United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Air and Land Forces, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Analysis of Processes 

Used to Evaluate 

Active Protection 

Systems 

June 2007 

 

GAO-07-759 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 2007

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Analysis of Processes Used to Evaluate 

Highlights of GAO-07-759, a report to Active Protection Systems 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

Active Protection Systems (APS) 

protect vehicles from attack by

detecting and intercepting missiles 

or munitions. In 2005, the lead 

systems integrator for the Army’s 

Future Combat Systems (FCS) 

program sought proposals for an 

APS developer and design and to 

deliver APS prototypes on vehicles

by fiscal year 2009. Raytheon was 

chosen the APS developer. At the 

same time, the Department of

Defense’s Office of Force 

Transformation (OFT) evaluated 

near-term APS for potential use in 

Iraq. 

GAO was asked to review the 

Army’s actions on APS/FCS: (1) the 

process for selecting the 

subcontractor to develop an APS 

for FCS and if potential conflicts of 

interest were avoided; (2) the 

timing of the trade study and if it

followed a consistent methodology 

to evaluate alternatives, and the

results; (3) the role the Army and 

Boeing played in selecting the 

developer; and (4) the process 

followed to provide a near-term 

APS solution for current forces. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense support 

additional testing and 

demonstration of APS systems to 

help develop tactics, techniques, 

procedures, and concepts of

operations for active protection

systems and provide useful data on

the use of APS. DOD did not agree 

to support such testing. 

In selecting the APS developer, the Army and Boeing--the FCS lead systems 

integrator--followed the provisions of the FCS lead systems integrator 

contract, as well as the Federal Acquisition Regulation, in addressing 

organizational conflicts of interest. No officials from the offering companies 

participated in the evaluation and all offerors were evaluated based on the 

same criteria. Four proposals were evaluated and three were determined to 

be comparable in terms of cost and schedule. The winner—Raytheon—was 

chosen on technical merit, as being more likely to meet APS requirements 

although its design had less mature technology. 

 

The APS development contract required the source selection winner to 

perform a trade study to assess alternatives and select the best design for 

development, and the Raytheon design was chosen. The trade study applied 

a consistent methodology to all alternatives before selecting Raytheon’s 

vertical launch design. While the role played by Raytheon in the trade study 

was in accordance with its contract, the rationale for having the trade study 

follow the source selection is not entirely clear. The purpose of the trade 

study was to select the best concept; yet the source selection process that 

preceded it had, in fact, chosen Raytheon primarily on the technical merits 

of its vertical launch design concept. Although the vertical launch 

technology is not mature, the Army estimated that it could be available for 

prototype delivery to current force vehicles in fiscal year 2009 and tested on 

a FCS vehicle in 2011. This may be an optimistic estimate, as the FCS 

vehicle is yet to be fully developed. 

The Army and Boeing were extensively involved in APS source selection and 

the trade study. FCS officials actively participated and concurred in the final 

selection of the APS developer. FCS officials and technical experts from 

Army research centers took part in the trade study and helped choose the 

vertical launch design. Boeing officials took part in various ways and, with 

the Army’s concurrence, selected Raytheon as the APS developer, 

participated in the trade study, and recommended the vertical launch 

approach. 

In its pursuit of a different APS concept, OFT was responding to an urgent 

need statement issued by the Central Command with potential for near-term 

fielding. This evaluation centered on the results of physical testing of the 

most technically mature candidate system, the Trophy. Decisions on how to 

proceed with Trophy involved disagreement between OFT and the Army. 

While the Trophy tests were successful, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

decided to defer fielding the APS system, based in part on the 

recommendation of Army officials, who believed that testing had not been 

realistic and integrating it on the platform would delay fielding other useful 

capabilities. OFT officials proposed additional testing of Trophy to answer 

these questions, but funding for further OFT testing of this system was 

discontinued after the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell’s decision. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-759.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul Francis at 

(202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 5

APS Source Selection Avoided Organizational Conflicts of Interest 9 

Trade Study Used Consistent Method in Reaffirming Vertical 

Launch Concept 12 

Army and Lead Systems Integrator Had Extensive Roles in APS 

Subcontractor Selection and Trade Study 17 

OFT Process for Evaluating APS Was More Test-Based and NearTerm Oriented 18 

Conclusions 21

Recommendations for Executive Action 22 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 25 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 27 

Tables 

Table 1: Composition of APS Trade Study Technical Team 13 

Table 2: Composition of APS Trade Study Stakeholders 14 

Table 3: APS Concepts Considered in Trade Study 15 

Table 4: Top-Level Criteria and Associated Weights 15 

Table 5: Technology Maturity Levels of APS Alternatives as of May 

2006 16 

Table 6: APS Candidate Systems and Developers 19 

Figures 

Figure 1: FCS APS Major Players 6 

Figure 2: Timelines for OFT and Army Processes for Evaluating 

Active Protection Systems 8 

Page i GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
Abbreviations 

APS Active Protection System 

DOD Department of Defense 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FCS Future Combat System 

JUON Joint Urgent Operational Need 

RFP Request for Proposal 

OFT Office of Force Transformation 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation 

TRL Technology Readiness Level 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

June 8, 2007

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

An Active Protection System (APS) is intended to protect a vehicle from 

attack by detecting and intercepting missiles or munitions before they hit 

the vehicle. It has significant possibilities for offering light vehicles some 

of the protection that armor gives, without the extra weight. In April 2005,

BAE, a subcontractor for the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) 

program, issued a draft request for proposals to choose the developer for 

an APS for FCS and current force manned ground vehicles. To avoid an 

organizational conflict of interest, the lead systems integrator, the Boeing 

Company, ultimately reissued the draft request for proposals, after BAE 

decided to submit its own bid on this contract. Raytheon was eventually 

chosen as the APS developer and a subsequent trade study reached the 

conclusion that Raytheon’s vertical launch concept was the optimal 

solution to meet the APS requirements. Also, in April 2005, the U.S. Central 

Command issued an urgent operational need statement to field a 

combination of near-term technologies, including a different APS, on a 

modified Stryker vehicle, the Full-Spectrum Effects Platform, for 

demonstration and potential use in Iraq. The effort made in response to 

this need was managed by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT), 

which reported to the Secretary of Defense. After evaluating six candidate

APS, the OFT chose to test the Trophy APS because they considered it to 

be the most technically mature. In June 2006, the Joint Rapid Acquisition 

Cell decided to defer fielding the APS system. 

