United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

INTERSTATE 

COMPACTS 

An Overview of the 

Structure and 

Governance of 

Environment and 

Natural Resource 

Compacts 

April 2007 

 

GAO-07-519 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2007

INTERSTATE COMPACTS 

An Overview of the Structure and 

Governance of Environment and Natural 

Resource Compacts 

Highlights of GAO-07-519, a report to 

congressional requesters 

Interstate compacts are legal 

agreements between states that are

designed to resolve concerns that 

transcend state lines, such as 

allocating interstate waters. While

some compacts assign their 

administration to existing state

agencies, compacts requiring 

greater coordination among states

may establish an interstate agency, 

typically called a commission, to

administer their provisions. 

Congress must give its consent to 

compacts that affect the balance of

power between the states and the

federal government. An example of

a congressionally approved

environment and natural resource

compact is the Tahoe Regional 

Planning Compact, which created

the Tahoe Regional Planning 

Agency (TRPA) to administer its 

provisions. For such compacts,

GAO determined (1) the 

organizational structures, powers 

and authorities, and dispute 

resolution and public 

accountability mechanisms; (2) the

extent to which concerns have 

been raised about the structure and 

governance of compacts that have

commissions; and (3) how the 

structure and governance of TRPA 

compares to those of other similar

compact commissions. 

GAO reviewed 59 congressionally

approved compacts and surveyed 

those 45 that had commissions. To 

view selected results from GAO's

survey of interstate compact 

commission officials, go to

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO07-524SP.

Forty-six of the 59 congressionally approved environment and natural 

resource compacts that GAO reviewed had established interstate 

commissions to administer the compact, while the remainder relied on 

existing state agencies. The 46 compacts with commissions varied in their 

organizational structure, powers and authorities, and means of resolving 

disputes, but were similar in how they ensured public accountability. For 

example, commission size ranged from 2 to 48 members, and some 

commissions had regulatory authority, while others had only advisory 

authority. Twenty-six percent of the compacts had provisions for resolving 

disputes. However, about 36 percent of the commissions responding to 

GAO’s survey reported that they had used means other than litigation to 

resolve disputes. Significantly more, about 94 percent, of the commissions 

reported having procedures for ensuring public accountability, such as 

holding public meetings and allowing public input. For the 13 compacts that 

did not have commissions, GAO found variations in their powers and 

authorities, and few of these compacts provided mechanisms for dispute 

resolution or public accountability. 

Interstate compact commissions reported that significant concerns about 

their structure and governance have rarely been raised. When concerns did 

arise about organizational structure and public accountability, they varied 

from commission to commission. However, concerns about regulatory 

authority largely centered on the scope of the commission’s authority. In 

addition, a number of compact officials believed that concerns about 

commission structure and governance often reflected disagreements with 

specific commission actions rather than actual concerns about the 

organizational structure, public accountability, or regulatory authority of the 

commission itself.

The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency is generally similar in organizational 

structure and governance to three other interstate compact commissions 

with comparable functions—the Columbia River Gorge, Delaware River

Basin, and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions. All four commissions 

consist of appointed representatives, although their size and composition 

vary; they all have an administrative appeals process to resolve disputes, and 

they use similar accountability mechanisms. A major difference between the 

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and the other commissions relates to the 

breadth of its authority regarding land use issues. This authority extends to 

water, air, and other natural resources, as well as public health and safety, 

whereas the Columbia River Gorge Commission has more limited land use 

authority, and the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions 

have no land use authority. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-519.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Anu MIttal at 

(202) 512-9846 or mittala@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 6

Most Environment and Natural Resource Compacts Are 

Administered by Commissions 8 

Significant Concerns about Compact Commissions’ Structure and 

Governance Have Not Been Frequently Raised 13 

While the Structure and Governance of TRPA Are Generally 

Similar to Those of Other Compact Commissions, Its Regulatory 

Authority Is Broader 18 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 28 

Appendix II Descriptions of Interstate Compacts Included in 

Our Review 31 

Appendix III Descriptions of TRPA and Three Selected Compact 

Commissions 35 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Tables 

Table 1: Environment and Natural Resource Compacts, by Subject 

Matter 7

Table 2: Comparison of Commission Management Plan Issues 21 

Table 3: Summary of the Composition of TRPA and Three Other 

Compact Commissions 23 

Table 4: Congressionally Approved Environment and Natural 

Resource Compacts 31 

Figures 

Figure 1: Frequency of Concerns regarding Organizational 

Structure 14

Page i GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Figure 2: Frequency of Concerns regarding Public Accountability 16 

Figure 3: Frequency of Concerns regarding Regulatory Authority 17 

Figure 4: Map of the United States Showing the Jurisdictions of 

TRPA and the CRGC 19 

Figure 5: Map of the United States Showing the Jurisdictions of the 

DRBC and the SRBC 20 

Figure 6: Map and Photographs of the Lake Tahoe Region 35 

Figure 7: Map and Photographs of the Columbia River Gorge 

National Scenic Area 37 

Figure 8: Map and Photographs of the Delaware River Basin 39 

Figure 9: Map and Photographs of the Susquehanna River Basin 41 

Abbreviations 

CRGC Columbia River Gorge Commission 

DRBC Delaware River Basin Commission 

FTE full-time equivalent 

SRBC Susquehanna River Basin Commission 

TRPA Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 

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Page ii GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 3, 2007

The Honorable Don Young 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Natural Resources 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Don Young 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Natural Resources 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John T. Doolittle 

House of Representatives 

Interstate compacts are legal agreements between two or more states that

are designed to resolve problems or concerns that transcend state lines. 

Such compacts enable states to act jointly and collectively to devise 

solutions for matters that are beyond the authority of an individual state 

but which are not within the immediate purview of the federal government 

or easily resolved through a purely federal response. Prior to the twentieth

century, interstate compacts were used almost exclusively to settle state 

boundary disputes. In more recent times, their use has expanded to 

include such diverse purposes as allocating interstate waters, developing

regional transportation systems, and enhancing law enforcement. More 

than 200 interstate compacts exist today, according to the Council of State 

Governments. At least 76 of these compacts are designed to address 

environment and natural resource management issues such as 

conservation and environment (fisheries, forest fire protection, and water

pollution control), energy (low-level radioactive waste), planning and 

development (land use planning for environment and natural resource 

protection), and water resource management (water apportionment and 

flood control). 

Interstate compacts are legal agreements between two or more states that

are designed to resolve problems or concerns that transcend state lines. 

Such compacts enable states to act jointly and collectively to devise 

solutions for matters that are beyond the authority of an individual state 

but which are not within the immediate purview of the federal government 

or easily resolved through a purely federal response. Prior to the twentieth

century, interstate compacts were used almost exclusively to settle state 

boundary disputes. In more recent times, their use has expanded to 

include such diverse purposes as allocating interstate waters, developing

regional transportation systems, and enhancing law enforcement. More 

than 200 interstate compacts exist today, according to the Council of State 

Governments. At least 76 of these compacts are designed to address 

environment and natural resource management issues such as 

conservation and environment (fisheries, forest fire protection, and water

pollution control), energy (low-level radioactive waste), planning and 

development (land use planning for environment and natural resource 

protection), and water resource management (water apportionment and 

flood control). 

To form a compact, two or more states typically negotiate an agreement, 

and then each state legislature enacts a law that is identical to the 

agreement reached. Once all states specified in the compact have enacted

such laws, the compact is formed. In some cases, if a compact affects the 

balance of power between the states and the federal government or affects 

a power constitutionally delegated to the federal government, it must also 

obtain congressional consent. In consenting to a compact, Congress may 

add certain conditions, such as specifying that compact disputes be 

resolved in federal courts. Otherwise, the compact’s subject matter and 

substance are largely left to the discretion of the negotiating parties. 

To form a compact, two or more states typically negotiate an agreement, 

and then each state legislature enacts a law that is identical to the 

agreement reached. Once all states specified in the compact have enacted

such laws, the compact is formed. In some cases, if a compact affects the 

balance of power between the states and the federal government or affects 

a power constitutionally delegated to the federal government, it must also 

obtain congressional consent. In consenting to a compact, Congress may 

add certain conditions, such as specifying that compact disputes be 

resolved in federal courts. Otherwise, the compact’s subject matter and 

substance are largely left to the discretion of the negotiating parties. 

Page 1 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
When negotiating a compact, the states typically establish a framework for 

administering and implementing the compact’s provisions. The framework 

varies widely and depends largely on the subject matter, scope, and 

complexity of the compact agreement. In some cases, the compact does 

little more than prescribe certain conditions with which the member states 

must comply or require the states to cooperate in furthering the purposes 

of the compact. In such cases, the states often assign the compact’s 

administration and implementation to existing agencies or officials within 

the member states. By doing so, the states can coordinate their resources 

to avoid duplicating efforts or costs, take advantage of economies of scale, 

and promote more effective management of issues common to the 

member states. For example, some interstate water allocation compacts 

that distribute fixed quantities of water to each of the member states—

such as the Snake River Compact—assign administrative responsibility to 

the official in each state who is in charge of managing the public water 

supply. 

In contrast, some compacts involve more complex interstate matters that 

require greater coordination among states, such as the disposal of lowlevel radioactive waste. In such cases, states are more likely to delegate 

authority to an interstate agency—typically called a commission—that is 

created to administer and implement the compact’s provisions.1

 The 

nature of each commission’s authority varies and can range from advising 

states on interstate problems to regulating activities of mutual concern. In

general, compact commissions consist of representatives of the member 

states, typically called commissioners. The commissioners are usually 

appointed by elected officials or serve by virtue of their elected position, 

such as governor, or their role as a federal, state, or local government 

official. For example, to administer the provisions of the Tahoe Regional 

Planning Compact, the states of California and Nevada created the Tahoe 

Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), which includes representatives from 

the two states and the federal government. Many compact commissions 

are funded, in whole or in part, by the member states. Although the federal 

government may provide grants or participate in some compact programs, 

compact commissions generally operate independently of the federal 

government. Since interstate compact commissions are neither federal in 

nature nor state in scope, they occupy what some have referred to as a 

“third tier” of government. 

 1

For purposes of this report, the term “commission” includes agencies, authorities, and

boards created to administer interstate compacts. 

Page 2 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Because of your interest in congressionally approved interstate compacts2

that address environment and natural resource issues and, in particular, 

the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, this report describes (1) the 

approaches used to administer congressionally approved environment and 

natural resource compacts, including their organizational structure, 

powers and authorities, and mechanisms for resolving disputes and 

providing public accountability; (2) the extent to which concerns have 

been raised regarding the structure and governance of those compacts, 

like the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, that have commissions; and 

(3) specifically, how the structure and governance of TRPA compares to 

those of other similar compact commissions. 

To conduct this review, we identified and reviewed 59 congressionally 

approved interstate compacts that address environment and natural 

resource management issues, interviewed compact experts and officials, 

and surveyed compact commission officials on the approaches used to 

structure and govern their compacts and the extent to which concerns 

have been raised regarding these approaches. We surveyed officials from 

only 45 of the 46 compacts that established commissions, because 1 

commission was not yet operational at the time of our review. We received 

responses from 36 of the 45 compact commissions we surveyed, for a 

response rate of 80 percent. In addition, using the survey results, we 

identified 3 compact commissions that have functions similar to those of 

TRPA: the Columbia River Gorge Commission, the Delaware River Basin 

Commission, and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission. To compare 

TRPA to these three commissions, we interviewed commission staff in 

Stateline, Nevada; White Salmon, Washington; West Trenton, New Jersey; 

and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In addition, we reviewed commission 

documents and activities, and interviewed compact stakeholders, 

including commission members; federal, state, and local government 

officials; environmentalists; and members of the business community, 

among others. See appendix I for additional details on our scope and 

methodology and appendix II for additional details on the 59 

congressionally approved environment and natural compacts we 

reviewed. A more complete summary of the results of our survey of 

compact commission officials can be viewed on our Web site at 

www.gao.gov in an electronic supplement that we are issuing concurrent 

with this report—GAO-07-524SP. We conducted our review from April 

 2

For purposes of this report, the phrase “congressionally approved interstate compacts”

refers to compacts for which Congress provided consent through legislation. 

Page 3 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
2006 through March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Most congressionally approved interstate compacts that address 

environment and natural resource issues have established commissions to 

administer the compact’s provisions. Of the 59 compacts that we reviewed, 

46 established interstate commissions, while the remaining 13 were 

administered by existing agencies or officials in the member states. Among 

the 46 compacts with commissions, we found variations in organizational 

structure, powers and authorities, and provisions for resolving disputes, 

but several similarities in how they provided for public accountability. For 

example, the number of commissioners ranged from 2 to 48, and some 

commissions included a representative of the federal government, while 

others did not. Additionally, some commissions had regulatory authority,

while others were limited to more of an advisory role. For example, the 

Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission has regulatory authority 

to set water pollution control standards for the Ohio River, while the Gulf

States Marine Fisheries Commission is limited to making 

recommendations to help member states promote the conservation, 

development, and utilization of fishery resources in the Gulf of Mexico. 

With regard to dispute resolution, although only 26 percent of the 

compacts with commissions specified ways to resolve disputes other than

litigation, 36 percent of them had used processes such as arbitration, 

mediation, administrative appeals, and negotiations to resolve disputes. 

Compact commissions generally used similar means of providing public 

accountability. For example, almost all of the commissions had 

procedures in place, such as giving the public access to commission 

documents, holding public meetings, and allowing public input, to ensure 

public accountability, even when not required by their compact. For the 13 

compacts that do not establish commissions, we found that their powers 

and authorities also varied. Eight of these compacts had authorized 

member states to develop regulations jointly to further the compact’s 

objectives, while five required member states only to coordinate resources 

to meet the compact’s goals. Compacts without commissions did not 

typically contain provisions addressing dispute resolution or public 

accountability, but their administering agencies or officials are subject to 

state requirements and procedures. Only 3 of the 13 compacts without 

commissions specified methods for resolving disputes, and one specified

mechanisms for providing public accountability. 

Results in Brief 

Significant concerns about the structure and governance of interstate 

compact commissions have not been frequently raised. Specifically, less 

Page 4 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
than half of the compact commissions that responded to our survey 

reported that concerns had been raised infrequently about the 

organizational structure and public accountability of their commissions, 

and about two-thirds of the commissions with authority to issue 

regulations reported that concerns had been infrequently raised about 

their regulatory authority. Concerns regarding organizational structure 

varied by commission and ranged from issues such as who should be 

represented on the commission to whether commissioners should be 

elected or appointed. Concerns regarding public accountability also 

varied, from issues such as whether the commission had adequate 

oversight to whether the commission was sufficiently independent of its 

member states. Concerns about the commissions’ regulatory authority 

have generally focused on the extent of the commission’s power, and were

more frequently raised when the issues being addressed by the compact 

were highly controversial. Moreover, a number of compact officials 

believe that the concerns raised about the commission’s structure and 

governance often reflected disagreements with specific commission 

actions or decisions, rather than general concerns about the commission’s 

organizational structure, public accountability, or regulatory authority. 

TRPA’s organizational structure and governance are generally similar to 

those of other interstate compact commissions with similar functions, but 

TRPA has greater land use planning authority. Specifically, we identified

three interstate compact commissions that perform similar functions to 

TRPA—the Columbia River Gorge, Delaware River Basin, and 

Susquehanna River Basin Commissions. These commissions are similar to 

TRPA in that they have the authority to issue regulations and they have 

developed comprehensive management plans that address at least six of 

the following issues: land use, transportation, conservation, recreation, 

public services and facilities, water pollution, flood control, and waste 

disposal. TRPA and the three other commissions have similar 

organizational structures, with each having appointed representatives, a 

staff, and advisory committees. However, the commissions differ in size, 

interests represented, and the role of the federal representative. As for 

governance, all four commissions generally use similar means, such as an

administrative appeals process, to resolve disputes that may arise with 

those they regulate. In addition, all four commissions also use similar 

public accountability mechanisms, such as undergoing an annual financial 

audit, regularly reporting their activities to member states, and holding 

public meetings where the public can provide input. A major distinction 

between TRPA and the three other compact commissions is that TRPA has 

broad land use authority that extends to water, air, and other natural 

resources, as well as public health and safety, while the Columbia River 

Page 5 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Gorge Commission only regulates land use when it affects cultural, 

natural, recreational, or scenic resources, and decisions made by the 

Delaware River Basin and Susquehanna River Basin Commissions only 

indirectly affect land use. 

Interstate compacts are legal agreements between states that bind 

member states to their provisions in the same manner as contracts entered 

into by individuals or corporations. Traditionally, compacts were 

negotiated by special joint commissions appointed by the state governors. 

Increasingly, however, compacts have been formulated by interested 

groups of state officials or other stakeholders and then recommended to 

the state legislatures. In either case, each state legislature accepts the 

compact by enacting a law that adopts the terms of the agreement. When 

the required number of states have enacted such a law, the compact is 

formed. 

Background 

In cases where the compact affects the balance of power between the 

federal government and the states, the states must obtain the consent of 

Congress for the compact to be valid. Congress generally gives its consent 

in one of three ways: (1) after the fact, by passing legislation that 

specifically recognizes and consents to the compact as enacted by the 

states; (2) in advance, by passing legislation encouraging states to enter 

into a specified compact or compacts for specified purposes; or (3) 

implied after the fact, when actions by the states and the federal 

government indicate that Congress has granted its consent even in the 

absence of a specific legislative act. In addition, Congress may impose 

conditions as part of granting its consent, and it typically reserves the right 

to alter, amend, or repeal its consent. Any proposed amendment to a 

compact must follow the compact approval process, unless the compact 

specifies otherwise. 

The use of interstate compacts has changed over time in terms of number, 

subject matter, and scope. Of the 32 compacts enacted between 1789 and 

1920, most resolved boundary disputes between 2 neighboring states. As 

the twentieth century progressed, states increasingly used interstate 

compacts to address complex problems that were not confined to their 

borders, such as apportioning interstate waters, supervising out-of-state 

offenders under community supervision, and constructing and 

administering bridges and shared port facilities. According to the Council 

of State Governments, more than 200 interstate compacts exist 

nationwide, with each state belonging to an average of 25 compacts. Along 

with the increasing numbers and subjects covered, interstate compacts 

Page 6 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
have also expanded their range of coverage from 2 states to as many as 50

and may also include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S. 

territories, and Canadian provinces as signatories. 

Over one-third of the compacts that exist today deal with environment and 

natural resource issues. Although a large number of these compacts deal 

with water allocation, they address other subjects as well. 

Table 1: Environment and Natural Resource Compacts, by Subject Matter 

Subject matter Number

Number with 

congressional 

approval

Water apportionment 22 22

Water resources and flood control 12 9

Low-level radioactive waste disposal 12 10

Water pollution control 7 4

Fisheries conservation 6 6

Forest fire protection 6 4

Conservation and environment (other than water pollution 

control, fisheries conservation, and forest fire protection) 

5 1

Energy (other than low-level radioactive waste disposal) 4 2

Planning and development (land use planning involving 

environment and natural resource protection) 

2 1

Total 76 59

Source: GAO analysis of Council of State Governments’ data. 

In addition to addressing a variety of subjects, the scope of these 

environment and natural resource compacts ranges from 2 to as many as 

30 states, and includes, in some cases, the District of Columbia, Canadian 

provinces, or the United States as signatories. As table 1 shows, about 

three-fourths of these compacts have received congressional approval. 

Prior to the 1920s, existing agencies and officials within compact states 

routinely administered interstate compacts. However, as states began to

jointly tackle issues of greater complexity and broader geographic scope,

the use of interstate commissions gained popularity. The majority of the 

compacts enacted since 1970 have established interstate commissions. 

These commissions consist of appointed representatives of each 

compacting state, called commissioners, who are responsible for 

administering the compact’s provisions. Additionally, commissions may 

employ technical and other staff to assist in the compact’s administration. 

In some cases, commissions will hire an executive director who is 

Page 7 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
responsible for administering the commission’s daily operations in 

accordance with the commission’s direction and policies. In addition, 

commissions may have advisory committees that study issues and make

recommendations to the commissioners. These committees may be 

permanent or temporary in nature, depending on need. 

Of the 59 interstate compacts we reviewed, 46 established commissions to 

administer the compact’s provisions, while the remaining 13 were 

administered by existing agencies or officials in the member states. Among 

the compacts with commissions, we found variations in organizational 

structure, powers and authorities, and provisions for resolving disputes, 

but similarities in how the compacts provided for public accountability. 

The 13 compacts without commissions also varied in powers and 

authorities. In addition, they generally did not contain provisions for 

alternative dispute resolution or public accountability, but their 

administering agencies or officials are subject to state requirements and 

procedures. 

Most Environment 

and Natural Resource 

Compacts Are 

Administered by 

Commissions 

Organizational Structure 

and Governance Generally 

Varied among Compacts 

Administered by 

Commissions 

The 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed varied in 

organizational structure, such as the number of commissioners and staff; 

powers and authorities, including whether the compact granted advisory 

or regulatory authority; and the dispute resolution mechanisms provided 

as alternatives to litigation.3

 However, the compacts shared similarities in 

their approaches for providing public accountability. 

The 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed generally varied in 

organizational structure, including the composition and size of the 

commission, use of administrative staff, and use of advisory committees. 

Organizational Structure 

Commission composition. The commissions established by the 46 

compacts we reviewed varied in size and interests represented. In all 

cases, the commissioners were appointed to serve—generally by elected 

officials or by virtue of their state office, such as governor or head of a 

state natural resources department. However, the number of 

commissioners ranged from 2 to 48, with each state generally having an 

equal number of commissioners. For example, the Rocky Mountain LowLevel Radioactive Waste Compact required that each of its three member 

 3

One of the 46 commissions was not yet operational at the time of our review. 

Page 8 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
states appoint one representative to the commission, while the New 

England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact required that each of 

its seven member states appoint 5 commissioners. Depending on the 

compact, there were as few as 1 and as many as 7 commissioners from 

each state. Of the 46 compacts, 15 explicitly required member states to 

appoint commissioners to represent additional interests. For example, 11 

compacts provided for local representation, 4 required the appointment of 

a knowledgeable citizen from each state, and 1 required the appointment 

of an industry representative from each state. In addition, 18 of the 46 

compacts, such as the Connecticut River Valley Flood Control Compact, 

specified the number of commissioners from each state, but left it to each

state to decide how to choose its commissioners. 

Of the 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed, 21 provided for a 

federal representative on the commission. For 16 of these compacts, the 

President appointed the federal representative; the other 5 compacts 

named an official of a specified federal agency, such as the Director of the 

U.S. Geological Survey. While nearly half of the compacts with 

commissions had federal representation, only 4 of these compacts—the 

Connecticut River Atlantic Salmon, the Delaware River Basin, the 

Susquehanna River Basin, and the Upper Colorado River Basin 

Compacts—explicitly gave the federal representative the power to vote on 

commission decisions or actions. 

Staff. Compacts also varied in their provisions for staff to conduct day-today operations and provide technical assistance to the commissions. Only 

8 of the 46 compacts explicitly required that their commissions hire staff, 

an additional 34 compacts left it to the commissions’ discretion to hire 

staff, and 4 compacts made no provisions for staff. In practice, we found 

that 67 percent of the commissions that responded to our survey reported 

having an administrative staff. Among these commissions, the number of 

full-time equivalent staff ranged from 1 to 85. 

Advisory committees. The way compacts provided for committees to 

advise the commission varied. Only 4 of the 46 compacts we reviewed 

expressly required their commissions to establish an advisory committee, 

while another 13 expressly authorized them. For example, the Pacific 

States Marine Fisheries Compact required that its commission establish a 

permanent advisory committee to represent the interests of the 

commercial fishing industry on an ongoing basis, as well as short-term 

advisory committees to draft position papers on a specific commission 

issue, such as ecosystem management. In practice, however, about 75 

percent of the commissions responding to our survey reported having at 

Page 9 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
least one advisory committee, and about 56 percent of these commissions 

reported that members of the public served on at least one of their 

advisory committees. 

The powers and authorities granted to the compact commissions also 

varied. In some cases, the commission only had advisory authority. For 

example, the Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission makes 

recommendations to its member states on the conservation, development, 

and utilization of fishery resources in the Gulf of Mexico, but it does not 

have the authority to implement its recommendations. In other cases, the

compacts explicitly granted commissions the authority to issue 

regulations. For example, the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation 

Commission has the authority to set water pollution control standards for 

the Ohio River. We also found cases where the commissions had both 

advisory and regulatory authority. For example, the Delaware River Basin 

Commission studies and advises states on approaches to water 

management, but also regulates water quality and water supply. In some 

cases, we had difficulty determining from a compact’s language whether 

the commission was advisory or regulatory in nature. However, over 55

percent of the commissions that responded to our survey reported that 

they had the authority to issue regulations, with 95 percent of these 

commissions reporting that they have sufficient authority to enforce the 

regulations they issue. 

Powers and Authorities 

The 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed also differed in their 

provisions for resolving disputes among the compact states or between the 

commission and those it regulates. While compact disputes generally can 

be brought before a court for review, litigation can be expensive. Possible 

alternatives to litigation include the following: 

Dispute Resolution 

• Arbitration—a process by which the parties refer a dispute to an agreedupon, independent third party for resolution. 

• Mediation—a process by which a neutral person facilitates discussion 

between the disputing parties to help them reach agreement.

• Administrative appeals—a process by which an action of the commission 

can be appealed to the commission itself. 

• Negotiation—a process by which the parties attempt to reach agreement

through discussion and compromise. 

Page 10 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Only 12 of the 46 compacts with commissions that we reviewed (26 

percent) specified alternative approaches for resolving disputes. Of these 

compacts, 9 made provisions for the use of arbitration, 2 provided for 

negotiations, and 1 called for mediation. For example, the Klamath River 

Basin Compact—which manages water resources for irrigation, fish and 

wildlife protection, and domestic and industrial use, among other things—

required that if the commission’s two voting members failed to agree on 

any matter before the commission, the commission must refer the matter 

to an independent third party for resolution. However, while 12 compacts 

expressly mentioned the use of arbitration, mediation, administrative 

appeals, or negotiation for resolving disputes, 36 percent of our survey 

respondents reported that they have used one or more of these dispute 

resolution mechanisms. Among these respondents, 7 had used mediation,

5 had used an administrative appeals process, 5 had used negotiations, and 

1 had used arbitration. 

While compact commissions varied with respect to organizational 

structure, powers and authorities, and methods for resolving disputes, 

they generally used similar approaches to provide accountability to the 

public, even when not required by their compact. For example, while only

18 of the 46 compacts expressly required that commission documents be 

made available to the public, all of the commissions that responded to our 

survey reported that they have given the public access to commission 

meeting minutes, and 94 percent reported that they also make available to 

the public documents used in preparation for commission meetings. 

Further, 94 percent of the survey respondents reported that they had 

established procedures—such as holding public meetings and allowing 

public input—to ensure public accountability. In addition, 78 percent of 

the commissions reported that they have conducted some form of public 

outreach. These commissions used various outreach approaches, such as 

meeting with stakeholders to discuss their needs and concerns, operating

a commission Web site, distributing newsletters and press releases, 

holding symposiums, producing public service announcements, and 

making educational presentations to schoolchildren. 

In addition, 6 of the 46 compacts that established commissions explicitly 

required representatives from the public to sit on advisory committees. 

However, according to our survey responses, at least an additional 9 

Public Accountability

Page 11 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
commissions have allowed representatives from the general public to 

serve on advisory committees, although they were not required to do so.4

Financial reporting by the compact commissions was frequently practiced

as a means of providing accountability to both the public and member 

states. Among the 46 compacts administered by commissions, 25 required

that the commission undergo an annual financial audit. Of the 

commissions responding to our survey, 86 percent reported undergoing 

financial audits. Of the commissions that undergo financial audits, 90 

percent told us that they undergo annual financial audits, with the rest 

undergoing financial audits somewhat less frequently. All of the 

commissions that undergo financial audits told us that they reported their 

audit results to the member states, and 71 percent of these commissions 

made their audits available to the public. 

The 13 compacts administered by existing agencies or officials also had 

varied powers and authorities. Compacts administered by state agencies 

or officials contained few provisions for dispute resolution and 

accountability. However, these agencies and officials are required to 

follow state requirements. 

Eight of the 13 compacts administered by existing agencies or officials 

authorized member states to jointly develop regulations for achieving 

compact objectives, while 5 required member states only to coordinate 

resources to meet compact goals. In general, the 8 regulatory compacts 

required that the member states mutually consent to any regulations 

issued under the compact. For example, the Columbia River Compact 

mandated that laws and regulations for protecting fish in the Columbia 

River be created or amended only with the mutual consent of both states. 

The 5 compacts that called for coordination among member states 

typically called for either sharing expenses among the member states or 

joint oversight of the compact’s subject matter. For example, the Middle 

Atlantic Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact requires member states 

to help each other in combating, controlling, or preventing forest fires. 

Compacts without 

Commissions Varied in 

Their Powers and 

Authorities 

Powers and Authorities 

 4

While 6 of the 46 compacts that established commissions explicitly required 

representatives from the public to sit on their advisory committees, only 3 of these 

compacts required that the commission actually establish an advisory committee. The 

other 3 compacts gave their commissions the authority to create one or more advisory 

committees, but did not require them to do so. 

Page 12 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Only 3 of the 13 compacts administered by existing agencies or officials 

specified methods for resolving disputes. However, the state agencies and 

officials that administer these compacts are already subject to state 

dispute resolution requirements or procedures. One of the 3 compacts that 

specified methods for resolving disputes is the Colorado River Compact—

a highly controversial water allocation compact—that gives the governors 

of the member states the authority to appoint individuals to consider and 

resolve certain conflicts that arise between member states regarding a

compact issue. Similarly, the New Hampshire-Vermont Interstate Sewage 

and Waste Disposal Facilities Compact and the New Hampshire-Vermont 

Interstate Public Water Supply Compact, which authorize municipalities to 

enter into agreements to establish joint waste facilities and public water 

supplies, respectively, require that these agreements include provisions for 

arbitration and dispute resolution. 

Of the 13 compacts administered by existing agencies or officials, only 1 

contained any provision relating to public accountability. However, as 

with dispute resolution, the state agencies or officials that administer 

these compacts are already subject to state requirements for providing 

public accountability. The Jennings Randolph Lake Project Compact, 

which provides for Maryland and West Virginia to jointly manage the 

natural resources of Jennings Randolph Lake, is the only compact 

administered by existing agencies that includes provisions for 

accountability. It called for the states to encourage the dissemination of 

“joint publications, press releases, or other public information.” 

Interstate compact commissions reported that significant concerns about 

their structure and governance have rarely been raised. While almost twothirds of the 36 commissions responding to our survey reported that 

significant concerns have been raised at least once about their 

commission’s organizational structure, public accountability, or regulatory

authority, none of the commissions reported that these concerns have 

been raised frequently. Moreover, a number of officials responding to our 

survey believed that these concerns often reflected disagreements with 

specific commission actions rather than general concerns about 

organizational structure, public accountability, or regulatory authority. 

Survey respondents reported that concerns about organizational structure 

have been raised infrequently. As shown in figure 1, less than half of the 36 

compact commissions responding to our survey reported that significant 

concerns have been raised about their commission’s structure or 

Dispute Resolution 

Public Accountability

Significant Concerns 

about Compact 

Commissions’ 

Structure and 

Governance Have Not 

Been Frequently 

Raised 

Concerns about 

Organizational Structure 

Page 13 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
composition—with 13 commissions reporting such concerns as seldom 

and 4 reporting such concerns as occasional. We found no consistent 

theme among the concerns identified. Examples of concerns included 

whether the appropriate interests were represented on the commission, 

whether the balance of state and local interests on the commission was 

fair, where the commission should be located, and how many votes each 

state should have. Regarding concerns about the method of selecting 

commissioners, less than one-third of the 36 commissions reported that

such concerns had been raised at all—with 7 reporting such concerns as 

seldom and 3 as occasional (see fig. 1). When concerns were identified, 

they also varied by commission and included, for example, whether 

commissioners should be directly elected to the commission and whether 

commission appointments were too political. 

Figure 1: Frequency of Concerns regarding Organizational Structure 

On occasion, 4

Seldom, 13

Never, 19

0%

Frequently, 0

Source: GAO.

11.1%

52.8% 36.1%

8.3%

19.4%

72.2%

On occasion, 3

Seldom, 7

Never, 26

0%

Frequently, 0

Frequency of concerns regarding structure or

composition

Frequency of concerns regarding the method of

selecting commissioners

Note: Totals may not equal 100 percent because of rounding. 

Page 14 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Survey respondents also reported that concerns about public 

accountability have been raised infrequently. As shown in figure 2, less 

than half of the 36 compact commissions responding to our survey 

reported that significant concerns have been raised about their 

commission’s public accountability—with 14 respondents reporting such 

concerns as seldom and 2 reporting such concerns as occasional. Again,

there was no consistent theme among the concerns identified. For 

example, 1 commission reported that a concern had been raised about 

whether the commission had adequate oversight, while another 

commission reported that concerns had been raised about whether the 

commission was sufficiently independent of its member states. Some 

concerns about public accountability have resulted in lawsuits. For 

example, the Susquehanna River Basin Commission was sued in 2006 for 

allegedly failing to provide adequate notice of public hearings on proposed 

changes to its water regulations.5

Concerns about Public 

Accountability 

 5

Complaint at 11, Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. The Susquehanna River Basin Commission, 

Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-02454 (C.D. Pa. 2006). This suit, which was filed in the U.S. District

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, was still pending at the time of our review. 

Page 15 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Figure 2: Frequency of Concerns regarding Public Accountability 

5.6%

On occasion, 2

Seldom, 14

Never, 20

0%

Frequently, 0

Source: GAO.

55.6% 38.9%

Note: The total does not equal 100 percent because of rounding. 

Concerns about 

Regulatory Authority 

Twenty of the 36 compact commissions responding to our survey reported 

that they have the authority to issue regulations. As shown in figure 3, over 

two-thirds of these commissions reported that significant concerns about 

their current regulatory authority have been raised infrequently—with 9 

reporting such concerns as seldom and 5 as occasional. Although the 

specific concerns varied from commission to commission, the concerns 

often involved the scope of the commission’s authority. For example, 1 

commission reported that concerns had been raised about whether it had 

the authority to regulate certain types of water rights, while another 

commission reported that concerns had been raised about whether it had 

too much regulatory authority. Commissions have also been sued over the 

scope of their authority. For example, a group of landowners 

unsuccessfully sued the Columbia River Gorge Commission and the 

Secretary of Agriculture on a number of grounds, including that the 

commission’s decision to deny the landowners’ applications to develop

their properties resulted in an illegal taking of private property under the 

Page 16 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
U.S. Constitution.6

 Notably, survey responses indicated that concerns 

about regulatory authority were more frequently raised in cases where the 

compact had addressed highly controversial issues. 

Figure 3: Frequency of Concerns regarding Regulatory Authority 

Never, 6

Seldom, 9

0%

Frequently, 0

On occasion, 5

Source: GAO.

30.0%

45.0%

25.0%

Note: The total number of responses equals 20, because only 20 of the 36 commissions responding 

to our survey reported that they had the authority to issue regulations. 

Concerns Have Reflected 

Disagreement with 

Commission Actions or 

Decisions 

A number of commission officials told us they believed that when 

concerns have been raised about a commission’s structure and 

governance, they often reflected underlying disagreements with specific 

commission decisions or actions. Officials repeatedly reported that some 

of the concerns about organizational structure, public accountability, and 

regulatory authority were raised only when an individual objected to a 

specific commission decision or action. For example, an official from one 

commission believed that a concern raised about the commission’s 

accountability to the public actually reflected an individual’s anger over a 

particular commission decision, while an official from another 

 6

Columbia Gorge United-Protecting People & Property v. Yeutter, 1990 WL 357613, CV No. 

88-1319-PA (D. Or. May 23, 1990), aff’d by 960 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Page 17 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
commission stated that concerns about the methods used to select 

commissioners have been raised only when someone dislikes a particular

regulation issued by the commission. Similarly, an official from a third 

commission stated that people have raised concerns about the 

commission’s organizational structure and authority when they simply 

disliked the commission’s actions and that such concerns arise as the 

commission deals with controversial or high-visibility issues. 

TRPA’s organizational structure and governance are generally similar to 

those of three other interstate compact commissions with similar 

functions—the Columbia River Gorge, Delaware River Basin, and 

Susquehanna River Basin Commissions. However, TRPA has greater 

regulatory responsibility and more extensive land use planning authority 

than these commissions. 

While the Structure 

and Governance of 

TRPA Are Generally 

Similar to Those of 

Other Compact 

Commissions, Its 

Regulatory Authority 

Is Broader 

Three Interstate Compact 

Commissions Perform 

Similar Functions to TRPA

We identified three interstate compact commissions that perform similar 

functions to TRPA, including the Columbia River Gorge Commission 

(CRGC), the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), and the 

Susquehanna River Basin Commission (SRBC). TRPA is responsible for 

developing and implementing an environmental and land use plan to 

preserve the natural quality of the Lake Tahoe region (see fig. 4). The 

CRGC is responsible for developing and adopting a management plan that 

regulates, through land use ordinances, the development and use of 

various categories of land within the Columbia River Gorge National 

Scenic Area (see fig. 4). Both the DRBC and the SRBC are responsible for 

multipurpose planning, development, and management of the water and 

water resources in the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basins, 

respectively (see fig. 5). (For more information on these compacts, see 

app. III.) 

Page 18 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Figure 4: Map of the United States Showing the Jurisdictions of TRPA and the CRGC 

89

28

50

Lake Tahoe Region

Lake

Tahoe

Columbia River Gorge

Sources: TRPA (basin map); CRGC and Oregon Department of Transportation (gorge map); Map Resources (U.S. map). 

PLACER CO.

DOUGLAS CO.

WASHOE CO.

CARSON

CITY

EL DORADO CO.

South

Lake

Tahoe

California

Nevada

MULTNOMAH CO.

HOOD RIVER CO.HOOD RIVER CO.

WASCO CO.

SKAMANIA CO. KLICKITAT CO.

Columbia River Gorge

National Scenic Area

TRPA jurisdictional area

Troutdale

Portland (16 mi.)

S

CLARK CO.

KAMANIA CO.

Washington

Multnomah

Falls

The Dalles

Oregon

Columbia River

Columbia River

Page 19 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Figure 5: Map of the United States Showing the Jurisdictions of the DRBC and the SRBC 

Trenton

New

York

City

Dover

Allentown

Philadelphia

Atlantic Ocean

Delaware

Bay

Maryland

Delaware

Pennsylvania

New

Jersey

New York

Delaware River

C h e s a p e a k e B a y

Maryland

Delaware

Pennsylvania

New York

New

Jersey

Renovo

Atlantic

Ocean

Delaware

Bay

Susquehanna River

Susquehanna River

Ch e s a p e a k e B a y

Sources: DRBC, SRBC (basin maps); Map Resources (U.S. map).

Susquehanna River Basin

Harrisburg

Elmira Binghamton

Delaware River Basin

Basin

Page 20 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Like TRPA, these three commissions have the authority to issue 

regulations. Also, like TRPA, these three commissions have developed a 

comprehensive plan for achieving their compact’s objectives. While their 

compact objectives differ, at least six of the issues addressed in their 

comprehensive plans are similar to those addressed in TRPA’s plan, 

including land use, transportation, conservation, recreation, public 

services and facilities, water pollution, flood control, and waste disposal. 

See table 2 for a comparison of issues addressed by the four management 

plans. 

Table 2: Comparison of Commission Management Plan Issues 

Issue 

Tahoe Regional

Planning

Agency 

Columbia 

River Gorge

Commission 

Delaware River 

Basin

Commission 

Susquehanna

River Basin

Commission 

Land use x x x x 

Transportation x x

Conservation x x x x

Recreation x x x x

Public services

and facilities x x x x

Water pollution x x x x 

Flood control x x x 

Waste disposal x x 

Source: GAO.

TRPA’s Organizational 

Structure and Governance 

Are Generally Similar to 

Those of Three Other 

Compact Commissions 

TRPA and the three other compact commissions have similar 

organizational structures, but differ in size, composition, and role of the 

federal representative. In terms of governance, the four commissions also 

use similar means for resolving disputes and providing accountability. 

TRPA and the three other commissions have similar organizational 

structures that consist of appointed commissioners, a staff, and advisory 

committees. However, commission composition differs in terms of size, 

interests represented, and role of the federal representative. 

Organizational Structure 

Commission composition. TRPA’s governing board is similar to those of 

the three other commissions in that it consists of appointed members, 

including a representative of the federal government. However, TRPA is 

more like the CRGC in terms of its size, interests represented, and role of 

Page 21 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
the federal representative. Specifically, TRPA’s governing board has 15 

members. California and Nevada each have 7 members, including 4 

statewide and 3 local representatives, and the federal government has a 

representative.7

 All 7 California board members are appointed by elected 

officials. Four Nevada board members are appointed by elected officials, 2 

serve by virtue of their state office, and 1 is appointed at-large by the other 

Nevada members. The federal representative is appointed by the 

President. All board members, except the federal representative, can vote

on matters before the commission. In comparison, the CRGC has 13 

members, including 3 appointees of each governor, 1 appointee of each of

the 6 counties in the Scenic Area, and a federal representative who is a 

member of the U.S. Forest Service appointed by the Secretary of 

Agriculture. As with TRPA, all of the CRGC’s commissioners are voting 

members except the federal representative. 

The remaining two commissions are much smaller than TRPA. The DRBC 

and the SRBC have only 5 and 4 members, respectively, including a 

representative of the federal government. Unlike TRPA and the CRGC, 

each state has one commissioner—the governor or a designee. According 

to DRBC and SRBC officials, the designee is typically the head of the 

state’s natural resources or environmental protection department. The 

federal representative is an officer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

appointed by the President. Unlike the federal representatives on TRPA 

and the CRGC, the federal representatives on the DRBC and the SRBC can 

vote on commission matters, because the United States is a party to the 

compacts. 

 7

Originally, the compact provided for an 11-member governing board, with each state 

having 3 local and 2 statewide representatives. However, the compact was amended in 1980

by adding 2 statewide representatives from each state, increasing the board’s size to 15 

members. 

Page 22 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Table 3: Summary of the Composition of TRPA and Three Other Compact Commissions

Item 

Tahoe Regional Planning

Agency 

Columbia River Gorge 

Commission 

Delaware River 

Basin Commission 

Susquehanna River 

Basin Commission 

Compacting parties 2 states 2 states 4 states and the 

United States 

3 states and the United

States 

Number of commissioners 15 13 5 4

State members 7 from each state, 

including 4 statewide and 3

local representatives 

6 from each state, 

including 3 state and 3

local appointees

1 from each state 1 from each state 

Method of selection Appointed by elected 

officials or by virtue of their 

state office; at-large 

member appointed by the 

other Nevada board 

members 

Appointed by elected 

officials 

Appointed by virtue of 

their state office 

Appointed by virtue of 

their state office 

Special requirements All California state 

representatives and at 

least 1 from Nevada must 

reside outside the region; 

local representatives must 

reside in their appointing 

body’s jurisdiction 

1 state representative from 

each state must reside in 

the Scenic Area; local 

representatives must 

reside in their respective

counties 

None None

Federal member Appointed by the President An employee of the Forest 

Service appointed by the 

Secretary of Agriculture 

An officer of the U.S. 

Army Corps of 

Engineers appointed

by the President 

An officer of the U.S. 

Army Corps of 

Engineers appointed by 

the President 

Role of federal member Nonvoting Nonvoting Voting Voting

Source: GAO analysis of interstate compacts.

Staff. Like the three other commissions, TRPA employs an executive

director who is responsible for administering the commission’s day-to-day 

operations in accordance with the commissioners’ direction and policies. 

The executive director is assisted by a staff of technical and other 

employees. At the time of our review, TRPA had the largest staff, with 85 

full-time equivalent (FTE) positions.8

 In comparison, the DRBC had 43 

FTEs, the SRBC had 35 FTEs, and the CRGC had 8.75 FTEs. 

Advisory committees. All four commissions rely on advisory committees 

to study issues and make recommendations to the commissioners. For 

 8

An FTE generally consists of one or more employed individuals who collectively complete 

2,080 work hours in a given year. Therefore, either one full-time employee or two half-time 

employees equal one FTE. 

Page 23 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
example, TRPA has a 19-member advisory planning commission—

composed of planning and natural resource management professionals in 

the region, as well as members of the public—that assists the governing 

board with technical and scientific issues dealing with land use planning. 

The advisory planning commission holds hearings, reviews proposed 

amendments to TRPA’s plans and ordinances, and makes 

recommendations to the governing board. In addition, TRPA’s governing 

board has formed four advisory committees, composed of board members, 

to review and make recommendations to the board on legal, operational, 

public education and outreach, and local government matters. Similar to 

TRPA, both the DRBC and the SRBC have established ongoing issuerelated advisory committees that sometimes include members of the 

public. For example, the DRBC has established a flood advisory 

committee and the SRBC an agricultural water use committee. Moreover, 

officials of the CRGC, the DRBC, and the SRBC reported that their 

commissions set up short-term committees, which may include members 

of the public, to provide input on specific issues or concerns that arise. 

To avoid litigation, TRPA and the three other commissions generally use 

similar mechanisms for resolving disputes between the commission and 

those it regulates. These mechanisms include administrative appeals, 

mediation, and negotiation. Specifically, TRPA, like the three other 

compact commissions, has an administrative appeals process that allows 

individuals to appeal a final action of the executive director to the 

governing board without proceeding directly to court. In addition, TRPA, 

like the CRGC and the DRBC, also uses mediation as an alternative 

process for resolving disputes. However, only the CRGC explicitly 

provides for mediation as part of its administrative appeals process. Lastly, 

TRPA, like the CRGC and the SRBC, uses negotiation to resolve cases 

involving noncompliance with its regulations. 

Dispute Resolution 

In addition to using similar mechanisms for resolving disputes, the four 

commissions use similar mechanisms to help ensure accountability. Some 

mechanisms serve to help ensure accountability and transparency of 

commission decisions, while others provide financial accountability. 

Generally, all four commissions: 

Public Accountability

• Report their activities to state or federal agencies or officials. TRPA, like 

the CRGC and the SRBC, regularly reports to its member states’ budget 

committees during its budget cycles. According to TRPA and CRGC 

officials, TRPA and the CRGC have also been required to report to state 

legislative oversight committees. Both the DRBC and the SRBC are 

required by their compacts to prepare an annual report to the legislative

Page 24 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
bodies of their member states. In contrast, TRPA and the CRGC are not 

required by their compacts to issue an annual report. In addition to their 

regular reporting, all four commissions report to state or federal agencies 

or officials when requested. 

• Conduct periodic progress reviews. As required by their compacts, all 

four commissions conduct periodic reviews of their progress toward 

meeting compact objectives and make the results available to the states 

and the public. Specifically, TRPA assesses its progress toward achieving 

the goals of its comprehensive plan every 5 years and issues a report. The 

CRGC conducts a similar assessment every 10 years. The DRBC evaluates 

its progress toward its strategic plan every year, and the SRBC does so 

from time to time, but not according to a set schedule. 

• Undergo state evaluations of their performance. TRPA, like the CRGC 

and the DRBC, undergoes state evaluations of its performance. However, 

such evaluations do not occur on a regular basis. The most recent TRPA 

evaluation occurred in 2004, the CRGC in 2003, and the DRBC in 2006. 

While no member state has evaluated the SRBC’s performance, officials 

reported that state member representatives have on occasion audited the

commission’s financial records. 

• Make commission meetings and records available to the public. All four 

commissions hold meetings that the public can attend, and provide 

opportunities for the public to provide input into decision making. They 

also make commission records available to the public, such as commission 

meeting minutes and records of individual members’ votes, enabling the

states and the public to hold individual commissioners accountable for 

their decisions. 

• Conduct public outreach. All four commissions use various approaches to 

conduct public outreach, such as press releases, commission Web sites, 

workshops, presentations, newsletters, and speakers’ bureaus. 

• Undergo annual financial audits. All four commissions are audited 

annually and the results are presented to each commission in a public 

meeting. Such audits are required for the CRGC, the DRBC, and the SRBC 

by their compacts. In the case of the DRBC and the SRBC, the audits must 

be performed by third parties. 

• Submit grant reports. All four commissions submit reports to the 

appropriate state and federal agencies, as required by the agencies, for 

grant monies received. 

Page 25 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
While all four commissions have the authority to adopt and enforce 

regulations, a major distinction between TRPA and the three other 

compact commissions is that TRPA has broad land use planning authority 

that requires it to address a wide range of environmental issues. 

Specifically, under its compact, TRPA is required to adopt environmental 

standards to protect the natural environment and to maintain public health 

and safety within the Tahoe region. The nine standards adopted by TRPA 

address air quality, water quality, soil conservation, wildlife habitat, fish 

habitat, vegetation preservation, noise, recreation, and scenic resources. 

After setting the standards, TRPA was required to adopt a regional plan 

and ordinances to achieve and maintain the standards. The ordinances 

were required to contain, at minimum, standards for water purity and 

clarity; subdivision; zoning; tree removal; solid waste disposal; sewage 

disposal; landfills; excavations; cuts and grading; piers, harbors, 

breakwaters or channels, and other shoreline developments; waste 

disposal in shoreline areas; waste disposal from boats; mobile home parks; 

house relocation; outdoor advertising; flood plain protection; soil and 

sedimentation control; air pollution; and watershed protection. Further, 

these ordinances preempt the regulations of local and state agencies in the 

region, unless such regulations are stricter, and must be interpreted 

consistently with federal laws that may also apply within the Lake Tahoe 

region. Any project that may substantially affect the land, water, or any 

other natural resources of the Lake Tahoe region must comply with 

applicable provisions of the compact, the regional plan, ordinances, and 

rules and regulations. 

In comparison to TRPA, the CRGC is more limited in its land use planning 

authority. Whereas TRPA is broadly responsible for how and to what 

extent land—as well as water, air, and other natural resources—is used 

within the region, the CRGC only regulates the use of land when it affects 

cultural, natural, recreational, or scenic resources. For example, unlike

TRPA, the CRGC cannot regulate land use for public health and safety, 

such as natural hazards, or for noise. Further, the CRGC can set and 

enforce standards only when a county fails to enact land use ordinances 

consistent with the commission’s management plan, and only one of the

six counties in the Scenic Area has failed to do so. In contrast, neither the 

DRBC nor the SRBC has regulatory authority over land use; instead, local

jurisdictions have such authority. However, the decisions of the DRBC and 

the SRBC, which both regulate water consumption and withdrawal, 

indirectly affect land use because the water withdrawal requirements each

commission sets to manage water resources in its respective basin can 

influence how land can be used. 

TRPA Has More Extensive 

Land Use Planning 

Authority than the Three 

Other Commissions 

Page 26 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees. We will also provide copies to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Anu K. Mittal 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 

Page 27 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

Our review focused on congressionally approved interstate compacts that 

address environment and natural resource issues. Specifically, we were 

asked to determine (1) the approaches used to administer congressionally 

approved environment and natural resource compacts, including their 

organizational structure, powers and authorities, and mechanisms for 

resolving disputes and providing public accountability; (2) the extent to 

which concerns have been raised regarding the structure and governance 

of those compacts, like the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, that have

commissions; and (3) specifically, how the structure and governance of

the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) compares to those of other 

similar compact commissions. 

To determine the approaches used to administer congressionally approved 

interstate compacts that address environment and natural resource issues, 

we used Interstate Compacts & Agencies 2003, a directory compiled by 

the Council of State Governments, and prepared a list of 76 such 

compacts.1

 From this list, we identified and reviewed 59 compacts with 

congressional approval. We also obtained and reviewed relevant compact

documents, such as bylaws, rules of procedure, and management plans, 

for information on the compact’s organizational structure, powers and 

authorities, and mechanisms for resolving disputes and providing public 

accountability. In addition, we developed and distributed a Web-based 

survey to officials from the 45 compacts with an operational commission 

to obtain additional information on the structure and governance of their 

compacts, as well as the extent to which significant concerns have been 

raised regarding commission structure or composition, method of 

selecting commissioners, current regulatory authority, and public 

accountability.2

The practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce 

nonsampling error. For example, differences in how a particular question

is interpreted, the sources of information available to respondents, or the 

types of people who do not respond can introduce unwanted variability 

into the survey results. Therefore, we included steps in developing and 

administering the survey for the purpose of minimizing such nonsampling 

errors. For example, we pretested the survey with three compact 

commission officials and used their feedback to refine the survey. Also, to

 1

This directory is the most recent compilation of interstate compacts available. 

2

The Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact established a commission, but at the

time of our review, the commission was not yet operational.

Page 28 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

reduce survey nonresponse, we sent e-mail reminders and conducted 

follow-up telephone calls with nonrespondents. Overall, officials from 36 

of the 45 compacts in our sampling frame responded to our survey, for a 

response rate of 80 percent. Where necessary, we conducted follow-up 

telephone interviews with commission officials to clarify survey responses 

and obtain additional information on the concerns raised regarding their 

commission’s structure and governance. 

In addition to our survey, we contacted officials of compacts without 

commissions to obtain information on the administration of these 

compacts. 

To determine the extent to which concerns have been raised regarding the 

structure and governance of compacts with commissions, we used the 

results of our survey of compact commission officials to identify 

commissions where significant concerns about commission composition, 

method of selecting commissioners, current regulatory authority, and 

public accountability have been raised. We conducted follow-up 

interviews with commission officials to obtain additional information on 

the nature and frequency of these concerns. We also reviewed relevant

documents, such as studies, news articles, and court cases for information 

on concerns. We also interviewed interstate compact experts to obtain 

their views on issues related to the organizational structure, authority, and 

public accountability of compact commissions. 

To determine how TRPA compares to other interstate compact 

commissions, we used the results of our survey of compact commission 

officials to identify commissions that are similar to TRPA. The criteria for

selecting similar commissions included (1) having the authority to issue 

regulations and (2) having a plan for achieving the compact’s objectives 

that addresses at least six of the following issues: land use, transportation, 

conservation, recreation, public services and facilities, water pollution, 

flood control, and waste disposal. We identified three commissions that 

met these criteria—the Columbia River Gorge Commission, the Delaware 

River Basin Commission, and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission. 

To obtain information on each of these commission’s structure and 

governance, we obtained and reviewed relevant documents, such as 

compact plans, commission meeting minutes, reports, and news articles. 

We interviewed commission staff in Stateline, Nevada; White Salmon, 

Washington; West Trenton, New Jersey; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and 

attended meetings of TRPA, the Columbia River Gorge Commission, and 

the Nevada legislative oversight committee on TRPA. In addition, we 

interviewed compact stakeholders, such as commissioners; federal, state,

Page 29 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

and local government officials; environmentalists; business community 

members; and representatives of groups regulated by the commissions to 

obtain their views on the organizational structure and governance of their 

commissions. 

We conducted our work from April 2006 through March 2007 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 30 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix II: Descriptions of Interstate 

Compacts Included in Our Review 

This appendix provides information on the 59 congressionally approved

environment and natural resource compacts that we included in our 

review. 

Table 4: Congressionally Approved Environment and Natural Resource Compacts 

Compact Members Description

Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Compact 

4 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

Arkansas River Basin Compact of 1970 2 states Apportions the waters of the Arkansas River Basin and creates a 

commission to administer the agreement, encourage pollution 

abatement programs, and facilitate cooperation for total development 

and management of water resources in the river basin. 

Arkansas River Compact of 1949 2 states Apportions the waters of the Arkansas River and establishes an 

administration as the supervising agency. 

Arkansas River Compact of 1965 2 states Apportions the waters of the Arkansas River Basin, establishes a 

commission to administer the agreement, and encourages further 

pollution-abatement programs.

Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact 15 states Establishes a commission to promote better utilization of fisheries 

along the Atlantic seaboard. 

Bear River Compact 3 states Apportions the waters of the Bear River and establishes a 

commission to administer the agreement. Also allocated new blocks 

of water for future development in the three member states. 

Belle Fourche River Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of the Belle Fourche River with particular 

emphasis on administering public water supplies in the two member 

states. 

Big Blue River Compact 2 states Establishes a commission to promote interstate comity and equitably 

apportion the waters of the Big Blue River Basin to promote orderly 

development of water resources and to continue active water 

pollution abatement programs. 

Canadian River Compact 3 states Establishes a commission to apportion the waters of the Canadian 

River in New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas, and to perform all 

functions required by the compact. 

Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive

Waste Compact 

4 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

Central Midwest Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Compact 

2 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

Colorado River Compact 7 states Apportions the waters of the Colorado River Basin. 

Columbia River Compact 2 states Provides for the regulation, preservation, and protection of fish in the 

waters of the Columbia River. 

Columbia River Gorge Compact 2 states Establishes a regional agency to govern the planning and 

development of the area designated by the Columbia River Gorge 

National Scenic Area Act. Powers include disapproving county land 

use ordinances that are inconsistent with the area’s management 

plan and enacting ordinances setting standards for using nonfederal 

land within the scenic area. 

Appendix II: Descriptions of Interstate 

Compacts Included in Our Review 

Page 31 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix II: Descriptions of Interstate 

Compacts Included in Our Review 

Compact Members Description

Connecticut River Atlantic Salmon Compact 3 states Promotes the restoration of anadromous Atlantic salmon by

developing a joint interstate program for stocking, protection, 

management, research, and regulation. 

Connecticut River Valley Flood Control 

Compact 

3 states Establishes a commission to provide for financial reimbursement by 

downstream states for economic losses to political subdivisions in 

which flood control reservoirs are located. 

Costilla Creek Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of Costilla Creek and creates the necessary 

administrative structure. Amended in 1963 to perfect further 

utilization of interstate waters.

Delaware River Basin Compact 4 states & U.S. Establishes a commission as a regional multipurpose water 

resources regulatory agency. 

Great Lakes Basin Compact 8 states Establishes a commission to advise and make recommendations to 

the member states concerning regional water resources matters. 

Gulf States Marine Fisheries Compact 5 states Establishes a commission to promote the better utilization of the 

fisheries of the seaboard of the Gulf of Mexico by developing a joint 

program for promoting and protecting such fisheries and preventing 

the physical waste of the fisheries from any cause. 

Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas 30 states Establishes a commission to study and make recommendations 

about energy efficiency that would help member states’ economies 

and encourage energy independence. 

Jennings Randolph Lake Project Compact 2 states Provides for concurrent jurisdiction among West Virginia, Maryland, 

and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to enforce civil and criminal 

laws of these states concerning natural resources, boating, and other 

regulations over the land and waters of the Jennings Randolph Lake 

Project. 

Klamath River Basin Compact 2 states Establishes a commission to promote comprehensive development, 

conservation, and control of the resources of the Klamath River. 

La Plata River Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of the La Plata River and creates a 

commission to administer the compact. 

Merrimack River Flood Control Compact 2 states Establishes a commission to coordinate flood control planning and 

water resource management in the basin of the Merrimack River and 

its tributaries. 

Middle Atlantic Forest Fire Protection 

Compact 

7 states Provides mutual assistance in forest fire protection and control. 

Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive

Waste Compact 

6 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

New England Interstate Water Pollution 

Compact 

7 states Establishes a commission to coordinate the water pollution control 

activities of the signatory states as they pertain to the waters of the 

compact area. Other activities include assurance of water quality 

planning and standards in the compact area, improving groundwater 

program coordination, and distributing public-oriented information 

addressing current environmental issues. 

New Hampshire-Vermont Interstate Public 

Water Supply Compact 

2 states Authorizes local governments in New Hampshire and Vermont to 

enter into agreements for jointly erecting and maintaining public 

water supply facilities. 

Page 32 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix II: Descriptions of Interstate 

Compacts Included in Our Review 

Compact Members Description

New Hampshire-Vermont Interstate Sewage

and Waste Disposal Facilities Compact 

2 states Authorizes local governments and sewage districts in New

Hampshire and Vermont to engage in programs for abatement of 

pollution through joint facilities for the disposal of sewage and other 

waste products. 

Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive

Waste Management Compact 

3 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

Northeastern Forest Fire Protection 

Compact 

7 states, 1 

national forest, &

3 provinces 

Establishes a commission to promote effective prevention and 

control of forest fires in the New England states, New York, and 

adjoining Canadian provinces.

Northwest Compact on Low-Level 

Radioactive Waste Management 

8 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact 8 states Establishes a commission for the purpose of maintaining waters in 

the river basin in a satisfactory condition, available for use as public 

and industrial water supply after reasonable treatment, suitable for 

recreational use, and capable of maintaining healthy aquatic

communities. 

Pacific Marine Fisheries Compact 5 states Establishes a commission to promote the conservation, 

development, and management of Pacific coast fishery resources 

through coordinated regional research, monitoring, and utilization. 

Pecos River Compact 2 states Establishes a commission to administer the compact and apportion

the waters of the Pecos River.

Potomac River Compact of 1958 2 states Establishes a commission to conserve and improve fishing resources 

in the tidewater portion of the Potomac River. 

Potomac Valley Compact 3 states, D.C., & 

U.S. 

Creates a conservancy district and establishes a commission to 

cooperatively preserve water quality and to conserve water and 

related land resources of the Potomac River Basin. 

Red River Compact 4 states Provides for the equitable apportionment of the waters and

tributaries of the Red River. 

Republican River Compact 3 states Establishes an agency to provide for the most efficient use of basin 

waters for multiple purposes and to provide for the equitable division 

of water. 

Rio Grande Compact 3 states Establishes a commission to administer the compact and apportion

water. 

Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Compact 

3 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

Sabine River Compact 2 states Establishes a commission to apportion the waters of the Sabine 

River and to plan, develop, and conserve the water resources of the 

river basin. 

Snake River Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of the Snake River. 

South Central Forest Fire Protection 

Compact 

5 states Provides mutual aid in forest fire protection and control among the 

states in the south central area. 

South Platte River Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of the South Platte River. 

Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive

Waste Compact 

7 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

Page 33 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix II: Descriptions of Interstate 

Compacts Included in Our Review 

Compact Members Description

Southeastern Forest Fire Protection 

Compact 

10 states Provides mutual aid in forest fire prevention and control among 

states in the southeastern area. 

Southern Compact 16 states Provides for regional cooperation in the proper utilization of energy 

and environmental resources in the southern states. 

Southwestern Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal Compact 

4 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

Susquehanna River Basin Compact 3 states & U.S. Establishes a federal-interstate administrative commission to engage 

in comprehensive planning, development, and management of water 

and related resources of the Susquehanna River Basin. 

Tahoe Regional Planning Compact 2 states Establishes a regional planning agency with power to adopt and 

enforce a regional plan of resource conservation and development 

and to exercise various environmental controls over the Tahoe 

Basin. Amended in 1980 to require adoption of environmental 

threshold capacities for the Tahoe Basin. 

Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal Compact 

2 states Establishes a commission to manage and dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste generated within member states’ borders. 

Thames River Flood Control Compact 2 states Establishes a commission to administer the compact and promote 

the cooperation in flood control and in the use of water resources of 

the Thames River Basin. 

Tri-State Sanitation Compact 3 states Creates a commission to promote water pollution abatement and 

control within the tidal and coastal waters in the adjacent portions of 

Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York. Since 1962, the 

commission has served as the coordinating and planning agency for 

air quality control within the tristate boundary area. 

Upper Colorado River Basin Compact 5 states Establishes a commission to administer apportionment of the waters 

of the Upper Colorado River Basin System and to promote

agricultural and industrial development. 

Upper Niobrara River Compact 2 states Apportions the waters of the Upper Niobrara River Basin and the 

ground waters common to Nebraska and Wyoming. 

Wheeling Creek Watershed Protection and 

Flood Prevention District Compact 

2 states Establishes a commission for the purpose of administering programs 

of flood control and preservation of natural resources and 

recreational facilities in the Wheeling Creek watershed. 

Yellowstone River Compact 3 states Establishes a commission to apportion the waters of the Yellowstone 

River. 

Sources: The Council of State Governments’ Interstate Compacts & Agencies 2003 and GAO analysis. 

Page 34 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix III: D

Selected

escriptions of TRPA and Three 

 Compact Commissions 

Page 35 GAO-07-519 

Appendix III: Descriptions of TRPA and 

Three Selected Compact Commissions 

This appendix describes the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) and 

three compact commissions that perform similar functions to TRPA. 

Tahoe Regional Planning 

Agency 

Lake Tahoe is located in the Sierra Nevada Mountains on the border of 

California and Nevada (see fig. 6). Approximately two-thirds of the lake

lies in California and one-third in Nevada. Lake Tahoe is about 22 miles 

long and 12 miles wide and has a surface area of 191 square miles. With an 

average surface elevation of 6,225 feet above sea level, Lake Tahoe is the

highest lake of its size in the United States. The lake, which is known for 

its exceptional purity and clarity, has been called a national treasure. 

Figure 6: Map and Photographs of the Lake Tahoe Region

Reports of Lake Tahoe’s beauty did not go unnoticed. By the turn of the 

twentieth century, the lake had become a summer resort, primarily for the 

wealthy. Following World War II, the Tahoe region experienced rapid 

growth with the availability of modern snow removal equipment, which 

Source: TRPA (basin map).

89

28

50

Lake

Tahoe

PLACER CO.

DOUGLAS CO.

WASHOE CO.

CARSON

CITY

EL DORADO CO.

South

Lake

Tahoe

California

Nevada

Source: Matt Smith.

Source: Matt Smith.

Source: Corey Rich.

TRPA jurisdictional area

Interstate Compacts
Appendix III: Descriptions of TRPA and Three 

Selected Compact Commissions 

enabled the states to keep the highways into Lake Tahoe open during the 

winter months, coupled with the establishment of year-round casinos in 

Nevada and the 1960 Winter Olympic Games in nearby Squaw Valley, 

which further stimulated development of the winter sports industry. 

Postwar affluence and increased leisure time, along with rapid population

growth in urban centers in northern California, resulted in a large increase 

in the number of tourists and seasonal residents at Lake Tahoe. In 

response to growing concerns about the impact of development on Lake 

Tahoe and its environment—particularly a proposal for a four-lane 

freeway with a bridge over Lake Tahoe’s famed Emerald Bay, the states of 

California and Nevada negotiated a bistate compact that created a regional 

planning agency to oversee development at Lake Tahoe. Congress gave its 

consent to the compact in 1969.1

The Tahoe Regional Planning Compact established the Tahoe Regional 

Planning Agency (TRPA) to administer the compact. It also created a 

governing board that, according to TRPA officials, functioned like a 

regional planning board. The majority of the board members were local 

residents. Project approval required a majority of votes from each state. 

Further, the compact had a provision that if a project was not acted upon

within 60 days, the project would automatically be deemed approved. 

Under this provision, development continued unchecked, and the compact 

was amended and ratified by Congress in 1980 to give more control to 

statewide rather than local representatives and to eliminate the 60-day 

provision.2

The compact, as amended, grants TRPA the authority to establish 

environmental quality standards, called thresholds, and to adopt and 

enforce a regional plan and ordinances for achieving and maintaining the 

standards while providing opportunities for orderly growth and 

development consistent with the standards. 

Columbia River Gorge 

Commission 

The Columbia River Gorge is a canyon up to 4,000 feet deep that stretches 

for over 85 miles as the Columbia River cuts through the Cascade 

Mountains, forming the boundary of the states of Washington and Oregon 

(see fig. 7). Because of its scenic beauty, abundant natural resources, and 

multicultural history, the Columbia River Gorge has been called a national 

 1

Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969). 

2

Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980). 

Page 36 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix III: Descriptions of TRPA and Three 

Selected Compact Commissions 

treasure. In addition, the gorge provides many recreational 

opportunities—such as fishing, hiking, rock climbing, and world-class 

windsurfing—that attract millions of visitors a year. 

Figure 7: Map and Photographs of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area MULTNOMAH CO. HOOD RIVER CO.

HOOD RIVER CO.

WASCO CO.

SKAMANIA CO. KLICKITAT CO.

Troutdale

Portland (16 mi.)

S

CLARK CO.

KAMANIA CO.

Washington

Multnomah

Falls

The Dalles

Oregon

Columbia River

Columbia River Gorge

National Scenic Area

Sources: CRGC and Oregon Department of Transportation.

Source: GAO. Source: CRGC. Source: CRGC.

The completion of a highway along the Columbia River in 1915 opened up

the gorge to recreation and stimulated growth on both sides of the river. 

By the 1930s, development impacts on the gorge were becoming a source 

of concern and, by the 1950s, both Oregon and Washington had created 

individual gorge commissions. However, their effectiveness became 

Page 37 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix III: Descriptions of TRPA and Three 

Selected Compact Commissions 

limited by inadequate funding, lack of authority, and opposition from 

various sources. In 1980, an attempt to build a subdivision in Skamania 

County, Washington, across the Columbia River from Multnomah Falls, 

one of Oregon’s premier tourist attractions, provided the catalyst to find 

permanent protection for the gorge’s natural resources, and, in 1986, 

Congress passed the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act.3

 The 

Scenic Area, which totals about 292,500 acres, stretches for 85 miles on 

either side of the Columbia River and includes portions of three counties

in Oregon and three counties in Washington. 

The purpose of the Scenic Area Act is to (1) establish a national scenic 

area to protect and provide for the enhancement of the gorge’s scenic, 

cultural, recreational, and natural resources and (2) protect and support 

the economy of the Columbia River Gorge area by encouraging growth in 

urban areas and allowing economic development that is consistent with 

the first purpose. The act authorized Oregon and Washington to enter into

a compact that would create a regional agency known as the Columbia 

River Gorge Commission and required that the commission carry out its 

functions and responsibilities in accordance with the compact and the act.

These functions and responsibilities included, among others, adopting a 

management plan for the Scenic Area, administering the plan, reviewing 

the plan periodically, and amending it as necessary. 

Delaware River Basin 

Commission 

The Delaware River Basin consists of 13,539 square miles, draining parts 

of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Delaware (see fig. 8). Nearly

15 million people rely on the waters of the basin for drinking and industrial 

use, including 7 million people in the New York City area and northern 

New Jersey who live outside the basin. New York City gets nearly half of 

its water from three large reservoirs located on the tributaries to the 

Delaware, and Philadelphia gets 100 percent of its water supply directly 

from the Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers. In addition, the Delaware River 

Port Complex (including docking facilities in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 

and Delaware) is the largest freshwater port in the world. 

 3

Pub. L. No. 99-663, 100 Stat. 4274 (1986). 

Page 38 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix III: Descriptions of TRPA and Three 

Selected Compact Commissions 

Figure 8: Map and Photographs of the Delaware River Basin

Trenton

New

York

City

Dover

Allentown

Philadelphia

Atlantic Ocean

Delaware

Bay

Maryland

Delaware

Pennsylvania

New

Jersey

New York

Delaware River

C h e s a p e a k e B a y

Source: DRBC.

Source: DRBC.

Source: DRBC.

Source: David B. Soete.

Basin

In 1954, the United States Supreme Court resolved years of interstate 

conflict over water rights by apportioning the waters of the Delaware 

River among the four states and New York City. In doing so, the Court did 

not guarantee a final apportionment of water resources, but allowed the 

parties to return to court if circumstances changed. Instead of risking 

future litigation, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and the 

Page 39 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix III: Descriptions of TRPA and Three 

Selected Compact Commissions 

United States created the Delaware River Basin Compact to provide a 

unified approach to managing the river system without regard to political 

boundaries. Congress granted its consent to the agreement in 1961.4

The compact created the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) to 

administer its provisions. The DRBC was given broad authority to plan, 

regulate, and coordinate management of the basin’s waters. The 

commission regulates water supply allocation and water quality protection 

and has the authority to issue pollution control standards. In addition, the 

commission, acting on information from its advisory committees, makes 

recommendations to its member states on issues such as toxic pollutants,

water quality, flooding, and flow management. 

Susquehanna River Basin 

Commission 

The Susquehanna River is the nation’s 16th largest river, originating near 

Cooperstown, New York, and emptying into the Chesapeake Bay at Havre 

de Grace, Maryland (see fig. 9). Along with its tributaries, the river drains 

27,510 square miles, an area nearly the size of South Carolina. It is also the 

largest river lying entirely in the United States that flows into the Atlantic

Ocean, and it provides 50 percent of the fresh water entering into the 

Chesapeake Bay. 

 4

Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). 

Page 40 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix III: Descriptions of TRPA and Three 

Selected Compact Commissions 

Figure 9: Map and Photographs of the Susquehanna River Basin

Maryland

Pennsylvania

New York

New

Jersey

Renovo

Susquehanna River

Susquehanna River

Harrisburg

Elmira Binghamton

Basin

Source: SRBC.

Source: SRBC.

Source: SRBC.

Source: SRBC.

Page 41 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix III: Descriptions of TRPA and Three 

Selected Compact Commissions 

New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the United States created the 

Susquehanna River Basin Compact to plan and manage the development 

of the basin’s water resources, among other purposes. The compact was 

modeled after the Delaware River Basin Compact. The compact received 

congressional consent in 1970.5

 However, unlike the Delaware compact, 

which was created after its member states had litigated before the 

Supreme Court over water distributions, the Susquehanna compact was 

created to avoid such a dispute by providing for interstate coordination of

efforts to develop and administer the water resources of the river basin. 

The compact established the Susquehanna River Basin Commission 

(SRBC) to administer its provisions. The SRBC regulates water 

withdrawals, diversions, and releases, and is authorized to issue water 

quality standards and enforce those standards. The commission also has 

established several permanent advisory committees that develop 

recommendations for member states to consider on a variety of issues, 

including water resources management, water quality, agricultural water 

use, and drought management. In addition, the commission establishes 

short-term committees as specific needs dictate.

 5

Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970). 

Page 42 GAO-07-519 Interstate Compacts
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 43 GAO-07-519 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Anu K. Mittal, (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, Sherry McDonald, Assistant 

Director; Fatema Choudhury; Christopher Ferencik; Katherine Freeman;

Susan Malone; Roderick Moore; and Tama Weinberg made key 

contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Kevin 

Bray, Thomas James, Alison O’Neill, and John Smale, Jr. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360680) Interstate Compacts
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