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External Research Associates Program Monograph

DELEGITIMIZING AL-QAEDA:

A JIHAD-REALIST APPROACH

Paul Kamolnick

March 2012

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ISBN 1-58487-522-4
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FOREWORD

During the past 2 decades, America and the world 

have witnessed the ignoble rise and now-pending destruction of the al-Qaeda terrorist entity, one of the 

modern world’s most vicious and successful transnational organizations. Scholars and national security 

personnel have dedicated vast resources to dissecting 

and analyzing al-Qaeda’s ideological, strategic, organizational, and tactical strengths and weaknesses. 

Notable in this entire debate, however, has been the 

repeated refrain among scholars and U.S. policymakers that we have yet to design and execute a successful 

messaging campaign that effectively attacks and delegitimizes al-Qaeda in the eyes of potential recruits. 

Dr. Paul Kamolnick’s monograph is designed to 

address that present lacuna. It is not in the realm of 

so-called narrative, ideology, or a “war of ideas,” he 

states, but in the realms of Islamic law, jurisprudence, 

and U.S. foreign policy that this delegitimizing can 

and should be waged. First, it is al-Qaeda’s violations 

of the jurisprudence regulating the lawful waging of 

the military jihad and also its reckless, catastrophic 

damage to the Islamic cause that most undercuts alQaeda’s appeal. And second, our willingness to engage in an honest and forthright appraisal of U.S. 

policies in the Muslim world, coupled with a genuine 

willingness to address long-simmering grievances, 

can also significantly undercut al-Qaeda’s appeal. 

It is incumbent, Kamolnick concludes, for national 

security decisionmakers to develop the motivation, 

capability, and sophistication to promulgate and execute a carefully calibrated messaging strategy on these 

bases. Kamolnick’s suggestion that al-Qaeda’s mass 

casualty terrorism violates the Islamic law of war and 
iv

that the key to dealing with al-Qaeda is a tractable 

clash of interests and not an intractable clash of civilizations is, if true, a welcome message indeed.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PAUL KAMOLNICK is presently full professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology and 

Anthropology, East Tennessee State University. He 

is the sole author of two books, co-editor of one, and 

has sole-authored several articles, review essays, and 

reviews for journals including Sociological Theory, Terrorism and Political Violence, Perspectives in Terrorism, 

and Small Wars Journal. Dr. Kamolnick teaches courses 

in social theory, sociology of religion, and the sociology of global terrorism. His present research interests 

include analyzing mechanisms of terrorist radicalization, deradicalization, and disengagement; and the 

national security implications of newly-emergent 

post-autocratic Islamist-influenced Muslim-majority 

nation-states. Dr. Kamolnick holds a Ph.D. from Florida State University.

vii

SUMMARY

The 9/11 Commission Report identifies three strategic objectives—decapitation, deradicalization, and 

hardening homeland security—as key to disrupting, 

dismantling, and ultimately defeating the al-Qaeda 

terrorist enterprise. Though the first and third have 

been notably successful, the second objective has been 

relatively less so. 

Approaches to counter-radicalization that rely 

on so-called “counterideological” or “counternarrative” approaches miss their mark: they presume ending al-Qaeda’s reign of terror requires that Islam as a 

religious faith delegitimize core Islamic and Islamist 

tenets, including key planks anchoring religious faith. 

They also fail to acknowledge and engage the breadth 

and depth of nonreligiously-motivated opposition to 

existing U.S. foreign and military policy, especially in 

the Middle East and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Finally, and most specifically, counternarrative approaches 

unnecessarily burden this strategic objective by casting a net far too wide and capturing in it a vast Islamic, Islamist, and salafist universe whose adherents 

are overwhelmingly morally repelled by al-Qaeda’s 

terroristic methods. 

Islam is a law-governed religious faith that proscribes and prescribes human conduct. The jihad—the 

religious prescription to struggle and strive in the 

path/way of Allah until Allah’s word reigns supreme 

throughout the earth—including its military sense, is 

despite disavowal in popular piety and much modern 

moderate Islamic discourse, a binding religious prescription. This presumption of an enduring obligation 

to wage the military jihad is an essential starting-point 

in potentially delegitimizing al-Qaeda’s reign of terror 
among adherents for whom shari’a compliance is an 

essential requirement. 

Recent important jurisprudential debates among 

jihad-realist Islamist militants have produced several 

conclusions that may be used to delegitimize al-Qaeda’s terror as both unlawful and imprudent. The majority of those conclusions arise from recent decades 

of “prison debates” in Muslim-majority societies over 

the legality, methods, means, and pragmatics of violent rebellion against their own governments. 

These rulings are supplemented by others of vital 

relevance for undermining al-Qaeda terrorism directed principally against noncombatant civilians living 

in Muslim-minority societies. Among the latter, the 

most decisive legal rulings include the following: (1) 

murder is one of the gravest and forbidden of sins; 

(2) the impermissibility of targeting Muslims, and 

non-Muslim civilians, especially women, children, the 

elderly, scholars, and students of knowledge; (3) the 

impermissible extension of the principle of Tartarrus, 

or human shields; (4) the impermissibility of treachery, violation of oaths, and pacts of security granted 

(implicitly, or explicitly) to Muslims in non-Muslim 

majority societies; (5) jihad is impermissible unless 

specific capacities, conditions, and circumstances are 

present; (6) permissibility to wage offensive jihad 

must be granted by parents and creditors; (7) impermissibility of violating a voluntary oath of unconditional allegiance and obedience (bay’at) given to one’s 

recognized ruler; (8) the impermissibility of waging 

offensive jihad under present conditions of Muslim 

weakness vis-à-vis the infidel powers; (9) the permissibility of jihad, emigration, or a truce when facing 

infidel occupation; (10) the impermissibility of attacking American civilians of an occupying country in the 

viii
ix

name of jihad or under its banner; and, (11) the imprudence of al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism. 

It is suggested that relevant policymakers give due 

regard to the key role that jihad-realist jurisprudential 

debates hold for contributing to the tactical implosion 

and marginalization of al-Qaeda’s terrorism. Those 

charged with strategic communication, public diplomacy, and counterterrorist messaging should develop 

the motivation, capacity, and sophistication to systematically analyze how jihad-realism and a jurisprudence of jihad, may be leveraged for, and not against, 

vital U.S. national security interests. 

Owing to present hostility directed in many quarters against U.S. policies in the Middle East and Muslim world generally, and the Israel-Palestine conflict 

in particular, however, it is extremely inadvisable for 

the United States to openly promote or publicize any 

of these initiatives. A key, indeed essential, ingredient for the authority of these findings is that they are 

viewed as absolutely untainted by any interest, factor, 

force, or power; rather, these debates rest on the legitimacy of the shari’a and involve credentialed actors of 

immense stature and learning.

It is advisable that the United States do everything 

within its power to make the case to the Muslim-majority countries, and the Muslim-minority populations 

in the Muslim diaspora, that as a country we are on 

the side of the lawful and the just, and we actively 

seek and promote solutions to long-simmering policy 

grievances. Our ability as a nation to openly associate with any efforts by internal Muslim actors must be 

deferred until the perception of our motivations is altered, and altered fundamentally. No amount of spin 

or messaging matters when daily life and its commonsense interpretation contradict official pretensions 

and pronouncements.

1

DELEGITIMIZING AL-QAEDA:

A JIHAD-REALIST APPROACH

HOW AL-QAEDA ENDS

Disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating 

al-Qaeda based and inspired transnational terrorism 

is the declared policy of the U.S. Government.1

 The 

9/11 Commission Report makes reference to three overarching strategies for defeating this enemy:2

 attacking 

the al-Qaeda terrorist organization; preventing further radicalization and recruitment to al-Qaeda; and 

protecting the homeland from future attack.3

Evidence strongly suggests that decapitating alQaeda4

 and hardening homeland security5 are having significant strategic effects.6

 Far less success is 

claimed, however, for the prevention of radicalization 

and recruitment to al-Qaeda’s transnational terrorist 

campaign. This monograph supplies a distinct approach for partially accomplishing this elusive strategic objective. 

It is important to note at the outset that preventing replenishment via incitement, radicalization, and 

recruitment to the al-Qaeda organization is only one 

of many factors associated with the certain decline 

and demise of terrorist campaigns, al-Qaeda included. 

Briefly, six variables individually or in some combination are predictors of terrorist organizational demise: 

decapitation, negotiations, success, reorientation, repression, and failure.7

Decapitation, along with hardened homeland security measures, has dramatically affected al-Qaeda’s 

capacity for launching its unique “brand” of violent 

extremism: complex, simultaneous, multiple-target, 

mass casualty terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. 
2

homeland.8 Short of a complete revolutionary reorganization of the global international order, al-Qaeda’s 

maximalist global violent extremist ambitions cannot 

succeed. Al-Qaeda’s global revolutionary terrorism 

also rules out negotiations; although a deliberate and 

sustained U.S. strategy of disaggregating al-Qaeda’s 

terrorist network suggests targeting select regional 

affiliates and associates for whom less ambitious political achievements (e.g., local, national, or specific 

policy grievance-based) are original drivers.9

 Selective 

reorientation of al-Qaeda from disciplined global masscasualty violent extremist terrorism toward opportunist criminality and less-ambitious Islamist militancy 

has occurred, though on a relatively minor scale.10

Repression for our purposes is captured by the above 

discussion of decapitating the terrorist organization 

but is somewhat broader and encompasses attacking 

the organizational capacities of al-Qaeda to persist as 

an organized terrorist entity.11

While the above five correlates contribute in varying degrees to al-Qaeda’s dramatically-weakening 

present capacities, it is the sixth predictor—i.e., failure—that is the primary concern of this monograph. 

This is so because it most directly touches on that 

heretofore underaccomplished strategic objective 

noted in the 9/11 Commission Report: preventing radicalization and recruitment to al-Qaeda’s transnational 

terrorist campaign. Again, it is the intention of this 

monograph to contribute to that strategic objective vital to declared national policy through the calculated 

exploitation of failure as a known predictor of terrorist organizational decline and demise.

What is meant by terrorist failure as applied to alQaeda? Failure here refers to a two-dimensional nightmare scenario facing the al-Qaeda terrorist enterprise: 
3

internal implosion and external marginalization. Indeed, 

these combined dimensions account for a significant 

swath of variance explained in terrorist failure: “Most 

terrorism ends,” Audrey K. Cronin claims: 

because the group employing the tactic fails and eventually disintegrates. The short life-span and limited 

success of most groups that use terrorism demonstrate 

that violence deliberately targeted against civilians repels rather than attracts popular support. Indiscriminate killing creates a backlash and undermines political staying power. Terrorism creates havoc, murders 

innocent people, draws morbid fascination; but it is 

insufficient to achieve political or social change.12

Evidence drawn from previous terrorist campaigns indicates four pathways to internal implosion: 

(1) the failure to attract new generations of membership and leadership; (2) in-fighting and fractionalization; (3) loss of operational control;13 and, (4) offering 

exit ramps for marginal members seeking to separate 

from the organization.14 “Implosion,” Cronin states, 

“happens when there is in-fighting over the mission, 

operations, competition for dominance,15 differences 

of ideology, loss of interest among members—even 

simple exhaustion or burnout.”16

Marginalization, on the other hand, signifies organizational isolation and distance from a broader 

mass of actual or potential supporters. “Groups that 

do not implode,” she continues, “may be cut off from 

their supporters. Marginalization occurs when there 

is a diminution of active or passive support, or even a 

popular backlash against the violence.”17

From the above one may predict that terrorist 

groups end because they are terrorist groups. As a type 

of political violence—excepting those terrorists that 
4

abandon terrorist means, reconnect to a broader mass, 

and transform into a legitimate insurgent or political 

entity—sustenance must become ever more perilous 

and fraught with all-too-human imperfections. As extremist outliers, they are isolated within, and therefore simultaneously inhabit the remotest outskirts and 

fringes of an imagined ideal, cause, or community they 

arrogantly presume to lead as vanguard. Further, they 

are marginalized by moral revulsion owing to the killing of innocents and the cold logic of a ruthless killing 

machine that lacks a pragmatic, hopeful, believable 

Other realizable by real persons in real time.18

A JIHAD-REALIST JURISPRUDENTIAL 

APPROACH 

However distasteful to U.S. national security decisionmakers, the presumption of Islamic supremacism and a past-perfect Islamic utopian “golden age” 

in contrast to an age of pagan ignorance and infidelity; belief in the exclusive right of the Islamic call and 

right to rule all of humankind; extremely-negative 

caricatures of certain features of present-day Western 

societies; and vehement opposition to U.S. foreign 

policy in the Middle East (and in particular what is 

regarded as a hypocritical embrace of democracy, 

support for autocracy, and one-sided support for Israeli occupation) is professed by many observant and 

“non-jihadi” Muslims. On pragmatic grounds alone, 

therefore, it is inadvisable to presume that destroying 

al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism necessitates 

displacing Islamic supremacism and its essentially 

apologetic “narrative.”19 Moreover, though the majority of observant Muslims in daily popular piety 

disavows the religious prescription to wage military 
5

jihad, the legal case upholding an enduring obligation 

to call others to Islam (da’wa); to wage the military jihad until the entire world proclaims the word of Allah 

supreme; and to enjoy the most privileged status and 

fruits awaiting a true mujahid in paradise, is, in fact, 

a compelling one.20 Neither popular piety, moderates, 

liberals, or modernists have to date, in the opinion of 

the present author, successfully refuted it.21

In this monograph, a jihad-realist jurisprudential 

approach is operationalized as a tactical contribution 

to the imploding of al-Qaeda.22 This approach is potentially of greater yield, however, since unlike those 

traditional categories of terrorist littering the political 

violence landscape (e.g., separatist, ethno-nationalist, 

communist, anarchist, or doomsday cults), al-Qaeda 

legitimizes its self-proclaimed right to wage jihad 

based on what it claims is a faithful adherence to Islamic law. 

Islam is a strictly-monotheistic, law-centered, 

world religion. Its legal and moral principles are rooted in a revealed sacred scripture (Qur’an), traditional 

accounts of Prophet Muhammad’s life (Ahadith), and 

nearly 1,400 years of jurisprudential tradition. Aptly 

described as aspiring toward a universal divine nomocracy,23 all persons regardless of social status, class, 

race, sex, tribe, or family background are duty-bound 

to strive for righteous intention and conduct in daily 

life. In its orthodox Sunnite and Shi’ite forms, Islam 

is quintessentially a religion commanding lawful and 

forbidding lawless behavior.24 Islamic law also prescribes a law of warfare, and for observant Muslims, 

the military jihad is a binding religious prescription.25

There is no attempt in this monograph to deny, 

minimize, or otherwise obfuscate this martial religious 

prescription. In the opinion of this author, a genuinely 
6

effective means for tactically imploding and marginalizing al-Qaeda—particularly in the eyes of those deeply religiously-motivated potential recruits for whom 

religious law is a sine qua non for participation—must

presume the validity of Islamically-prescribed military jihad, and in those terms, objectively assess and decisively refute the validity of al-Qaeda’s declaration of 

war and subsequent global terrorist campaign.26 This 

approach proposed by the present author is designed 

to target exactly the type of person to which Noman 

Benotman, former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group violent militant ”jihadist” refers, when he states that for 

genuine dialogue to even begin, “The starting point 

has to be that jihad is legitimate, otherwise no one will 

listen.”27 Three essential additional premises must also 

be conceded if an Islamically-rooted legal case against 

al-Qaeda’s reign of terror is to be valid, namely first, 

that there is an absolute legal distinction between “legitimate jihad and terrorism”;28 second, that terrorism 

is “haram” (forbidden);29 and third, in addition to being forbidden, “grave Sharia violations”30 have accompanied terrorist methodologies.31

WAGING JIHAD: AL-QAEDA’S VIOLATIONS OF 

THE SHARI’A32

A summary of select jihad-realist jurisprudential objections raised against al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism is provided.33 Before embarking on 

this task, however, it is crucial to understand that for 

those young seekers of truth and justice targeted by 

al-Qaeda’s tactical propaganda, taking jihad “off the 

table” means potentially leaving on the table a massive structure of injustice that still demands a remedy 

in their eyes. If not jihad, then what? If terrorism is 
7

indeed impermissible, how then are Muslims to fight 

back? Consider the following three online posts in 

response to the republication of a letter34 by prominent salafi Saudi Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, calling for 

a categorical condemnation of terrorism, regardless 

of motive or cause, without hesitation, “ifs,” “ands,” 

or “buts.”35 These were just three of 185 posts over a 

4-day period from al-Qaeda sympathizers (a distinct 

minority) to modern, justice-seeking, young westernized Muslims (the vast majority)—all convinced the 

Muslim world requires definite action in its defense. 