An Active Protection System (APS) is intended to protect a vehicle from 

attack by detecting and intercepting missiles or munitions before they hit 

the vehicle. It has significant possibilities for offering light vehicles some 

of the protection that armor gives, without the extra weight. In April 2005,

BAE, a subcontractor for the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) 

program, issued a draft request for proposals to choose the developer for 

an APS for FCS and current force manned ground vehicles. To avoid an 

organizational conflict of interest, the lead systems integrator, the Boeing 

Company, ultimately reissued the draft request for proposals, after BAE 

decided to submit its own bid on this contract. Raytheon was eventually 

chosen as the APS developer and a subsequent trade study reached the 

conclusion that Raytheon’s vertical launch concept was the optimal 

solution to meet the APS requirements. Also, in April 2005, the U.S. Central 

Command issued an urgent operational need statement to field a 

combination of near-term technologies, including a different APS, on a 

modified Stryker vehicle, the Full-Spectrum Effects Platform, for 

demonstration and potential use in Iraq. The effort made in response to 

this need was managed by the Office of Force Transformation (OFT), 

which reported to the Secretary of Defense. After evaluating six candidate

APS, the OFT chose to test the Trophy APS because they considered it to 

be the most technically mature. In June 2006, the Joint Rapid Acquisition 

Cell decided to defer fielding the APS system. 

Both the Army’s FCS program and the OFT effort were looking for APS 

applications for current Army forces, but with somewhat different 

objectives in mind. Although the primary focus of the APS subcontractor 

selection and trade study was to pick a developer and a design for the FCS 

APS, another objective was to field an APS on current force combat 

Both the Army’s FCS program and the OFT effort were looking for APS 

applications for current Army forces, but with somewhat different 

objectives in mind. Although the primary focus of the APS subcontractor 

selection and trade study was to pick a developer and a design for the FCS 

APS, another objective was to field an APS on current force combat 

Page 1 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
vehicle platforms in the 2009 time period.1

 On the other hand, the OFT 

worked on a separate objective aimed at providing these capabilities 

sooner to forces currently in theater, to provide a nearer-term 

demonstration of APS. 

This letter is to respond to your request for a review of the process that led

to the Army’s decision to pursue a new APS system under the FCS 

program. You asked us to review this process because of uncertainty 

surrounding the facts that led to the Army’s decision to pursue a vertical 

launch APS concept. Specifically, this report addresses: 

1. The process for selecting the subcontractor to develop an APS for FCS 

and whether potential conflicts of interest were avoided. 

2. The timing of the trade study, whether it followed a consistent

methodology to evaluate all the alternatives, and the results. 

3. The role the Army and the lead systems integrator played in selecting

the APS developer. 

4. The process followed for evaluating a near-term APS solution for 

current forces. 

In conducting our work, we held discussions with FCS, Army, and other 

DOD officials. We reviewed documents relevant to the decision the Army 

made about which APS system to pursue and held discussions with key 

officials about various decisions that have been made in pursuing this 

technology. We conducted our work between October 2006 and June 2007 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I further discusses our scope and methodology. 

In choosing the developer for the APS system, the FCS lead systems 

integrator ran a competition, with Army participation in the process and 

concurrence in the selection. The contractor followed the organizational 

conflict of interest clause developed in accordance with the FCS contract 

and applicable to all subcontract tiers under the FCS contract, as well as 

Results in Brief 

 1

The Army defines its “Current Force” as including the Stryker, Bradley, and Abrams

combat vehicles. Of the three, the Stryker is the only system for which the Army has 

definite plans to incorporate an APS. 

Page 2 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
the applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provisions. According 

to these terms, subcontractors cannot conduct or participate in a 

subcontract source selection if any part of its organization submits a 

proposal. Since BAE was the integrator of the hit avoidance system—of 

which the APS is a subset—and was submitting a proposal to be the APS 

developer, the lead systems integrator, Boeing Company, issued the final

request for proposals and completed the source selection without BAE’s 

involvement. The lead systems integrator chose the APS developer—the 

Raytheon Company—after all offerors were evaluated based on the same 

criteria contained in the request for proposals. Proposals from three 

companies were evaluated in the subcontractor selection process and all 

three were found to be comparable in the areas of cost, 

management/schedule, and past performance. The primary discriminating 

factor became technical merit. Based on input from the source selection 

evaluation team and source selection advisory council, the source 

selection executive decided that the Raytheon vertical launch concept

would be more likely to meet all the APS requirements, even though it was 

based on less mature technology than other proposals. In March 2006, the 

APS contract was awarded to Raytheon. 

The APS development contract required the winner of the subcontractor 

selection to perform a trade study that would identify and assess APS 

alternatives and select the best design for further development from 

among the competing alternatives. Even though the role played by 

Raytheon in the trade study was in accordance with its contract, the 

rationale for having the trade study follow the source selection is not 

entirely clear. While the trade study applied a consistent methodology to 

all alternatives before selecting Raytheon’s preferred design as the best 

solution, this was a likely outcome given that the selection of Raytheon as

the APS developer was based largely on this design concept. According to 

the study documentation, only one of the seven alternatives evaluated was 

less technologically mature than the vertical launch concept at the time 

the study was conducted. However, in assessing it against the weighted 

criteria, vertical launch scored the highest in all categories except risk. 

The study concluded that the vertical launch concept would be a highpayoff approach, albeit at a high risk. The Army estimated that, despite the 

immaturity of this APS, it could be available for prototype delivery to 

current force vehicles in fiscal year 2009 and tested on a FCS manned 

ground vehicle in 2011. This may be an optimistic estimate as the FCS 

manned ground vehicles are in the early stages of development. 

Both the Army and the lead systems integrator were extensively involved 

in the APS subcontractor selection and the trade study. The Army FCS 

Page 3 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
program officials were active participants in the source selection 

evaluation team and source selection advisory council and concurred in 

the final selection of the APS developer. Army FCS officials, as well as 

technical experts from Army research centers, were members of the trade 

study technical team and also concurred in the choice of the vertical 

launch design. Lead systems integrator officials were members of the 

source selection evaluation team and, with the Army’s concurrence, made

the source selection of Raytheon as the APS developer. In addition, the 

lead systems integrator participated in the trade study and was one of the 

trade study members who recommended the vertical launch approach. 

