A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

1 

## W orking P a per 87

Explain i ng “ Sa f e t y Ca s e”

T his p a p e r i s an e x t e n d ed v ers i on of a t a l k g i v en t o t he J o i n t R e g ul at ors For u m on t he

U se of P e r f o r man c e

- b a s e d R e g u l at o ry M o d els i n t he U S Oi l a n d G as I n d u s t r y

,

h e l d i n T e x as Ci t y

, T e x a s

, S e p t e mber 2 1 , 2 0 12



## A nd r e w Ho p ki n s

Profe ss or Em e ritu s

, A u s tra l i a n National U ni v e r s i t y

, Canb e rra

A n dr e w .ho p k in s @a n u. e du. a u



## A p r il, 2012A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

2 

### A b ou t t h e C e n t r e

The N a t i on a l R e s e a r c h C e ntre f o r O HS R e g ulat i on ( N RCO H S R) is a r e s ea r c h c e ntre with i n

the R e g ulat o r y I nst i tu t ions N e twork (R e g N e t) a t The Austr a l i a n N a t i on a l Univ e rsi t y

(C a nb e r r a ), a nd op e r a tes in a ssoci a t i on with G r i f f i t h Univ e rsi t y ( Q u ee n s land )

. The C e n t re

mon i tors, do c uments a nd a n a l y s e s Austr a l i a n a nd in t e rn a t i on a l d e v e lop me nts in wo r k h ea l t h

a nd s a f e t y re g ulation a nd r e s e a r c h, a nd r e lat e d a re a s of re g ulation, a nd pub l i shes a w e b

- b a s e d

s e ri e s of wo r ki n g p a p e r s r e lati n g to wo r k h ea l t h a nd s a f e t y re g ulation. The C e ntre a lso

c ondu c ts a nd fa c i l i t a tes high qu a l i t y e mp i ri ca l a nd pol ic y

- fo c used r e s e a r c h in t o wo r k h ea l t h

a nd s a f e t y re g ulation, f a c i l i t a tes the in t e g r a t i on of r e s e a r c h in t o re g ul a t i on with r e s ea rch

findin g s in oth e r a r e a s of re g ulation, a nd e n c o u r a g e s c ol l a bor a t i n g r e s ea r c h e rs to c ondu c t

e mp i ri ca l and poli c y

- focused r e s e a r c h in t o w o rk h ea l t h a nd s a f e t y r e g ulat i on.



### A d d r ess f o r NRC O H SR c or r es pond e n ce

N a t i on a l R e s ea r c h Cent r e f or O H S R e g ulation

R e g ulato r y I nst i tu t ions N e twork

Coombs Ext e nsion, B ui l ding 8

Cnr Fe l l ows a nd G a r r a n Ro a d

The Austr a l i a n N a t i on a l Unive r si t y

C a nb e r ra

, ACT, 0200

Email: n rc ohsr@ a nu. e du

. a u

.



### D i sc l a i m e r

The vie w s e x p re ssed in t his pap e r are the a uthor ’ s a lone a nd do not r e fl e c t a n y fo r mal opin i on

of the N a t i on a l R e s e a r c h C e ntre for O HS R e g ula t ion, the R e g ulato r y I nst i tu t ions N e twork or

The Austr a l i a n N a t i on a l Univ e rsi t y . T h e y a re pr o vided f or the pu r po s e s of g e n e r a l d i s c uss i on.

B e f o re r e l y i n g on the mat e ri a l in th i s p a p e r, r e a d e rs should c a r e ful l y make their own

a ssessment a nd c h e c k with other sour ce s a s t o i t s acc u ra c y

, c u r r e n c y

, c omp l e ten e ss a nd

r e lev a n c e f o r th e ir pu r p o s e s.A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

3 

### I n t r odu ct i o n

The P r e sidenti a l Com m i s sion of inqu ir y in t o the 2010 oil w e ll blowout in t he Gulf of Me x ico

(the Ma c ondo blowout) d ea lt a t len g th with the d e f e c ts of the p r e s c riptive re g ulato r y re g i m e

op e r a ted b y the MMS (Min e r a ls Manag e ment S e rvi c e )

. 1 The Com m is s i o n h ea rd e viden c e

a

bout g o a l

- s e t t ing re g i m e s that op e r a te in oth e r p a rts of the wo r ld, in p a rt i c ular in the UK a n d

in No r w a y

, a nd e nd e d b y maki n g a stro n g r e c o m m e nd a t i on that the US should “ d e v e lop a

p r o ac t i v e

, risk

- b a s e d p e r fo r man c e a pproa c h specific to ind i vidual f a c i l i t i e s, op e r a t i ons a nd

e nvironme n ts, si m i l a r to the “ s a f e t y ca s e ” a ppr o ac h in the No r th S ea .” (p 2 52). The s a f e t y

ca se a pproa c h is qui t e fa m i l i a r in Austr a l i a a nd h a s b ee n a dopted for h a z a rdous industries in

ma n y jurisd i c t i ons in th i s co u nt r y , in p a rticul a r, f o r the of f

sho r e p e trol e um i ndust r y

.

Un f o r

tunat e l y

, l i t t le p rog re ss h a s b ee n m a de on the P r e s ident i a l Com m is s ion’s

r e c om m e nd a t i on, in p a rt b eca use t h e s a f e t y ca se c on ce pt is wid e l y m i sun d e rstood in the US.

This f a c t led me to th i nk ca reful l y a bout how to d e s c ribe a s a f e t y ca se re g i m e f o r US

a

udien ce s. I h a v e now d o ne th i s twic e

, fi r st in a b ook, Disas t rous D ec is i on s

, 2 a nd s ec ond a t a

c onf e r e n c e in the US o r g a nised b y a c omb i n e d g roup of re g ulato r y a g e n c ies, w a nt i n g to

e x plore wh a t m i g ht be i n volved in in t rodu c ing the s a f e t y c a se a ppr o ac h in that c ount r y

. This

p a p e r is a n e x p a nd e d v e rsion of that c onf e r e n c e p re s e ntation. I t is note w o r t h y that some of

the c ritic a l c onte x tual a spe c ts of suc c e ssful s a f e t y c a se re g ulation on l y b ec ome a pp a r e nt

wh e n s ee ki n g to c om m unic a te with US a udie n c e s. This p a p e r th e r e f o re e mphasises f e a tu r e s

of s a f e t y ca s e re g i m e s t h a t a re sometimes tak e n for g r a nted in the juri s dictions wh e re t h e y

op e r a te. T h e d e s c ription d ra ws p a rticul a r l y on UK a nd Aust r a l i a n o ff shore s a f e t y ca se

re g i m e s and sets out a m od e l of w h a t m i g ht b e d e s c rib e d a s a m a ture s a f e t y c a se re g i m e

.