Naeem: Very nice article [Sheikh Oudah’s] and follow-up comments [three other Sheikhs]. I like how it’s 

been made unequivocally clear what Jihad IS NOT. 

However, I’m convinced that we must simultaneously 

make clear what Jihad IS. Otherwise, confusion will 

persist. This article, while condemning the ill-advised 

actions and beliefs of many disenfranchised youth, 

does not allay their worries and concerns. The frustrations are still there and are VERY REAL. Should we 

cease to be concerned about the oppressions [sic] facing the Muslim Ummah? If not, what avenues do we 

have open to us? If (combative) Jihad is one of them, 

then what type of Jihad-oriented activities and efforts 

should we be supporting? In what manner? It is incumbent upon our scholars to not only teach us what 

is deplorable, but what is commendable, particularly 

in this very gray area of 21st century Jihad.36

Yaser: Absolutely valid concern [raised by Naeem], 

and I believe it is the right of every Muslim, especially 

those in the west, to know what is the right and valid 

way of Jihad, away from any zealous spirit or apologetic approach. I hope we can fulfill this request in 

future posts and articles insha’Allah [God willing].37
8

Mystrugglewithin: Naeem’s comment, and your 

[Yaser] feedback summarize everything that most of 

us here are concerned with.38

It is clear that al-Qaeda’s “center of gravity” is a 

younger generation of savvy, justice-seeking recruits 

and, owing to this, that prominent shaykhs and ulema

are attempting to argue that, yes, justice is supreme, 

but unjust means can never attain just ends. It is entry to Paradise itself that will be denied to those using 

sinful or criminal shortcuts—even if those actions are 

based in ignorance of one’s religion—and discounting 

genuine human costs. Shaykh al-Oudah clarifies these 

very consequences and the choice of two paths awaiting these youth.

The merciful thing to do is to tell those young people 

who have been deceived, and those who are set to join 

their ranks tomorrow, that: ‘This path you are taking is 

not going to bring you to your goal. It will not save 

you from Hell or earn you Paradise. Whoever wants 

success in this life, salvation in the next, and Allah’s 

pleasure should adhere to the true teachings of Islam 

and keep far away from bloodshed and strife. Do not 

attempt to reinterpret the faith so as to justify acts 

that are clearly and patently evil. In the boldness with 

which you commit mortal sins, you engage in crimes 

far worse in Allah’s estimation than those whom you 

purport to condemn (italics added).’39

Sayyid al-Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif (aka Dr. Fadl), 

imprisoned former senior shari’a scholar for the Egyptian Jihad Organization and al-Qaeda’s former shari’a 

guide—whose guidelines for legal jihad we shall soon 

consider—also understands this center of gravity all 

too well. It is not difficult to read between these lines. 

To the question posed by Al-Hayah journalist Muham-
9

mad Salah, “What advice would you give Muslim 

youths regarding jihad?” he replies:

You should know that jihad is right, but beware those 

who exploit the youths’ ignorance of their religion and 

their zeal for Islam, pushing them to engage in jihad for 

which the means and resources are not available. They 

end up in jails or getting uselessly killed. This allows 

those who trade in Muslim youths’ zeal to earn reputation and donations. You must know that jihad has 

conditions and impediments, which must be carefully 

considered. The reasons for jihad in and of themselves 

are not sufficient to go to jihad, such as the presence 

of the enemy [in Muslim lands]. You should consider 

whose interest the jihad will serve. The Prophet, may 

God’s peace and prayers be upon him, said: ‘He who 

fights to elevate God’s word follows God’s path.’ This 

is an agreed upon Hadith. Do not leave your country and travel for jihad without permission from your 

Muslim parents. Do not move to a place without a full 

knowledge of circumstances.40

And in the same interview, in response to Muhammad Salah quoting Egyptian radical fundamentalist 

and al-Qaeda member Muhammad Khalil al-Hakayimah who “on 26 September . . . said: ‘Young Muslims 

will only trust the fatwas of the shaykhs and ulema 

who advocate jihad’,” Sayyid Imam retorts: 

O Al-Hakayimah: When God Almighty said: ‘O Messenger, rouse the Believers to the fight’ [Koranic verse, 

Al-Anfal 8:65], He ordered him to begin with himself. 

God Almighty says: ‘Then fight in Allah’s cause—

Thou art responsible only for thyself—and rouse the 

believers’ [Koranic verse, An-Nisa 4:84]. The Messenger is a good example for us, for he led his companions 

in fighting. Quit the remote control electronic jihad, and 

come to set a good example for the people here, espe-
10

cially because you deny being powerless. Otherwise, 

your victims who are recruited on the internet will purposelessly fill prisons, just because they believed you, 

unaware of the rule: ‘If you are my imam, you should 

stand in front of me in battle (italics added).’41

And even more emphatically, Sayyid Imam states:

My document [‘Rationalization’] will also save many 

Muslim young men from being lured by al-Qaeda over Internet and being taught treachery and betrayal. It will save 

many of al-Qaeda’s current followers and admirers 

who will hasten to repent before they are betrayed and 

encouraged to be treacherous to others, something for 

which they would be punished on the Day of Judgment. This document has caused some people to be released from jail and brought back happiness to many 

homes that had been living in sorrow. If the Muslims’ 

enemies profit from this, this is incidental and not the 

result of agreement just as they benefited from our 

participation in the Afghan jihad. Yet the Muslim people’s benefit is greater. Not everything that benefits 

the enemy is to be disdained (italics added).42

Let us now consider the principal Islamic shari’a 

objections to al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism. 

We also briefly consider jurisprudential objections 

identified in this same literature that may ultimately 

prove more persuasive to potential recruits unmoved 

by strict compliance with often scholastically encumbered jurisprudential disputes, who seek concrete results manifest in tangible evidence of Muslim empowerment, well-being, and the expansion of the Islamic 

call. 

It is beyond the scope of the present monograph, 

and the competency of the present author, to enter into 

a detailed consideration of the entire chain of reason-
11

ing and jurisprudential proofs offered for each point 

listed below. Genuine shari’a scholars are required to 

glean from every issue they consider some combination of reliance on the primary sources—Qur’an, Hadith, ijma, and qiyas—to derive valid legal opinions. 

The unrivaled source of authority in each dispute, 

barring corruption or circumvention of this process, 

is both the scholarly and jihadi reputation of the participants to this debate, and their ultimate ability to 

prevail in the ongoing worldwide conversation about 

the jihad imperative in the 21st century. Especially 

key is the fact that these disputant scholars are unconditionally associated with the religious duty to wage 

jihad, and are untainted by any conflicts of interest, 

for example, service on behalf of regimes perceived 

to be self-serving who seek to undermine violent rebellion not on grounds of religion, but sheer regime 

survival.43

These objections considered in their entirety 

amount to violations of what is in essence an Islamic 

law of armed conflict, including the right and duty to 

violent rebellion against an unjust ruler. These objections overlap, but naturally fall into two distinct clusters. The first concern predominantly Muslim societies 

in which violent armed Islamist organizations wage 

what they claim is jihad against what they assert are 

“apostate” regimes (i.e., declarations of “takfir of the 

ruler” or regime). The rules governing jihad, declaring one an apostate, and the many issues arising from 

targeting various kinds of person, are addressed here. 

The second cluster comprises those objections of 

greatest interest to those non-Muslim majority societies, including the United States, targeted by al-Qaeda’s 

reign of terror. Though some overlap exists with the 

first cluster, unique legal issues are raised, and shari’a 
12

violations identified. It is this second cluster that is of 

greatest interest to citizens living in predominantly 

non-Muslim societies presently targeted by al-Qaeda. 

The Jihad-Realist Rejection of Violent Rebellion 

and Takfir.44

The following shari’a violations have been most 

consistently cited by an emergent consensus of jihadrealist militant Islamists who have religiously delegitimized violent armed conflict directed against their 

governments. 

1. The Impermissible Rejection of Scholarly Authority. 

This includes the failure to recognize the legitimate 

authority of learned Islamic experts and scholars on 

matters pertaining to shari’a, its legitimate methodology, and as a corollary, the need for deep skepticism 

about persons whose scholarly credentials in shari’a 

are insufficient, particularly in such weighty matters 

as inflicting harm and violence on others.45

2. The Impermissibility of Extremism and Fanaticism. 

Fanaticism, extremism, and immoderation violate 

explicit and unambiguous Islamic tenets and traditions. Immoderation is the gateway to violations of 

the shari’a, and most often results in undermining the 

interests and values of the Umma.46

3. Murdering Muslims is Haram. Unlawfully murdering Muslims is an absolute sin whose moral gravity is second only to the denial of the singularity and 

sovereignty of Allah.47

4. The Impermissible Declarations of Takfir. The impermissibility of takfir—declaring another Muslim 

an apostate and therefore rendering their lives and 

property forfeit—stressing especially its historic consequence in undermining social solidarity, sowing 
13

chaos, creating disorder, facilitating dissension (fitnah), and unleashing mayhem.48

5. The Impermissibility of Violating the Lives, Property, 

and Honor of Non-Muslims Granted Promises of Security. 

An extensive jurisprudential literature exists regulating the permissible security granted non-Muslims visiting or residing in Muslim lands. It is impermissible 

to target civilians involved in leisure, tourism, business, or other affairs.49

6. The Religiously Ignorant, Impermissible, and Pragmatically Disastrous Isolation of Jihad as a Means of Promoting Allah’s Word.50 This jihadism is characterized 

by unlawful, inadvisable risk-taking in matters of military action, eschewing for example, legal and customary requirements bearing on such factors as the relative strength of one’s opponents; the relative capacity 

to wage jihad; the relative availability of less-costly 

options (i.e., da’wa, enforcing the good and forbidding 

evil, isolation, emigration, etc.),51 and the relative costs 

to the Umma. This imprudence is likely owing to fanaticism, extremism, and the placing of means before 

ends, each of which are rooted in religious ignorance 

or worldly desires. The inflicting of overwhelmingly 

burdensome costs has not only destroyed lives, property, homes, and families in the short-run, but has also 

come at the expense of the longer-term benefits, values and abiding interests of the Umma.52

7. Impermissibility of Rejecting the Modern State’s Prerogative to Exercise Political Authority and Wage Jihad. 

The medieval circumstances dividing the world into 

Islamic (Dar al-Islam) and non-Islamic (Dar al-Harb; 

literally “Abode” or “House” of War) spheres, and elevating the role of Caliph and Caliphate, no longer exists. Collective Muslim majorities are now territorially 

organized into sovereign nation-states, and the state is 
14

a political organ possessing a legitimate monopoly on 

the means and use of violence. If today jihad is to be 

declared and waged to discharge the lawful collective 

duty (fard kifaya) to conduct offensive jihad to expand 

the Umma, it can only be declared by a legitimate sovereign on the basis of the shari’a.53

8. Impermissible Extremism in the Exercise of the Right 

to Retribution (the “principle of justice”). Recall that the 

range of legal/moral permissibility for a given action 

is five-fold: absolutely required or commanded (fard); 

commendable or recommended, but not required 

(mustahabb); indifferent, neutral, permissible (mubah); 

discouraged or reprehensible, but not forbidden 

(makruh); absolutely and explicitly forbidden because 

both sinful and criminal (haram). Not only does Islam 

maintain that charity, mercy, and forgiveness are even 

greater virtues than mere retribution54—though that 

is certainly just and does restore a lawful reciprocity—permissible conduct (i.e., retribution) has been 

replaced with terroristic conduct that is forbidden (haram).55

9. The General Impermissibility of Violent Rebellion 

Against a Ruler, and its Necessary Conditions Specified.

56

It is only under the most dire circumstances that the 

Muslim community would not be threatened in their 

lives, security, honor, and possessions by overthrowing a ruler. Apostasy amounting to active disavowal 

of the Islamic creed and assisting the enemies of the 

Umma, are today the only sufficient grounds. 

The Jihad-Realist Rejection of al-Qaeda Based and 

Inspired Terrorism.57

The above legal rulings apply most specifically to 

Muslim-majority societies that over past decades have 

faced violent Islamist rebellions in the name of jihad. 
15

These rulings may be complemented with additional 

ones of direct and vital relevance, undermining alQaeda’s reign of terror principally directed against 

noncombatant civilians living in Muslim-minority 

societies. The force of these legal objections does not 

lie in any kind of sentimentalism, but in a deeplyembedded set of principles that legally regulate the 

military jihad. It is worth restating at the outset, before 

considering al-Qaeda’s chief violations, what a jihadrealist jurisprudential approach is. Such an approach 

is succinctly stated by Sayyid Imam himself:

. . . [J]ihad is a continuing religious duty in the Nation 

of the Muslims, since Allah the Almighty ordained it 

and until the last one of them combats the imposter 

together with the Lord Christ [sic]58 peace upon him, 

at the end of time, as our Prophet Muhammad Allah’s 

prayers and peace upon him told us. The prophet described jihad as “the peak of Islam’s hump,” for Allah 

preserves for the Muslims and their religion and their 

world, their pride and dignity here and in the Hereafter. Thus it is necessary to rationalize the understanding of the religious duty of jihad.59

What, then, are the cardinal shari’a objections 

raised against al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism? 

1. The Murder of Persons is Haram. Due to the sacred 

nature of all life—its absolute sanctity—persons must 

be secure in their lives, persons, property, possessions, 

and honor.60

2. The Impermissibility of Targetting Muslims; and 

non-Muslim Civilians, Especially Women, Children, the 

Elderly, Scholars and Students of Knowledge.

61 This is 

self-explanatory but bears repeating, since it is stated 

explicitly within the context of non-Muslim majority 

societies.
16

3. The Impermissible Extension of the Principle of Tartarrus (targeting human shields).62 The sanctity of life, 

and specific conditions that must be met for jihad to 

be waged, almost always render impermissible the 

killing of a Muslim, even if unintentionally. The jurisprudence of justification has, however, violated these 

conditions in order to facilitate its unlawful terrorist 

activities.

4. The Impermissibility of Treachery, Violation of Oaths 

and Pacts of Security Granted (implicitly, or explicitly) to 

Muslims in Non-Muslim Majority societies.

63 The question of safe passage for non-Muslims in Muslim-majority societies was examined above. This deals with 

the security pact that governs the duty of Muslims 

who are provided the opportunity to enter, be secure 

in, and enjoy the liberties of life, property, possessions, 

and honor, in a non-Muslim society. 

5. The Impermissibility of Killing on the Basis of Nationality. There is no precedent in Islam for killing persons 

on the basis of national affiliation. Since in the modern 

era Muslims may, and often likely will be, living in 

non-Muslim societies, this invites the potential killing 

of Muslims. However, its impermissibility rests on a 

broader religious tradition that, while distinguishing 

persons on the basis of faith, does not do so on the 

basis of territorial residency or citizenship. Osama bin 

Laden’s and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s claim that they are 

targeting “Crusaders” in the “Crusader-Zionist” alliance is shown to be another instance of the jurisprudence of justification.64

6. Jihad is Impermissible Unless Specific Conditions and 

Capacities are Present. Jihad is an enduring religious obligation. However, because of the seriousness of such 

a declaration—the equivalent of a declaration of war, 

in the West—waging jihad is only permissible if one 
17

has taken explicit and careful account of the abilities, 

circumstances, conditions, and costs involved (relative to perceived benefits, and perceived alternative 

courses of action) that this religious prescription demands.65

7. Permissibility to Wage Offensive Jihad Must Be 

Granted by Parents and Creditors. Individuals participating in an offensive jihad must have these permissions. Persons participating in a defensive jihad, however, generally do not. The costs of abandoning one’s 

parents, families, properties, and possessions, however, must be factored in, and the ulema have issued 

divided opinions. 66

8. Impermissibility of Violating a Voluntary Oath of 

Unconditional Allegiance (bay’at) Given to One’s Recognized Ruler. Osama bin Laden knowingly and willfully 

disobeyed then supreme leader of the Taliban regime, 

Mullah Omar, by provoking in word and deed the 

United States, and thus increasing the likelihood that 

Afghanistan would be invaded and a Muslim government overthrown. Osama bin Laden was an invited 

guest enjoying complete security of person, property, 

and liberty of action. His impermissible actions are 

widely viewed as the proximate cause of the removal 

of the Taliban from power, and the calamitous consequences that have resulted from those events.67

9. The Impermissibility of Waging Offensive Jihad 

Under Present Conditions of Muslim Weakness vis-à-vis 

the Infidel Powers. Jihad-realism is not a suicide pact, 

and the present power imbalance between Muslim 

and non-Muslim parties recommends against violent 

means. Other alternatives are available to Muslims 

“short of war” for advancing the Muslim cause. Until objective conditions favoring military action exist, 

these alternatives are both permissible and desirable.68
18

10. The Permissibility of Jihad, Emigration, or a Truce, 

When Facing Infidel Occupation. A defensive jihad is 

understood to be an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) that 

devolves on every believer. However, it may be that 

the costs of such a jihad outweigh the benefits, and 

other courses of action are legally permissible.69

11. The Impermissibility of Attacking Civilians of an 

Occupying Country in the Name of Jihad or Under Its Banner. This is the central legal question of greatest interest 

to Americans and American policymakers. Regardless 

of whether a country is presumed to be an occupying 

country, in this case the presumption by al-Qaeda that 

the United States is “occupying Muslim lands,” it is 

impermissible to harm civilians or combatants in that 

home country.70

12. The Imprudence of al-Qaeda Based and Inspired Terrorism. Behind virtually every legal discussion above 

is the implicit relation between law and life. Law that 

does not support life does not last. Religious principles 

that are radically at odds with the reality principle—

the conditions of the world as they exist in reality, not 

in fantasy or wish-projection—either reinterpret these 

principles, reform them, or become of mere antiquarian interest. A pragmatic, prudential substrate exists 

in Islam, as in every other great faith, that relates desired ends to available means, and evaluates courses 

of action in relation to the actual benefits that arise for 

its intended beneficiaries. It is on these grounds that 

the events occurring on September 11, 2001 (9/11) 

are arguably the most calamitous, catastrophic blow 

against Islam. A Muslim who is deeply observant, but 

also wisely pragmatic may then ask: How has Osama 

Bin Laden’s so-called jihad benefitted Islam? What 

has been the cost to Islam and Muslims worldwide 

of al-Qaeda’s unilateral decision to declare, launch, 
19

and wage a reign of terror whose principal victims are 

noncombatant civilians, Muslim and non-Muslim? 

The answer is not hard to find. The mind of the world 

is not focused on Islam as a majestic, deeply lawabiding, religion of peace, mercy, and justice; but on a 

religion whose reputation has now been perverted by 

its association with intolerance, fanaticism, and terror. 

Bin Laden’s gift has not been to expand the sphere of 

those prepared to hear and respond to the Muslim call 

but those prepared—by the ignominy of 9/11, and religious ignorance in the West regarding Islam’s actual 

moral soul—to resist it, and indeed extinguish it.71

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 

Conclusion.

1. Several variables affect the demise and eventual 

destruction of terrorist organizations. The tactical implosion and marginalization of al-Qaeda based and 

inspired terrorism is a necessary but insufficient condition for ending al-Qaeda. 

2. The 9/11 Report identifies three key strategic objectives—decapitation, de-radicalization, and homeland security/resilience—as keys to defeating al-Qaeda, and while the first and third have been notably 

successful, the second objective has been relatively 

less so. 

3. Approaches to counterradicalization that rely on 

so-called counterideological or counternarrative approaches miss their mark: they presume ending al-Qaeda’s reign of terror requires that Islam as a religious 

faith delegitimize core Islamic and Islamist tenets, 

including key planks anchoring religious faith, including a Past-Perfect, Present-Imperfect, and Future-
20

to-be-Perfect belief system that demands the right 

and duty to make Allah’s word Supreme; they fail to 

acknowledge and engage the breadth and depth of 

nonreligiously motivated opposition to existing U.S. 

foreign and military policy, especially in the Middle 

East and the Israel-Palestine conflict; and most specifically, counternarrative approaches unnecessarily 

burden this tactical objective by casting their net far 

too wide and capturing a vast Islamic, Islamist, and 

salafist universe whose adherents are overwhelmingly 

morally repelled by al-Qaeda’s reign of terror. 

4. Islam is a law-centered religious faith that proscribes and prescribes human conduct. The jihad—the 

religious prescription to struggle and strive in the 

path/way of Allah until Allah’s word reigns supreme 

throughout the earth—including its military sense is, 

despite disavowal in popular piety and much modern 

moderate Islamic discourse, a binding religious prescription. This presumption is an essential startingpoint in potentially delegitimizing al-Qaeda’s reign of 

terror among adherents for whom shari’a compliance 

is an essential requirement to wage lawful jihad. 

5. Recent important jurisprudential debates among 

jihad-realist Islamist militants have produced several 

conclusions that may be used to delegitimize al-Qaeda’s reign of terror as both unlawful, and imprudent. 

The majority of those conclusions arise from recent 

decades of prison debates in Muslim-majority societies over the legality, methods, means, and pragmatics 

of violent rebellion against existing governments in 

Muslim-majority societies. Among the most important shari’a violations are: (1) The impermissible rejection of scholarly authority; (2) The impermissibility 

of extremism and fanaticism; (3) Murdering Muslims 

is haram; (4) The impermissible declarations of takfir; 
21

(5) The impermissibility of violating the lives, property, and honor of non-Muslims granted promises of 

security; (6) The religiously ignorant, impermissible, 

and pragmatically disastrous isolation of jihad as a 

means of promoting Allah’s word; (7) Impermissibility 

of rejecting the modern state’s prerogative to exercise 

political authority and wage jihad; (8) Impermissible 

extremism in the exercise of the right to retribution 

(the “principle of justice”); and, (9) The general impermissibility of violent rebellion against a ruler, and its 

necessary conditions specified.

6. These rulings may be complimented with additional ones of direct and vital relevance, undermining 

al-Qaeda’s reign of terror directed principally against 

noncombatant civilians living in Muslim-minority societies. Among the latter, the most decisive legal objections include: (1) The murder of persons is haram; 

(2) The impermissibility of targeting Muslims, and 

non-Muslim civilians, especially women, children, 

the elderly, scholars, and students of knowledge; (3) 

The impermissible extension of the principle of Tartarrus; (4) The impermissibility of treachery, violation of 

oaths, and pacts of security granted (implicitly, or explicitly) to Muslims in non-Muslim majority societies; 

(5) Jihad is impermissible unless specific capacities, 

conditions, and circumstances, are present; (6) Permissibility to wage offensive jihad must be granted by 

parents and creditors; (7) Impermissibility of violating a voluntary oath of unconditional allegiance and 

obedience (bay’at) given to one’s recognized ruler; (8) 

The impermissibility of waging offensive jihad under 

present conditions of Muslim weakness vis-à-vis the 

infidel powers; (9) The permissibility of jihad, emigration, or a truce, when facing infidel occupation; (10) 

The impermissibility of attacking American civilians 
22

of an occupying country in the name of jihad or under its banner; and, (11) The imprudence of al-Qaeda 

based and inspired terrorism. 

Policy Suggestions.

1. Give due regard to the key role that jihad-realist 

jurisprudential debates hold for contributing to the 

tactical implosion and marginalization of al-Qaeda’s 

reign of terror.

2. Owing to present hostility directed in many 

quarters against U.S. policies in the Middle East and 

Muslim world generally, and the Israel-Palestine 

conflict in particular, it is extremely inadvisable for 

the United States to openly promote or publicize any 

of these initiatives. A key, indeed essential, ingredient for the authority of these findings is that they are 

viewed as absolutely untainted by any interest, factor, 

force, or power; rather, these debates rest on the legitimacy of the shari’a and involve credentialed actors of 

immense stature and learning.

3. Those charged with strategic communication, 

public diplomacy, and messaging generally to promote United States interests should develop the sophistication, capacities, and motivation, to systematically analyze how jihad-realism and a jurisprudence 

of jihad, may be leveraged for, and not against, these 

interests. 

4. The proper counternarrative frame is not “genuine peaceful pro-Western mainstream Muslim seeking 

liberal democratic freedoms versus jihadist violent 

killer seeking the destruction of Western civilization.” 

While relevant to some targets—those for whom 

Western cultural modernity is a value, and the shari’a 

of customary or merely historic interest—this coun-
23

ternarrative is not the one to defeat the religiously 

learned for whom living and dying to promote the 

word of Allah as supreme, is Islam. The debate is one 

within militant Islamism over the lawfulness of al-Qaeda’s methods. It is about whether terrorism is haram, 

and has done virtually incalculable damage to Islam’s 

global image; or it is fard, and an essential condition 

of being a True Mujahid and advancing the Muslim 

Umma. In this battle it is, ironically, the learned, jihadrealist jurisprudents—lovers of religious truth, and religious law—whose spirit most resembles that of our 

own learned constitutional scholars. It is the law that 

they love first, because law is a condition of life; of 

security; of any reasonable attempt to fashion a lasting and just social order. Impatience and imprudence 

have always been enemies of the law. It is in essence 

the law’s revenge that is finally wreaking havoc, along 

with those several other causes, on al-Qaeda’s reign of 

terror. 

It is advisable that the United States do everything 

within its power to make the case to the Muslim-majority countries, and the Muslim-minority populations 

in the Muslim diaspora, that as a country we are on 

the side of the lawful and the just, and that we actively 

seek and promote solutions to long-simmering policy 

grievances. Our ability as a nation to openly associate with any efforts by internal Muslim actors will 

only be the kiss of death until the perception of our 

motivations is altered, and altered fundamentally. No 

amount of spin or messaging matters when daily life 

and its common-sense interpretation contradicts official pretensions and pronouncements. One should 

always remember that the “Planes Operation”—the 

momentous event that shook the world and created an 
24

alternative one rooted in war-footing and a threatened 

“clash of civilizations” was the work of terrorist entrepreneurs whose primary goal was to cause as much 

pain to the United States as possible, not because of its 

lack of shari’a compliance; or its infidelity; or its craven and immoral ways; or its freedoms. But quite the 

opposite, for it was seen—certainly through a mindset rooted in paranoia, scapegoating, and a reversedemonology—as being the singular superpower actor 

whose support for its ally Israel was the essential condition preventing a resolution of an enduring conflict 

thousands of miles from its borders—not shari’a, but 

retribution; not jihad, but terrorism; not Muslim holy 

war, but terrorist moral rage.72

ENDNOTES

1. National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White 

House, Office of the President, May 2010, pp. 4, 19-22, available from 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer?national_security?

strategy.pdf; National Strategy for Countering Terrorism, Washington, 

DC: The White House, Office of the President, June 2011, p. 1, 3, 

available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, February 2010, pp. v, 6, 15, available 

from www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.

pdf; Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The QDR 

in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st 

Century, Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent 

Panel, Corrected Advance Copy, Washington, DC: United States 

Institute of Peace, 2010, p. 26. 

2. As classically noted, a clear definition of the enemy and 

nature of war one fights are essential first principles for sound 

policy and strategy. See, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael 

Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1976/1989, pp. 88-89; Sun Tzu, The Art of War,

Thomas Cleary, trans., Boston, MA: Shambala, 2005, p. 53. The 
25

June 2011 National Strategy on Counterterrorism defines this war 

in the following terms: “The United States deliberately uses the 

word ‘war’ to describe our relentless campaign against [al-Qaeda]. However, this administration has made it clear that we are 

not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam. 

We are at war with a specific organization—[al-Qaeda],” (p. 2). 

The scope of this [al-Qaeda] threat is more expansive than its core 

command and control, or al-Qaeda central, to include its affiliates 

and adherents. As further stated: “The preeminent security threat 

to the United States continues to be from [al-Qaeda] and its affiliates and adherents,” National Strategy on Counterterrorism, p. 3 

(bold in original). This more expansive scope now includes what 

might be termed al-Qaedist groups and individuals—associated, 

affiliated, and inspired—who use violence to target the United 

States, its interests, allies, and other targets of opportunity (Ibid., 

p. 3). Key definitions (Ibid., p. 3) further clarify the scope of this 

adversary and nature of this war. [1] “Associated Forces” is “a legal term of art that refers to cobelligerents of al Qa’ida and the 

Taliban against whom the President is authorized to use force (including the authority to detain) based on the Authorization to Use 

Military Force, Pub.L.107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).” [2] “Affiliates” 

includes “Associated Forces” but also includes “groups and individuals against whom the United States is not authorized to use 

force based on the authorities granted by the Authorization for 

the Use of Military Force, Pub.L.107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). “The 

use of Affiliates in this strategy,” the document continues, “is intended to reflect a broader category of entities against whom the 

United States must bring various elements of national power, as 

appropriate and consistent with the law, to counter the threat they 

pose.” Finally, [3] “Adherents” are defined as “Individuals who 

have formed collaborative relationships with, act on behalf of, or 

are otherwise inspired to take action in furtherance of the goals of 

al-Qaeda—the organization and the ideology—including engaging in violence regardless of whether such violence is targeted at 

the United States, its citizens, or interests.” A final official, illuminating definition of the enemy is provided by former 9/11 Commission co-chairs Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, “The [9/11] 

commission embraced a definition of the enemy as two pronged: 

‘al-Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on 9/11; 

and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired 

in part by [al-Qaeda], which has spawned terrorist groups and 

violence across the globe.’ We made a conscious decision to refer 
26

to the enemy as ‘Islamist terrorism’—not as ‘terrorism’ the tactic, 

or ‘Islam the religion’.” (See Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, New 

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p. 283.) For the likelihood that latent 

conflicts are beginning to emerge between the Departments of 

State and Defense as a result of this more expansive conception 

of terrorist opponent and the jurisdictional, diplomatic, strategic, 

and operational issues involved, see Charlie Savage, “Obama Adviser Discusses Using Military on Terrorists,” The New York Times, 

September 16, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/09/17/

us/john-o-brennan-on-use-of-military-force-against-al-qaeda.html.

3. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, New York: W. W. Norton, 2004, chap. 

12 (hereafter The 9/11 Commission Report).

4. See, for example, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, 

“Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the Drone Program in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4, July/August 

2011, pp. 12-18; “Al Qaeda Shadow of Former Self 10 Years After 9/11,” Reuters, September 9, 2011, available from http://

www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/09/us-sept11-alqaeda-future-id

USTRE7881DS20110909; Greg Miller, “U.S. officials believe alQaeda on brink of collapse,” The Washington Post, July 26, 2011, 

available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/

al-qaeda-could-collapse-us-officials-say/2011/07/21/gIQAFu2pbI_

story.html; “Charting the data for U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-

2011,” The Long War Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.

org/pakistan-strikes.php. Remarkably, just 5 months since the takedown of bin Laden, American-born Yemeni Anwar al-Awlaki—

notorious for his effectiveness at radicalization and recruiting 

English-language Muslims living in Western societies—has met 

a similar fate. See CNN Wire Staff, “U.S. officials warn of possible retaliation after al Qaeda cleric is killed,” September 30, 2011, 

available from www.cnn.com/2011/09/30/world/africa/yemen-radicalcleric/. 

5. For a measured assessment that identifies notable achievements yet highlights continuing areas of vulnerability, see Bipartisan Policy Center, Tenth Anniversary Report Card: The Status of the 

9/11 Commission Recommendations, Washington, DC: National Se-
27

curity Preparedness Group, September 2011, available from www.

bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/tenth-anniversary-report-card-status-911-commission-recommendations; Cheryl Pellerin, “Officials: 

Defense-Intelligence Integration Strongest Since 9/11,” Armed 

Forces Press Service, September 8, 2011, available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65279.

6. The 10th-anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the 

United States should have seen a catastrophic follow-on attack, 

but did not. Rather we witnessed a rather gaunt, ghostly, hunted, hidden shell of a savaged underground conspiratorial vanguard group whose singular accomplishment that day was to 

post a video entitled “The Dawn of Imminent Victory,” to jihadist 

websites. New al-Qaeda emir Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri appears in 

a still image, accompanied by audio. Footage is also presented 

of former terror master bin Laden, identical to that gathered by 

special operators in the May take-down in Abbotabad, Pakistan, 

but no longer muted, in which he warns Americans, among other 

things, of “falling slaves to corporations”as bin Laden himself in 

actuality falls slave to deep sea ocean currents and inevitable corporeal decomposition. And, of course, solidarity is expressed for 

the Arab revolutions; a nod toward defeating the United States 

in Iraq and Afghanistan; and . . . drum roll please. . . “the 9/11 

attacks.” One can only begin to imagine the signal intelligence 

(SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) operators slowly 

but surely tightening the noose and thus forcing continuing reliance on a practically-medieval courier network used to secretly 

send out that earth-shattering, momentous signifier of al-Qaeda’s 

present incapacity (available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-uscanada-14895727). 

7. Audrey K. Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the 

Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, MA: Princeton University Press, 2009/2011, p. 8. See also 

Antulio J. Echevarria, II, Wars of Ideas and The War of Ideas, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2008, 

pp. viii, 39, available from www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, 

for explicit recognition of the importance of physical events that 

serve to undermine terrorist recruitment, organizational success, 

and the legitimizing of intellectual, ideological, or dogmatic-theological concepts and narratives. 
28

8. Cronin, based on data trends ending c. 2008, severely underestimates the strategic potential of relentless hunting and decapitation of high value terrorist targets, and significantly overestimates the costs that she believes it may entail, which include the 

likely elevating of Osama bin Laden to the status of a martyred 

Muslim icon and the relative ease of generating new high value 

terrorist cadre. (see, e.g., pp. 177-179, 190, 194-195); This may be 

due to her underestimation of al-Qaeda’s vanguardist ambitions 

and organizational structure that, while not tied to a single individual, presumes a battle-hardened, time-tested, absolutely loyal 

secret cadre capable of monopolizing and carrying out a global 

projection of strategic vision.

9. Ibid., pp. 179-182. Defeating an adversary demands that one 

fully understand, master, and defeat an adversary’s strategy (Sun 

Tzu, p. 35; Robert Kennedy, “The Elements of Strategic Thinking,” 

in Gabriel Marcella, ed., Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

March 2010, p. 16; Jarret Brachman, Global Jihadism: theory and 

practice, New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 183-184). It is on these 

grounds that a deliberate, intentional, thoughtful U.S. policy of 

disaggregation has been suggested by scholars and many Western counterterrorism analysts as the sine qua non for countering 

al-Qaeda’s principal strategy of aggregation. See, for example: 

Cronin, pp. 182, 193, 195; David C. Gompert and John Gordon, 

IV et al., War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, Santa Monica, CA: RAND National 

Defense Research Institute, 2008, pp. 49-73; David Kilcullen, The 

Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, 

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009 (esp. pp. 14-15, 292-

293). For an excellent analysis of al-Qaeda’s “double-bind” preventing it from aggregating with either local-national territorial 

insurgent movements or classical defensive jihad movements, see 

Vahid Brown, “Al-Qaeda Central and Local Affiliates,” in Assaf 

Moghadam and Brian Fishman, eds., Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates 

and Divisions within al-Qaeda and its Periphery, Harmony Project, 

West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, Combating Terrorism 

Center, December 16, 2010, pp. 69-99, available from www.ctc.

usma.edu. 

10. Cronin, pp. 191.
29

11. Ibid., pp. 190-191. Like decapitation, Cronin significantly 

downplays the cumulative effects of repression for the viability 

of al-Qaeda’s external operations capability. Again, in fairness to 

her, at the time of publication (c. 2009) the relentless, systematic, 

drone-based, high-value targeting campaign had barely just begun. 

12. Cronin, p. 94; As David Blair states “Terrrorist movements across the world have a history of alienating their popular support by waging campaigns of indiscriminate murder.” 

See “Al-Qaeda Founder Launches Fierce Attack on Osama bin 

Laden,” The Telegraph, February 20, 2009, available from www.

telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/4736358/

Al-Qaeda-founder-launches-fierce-attack-on-Osama-bin-Laden.html.

For dramatic data on al-Qaeda’s decline in support from three key 

bases: the Arab and Muslim populace, influential salafi Islamic 

scholars and clerics, and bona fide jihad-realist militants, see Rajeh Said, “Ten years after September 11th Attacks, al-Qaeda Lacks 

Popular Support,” Al-Shorfa.com, September 9, 2011, available 

from al-shorfa.com/cocoon/meii/xhtml/en_GB/features/meii/features/

main/2011/09/09/feature. 

13. See Alia Brahimi, “Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al 

Qaeda will Lose the War of Ideas,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,” Vol. 33, 2010, pp. 93-110, for how the devolution of operational control to local affiliates and adherents in Iraq dramatically 

undercut al-Qaeda’s broader strategic objectives.

14. Cronin, Chap. 4, pp. 183-186. 

15. See for example, Joas Wagemakers, “Invoking Zarqawi: 

Abu al-Maqdisi’s Jihad Decifit,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 

2009, pp. 14-17, for a strategically consequential example of how 

divisions arose pitting the highly-credentialed salafi scholar alMaqdisi, with his rigid commitment to binding shari’a-based 

rules for waging jihad, against those claiming to prove their “real” 

jihadi credentials through their willingness to practice and justify 

brutally savage sectarian violence. For how this operational devolution is manifest in meta-narratives that elevate opportunistic 

constructions of sacred sources that simultaneously demote scholarly acumen in favor of violent praxis, see Akil N. Awa, “Success 

of the Meta-Narrative: How Jihadists Maintain Legitimacy,” CTC 
30

Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 2009, pp. 6-8, available from 

www.ctc.usma.edu. 

16. Ibid., p. 95; See especially, Brian Fishman and Assaf Moghadam, “Do Jihadi and Islamist Divisions Matter? Implications for 

Policy and Strategy,” in Moghadam and Fishman, eds., Self-Inflicted Wounds, pp. 224-240, for a deeply insightful description of 

potential implosion tactics applicable to al-Qaeda. 

17. Cronin, p. 95.

18. Cronin’s approach is usefully complemented by an extremely compelling account of traditional deterrence theory extended to counterterrorism advocated by Alex S. Wilner, “Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial and Delegitimation in 

Counterterrorism,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2011, 

pp. 3-37, available from dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.541760. 

19. The structure of this narrative is Islam’s very self-understanding as the exclusive agent on earth of Allah’s will manifest 

as Islam’s glorious rise, divinely-inspired spread, present-day inglorious absence, and a proposed path for its restoration to divine 

glory. In apologetic writings, one first encounters a benedictory 

introduction thanking Allah, supreme God of the worlds, for all 

that is, and all that is Good. Immediately following, one is apprised of a Past-Perfect Islamic glorious golden age. Third, an account of “The Fall” is provided that is largely a dystopian odyssey 

involving Western cultural modernity being imposed as a predatory colonial plot to rip apart, weaken, and disable the Umma. 

Fourth, the question “What is to be done?” is posed and a singular 

answer offered: Islam. Specifically, one must reinstitute the rule 

of Allah’s shari’a through the twin means of da’wa (preaching, the 

call) and jihad. This demand to resurrect the religious prescription 

to wage military jihad is a key dividing line that separates jihadi 

and non-jihadi Islam and, in the opinion of the present author, 

the religious prescription is indeed religiously-grounded and 

thus, the fifth and sixth components are essential to the completion of the specifically jihadi narrative. Fifth, how it is to be done 

lawfully; and sixth, how it is not to be done unlawfully. For an excellent example of this six-part narrative structure in the writing of 

one of the most important of the revisionist jihad-realist scholars, 

see Sayyid al-Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif, Doctrine of Rationaliza-
31

tion (i.e., Right Guidance) for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World

(Wathiqat Tarshid Al-‘Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’Al-Alam), November 

2007, serialized in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic and partially available on www.opensource.gov, Part 1. Crucial here is that (1) jihad 

is regarded as including an armed, military dimension; and, (2) 

its legal parameters precisely specified. The purpose of the present monograph is to demonstrate that it is possible to disable alQaeda’s reign of terror on these grounds, i.e., the jurisprudence of 

lawful military jihad. This does not require a counternarrative, 

which would in effect amount to an attempted demythologization of a religious faith whose overwhelming majority of adherents—despite maintaining faith in the first three elements of the 

above narrative— regard terrorism directed at innocent civilian 

noncombatants—Muslim and non-Muslim—as morally abhorrent, repulsive, murderous, and un-Islamic. 

20. For the Quranic injunction to fight in the way of Allah to 

make Allah’s word supreme, including nonmartial forms of such 

struggling and striving, see for example Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The 

Meaning of the Holy Qur’an, New Ed. with Rev. Trans. and Commentary, Brentwood, MD: Amana Corporation, 1992, 2:148, 190-

193, 216-218, 246, 256, 262-263; 3:13, 104, 121-123, 134-136, 150-58, 

167-171, 195; 4:71-78, 89-96; 5:35; 8:12-19,30, 38-48, 59-75; 9:1-16, 

20-24, 36-49, 111, 123; 22:39-41, 58-59, 78; 29:68-69; 33:18-27, 60-

62; 47:4-11, 20, 33-38; 48:15-29; 49:15; 57:10; 59:2-14; 60:1, 7-9; 61:4, 

11-13; 73:20. This authoritative support for the superlative nature 

and religious prescription to wage the military jihad is also explicit in many passages in the two most authoritatively-binding 

hadith collections—Sahih Al-Bukhari, and Sahih Muslim. See for 

example, Sahih Al-Bukhari (The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih 

Al-Bukhari), Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, trans., Riyadh: Saudi 

Arabia: Darussalam, 1997, Vol. 4, Book 56, “The Book of Jihad” 

(2782-3090): 2783-2785, 2787-2789, 2791, 2792-2805, 2808-2810, 

2811, 2813-2820, 2824-2829, 2831-2835, 2837-2839, 2841, 2843-2847, 

2849-2853, 2860-2861, 2863-2864, 2874-2884, 2887-2891, 2892-2895, 

2897-2899, 2902-2904, 2906, 2909-2910, 2913, 2919-2922, 2924-2935, 

2942-2950, 2954, 2961-2967, 2970-2973, 2975, 2977-2978, 2981, 2986, 

2990-2991, 2995, 2997, 3002-3004, 3006-3010, 3012, 3016-3018, 

3020-3025-3034, 3037, 3039, 3041-3043, 3045-3048, 3051-3052, 3057, 

3061-3069, 3073, 3074-3077, 3081-3084,3087-3088. For what might 

be termed ‘ultra-jihad’, see 2887, 2927-2930, 2943, 2945-46, 2961-

62, 2966, 2972, 3022, 3043, 3051, 3076, 3077; 2966, 3025 (“Paradise 
32

under the Shade of Swords”); 2792-2798 (“Martyrdom, and Paradise”); 2833-2834 (“Actual Fighters, and Rewards”). See also Sahih 

Al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 2, “The Book of Belief” (aman), chapter 

26, #36, p. 73. In Sahih Muslim, Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, trans., Sh. 

Muhammad Ashraf: Lahore, Pakistan, 2004, Vol. 3, Book 10, “Kitab 

al-Jihad” (4292-4472): 4292, 4294, 4297-4300, 4311, 4313-4315, 4319, 

4321-4325, 4327-4330, 4332-4341, 4344-4349, 4353-4355, 4357-4358, 

4360-4361, 4363-4366, 4368, 4370, 4372-4375, 4377, 4385, 4388-4390, 

4392-4396, 4405-4406, 4413, 4429, 4437-4441, 4445-4447, 4452-4453, 

4456-4457, 4462, 4464-4470, 4472; and, for the most militant of 

the martial jihad traditions, see 4292, 4294, 4340-4341, 4344, 4347, 

4363, 4366, 4370, 4372, 4375, 4385, 4388-4393, 4395-96, 4405, 4406, 

4413, 4437-4447 , esp. 4462-4470, 4472. The religious prescription 

to wage military jihad is also found outside the “Book of Jihad” in 

the “Book of Faith” (aman), Sahih Muslim, Vol. 1, Chap. 9, “Command for Fighting Against the People So Long as They Do Not 

Profess That There is No God But Allah and Muhammad is His 

Messenger,” # 30-34 (pp. 16-17). The crux of the martyrological 

covenant is crisply captured in this classical Qur’anic ayah, a kind 

of “jihadi covenant” (Ali, pp. 470-471, 9:111): “Allah hath purchased of the Believers their persons and their goods; For theirs (in 

return) is the Garden (of Paradise): They fight in His Cause, and 

slay and are slain: A promise binding on Him In Truth, through 

the Law, The Gospel, and the Qur’an. And who is more faithful 

to His Covenant than Allah? Then rejoice in the bargain which ye 

have concluded: That is the achievement supreme.” 

Despite the fact Islam is by wide consensus viewed to rest on 

five pillars—creed, prayer, alms, fasting on Ramadan, and participation in the Hajj—the classical sources are not in agreement. 

For example, Sahih Muslim, Vol. 1, “The Book of Faith,” chap. 6, 

pp. 10-11, #21, states: “It is reported on the authority of Ta’us that 

a man said to Abdullah son of Umar (may Allah be pleased with 

him): Why don’t you carry out a military expedition? Upon which 

he replied: I heard the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon 

him) say: Verily, al-Islam is founded on five (pillars): testifying 

the fact that there is no god but Allah, establishment of prayer, 

payment of Zakat, fast of Ramadan and Pilgrimage to the House.” 

In Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 2, “The Book of Faith,” chapter 

18, #26, it reports the following tradition: “Narrated Abu Jurairah: 

Allah’s Messenger [peace be upon him] was asked, “What is the 

best deed?” He replied, “To believe in Allah and His Messenger 

(Muhammad)[peace be upon him].” The questioner then asked, 
33

“What is the next [in goodness]?” He replied, “To participate in 

Jihad [holy fighting] in Allah’s Cause.” 

21. For select contributions to this vast and ever-growing literature touting the utility of various non-jihadi counternarrative 

strategies, techniques, and recipes—often imagined as silver bullets—for disabusing the Muslim world of such “myths,” “narratives,” “ideologies,” “religious ideologies,” and other foibles allegedly at the heart of their distorted and contorted “occidentalist” 

imagination of the West, see Kenneth Payne, “Winning the Battle 

of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror,” Studies in Conflict 

and Terrorism, Vol. 32, 2009, pp. 109-138; William D. Casebeer and 

James A Russell, “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive ‘Counter-Narrative’ Strategy,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 

4, No. 3, March 2005, available from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/

nps/casebeer_mar05.pdf; Angela Trethewey, Steven R. Corman, 

“Out of Their Heads and into Their Conversation: Countering 

Extremist Ideology,” Consortium for Strategic Communication, 

Phoenix, AZ: Arizona State University, Report #0902, September 

14, 2009, available from comops.org/article/123.pdf; Bud Goodall, 

Angela Trethewey, and Kelly McDonald, “Strategic Ambiguity, 

Communication, and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World: 

Principles and Practices,” Consortium for Strategic Communication, Phoenix, AZ: Arizona State University, Report #0604, June 

21, 2006, available from comops.org/article/116.pdf; H. L. Goodall, 

Jr., “Why We Must Win the War on Terror: Communication, Narrative, and the Future of National Security,” Qualitative Inquiry, 

Vol. 12, No. 1, February 2006, pp. 30-59; Tom Quiqqin, “Understanding al-Qaeda’s Ideology for Counter-Narrative Work,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2009, pp. 18-35, available from www.terrorismanalysts.com. Heather S. Gregg, “Fighting 

the Jihad of the Pen: Countering Revolutionary Islam’s Ideology,” 

Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, 2010, pp. 292-314; Simon 

Cottee, “Mind Slaughter: The Neutralizations of Jihadi Salafism,” 

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33, 2010, pp. 330-352; Allison 

G. Smith, “From Words to Action: Exploring the Relationship between a Group’s Value Preferences and Its Liklihood of Engaging 

in Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, 2004, pp. 

409-437. 

Though this work is admirable in many respects, Burki’s implicit assumption (Shireen K. Burki, “Ceding the Ideological Battlefield to Al Qaeda: The Absence of an Effective U.S Information 
34

Warfare Strategy,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 38, 2009, pp. 349-366) 

that Islamic supremacism begins with medieval Hanbali Fiqh luminary Ibn Taymiyyah, (see p. 350), and not al-Qaeda per se, but a 

shifting mosaic of fundamentalist signifiers must be delegitimated—i.e., “fundamentalist Islam” (p. 357). “Once the enemy has 

been correctly, and publicly, identified as Islamic fundamentalists 

(i.e., Wahhabists, Salafists, and others). . . a certain type of virulent 

Islamic ideology derivative of Hanbali Fiqh,” (p. 360); “Salafist/

Wahhabi ideology,” (p. 362)—unnecessarily broadens the enemy 

to include enormous chunks of fundamentalist adherents whose 

propensity for terrorism, despite intolerance and supremacism, is 

extremely questionable. 

For scholarly analyses of Salafism and Wahhabism, see for example Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009 generally, but 

especially Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism,” 

Meijer, ed., Global Salafism, pp. 244-266; Quintan Wiktorowicz, 

“Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,” Vol. 29, 2006, pp. 207-239; International Crisis Group, 

“Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly 

Don’t Mix,” September 13, 2004, available from www.crisisgroup.

org; Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform 

to Global Jihad, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004; Christina Hellmich, “Creating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi Jihadis,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31, 

2008, esp. pp. 114-119, for a devastatingly-accurate critique of 

what the author terms “outside-in” scholarship on al-Qaeda, and 

key failures in conceptualizing Salafism, so-called Wahhabism, 

and in consulting primary sources such as Ibn Taymiyyah’s actual Fatawa or al-Wahhab’s actual theological demands, instead 

of exclusively consulting the group-think that mostly rests on 

often-ignorant or biased commentary. For what the present author regards as the most sophisticated, persuasive, and nuanced 

critique of the presumption of a fundamentalist-terrorist nexus—

whether Salafi, Wahhabi, or otherwise—see Muhammad Haniff 

Bin-Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counterideological Work 

against Terrorist Ideology,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 

29, 2006, esp. pp. 541-547. 
35

22. Bin Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counterideological 

Work against Terrorist Ideology,” pp. 537-538, advocates a “theological and juristic approach” virtually identical to that developed 

by the present author. However, the explicit recognition of jihad 

as a binding religious prescription (jihad realist) and Islamic jurisprudence (jurisprudential) or sacred law and shari’a methodology concerning behavioral proscriptions, prescriptions, and a 

continuum of lawful conduct—from obligatory (fard) to forbidden (haram) and stages in-between—is the vital center-of-gravity 

identified in the present author’s approach. “Theological” too often connotes more abstract, scholarly investigations into the manner in which the godhead exists, relates to the world and to man 

in the world, as well as debates over the relative rights of human 

reason versus faith in discerning those properties. 

What is key in the above approach is clearly understood by 

both bin Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counterideological 

Work against Terrorist Ideology,” p. 531, and Wilner, “Deterring 

the Undeterrable,” pp. 26-31, who both amply demonstrate the 

vital importance of attacking terrorist beliefs about their own legal and moral legitimacy. For bin Hassan, a successful terrorist act 

rests on three factors: opportunity (i.e., available targets), capability (i.e., money, training, weapons, recruits), and motivation (i.e., 

ideological and nonideological drivers), p. 531. Citing General 

William Slim, commander of the Fourteenth Army in Burma during World War II, bin Hassan identifies “morale”—a crucial factor for the willful disposition of the fighter—as presuming three 

key dimensions: intellectual confidence that “the goal can be attained,” material confidence that “the means of attaining the goal 

are available,” and spiritual confidence “that the cause is just,” 

p. 534. Translated in the vernacular of shari’a-based criteria for 

judging the legality of a jihad, the first two requirements—available means and probable success—deal with the pragmatics of jihad (i.e., Can it be done? Do the benefits outweigh the costs for 

the Umma?). The third requirement, concerns the legality or Islamic legitimacy of jihad (i.e., Is it just? Should it be done? Does the 

shari’a justify this jihad?). Wilner, extending deterrence theory to 

counterterrorism also identifies three key bases underpinning the 

terrorist cost/benefit calculus, two rooted in pragmatics, and the 

third—legitimation (see esp. pp. 26-31)—that demands that terrorist actors root their actions in the moral and legal demands of 

Islamic shari’a. 
36

23. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, pp. 14-18. 

24. See Sherifa Zuhur, Precision in the Global War on Terror: 

Inciting Muslims Through the War of Ideas, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2008, available 

from www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, for an outstanding 

contribution designed to disabuse ignorant, opportunistic, or otherwise dangerously-off-the-mark scholars from egregious stereotypes and ignorant formulations of essential Islamic and Islamist 

beliefs, practices, concepts, and values. Armed with an accurate 

mapping of actual Islam and Islamism, one can both establish the 

trusted long-term networks essential to the intra-civilizational debates informing Western and Islamic socicultural life, and partially mitigate the damage done to such a project by those seeking, 

on the basis of the wildest and most erroneous premises, an intercivilizational war. 

25. For academic accounts of this binding religious prescription, see for example: E. Tyan, “Djihad,” Encyclopedia of Islam, 

New Ed., Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 1965; David Cook, Understanding 

Jihad, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005; W. Gardner, “Jihad,” The Moslem World, Vol. 2, 1912, pp. 347-357; Majid 

Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Baltimore, MD: Johns 

Hopkins Press, 1955, Book II, The Law of War: The Jihad, pp. 

51-137; Rudolph Peters, ed., Jihad: In Classical and Modern Islam: 

A Reader, 2nd Ed., Princeton, NJ: Marcus Wiener, 2005; Michael 

Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice, Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006; Richard Bonney, Jihad: From 

Qur’an to bin Laden, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Andrew Bostom, ed., The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate 

of Non-Muslims, Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005; Stephen Collins 

Coughlin, “To Our Great Detriment”: Ignoring What Extremists Say 

About Jihad, Unclassified Master’s thesis submitted to the faculty 

of the National Defense Intelligence College, July 2007; Reuven 

Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; William Gawthorp, “Dogmatic Basis 

of Jihad and Martyrdom,” Small Wars Journal, July 6, 2011, available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/dogmatic-basis-of-jihad-andmartyrdom, presents a virtual inventory of jihad and martyrdomauthorizing statements and legal requirements contained in the 

classical sources and commentary. 
37

26. See also Alia Brahimi, “Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al 

Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33, 2010, p. 96, for insistence on placing al-Qaeda’s terrorism within the legal framework of a legitimately declared and 

fought defensive jihad. The connection between the imperative to 

wage jihad, and the requirement that it be waged lawfully, is evident in the following quote from Sayyid Imam, whose works will 

be discussed at length (see Sayyid Imam, Exposure of the Exoneration Book Al-Ta’riya li Kitab Al-Tabri’ya, “Twelfth Episode of Sayyid 

Imam: Al-Zawahiri had no Prior Knowledge of 09/11,” appearing in Al Misri Al Yawm in Arabic December 1, 2008 by Ahmad 

Al-Khatib, “The Second man in Al-Qai’ida Turned Osama Bin 

Ladin from a Traitor to a Mujahid to Inherit the Allegiance of his 

Followers,” Part 12, p. 6: “Jihad for Allah’s sake is just, but do not 

allow those people and their likes to auctioneer with this noble 

cause. They push youths to extreme sacrifices and they bring major catastrophes on the Muslims even though they most [sic] careful about their personal safety and about reaping benefits without 

realizing the least benefit for Islam and the Muslims.” 

27. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Unraveling: 

Al Qaeda’s revolt against bin Laden,” The New Republic, June 11, 

2008, p. 17.

28. Ibid., p. 20.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 18.

31. While insufficient in itself, the importance of the legal repudiation of al-Qaeda arising from jihad-realist militants committed to rigorous adherence to shari’a requirements, is a necessary 

condition for undercutting any conceivable religious warrant. As 

these authors state: “[T]he repudiation of Al Qaeda’s leaders by 

its former religious, military, and political guides will help hasten 

the implosion of the jihadist terrorist movement. . . . And, given the religio-ideological basis of Al Qaeda’s jihad, the religious 

condemnation now being offered by scholars and fighters once 

close to the organization is arguably the most important development in stopping the group’s spread since September 11,” Ibid., 
38

p. 21. Quoting Kamal El Helbay, a Muslim Brotherhood leader 

who helped wrest the Finsbury Park, London mosque from its 

shari’a violating former firebrand al-Qaedists’: “No government, 

no police force, is achieving what these [religious] scholars are 

achieving. To defeat terrorism, to convince the radicals . . . you 

have to persuade them that theirs is not the path to paradise,” 

Ibid., p. 21. The difficulty of this task of differentiating lawful jihad 

from unlawful murderous terrorism remains, however, for it is 

not just a matter of convincing, but of first penetrating an extremist, arrogant, hostile, self-righteous mindset, often entirely ignorant of crucial Islamic tenets, and one that is self-insulating since 

all scholars, clerics, and observant Muslims not engaged in the 

terrorist project are viewed as internal enemies. For a real sense of 

the difficulty facing these salafi sheiks, even highly-regarded ones, 

on the front lines—not only among the youth, but from among 

fellow sheikhs, see the article by Sheikh Salman al-Oadah, and 

Comments by Shaykh Yaser Birjas in “UPDATE: Standing United 

Against Terrorism & Al-Qaeda – Salman al-Oudah (with Yasir 

Qadhi, Yaser Birjas, Tawfique Chowdhurry, and Waleed Basyouni), http://muslimmatters.org/2009/10/12/standing-united-againstterrorism-al-qaeda-salman-al-awdah-with-yasir-qadhi-and-yaserbirjas/.

32. Islamic jurisprudence, which presumes a foundation in 

Fiqh—the science of shari’a (sacred Law)—is, as in other religious 

and secular traditions, highly specialized and contentious owing 

to differing traditions and principles of legal interpretation. The 

authority of a given legal scholar resides in his proven expertise in 

the sources and methods of the shari’a. The four traditional sources for shari’a comprise, in order of their authority: Qur’an (Islamic 

sacred scripture), Ahadith (traditions of varying soundness and 

quality concerning what Prophet Muhammad, and also his earliest companions, said and did), Ijma (unanimous scholarly consensus, which functions like precedent), and Qiyas (the use of simile 

or analogical reasoning). In addition, Tafsir (Qur’anic commentaries), Handbooks (handbooks of the various legal schools, e.g., 

Hannafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali, that present binding law), and 

Fatawa (compendia containing authoritative legal opinions or verdicts) are used. The range of legal/moral permissibility of a given 

action is five-fold: [1] absolutely required or commanded (fard); 

[2] recommended, but not required (mustahabb); [3] indifferent, 

neutral, permissible (mubah); [4] discouraged or reprehensible, 
39

but not forbidden (makruh); [5] absolutely and explicitly forbidden because both sinful and criminal (haram). See especially John 

Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 2007, chap. 2, “Shari’a Reasoning,” pp. 43-96; 

“Shari’a” entry in Encylopedia of Islam, New Ed., C. Bosworth, E. 

Donzel, W. Heirichs, and G. Leconte, eds., Vol. 9, Leiden, UK: E. 

J. Brill, 1996, pp. 321-328. Because of the enormous stature of the 

arch-traditionalist, originalist Hanbali Fiqh that is upheld in Saudi 

Arabia, the more conservative Gulf countries, and among jihadrealist scholars and militants, the most damning case against alQaeda arises when this jurisprudential tradition, which uses the 

two “primary” and most authoritative sources (Qur’an, Ahadith) 

determines that absolutely forbidden sinful, criminal (haram) violations of the shari’a have occurred. The three key luminaries of 

the Hanbali school: its namesake Ibn Hanbal (d. 855); the great 

medieval scholar and ‘jihadist’ Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328); 

and Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab, namesake for the so-called 

Hanbalite ‘Wahhabi’ school (d. 1792); form a theologico-juridico 

backbone against whom contemporary al-Qaedist terrorists run 

afoul, because the teachings of these three key luminaries readily condemn al Qaeda of abominable acts in the strictest Islamic 

terms. For a survey of Hanbali scholars, see, H. Laoust, “Hanabila” in The Encyclopedia of Islam, New Ed., B. Lewis, V. L. Menage, 

Ch. Pellat, and J. Schacht, eds., Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 1971, Vol. 3, 

pp. 158-162. 

33. Owing to the recognized stature of these jihad-realist 

authorities, and available English-language translations, the following works by present and former members of armed ‘jihadist’ organizations were consulted. For the Libyan Islamic Fighting 

Group (LIFG): Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), A Selected 

Translation of the LIFG Recantation Document, Transl. Mohammed 

Ali Musawi, Quilliam Foundation, available from http://www.

quilliamfoundation.org/images/a_selected_translation_of_the_lifg.pdf, 

2009. Each work provides a translation of the introductory passages, which are key to understanding the document's intentions 

and context, as well as providing a translation of the summary 

of each chapter that appears in the original Arabic. The document, Revisionist [or Corrective] Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Hisbah [Accountability], and Takfir [Judging others’ ‘Muslimness’]—is 

approximately 400 pages organized in nine chapters and made 

available to the public on September 6, 2009. Its six authors comprise the LIFG’s highest echelon leadership: current emir, Abdul 
40

Hakim al-Khwailidi Balhaj, aka: Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq; deputy 

emir, Khalid Muhammad Al-Sharif; spiritual leader, Sami Mustafa Al-Saadi, aka: Abu al-Munzir al Saaidi; its first emir, Miftah 

al-Mbruk al-Thawadi, aka: Abdul Ghaffar; military commander, 

Musafah Al-Said Qunayid, aka: Abu al-Zubair; and, Abdul Wahhab Muhammad Qayid, aka: Abu Idris (remarkably, also the 

elder brother of senior al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi). 

The original Arabic text is available online from www.akhbarlibyaonline.com. For background, commentary, and additional 

analysis, see “The Daily Star: Deradicalizing Jihadists, the Libyan Way,” April 26, 2010, available from www.opensource.gov; 

Noman Benotman, “Al-Qaeda: Your Armed Struggle is Over,” 

September 10, 2010, available from www.quilliamfoundation.org/

images/stories/pdfs/letter-to-bin-laden.pdf; Rania Karam, “Former 

LIFG leader: Bin Laden lacks Islamic authority to wage ‘Western Jihad,” May 5, 2010, available from www.magharaebia.com; 

Kamil al Tawil (Camille Tawil), “Noman Benotman criticizes 

al-Qaeda in bin Laden letter,” September 23, 2010, available 

from www.magharebia.com; Rania Karam, “Former LIFG leader 

questions bin Laden rationale,” April 29, 2010, available from 

al-shorfa.com; Kamil al Tawil (Camille Tawil), “Al-Qaeda yet to 

respond to corrective studies forbidding killing of civilians,” 

September 15, 2009, available from al-shorfa.com; Camille Tawil, 

“Libya closes the case of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,” 

March 30, 2010, available from al-shorfa.com; Nic Robertson 

and Paul Cruickshank, “In bid to thwart al Qaeda, Libya frees 

three leaders of jihadist group,” March 23, 2010, available from 

edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/03/23/libya.jihadist.group; Vahid Brown, “A First Look at the LIFG Revisions,” September 

14, 2009, available from www.jihadica.com/a-first-look-at-the-lifgrevisions/; Camille Tawil, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting 

Group’s revisions: one year later,” July 23, 2010, available from 

www.magharebia.com; Jarret Brachman, “Why the LIFG’s Revisions are Falling on Our Deaf Ears,” September 21, 2009, available 

from jarretbrachman.net/?p=1036; Thomas Hegghammer, “Libyan 

Jihad Revisions,” September 8, 2009, available from www.jihadica.

com/libyan-jihad-revisions/; Camille Tawil, “Libyan Islamists Back 

Away from al-Qaeda Merger in Reconciliation with Qaddafi Regime,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol.7, No. 17, June 18, 2009, available 

from www.jamestown.org; Jarret Brachman, “Abu Yahya al-Libi’s 

‘Human Shields in Modern Jihad’,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, No. 6, 

May 2008, pp. 1-4, available from www.ctc.usma.edu; Alison Par-
41

geter, “LIFG Revisions Unlikely to Reduce Jihadist Violence,” 

CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 10, October 2009, pp. 7-9, available from 

www.ctc.usma.edu; Paul Cruickshank, “LIFG Revisions Posing 

Critical Challenge to al-Qaeda,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 12, December 2009, pp. 5-8, available from www.ctc.usma.edu; Ian Black, 

“Libya’s jihadis reject violence as leader bids for acceptance,” 

September 4, 2009, available from www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/

sep/04/libyan-islamist-fighters-reject-violence; Oea Online, “Libyan Islamists’ ideology revision serialization to start 6 Sep-paper,” (Text 

of report by Libyan pro-government newspaper Oea: “Oea will, 

as of tomorrow [Sunday 6 September 2009], begin a serialization 

of the ideological revisions ‘corrective studies’ prepared recently by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group [LIFG]”),September 6, 

2009, available from www.opensource.gov; Camille Tawil, “Libyan 

Islamist Criticizes Tripoli’s Refusal to Release the Libyan Islamic 

Fighting Group Prisoners,” Al Hayah Online in Arabic, “Report 

by Kamil al-Tawil, ‘Libyan Islamist Criticizes Tripoli’s Refusal to 

Release the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s Prisoners’,” February 22, 2010, available from www.opensource.gov; BBC Monitoring

in Arabic, “BBC Monitoring: Review of al-Qaeda Activities in 

North Africa 16 February-1 March [20]11,” available from www.

opensource.gov; Paul Cruickshank, “How Muslim Extremists are 

turning on Osama Bin Laden,” June 7, 2008, available from www.

nydailynews.com.

For the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, the following 

sources by, or commentary on Sayyid al-Imam Abd-al-Aziz alSharif's (aka Dr. Fadl, or, Shaykh Abd-al-Qadir Bin-Abd-al-Aziz) 

key jihad-realist revisionist works are: Omar Ashour, The DeRadicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements, New York: Routledge, 2009, esp. Chaps. 3, 5. For 

brief biographical details on Sayyid Imam, see Al-Sharq al-Awsat 

Online in Arabic, “Report Lists Stages in Life, Career of Egypt’s 

Jihad Group Leader Dr. Fadl” and Al-Sharq al-Awsat Online in 

Arabic, “Report: Seven Places Which Made Up Dr. Fadl’s Life, the 

First Amir of Egyptian ‘Jihad’ Organization,” November 19, 2009, 

available from www.opensource.gov. For publicity for the revisions, 

see Al-Misri al-Yawm, “Detained Egyptian Islamist leader urges 

‘rationalization’ of jihad activity,” Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic, text 

of report by Ahmad al-Khatib: “Faqih of [Egyptian] Jihad Organization to announce within days a document on ‘rationalizing 

jihadist actions’,” May 6, 2007, available from www.opensource.
42

gov; Al-Sharq al-Wasat, “Egyptian Islamic Group ‘Theoretician’ 

Supports Call for ‘Rationalized’ Jihad,” Al-Sharq al-Wasat in Arabic article by Abdu Zaynah: “’Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah’ Theoretician in Egypt Supports al-Qaeda Call for Ending Violence,” May 

13, 2007, available from www.opensource.gov; Al-Misri al-Yawm, 

“Egyptian Islamist lawyer says al-Qaedah to carry out religious 

revisions–paper,” and Al Misri al-Yawm in Arabic excerpt from 

report by Ahmad al-Khatib: “Jihad Organization leaders unanimously approve Fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] revisions,” November 3, 2007, available from www.opensource.gov. 

For the two key texts containing the legal requisites of lawful jihad: [1] Sayyid Imam, Doctrine of Rationalization [i.e., Right 

Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World (Wathiqat Tarshid 

Al-‘Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’Al-Alam), November 2007, serialized in 

Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic and partially available on www.opensource.gov; [2] Sayyid Imam, Exposure of the Exoneration Book [AlTa’riya li Kitab Al-Tabri’ya], completed by the author March 25, 

2008, and published in 13-parts in Arabic by Al-Misri Al-Yawm, 

between November 18-December 2, 2008, available from www.

opensource.gov. See Daniel Lav, “An In-Depth Summary of Sayyid 

Imam’s New Polemic Against Al-Qaeda, ‘Exposing the Exoneration,’ February 23, 2009, available from www.memri.org, for an accurate summary of several key points made in the latter text. 

Though ‘Rationalization’ does indeed contain occasional 

needless ad hominem attacks, three points are worth mentioning. First, a careful reading of both texts places these remarks in 

proper context and though perhaps unwise and distracting, they 

do not invalidate Sayyid Imam’s key legal criticisms. Second, the 

vast majority of these ad hominem assaults are directed at Ayman 

al-Zawahiri’s trustworthiness. To the extent that honesty, trustworthiness, and commitment to truthfulness are essential dispositional qualities for a person claiming ultimate concern for shari’a, 

evidence to the contrary is potentially devastating. It suggests that 

legal errors do not arise merely from inaccurate, ignorant, or invalid inference, but from intentional, willful deception. The original “Exposure” book consists of four interlinked chapters, one of 

which focuses virtually exclusively on what Sayyid Imam deems 

“theological inaccuracies,” while the other three deal with questions bearing directly on motive and character. The linkage of the 

first two chapters is represented thusly, “You also ascertain the 

veracity of what I stated at the start of this chapter [two] in citing 

predecessor ulemas as saying that ‘the statements of a liar and de-
43

bauchee are not accepted in religion’. I have demonstrated in the 

first chapter that Al-Zawahiri is a liar who invents and fabricates. 

So what did that liar do when he issued fatwas about Allah’s religion? You have seen in this chapter [two] how he perpetrated 

monstrosities and heresies that contradict the Shari’a of Islam. His 

monstrosities followed one another until they formed a criminal 

doctrine that allows wholesale killings under various pretexts 

and justifications. . . . Al-Zawahiri ought to have called his book 

‘The Justification’ rather than ‘The Exoneration’. The justification 

they sought to make for their criminal behavior rightly sets the 

foundation for the school of ‘Ignorance and Crime in Jihad’ in our 

times” (Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 7, p. 2). And third, Sayyid 

Imam constructs a coherent explanation that explains both legal 

inaccuracies and intentional deception: that 9/11 and al-Qaeda 

represent in their essential core the personal vendetta of Osama 

bin Laden, and those whose agendas converged with his, e.g., 

Khalid Shaik Muhammad, to inflict the greatest loss of life possible on the United States. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s legal function then, 

in Sayyid Imam’s opinion, is to produce ‘jurisprudence of justification’ legalizing what amounts to a “corrupt doctrine about excessiveness in wholesale killing” or “a corrupt deviate doctrine 

to entrench excessiveness in spilling of blood, . . . This corrupt 

doctrine is what some call ‘al-Qaeda ideology’” (Sayyid Imam, 

“Exposure,” Part 2, pp. 1-2 , 2-7; Part 3, pp. 3-6; Part 4, entire; Part 

7, p. 6; Part 11, p. 2; Part 13, p. 2-4). 

Second, and in some sense more important, Sayyid Imam indicates the circumstances under which these attacks became more 

likely (see, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 13, pp. 4-5), and they 

are directly related to al-Zawahiri’s attempt to poison the reception of his “Rationalization,” and therefore prevent the kind of 

genuine scholarly debate that Sayyid Imam believed was essential for restoring legality and pragmatics to the waging of jihad. 

For the majority of a 10-hour, 2-day exclusive first-ever interview conducted in Turrah Prison, n.d., conducted just after 

release of “Rationalization,” see Al-Hayah,”Egypt’s Dr. Fadl of AlJihad Group Upbraids al-Qaeda’s Al-Zawahiri,” Al-Hayah in Arabic, Part One of a six-part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-alAziz al-Sharif: ”Al-Hayah in Eguypt’s Turrah Prison Interviews 

Author of the Document ‘the Rationalization of Jihad in Egypt 

and the World’. Dr. Fadl: ‘Al-Zawahiri Deceived me and was the 

Reason I was Accused in the Al-Sadat Case. I Left Jama’at al Jihad 

After it Insisted on Operations Inside Egypt and Distorted my 
44

Book, ‘A Compilation’,” December 8, 2007, available from www.

opensource.com; Al-Hayah, ”Egypt: Former Al-Jihad Ideologue Rebukes ‘Leaders Abroad’, Al-Zawahiri,” Al-Hayah in Arabic, Part 

Three of six-part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz alSharif: “Al-Hayah interviews the Author of the Document ‘Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World.’ Dr. Fadl: al-Qaeda Does 

Not Have a Shari’a Scholar and Al-Zawahiri Turned Al-Jihad 

Members into Mercenaries,” December 10, 2007, available from 

www.opensource.com; Al-Hayah,”Former Al-Jihad Theorist Says 

Document on Rationalization of Jihad Unaswerable,” Al-Hayah

in Arabic, Part Four of six-part interview with Al-Sayyid Imam 

Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif: Al-Hayah Interviews Author of the Document “‘Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World.” Dr. Fadl: Bin 

Ladin and Al-Zawahiri Are Creations of Intelligence Services and 

Were Playthings in the Hands of the Sudanese and Pakistanis,” 

December 11, 2007, available from www.opensource.com; Al-Hayah, 

“Former Jihad Ideologue Attacks Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri, 9/11 

Atrocity,” Al Hayah in Arabic, Part Six of six-part interview with 

Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif: “Al-Hayah in the Egyptian Turrah Prison interviews the author of ‘The Rationalization 

of Jihad in Egypt and the World’ document; Dr. Fadl: the victims 

of al-Qaeda through recruitment on the internet fill prisons purposelessly; my advice to Muslim youths: Learn your religion, 

learn your religion; and seek the truth,” December 13, 2007, available from www.opensource.com. 

For select examples of post-“Rationalization” responses, 

analyses, and commentary, see Al-Misri al-Yawm, “Al-Jihad organization leaders in the world voice support to Imam’s revisions,” 

Al-Misri al-Yawm in Arabic text of report by Ahmad al-Khatib 

headlined, “Al-Jihad leaders are anticipating Dr. Fadil’s revisions, 

[Al-Jihad] world leaders support him,” November 15, 2007, available from www.opensource.gov; Nahdat Misr, “’Rationalization of 

Jihad’ Paper Triggers ‘Crisis’ Among Egyptian Fundamentalists,” 

Nahdat Misr in Arabic: “Hani al-Siba’i: Rationalization of Jihad 

Document Product of Prisons, Lacks Credibility; Abu-Umar AlMasri Responds: The Document is a Product of Sympathy, Mercy 

Not Coercion in Prison,” November 20, 2007, available from www.

opensource.gov; Al-Misri Al-Yawm, “Report on Reaction of Al-Jihad 

Revisions by Islamists Residing in London,” Report by Ahmad 

Al-Khatib in Al-Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic : “Al-Misri al-Yawm 

opens the door for debate on Al-Jihad revisions,” November 23, 

2007, available from www.opensource.gov; Jihadist Websites, “Basir 
45

al-Tartusi Questions Shaykh Sayyid Imam’s Words as Revisions, 

Retractions,” Syrian Salafi cleric Abu-Basir al-Tartusi post to jihadist website, November 29, 2007, available from www.opensource.

gov; Al-Misri Al-Yawm, “Egypt: Islamic Group Invites al-Qaeda 

to Commit to Sayyid Imam Revisions, Pins hope on Bin Laden,” 

Report by Ahmad al-Khatib in Al-Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic: “The 

Islamic Group Demands Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri to Consider 

Sayyid Imam’s Revisions ‘Seriously’; In the first reaction, Karam 

Zuhdi and Najih Ibrahim: The document which Al-Misri AlYawm Published is unprecedented and its impact will reach alQaeda members,” November 19, 2007, available from www.opensource.gov; MEMRI, “Major Jihadi Cleric and Author of Al-Qaeda’s 

Shari’a Guide to Jihad: 9/11 Was a Sin; A Shari’a Court Should Be 

Set Up to Hold Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri Accountable; There 

Are Only Two Kinds of People in Al Qaeda—The Ignorant and 

Those Who Seek Worldly Gain,” MEMRI Special Dispatch Series 

No. 1785, December 14, 2007, available from memri.org; MEMRI, 

“Major Jihadi Cleric and Author of Al-Qaeda’s Shari’a Guide to 

Jihad Sayyed Imam vs. Al Qaeda (2): Al-Zawahari Was Sudanese Agent—Sudan’s VP Ali Othman Taha Hired Him to Attack 

Egypt; Ban on Jihad against Egyptian Regime in Egypt; Summary 

of Imam’s New Right Guidance for Jihad Book,” January 25, 2008, 

available from memri.org. For select Western analyses and commentary of this broader “revisionist” trend, see Jarret Brachman, 

“Al Qaeda’s Dissident: How the Prison Writings of Sayyid Imam 

al-Sharif, One of al Qaeda’s Founders Now Labeled a Turn Coat, 

are Doing More to Expose the Terrorist Group’s Hypocrisy than 

Anyone Else,” December 2009, available from www.foreignpolicy.com; Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda 

Mastermind Questions Terrorism,” The New Yorker, June 2, 2008, 

pp. 37-53; Daniel Lav, “The Party of Jurisprudence vs. The Party 

of Action: Sayyed Imam, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and the Split in 

the Jihad Movement,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 

144, May 29, 2008, available from www.memri.org; Omar Ashour, 

“Post-Jihadism and the Inevitability of Democratization,” Arab 

Reform bulletin, November 10, 2009, available from carnegieendowment.org/2009/11/10/post-jihadism-and-inevitability-of-democratization/kry; Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Unraveling: 

Al Qaeda’s Revolt Against Bin Laden,” The New Republic, June 11, 

2008; Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, CNN, “New Jihad 

Code Threatens Al Qaeda,” November 10, 2009, available from 

edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/Africa/11/09/Libya.jihadi.code/; Khalil 

Al-Anani, “Jihadi Revisionism: Will It Save The World?,” Mid-
46

dle East Brief, No. 35, April 2009, pp. 1-7, available from www.

brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB35.pdf; IDC Herzliya, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, “’Retracting’ – Using 

Ideological Means for Purposes of De-Radicalization,” January 

2011, pp. 1-14, available from www.ict.org.il/Portals/O/Internet%20

Monitoring%20Group/JWMG_Deradicalization.pdf.

The Egyptian Islamic Group’s (Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya) 1997 

cessation of violence, and 2002/2003 revisionist writings, were 

unfortunately not available to this author in English translation. 

For select commentary on Al-Gama’a, see Y. Carmon, Y. Feldner, 

and D. Lav, “The Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya Cessation of Violence: 

An Ideological Reversal,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 

309, December 22, 2006, available from memri.org; Rudolph Peters, 

“The Notion of Jihad at the Turn of the 21st Century,” in R. Peters, 

ed., Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader, 2nd Ed., Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, esp. Chap. 3., “The Change 

of Strategy of the Egyptian Jama’a Islamiyya,” pp. 180-183, for 

major revisions in jihad doctrine represented in the 2002/2003 

books away from the notion of kufr al-nizam (the unbelief of the 

regime), and other doctrines; Omar Ashour, “Lions Tamed? An 

Inquiry into the Causes of De-Radicalization of Armed Islamist 

Movements: the Case of the Egyptian Islamic Group,” The Middle 

East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 4, Autumn 2007, pp. 596+, available from 

Academic OneFile, go.galegroup.com.

34. The original article by Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, “Standing 

United Against Terrorism & al-Qaeda,” was published September 

21, 2009, available from en.islamtoday.net/print/3490. Apologizing 

for his “harsh words” and “harsh tone—which departs from my 

normal writing style—in order to confront those people who take 

up arms with the purpose of bringing death to numerous people 

and reducing societies to ruin,” his teaser blurb states: “Today, 

I must stress how important it is to condemn the abominable 

and criminal acts being perpetrated around the world in Islam’s 

name.” See also his widely-quoted letter to Bin Laden: Shaykh 

Salman al-Oudah, “Shaykh Salman al-Oudah’s Ramadan Letter 

to Osama bin Laden,” September 18, 2007, available from www.

islamtoday.com/showme2.cfm?cat_id=29&sub_cat_id=1521.

35. Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, “Standing United Against Terrorism & al-Qaeda,” was published September 21, 2009, available 

from en.islamtoday.net/print/3490. “UPDATE: Standing United 

Against Terrorism & Al-Qaeda, Salman al-Oudah with Yasir Qa-
47

dhi, Yaser Birjas, Tawfique Chowdhurry, and Waleed Basyouni,” 

March 10, 2009, available from muslimatters.org/2009/10/12/sanding-united-against-terrorism-al-qaeda-salman-al-awdah-with-yasirqadhi-and-yaser-birjas.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Sheikh Salman al-Oudah, “Standing United Against 

Terrorism & al-Qaeda,” September 21, 2009, available from 

en.islamtoday.net/print/3490.

40. Al-Hayah, “Former Jihad Ideologue Attacks Bin Laden, 

Al-Zawahiri, 9/11 Atrocity,” Al Hayah in Arabic, Part Six of sixpart interview with Al-Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif: “AlHayah in the Egyptian Turrah Prison interviews the author of 

‘The Rationalization of Jihad in Egypt and the World’”; Dr. Fadl: 

the victims of al-Qaeda through recruitment on the internet fill 

prisons purposelessly; my advice to Muslim youths: Learn your 

religion, learn your religion; and seek the truth,” December 13, 

2007, available from www.opensource.com; See also, in his Rationalizing Jihad, Part One: 

The signatories to this document, in making known their 

dissatisfaction with those violations of shari’a and the 

corruption this caused, remind themselves and the general Muslims of some religious controls on the Fiqh [sic] 

theology of jihad. They affirm their commitment to these 

controls as mentioned in this document. They call on other Muslims, especially the young generations of Islam’s 

youth, to be bound by them, and not to fall in the shari’a 

violations of their predecessors, as a result of ignorance 

of religion or deliberate action. 

41. Al-Hakayimah is described by Sayyid Imam’s interviewer, Muhammad Salah, as an “Egyptian fundamentalist” who is 

also a member of al-Qaeda.
48

42. Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part Four; See also, 

additional mentions of the “overzealous attitudes and the phenomenon of young men joining organizations that exploit religion but do not faithfully follow religious teachings” in the same 

Part Four, Al-Hayah Interview. Sayyid Imam continues later, in 

his “Exposure”: “I wanted to warn the people against them [alQaeda], especially Muslim youths whom they entrap through 

an array of deviate concepts and firebrand speeches in order to 

throw them in perils [sic] without any benefit and without the 

least achievement on the ground, except the media fanfare they 

use to cover up their crimes and confuse matters in the minds of 

people (Part 11, pp. 1-2); “I am mentioning this so that the budding generations of youth will be aware of how they were sold 

and gambled with, and so that no Muslim would venture to do 

something except with a fatwa from established ulemas. . . . So 

where is Al-Zawahiri from it [sic] as he incites with remote control?” (Part 11, p. 5); “I have written these words, as I have written 

‘The Document on Rationalizing Jihadist Action’ [“Rationalization”] to warn Muslims, especially the young, against those opportunistic adventurers and their likes” (Part 12, p. 6).

43. According to Khalil Al-Anani, “Jihadi Revisionism: Will it 

Save the World?,” No. 35, April 2009, available from www.brandeis.

edu/crown, Sayyid Imam’s major revisionist work represents “the 

most significant moment in jihadi revisionism” (p. 2), and that 

this is owing to Sayyid Imam’s significance on three distinct 

fronts (p. 3): his biographical prestige owing to his actual proximity to ‘jihadi’ battlefields; his bibliographical prestige owing to 

his having provided in his two major ‘pre-revisionist’ works—The 

Faithful Guide to Preparation (al-Umda fi ‘idad al-idda), a 500-plus 

work published in 1988 providing the “legal and operational parameters of jihadism”; and, The Compendium in Pursuit of Divine 

Knowledge (al-Jami’ fi talab al-‘ilm al-sharif), an 1,100-page work released in 1993; and third, the fact that Sayyid Imam’s considered 

judgment has led to a substantial evolution in his explicit writings 

and interviews toward positions that fatally undercut the legal 

underpinnings of al-Qaeda’s modus operandi. (See, esp.: Sayyid 

Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif, Doctrine of Rationalization [i.e., Right 

Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World (Wathiqat Tarshid 

Al-‘Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’Al-Alam), November 2007, serialized in 

Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, available from www.opensource.gov.) 
49

44. Owing to the highly-esteemed role of martyrdom “in the 

process of killing and being killed” in Islamic jurisprudence, history, and theology, and also its relative paucity as a tactic during 

the 1970s-90s, there is bare mention of this phenomenon and certainly not an extended objection on par with others raised. For recent scholarship examining the jurisprudential justifications and 

legal debates involved, see David Jan Slavicek, “Deconstructing 

the Shariatic Justification of Suicide Bombings,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31, 2008, pp. 553-571; Shireen Khan Burki, 

“Haram or Halal? Islamists’ Use of Suicide Attacks as ‘Jihad’,” 

Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 23, 2011, pp. 582-601. See also 

for a concise summary of a recently issued 600-page fatwa issued 

by Shaykh Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri: “Fatwa on Suicide Bombings and Terrorism: Table of Contents, Summary & Bibliography,” Transl. Shaykh Abdul Aziz Dabbagh, Minhaj Publications, 

February 2010, available from www.minhaj.org.

45. See, for example, LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 2, chs. 5; 

Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 1, pp. 2-3; ‘Exposure,’ Part 

6, pp. 5-6; Part 13, pp. 6-7. Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah interview, Part 

3, virtually entirely calls into question the shari’a qualifications 

versus ignorance and worldly motives of Osama bin Laden and 

Ayman al-Zawahiri; Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part 6, especially pp. 3-4. Sayyid Imam’s assertion that al-Qaeda practices 

a “jurisprudence of justification” that privileges illicit ends and 

means, and then opportunistically gathers justificatory sources is 

particularly damning. See, for example, Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part Two, esp. pp. 3-4; Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah interview, Part 3, p. 7; Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part 6, p. 4. 

46. See especially LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” ch. 6.

47. See especially Ibid., ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” 

Part 6, pp. 1-2.

48. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 1, 9; Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, pp. 2-4. This is also the major thrust of “The Amman Message,” 2004. The latter is far more ecumenical than that 

proposed by jihad-realist salafi Sunni militants, however, in its 

willingness to embrace all extant schools of jurisprudence, including non-Sunni, non-salafi variants.
50

49. See LIFG 2009, ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, (see, “Rationalization,” 

Part 6, p. 4), outlines and extensively treats the “six proscriptions 

each of which is sufficient on its own to spare the foreigners and 

tourists and not confront them with harm or damage.” Having 

discussed them, he then asks rhetorically: “So how can the situation be when all these proscriptions or some of them are combined?” According to "Rationalization," Part 3, pp. 4-5, these proscriptions also apply to the financing of jihad:

It is regrettable to see that some of those [for whom jihad 

has been waived because they do not have the expenses required]imposing on themselves a duty Allah has 

waived for them, and then resort to forbidden routes to 

collect money on the grounds of preparing for jihad. So 

they abduct innocent hostages to demand ransom, or rob 

the money of the ma’sumin [non-Muslims given a pledge 

of safety], and they might kill during the robbery of the 

people whose killing is not allowed. Aggression on the 

money and lives of the ma’sumin is a major sin, so those 

who commit it would have done something they are not 

allowed to do [aggressing on the lives of the ma’sumin] 

to perform a jihad that is not required of them by religion because of lack of money or other excuses. What 

theology is this? Nay, what mind is this? Is this not but a 

consequence of leadership by the ignorant and asking for 

their fatwas on issues of jihad? . . . [W]e tell all Muslims 

to desist from them, for the sinful acts of burglary and abductions and other forbidden acts cannot be sanctioned 

under the pretext of financing jihad.

See also, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 4. 

50. See, for example: Mohammad M. Hafez, “Chapter 2: Tactics, Takfir, and anti-Muslim Violence,” in Assaf Moghadam and 

Brian Fishman, eds., Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Discussions 

within al-Qaeda and Its Periphery, Harmony Project, Washington, 

DC: Combating Terrorism Center, December 16, 2010, p. 40: “[E]

ven if certain actions are permissible in Islam, they should not be 

carried out without regard to the circumstances and capabilities of 

Muslims. Actions must be judged according to the balance between masalih wa mafasid (interests and harms). An action may be 

permissible in abstract,[sic] but when applied in practice it ceases 
51

to be wise because its deleterious effects (mafasid) outweigh its 

presumed benefits (masalih).”

51. For example, Sayyid Imam lists the following options exercised by Prophet Muhammad as examples for those committed 

to upholding the shari’a but unable by ability of circumstance, to 

wage jihad: “These options ranged from disguise, hiding faith, 

going into seclusion, migration to Ethiopia and then Medina, 

pardon, forgiveness, and shunning the mushrikin [polytheistic 

idolaters], and the possibility of hurting the mushrikin by words, 

deeds, and patience on this, to jihad against the kuffar [infidels] 

including the mushrikin, apostates, and People of the Book [Christians and Jews] by sacrificing self and possessions by tongue, to 

the conclusion of truce and treaties.” And he concludes in reference to contemporary duties to jihad: “There has been no change 

in any of these options, for all of them are legitimate according to 

the status of the establishment.” Several additional examples of 

the relation of the duty to jihad in relation to actual capacities, and 

other options, are provided in this section.

52. See LIFG 2009, “Revisionism,” Summary of experiences,’ 

chs. 7, 8; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 3, and especially 

Part 4.

53. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 4, 8; Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 3, p. 2. 

54. See for example: Qur’an 4:43, 105-112; 16:126-127; 20:81-82; 

35:45; 42:37, 40; 67:12-14. 

55. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 6, 8 for rather indirect 

inferences here; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 7, pp. 3-4; 

Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 4; Part 4, pp. 4-6; Part 13, p. 5.

56. See especially Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 5 in 

general, and summary at p. 4-7. For the classical and still legallycompelling refutation of the underlying justification promulgated 

by violent takfiris responsible for Anwar Sadat’s assassination, 

see Johannes J.G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s 

Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 54-62. In brief, the following points are the most 

salient: Only the denial of the Indivisibility and Sovereignty of 
52

God disqualifies one as a Muslim (Qur’an 4:116); jihad includes, 

but significantly exceeds, martial fighting; put in its actual context, 

the charge that not ruling based on what God sent down amounts 

to unbelief, was actually addressed to the Jews, not the Muslims 

(Qur’an 5:48); Egypt by any reasonable standard observes Islamic 

dictates and where it does not, persons must remedy that to the 

last detail; there is no support in the Traditions for sanctifying let 

alone prescribing the violent removal of a leader who does perform the prayer ceremonies; the so-called sword verse (Qur’an 

9:5) was directed at pagan polytheists, and is wholly inapplicable 

to observant Muslims; it is erroneous to equate the ruling regime 

in Egypt, whatever its faults, with the savage destruction meted 

out to Muslims by the Mongols (Al-Tatar); erroneous and opportunistic use of Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwas; referring to the Faridah

as a “political pamphlet,” errors are made regarding a de-contextualized and mythologized absolute oath of loyalty owed by an 

adherent to a ruling Caliph, in fact, and the Qur’an is largely silent 

on the precise means of selecting and holding accountable rulers of a Muslim political entity. Moreover, modern circumstances 

now empower the nation-state and its legitimate monopoly of 

violence to act on behalf of the citizenry in matters of war, justice, and peace; in contrast to a mystical praxis jihad doctrine, 

Islamic jurisprudence upholds the necessity of deep knowledge 

in Islam, and of the world and its circumstances: this is also a 

means of “striving and struggling in the path of Allah” or jihad; 

there is great historical precedent for Muslim cooperation with 

non-Muslims; the author of the Faridah is merely a contemporary 

exponent of a specific deviant movement within Islam—the khawarij, or “Kharijis,” whose fanaticism, self-righteous arrogance, 

and violent willingness to takfir virtually all who disagree; and 

finally, in stark contrast to the claim that jihad is a “nonfulfilled 

duty,” he states:

Qur’an and Sunnah, so the Mufti teaches, command 

Muslims to resist the enemies of Islam, but they certainly 

do not order attacks on other Muslims, or on non-Muslim 

compatriots. Jews and Christians must have freedom of 

cult and belief, the Mufti insists. They have the same 

rights as Muslim citizens, he continues. The character 

of jihad, so we must understand, has now changed radically, because the defense of the country and religion is 

nowadays the duty of the regular army, and this army 
53

carries out the collective duty of jihad on behalf of all 

citizens. ‘To conquer oneself and Satan’ is equally part 

of the Muslim duty of jihad, the Mufti adds, while calling other Muslims apostates is not. Whatever the people 

of the Faridah and their sympathizers might say, jihad is, 

according to the Mufti, not a forgotten or absent duty at 

all (p. 60). 

57. Jihad-realist jurisprudential objections—the focus of the 

above—are also complemented by a vast literature comprising 

resolutions, Fatawa, letters, and official rulings, which together 

reinforce many salient points raised above regarding the sinful 

and illegal acts perpetrated by the terrorist enterprise. See, for example: The Amman Declaration: King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein 

of Jordan, (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), “The Amman 

Message,” November 9, 2004, available from ammanmessage.com. 

(Now includes “The Official Website of THE AMMAN MESSAGE,” available from ammanmessage.com, launched, March 1, 

2007); International Islamic Fiqh Academy, “The Three Points of 

the Amman Message, V. 2,” June 2006, available from ammanmessage.com; The Mardin Conference: Reuters, “Islam Scholars Recast 

Jihadists’ Favorite Fatwa: Declaration is Latest Bid to Counter 

Militant Islam,” March 31, 2010, available from www.alarabiya.net/

save_print.php?print=1&cont_id=104563&lang=en; Muslim World 

League, “Document: What is Jihad? What is Terrorism? Statement 

by Muslim Scholars,”available from www.middle-east-online.com/

English/?cat=main&page=1&id=174; Charles Kurzman, “Islamic 

Statements Against Terrorism,” available from kurzman.unc.edu/

Islamic-statements-against-terrorism/ (Updated November 16, 

2010); Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), “CAIR’s 

Anti-Terrorism Campaigns,” available from www.cair.com/americanmuslims/antiterrorism.aspx; Sheila Musaji, “Muslim Voices 

Against Extremism and Terrorism– Part 1 – Fatwas and Formal 

Statements by Muslim Scholars & Organizations – updated,” January 28, 2011, available from www.theamericanmuslim.org; 

58. This term “Lord Christ” is very likely a mistranslation 

from the original Arabic text since Muslims, though regarding Jesus (Isa) as an immaculately conceived Prophet who revealed the 

Gospel, deny both the lordship and messiahship implied in each 

of those titles.
54

59. Sayyid Imam Abd-al-Aziz al-Sharif, Doctrine of Rationalization [i.e., Right Guidance] for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World

(Wathiqat Tarshid Al-‘Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w’Al-Alam), November 2007, serialized in Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Arabic, available from

www.opensource.gov. Also, Ibid. “In the domain of jihad for the 

sake of Allah the Almighty, this is one of the branches of faith, 

or ‘the peak of Islam’s hump’, as correctly cited from the beloved 

chosen one [Muhammad], Allah’s prayers and peace upon him.” 

60. LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization” Part 1, p. 2; and especially Part 6 (entire). Though it may 

strike non-Muslims as immoral, a key ground for not targeting 

persons based on nationality includes the possibility that Muslims 

themselves will be harmed: for example, Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 6, examines six proscriptions against killing nonMuslims and begins the list with the possibility that a Muslim 

may be among them. Also, “Rationalization,” Part 7, deals again 

with the unlawfulness of conducting bombings in non-Muslim 

countries by first stating that Muslims themselves may be killed 

(p. 1-2; again at pp. 4-5).

61.LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” ch. 4; Sayyid Imam,‘Rationalization’ Part 1, p. 2; and especially Part 6 (entire); Sayyid Imam, 

“Exposure,” Part 4, p. 3; Part 6, p. 5. 

62. Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 5, p. 3; Part 7, extensively discussed at pp. 2, 4-5; Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 

4; Part 4, p. 4.

63. LIFG 2009, ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 1, 

p. 2; Sayyid Imam, ‘Rationalization’ Part 5, p. 3; On p. 6, he states: 

“The alternative is not killing civilians, foreigners, tourists, destroying property, or aggression on the blood and property of the 

ma’sumin [inviolable] under the claims of jihad. All this is haram”; 

Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 7, pp. 3-4; Sayyid Imam, AlHayah interview, Part 4, p. 3; On p. 5, Sayyid Imam goes so far as 

to say: 

I say this to those who defend al-Qaeda’s leaders: Your 

friends Bin Ladin and Al-Zawahiri and their followers 

are treacherous, backstabbing people. God, may He be 
55

praised, forbade you to act as advocate for such persons. 

Anyone who admires their deeds is a partner in sin. They 

are now counted as people of weak faith because they 

have committed the major sins of lying and treachery. 

Only a thin line separates them from being outright infidels. The ancient Muslims said that “major sins are the 

path to disbelief.” These sins are the introduction to disbelief. God Almighty said: “In the long run evil in the 

extreme will be the end of those who do evil because they 

rejected the Signs of God, and held them up to ridicule” 

[Qur’an 30:10].

See also Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah interview, Part 6, p. 2: “It is inadmissible for a Muslim to betray the trust of the people of the country in their blood, honor, or funds, or act treacherously against 

them in the name of jihad. So the 9/11 attacks were wrong and 

contradicted the Islamic shari’a.”; Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 

1, p. 3; Part 2, p. 4; Part 5, entire; Part 6, pp. 1-2, 4-6; Part 13, p. 

5; See also, Al Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic, “Jihad Mufti Condemns 

09/11 Bombings, Opposes Building Mosque Near Ground Zero,” 

September 18, 2010, available from www.opensource.gov.

64. See, for example, Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 6, 

p. 4: 

We believe that it is by no means permissible to assume 

the right to kill a human being just because he belongs to 

a certain country [killing on nationality]. This heterodoxy 

is without precedent in the heritage of the [Muslim] Nation. Affiliation by an individual to a certain country is no 

proof of his Islam or kufr, for the objective of affiliation 

to nations and similar affiliations is just identification. . . . 

So killing on nationality is a hideous heterodoxy without 

precedent in the heritage of the Nation.

See also Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah interview, Part 3, p. 7: 

[Salah] Some organizations have denied that there are 

groups that select and kill their victims on the basis of nationality. They claim that they carry out these operations 

in the context of their war against the West and the Arab 

regimes. [Al-Sharif] This is not true. al-Qaeda and Bin 

Ladin announced more than once that they target U.S. 
56

citizens without discrimination. This is what they did on 

9/11. They killed on the basis of nationality. Groups that 

sympathized with them carried out the Madrid bombings in 2004, killing Spaniards indiscriminately. In the 

London Underground bombings in 2005, they killed British citizens on the basis of nationality. All this was killing 

on the basis of nationality. Being a citizen of a particular 

country is not proof of disbelief or faith. It is not evidence 

of declaring the lives of certain persons forfeit or that 

their property is forfeit.

See Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 4; Part 4, pp. 2-3. 

65. Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 1, pp. 4-5:

In this great domain, the domain of jihad, the slavery of 

the Muslim to his God the Almighty is [sic] by giving 

precedence to his God’s quest from him over his own 

quest for himself. . . . This is done through the Muslim 

knowing what Allah has made a duty for him at a certain 

time, according to his ability. He gets reward for what he 

is able to do, and he is absolved from the sin of what he 

could not do. This is the way of the Muslims in all affairs, 

on jihad and other issues. . . . [F]or the Muslim to place 

an objective for himself that is beyond his capacity and 

not suitable to his conditions, even if it is legitimate in 

itself, and then follow any road to attain his objective, 

without being bound by the restrictions of Shari’a, then 

would have given precedence to his quest from himself 

over his God’s quest from him. This is not the way of 

the Muslims but the way of the revolutionary secularists. 

In Islam, there is no such thing as ‘the end justifies the 

means’, [sic] even if the end is noble and legitimate to 

begin with. On the contrary, a Muslim worships Allah 

through the means used just as he worships Him through 

the ends sought. If he dies before getting his end, he gets 

the reward for trying, and he is absolved from the sin of 

what he could not do.

In Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 4, this is also extensively 

discussed; see also, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 3; Part 3, 

pp. 2-3. 
57

66. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” ch. 4; Sayyid Imam, “Rationalization,” Part 4, p. pp. 1-2; Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, 

pp. 3-4; Part 3, pp. 3-5; Part 10, p. 3.

67. See Sayyid Imam, Al Hayah interview, Part 1, p. 5.

68. Ibid., Part 6, p. 2. Since the law of jihad rules that a “powerless person in infidel countries is not required to conduct jihad” 

other options must be exercised, including: “engage in a jihad that 

propagates the Islamic call,” and “[i]f they are unable to do that, 

they can repudiate abominable acts in their hearts, which is a duty 

in any case,” or he “can conceal his faith and use what is allowed 

in the shar’iah, like dissimulation.” This key question faced by 

Muslims living in non-Muslim majority societies led to virtually 

an identical response from the salafi “jihadist” cleric Mohammad 

Tahir al-Barqawi (aka Shaykh Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi), i.e., 

he encourages several nonviolent alternatives for promoting the 

Islamic call in Belgium, empowering and protecting the Muslim Umma, and also, interacting on the basis of reciprocity and 

fairness with those who do the same. See Jihadist websites, “AlMaqdisi Advises Muslims in Belgium on How to Deal with NonMuslim Society,” April 23, 2010, available from www.opensource.

com.

69. See Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part 6, p. 2: 

If an enemy invades a Muslim land jihad against the 

enemy is an individual duty. If Muslims are unable to 

take on jihad, it becomes the duty of neighboring Muslim 

countries, if they are capable of conducting jihad. In case 

they are incapable, Muslims are duty bound to leave the 

country. . . . Whoever is incapable of jihad or emigration, 

may stay in the country and make a truce with the enemy 

without committing sins or harming other Muslims. In 

short, the options are either take on jihad, emigrate, or 

conclude a truce.

See also, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 2, p. 3; Part 3, pp. 2-3; 

Part 9, pp. 1-3.

70. See Sayyid Imam, Al-Hayah Interview, Part 6, p. 3: 
58

The issue of killing civilians of the subjects of countries 

occupying Muslim countries is explained in the document [‘Rationalization’]. The gist is that whoever enters 

enemy countries on a visa, even if forged, must not act 

treacherously against the people of that country, betray 

their trust, kill them, or steal their money. It is not admissible to kill civilians or combatants. Ulema do not disagree over this issue. 

See also, Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 6, pp. 3-4; Part 10, p. 5; 

Part 13, p. 5.

71. See LIFG 2009, “Revisions,” chs. 7, 8; Sayyid Imam, “Exposure,” Part 3, p. 1; Part 10, p. 2, 5; Part 12, p. 2, 3. The linkage between the law, and pragmatics, is clearly stated by Sayyid Imam 

in “Exposure,” Part 10, p. 5: 

[W]hat then would you say about Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri and their followers who betrayed the Emir [violation of bay’at], hit their enemy in the back [violation 

of security pact, visa], and brought catastrophes to the 

Muslims [pragmatics] destroying groups and States and 

filling graveyards and prisons with Muslims, in addition 

to founding a criminal doctrine to justify wholesale killing . . . So what do you say to these people? I leave it 

to the Muslims to judge them. A debauched person who 

drinks liquor hurts no one but himself. But the damage of 

those [sic] we refer to is wholesale.

 And again, Sayyid Imam provides this linkage in Sayyid Imam, 

“Exposure,” Part 13, p. 2: 

So Muslim folks do not be deceived by any body [sic] 

who talks about religion and jihad until you judge him 

by Shari’a. . . . So how about those who bring disasters 

to the Muslims, destroy States and groups, adulterate religion and replace it with heresies and inaccuracies that 

are counter to Allah’s Book, and also cause the killing and 

imprisonment of tens of thousands of Muslims? How are 

they to be described? What good is it to demolish two 

buildings in the United States and it [the US] demolishes 

the Taliban State, the only State in the world that wel-
59

comed fugitive Muslims? Bin Ladin then fled and left the 

Afghans to pay the price for his foolhardiness in death, 

homelessness, and large-scale ruin. He sheds tears for the 

children of Palestine and forgets the children of Afghanistan whose blood is spilled every day because of him. . . .

See also, Sayyid Imam, in Al Misri Al-Yawm in Arabic, “Jihad 

Mufti Condemns 09/11 Bombings, Opposes Building Mosque 

Near Ground Zero,” September 18, 2010, available from www.

opensource.gov.

72. The Israel-Palestine conflict was significantly underplayed 

in the The 9/11 Commission Report, and according to the follow-up 

volume describing the Commission’s inside-story, this was the 

result of a compromise. Thomas A. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, 

Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, New 

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, p. 284-285:

We did, however, have some disagreement over foreign 

policy issues. Much of it revolved around the question of 

Al Qaeda’s motivation. For instance, Lee felt that there 

had to be an acknowledgment that a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was vital to America’s long-term 

relationship with the Islamic world, and that the presence of American forces in the Middle East was a major 

motivating factor in al Qaeda’s actions. . . . This was sensitive ground. Commissioners who argued that al Qaeda 

was motivated primarily by religious ideology—and not 

by opposition to American policies—rejected mentioning 

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the report. In their view, 

listing U.S. support for Israel as a root cause of Al Qaeda’s opposition to the United States indicated that the 

United States should reassess that policy. To Lee, though, 

it was not a question of altering support for Israel but of 

merely stating a fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 

was central to the relations between the Islamic world 

and the United States—and to Bin Ladin’s ideology and 

the support he gained throughout the Islamic world for 

his jihad against America.

Moreover, the 9/11 Commission Report does acknowledge, 

at least with respect to Khalid Sheik Muhammad (KSM), 

this motivation: “ [Ramzi] Yousef’s instant notoriety as 
60

the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing inspired KSM to become involved in planning attacks 

against the United States. By his own account, KSM’s 

animus toward the United States stemmed not from his 

experiences there as a student, but rather from his violent 

disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel. 

(Source: The 9/11 Commission Report, New York: W.W. 

Norton, 2004, p. 147. 

Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center plot, 

as well as others, including the initial planning of the “Planes Operation”—who had earlier failed in an attempt to bomb the Israeli 

embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, and whose initial New York targets were not the World Trade Center but targeting Jewish neighborhoods in Crown Heights and Williamsburg—had this to say as 

a final statement following his conviction for that crime:

We are, the fifth battalion in the Liberation Army, declare our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the 

American political, economical and military support to 

Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator 

countries in the region.

Our demands:

Stop all military, economical, and political aids [sic] to 

Israel.

All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop.

Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries 

[sic] interior affairs.

. . . The terrorism that Israel practices (which is supported 

by America) must be faced with a similar one. The dictatorship and terrorism (also supported by America) that 

some countries are practicing against their own people 

must also be faced with terrorism.

The American people must know, that their civilians 

who got killed are not better than those who are getting 

killed by the American weapons and support.
61

The American people are responsible for the actions 

of their government and they must question all of the 

crimes that their government is committing against other 

people. Or they – Americans – will be the targets of our 

operations that could diminish them.

We invite all of the people from all countries and all of 

the revolutionaries in the world to participate in this action with us to accomplish our just goals.

“IF THEN ANYONE TRANSGRESSES THE PROHIBITION AGAINST YOU TRANSGRESS YE LIKEWISE 

AGAINST HIM . . . 

AL-FARBEK AL-ROKN, Abu Bakr Al-Makee (Simon Reeve, The 

New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism, Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999, “Appendix 

Three: A letter from Ramzi Yousef and the other conspirators in 

the World Trade Center bombing, published as received by the 

New York Times four days after the February 1993 explosion,” 

pp. 274-275.) 

CNN in its write-up of the final verdict represented facts in the 

following manner: “After three days of deliberation in November, 

a federal jury convicted Yousef and Eyad Ismoil on murder and 

conspiracy charges for their roles in a plot by Islamic extremists 

to topple the trade centers two 110story [sic] towers to punish 

the United States for its support of Israel,” available from articles.

cnn.com/1998-01-08/us/9801 08 yousef 1 trade-center-bombing-yousefand-eyad-ismoil-conviction-S=PM:US. For a chillingly-prescient, 

sympathetic account of Yousef’s motives, but not tactics, see Jude 

Wanniski, “The mind of a terrorist” September 12, 2001, available 

from www.wnd.com/index.php?pageId=10813. 

Finally, at least one of the East Africa Embassy bombers made 

his motives known in published transcripts of the case (See United 

States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, United 

States District Court, Southern District of New York, New York, 

October 18, 2001, Sentencing hearing), available from fl1.findlaw.

com/news/findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/usbinldn101801.pdf.

El-Hage’s complicity in the attacks was proved, but based on 

his testimony one learns that policy, not shari’a, primarily motivated him; also, that the killing of innocent human beings—some-
62

thing he apparently did not know would happen—is absolutely 

unacceptable under Islamic law. The defendants Wadih El Hage, 

Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-‘Owhali, 

and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed all received life without parole: 

Odeh’s views (see p. 112) are referred to by Judge Leonard B. 

Sand when he states as motives, Mr. Odeh’s opposition to United States’ support of Israel, financially, politically and militarily, 

[and] presence of the “United States military in the holy lands of 

Saudi Arabia, [and] the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa.” At 

p. 113, Judge Sands states: “The attack may have been intended 

to attack American foreign policy, but the victims were innocent 

people. . . .” At pages 115-116, the distinction is made between 

support of al-Qaeda’s military goals and deep regret at loss of innocent civilian life. His attorney, Anthony L. Ricco, states:

He is now prepared to face the sentence that the court 

must impose here. He is very much aware of the substantial human loss that occurred here. He is not oblivious to the fact that many people were injured and many 

people died here who were innocent. He acknowledged 

that very early on in the case when he was interrogated. 

He has always expressed that. He does not have remorse, 

your Honor, about his participation in Al Qaeda. That’s 

a difference in his mind. . . . Mohamed Odeh has always 

stated that he was not a part of the execution of the bombing. He continues in that position today, but that does not 

mean, your Honor, that he is a person who is oblivious to 

the great loss of human life and the great injury that was 

inflicted upon people here (pp. 115-116).

El-Hage, a second defendant, addressed the Court before his 

sentencing with a very revealing, fundamentalist narrative but 

one that appears to recognize the enormity of killing innocents 

and indeed one that exhibits moral revulsion. His view of the 

United States is positive from a Muslim perspective: he repeatedly refers to the U.S. as a land where Islam can be freely spread and 

practiced (“Others chose to migrate to other countries, such as the 

U.S., where they can spread the message of Islam freely and in the 

same time support their brothers and sisters who are continuing 

their efforts to apply God’s rules in the Islamic countries,” (p. 139); 

also: “Islam became the fastest growing religion in the U.S., as it is 

in the whole world, all praise be to God first, and to the tolerant, 
63

open society here,” (p. 139); also: “Now, even though the Islamic 

system and way of life is for the best of all humanity [sic], devout 

Muslims, as I believe, are not asking to apply it here in the U.S., 

where Muslims are less than 7 million. They are a minority. The 

fact is that they want to apply it in the Islamic countries where the 

majority are Muslims. But in those countries, today’s selfish, arrogant and self-deceited kings, presidents and rulers want to apply 

their own self-invented rules . . . [T]o make the long story short 

[sic], by the 20th century, the rulers started to neglect the Koranic 

laws, substituting them with manmade [sic] laws. The result is 

what we see today. Muslim nations are the weakest, poorest and 

most miserable. That is why, in my opinion, we find devout, committed Muslims, individuals and groups, working actively to reimplement God’s rules and guidance” (pp. 137-138). 

As for moral revulsion: “[D]evout Muslims, . . . even in time 

of conflict, they should not exceed certain limits, harming innocent people or noncombatant ones. This is very stressed upon [sic] 

in the Koran and the teachings of the prophet Muhammad, peace 

be upon him, who even prohibited destroying crops, animals or 

property at time of war (p. 139); and again: 

When the bombings happened in Africa in ’98, my opinion was that that action was extreme and not in accordance with the beliefs that I learned. I made my opinion clear well before I was arrested or charged. Today, 

my opinion is still the same towards what happened in 

Africa and what happened here last month [9/11]. The 

killing of innocent people and noncombatant is radical, 

extreme and cannot be tolerated by any religion, principles, beliefs or values. Today I can stand here and say 

that I did not participate or support any extreme conduct 

or any act that violates my beliefs as a devout Muslim. . .

(pp. 141-142). 

El-Hage at pp. 142-143 identifies “many American policies towards Muslim countries [that] are wrong” including the alleged 

“over one million child [sic] and thousands of innocent people” 

affected by the embargo on Iraq; “the unconditional support of 

the American government to the Israeli government that is killing innocent Palestinians, taking their land, expelling them and 

destroying their homes” (p. 142); the effect on deeply religious 

Muslims of “having non-Muslim troops on the land of Muslims’ 
64

holiest sites, its negative impact on Muslim masses around the 

world and specifically those on the Arabian Peninsula” (p. 142). 

He goes on to also say though: “Such policies, in my opinion, 

are wrong and end up breeding unjustified extremism. . . . Many 

Muslims and non-Muslims have expressed the same views. That 

includes the American Muslim community, which I am a member 

of, which is free to voice its criticism to the American policy [sic] 

but without committing or supporting any extreme acts” (pp. 142-

143). And in his defense he also states: “I am still the person who 

avoids radical solutions and acts, as I did in the past” (p. 145). 

[El-Hage had at that time no prior record of any violent or illegal 

activity.] 

Bin Laden’s butchery and contrast with El-Hage could not be 

greater. He acknowledges El-Hage: “[He] was one of our brothers 

whom God was kind enough to steer to the path of relief work 

for Afghan refugees. I still remember him, though I have not 

seen him or heard from him for many years. He has nothing to 

do with the U.S. allegations” (FBIS Report, January 2004, “Time 

Magazine Interview with Bin Laden,” January 11, 1999, pp. 83-

86). In stark contrast to El-Hage’s revulsion, Bin Laden answers 

the TIME magazine correspondent’s question, “[H]ow can you 

justify the death of Africans?” (p. 84), by invoking the ‘jihad of 

justification’ and extends the Tartarrus (human shield) doctrine 

to justify the mass murder in Nairobi, Kenya, on August 7, 1998, 

of 213 persons, and injuring of 4500; and in Dar as Salam (literally, “House of Peace”), Tanzania, to 11 dead, and 85 injured.” 

(See United States of America v. Osama bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 

1023, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 

New York, N.Y., March 12, 2001, Superseding Indictment, pp. 43-

44, available from www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/US/US_v_

Osama_bin_Laden_et_al_Superseding Indictment-1.pdf ; 2.pdf; 3.pdf.) 

See, finally, Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of 

Cultures or Clash of Interests, New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1999, esp. pp. 238-242, for several prescient suggestions the 

actual implementation of which may have substantially altered 

the events defining the decade to come.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. Paul Kamolnick

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil