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AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS:

CROSS-CONTINENTAL PROGRESS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 17, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida, Chairman

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Cooke, Jennifer, G., co-director, Africa Program, Center for Strategic and

International Studies ........................................................................................... 26

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 28

Frazer, Hon. Jendayi E., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department

of State .................................................................................................................. 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Holt, Victoria K., senior associate, the Henry L. Stimson Center ....................... 33

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35

Martinez, Hon. Mel, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement .................. 1

Pierson, Hon. Lloyd O., Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for

Development ......................................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Response of Hon. Jendayi Frazer to written questions submitted by Senator

Richard Lugar ...................................................................................................... 45

(III)

(1)

AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS

AND INSTITUTIONS:

CROSS-CONTINENTAL PROGRESS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2005

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mel Martinez (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Martinez, Feingold, and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MEL MARTINEZ,

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

Senator MARTINEZ. I call this subcommittee hearing to order and

thank all of you for coming. This is a hearing of the Subcommittee

on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We

want to welcome to the subcommittee hearing this afternoon, all of

you, especially my ranking member, Senator Feingold.

Let me first thank our distinguished witnesses who have joined

us today for coming. Last month we unexpectedly had to postpone

the hearing because of the terrible storms that we had in Florida,

and I had to return home to see about those. But I appreciate your

understanding that situation and your flexibility in rescheduling it

for today, and I want also to thank the ranking member for his

flexibility and very much thank you for coming today.

This afternoon our focus is on African organizations and institutions, looking at cross-continental progress. By cross-continental

progress, we are talking about the positive trend we have seen in

recent years with African initiative, the commitment and consistency of African leadership, the development and demonstration of

African resolve.

As our panelists will discuss this afternoon, this initiative and

this resolve have led to the formation of unprecedented and historic

African-led organizations and institutions, most notably the establishment of the African Union. In just a few short years, the AU

has emerged as the leading pan-African organization of states,

comprised of all states in Africa with the exception of Morocco.

At its core, the AU is about African leadership and African resolve. It is about the potential and promise for African nations to

collectively increase good governance, democracy, stability, and economic growth. The shared goals and shared ambitions embodied in

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the AU are extremely valuable and commendable. I am confident

the AU will increasingly play a leading role in addressing and advancing key priorities facing the continent.

Equally positive are the efforts and initiatives being advanced by

the regional economic communities. Initially established as economic bodies, several of the regional economic communities have

launched conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations. For example, the Economic Community of West African States has played

a central mediating role in nearly every civil war in West Africa

since its creation.

An additional positive development is the innovation being advanced by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. In its initial years, NEPAD has successfully identified projects and programs aimed at spurring economic growth, political-economic integration, as well as good governance and security. Collectively, these

African-led organizations and institutions hold great promise for

the future.

Together these organizations can truly advance and sustain good

governance, democracy, stability, and prosperity. At the same time,

however, these organizations and their leadership are encountering

great challenges. Despite laudable and commendable success, these

institutions are being tested. Their leaders are being tested. From

institutional capacity to leadership difficulties and resource constraints, there are real hurdles.

There are also credible concerns about the apparent multiplicity

of organizations, their overlapping memberships, and seemingly

conflicting areas of responsibility. These are hurdles and questions

that require urgent attention for continental progress and advancement to continue, and that is what I encourage our distinguished

witnesses to outline and discuss this afternoon.

Africa is at a crucial and critical crossroads. The challenges and

opportunities are immense. I encourage our panelists to address

where things are going, where they are working, why they are

working, look at where U.S. priorities and resources are assigned,

and why, and finally outline prospects for the future and how we

can help. Long-term sustainable success in Africa will undoubtedly

depend on the strength and resolve of African leadership and African initiative. Our challenge is to provide the right kind of support

and the right kind of assistance, targeted in meaningful, balanced,

and welcomed areas.

Now, I would like to briefly introduce our witnesses. We have

two very distinguished panels before us. We will hear from two administration officials, Ms. Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of

State for African Affairs, and Mr. Lloyd Pierson, Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development for African Affairs.

In our second panel, we are pleased to have Ms. Jennifer Cooke,

co-director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies. We also welcome Ms. Victoria Holt, senior

associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center here in Washington. We

look forward to a lively discussion. We welcome all of you, and before turning it over to our witnesses, I would like to invite my distinguished colleague and ranking member for his opening remarks.

3

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, first, for your excellent leadership of the subcommittee, and second, for your kind

words about me and our work together. I will forgo a formal opening statement because we want to hear from you. We have four

votes starting I think at 3:30.

Senator MARTINEZ. That is right.

Senator FEINGOLD. But let me just quickly say that I have been

on this subcommittee for 13 years. I have been a chairman for

those wonderful 18 months when we were in the majority, ranking

member the rest of the time.

I see these organizations as some of the most interesting, exciting, and challenging aspects of work on Africa. It holds great hope

for the future, but there are enormous challenges and this is an important subject to take up, and I look forward to hearing the testimony and hopefully having time to ask some questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you.

At this time we would call on Secretary Frazer for your opening

comments.

STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary FRAZER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of

the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before

you along side my colleague, Lloyd Pierson, at this hearing to discuss our work with the African Union and subregional organizations to advance freedom, peace and prosperity in Africa.

It is my first Senate testimony as Assistant Secretary of State for

African Affairs. I am very pleased to be here, especially on this important topic.

I have a longer written statement, Mr. Chairman, and ask that

I be allowed to submit it for the record.

Senator MARTINEZ. Without objection.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you. I firmly believe there has never been a

more auspicious time than now to consolidate the progress and

promise of the continent. The emergence of an activist African

Union with a modern, forward-looking agenda is one of the most

important developments on the continent in decades. We have embraced a U.S.-Africa partnership that will allow the United States

and the African Union to jointly advance our many shared key

goals, including promoting good governance, social and economic

development, combatting terrorism, and ending and preventing

conflict. Most importantly, the African Union and some of the regional and subregional organizations in Africa are demonstrating

increasingly effective leadership in advancing these goals.

Helping to strengthen further those organizations to prepare

them to be fully effective for the 21st century, so they can address

Africa’s challenge is vital to U.S. interests.

Our cooperative efforts with the African Union and subregional

organizations generally focus on the following key areas: First, diplomatic cooperation to prevent conflicts when possible and to resolve conflicts that have broken out; second, support for regional or

subregional military interventions when there is no other alternative to end violence; third, assistance for capacity-building and

4

institution-strengthening; fourth, support for efforts to promote

trade, economic growth and development; and fifth, increasing cooperation in other areas ranging from counterterrorism to disease

eradication to the promotion of good governance.

I would like to very briefly review the efforts made by the African Union and subregional organizations, the support we have provided, and areas of needed future focus.

The African Union and some of the subregional organizations,

particularly the Economic Community of West African States, have

joined in mitigating conflicts through peace support operations and

diplomatic missions. African nations already provide close to 30

percent of United Nations peacekeeping forces worldwide, with 4

African countries—Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa—

among the top 10 UN troop contributors. In peacekeeping, African

forces, rather than non-African ones, are more easily deployed in

African states.

In cases where political agreement and preparations for a UN

mission oftentimes involve months of delay, a deployment by peacekeeping forces from the African Union or subregional organizations

like ECOWAS is often a vital response tool. The United States supports African peacekeeping in two major ways, through direct assistance to ongoing operations and through programs to enhance

the capacity of African peacekeepers.

The Bush administration has assisted the African Union with operations first in Burundi and more recently in Darfur, Sudan. We

also supported ECOWAS in Liberia in 2003. In Burundi, we supported the African Union’s first operation, which was called AMIB,

contributing some $11 million to the AU mission as it monitored

peace agreements reached between the former Tutsi-dominated

government and its three main Hutu rebel groups. The United

States has provided a major share of the African Union mission in

Darfur, known as AMIS, funding over $160 million. We have also

provided over $768 million in humanitarian relief in Darfur.

In Darfur, the AU forces have much reduced large-scale organized violence in areas where they are deployed. Some violence continues as a result of banditry, rebel attacks, and janjaweed actions.

But among those options that we must consider in Darfur is clearly

the possibility of increased support by the United Nations or perhaps a transition to a UN mandate.

We are consulting with the African Union and our partners closely on such options. We expect to support logistics, communications,

training, and other assistance to the AU and the regional peacekeeping standby brigades. For example, over the past 4 years, we

have provided over $11 million in equipment to set up an ECOWAS

peacekeeping logistics depot in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Equipment

from this depot has been vital in supplying ECOWAS and UN

forces in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, as well as the AU forces in Darfur,

and we are now working on provision of equipment for an AU

depot as well. We are strengthening AU and ECOWAS communications capacity. The United States has provided over $10 million

worth of computer, radio, and other communications links to help

ensure that ECOWAS member states can communicate smoothly

and that the AU forces have the radio equipment they need to be

effective.

5

We also support the efforts of the African Union to boost its

counterterrorist capabilities. We will be working with our African

partners to encourage the provision of adequate funding, personnel,

and support to the regional counterterrorism training at the African Union’s African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers, Algeria, and the AU’s planned early warning center to counter terrorist threats.

We are increasing our engagement with subregional organizations based on the regional economic communities. These regional

organizations are recognized by the African Union as pillars of a

continental architecture. They play a lead role in regional stability

and will be the focus for regional African peacekeeping brigades of

the AU’s African standby force. Sub-regional organizations can

apply neighborly persuasion and even military force to stabilize a

country before it slips into conflict. An important factor in the work

of subregional organizations is leadership by a strong regional

country, such as South Africa in the Southern African Development

Community, or Nigeria in ECOWAS, two countries which combined

have 50 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP. A strong lead nation

seems to ensure a more effective subregional organization, although, at times, it may also inhibit open and thorough discussion

and examination of alternative policies. We will support

rationalizing Africa’s subregional organizations to eliminate overlapping memberships and responsibilities and reduce costs of maintaining headquarters and staff. We will also support efforts by the

AU and subregional organizations to speed up conclusion of the

operational agreements. ECOWAS, the Economic Community of the

West African States, has one of the continent’s most effective military arms. Its deployments have served as precursors to UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, with

ECOWAS still retaining a presence in both Liberia and Cote

d’Ivoire. In addition to the funds contributed to the ECOWAS efforts in Cote d’Ivoire, we contributed over $90 million to ECOWAS

for its outstanding efforts in Liberia.

In Southern Africa, we look to the Southern Africa Development

Community to continue regional economic growth, stability, and

prosperity; and we are looking at efforts to re-engage with the

SADC troika in the near future.

In East Africa, our work with Kenya and Uganda on a northsouth peace agreement in Sudan is a model for what can be accomplished by U.S. engagement with Africa’s subregional organizations. We are also increasing our work with the AU’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD, and the subregional organizations to support regional economic integration, good governance,

and prosperity throughout the continent.

Regional economic integration is crucial to increasing trade and

investment and to breaking down barriers to trade and investment

in order to drive growth and prosperity. In fiscal years 2002 to

2005, we have provided nearly $5 million to the African Union and

to subregional organizations to advance regional trade and investment, to advance climate reform practices, to develop regional financial markets, and to provide technical assistance to increase

trade and the free flow of goods, services, and capital.

6

We provide over $100 million a year in funding for the African

Development Bank, which promotes economic development and regional integration across Africa. The African Union and the subregional organizations have made major progress in the past 5

years. We will continue our work with the UN to help us strengthen the AU as an institution and as a continental actor and to support Africa’s subregional organizations. We will also work to support commitments by African governments, organizations, and nonAfrican partners to ensure stability, development, and good governance.

In conclusion, our vision is that African nations and peoples can

enjoy the fruits of peace, democracy, and prosperity and good

health working through the African regional and subregional organizations. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I look

forward to answering any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Frazer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,

I am delighted to have the opportunity to appear before you today, in my first

Senate testimony as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to discuss our

work with the African Union and African subregional organizations to advance freedom, peace, and prosperity in Africa.

I firmly believe there has never been a more auspicious time than now to consolidate the progress and promise of the continent. The emergence of an activist African

Union (AU) with a modern, forward-looking agenda is one of the most important developments on the continent in decades. The AU offers a considerably more dynamic

vision of the future than did its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. The

timing could not be better, coming as it does when we have embraced a U.S.-Africa

partnership that will allow the United States and the AU to jointly advance our

many shared key goals including promoting prosperity, good governance, social and

economic development, and combating terrorism.

Most importantly, the African Union and some of the regional and subregional organizations in Africa are demonstrating increasingly effective leadership in advancing these goals. Helping to strengthen further those organizations—to prepare them

to be fully effective for the 21st century so they can address Africa’s challenges—

is vital to U.S. interests.

Our cooperative efforts with the AU and subregional organizations generally focus

on the following key areas:

• Diplomatic cooperation to prevent conflicts when possible, and to resolve conflicts that have broken out.

• Support for regional or subregional military interventions when there is no

other alternative to end violence.

• Assistance for capacity building and institution-strengthening.

• Support for efforts to promote trade, economic growth and development.

• Increasing cooperation in a broad range of areas key to achieving peace and

prosperity in Africa, ranging from counter-terrorism, to disease eradication, to promotion of good governance.

Let me review briefly the efforts made by the AU and the subregional organizations, the support we have provided, and areas of needed future focus:

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The African Union and some of the subregional organizations, particularly the

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have joined in mitigating

conflicts through peace support operations and diplomatic missions. African states

have the capacity to staff peace support operations: many do not realize that African

nations already provide close to 30 percent of United Nations peacekeeping forces

worldwide, with four African countries—Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa—among the top ten U.N. troop contributors.

7

African states and organizations quite reasonably prefer that African forces, rather than non-African intervention, be the first approach to conflict response on the

continent and we support that. In fact, in cases where political agreement and preparations for a U.N. Mission oftentimes involve months of delay, a deployment by

peacekeeping forces from the African Union or other subregional organization is

often the only response tool available.

The United States supports Africa peacekeeping in two major ways: through direct assistance to ongoing operations and through programs to enhance the capacity

of African peacekeepers. In addition to U.S. support for global U.N. peacekeeping

operations—where the United States currently provides 27 percent of the funding

for such operations—the United States has assisted the African Union to stand up

operations first in Burundi and more recently in Darfur, Sudan. We also supported

ECOWAS in Liberia in 2003 and Sierra Leone in 1998–2000.

In Burundi, we supported the AU’s first such operation (AMIB), which was crucial

in advancing the peace process and monitoring peace agreements reached between

the former Tutsi-dominated government and three main Hutu rebel groups. That

Burundi operation transitioned into a United Nations peacekeeping operation,

which successfully paved the way for elections that have installed a new government and Parliament. We contributed some $11 million to the AU’s Burundi effort,

in addition to the money provided in support of the U.N. operation once the U.N.

took charge. The AU did a good job in this first effort, but could not have succeeded

in this very important endeavor without donor support.

In Darfur, Sudan, the AU has taken the next big step by taking on the daunting

task of managing the deployment needed to seek peace in Darfur. Its staff and officials clearly have learned important lessons from their Burundi experience and their

capabilities have improved. Still, they cannot do this alone. International partners

are necessary, and the United States has shown that it is such a partner. We have

put forward a major share of the funding needed to bring peace to Darfur, including

providing over $160 million in funding to support the AU deployment in Darfur. To

date, we have provided over $768 million in humanitarian relief in Darfur. It is vital

that the AU effort succeed, and we are helping to ensure that it does. Our logistics

support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is key to its success, and

we will not halt our PKO-funded support.

Separately, we are providing expertise in ways that help enhance the AU’s capacity. The AU welcomes the opportunity for its staff to develop cooperative working

relationships with non-African governments and organizations, such as the U.S. and

NATO. Through NATO, we and our NATO partners are providing training expertise

and airlift that are vital to the AU operation.

The African Union effort in Darfur has demonstrated why deployment of African

troops is a viable option. It has also underscored the need for us to continue to work

closely with the African Union to address continuing needs related to command and

control that must be addressed to increase the effectiveness of AU interventions.

The African Union showed that its majority Muslim (three of four major troop contributors have heavily Muslim forces—Nigeria—50 percent of its contingent, Gambia—95 percent, Senegal—90 percent; Rwanda is only 1 percent) forces are best

suited to address the complex social and political issues, in a context in which virtually all of the population is Muslim. The result has been impressive: where the

African Union forces are deployed, large-scale organized violence has largely diminished. In many cases, the African Union commanders are also engaged in mitigating

local disputes and in facilitating urgently needed humanitarian relief. While violence continues as a result of banditry, rebel attacks, and janjaweed actions, the African Union forces are playing a crucial role to help bring about an end to violence.

To help ensure greater peace and stability in Darfur, we must simultaneously increase our support to the African Union forces in Darfur (AMIS) while working

closely with the AU and other donors to press the parties to make additional political progress and determine next steps. Among those options that must be considered is a possible increased support role for the United Nations, or perhaps a transition to a U.N. mandate. We are consulting with the AU and our partners closely

on such options.

The African Union’s ongoing mediation of talks between the Sudanese government

and the Darfur rebels also highlights the value of the AU’s dynamic, holistic approach to conflict resolution. African Union political offices and missions also have

had some success in dealing with crises and helping to advance development of democracy in the region. For example, the AU is committed to sustaining the peace

process in Cote d’Ivoire, begun earlier by ECOWAS and to which, I might add, the

United States contributed over nine million dollars.

A key element of building capacity for the AU flows from our intended support

for the AU’s Africa Standby Force (ASF) and the national militaries that will make

8

up that force. The AU plans for the ASF to provide both a rapid deployment capability to prevent mass violence or a longer-term force to sustain a peace agreement.

Primary to our efforts is the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program that provides training to African regional organizations and

national peacekeepers. ACOTA training activities will continue with Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Mozambique, Gabon and others, while adding additional partner countries via funding through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. As part of the

worldwide GPOI effort, the United States expects to provide training to at least

40,000 African peacekeepers over 5 years.

Training peacekeepers is not enough, so we will also support logistics, communications, training and other assistance to the AU and standby brigades. For example,

over the past 4 years we have provided over $11 million in equipment to establish

and stock an ECOWAS peacekeeping logistics depot in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Equipment from the depot in turn has been vital in supplying ECOWAS and U.N.

forces in Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire, as well as AU forces in Darfur. The demonstrated value of that depot has shown that it will be worthwhile to provide equipment for the AU depot as well.

Additionally we are strengthening AU and ECOWAS communications capacity.

The United States has provided some $10 million worth of computer, radio, and

other communications links to help ensure that ECOWAS member states can communicate smoothly, and that AU forces have the radio equipment they need to be

effective. On the training front, we look forward to extending ACOTA multinational

exercises to willing regional organizations in the near future and have recently provided support to peacekeeping training centers in Ghana and Mali.

Our ties with the African Union are growing stronger. We currently coordinate

with the AU office in New York, including on U.N. matters. Congressional action

and an Executive Order by President Bush have placed the AU on the list of Public

International Organizations, entitled to official G visas and civil immunity for official acts, and the AU plans to open a Washington office this year. We plan to assist

the AU in that effort as much as possible. The AU office will expedite and enhance

contacts between the AU and Congress and with executive branch agencies. The AU

also plans to have the staff of its Washington office reach out to the African diaspora and to the business community, and engage groups with a focus on Africa.

The Director of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, Dr. Stephen D. Krasner,

hosted the first Planning Policy Talks with the AU on July 29, 2005 to help identify

policy challenges and capacity needs. The talks covered a broad range of topics

under the headings of democracy and governance, the Millennium Challenge Account, post-conflict reconstruction, and counter terrorism. The talks, which we hope

will occur biannually, provide another vehicle for policy exchanges and information

exchanges on sharing how we can support capacity building within the AU and

among the member states.

We fully support the efforts of the AU to boost its counter terrorism (CT) capabilities. The AU has developed a strategy to create both an early warning center to

counter terrorist threats and a regional CT training center as part of their CT center’s mission. We support these goals, and are exploring ways to support these efforts with training opportunities, resources to increase CT cooperation in the region,

and the provision of expert advice and guidance. We already have provided some

$250,000, for example, to help set up an anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist

finance assistance program in West Africa through West Africa’s Inter-Governmental Anti-Money Laundering Group. Most important, we will be working with our

African partners to encourage the provision of adequate funding, personnel and support to the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers. The

Department will be supporting a conference in February at the AU Center that will

draw resources from trans-Saharan countries into the Center’s mission.

SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

As we work with the African Union and subregional organizations to accelerate

economic progress, we will support the development of African mechanisms that

help to mitigate crises before they fester and erupt into conflict. Prevention and

mitigation are ultimately far less costly to both the people of Africa and to their

partners working with them toward a safe and free continent. The AU has several

mechanisms to address this, including eminent persons who work to mediate crises;

regional workshops on best practices in democracy and elections; and training and

deployment of AU election monitors. As a result, the United States has the opportunity to work with the AU and subregional organizations to bring an end to conflict

on the continent.

9

The administration’s approach to work with lead African mediators and multilaterally with the United Nations, African Union, and subregional organizations like

ECOWAS has worked. As the member states demonstrate buy-in, I strongly support

increasing our engagement with subregional organizations in the four distinct subregions of sub-Saharan Africa—Central, Western, Eastern and Southern Africa. The

subregional organizations based on the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are

recognized by the African Union as pillars of a continental architecture. They play

a lead role in regional stability and will be the focus for regional African peacekeeping brigades of the AU’s ‘‘African Stand By Force.’’

Sub-regional organizations can apply neighborly persuasion and even military

force to stabilize a country before it slips into conflict. There are disadvantages,

however, when affected states feel their neighbor has taken too much interest in

their internal affairs. Another important factor in the work of subregional organizations is leadership by a strong regional country, such as South Africa in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or Nigeria in ECOWAS (two countries

which combined have 50 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP.) A strong lead nation

seems to ensure a more effective subregional organization, but at times could also

inhibit open and thorough discussion and examination of alternative policies.

We will support efforts by the AU and subregional organizations to speed up conclusion of their operational agreements, to clarify responsibilities and reduce costs

while sharpening their focus.

The activities of three of the more developed subregional organizations illustrate

issues they are tackling and the character of our engagement and partnership:

ECOWAS—THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

Nigeria plays a lead role, with French-speaking Senegal senior among ECOWAS’s

Francophone members. ECOWAS has one of the continent’s most effective military

arms. Its deployments have served as precursors to U.N. peacekeeping missions in

Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, with ECOWAS still retaining a presence

in both Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire. President Obasanjo of Nigeria has both a role

within ECOWAS and within the African Union (as Annual Chair of the AU Assembly), which has illuminated some policy disconnects, particularly between the AU’s

Peace and Security Commission and ECOWAS, and between Nigeria and the office

of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary. In addition to the funds contributed to the

ECOWAS effort in Cote d’Ivoire, we contributed over $19 million to ECOWAS for

its outstanding effort in Liberia.

SADC—THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

South Africa, the economic powerhouse of the continent, is the dominant player

in SADC. The United States and South Africa have a shared interest in promoting

peace and stability on the continent. Our already strong bilateral relationship is expanding to include greater military-to-military cooperation, including planning for

training for peacekeeping operations. Our Ambassador to Botswana, where SADC

has its headquarters, also serves as the Secretary of State’s Representative to SADC

and works closely with the organization. An effective SADC, working to enhance

peace, stability, and prosperity in the continent is vital to U.S. national interests.

IGAD—THE INTER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT

Somalia continues to be a significant concern for the IGAD member-states of East

Africa, particularly Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. The government of Kenya, under

the auspices of IGAD, chaired the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference,

which concluded in October 2004 following the formation of a national parliament,

election of a transitional president and formation of a transnational cabinet—collectively known as the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions (TFls). Although Somali parties remain divided by key issues that have prevented further progress in

establishing the TFls inside Somalia, IGAD member states continue to play a significant role in the ongoing political process. The international community, including

the United States, is urging Somali leaders to reach a consensus agreement on these

key issues, including how to address continued insecurity throughout Somalia,

through dialog at the cabinet and parliamentary levels. The United States has contributed some $750,000 to IGAD’s efforts to bring peace to Somalia. There is much

yet to be done, but we will continue to coordinate our engagement in Somalia with

our regional and international partners to support the establishment of effective

governance in Somalia. IGAD also played a key mediation role in the Sudan NorthSouth peace process.

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ENGAGING WITH AU INSTITUTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Africa is not a continent of conflicts, despair, and disease. The bulk of the continent is not in crisis. Democratic elections are increasingly the norm, and economic

growth is at its highest levels in nearly a decade. We are deeply engaged with African countries and institutions to support Africa’s efforts to consolidate and build on

the remarkable progress of recent years, as well as to prevent the outbreak of new

conflict. Most of the more than three billion dollars in assistance that we provided

to Africa last year supported bilateral programs at the country level. We also are

working with the AU’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the

RECs in support of their programs to promote regional economic integration, good

governance, and prosperity throughout the continent.

The RECs have a major role to play, not only in peace support operations, but

also in promoting the regional economic integration that is so crucial to increasing

trade and investment, which will drive growth and prosperity. In many respects the

RECs have not advanced as far on the economic front as on the peace and security

front, and further progress could be enhanced were there to be some rationalization

of the current overlapping REC structure. However, we are seeing sustained efforts

to break down barriers to trade and investment through, for example, customs

unions and trade agreements by the Common Market for East and Southern Africa

(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and others. Another example is the

West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Historically this was just

a monetary union made up of the countries with currencies tied to the French

Franc. In recent years, however, these countries have begun to work together in

other ways as well. In fiscal year 2003, the United States contributed $250,000 to

help the WAEMU improve its member countries’ government debt issuance practices, and in recent years, FY2002–FY2005, we have provided nearly $5 million to

the AU and to subregional organizations—WAEMU, COMESA, and the EAC—to advance regional trade and investment climate reform practices, develop regional financial markets, and provide technical assistance to increase trade and the free flow

of goods, services and capital.

At the continent-wide level, we provide over $100 million a year in funding for

the African Development Bank, which in turn promotes economic development

across Africa, giving special attention to national and multinational projects that

promote regional integration.

We hope to increase our engagement with both the AU and RECs to help build

their capacity to accelerate economic growth and poverty alleviation through strategically targeted financial and technical support for their programs to promote trade,

investment climate reform, transparency and good governance, sound management

of natural resources, and social development.

The United States and its G8 partners have an ongoing dialog with NEPAD and

have made far-reaching commitments to develop enhanced partnerships with those

countries that demonstrate commitment to AU/NEPAD’s principles of sound economic, political, and social governance. In addition to our many bilateral programs

that support the goals and objectives of the AU and NEPAD at a country level, we

are supporting the realization of NEPAD programs such as the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Plan and NEPAD’s efforts to facilitate and accelerate

regional infrastructure development. Through the Africa Partnership Forum, which

includes all of the major African institutions as well as development partners, we

are developing a process to hold each other mutually accountable for fulfillment of

our many respective commitments.

Africans themselves are also increasingly seeking to hold each other accountable.

The NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a bold undertaking by and

for African countries to review a country’s economic, political and corporate governance in a manner based on clear standards and criteria that reflect best practice.

Nearly two dozen countries have signed up to be reviewed, and the first two reviews, of Ghana and Rwanda, including associated national action plans to address

shortcomings, have been discussed at high levels and should be finalized by the end

of the year.

Working with the AU through enhanced relationships, and with stronger subregional organizations, I believe we can secure the progress already underway. The

AU and the subregional organizations have made major progress in the past 5

years, and the United States has made a major contribution to advancing stability

and prosperity in Africa. Yet more needs to be done. We will continue our efforts

to work with the U.N. to help us strengthen the AU as an institution and as a continental actor, and to support Africa’s subregional organizations. We will also work

to ensure that Africa and its people have a future which is not shadowed by images

of conflict, refugees and corruption, but which, rather, is buoyed by commitments

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by African governments, organizations and non-African partners to ensure stability,

development and good governance. Our vision is that African nations and peoples

can enjoy the fruits of peace, democracy, prosperity, and good health. With your

help, we will help make that vision a reality.

Senator MARTINEZ. Madam Secretary, I thank you very much for

your remarks.

We also welcome the distinguished Senator from Illinois to the

hearing.

We want to now hear from Administrator Pierson.

STATEMENT OF HON. LLOYD O. PIERSON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

Mr. PIERSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator

Feingold, Senator Obama. I have a brief opening statement I would

like to read, but a longer statement for inclusion in the record.

Senator MARTINEZ. Your statement will be included in the

record. Thank you.

Mr. PIERSON. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you once again as Assistant Administrator for Africa.

At the request of the subcommittee, I am here to update you on

our work at the United Nations Agency for International Development to support development and peace and security efforts in

sub–Sahara Africa, in particular as they relate to areas of democracy and governance, trade and economic development, and security sector reform.

As the G–8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in July demonstrated, there is a general consensus among world leaders to

focus more attention on Africa and African development needs. The

United States has been and will remain a leader in this effort. I

believe that it is our role at USAID to work with our African partners to hasten the advent of peace, democracy, good governance, security, and quality of life on the continent, as well as address major

humanitarian crises such as the potential spread of Avian influenza. Bilateral country programming is the central avenue for U.S.

assistance, but in Africa many of the most complex development

challenges do not respect national boundaries.

Many important issues can best be solved on a regional basis.

Thus, we are giving priority to funding selected regional programs

and initiatives that have achieved impact by addressing regional

conditions. USAID programs promote and endeavor to enhance

partnerships between African leaders, governments, multilateral

development institutions, business, universities, and other nongovernmental organizations.

We also value the principle of ownership and attempt to build on

the leadership, participation, and commitment of countries and

their peoples. One of the ways we do this is by supporting and

strengthening African subregional organizations as well as organizations such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development that

cover all regions of Africa. Organizations such as this are key partners and stakeholders in the work that we do.

This past year, USAID through the President’s initiative to end

hunger in Africa actively facilitated NEPAD’s leadership to organize five regional meetings along with a continent-wide summit.

12

The meetings engaged most African countries and over 1,000 stakeholders took part. Subsequently, the G–8 members at Gleneagles

committed to supporting the CAADP, which is the Comprehensive

Africa Agricultural Development Program.

Other key regional organizations with whom we work include

COMESA and ECOWAS, and my written statement provides details about the extent of our work, the work of USAID, with these

organizations. As the largest bilateral donor in sub–Saharan Africa, we must actively collaborate with our African counterparts in

order to achieve common goals.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely appreciate this subcommittee’s continuing interest in Africa and USAID’s critical role on the continent. I would be happy to take your questions at this time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pierson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LLOYD O. PIERSON, USAID ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you once again as Assistant Administrator for Africa to update you on our work at the United States Agency for International Development

(USAID) to support development and peace and security efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. In today’s testimony, I’d like to address the importance of African ownership of

regional development and humanitarian efforts and the critical role of African regional and subregional organizations, in the areas of democracy and governance,

trade and economic development, and security sector reform.

As the G–8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland in July demonstrated, there is a general consensus among world leaders to focus more attention on African development

needs. The United States has been and will remain a leader in this effort. It is our

role at USAID to work with our African partners to support the advent of peace,

democracy, good governance and security on the continent, as well as help ensure

the conservation of Africa’s natural resource base and address major humanitarian

crises such as the potential imminent spread of Avian Influenza.

As you are aware, sub-Saharan Africa is the world’s poorest region: over half of

its 700 million people live on less than $1 per day. Rapid urbanization poses new

and difficult challenges as the demographic landscape changes and cities struggle

to provide sufficient jobs and services, particularly for the young, who can become

easy targets for extremists, criminal gangs or armed militias. The HN/AIDS pandemic has completely overwhelmed many health systems and impoverished families.

The aftermath of lingering conflicts and armed strife have exacted a huge toll on

economic growth. And, if not averted, Avian Influenza could have a similarly disastrous effect on the region.

Yet despite these challenges, significant progress has been made on several fronts.

The number of free democracies in Africa has almost tripled from four to 11 over

the past decade and more than half of the remaining countries in the region are

in the transition process toward transparent and free democracy. The number of

conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa has decreased in recent years, signaling achievements in conflict mitigation and resolution. Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone have

restored peace after years of civil war. And the peace agreements in Congo and the

Sudan give rise to renewed hope that an end to these prolonged conflicts is in sight.

Furthermore, sub-Saharan Africa posted its strongest level of overall GDP growth

in 8 years in 2004, topping 5 percent. Mozambique, Tanzania, and Senegal are

among countries with robust growth rates. However average GDP per capita in Africa is still only $500, less than one-tenth the global average of $5,510, meaning that

much work remains.

During President Bush’s June 10, 2005 speech, he noted that the link between

democracy and development is critical as experience has shown that ‘‘aid works best

when certain conditions are in place such as a commitment to just governance, respecting the rule of law, investing in citizens’ health and education, and opening up

economies.’’ The number of African countries that pass the Millennium Challenge

Account (MCA) indicator test is a clear indication of the continent’s progress and

potential. As you know, the MCA funds only countries that have demonstrated a

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commitment to democracy and good governance, investing in people and economic

freedom. In FY06, twelve of the twenty-three countries that are fully eligible for

MCA funding, and seven of the fifteen countries eligible for threshold assistance,

were located in Africa. Also for FY06, four of the seven new countries selected as

eligible to apply are Sub-Saharan African.

USAID programs in Africa are rooted in the President’s commitments to Africa.

Funding for these Presidential initiatives is programmed to countries where the impact is expected to be the highest. I will briefly discuss the most significant and farreaching of these Presidential and Agency commitments toward the end of my testimony.

II. THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Country programming is the central avenue for U.S. assistance, but many of the

most complex development challenges do not respect national boundaries and are

best addressed on a regional basis.

Examples of regional program priorities include:

1. Programs that address cross-border problems requiring action from several

countries. For example, inter-regional trade programs to reduce barriers to movement of goods and services across borders; cross-border peace or counter-terrorism

initiatives; and health initiatives to stop the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS

through regional transportation channels.

2. Programs to help indigenous governmental and non-governmental regional organizations to promote policy reforms and improve the institutional capacity of

member countries. These include programs to improve governance, fight infectious

diseases, expand trade, improve food security, protect biodiversity, mitigate the

risks of conflicts, and address the sources of state fragility that cross national

boundaries.

3. Regional programming is also used to improve information-sharing, technology

transfer and research among neighboring countries and support joint management

of shared resources (e.g., water).

To effectively implement regional programs, efficient coordination mechanisms are

required. African regional organizations, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s

Development (NEPAD) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

(COMESA) are ideally suited to provide this mechanism. Therefore, USAID seeks

to improve the effectiveness of African regional organizations to perform their missions and to work through these organizations to target regional development objectives.

USAID programs promote and enhance partnerships between African leaders, governments, multilateral development institutions, business, universities, and other

nongovernmental organizations. We also value the principle of ownership and strive

to build on the leadership, participation and commitment of countries and their peoples by supporting and strengthening African regional organizations. Regional organizations are key partners and stakeholders in our work to improve the lives of the

continent’s citizens for a variety of reasons.

First, because regional organizations are backed by national African leadership,

they provide a level of local legitimacy to critical issues in ways that global or bilateral institutions cannot. For example, the African Union (AU) and the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have played pivotal roles in mediating conflict and securing peace in the Sudan and Liberia.

Second, as I noted earlier, many of Africa’s challenges require a regional approach. It is essential to address the HIV/AIDS crisis through regional mechanisms,

as this disease travels freely across borders. With this in mind, USAID is providing

a grant to the West Africa Health Organization (WAHO) to allow key personnel to

receive joint training and share critical information needed to combat HIV/AIDS

more systematically.

Third, coordination of multi-donor, multi-country initiatives is far more efficient

when carried out through a single institution that is engaged with all relevant partners and has a significant presence in each participating country. Each donor is

thus engaged with a single partner, rather than one or more per country; and the

regional organization is able to harmonize donor support, thereby greatly reducing

transaction costs.

For these reasons, the USAID is aligning several key programs to support African

leaders in strengthening African regional institutions.

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III. STRENGTHENING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

African regional and subregional organizations were established and have evolved

during different time periods and for distinct purposes. As you are aware, there are

organizations that encompass the continent, such as the African Union (AU) and the

New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as well as those that operate

within small geographic regions, such as the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

(COMESA). They currently possess varying levels of capacity and do not always coordinate their efforts.

The Africa Bureau is collaborating with regional organizations in an effort to

achieve mutual goals and objectives. We, along with other international and bilateral donor agencies, see great promise in these institutions as they continue to increase their capacity to bring about peace and security, and improve the policy environment for sustainable development in Africa. I will highlight several examples in

which African leadership and ownership of a regional initiative contributed to the

overall positive outcome.

A. Democracy and Governance

We are beginning to see the genuine results of African regional leadership in the

area of democracy and governance. One innovative instrument introduced by African leaders through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is the

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). NEPAD was launched in July, 2001. Its

mission is to ‘‘establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play

its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations’’ and to ‘‘promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as

the integration of African economies.’’ NEPAD falls under the African Union (AU)

umbrella of regional organizations and is both a framework and a vision for sustainable development in Africa. As part of NEPAD, African leaders have made a commitment to seek the end of conflicts in Africa and improve political, economic and

corporate governance to foster a better climate for transformational development.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is designed to monitor progress in

improving political, economic and corporate governance. This Peer Review process

began in late 2004 in Ghana, Mauritius, Kenya and Rwanda. As of today, 24 African

countries have agreed to undergo peer review. The NEPAD Secretariat oversees the

process, with participation from African institutions such as the U.N. Economic

Commission on Africa, the African Development Bank, the Africa Commission on

Human Rights, and the Africa Institute. Representatives from these institutions

serve on Peer Review Teams assigned to the countries volunteering for review.

Though the implementation of the review process is proceeding much slower than

expected, the results of the reviews of two countries—Ghana and Rwanda—should

be made known soon.

While recognizing that Africans have the principal responsibility for the continent’s development, African leaders look to their development partners—primarily

donor countries, multilateral organizations and international financial institutions—

to help create a more enabling external environment for African development. Specifically, they seek to increase Official Development Assistance (ODA) with lower

transaction costs, greater access to markets in the industrialized countries, a reduction in the debt burden, and expanded foreign direct investment. NEPAD refers to

these African commitments and desired changes by donors as ‘‘mutual accountability.’’

The United States has expressed its support for the commitments that African

governments have made to improve political, economic, and corporate governance.

As an active participant in the G–8 African Personal Representatives Meetings, the

United States is involved in assessing the progress in implementing the G–8 African

Action Plan.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was founded in 1979 as

the Southern African Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), to harmonize economic development among the countries in Southern Africa. In 2001, SADC reorganized to

focus on trade and finance, infrastructure, food and agriculture, and social and

human development.

USAID has supported SADC initiatives since the early 1980s in areas such as

strengthening regional transportation systems, agricultural development through research and food security and environmental and natural resource activities. With

the end of apartheid in South Africa, SADC has placed an increasing priority on

regional economic integration. USAID has provided assistance, particularly in the

implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol, which lays the groundwork for a free

trade area among SADC member states by 2008.

15

Our current relationship with SADC can best be described as strained. In 2003,

the SADC Secretariat decided to cease official cooperation with USAID because U.S.

policy and legislation restricts assistance to Zimbabwe, a SADC member. For our

part, we were disappointed that SADC did not support our position on Zimbabwe.

However, we continued to support regional integration in Southern Africa by working directly with the SADC technical working groups and independent units. For example, USAID has supported the SADC Parliamentary Forum, an autonomous unit,

to promote compliance with regional norms and standards for free and fair elections.

B. Trade and Economic Development

USAID actively supports African regional and subregional organizations in the

area of trade and economic development. For example, USAID is playing a major

role in supporting NEPAD by funding and facilitating the implementation of the

Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP). One of

NEPAD’s major initiatives, CAADP was established by African Heads of State, who

have committed the resources and leadership of their governments to support its implementation.

USAID’s support for the African Union is channeled through NEPAD, as just

noted, to establish a CAADP process and investment plan. CAADP is a growth-oriented agriculture program, aimed at increasing agricultural growth rates to 6 percent per annum to create the wealth needed for rural communities and households

in Africa to prosper. The CAADP has four key components: (1) Extending the area

under sustainable land management and reliable water systems; (2) improving rural

infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access; (3) increasing food

supply, reducing hunger, and improving responses to food emergency crises; and (4)

improving agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption.

We will also support AU/NEPAD’s CAADP implementation through other regional

economic communities that will build the regional capacity needed for achieving agricultural growth and increase the availability of and access to food within regions.

CAADP will enable the AU to build a global multi-donor partnership that will align

with African agriculture resources and country and regional contexts, help African

leaders create the conditions needed to achieve a 6-percent agricultural growth rate

per year and finally break the cycle of famine.

USAID will support the CAADP in up to six countries that are meeting their

pledges to increase support for and attention to the agricultural sector. In addition,

we will collaborate on efforts in hunger hot spots to develop a process and plan to

address the policy and technical barriers that make countries famine prone and ultimately integrate them into the CAADP. This past year, USAID, through the President’s Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA), actively facilitated NEPAD’s leadership to organize five regional meetings—along with a continent-wide summit,

which was held in Accra, Ghana in May of this year. This was a featured G–8 action

promised at Sea Island. The meetings engaged almost every African country and

over 1,000 stakeholders took part. Subsequently, the G–8 members at Gleneagles

committed to supporting CAADP. NEPAD and its Regional Economic Communities

continue to look to USAID for leadership and advice on CAADP, and we expect this

initiative to yield tangible results in the very near future.

At a subregional level, the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 to attain regional integration through cooperation

and development in all fields of economic activity that would raise the standard of

living and increase the stability of West African countries. ECOWAS works toward

creating region-wide policies and programs in key sectors including energy, transportation and agriculture, as well as on developing a common external tariff for the

region. ECOWAS also has been actively engaged in mitigating conflict in the region

in order to enable stronger economic ties.

In the energy sector, USAID is currently assisting ECOWAS to create a West Africa Power Pool (WAPP) for energy trading and to build linking lines throughout

the region to integrate the fragmented national electric power systems of West Africa, increasing access to affordable, reliable electricity. USAID’s technical assistance

was a deciding factor in the World Bank’s June 2005 approval of a $350 million

adaptable program lending facility to support the WAPP. We plan to continue our

collaboration with ECOWAS to speed development of this critical sector.

USAID is also helping ECOWAS to enhance regional economic integration by increasing trade and reducing customs barriers. In addition, we are currently providing financial and capacity building support to ECOWAS in the areas of agriculture, humanitarian concerns such as trafficking in persons, health, and organizational development, primarily in financial management and manpower systems.

Prospects for ECOWAS’ continued growth and development are good primarily because there is widespread recognition in the region that an effective regional organiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 May 25, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33724.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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zation must exist if economic and political integration is to occur and, within the

donor community, there is a willingness to collaborate and to coordinate assistance

efforts, with an emphasis on capacity building.

In another sub-region of the continent, the Common Market for Eastern and

Southern Africa (COMESA) is a group of 20 African nations which agree to promote

integration through trade, natural resource and human development for the benefit

of their respective populations. The primary objectives of COMESA are to create a

Free Trade Area, establish a Common External Tariff among member states, and

to remove structural and institutional weaknesses of member states to attain collective sustainable development. With a combined population of 385 million and a market of $388 billion, the COMESA region constitutes an important potential market

for the United States.

Since 1998, USAID has viewed COMESA as a key development partner, providing approximately $25 million in assistance to support capacity building for COMESA

in the areas of (1) trade and institutional strengthening and (2) conflict prevention,

mitigation and response.

COMESA is a principal USAID partner in promoting and fostering U.S.-Africa

trade relationships. Our programs seek to help the private sector and governments

in the region understand the challenges of the global marketplace and take advantage of the opportunities stemming from the World Trade Organization and the

COMESA Free Trade Area. Specific areas of focus include drafting a regional approach to biotechnology and biosafety, harmonization of telecommunications policy,

development of a common investment area, and the creation of a regional customs

bond guarantee program. It should be noted that in 2002 COMESA member states

experienced an intraregional trade growth rate of 22 percent. Finally, USAID funding is helping COMESA to develop stronger linkages between the Secretariat and

the relevant Ministries in member states to improve capacity in financial management, human resource development and information technology.

C. Security Sector Reform

USAID is aligning its efforts in security sector reform to complement the extensive initiatives of the State Department and other USG agencies. For example,

USAID is working with ECOWAS to develop its conflict prevention and mitigation

mechanism, which involves setting up a central unit at headquarters, establishing

Observation and Monitoring Centers and setting up ancillary entities for conflict

resolution. While progress toward achievement of its economic objectives has been

slower, ECOWAS has established a strong track record in its peace keeping operations in conflict-prone areas, which substantially improves the regional economic

climate and sets the stage for sustained growth. For example, ECOWAS had a pivotal role in brokering peace in Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and Guinea Bissau in recent years. ECOWAS and the African Union were instrumental in overturning the

coup in Togo earlier this year.

USAID is also working with COMESA in conflict prevention and mitigation to

provide governance skills training for parliamentarians and civil society organizations throughout the region. Support was also provided to the COMESA Court of

Justice to adjudicate cases and disputes at a regional level. In addition, USAID

funds are being used to design a protocol and accreditation system for private sector

and civil society organizations, along with the establishment of a Peace Desk to advise the Secretariat on peace and security issues among member states.

Finally, I would like to note our work with the Intergovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD). Comprised of seven member states (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,

Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) located in the Horn of Africa, IGAD was established in 1986. Its focus is on three priority areas: food security and environmental

protection, conflict prevention and management, and economic cooperation and integration.

Although USG funding for IGAD is complicated by statutory restrictions regarding Sudan and Somalia, both IGAD member states, IGAD is a significant partner.

Most concerns have abated since Uganda took on the rotating Chairmanship of

IGAD in 2003. Currently, we assist IGAD in three critical areas.

IGAD provides the platform for the organization of the peace talks for both Sudan

and Somalia. Kenya has been designated by IGAD as the member state to lead

these negotiations. The IGAD Secretariat has played a substantial role in mobilizing

financing for both initiatives; without the contribution of IGAD, these regionally led

negotiations might never have taken place.

A second major IGAD activity is the implementation of a conflict early warning

mechanism (CEWARN). From its inception in 1987, this initiative has been financed

jointly by USAID and the German Technical Cooperation Organization. While

CEWARN had no actual response mechanism, it has the near-term potential to sigVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 May 25, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33724.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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nificantly reduce the level of livestock theft, conflict, violence and death in transborder areas by providing information on causes and events that will permit IGAD

member states to intervene in local conflicts before they escalate. If successful, this

activity will help moderate conflict in a severely conflict-prone region.

The third IGAD activity supported by USAID is the Drought Monitoring Centre

based in Nairobi. IGAD member states have assumed responsibility for financing

the operational costs of the center, which was previously operated through the

World Meteorological Organization. The Centre’s reports on drought conditions, food

production projections and forage conditions are essential for the planning of food

and other emergency assistance in the region.

Each of these regional organizations cited in this testimony has assumed a critical

coordination and technical role to advance economic development and trade, improve

conditions conducive to democracy and good governance, and to bring about an end

to violent conflict and to secure peace in Africa. By supporting activities to increase

institutional effectiveness and improve the enabling environment in which they operate, USAID support enables these regional partners to fulfill the missions that

their members have laid out for them.

IV. KEY PRESIDENTIAL AND AGENCY INITIATIVES FOR

STRENGTHENING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

As I noted in my testimony before you last March, over the past 4 years, USAID

has significantly expanded our level of official development assistance in Africa. Our

strategy in Africa is shaped by new thinking about the role of foreign assistance

that has crystallized since the millennium began. First, U.S. strategic and foreign

policy interests are front and center, in keeping with USG recognition that development—along with diplomacy and defense—is one of the three tools of foreign policy

and is consistent with the joint objectives laid out in the State Department-USAID

Strategic Plan.

Second, our strategy reflects a new paradigm for foreign aid focusing on the distinction between ‘‘transformational development’’ and ‘‘fragile states.’’ Africa has

more ‘‘top performing’’ transformational states and more ‘‘fragile’’ states than any

other region. And many of the transformational development countries have important vulnerabilities that, if neglected, may cause them to slip into fragility.

Third, we are exercising a more directive role in USAID/Washington, to ensure

that funds are allocated to those country and regional programs and toward those

sectors and goals with the greatest likelihood of significant impact. For its part,

Washington will align its staffing, operating expense and programmatic resources

to assist recipient Missions to achieve that impact. A significant portion of our assistance will be channeled through six Presidential Initiatives.

The President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief provides major funding to address

the most serious effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic;

Another health initiative, the President’s Initiative on Malaria, will expand malaria prevention and treatment programs in up to 15 African countries where the

incidence is highest by 2008. USAID is the lead managing agency of this program;

In the area of education, the Presidential Africa Education Initiative supports

training of new teachers and provides more textbooks and scholarships for children

throughout Africa;

The Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa focuses on programs to improve the use of modem technology and increase agricultural productivity and income for small-scale farmers, thereby increasing food availability;

Formerly known as the Africa TRADE Initiative, the President’s African Global

Competitiveness Initiative is working to improve the trade and investment environment and promote the fuller integration of Africa into the global economy;

The Congo Basin Forest Partnership supports efforts to conserve the outstanding

forest and wildlife resources of the Congo Basin Forest, which is the second largest

remaining tropical rain forest in the world; and finally,

The Africa Bureau Anti-Corruption Initiative is designed to reduce corruption in

sub-Saharan Africa and to lend specific support to recent efforts by African leaders

to link good governance with sustainable development practices.

V. CONCLUSION

As the largest bilateral donor in sub-Saharan Africa, we must actively collaborate

with our African counterparts in order to achieve our common goal of a better quality of life for all Africans. Regional organizations are key development actors in the

countries they serve. Their successes contribute to overall levels of peace and secuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 May 25, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33724.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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rity, and economic development. As they strengthen their institutional and technical

capacity, their potential impact will only increase. By supporting discrete regional

activities and by helping to strengthen these regional organizations through training and well-targeted technical assistance, USAID will continue to play a leadership

role in this process.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely appreciate this committee’s continuing interest in Africa and USAID’s critical role in the continent. I would be happy to discuss these and

other issues of concern in Africa with you and members of the committee at this

time.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Pierson, very much.

Senator Obama, do you have an opening statement you care to

make?

Senator OBAMA. Well, I just want to thank both of you for the

services you are rendering to the country, and I think that all of

us recognize that, given the enormous problems and enormous opportunities in Africa, that it is absolutely critical that we build up

institutional capacity in these areas, whether it is military capacity

or peacekeeping capacity through the African Union or it is various

institutional mechanisms to improve public health systems

throughout the region or mechanisms to ensure that economic development is happening at an appropriate scale. These are all

issues that would benefit from both institutions inside each country, but also regional approaches.

So I am just encouraged that we are thinking in those terms and

I hope that our good intentions are followed up by strong action.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Senator.

Just a couple of questions to follow up. Secretary Frazer, I was

intrigued by your mention of the Darfur and increased support role

for the UN. I wonder if you might elaborate a bit on the Darfur

situation and what you see. You mentioned also something about

a mandate and I am not sure I understood what you meant by

that. So if you could elaborate on that aspect of your testimony I

would appreciate it.

Ms. FRAZER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What we have seen in Darfur is that the African Union has

about 6,700 troops, the AMIS force in Darfur currently. The sense

is that you need about 12,000 forces in Darfur. The African Union

forces have played a fabulous role in deploying quickly and also in

ending the type of organized, systematic violence. There is episodic

violence that is taking place right now, but AMIS has effectively

stamped down the massive human rights violations and killings

that were going on last summer.

But what we have found is, both in terms of providing logistical

support and operational command and control, that there may need

to be some further assistance to the AMIS force as well as to increase the troop ceiling, to actually get to that target, about 12,000.

What type of assistance are we talking about specifically? What we

have found is that when you get beyond battalion and brigade

level, you start going to brigade and division level, and coordinating the logistics and the operational understanding of the battlefield as a whole requires more headquarters planning.

So the UN is able to provide that capacity, that headquarters

planning element, where the AU may be reaching the limit of its

capacity. Also, they may not have enough forces sufficient to actually reach that 1se priority2,000 troop ceiling in Darfur, as AU misVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 May 25, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\33724.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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sions currently are in Cote d’Ivoire, in Liberia, and still in Burundi

and other places.

So what we are looking at is the possibility—we are discussing

this with our colleagues in the AU—the possibility of the UN basically rehatting the forces that are there and then expanding those

troops with new troop contributors. When I talked about a mandate

change, I was talking about from an AU mandate to a UN mandate, basically rehatting the force.

Senator MARTINEZ. So it would be a UN force then rather than

an AU force?

Ms. FRAZER. That is one of the options that is being looked at,

to try to again increase the capacity, as well as the troop numbers.

This is still under discussion.

Senator MARTINEZ. How many troops does the AU have currently

deployed in the three or four nations that you referenced?

Ms. FRAZER. That is a good question, Mr. Chairman. I do not

have those specific numbers. In Darfur alone it is 6,700.

Senator MARTINEZ. But it is reaching the maximum that they

can deploy probably, which prompts the need for UN

intervention——

Ms. FRAZER. That is exactly right.

Senator MARTINEZ [continuing]. At least in the sense of command

and control and technical support, I suppose?

Ms. FRAZER. That is right, yes, sir.

Senator MARTINEZ. There seem to be a lot of organizations and

hard to sometimes understand their responsibilities and whether or

not they might even be conflicting and overlapping in terms of responsibility, objectives, and membership.

I just wonder if you could explain to us how formal the relationships are between the various organizations, ECOWAS and the African Union and all of these various groups that are all participating one way or the other. What are the agreements that govern

them and how do we interact with them?

Ms. FRAZER. Yes. The relationship between the subregional organizations and the AU is rather formal. The subregional organizations, as I said, are the constituent architecture of the African

Union and in particular, in the peacekeeping field, the standby brigades will be based on the subregional organizations, but they

would be the standby brigades deployed by the AU. So the relationship between, say, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and the East Africa

community is rather formal. The overlapping relationship is where

you get into the monetary unions, the economic communities,

which often are broader. Let us say the COMESA overlaps East Africa Community, as well as the Southern African Development

Community.

And they have to harmonize their rules for trade, for example,

or the Southern African Customs Union and how it fits within the

Southern African Development Community. So harmonizing the

trade rules, the tariff rules, is important amongst these economic

units. Then what started as economic organizations have taken on

more of a political and military character or security character. The

main ones are ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and the East Africa Community. Our relationship is more or less formal with those four.

Our Ambassador in Nigeria also is accredited to ECOWAS. Our

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Ambassador in Botswana also is accredited to the Southern African

Development Community and serves as our liason to that organization.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you.

Administrator Pierson, I heard you reference Avian influenza.

How big a threat does it appear to be in the African continent? Do

we have a handle on that and what steps are we taking to respond

to a potential outbreak?

Mr. PIERSON. It potentially is a major threat, Mr. Chairman Approximately 3 weeks ago all of our mission directors and regional

mission directors in Africa were on a conference call with me and

the director of the veterinary services for the Food and Agriculture

Organization in Rome. What he told us at that time—this was approximately 3 weeks ago—that Africa was at very high risk and

there was the potential, particularly in East Africa, that Avian flu

could hit within a 2-week period.

That 2-week period has gone. There are no cases of which we are

aware at this time. But what it did emphasize to us is the urgency

of how we had to approach the problem. The migratory pattern of

the birds as we understand put the East Africa area at the highest

risk immediately. On a longer term, West Africa is potentially,

what we are told, within a 6-month period.

The President has made Avian flu a very large priority. It is the

number one priority for the Administrator of USAID. We have

asked all—we have met with all of the African ambassadors in

Washington, emphasizing the importance of preparation for Avian

flu.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, sir. My time is up.

Distinguished ranking member, we turn it over to you for your

questions.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Frazer, clearly the AU demonstrated incredible ability

and was vital in bringing steadiness in Burundi. What can we

learn from that accomplishment that would help us address the

terrible human rights abuses in Darfur and are there any shortcomings of the AU’s approach that we ought to be careful to avoid?

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you for that question. Indeed, in Burundi,

the AU again took a leadership role. They deployed early. They had

tremendous challenges in terms of financing. The United States

helped to finance them with about $10 million, but over time what

we ended up doing was exactly what is being looked at as an option

for Darfur, which is eventually we blue-hatted the force in Burundi

and it became a UN force, and that was partly to help to sustain

that force. So I think that that model is also a model that we used

in Liberia, in which the ECOWAS forces were able to deploy quickly into the crisis. These mainly were Nigerian forces, but there also

were Ghanaian, Senegalese, and others, and over time we again

blue-hatted them and brought in international forces to help sustain that mission. So I think that that is a lesson learned and a

model both from Burundi and Liberia that applies very well to

Darfur. Of course, the operational area is much larger in Darfur

than was the case in Burundi, so the logistical challenge is much

greater. So the importance of trying to build the capacity of the

AU’s headquarters—right now it is important for us to, as we said,

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look at blue-hatting that force, but it is also over the long term necessary to build that institutional capacity within the AU itself.

Senator FEINGOLD. In the examples you gave, were the AU force

supplemented by international, other national forces, or did they

displace the African forces?

Ms. FRAZER. In the case of Liberia they were supplemented. In

the case of Burundi, it is basically the AU forces that stayed there

and they were paid for as a UN force. But in the case of Liberia

they were supplemented. Also in the case of Liberia, we found

again this issue of headquarters planning support.

Actually, in the case of ECOWAS, the United States played a

role putting military advisers into ECOWAS headquarters to give

them that planning capability. So what we need to do over the long

term is provide that capacity internally.

Senator FEINGOLD. When do you think the time frame would be

for having this happen in Darfur, the blue-hatting that you are

talking about?

Ms. FRAZER. Well, as I say, it is being discussed as one of the

options. But if you look at the time line for UN deployments, the

advantage of the AU and regional forces is that they can deploy

rather quickly, but the time line for a UN force, where the Untied

Nations Peacekeeping Office (DPKO) would have to actually get involved in coming out, doing an assessment, then doing the planning at UN headquarters, it would not be any earlier, I would

think, than mid-2006.

Senator FEINGOLD. Would you talk about your sense of U.S.-AU

relations? What is the status of the expected AU office in Washington here and will the U.S. appoint an ambassador to the AU?

Ms. FRAZER. I think our relations are excellent with the AU. We

consult frequently with them. The United States, as you know, deployed troops to AMIS. We airlifted some of those troops to Darfur.

So we have a very good diplomatic and operational relationship.

We are expecting the AU office to open in Washington. We are

looking forward to that. We have discussed it with Chairman

Konare, as well as President Obisanjo, the chairperson of the AU

right now. As for the United States appointing an ambassador, that

is certainly under strong consideration by the administration, to

appoint an ambassador to the AU to increase that strong positive

relationship.

Senator FEINGOLD. When do you think the Washington office of

the AU will open?

Ms. FRAZER. Any day. We are working with them right now to

open that office. They have agreed to do it.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK. How are we helping on the border of

Ethiopia and Eritrea? UNMEE has said that we are on the cusp

of warfare there and I understand the AU hopes to have a preventative force, I think it is called the Africa Standby Force, ASF, in

this region by next year. How quickly can this nascent ASF establish stability and where do the AU forces come into play here?

Ms. FRAZER. On the Eritrea–Ethiopia border, Senator Feingold,

I have been focusing my attention on getting UNMEE back up and

running. As you know, President Isaias has grounded UNMEE. We

think it is critical that UNMEE be allowed to operate, and I have

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sion back up and operating. So I am not certain about the time line

for an AU force or specifically what role an AU force would play

on that in terms of the boundary.

I think the important thing is to concentrate on the UN mission

that is already there, that has the legitimacy, that has the mandate.

Senator FEINGOLD. Keep me informed, if you could, of whatever

developments there are in that regard. You obviously noted that

prevention and mitigation are important in assuring that tension

does not erupt into a conflict here. Are we engaged in political diplomacy to prevent Ethiopia and Eritrean conflict?

Secretary FRAZER. We are, with Kofi Annan. He has talked often

with Secretary Rice on this issue. We feel that it is extremely important to move towards demarcating the boundary. We believe

that it is also important to get both countries to reduce the tensions between them, and we think it is extremely important, as I

said, to get UNMEE up and operating again. So we are working

with the UN. We have had conversations at a high level both with

Ethiopia, Prime Minister Meles, as well as with Eritrea. So there

is definitely quite a lot of diplomacy taking place right now to try

to lower the tension.

Senator FEINGOLD. There have been very disturbing allegations,

on another front, about the activities of peacekeeping forces in Africa. Reports have described evidence of rape and sexual abuse by

peacekeepers and staff members in Congo, for example, and have

suggested that such abuses are too often tolerated. What role has

the United States played in supporting regional military training

to ensure that peacekeepers do not engage in these kinds of

abuses?

Ms. FRAZER. We certainly have—in our African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program, we certainly engage in

human rights training. We have supported the development of

codes of conduct in places like Mali. We support the work of UNDP,

UNDPKO, and others also to try to develop these codes of conduct,

that even soldiers can carry in their pockets. So this is integrated

into our training programs. We also have to hold those who have

committed these crimes accountable, and I think that the UN and

UNDPKO are definitely focused on that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARTINEZ. Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Let me just see if I can close the loop here on

the Darfur situation. Is it my understanding then that blue helmets—that the United States is currently and actively working

with the United Nations to get UN troops to supplement the AU

in Darfur?

Ms. FRAZER. No, Senator Obama, that would be going too far at

this point. What we are doing is consulting with the African Union

about various options for increasing the capacity of the AMIS force.

One of the options is the possibility of blue-hatting them with the

UN.

Senator OBAMA. OK. But the AU forces as I understand it—several months ago there was talk about ramping up to 12,000. That

does not seem to be possible any time soon, am I correct?

Ms. FRAZER. That is correct. That is exactly right.

23

Senator OBAMA. What also seems to be accurate is that with the

7,000 or so AU troops that are currently there we do not have—

we have sufficient coverage to essentially bear witness and perhaps

stop some of the most egregious activity; we do not have the capacity to cover an enormous region, and so what is frequently happening then is that activities outside of the site of AU forces may

intimidate populations. They are all displaced. There does not seem

to be any prospect at this point, given the strength of forces there,

that we are going to be able to actually start moving people back

to their homes from the settlements that have developed. Is that

accurate?

Secretary FRAZER. I think I would answer it in this way. We are

working on three fronts. The most important front—and I am leaving this evening, going to Darfur to meet with SLM leaders. The

most important front is to try to get a political solution. That ultimately is what will allow people to return home to create an environment of peace and safety and security, through a political negotiation. So we are working very hard on that track. The second is

to continue to put pressure on all parties to adhere to the ceasefire,

because frankly even 12,000 troops, given the size of the area, will

not be able to stop all incidents of violence.

Senator OBAMA. Fair enough.

Ms. FRAZER. So we really do need to get a commitment out of the

government of Sudan, out of the SLA, the JEM, and force the government to control the activities of the janjaweed to adhere to their

ceasefire. Then yes, indeed, on the final front, we need to increase

the number of monitors. The important point here is we can do a

lot now even with the 6,700. Part of that is for the AU to clarify

the mandate of those forces. It seems to be that some units——

Senator OBAMA. Sorry to interrupt, but is that a problem of the

AU clarifying the mandate or is that us forcing Sudan’s hand in

order to clarify the mandate?

Ms. FRAZER. No, I think that what I was saying is that it is the

AU. It is the AU mandate. Some units of the AU, the AMIS force,

understand that they can protect civilians, for example, and that

is within their mandate to do. Others think that they have to stand

back and do nothing and just observe and report.

Senator OBAMA. Yes, but are they not also constrained by what

the Sudanese government is willing to grant them; there has been

a consistent issue of whether the mandate is too weak, and that

we should be forcing the Sudanese government’s hands even as the

parallel negotiations are taking place with the rebel groups and the

Sudanese government, that we also have somewhat hamstrung the

AU? So it is not entirely a mistake on their part to assume that

there is some ambiguity to that mandate.

Ms. FRAZER. No, I think there is a mistake on their part. I think

that that has been a discussion here, but it is my understanding

that the AU mandate is quite clear and they do have the capacity

under their mandate to protect civilians, but that that word has

not gotten out to the units uniformly.

Senator OBAMA. OK.

Ms. FRAZER. So part of it is absolutely clarifying that mandate

to the various units. Some units, national units, act one way; othVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 May 25, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\33724.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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ers sit back. We need to make sure that the force commanders out

there——

Senator OBAMA. So I just want to be clear. Under your understanding, under the existing mandate that exists, they can protect

civilians against janjaweed and the Sudanese government has authorized such intervention?

Ms. FRAZER. That is right.

Senator OBAMA. That is your understanding?

Ms. FRAZER. That is right. Part of the problem for the AMIS

forces in protecting civilians is getting the equipment that they

need, which is why we are trying to get the armored personnel carriers in there, because then they can have greater mobility and security for themselves. So we do need to increase their capacity. But

in terms of the mandate, it is my understanding that they have the

sufficient mandate to protect civilians.

Senator OBAMA. When I met with the AU countries at the UN,

part of—speaking to the resource issues that you are talking about,

obviously they were hoping, I think, for more money from the UN

and from the United States. My general view is I want to make

sure that money is well spent and that there is accountability and

transparency in terms of how that money is spent. Having said

that, it does seem that these forces that are deployed are real

strapped. So my question is what are we, either as the U.S. Government or through various UN bodies or through NATO or other

mechanisms, what kinds of support are we giving them in terms

of airlifts, food supplies, equipment, and so forth?

Secretary FRAZER.We have spent about $160 million and we have

set up 32 base camps for the AMIS forces. So we have been a major

contributor to them. We obviously also airlifted the Rwandan forces

into Darfur. So we continue to support them materially. We have

contractors out there working very closely with them. So I think

that we are supporting them and if they need additional support

we will look at how we can do that with the resources, if we can

get the resources.

Senator OBAMA. My time is up. Let me just say this. The administration generally has been better on this issue than a number of

European countries. I have said that to Secretary Rice and I have

said that to Ambassador Zoellick. I still do not get a sufficient

sense of urgency at the highest levels on this issue. There is a lot

of stuff going on in the world and I recognize that our foreign policy

apparatus is rightly busy with Iraq and Afghanistan and the situation in the Middle East. But I have to say that I am getting a sense

of drift right now in terms of the policy in Darfur. My hope would

be that we start ramping up activity, including putting more pressure on other countries to get involved in this issue, because right

now we have an enormous number of people who have now for a

year, year and a half, been living in camps, and there is a crisis

that is going to explode at some point if we do not catch it now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary FRAZER.Senator Obama, if I might, I understand exactly what you are saying, and I think that we do feel the urgency.

Ambassador Zoellick, our Deputy Secretary, has been there four

times. He just returned. I have been there three times in the last

month, or I am going tonight, so it will be three times in one

25

month that I am going out to Darfur. I can assure you that this

is getting the highest level attention from President Bush, Secretary Rice, Deputy Secretary Zoellick, myself and others, Andrew

Natsios and others. So we do need to fix this. But as I said, a lot

of attention has to be focused to support the AMIS force, but also

to really push hard for a political settlement, which is why I am

getting on a plane tonight.

Senator OBAMA. Absolutely. That is not just true in Darfur, that

whole political settlement issue.

Secretary FRAZER.Yes, sir.

Mr. PIERSON. Mr. Chairman, may I also add——

Senator OBAMA. Please.

Mr. PIERSON [continuing]. To what the Assistant Secretary has

said in terms of urgency? By far the majority of time, effort, and

money in the Africa Bureau at USAID is spent on Sudan-related

issues. In this past fiscal year, approximately $850 million got

strong bipartisan support, but approximately $850 million has been

spent in Sudan by the United States, both in terms of humanitarian assistance and development assistance in the south. That

number we expect to go up in the next fiscal year.

We do understand your comments, sir, but I will assure you I

think both from the Department of State, throughout the administration, and USAID, we view those problems, as well as a number

of issues in Africa, that we are trying the address them on a very

urgent manner. I have been to Darfur, I have been to the South,

and when you see the suffering there and understand some of the

complexities of the issues, you can only come away thinking of it

in terms of human life and you have to deal with it urgently.

Senator OBAMA. Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time and I

am not trying to get the last word here, but I just want to say, a

lot of the activity you are talking about has to do with the NorthSouth issues. Those are important and we want to preempt additional problems—and obviously Garang’s death increased those

problems. So we have been dealt a bad hand. You guys personally,

I know, have been putting time into this issue and I very much appreciate it. But the spotlight is not being shown on this right now.

There is not sufficient discussion in my view, not simply in the

press, but in the UN. We are not pressuring our allies more vigorously to get involved and engaged in this process. So I know it is

tough, and I know you personally have been committed to this

issue, but we need to ramp it up.

Senator MARTINEZ. My intent was to perhaps delve a little longer

with this panel, but we are going to move along to the second

panel. I want to thank you both for being here. Madam Secretary,

I want to wish you very great success in your trip today. I know

how important that is. I know with Secretary Zoellick’s continued,

repeated visits that it is hard to conceive of how we could be adrift.

I think you have shown great interest and concern. So I commend

you and wish you well on your trip this evening.

Secretary FRAZER.Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARTINEZ. We want to at this time, because of the vote

upcoming, move to the second panel and welcome them to the

table. Thank you. For our second panel we have Victoria Holt, a

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ington, and Jennifer Cooke, co-director of the Africa Program at

CSIS. We welcome you both and thank you both for being here.

The last time we went from right to left, so this time we will go

from left to right and, Ms. Cooke, we will hear from you first for

your opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER G. COOKE, CO-DIRECTOR, AFRICA

PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES

Ms. COOKE. Chairman Martinez, Senator Feingold, I am grateful

to you for the opportunity to speak today on the important subject

of African regional organizations. I am going to concentrate my remarks primarily on the launch of the African Union and how best

the United States can assist it. I will give a brief summary of my

written remarks.

Senator MARTINEZ. Your full remarks will be made a part of the

record. That is fine.

Ms. COOKE. As we heard from Secretary Frazer, the formation of

the African Union in 2001 signaled a new determination among

key African leaders to take greater responsibility for shaping the

continent’s future. Most significantly, these leaders consciously

committed the AU to play a more proactive role in ending Africa’s

conflicts and in setting credible new norms for economic and political governance.

This shift is still early and in its fragile stages and we should

not be surprised if it is a little uneven and if it takes time to really

consolidate itself. But it is already beginning to generate some

early promising returns. It is being called upon to play a lead role

in some of the continent’s most formidable crises, among them

Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, and of course Darfur.

Mr. Chairman, as the AU’s new role has unfolded it has become

increasingly clear that U.S. interests in Africa are in close alignment with and indeed interdependent with those of the African

Union. We see this in Darfur, but also well beyond Sudan. Over the

last decade there has been a dramatic rise in U.S. interests in Africa, in counterterrorism, energy, HIV–AIDS, answering the threat of

genocide, promoting democracy, and ending chronic wars. There is

increasing bipartisan consensus in Congress, in successive administrations, within the American public, to help address Africa’s challenges and encourage and support promising trends. But to meet

these rising U.S. national interests, we need competent, like-minded partners on the continent. The African Union is just such a

partner. It is not without uncertainty, it is not without problems,

but it is nonetheless a promising partner. It has embraced many

of the same values and goals that animate U.S. policy.

Mr. Chairman, it is in the U.S. national interest to support the

Nation’s sense of collective African responsibility. This goal should

be a long-term priority of U.S. foreign policy. For the United States

to be successful in this arena, however, it will need to take three

steps to build more systematic, reliable, bipartisan U.S. engagement. A critical first step is for the United States to appoint a fully

accredited U.S. Ambassador to the African Union. I was pleased to

hear that this is under discussion. I think this is an excellent idea.

The United States has taken this step with other regional organiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 May 25, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\33724.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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zations, to the considerable benefit of U.S. foreign policy interests.

Such an appointment will help ensure consistency of U.S. approach. It will signal the seriousness with which we take the AU

and it will allow a single focus point for U.S. engagement, both on

immediate priorities and on longer-term goals. It is not a costly

step, nor is it premature. If anything, it will provide additional

oversight over the multiplying streams of U.S. assistance to the

AU.

A second critical step is for the U.S. to define a realistic, dynamic

strategy of long-term engagement with the AU, tied, importantly,

to reliable baseline year to year funding. The United States should

be looking out at least a decade in this engagement and begin setting targets for support, either in absolute dollar amounts, or as a

percentage of international support. Currently U.S. support to the

AU is ad hoc, it is crisis-driven and it is very uneven and unpredictable from year to year. We need to fix this. To help the AU to

work more closely with our European partners, we need to be more

predictable in this.

Priorities for our support should include targeted training and

flexible support to build mediation capacities, strengthening regional peacekeeping capacities—and we have heard some on that;

I think we will hear more from Victoria—encouraging norms on

governance and economic stewardship, both in our bilateral relations and in supporting emerging AU mechanisms, and helping

strengthen AU action and consensus on infectious disease and environmental stewardship. In all these areas, the United States has

special expertise to contribute.

Third, the United States has to respond more effectively to the

ongoing emergency in Darfur. Beyond the evident humanitarian

costs of the conflict, the current intervention is an early test of AU

commitment, capacity, and credibility of future efforts. We cannot

allow this mission to fail. The administration is to be commended

for the critical high-level attention it has given to this crisis, but

U.S. leadership should push for an expanded U.S. peacekeeping

role in Darfur. This request has to come from the AU if it is going

to fly within the Security Council. We need to urge AU leadership

to put a direct and persuasive request to the Security Council to

partner with the AU in Darfur.

The United States should also work to place greater diplomatic

pressure on the parties to the conflict, potential regional spoilers,

and international stakeholders. President Bush, for example, has a

prime opportunity this week to signal to the Chinese government

the importance he attaches to Darfur and to ask China for greater

cooperation in resolving the crisis there. We also need to ensure,

though, that in responding to this crisis we do not undermine efforts to build enduring AU capacities. U.S. support will be critical

to the African Union’s future and the African Union’s success will

be important to advancing U.S. stakes in Africa.

The administration is to be commended for its current support to

the AU and to the negotiations in Darfur, but to build a long-term

reliable partner, the United States can do more and should build

an approach that is coherent, predictable, institutionalized, and

well-led at a senior level. Supporting the trend towards African

ownership and responsibility warrants such an approach.

28

Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, I want to thank you for your

attention and for the opportunity to speak with you today.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JENNIFER COOKE, CO-DIRECTOR, AFRICAN PROGRAM

CENTER FOR STRAGETIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Martinez, and members of the subcommittee, I am grateful to you for

the opportunity to appear here today to speak on the very important subject of the

African Union. I will concentrate my comments on the launch of the African Union

and how best the United States can assist it.

In 2001, the transformation of the Organization for African Unity into the African

Union signaled a new determination among several key African leaders to take

greater responsibility for shaping the continent’s future. Most significantly, these

leaders consciously committed the AU to play a proactive role in ending Africa’s conflicts and in setting credible new norms for economic and political governance. They

stirred the AU to come out openly in opposition to military and other forms of egregious misrule, to fight corruption, and to embrace the principle of self-criticism and

peer review.

This shift was a conceptual and political watershed. It emerged from the 1990s

when a proliferation of African crises—in Somalia, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and others—wreaked untold misery on African populations, while the OAU stood on the sidelines, quiescent and utterly ineffectual,

shielded by its founding principles of the sanctity of state sovereignty and non-interference. With the formation of the African Union, and a parallel initiative, the New

Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), a new consensus began

to emerge around the paradigm of human—versus state—security, and the collective

responsibility of Africans to protect that security. This has translated into a far

greater willingness by African leaders to mediate conflicts among their continental

neighbors and to begin to lay down standards of good governance, economic stewardship, and meeting basic needs in health, education, and other social services.

These steps led to the creation in 2003 of the AU Peace and Security Council,

plans for the eventual creation of a continent-wide African Standby Force, and the

ambitious embrace of a lead role by the AU in both brokering a peace settlement

and putting in place a major peace operation in the Darfur region of Sudan. At the

same time, the AU has assumed responsibilities for ending internal conflict and misrule in Burundi, Togo, Mauritania, and Cote d’Ivoire. On a parallel track, the AU

is moving forward with a newly formed African Peer Review Mechanism to evaluate

governance among states that volunteer for review.

This pivotal change is still at an early, fragile stage. The new norms are an aspiration. They are often violated, as the case of Zimbabwe shows only too clearly. Implementation of the change is uneven, and the AU remains heavily dependent on

external support. The institutional architecture envisioned for the AU is ambitious

and broad, and yet at the moment these ambitions remain largely a framework,

with neither depth nor capacity. Nor has the AU fully sorted out how it will relate

to the multiplicity of other African institutions and initiatives, many of which overlap: the regional economic communities, the African Inter-Parliamentarian Union,

the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and others. Action often depends on the inclination of key personalities within the AU, and on occasion, rivalry

for influence hampers effectiveness.

We should not be surprised that it takes time for a new regional body such as

the African Union to launch itself. It took many years for other comparable regional

bodies in Latin America, Asia, and Europe to acquire institutional capacity and

build confidence both within and without their respective regions. The AU experience will not be fundamentally different. It is equally important to note that the

advent of the AU has generated high expectations within Africa and in the international community and has begun to generate some early promising returns. Indeed, the AU is already being called upon to play a lead role in some of the continent’s most formidable crises.

Mr. Chairman, as the AU’s new role has unfolded, it has also become increasingly

clear that U.S. interests in Africa are in close alignment with—indeed interdependent with—those of the African Union. That intersection is most poignantly

seen in Darfur, but also reaches well beyond Sudan. Over the last decade there has

been a dramatic rise in U.S. strategic interests in Africa: in combating terrorism,

ensuring steady and reliable energy supplies, combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic,

29

preventing mass atrocities and answering the threat of genocide, promoting democratization, and ending Africa’s chronic wars that undermine hope for economic

growth and development within an expanding global economy. There is increasing

bipartisan consensus, in Congress, in successive administrations, and among the

American public to help address the challenges that Africa faces and to encourage

and support promising trends and initiatives.

To meet these rising U.S. national interests in Africa requires an effective U.S.

policy that looks out into the future and that identifies competent and like-minded

partners on the continent. The African Union is just such a key emergent partner,

not the sole option, and not one without uncertainty and problems, but nonetheless

an important and promising partner. It has embraced many of the same values and

goals that currently animate U.S. policy, and is showing early progress. Conversely,

the African Union’s continued future progress rests to a significant degree on its

success in building effective external partnerships, most importantly with the

United States and the European Union.

For these reasons, it is in U.S. national interests to support the nascent sense of

collective African responsibility embodied in the African Union and to work assiduously to build a strong, enduring partnership with the AU. That goal should be a

long-term priority of U.S. foreign policy.

For the United States to be successful in this arena, however, it will need to take

three steps to build a more systematic, reliable, bi-partisan, and long-term U.S. engagement with the African Union.

1. A critical first step is for the United States to appoint a fully accredited U.S.

Ambassador to the African Union. The United States has taken this step with several other regional organizations (NATO, OAS, ASEAN, EU) to the considerable

benefit of U.S. foreign policy interests. Such an appointment to the AU, with adequate authority and staff support, will help ensure consistency of U.S. approach, signal the seriousness of U.S. purpose, and allow a single focal point for U.S. engagement on both immediate priorities and the longer-term challenges that the AU will

face. This is not a costly step, nor is it premature. If anything, it will provide additional valuable oversight of the multiplying streams of U.S. assistance to the AU.

2. A second, critical step is for the United States to define a realistic, dynamic

strategy of long-term engagement with the AU, and to tie that strategy systematically to consistent, reliable baseline funding. The United States should be looking

out at least a decade in this engagement and begin setting targets for support, either in absolute dollar amounts or as a percentage of support requirements. Currently U.S. support to the AU is ad hoc, crisis-driven, vulnerable to raids from other

budget lines, and uneven from year-to-year. If the U.S. is to be credible and reliable

in assisting the AU to acquire key new capacities, it needs to break consciously with

current practices. Sectoral priorities for financial and technical support should include:

i. Helping build the AU’s capacity to resolve conflicts though targeted training

and support of mid-level mediators, expanding the competence of negotiating

teams beyond the senior-most echelons; and strengthening regional peacekeeping capacities, notably the planned African Standby Force;

ii. Helping to standardize and strengthen emerging norms on governance and

economic stewardship; and

iii. Helping strengthen approaches to chronic and infectious diseases (to include HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria) and the environment. In all of these areas,

the U.S. has special expertise to contribute.

3. Third, the United States must respond more effectively to the ongoing emergency in the Darfur region in Sudan. This will require (as outlined below) heightened U.S. leadership to facilitate an expanded U.N. peacekeeping role in support of

the AU in Darfur and greater diplomatic pressure on the parties to the conflict. It

will also require special care that the U.S. response to this immediate crisis does

not weaken the U.S. resolve to build enduring AU capacities over the long-term. The

United States should not mortgage the AU’s future to finance its current, urgent

emergency requirements. The United States and the EU alike suffer from this malady, and each needs somehow to learn how simultaneously to balance meeting immediate urgent requirements like those in Darfur while also addressing the AU’s

long term capacity requirements.

THE IMMEDIATE CHALLENGE: CRISIS IN DARFUR

The United States should use all its persuasive power to encourage the African

Union to partner with the United Nations and request an alignment of AU and U.N.

30

forces in Sudan, and, together with the international community, to pressure the

Government of National Unity in Khartoum to acquiesce.

The most immediate and pressing challenge for the African Union is the crisis in

Darfur. Beyond the evident humanitarian costs of the conflict, the current security

operation and mediation efforts under way are an early test of AU commitment and

capacity. Success of this mission is critical, not only for the people of Darfur, but

for the longer-term prospects of AU interventions. And right now that intervention

is in crisis.

The world’s first priority there must be to fix the security situation, which is disintegrating into an increasingly diffuse mix of banditry, retaliation, and breakdown

of command and control both within the fragmenting rebel movements and on the

government side. There can be no progress on political mediation until there is some

restoration of order, some control over cross-border trafficking in arms and support,

an effective clamp-down on Eritrean, Libyan and Chadian meddling in the conflict,

and heightened pressure on Khartoum. This is clearly beyond the AU’s current capacity.

The United States has committed $167 million to the AU mission in Darfur. And

as Deputy Secretary Zoellick stated earlier this month, in areas where they have

deployed, security has improved. But the African Union itself, currently with just

over 6,000 troops on the ground, has acknowledged that it will be near impossible

to get 13,000 troops deployed in any reasonable timeframe. The recent kidnappings

and killings of AU troops and continued insecurity in Darfur are proof that the African Union at this stage, despite commitment and commendable performance, does

not have the capacity to fulfill this daunting task.

At this point, our best and most realistic option would be for the U.N. Security

Council to enlarge the ambit of its Sudanese peacekeeping operation, to allow support for the AU mission in Darfur. It simply makes no sense to have 10,000 U.N.

troops in Sudan, mandated to monitor and support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, parallel to an AU force in Darfur, but forbidden from

intervening in that area of the country that most needs security. But for the Security Council to take this step to merge the two missions, the request will need to

come—directly and persuasively—from the African Union itself. A merger of this

kind need not undermine or detract from the accomplishments, responsibility, or

command structure of the AU forces on the ground, but rather will signal a mature

acknowledgement of what is required to uphold the responsibility to protect.

The United States and other key players should lend political support to AU mediation efforts in Abuja by assigning senior, empowered advisers and mediators to

the talks; by making available quick and flexible financing for training and technical assistance; by exerting diplomatic pressure to minimize the role of potential

regional spoilers; and, in consultation with AU mediators, by continuing to build

unified, international pressure on both the rebel groups and on Khartoum to make

demonstrable progress in fulfilling their promises and negotiating in good faith.

The Darfur negotiations in Abuja will be stalled unless there is a change in the

security situation on the ground. That said, since negotiations began last year, the

AU mediation team has improved dramatically in competence, organization, operational capacity, and openness to external assistance. The African Union’s Special

Envoy for the Darfur Talks, former Tanzanian Prime Minister Salim Ahmed Salim,

has proven an adept and able leader, and according to those involved in the negotiations has made a real difference. If the AU, with U.N. assistance, can exert a modicum of control over the security situation in Darfur, the AU talks, with focused

multilateral support may be able to make some headway in reaching a negotiated

settlement. But here too, they will need substantial support from the international

community.

The division between the two factions of the SLM is both a threat to security and

an obstacle to peace negotiations. Neither the U.S. nor the AU can dictate who

should represent the SLM at the peace negotiations. However, until they resolve

their internal differences, our only option is to recognize a de facto situation of two

parallel movements. In the light of this, it is essential that the U.S. make clear that

hostilities between the two factions are unacceptable. The African Union should not

be tasked with sorting out the thorny question of SLM representation when the

peace talks begin. Rather, the U.S. and other international partners should adopt

a common position and do their utmost to ensure SLM agreement in advance.

MANY CRISES, LITTLE CAPACITY, MIXED RESULTS

Darfur is currently the most pressing challenge that the African Union’s peace

and security architecture faces, and the one that for many reasons has garnered the

most international attention. But the organization has interceded in a number of

31

See Kristiana Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime, Institute for

Strategic Studies, Pretoria, 2005.

other African crises and today continues to grapple with multiple complex crises.

And for the foreseeable future, it will not lack for crises. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, rising tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea (and within

Ethiopia itself), a deteriorating situation in Chad, and the failed state of Somalia,

are among the situations where the African Union will likely be expected to play

an increasingly active role.

Even in Darfur, notwithstanding the enormity of the catastrophe and the momentous international attention generated, the African Union mediation effort was slow

in starting, initially disorganized, and divided on how much external involvement

would be acceptable. Darfur and other interventions that have received much less

international attention and support have illustrated the critical need for longer-term

capacity building and institutionalization. A number of the most senior envoys in

these efforts have been outstanding statesmen, and highly effective. But at more

junior and mid-level echelons, there is often a lack of mediation, administrative, or

managerial experience and capacity, making it difficult for the organization to

prioritize, to manage external assistance, or adequately plan. The majority of AU

interventions remain heavily contingent on the inclination of the most powerful AU

leaders, most notably President Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Mbeki of South

Africa, and the organization has not yet fully sorted out its relationship with regional organizations like SADC and ECOWAS in determining which body should intervene in given situations.

Finally, the African Union should not be expected to shoulder the responsibility

for Africa’s most intractable conflicts alone. In many of these conflicts, only a strong

concerted multilateral effort will be able to generate the pressures and incentives

necessary, with the AU as a key—or ideally a leading—negotiating presence.

Some examples from previous AU interventions point to the potential and actual

gains from AU initiatives along with the need for greater international support to

them.

Burundi—African Union engagement in Burundi was considered an important

first test of the organization’s commitment and capacity to promote peace and security in Africa, and by most accounts the AU’s role was crucial in consolidating the

Burundian peace process, as well as bolstering the organizations confidence in carrying out its new mandate. However, a number of considerations should be kept in

mind.

First, the AU intervention in Burundi was driven largely by the personal leadership of then AU chair Thabo Mbeki, who saw the deployment as an opportunity to

demonstrate the new AU commitment to the responsibility to protect. South Africa

provided the majority of the AU troops.

Second, the African Union was not alone in the process. The Arusha Accord of

2000, a first major breakthrough in Burundi’s peace process, called for a U.N. peacekeeping operation, but absent a comprehensive cease-fire agreement the U.N. would

not authorize the mission. The AU peacekeeping operation therefore, deployed in

April 2003, was conceived and implemented as an interim, bridging force. The 3000-

plus AU troops were absorbed into a larger U.N. force of 5,650 little over a year

later in June 2004, in direct response to a request from the AU. The transition from

an AU to U.N. force was smooth, with the AU command structure left largely intact,

and troops on the ground re-hatted as U.N. forces.1

Third, while the African Union mission paved the way for the U.N. deployment

by bringing a modicum of security while cease-fire negotiations were underway, it

by no means had the capacity—in numbers, equipment, or financial capacity to implement the robust mandate required—including protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. The process might have floundered

badly had not the U.N. come in with the manpower, equipment, resources, and experience to get the job done. The African Union mission was blessed with the excellent negotiation skills and staying power of AU envoy Mamadou Bah, backed by

senior South African leadership, but crucial to the mission’s success was the close

collaboration with, and generous support from, the United States, the UK, and the

United Nations, all of which invested significant diplomatic and financial resources

in the effort.

Togo—Among the most striking shifts since the establishment of the AU has been

that coups within member states, once a fairly regular and unremarkable occurrence in the African context, are now deemed unacceptable and generally provoke

a strong condemnatory reaction from the AU membership. When President

Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, died in office after ruling the country for 38 years,

32

the military appointed his son Fame Gnassingbe as president and pushed the national assembly to amend the constitution retroactively to make the move technically legal. The African Union acted quickly, labeling the move a coup and, with

unanimous endorsement of the AU Peace and Security Council, imposed diplomatic,

travel and arms sanctions on the Togolese state. Bowing to pressure by the African

Union and regional leadership, Gnassingbe announced that Presidential elections

would be held, and lifted, albeit partially, a ban on political activity.

The Togo example is not an unqualified success. Although the AU forced an electoral process, the elections were deeply flawed and political participation in Togo remains severely constrained. The African Union has yet to come to terms with the

limits of national sovereignty, and so far has been loath to offer frank assessments

of even the most blatantly shoddy election processes. Nor does the AU have the capacity or staying power to exert high-level, long-term follow-up pressure and attention in these instances.

Mauritania—When a coup in Mauritania in August 2005 unseated President Ould

Taya, an unpopular autocrat, the African Union quickly condemned the move and

suspended the country’s membership from the organization. Although the AU did

not push to have Taya re-installed, it has insisted on a timetable for elections and

a transfer to civilian rule. The Mauritania coup illustrates a broader concern of how

the United States can support the goals and the norms that the African Union is

attempting to set. There is some conjecture that the United States’ fairly uncritical

embrace of Taya on counter-terrorism operations fueled popular discontent, since

Taya used that engagement to legitimate his rule and sideline dissenters. This illustrated the broader point of how U.S. engagement with African leaders needs to be

carefully calibrated to reinforce the governance norms that the African Union is

seeking to promulgate. In coming years, the U.S. will need to grapple with how to

integrate short-term security concerns with the longer-term challenges of democratization and popular participation.

Zimbabwe—Finally, Zimbabwe reveals most clearly the African Union’s limitations. The AU—as well as much of the rest of the world—has relied almost exclusively on South African President Mbeki for a political solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis,

and Mbeki, for political and philosophical reasons, has been so far unwilling to take

meaningful action. The AU is paralyzed; although some individual states—Senegal,

Kenya, Ghana—have voiced cautious disapproval of Zimbabwean leader Robert

Mugabe, many are loath to criticize an elder statesman and former front-line leader.

Further, Mugabe has fairly skillfully appealed to populist sentiments in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa by portraying the opposition as merely a front for Western neo-colonial interests. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anan’s naming of Special

Envoy Anna Tubaijuka to report on the mass housing demolitions in spring 2005

nudged Mbeki to name former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano to mediate

between Mugabe’s ruling ZANU–PF and the opposition MDC. But President

Chissano was rebuffed by Mugabe, and ZANU–PF has only intensified its efforts to

silence the opposition.

Public opinion may be shifting in South Africa the housing demolitions, which

were broadcast on South African television, were starkly reminiscent of apartheidera tactics—but the international community cannot rely on quick AU action. The

United States and others will need to continue to seek common ground with the African Union, both in perception of the problem and in looking toward solution. But

this should not stymie consideration of other options, for example, broadening bilateral and U.N. pressures through additional investigations and rapporteurs. The

United States will need to prepare for the worst case scenario in Zimbabwe, a possible collapse of the Zimbabwean state, which would demand close cooperation between African states and international partners to address.

BEYOND CONFLICT: ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR GOVERNANCE

Perhaps the greatest role the African Union can play over the long-term is addressing the root causes of conflict, most importantly in setting norms for good governance, economic management, environmental stewardship, and investment in

health and education. This will be a long and gradual process, but one that is wellworth supporting. A number of promising initiatives are today in their infancy.

The innovative African Peer Review Mechanism, for example, measures participating states’ performance against political, economic, and corporate governance

standards. To date, 23 countries have signed up for peer review; two of these reviews have been completed and several more are under way. Countries initially undergo a self administered internal review, followed by an outside assessment. A final

33

report, including plans for corrective measures is discussed among AU heads of

state, and countries volunteering for review.

The Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and other Related Infectious

Diseases of 2001, was an important symbolic achievement. African leaders collectively acknowledged the exceptional threat HIV/AIDS poses to development, political

stability, food security, and social cohesion, and pledged to set a target of allocating

15 percent of annual budgets to their countries health sector.

Other proposed measures include a continent-wide early warning system, intended to link regional early warning reporting with the AU Peace and Security

Council; an African Productive Capacity Initiative intended to strengthen African

industrial capacities and regional integration; and a post-conflict reconstruction

commission. Today, it is difficult to guess which of these initiatives will eventually

flourish, but the United States and international community can work with the AU

leadership as the organization sets priorities and crafts longer-term strategies.

U.S. support will be critical to the African Union’s future. And the African Union’s

success will be important in advancing rising U.S. stakes in Africa. The administration is to be commended for its current support to the AU and to the negotiations

in Darfur. However, to help build a long-term, reliable partner, the United States

can do more, and should build an approach that is coherent, predictable, institutionalized, and well-led at a senior level. Supporting the trend toward African ownership and responsibility warrants such an approach.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for bringing attention to these important issues and for the opportunity to speak with you today. Thank you.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you very much.

Ms. Holt, we will hear from you now. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF VICTORIA K. HOLT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, THE

HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

Ms. HOLT. I too will summarize my remarks, so I hope that——

Senator MARTINEZ. The full remarks will be made a part of the

record. Thank you very much.

Ms. HOLT. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, it is a

pleasure to be here. I know we are a bit short on time, so I thought

I would hit some high points.

First, I will just put peacekeeping in context, look specifically at

Africa and then make some recommendations as you look forward

to your agenda for the coming year. First, congratulations, I think

this is a very important issue. I think it is important for two reasons. The U.S. cares deeply about its own security and its national

interests, and that is one reason we look at peacekeeping in Africa.

We care about failed states. We care about ungoverned spaces. But

we also have a humanitarian urge in this country and peacekeeping can serve that as well.

Just a quick reminder, what is peacekeeping, before I talk about

it in the Africa context? It is an effort to move violent conflict into

political expression. It is not the answer to everything. It is not the

equivalent of going in and fighting a war. But when it is done right

it can be a very useful tool.

What we have seen, which is quite impressive, is African leadership coming to take this on on their own continent in greater numbers, particularly with the African Union and with ECOWAS. But

before I talk specifically about them, I should point out that peace

operations and stability operations have grown worldwide. We see

American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Balkans. We see

a military stretched beyond an area that we have seen before. So

as a result, I think we also look at African leadership because Africa has been the host to more peacekeeping in the last few years

than any other continent. Eight of the 16 UN operations today are

34

in Africa. Seventy-five percent of UN peacekeepers now are working there. Some of these missions are large and complex.

So what does that mean in the context of the African Union?

Well, since 2002 it has taken on, as we have already heard, two

new peacekeeping operations, first in Burundi and now in Darfur.

ECOWAS has had a longer history of peacekeeping through the

1990s, but has also taken on ambitious operations—Sierra Leone,

Cote d’Ivoire, and Liberia—most recently. But we should not mistake their willingness, their personnel, and their speed of deploying

troops, as well as their understanding of the regional issues and

the willingness to live in difficult situations, which are all vastly

important and critical, with the capability that we usually equate

with successful operations. So just a note of caution.

Headquarters of both ECOWAS and AU are roughly two dozen

people. This is a vast improvement over 5 years ago, when you

might have found one or two people there. But this is why it matters. We need to think about how we help them with planning and

management. We know well that their member states cannot financially support them at this time. We know also that they need logistics and transportation and many of basically what I call surround-sound, particularly the handoff to what the UN calls peacebuilding. We want rule of law to last. They need better expertise

in how to convey that. For a long time, that is going to be reliant

on the UN to come in and help them with that kind of work.

In general this is a good news story. I think that an excellent

leadership effort has been going on. But I do not think this is a situation where at this point we can see them take on missions that

we usually equate with the capabilities of the UN, and in some

cases, NATO and the European Union, if not MNFs.

One more note on the UN and then I will move to U.S. policy

options. One thing we could really do to assist better coordination,

this sort of ‘‘all boats rise’’ approach, which I think would benefit

us, is if we enabled the United Nations to work better with the African Union, ECOWAS, and with SADC and IGAD, as they emerge

more into peacekeeping. What do I mean? The UN is designed to

support UN operations. They do not have a mechanism currently,

formally, to work with these regional groups. They were able to do

it in Darfur, basically by using another device, a special political

mission. But it would do us well to think about this and have a

few people whose job it is to work with these organizations, to help

them plan and then help with the inevitable handoff, which we

may see in Darfur, but we have already seen in Liberia, Burundi,

Cote d’Ivoire and other places; it could be smoothed out and work

better. We would all benefit from that.

Real quick on U.S. policy: The United States, in general, does not

do peacekeeping in Africa, certainly not since the last large mission

in Somalia. So our strategy tends to be to support other actors. We

do this through training, we do the support to operations, we do

this through support to regional organizations and through paying

our assessments to the UN and voting on the Security Council.

Two accounts that you need to look at that support all of this.

The voluntary Peacekeeping Operations account in the State Department is around $200 million this year. Appropriators cut about

$20 million out of it. That houses all of our Global Peace OperVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 May 25, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\DOCS\33724.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
35

ations Initiative and other training. It houses our bilateral support

to operations and it hosts all of our bilateral support to ECOWAS

and the AU, which is great work. But I worry that we need at least

$75 million for our support to Darfur for this year, so we already

start out with a bit of a shortfall. Our dues to the UN certainly has

caused some sticker shock up here. We are looking at over a billion

dollars being required for the coming year. If State was candid

with you, they would say that is about $500 million short, what

you just sent them, for what they are actually going to need. It is

fair of us to ask hard questions about these peacekeeping budgets,

but we vote for them on the Security Council. And if they work,

then we will have a better chance of success, both on the peacebuilding piece and going in correctly. So I need to flag those two

accounts to you and to suggest thinking about, in the coming year,

how we can make those programs work better.

Finally, in addition to the UN mechanism and funding, I have

to mention Darfur briefly. I agree that there is mission mandate

language that talks about civilian protection. It is much like the

language in most of UN peacekeeping operations. But the AU cannot do this without stronger political leadership and potentially a

deterrent that can back them up. I think we have heard some good

options in testimony in full committee. I do worry that Deputy Secretary Zoellick is correct, that Darfur remains a tinderbox and that

we do need to look at the security question if we are going to get

to a political solution.

Finally, it is never popular for Congress to ask for more reports,

but I might suggest to the subcommittee it would be very helpful

if you could ask the administration, particularly State, to come

back to you and bring together these various programs that they

are presenting. We did not touch on counterterrorism today, but

much of the training we are going to be doing in Africa will overlap

with peacekeeping. We have varied accounts, and excellent people

working in the administration on this, but particularly as you start

out the new year, it might be nice to have this in one place to help

guide your discussions as we look at both our interests in security

and our humanitarian concerns in Africa.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Holt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICTORIA K. HOLT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE,

THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

Chairman Martinez, Senator Feingold, members of the committee, it is an honor

to testify before you today on the role of African leadership and organizations in regional conflict management and peace operations. I applaud the committee’s attention to this topic, and hope this discussion will draw needed attention to Africanled endeavors, to our interests in the region, and to how the U.S. and international

actors can better address and leverage success.

OVERVIEW: AFRICAN SECURITY AND PEACE OPERATIONS

First, let me offer some context. The world has increasingly turned to peace operations as tools to help support transitions from armed conflict to sustained peace.

Today we see thousands of forces deployed worldwide, from Afghanistan to Haiti,

from Iraq to the Sinai. As more civil wars end, regional crises calm, and democratic

efforts look for support, peace operations are often the tool of choice for the international community. They are often sent to help prevent state failure, to support

post-conflict reconstruction and to address aspects of humanitarian crises. Many of

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1 In September 2005 the U.N. reported 68,513 peacekeepers deployed worldwide, with 53,702

in Africa. Peacekeepers include troops, military observers and civilian police. These numbers do

not include civilian staff in the field or at U.N. headquarters. 2Data from the United Nations as of 30 September 2005.

3This statement draws on my work at the Henry L. Stimson Center, including a study conducted with support from the U.S. Institute of Peace, African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: U.N. Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS (2005).

these multinational missions are large and complex, led as coalitions or by NATO,

but increasingly by the United Nations and African actions.

Africa has seen dramatic growth in peace operations over the last 6 years, hosting

more peacekeepers than any other region. The United Nations currently leads eight

such operations on the continent: in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic

of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and the Western Sahara.1 Over 30 African nations contribute personnel to these missions, and in most

cases, make up from one-quarter to one-half of U.N. forces.2

With the increased demand for security providers, the spotlight has also moved

to African organizations and their efforts to manage regional crises. We see new African engagement in resolving conflicts, promoting democratic regimes, and

strengthening multinational efforts. Fueled by ambitious leadership and prompted

by multiple conflicts, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) are developing greater capacity to tackle issues of regional peace and security. Both groups have deployed troops and led new peacekeeping missions, as seen in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Darfur and Liberia. Other organizations are more focused on conflict resolution, such the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (MAD), with its efforts in Somalia and Sudan.

More than a decade after the Rwandan genocide, the crisis in Sudan again brings

international attention to the questions of intervention and peace operations. Which

African groups have the will and mechanisms to plan, deploy, manage, and sustain

peace operations effectively? What is their relationship to the United Nations and

other multinational organizations? What role can and should the United States

play?

My testimony looks at three areas related to African security and peace operations.3 First, I will consider the emergence of African organizations in leading

peace operations. Second, I will look at how these African organizations and their

operations fit within the context of international efforts, especially those of the

United Nations. Third, I will consider U.S. goals and how our policies support these

efforts in Africa, including the situation in Darfur with the AU, and offer some options for Congress.

Second, let me argue that these issues are very important to the United States.

As Americans, we view peace operations as serving U.S. strategic and security interests through preventing state failure, increasing stability, and moving conflicts into

lively political expression rather than deadly armed warfare. We also view peace operations as a means to address our deep-felt concern for addressing humanitarian

crises and supporting human rights, part of our commitment to act well in the

world. These goals are inter-related, and serve both immediate and longer-term

aims such as supporting democratic reforms and reducing terrorist havens, enabling

trade and economic opportunity, and strengthening regional security and healthy

governance.

Defining Peace Operations—A Tool For What?

Peacekeeping missions are intended to provide temporary security and enable political efforts to take hold for sustaining peace. Such missions range from military

observers overseeing disputed border areas, as in the U.N. mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea, to more complex operations involving disarmament of forces and establishment

of the rule of law, such as in Liberia. These operations should be married with concurrent peacebuilding efforts that continue after the troops have left.

Peace operations are never assured of success, however. Each mission is deployed

with cautious optimism that a conflict can be brought to a conclusion—that peacekeepers will help the shift to a sustained peace—but the result ultimately rests with

local actors. Even after international forces deploy, crises can remain challenging,

as seen dramatically in Sudan and the DRC where conflict continues and keeps millions displaced, vulnerable and at risk of death. Peacekeepers should not be sent

to wage war or substitute for political engagement, yet they often operate under difficult conditions, in dangerous neighborhoods with tenuous peace agreements, and

with too little back-up. When peace operations are not married with political support from member states, their jobs become even more difficult, especially for the

nations volunteering troops and police. Peacekeepers put their lives on the line, as

seen by the 86 U.N. personnel who died this year.

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AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE OPERATIONS

Matching Political Will and Operational Capacity

African leadership has helped bring a new era of engagement in security and support for peace efforts. Leaders such as Olusegun Obansanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki

of South Africa and Alpha Konare of Mali have played public roles to bring the African Union and other initiatives into the forefront, in contrast to the criminal actions

of Charles Taylor of Liberia and Charles Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Many others have

contributed to peace efforts, such as Nelson Mandela’s engagement with Burundi,

as well as countless leaders who work in national roles or serve as envoys, diplomats and military leaders.

As African nations develop greater capacity for peace operations, two multinational organizations stand out: the African Union and the ECOWAS. Both have

adopted formal mechanisms with wide-ranging peace and security responsibilities,

unparalleled in Asia, South America or the Middle East. Other regional organizations, such as the South African Development Community (SADC) and IGAD, can

play a significant role in conflict resolution but are not yet able to deploy peace operations.

The African Union. The African Union was born from the Organization of African

Unity (OAU) in 2002. With 53 founding members (all African nations except Morocco), the AU is headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It has more authority to

intervene in matters related to peace and security than its predecessor, which valued non-interference. The AU Constitutive Act embraces international cooperation,

but also sets out an AU role ranging from mediation to forceful intervention.

The AU has an ambitious agenda on the continent, and has already deployed two

peace operations. In April 2003, the AU launched a mission in Burundi which would

grow to over 3,300 peacekeepers, led by South Africa with troops from Mozambique

and Ethiopia. The objective was to uphold the cease-fire agreement, support disarmament of armed forces, assist in establishing stability, coordinate with the U.N.

and facilitate humanitarian assistance. More observers were supplied by Burkina

Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia. The AU mission in Burundi was established

with the understanding that mission leadership would pass to the U.N. Indeed, the

AU relied heavily on outside support from the U.N. and Western countries (including the U.S. and the United Kingdom) for logistics and funding. While there was

cooperation among these actors, it was improvised, and the AU transitioned its mission to the U.N. in 2004.

Building off its success in Burundi, the African Union launched its second mission

in Darfur in 2004. This mission was much more ambitious, with the aim of monitoring a cease-fire agreement in an area equivalent to the size of Texas, where conflict and a humanitarian crisis continued at a level considered genocide by the

United States. Today that mission has grown to nearly 7,000 personnel, benefiting

from both willing African nations and major financial, logistical and operational

support from the West and other developed states. Even as it has succeeded at

many tasks, the AU faces fundamental problems.

In addition, the African Union is also developing the African Standby Force (ASF),

a force designed to be made of multidisciplinary contingents on standby in five regions of Africa. By 2010, the ASF forces are to be ready for swift call-up for missions

ranging from observation to intervention against genocide. ECOWAS has endorsed

a Standby Force, but has yet to develop specific doctrine or policies to support it.

IGAD is slated to coordinate development of the Eastern African Standby Brigade

(EASBRIG) and SADC is moving to create a standby brigade. Progress is slow, and

coordination across the regions is challenging, reflecting the uneven distribution of

support for the ASF and capability in regional groups.

ECOWAS. Made up of 15 West African states, ECOWAS is the most advanced regional organisation in Africa in terms of peace operations. Based in Abuja, Nigeria,

ECOWAS put boots on the ground during the 1990s in Liberia, Sierra Leone and

Guinea Bissau, with mixed reviews. ECOWAS’ security-related responsibilities were

further outlined in its 1999 Protocol. They include resolving internal and interstate

conflicts, strengthening conflict prevention, supporting deployment of peacekeeping

operations and humanitarian relief missions. ECOWAS has also deployed peacekeepers to Cote d’Ivoire in 2002 and Liberia in 2003.

ECOWAS forces deployed to Liberia in July 2003 with troops from Ghana, Senegal, Mali and Nigeria, backed up by U.S. Marines, and later by U.N. personnel and

the multinational group, the Standby High Readiness Brigade. The ECOWAS forces

made a strong impact, stabilizing the country even as they faced deployment delays,

equipment shortages and limited communications and information systems. The

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4The G8 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and

the United States.

mission later transitioned to U.N. leadership, with ECOWAS forces being ‘‘rehatted’’

as U.N. troops.

Common Challenges. With these operations, African organizations can be misunderstood as having more capacity than they actually possess. Certainly progress

is clear: the AU and ECOWAS have adopted frameworks, increased their headquarters staff, built better planning capacity, and worked with member states and

outside partners to organize, deploy and manage peace operations. But both organizations face substantial hurdles.

The AU and ECOWAS have deployed troops, but they are not self-sustaining and

require outside logistical support. They face fundamental gaps in their planning and

management capacity to lead peace operations. Their headquarters staff total a few

dozen professionals; the most skilled are taxed by the requirements of their (often

multiple) responsibilities. The AU and ECOWAS are reliant on external sources to

finance their operations, since they lack sufficient funding from their member

states. Ambitious plans for coordinating peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions

are still in the early stages of being operationalized.

In short, there is striking contrast between the AU and ECOWAS willingness to

deploy troops and their capacity to plan and support such deployments. For these

African organizations to play a stronger role in peace operations, they require baseline capacities: management and planning, financing, logistics and transportation,

command and control, skilled and available personnel, and clear leadership. The AU

and ECOWAS would also benefit from clearer concepts of operations, mandates,

leadership qualifications and doctrine for their missions, as well as from more development of deployable police and other personnel.

Outside Partners. Donor governments are looking to support successful efforts in

Africa, and have offered bilateral support directly, through regional venues (e.g., the

European Union, or EU) and via the G8 process, to leverage African national, regional and continent-wide capacities.4 The G8 nations are pledged to their 2002 Africa Action Plan, an ambitious effort to provide bilateral funding and support peace

and security tools in Africa, especially the ASF and added forces for peace operations.

Outside partners can address some needs (e.g., logistics and transportation support). Other areas require development of skills within the organizations (e.g., command and control, leadership) and support from member states. Support from the

West includes military training, such as the recent French-led RECAMP exercises,

which involved 1,800 troops from 12 African nations, as well as training programs

run by the United Kingdom, Norway and the United States.

ECOWAS and the AU have had difficulty responding to outside offers of assistance, however, and often partner countries can be unsure how to approach them.

Bilateral donors could improve their impact with better coordination of competing

bilateral efforts to train and equip African forces, which can lack coordination, be

duplicative, and not focus on where real gaps exist. A headquarters data base and

tracking system to handle incoming offers of financial, material and personnel support could be useful for partner countries, African organizations and the United Nations.

II. LINK TO INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

How do African regional organizations and operations fit within the context of

international efforts?

African organizations are taking on a role in peace operations where few other

multinational organizations act. NATO and the EU, for example, have only recently

become active in Africa, with NATO support to the AU mission in Darfur and the

EU authorizing a peacekeeping operation, Operation Artemis, led by the French to

help stabilize the town of Bunia in the DRC in the summer of 2003. The primary

organization with a role in Africa is the United Nations.

The Prominence of Africa in U.N. missions. Africa dominates the U.N.’s peace operations agenda. Seventy-five percent of U.N. peacekeepers today are in Africa. The

United States and other members of the Security Council have approved an unprecedented number of complex, Chapter VII peacekeeping operations since 2003, adding African operations in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, and most recently, Sudan.

The Security Council has also tripled U.N. forces in the DRC since 2000.

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5 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats,

Challenges and Change, the United Nations, December 2004, page 85. The Panel suggested collaborations ranging from information exchanges to co-training of civilian and military personnel

to the use of NATO to help train and equip regional organizations.

The U.N. manages nearly 80,000 personnel around the world with a headquarters

staff of about 600 people in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

While overstretched, the U.N. still has more political leverage and organizational

reach to support peace operations and run multiple efforts simultaneously than any

other organization. The U.N. has programs related to relief, development, health,

and peacebuilding, for example. No African group has this breadth or the ability to

yet leverage peacebuilding efforts, which are needed to sustain post-conflict security

and support rule of law. This role continues to require U.N. engagement.

UN Collaboration with Regional Efforts. With the U.N. peacekeeping budget at

about $4 billion (and growing), the benefit of collaboration between African organizations and the U.N. is clear. Some progress has been made. The United Nations

has held high-level meetings on regional cooperation; the Security Council has identified Africa as a priority; and varied U.N. initiatives have looked at collaboration.

Last year the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and

Change urged improving U.N. relationships with regional groups, developing a 10–

year effort to support African regional capacities, and considering the provision of

U.N. stocks and funding, to African-led operations.5

The U.N. has helped match countries offering troops for African-led operations

with countries that can provide airlift to deploy troops, and assisted with mission

planning. For the AU mission in Darfur, the U.N. Secretariat provided unusually

strong mission planning support after the Security Council approved that role via

a unique U.N. special political mission.

So far, however, collaboration is ad hoc. The United Nations is designed and funded to focus on U.N. operations rather than those led by other multinational groups—

even when such missions are authorized or welcomed by the Security Council—

which makes collaboration more difficult.

Getting Serious: Create a Plan. The U.N. needs two tools. First, the U.N. needs

a strategy for providing support to regional organizations such as the African Union.

Second, the U.N. needs a mechanism to trigger support and a means to provide it

consistently.

This is straightforward. The strategic vision already is the working notion of

many U.N. member states: create an international architecture of capacity for peace

operations, and adopt an ‘‘all boats rise’’ approach to regional groups who are willing

to take on missions relative to their capacity. The Security Council already has a

trigger that could be brought to life: citation of Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter,

which recognizes the role of regional actors. Finally, the means is fairly simple: add

a few personnel to the U.N. Secretariat whose job it is to plan and work with regional organizations effectively.

There are plenty of areas ripe for better collaboration. The U.N. could help facilitate improving AU and ECOWAS headquarters capacity, with a focus on mission

planning and support. Other areas include: use of logistics sites (such as the U.N.

Logistics Base at Brindisi and African depots); development of the African Standby

Force capacities; integration of participation in the U.N. Standby Arrangements

System, a data base of national capacities of member states; design of pre-deployment training; systems for hand-offs between African-led and U.N.-led operations;

sharing of lessons learned; use of early warning and analytical information in Africa; harmonization of national training and doctrinal materials; identification of command and control issues; and coordination of funding.

In many areas, the continuing U.N. effort to modernize and reform its peacekeeping capacity is instructive. As U.N. missions have grown in numbers, size and

complexity since 1999, the U.N. has scrambled to fill shortages in available, welltrained military and civilian personnel, funding, ready equipment and logistics. Lessons could also be learned from NATO, the EU and other member states.

III. U.S. LEADERSHIP AND POLICY ISSUES

The United States and other developed states are deciding how best to support

peace operations and related efforts, as well as allocate resources to African-led efforts, the U.N. and other multinational operations, and their own initiatives to address such conflicts and transitions to peace.

U.S. Approach. Since the end of the cold war, the United States’ only major peacekeeping role in Africa has been in Somalia. The U.S. remains very cautious about

40

participating in peace operations. With more attention after 9/11 to preventing state

failure, helping prevent terrorism, and post-conflict reconstruction, U.S. policy has

focused on supporting other actors to conduct and manage peace operations. There

are four major approaches:

• Training African Forces. The U.S. has trained African military forces, primarily

through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)

program, which began in 2002 and followed the earlier African Crisis Response

Initiative. That program is expected to expand as part of the new Global Peace

Operations Initiative (GPOI), which aims to train roughly 75,000 troops worldwide, with two-thirds in Africa.

• Bilateral Support to Operations. The U.S. has provided some bilateral assistance to African-led multinational operations in Africa, such as support to

ECOWAS forces in Cote d’Ivoire, providing airlift to help Ethiopians deploy

with the AU into Burundi, and offering contracted support for AU forces in

Darfur today.

• Direct Assistance to African Organizations. The United States has provided

some support to regional multinational organizations, such as funding a U.S.

advisor at ECOWAS headquarters.

• Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations. As a member of the Security Council, the U.S. supports U.N. peace operations and pays a percentage of the U.N.

peacekeeping budget.

All of these programs are solid approaches to security challenges. But the State

Department is chronically faced with difficult choices about resources due to its limited funding. U.S. budgets for these programs have not kept pace with the dynamic

growth in African-led efforts, U.N. operations, and the need to accelerate support

to such efforts. One exception is GPOI, which may bring substantial new resources

to bear in the region, especially if it supports regional organizations and their operations, as well as training. Even so, the United States is unlikely to play a major

role in this area of African security without more support for these programs.

U.S. Programs & Funding. Within the State Department budget, two accounts before the committee resource the current U.S. approach and deserve support:

• The Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, requested at $196 million for fiscal year 2006 (FY06), is the primary source of U.S. support to regional efforts and organizations worldwide. Funding for the African Regional account is requested at about $41 million, to provide support to African operations, regional initiatives and African organizations, an amount insufficient to

meet U.S. interests in this area. Also requested within this account is $114 million in funding for the Global Peace Operations Initiative, with activities in Africa including the ACOTA program, for training of African forces.

• The Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account, requested at $1.036 billion for FY06, provides the U.S. share of contributions for

UN-led peace operations. The request is less than the $1.3 billion projected as

needed for the coming year—before taking into account the U.N. mission in

Sudan, new or expanded missions. This budget lacks room for initiatives that

invest in capacity-building and long-term reform efforts, which limits the U.S.

ability to promote such reforms at the United Nations or within specific missions. To avoid new arrears for operations we support, Congress also needs to

lift the ‘‘cap’’ on payment of our U.N. peacekeeping share, and realign our funding with the U.N. assessment rate we negotiated and agreed to pay.

Enough Support? When one considers all these two accounts are trying to accomplish in Africa, they are an excellent investment. Even in a time of limited budget

resources, however, this funding is less than needed to meet our interests in the

continent most faced with post-conflict operations. The PKO Africa Regional funding

could easily be doubled for good use, such as providing some of the $50 million needed to support the AU in Darfur, which many in Congress have sought to provide.

The U.S. would also benefit and maximize its impact if the State Department office

for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was fully supported and

funded (which it is not).

The administration is also increasing U.S. training for counter-terrorism activities

in Africa, first through the Pan Sahel Initiative and more recently through the

Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative. Both programs offer training to African

militaries in areas that include skills useful for peace operations. At the same time,

the U.S. has cutoff our International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding to some African countries, including South Africa, further reducing our militaryVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:52 May 25, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\33724.TXT sfrela2 PsN: sfrela2
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to-military relations and preventing their leaders from participating in peacekeeping

seminars hosted by the U.S. War Colleges and related programs. This is counterproductive to our goals.

See the Bigger Picture. As Africa draws greater U.S. resources and attention, a

better strategic vision is needed to many disparate programs and objectives. This

committee does not benefit from a single source of information on the varied U.S.

efforts, put in the context of parallel international efforts. To understand where U.S.

policy is leading us, this committee would be well-served to ask for a comprehensive

review of U.S. security assistance in Africa, of U.S. funding for peacekeeping efforts

and related U.S. counter-terrorism accounts, as well as the rationale for these programs, and hopefully, how they are coordinated and working together toward a

shared strategic vision.

Sudan. In Sudan today we see an on-going crisis in Darfur, where the U.S. declared that genocide has occurred. Roughly two million people have been forced from

their homes. The international community has supported deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur by the African Union, recognized as the only force likely to be

acceptable to the government of Sudan.

By all accounts, the AU has achieved a great deal, providing eyes and ear on the

ground and carrying out important work to report on cease-fire violations, offer

presence and deter violence in the areas they are deployed, bolstered by Western

support and funding. Yet the AU force is primarily an observer force with some deterrent ability. Their mandate gives them only a limited ability to intervene on behalf of civilians and offer them protection. Even as the AU operation grows to nearly

7,000 personnel, the force is too small and ill-equipped to effectively cover the area

of Darfur. The peacekeepers there are hampered without greater mobility and communications. In short, the AU force is not a force prepared or equipped to help bring

stability to a region with ongoing conflict and a tremendous humanitarian crisis.

The U.S. has argued strongly for peace in Sudan and in Darfur, and backed up

the AU troops with funding and logistical support. We see renewed political attention with Deputy Secretary Zoellick’s recent trip to Darfur. The U.S. supported a

U.N. team to work with the AU to develop its plans, including Americans with experience and practical expertise. The U.S. has helped keep world attention on the crisis and organized with others governments to identify financial and materiel needs

of the African Union. But no matter how much support the U.S. offers the African

Union—and we could offer much more—the AU mission is fundamentally ill-suited

to act as much more than a monitoring force in the region.

In short, the AU can do extremely well but still fail to solve the larger problem

of violence against civilians in the region. No one wishes to see the AU fail, especially in a mission where it has staked its credibility. Until a political settlement

takes hold, the AU force needs to be backed up by a credible deterrent against continuing acts of violence by the Janjaweed, the Government of Sudan and the rebels.

These measures would also support humanitarian efforts, including the return of

refugeesiind those displaced by the war to their homes. This job requires the mobility, command and control, support and credibility of a well-trained coherent military

force.

Many options have been offered. Proposals include doubling the AU force and

backing it up with better equipment, transportation, communications, and a credible

military deterrent; creation of a no-fly zone to deter and police incursions; stationing

of a rapid reaction force able to respond on short notice to attacks; and development

of a NATO bridging force to support the AU better. Such options require action by

the Security Council, clearly not an easy task. Nevertheless, the Council could use

expansion of the current U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sudan to address the situation in Darfur. Otherwise, we need to be honest that the AU will continue to be

limited in what it can do in Darfur. Where else in the world would we ask a new

multinational organization with little experience to lead a mission that would be

challenging to NATO?

A few trends are clear. There is genuine growth in African ambitions and willingness to deploy peacekeeping forces. There is greater multinational engagement in

Africa, especially through the United Nations, which needs to be developed further.

And there is increased support from developed states and the U.S. to support African capacity-building. The challenge is to support and leverage this political energy

into tangible results.

Strengthen U.S. Tools. The United States has a vital role to play in Africa and

in peace operations. We will benefit from increasing our funding of U.S. initiatives,

especially those supported through the State Department’s PKO and CIPA accounts,

to train, support, and enhance African peacekeeping missions. We can and should

42

offer political and materiel resources to Africa organizations and operations, to support lead countries and leaders in Africa, and to the U.N. and other multinational

efforts to build capacity and a better-working international capacity. The U.S. also

should take a leadership role in strengthening the capacity and effectiveness of the

AU mission in Darfur.

Understand U.S. Strategy and Policy. This committee could benefit from a central

source of information on the funding and programs in Africa in this area, since programs are spread across offices and even Departments. The committee should request a review of U.S. security assistance to Africa, including support for regional

capacities, training and bilateral aid for peace and stability operations. This review

should be put in the context of U.S. strategy toward Africa, to help consider policy

options.

Create a Mechanism to Enable Better U.N. Collaboration with Regional Groups.

U.N. mechanisms to work with regional organizations are still in their infancy.

Even citation of Chapter VIII by the Security Council does not trigger U.N. collaboration. This should change. The U.N. needs a strategy and formal means of providing support to organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS on a consistent basis. To identify these areas of potential support, the United States should

urge the U.N. to conduct a full assessment of how it could work more effectively

with African organizations in the early planning and startup phase of an operation;

during the initial deployment and as forces ramp up; and, when appropriate, during

hand-offs of leadership from regional to U.N. peace operations. U.N. member states

should agree to use Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter to trigger real support to regional peace operations authorized by the Security Council. On a case-by-case basis,

the Council could also direct the use of assessed funding through the United Nations to support these missions.

Thank you.

Senator MARTINEZ. Well, thank you both for excellent remarks

and very insightful comments. I think you have hit on a lot of key

issues. With the time we have remaining, what we might just do

is have a quick round, each of us, and we might repeat it again to

make sure each of us gets a few questions.

Ms. Holt, I want to just follow up with you as to whether you—

and I do not think you discussed this specifically, but the African

Standby Force, that concept. Please speak to that if you would.

Ms. HOLT. The African Standby Force is an idea that is the backing up of the African Union. The African Union is now going to be

taking on missions that range all the way from mediation to intervention against genocide. Their concept is to create a standing force

within Africa based in each of the five regions within Africa. It is

ambitious. They wish to be operational by 2010. At this point

ECOWAS is probably the most advanced. They have endorsed an

idea for a standby force within the region. The last time I looked

at their proposal it was about 6,000 troops. IGAD I think may be

involved with EASBRIG, the eastern task force; and SADC in the

South, I have heard that they are moving forward. But the reality

is that these troops right now are not sitting at home ready to go.

I do think there is a question of connectivity between each of the

regions and the African Union itself and the headquarters. So I

think it is still evolving. I think it is something that the G–8 has

endorsed with its Africa Action Plan, that the United States is also

supportive of. But I think we are going to have to make a better

connection between our training of troops, their headquarters capacity, and how they work within the continent to see this come

to the fore.

Senator MARTINEZ. Let me see. I am going to let you get a question or two in. I think we are going to be called any time, and then

I will come back.

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Senator FEINGOLD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

To either of you or both of you, what obstacles are there to AU

intervention in a political crisis? Does the AU have to wait for

states to formally request intervention to restore peace and security or gain member consensus before restoring peace and stability

in a crisis? What role does NEPAD’s voluntary African peer review

mechanism evaluation play into intervention? I just want a sense

of how that works.

Ms. COOKE. Sure. I think currently one of the limitations of the

AU is that intervention in particular crises is still hinged to a large

extent on the inclination of particular leaders, so that when Mbeke

decides or Obisanjo decides they can really drive that intervention.

But if there is not that kind of high-level leadership, it is often

much slower to come together. That said, there are many energetic

African leaders and Cunairy, who is the current chair of the AU

commission, is a superb statesman, former president of Mali, and

I think we can see more activism there. However, it does go to the

issue of institutionalizing and kind of setting standards for intervention and so forth. The Africa peer review mechanism, which

grew out of NEPAD, which is part of or under the auspices of the

AU, but it is somewhat parallel, does not play much of a role in

these mediation efforts.

This is a mechanism to which countries voluntarily submit or

join. They first undergo an internal review of their governance

standards, then open it up to the broader group, come up with a

policy for redressing whatever their weaknesses may have been. It

is a voluntary system so far. Two countries have undergone the review. Twenty-three have signed up for voluntary review.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Ms. Holt.

Ms. HOLT. I would just concur with Ms. Cooke’s statement.

Maybe just to add, if you mean intervention in the more military

sense, theoretically at least the African Union can intervene, particularly in the case of genocide. It is the (h) clause in their Constitutive Act. But it recognizes that to do so it would probably ask

a member state to lead an intervention, and obviously we have not

seen this yet on the continent. So I would just flag that as something still to be developed. I cannot offer more than that on that

point.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator MARTINEZ. They have called us to a vote, but I want to

just ask one last question if I may. Thank you, sir, for your participation. The interaction between NEPAD and AU, can you just deal

with that and if you can in brief moments help me a little bit with

that.

Ms. COOKE. Sure. NEPAD grew up—it was kind of the brain

child of three or four key African leaders—President Mbeke of

South Africa, President Obisanjo of Nigeria, President Boutaflica of

Algeria, and President Wadd of Senegal. It grew up at the same

time that the Organization of African Unity was reinventing itself

as the African Union. So initially it was not meant to be part of

the African Union, but the two have merged and it is somewhat

under African Union leadership. So I think it is all part of this momentum of kind of taking greater responsibility that happened

44

within the AU. NEPAD is another expression of that. The two are

more closely merged than they were originally.

Senator MARTINEZ. One of the things we did not get to today—

and I would love to have enough time for us to —first of all, I want

to thank you both. You have done a great job and you have really

added to our discourse greatly. So I appreciate your insights and

your great knowledge and I wish we had more time to expand on

all of this. But one of the things I wanted out of this hearing is

for us to discuss all the good things that are happening. Unfortunately, we have talked too much about, still like always we do,

about some negative aspects of it. But there is much going on that

is good. I know that progress is being made in the fight against

AIDS and I know that our government has played I think a leading

role in the world. I was also pleased recently to have had an opportunity to talk with Prime Minister Blair and his great interest,

right before Gleneagles, and his commitment to renewed effort. I

hope we could on the next occasion talk about economic development, about growth, about ownership opportunities, about business

creation, about trade and things of that nature. I would hope it

would come to a day when a hearing like this would be held and

we would talk about how the AU is managing all of the trade

agreements that are being made between the countries. So anyway,

with that hope and that bright future, I thank you for your participation today and look forward to coming together again another

day to talk some more about this topic.

Thank you very much and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

(45)

APPENDIX

Additional Material Submitted for the Record

RESPONSE OF HON. JENDAYI FRAZER TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

Question. Why hasn’t a permanent ambassador been named to Ethiopia? How

long has it been? When will the President name a permanent ambassador for Ethiopia? Has our ambassador to Ethiopia ever been a non-Foreign Service experienced

official?

Answer. The White House remains engaged in identifying a chief of mission candidate for Ethiopia.

While the majority of past U.S. ambassadors to Ethiopia have been career Foreign

Service Officers, there have been three non-career U.S. ambassadors to Ethiopia: Joseph Simonson served 1953 to 1957; Edward M. Korry served 1963 to 1967; and E.

Ross Adair served 1971 to 1974.

Ambassador Brazeal departed Ethiopia on September 3, 2005. Since that date,

Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, a retired career member of the Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Career Minister, has very capably represented the U.S. Government in Ethiopia as Charge d’Affaires.

Question. Although electoral advances have been made since the last election the

brutality remains and the reform of the country’s institutions is weak.

What are the determinant factors in U.S. policy toward Ethiopia with regard to

the war on terror, cooperation on the Eritrean border dispute, economic, social, and

political reform?

Answer. United States national security and national interests guide U.S. policy

determinations on Ethiopia. Major U.S. objectives with regard to Ethiopia include

countering any terrorist threats in the region; enhancing regional peace and stability; promoting democratization, rule of law, and respect for human rights; supporting economic prosperity; and providing humanitarian assistance to mitigate

human suffering. Helping the people of Ethiopia address the effects of HIV/AIDS is

also a key U.S. interest, as Ethiopia is one of 15 focus countries for the President’s

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). These objectives are interrelated and

one objective does not supercede others.

In all of these sectors, U.S. interests guide the policy formation process. The pursuit of each of these objectives reinforces the other by helping create an environment that supports a stable Ethiopia, prevents the conditions that breed and provide safe haven for terrorists, and builds our partnership with the Ethiopian government in addressing common threats. Our policy formation, however, must factor in

how our objectives fit with Ethiopia’s objectives, how much leverage the United

States holds with Ethiopian decisionmakers, and in what areas we may be most

able to achieve progress at any given time.

Ethiopia has been an active and receptive partner in the global war on terrorism.

Our common objectives enable the United States to work closely with Ethiopia in

pursuit of countering the terrorist threat in the region and building local capacity

in support of that objective. Ethiopia is an active participant in the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, and is one of the continent’s major contributors to multilateral peacekeeping operations.

With regard to the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the United States and Ethiopia agree

broadly on the need for long-term regional stability, but may disagree on the tactics

in pursuit of that end. We recognize that the parties themselves have determined

that the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s (EEBC) decision shall be final

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and binding, and that it is incumbent on the parties to reach a lasting solution to

the border standoff. Bilaterally, and through the United Nations, we have called on

Ethiopia to start the implementation of demarcation, by taking the necessary steps

to enable the Commission to demarcate the border completely and promptly and

without preconditions. The Government of Ethiopia has affirmed that it will pull

back troops deployed near the Ethiopian-Eritrean border to positions held in December 2004, as called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1640. Prime Minister

Meles has also publicly pledged Ethiopia’s full cooperation with the United Nations

Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the peacekeeping mission monitoring

the Temporary Security Zone along the border.

The United States has encouraged Ethiopia to take steps to liberalize its economy

since the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front government came to

power in 1991. There has been some, albeit slow, progress on the economic front—

robust economic growth rates, progress in the investment climate, improved revenue

collection, etc.—as a result of our economic assistance programs and U.S. and international advisors. We have been able to assist the Ethiopians to strengthen and diversify their economy.

Our interests in the areas of social and political reform include protection of

human rights, fostering press freedoms, opening of political space for dialog, and the

expansion of educational and health services.

While the dynamic and open campaign period in the run-up to the May 2005 elections showed promise, irregularities with the conduct and vote-tallying portion of

the elections highlighted the fragility of this progress. Nonetheless, the opposition

made tremendous gains as evidenced by the numbers of elected to Parliament. The

post-election political violence and harassment of opposition leaders and supporters

stand out as issues of particular concern in policy formulation deliberations. We are

strongly encouraging the Government of Ethiopia to respect the human rights of all

its citizens and to work with the opposition to ensure stability and an inclusive government.

The breadth of U.S. engagement with a country such as Ethiopia is great and factors in policy determination are complex. U.S. relations with Ethiopia have entered

their second century and it is a relationship that the United States values. The

United States and the people of Ethiopia share many common objectives and values

and there are significant areas of mutual interest on which we can collaborate. In

each of the realms of policy consideration noted in this question, however, there are

areas for improvement. Some are greater than others, but these are areas in which

we continue to engage. The United States continuously re-evaluates this relationship and neither takes it for granted nor stands by it at all costs. As such, we continue to engage the range of stakeholders in Ethiopia and within the United States.

We value the input and perspective of each of these stakeholders and appreciate the

Congress’s close attention to this complex relationship.

Question. Is the U.S. policy one of advising the opposition to wait until the next

elections to challenge for control of the legislature and executive?

Answer. Active political debate and representation of the range of positions is key

in a democracy. United States policy is that the opposition, as well as the governing

party, should pursue their political efforts through legal and constitutional means.

All political parties should participate actively in the political process, but resorting

to violent actions is unacceptable. The United States has consistently called on Ethiopian opposition parties to take up their elected seats in parliament and in the regional councils to represent the will of the public that voted for them. It is incumbent on these individuals to represent an active and vocal alternative voice to the

governing party. The United States has also called for the Government of Ethiopia

to release political detainees and to ensure that detained opposition leaders be accorded timely due process in accordance with the constitution.

The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia certified the final results of the May

2005 parliamentary elections. While there were significant irregularities in the conduct and compiling of results from these elections, the Carter Center’s election observation team has stated that the majority of the results were credible. While the

May 2005 elections were far from perfect, they do represent a milestone in Ethiopia’s progress toward democratization. For the first time in history, average Ethiopians truly believed that they had a choice in their national leadership, opposition

parties were able to campaign in cities and the countryside, large public demonstrations were permitted, and all parties were able to convey their platforms through

the media. As a result, the total opposition representation in parliament increased

from 12 seats in 2000 to 174 seats in 2005. If any party objects to these results,

the United States encourages them to pursue their complaints through established

legal channels.

47

Beyond this, the United States persists in pressing the Ethiopian government to

open political space to allow the opposition to play a meaningful and active role in

parliament, to enhance the transparency and capacity of the National Electoral

Board, to end detentions of opposition supporters, and institutionalize the democratic gains evidenced in the campaign period. This can only happen successfully

through the full and active participation of opposition parties in this process.

Question. What assistance is the U.S. prepared to offer for Ethiopians? What assistance will be made to those building on democratic gains? What assistance will

be directed to the governing regime?

Answer. The United States has been very active in coordinating with the international community regarding assistance to Ethiopian governing and opposition parties to support the democratization process. Collective statements by the United

States and other members of the international community calling for non-violence,

encouraging the rule of law, and confirming the goodwill of both the Ethiopian government and opposition aided both sides to reach out to the other in the aftermath

of the parliamentary elections to stem the violence and restore order.

Since the release of the final results of the May 2005 elections, by lending its good

offices, the United States has played a key role in bringing the government and opposition together to bridge their differences in resolving the political stalemate. Because of this active diplomacy, the government and opposition came together for

talks in late-September and early October, and a period of peaked political tension

passed. U.S. encouragement resulted in major portions of the Ethiopian opposition

taking their seats in parliament as an active alternative voice to the governing regime. Active U.S. engagement has also succeeded in the appointment of an independent commission to investigate the political violence of June and November

2005. We continue to push the Ethiopian government to accord expeditious due

process to opposition leaders under arrest and to reach out to the opposition to move

forward with reconciliation.

The United States has also coordinated with the broader international community

in identifying assistance to support the democratic gains that these talks have

achieved. The United States, working through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is currently providing assistance to new members of parliament

on parliamentary procedure and legislative drafting to build their capacity to serve

as strong representatives of their constituents. Following U.S. consultations with

European partners, the international community has offered expert assistance from

established parliamentary democracies on parliamentary rules of procedure to assist

both the Ethiopian government and opposition in reviewing a major impediment to

active opposition participation in parliament—rules changes governing the tabling

of agenda items in parliament.

The U.S. Government is currently examining its fiscal year 2006 resources to determine the most appropriate use of technical and financial assistance to widen political space in Ethiopia. The U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa stands prepared to provide media training and capacity building for both state-run and private media institutions in Ethiopia. Additionally, the United States is willing to provide technical

assistance in any efforts by the Ethiopian government and opposition to develop

new media laws and a media code of conduct.

Finally, the United States stands prepared to resume assistance to the National

Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and/or IFES, in the event

that they are permitted to return to Ethiopia. These organizations have the unique

qualifications to provide technical assistance to the National Electoral Board of

Ethiopia on the administration of elections, to civil society organizations on election

observation, and to political parties to promote capacity development.

Question. The European Commission and the Carter Center have denounced recent elections in Ethiopia that were flawed by intimidation of opposition supporters,

beatings, and killings of opposition candidates, and rigged ballot counting. Our own

IRI and NDI and IFES observers were expelled prior to the election. Despite similar

circumstances in Ukraine where a new election was called for by the international

community, Ethiopia has not been encouraged to do so.

Is there a double standard here in not encouraging similar steps? Why or why

not? What message is being sent to Ethiopia and the region?

Answer. There is no double standard. While the expulsion of NDI, IRI, and IFES

was regrettable and protested by the United States, the Carter Center was able to

field election observers to follow the May 15 parliamentary elections. Furthermore,

the Carter Center was able to keep observers in place throughout the election complaints review process and the August 21 elections in the Somali region and re-runs

of contested seats.

48

The Carter Center has not denounced the May 2005 parliamentary elections in

Ethiopia. While the Carter Center did highlight concerns and cases of intimidation

and electoral irregularities, it also stated that these elections ‘‘offered Ethiopian citizens a democratic choice for the first time in their long history.’’ While the Carter

Center did note that some results based on the complaints review process lacked

credibility, it noted that the ‘‘majority of the constituency results . . . are credible

and reflect competitive conditions.’’ The United States believes that the Carter Center’s assessment accurately reflects the conduct of this election.

The campaign period and many aspects of the May 2005 elections did show significant improvements over previous Ethiopian elections. Opposition candidates had

an unprecedented ability to campaign actively and convey their messages through

state media, and the record turnout and heavy pro-opposition vote show that the

public truly felt that it had a choice in these elections. Certainly, irregularities were

noted throughout the process, and these are issues that should be addressed by the

Ethiopian people and political parties as the country further entrenches its democratic gains. The United States has encouraged candidates for office to challenge the

election results which they dispute through existing legal channels and rejects pursuit of unconstitutional means as an acceptable strategy.

Question. The Meles regime has been in power for 14 years and during this time

there has been little economic progress in Ethiopia.

Should the U.S. make economic aid contingent on land reform, privatization of nationalized businesses, and elimination of communist style economic policies?

Answer. Since the early 1990s, Ethiopia has pursued a market-oriented economic

development strategy. It has eliminated discriminatory treatment of the private sector in areas such as taxes, credit, and foreign trade, and worked to simplify bureaucratic regulations and procedures. Ethiopia has participated in World Bank and

International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs that promoted reforms in macroeconomic policies and procedures, including public expenditure reviews, conservative management of the money supply, tax reforms, and customs and

civil service reforms. Over 220 properties have been privatized since 1994, worth

$405 million, though the privatization effort has slowed since 2001. In 2003, Ethiopia formally applied for membership to the WTO.

While Ethiopia remains one of the world’s poorest countries, the economic assistance that the United States provides to Ethiopia is contributing to the country’s efforts to prevent famines and to promote economic stability and prosperity. The

United States continues to encourage economic sector reforms by providing economic

assistance that contributes to establishing an environment conducive to private sector led economic growth. With U.S. Government assistance, progress has made in

the areas of reforming tax administration and operations, reducing the number of

days to register a business, and improving land tenure security through land certification.

Other major non-humanitarian U.S. assistance programs focus on improving community level primary health care and primary education, especially for girls and

mothers, fighting HIV/AIDS, increasing food security for households, enhancing agricultural productivity, capacity development for local government transparency, increasing exports and jobs, and counter-terrorism assistance. The U.S. emphasis on

project support, rather than budget support, ensures that economic aid is targeted

to bring about specific results on the ground.

Despite its macroeconomic challenges, Ethiopia has seen some notable economic

progress in recent years. The Ethiopian economy grew by 11.6 percent in 2004. In

September, a British publication rated Ethiopia first among African countries for

cost effectiveness for foreign direct investment, noting the country’s inexpensive

labor and suitable infrastructure. The economy’s dependence on agriculture has decreased notably. Industry grew by 5.1 percent per year between 1992 and 2004,

while the service sector achieved a real growth rate of 6.8 percent per year during

this period. Ethiopia has even begun attracting international investors away from

other African countries in areas such as floriculture. The Ethiopian government introduced a value-added tax in January 2003, which has broadened the tax base and

increased revenues. To attract foreign investment, Ethiopia has reduced the minimum required level of investment from $500,000 to $100,000 for foreign firms and

lifted minimum capital requirements altogether for those exporting over 75 percent

of their output.

The Government of Ethiopia is actively engaged in supporting Ethiopia’s participation in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and has undertaken a

number of programs and policies to promote exports, including a government credit

facility, provision of serviced land, and tax incentives. The U.S. Government is

49

working to support Ethiopia’s participation in AGOA through outreach/promotion efforts and technical assistance to the private sector.

Greater economic reforms are certainly necessary for Ethiopia to achieve its full

development potential—whether it be continued land reform to allow land to be

used as collateral for investment, private sector involvement in telecommunications,

opening the country to foreign financial institutions, or privatizing more state owned

enterprises. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of economic assistance—which promotes

a healthy population and workforce, bolsters basic literacy and numeracy, ensures

safe births, fights HIV/AIDS, promotes the adoption of improved agricultural production methods, provides assistance to chronically food insecure households, provides technical assistance for small-scale agricultural marketing, and greater transparency and good governance—would harm the Ethiopian people and do little to enhance economic progress.

We believe that continued bilateral and multilateral pressure on the Ethiopian

government to adopt economic reforms and liberalize its economic and investment

regimes for the country’s own best interest will yield the greatest results toward

broad-based poverty reduction and economic prosperity.

Question. What steps are the State Department and Bush administration taking

or prepared to take to pressure the Meles regime to restore the rights of minority

parties in Parliament?

Answer. Senior United States officials have met regularly with Ethiopian government officials to seek fair and constitutional treatment of minority parties. Under

Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns has specifically urged Prime

Minister Meles Zenawi to reach out to and work with the opposition.

Regarding the restoration of the rights of opposition parties in parliament, our

Charge d’Affaires in Addis Ababa, and senior State Department officials have met

numerous times with Prime Minister Meles, the Speaker of Parliament, and other

Ethiopian officials to press for a reversal of the parliamentary rule changes made

in July that imposed new constraints on opposition participation in debate. Prime

Minister Meles has responded that he is willing to explore this matter; the subject

currently stands as an agenda item for on-going government-opposition talks.

Ambassador Huddleston and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Don Yamamoto

have encouraged the Speaker of Parliament to set aside at least one committee

chairmanship for the opposition to fill. The Speaker has expressed openness to this

suggestion.

With our encouragement the Speaker of Parliament has agreed to permit an opposition whip to participate in deliberations on setting the parliamentary agenda

along with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s whip and the

Speaker.

Recent parliamentary debates have shown that those opposition members of parliament who have taken their seats have had an opportunity to participate in debates on agenda items.

With respect to minority parties outside of parliament, there has been little

progress. While representatives from all parties from which candidates were elected

have taken their seats, a significant portion of MPs-elect from the Coalition for

Unity and Democracy (CUD) have continued to boycott parliament. In early November, the Ethiopian government detained senior CUD officials for advocating a

change in government through extra-constitutional means. CUD officials have complained since August that their supporters were being harassed by government and

security officials, that their leaders were being followed, that the government had

shut down various CUD offices in rural areas, and that thousands of CUD supporters were being detained by the police. The United States has taken every opportunity to investigate these allegations and protest such actions to the Ethiopian government. We have called for the government to release all political detainees, and

either charge and accord due process to, or release, detained CUD officials. We have

called for the Ethiopian government to cease all harassment of opposition officials

and supporters. We have called on all parties to abide by the rule of law.

We will continue to push the Ethiopian government to permit opposition parties

to actively participate in all legal political activities, to extend greater access for

these parties to state-operated media, and to open the political space for opposition

representatives to play meaningful leadership and minority roles in parliament and

the regional councils to which they were elected.

Question. Has the Ethiopian government investigated the June 8, 2005 killing of

civilians who were protesting? Why not?

Answer. After persistent pressure by the United States, including the specific request by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian parliament voted on November 14 to establish an

50

independent commission to investigate the election-related violence of June 8 and

early November. Parliament approved the appointment of eleven commissioners

nominated by the Prime Minister on December 6. The commissioners include religious, academic, business, and judicial leaders. The commission is charged with preparing a report detailing the number of deaths, the amount of property destroyed,

and whether there were violations of constitutional or human rights. The commission has 90 days in which to produce its report.

Question. Is the State Department doing anything to press for an investigation

of the killing of civilians and the imprisonment of thousands of political prisoners?

Answer. After persistent pressure by the United States, the Ethiopian parliament

voted on November 14 to establish an independent commission to investigate the

election related violence of June 8 and early November. Parliament approved the

eleven nominated commissioners on December 6. Senior State Department officials

have protested the detention of thousands of demonstrators and opposition supporters in meetings with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and senior Ethiopian government officials in Addis Ababa and in Washington. We have called on the Ethiopian

government to immediately release all political detainees. We have urged the Ethiopian government to charge those detainees whom it refuses to release, accord them

full due process, and allow for access to counsel, family and international observers.

The vast majority of those detained during and in the aftermath of the public demonstrations of early November have now been released.

Prime Minister Meles publicly announced on December 13 that approximately

3,000 individuals would face charges in connection with anti-government protests

that occurred in November.

We continue to monitor the detention of opposition leaders closely and to press

for access to them by representatives of the international community. Senior U.S.

officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald

Yamamoto and Charge ́ d’affaires Vicki Huddleston, have met with immediate family

members of detainees to hear their concerns. Embassy officials will attend the December 16 court hearing of detained opposition leaders, at which we expect the Government to announce formal charges.

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