge 

the person if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the person has recovered from his mental disease or defect to 

such an extent that his unconditional release would no longer 

create “a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or 

serious damage to property of another.” Id. § 4246(e). The

committed person seeking discharge bears the burden of proving 

that he has so recovered. See United States v. Evanoff, 10 F.3d 

559, 563 (8th Cir. 1993); Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant, 

665 F.3d 620, 623 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011).8

 8 See also United States v. Anderson, No. 97–6372, 1998 WL 

372382, at *2 (4th Cir. May 19, 1998) (On a motion to discharge, 

“the Government no longer bears the burden of proving 

dangerousness. Rather, [the committed person] must present a 

preponderance of evidence proving his release ‘no longer 

create[s] a substantial risk of bodily injury.’” (quoting 18 

U.S.C. § 4246(e))).
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B.

In this case, we conclude that the district court’s 

findings justifying Appellant’s continued commitment were not 

clearly erroneous. First, the expert witnesses, through their 

testimony and reports, offered concurring opinions establishing 

that Appellant suffers from a severe mental illness, namely, 

schizoaffective disorder. They reported that Appellant 

continued to manifest active symptoms of his illness, and 

nothing in the record contradicts the expert opinions that 

Appellant continued to suffer from a severe mental disease or 

defect. He offered no testimony other than his own to suggest 

he had recovered from his illness. Accordingly, the district 

court did not clearly err when it found that Appellant continued 

to suffer from a mental disease or defect.

Second, the totality of the evidence before the 

district court established that, in light of Appellant’s mental 

illness, his release would create a substantial risk of bodily 

injury to another person or serious damage to property of 

another. In support of her opinion, the independent 

psychiatrist, Dr. Tabrizi, reported that Appellant exhibited 

several risk factors shown to be associated with an increased 

risk of violent/aggressive behavior, including a psychotic 

mental illness with persecutory delusions, poor insight into his 

mental illness, refusal of anti-psychotic medications, history 
12

of alcohol abuse while subject to release conditions, history of 

aggression and threats due to his psychiatric symptoms, history 

of gun possession, inadequate social support, and an extensive 

juvenile and criminal history. 

Dr. Lucking testified that Appellant’s refusal to take 

his prescribed medication during his current hospitalization has 

attributed to the reemergence of his psychotic symptoms, which 

Dr. Lucking expects will cause Appellant to engage in 

threatening and aggressive behavior against persons and 

property. Dr. Lucking testified concerning Appellant’s 

condition before he was medicated:

[Appellant] threatened to kill himself and other staff 

members. He engaged in specific aggressive behavior 

against property by breaking and throwing food trays. 

I think it’s only a limited period of time before we 

see the emergence of this behavior again.

J.A. 18-19.

The factors presented by the experts are among those 

typically considered by mental health professionals when 

conducting risk assessments. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 

964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ecker, 30 

F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1994). Thus, when considered in its 

entirety, the evidence before the district court established 

that Appellant’s release would create a substantial risk of 

bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of 

another.
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Appellant responds that the opinions offered by Dr. 

Lucking and the opinions contained in the March 2011 Butner

annual report regarding Appellant’s risk of dangerousness are 

speculative in nature, and, thus, not enough to support a 

finding of “substantial risk” under § 4246. He emphasizes that,

“since the annual report entered in October 2011, [he] has not 

engaged in any physically aggressive behavior directed against 

others or property.” Appellant’s Br. 11. The dangerousness 

evaluation and determination, however, require the evaluators 

and the district court to consider Appellant’s “entire 

behavioral and psychological profile.” United States v. 

Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2002); see also Cox, 964 

F.2d at 1433. Thus, the experts properly considered a broad 

range of historical and clinical data, rather than a selected 

event or narrowly defined characteristic or time period. As 

such, the length of time since Appellant’s last aggressive 

behavior is merely one piece of data among the array of 

information that is properly considered.

As detailed above, the experts involved in 

Appellant’s review considered a host of relevant factors that 

convinced them Appellant was still suffering from a mental 

disease or defect to the extent that his release would create a 

substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious 

damage to property of another. As such, the evidence cleared 
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the statutory hurdle that Appellant’s release presents a 

“substantial risk.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). Accordingly, 

Appellant did not meet his burden to show that he had recovered, 

and the district court did not clearly err when it relied upon 

the uncontroverted expert testimony to find that Appellant 

continues to satisfy the criteria for civil commitment under 

§ 4246.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order 

is

AFFIRMED.