Th e re a r e five b a sic fe a tur e s that will be hi g hl i g hted in wh a t follows. I n l a y i n g out these

f e a tu r e s, I will c om m e nt on wh a t t his m ea ns for t h e US. The five f e a tu r e s a r e :

 A r is k

- or h a z a r d

- man a g e ment f ra m e wo r k

 A re quir e m e nt t o make t he ca se to t he re g ulator

 A c ompet e nt and ind e p e nd e nt r e g ulator

 W o r k f o rc e invo l v e ment

 A g e n e r a l du t y o f c a re i mpos e d on the op e r a tor



### A h a z a r d

- ma n a g e me n t f r am e w o r k

A s a f e t y ca s e re g i m e r e quir e s c ompani e s to a dopt a s y stem a t i c h a z a rd ma n a g e ment

f ra me w o rk. This m e a ns t h e y must i d e nt if y a ll m a j or h a z a rds a nd d e v e lop p lans for how these

h a z a rds will be man a g e d

. I n p a rticul a r, th e y m ust identi f y the c on t rols that will be put in

pla c e to d ea l with the identifi e d h a z a rds, a nd the me a sur e s that will be t a k e n to e nsu r e that

1 OSC ( N a t io n al Co m m i s s ion o n th e BP D ee p w a t e r H oriz o n O il S p ill an d O f f s h ore Drilli n g ), De ep w a t e r : T h e Gulf

O il Di s a s t e r an d th e F u t u r e o f O f f

s ho r e D r illin g

, R epo r t to th e P r e s id ent

. J a nu ary 2011.

2 H o p ki n s A	(2 0 12) D i s a s t r ou s De c i s i on s : t h e Huma n an d O r gan i s a ti ona l Ca u s e s o f th e Gulf o f M e xi c o Bl o w ou t

( C CH: S ydn e y )A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

4 c ontrols c ont i nue to func t ion a s in t e nd e d. This p a rt of the s a f e t y ca s e f r a m e wo r k is a lr ea d y in

pla c e f o r m a n y h a z a rdo u s industries in the US. F or ins t a nce f o r a ll proc e ss industries o n shor e

,

a nd that i n c ludes p e t r oleum a nd p e tro c h e m ic a l industries, the f e d e r a l p r o c e ss s a f e t y

man a g e ment stand a rd re quir e s op e r a tors to h a ve such a f ra me w o rk. The h ea rt of the p r o ce ss

man a g e ment st a nd a rd is the p r o ce ss h a z a rd a n a l y s i s, the f irst cl a use o f whi c h st a te s :

The e mp l o y e r shall p e rf o r

m a n in i t i a l p r o ce ss h az a rd a n a l y sis ( h a z a rd e v a luation) on

p r o ce sses c o v e r e d b y th i s stand a rd. The p r o ce ss h a z a rd a n a l y sis shall be a ppro p ri a te

to the c omp l e x i t y of the p r o ce ss a nd shall identif y

, e v a l u a te, a nd c ontrol the h a z a rds

invo l v e d in t he pro c e s s

...

A n y r e a d e r who e x a m i n e s the full te x t d e s c ribing a p ro c e s s h a z a rd a n a l y sis a nd who is

f a m i l i a r w i t h sa fe t y ca se r e quir e ments will r e a l i se just how simi l a r th e se r e quir e ments a r e

.

One of the m a jor c h a n g e s to the o f fsho r e re g ulato r y re g i m e since the M a c ondo a cc ident h a s

b ee n the a dopt i on b y t he re g ulat o r of the API s t a nd a rd 75 that specifies a S a f e t y a n d

Environm e ntal Manag e ment S y stem or S EM S

. This h a s a h a z a rd a n a l y s is s ec t i on si m i l a r to

that d e s c rib e d a bov e

, a l t hou g h not a s d e tailed. I n p r incipl e

, the r e fo r e

, the o f fsho r e p e trol e um

s ec tor now o p e r a t e s u n d e r the s a m e g e n e r a l r e g u l a to r y r e qu i r e ment a s onshore p r o c e ss

industries. P ut a nother w a y

, the US a l r ea d y h a s t he fi r st of the five e lem e nts of a s a f e t y ca se

re g i m e , both onshore a nd of f

shor e

.



### Em p lo y ee p a r t i c i p at i o n

A s ec ond fe a ture of s a fe t y ca s e re g i m e s is t h a t th e y p r ovi d e for e mp l o y e e p a rticip a t i on, in

v a rious w a y s. I n p a rticul a r, e mp l o y e rs must f a c i l i t a te e mp l o y e e p a rticip a t i on in the

d e v e lop m e nt of s a f e t y c a s e s, a nd the re g ulato r s who ca r r y out si t e a udi t s must c onsult with

e le c ted wo r k fo r c e r e p r e s e ntati v e s. Th e se r e qui r e ments a re wid e l y r ec o gnised a s i m port a nt,

a l t hou g h the r e a re oft e n c omp l a in t s f r om un i ons t h a t t h e y a re not e f f

ec t i v e l y i m plem e nted.

The US p r o ce ss s a f e t y man a g e ment (P S M) stand a rd a lso r e quir e s t h a t e mp l o y e e s be

c onsulted in the p r o ce ss h a z a rd a n a l y si s

. T h e in i t i a l S EMS rule h a d no s u c h r e quir e m e nt, but

und e r S EMS II

, whi c h b ec omes e f f e c t i ve on J une 4, 2013, e mp l o y ee s m ust be c onsulted i n

the d e v e lop m e nt a nd i m plem e ntation of the S EM S

. Und e r OS H A pol ic y

, insp e c tors should

c onsult with a n y e mp l o y e e r e p re s e ntatives on si t e

. To d a te th e re d o e s n o t a pp ea r to b e a n y

such r e quir e ment for o ff shore inspe c t i ons. I n sh o rt the p r inciples of e mp l o y e e p a rticip a t i on

a re p a rt a nd p a r c e l o f the onshore r e g i m e

, a nd a r e d e v e lop i ng in t he n e w o f fsho r e re g i me.



### A r e q u ir eme n t to “ make t h e cas e ”

Althou g h PS M a nd S EMS r eg i m e s h a v e some of the f e a t u r e s of the s a f e t y ca s e a ppr o ac h,

th e y f a ll short in i m port a nt r e spe c ts. A s a f e t y ca se is a c ase

- a n a r gument made to the

re g ulato r

. Compani e s must d e monstr a te to the r e gulator the p r o ce sses th e y h a ve g one thro u g hA nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

5 to identi f y h a z a rds, the methodolo g y th e y h a v e used to a ssess risks a nd t h e r e a soni n g that h a s

led them to c hoo s e one c ontrol r a ther t h a n a n o the r

. F i n a l l y t h e re g ula t or must a c ce pt ( o r

r e

je c t) t h e ca s e

.

W hi l e a s a f e t y ca s e re g i me p r ovides the op e r a tor with a l i ce nse to op e r a t e

, th i s is not true for

e i t h e r onshore or o f fsho r e p r o ce ss h a z a rd re g u l a t i on in the US. I n the US, r eg u l a tors do not

e v a luate a nd p a ss ju d gment of h a z a rd m a n a g e ment plans b e f o re a l l o w ing a n op e r a t i on to

c om m e n ce

.

A s a f e t y c a se do e s not give op e r a tors a f r e e r e in in how th e y r e spond to h a z a rds. Th e y n e e d

to spe c i f y the p roc e dur e s a nd stand a rds th e y in t e n d to a dopt. W h e re a n o p e r a tor p ropos e s to

a dopt a n inad e q u a te sta n d a rd, a s a f e t y c a se r e g u l a tor m a y c h a l l e n ge the o p e r a tor to a dopt a

b e t t e r stand a rd. F or ins ta n ce

, if a n op e r a tor ind i c a ted in i t s s a f e t y ca se that it in t e nd e d to r e l y

on a mani fe st l y ina d e q u a te stand a rd, the re g u l a tor c ould c h a l l e n g e it to a dopt the b e s t

in t e rn a t i on a l stand a rds. Ho we v e r the suc c e ss of th i s c h a l l e n g e m a y d e p e n d on wh e ther or not

the jurisd i c t i on i m poses a g e n e r a l du t y on t h e o p e r a tor to r e du c e risk a s low a s re a sona b l y

poss i ble (s e e b e low), whi c h would in e f f e c t mand a te that op e r a to r s a dopt the b e st

in t e rn a t i on a l s t a nd a rds.

One of the m i s c on ce pt i ons in the US a bout s a f e t y c a se re g ulation is that it invo l v e s the

a

b a ndonment o f p r e s c rip t ion. Th a t i s not so. A sa f e t y ca s e r e quir e s that t e c hnic a l s t a nd a rds be

spe c ified a nd re g ulato r s ca n then e n f o r c e those stand a r ds. Mor e o v e r the r e r e mains room for

p re s c riptiv e

, g ov e rnm e n t

- i m posed re g ulation. F o r e x a mp l e

, r eg u l a t i ons c a n spe c i f y the kinds

of incid e nts t h a t ope ra t o r s a r e r e quir e d to r e port.



### A c o m p ete n t, i nd e p e nd e n t a n d w e ll

- r es ou r ced r e gu l a t o r

Ma n y jurisd i c t i ons arou n d the wo r ld h a ve f a l l e n i nto the tr a p of th i nking that a ll th e y n e e d to

do to ins t i t ute a s a f e t y c a se re g i m e is e n ac t the n ece ss a r y l e g is l a t i on. This is a s e rious e r r o r

.

S a f e t y c a se re g i m e s h a v e on l y fu n c t i on e d w e ll wh e n th e re is a c ompet e n t

, indep e nd e nt a nd

w e l l

- r e sou r ce d re g u l a to r

. I mport a nt l y

, t he in i t i a l p r o c e ss of e v a l u a t i ng a nd a cce pt i n g (or

r e

je c t i n g ) a s a f e t y ca s e r e quir e s a h i g h lev e l of e x p e rtise, if it is not to d e g e n e r a te in t o a

rubb e r st a mp e x e r c ise.

A s a f e t y ca s e re g i m e w i ll a l m ost ce rt a in l y f a il wh e re s a f e t y ca s e s a r e n ot s c rutinis e d b y a

c ompet e nt re g ulator. A d ra matic e x a mp l e of th i s is p r ovided b y the c rash of a B riti s h Air

F o r c e Nimrod in A f g h a nis t a n in 200 6

. 3 The Air F o r c e h a d p r e p a r e d a s a f e t y c a se f o r the

Nimrod whi c h w a s to t a l l y ina d e qu a te a nd f a i l e d t o identi f y the h a z a rds that led to the c r a sh.

The s a f e t y c a se w a s not p re s e nted to a n e x te r n a l r e g u l a tor a nd w a s not su b

je c t to indep e n d e nt

c h a l l e n g e

. 4 I t w a s a p p r ov e d in t e rn a l l y

, without s c ruti n y

, a t a “ c us t omer a cce p t a n c e

3 H addon

- C a v e C, The N i m rod r e v i e w

, H e r Ma j e st y ’ s S t a t i o n e r y O f f i ce, L o ndon, 2 8 O ct 20 0 9.

4 The i m p o r tance o f th i s	c h a llen g e f un cti o n is d isc u s s ed in Le v e s on, N

, “ T h e u s e of s af e t y ca s es i n

ce r t i fi c a t i on and r e g u l a t i o n ”, M I T E SD t ech n i c a l r e po r t , 2011, w eb s it e at

h tt p : / / s u nn y da y

. m it .ed u / s af e r

- w o rl d.A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

6 c onf e r e n c e”

. As a r e su l t, i t s ma n y e r ro r s a nd d e fi c ien c i e s w e nt unno t ic e d. The a cc ident

r e view e x c o r iat e d t h e N i m rod s a f e t y ca s e a s “ a lam e ntable job f r om sta r t to finish” a nd

c on c luded that those r e spons i ble for it disp la y e d “ incomp e te n ce

, c omp l ace n c y a nd

c y n i c is m ”. 5 The point is t h a t without s c ruti n y b y a n indep e nd e nt re g ulato r

, a s a f e t y ca s e m a y

not be w o r th t he p a p e r it is w r i t ten on.

A s a f e t y ca s e re g i m e a l so c h a n g e s wh a t it is t h a t re g ulato r s must do w h e n th e y ma k e si t e

vis i ts. R a ther than inspe c t i ng to e nsu r e that h a rd w a re is w o rkin g

, or that d o c uments a r e up to

d a te, th e y must a udit a g a inst the s a f e t y ca s e

, to e nsure that t h e sp ec ified c ontrols a re

fun c t i oning a s in t e nd e d. The outcome of a n y risk man a g e ment p r o ce ss c a n be sum m a ris e d in

a bowtie di a g r a m, o r s e r ies of such di a g r a ms. A g ood a udi t or will the r e f o re find it use f ul to

stu d y the bowtie di a g ra ms a nd c h ec k wh e ther the c ontrols ind i ca ted in these diag ra ms a re

inde e d in pla ce

. Audit i ng in th i s w a y b r ea th e s l i fe in t o s a f e t y ca s e do c uments. Unl e ss

re g ulato r s a re wil l ing a n d a ble to do th i s, a s a f e t y c a se m a y b e no mo r e t h a n a l if e less s e t o f

do c uments si t t i ng on s ome ina c c e ss i ble shel f

, g a the r i n g dust. Ho we v e r

, such a udi t ing

r e quir e s a sophist i ca ted und e rst a ndi n g of a c c id e nt ca usation a nd p re v e nt i o n, whi c h in turn

me a ns that s a f e t y ca s e re g ulato r s n e e d a hi g h le v e l of e du ca t i o n

. R e g ula t o r s in a s a f e t y ca se

re g i m e must a lso be a b l e to talk a s e qu a ls to c ompa n y risk ma n a g e rs. All of th i s me a ns

p a y i n g them much hi g h e r s a la r ies than a r e tr a d i t i on a l l y p a id to r eg ulat o r sta f f. Compet e nt

s a f e t y c a se re g ulation t h e r e fo r e h a s v e r y si g n i fi ca n t r e sour c e i m pl i ca t i ons.

R ece nt c om m e nts a t t ribut e d to the dir ec tor of the US o f fsho r e s a f e ty re g ulat o r, J a mes

W a tson, su g g e st that the a g e n c y d o e s not in t e nd to e n g a ge c ompani e s in the w a y that is

n ece ss a r y if a s a f e t y ca se r eg i m e is to op e r a te su c ce ssful l y

. A cc o r di n g to c olu m nis t

, J e nnif e r

Dlou h y

,

[ H ] e str e ssed th a t t he la c k of g o v e rnm e nt audits [ of the n e w Sa f e t y a nd

Environm e ntal Mana g e m e nt S y stems] is b y d e s i g n

, to k ee p c ompani e s fo c u s e d on

their own s a f e t y

. “ W e will do v e r y f e w a udi t s ours e lves,” he s a id. “ I f t h e indust r y is

r e l y i n g on the g o v e rnm e nt, t h e y ’ re not g oi n g to be e n g a g e d in t his t hin g

. T h e y ’ re just

g oi n g to po t e nt i a l l y let t h e g o v e rnm e nt do some of the m a n a g e ment

. ” “ The last thing

we w a nt t o do is man a g e these c ompani e s

, ” W a tson add e d. “ W e w a nt t o see them

man a g e thems e lves

. ” 6



### A g e n e r al du t y o f care

Most s a f e t y c a se re g i me s a re support e d b y l e g i s lation that i m poses a g e n e r a l du t y on the

op e r a tor to r e du c e risks “a s low a re a sona b l y p rac t i ca b l e”

, or wo r ds t o that e f f

ec t. This

tr a nsf e rs the c om m on l a w du t y of ca r e in t o l e g is l a ted re qui r e men t

.

This h a s i m port a nt c onse q u e n c e s. F irst, it p r ovides lev e ra g e f o r re g ula t o r s. I f a n o p e r a t o r

wish e s to a dopt a p r o c e dure or a stan d a rd th a t f a l l s short of g ood or b e st p rac t i ce

, the

5 Le v e s o n

, ab o v e n	4, p 259

6 h t tp : / / f u e l f ix

. c o m / b lo g /20 12 /12/ 1 3 /t ou g h e r

- o f f s h ore

- s cr u ti n y

- n o t

- y e t/A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

7 re g ulator ca n r e je c t it on the g roun d s that is d o e s not r e du c e the risk a s low a s r e a sona b l y

p rac t i ca b l e

. This a ddi t i o n a l lev e ra g e is t h e r e a s o n the fi r e p r ote c t i on stand a rds on ri g s in UK

w a te r s a re h i g h e r th a n f o r those in t he Gulf of M e x ico. 7

S ec ond, the g e n e r a l du t y is in e f f e c t a du t y to do wh a te v e r is r ea son a b l y p r ac t i ca b l e to

identi f y a nd c ontrol a ll h a z a rds. An op e r a tor c a n n ot c laim to be in c omp l ian c e just b e c a use it

h a s g o ne thro u g h a h a za rd identifi ca t i on p r o ce ss, if that p r o c e ss is d e mo n str a b l y i n a d e qu a t e

a nd f a i l s to identi f y a nd c ontrol h a z a rds that a r e a sona b le op e r a tor would h a ve identifi e d a nd

c ontroll e d. This mak e s it r e lative l y e a s y to p r o s ec ute c ompani e s f o r a vio l a t i on o f their

g e n e r a l du t y a ft e r a Macond o

- s t y le e v e nt.

Third, the g e n e r a l du t y me a ns that e v e n if the r e is no dir ec t l y a ppl ic a ble rul e

, op e r a t o rs st i ll

h a ve a du t y to man a ge risk. Th e y must the re fo r e maintain some r e a sona b le lev e l of risk

a w a r e n e ss t h a t g o e s b e y o nd me r e c omp l ian ce

. I t i s the g e n e r a l du t y o f c a re that ra ises a s a f e t y

ca se re g i m e a bo v e the blind compl i a n c e ment a l i t y that c h a ra c te r ised t h e M MS re g i m e

. 8

The g e n e r a l du t y of c a r e is in theo r y qui t e i m p r e c ise, but the r e a r e nume r ous ca s e s in whi c h

c ourts h a ve h a d to d ec ide wh e ther the du t y h a s b e e n c omp l ied w i t h. This c a se law g ives f a ir l y

c le a r g uida n c e a s to wh a t the g e n e r a l du t y m e a ns i n p a rticul a r ca s e s.

I nt e r e st i n g l y the r e is a g e n e r a l du t y un d e r the US OSH A c t. S ec t i on 5 (a ) ( 1 ) of the A c t

spe c ifies t h a t e mp l o y e rs must p r ovide a wo r kpl a c e that is ‘‘ f r e e f r om re c o g ni z e d h a z a rds that

a re ca usi n g o r a re l i k e l y to ca use d ea th or s e rious p h y s i ca l h a rm.” This is r a di c a l l y dif f e r e nt

f r om the g e n e r a l du t y to e nsure s a f e t y so far a s re a sona b l y p r ac t i ca ble. I t a pp ea rs to i m pose a

du t y on e mp l o y e rs on l y wh e n the h a z a rd is ac tu a l l y ca usi n g h a rm or is l i k e l y to ca use h a rm.

F or e x a mp l e

, if wo r k e rs a re c u r r e nt l y e x p e r i e n c i n g r e p e t i t i ve str a in in j u r ies or h ea l t h

p r oblems, th i s g e n e r a l du t y is potentia l l y e n f o rcea b l e

. Ho w e v e r the r e a r e insup e r a ble

dif f icult i e s in a pp l y i n g t h is p r ovis i on in d ea l i ng w i t h major h a z a rd industries. S u c h industries

t y

pic a l l y r e l y on d e f e n c e in d e pth, t h a t is, th e y d e pl o y a s e ri e s o f c ontrols or d e f e n c e s a g a inst

the h a z a rds of g r ea test c on ce rn. I f one of t h e se d e f e n c e s is fo r e g o n e

, or is not maintain e d, the

risk of a major a c c ident inc rea s e s, but it m a y st i l l be v e r y sl i g ht. Th e r e in l i e s the re g u l a to r y

p r oblem. I t is on l y if the a bsence or f a i l u r e of t h e d e f e n c e mak e s a n acc i d e n t l i ke ly that t h e

OSHA g e n e r a l du t y a p p l i e s. To g ive a n e x a mp l e

, i t would be dif f icult t o d e monstr a te that

f a i l u r e to l i ve up to some g ood indust r y p r a c t i ce

, s u c h a s the ins t a l l a t i on of a uto m a t i c c utou t s,

w a s ‘ ‘ l i ke l y to ca use d e a th or s e rious h a r m ” (emph a sis a dd e d )

, since w i t h or without such

a

uto m a t i c c utou t s, d ea th or s e rious h a rm is unl i k e l y

, b eca u s e of a ll the other d e f e n ce s that

m a y b e in pla ce

. H o w e v e r, if the r e is a g e n e r a l du t y to r e d u c e risks a s low a s r e a so n a b l y

7 S e e th e w i d e ly circ u la t e d p a p e r b y Bill Ca m pb e ll, f or m e r S h e ll aud it o r, “ A n al y s is o f Ca u s e of E x p lo s ion o n

D ee p w a t e r H oriz on

, 24/6/ 2 0 1 0”, p 8

8 On th is p oi n t se e H o p ki n s ( a b o v e n	2), pp 14 0

- 144A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

8 p rac t i ca b l e

, a nd if a ut o matic c ut o uts a re g e n e ral l y reg a rd e d a s g ood i n dust r y p r ac t i ce

, the

re g ulator will h a ve a str o ng c a se a g a inst a n op e r a t or who fa i l s to i nstall them

. 9

As if in r e c o g ni t ion of t his p r oblem, the r e is a s ec ond p r o n g of the OSH A c t’s g e n e r a l du t y

c laus e

, s ec t i on 5 ( a )( 2 ). T his stat e s that e mp l o y e rs “ shall c omp l y with o cc u p a t i on a l s a f e t y a nd

h ea l t h stand a rds p rom u l g a ted und e r th i s A c t

. ” A cc o r di n g l y

, OS H A h a s d e v e loped a n

e x tensive a r r a y o f re g u l a t i ons whi c h ca n be e n f o rce d und e r th i s c laus e

. Much of OSHA ’ s

e n f o r c e ment a c t i vi t y re l i e s on this asp ec t of the g e n e r a l du t y

.

The d ra wb a c k of s ec t i on 5 (a ) ( 2) it that it is a lw a y s op e n to the e mp l o y e r to a r g ue that the

re g ulation do e s not a pp l y in the p a rticul a r si t u a t i on. Attempts to e n fo r c e p a rticul a r rul e s c a n

the re fo r e le a d to endless leg a l d i sput e s. F or e x a mp l e , in l a te 2009 the US O cc up a t i on a l Sa f e t y

a nd H e a l t h Admin i str a t i on p r opos e d t h a t B P b e f ined $87 m i l l ion, ov e r a n d a bove the in i t i a l

$21 m i l l ion a rising out of the T e x a s Ci t y r e fi n er y disaste r

. The n e w fi n e s w e re for B P ’s

f a i l u r e to i m plem e nt c e r t a in risk r e du c t i on st r a t e gies a t T e x a s Ci t y

. B P ’s l a w y e rs c ontested

the n e w fin e s on v a rious g roun d s. O n e of these c o n ce rn e d the is s ue is wh e t h e r e x is t ing r e l i e f

v a lves should be r e quir e d to me e t a ce rt a in p e r f o rm a n c e stand a rd. T h e A me r ic a n P e trol e um

I nst i tu t e had fo r mu l a ted the p e r f o rm a n c e stand ar d a s ‘ ‘ a r ec om m e nd e d p r a c t i c e ” (RP 520).

B P stated that ‘ ‘ a s a re c o m m e nd e d p r a c t i c e A P I R P 520 w a s not a man d a t o r y s t a nd a rd in t h e

r e fini n g indust r y ”

. I t a g re e d to c omp l y with the stand a r d for n e w ins t a l lations but not for

e x is t ing on e s. OSHA ins i sted that e x is t ing r e l i e f v a lves a t T e x a s Ci t y shou l d c omp l y with the

stand a rd, on the g r oun d s that it i s ‘ ‘ r e c o g ni z e d a nd g e n e r a l l y a cce pted g ood e n g ine e ri n g

p rac t i c e ” (RA G A GEP). B P c ounte re d t h at e x is t i ng r e l i e f v a lves a t most r e fin e ri e s ac ross the

US do not in f a c t c o m p l y a nd th e r e f o re th i s c a nnot c onsti t ute RA G A GEP. I n sh o r t

, B P

r e si st e d OSHA ’ s a t t e mp t s to fo r c e T e x a s Ci t y to a dopt the p e r f o r

m a n c e s t a nd a rd in qu e st i on

on the b a sis that the r e wa s not a r ule th a t unequiv o ca l l y r e qui r ed it to do so

. 10

On the other h a nd, wh e re the r e is a g e n e r a l du t y to r e du c e t h e risk a s low a s re a sona b l y

p rac t i ca b l e

, the ul t i m a te is s ue for a c o u rt or d e c is i o n

- mak e r is no longer wh e th e r the ru l e

te c hnic a l l y a ppl i e s

, but wh e ther the d e f e n d a nt h a s done a ll that is r e a s o n a b l y p r ac t ic a ble to

r e du c e the risk. I n such c ir c ums t a n c e s the d e f e n d a nt will not be h e lped b y a r g ui n g a bout a

leg a l t ec hnic a l i t y

. 11

9 For a	more d e t a il e d an d v e ry u sef u l d i s c us s ion s e e B a r a m

, M, “ Ge n e ric s tr a te g i e s for p r o tecting wor ke r

h e al t h an d sa fe t y : OSHA ’ s g e n e ral du ty cla u s e an d h a z ard c o mm un icati o n sta nd ar d”

, O ccupa ti ona l M ed i c i n e

11 ( 1) 1 996, pp 69

- 77

1 0 For r efe r e n c e s

, s e e H o p ki n s A, ” Ri s k

- m a n ag e me n t a n d r u l e

- complia n c e : D e c i s io n

- m a k i n g in h a z ar d o u s

i ndu s trie s ”

, Sa f

e ty Sc ie nc e 49 (2 0 11) 11 0

– 120, p 116.

1 1 T h e O u ter Co n ti n e n t a l S he lf L a nd s Act (OCS L A) und e r w h ich th e US o f f s h ore r e g u la t or o p e rates a l s o

co n t a i n s a	general du ty p r ov i s io n

, s e c t ion 1348 ( b )

, w h ich s t a t e s : “ It sh a ll b e th e du ty o f an y h ol d e r of a	lea s e

or p e rmit und e r t h is su b c h a p ter t o

— (1) m ai n t a in a ll p lac e s of e m p lo ym e n t

... in c o m p lia n ce with o ccu p a t io n al

s af e ty an d h e al t h sta nd ar d s and

, in a d d iti on

, fr e e from r e c o g n ized h a z ar d s	to e m p lo y e e s ”

.

T h is se em s t o c o m b i n e b oth du ties und e r t h e O SH Act, e x c ep t t h at th e r e qu ir eme n t is t o m ai n t a in th e

w or kp lace f r e e f r o m r e cog n i s e d h a z ar d s

, r ega r d less o f wh e t he r the y a r e li ke l y to c au s e h a r m

. T h is w o u ld s e e m

to b e a n ab s ol u te du ty w h ich w o u ld ma k e it	imp o ss i b l e t o e s ca p e li ab ility a f ter a n e ve n t l i ke M a co nd o. T h e re

w as n o sug g es ti o n a f t e r t h e Maco nd o a cc i d e n t t h at BP b e p r o se c u ted und e r t h is p r o v i s i o n ; t h e Act app e ars t o

b e a d e ad letter in th is r e s p e c t.A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

9 

### Th e mea n i n g o f A L A R P

The g e n e r a l du t y r e quir e s c ompani e s to r e du c e r isks “a s low a s r e a sona b ly p r a c t i ca bl e ”

. This

is inhe re nt l y v a g u e

. T h e le a ding l e g a l in t e r p r e ta t ion is that i t r e quir e s a dopt i on of e f fec t i ve

p reca ut i ons, unless th e re is a “ g ross dispropo r t i o n” b e tw e e n the le v e l of r isk a nd the c ost of

taking p a rticul a r p r e c a ut i ons to r e du c e that risk. T his is e qu a l l y v a g u e

. I n these c i r c ums t a n c e s

c ourts m a y turn for g ui d a n c e to c u r re nt g ood indu s t r y p r a c t ic e or to c u r r e nt indust r y t e c hnic a l

stand a rds. W h e re op e r a t o r s h a ve f a l l e n short of such p rac t ic e s or stand a r ds, th e y will h a ve

dif f icul t y ar g uing t h a t th e y h a ve r e du ce d risks a s low a s r e a sona b l y p r ac t i ca ble. On the other

h a nd, c omp l ian c e with indust r y p r a c t i ce s a nd sta n d a rds do e s not a uto m a t i ca l l y g u a r a ntee that

a n op e r a t o r h a s r e d u c e d the risk a s low a s re a sona b l y p ra c t i ca ble a s it m a y h a ve b e e n

r e a sona b l y p r a c t i ca ble to use some other a nd s a f e r method (s e e M art i n v Boulton and Paul

( St e e l Construction) L td [ 1982] I CR 366 ( Q B ) )

. R ea sona b l y p r a c t i ca ble is not a c on c e pt that

ca n e v e r be g iven a f i x e d me a ni n g, a nd w h a t i s r e a sona b l y p r ac t i ca b l e will v a r y f r om i ndust r y

to i ndust r y

, f a c i l i t y to f ac i l i t y

, a nd ov e r time a s t e c hnolo g y , stand a rds a nd p r a c t i ce s c h a n g e

.

Th e re is h o w e v e r a s c h o ol of thou g ht that reg a rds th i s a pproa c h a s u n a c c e ptab l y a rbitr a r y a nd

subj ec t i ve a nd h a s so u ght to in t rodu c e a more ri g o r ous c os t

- b e n e fit a n a l y sis (CBA). This

d e p e nds on qu a nt i f y i n g the risks, ca lcul a t i n g t h e b e n e fit of some risk r e du c t i on me a su r e

,

usual l y in t e rms of the n umber of l i v e s s a v e d a nd the v a lue o f e ac h s u c h l i fe s a v e d, a n d t h e n

c ompa r i n g the b e n e fit w i t h the c ost of the risk redu c t i on me a sur e

. I f t h e c ost outw e i g hs the

b e n e fit, (or in some in te rp re t a t i ons, is g ross l y dispropo r t i on a te to the b e n e fit) then risk

r e du c t i on me a su r e is j ud g e d to b e not r ea so n a b l y p rac t i ca b l e

.

This a ppro a c h w a s c h a m pioned b y t h e re g ulator i n the UK wh e n o f fsho r e s a f e t y ca s e s w e r e

fi r st in t rodu c e d

. 1 2 Ho we v e r, the r e a r e insurmoun ta ble methodolo g i c a l a nd mor a l obje c t i ons

that h a ve b ee n r a ised a g a inst th i s kind of C B A. S o much so that some c om m e ntat o rs a r g u e

,

not just that C B A shou l d be t r ea ted a s o n e a mong s e v e r a l matte r s to be g iven w e i g ht in

d ec is i on

- maki n g

, but that it should n o t be u s e d a t a l l

. A cc o r di n g to H e in z e rling a nd

A c k e rm a n:

Cos t

- b e n e fit a n a l y sis c a nnot ov e r c o m e i t s f a tal fl a w: it is c o m plet e l y re l i a nt on the

i m poss i ble a t t e mpt to p r ice the p ri ce less v a lues o f l i f e

, h e a l t h, n a ture a nd the futu re

.

B e t t e r publ i c pol ic y d e c i sion ca n be made without c os t

- b e n e fit a n a l y si s

, b y c omb i ning

the suc c e s s e s of t r a di t ional re g ulation with the b e st of t he innovative a nd fl e x ib l e

a

ppro a c h e s that ha v e g a i n e d gr o und in r e ce nt y e a r s

. 13

One r e ma r k a ble e x a mp l e of wh e r e th i s th i nking ca n le a d is p r ovided b y H a r v a rd p ro fe ss o r

Kip Visc u si, who und e r took a c os t

- b e n e fit a n a l y s is of smoki n g

. He c o n c luded that stat e s

sav e d mon e y a s a r e sult of smoking b y their c i t i z e ns! This w a s b eca u s e s moke r s died e a r l y

,

1 2 H e al t h an d S a fe ty E x e c u t i ve

, Re duc ing Risk s

, P r o t ec ti n g P e op le: HSE ’s d e c i s i o n

- ma ki n g pr oce s s (HMS O ),

L ond on 2001 < w w w

. hs e .g o v

. u k/ri s k/ th e or y /r2 p 2. pd f >

1 3 H e i n zerli n g, La n d Ac k e rma n

, F, P r i c ing th e P r i ce les s : C o s t

- B ene f

it An a ly s is o f E n vi r onme n t a l Pro tec ti o n

Ge or g e t o w n U n i ve r s ity L a w C e n ter, 200 2

.A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

10 thus r e du c ing the e x p e n s e of p r ovid i ng nursi n g h omes a nd other s e rvi ce s for the a g i n g

. On

the b a sis of th i s a n a l y sis he sugg e sted that c i g a r e t t e smoking should be s ub sid i s e d r a ther than

ta x e d ! 14

A more p e rtine n t i l lus t r a t i on of the p robl e m in the p re s e nt c onte x t w o uld be a s follows.

E c onom i sts a r g u e that the v a lue of l i fe in dif fe r e nt c ount i e s v a ri e s with the lev e l of

d e v e lop m e nt. Visc u si ca lcul a tes that a round the y ea r 2000, t h e v a lue o f l i fe in J a p a n w a s

$9.7m i l l ion while in T a i w a n it r a n g e d f rom $0.2 to 0.9m i l l ion

. 1 5 I f w e u s e the a v e ra g e o f

these two f i g u re s for T a iw a n, we c on c lude t h a t the v a lue of l if e in J a p a n is a t le a st 17 t i mes

hi g h e r t h a n the v a lue o f l i fe i n T a iw a n. Th e re w e re no tru l y i m pov e r ished c ountri e s in

Visc u si’s l i st, but supp o se we a ssu m e that the v a lue of l i f e

, in a c ount r y l i ke Ni g e ria is a n

o r d e r of m a g ni t ude less than in T a iw a n. W e c on c lude that the v a lue of l i f e in J a p a n is more

than a hund re d t i mes t h e v a lue of l i fe in Ni g e r ia. Consid e r now a m ul t i n a t i on a l pipeline

c ompa n y t r y i n g to use c os t

- b e n e fit a n a l y sis to d e te r m i ne how much to spend on c onstru c t i on

a nd mainten a n c e o f hi g h p re ssure g a s pipe l i n e s in populous a r e a s. I t w o uld be jus t ified in

spen d ing o r d e rs of m a g n i t ude less in Ni g e ria th a n in J a p a n, on the b a sis the v a lue of l i fe in

Ni g e ria w a s o rd e rs of ma g ni t ude less than in J a p a n. This would sur e l y b e a n e th i ca l l y

unten a ble c o n c lus i on.

Th e re is no spa c e h e r e to l a y out H e in z e rli n g a nd A c k e rm a n ’s full r e a soni n g

. S u f fi c e it to s a y

it is e x tr e me l y p e rsu a si v e

. Those who c ont i nue to a dvo ca te CBA n ee d to be v e r y c e rt a in that

th e y ca n e f f e c t i v e l y c ou n ter H e in z e rli n g a nd A c k e rm a n ’ s a r g u m e nts.

As a r e sult of the met h odolo g ic a l d i f f icult i e s i n volved, the UK s a f e t y ca se re g ulator h a s

r e tr e a ted f rom C B A in more r ece nt y ea rs a nd i n c r ea sin g l y r e l i e s on g ood i ndust r y p r a c t ic e a s

a d e monstr a t i on of A L A R P

. 16

I t is i m port a nt to hi g hl i ght th i s r e tr ea t f r om CBA to US a udien ce s. One o f the obje c t i ons that

is s ometi m e s made to sa f e t y ca se re g ulation i n the US i s that it allows e mp l o y e rs to d e te r m i ne

their own risk a c ce pta n c e c rite r ia a nd to i m p o se risks on e mp l o y e e s that m i g ht not be

ac c e ptable und e r more p r e s c riptive a r r a n g e ments. Cle a r l y

, to the e x tent t h a t in the c onte x t of

hi g h h a z a rd industries, A L ARP h a s c ome to me a n followi n g g ood in d ust r y p r ac t i ce s a nd

stand a rds, this is not an issue.



### S u mma r y

The p r e ce di n g discuss i on identifi e s five e le m e nts of a s a f e t y ca s e re g i m e : a h a z a rd

man a g e ment re g ulato r y f r a me w o r k; e mp l o y e e in v olvem e nt; a r e qui r e ment to make the ca s e

for s a f e t y to the re g ula t o r ; a c ompet e nt a nd in d e p e nd e nt r e g ulato r ; a nd a n op e r a t o r g e n e r a l

du t y of c a r e

. T h e five a r e in t e r

- d e p e nd e nt a nd a fun c t i oning s a f e t y ca s e r e g i m e r e quir e s a ll

fiv e

. The f i rst a nd s e c o n d of these e l e ments a lr ea d y e x is t s in the U S

, but the other thr e e a r e

1 4 R ef e r e n c e s ci t e d in H e i n zerl i n g an d Ac k e rman

, ab o v e n	1 4

. 1 5 Vi s c us i, K, “ T h e V a l u e o f L i fe ” Di s c us s ion P a p e r 5 1 7, J un e 2 005, w ww .l a w

. h a v ar d

. e du / p r ogram s /oli n

_ c e n tre/

1 6 S e e a	mo r e c o m p l e te a cco u n t of th is r e treat in H o p ki n s 2 0 11, a b o v e	n	10A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

11 m i ss i n g

. The US will n e v e r be a ble to c laim that it h a s a s a f e t y ca s e r eg i m e unt i l these

a ddi t ional e lem e nts a r e p r e s e nt.

Th e re a r e h u g e i m p e di m e nts stan d ing in the w a y of refo r m in the US. The fi r st is the pol i t i ca l

s y stem, whi c h ma n y c o m m e ntato r s a g r e e is p a r a l y s e d. The Co n g r e ss is hop e less l y div i d e d

a nd majo r i t ies h a ve to be labo r ious l y c onstru c t e d for e v e r y c ontrov e rsi a l bi l l. S o me of the

e lem e nts of a s a f e t y c a s e re g i m e would p r ob a b l y r e quire Congr e ss i on a l le g is l a t i on, whi c h

v e sted in t e r e sts would oppos e

, making the r e f or m task v e r y m u c h more dif f icult than is t h e

ca se in a W e st m ins t e r s y stem such a s Austr a l i a ’s.

The s ec ond p r oblem is that the e x ec ut i ve a rm of g ov e rn m e nt op e r a tes a n O f fi c e of

Mana g e ment a nd B u d g e t whi c h subj ec ts a ll p r opos e d n e w re g ulation to r i goro u s c os t

- b e n e fit

a n a l y sis a nd r e j ec ts p r o p osals wh e re it c a nnot be d e monstr a ted nume r i c a l l y that the b e n e fits

outw e i g h t h e c ost s

. 1 7 Quite a p a rt f r om a ll the other a r g uments a g a inst C B A, it is notorious l y

dif f icult to p r ovide a n u me r ic a l d e monstr a t i on of the b e n e fits of a r eg ula t o r y re g i m e d e si g n e d

to p re v e nt r a r e e v e nts ( s e e b e low). F or th i s r e a s on the methodol o g y of the O M B m i l i tat e s

a g a inst r e g ulato r y innov a t i on.



### Th e effec t i v e n ess of safe t y case r e gi mes

W h a t e viden c e is the r e of the e f fec t i v e n e ss of s a f e t y c a se re g i m e s? T his is a le g i t i m a te

qu e st i on p r opon e nts of the s a f e t y ca se a pproa c h n e e d to add re ss.

Th e re a re h u ge dif f icult i e s in t r y i n g to a s s e mb l e e mp i ri ca l d a ta on t h e e ff e c t i v e n e ss of s a f e t y

ca se re g i m e s. One o f the most si g nifi ca nt is t h a t t h a t since m a jor a cc ident e v e nts a r e r a re it is

dif f icult to c omp i le stat i st i c s that d e monstr a te tr e nds. P rob a b l y the most s e rious e f f o r

t to

p r odu c e such d a ta w a s made in 2006 in a r e port c om m is s ioned b y the UK re g ulator

– the

H ea l t h a nd S a f e t y E x ec u t ive. The r e port a ddr e ssed the e f fec t i v e n e ss of the UK onshore s a f e t y

ca se re g i m e s e t up in 1999 und e r the Control of Major A cc ident H a z a rd (COM A H)

R e g u l a t i ons. The r e port s tat e d:

W e found no dir e c t e vi d e n c e t h a t COM A H is re sul t ing in a r e du c t i on of the risk of

major acc idents. Ho we v e r a s COM A H is d e si g n e d to man a g e risks f r om r a re e v e nts

we would not e x p ec t t o be a ble to s e e s t a t i st i ca l l y robust e viden c e o f a n e f f

ec t

. 18

Giv e n these di f fi c ul t ies, it g o e s without s a y i n g t h a t qu a nt i tative c os t

- b e n e fit a n a l y sis ca nnot

be ca r ri e d out. This me a n s that wh e re the g ov e rn m e nt ins i sts on a qu a nt i tat i ve C B A a s p a rt of

the justific a t i on f o r intr o du c ing n e w re g ulatio n s it will be e x tr e me l y dif f ic u lt to ove rc ome this

obst ac le.

1 7 Bar a m

, M, C h ap 5	in B a ram an d Li nd oe (ed s ) Ri s k G o v e r n a nc e o f O ffs ho r e O il an d Gas O pe r a ti on s

, in p r ess

.

OMB rec o g n i s e s th at in so m e circ um s t an c e s qu a n ti t a t i v e C B A is imp o ss i b l e an d will l i s ten to qu ali t a t i v e CBA

arg u me n t s

. But its e m ph as i s i s o n qu a n ti t a t i v e CBA.

1 8 F e nn i n g, N a n d B o a t h

, M. I m pac t o f th e Co n t r o l o f M a j o r A cc id en t H a z a r d s (C O MAH) R e g u la t i on s 1999.

Re s ea r c h R epo r t 34 3

. H SE 20 0 6, p 11A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

12 The p r opon e nts of the s a f e t y ca se a p p roa c h point out that we ca nnot w a it unt i l the e viden c e is

c on c lus i v e . A c c o r di n g to W i l kinson, a f o r

mer UK sa fe t y c a se re g ulato r

,

I t will be the his t o r ians of h ea l t h a nd s a f e t y who will h a ve the p r iv i l e g e of maki n g

that jud g e m e nt [ a bout the e f f e c t i v e n e ss of the s a f e t y ca s e a p p ro a c h ]

. H ow e v e r, we do

not have the lu x u r y of t i me a nd we must make j u d g ments a s w e g o a lo n g

. 19

I n these c i r c ums t a n ce s we must f a ll b a c k on t h e e x p e rt opin i on. W i lk i n son notes that “ the

n ea r univ e rs a l opin i on of man a g e rs a nd most of the wo r k f o r c e a t h a z a r d ous ins t a l l a t i ons is

that s a f e t y c a s e s h a v e b ee n v e r y s u c c e ssful.” His own e x p e ri e n c e is that s a f e t y c a se

re g ulation has

 I mpro v e d und e rstanding h a z a rds a nd risk

 Enh a n ce d know l e d g e of the te c hnic a l a nd ma n a g e ri a l c ontr o ls r e qui r e d to man a ge

them, a nd

 I mpro v e d ov e rsi g ht b y t h e r e g ulator

I n a p a p e r t i t l e d “ H a s the S a f e t y C a se f a i l e d ? ” F i tz g e r a ld a nd B r ee n c on c lude, a ft e r a n

e x tensive discuss i on, t h a t “ the s a f e t y ca se h a s not f a i l e d. I t is st i ll ac c e pted a s the most

e f

f e c t i ve w a y of man a ging major h a z a rd industries. W h e n p r o p e r l y a p pl i e d it is inde e d

e f

f e c t i v e”

. 20

F i tz g e r a ld a nd B r ee n a r gue that c riticis m s ca n legit i mat e l y b e lev e l l e d a t s a f e t y ca s e re g i m e s,

but these a re a ll to do with i m plem e ntation f a i l u re s, a nd do not ca ll in t o qu e st i on the s a f e t y

ca se f un d a ment a ls

. 21



### Con c l u s i o n

The US h a s b ee n some t hing of a slu m b e ri n g g i a nt wh e n it c omes to the re g ulation of the

p e trol e um indust r y o f fs h o re

, a nd to a les s e r e x tent on shor e

. T h e UK moved to s a f e t y ca s e

re g ulation s e v e r a l d ec a d e s a g o followi n g ma j or acc idents both on a nd o f f shor e

, a nd

in t e r e sted p a rties h a ve b ee n s u g g e st i n g for d e c a d e s that the US do l ik e wise, to no a v a i l

. T h e

M ac ondo acc i d e nt the re f o r e p r ovided a window of oppo r tun i t y f o r the a dvo ca tes of s a f e t y

ca se re g ulation. T h e re h a s b ee n wid e spr e a d m i sund e rst a ndi n g in the U S of p rec ise l y wh a t

th i s invo l v e s a nd th i s p a p e r i s a n a t t e mpt to l a y out the e lem e nts o f a matu r e s a f e t y ca s e

re g i m e

, with th i s in m i nd. Althou g h the r e is in t e r e st a mong re g ulato r s in mov i ng in th i s

dir ec t i on, the obst ac les a re g re a t, a nd the window of oppo r tun i t y p rovid e d b y Ma c ondo m a y

not r e main op e n much l o n g e r.

1 9 Wilki n s o n

, P

, “ Saf e ty Ca s es : S u cc e s s o r Fail u r e ”

, P r es e n t a ti o n t o th e N R C O H

, May 2002 p 9

2 0 Fitzgeral d

, B a n d Bre e n “H as t h e S a fe ty C a s e F a i l e d ? ” P a pe r p r ese n ted t o SP E

, Br i s b a n e

, O ct ob e r 201 0

, p 15

2 1 P a ter s on c on clu d e s th at “ w h i le th e sa f e ty c as e app r o ach may r em ain th e b es t o p ti o n am o n g th e a ltern a ti v e s

(a n d e s p e cially d e t a i l e d p r e s c ri p ti on ), q u es ti on s r e m ain a s t o w h e t h e r it	is a s y e t b e i n g i m p le men t e d as we ll a s

it m igh t .” P a t e r s on J, “H e al t h a n d sa fe ty r e g u la t ion o n th e UK C S : e v ol u ti o n an d f u t u re p r o s p e c t s ”

, C h ap 6	in

Bar a m an d L i nd o e

, ab o v e n 1 7, p	93A nd r e w H o p ki n s E x p lai n i n g “ Saf e ty Cas e ”

13 F inal l y

, a l t ho u g h s a f e t y ca se re g i m e s a r e a n i m p r ov e ment on wh a t w e nt b e fo re

, f u rth e r

i m p r ov e ment is poss i b l e

. Mode r n acc ident a n a l y sis h a s d e monstr a t e d that a n a r r a y of

organisat i onal f a c tors n ee ds to b e a t t e n d e d to i n o r d e r to r e d u c e fu r th e r the risk o f major

acc ident s 22

. Th e se fa c tors a re c u r r e nt l y b e y ond the s c ope of s a f e t y ca s e re g u lations. The n e xt

i t e r a t i on of sa f e t y ca se re g ulation wi l l ne e d to e n c ompass su c h is s u e s.

2 2 S e e H o p ki n s

, ab o v e n	2, p p 14 0

- 1 5 1