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35–351 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 110–87 

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2007 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SPECIAL HEARING 

FEBRUARY 27, 2007—WASHINGTON, DC 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BEN NELSON, Nebraska 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

TERRENCE E. SAUVAIN, Staff Director 

BRUCE EVANS, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2007 

Page 

Opening Statement of Chairman Robert C. Byrd ................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Thad Cochran ...................................................................... 3 

Statement of Hon. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, Department of 

Defense .................................................................................................................. 3 

General Peter Pace, United States Marine Corps, Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, Department of Defense .......................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert M. Gates ...................................................... 5 

Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental Request ............................................................... 5 

Statement of Hon. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Department of 

State ...................................................................................................................... 7 

Fiscal Year 2007 Iraq Supplemental Request ....................................................... 7 

Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ...................................................... 7 

Iraq Neighbors’ Meeting .......................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement of Hon. Condoleezza Rice ..................................................... 9 

Iraq ........................................................................................................................... 10 

Afghanistan .............................................................................................................. 11 

Lebanon .................................................................................................................... 11 

Kosovo ....................................................................................................................... 11 

Sudan ........................................................................................................................ 12 

Avian Flu .................................................................................................................. 12 

Migration and Refugee Assistance ......................................................................... 12 

Public Diplomacy ..................................................................................................... 12 

Education and Cultural Exchange Programs ........................................................ 12 

Broadcasting Board of Governors ........................................................................... 13 

Food Assistance ........................................................................................................ 13 

Weapons/Insurgency ................................................................................................ 14 

Changes in the Iraq War ........................................................................................ 15 

Threat to the United States .................................................................................... 16 

Air Strikes ................................................................................................................ 16 

New Embassy Compound in Baghdad ................................................................... 17 

Funds ........................................................................................................................ 17 

Dealing With Improvised Explosive Devices ......................................................... 18 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) ........................................................ 19 

Iraqi Security Forces ............................................................................................... 21 

Support of USG From Iraqi People ........................................................................ 21 

Iraqi Neighbors Meeting ......................................................................................... 23 

Bilateral Relations With Iran ................................................................................. 23 

Military Action Against Iran .................................................................................. 24 

How Long Will Success in Iraq Take? ................................................................... 25 

Fixing Walter Reed .................................................................................................. 26 

Security ..................................................................................................................... 27 

Iraq Sectarian Violence Militias ............................................................................. 29 

Iraqi Refugee Admissions ....................................................................................... 30 

Iraq National Reconciliation ................................................................................... 30 

Al-Qaeda ................................................................................................................... 30 

Armored Vehicles ..................................................................................................... 31 

Government Accountability Office Presence in Iraq ............................................. 32 

Baker-Hamilton Report ........................................................................................... 33 

Iraq Study Group Recommendations ..................................................................... 34 

Timeline for Improving Care of Wounded Troops ................................................. 36 

Military Construction .............................................................................................. 38 

Multilateral Discussions With Iran ........................................................................ 39 
Page

IV 

Treating the Wounded and Brain Injuries ............................................................ 40 

Veterans Benefits .................................................................................................... 43 

Amendments on Troop Deployments ..................................................................... 44 

Al-Qaeda, Greatest Threat to Homeland ............................................................... 46 

Management of Iraq Reconstruction Funding ....................................................... 47 

Iraq Sectarian Violence ........................................................................................... 47 

Failing our Wounded ............................................................................................... 48 

Eliminating Al-Qaeda Leadership .......................................................................... 49 

Attack Into Pakistan ............................................................................................... 49 

Iraq Reconstruction Coordinator ............................................................................ 50 

Iraqi Commitments .................................................................................................. 51 

Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams ................................................................... 51 

Iraq PRT Staffing .................................................................................................... 52 

Retirees/Volunteers .................................................................................................. 53 

Turkey-Iraq Security Discussions .......................................................................... 53 

Iraqi Battlefield Success ......................................................................................... 54 

Alternative Strategies ............................................................................................. 55 

Baker-Hamilton Report Recommendations ........................................................... 56 

Encouraging Signs in Iraq ...................................................................................... 57 

Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area .................................................... 57 

Bonuses for Deployed Troops .................................................................................. 58 

Iraq Reconstruction Funding .................................................................................. 59 

State-DOD Cooperation on Provincial Reconstruction Teams ............................. 59 

Active Service ........................................................................................................... 60 

Guantanamo Facilities ............................................................................................ 60 

How the War in Iraq Will End ............................................................................... 62 

Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 63 

Questions Submitted to Hon. Robert M. Gates ..................................................... 63 

Questions Submitted by Chairman Robert C. Byrd ............................................. 63 

Justification of the Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental Budget Request ................. 63 

Monthly Cost of the War in Iraq ............................................................................ 63 

Expansion of Authorities and Funding .................................................................. 63 

Global Lift ................................................................................................................ 64 

Impact of Supplementals on the Base Budget ...................................................... 65 

Force Protection ....................................................................................................... 65 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program ....................................................... 67 

National Guard Equipment .................................................................................... 67 

National Guard Deployments ................................................................................. 67 

Riverine Force .......................................................................................................... 68 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters ........................................................................ 69 

Recruiting and Retention ........................................................................................ 69 

Question Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein ............................................... 70 

Guantanamo ............................................................................................................. 70 

Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg ....................................... 70 

Iraq and Afghanistan .............................................................................................. 70 

Question Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson ......................................................... 72 

Question Submitted by Representative Ken Calvert ............................................ 72 

Guantanamo Power Supply .................................................................................... 72 
(1) 

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR 

FISCAL YEAR 2007 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met at 2:55 p.m., in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert C. Byrd (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Byrd, Inouye, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski, Kohl, 

Murray, Dorgan, Feinstein, Landrieu, Reed, Lautenberg, Nelson, 

Cochran, Stevens, Specter, Domenici, Shelby, Gregg, Bennett, 

Craig, Hutchison, Brownback, Allard, and Alexander. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ROBERT C. BYRD

Chairman BYRD. The committee will come to order. 

Senator Cochran, members of the committee, welcome. Thank 

you for your interest in this critical topic for our time. 

Secretary Gates, Secretary Rice, General Pace, the committee appreciates your appearance before this committee, as we address the 

President’s fiscal year 2007 supplemental request. On February 5, the President submitted to Congress, a $103 billion emergency supplemental request, related to the global war on 

terror (GWOT). And for additional assistance for the victims of 

Hurricane Katrina. 

I look forward to working with the Senator from Mississippi, and 

all of the Senators, on meeting the needs of the victims of Hurricane Katrina. 

Our hearing today focuses on the administration’s $99.6 billion 

supplemental request for the global war on terror. Predominantly 

for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, through the remainder of fiscal year 2007. The administration’s $99.6 billion request is in addition to the $70 billion appropriated by Congress in 

September 2006 for the global war on terror. 

This supplemental request also begins the process of expanding 

the size of the United States Armed Forces by accelerating two 

Army brigade combat teams, and establishing one new Marine 

Corps regimental combat team. 

Funds are included for reconstituting depleted equipment for existing forces, for training and equipping Iraqi and Afghani military 

and police units. In addition to the $99.6 billion covered by this request, Congress has already appropriated $507 billion for the wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, including $376 billion for the war in Iraq. 

In fiscal year 2007 alone, the Department of Defense (DOD) is spending some $10 billion per month in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
2 

Over the last 7 fiscal years, including funding combat operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, the Congress has provided a total of $3.2 

trillion. How does that sound to the Senator from Tennessee? 

That’s trillion dollars—trillion, with a ‘‘T’’—or three followed by 

12 zeroes provided to the Department of Defense. The current large 

increase in defense spending requiring difficult tradeoffs in other 

areas of the national budget, are the consequences of an ever-increasing debt. Every dime—every dime for the war in Iraq has 

been borrowed. 

In this committee we have a serious obligation to ensure that the 

taxpayers’ money is well spent. 

The President suggests from time to time that we may have to 

fund and fight this war in Iraq, far into the future. Congress cannot, however, continue to fund failing policies, and failing strategies. We need to identify strategies with potential for success, and 

turn the future of Iraq over to Iraqis. 

But, under the President’s plan there is no end in sight—no plan 

for redeployment, no plan for diplomacy, no plan for engaging our 

international partners in efforts to improve security in the region. 

All the President has requested is more money—more money for 

military force, and more money for obviously ineffective reconstruction efforts. 

The Congress has provided billions and billions of dollars above 

the administration’s request for additional body and vehicle armor 

to keep our troops safe. And billions more for the development and 

deployment to the field of equipment to counter improvised explosive devices. Yet, after all of the billions of dollars and those thousands of precious lives that have been spent in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001, we do not seem to be close—not even close—to 

achieving the goal of establishing a stable, effective government in 

either nation, which can provide for security, provide for the needs 

of its populace, or prevent the use of its territory by terrorists and 

other armed insurgent groups. 

Even at home, there are concerns about the care being provided 

to our wounded and their families, and I expect that this committee will have questions for you about that, Secretary Gates. 

This Nation supports our troops in the field. We, in this Congress, 

have pushed for the best equipment for our troops in the field, and 

for our troops at home. 

We have the right to expect that our wounded will receive a 

higher standard of care and consideration as they navigate the hostile bureaucracies of medical treatment. As this committee considers this supplemental appropriations request, and as we review 

the fiscal year 2008 budget, we have a number of questions regarding the short- and the long-term outlook for the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and for the United States position in the region 

as a whole. 

A majority of the American people have expressed their dissatisfaction with the way that things are going. We need to know 

that the funds that you are requesting will do more than merely 

continue the status quo. We need to know that you are working 

hard toward an acceptable resolution to the conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 
3 

The Congress has consistently supported our men and our 

women in uniform. Congress will continue to support our troops 

and their families. Nevertheless, with regard to the failed policies 

of this administration, this Congress is not blind. The Congress has 

a vital constitutional role to play in the development and the execution of U.S. defense policy. Congress is not a rubber stamp, or 

a Presidential lap dog—obedient and unquestioning. 

Oversight, oversight, oversight is among our most important responsibilities. And oversight, oversight, oversight have been lacking 

for far too long. 

Senator Cochran, do you have a statement? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I’m 

pleased to join you in welcoming this distinguished panel to our 

committee, to discuss the President’s request for emergency supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan. We appreciate 

their leadership, their distinguished service to our country, in this 

very challenging and difficult time. 

We also appreciate the inclusion, in this request, of the funds 

that are required to continue the recovery from the devastation of 

Hurricane Katrina. This supplemental funding request deserves 

our very careful consideration, as we understand the needs and the 

challenges that we face in bringing the action in Iraq to a successful conclusion. And, we look forward to the day when we can celebrate that. 

Until then, I think we need to carefully consider the new strategic plan that’s been laid out by our military leaders—not just the 

President—but our military leaders, on their recommendation for 

bringing this action to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date, and that’s the purpose of this funding request, in large 

part. To accommodate to the new strategic plan for a successful 

conclusion—that’s our goal. 

So, this supplemental funding request deserves our very careful 

consideration, and we look forward to the time when our troops 

will be coming home. 

I know I join you, Mr. Chairman, looking forward to hearing our 

distinguished panel discuss this request. We appreciate their service to our country. 

Chairman BYRD. And thank you, Senator. 

Secretary Gates, would you proceed, please? 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL PETER PACE, UNITED STATES MARINE 

CORPS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee, I 

appreciate the opportunity to join Secretary Rice, and General Pace 

in discussing the President’s supplemental appropriations request 

to fund the cost of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the wider 

global war on terror. 
4 

I would like to, especially, thank you, Mr. Chairman for scheduling this hearing so quickly, given the urgency of taking up, and 

enacting, this request. 

It is a special privilege to testify for the first time alongside the 

Secretary of State. From the start, I would like to express my 

strong support for the programs funded in the State Department’s 

request, and recognize the important role our diplomats and other 

civilians play in our efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and all over the 

world. 

The kind of challenges our country faces in Iraq and Afghanistan 

cannot be overcome without the important non-military efforts Secretary Rice will outline. The 2007 supplemental request of $93.4 billion for the Depart- ment of Defense is in addition to the $70 billion that has already 

been appropriated for war-related costs in this fiscal year. If these 

additional funds are delayed, the military will be forced to engage 

in costly and counterproductive reprogramming actions starting 

this spring to make up the shortfall. Timely enactment of this supplemental request is critical to ensuring our troops in the field 

have the resources they need. 

This request provides for the incremental pay, supplies, transportation, maintenance, and logistical support to conduct military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It provides for the reconstitution 

of our Nation’s armed forces, with a special focus on the Army and 

the Marine Corps, by repairing or replacing equipment that has 

been destroyed, damaged, or stressed in the current conflict. 

It provides for investments in new technologies to better protect 

our troops from an agile, and adaptive enemy—including a new 

generation of body armor, vehicles that can better withstand explosions from improvised explosive devices (IED), and electronic devices that interrupt the enemy’s ability to attack U.S. forces. And, 

it provides for the training and equipping of Iraqi and Afghan security forces, with a significant increase in our commitment to building the size and capabilities of the Afghan army and police. 

I would note that while our country is properly focused on the 

serious situation in Iraq, it is critical that the gains made in Afghanistan these past few years not be allowed to slip away. This 

was at the top of the agenda at my NATO Ministerial earlier this 

month in Seville. 

In closing, I believe it is important to consider the defense budget 

request submitted to the Congress this year in some historical context, as there has been—understandably—sticker shock at their 

combined price tags, more than $700 billion total. Please consider, 

that at about 4 percent of America’s gross domestic product, the 

amount of money the United States is projected to spend on defense this year, is actually a smaller percentage of gross domestic 

product (GDP) than when I left Government 14 years ago, following 

the end of the cold war, and a significantly smaller percentage than 

during previous times of war, such as Vietnam and Korea. 

Since 1993, with a defense budget that is a smaller relative 

share of our national wealth, the world has gotten more complicated, and arguably, more dangerous. In addition to fighting the 

global war on terror, we also face the danger posed by Iran’s and 

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, and the threat they pose—not 
5 

only to their neighbors—but globally, because of their record of proliferation. 

The uncertain paths of China and Russia—which are both pursuing sophisticated military modernization programs—and a range 

of other flash-points, challenges, and threats. In this strategic environment, the resources we devote to defense at this critical time, 

should be at the level to adequately meet those challenges. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the support this committee has 

provided to the men and women of our armed forces over many 

years. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to join Secretary Rice in discussing the President’s supplemental appropriation request to fund the costs of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the wider 

global war on terror. 

From the start, I would like to express my strong support for the programs funded 

in the State Department’s request. The kinds of challenges our country faces in Iraq 

and Afghanistan cannot be overcome without the important non-military efforts outlined by Secretary Rice. 

The 2007 supplemental request of $93.4 billion for the Department of Defense is 

in addition to the $70 billion that has already been appropriated for war-related 

costs in this fiscal year. If these additional funds are delayed, the military will be 

forced to engage in costly and counterproductive reprogramming actions starting 

this spring to make up the shortfall. Timely enactment of this supplemental request 

is critical to ensuring our troops in the field have the resources they need. 

While our country is properly focused on the serious situation in Iraq, it is critical 

that the gains made in Afghanistan these past few years not be allowed to slip 

away. This was at the top of my agenda at the NATO ministerial earlier this month 

in Seville. 

I believe that it is important to consider the defense budget requests—both for 

the base budget and the war-related requests—submitted to the Congress this year 

in some historical context, as there has been, understandably, sticker shock at their 

combined price tags—more than $700 billion total. 

Please consider that, at about 4 percent of America’s Gross Domestic Product, the 

amount of money the United States is projected to spend on defense this year is 

actually a smaller percentage of GDP than when I left government 14 years ago following the end of the Cold War—and a significantly smaller percentage than during 

previous times of war, such as Vietnam and Korea. 

Since 1993, with a defense budget that is a smaller relative share of our national 

wealth, the world has gotten more complicated, and arguably more dangerous. In 

addition to fighting the global war on terror, we also face: 

—The danger posed by Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, and the 

threat they pose not only to their neighbors, but globally, because of their 

record of proliferation; 

—The uncertain paths of China and Russia, which are both pursuing sophisticated military modernization programs; and 

—A range of other potential flashpoints, challenges and threats. 

In this strategic environment, the resources we devote to defense at this critical 

time should be at the level to adequately meet those challenges. 

FISCAL YEAR 2007 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

The fiscal year 2007 supplemental request includes $39.3 billion to provide the 

incremental pay, supplies, transportation, maintenance and logistical support to 

conduct military operations. The additional U.S. ground and naval forces being sent 

to the Iraq theater are projected to cost $5.6 billion. This total includes funding for 

personnel costs, supplies, spare parts, contractor support, and transportation. The 

fiscal year 2008 GWOT request complies with Congress’s direction to include the 

costs of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in the annual Defense Department 

budget. 
6 

Reconstitution 

The request includes $13.9 billion to reconstitute our Nation’s Armed Forces—in 

particular, to refit the ground forces, the Army and Marine Corps, who have borne 

the brunt of combat in both human and material terms. These funds will go to repair or replace equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, or stressed in the current conflict. 

All Army units deployed, or about to deploy, for missions overseas are fully 

trained and equipped, often with additional gear for their particular mission. In an 

expeditionary, rotational force one can expect that units returning from their deployment will decline to a lower readiness level as personnel turn over and equipment is repaired or replaced. 

Force Protection 

This supplemental includes $10.4 billion for investments in new technologies to 

better protect our troops from an agile and adaptive enemy. Programs being funded 

would include a new generation of body armor, vehicles that can better withstand 

explosions from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and electronic devices that interrupt the enemy’s ability to attack U.S. forces. Within this force protection category, the fiscal year 2007 supplemental includes $2.4 billion to counter and defeat 

the threat posed by IEDs. 

Afghan/Iraqi Security Forces 

The request includes $9.7 billion to stand up capable military and police forces 

in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The bulk of these funds are going to train and equip Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) to assume the lead in operations throughout Afghanistan. Some 

88,000 have been trained and equipped, an increase of 31,000 from the previous 

year. 

The $5.9 billion for the ANSF in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental is a substantial increase over previous years’ appropriations. It reflects the urgent priority of 

countering increased activity by the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and narcotics traffickers to 

destabilize and undermine the new democracy in Afghanistan. These funds will significantly upgrade the capability of Afghan forces to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations. 

In Iraq, more than 300,000 soldiers and police have been trained and equipped, 

and are in charge of more than 60 percent of Iraqi territory and more than 65 percent of that country’s population. They have assumed full security responsibility for 

3 out of Iraq’s 18 provinces and are scheduled to take over more territory over the 

course of the year. These Iraqi troops, though far from perfect, have shown that 

they can perform with distinction when properly led and supported. Iraqi forces will 

be in the lead during operations to secure Baghdad’s violent neighborhoods. By significantly increasing and improving the embedding program, Iraqi forces will operate with more and better Coalition support than they had in the past. 

Non-Military Assistance 

Success in the kinds of conflicts our military finds itself in today—in Iraq, or elsewhere—cannot be achieved by military means alone. The President’s strategy for 

Iraq hinges on key programs and additional resources to improve local governance, 

delivery of public services, and quality of life—to get angry young men off the street 

and into jobs where they will be less susceptible to the appeals of insurgents or militia groups. 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program, or (CERP) funds are a relatively 

small piece of the war-related budgets—$456 million in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental. But because they can be dispensed quickly and applied directly to local 

needs, they have had a tremendous impact—far beyond the dollar value—on the 

ability of our troops to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan. By building trust and confidence in Coalition forces, these CERP projects increase the flow of intelligence to 

commanders in the field and help turn local Iraqis and Afghans against insurgents 

and terrorists. 

CONCLUSION

With the assistance and the counsel of Congress, I believe we have the opportunity to do right by our troops and the sacrifices that they and their families have 

made these past few years. That means we must make the difficult choices and commit the necessary resources not only to prevail in the current conflicts in which they 

are engaged, but to be prepared to take on the threats that they, their children, and 

our Nation may face in the future. 
7 

Chairman BYRD. Secretary Rice. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Senator Cochran, thank you members of the committee. I am honored to testify alongside Secretary Gates for the 

first time. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a longer written statement that I would 

like to be entered into the record about the full supplemental request, the critical funding that will be provided by the supplemental for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, for ongoing State Department operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, for 

emergencies in Sudan, for reconstruction in Lebanon, and so forth. 

But, I will restrict my comments to a few, concerning—particularly—Iraq. 

Chairman BYRD. You may proceed as you like. 

FISCAL YEAR 2007 IRAQ SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

Secretary RICE. Thank you, sir. 

Across the board, in Iraq, Iraqis are now in the lead, and we are 

supporting them. To support the new strategy in Iraq that President Bush announced in January, the administration is requesting 

$3.2 billion in supplemental funding for Iraq this year. 

These resources will enable the State Department to support the 

Iraqi government, and to support our counter-insurgency strategy 

alongside our military, in order to bring a new civilian surge on 

multiple fronts. 

We are supporting the Iraqis in an economic offensive—Iraq’s 

Council of Representatives recently passed a budget for 2007, including a plan to devote $10 billion of its own money for reconstruction and development. This is an encouraging step, but they 

need our technical assistance in matters like budget execution and 

ministry capacity, and this supplemental will help with those matters. 

We are also supporting the Iraqis in their political offensive. Yesterday, Iraq’s Council of Ministers approved a hydrocarbon framework law. They will now transmit it—along with accompanying legislation—to the Council of Representatives. This is an important 

step, and we hope that it builds momentum for the Iraqi government to make further progress, particularly on de-Ba’athification, 

on increased support for displaced Iraqis—both Shia and Sunni— 

who wish to return to their homes. 

When I met with Prime Minister Maliki last week in Baghdad, 

I urged him to waste no time in finding resolution to critical issues 

of national reconciliation. 

IRAQ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRTS)

At the same time, we recognize that Iraq has a federal government, and that its provinces have significant responsibility. And so 

this supplemental funding provides the funding to allow us to double the number of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) in Iraq, focusing on Baghdad—but also beyond—in key provinces like Anbar. 

We are doubling the number of personnel within our existing PRTs, 
8 

and our expanded PRT strategy will enable us to decentralize and 

diversify our civilian presence in Iraq, thereby increasing our 

chances of success. 

Again, I would emphasize here, that we are transitioning our 

role. This is to help Iraqis build their own democratic institutions, 

and lead their own economic development at the provincial and 

local levels. 

Let me say one other thing about the PRTs. Our previous strategy called for 10 teams in Iraq. We have met that goal. Those provincial reconstruction teams are fully staffed, fully deployed, and 

fully operational. Under the new strategy, we will now move from 

10 to 20 PRTs. We have already identified all of the Foreign Service officers who will lead these new teams, and we expect them to 

arrive in Iraq before the end of March. 

To staff the PRTs, the President has asked the State Department 

to recruit additional civilian specialists from other Federal agencies, and from the Nation at large. These are people like 

agronomists, veterinarians, city planners, and others. No diplomatic service in the world has these specialties, and we have, 

therefore, asked the Department of Defense to fill the first rotation 

of about 100 specialist positions. Our supplemental request will 

then enable us to hire about 300 new civilians for this mission. It 

will allow us to reimburse other Government agencies when we recruit their personnel, and to send them out quickly to join the diplomats who are already in the field doing the political work that 

is so important. 

So, we are advancing politically, economically, and, of course 

militarily. 

I would like to take one moment to talk about our diplomatic offenses, the fourth leg of our strategy, to build greater support both 

within the region and beyond, for peace and prosperity in Iraq. 

We are recommitting ourselves to the security and stability of 

the gulf region. We have rallied our traditional partners, responsible governments—like those of the gulf states—plus Egypt and 

Jordan. Or, as it is called, the GCC plus two, and we are working 

with those governments to support embattled democratic leaders, 

like Prime Minister Siniora, in Lebanon, President Abbas in the 

Palestinian territories, and Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq. 

We are also continuing to rally international support for Iraq’s 

political and economic success in the form of the international compact for Iraq. In March, dozens of countries will gather at the 

United Nations to finalize agreements on the compact. This compact outlines international responsibilities to Iraq, as Iraq meets its 

responsibilities to its own people. 

IRAQ NEIGHBORS’ MEETING

There is one additional component to this diplomatic offensive 

that I would like to highlight today. It is a new component. Prime 

Minister Maliki believes—and President Bush and I agree—that 

success in Iraq requires the positive support of Iraq’s neighbors. 

This is one of the key findings, of course, of the Iraq Study Group 

and it is an important dimension that many in the Senate and in 

the Congress have brought to our attention, and I have had very 

fruitful discussions about how to do this. 
9 

So, I am pleased to inform you that the Iraqis are launching a 

new diplomatic initiative, which we are going to fully support: the 

government of Iraq is preparing for an expanded neighbors’ meeting, first at the sub-ministerial level that will take place in Baghdad in the first half of March. Invitees would include Iraq’s immediate neighbors, as well as representatives from other regional 

states, multi-lateral organizations, and the permanent members of 

the United Nations Security Council—including, of course—the 

United States. 

This initial meeting will be followed, perhaps as early as the first 

half of April, by a ministerial-level meeting with the same 

invitees—that is, regional states, neighbors, international organizations, and the permanent five of the United Nations—as well as, 

perhaps, the members of the G–8. I would note that the Iraqi government has invited all of its neighbors—including Syria and 

Iran—to attend both of these regional meetings. We hope that all 

governments will seize this opportunity to improve their relations 

with Iraq, and to work for peace and stability in the region. 

I am pleased that the government of Iraq is launching this new 

diplomatic initiative, and that we will be able to support and participate in it. The violence occurring within the country has a decided impact on Iraq’s neighbors, and Iraq’s neighbors—as well as 

the international community—have a clear role to play in supporting the Iraqi government’s efforts to promote peace and national reconciliation within the country. 

So far from just a military campaign, our efforts in Iraq are moving forward on all fronts at the same time: security, political, economic, and diplomatic. America’s diplomatic corps, of course, is not 

an expeditionary force. But, our men and women are playing their 

roles superbly in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. They are enduring long and difficult deployments, far away from their families. 

Many are even working on the front lines in dangerous places like 

Anbar and Baghdad, working shoulder to shoulder with our soldiers and marines. Every day, our civilians are taking mortar fire, 

risking attacks, just to do their jobs, and then they get up the next 

day, go back out and do it all again. 

The men and women of the Department of State are patriots, 

and they make us all extremely proud. I ask you to provide them 

with the resources that they so urgently need to be successful in 

the vital mission that they perform. A mission that, together with 

our men and women in uniform, will help us to win the war on terror, and to make us safer. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

Chairman Byrd, Senator Cochran, members of the committee: It is a pleasure to 

appear before you today in support of the President’s fiscal year 2007 supplemental 

appropriations request for International Affairs. I appear today at a time when the 

Congress has just completed work on the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolution. I 

appreciate the work which this committee, and the entire Congress, has done to ensure adequate funding for the global HIV/AIDS program; for resources to combat 

malaria; for the U.S. contributions to international peacekeeping activities; for the 

foreign military financing program; and for both the regular and the emergency migration and refugee assistance programs. In a tight fiscal year, these are not small 
10 

accomplishments, and we look forward to implementing these programs which Congress has funded. 

At the same time, we face very pressing needs that must be addressed by prompt 

Congressional action on the 2007 supplemental. 

The administration has requested a total of $5.99 billion for international affairs 

programs in this supplemental to support urgent requirements that are not funded 

in the annual budget. Let me address a number of the most significant funding requests that are contained within the fiscal year 2007 supplemental. Chief among 

these, of course, is funding to continue our operations and programs in Iraq. 

IRAQ

Before I discuss our specific request for Iraq, I would like to take this opportunity 

to announce a new diplomatic initiative relating to Iraq’s future. I am pleased to 

tell members of Congress that there is now being formed a neighbors’ conference 

to support Iraq. This conference is being spearheaded, and properly so, by the government of Iraq. Invitees will include Iraq’s immediate neighbors, as well as representatives from other regional states, multilateral organizations, and the U.N. 

Permanent Five (the United States, France, Britain, Russia and China). I would 

note that both Syria and Iran are among Iraq’s neighbors invited to attend. 

An initial preparatory meeting of the neighbors’ conference will occur at the ambassadorial level in Baghdad on or around March 11. This will be followed, perhaps 

as early as the first half of April, by a ministerial level meeting with the same 

invitees, plus the G–8. 

I am pleased that the government of Iraq is taking this step. The violence occurring within Iraq has a decided impact on Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq’s neighbors have a 

clear role to play in helping Iraq to move forward, and this conference will provide 

a needed forum in order to do just that. 

The administration has requested a total of $3.2 billion for Iraq. This request is 

vital to the government of Iraq’s efforts to stabilize the country, bolster the economy, 

and achieve national reconciliation. It is a critical component of the USG civilian 

surge, expanding the presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and enabling USG agencies to decentralize and diversify their civilian presence and assistance to the Iraqi people. This request includes $824 million for the operation of the 

U.S. Mission in Iraq, including the extraordinary security measures which we must 

undertake in order to protect our diplomats and other personnel who are advancing 

our agenda of freedom and stability. 

The request includes $720 million in Economic Support Funds for programs critical to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), including $400 million for a civilian equivalent to DOD’s successful Commanders Emergency Response Program 

(CERP), a key component of the President’s ‘‘New Way Forward’’ in Iraq. We seek 

to expand the number of PRTs in Iraq from the 10 which are currently deployed 

to 20. This will include new PRTs in Baghdad and Anbar where the stakes are now 

highest. Civilian and military personnel will work side by side in these PRTs, in 

which the State Department will have the lead in all staff recruiting and hiring. 

PRTs work with Iraq’s provincial and local governments to improve governance, 

support moderate Iraqi leaders, and address local needs at a community level. Competent and capable provincial and local government officials, who pursue their interests peacefully and under the rule of law, will be an essential element of a secure, 

unified, and federal Iraq. 

The $720 million in PRT program funding is part of the administration’s $2.07 

billion request in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for Iraq under this supplemental. 

We have learned from our experience in Iraq that the most effective use of funds 

is to provide direct assistance at the local level. The request before you embodies 

this approach. It does not fund large-scale reconstruction projects, for which American funding is ending under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). In 

addition to the $720 million in program funding for the PRTs, the administration 

has requested $534 million for programs coordinated by PRTs which create jobs and 

support businesses at the local level, necessary steps to bring stability to areas that 

have been cleared of insurgents. We also propose a program to jump start employment in the agriculture sector, Iraq’s second largest employer. Our request provides 

$293 million to support the continued improvement in the core capacities of Iraq’s 

ministries, particularly in budgeting, and policy and regulatory reforms, and $200 

million to strengthen Iraq’s judicial processes, criminal justice system and anti-corruption initiatives. It also includes $428 million for democracy programs to support 

greater engagement with political parties, civil society organizations, and national 

political institutions, such as parliament. 
11 

We are undertaking a broad review of the Iraqi refugee situation, including both 

refugees who have fled from Iraq and those who are internally displaced within 

Iraq. There are an estimated 1.5 million Iraqi refugees living outside Iraq, mainly 

in Jordan and Syria. There is a rapidly growing number of internally displaced persons in Iraq as well, owing to the increase in sectarian violence over the past year. 

We have requested $60 million for State Department and USAID programs in this 

supplemental to address the growing humanitarian needs in Iraq. This funding is 

the bare minimum necessary to address the pressing and growing problem of Iraqi 

refugees, internally displaced, and conflict victims. The request also includes $7 million to continue humanitarian demining in Iraq, 

one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. 

AFGHANISTAN

The administration has also requested a total of $751 million in 150 account funds 

for Afghanistan. These funds complement the parallel request in the military supplemental for Afghanistan. They include $53 million for additional security for State 

Department and USAID personnel who are on the front lines in Afghanistan. 

Let me stress two points. First, as our military leaders in Afghanistan will testify, 

these foreign assistance funds are a vital part of our overall strategy in Afghanistan. 

We cannot secure Afghanistan in the long term by military means alone; we need 

to be able to address the pressing needs for reconstruction and economic development if we are to succeed. Among these needs are the construction of high priority 

roads in the southern and southeastern portions of Afghanistan; a more stable, long 

term source of power supplies to Kabul and elsewhere; and an expansion of alternative livelihood programs to counter the cultivation of opium poppies. 

Second, I convened a conference in Europe several weeks ago in which I pressed 

our NATO allies to do more in Afghanistan. We seek, of course, to reduce or eliminate the so-called caveats on what other NATO members’ military forces will and 

will not do in Afghanistan. But we also seek multinational contributions of additional resources to address Afghanistan’s very pressing economic problems. This request before you in the 2007 supplemental represents our commitment to that 

shared goal. 

LEBANON

At the recent Paris donors’ conference for Lebanon, the United States pledged a total of $770 million to assist in addressing the security and reconstruction needs 

of Lebanon. I made clear there, as I do now, that honoring this request depends 

upon the provision of these funds by the Congress. Inspired in part by our demonstration of support for the Lebanese people, other donors at the Paris conference 

gave quite generously, resulting in a total of $7.6 billion pledged to support Lebanon. The funds requested in this supplemental—including peacekeeping, security 

and economic reconstruction funds—represent the American pledge, and I am hopeful you will provide these funds in order to encourage others to join in an economic 

and security package that will give Lebanon’s democratically elected government 

and the Lebanese people the assistance they require. 

Economic support to the legitimate government of Lebanon is vital to providing 

long-term peace, stability and economic opportunity. These funds will support a 

broad economic reform agenda, an agenda which will dovetail with the post-conflict 

reconstruction of Lebanon, while putting Lebanon on the path to fiscal stability. On 

the security side, the funds we are requesting will assist the Lebanese Armed 

Forces, which require a substantial infusion of equipment and expanded training. 

Their responsibilities will include providing security at Lebanon’s ports, airports 

and borders, and being on the front lines of interdicting the movement of terrorists 

and their armaments into and out of Lebanon. 

The request also includes $184 million for the U.S. share of costs for the U.N. 

peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL). 

KOSOVO

The administration also requests a total of $279 million for Kosovo. We have 

made great progress in stabilizing the Balkans. As we move toward lasting political 

reconciliation and permanent political structures, these funds for Kosovo are crucial. 

These funds will support the settlement of Kosovo’s status which we anticipate will 

be completed early this year. I would note that the European Union and international financial institutions will bear the lion’s share of the post-settlement costs, 

which could run as high as $2 billion. The U.S. contribution will leverage these and 

other donor contributions and could enable a quicker reduction of U.S. forces in 

Kosovo. 
12 

SUDAN

The administration also requests a total of $362 million for programs to address 

the continuing crisis in Sudan. These funds will be used for two purposes: to provide 

food and other disaster assistance and to provide enhanced peacekeeping operations 

for Darfur. I know that members of Congress on both sides of the aisle are moved 

by the suffering and the horrors experienced daily by so many people in Sudan. The 

funds we have requested for International Disaster and Famine Assistance and Public Law 480 Title II will allow us to continue to help the populations affected by 

the violence in Darfur, including internally displaced persons, and helping to feed 

affected populations in Darfur and Chad. 

Included in the $362 million, we are requesting $150 million to support peacekeeping in Darfur, including support for the African Union Mission (AMIS) there. 

We continue to work toward the expansion of these forces and for a transition of 

AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping force. 

We are requesting $20 million for security for high threat protection for Department officials in Sudan, including in Juba and Darfur, as well as security support 

for the Special Envoy and others. To continue to support diplomatic efforts in 

Sudan, we are requesting $1.9 million for diplomatic operations. 

AVIAN FLU

The administration also requests a total of $161 million to support efforts to enhance preparedness and communication, and improve surveillance and detection to 

respond more quickly to H5N1 outbreaks wherever they occur. Given the bird flu 

outbreaks in a number of countries in recent months, we must address the urgent 

need to expand operations in the field. Existing funds to support emergency field 

operations will be fully spent by summer of 2007, and we must maintain continuity 

of these efforts if we are to be successful. A substantial portion of this funding will 

be focused on high-risk African countries with additional funds enabling responses 

to the spread of the disease in South Asia, the Near East, and Eastern Europe. 

At international pledging conferences in 2006, the United States pledged $434 

million in assistance for regional disease detection sites, stockpiles of non-pharmaceutical supplies, wild bird surveillance, building vaccine production capacity and 

other purposes. 

MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

The administration requests a total of $71.5 million to address refugee emergencies in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Palestinian territories. This funding will also address the needs of Iraqi refugees and conflict victims, as I previously mentioned. We are also requesting an additional $30 million 

to respond to unanticipated emergency refugee and migration needs in places such 

as Somalia, Sri Lanka, Chad, and the West Bank and Gaza. 

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The administration also requests $20 million in public diplomacy funds to counter 

ideological support for terrorism, especially in critical countries. Some of these funds 

will be used to fund international information programs to engage Muslim communities, promote democracy and good governance, refute the idea that the West is at 

war with Islam, and isolate and discredit terrorist leaders and organizations. Countering ideological support for terrorism and undermining the ability of terrorist 

groups to attract new recruits are a critical part of our counterterrorism efforts. 

These new funds will provide for a significant expansion of existing, effective programs as well as the launching of new initiatives designed to reach more vulnerable 

groups, especially youth. These initiatives seek to build new bridges of understanding, increase tolerance and respect for other cultures and religions, and de-legitimize terrorism and discredit terrorist leaders and their ideology. 

EDUCATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

The administration is requesting $20 million in exchanges funding for the critical 

countries to confront the increasing prevalence of violent extremism. Our experience 

in exchanges—whether they are academic exchange programs to encourage English 

language instruction or professional or cultural exchanges that promote bilateral 

and multilateral dialogue in a common realm like art or athletics—has shown that 

extremist messages of hatred toward the United States take root more readily 

among those walled off from Americans by barriers of language and or lack of exposure to the breadth of our culture. Increased support for English language instruc-
13 

tion and the exchange of people in such diverse fields as art and culture, sports, 

and interfaith dialogue, are central to lessening these barriers. 

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS

The administration also requests $10 million for the Middle East Broadcasting 

Networks. As part of the administration’s strategy to counter violent extremism, 

Alhurra television will launch a signature three-hour daily program. The three-hour 

daily program capitalizes on Alhurra’s unique perspective in a growing market of 

over 200 channels by giving viewers a reason to turn to Alhurra as a primary information source, providing a format and information mix unavailable in the region 

today. This format is a proven broadcast technique for developing audience loyalty 

and will enable Alhurra to reach a large listening area that crosses several time 

zones in the Middle East. The three-hour original production will provide the means 

to focus the agenda for news and information in the region. The new show will focus 

on the news of the day, discuss compelling social issues, broadcast investigative reporting and a spectrum of information not presented anywhere else. 

FOOD ASSISTANCE

Finally, the administration requests $350 million for the provision of worldwide 

food assistance. The funds are urgently needed for Sudan, especially in Darfur; for 

refugees in Chad; and for drought relief in Afghanistan which have already been 

mentioned. The request also includes emergency funds to enable a timely response 

to emerging food shortages and to prevent famine in southern Africa, Somalia and 

elsewhere in the Horn of Africa. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, there are many additional pressing needs for assistance beyond 

the ones I have addressed here. Some of these can be addressed with the funds provided in the fiscal year 2007 continuing resolution; others are addressed in our fiscal 

year 2008 budget request. What is before you in the current supplemental, however, 

represents the most urgent requirements—requirements that are appropriate to be 

considered within the framework of a supplemental appropriations bill. 

I am mindful that all such requests are ultimately not requests of this or other 

committees, but of the American people. For that reason, we have thoroughly and 

closely considered the requests which are before you in this supplemental. For that 

reason, too, I pledge our careful stewardship of the funds which are provided to us. 

Thank you for your thoughtful and prompt consideration of this request. 

I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you, Madam Secretary, thank you. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, how soon do you need the supplemental funds 

before you run out of funds in your operating accounts, and how 

has your spending plan been affected by the proposed surge in 

troop strength? 

Secretary GATES. Senator Stevens, we would need the supplemental in April—clearly, the earlier the better, before the services 

have to begin reprogramming—the Army would be affected first, 

and probably most dramatically. Although the supplemental contains an identified $5.6 billion for the surge, as you suggest, we’ve 

already begun spending money to send the brigades that are already there, so we will need that money in that respect. 

Senator STEVENS. Well, have you had to curb your current operations in order to fund this change now—is it really having any effect on our total readiness elsewhere? 

Secretary GATES. In terms of the financial resources, I don’t believe so yet, Senator. 

Senator STEVENS. It’s my understanding you made a statement 

concerning how long you anticipate the surge forces will be in Iraq. 

Could you tell us what that is? 
14 

Secretary GATES. Well, we have budgeted for them through the 

end of fiscal year 2007. Our global war on terror submission for fiscal year 2008 has a straight line projection for forces of 140,000 in 

Iraq. So, the funding for the surge actually extends only to the end 

of this fiscal year. 

WEAPONS/INSURGENCY

Senator STEVENS. We’ve all been reading about these new weapons that have been introduced in Iraq, and about the new insurgency in Afghanistan. Can you tell us—do we have the equipment 

and the force that’s necessary to face these changes over there 

now? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, with your permission, I’d like to ask 

General Pace to address that question. 

General PACE. Thank you, sir. 

Sir, we do—the Secretary approved the addition of one U.S. brigade combat team to add to the current forces over there, to be 

properly positioned for the—what’s called the Spring Offensive— 

every year when things thaw in Afghanistan, there is an offensive 

this year. The intent is for that to be a NATO offensive, as opposed 

to a Taliban. 

Senator STEVENS. In terms of the surge force, would it be proper 

to categorize their major function as adding to the security of those 

people that are there as we bring about this rotation of force? That 

is, as Iraqis move forward with our new embedded battalions in 

their brigades—is this force related to the total security of the operation? 

General PACE. Sir, it is. There’s three parts to this operation: one 

is a security part, which is where the additional forces come in and 

the additional trainers come in, the other two are the increase in 

governance and economics. 

Senator STEVENS. With regard to this movement that’s anticipated now, in terms of bringing the Iraqi army forward into more 

combative positions—most of that takes place on the arterial highways, doesn’t it? 

General PACE. Sir, it does. 

Senator STEVENS. Is this surge force related to the security of 

that type of movement? 

General PACE. It is not, sir. The Iraqi—three brigades that the 

Iraqis are bringing forward, two are already in place, the third will 

be coming online in about the next 2 weeks. And they have all 

come down—as a matter of fact, part of that force, for the first time 

was flown from the northern part of Iraq—Iraqis being flown, on 

Iraqi airplanes, into Baghdad. 

Senator STEVENS. How long will it take to complete that relocation of Iraqi forces? 

General PACE. Sir, it will be done by about the first week in 

March—about another week, week and a half. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you, my friend. 

The Senator from Alaska is my long-time friend. So, I’d like to 

turn to him, because he was always courteous to me. 
15 

Secretary Gates, in his State of the Union message, the President said that the war is not the fight we entered in Iraq—but is 

the fight we’re in. Whatever you voted for, you did not vote for failure. 

Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and 

stockpiles, and the means to deliver them no longer exist. The current Iraqi regime no longer demonstrates hostility toward, and the 

willingness to attack, the United States. A new government is 

emerging to replace the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein. 

So, let me ask you, is the war today in Iraq the same war that 

Congress authorized nearly 41⁄2 years ago? 

CHANGES IN THE IRAQ WAR

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I think that the situation in 

Iraq clearly has evolved since 2003. I think that the effort to try 

and create a stable and more democratic Iraqi government that is 

an ally of the United States, not an adversary in the war on terror—that goal remains the same. I think that was a central goal 

of the original policy, and I think that remains the same. 

It’s obviously become more complicated with the situation inside 

Iraq, as I’ve described it. We’ve faced, in essence, four different 

wars: the war of Shia on Shia—principally in the south; sectarian 

conflict—principally in Baghdad, and in the environs of Baghdad; 

third, a Ba’athist insurgency; and, fourth, al-Qaeda. And the national intelligence estimate would add a fifth, and that is criminal 

operations around Iraq. 

So, I think what we are still trying to achieve is an Iraqi government that has been elected by its people, and that can stabilize the 

country, and move forward—able to defend itself and govern itself. 

Chairman BYRD. Secretary Rice, President Bush has said that 

the enemy will follow us here, meaning to the United States. If we 

withdraw from Iraq, what is the evidence of that? 

Secretary RICE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that the President’s 

remarks were addressing the concern that if we withdraw prematurely from Iraq, and before the Iraqis are, themselves, able to 

stabilize their country, that we would face an Iraq that would be 

a haven for terrorists, an Iraq in which the instability would likely 

spill over into the region—both into its south, its neighbors like 

Iran, and that might, indeed, invite neighbors into Iraq, and into 

the region in which we have very longstanding allies. That kind of 

instability, then, would produce a safe haven for terrorism and a 

safe haven for chaos that would allow the maturation of terrorist 

forces that would have very high on their priority lists, attacks on 

the United States. I think that is what is being referenced there. 

If you look at what the national intelligence estimate said about 

an Iraq in which there was not an effort to stabilize it, or in which 

it did not become stable, I think it would accord with that picture. 

Chairman BYRD. According to the national intelligence estimate, 

our commanders on the ground, and other experts, the core of the 

violence in Iraq is a self-sustaining, sectarian struggle, resembling 

a civil war, in many respects. So, what is the evidence you have 

that the next stop for this ethnic and sectarian fight would be the 

United States? To me, that is like assuming that in 1865—going 
16 

back quite awhile—the United States was preparing to start a war 

in France. 

THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

Secretary RICE. Mr. Chairman, obviously the sectarian violence 

in Baghdad—as Secretary Gates just mentioned—is one of the elements of the instability in Iraq. But, of course, there is the presence of al-Qaeda in, for instance, Anbar, where the fight there is 

to prevent the hardening or the acquisition of a terrorist safe haven 

for the most dangerous terrorist group, in terms of our own domestic security, which is al-Qaeda. 

I think it is also fair to say that, in a broader sense, if you were 

to get the kind of instability in the region that might come from 

an Iraq that was unstable and unable to control its borders, unable 

to control its relations with its neighbors, that that kind of instability in the Middle East has also been a kind of breeding ground 

for the kind of terrorism that would come back to haunt us here 

at home. 

But, if one only focuses on al-Qaeda, I think that the link between the maturation of al-Qaeda in the center of the Middle East, 

and our own security, is clear because al-Qaeda is obviously the 

greatest threat right now to our homeland. 

Chairman BYRD. To our homeland? 

Secretary RICE. Yes, al-Qaeda, as the gravest terrorist threat to 

our homeland. 

Chairman BYRD. Do you think they will attack us, in the United 

States, if we leave? 

Secretary RICE. Mr. Chairman, I believe that every day—and I 

do not mean to be hyperbolic—but, frankly, every hour of every 

day, I suspect that there are al-Qaeda forces that are—I believe, 

I know—trying to figure out how to attack us. September 11, I 

think, was not their last attempt, we have broken up several attempts, and we are going to continue to have to do that. 

Our problem, of course, is that the terrorists only have to be 

right once and we have to be right 100 percent of the time. That 

is an unfair fight on the defense. So, going to the source of that 

problem—the Middle East—and trying to provide a more stable 

and democratic environment in the Middle East so that terrorism 

does not arise from that region, is an extremely important part of 

the global war on terror. But, I do believe, Mr. Chairman that alQaeda is trying every day to try to figure out a way to attack us, 

and if they have a safe haven in a sophisticated and central place 

like Iraq, I believe strongly that that is going to enhance their capability to do so. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

AIR STRIKES

There has been a number of reports, General Pace, that the 

United States is preparing to launch air strikes against Iran. Is 

this true? Did you understand the question? Let me ask it again. 

There have been a number of reports that the United States is preparing to launch air strikes against Iran. Is that true? 

General PACE. Mr. Chairman, it is not true. 

Chairman BYRD. Categorically? 
17 

General PACE. Categorically, sir. 

Chairman BYRD. News reports today regarding your assessment, 

General Pace, of military readiness note that the United States is 

at significant risk of not being able to respond to a new crisis. This 

assessment is considerably more worrisome than last year’s assessment of ‘‘moderate’’ risk, and was reportedly made before the President announced his intention to ‘‘surge’’ 21,500 more troops to 

Baghdad. What does this state of affairs mean for us? 

General PACE. Mr. Chairman, first of all, the news report is inaccurate. My report to Congress is classified, but it is available to 

every member of this committee. To be precise, what the level of 

risk is, is to how quickly we can get the job done. And the level 

of risk is to the timelines that we have set for ourselves to be victorious. So, the risk is to how long it will take—not whether or not 

we will get it done. We will get the job done. It will be less precise 

and more heavy-handed because we have some of our force, including our precision intelligence force, already committed around the 

world. But, no one in our country, or any potential adversary, 

should question our ability to handle another crisis tomorrow. And, 

the addition of 21,500 troops, more or less, from a force of 2.4 million, does not change my assessment, sir. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you very much. 

Senator Cochran. 

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Secretary Rice, I recall that in an earlier hearing, we talked 

about the importance of infrastructure improvements for safety 

reasons in the Baghdad area, particularly the Embassy and facilities for housing U.S. personnel who are there carrying out their responsibilities. Could you give us a status report on the level of completion that we’ve reached to date, and whether or not there are 

funds being requested in this supplemental that are designed to 

meet those needs? 

NEW EMBASSY COMPOUND IN BAGHDAD

Secretary RICE. Thank you Senator, in fact, the new Embassy is 

on budget and on time—I’m happy to report—despite the challenging security situation. The project is underway—almost all of 

the money, about 98 percent of it, has been obligated, and most of 

it—in the 80 percent range—has been spent. There is additional 

funding requested in the supplemental for State Department operations in Iraq for security costs. But the Embassy is on budget and 

on time. 

FUNDS

Senator COCHRAN. In the recent continuing resolution, we were 

asked to provide funds, but not at the level that we were told they 

were needed, for base realignment and closure (BRAC) activities. 

Senator Hutchison was one of the main proponents of getting these 

funds approved at the earliest possible date. Is there a request included in this supplemental that seeks to deal with that shortfall 

of funds? Unfortunately, we couldn’t include everything in the continuing resolution that some thought was needed. 

General PACE. No, sir, there is not. And, I’m glad you highlighted 

this, the $3.1 billion for BRAC is badly needed, it is, in fact, imper-
18 

ative. Without it, we will not be able to meet the statutory deadline 

for the completion of BRAC. It has monies in it that are specifically 

allocated for the troops, $300 million for their housing allowances. 

It has—just to give you two examples—26,000 soldiers going to 

Fort Bliss and Fort Sam Houston, and their families will not have 

dental clinics or youth centers, if this money isn’t approved. Five 

thousand troops that are going to Fort Benning for training won’t 

have barracks. So, this bill is full of military construction projects 

such as this, that are essential as we reallocate, as we relocate 

forces as part of the BRAC process. And so, it really becomes a serious problem. 

Senator COCHRAN. In connection with the forces in Iraq, what 

progress is being made on the development of successful research 

for dealing with the improvised explosive devices challenge that we 

face? These remote-controlled explosive devices that have caused so 

much damage in the region? 

DEALING WITH IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Secretary GATES. Let me take a crack at that first, and then ask 

General Pace to chime in. 

First of all, there’s $2.4 billion in this supplemental for IED research, that’s on top of $2 billion that you’ve already approved in 

the enacted fiscal year 2007 appropriations. 

I met with General Miegs last week for the first time, and I had 

the list in front of me of all of the different companies and universities where his organization has research going to try and find 

new ways of dealing with these IEDs. And I asked General Miegs, 

basically, one question: Do you have enough money? Are you pursuing every avenue that makes any sense at all? And he assured 

me, that with the enactment of the requests that we have made— 

both for the supplemental, and then for fiscal year 2008—that he 

has the resources that he needs to do this. 

But, I will tell you, that one of the—no, not one of the—the most 

unpleasant aspects of my job is, every night, going home and handwriting notes to the families of those who have been killed in action. And, there’s a sheet behind every one of those letters that 

tells me how they died. And about 70 percent of them are these 

IEDs. So, the whole Department of Defense is as highly motivated 

as an organization can be, to try and figure out a way to get 

around these. 

But, the reality is, we face an agile and a smart adversary. And 

as soon as we find one way of trying to thwart their efforts, they 

find a new technology, or a new way of going about their business. 

But, I can assure you, this is a very high priority for us. 

General Pace. 

General PACE. Sure, if I may add to what the Secretary has already said. In addition to the technology, several other aspects of 

it, one is—literally every time one of these devices goes off, the 

team assessment is made, and the information is put into the 

worldwide IED network, so the troops training right now to go 

overseas in the future, have the information from the most recent 

tactics, techniques, and procedures of the enemy. We then adjust 

our own. 
19 

We look at the entire chain, starting with the ammunition. We’ve 

policed up 435,000 tons of ammunition from more than 15,000 locations in Iraq. So, just getting at the source of the explosives is part 

of the problem. Then, the factories where they’re built, and the individuals who build them, and then the individuals who deliver 

them, and then the individuals who put them in place—so we go 

after the entire chain of events. 

And, we’ve been successful at locating, now, just about a little bit 

better than one-half of those that are in place. And, thanks to the 

technologies involved, we have fewer and fewer casualties for the 

explosions that do take place, sir. 

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you. 

Senator Inouye. 

Senator INOUYE. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates, the President of the United States, President Bush, requested over $22 billion for reconstruction funds, and the Congress responded by appropriating like 

amount. 

Now, we hear that over $6 billion of that amount has been wasted, abused, stolen, et cetera, et cetera. What is the present status? 

Are these charges correct? And, if so, what are we doing about it? 

IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND (IRRF)

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think there are several different elements here. In terms of the funding that was provided by the Congress under the Iraqi relief and reconstruction fund (IRRF), I think 

that there have been some problems with some particular contracts—a particular contract, for instance, for health clinics and 

health services—but I do not believe that there has been a claim 

of widespread abuse of the funding that was provided under the 

IRRF. 

There has been a concern about some of the funding that was 

used through what was called the DFI, the Development Fund for 

Iraq that had a number of problems in terms of waste. 

I believe that you will find, Senator, that—while it is true that 

some of the targets that were initially set for reconstruction out of 

the IRRF have not been met for a variety of reasons, having to do 

with the dilapidated infrastructure in Iraq, having to do with insurgent attacks, for instance, against the oil infrastructure and the 

gas pipelines—the monies have been spent as intended. Reconstruction funding has not always had as great an impact because 

of these other factors, but I do not believe that you will find an argument from the SIGIR, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, that there has been widespread abuse of the Iraq reconstruction funding provided by the Congress. 

There have been problems with the DFI, and there have been 

problems with some specific contracts relating to one company in 

particular. 

Senator INOUYE. If I may interrupt. We have been advised that 

the inspector general has cited the number $6 billion, and the 

Army, through the Justice Department has already indicted people. 

So, are we suggesting there’s no fraud or waste? 

Secretary RICE. No fraud or waste concerning IRRF funds. 
20 

Senator INOUYE. Or corruption? 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I will write an answer for you for the 

record, so that I can make certain that I am untangling the various 

elements of this. But, in terms of the Iraq reconstruction funding 

that was provided through the Congress, it is my understanding 

that there are some specific contracts—particularly relating to 

health clinics—that have been problematic, that, certainly, some of 

the targets have not been met concerning the reconstruction planning. A good deal of the Iraq reconstruction funding was actually 

redirected to security funding—about $5 billion was redirected to 

security funding. But, I will get an answer for you, for the record, 

Senator. 

[The information follows:] 

Secretary Rice has asked me to respond to the questions you asked her during 

her testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations and Foreign Operations on February 27 concerning allegations that large amounts of United States 

Government reconstruction funds have been wasted or abused in Iraq. The Department of State takes oversight of foreign assistance funds very seriously, including 

the $20.9 billion Congress appropriated for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

(IRRF). Secretary Rice and other senior Department officials meet regularly with 

the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Stuart Bowen, and 

our staff works closely with investigators from SIGIR, GAO and the audit agencies 

of implementing agencies. 

While we are aware of problems in managing some of the projects under IRRF, 

there have been no allegations to date of fraud or abuse with IRRF or other foreign 

assistance funds. Rather, questions have been raised with respect to the administration by the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) of Iraqi funds from the Development 

Fund for Iraq (DFI) in 2003–04. SIGIR, for example, has questioned whether the 

Iraqi Government kept adequate records of $8.8 billion in Iraqi DFI funds which 

CPA transferred to Iraq in 2003. The GAO has also noted that up to $10 billion 

in Defense Department contracts awarded during CPA contained charges which 

were questioned or found to have been inflated by contractors. As the GAO has 

noted, some of these costs for contracts awarded by CPA have been recovered. 

SIGIR has also identified cases of fraud or abuse involving DFI money. We have 

worked closely with SIGIR and the Department of Justice to make sure that those 

responsible are brought to justice. The recent criminal convictions of Robert J. Stein, 

Jr. and Phillip Bloom are just two examples of the seriousness of U.S. efforts to 

fight corruption within the Iraq reconstruction effort. 

Over the last three years, SIGIR has performed hundreds of audits throughout 

Iraq in all of the IRRF sectors. There have been instances when SIGIR has brought 

to our attention deficiencies in IRRF project management or problems with contractors. In these instances, we have acted quickly to correct the problems that SIGIR 

identified and put changes in place to make sure that these problems are not repeated. However, as Mr. Bowen has repeatedly highlighted, fraud and abuse have 

played a very small role in American reconstruction efforts in Iraq. His concern— 

and ours—is more focused on the issue of waste. We are aware that Special Inspector Bowen has estimated in oral testimony that 10–15 percent of IRRF II funds may 

have been ‘‘wasted’’. However, we understand that neither SIGIR nor GAO has ever 

issued a forensic audit report on this issue, and we understand that Special Inspector Bowen has made the point that any estimate on this subject depends on the parameters defining ‘‘waste’’. Mr. Bowen has also noted in testimony before Congress 

and in public interviews that most IRRF projects are completed on time and as 

planned. 

We are working hard to ensure that U.S. tax dollars appropriated for Iraq are 

used to the greatest benefit of the Iraqi people. Despite this, we did not meet all 

of our original reconstruction goals for a variety of reasons, most importantly security. Insurgent attacks on critical infrastructure prompted us to shift $2 billion from 

water projects in 2004 to increase support for the Iraqi Security Forces and police 

training to $5 billion under IRRF. In addition, reconstruction projects in several sectors have faced higher than expected security costs and construction delays, which 

have accounted for between 16–22 percent of the cost of reconstruction contracts executed over the last two years. Security costs for training and technical assistance 

programs have been lower, averaging less than 10 percent. We have taken steps to 

address this issue by shifting construction contracts away from expensive foreign de-
21 

sign build contractors towards Iraqi contractors who often are better able to resolve 

security issues and are less expensive. We are also winding down our reconstruction 

programs and expect to finish most by the end of 2007. 

The Department of State will continue to work closely with SIGIR and other auditors, including the Government Accountability Office and the State Department Office of the Inspector General, to maintain the highest standards of oversight and accountability for all of our operations in Iraq. 

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Gates, do you have any response? 

Secretary GATES. This is not an area, frankly, because it involved 

the past, that I’ve spent any time on. The only comment that I 

would make was that when I was in Baghdad with the Baker-Hamilton Group, one of the discussions that we had was how much 

money had been spent out of those emergency reconstruction funds 

for security, because the projects that were underway were at risk 

from attacks, but that’s about the only contribution I can make on 

this discussion. 

Senator INOUYE. General Pace, in all of our debates on Capitol 

Hill, involving withdrawal from southwest Asia the subject of the 

Iraqi security forces comes up. Those who are not too keen about 

withdrawal cite that, ‘‘Well, they’re not ready to take over.’’ 

We have expended over $10 billion to equip and train the Iraqi 

army and police forces. How would you rate them at this moment? 

General PACE. Sir, they are good for the most part, getting better. Their military is much better than their police. We started 

training their police a couple of years ago, when we started training their military. Their military battalions, about 10 are conducting independent operations as we sit here. Another 82, at the 

last count, were in charge of their own territories. Another 20 

some-odd were working side-by-side with coalition forces, and a 

number in the teens were still in the process of doing some final 

training. So, the Iraqi military is coming on very well. 

Examples: About 3 weeks ago, now, in Haifa Street in Baghdad, 

against Sunni insurgents, the Iraqi army did extremely well. They 

needed assistance from the coalition with regard to air strikes. But 

we—— 

Senator INOUYE. Your response is that they’re coming along very 

well. When will they be ready to replace our forces? 

General PACE. Sir, I cannot pick a precise moment in time. By 

the end of this year, we should have a significant portion of the 

country turned over to Iraqi provincial, Iraqi military, and Iraqi police control. But to put a precise dot on the map, sir—or on the calendar—I could not do that. But, we should have significant turnover this year. 

Senator INOUYE. Secretary Rice, we always are reminded that 

the leaders of Iraq want us there. How would you rate the sentiment of the people of Iraq, do they want us there? 

SUPPORT OF USG FROM IRAQI PEOPLE

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, I am myself rather skeptical of 

polls that are taken among the Iraqi people. I am myself a social 

scientist; I want to know exactly how the public opinion survey 

question was asked and was answered. I know that in both the 
22 

council of representatives, and in the leadership, which, after all, 

are the people who were elected to represent the Iraqi people, there 

has been widespread support for our mission because the leaders 

understand, and many in the council of representatives understand, that Iraq is not yet ready to carry out its own security functions without our help. 

I will say that, I think just like any country in the world, and 

particularly a proud culture and people like the Iraqis, they would 

prefer to be able to do these things on their own. Sometimes one 

will get readings from the Iraqi population that they look forward 

to the day that it is really Iraqi forces that are carrying out the 

security missions, and when the multi-national forces are not needed to do the kinds of functions that they are now. I think that’s 

a natural outcome of a very proud people, and a people who don’t 

particularly want foreign forces on their soil. But, I think there is 

an understanding that we are providing, now, essential security 

functions that they cannot provide on their own, and that among 

those Iraqis with whom we speak, the leadership and the great majority of the council of representatives, there is respect for that mission. 

Senator INOUYE. Did the proud Iraqi people ask us to get rid of 

Saddam Hussein? 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I do not think they were in any position 

to ask us to get rid of Saddam Hussein. This was a thoroughly brutal regime that did not allow any expression of discontent. 

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

At the outset, I thank you, Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, and 

General Pace, for your service. I’m pleased to see Madam Secretary. Your announcement today on a conference involving Iraq’s 

neighbors, where the United States will participate, Syria will participate, and Iran will participate. I think that is very important 

in evaluating or moving ahead with congressional willingness to 

fund what you are requesting, because of the widespread sentiment 

in Congress that a resolution of the Iraqi issue will require diplomacy—in conjunction, perhaps, with military force—but that diplomacy is an indispensable element, so that is a good development. 

I compliment the administration, the President, and you, Madam 

Secretary, for the progress—which, at least appears—to have been 

made on diffusing the North Korean threat, and that has been accomplished through diplomacy—multilateral—but I note a Washington Post report, recently, February 20, saying that you had authorized your chief negotiator, Christopher Hill, at one point to 

have one-on-one negotiations with the North Koreans. I note you 

nodding in the affirmative that that was true—that is true? The 

one-on-one? Yes. 

It would be my hope, as you know from our correspondence in 

the past, and our discussions, that there would be more intense 

one-on-one negotiations with the Iranians and the Syrians. I know 

there are differences of—I know the administration has a different 

opinion—but it is my, has been my experience that when we talk 

one-on-one to other countries that there is an element of respect 
23 

and dignity which goes a long way toward trying to reach some understanding. And, we know that President Reagan called the Soviet 

Union ‘‘The Evil Empire,’’ and then shortly thereafter had negotiations. And the most famous illustration is President Nixon going to 

China, he’s really an example, if that can be done, that’s the way 

to do it. 

And, I would like to inquire about the reports of an initiative, socalled, by Iran back in 2003. And, I wrote to you, by letter dated 

February 19, to ask you about that, and the reports were that 

there was a writing from Iran. And, members of the National—or 

employees of the National Security Council—have reported that it 

was seen by the National Security Council, you were the Chief, of 

course, at that time. And you made a statement, or at least quoted 

in the press, that if there had been any paper which included the 

recognition of Israel, you certainly would have remembered that. 

I’m advised that the paper did not have any reference to Israel, 

but my question to you is, did you ever know about a writing back, 

contemporaneously in 2003, where the Iranians sought to have oneon-one discussions with the United States? 

IRAQI NEIGHBORS MEETING

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. 

If I may say, first, thank you very much in terms of the meeting 

that we will attend with Iraq and Iraqi’s neighbors. I should note 

that Iraq has invited the Syrians and the Iranians—I do not know 

if either country has accepted—but we certainly will be there. I 

want to thank you and others, we have had conversations with 

about the importance of doing this. We have listened, and I want 

you to know that. 

BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN

I want to—on the issue of what happened in 2003—Senator, I 

simply do not remember ever seeing a paper of the kind that I have 

seen described in the press. There was, apparently, a fax that came 

to the Department of State. I think that some who were at the Department of State have described that paper, and that perhaps its 

parentage was even unclear at the time, because it was not clear 

whether it was from the Iranian government or not. I think that 

Deputy Secretary of State Armitage has talked about this openly 

with the press—— 

Senator SPECTER. But in any event, you didn’t—— 

Secretary RICE [continuing]. But I do not, I do not remember seeing a paper—let me be very clear. There were, obviously, a number 

of people who wanted us to talk to the Iranians, to reach out to the 

Iranians, who suggested that we try to do that, or that the Iranians 

might wish to have contact, but Senator, I just do not ever remember seeing a paper of that kind. I am not saying that a paper did 

not come to the government some place, but I don’t ever remember 

seeing it. 

Senator SPECTER. Okay, that’s 2003, this is 2007. If there will be 

a conference which you will attend, the United States will attend, 

I had a chance to talk to President Bashir Assad in December— 

as I told you in our lengthy conversation—and he’s looking for such 

a conference, a proposed one in Damascus. 
24 

I have had a chance the past 2 weeks to talk to the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations, and while he does not speak for 

his government, my instinct is they, too, will be willing to attend. 

So, I think that’s a very significant step forward. 

MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAN

Secretary Gates, would you agree that congressional authorization would be required before the United States initiates any military action into Iran? 

Secretary GATES. I think I’d have to defer to the constitutional 

lawyers on that, Senator. 

Senator SPECTER. I’d like for you to, as well. Senator Leahy and 

I wrote to the constitutional lawyer, the Attorney General of the 

United States, several weeks ago, January 30—we’re embarking on 

some very difficult—— 

Senator LEAHY. We also had a hearing in Judiciary on this matter, as you know. But, the Attorney General does not answer such 

questions. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, will you take that time from 

Senator Leahy? 

Secretary Gates, we’re embarking on some very difficult areas 

here. Congress can’t pass a law which trumps the President’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief. We do have constitutional authority under the appropriations power—the so-called 

power of the purse. I’ve studied the issue, and discussed with the 

chairman of the Judiciary Committee hearings, and I believe that 

Congress does not have the authority to micro-manage the war— 

constitutional authority as a legal matter, or as a practical matter. 

But the issue of conditioning is very tricky, with legislation which 

was passed in 1974 when Vietnam was winding down, and Congress passed legislation saying that there could be no more than 

4,000 troops in 6 months, no more than 3,000 in 1 year. 

But, we need to have an expression from the administration. It 

would be my hope that as Secretary of Defense, you would be in 

a position to say—because of the obvious constitutional issues involved—that the President cannot initiate military action in Iran 

without congressional authority. But, I’ll pursue the matter with 

the Attorney General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Leahy. 

Senator LEAHY. Of course we had a hearing on the matter the 

Senator from Pennsylvania has raised. In your answer to Senator 

Inouye, Secretary Rice, I want you to know there has been waste 

and theft of IRRF funds—not just Iraqi funds—but money that this 

committee appropriated, this Congress voted for and sent over 

there. The special investigator found that. 

You also said that it’s unfair that you have to fight on defense 

all the time. I agree with you. The fact is, of course, your administration, after we were hit on 9/11, obviously your attention was focused to it, it did happen on your watch, and we went on offense. 

The Congress solidly backed going after Osama bin Laden. 

I think we’ve been on defense ever since, because instead of getting Osama bin Laden when we had him cornered, the President 

decided we had to go into Iraq, hit Saddam Hussein who had abso-
25 

lutely nothing to do with 9/11, and we’ve been on defense ever 

since. 

Secretary Gates—we’ve heard time and again—that if we disagree with the administration’s policy in Iraq we don’t support the 

troops. We hear it from the Vice President, we heard it in the midterm elections—I’ve never heard it from you, sir. But, I suspect 

when we debate this supplemental, those of us who will question 

the administration’s policy in Iraq will hear it again. 

As a father of a former marine, I’m tired of it. I think it’s beneath a country that has always cherished the right to disagree, 

it’s one of the things we fight for in this country. We ought to talk 

about what’s right for the troops. Senators on both sides of the 

aisle have asked for proper armor for them, for proper training for 

them—they didn’t get either before they were sent into Iraq—some 

are still not getting proper armor. And was it right to subject them 

to substandard conditions at Walter Reed Hospital? And to a bureaucratic nightmare that’s reminiscent of a Kafka novel? 

I appreciate the way you’ve responded to the Walter Reed scandal, I told you that already and I want to make sure people understand—I was glad to see you speak out, I was glad to see General 

Cody speak out about the bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo of how great 

those conditions were. Neither you nor I would want a member of 

our family to be put in such a situation, and we would hope that 

a member of our family would never be so badly wounded. 

Our soldiers are returning with serious mental illnesses, and not 

getting the help—and serious physical illnesses, not getting the 

help they need. We have alarming rates of domestic abuse, of divorce, we have families destroyed by it. 

The Vice President doesn’t mention this when he says, ‘‘We’re 

winning in Iraq.’’ He says we’re winning because Saddam Hussein 

is dead. Iraq has a new constitution. He says nothing about the catastrophe we’ve unleashed on the Iraqi people, and nobody wants 

to talk about the fact that, when the Congress—Democratic members and Republican members—said ‘‘Go get Osama bin Laden,’’ 

this administration dropped the ball. 

I don’t think that the fighting in Iraq today bears any resemblance to the war that Congress authorized, or that our soldiers 

were trained for. I don’t think we need to spend another $80 billion 

to keep our troops bogged down in Iraq. 

HOW LONG WILL SUCCESS IN IRAQ TAKE?

If we’re going to have a pro-American, democratic government 

there, how long will it take? How much money? How many more 

of these huge supplementals, how long are we going to have to do 

this? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, the honest answer to your question is, 

I don’t know. The circumstances are obviously determined by the 

conditions on the ground. We have a new commander in Iraq. I 

think those of you who have been there, and visited with General 

Petraeus and with General Odierno have been impressed by what 

they’re doing, and the progress that they’re beginning to make. 

You know, I think that we all share—with all of the heated debate, the reality is—I think nearly all of us are trying to do the 

right thing for America. Certainly, everybody here in the Congress. 
26 

And trying to do what we think is best, in the best national security interest of this country. And that is—how do we avoid chaos 

in Iraq, and at the same time, bring about conditions in Iraq that 

allow us—at some point—to bring our troops home? That’s what 

we’re really all engaged in. We’re all patriots in considering this 

question, and we all have the best interests of the troops, as well 

as our country, in mind. And, I think sometimes folks on the outside lose sight of that general view, that is held across the political 

spectrum. 

Senator LEAHY. Unfortunately, some of the people on the inside 

lose sight of it, too. I look at some of the things that were said during the campaign—you weren’t Secretary of Defense then—but during the mid-year campaigns, I think that’s one of the reasons why 

the control of the Congress changed. I think people were so turned 

off because they know loyal Americans—they know we want our 

people back. You have a small minority of the Sunnis, power was 

taken from them, was given to an aggrieved majority—and they 

had real grievances, but bent on revenge. 

I don’t know how you stop this. A Vermonter wrote me to suggest that since we’re spending $1 billion a week over there, why don’t 

we just get out, let them settle their differences, and when they do, 

we’ll send them $1 billion a week to fix things back up. I know 

you’re not going to do that, but in some ways, that makes more 

sense, especially to the families of the marines, to the soldiers and 

airmen that are over there. 

FIXING WALTER REED

How long would you say it will take to fix up things at Walter 

Reed? There’s 16 different databases that soldiers out there deal 

with—how long is that going to take? 

Secretary GATES. Those are the kinds of questions that I’ve 

asked the outside study group that I’ve appointed to review within 

45 days. We’re not waiting on that. There are really two separate 

problems, it seems to me. The first—and frankly, the easiest—to 

resolve is the physical facilities, Building 18, and so on. And 

they’ve moved on that, I visited Building 18 on Friday, and a lot 

of the repairs have been made. The truth is, it’s not a great building, even once the repairs are made. And, I think some of our senior military leaders who have toured that building feel the same 

way. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was with me, 

and wasn’t too pleased, I might say. 

The larger problem—I’d say there are two other problems. One 

is the caseload for a lot of those working with outpatients—and 

they are, frankly, just overwhelmed. And, we’ve got some very dedicated people out there at Walter Reed, but when you have 130 patients you’re taking care of, instead of 20 patients—it’s like a student/faculty ratio, either it’s going to be good or it’s going to be terrible. And, so you have dedicated people who are overwhelmed. So, 

that’s a second area that needs to be addressed; along with that, 

a lot of the administrative problems and bureaucracy that some of 

these outpatient soldiers have had to encounter, and try and deal 

with. 

I think the third level that needs to be dealt with are some of 

the deeper questions about the length of time in evaluation of some 
27 

of these soldiers, and then the handoff to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and how that all happens, and what happens 

when they get home, and so on. And, I think all of those issues 

need to be addressed. 

We’re trying to tackle the first two of those right away. We just 

have had, I think, an inspector general report from the Department 

of Defense on some of these evaluations, and ways to go about correcting that. But, I expect a comprehensive approach to dealing 

with this to be in the recommendations of this outside group. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Secretary, I’ll say again what I told you earlier, privately. I’m so glad that you went out there and spoke out. You deserve high praise for doing that. Because, to tell you the truth, 

there’s a lot of CYA going on out there, and I think right now, 

they’re probably a lot more focused than they were before the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and others showed up there, so thank 

you for that. 

Secretary GATES. I will tell you, Senator, that they are very focused right now. 

Senator LEAHY. I’ll bet they are. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Senator Shelby. 

Senator SHELBY. Thank you. 

It seems to me that we’re at a crunch time, Mr. Secretary, as far 

as Iraq is concerned. And that a lot—a lot—depends on the surge. 

I had a nice conversation with General Petraeus. He seemed to 

be confident of what he could do with the extra troops. I hope he’s 

right. I support the troops. I support this supplemental, you know. 

We might tweak it some way, I don’t know, but we’ll look at it. 

But, it’s late in the game. Mr. Secretary, do you—and then General Pace—do you share the confidence that General Petraeus 

seems to have—at least he had when he was here with us, before 

he went back over there—in the success, possible success, of the 

surge? 

Secretary GATES. I have a lot of confidence, Senator, in General 

Petraeus, and his team, and in our soldiers. I think, critical to the 

success of the surge is the Iraqis stepping up to the plate, fulfilling 

their commitments, taking the lead, as they have said, and also 

going forward with their political reconciliation. All of those things 

have to happen for this to work. 

We will begin—the three of us—will begin briefing the entire 

Senate, and the entire House, Thursday afternoon, in closed session, to begin giving you a status report of where we stand against 

the benchmarks, against the commitments that have been made— 

both by our Government, and by the Iraqis. 

But, the direct answer to your question is—I have every confidence in our troops and in our generals. I am watching to see how 

the Iraqis perform. So far, so good. 

Senator SHELBY. General Pace. 

SECURITY

General PACE. Sir, I have confidence in a three-pronged surge. 

Prong number one, is security. Prong number two is, good govern-
28 

ance. Prong number three is, economics that gets jobs, and gets the 

young men off the street. No number of troops—whether it be 

20,000 or 100,000—will make a long-term difference. However, 

without the additional security, good governance and economics 

won’t have a chance. But, with the additional security, we must 

have good governance, we must have economic progress, otherwise, 

the security in and of itself will not turn the tide. 

Senator SHELBY. It seems to me from what I’ve read and known 

and been briefed on from time to time, that the militias seem to 

be out recruiting the Iraqi national army, and seem to be, at times, 

a lot more effective. How big a challenge is this, and what can you 

do about it? What can they do about it, with our possible help? 

‘‘They’’ being the national army? 

General PACE. Sir, I think success begets success, and begets 

good recruiting. And, the young Iraqis are going to hedge their 

bets. And, if they think that there’s weakness on our part, or the 

Iraqi government’s part, they’re going to be more tend toward 

home-grown militias that will protect their neighborhoods. But, if 

they see that we’re all in this together, and that we’re going to be 

doing all three parts of what I said, and they start seeing successes, then I believe they will throw their lot with the national 

government. 

Senator SHELBY. It’s March the first coming up in a day or so. 

Do you believe, Mr. Secretary—Secretary Gates—that 7 or 8 

months from now that we will know one way or the other if we’re 

making real progress in Iraq? Both economically, militarily, and 

the training of the Iraqi army? I don’t think you have too much 

time. I’m just trying—I’m not putting a deadline on it—I’m just 

throwing that out, because, I think that’s—will be another crunch 

time. 

Secretary GATES. Senator, let me offer a comment, and ask General Pace to correct me if I’ve got my facts wrong. 

I think General Petraeus believes that he will have a pretty good 

idea whether this surge and whether this strategy is working probably by early summer. And, I think—as I’ve told the Armed Services Committee—we will know pretty quickly, and we’ll be able to 

give you some information on this on Thursday—whether the 

Iraqis are keeping their military and security commitments that 

they’ve made to us. Are they showing up? Are they showing up in 

the right numbers? And so on, and so forth. Are they being able 

to move without political interference? 

The political side, we’re—as Secretary Rice indicated—we’re seeing some progress there. And we may be able to see more in a relatively short period of time. The economic side of it, the ‘‘build’’ 

part of clear, hold and build, is probably the one where we will 

have—that will take a little more time, in terms of whether the 

Iraqis are spending their own money, and whether we are providing the conditions—along with the Iraqi army—with our support, are providing the conditions in which they—as General Pace 

says—can begin to put young men back to work, and begin to get 

them off the streets. It’s surprising the information that you get, 

and the intelligence about the number of these people that are involved in this fight that are doing it because they got paid $100. 

Not because they were committed. 
29 

Senator SHELBY. Secretary, why over the time—I know you 

haven’t been in this post that long—but why have we, the Government, all of us, let the militias flourish for 2 or 3 years? It seems 

like, gosh, nothing was done, you know. They’re powerful forces in 

their own right. And could be helpful, or could be an obstacle, of 

what we’re trying to do. Do you want to speak to that? Or Secretary Rice? 

IRAQ SECTARIAN VIOLENCE MILITIAS

Secretary RICE. Well, I think, Senator, we have known that the 

militias were going to be a problem for quite some time. But, 

the—— 

Senator SHELBY. But what did you do about it? 

Secretary RICE. Well, frankly, they were entangled in Iraqi politics in ways that made it very difficult to do anything about them. 

The Iraqis did, finally, have a law at the time of the CPA, to disband the militias. But, frankly, the political circumstances, and 

then the growth in violence, meant that people relied on the militias, and it was very difficult to disentangle them. 

I think we will start to see, now, that these militias will begin 

to disentangle as the security forces are able to provide that security. 

Senator SHELBY. Madam Secretary, are you confident, or are you 

just hopeful—we’re all hopeful—about your diplomatic initiatives, 

that they will bear fruit? Sometimes diplomatic initiatives bear 

fruit after you’ve had military success, and you bring some stability 

there. What do you think? 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I do think that success is—success on 

the ground—is going to help us diplomatically. 

Senator SHELBY. And politically. 

Secretary RICE. Because, frankly, some of the neighbors are 

hedging their bets and keeping their options open, and to the degree that the Maliki government shows that it is capable of supporting its own security strategy with a political strategy that 

brings the national reconciliation into place, that shows that it is 

going to be even-handed between Sunnis and Shia—it is going to 

be much easier to make the neighbors more positive forces. But, it 

is important to get the work started with them. We have already 

begun that work with some of them, and we hope that other neighbors of theirs that have been less helpful, will try to be more helpful in the future. 

Senator SHELBY. I think time’s of the essence. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Harkin. 

Senator HARKIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Madam Secretary, this is just a question that occurred to me. 

Has a decision been made at the highest levels of this administration, that we’re going to turn over Iraq to the Shiites? 

Secretary RICE. No, Senator. 

Senator HARKIN. Well, I just heard General Pace say that by the 

end of this year we’re going to have better security and that we 

might be able to turn things over. I noticed that the President also 

has asked for 7,000 or more additional visas for Iraqis—are these 

Sunnis? Do you know that? Or can you speak to that? 
30 

IRAQI REFUGEE ADMISSIONS

Secretary RICE. Senator, you are referring to the 7,000 refugee—— 

Senator HARKIN. Yeah. 

Secretary RICE [continuing]. Positions? They will be processed 

without regard to their ethnic—or their sectarian—identification. 

Senator HARKIN. So, no decision has been made that, basically, 

after this surge, and after things quiet down, that basically we 

start withdrawing our forces, and the Shiites will simply run the 

country? 

IRAQ NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

Secretary RICE. Senator, we have had quite the opposite policy. 

Which is, that Iraq has to be an Iraq for all Iraqis, that is why we 

have been so insistent on national reconciliation efforts, on deBa’athification laws that would allow Sunnis to participate more 

fully in the country. We have had a strong Sunni outreach element 

in our policies—it is true that Shia are the majority in the country. 

But, we have been the strongest proponents—certainly in the international community—of a unified Iraq that is for all Iraqis. 

Senator HARKIN. You made the statement, Madam Secretary, 

that al-Qaeda is the greatest threat to the U.S. homeland. How 

many—you just said that, just a few minutes ago. 

AL-QAEDA

Secretary RICE. Yes, as a terrorist organization, I think that alQaeda—given their record on September 11—is the terrorist organization that most people believe is most likely to try to attack us 

again. 

Senator HARKIN. Oh, I see. You’re just putting it in the context 

of a terrorist group. 

Secretary RICE. Yes. 

Senator HARKIN. Not in the terms of comparing it to North 

Korea, or to China, or to Russia, that has several thousand nuclear-tipped missiles—you’re not comparing it there, are you? 

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, frankly I think—I should probably 

let Bob speak to this—but we have been in a nuclear standoff with 

Russia for a very long time. And, even though in an aggregate 

sense, I guess, it is a greater threat, the underlying political dynamic with Russia is one that, I think, you would not consider Russia the kind of threat to our homeland that I would consider alQaeda. 

Senator HARKIN. Well, it just occurred to me, you know, that we 

don’t even—how many members of al-Qaeda are there? Who is 

their leader, where is their headquarters? I’d ask Secretary 

Gates—how many ships do they have? How many aircraft do they 

have? How many tanks do they have? How many armored personnel carriers do they have? And again, here, that’s what we’re 

fighting them with. And it just seems to me the wrong response to 

terrorism, to be trying to fight that kind of war, when they don’t 

have any missiles, or tanks, or armored personnel carriers, and 

we’re throwing all of that stuff at them. 
31 

Well, anyway, I just make that point to say that that’s why I 

think that this war is the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the 

wrong time, against the wrong enemy. But, that’s just my feeling, 

and I just, I just say I do not think that compared to the threat 

that Russia would be, in case it turns on a dime—which it could— 

or China. 

I see Parade magazine had a list of the worst dictators in the 

world, a couple of weeks ago, number five, the head of China. Well, 

that’s interesting. With all the power that they have. China is now 

putting into the ocean right now, I think, one nuclear sub every— 

every 6 weeks. Let me think about that, every—about every 9 

weeks they’re putting a new sub in the water, and they’re going to 

do that over the next 9 years. You know, these are—these are really potential threats to our country. 

But, again, I have a—that’s why I think, you know, we are wasting our resources, wasting our resources. Quite frankly, I think, 

abusing our military by throwing them at this enemy in Iraq, when 

we’re going to need our military, I think, for other things down the 

road. And, I’d hate to see it undermined by fighting this wrong 

war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, against the wrong 

enemy. 

But, let me just move on to protecting our troops. Right now, we 

have another, what, five brigades going to Iraq? Part of the recent 

escalation? It’s estimated that there’s a shortage of about 4,000 uparmor kits, called FRAG Kit Five—I don’t know that all particularly—but estimated that over 2,000 Humvees in urgent need of 

up-armoring—why? Mr. Secretary, why? Why are we sending all of 

these troops over there, and yet we haven’t upgraded the Humvees 

themselves? It seems to me, you’re talking about the IEDs, and the 

roadside bombs, and yet, we can’t even provide the armor-plating 

for the Humvees before we send them over there. It seems to me 

the wrong order of things. 

Secretary GATES. Senator, let me ask General Pace to address 

that. 

ARMORED VEHICLES

General PACE. Senator, we started this war with about 214 uparmored Humvees in the entire United States military. Since that 

time, thanks to Congress, we now have 43,000 plus, armored vehicles in Iraq. As we have learned—and as our industry has been 

able to provide new technologies, we have been able to provide that 

protection to our troops. We now have every single troop, who 

leaves the base in Iraq, inside of level one protection, armored vehicles, thanks to the funding of the Congress. 

And, what’s happening is, as technology—our industries are able 

to produce better protective plates for the chest, as they provide 

better protective armor for the vehicles, it comes forward, we test 

it, we come to Congress for funding, you provide the funding, and 

the industry produces it as fast as possible. 

Senator HARKIN. General, excuse me for interrupting, but are we 

short 4,000 up-armor kits, or not? For Humvees? Do we know that, 

or—if you don’t know that off-hand, just let me know, will you? I 

mean, if you don’t know that off the top of your head. 
32 

General PACE. There are, at least, 4,000 more kits to be produced 

by industry, to be able to continue to swap out what used to—what 

yesterday was best armor—for what today is best armor. But, for 

the troops leaving the bases, every single troop that leaves a base 

in Iraq is in the very best armor we have today, the kind that’s 

being produced for the rest of the fleet. 

Senator HARKIN. So that, 2,000 Humvees—the information I 

have—are not in urgent need of up-armoring. Well, that’s interesting to know. 

General PACE. Sir, they are—I don’t want to misspeak. We do 

need those vehicles, you are funding those vehicles if you vote for 

this bill, but what I need to assure you—and especially to the 

moms and dads out there—is that PVC Pace, when he leaves the 

base, is inside the very best vehicle we have, thanks to your funding. 

Senator HARKIN. Last question, Madam Secretary, we had—the 

Congress insisted that we have Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) auditors—Government auditors—in Iraq. The DOD has confirmed support for GAO’s request, as of February 20, 2007, but the 

State Department continues to delay GAO’s request to establish a 

continuing presence. Is the State Department supportive of the 

GAO’s request to establish sustained oversight in Baghdad? 

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE PRESENCE IN IRAQ

Secretary RICE. Senator, I am unaware of that request. We do 

have, of course, an extensive auditing operation in Iraq, which is 

the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, known as 

SIGIR. 

Senator HARKIN. I know that. 

Secretary RICE. But, I will get back to you on the GAO. 

Senator HARKIN. This is the GAO request. 

Secretary RICE. Let me—— 

Senator HARKIN. DOD has already acceded to it, but State 

hasn’t. 

Secretary RICE. I will have to see why that is, Senator. 

Senator HARKIN. I appreciate that. Thanks, Madam Secretary. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department of State welcomes the work and recommendations of the GAO 

and fully supports short, focused temporary duty (TDY) trips by GAO staff to Iraq. 

The security environment and resource and logistical issues in Baghdad at present 

make accommodating the GAO requests to conduct longer-term visits a serious challenge to mission resources. 

The GAO’s most recent request is for a three-month TDY visit by three GAO personnel, each of whom would require lodging, extensive support services, security, 

computers, and other administrative support, as well as the attention of our staff 

in Baghdad in responding to their requests and inquiries. We have spoken with our 

colleagues in the Iraq Planning section in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

they informed us that they have neither approved the GAO’s request for a threemonth stay nor received such a request in writing. 

Given logistical constraints (primarily housing) and the security situation, the 

Embassy must carefully review all requests for official visits to Iraq, regardless of 

agency. In order to obtain a full understanding of the GAO’s request, we sought additional information from the GAO to gain a better sense of the goals of the proposed visit and the specific support requirements needed. 

After a thorough review, we are prepared to approve a two-week TDY visit by 

GAO staff. Embassy Baghdad advises us that they have made the necessary facilities and services available and that they can support the GAO’s presence for this 

period, although this will place considerable burden on Embassy staff and resources. 
33 

In addition, our ability to approve requests for future long-term visits will continue to be severely constrained in our current location in the Green Zone, as well 

as when the Embassy moves to the New Embassy Compound (NEC) later this year. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gates, you mentioned a little—thanks to each of you for your 

service, and your testimony. You mentioned a little earlier, the 

Baker-Hamilton report—you were a member of that bipartisan 

group, were you not? 

Secretary GATES. Up until that happy day when I was nominated 

for this job, Senator. 

Senator ALEXANDER. But that group was a very distinguished 

group, if I’m not—it included President Reagan’s former Attorney 

General Ed Meese, it included President Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, it included two of the former President Bush’s Secretaries of 

State. And based upon, I’m looking at the report—it looks like it 

met March 15, 2006—when was your last meeting with the group, 

do you recall? 

Secretary GATES. My last meeting was—well, I resigned from the 

group on November 9, or the 10th—and I think they held their first 

meeting to consider recommendations the following Monday. 

Senator ALEXANDER. The following 13—so, you were able to meet 

with them in March and April and May and June and August 

and—— 

Secretary GATES. I went through the whole educational process. 

Senator ALEXANDER [continuing]. On to Baghdad. And, the question—my question is this: As I recall, the report came out in December, something like that. And almost immediately, it got put on 

the shelf. One Senator said, ‘‘It’s a recipe for defeat,’’ a bunch of 

other Senators said, ‘‘We need to get out quicker,’’ and despite the 

fact that there were nine meetings—one of the most distinguished 

groups put together in a while—9 months of study, the report—it 

seemed to me to disappear. And I didn’t hear much about it. 

But, as I’ve listened to the testimony today, and read the newspapers, it seems to me that almost everything in the report is on 

the path, at least, that seems to be consistent with what the administration is doing. 

BAKER-HAMILTON REPORT

So, I wondered if—based upon your familiarity now with the administration’s path, and your familiarity then with the Baker-Hamilton report—can you say to me what the differences are, between 

the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report, and the administration’s way forward in Iraq? 

Secretary GATES. Well, my copy of the report’s pretty dog-eared, 

and I would tell you that I think that—and I think Secretary Rice 

would confirm this—that from the time the report came out, members of the administration were looking to it, and looking to ways 

where we felt informed by the recommendations, and some of the 

recommendations have been put into place exactly as they were 

made. Some of the recommendations have been modified somewhat, and some of the recommendations have ended up being 

sequenced differently. 
34 

But, I think that there is a substantial degree of, substantial embrace of the Baker-Hamilton report, and many of the recommendations in it—if not in exactly the same pacing, or exactly the same 

way as the Baker-Hamilton report came out. 

But I think that, first of all, when you have 79 recommendations—it gets down to a pretty specific level of detail. But, I think 

in some important ways—in many important ways—that the direction the administration is headed, and I would say a propos of Secretary Rice’s comments earlier, our participation in a conference involving Syria and Iran gets to the last major piece of Baker-Hamilton that had not been implemented in some measure. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Secretary Rice, may I ask you to comment 

on that? How—there are a lot of recommendations in the Iraq 

Study Group, but the executive summary is pretty short, and pretty much to the point. Is it fair to say that the path that the administration is on is consistent with the recommendations of the Iraq 

Study Group? 

IRAQ STUDY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS

Secretary RICE. I think, certainly, in large part they are consistent. I think that it was provided, for instance, that a surge of 

some kind might be useful, if it were targeted to specific requirements, specific goals. Obviously, on the diplomatic front, the recommendation that Iraq be put into a regional context, I think, is 

very important. 

We have not done it, always, in exactly the way that the recommendations would suggest. For instance, we concentrated first 

on the countries that have been most supportive of our policies in 

the Middle East, but now broadening that out to an international 

meeting. So yes, I think that, for the most part, they are quite consistent. 

Senator ALEXANDER. In the executive summary, it says, ‘‘The primary mission of United States forces in Iraq should evolve to one 

of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations by the first quarter of 2008. Subjected to unexpected developments, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. 

combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded 

with Iraqi forces, and rapid reaction, and special operation teams 

in training, equipping, advising, force protection, search and rescue, et cetera. 

It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from 

the United States for some time to come—especially when carrying 

out security responsibilities. Is that path consistent with the path 

that the administration is on? Secretary Gates, or—it seems to me 

it is, and maybe this is—the President has a prerogative of his own 

tactics—but then, if that’s the case why did the President not invite, in January, in the State of the Union Address, Ed Meese and 

Vernon Jordan, and Secretary Perry, and Secretary Baker to sit in 

the State of the Union Address? And say to the people of this country that this distinguished bipartisan group believes we have a 

long-term interest in Iraq, but we need to get our troops out of the 

combat business, and into the support business as soon as we can, 

that we need to engage diplomatically, that we may have to have 
35 

a short-term surge, but by the first quarter of 2008, all combat 

forces not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq, except 

for those on the border, and except for those going after al-Qaeda. 

Why wouldn’t that have been a way to invite the country to join 

the President in a path forward that could have united us in a way 

forward in Iraq? Rather than backing into a consistent, some consistency with the Iraq Study Group? Can either of you speak to 

that? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t know the answer to that question, Senator. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Secretary Rice, you’ve been with the administration. I’m—it’s not a—— 

Secretary RICE. I understand. I understand the question. 

I think the President felt that it was important to lay out a path 

forward for the country. Obviously, many of the elements of that 

path are consistent with Baker-Hamilton. I think it’s also the case 

that he took advice from a lot of other places, and a lot of other 

people, including from some key allies, and put together, then, a 

path forward. 

But, I believe—if I remember correctly, his speech from January 

in which he spoke to the country—that he did credit Baker-Hamilton as one of those most important sources for support. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Well, he mentioned it, but my point is—and 

I won’t belabor it—I think he missed an opportunity to do what we 

need as much as anything else in this exercise, which is to increase 

popular support for a long-term interest of the United States in 

Iraq. And it would have to be on different—it would have to be on 

different terms. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you. 

Senator Mikulski. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, to General Pace, we’re glad 

to see you. Particularly, Mr. Gates, I want to thank you for just 

being here, and engaging in a very civil and candid conversation. 

We haven’t usually had that from the Secretary of Defense. 

So, let me get right to the point, and I’d mentioned to you it earlier. It goes to the support of the troops, and the support of the 

troops—not only there—but as they come home, and the medical 

care. 

Like you, I was absolutely shocked about the Washington Post 

articles describing the squalid conditions that our out-patients were 

finding themselves living in, and the broken down system of casework, out-patient appointment-keeping, and so on. 

I want to thank you for going, personally, to Secretary Harvey, 

and to General Cody for your immediate and swift—and I believe— 

compassionate response. 

Twenty-two thousand of our military wear Purple Hearts— 

22,000. Now, that’s a tribute to our acute care. I think everyone 

would, just has to give kudos from the Army medics, the military 

medics in the battlefield, all the way through the doctors and 

nurses, to Germany, back to Walter Reed, in Baghdad. How are 

you—and ward 57, that we’ve all visited. So, I believe that our 

acute care is absolutely working, and is stunning. But, there seems 
36 

to be a complete breakdown when it comes to outpatient care, and 

both—and the follow-up that our military needs. 

Now, what it seems to be, is that our troops faced one enemy in 

Baghdad, and then a bureaucratic enemy. Maybe you didn’t see, 

but over the weekend there was another Washington Post article 

called, ‘‘Twice Wounded,’’ about one of our military—tracing the 

case of our military dealing with the disability benefit quagmire, 

where the disability benefit, it seems to people, seem to be in an 

adversarial relationship with our soldiers. 

This week’s Newsweek has a front-page feature thing called, 

‘‘Failing Our Wounded.’’ This young soldier is alive because of the 

brilliance of our acute care. But at the same time, then, we’ve not 

only got to save their life, but give them their life back. So, here 

goes my question. 

TIMELINE FOR IMPROVING CARE OF WOUNDED TROOPS

First of all, I’m worried that what we saw at Walter Reed is only 

the tip of the iceberg. I was so glad you’ve included Naval Bethesda 

in looking at this, but could you tell us, then, in terms of factfinding on what is wrong with facilities, casework management, 

out-patient care, as well as the linkage to the VA. And then what 

is the timeline and remediation plan you’re going to have at DOD, 

and then to us. Can you kind of take us through that? 

Secretary GATES. My hope is that, that this group of outside observers will—first of all, I—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. And it’s a good group—Togo West, and John 

Marsh—good guys. 

Secretary GATES. I asked them to look, not just at Walter Reed 

and Bethesda, but told them that they could have access to any 

other facilities that they wanted to look at. 

I’m very concerned about this, and frankly, I was quite explicit 

in my press conference at Walter Reed last Friday that accountability on this will not be limited to a couple of non-commissioned 

officers (NCO) and a junior officer, once we know the facts. 

Admiral Giambastiani and I met with five soldiers to talk about 

their out-patient care, and they couldn’t have been more complimentary about their caseworkers—these are all out-patients—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. If they have one. 

Secretary GATES. They couldn’t be more complimentary, but their 

concern—and they talked about how many hours a day they 

worked, and 7 days a week, and so on and so forth—the problem 

is there aren’t enough of them. 

So, I guess I just want to make sure that people understand 

there are a lot of dedicated people trying to make this work, and 

my concern is that they have a bureaucratic problem that even the 

administrators have to fight, not only the patients, but also lack 

the resources. And that’s what I want this group to look at, as well 

as the whole process, as we indicated. 

Part of the problem we have, frankly—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. Mr. Secretary, can I jump in? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. 

Senator MIKULSKI. First of all, we salute the independent commission, and I’m glad you’re doing it. Senator Murray and I also 
37 

sent a letter also asking that you make use of the inspector general 

in our letter to you this. 

But, as I understand it, is this report going to be done in 45 

days? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MIKULSKI. So that we can—so it’s not going to be a commission that goes on. So that, in 45 days, you’re going to have the 

independent commission report, and then you’ll also, I presume, be 

using the tools of the inspector general. Again, for another type of 

independent review, particularly on things like disability benefits 

that are so complicated. Can we expect that in 45 days? 

Secretary GATES. Part of the problem here, and what I started 

to say was—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. I didn’t mean to interrupt you. 

Secretary GATES. No, that’s okay. But—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. I think what the people want is a sense of urgency from all of us. 

Secretary GATES. I understand. And, I picked a shortened deadline for a purpose. But the problem is that, for example, in that 

Newsweek article, much of that Newsweek article is not about Walter Reed, but is about the Department of Veterans Affairs. And—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. That’s our whole point. 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. And the American people don’t differentiate. The question is, how do we take care of the kids who 

are wounded in battle? And, it doesn’t matter if it’s the Department 

of Defense or Veterans Affairs. I need to find out, first of all, what 

those linkages are, and I need to find out where the weaknesses 

are, and we need to tackle this as a Government, in terms of endto-end care for these kids—from the battlefield, to when they get 

back to their hometown, and their local VA Hospital, and so on. 

And I intend to pursue that with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

and the White House. 

Senator MIKULSKI. What—I’m sorry. 

Secretary GATES. And we will use all of the tools available to us, 

to try and identify what the nature of the problem is, and—and as 

far as I’m concerned, and I’d wager, as far as the Congress is concerned, across the entire political spectrum—resources are not an 

issue here. We will provide what is necessary to take proper care 

of these young men and women. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, I know my colleague will be following 

up on the issue of veterans’ care, where she herself is a national 

expert. 

First of all, I want to thank you for at least having a timeline— 

I just need to finish my sentence, Mr. Chairman—following up on 

the timeline that you’ve outlined, and so on. 

I really, also, want to thank you for the commitment to accountability. For too long in this war, we’ve seen good old people be 

blamed, while we see generals go on to get medals and book deals. 

So, I wasn’t real happy seeing Kiley’s comments. It was the typical 

‘‘cover your brass,’’ we’ve now—the articles are accurate, but we’ve 

got to reset your mind. Reset our mind about mold, reset our mind 

about waiting, and sleeping, in lobbies, using Honduran taxi drivers to be the translators—you tell me what we need to reset. So, 

thanks to you, we’re going to count on your leadership, but I think 
38 

we need some new leadership. So, we look forward to working with 

you, and we appreciate the vigorous way that you’ve gone about 

this. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, all, for the long time that you’re spending with 

us. I think that it is very important that we look at this, that we 

have the supplemental before us, on an expedited basis, because we 

know the Department needs the money. 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

I want to go back to the military construction, because I’m the 

ranking member—Senator Reed is the chairman now, I’ve been the 

chairman and the ranking member before—and I want to go back 

to the $3 billion that was taken out of the continuing resolution for 

the rest of this year, and ask you, Mr. Secretary, if there’s a delay 

in the $3 billion, because I am trying to fashion an amendment 

that would get you where you need to go. 

I want to ask you two questions. Do you need the full $3 billion 

from now until the first of the fiscal year? And second, if you don’t 

have some percentage of the $3 billion, what does that do to the 

troops that are coming home from Germany, and possibly even 

Iraq, scheduled for this year—I understand there were 12,000 in 

the rotation that were to come home, of the roughly 70,000 that 

were planned to come home from overseas. And I guess, the third 

part of the question is, not only did we have housing needs for 

them, but it was the training constraints in overseas bases that 

really caused the Department of Defense originally to say they 

were going to bring these troops home. 

So, my question is, with the $3 billion cut that was taken out of 

the continuing resolution, how much of it do you need in this supplemental, and second, are we going to have a delay in the troops 

coming home from Germany, and what is that going to do to their 

training? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, rather than try and answer those 

questions off the top of my head, let me get back to the folks at 

the Department, get a specific answer for you, and get it to you 

right away. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. All right, thank you. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department needs the full $3.1 billion request in fiscal year 2008 for BRAC 

2005 funding. BRAC and global defense posture realignment have a symbiotic relationship and are mutually reinforcing. The possible reduction in BRAC funds would 

have adverse impacts on force posture changes and our desired level of military 

presence overseas. Delays in completing BRAC and overseas implementation plans 

could result in postponing scheduled redeployments of heavy division units from Europe to the United States, and will impede our ability to realize savings, organizational and operational efficiencies of the force, and overall execution of our strategy 

to reduce legacy Cold War basing structures, forces, and presence. 

Examples of fiscal year 2007 Military Construction with urgent operational links: 

—Stationing and conversion of—1/1, 2/1, 3/1 Armor Division from Germany to 

(Fort Bliss) and 3/1 Infantry Division (Fort Knox). 

—Stationing of the 7th Special Forces Group—Eglin AFB, FL. 

—Barracks complexes—at Forts Bliss, Benning, Riley and Shaw AFB. 

—Operations and Maintenance facilities—at Forts Carson, Knox, Bliss, and Riley. 

—Training Ranges and associated facilities—at Forts Benning, Bliss, and Riley. 
39 

For Reserve Component facilities, all fiscal year 2007 Military Construction 

projects and follow-on Military Construction (2008–2013) are synchronized with 

modular force build, operational rotations, BRAC, and Global Defense Posture Review. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. All right, thank you. I will rely on your answer to Senator Cochran that it is what you—you do need all or 

part of it—— 

Secretary GATES. Absolutely. 

Senator FEINSTEIN [continuing]. If you’re going to stay on schedule. 

Secretary GATES. Absolutely. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Because we, Congress, set a 6-year deadline 

for BRAC, and now we are delaying you by not giving you the 

money that you have asked for, for the construction this year. I’m 

very concerned about it, and I hope that we can correct it, and I 

need the information about what we need to do. 

Secretary GATES. Thank you, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. The next question that I’d like to ask you is, 

something that hasn’t been brought up here, but the North Korean 

agreement, Madam Secretary—I thought the fact that the administration stuck to the need for multilateral talks with North Korea— 

having seen that the first framework agreement was a disaster, because we sent the oil, and we didn’t require the North Koreans to 

show that they were living up to their part of the agreement—it 

doesn’t seem to me that the North Korean agreement that has just 

been announced, will have that possibility, because it is multilateral, and countries that are trading with North Korea, like China, 

will be a part of the requirement that they step up to the plate, 

and do what they say that they’re going to do. And I commend you 

for that. 

MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAN

My question is, is that a model for Iran? 

Secretary RICE. Thank you, Senator. It actually is the model that 

we are trying to use for Iran, because the EU–3, the British, the 

Germans, and the French, plus Russia, China, and the United 

States, are, in fact, joined together in having offered Iran a package of incentives if they are prepared to suspend their enrichment 

and reprocessing activities, and come to the negotiating table. So, 

again, you would have a multilateral approach. 

And, when we have said that we are prepared to reverse 27 

years of American policy and meet with the Iranians, it is of 

course, in the context of that multilateral approach. And, I do believe that we are stronger when we are able to bring to the table 

a group of countries that have the right set of incentives—and the 

right set of disincentives—at their disposal to both bring about 

agreement, and then to hold a nation accountable to live up to the 

terms of those agreements. 

So, if we can get the Iranians to suspend their enrichment and 

reprocessing activities, it would indeed, put that negotiation also in 

a multilateral context. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. We also think that some of the neighboring 

countries that seem to be concerned about Iran having a nuclear 

weapon, but have not really stepped up to the plate fully, could be 
40 

a constructive part of any negotiating group. Do you see any movement toward that beginning to happen? 

Secretary RICE. Well, I think the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737, of a couple of months ago, has given countries a basis 

on which to begin to act against Iranian activities that might support their nonproliferation activities. And, you are starting to see 

country after country, now, pass either legislation, or put forward 

policies, that implement the Security Council resolution. So, I think 

you are getting a broader number of countries. But the neighbors 

of Iran—particularly countries in the gulf, and also in the broader 

Middle East, are very concerned about an Iranian nuclear weapon. 

I think it is why you are seeing talk about civilian nuclear programs in places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. So we are encouraging them, if they are, indeed, concerned about a nuclear weapons 

program, to be more vigilant in the kind of trade and assistance 

that they’re prepared to engage in with Iran. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Murray. 

TREATING THE WOUNDED AND BRAIN INJURIES

Senator MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, thank you to our panelists. You know, we’ve heard a lot 

about ‘‘support our troops’’ in debates around here. I just have to 

say that I’m one of those who voted against the war in Iraq, because I felt that there were too many unanswered questions. And 

today, watching all of the reports about what’s happening, both 

within our VA system and of course in the last few weeks here, it 

seems to me, who has really paid the price of this war is our 

troops. They went into Iraq without the proper equipment and supplies; they come back and have been left in limbo in really deplorable conditions at Walter Reed, as Senator Mikulski talked about; 

and they get into the VA and get stuck in long waiting lines to get 

healthcare benefits and to see a doctor. I just think that is really 

a crime. 

And it’s unbelievable to me, looking at this supplemental request, 

and this pie chart, that we’re not asking in this supplemental for 

the additional dollars we need to take care of these troops. It’s not 

just a matter of putting a little more paint on the wall—although, 

I really commend you, Secretary Gates, for what you’ve done in 

looking at this—but it is really asking the question, Are we doing 

everything we can, whether they’re still in DOD, or they’ve been 

separated into VA, how much is this going to cost, and do we have 

the resources to do it? 

Case in point is the issue of traumatic brain injury (TBI). I think 

we’re going to see that more and more as the signature injury of 

this war. Some are estimating that 10 percent of our returning Iraq 

and Afghanisan war veterans have suffered from traumatic brain 

injury. And one of the really big problems is that it’s an unseen 

wound, and it’s often misdiagnosed. In many cases, unless a service 

member is involved in an IED incident is bleeding, they’re not documented as having been involved in an explosion. So, it’s a result 

of that that the actual number of Iraq and Afghanistan war vet-
41 

erans with TBI could be even higher than many of the statistics 

indicate that we’ve seen so far. 

It’s pretty clear to me that our system is not catching all of the 

TBI patients in this war, and Secretary Gates, I want to ask you 

this afternoon, Would you support a policy to require the Pentagon 

to keep track of where and when a service member is exposed to 

an IED incident, so we can improve screening and treatment for 

traumatic brain injury? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t know about the specific implications of 

it, but certainly in principle, I would be supportive of that. 

Senator MURRAY. Well, I would like to know if you would follow 

up on that and put it in place. It’s my understanding that the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center is refusing to give us any 

data on how many soldiers have actually suffered from brain injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan. They’ve been saying they don’t want 

to disclose the results because it would put the lives of those fighting at risk, which I found pretty preposterous. 

But, this information was collected at taxpayer expense and 

could really help us get a handle on this problem, know how much 

we need, and how we can best treat it. I would like to get a commitment from you today to release that critical information, so we 

know that we are treating those men and women, that they don’t 

go home not knowing that they have had traumatic brain injury, 

and that we can provide the dollars we need, within this supplemental or otherwise, to make sure these individuals are taken care 

of and tracked. Can you tell me that you will release this information? 

Secretary GATES. Well, again, I don’t know the reasons why it 

hasn’t been released, or the specifics. This is the first I’ve heard of 

it. But, I will certainly look into it, and if there’s no compelling reason, absolutely. 

Senator MURRAY. When can I get an answer from you on that? 

Secretary GATES. Certainly within a week. 

Senator MURRAY. It’s absolutely critical that we know what those 

numbers are. As I said, TBI is a signature issue of this war, many 

people are beginning to predict. And when we’re sending those soldiers home without knowing that they’ve been injured, or without 

us providing the resources they need, I do not think we are doing 

our job to support the troops. So, I look forward to hearing from 

you on that, as soon as possible, and I appreciate that. 

I also wanted to ask about a report that was released Sunday, 

titled ‘‘The Psychological Needs of U.S. Military Service Members 

and Their Families.’’ These are members who are still in the DOD 

system, not in the VA system. And it really highlighted the need 

for mental health services for our troops and for our families. It 

was really a long list of needs. I’m not sure if you’ve seen it or not, 

but it was very discouraging to me. There was no well-disseminated approach to providing mental health care to service members 

and their families, there’s no coordinated approach for providing 

care as service members transition from military health system 

into the VA, and about 40 percent of the slots for psychologies in 

the Army and Navy are vacant. 

This is a huge issue. I was out at Fort Lewis last week, in my 

home State, Secretary Gates, you know it well. I got an update on 
42 

some of the programs they’re doing there, I learned about a new 

program for spouses of deployed soldiers, but I would like to find 

out from you what the Department of Defense is doing for the 

whole service member, including mental health services for our 

troops and their families. And, are we providing enough dollars for 

that? 

Secretary GATES. I will get information to you. 

[The information follows:] 

The Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center (DVBIC) has much of the incidence information on traumatic brain injury (TBI), but not all. As of the end of December 2006, 1,950 Service members (Operation Enduring Freedom: 5 percent, Operation Iraqi Freedom: 95 percent) have been seen in the DVBIC. Of these, 67 percent were assessed as having mild TBI (post-concussive syndrome), 4 percent were 

penetrating, 10 percent severe, and 13 percent moderate. These data do not include 

mild cases for those soldiers who never left theater. 

The Department’s approach to providing mental health care to its beneficiaries is 

multifaceted with multiple points of entry. The Military Health System provides robust mental health benefits at our military treatment facilities (MTFs) and in partnership with civilian TRICARE network providers. Transitioning Service members 

and their families also have six months of TRICARE benefits when leaving military 

service, including TRICARE Prime benefits when living in a TRICARE Prime Service area. 

The American Psychological Association provided a paper expressing concerns 

about mental health needs of Service and family members and seamless transition 

of care to the VA. They also speculated upon staffing levels of psychologists. While 

this paper contains some factual errors, we share their interest in ensuring that the 

mental health needs of our Service members and their families are met. The assertion in their report that 40 percent of active duty psychologist slots are vacant is 

not correct. Individual Service branches continuously adjust the balance of their 

health care professional specialties to best meet their mission requirements with 

various incentive programs. In addition to uniformed personnel, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) employs hundreds of civilian psychologists and utilizes civilian network providers to meet needs beyond local MTF capacity. 

The DOD has a broad range of programs designed to sustain the health and wellbeing of each and every military and family member in the total military community. A continuum of care encompasses (1) prevention and community support services; (2) early intervention and prevention to reduce the incidence and chronicity of 

potential health concerns; (3) service-specific deployment related preventive and 

clinical care before, during, and after deployment; (4) sustained, high-quality, readily available clinical care along with specialized rehabilitative care for severe injuries or chronic illness, and transition of care for veterans to and from the Veterans 

Health Administration system of care; and, (5) a strong foundation of epidemiological, clinical, and field research. 

Services available at military installations include health and wellness programs, 

stress management, family readiness and community support centers, family readiness groups, ombudsmen, volunteer programs, legal and educational programs, and 

chaplains, among many other community programs. 

Early intervention and prevention programs include pre-deployment education 

and training, suicide prevention training, Military OneSource, the Mental Health 

Self Assessment Program, National Depression and Alcohol Day Screening, and 

health fairs. DOD has formed a strong partnership with the VA and other Federal 

agencies and professional advocacy groups to provide outreach and prevention programs available to Reserve and National Guard members. A congressionally-mandated pilot study using the Internet to support Service and family members with 

resources to identify and help those with Post Traumatic Stress symptoms and other 

mental health conditions is currently being developed by VA and military providers, 

and will include Madigan Army Medical Center at Fort Lewis, Washington for initial pilot studies. 

Medical conditions that may limit or disqualify deployed Service members are continually assessed, while screening, assessment, and educational programs take place 

across the entire deployment cycle. A spectrum of prevention, stress control, and 

mental health care are available in theater. Expanded clarification of deployment 

limitations for mental health conditions and psychotropic medications were put into 

place in November 2006, to ensure consistent standards across all branches of Service. 
43 

A post-deployment health assessment and education process is conducted upon returning from deployment to identify health concerns that might have arisen. An additional post-deployment health reassessment, with additional education, takes 

place 90 to 180 days after deployment to identify any issues that might arise in that 

timeframe. Periodic health assessments are also conducted to identify any health 

issues a person might have prior to entering the pre-deployment cycle. A Mental 

Health Self-Assessment is also available 24/7, as an additional tool for family members and Service members. 

The Service-specific combat stress and deployment mental health support programs provide support tailored to the Service’s mission and risk factors their personnel might face. Cross-functional planning teams bring together subject matter 

experts from across the Services, the Joint Staff, and DOD. 

The Military Health System is second to none in its ability to deliver timely, quality mental health and behavioral health care. This includes Behavioral Health in 

Primary Care, Mental Health Specialty Care, Clinical Practice Guidelines, and 

ready access to high quality, occupationally relevant primary care, along with model 

and demonstration programs designed to continuously learn and improve the system 

of care delivery. In addition, walk-in appointments are available in virtually all military mental health clinics around the world. Because no two individuals are exactly 

alike, multiple avenues of care are open to our military community to create a broad 

safety net that meets the preferences of the individual. DOD does not rely on one 

single method or program to care for our military members and their families. 

Per Section 723 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 

a DOD Task Force on Mental Health has been examining the mental health care 

delivery system of the Department for the past 11 months. For this task force, DOD 

has funded over 30 site visits around the world and several series of open hearings 

around the country for testimonies and deliberations. DOD has responded to a substantive data call to provide detailed information about all aspects of mental health 

delivery from both DOD and Service branch levels. Veterans’ Service Organizations 

have also made substantive input to this process over several hearings. 

The DOD Task Force on Mental Health report is due on May 15, 2007. We will 

consider each of the recommendations seriously, including their cost implications, 

and respond to Congress no later than six months after receiving the task force report. 

VETERANS BENEFITS

Senator MURRAY. Well, okay, this is a huge issue to me because 

I have two Stryker brigades and a third is forming right now. I 

know those troops well. I’ve sat down with them and their families. 

And under the President’s proposed surge that is now occurring, 

the 4–2 is going to deploy a couple of weeks early, and the 3–2, 

which was deployed in June for 1 year, has now been extended. So, 

these are people in my State, and, I am deeply concerned that we 

are—both in my State and across the Nation—supporting our 

troops with real dollars. So, I look forward to answers from you 

very quickly on this. 

And while I’m talking about my Stryker brigades, I’m very concerned that as we extend the deployment of the 3–2, and we send 

the 4–2 over early, do we have the adequate supplies and equipment for those troops? Are they going to be going to battle without 

what they need? 

Secretary GATES. Let me ask General Pace to answer that question. 

General PACE. Senator, first if I may, thank you for your tenacity 

on all of the veterans benefits, and the way that you’ve tracked 

that. There is a lot going on right now on the mental health side, 

thanks to what you’ve already done, and there’s more than can be 

done. 

Senator MURRAY. Well, before you answer this question, the huge 

problem is that everybody falls into this big crack between DOD 
44 

and VA, and the transition services, and we are way far behind. 

But, I’d like your answer on the Stryker brigade. 

General PACE. Yes, ma’am. All of our troops—Stryker brigades, 

infantry brigades, regardless of how they’re going over—will have 

the proper equipment. They’ll be properly trained, they’ll be properly manned, they’ll be properly equipped before they get sent into 

a combat zone. 

Senator MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I appreciate 

the responses. 

Secretary Gates, I look forward to getting your responses on 

those, thank you. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Gregg. 

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

AMENDMENTS ON TROOP DEPLOYMENTS

General Pace, I’ll address this question to you. Congressman 

Murtha, who is an extremely highly regarded member of the Congress, I served with him, I respect him immensely—has said that 

he’s going to develop an amendment, and I’ll quote what the purposes of the amendment are. Quoting Congressman Murtha, ‘‘To be 

sent to battle, troops would have to have had 1 year’s rest between 

combat tours. Soldiers in Iraq could not have their tours extended 

beyond 1 year, and the Pentagon’s stop-loss policy, which prevents 

some officers from leaving the military when their service obligations were up, would end. Troops would have to be trained in 

counter-insurgency and urban warfare, and sent overseas with the 

equipment they used in training.’’ He said that the practical purposes of this are to make it impossible to continue to maintain the 

troops levels that are in Iraq today. That’s my paraphrasing of his 

statement of what his purpose is, but I believe it’s an accurate paraphrase, and the quote was accurate as to his proposed amendment. 

Does not that type of an amendment represent the functional 

equivalent of the Congress taking operational control over the theater of war? 

General PACE. Sir, I can tell you what the effect is, and that is, 

if the 1-year rest at home, the no extensions in the battlefield, and 

the no-stop loss are implemented—we have done our homework on 

that, and we know that based on those—if those are the rules, that 

instead of being able to have the 20 brigades on the ground, in Iraq 

that we require, that we would at least—we would have somewhere 

between 14 brigades and 19 brigades, at most, and that there 

would be gaps on the battlefield between the brigade that left, and 

then wait for the brigade that was coming in. So, we would have— 

it would have enormous effect on the battlefield, with regard to 

what’s required, versus what’s available. 

Senator GREGG. Well, if the Congress were to pass a law to that 

effect, does not that mean that Congress is managing the battlefield? 

General PACE. Sir, it’s not my judgment to make about what 

Congress is doing or is not doing. I can simply tell you what the 

effect is. And the effect is damaging on the battlefield. 

Senator GREGG. Well, Secretary Gates, since you were a political 

appointment, maybe you could answer that question. Is not that— 
45 

I mean, I think the answer was given, even though it was not specific—but, if that means that the Congress, by law, is limiting the 

number of brigades on the field of battle, and that you have no authority to change that, then the Congress has basically taken operational control over the battlefield, has it not? 

General PACE. Sir, I’ll step up to the answer, I apologize, I don’t 

mean to be obtuse. That would have very direct, operational effect 

on the battlefield. 

Senator GREGG. And, so you agree with that, Secretary Gates? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator GREGG. Well, then I would ask you, Secretary Gates— 

who is your Commander-in-Chief? 

Secretary GATES. The President. 

Senator GREGG. And General Pace, who is your Commander? 

General PACE. The President is, sir. 

Senator GREGG. I assume the Secretary intercedes occasionally? 

General PACE. You said my Commander-in-Chief, sir. 

Senator GREGG. That’s correct. 

But, what would be the situation if the Congress has taken operational control of the battlefield, and your Commander-in-Chief has 

given you a different directive? 

General PACE. Sir, as I understand it, my President has the authority to use the resources of the Nation to fight this Nation’s battles. And I am not a congressional scholar, I mean a constitutional 

scholar—but it’s my belief that given the mission, that he has the 

food and forage responsibilities and authority to resource as he 

needs fit to accomplish the mission. 

Senator GREGG. I appreciate that, and I think that’s the correct 

answer. But, I think the actual answer—and the correct answer 

from your viewpoint. But, the actual answer is that we would have 

a constitutional crisis. Congress would basically be telling you, as 

General, that you could not put any more than 14 to 19 brigades 

in the field. The Commander-in-Chief would have told you that he 

wanted 20, and the law would be that you could only use 14 to 19, 

and the Congress would have taken operational control of the battlefield, as you have reflected. 

I don’t think when our Founding Fathers put this whole thing together, that they ever perceived that the Congress was going to get 

that involved in the day-to-day activities of a field commander. I’m 

not a general, I’m not a lieutenant colonel, I’m not a captain, I’m 

not a private who has to carry out that order. I just don’t see that 

as being our responsibility as a Congress. I think our responsibility 

as a Congress is to assure that when there is a decision made to 

send soldiers into the field, that they will be supported with all of 

the resources that the Government can possibly give them, and 

that they need. 

I was interested, Secretary Rice, in your exchange with Senator 

Harkin, about fundamentalist Islam being the threat. I don’t see 

how anyone could not perceive that fundamentalist Islam is the 

most significant threat which our Nation faces, and potentially has 

ever faced, should they get their hands on a nuclear weapon, or a 

weapon of biological destruction. Because they’ve shown that they 

have no reservation about attacking our homeland. They’re not organized in the sense of a nation-state, but they are certainly orga-
46 

nized in the sense of a religious philosophy. It is fanatical. And, 

throughout time, we’ve seen that fanatical religious philosophies 

can reap huge, huge chaos and destruction. 

So, I guess I’d just like to hear your thoughts on that, again. Because I just found it sort of astonishing that we would not perceive 

them as our number one threat. That is, our number one threat as 

a Nation. 

AL-QAEDA, GREATEST THREAT TO HOMELAND

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, I made the statement that I think 

al-Qaeda is the greatest threat to our homeland. It is a terrorist 

organization, it does not have armies, it does not have airplanes, 

but I think we experienced on September 11 what damage it can 

do. In fact, it is the most devastating attack on our territories since 

Pearl Harbor—really, since 1815, the most devastating attack on 

the mainland. So with all due respect—I’m sorry, yes? 

Senator GREGG. My time’s running out, but what would you 

think if they had their hands—if they got possession of a nuclear 

weapon, or a weapon of mass destruction, such as a chemical bomb. 

Do you think they would use it on, in the United States? 

Secretary RICE. I think they would use it in the United States, 

and I think you would have a catastrophe of many, many, many 

greater times than September 11 using a weapon of mass destruction. I think there is no doubt that al-Qaeda has tried to get them. 

They continue to try to get them, and it is that nexus of terrorism 

and weapons of mass destruction that would be an enormous 

threat to our homeland. 

Senator GREGG. And is not the source of their power mostly residing in the Middle East? 

Secretary RICE. Yes, Senator. My point was that—we can—we 

are trying to do a lot to defend the homeland. Homeland Security 

is doing a great deal, but, in fact, because we have to be right 100 

percent of the time, we have to go on the offense and the circumstances that produce them are in the Middle East. That is 

where al-Qaeda was born, and that has to be dealt with, if we are 

not to face a constant terrorist threat well into the lives of our children and grandchildren. 

Senator GREGG. Thank you, thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Dorgan. 

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Secretary Rice, let me respond, just for the record, to two points 

that you made. 

First, I think there’s ample evidence from the inspector general’s 

reports from at least a dozen hearings that have been held—with 

both reconstruction funding, the RIO contracts and LOGCAP 

projects or contracts, that there is some of the greatest waste, 

fraud, and abuse that we have ever seen in the history of this country. And I would refer you to the highest, highest-ranking contract 

official in the U.S. Corps of Engineers, which handled the RIO and 

the LOGCAP contracts. Here’s what she says, ‘‘Publicly, I can unequivocally state that the abuse related to the contracts rewarded 

to KBR represents the most blatant, improper contract abuse I 

have witnessed during the course of my professional career.’’ That 

doesn’t deal with reconstruction. That deals RIO and LOGCAP, but 
47 

I would refer you to inspector general’s reports, and you properly 

pointed to the Parson’s contract and others. 

All I can say to you is, I think there is rampant waste, fraud, 

and abuse in all three areas. And I think the evidence is substantial. 

One additional point, if I might, one of my colleagues asked you 

about the sectarian violence. You said that is just one of the areas 

of violence and you quickly referenced to al-Qaeda. The national intelligence estimate just released, points out that the sectarian violence is the dominant violence in Iraq. And I don’t, I don’t know 

what you intended with that; but clearly the national intelligence 

estimate speaks to this, and the dominant violence in Iraq is sectarian violence. 

MANAGEMENT OF IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING

Secretary RICE. Senator, if I may respond on both. 

First of all, I referenced the Parson’s circumstance, and that obviously was a specific contract. I was asked about the reconstruction funds that were provided. 

Senator DORGAN. I understand. I made that point. 

Secretary RICE. And KBR, RIO and LOGCAP are not a part of 

reconstruction funding. I talked myself with the SIGIR head, and 

while there are certainly questions about whether or not we have 

met the targets and goals that we had intended. I do not think that 

there are arguments about widespread abuse in the IRRF program, 

but I will get a more formal answer for the Senator. 

[The information follows:] 

This is in response to the questions you raised with Secretary Rice during her testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations and Foreign Operations 

on February 27 concerning the KBR RIO and LOGCAP contracts, as well as the 

Parsons contract to construct primary health care centers throughout Iraq. 

As Secretary Rice stated in her testimony, the KBR RIO and LOGCAP contracts 

were not funded with Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) monies. These 

contracts were issued during the tenure of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The 

head of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Stuart 

Bowen, has repeatedly highlighted in testimony and public statements that fraud 

and abuse have played a very small role in American reconstruction efforts in Iraq 

under the IRRF program. 

Several audits have been conducted on the KBR RIO contract, including audits 

by SIGIR, the Defense Contracting Audit Agency and the International Audit and 

Monitoring Board for Iraq (IAMB). It is our understanding that the Department of 

Defense has resolved most, if not all, of the questioned costs in this contract and 

has reduced the amount paid to KBR. For specific information regarding the KBR 

RIO or LOGCAP contracts, we would suggest you contact the Department of Defense, which is better placed to provide detailed information. 

IRAQ SECTARIAN VIOLENCE

Secretary RICE. I have to say that as to the sectarian violence, 

while it is true, as Secretary Gates has said, that we have in effect, 

four different sources of violence—I think we have to remember 

that the tremendous spike in sectarian violence came as the result 

of a deliberate strategy by al-Qaeda to do precisely that. 

The Golden Mosque bombing, which most believe was inspired by 

al-Qaeda, the Zarqawi e-mails that we have found, in which he said 

that he intended to set off civil conflict between Shia and Sunnis. 

I think we have to recognize that there is even an al-Qaeda hand 
48 

in the sectarian violence, particularly from the time of the bombing 

of the Samarra Mosque. 

Senator DORGAN. Well, Madam Secretary, the national intelligence estimate is pretty clear about what kind of violence exists 

in Iraq, the dominant violence is sectarian. And the transference 

to al-Qaeda with respect, I understand the attempt, but I don’t believe that comports with the national intelligence estimate. 

I want to mention two additional points if I may. Well, I have 

very limited time, I’m sorry. The issue of al-Qaeda, the top intelligence expert in the country said they continued—he said, as you 

suggested Madam Secretary, it’s the terrorist organization that 

poses ‘‘the greatest threat to U.S. interests, including to our homeland. They continue to maintain,’’ I’m quoting now, ‘‘active connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leader’s secure hideout in Pakistan.’’ One wonders if we had soldiers to surge 

somewhere, if we would not have wanted to surge and eliminate 

the leadership of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and others, who have 

boasted they are the ones that murdered Americans. They have 

now been apparently in the hills of Pakistan for some 5 years. And 

whatever surge exists apparently doesn’t exist with respect to the 

leadership of al-Qaeda that is so-called, ‘‘the greatest threat to U.S. 

interests.’’ 

FAILING OUR WOUNDED

And let me make one final point, and then I’ll be happy to have 

you respond. And let me thank all of you for being here today to 

respond to questions. But I hold up Newsweek today, it says, ‘‘Failing Our Wounded.’’ Inside it says, ‘‘Forgotten Heroes.’’ It’s a picture 

of a young woman with no legs. This is an embarrassment to this 

country, and Mr. Secretary this is about resources—it’s not about 

resources. The fact is, I asked the same questions of your predecessor, at a similar hearing, with respect to the urgent supplemental. This supplemental comes to us—there’s not a penny in it 

as I understand it—not a penny of it, in this supplemental dealing 

with veteran’s issues. 

And it’s not just about a building on the Walter Reed grounds. 

This story, and the stories many others of us have heard repeatedly, is about the lack of resources in the whole system. 

A mother called me last week. She said, ‘‘My son came home 

from Iraq. He was substance dependant. He was lying under his 

covers at night shaking with nightmares, all kinds of severe emotional problems and we couldn’t get help for him at the VA Center. 

We went to private psychiatrists. It’s been 1 year and he’s much, 

much better now.’’ And last week she said he got his alert notice 

for a June call-up to go back to Iraq. 

The point is, it’s a big, big issue. And this sort of story, I think, 

is an embarrassment to the entire country. And I hope—I hope 

very much—that we will not pass a supplemental out of this Congress without including funding for these folks. Yeah, they’re veterans, but they’re also soldiers. And there should be a continuum 

of care, whether they’re in the active duty, at Walter Reed, or 

transferred to some other facility. So, I wanted to say that because 

I feel very strongly. It needs to be said. I’m know—I’m not suggesting you don’t feel the same way and feel the same passion 
49 

about this. That’s not my suggestion. I just think we have to publicly describe what is happening here, and take every step that’s 

necessary to fix it, and fix it now. 

Secretary GATES. Senator, I couldn’t agree with you more. And 

when I referred to resources not being a problem, what I meant 

was that we will find the resources, as we diagnose what’s wrong 

with this system, and what has led to some of these stories—both 

in the Department of Defense and, apparently, in Veterans Affairs. 

I think there’s a mutual commitment on the part of the administration and the Congress to do what’s right by these young people. 

Senator DORGAN. Will you request the funding? Will you ask the 

administration to request the funding, whether it’s active duty or 

veteran’s needs? 

Secretary GATES. Once we’ve identified the problem, if we don’t 

have enough money, yes sir. 

Secretary RICE. Senator—— 

Senator DORGAN. Madam Secretary, I’m sorry I interrupted you. 

Secretary RICE. That is quite all right, Senator. 

No, first of all, just on the sectarian violence. Obviously, the sectarian violence is a huge problem in Iraq, and particularly in Baghdad, and it is the reason that the President focused his strategy on 

trying to help the Iraqis in Baghdad. 

But I think we should not lose sight of the fact that in provinces 

like Diyala and Anbar, we are talking about al-Qaeda, and a combination of insurgents and al-Qaeda, that is really the source of 

much of the violence against our forces. So I just want to be clear. 

It is not that I am arguing that sectarian violence is not a 

major—even the major—problem, but we do have a significant alQaeda problem, and there was union of those problems in alQaeda’s determination to try and bring about more sectarian violence. 

Senator DORGAN. And was there any discussion anywhere in the 

administration about surging against the al-Qaeda leadership and 

perhaps eliminating the al-Qaeda leadership? 

ELIMINATING AL-QAEDA LEADERSHIP

Secretary RICE. Well, perhaps General Pace should speak to this, 

Senator. But I am rather dubious that the surge of American forces 

into the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of Pakistan, 

those tough mountains of places like North Waziristan, would have 

been a workable strategy. 

ATTACK INTO PAKISTAN

General PACE. Sir, one of the most difficult problems we face in 

this war is, How do you attack an enemy inside of a country, with 

which you’re not at war? 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Domenici. 

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Hello to all three of you, and since I’m getting tired I wonder how 

you feel. So, that probably means that I should hurry up. 

Let me ask any of you, or each of you, or all of you: I as one Senator have decided that I support what the President has decided 

he would try to do under the leadership of the new General that 

was confirmed by the Senate, overwhelmingly. 
50 

Now, since we are going to be involved in something different— 

in some respects different we were told by the President, and by 

some of you on various occasions, that this change would be evidenced by certain things happening that weren’t happening before, 

that could be measured and reported to the American people. Some 

of those were called benchmarks. Some of those events were given 

other names. This indicates that you would, in your respective capacities as leaders, see to it that information was put together in 

such a way that we the Congress and the American people—could 

discern that things were happening that are prompted by this new 

approach, so we can see if the new plan has a chance of succeeding. 

Am I all right so far? Is that an all right statement? And General 

Pace that’s an all right statement? Only you and I know your real 

name, right? 

General PACE. It is, sir. 

Senator DOMENICI. Yes. 

Now, could I ask, let’s use the word ‘‘benchmark’’ for a minute. 

Iraq is expected to spend $10 billion of its money in reconstruction 

efforts, right? I note for the record everyone said yes. Now, who’s 

in charge, and in what manner will this $10 billion in reconstruction efforts be monitored, so that in 4 months, the chairman might 

call a meeting and say, ‘‘We want to find out what happened to the 

benchmark of $10 billion.’’ Tell us, how are we going to do that? 

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION COORDINATOR

Secretary RICE. Yes, Senator, that is the responsibility of the 

Embassy, and we have a person out there now Ambassador Tim 

Carney—whose responsibility it is to work with the Iraqis on budget execution, and making certain that $10 billion is spent for 

projects that are supportive of the general goals that we and the 

Iraqis have agreed on. 

Senator DOMENICI. Now, Madam Secretary, I take it then that in 

a round about way in terms of hierarchal responsibility, you are 

the one responsible. Is that correct? It’s yours. 

Secretary RICE. It is mine. It is my responsibility. 

Senator DOMENICI. Sure. Now, ma’am let me ask—are you serious enough about this that you are truly having somebody do it, 

so that in 3 months we won’t say, ‘‘Oh, nobody knew how to do it,’’ 

but rather you’d be able to tell us if it fell apart or it’s ongoing. 

Secretary RICE. Senator, I will track it very closely. It requires 

us to help the Iraqis develop the capability to spend the money. 

The problem has been their inability—just in terms of budget execution—to spend the money. But they have passed the budget, they 

have made the allocations, we have a person out there who is 

working with them. We want to help them get the money to the 

right places, including to the provinces, and we will be able to report to you on how it is going as they move along. 

Senator DOMENICI. Now ma’am, and any of the others of you, let 

me say—since there is a chance that this change might work, I 

want to say to you that I think it’s very, very important that whatever commitments were made about differentiating this new thrust 

that you truly try to do them, to mark them, to make sure that if 

they’re not working, that it be noted early and often. Do you all feel 

that way? Is it important to you that the things that are supposed 
51 

to be different, and handled differently, are really going to be 

watched? And is the military going to be involved in that General? 

IRAQI COMMITMENTS

General PACE. Sure, we will be. And, in fact, the briefings that 

will begin this week on Thursday to the full Senate and to the full 

House, closed session, will be focused on the commitments that 

have been made by the Iraqis, the commitments that have been 

made by us. Where are we? What steps have been taken? What 

have the effects of those steps been? And what’s going to happen 

next? 

Senator DOMENICI. I got it. Thank you very much. Thank you 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, you were right to cite the talent and courage 

of many individual Foreign Service offices. I had the occasion to 

run into John Weston in Fallujah and he was a one-man band, but 

that was the problem. He was the only person out there, really. 

And, institutionally, the State Department many times, I feel, have 

overpromised and underperformed. Let’s take the PRTs, for example. 

You said that you achieved your goal of 10 PRTs. In November 

2005, you announced a goal of 15 PRTs. What happened to the five 

PRTs, and how confident can we be that this new goal will be 

achieved? 

IRAQ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Secretary RICE. Well, Senator, we did decide to take a hard look 

at how we could roll the PRTs out. I think we said up to 15 PRTs, 

I believe. 

The big problem in many of these cases, is to provide adequate 

security for people in these very difficult areas in conjunction with 

the military. So we and the military sat down and began to roll out 

these PRTs one at a time. We finally settled on 10, I think 7 American—3 that are led by others—and we now believe that 20 is the 

appropriate number. 

We will have all of the State Department people that we need 

for those PRTs available for duty in those 10 new PRTs. We have 

identified them, we are ready to go. 

Senator REED. So you have 10 PRTs that are fully staffed? 

Secretary RICE. Ten PRTs that are operational and staffed. 

Senator REED. Operational and staffed. You hope to have 10 

more? 

Secretary RICE. That is correct. 

Senator REED. Is that a hope, or a commitment? 

Secretary RICE. No, we are committed to having 10 more. We 

have identified the State Department personnel who will lead those 

PRTs. The goal now is to identify other kinds of specialists who 

need to populate those PRTs. We do not have those specialties at 

State. We will have to get them from other Government agencies, 

or from the civilian population at large. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 
52 

But, I think what I’m hearing is you’ve got State Department 

people identified, but you don’t have full teams identified. 

And let me just raise another issue. A few weeks ago when it 

was announced, the surge, you’ve indicated to the Department of 

Defense that 40 percent of the 300 State Department positions that 

were to be added would have to be filled by military personnel? 

IRAQ PRT STAFFING

Secretary RICE. That is because those are not State Department 

positions in the sense that I have the personnel to fill them. The 

State Department was asked to recruit for the positions from the 

civilian population. Senator, it is an extremely important distinction, because we have filled the positions that State has the expertise to fill. 

Senator REED. Let me just step back now. I think what you’re 

saying, is that either you’re the recruiting agent, but essentially 

have not yet mobilized the full national authority to go and staff 

these teams. 

Secretary RICE. What I need, Senator, is the money. 

Senator REED. Is the money in this budget? 

Secretary RICE. The money is requested in this supplemental. I 

can then let the contract for civilian personnel, who are not in the 

U.S. Government. We have identified—we are in the process right 

now of identifying—those people and recruiting them. But for reasons having to do with the law, I cannot sign the contract until I 

have the money. So if we can pass the money in this supplemental 

we will be able to recruit the appropriate civilian personnel to go 

out to the field. 

Senator REED. So these will not be Federal employees, they will 

be contractors. 

Secretary RICE. Some of them will be Federal employees. We will 

get some from U.S. domestic agencies, and we have asked that we 

have the capacity to reimburse, for instance, the United States Department of Agriculture, or the Justice Department, or Homeland 

Security. 

Senator REED. Have you previously asked for this type of money, 

going back to last year? 

Secretary RICE. We did it on a nonreimbursable basis before. We 

believe that given the numbers that we needed, it was better to do 

it on a reimbursable basis, and so if I can get that authority and 

that money we can do this. But Senator I just—— 

Senator REED. Madam Secretary, my time is very short. 

Mr. Secretary, have you been tasked to provide personnel to, 

under the auspices of the State Department for these PRT teams? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. On a temporary basis I think we’ve 

identified 129 people who will participate in the PRTs. 

Senator REED. So they’ll do that. And that takes away from your 

ability—I presume these are civil affairs officers, translators, people with some expertise. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. And that takes away your ability to staff your 

units that are going into these neighborhoods in small unit groups, 

that need essentially the same type of personnel. 
53 

And I would add in my discussion with General Schoomaker, 

when he came up—he’s the, generating these forces—he was not 

able to give us assurance that he could fulfill the civil affairs slots, 

and the translator slots. 

RETIREES/VOLUNTEERS

General PACE. Sir, that’s true. We are looking to the retired community, and a Reserve volunteers, first. And, if we’re not able to 

fill those 129 spots from the retirees, and the volunteer Reserve, 

and Guard, then we will have to go to active duty forces, but we 

are committed to filling these spots. 

Senator REED. Well, it just seems to me that this is more of the 

same, and there’s reasons about security and contracting and 

money. But we have known for several years that if we didn’t get 

these PRT teams in the field, not just 10, but upwards of 18 or 20, 

that the likelihood this whole mission would fail. And we’re still 

messing around, trying to find people to fill these teams. Thank 

you. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Allard. 

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have to remind myself—I think it’s maybe not a bad idea to remind all of us—that we do deal with a voluntary military. And in 

light of that, General Pace, I’d like to thank you, and the men and 

women in our armed forces, for being willing to put their lives on 

the line, and fight for freedom, and the great job that they’re doing 

throughout the world. 

I would also like to thank Secretary Gates and Secretary Rice. 

I think you’re trying to do a good job, and I appreciate your efforts, 

it can’t be easy in these times. 

Having said that, I want to direct my first question to Secretary 

Rice. We had some discussion earlier on, about the negotiations 

that were going on in the area. We talked about Syria and Iran negotiating with Iraq and the role that you’re playing with that. I 

read in—I think it was this mornings clips, or maybe yesterday— 

where there are some negotiations going on between the Kurds in 

Iraq, and Turkey. Can you elaborate on where that’s taking us, and 

what that’s about? 

TURKEY-IRAQ SECURITY DISCUSSIONS

Secretary RICE. Yes, Senator. That is concerning the existence of 

an organization that we list as a terrorist organization, the PKK, 

which has operated on the border between Turkey and the Kurdish 

ports of Iraq, and is responsible for attacks into Turkey. 

We developed with the Turks a trilateral grouping, a trilateral 

commission, to try and deal with the problem of the PKK. Because, 

obviously we do not want—and the Iraqi government does not 

want—attacks coming from the territory of Iraq into Turkey. 

So when we speak of negotiations, it is really discussions between the Kurds and the Turks, and the Iraqi government. The 

United States is facilitating these discussions, and I have retired 

General Ralston as an envoy to do this, to try and mitigate those 

circumstances and try to—to the degree that we can—diminish the 

ability of the PKK to attack Turkish territory. 

Senator ALLARD. Thank you. 
54 

I’ve had an opportunity to have some very candid conversations 

with men and women who’ve come back from Iraq. They returned 

to Fort Carson, in Colorado, and they relate to me that they feel 

like they’re making a difference in the country. They talk about 

building up the infrastructure, the relationship with Iraqis and everything. But if they seem to have some hesitancy, that has to be 

in the area of how invested the Iraqi forces are in making their 

own government work. And I was wondering maybe, if Secretary 

Gates, or maybe General Pace, or both of you, could help me respond to that concern that’s raised by those soldiers. 

IRAQI BATTLEFIELD SUCCESS

General PACE. Sir, I think it’s a valid concern that is getting better. I think that many Iraqi youth are hedging their bet—had been 

hedging their bet—as far as whose going to come out on top on 

this: the local militias, or the central government, or some other 

entity. But, as the training of the units has improved, and as they 

have had success on the battlefield—the Iraqi army, especially— 

has been getting much better, both in performance and in retention, and in their capacity to control operations in the field. 

So, I do understand that there are still some units in the Iraqi 

army that are not as proficient on the battlefield as we would like, 

but about 92 of their battalions now are either in the lead, or operating on their own. Another 27 are operating side by side with us, 

and about 19 or so are in the building phase. So, they are getting 

better, but they do need more assistance. 

Secretary GATES. Senator, I would just add, on my trips to Iraq, 

I generally meet with our troops and have breakfast. And on my 

first trip, I met with some of our sergeants and others who are 

imbedded with the Iraqis. And they basically made the comment 

that General Pace made a little earlier, that success breeds success. 

And that, when these guys go out and fight with the Americans 

and they’re successful, then all of a sudden they carry themselves 

a little bit differently. They get some pride, and they’re more aggressive next time. And they begin to even want to look like the 

American soldiers, with the wraparound sunglasses and things like 

that—and they want to emulate our soldiers as they go through 

this experience with them. So, I think that this imbedding and this 

support role has the opportunity to accelerate that process of the 

Iraqi forces gaining confidence and capability, as well. 

Senator ALLARD. One other area that I want to approach during 

my time here. In the last few weeks—or at least the last week— 

there’s been some discussion in the papers about limited use of 

IEDs combined with chlorine gas for a makeshift chemical weapon. 

And this, apparently, is being prepared or has been used against 

some Iraqi civilians and our troops. Are our men and women prepared and equipped for a much wider spread of such devices, if it 

were to occur? 

General PACE. Sir, we do have the protective equipment we need. 

We need to make sure that we learn the lessons from those several 

attacks that have taken place, that we learn the enemy’s tactics 

and techniques and make sure that our folks on the ground know 

about it, to include those who are training up right now to go. But 
55 

we do have the protective equipment. We need to make sure we 

share that training. 

Senator ALLARD. My time’s expired. I just have one more question on Basrah. May I ask the question, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman BYRD. Your time has expired. 

Senator ALLARD. I’ll—we’ll send you a question on Basrah. 

Thank you. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Kohl. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Senator Byrd. 

Secretary Gates, Secretary Rice, and General Pace—I believe everyone agrees that Iraq is an enormous problem for us and that by 

anyone’s reckoning, it’s been badly mismanaged. Republicans and 

Democrats alike are desperately searching for a way out that 

leaves behind a stable Iraq and allows the men and women in our 

military—who have done a magnificent job, and been stretched to 

the breaking point—to come home. 

I also think we agree that the answer to our problems can not 

be found down the barrel of a gun. Changes that need to be made 

are more political than military. Our hopes increasingly focus on 

our diplomatic efforts. Iraq’s neighbors must be more invested in 

quelling the country’s violence, and Iraqis themselves need to believe in their government, and to take charge of their own security. 

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES

Secretary Gates, a few weeks ago you said that if the surge did 

not work, that you were considering ‘‘alternatives.’’ What concerns 

me about that statement is that it implies that there will be no end 

to our commitment. I’m worried that there is no point at which this 

administration would look at the situation in Iraq and say that it 

can not continue the way it is. Who knows, the administration 

could change strategies several more times. Is that right? Are you 

proposing an open-ended commitment with constantly changing 

strategies if necessary? And if not, Secretary Gates, when do we 

run out of ‘‘alternatives?’’ 

Secretary GATES. Senator, I think the President, in December, 

essentially said, it can’t go on like it is. And, I think there was general agreement—both within the administration, and here on the 

Hill—that whatever, that the strategy we were following at the 

time wasn’t working. 

The dilemma we all face is, we all would like to bring our troops 

home, but I think a very large preponderance of opinion also is, 

that if we leave Iraq in chaos that we are just storing up even 

worse problems for ourselves in the future—not only in the region—but more broadly. 

So, my view is that we will know within a few months whether 

or not this strategy is working. As I say, the early signs are somewhat encouraging. That is certainly the message we’re getting out 

of the field. 

So, I would say to you—No, it clearly can’t go on forever. The 

President himself has said that the patience of the American people is limited. And so, I think that you take those things into account when—if down the road this hasn’t worked—you begin to 

think about the alternatives. The alternatives clearly involve, 

Where do we go next? In terms of both the limited patience of the 
56 

American people to continue dealing with this, but also the imperative need in terms of national security of the United States, that 

would not leave Iraq in chaos. 

Senator KOHL. Okay, I understand what you’re saying, and I understand how difficult it is to be precise in a situation that is so 

imprecise. 

BAKER-HAMILTON REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

But I would like to ask you another question. Secretary Gates, 

you were a member of the Iraq Study Council—the Iraq Study 

Group, I’m sorry—almost until the very end. And their report recommended moving away from the security mission in Iraq, and toward a training and support role, number one. Number two, engaging Iran and Syria on Iraq; and number three, the group believed 

that we could withdraw most of our troops by 2008. 

You were a member of that group until almost the very end. And 

that was a unanimously signed report. You no longer were there 

when that report was signed. How do you reconcile the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group with the strategy the administration is pursuing now? And where do you stand on the recommendations in that report—which were as I say, unanimously 

signed—but you had left by that time. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. I had, I actually left just prior to the 

first meeting that they had when they began to come to their conclusions, or began to draw their conclusions. 

First of all, I would note that Secretary Rice announced earlier 

in the hearing that there will be a regional conference involving 

Iran and Syria and so on, and so the diplomatic strategy proposed 

by the Baker-Hamilton Group, I think, is in train. 

The study also provided that there were circumstances under 

which a surge of troops might be useful, and particularly if there 

was a specific mission and frankly this was the attitude of our senior officers. If there is a specific mission that would warrant having 

some additional troops, then we’re willing to take that approach— 

then they were willing to entertain that possibility. 

We’ve talked earlier in the hearing about the fact that—Senator 

Alexander asked a number of questions relating to this—that in 

some very important respects, the administration’s policy at this 

point embraces the principal recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Group. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Senator Byrd. 

Chairman BYRD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Brownback. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Rice, Secretary Gates, General Pace, thank you for 

your great service. I know it’s a difficult time and it’s a difficult 

topic. And Secretary Gates, you may be, desire us to be back at 

Texas A&M with a good basketball team and all, now with the difficulties you’re facing here. 

Secretary GATES. Lousy timing, Senator. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Let me ask you a couple of questions on a 

series of issues, if I could. 
57 

ENCOURAGING SIGNS IN IRAQ

First, General Pace—Secretary Gates was talking about encouraging signs from the initial surge report, and I was looking at a 

Stars and Stripes article today. What can you identify as—are 

there some things that you look at? I know we’re only days into 

this, but that look at encouraging signs? 

Secretary GATES. Several, sir. And I will just tick them off as 

they come to my head. 

One, Lieutenant General Aboud, who was selected by Prime Minister Maliki, has been a very balanced leader, and all of his leaders 

below him have been selected by a team of Iraqi and U.S. leaders 

who have ensured that they will be balanced in their approach to 

getting criminals off the streets, regardless of whether they’re 

Sunni, Shia or Kurd. 

Next, the Iraqi units that were promised to be brought to the 

capital, three brigades consisting of nine battalions, each battalion 

being 500 or 600 troops. Seven of those brigades have, in fact, arrived. The next two will arrive over the next 10 days to 2 weeks. 

There’s been a little bit of mix in that, with regard to one unit 

showed up as low as 45 percent manning. Several showed up in the 

70s, but the last two are almost 90 percent in their manning. So, 

the Iraqi government has been learning—as they’ve been moving 

their people for the very first time from one part of the Nation to 

another—on how to do that, and how to make sure they show up 

in whole cloth. 

The first operations against Sunnis was done by the Iraqi army, 

and was done with the support of the coalition forces. The first operations against Shia was done by the Iraqi army, supported by the 

Iraqi police, and supported by the coalition. And so the operations 

that have taken place so far have been balanced in approach to the 

problem. They have been done very well. They have been done by 

Iraqis in the lead, and to this point in time—all the promises that 

were made by the Iraqi government have been fulfilled. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Good. Although you read some of the news 

accounts and it looks like the violence levels are still, and they are 

quite high, but I’m glad to hear that you tick off a series of things. 

Because—while I’ve not been supportive of the surge—I hope it 

goes well. And we need this to succeed as much as possible. 

Secretary Rice, on President Musharraf’s meeting with the Vice 

President yesterday—I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan about 6 

weeks ago, and it does seem like, I mean, this is all—not all, but 

mostly—coming from the Pakistani side. And his agreement with 

the leaders in that region, the warlords, not to go in. Are we going 

to have some luck with—or I shouldn’t say luck—but are we going 

to have some success in getting this dealt with, on that Pakistani 

frontier area? From what you heard back from the meetings yesterday with the Vice President? 

PAKISTAN’S FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA

Secretary RICE. Well, I have—the Vice President will come back, 

I think, and report to the President on what he learned. But I do 

think that we need to remember that the Pakistanis have a very 

strong interest also in not having extremism breed in the federally 
58 

administered tribal area. After all, al-Qaeda has had a couple of attempts on President Musharraf’s life, and so, I am certain that the 

cooperation remains good. 

The FATA is very, very tough and we do have some concerns 

about the plan that was put into place to which you are referring, 

Senator, and about how it is working. I believe we—in part Secretary Gates, who may want to speak to this because he was out 

in Pakistan, and in part Vice President Cheney, who went out to 

follow up—believe that we have the commitment of the Pakistanis 

to fight these extremists because they threaten Pakistan, as well. 

We have had some problems with the particular agreement that 

was signed between the Pakistani government and some of the 

tribal leaders and we have been working our way through ways to 

cooperate with the Pakistanis to make sure that does not become 

a terrorist safe haven. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Well, we need to have that success. 

And two other things I want to mention very quickly. First, 

thank you on the issue of Sudan and what you put in the supplemental. I think that is critical. It’s a broad base of support within 

the Congress. Food and support for the African Union troops, I 

think, is key for us to get any semblance of this under control from 

the genocide that it has been and continues to be. So, thank you 

for putting that in. 

And finally, I was in Ethiopia, as well, on this same trip, and I 

was pleased to see their effort of engaging in the war on terrorism 

in Somalia, in an area that has been a very difficult spot. I want 

to commend the troops, General Pace for, as far as any sort of support that we gave to the Ethiopians, and I hope we can support 

both Ethiopia and Somalia in important ways—probably humanitarian ways—to help the rebuild so that this festering area doesn’t 

continue, and I would just make that as a comment. 

Chairman BYRD. Senator Lautenberg. 

BONUSES FOR DEPLOYED TROOPS

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And first, I want to note my admiration and respect for each one 

of you even though there may be some policy differences. I know 

how hard you work and how able each one of you is. And I would 

ask a favor of you, and that is forgive me if I ask you to be as brief 

as possible with your answers. 

And I will start with this, Secretary Gates, the families of reservists, in particular, are in financial distress with these long deployments that they’re undergoing. Now, there are bonuses that are 

paid that amount to, I think, about 7.5 percent over their base salary when they’re in the combat environment. Is there something 

we could do to—that we might double or triple combat pay for our 

people serving in Iraq and Afghanistan? I don’t know, did you miss 

the question? 

Secretary GATES. No, I got it. I was just confirming my recollection with General Pace. I’ll double check this. But first of all, I 

think that we pay soldiers who are extended an extra $1,000 a 

month when they go beyond the length of their tour. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. What is a tour length? 
59 

Secretary GATES. It depends upon the service. The marines have 

a 7-month rotation, the Army has a 12-month rotation, and generally they’re extended for anywhere from 2 to 4 months—generally 

speaking. 

But also, in some of the changes that I’ve made in Guard and 

Reserve policy, we’re also looking at additional incentives to take 

it—to acknowledge the sacrifice that these families are making, in 

particular—as well as the soldiers, in terms of those who are called 

up early, and those who are extended, so that we can give them 

some recognition of the extra effort and the extra sacrifice that we 

know their families are making. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I would hope that that is a review that can 

take place, because the financial burden on those who aren’t on a 

base, where medical care is readily available, like they are often in 

the regular service. 

Madam Secretary, we’ve done a lot of economic assistance—$22 

billion in economic assistance failures, contracts, some misconduct—I believe that the Iraqis are sitting on tens of billions of 

dollars, of atone dollars. Why should we continue to suggest aid, 

after we’ve had the kind of experience that we have had? 

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING

Secretary RICE. Senator, I think we are through with the kind 

of major reconstruction effort that the IRRF was intended to be— 

the big national-scale projects. Those are almost coming to an end. 

They have achieved some—it has been difficult because of the security situation and because of the state of the infrastructure—but 

the monies now for that kind of reconstruction really have to come 

from the Iraqis. They have put $10 billion forward for reconstruction and infrastructure. They also are putting forward out of that 

$10 billion, $2 billion to their provinces for job growth and smaller 

projects. 

The monies that we are requesting are for a different kind of assistance. They really are a part of our counter-insurgency strategy 

of having the provincial reconstruction teams out with local government, with communities, to help them to do smaller scale work 

that will help with job growth and that can marry up with Iraqi 

forces in an effective way. 

STATE-DOD COOPERATION ON PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Senator, if you do not mind, I just have to say, because I think 

there was a misimpression left. We have completed the 10 PRTs 

that were part of the original plan. The State Department’s requirement to fill an additional 10 PRTs is a requirement that we 

received in January, as a part of the President’s new surge. And 

we will do that, but we need the help of the Defense Department 

to bridge. These monies are for that purpose—it’s for more local, 

diversified efforts. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Okay, I see it as, kind of, one larger reserve. 

General Pace, what’s the recruiting situation like these days? I 

know it’s fairly aggressive on our part. What’s the response? 
60 

ACTIVE SERVICE

General PACE. Sir, the active services are all over 100 percent. 

The Army’s about 109 percent, the Marine Corps, about 114 percent. Retention is the same—the Army’s about 109 percent, the 

Marine Corps, about 214 percent of their objectives. 

We are light in two places. One, the Navy Reserve is coming in 

at about 88 percent, but that’s based on a decision made by the 

CNO to slim down the size of the Navy Reserve, and the other is 

the Army—not sure if it’s the Army National Guard or Army—it’s 

Army Reserve. The Army Reserve is at about 97 percent right now, 

sir, as far as recruiting. But they’re making up for the total numbers because their retention is stronger than it otherwise has been. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be 

assured that written questions will get a response and that the 

record is kept open for that. I appreciate it. 

Chairman BYRD. The Senator is so assured. Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I’m 

sorry I had to leave. The Governor of California was here, and I 

had a meeting with him, and so I’m sorry. 

Madam Secretary, I noted with great interest, your regional initiative. I just want to thank you for it, congratulate you. I think 

it’s really on the right track, and particularly involving Syria and 

Iran. So, thank you very much. 

GUANTANAMO FACILITIES

Secretary Gates, if I could, I want to ask you a question about 

Guantanamo. Last December, as the ranking member of MilconVA, I was informed that the Pentagon planned to invoke 10 U.S.C. 

2808 authority to expedite the construction of a permanent $102 

million state-of-the-art courthouse and supporting facilities at 

Guantanamo. To make a long story short, I questioned the use of 

such authority, and I was later informed by Secretary England that 

based on the sensitivity of the issue and the significant opposition 

to invoking that section, DOD had decided to pursue funding 

through regular budget processes. 

When the President’s budget was released, I noted with interest 

that there was no request in either the 2008 or the 2007 supplemental for further construction at Guantanamo except for $1.6 million in facility upgrades. My question is this—does the Pentagon 

still plan to construct a large, permanent courthouse complex at 

Guantanamo? 

Secretary GATES. The reason that got changed, Senator, is because I said so. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Good. 

Secretary GATES. It seemed to me that, by the time I received it 

the request was, I think, for $92 million and I basically said, ‘‘This 

is ridiculous.’’ And to be honest—and I guess because the hearing’s 

at 31⁄2 hours I’ll be more candid than I probably should. I said—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I’m all for that. 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. We’ll be handed our hat if we go 

up to the Hill for $100 million for these prisons—for these courthouses. What we intend to do is use some temporary buildings like 

we’ve used in Iraq. We will begin the court processes. The trials are 
61 

likely to begin for the non-high value individuals in July. We will 

do that in the facilities that we already have, or those that are covered by the $1.6 million. We will then turn to these temporary 

buildings, of the kind we’ve used in Iraq, and that we can disassemble, and we’re looking at a, I think, a total figure for the entire complex—we’re trying to provide facilities not only for the 

trials themselves, but living conditions for the press, and for the 

clerks, and for the various others associated with trials going on— 

but, we’re looking at a number that is a tenth of what we were 

originally contemplating. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. But not in this supplemental and not in the 

2008 budget? 

Secretary GATES. No ma’am. To tell you the truth I’m not quite 

sure where the money is at this point, but I can get back to you 

on that. 

[The information follows:] 

The Department will use relocatable buildings and portable equipment wherever 

possible to minimize costs for facilities at Guantanamo. We expect these costs to be 

a fraction of earlier estimates. We are currently preparing planning documents and 

cost estimates for these additional facilities and will brief the Congress as soon as 

those cost estimates are complete. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I’d appreciate that. Thank you very much. 

Over the past 4 years we’ve been told, time and time again—by 

both the Pentagon and White House—that once enough Iraqi security forces were trained, U.S. troops could come home. At one point, 

the goal was to train 325,000 Iraqis. 

The latest DOD document that I have seen shows that as of February 20 of this year, there were 323,180 Iraqi security forces 

trained, ‘‘trained and equipped.’’ What correlation do you now see 

between the number of Iraqi security forces trained, and the possible drawdown of U.S. troops from Iraq? 

General PACE. Senator, I was part of that course last year, 

around last January, had you asked me the size of the force and 

when we’d be able to draw down, I would have told you last January that we were going to train the 328,000—which we did—we 

were going to equip the 328,000 by December—which we did—and 

we were going to turn over to them the responsibility, which we did 

not. 

We did not, because in February of last year the Golden Mosque 

bombing and all the sectarian violence that ensued from that, we 

realized by around June that we were not going to be able to come 

down, even though we were training up the right number of Iraqis 

for the environment that we thought we were going to be in. The 

violence got out ahead of our ability to control it. That led us, then, 

to the reevaluation and the recommendations for the increase in 

the U.S. numbers of troops, more importantly the increase in good 

governance and the increase in economics. 

That, then, will allow us, with 328,000 Iraqis plus the 42,000 

more that Prime Minister Maliki is budgeting in his budget, that 

will allow us, then, to have the right number of troops—but they’re 

going to need our help—to get the security situation. But, I was 

part of the group that would have told you 1 year ago that—13 

months ago—that we could have been down substantially by the 

end of December, and then the enemy voted the way they did. 
62 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

HOW THE WAR IN IRAQ WILL END

Chairman BYRD. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator Gates—Secretary Gates—do we have a plan that explains how the war in Iraq will end in terms of the presence of U.S. 

combat forces, and in terms of our long-term relationship with 

Iraq? In other words, Mr. Secretary, what is the happy ending to 

this ill-considered war, and when will it occur? What are the greatest obstacles we have to overcome? 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I think that the outcome we 

would hope for is that in the coming months we are not only able 

to reduce the overall level of violence in Baghdad, but in the space 

that is bought for the Iraqi government in that respect, by their 

own troops and with ours in support, that political reconciliation 

can go forward. And there are some early signs on that, as Secretary Rice mentioned earlier, on the hydrocarbon law and so on. 

That economic development will proceed and there are several 

initiatives associated with that, in addition to the provincial reconstruction teams that we’ve been talking about. And as this violence 

is quieted over the months, we will be able to begin—as we had 

hoped to do so last year—drawing down our forces with the Iraqis 

remaining in charge and keeping security in these neighborhoods. 

I believe we will need to have some kind of a military presence 

in Iraq for some prolonged period of time, but at a fraction of the 

level of forces that we have now. Partly because the Iraqis are 

going to continue to need help with the logistics and communications and intelligence and various other aspects and training. I believe that we, clearly, have no desire for permanent bases in Iraq. 

And I think the outcome of this, if this plan works out as we hope, 

will be that an Iraqi government that can, in fact, sustain itself 

and defend itself and be an ally of United States in the war on terror, and at the same time a barrier to Iranian influence in the region, rather than a bridge for it. 

Chairman BYRD. You say that you think we’ll have a presence in 

Iraq for some time to come. Can you tell us a little more about 

that? How long? 

Secretary GATES. I think that at a very much reduced level we 

will probably have some presence in Iraq, as we have had in Korea, 

and Germany, and a variety of other places around the world 

where we’ve been at war, for a prolonged period of time, a number 

of years. But as I say, at a fraction of the level of troops that we 

have there now. 

I thank the witnesses. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

Are you tired, Secretary Rice? 

Secretary RICE. No, Senator, but I am hungry. 

Chairman BYRD. You’re not tired? 

Secretary RICE. No sir, but it is dinner time for all of us. 

Chairman BYRD. The Committee is expecting to mark up the 

supplemental bill on March 20. 
63 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Do any of the witnesses have anything further? Let me thank the 

witnesses for their testimony. You have been patient. I know that 

you are tired. You have done a good job. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO HON. ROBERT M. GATES

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN ROBERT C. BYRD

JUSTIFICATION OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2007 SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET REQUEST

Question. In the past, this Committee has expressed concerns about the lack of 

detailed justification materials in support of supplemental budget requests. While 

the Department has provided much improved materials along with the fiscal year 

2007 Supplemental budget request and is to be commended for its efforts, I believe 

there is still room for improvement. 

Secretary Gates, will the Department work with the Committee to ensure that the 

Committee receives all the information it requires in a timely manner for this and 

the fiscal year 2008 Budget request? 

Answer. It is my understanding that for the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request and the fiscal year 2008 Budget request, the Department submitted almost 

all of the required detailed justification during the first week of February 2007. 

MONTHLY COST OF THE WAR IN IRAQ

Question. The explanatory material which accompanies the fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental request lists the cost of the war in Iraq at $8.6 billion per 

month, up from $7 billion per month in fiscal year 2006, and $5.9 billion in fiscal 

year 2005. 

Secretary Gates, why does the cost of the war continue to increase? Does the fiscal 

year 2008 supplemental appropriations request anticipate further increases to the 

cost of the war in Iraq? If so, how much do you estimate the war in Iraq will cost 

each month in the next fiscal year? 

Answer. The major drivers in the increased cost of the war are the cost to replace 

and repair equipment and the cost to train and equip the security forces. Military 

operations costs have increased some as force levels and pace of operations have 

changed in theater. The cost of repairing and replacing equipment continues to increase as more equipment is lost due to battle damage and it is no longer economically feasible to repair. Accelerating the training and equipping of the Iraqi Security 

Forces so that they can assume responsibility for providing for the security of Iraq 

also drives an increase in cost. In addition, we continue to ensure that U.S. forces 

have the best force protection equipment available. The fiscal year 2008 budget request for the Global War on Terror for activities supporting operations in Iraq is 

$109.7 billion—or roughly $9.1 billion per month—this includes costs for military 

operations, equipment procurement, construction, and training and equipping Iraq 

Security Forces. 

EXPANSION OF AUTHORITIES AND FUNDING

Question. The supplemental includes $300 million in continued funding for Coalition Support Funds in addition to the $900 million previously provided in the fiscal 

year 2007 Bridge supplemental. These funds reimburse partner nations that support 

our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Secretary Gates, the supplemental requests for coalition support continue to rise. 

It seems we are only able to secure coalition support with the commitment of these 

funds. Since this is not the road we want to continue on for future conflicts, where 

do we see an end to this funding? 

Answer. 

—Coalition Support Funds are critical to the United States’ success in the global 

war on terror, helping to multiply the force and save money. Without a means 

to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating countries, U.S. forces 

would be required to conduct these military operations, which could require additional U.S. forces to be deployed. In some instances, U.S. forces may not be 

as effective as the indigenous forces can be. 
64 

—Many countries, including several of the newer NATO countries, have an intense desire to participate in U.S. military operations but do not have the economic means to finance their logistical support. With Coalition Support Funds, 

the United States is able to financially assist these countries in fighting the 

global war on terror and at the same time reduce the numbers of U.S. soldiers 

required for this fight. 

—Use of Coalition Support Funds to reimburse other nations for their support to 

U.S. military operations generally saves money because most countries have 

lower operational costs than U.S. troops. 

—Finally, with the United Kingdom reducing its forces in Iraq, the use of Coalition Support Funds is expected to increase to reimburse replacement countries 

for necessary logistical support previously provided by the United Kingdom. If 

Coalition Support Funds are not available, U.S. forces may be required to fill 

those gaps. 

—For these reasons, the Department will continue to need Coalition Support 

Funds to support the global war on terror into the near future. 

Question. The fiscal year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act continued a 

provision granting the Secretary of Defense the authority to train and equip partner 

nations in our efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. The authority allows the Department of Defense to use up to $300 million from O&M accounts for this purpose 

and the fiscal year 2007 Defense Appropriations Act subjected this provision to our 

prior approval reprogramming procedures. The President requests the full $300 million for this Global Train and Equip authority in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental 

request without following prior approval reprogramming procedures. 

Secretary Gates, to date, the Department has only sought this authority for activities in Lebanon. What is the planned use for the full $300 million? 

Answer. The Department has not yet used any of the fiscal year 2007 Global 

Train and Equip authority. Currently, the Departments of Defense and State are 

finalizing the prioritization of $300 million in projects for fiscal year 2007. Proposals 

from Combatant Commanders and U.S. Embassies total more than $800 million. 

Once the projects are approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Department of Defense will notify the Congress as required by law. The Department of Defense expects to use the entire $300 million of authority in fiscal year 2007 and 

asked the Congress to provide the necessary funding when it enacts the fiscal year 

2007 Supplemental. 

Question. Secretary Gates, when this authority was first granted, the Department 

requested a change that took the President of the United States out of the required 

approval process. Now the Department is seeking to take Congress out of the approval process by avoiding the reprogramming requirement. Why are you attempting to circumvent congressional oversight on activities that could be extremely controversial? 

Answer. The Department does not believe it is attempting to circumvent congressional oversight. The Global Train and Equip authority requires the Department of 

Defense to notify Congress 15 days prior to initiation of any program. The notification includes the source of funds and is provided to the same committees as a reprogramming action thus ensuring Congressional oversight of all aspects of the program, including the funds that will be used to finance the train and equip programs. 

In the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental, the Department is requesting dedicated funding to support train and equip programs to ensure resources are available exclusively for this program. The Department will still be required to provide Congress 

with the 15-day notification prior to initiating any program. 

GLOBAL LIFT

Question. The President requests $50 million for a new global lift and sustain authority. These funds would finance operations outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

specific use of these funds is not delineated in the request. 

Secretary Gates, what is the planned use for this funding? 

Answer. The Department of Defense has requested $50 million in the GWOT Supplemental of the $100 million of global lift and sustain authority in fiscal year 2007 

providing lift and sustainment to eligible coalition partners supporting combined 

military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Philippines, and elsewhere. These funds 

will be expended in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007. The Department has requested $50 million because of the need to coordinate requirements for global lift 

and sustainment from the Combatant Commanders and to ensure proper documentation and approval of those requirements in line with the legislation authorizing the program. If requirements exceed $50 million, the Department will identify 

sources within the appropriated resources. 
65 

IMPACT OF SUPPLEMENTALS ON THE BASE BUDGET

Question. Secretary Gates, I have repeatedly expressed my concerns over the Department’s continued reliance on supplemental budgets for the war when in fact 

many of the war’s costs—such as costs for military personnel—are quite predictable 

and could thus be included in the regular defense budget. Yet the Department continues to seek supplemental funding for the war. 

Why is the cost of war not included in the regular defense budget? 

Answer. The cost of the war is included in the President’s fiscal year 2008 submission to Congress. The Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror (GWOT) request includes $141.7 billion for war-related costs. 

Question. It is my understanding that the guidance given to the Services when 

assembling this supplemental request was broader than guidance provided for previous supplementals. Consequently, it appears that certain items that have previously been funded in the regular budget have migrated into the supplemental 

budget request. 

Secretary Gates, why was the guidance for the fiscal year 2007 supplemental 

budget request expanded compared to previous supplemental requests? 

Answer. That guidance was issued before I arrived. It is my understanding that 

in his October 2006 memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense England expanded 

the ground rules to capture the Department’s overall efforts related to the Global 

War on Terror (GWOT) and not strictly limited to OIF and OEF theaters of operation. This widening of the scope was done not to provide a new avenue for funding 

of base programs. These ground rules focused on including the Department’s need 

to reconstitute forces and accelerate specific force capabilities and to make available 

necessary funds for Combatant Commanders to address worldwide emerging terrorist threats outside of Iraq and Afghanistan that are part of the broader GWOT. 

Question. What are the criteria for funding requirements in the supplemental request instead of the regular baseline budget? 

Answer. The general criterion that the Department uses to submit requirements 

for the global war on terror supplemental funding is that the requirement should 

only be for the incremental costs above the baseline funding. This means that if it 

were not for the global war on terror, these costs would not be incurred. This includes not only the operations costs but also replacing and maintaining equipment 

that has been lost or worn out and it is no longer economical to repair it. The Department also includes force protection requirements to ensure that U.S. Forces are 

protected with the best possible equipment available. Supplemental requests have 

included other unforeseen, emergency requirements that may not appear to be directly related to GWOT, but have emerged as must fund requirements. Once the Department has an opportunity to budget for these requirements lead-time away, it 

does (e.g., growing the Army and Marine Corps force structure). 

Question. Mr. Secretary how is the Department’s continued reliance on 

supplementals affecting the strategic programming and planning process that informs the formulation of the regular budget? 

Answer. The Department is not continuing to rely on supplementals. The cost of 

the war is included in the President’s fiscal year 2008 submission to Congress. The 

Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror (GWOT) request includes $141.7 billion for war-related costs. The Department continues to use a 

strong strategic programming and planning process to formulate its annual budgets. 

FORCE PROTECTION

Question. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental request contains $8 billion for force 

protection. Of the $8 billion, $1.6 billion is specifically for body armor. 

Secretary Gates, what body armor equipment is being bought with the fiscal year 

2007 supplemental request? Are these replacement items, or are there still forces 

that are without the required protection level for all combat operations? 

Answer. The $1.6 billion requested in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental for body 

armor includes $347.6 million specifically for body armor (‘‘equivalent whole set’’ 

quantities and replacement items), and $1,291 million for ‘‘other protective gear.’’ 

BODY ARMOR SAPI/E–SAPI EQUIVALENT SETS, QUANTITIES 

Army USMC Navy USAF SOCOM DOD Totals 

Fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2006 

baseline, title IX and supplemental .............. 825,477 63,306 5,750 137,404 28,108 1,060,045 

Fiscal year 2007 baseline .................................. ................ 14,000 725 ................ 7,562 ................
66 

BODY ARMOR SAPI/E–SAPI EQUIVALENT SETS, QUANTITIES—Continued 

Army USMC Navy USAF SOCOM DOD Totals 

Fiscal year 2007 title IX .................................... 202,846 25,000 3,300 6 062 ................ 259,495 

Totals fiscal year 2004–2007 title IX .. 1,028,323 102,306 6,475 140,704 41,732 1,319,540 

Fiscal year 2007 Supplemental ......................... 61,220 ................ 10,000 30,000 ................ 101,220 

Totals fiscal year 2004–2007 .............. 1,089,543 102,306 16,475 170,704 41,732 1,420,760 

Requirement, whole sets .................................... 966,000 75,000 7,200 177,000 4,900 1,230,100 

Above (∂)/Below (¥) Goal .............................. 123,543 27,306 9,275 ¥6,296 36,832 190,660 

With funds appropriated through fiscal year 2007, including Title IX, the Department has procured 1,420,760 sets, with both Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI) 

and Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insets (E–SAPI) for all Active, Reserve and 

National Guard forces, both deployed and non-deployed. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental request procures an additional 101,220 ‘‘equivalent whole sets,’’ all E–SAPI, 

and represents a replacement program for older and worn out sets. While some body 

armor sets are constantly being replaced with better components, all deployed and 

next-deployers units have the required protection level for combat operations. 

For example, in fiscal year 2007, the Army used the $1 billion from the fiscal year 

2007 DOD Appropriations Act, Title IX funding to acquire 264,000 sets of E–SAPI 

($875 million); 7,700 ($10 million) for Air Save Body Armor; and Advanced Combat 

Helmets ($108.2 million). The current fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request will 

allow the Army to complete the fiscal year 2007 fielding of the projected Improved 

Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) with quick release. This acquisition results in a total of 

671,000 sets of E–SAPI out of an overall requirement for 966,000 body armor sets 

for all Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard units. This will meet all personnel assigned to combat operations, including next-deployers. The combination of 

the Title IX and supplemental funding will outfit 150,000 fiscal year 2007 deployers, 

88,400 next-deployers, and 25,600 for Reset. In addition, the Army will acquire 

156,000 Improved Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and conversion kits, as well as 306,000 

Advanced Combat helmets. Similarly, fiscal year 2007 supplemental funding will 

buy the Navy and Air Force an additional 10,000 and 30,000 body armor sets, respectively. 

In addition, $1,291 million is requested for Other Force Protection equipment, as 

follows: 

[In millions of dollars] 

Amount 

C3I Force Protection: Army—Bio Surety and Hotline .......................................................................................... 126.3 

Other Personal Protection: 

Army—Automated Biometrics ID System ................................................................................................... 136.9 

Army—OEF/OIF/Horn of Africa/Philippines Uniforms, special/fire retardant clothing ............................... 488.7 

Army—Rapid Fielding Initiative (boots/gloves/goggles/helmets/etc.) ....................................................... 72.1 

Marine Corps—Special/fire retardant clothing and other gear ................................................................ 20.0

Navy—Special/fire retardant clothing and other gear .............................................................................. 44.1 

SOCOM—Special/fire retardant clothing and other gear .......................................................................... 14.0 

USAF—Special/fire retardant clothing and other gear .............................................................................. 66.0 

Other Force Protection: 

AFIS—Joint Communication/Transformation .............................................................................................. 3.5 

Army—Individual Chemical/Biological Countermeasures .......................................................................... 7.4 

Army—Munitions Clearance ....................................................................................................................... 124.3 

Army—Rapid Equipping Force ................................................................................................................... 67.5 

Army—Asymmetrical Warfare Group .......................................................................................................... 102.6 

Defense Wide—Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) ............................................................... 9.3 

Defense Wide—Rewards Program .............................................................................................................. 3.0 

Air Force—Personnel Security .................................................................................................................... 5.3 

Total ........................................................................................................................................................ 1,291.0 
67 

COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

Question. Secretary Gates, what are lines of distinction between projects funded 

through CERP and projects funded through the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund 

(IRRF)? 

Answer. The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) is an appropriation that 

provided funding for security, relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in Iraq. The 

IRRF was made available through September 30, 2006 and has been managed by 

the State Department. It was allocated among a variety of sectors, including security and law enforcement, water resources, electricity, etc., with a focus on relatively 

large, longer-term reconstruction programs and projects. 

By contrast, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) is a Department of Defense program designed to enable military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent, humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out small-scale projects that 

will immediately assist the local population. The CERP complements security operations by giving military commanders a flexible source of funding that can create 

immediate effects for the Iraqi people and establishes goodwill between the military 

and the local populace. Examples of CERP projects include area clean-up, repair of 

battle damaged structures, supplies for schools and hospitals, seed for farmers, etc. 

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT

Question. It has been often reported that the National Guard units not deployed 

overseas are short of critical equipment, such as trucks, radios, and other equipment. 

Secretary Gates, how much of the $93.4 billion in the defense supplemental appropriations request is intended to address National Guard shortages here at home? 

What steps are being taken to see that new equipment for the National Guard will 

be distributed to units with the most urgent shortages here at home? 

Answer. The Army National Guard has $1.48 billion and the Air National Guard 

has $242.1 million included in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request for equipment. For the Air National Guard, $237.2 million was submitted by Air Force as 

part of the aircraft procurement requirements; along with $4.1 million for the Guard 

Operations and Maintenance Appropriation. Aircraft procurement and equipment 

funding will not be allocated to a specific state. The procurement funding for the 

National Guard is executed by the services; procured equipment is then allocated 

to units based their wartime mission requirements with consideration given to the 

states’ emergency response requirements. 

Question. The number of National Guard troops deployed to Iraq has decreased 

since the initial invasion, but the continuing deployment of large numbers of Guard 

members still has an impact on Guard readiness. In December, General Schoomaker 

told the Commission on the National Guard and the Reserves that the Army may 

have to call upon our citizen-soldiers more often as a short-term measure until the 

size of the active duty Army can be increased. 

Secretary Gates, of the troops now serving in Iraq, what percentage are members 

of the National Guard? 

Answer. There are currently approximately 15,200 Army National Guardsmen or 

16 percent of the total Army forces serving in Iraq and over 1,400 Air National 

Guardsmen or 12 percent of the total Air Force personnel currently serving in Iraq. 

NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Secretary Gates, many members of the National Guard are concerned 

that more National Guard troops are going to be deployed to Iraq as a result of the 

surge and the troop rotations scheduled for next year. How many members of the 

Guard are having their deployments extended as a result of the surge? 

Answer. Approximately 4,000 Army National Guard soldiers have been impacted 

by the surge with the extension of the 1/34 Brigade Combat Team. The Air National 

Guard does not expect to have current or future deployments extended as a result 

of the surge. We do expect the number of CENTCOM requirements and mobilizations to be increased to support the surge. 

Question. Secretary Gates, do you expect the number of Guardsmen deployed to 

Iraq to increase this year? What about next year? If you expect more members of 

the Guard to either stay longer in, or deploy to Iraq, that will cause even more 

strains on Guard equipment. Are we resetting the Guard fast enough to counter this 

strain on National Guard equipment? 

Answer. The number of Army National Guardsmen deployed to Iraq is currently 

not projected to increase this year; however, there may be an increase in the num-
68 

ber of Air National Guardsmen. The Army rotation program requirement for fiscal 

years 2006–08, called for 21,000 National Guardsmen. However, through the remainder of this fiscal year and through fiscal year 2009, the Army National Guardsmen deployments will be sustained at about 23,500 troops. The pace of reset of the 

National Guard equipment is not optimal at this point in time but the Department 

is committed to reset the National Guard as quickly as capability allows. 

RIVERINE FORCE

Question. The supplemental requests nearly $30 million in emergency funds for 

equipment for the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, also known as the 

Riverine force. This request comes one year after Congress rejected funds to equip 

the new Riverine force using emergency funds in the fiscal year 2006 supplemental 

appropriations bill. 

Secretary Gates, knowing that Congress did not approve emergency funds for a 

similar purpose last year, why should Congress look differently upon this request? 

Answer. The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was established in 

January 2006, per CNO Guidance of 2006 to serve as the single functional command 

for the Navy’s expeditionary forces and as central management for readiness, resources, manning, training and equipping of those forces. NECC consolidates, aligns, 

and integrates diverse expeditionary capabilities and combat support elements to 

create consistent expeditionary practices, procedures, and requirements and logistics 

in the joint battle space. Specifically, NECC integrates the following capabilities: the 

Naval Construction Force, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Mobile Diving and Salvage, 

Naval Coastal Warfare, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group, Expeditionary 

Combat Readiness Center, Expeditionary Training Command, Maritime Civil Affairs Group, Combat Camera, and the Riverine Force. 

For clarification, the Riverine Force (comprised of Riverine Group [RIVGRU] 

ONE; and three deployable commands; Riverine Squadrons [RIVRONs] ONE, TWO 

and THREE) is an operational component of the NECC. Also, the Navy included 

$73.942 million in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental Request (principally Other 

Procurement Navy [OPN] and a small amount of Procurement of Ammunition Navy 

and Marine Corps [PANMC]), vice nearly $30 million, to support initial outfitting 

of the Riverine Force. 

Congress should look differently upon this request because Navy and RIVGRU 

ONE have fully assumed the riverine mission in OIF from the Marine Corps. Acceleration of initial outfitting of the Riverine Force is necessary to sustain this OIF 

and Global War on Terror mission. This request is considered justified due to factors 

such as the lack of equipment for the Riverine Force being available from existing 

stocks (beyond what has already been provided), the long delivery timelines for 

much of the equipment required for initial outfitting of three deployable RIVRONs 

(that can exceed 10 months from contract/contract option award to delivery), the fact 

that each RIVRON is deployed/scheduled to deploy to OIF within the next 21 

months and the demand signal from all Geographic Combatant Commanders for a 

riverine capability in respective Areas of Responsibility. 

The Navy approved establishment of the Riverine Force in late 2005. Two components of that Force, RIVGRU ONE and RIVRON ONE, were commissioned in May 

2006 and RIVRON ONE deployed in February 2007 in support of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF). RIVRON TWO has been commissioned, is in training and will relieve RIVRON ONE in Fall 2007. RIVRON THREE will be commissioned Spring 

2007 and will relieve RIVRON TWO in Spring 2008. 

In fiscal year 2006 the Navy reprogrammed procurement resources, within established thresholds, to partially fund initial outfitting of the Riverine Force. In fiscal 

year 2007 the Navy used funding from a modestly resourced Riverine Force program 

of record and additional funds from reprogramming to continue initial outfitting. 

The Navy has also programmed funding in fiscal year 2008 and planned funding 

in future years for this purpose; the goal being for the Riverine Force to achieve 

Full Operational Capability by fiscal year 2010. These measures will provide approximately two-thirds of the procurement funding required for initial outfitting. 

Approximately one-third of the funding required for initial outfitting constitutes the 

request in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental. 

Specifically, the $73.942 million of the requested fiscal year 2007 Supplemental 

will be used to buy deployable CBR equipment, boats, communications gear, Civil 

Engineering Support Equipment (CESE) and material handling equipment (MHE) 

which will be used by RIVRON TWO (slated to deploy later this year), up-armored 

HMMWVs, tactical vehicles, body armor, and training for RIVRON TWO and 

THREE, as well as other requirements for RIVGRU. Without these funds deploying 

Sailors may not have the highest levels of individual protective equipment, nor will 
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their vehicles have the best force protection capabilities that currently exist. Additionally, training will be drastically curtailed. This will impact the deployability of 

Riverine Squadron THREE. 

ARMED RECONNAISSANCE HELICOPTERS

Question. The supplemental request includes $38 million for two Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters. This is a new type of helicopter, which will not be fielded 

until 2009. 

Secretary Gates, why is there an emergency need for a new type of helicopter that 

will not be available to our troops for nearly two years? Considering the Army has 

also requested 37 Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters in its fiscal year 2008 base 

budget request, what would be the effect on our troops if the request for emergency 

funds for these two helicopters were to be delayed? 

Answer. The replacement of OH–58D with ARH that this request provides is a 

key part of the Army Aviation Transformation and Modernization stemming from 

the termination of Comanche and the reinvestment of those dollars into the fleet. 

Since 9/11, the Army has had 30 OH–58D operational losses. As the Army no longer 

procures the OH–58D aircraft, the ARH is a one-for-one replacement for the OH– 

58D. With the continuing OH–58D operational losses, increased operational tempo 

and age of the fleet, it is becoming more challenging to meet our requirements. 

There is a 24- to 36-month lead time from aircraft combat loss to the receipt of the 

ARH aircraft to the Army. This supplemental will ensure that the Army losses are 

filled by buying forward the ARH requirement to meet our operational requirements. 

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The supplemental request includes $1.7 billion for retention and recruiting, which is a 30 percent increase over fiscal year 2006. In recent years, the services have struggled to reach their recruiting goals. Last year, all of the active components achieved their goals but the National Guard and Reserves still fell slightly 

short. 

Secretary Gates, will the $1.7 billion provide sufficient resources for the services 

to reach their fiscal year 2007 recruiting and retention goals? 

Answer. The recruiting and retention funding in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request for the military personnel accounts is now $1.8 billion rather than 

$1.7 billion, as mentioned in the briefing. An additional $0.3 billion is also included 

in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request for the Operation and Maintenance accounts to support recruiting and retention. The $2.1 billion will enable the Services 

to achieve their recruiting and retention goals. 

Question. Secretary Gates, the Army Reserve experienced the largest recruiting 

shortfall last year at 4.5 percent below targeted recruiting levels, yet the supplemental request cuts funding for Army Reserve recruiting and retention by $9 million, or by nearly 5 percent. Why was funding cut when Army Reserve recruiting 

results are still short of desired levels? 

Answer. The Army Reserve’s budget for manning supports both recruiting and retention missions. The $9 million referenced in the question reflects the 1,733 reduction in the Army Reserve’s retention mission. 

Question. Although the Department recently announced plans to increase Army 

and Marine Corps permanent end strengths, the increase will be gradually achieved 

over several years. Currently, the National Guard and Reserves are shouldering a 

great deal of the Global War on Terror burden and, with the new ‘‘surge’’ effort, significant troop deployments will continue. 

Secretary Gates, how do you see this heavy burden affecting recruiting and retention of the National Guard and Reserves in the coming year? Do you have a feel 

for how an effort such as the ‘‘surge’’ has on the retention of our troops? 

Answer. Though it is difficult to predict the impact of a specific action on retention, I believe that our continued prudent and judicious use of Reserve component 

members during this ‘‘surge’’ will help toward sustaining reenlistment and attrition 

trends established over the past several years. Last year, reenlistment goal achievement increased for the fourth straight year, attaining the second highest level since 

fiscal year 1990. Similarly, Reserve component attrition rates, the best metric for 

measuring Reserve retention, continued its positive trend, decreasing to a loss rate 

of 18.4 percent, the lowest since fiscal year 1991. These data, coupled with survey 

results, tell us that those Reserve component members, who receive proper notification, treatment, and consideration of family and employer issues, will serve and remain. But we also know that overuse will have a negative impact, making it critical 
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that we continue to employ our prudent and judicious use tenets throughout this 

‘‘surge’’ effort. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

GUANTANAMO

Question. When the President’s Budget was recently released, I noted with interest that there was no request in either the fiscal year 2008 Budget or the fiscal year 

2007 Supplemental for further construction at Guantanamo, except for $1.6 million 

in facility upgrades. 

Does the Pentagon still plan to construct a large, permanent courthouse complex 

at Guantanamo? 

Answer. We will use the $1.6 million in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental to upgrade the existing courtroom. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Question. What changes to recruitment standards has the military made since the 

beginning of the war in Iraq (March 2003)? 

Answer. The military has made no changes to our recruitment quality standards 

since March 2003. The quality of new active duty recruits remains high—well above 

the average of the youth population. For instance, in 2006, DOD-wide, 91 percent 

of new recruits were high school diploma graduates (against the goal of 90 percent). 

This compares favorably to the national average in which only about 80 percent 

graduate from high school. On the Armed Forces Qualification Test, 69 percent are 

drawn from the top half of America’s youth (versus a desired minimum of 60 percent). 

Question. Do you think that we should double or triple combat pay for our troops 

serving in Iraq and Afghanistan? 

Answer. We do not believe an increase in the current rate is warranted at this 

time. All military members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan receive a total additional $430 per month: $225 in Hostile Fire/Imminent Danger Pay; $100 in Hardship Duty Pay; and $105 for incidental expenses. Members who have dependents receive $250 per month in Family Separation Allowance. Additionally, all members in 

Iraq and Afghanistan are entitled to Combat Zone Tax Exclusion. 

Question. Why are funds being requested in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental for 

items like the Joint Strike Fighter, which will not help us either in Iraq or Afghanistan? 

Answer. Our original fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request included the F–35 

Joint Strike Fighter because combat losses of our aircraft must be replaced, and the 

best use of taxpayers’ dollars is not to spend them on legacy aircraft, but rather to 

invest in the latest capability—such as the F–35. 

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Question. Why was the RIO contract repeatedly given to Halliburton/KBR, against 

the advice of auditors, and despite that companies track record of unsupported 

charges? 

Answer. The mission to execute the Contingency Support Plan was assigned by 

the Department of Defense to Army on January 18, 2003. Army assigned the Contingency Support Plan mission to the Corps of Engineers on February 13, 2003. At 

the time, the mission was still classified and it appeared that the services would 

be needed quite soon. The Corps of Engineers was ordered to begin executing the 

Contingency Support Plan on March 17, 2003, just 32 days after being assigned the 

mission. 

Under the circumstances, which were fully explained in the written justification 

requesting authority to award a sole source contract, Kellogg, Brown and Root Services (KBRS), the developer of the Contingency Support Plan, was the only contractor 

who could have provided the required services within the required time frame. This 

justification was reviewed and approved by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology on February 28, 2003. The sole source contract was awarded on March 8, 2003 and pre-positioning of equipment and personnel began on that same date. 

Before awarding the sole source contract, the contracting officer followed normal 

procedures and checked with the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 

contracting officer and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Neither 
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provided any negative information concerning KBRS. There was no information 

available to the contracting officer indicating any problems with unsupported costs 

on the LOGCAP contract or any other KBRS government contract. Similarly, there 

was no advice from auditors indicating that the contract should not be awarded to 

KBRS. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the award of the sole 

source contract. In Report No. 04–0605, it found, ‘‘. . . the Army Corps of Engineers 

properly awarded a sole-source contract for rebuilding Iraq’s oil infrastructure to the 

only contractor that was determined to be in a position to provide the services within the required time frame. The Corps documented the rationale in a written justification, which was approved by the appropriate official.’’ 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) also reviewed the 

award of the sole source contract and found it to be proper. 

In addition to the initial sole source contract, KBRS also was awarded one of the 

two fully competitive contracts which replaced the sole source contract. Prior to 

awarding the competitive contract to KBRS, the procurement action was reviewed 

by a Source Selection Evaluation Board whose recommendations were ultimately 

adopted by the Source Selection Authority. The Board included representatives from 

both DCMA and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), who reviewed available audit reports and checked with personnel from their agencies and others as 

part of the evaluation process. On November 12, 2003 the DCMA Corporate Administrative Contracting Officer advised the Board that KBR’s accounting system was 

considered adequate for the accumulation and reporting of costs under government 

flexibly priced contracts. The board concluded that, ‘‘the risk associated with the 

adequacy of the accounting system for KBE is no risk to minimal.’’ The Source Selection Evaluation Board, which included members from DCMA and DCAA, recommended KBRS receive one of the contracts. The Source Selection Advisory Counsel concurred with the Source Selection Evaluation Board. The Source Selection Authority made his decision and his decision document was signed and forwarded for 

a final sufficiency review on January 13, 2004. 

The Corps of Engineers was not familiar with all audit reports which may have 

been generated on KBRS dealing with contracts other than RIO, particularly those 

which may have been completed after the Source Selection Evaluation Board made 

its recommendations. The only audit report on the RIO sole source contract available to the Corps of Engineers which had not been available to the Source Selection 

Evaluation Board when the award of the competitive contracts were made, was a 

draft audit report issued by DCAA in December of 2003. That audit report included 

$62 million in questioned costs based on the difference between the cost of delivering fuel to Iraq from Turkey and Kuwait. For a variety of reasons, this comparison was questionable and DCAA chose not use this comparison in its final audit report. The Source Selection Authority did review the audit report but did not change 

his decision. He signed a final decision document, with minor revisions on January 

16, 2004. The contracting officer had not yet completed his responsibility determination and did carefully consider this audit report before making a positive responsibility determination. He noted that the estimating system remained approved by 

DCMA. 

In reference to the question on unsupported costs. Audits generally are an 

iterative process. An auditor determines if the costs are adequately supported by the 

documentation available at the time and raises questions about certain transactions. 

The contractor normally provides supporting documentation for unsupported costs 

or drops them from the proposal. The contractor also normally provides additional 

information about the questioned transactions, which may or may not resolve the 

questions. When the audit has been finalized, it is given to the contracting officer, 

who is responsible for resolving any remaining questioned costs with the assistance 

of appropriate technical staff and DCAA. 

There were no significant unsupported costs on the RIO sole source contract at 

the time the award of the competitive contracts were made. In subsequent audit reports, there were significant unsupported costs. However, the contractor either provided the necessary support or deleted them from his proposal. By the time the final 

versions of the audit reports were prepared, there were no significant unsupported 

costs. No payments were made to reimburse the contractor for costs which were not 

supported. 

Question. Why was the Army Corps given the responsibility for being the Army’s 

delegated contracting authority in Iraq? Had the Corps ever previously held such 

responsibilities? 

Answer. The Army Corps of Engineers was not given responsibility for being 

Army’s delegated contracting authority in Iraq. The Army office responsible for Iraq 

Reconstruction Contracting is the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
72 

Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. The Corps of Engineers provided construction management support to the Army reconstruction effort until October 2006 at 

which time the Corps of Engineers assumed responsibility for both construction and 

program management of Army reconstruction projects in Iraq. 

Question. Could you describe the new guidelines being formulated regarding religious exercise in the military? What grievance procedure can they use so that they 

will not have fear of penalty or retaliatory harm to their careers? 

Answer. The guidelines provided by the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2007 and current law are clear and sufficient guidance. The Services 

provide both formal and informal Military Equal Opportunity grievance procedures 

for Service members who believe that their rights (to include their religious exercise 

rights) have been violated. Those procedures are designed to guarantee Service 

members freedom from penalty or retaliatory harm. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BEN NELSON

Question. $28.5 million of the NE Guard’s shortfall is equipment Nebraska units 

deployed in the Global War on Terrorism were directed to leave behind when returning home. The type of equipment includes such items as night vision goggles, 

trucks, trailers, tool sets, camouflage netting, and radios. As you know, this equipment serves a dual use because the Guard is a shared resource having State and 

Federal missions. 

How much funding is in the supplemental for National Guard equipment in fiscal 

year 2007? How will this funding allocated to the states? 

Answer. The Army National Guard has $1.48 billion and the Air National Guard 

has $242.1 million included in the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental request for equipment. For the Air National Guard, $237.2 million was submitted by Air Force as 

part of the aircraft procurement requirements; along with $4.1 million for the Guard 

Operations and Maintenance Appropriation. Aircraft procurement and equipment 

funding will not be allocated to a specific state. The procurement funding for the 

National Guard is executed by the services; procured equipment is then allocated 

to units based on their wartime mission requirements with consideration given to 

the states’ emergency response requirements. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE KEN CALVERT

GUANTANAMO POWER SUPPLY

Question. The Navy has requested $34 million in emergency funds for new generators and associated military construction at Guantanamo Bay. 

Secretary Gates, are these generators intended to anticipate future construction 

at Guantanamo, such as new courthouses for trials of detainees or other new detention facilities? How much of the increase in power demand at Guantanamo is a result of the construction of detention facilities since 2002? 

Answer. No. The need for new generators and the associated Power Plant 

MILCON aboard Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba are not due to any anticipated 

future requirements. They are required to provide reliable, efficient electrical generation for the current load that GTMO is experiencing due its mission of supporting the Navy’s, the Coast Guard’s, and the Joint Task Force’s various counter 

drug, migrant, and contingency operations. While the current project is not designed 

to provide power for the additional load that any future construction may carry, it 

will possess the capability to expand to meet an increase in demand. 

Exact data on the electrical demand the current detainee operations places on the 

existing GTMO system are not available, however in February 2001 the average 

daily load was 10MW. In February 2007 the average daily load was 14MW. Additionally, the base has average summertime requirements of 17MW with peak requirements over 20MW. This load exceeds the upper limit of the existing 

switchgear’s capacity, resulting in frequent breaker trips and power outages. In 

order to be able to provide a reliable source of electricity to meet the existing power 

requirement, a new power plant and switchgear is needed. 

COMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman BYRD. So, if you don’t mind, General Pace, we’re going 

to say here, Secretary Rice, that the committee stands in recess. 
73 

Thank you, Secretary Gates. Thank you and good night. Good 

evening, I should say. 

[Whereupon, at 6:08 p.m., Tuesday, February 27, the hearing 

was concluded, and the committee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.] 

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