COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00497-CR

SEAN ARMSTRONG APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1375092D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Sean Armstrong appeals from his conviction for forgery by 

possession with intent to pass a forged writing, to-wit: money. See Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. § 32.21(e) (West 2011). After Armstrong pleaded true to the repeatoffender paragraph, the trial court sentenced him to fifty-four months’ 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

confinement. In one point, Armstrong argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by admitting his confession that was allegedly obtained by law 

enforcement in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.

2 Because Armstrong’s complaint 

concerning the admission of his confession was not asserted in the trial court, we 

will affirm.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

During the trial to the bench, Carmen Serrato testified that she was a 

cashier at the Albertson’s in Lake Worth on June 24, 2014. Armstrong came to 

Serrato’s lane to check out and handed her two fake twenty-dollar bills to pay for 

his items. Serrato testified that she could tell that the money was fake because it 

felt like ordinary paper and because the ink was blue. Serrato marked the bills 

with a counterfeit marker; the mark turned black, indicating the bills were fake;

and she called the manager to come to her register. Serrato testified that the 

manager came to her register and that Armstrong attempted to leave the store 

but was stopped. 

Jerry Sallee, a police officer with the Lake Worth Police Department, 

testified that on June 24, 2014, he received a dispatch that someone was trying 

to make a purchase at Albertson’s using counterfeit money. When Officer Sallee 

arrived at Albertson’s, he met with loss prevention and Serrato to find out what 

had happened. Officer Sallee then made contact with Armstrong, who had been 

 

2

384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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detained by loss prevention, and asked him if he had any additional fake money. 

Armstrong responded that he had more fake money in his back pocket and that 

his mother had given him the money. Officer Sallee retrieved a white envelope 

from Armstrong’s back pocket; inside the envelope were six additional counterfeit 

twenty-dollar bills. Officer Sallee testified that he read Armstrong the Miranda

warnings at 11:37 a.m., placed him under arrest, and transported him to jail. 

Officer Sallee testified that he could not recall whether he had read Armstrong 

the Miranda warnings prior to talking to him. 

Detective Christopher Gregory with the Lake Worth Police Department 

testified that he and Special Agent Victor Martinez with the Secret Service

interviewed Armstrong after he was transported to jail. Detective Gregory said 

that Officer Sallee had read Armstrong his rights on the scene, that Armstrong 

had indicated his understanding of each of the rights by signing the Miranda card 

containing the warnings, and that Armstrong had agreed to waive those rights 

and to speak to Detective Gregory. During the interview, which was recorded, 

Armstrong gave an oral confession; the recording was admitted into evidence 

without objection. Armstrong also provided a written statement, which was also

admitted without objection. Detective Gregory testified that the Miranda warnings 

were listed at the top of Armstrong’s written statement and that Armstrong had 

initialed below them, indicating that he was waiving his rights. Armstrong’s 

written statement contained the following: “I got the bills From. Stan Beck. An

Christian Walker. The money is from them. Im sure there making it. Lancaster 
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Ave.” Armstrong admitted during his oral statement that he knew that the money 

was counterfeit when he tendered it at Albertson’s. 

Special Agent Martinez testified that the money seized from Armstrong 

was counterfeit because, among other things, it all had the same serial number, it 

was not made of the type of linen paper that is used with genuine currency, and it 

had a security thread that was not clear. Special Agent Martinez further testified 

that in his expert opinion, the bills seized from Armstrong were forged writings 

and were not genuine currency produced by the federal government. 

III. COMPLAINT FORFEITED

In his sole point, Armstrong argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

by admitting his confession that was allegedly obtained by law enforcement in 

violation of Miranda v. Arizona.

To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the 

trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds 

for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request, 

objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Everitt v. State, 407 S.W.3d 

259, 262–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Sanchez v. State, 418 S.W.3d 302, 306 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d). Further, the trial court must have ruled 

on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the 

complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. 

App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Everitt, 407 S.W.3d at 263. A reviewing court should not 
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address the merits of an issue that has not been preserved for appeal. Ford v. 

State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Here, Armstrong did not file a motion to suppress and did not object when 

his oral and written confessions were admitted at trial. Because Armstrong did 

not raise his complaint in the trial court, the merits of the complaint he raises in 

his brief are forfeited. See Brantley v. State, No. 07-13-00218-CR, 2015 WL 

780266, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (holding that appellant’s failure to communicate his 

complaints—regarding a violation of his Miranda rights or the involuntariness of 

any statements he made—in his written motion to suppress and his failure to 

complain during trial about the issues upon which he sought relief on appeal 

operated as a forfeiture of those complaints); cf. Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359,

365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding alleged violation of Miranda right-to counsel 

warning was waived because “global statements” in pretrial motion to suppress 

“were not sufficiently specific to preserve” appellant’s argument), cert. denied, 

549 U.S. 861 (2006). We overrule Armstrong’s sole point.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Armstrong’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
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DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: August 27, 2015