The process followed by OFT to meet the urgent needs of the Central 

Command included a simpler evaluation of active protection systems with 

potential for near-term fielding and then centered on the results of 

physical testing of the most mature of the candidate APS systems, the 

Trophy. Decisions on how to proceed with the Trophy system involved 

considerable disagreement between OFT and the Army. While the testing 

of Trophy had a high success rate, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

recommended that the Central Command defer fielding the Trophy, based 

in part on the recommendations of the Army, which believed that the 

testing was not realistic and the Trophy’s integration on the platform 

would delay fielding of other useful capabilities by at least 6 to 14 months. 

Further, the Army estimated that it would take 5 years to integrate and 

field Trophy on other current force manned ground vehicles. OFT officials 

recommended that additional testing of Trophy be conducted to answer 

the questions raised by the Army, but the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

funding for further testing of the Trophy by OFT ceased after the Joint 

Rapid Acquisition Cell decision. 

Because of the likelihood that the Army will introduce APS into its forces, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense support additional testing 

and demonstration of near-term APS systems on the Full Spectrum Effects 

Platform or similar vehicles to, at a minimum, help develop tactics, 

techniques, procedures, and concepts of operations for both near-term and 

long-term active protection systems. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD did not agree with our 

recommendation that it support additional testing and demonstration of 

near-term active protection systems on the Full Spectrum Effects Platform 

that could respond to the Central Command’s need. It stated that there are 

no active protection systems mature enough at this time to integrate on 

this vehicle, regardless of any additional testing and demonstration efforts. 

DOD also stated that it continues to pursue active protection, citing its 

Page 4 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
efforts with the vertical launch system for use on the FCS, among other 

things. However, we believe that testing near term active protection 

systems on the Full Spectrum Effects Platform or similar vehicles is 

valuable for answering remaining questions about such systems and future 

systems. This is particularly important given the likelihood that the Army 

will field some form of APS to its forces. We have broadened our 

recommendation to capture the value of continued testing of near-term 

APS for tactics, techniques and procedures and concepts of operations. 

The FCS concept is designed to be part of the Army’s Future Force, which 

is intended to transform the Army into a more rapidly deployable and 

responsive force that differs substantially from the large division-centric 

structure of the past. The FCS family of weapons is now expected to 

include 14 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, 

and munitions that will be linked by an advanced information network. 

Fundamentally, the FCS concept is to replace mass with superior 

information—allowing soldiers to see and hit the enemy first rather than 

to rely on heavy armor to withstand a hit. The Army envisions a new way 

of fighting that depends on networking the force, which involves linking 

people, platforms, weapons, and sensors seamlessly together in a system 

of systems. 

Background 

Within the FCS program, eight types of manned ground vehicles are being 

developed, each having a common engine, chassis, and other components. 

One of the other common components is a hit avoidance system that 

features a set of capabilities to detect, avoid, and/or defeat threats against 

the manned ground vehicles. One of its subsystems is the APS, which is 

intended to protect a vehicle from attack by detecting a threat in the form 

of an incoming round or rocket propelled grenade (threat) and launching

an interceptor round from the vehicle to destroy the incoming weapon. An

APS system consists of a radar to detect the incoming weapon, a launcher, 

an interceptor or missile, and a computing system. 

The Army has employed a management approach for FCS that centers on a 

lead systems integrator to provide significant management services to help

the Army define and develop FCS and reach across traditional Army 

mission areas. Boeing, along with its subcontractor, the Science 

Applications International Corporation (SAIC), serves as the lead systems 

integrator for the FCS system development and demonstration phase of 

acquisition, which is expected to extend until 2014. The lead systems 

integrator has a close partner-like relationship with the Army and its 

responsibilities include requirements development, design, and source 

Page 5 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
selection of major system and subsystem subcontractors. In the case of

APS, the first-tier subcontractors are the manned ground vehicle 

integrators, BAE and General Dynamics Land Systems, who are 

responsible for developing individual systems. BAE was designated the hit 

avoidance integrator, a role that covers more than active protection, and 

was responsible for awarding the subcontract to the APS developer. This 

subcontract has three elements: a base contract, option A to support the 

current force (the short-range solution) and option B to support the FCS 

manned ground vehicles (short- and long-range solution). Figure 

1illustrates these relationships. 

Figure 1: FCS APS Major Players

FCS Lead Systems Integrator 

Boeing/SAIC

Manned Ground Vehicle Integrator

BAE

Active Protection System DeveloperBase Contract- Raytheon

Manned Ground Vehicle Integrator

General Dynamics

Option A

Option B

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation).

A separate initiative involving active protection resulted from a Joint 

Urgent Operational Needs Statement,2

 issued by Central Command and the 

Multi-National Corps in Iraq in April of 2005, which requested 14 specialequipped vehicles with a host of distinctive capabilities, one of which was 

 2

 A joint urgent operational need is a need that can be considered life or combat-missionthreatening based on unforeseen military requirements that must be resolved in days, 

weeks, or months. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions 3470.01, Rapid

Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) in the Year of 

Execution, July 15, 2005. 

Page 6 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
an APS. The need statement called for a capability to field a combination 

of near-term technologies that would be useful in conducting force 

protection missions, reconnaissance and crowd control in Iraq and an 

evaluation of an active protection capability against rocket-propelled 

grenades as part of this suite of capabilities. To respond to this need 

statement, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, a group within the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that seeks solutions to urgent needs and 

focuses on near-term or off-the-shelf equipment to meet these needs, 

provided funding to the Army, which worked with the OFT to evaluate 

various technologies, including an APS, for inclusion on the vehicles. The 

OFT was also an office within the OSD, and its role was to examine 

unanticipated needs and experiment with innovative technologies that 

could be used to meet warfighter needs. 

Both the process for evaluating APS sources and concepts to meet FCS 

needs and the urgent needs of the Central Command occurred nearly 

simultaneously, as shown in figure 3.

Page 7 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 2: Timelines for OFT and Army Processes for Evaluating Active Protection Systems 

Joint Operational Needs Statement issued by Central

Command and the Multi-National Corp in Iraq

April 05 Draft APS request for proposal issued by BAE Systems

June 05

Aug. 05

Sept. 05

Oct. 05

Feb. 06

March 06

April 16, 06

May 06

June 1, 06

Trophy selected for integration on Full-Spectrum

Effects Platform

Lead System Integrator assumes responsibility for

APS procurement

Contract to integrate Trophy aboard the platform

funded by Office of Force Transformation

APS request for proposal issued by Lead System

Integrator

Evaluation of proposals, Trophy included

Source selection decision made

Naval Surface Warfare Center- Dahlgren Division

testing and demonstration

APS base development contract awarded to Raytheon

Army formally requests to Office of the Secretary of

Defense- Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell that Trophy be

removed from Full-Spectrum Effects Platform

Trade Study required by APS contract is completed.

Trade Study evaluators agree that Raytheon’s Vertical

Launch concept is the most promising.

Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell recommends that Trophy be

slipped to a later spiral.

Trophy/Platform events FCS APS efforts

Source: Army and OFT (data), GAO (presentation and analysis).

As can be seen in figure 3, many events took place at the same time. The 

lead systems integrator for FCS completed its subcontractor selection for

APS shortly before decisions were made on the near term system being 

considered to meet the Central Command need. The Trophy system was 

evaluated as a candidate system in both processes. 

Page 8 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
In choosing the developer for the APS system, the FCS lead systems 

integrator, with Army support and concurrence, conducted a source 

selection and followed the FCS lead systems integrator subcontract 

provisions for avoiding organizational conflicts of interest. The purpose 

was to select the subcontractor for the APS that would be best able to 

develop the overall APS architecture to address the FCS requirements to 

defeat the short- and long-range antiarmor threats as well as meet the 

current force needs for defeating short-range rocket-propelled grenade 

attacks. The subcontractor selected would support the hit avoidance 

integrator in integrating APS technology into the FCS manned ground 

vehicles and also apply this architecture to the Army’s current force. The 

contract included two options that were to supply the specific design for 

the APS system: Option A for the short-range APS for the current force; 

and Option B for the short- and long-range solution for the FCS. These 

options would be awarded later, based on the results of trade studies 

subsequently performed. 

APS Source Selection 

Avoided 

Organizational 

Conflicts of Interest 

To protect against organizational conflicts of interest, contracts between 

the FCS lead systems integrator and its subcontractors preclude a 

subcontractor from conducting or participating in a source selection for 

other FCS subcontracts if any part of its organization submits a proposal.3

Under normal circumstances, since the APS would be part of the hit 

avoidance system of the FCS manned ground vehicles, the hit avoidance 

integrator, BAE, would have had the primary responsibility to issue the 

requests for proposals, conduct the source selection evaluation, and award 

the contract. In this capacity, BAE issued a draft request for proposals for 

the APS in April 2005. When the firm subsequently decided to submit a 

proposal on the APS subcontract, it was required, under the FCS lead 

systems integrator subcontract organizational conflict of interest 

provisions, to notify the lead systems integrator, Boeing, of its intention. 

BAE did so and the lead systems integrator reissued the request for 

proposals for APS in September 2005 and assumed the source selection 

responsibilities. BAE submitted its proposal but then had no further role in 

the evaluation of proposals or the actual source selection. After the source 

 3

The FCS lead systems integrator contract required that an organizational conflict of 

interest provision be included in the subcontracts under the FCS lead systems integrator

contract and flowed down to all lower level subcontract tiers. The lead systems integrator 

developed a specific organizational conflicts of interest clause applicable to all subcontract 

tiers under this contract. Additionally, the lead systems integrator contract provided that

pursuant to the FAR 9.5, subcontractors could neither prepare RFP documents nor conduct 

or participate in a source selection if any part of its organization submits a proposal. 

Page 9 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
selection was complete, the lead systems integrator transferred contract 

responsibility to BAE, and BAE assumed the responsibility for awarding 

and administering the APS contract.

From our review, the documentation from the APS source selection 

process shows that (1) no officials from the offering companies 

participated in the source selection process, and (2) all offerors were 

evaluated based on the same criteria contained in the request for 

proposals.4

 In response to this request for proposals, four proposals were 

received. Three proposals were considered competitive, while the fourth 

was eliminated from consideration as it was considered “unsatisfactory” in 

technical merit and its architectural approach did not meet the 

requirements. Proposals from the remaining three companies—BAE, 

Raytheon, and General Dynamics Land Systems—were evaluated in the 

source selection process and no officials from these companies were on 

the evaluating or selecting teams. The source selection evaluation team 

consisted of 53 members, with 27 lead systems integrator representatives 

and 26 government representatives, including personnel from the FCS 

program manager’s office, Army research centers, and the Defense 

Contract Management Agency. After evaluating each of the proposals 

against the criteria spelled out in the request for proposals, the source 

selection evaluation team made its recommendation to the lead systems 

integrator source selection executive, who accepted itsrecommendation. 

Our review of the documentation shows that the criteria were ranked in 

order of importance, with technical merit considered most important, then 

cost, management/schedule and finally past performance. The technical 

merit criteria were divided into six sub-factors: systems engineering and 

architecture; expertise in APS technologies; simulation, modeling and test; 

fratricide and collateral damage; specialty engineering; and integration 

capability. Cost criteria were based on the realism, reasonableness, 

completeness, and affordability of the proposal. Management/ schedule 

criteria included such areas as expertise and experience in key positions. 

The past performance risk rating category was based on whether the 

respondents’ past performance raised doubts about their being able to 

perform the contract. 

 4

We reviewed the source selection documentation for reporting purposes and did not

conduct a legal review of the evaluation or selection decision. 

Page 10 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
Since all three proposals were deemed comparable in the areas of cost, 

management/schedule, and past performance, the primary discriminating 

factor became technical merit. According to the evaluation 

documentation, the technical merit scores were assessed based on 

whether the proposal demonstrated that the contractor understood the 

requirements and on its approach to meeting these requirements in each of

the six technical merit sub-factors. Also, part of the technical score was a 

proposal risk evaluation, defined as the degree any proposal weaknesses 

could cause disruption of schedule, increase in cost, or degradation in 

performance. 

While the source selection’s stated purpose was to choose the company 

best able to develop the APS and not a specific design, each proposal used 

a specific APS system as an “artifact” to illustrate how they intended to 

meet the requirements. Even though, in theory, one company could have 

been chosen as the APS developer while another company’s preferred 

design could have been selected for development, much of the source 

selection assessment of technical merit was based on the “artifact” used 

for illustration. For example, in the technical merit category of APS 

expertise, the source selection evaluation of Raytheon states that “the 

vertical launch concept solves several design and integration problems.” 

Similarly, the BAE evaluation in the criteria of APS expertise states that 

“the proposed long-range countermeasure...design has effectiveness 

against the full spectrum of threats.” The General Dynamics Land System’s

evaluation discusses the relatively high technology readiness level (TRL)5

of the “proposed Trophy system.” Therefore, while each company’s 

proposed solution was not the only aspect of the proposals to be 

evaluated, the evaluation documentation shows that the technical merit 

category was a key factor in the evaluation. 

The source selection evaluation team decided that the BAE and Raytheon 

proposals had the highest technical merit. BAE had a lower-risk approach 

and its solution had been tested in a relevant environment: however, the 

source selection evaluation team stated that this low-risk approach could 

prevent BAE from considering higher-risk options that would enable them 

to meet the full range of the performance requirements, such as protection 

from top-attack weapons. In addition, the source selection evaluation team 

 5

Technology readiness levels characterize the readiness of technologies for hand-off to

project implementers. Nine levels are defined, representing concepts from fundamental 

research level (TRL 1) through technologies fully qualified and demonstrated (TRL 9). 

Page 11 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
determined that, while both Raytheon and BAE could develop the design 

presented in the BAE proposal, Raytheon would have the advantage if the 

vertical launch design was chosen. The evaluation team concluded that the 

Raytheon approach would have the best chance of meeting all the 

requirements. Based on the team’s recommendation, the lead systems 

integrator selected Raytheon. The integrator accepted the higher risk 

because it concluded that the Raytheon proposal had excellent technical 

merit and the firm would be better able to develop the vertical launch 

technology, if that were the design decided upon in the trade study. 

The APS development contract required the winner of the source selection 

to perform a trade study identifying and assessing competing APS 

alternatives. The trade study used a methodology consistent with Army 

guidance to evaluate all alternatives, ultimately selecting Raytheon’s 

vertical launch as the best design. According to the Army and the lead

systems integrator, conducting the trade study after choosing the APS 

subcontractor could have resulted in selecting a different concept than

Raytheon’s vertical launch design. However, in our view, this possibility 

appears remote given the selection of Raytheon as APS developer was 

based largely on the technical merits of its vertical launch design and the 

fact that it would be best able to develop that design. 

Trade Study Used 

Consistent Method in 

Reaffirming Vertical 

Launch Concept 

The development contract’s terms required the source selection winner to 

perform a trade study that would identify and assess APS alternatives and

select an APS design from among competing alternatives. Therefore, once 

Raytheon won the development contract in March 2006, it was required to

conduct the trade study rather than simply develop its own design. Since 

the trade study was not a source selection, FAR contract provisions 

regarding organizational conflicts of interest did not apply and Raytheon 

was free to participate in the study as the responsible contractor. The 

trade study’s specific objective was to choose a single short-range APS 

architecture (launcher and interceptor) that best met active protection 

requirements for FCS manned ground vehicles, with consideration for 

application to the current force. The study was conducted in May 2006 and 

Raytheon’s vertical launch concept was selected as the design. 

Based on the trade study documentation, the study was conducted using a 

methodology prescribed by Army guidance and this methodology was 

applied consistently to all APS alternatives. Seven alternatives survived a 

screening process and were then evaluated against a set of weighted 

criteria. The study concluded that Raytheon’s vertical launch was the best 

design approach. 

Page 12 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
According to general Army guidance for trade studies, steps in the trade 

study process should include such elements as incorporating stakeholders, 

identifying assumptions, determining criteria, identifying alternatives, and

conducting comparative analyses. The APS trade study process 

consistently applied such methodology to all APS alternatives by using 

separate, independent roles for a technical team and stakeholders; 

operating under a set of assumptions; using validated, protected technical 

data on each alternative; having a screening process to filter out nonviable alternatives; and using a set of weighted criteria to assess 

alternatives that survived the screening process.

The trade study was performed by a technical team and stakeholders—

each having separate roles and operating independently from one another.

The technical team provided technical input and expertise to the 

stakeholders, who were the voting members of the study and made the 

final selection. The technical team, 21 members from industry and 

government as shown in table 1, included individuals who were subject 

matter experts as well as those from organizations participating in 

development of the short-range APS. Raytheon had 11 members on the 

technical team—the most from any single organization. The Army stated 

that this representation included administrators and observers and 

occurred because Raytheon had been designated APS developer, was thus 

required to conduct the trade study, and could gain knowledge from 

attending subject matter experts. 

Table 1: Composition of APS Trade Study Technical Team

Industry Government

Boeing/SAIC (1) U.S. Army Program Manager, FCS (1)

BAE (1) U.S. Army Armament Research, 

Development, and Engineering Center 

(1)

General Dynamics Land Systems (3) U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis 

Activity 

(1)

Raytheon (11) Department of Energy - Idaho National 

Lab 

(2)

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

The stakeholders made the final selection. The composition and number of 

stakeholders are shown in table 2. The stakeholders were program leads 

from the Army, lead systems integrator, and subcontractors responsible 

for integrating the FCS manned ground vehicles. According to the Army, 

Raytheon’s APS program manager was included as a stakeholder because 

Page 13 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
Raytheon as developer had responsibility for developing the design chosen 

by the trade study process. 

Table 2: Composition of APS Trade Study Stakeholders

Industry Government

Raytheon (1) U.S. Army Program Manager, FCS (1)

BAE (2) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (1)

General Dynamics Land Systems (2) U.S. Army Program Executive Office for 

Ground Combat Systems 

(1)

Boeing/SAIC (1)

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

The technical team and stakeholders operated the trade study under 

assumptions that set parameters for screening and evaluating each 

alternative. These assumptions were tied to such areas as performance 

and threat. Additionally, they conducted the study using data that was 

previously validated and remained protected throughout the study’s 

course. The primary source of the data was the Army Research, 

Development, and Engineering Command’s APS database, which 

contained data gathered and validated by the Command’s subordinate 

labs. This data was protected by third parties, including the Department of 

Energy’s Idaho National Lab, to ensure it was not changed during the 

study. 

The technical team used initial screening processes to eliminate four 

alternatives and identify seven viable alternatives for further assessment. 

The screening process filtered out the four alternatives that could not 

meet one or both of two criteria: (1) ability to grow to meet 360-degree 

hemispherical requirements, and (2) ability to be procured within a 

program schedule that would meet the need for prototype delivery of a 

short-range solution to the current force in fiscal year 2009. The seven 

alternatives that survived the screening process are shown in table 3, along 

with the respective government organizations and industry associated with 

each. 

Page 14 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
Table 3: APS Concepts Considered in Trade Study

Government organization/industry Alternative 

U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, 

Development, and Engineering Center/Boeing 

Close-In Active Protection System 

U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, 

Development, and Engineering Center/Boeing 

Close-In Active Protection System II 

U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Research, 

Development, and Engineering/BAE 

Close-In Countermeasure 

U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Research, 

Development, and Engineering/Chang 

Industries 

Full Spectrum Close-In Layered Shield 

U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Research, 

Development, and Engineering/BAE and 

Northrup Grumman 

Integrated Army Active Protection 

System 

Israel/Rafael and General Dynamics Land 

Systems 

Trophy 

 U.S. Army Program Manager, FCS/Raytheon Vertical Launch 

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

The technical team assessed the seven alternatives against a set of five 

weighted criteria. According to the Army, these were the same top-level

criteria mandated in all FCS trade studies, and their weights were assigned 

by FCS chief engineers. Table 4 defines each of the criteria and provides 

information on respective weights. 

Table 4: Top-Level Criteria and Associated Weights 

Criteria Description Weight

Performance Survivability, logistics, and reliability 35%

Cost Average unit production cost for fitting 500 vehicles 25%

Burdens Includes signature, weight, volume, power, and 

integration complexity 20%

Risk Technical, schedule, and cost risk 15%

Growth potential System growth potential to counter full spectrum of 

threats 5%

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

The vertical launch concept scored highest in every category of criteria 

except risk. The Army indicated that the concept had about one-third 

better overall weighted performance than the other alternatives. Army 

officials described the vertical launch design as having technical 

Page 15 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
advantages over the other alternatives—including the need for less space, 

weight, and power—as well as cost benefits. 

The Army and lead systems integrator officials told us that the trade study 

could have resulted in the selection of a design other than Raytheon’s. 

They also stated that, had this occurred, Raytheon as APS developer 

would have been required to develop this design rather than the vertical 

launch. While in theory the APS source selection chose a developer and 

the trade study chose the design to develop, in reality it is difficult to 

separate the trade study results and the source selection decision. In our 

view, in both the source selection and trade study, criteria related to 

technical aspects of the designs were deciding factors. Considering that 

the source selection evaluation relied on artifacts representing specific 

systems—and Raytheon won the source selection based in large part on 

the technical merit of its artifact—it seems unlikely that the APS trade 

study would have resulted in the selection of any system other than 

Raytheon’s vertical launch. 

Although the trade study concluded that vertical launch was a high-payoff 

approach, it also noted that it was a high risk due to its low technology 

maturity. At the time of the trade study, as shown in table 5, the vertical 

launch was less technologically mature than the other alternatives except 

for one. 

Table 5: Technology Maturity Levels of APS Alternatives as of May 2006 

Alternative Technology maturity

Close-In Active Protection System 6

Close-In Active Protection System II 3

Close-In Countermeasure 6

Full Spectrum Close-In Layered Shield 6

Integrated Army APS 6

Trophy 6

Vertical Launch 5

Source: Army (data), GAO (presentation and analysis). 

The Army expects the design to reach TRL 6 (system model or prototype 

demonstration in a relevant environment) by August or September 2007.

The Army expects the vertical launch concept to be available for prototype 

delivery to current force combat vehicles in fiscal year 2009 and for testing 

on a FCS vehicle in 2011. These estimates appear optimistic. At a TRL 5, 

Page 16 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
the vertical launch will require additional technology development and 

demonstration before it is ready for either application. Also, the FCS 

vehicles have not been fully developed yet. Assuming all goes as planned,

most FCS vehicle prototypes are expected to be available in 2011 for 

developmental testing. As we noted in our March 2007 report,6

 the Army 

has in general been accepting significant risks with immature technologies 

for the FCS program, coupled with compressed schedules for testing and 

evaluating prototypes. 

The Army and the lead systems integrator were both extensively involved 

in preparing for and conducting the APS subcontractor selection and the 

trade study. Prior to the selection, FCS program officials assisted in APS 

requirements development and reviewed and approved the scope of work, 

schedule, and evaluation criteria for the request for proposals. After the 

proposals were received, FCS program officials, technical experts from 

various Army research centers, representatives of the Tank-Automotive 

and Armaments Command and the Training and Doctrine Command were 

active participants in the selection evaluation team and reviewed the 

proposals along with the lead systems integrator members. The Source 

Selection Advisory Council, who advise the Source Selection Executive, 

provided oversight to the evaluation team and also had representatives 

from the FCS program manager’s office and the Army research 

community. Similarly, Army FCS officials, as well as technical experts 

from Army research centers, were members of the trade study technical 

team and also concurred in the choice of the vertical launch concept. The 

co-lead of the trade study was an FCS official. The lead systems 

integrator’s office assumed responsibility for the selection process, was 

the selection executive, and made the final choice of an APS developer. In

addition to its lead role in the APS subcontractor selection, the lead 

systems integrator was represented on the trade study technical team and 

was one of the stakeholders. 

Army and Lead 

Systems Integrator 

Had Extensive Roles 

in APS Subcontractor 

Selection and Trade 

Study 

As our previous body of work on the FCS program has shown, the Army’s 

participation in the APS subcontractor selection and trade study is 

consistent with the Army’s general approach to FCS. Army leadership set 

up the FCS program in such a way that it would create more competition 

and have more influence over the selection of suppliers below the lead 

 6

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Decisions to Be Made on Future Combat System, 

GAO-07-376 (Washington D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007). 

Page 17 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
systems integrator. In setting up FCS, Army leadership noted that 

traditionally, once the Army hired a prime contractor, that contractor 

would bring its own supplier chains. The Army was not very involved in

the choice of the suppliers. In FCS, the Army called for the lead systems 

integrator to hold a competition for the next tier of contractors. The Army 

had veto power over these selections. In addition, the Army directed that 

the lead systems integrator employ integrators at lower levels in the 

program, for high-cost items such as sensors and active protection 

systems and the Army has been involved with these selections. These 

integrators were also to hold competitions to select suppliers for those 

systems. This strategy was designed to keep the first tier of contractors 

from bringing their own supplier chains and pushed competition and Army 

visibility down lower in the supplier chain. The fact that the decisions on 

the APS subcontractor selection and trade study lend themselves to afterthe-fact examination is due in part to the Army’s focus on competition at 

lower supplier levels on FCS. 

The process followed by OFT to meet the urgent needs of the Central 

Command was characterized by a simpler evaluation of active protection 

systems with potential for near term fielding, followed by actual physical

testing of the APS candidate system that the OFT considered most 

technically mature, the Trophy. The Army’s Program Manager’s Office for 

Close Combat Systems was also involved in this evaluation. While the 

testing of Trophy had a high success rate, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

decided to defer fielding the Trophy based, at least in part, on the 

recommendations of the Army that the testing was not realistic and the 

Trophy’s integration on the platform would delay fielding of other useful 

capabilities. OFT officials did not agree with the Army’s position and 

thought the system’s success in testing indicated it should be further 

evaluated. 

OFT Process for 

Evaluating APS Was 

More Test-Based and 

Near-Term Oriented 

To meet the Central Command’s need, OFT began an effort, the FullSpectrum Effects Platform, to incorporate and test various improvements 

for potential application to existing military vehicles such as the Stryker. 

The platform itself is a modified Stryker vehicle.7

 The program was divided 

into spirals: spiral 0 was to evaluate the synergy of the different systems, 

 7

The OFT had initiated a program called Project Sheriff in 2004, prior to the Central 

Command’s need statement, to address urgent warfighter needs for lethal and non-lethal 

weapons, and force protection. After the needs statement, this evolved into the FullSpectrum Effects Platform effort. 

Page 18 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
including the APS, on the vehicle and to compile lessons learned to aid in

future concepts of operations, development and integration. Spiral 1 was 

intended to field a limited number of such systems to current forces intheater in 2007, for purposes of an operational assessment of the various

capabilities. The Full Spectrum Effects Platform is not part of or 

associated with FCS. 

OFT, in association with the Naval Surface Warfare Center, evaluated six 

candidate APS systems. Army representatives from the Program Manager, 

Close Combat Systems were also involved in this evaluation. The six 

candidate systems evaluated are shown in table 6. 

Table 6: APS Candidate Systems and Developers 

Candidate Developer

Close-in Active Protection System Aviation and Missile Research, 

Development and Engineering Center 

Close-in Countermeasure British Aerospace (formerly United 

Defense) 

Canister-Launched Area Denial System Northrop Grumman 

Tactical Rocket-Propelled Grenade Airbag

Protection System 

Innovative Survivability Technologies 

Full-Spectrum Close-in Layered Shield Chang Industries 

Trophy Rafael/General Dynamics Land Systems 

Source: OFT. 

These systems were evaluated because the OFT and Navy and Army 

officials considered them to be the most promising APS solutions available 

within the required schedule. They evaluated each system based on such 

criteria as the feasibility of the operational concept, its cost and schedule 

factors, as well as its weight, size, and power requirements. Trophy was 

selected as the most promising system because it was the most technically

mature system and was being developed by Israeli defense forces that had

done initial work to integrate it on a light armored vehicle. 

OFT subsequently sponsored tests of the Trophy APS as part of the FullSpectrum Effects Platform at Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, 

Virginia. A representative from the Army’s Program Manager, Close 

Combat Systems, was part of the oversight team for these tests. In these 

test firings, the Trophy APS did well, destroying 35 of 38 incoming rocketpropelled grenades. However, the process for deciding how to proceed 

based on the test results was not agreed to in advance. A disagreement 

Page 19 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
subsequently arose between OFT and the Army Close Combat System 

officials on how best to proceed from the testing. 

Although the tests were not designed to represent the Trophy’s capabilities 

in a realistic operational environment, OFT officials concluded that 

Trophy showed enough promise that they recommended continued testing 

to demonstrate its capabilities under various conditions. These officials 

estimated that an additional $13 million would cover the cost for this 

testing. They believed that Trophy could be integrated in the near term on 

existing light-armored vehicles and meet the urgent need for an immediate 

APS capability. 

The Army officials disagreed with OFT’s assessment that further testing of

Trophy for inclusion on the Full Spectrum Effects Platform was justified. 

According to the Army officials, Trophy was not tested in a realistic 

environment for collateral damage or effectiveness. They believed that it 

would not be sufficiently tested for operational and safety issues within 

the time period required for the first spiral of the Full Spectrum Effects 

Platform. A delay in its integration on the Platform would delay, by at least 

6 to 14 months, demonstration of other potentially useful capabilities,that

could be immediately incorporated. Further, the Army estimated that it 

would take 5 years to integrate and field Trophy on other current force 

manned ground vehicles. The Army recommended to the Joint Rapid 

Acquisition Cell that the Trophy APS be excluded from Spiral 1 of the FullSpectrum Effects Platform. In lieu of putting this technology in the field,

the Army recommended that slat armor8

 be incorporated on Spiral 1, since 

it has been effective in defeating the current rocket-propelled grenade 

threat. OFT officials disagreed, reasoning that although the use of slat 

armor on the current force has seemed to mitigate the effects of the 

rocket-propelled grenades currently in use, improved munitions will soon

be available, and the slat armor will no longer be effective against these 

threats. They believed that the Trophy should be tested further in order to 

answer the questions raised by the Army and to provide insight into its 

capabilities. OFT officials based their position on the Trophy’s success in 

these tests, its high level of technical maturity when compared to other 

active protection systems, and the criticality of the need. 

 8

Slat armor forms a metal frame barrier on the front of the vehicle that detonates the

rocket-propelled grenade away from the vehicle, preventing it from boring through the 

vehicle and causing damage and injury. 

Page 20 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell presented this information to Central 

Command and recommended slipping the active protection capability to a 

later platform spiral, once it was more mature. Currently, there are no 

plans for further evaluation of active protection for future platform spirals. 

Upon the removal of the Trophy APS system from the Full-Spectrum 

Effects Platform vehicle, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell discontinued 

funding for further testing and evaluation of the Trophy. The disagreement 

between Army and OFT officials notwithstanding, we did not find 

information that would challenge the decision to defer the introduction of

the Trophy on light-armored vehicles. On the other hand, the 5 years the 

Army estimated would be needed to integrate the comparatively mature 

Trophy system on the existing Stryker vehicle does not appear consistent 

with its estimates that the less mature vertical launch system could be 

ready for prototype delivery on Strykers in 2 years and on the yet-to-be

developed FCS prototypes in 3 years. 

The FCS lead systems integrator, with support from the Army, followed a 

consistent and disciplined process in both selecting Raytheon to develop

the APS for FCS and in conducting the trade study and followed the lead 

systems integrator subcontract and FAR provisions for avoiding 

organizational conflicts of interest. While the role played by Raytheon in 

the trade study was in accordance with its contract and thus not improper, 

the rationale for having the trade study follow the source selection is not

entirely clear. The purpose of the trade study was to select the best 

concept; yet, the source selection process that preceded it had, in fact, 

chosen Raytheon primarily on the technical merits of its vertical launch 

design concept. It was thus improbable that the trade study would reach a 

different conclusion. Both the Army and the lead systems integrator were 

closely involved throughout the source selection and trade study 

processes and concurred in the selection of Raytheon’s APS concept. 

Conclusions 

The process for evaluating the Trophy system to meet the urgent needs of 

the Central Command was different. It centered more directly on the 

results of physical testing, followed a less-disciplined decision-making 

process, and was characterized by considerable disagreement between 

OFT and the Army. While the decision to defer the use of the Trophy on 

fielded vehicles appears prudent in light of the limited realism of the 

testing, the promising results of the testing likewise appeared to warrant 

additional testing of the Trophy system to either confirm or dispel 

potential risks in the use of APS capabilities. Discontinuing all testing of 

the Trophy systems may thus have been premature, particularly in light of

Page 21 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
the need to better understand tactics, techniques and procedures and 

concepts of operations for both near-term and long-term applications. 

Because of the likelihood that the Army will introduce APS into its forces, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense support additional testing 

and demonstration of near-term APS systems on the Full Spectrum Effects 

Platform or similar vehicles to, at a minimum, help develop tactics, 

techniques, procedures, and concepts of operations for both near-term and 

long-term active protection systems. 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The 

comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD did not concur with our 

recommendation. DOD also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated where appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense support additional testing and demonstration of near-term active 

protection systems on the Full Spectrum Effects Platform that could 

respond to the Central Command’s need. It stated that the original 

decision in May 2006 that delayed delivering Full Spectrum Effects 

Platform capabilities due to technical development and performance risks 

remains true today. DOD added that there are no active protection 

systems mature enough at this time to integrate on a Full Spectrum Effects 

Platform regardless of any additional testing and demonstration efforts. 

This represents a much more decided opinion than was rendered at the 

time of the OFT tests. At that time, Army officials believed that the Trophy 

would not be sufficiently tested for operational and safety issues in time 

for the first spiral of the Full Spectrum Effects Platform. OFT officials 

believed that the Trophy should be tested further to answer the questions

raised by the Army and to provide insight into its capabilities. Ultimately, 

the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell recommended slipping the active 

protection capability to a later spiral of the Full Spectrum Effects 

Platform. This was the basis for our recommendation for additional 

testing of near-term active protection systems on the Full Spectrum 

Effects Platform. 

DOD stated that it continues to pursue active protection, citing the Army’s 

vertical launch system for FCS. As stated in our report, this system is 

technically immature and the Army’s estimates for testing it appear 

optimistic. According to the Institute of Defense Analysis, the vertical 

launch system is ambitious, with much enabling technology not yet 

Page 22 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
demonstrated. Given the criticality of active protection for the FCS 

manned ground vehicles, additional testing of near-term active protection 

systems could provide valuable insights into operations and tactics that 

would benefit future applications, such as FCS. DOD noted that the 

Trophy system is being tested on the Wolf Pack Platoon Project, an OSD 

Rapid Reaction Technology Office (formerly OFT) effort. However, this 

project is not directed toward development of APS tactics, techniques, 

procedures, or concepts of operations. In addition, it will not include 

testing against live targets. 

Testing near-term active protection systems on the Full Spectrum Effects 

Platform or similar vehicles is valuable for answering remaining questions 

about such systems and to provide insights for the employment of future 

systems. This is particularly important given the likelihood that the Army 

will field some form of APS to its forces. We have broadened our 

recommendation to capture the value of continued testing of near-term 

APS for tactics, techniques and procedures and concepts of operations. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff has any questions

concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Paul L. Francis 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 23 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To develop the information on the U.S. Army’s decision to pursue a new 

APS system under the FCS program, we interviewed officials of the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology); the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command; the Joint 

Rapid Acquisition Cell; the Office of Force Transformation; the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren Division); the Program Manager for the 

Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); and the Future Combat 

System Lead Systems Integrator. 

We reviewed the APS subcontractor selection documentation, including 

the APS request for proposal, current force and FCS operational 

requirements documents, subcontract proposals, criteria used to rate 

those proposals, and the APS development contract to determine if 

procedures for avoiding organizational conflicts of interest were followed 

and how the APS subcontractor was selected. In addition, we held 

discussions with key Army officials and lead systems integrator 

representatives regarding this process and their roles in it. To determine 

why the trade study was conducted after source selection, we reviewed 

the trade study process and results and Army guidelines for conducting 

trade studies. To identify the roles played by both the Army and lead

systems integrator in the selection of an APS, we reviewed documentation

concerning their roles in these processes. We also reviewed these 

materials to determine whether consideration was given to a separate APS 

solution for current forces and, in conjunction with this issue, we 

reviewed test reports and other documentation and discussed the testing 

of an alternative APS system, the Trophy, with the parties involved. 

In evaluating the APS subcontractor selection and trade study processes, 

we did not attempt to determine if the best technical solution was chosen, 

but only if these processes followed lead systems integrator provisions for 

organizational conflicts of interest and used a consistent methodology for 

the trade study. We conducted our work between October 2006 and June 

2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

Page 24 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisiti
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 25 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 26 GAO-07-759 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: GAO

St

 Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 27 GAO-07-759

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Paul Francis, (202) 512-4841 

Other contributors to this report were Assistant Director William R. 

Graveline, Marie P. Ahearn, Beverly Breen, Tana Davis, Letisha Jenkins, 

Kenneth E. Patton, and Robert Swierczek. 

Defense Acquisitions

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(120624) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER