NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

JESSICA Y. CHOI, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D16-4642 

 ) 

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE ) 

COMPANY and HALEY P. BEUTLER, ) 

 ) 

 Respondents. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

Opinion filed August 16, 2017. 

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit 

Court for Hillsborough County; Elizabeth G. 

Rice, Judge. 

Kristin A. Norse of Kynes, Markham & 

Felman, P.A., Tampa; and Joseph Bryant 

and A. Crosby Crane of Morgan & Morgan, 

Tampa, for Petitioner. 

Michael L. Forte of Rumberger, Kirk & 

Caldwell, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent AutoOwners Insurance Company. 

No appearance for remaining Respondent. 

SILBERMAN, Judge. 

 The underlying action is an automobile negligence action filed by Jessica 

Y. Choi against alleged tortfeasor Haley P. Beutler and Choi's underinsured motorist 
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(UM) insurance carrier, Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Choi seeks certiorari review 

of an order granting Auto-Owners' motion to sever the causes of action against the two 

defendants. We conclude that because all three claims were inextricably interwoven, 

the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law by granting the 

motion to sever. Accordingly, we grant the petition. 

 The automobile accident occurred in September 2014. According to the 

amended complaint, Choi was a passenger in a car that was struck by Beutler's vehicle. 

Choi was seriously injured, and Beutler was underinsured. In count one, Choi sought 

recovery from Beutler for the injuries she suffered in the accident under a negligence 

theory. In count two, Choi sought UM benefits from Auto-Owners for damages she 

suffered in excess of the amount covered by Beutler's insurance policy. In count three, 

Choi sought punitive damages against Beutler based on a claim that Beutler was 

intoxicated to the extent her faculties were impaired at the time of the accident. 

 Auto-Owners filed a motion to sever the UM claim against it from the 

claims against Beutler in counts one and three. Auto‐Owners contended that Florida's 

nonjoinder statute, section 627.4136(1), Florida Statutes (2014), required separate trials 

of Choi's claims against the tortfeasor and the UM carrier. Auto-Owners also argued it 

was entitled to severance under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.270(b) to avoid 

prejudice from the jury's discovering that Choi had insurance coverage and that Beutler 

was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The trial court granted the motion finding 

"Auto-Owners' arguments to be the more logical and better reasoned view of the current 

state of the law and application of the rules of procedure in Florida." 
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 "A petitioner seeking a writ of common law certiorari 'must establish (1) a 

departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for 

the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.' " Rogan 

v. Oliver, 110 So. 3d 980, 982 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers 

Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). The second and third 

elements are jurisdictional, and the failure to establish those elements requires 

dismissal of the petition without considering the merits. Id. 

 "Certiorari is an appropriate remedy for orders severing or bifurcating 

claims which involve interrelated factual issues because severance risks inconsistent 

outcomes." Minty v. Meister Financialgroup, Inc., 97 So. 3d 926, 931 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2012) (quoting Kavouras v. Mario City Rest. Corp., 88 So. 3d 213, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2011)). Choi's claims against Auto-Owners and Beutler involve more than interrelated 

factual issues. In seeking recovery under the UM benefits available to her, Choi has in 

essence the same cause of action against her UM insurer, Auto-Owners, that she has 

against the underinsured tortfeasor, Beutler, for damages for bodily injury. See State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath, 419 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1982). Thus, an order 

severing Choi's UM claim against Auto-Owners from her claims against Beutler may risk 

inconsistent outcomes and result in material injury that cannot be corrected on 

postjudgment appeal. 

 On the merits, Choi argues that the severance order departs from the 

essential requirements of the law because it rests on Auto-Owners' argument that the 

nonjoinder statute applies to require severance. However, Auto-Owners has changed 

its argument from that which it presented below. It no longer asserts that the nonjoinder 
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statute requires severance of the UM claim. Rather, it correctly recognizes that joinder 

is permitted under the circumstances present here. But it asserts that the trial court had 

the discretion to grant the motion to sever under rule 1.270(b) because the prejudice to 

Auto-Owners outweighs Choi's preference to have the claims tried together. 

 Rule 1.270(b) generally gives courts the discretion to sever claims "in 

furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice." However, it is well-settled that it is a 

departure from the essential requirements of the law to sever claims that are 

inextricably interwoven based on the risk of inconsistent verdicts. See Rocket Grp., 

LLC v. Jatib, 174 So. 3d 576, 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); Minty, 97 So. 3d at 931; 

Kavouras, 88 So. 3d at 214; Bethany Evangelical Covenant Church of Miami, Fla., Inc. 

v. Calandra, 994 So. 2d 478, 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Maris Distrib. Co. v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 710 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Thus, to the extent the trial 

court relied on rule 1.270(b) to support its decision, it was a departure from the essential 

requirements of the law. 

 Furthermore, we note that severance would not avoid prejudice to AutoOwners arising from the claims against Beutler. First of all, the jury would still learn that 

Choi had insurance coverage in the severed UM action against her insurer. Second, 

the jury would also learn that Beutler was intoxicated at the time of the accident in the 

severed UM action. As we stated previously, Choi's cause of action against AutoOwners for damages arising from Beutler's negligence is at heart the same as her 

cause of action against Beutler. While Choi need not establish entitlement to punitive 

damages in her action against Auto-Owners, the facts regarding Beutler's alleged 

intoxication will be relevant to the issue of fault if Auto-Owners challenges liability, as it 
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asserts it will. See Frazee v. Gillespie, 124 So. 6, 9-10 (Fla. 1929) (holding that the 

intoxication of a driver may be a basis for liability for injuries sustained as a result of an 

accident if the accident was caused by a negligent or wrongful act that resulted from 

being intoxicated). 

 In conclusion, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of 

the law by granting the motion to sever three inextricably interwoven claims. We 

therefore grant the petition for certiorari and quash the order granting Auto-Owners' 

motion to sever. 

 Petition granted; order quashed. 

CASANUEVA and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.