NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-1159

SUSAN L. SCANGAS

vs.

DIANNE C. CORMIER.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In this partition matter out of the Land Court, the

defendant (Cormier), pro se, has noticed appeals from: (1) an 

order of partial distribution, entered August 30, 2022; and (2) 

an order, entered October 18, 2022, denying Cormier's request 

for an additional stay of the order of partial distribution. 

Setting to the side whether either of these orders is subject to 

immediate appeal,1 we discern no error in either order.

The case has been excessively litigated previously, and its 

course has been marked by what can be fairly characterized as

repeated requests for delay by Cormier. We summarize here only 

briefly the history that leads to this appeal. The plaintiff

1 The Land Court docket contained in the assembly of record does 

not reflect either an order for final distribution or an order 

approving the commissioner's final report.
2

(Scangas) filed this action to partition certain property in 

Arlington that she and Cormier co-owned. Cormier opposed. A 

right to partition was found and a commissioner was appointed to 

make recommendations as to whether the property "may be divided 

into shares" and, if not, to sell the property and distribute 

the proceeds. The commissioner concluded that the property 

could not advantageously be divided and recommended its sale; a 

warrant issued confirming the commissioner's appointment and 

authorizing the sale. In January 2022, the commissioner sought 

approval for a sale at just less than $1 million. An order 

approving the sale entered in April 2022. All of these matters 

were the subject of Cormier's earlier appellate proceedings and 

are not at issue here.

After closing, the commissioner filed a request that the 

net sale proceeds -- $921,269.73 -- be equally distributed to 

Scangas and to Cormier and that the commissioner be paid fees 

and costs of $43,560. Cormier opposed, essentially by 

requesting a continuance as a "reasonable accommodation" under 

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et 

seq. On August 30, 2022, the Land Court judge entered the first

order at issue here, essentially ordering that the commissioner: 

(i) "pay to himself his fees and expenses in the amount of 

$43,560.00;" (ii) make a "partial distribution" to Scangas of 

$250,000; and (iii) place the remaining funds into escrow with 
3

the court. The judge also continued the matter to October 14, 

2022, so that the parties could make "any objections to the 

final accounting" and, more specifically, so that Cormier could 

"file her objections, and all supporting material, after which 

the court will set down a briefing and hearing schedule. No 

further extensions shall be allowed." As noted, Cormier filed a 

notice of appeal from this order.

The commissioner filed his final report on September 12, 

2022 (essentially reflecting the distributions and escrow 

ordered on August 30), after which Cormier filed another 

"reasonable accommodation" request for a continuance along with 

purported "objections" (also essentially amounting to a request 

to continue). On October 18, 2022, the judge, apparently 

treating Cormier's pleadings as a motion for reconsideration of 

the August 30 order, denied the motion. Cormier filed a notice 

of appeal from this order as well.

Even taking into account Cormier's pro se status, her 

filings with this court are wholly inadequate. Cormier's brief 

lacks reasoned argument, record citation, or reference to 

meaningful authority. The argument section of her brief 

consists of four paragraphs containing neither legal nor factual 

citations and does not rise to the level of appellate argument. 

See Kellogg v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 1001, 

1003 (2011); Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 
4

Mass. 1628 (2019). She also did not provide an appendix 

sufficient to assess the arguments she raises on appeal. Mass. 

R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019) (duty of 

appellant to prepare and file appendix). Although "some 

leniency is appropriate" for self-represented litigants, the 

rules of procedure "bind a pro se litigant as they bind other 

litigants." Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 617, 620 (1985).

Although we are not required to pass on questions or issues 

that are not adequately briefed, see Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9)

(A), we have nonetheless reviewed Cormier's contention that 

under the ADA, her requests for continuances should have been 

allowed as a "reasonable accommodation" of her claimed 

disabilities because, among other reasons, "like most people who 

have lived on a disability income, [she] could not secure 

representation" and because the Land Court judge "created 

problems for her by refusing her the ability to speak to the 

commissioner or the realtors." Cormier also suggests that 

Scangas "has no apparent need for a quick payout" because 

Scangas purportedly "has a house on the water in Gloucester and 

her husband just was a co-inheritor of a house in Rockport." 

Cormier does not explain what additional continuances might have 

accomplished for her or how the judge might otherwise have 

abused his discretion. Nor does she attempt to address 

Scangas's contention -- which is buttressed by the Land Court 
5

docket, the proceedings in this appeal, and Cormier's 

abandonment of her previous appeal -- that delay has been the 

cornerstone of Cormier's defense to a straightforward petition 

for partition. In the circumstances, she has failed to 

demonstrate any error or abuse of discretion in the judge's 

rulings below.

We accordingly affirm the order of partial distribution, 

entered August 30, 2022, and the order, entered October 18, 

2022, denying Cormier's request for an additional stay of the 

order of partial distribution. We also allow Scangas's request 

for an award of her appellate attorney's fees and costs on the 

ground that the appeal is frivolous. In accordance with the 

procedure specified in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 

(2004), Scangas may, within fourteen days of the issuance of the 

rescript of this decision, submit an application for appellate
6

attorney's fees and costs with the appropriate supporting 

materials. Cormier shall have fourteen days thereafter to 

respond.

So ordered.

By the Court (Wolohojian, 

Milkey & D'Angelo, JJ.2),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: January 26, 2024.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.