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THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DECEMBER 14, 2011 

Serial No. 112–152 

Printed for the use of the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

RAU ́ L R. LABRADOR, Idaho 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS A. ROSS, Florida 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on December 14, 2011 ...................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 7 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Ms. Kristine L. Svinicki, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 19 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 21 

Mr. William D. Magwood IV, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 23 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 25 

Mr. William C. Ostendorff, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 29 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 31 

Mr. George Apostolakis, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 33 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 35 

Mr. William Borchardt 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 71 

Mr. Stephen Burns 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 73 

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings, a Member of Congress from the State 

of Maryland, opening statement ......................................................................... 83 

Davis-Besse Atomic Reactor: 20 MORE Years of Radioactive Russian Roulette 

on the Great Lakes Shore?! ................................................................................. 86 

Regulatory Meltdown .............................................................................................. 96 

Letters and Questions sent to Witnesses provided by Chairman Darrell Issa .. 141 

(1) 

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NUCLEAR 

REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Issa, Platts, Jordan, Chaffetz, Walberg, 

Lankford, Buerkle, Labrador, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Ross, Guinta, 

Kelly, Cummings, Towns, Kucinich, Tierney, Cooper, Connolly, 

Davis, Welch, and Murphy. 

Staff Present: Ali Ahmad, Communications Advisor; Kurt 

Bardella, Senior Policy Advisor; Michael R. Bebeau, Assistant 

Clerk; Robert Borden, General Counsel; Will L. Boyington, Staff 

Assistant; Molly Boyl, Parliamentarian; Lawrence J. Brady, Staff 

Director; John Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director; Adam P. Fromm, 

Director of Member Services and Committee Operations; Linda 

Good, Chief Clerk; Peter Haller, Senior Counsel; Christopher 

Hixon, Deputy Chief Counsel, Oversight; Justin LoFranco, Deputy 

Director of Digital Strategy; John Ohly, Professional Staff Member; 

Ashok M. Pinto, Deputy Chief Counsel, Investigations; Laura L. 

Rush, Deputy Chief Clerk; Jonathan J. Skladany, Counsel; Cheyenne Steel, Press Assistant; Rebecca Watkins, Press Secretary; 

Nadia A. Zahran, Staff Assistant; Erin Alexander, Fellow; Krista 

Boyd, Minority Counsel; Beverly Britton Fraser, Minority Counsel; 

Lisa Cody, Minority Investigator; Kevin Corbin, Minority Deputy 

Clerk; Ashley Etienne, Minority Director of Communications; Carla 

Hultberg, Minority Chief Clerk; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; 

Paul Kincaid, Minority Press Secretary; and Chris Knauer, Minority Senior Investigator. 

Chairman ISSA. Good morning. The committee will come to order. 

The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental principles: First, Americans have a right to know what they get from 

the money Washington takes from them and that it is well spent. 

And, second, Americans deserve an efficient, effective government 

that works for them. 

Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform committee is 

to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers, because taxpayers have a right to 

know what they get from their government. We will work tirelessly, in partnership with citizen watchdogs, to deliver the facts to 

2 

the American people and bring genuine reform to the U.S. Government bureaucracy. 

Today we have a distinguished panel, and today we will hear 

from five commissioners in what I believe will be an extraordinary 

hearing, one in which an independent Commission that Americans 

rely on to ensure that we have safe and reliable nuclear power— 

and, particularly, safe nuclear power. It has become a concern to 

this committee that, in fact, the Commission is not operating in a 

way that can continue. 

I will not prejudge anyone’s motives. I will not prejudge, here 

today, anyone’s testimony. But I am deeply concerned. A Commission is not, in fact, an autocratic agency; it is not, in fact, the office 

of any one person. For a Commission to work successfully or any 

agency that has a board, whether it is the National Transportation 

Safety Board or a host of others that we rely on for safety particularly, it has to lead by consensus. Doing the basic arithmetic, this 

is a three-Democrat, two-Republican Commission. If it were three 

and two the other way or any combination, it should work, and 

work by consensus. 

The history of this agency, of this Commission, has been generally to work by consensus or near-consensus. The committee will 

examine today whether, in fact, under current Commissioners and 

current structure, this Commission can get back to working on a 

consensus-like basis. Ultimately, all five of you are charged with 

the same level of responsibility and the same obligation to sound 

science and sound safety. 

On a personal note, I have two active reactors in my district. 

Like anyone who has nuclear power in their district, every day we 

ask, ‘‘Is it safe?’’ and we are answered, ‘‘Yes.’’ And every day we 

ask, ‘‘Could it by safer and more reliable?’’ We want that answer 

always to be increasingly ‘‘Yes.’’ 

So as we hear from Members on the dais and then hear from our 

witnesses, I think you will hear that all of us have the same concern. One of the ranking members, Mr. Kucinich, has been actively 

involved in his nuclear power plant for many years. But whether 

you have nuclear power in your district or not, we all understand 

that if all our nuclear power plants went down in America, the 

lights would go out. There is not sufficient replacement power 

today or in the foreseeable future to live without the highly reliable 

baseload that comes from nuclear energy. 

So, as we hear from all of you, I intend to allow each of you to 

deliver your full opening statements and a reasonable amount of 

additional remarks if they are beyond what your opening statement 

is. I then intend to be very, very, very, very willing to hear you give 

a complete answer to any question. That is not to say that Members on the dais can go to 4 minutes and 59 seconds and then 

somehow find a question, but I want to hear from each of you. 

This is not one in which anyone on the dais here today, to the 

best of my knowledge, has the capability of taking the seats you 

occupy. We have to rely on what we learn here today to know 

whether or not this Commission can operate at the level that is essential if we are going to have safe nuclear power in this country. 

And, with that, I recognize the ranking member for his opening 

statement. 

3 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

In March of this year, a massive earthquake and subsequent tsunami killed more than 20,000 people and devastated northern 

Japan. It caused catastrophic damage at four of the nuclear reactors at the Fukushima power station. This was the worst nuclear 

disaster since Chernobyl 25 years earlier. Our number-one priority 

on this committee must be ensuring that we learn the lessons of 

the Fukushima disaster and take appropriate action to improve the 

safety of nuclear power plants in this country. 

Yesterday, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a statement 

imploring our committee to focus today’s hearing squarely on these 

safety issues. Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund, a physicist and co-director of 

global security program at UCS, urged the committee to focus on 

the safety issues facing the U.S. reactor fleet rather than on NRC’s 

internal squabbling. 

And let me say this on behalf of the American people. I ask that 

you, Chairman Jaczko, and to the other Commissioners, I ask that 

you not allow your disagreements to become the enemy of the destiny of this great organization. I also ask that you not allow your 

squabbling to have the effect of being a weapon of mass distraction. 

That is so important. 

I strongly agree with the statements of Ms. Gronlund. The single 

most critical issue facing the NRC today is how it will respond to 

the Fukushima crisis. Five months ago, a task force of career NRC 

staff issued 12 recommendations intended to make U.S. nuclear 

power plants safer. In October, the staff prioritized eight of these 

recommendations. According to the staff, these recommendations 

have the greatest potential for safety improvement in the near 

term and should be started without delay. 

For example, one of the key problems in the Fukushima disaster 

was that the tsunami knocked out the station’s backup power, 

causing temperatures to rise in four reactors and resulting in the 

substantial release of radiation. NRC staff has recommended that 

all existing and new reactors in the United States strengthen their 

capabilities to mitigate these types of blackouts. I look forward to 

hearing the views of all the Commissioners today on how we can 

implement this and other reforms as soon as possible. 

With respect to the allegations of mismanagement, let me say 

this. I agree that it is a serious matter when four Commissioners 

write a letter to the White House criticizing the chairman for creating a chilled work environment. These allegations should be 

taken seriously, which the White House has done. And I don’t plan 

to be a referee; I believe that you should be able to work out these 

disputes among yourselves. 

Based on my review of this issue, however, I also believe that the 

current chairman has exhibited one of the strongest safety records 

of any previous NRC chairman. I would urge anybody interested in 

this issue to read the harrowing transcripts of the recordings from 

the emergency operations center stood up by the chairman to help 

the people of Japan and United States citizens in close proximity 

to the Fukushima danger zone. You will be impressed by the skill 

and courage of those who worked around the clock to prevent this 

disaster from becoming far worse. As a result, I am struggling to 

determine how much of this squabbling relates to personality conVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:04 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75051.TXT APRIL
4 

flicts and how much relates to a fundamental disagreement about 

the statutory structure of the Commission itself. 

The inspector general, after interviewing all five Commissioners 

and senior NRC staff, concluded that the chairman acted within his 

authority. The general counsel of the NRC agreed. After examining 

the chairman’s actions relating to Fukushima, he wrote in an opinion that the chairman’s actions fit within his authorities. Similarly, 

our committee’s own investigation, which has included transcribed 

interviews of 15 senior NRC staff and the review of thousands of 

documents, has uncovered no violations of law or instances in 

which the safety of U.S. nuclear facilities have been placed in jeopardy. 

The truth is that when Congress reorganized the NRC in 1980, 

it created a structure with a very strong chairman. As President 

Carter said at the time, the experience of Three Mile Island demonstrated that the Commission as a whole cannot deal expeditiously with emergencies. 

Moreover, this is not the first time there has been conflict between the NRC chairman and the other Commissioners. A 1999 report by the inspector general described a very similar situation 

that found that the statutory structure of the NRC leads to tensions between the chairman and other Commissioners. 

Finally, the natural question is, where do we go from here? 

Based on the letters all five Commissioners have sent to the committee in preparation for today’s hearing, I believe they are all willing to fulfill the fundamental mission of the NRC. I sincerely hope 

that we can use today’s hearing as an opportunity to get beyond 

past differences and refocus our energies on the goal of nuclear 

safety. 

And I remind the Commissioners, when the hearing is over, 

when the lights are down and the cameras are out and the reporters are gone, you all still have to return to your workplace and 

work together to protect the safety of all Americans. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory 

Affairs, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for 5 minutes for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. JORDAN. I thank the chairman, and I will be very brief. 

I just want to thank the chairman for having this important 

hearing today and remind the committee that this is in no way a 

partisan issue. This is about an important Commission who seems 

to be, based on some of the things we have said, not functioning 

the way we would want, maybe even use the term ‘‘dysfunctional.’’ 

And I think it is important to hear from all of them, ask the appropriate questions and get to the bottom of this. 

This is a Commission charged with making sure nuclear power 

plants are safe, and that is an important task. That is all about 

good government, and this is the appropriate venue to have this 

discussion and this hearing. 

So I just want to thank the chairman and would yield back the 

balance of my time. I know the ranking member of our committee 

wants to make an opening statement, as well. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

5 

We now recognize the ranking member of that same subcommittee, the other gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling 

this hearing. 

Safety is the issue. I take it personally. This affects my State and 

my area. In February 2001, the NRC began investigating an aging 

mechanism that often caused cracking in reactors. As a result of 

these findings in late September 2001, the NRC determined that 

the Davis-Besse plant was at risk and should shut down by December 31st, 2001. 

FirstEnergy, the owner the of Davis-Besse plant, which is in Port 

Clinton, Ohio, resisted the order, claiming that it could stay open 

without incident until March 2002. FirstEnergy argued that a 

shutdown would cause an unnecessary financial burden. Rather 

than following its own safety procedures and shutting down DavisBesse, the NRC relented and allowed the plant to operate until 

February 2002. 

After the plant had been shut down, workers repairing one of the 

five cracked control rod nozzles discovered extensive damage to the 

reactor vessel head. The workers found a large corroded crater the 

size of a football in the reactor vessel head next to one of the nozzles. Only 3⁄16 of an inch of steel remained intact at the bottom. 

That began to bulge and crack. 

The NRC later found that the plant might have been as close as 

60 days from bursting. If it did, they would have had a major release of radio activity that would have jeopardized the immediate 

and long-term safety of millions of Americans, not to mention the 

single biggest source of freshwater in the world being jeopardized 

in the Great Lakes. 

The Government Accountability Office later weighed in on this, 

calling it, quote, ‘‘the most serious safety issue confronting the Nation’s commercial nuclear industry since Three Mile Island.’’ The 

Department of Justice said that FirstEnergy admitted that they 

knowingly, quote, ‘‘knowingly made false representations to the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the course of attempting to persuade the NRC that its Davis-Besse nuclear power station was safe 

to operate beyond December 31st, 2001,’’ unquote. 

FirstEnergy’s insurance company became worried and commissioned an independent study to analyze the data from the incident. 

The study, which was released in April 2007, painted an even darker picture than the regulatory rebukes that came before it. The report found that the corrosion of the steel plate happened at a faster 

rate than was reported by FirstEnergy, bringing the reactor closer 

to a catastrophe incident than had previously been reported. 

Now, despite the finding of these three bodies, just a few weeks 

before that study was released FirstEnergy asked the NRC to remove the requirement for independent assessments of DavisBesse’s operation. They asked for less oversight. 

The NRC’s 2004 confirmatory order modifying license lists some 

of FirstEnergy’s malfeasant policies and actions that led to the 

2002 incident, providing more evidence that profits were prioritized 

over safety. It specifically lists the key reasons the leak was allowed to persist and grow. FirstEnergy’s self-policing mechanisms 

6 

failed. Worse, FirstEnergy tried to convince the NRC the problems 

were solved, when in fact they were not. 

FirstEnergy continues to try to prioritize profits over safety. 

Since I don’t have time here to cover in detail the full history of 

FirstEnergy’s bad decisions, near-misses, and safety lapses, I ask 

unanimous consent to place into the record a document prepared 

by Beyond Nuclear which does that, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Several weeks ago, FirstEnergy had to shut down 

Davis-Besse to replace yet another reactor head because its design 

has flaws which creates leaking problems. In doing so, they found 

cracks in a building designed to protect the core from external missiles like planes, but also to prevent the release of radioactive air 

and steam in the event of a problem with the reactor. The latter 

scenario is what almost happened in 2001 at Davis-Besse and is exactly what happened at Fukushima when the containment buildings blew up from the steam buildup. A structurally compromised 

building affords less protection to protect the public. 

True to form, there were important differences between the story 

FirstEnergy told the public and the real story, which I only uncovered because of my own investigation and because of my staff. Specifically, FirstEnergy tried to convince the public that the cracks 

were only cosmetic in nature, were few in number, and were not 

widely distributed. None of the above was accurate. And yet, 

FirstEnergy was eager to restart Davis-Besse, even though they 

will not know the cause of the cracking until February. 

We should be looking at this. The corporations that run nuclear 

power plants are fundamentally no different than the corporations 

that drove our economy off a cliff. They will cut corners to maintain 

or increase profits in the absence of sufficient incentives to act differently. They must be sufficiently and carefully regulated. The 

consequences of the failing to do so are unthinkable. 

I hope we will reflect on the NRC’s position here and help to 

achieve a culture of independence, objectivity, and public interest 

over corporate interest, and that we will have complete dedication 

to safety. 

I thank the chair for calling this hearing and for your attention 

to this critical matter at this time. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. And I look back fondly 

on the years we have worked on this issue together on the committee, with each of us at different times being a subcommittee 

chairman. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. We now recognize our panel of witnesses. 

Mr. Gregory Jaczko is the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. The chairman is, I think, a particle physicist, to be 

more accurate—— 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. —and an experienced policy advisor who has 

served on the Commission since 2005 and has served on both sides 

of the dome, both in the House and Senate, in the past. 

Commissioner Kristine—I am going to try this again—Svinicki? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Svinicki. 

7 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. And I grew up near Slavic Village, and I 

should be able to do these names better—is an experienced nuclear 

engineer, a policy advisor who came to the Commission in 2008. 

Commissioner William Magwood IV—Commissioner Magwood 

joined the Commission just in 2010. He previously served 7 years 

as director of nuclear energy at the Department of Energy. 

Commissioner William Ostendorff—Commissioner Ostendorff 

came to the Commission last year after a distinguished career in 

the nuclear navy and much time also with the Department of Energy. 

And then, Commissioner George Apostolakis. Thank you for 

being understanding. The Commissioner is an expert in risk assessment and came to the Commission in 2010 after many years 

as a professor at MIT. 

Gentlemen and lady, pursuant to the rules of the committee, all 

witnesses here will be sworn. Would you please rise to take the 

oath and raise your right hands? 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth? 

Let the record indicate all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Please be seated. 

As I said earlier, nobody on the dais here knows anything other 

than what we have heard. You are here today so we hear all of you. 

So I will ask you to try to come close to 5 minutes. I am not going 

to gavel people if they are going through with their statements. 

And I am likely also going to be very generous in your response 

times so that we can fully hear from all of you here today. 

Chairman Jaczko, would you please go first? 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. JACZKO 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, thank you, Chairman Issa and Ranking Member Cummings and members of the committee. 

We have been asked to appear before you today to discuss the 

management and operations of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

This year, 2011, has been an exceptionally challenging and productive year for the NRC. And, as usual, the NRC staff has done 

an outstanding job over the past year. And the agency once again 

scored among the top tier of Federal agencies in the 2011 Best 

Places to Work in the Federal Government rankings, scoring number one in all four major indices. 

At the NRC, we anticipated that 2011 would be a busy year, but 

unexpected issues, most notably the Fukushima Daiichi accident 

and multiple natural disasters, including flooding in the Midwest 

in June, the earthquake on the east coast in August, and other serious threats, such as hurricanes and tornadoes, created additional 

pressures for the staff at NRC’s headquarters and regional offices. 

In spite of those challenges, the staff and the Commission remained focused on our critical safety mission. During the past fiscal year, we have performed thousands of hours of inspections at 

nuclear power plants and materials sites, took hundreds of enforceVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:04 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75051.TXT APRIL
8 

ments actions, reviewed more than 1,000 licensing actions and 

tasks, and issued a number of new regulations. And we completed 

a very important final safety culture policy statement. 

The NRC has conducted a greater number of special inspections 

in the past year—21 to date—than at any point in recent memory. 

During the past year, we completed the safety and environmental 

reviews of the first two new reactor combined license applications 

and held mandatory hearings on both of these applications. And 

these were both historic actions by the Commission. 

We issued final safety evaluation reports for the AP1000 and 

ESBWR design certifications and issued eight reactor license renewals. We also successfully completed two pilot applications for 

transition to our new risk-informed, performance-based approach to 

fire protection. And we held a meeting yesterday to talk about the 

progress that is being made on that issue. 

We issued three new uranium recovery licenses, authorized the 

restart of one uranium recovery facility, and issued the license for 

the AREVA Eagle Rock centrifuge enrichment facility to be built in 

Idaho. We also completed the orderly closeout of our Yucca Mountain activities and preserved the technical work in 3 technical reports, more than 40 other reports, and in videotaped staff interviews. 

We have also approved cybersecurity plans for all nuclear power 

plants, published approximately 30 new guidance documents, and 

hosted the first integrated regulatory review service mission to the 

United States. And that is an international, peer-reviewed mission 

that is done under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency. 

Now, the Commission itself was also incredibly productive in 

2011. My colleagues and I held 38 public Commission meetings, 10 

closed meetings, and issued 92 staff requirements memoranda on 

substantive Commission voting matters. This was 30 more substantive Commission decisions than we completed in fiscal year 

2010. And in line with our commitment to transparency and openness, we noticed more than 1,030 public meetings and improved 

and expanded our public outreach. Construction of our new third 

headquarters building is also on schedule and on budget for opening in late 2012. 

And, of course, the NRC undertook tremendous efforts in response to the March 11th earthquake and tsunami in Japan and 

the nuclear emergency at Fukushima Daiichi. In addition to monitoring the crisis and providing on-the-ground support in Japan, the 

Commission established a task force to review the accident and 

make recommendations to the Commission for enhancing reactor 

safety. This task force reported back with a comprehensive set of 

12 safety recommendations addressing a broad range of issues. 

These recommendations have undergone additional reviews by the 

NRC staff, our Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, and we 

have benefited from the insights of a broad range of stakeholders. 

The Commission has directed the staff to begin immediately implementing, partially or fully, five of the safety recommendations from 

the task force and set goals of completing station blackout rulemaking within 24 to 30 months and has encouraged completion of 

all actions within 5 years. 

9 

Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of 

the committee, this concludes my formal testimony today, and I 

would be pleased to respond to questions you may have. Thank 

you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Jaczko follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Thank you, Chairman. 

Commissioner Svinicki? I will get it eventually. 

STATEMENT OF KRISTINE L. SVINICKI 

Ms. SVINICKI. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member 

Cummings, and members of the committee, for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. 

You have requested that members of this Commission address 

the topic of management and leadership issues at the NRC. 

I have been privileged to serve as a Commissioner of the NRC 

for over 3–1/2 years. During this time, the agency’s approximately 

4,000 technical, legal, and administrative staff members have impressed me with their professionalism and their unyielding commitment to the NRC’s important missions of nuclear safety and nuclear security. Their efforts are led by a skilled group of senior executive service managers, most of whom have decades of experience, not just in Federal service but specifically at the NRC. I have 

confidence in the work they do and believe the Nation is well 

served by their constant vigilance on matters of nuclear safety and 

security. 

I appear before you today, however, to address topics related to 

the current functioning the Commission itself and the engagement 

between the Commission and the agency staff. 

I have served as a Commissioner with six other individuals—four 

currently serving and two whose service on the Commission has 

ended—and under the tenure of two different chairmen. Although 

some amount of tension is expected in any deliberative body, I believe the level of tension among the currently serving members of 

this Commission is impeding the collegial processes of the NRC 

and is obstructing the functioning of key processes between the 

Commission and the agency staff. These tensions are rooted in an 

interpretation of the NRC chairman’s statutory authorities as well 

as his conduct toward his Commissioner colleagues and the NRC 

staff. 

Despite these problems, I believe it is likely that the Commission 

would have continued its tug of war over these issues, to the extent 

possible, out of the public spotlight. Events of the past few months, 

however, pushed the Commission beyond its tolerance for current 

circumstances and led us to communicate our concerns beyond the 

Commission. 

As a result of interpretations of the NRC chairman’s authorities 

that grant the chairman the authority to decide which issues appropriately involve any of the Commission’s statutory functions and 

to interpret for the agency staff the meaning of direction issuing 

from Commission decisions, the situation at the NRC has, in my 

view, become increasingly unworkable and threatens the viability 

of a functioning Commission structure. 

While the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 certain administrative responsibilities in the hands of the chairman, the legislative 

history makes clear that it was not intended to displace the ultimate authority of the full Commission over the affairs of the agency. The plan itself includes a provision that the Commission may 

decide by majority vote in any area of doubt whether any matter 

pertains to one of the Commission’s statutory functions. In its deVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:04 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75051.TXT APRIL
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liberations on the plan, Congress also emphasized that the Commission shall have full access to all information within the agency, 

including that in existence and that which requires development by 

the staff. The chairman may not withhold or delay providing information requested by the Commission. In both of these critical 

areas, however, I do not believe that the processes under the current chairman satisfy the intent of the law. 

Over the past year and a half, the Commission has engaged in 

a protracted effort to resolve its disagreements over its respective 

roles and responsibilities through a comprehensive revision of its 

internal operating procedures. This effort proved ultimately unfruitful, however, in resolving the underlying disagreements. 

Exacerbating these longstanding disagreements are recent events 

of concern that have come to the Commission’s attention. In October of this year, the chairman appeared at an annual retreat held 

by the agency’s executive director for operations and senior agency 

staff. Within days of this event, a number of attendees from the retreat sought me out to express their strong reaction to the chairman’s statements. They described the content of his remarks as an 

expression of contempt for the Commission. It was described to me 

that the chairman instructed those present to advance his agenda 

and that this must come at the price of having their own independent assessments and recommendations. The executive director 

for operations described it to me by saying, ‘‘We were pretty much 

instructed to leave our brains at home.’’ 

Hearing of this event was a formative moment in leading me to 

conclude that the points of tension between the chairman and the 

Commission were no longer isolated to the Commission itself. Interference in the flow of information coming to the Commission was 

occurring to such a pervasive extent and was being conducted so 

brazenly that the Commission needed to take additional action. 

Another circumstance that I believe caused the Commission to 

bring these issues forward is the chairman’s continued outbursts of 

abusive rage directed at subordinates within the agency staff. All 

members of the Commission, including me, have been on the receiving end of this conduct, which was also acknowledged by the 

NRC inspector general in his testimony before the House Energy 

and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Environment and the 

Economy earlier this year. 

These incidents appear to have grown more frequent, however, 

and I am now aware of this conduct being directed against staff at 

various levels in the agency. Some of these employees have spoken 

to me privately of the embarrassment and humiliation of being 

made to lose their composure in front of their colleagues or to be 

seen exiting the chairman’s office in a state of obvious upset. 

I regret that we have come to this point, but our agency, one 

whose fundamental mission is to ensure the health, safety, and security of the American public, is premised on the variability of individuals to speak out. It is my hope that a positive lesson about the 

willingness to speak out will be drawn by not just the NRC staff 

listening to this hearing but by all those responsible for safety and 

security across our government. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Svinicki follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Commissioner Magwood? If you could pull the mic just a little 

closer. They are not very good from a distance. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM D. MAGWOOD IV 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Even better when they are turned on. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of 

the committee, it is with considerable disappointment that I appear 

before you today to share my concerns regarding the management 

and leadership issues facing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

I provided a written statement and ask that it be included in the 

record. So I will try and summarize my comments. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Let me begin by reassuring the public that the 

NRC staff has and continues to work diligently to carry out its responsibilities to protect the health, safety, and security of the 

American people. They are led by an excellent cadre of senior career managers who have done a fantastic job of insulating most of 

the staff from the serious problems that are the subject of this 

hearing. 

My colleagues and I have endured a rather distasteful and dishonest media campaign over the last week. We have seen a wide 

range of misleading and untrue reports about our motivations, our 

characters, and our commitment to safety. It is quite clear that this 

campaign is intended to divert the attention of Congress and the 

public from the very real concerns we have about the leadership of 

our agency. I do not intend to allow this tactic to succeed. 

However, one item I feel I must address concerns this Commission’s commitment to safety. After 20 months of working with the 

people at this table, I can promise you that we all place the safety 

and security of the public we serve at the very top of our considerations. We do not always agree on how to achieve the goal of safety 

and we always do not view issues the same way, but I believe we 

are all equally committed to the same goal. To impugn the motivations of members of the Commission because of disagreements on 

strategy or approaches is irresponsible. 

Now, as I discuss the real concerns facing us, I feel my true role 

before you today is to give voice to the dedicated men and women 

who serve the NRC, many of whom have come to me to discuss 

their concerns. 

First, I am most concerned that the chairman has made a regular practice of interfering with the ability of the Commission to 

obtain information from the NRC staff. He has asserted the authority to decide what information is provided to the Commission, when 

it is provided, and, increasingly, what the information contains 

when it reaches the Commission. This behavior is contrary to both 

the letter and intent of the organization plan, and no Commissioner could confidently carry out his legal obligations under these 

conditions. 

In my written statement, I outline a specific example in which 

the chairman prevented the staff from providing the Commission 

a voting paper regarding our program for fire protection in nuclear 

24 

power plants. He went as far as to send someone to break up a 

staff briefing being held for myself and another Commissioner. For 

the record, we did not allow the briefing to end. 

It has become routine for individual members of the staff to come 

to Commissioners to alert us about issues they believe require 

Commission attention but that staff can’t get through the chairman. That the Commission has come to rely on the personal bravery of individuals on the staff to keep us informed is a very sad 

statement. But what worries me most is the fact that we don’t 

know what we don’t know. 

The second concern I raise is a growing cancer of a chilled work 

environment at the agency. As I outline in my written statement, 

I have observed the effects of this chilled environment firsthand, 

and I believe the situation is actually worse in recent months. And 

I think Commissioner Svinicki mentioned some of that. 

I would like to move on to my final concern, however, which I 

raised, concerning the chairman’s abusive behavior toward the 

staff. To understand this matter, I spoke with three of the women 

who have had personal experience with the chairman’s extreme behavior. These women remain very disturbed by these experiences. 

A common reflection they all shared with me was, ‘‘I didn’t deserve 

this.’’ One woman said she felt the chairman was actually irritated 

with someone else but took it out on her. Another told me she was 

angry at herself for being brought to tears in front of male colleagues. A third described how she couldn’t stop shaking after the 

experience. She sat, talking through what had happened to her, 

with a supervisor until she could calm down enough to drive home. 

Senior female staff in an agency like the NRC are tough, smart 

women who have succeeded in a male-dominated environment. Enduring this type of abuse and being reduced to tears in front of colleagues and subordinates is a profoundly painful experience for 

them. The word one woman used was ‘‘humiliating.’’ I must note 

that none of these women want to have their names used publicly. 

As another woman told me, ‘‘It is embarrassing enough that I went 

through this. I don’t want to be dragged through the mud before 

some congressional committee.’’ 

These are major concerns facing the agency today: blocking staff 

from providing information to the Commission, the creation of a 

chilled work environment, and the abuse of NRC staff. I do not believe that fear, intimidation, and humiliation are acceptable leadership tactics in any organization, least of all in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Thank you for your attention, and I stand ready to answer any 

of your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Magwood follows:] 

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29 

Chairman ISSA. I thank you. 

Commissioner? 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member 

Cummings, members of the committee, for the chance to be here 

before you today. 

I have served on this independent commission since April 2010. 

During that time, I have come to better appreciate the reputation 

the NRC has historically enjoyed as a competent regulator and a 

leader in nuclear safety not only in the United States but also in 

the international community. The reputation can be attributed to 

the employees of the NRC, who have shown dedication to the safety 

mission and the NRC’s organizational values of integrity, service, 

openness, commitment, cooperation, excellence, and respect. 

For decades, these values have served as a guide for the operations of the NRC staff as well as for the Commission. These values have also historically fostered an open and collaborative workplace that brings out the best regulatory and technical judgments 

of the NRC staff without undue influence or pressure. 

Unfortunately, we find ourselves today in an environment where 

those historical values have been compromised and the agency’s 

reputation placed at great risk. Left uncorrected, this trend damages the ability of the NRC staff and the Commission to carry out 

its nuclear safety mission for this country. 

I have over 30 years of service to this country. As a Rickover-era 

nuclear-trained submarine officer, I served on six submarines, I 

commanded a nuclear attack submarine for 3 years, had subsequent command of an attack submarine squadron of eight submarines. I have been personally accountable to the United States 

Government—the White House, Department of Defense—for ensuring the safety of nuclear-powered warships. I take great pride in 

that service and in my own decision-making with respect to those 

principles that best ensure reactor safety. 

After retiring from the Navy in 2002, I worked upstairs in the 

House Armed Services Committee as a counsel with oversight responsibility for atomic energy activities at the Department of Energy. Subsequent to that, I spent 2 years as a senior official at the 

Department of Energy and now with the NRC. 

With significant experience in leadership positions dealing with 

nuclear oversight, whether it be nuclear weapons or nuclear power, 

I can honestly say to this committee that I have never seen an environment where the highest level of the organization does not reflect the values shared by the whole. 

Along with the three of my Commissioner colleagues who signed 

the letter of October 13th, who took the same oath to, quote, ‘‘well 

and faithfully discharge the duties,’’ unquote, of our office, I refused to be silent while damage was being done to the NRC’s work 

environment. 

It is important to comment briefly on what I will label as an unprecedented action—the four of us writing a letter to the White 

House. That is the letter this committee received last Thursday 

evening. 

30 

This letter is not about politics. It was signed by two Democratic 

and two Republican members of this Commission. I regret that 

that letter has been portrayed by many in Congress over the last 

3 or 4 days as being politically motivated. I assure this committee, 

it is not. It is not Yucca Mountain, it is not about other policy disagreements. It is not about internal conflict between Commissioners, though that is one element of our concerns. With great respect for the White House, I must take strong exception to White 

House Chief of Staff Daley’s letter from Monday night that I believe mischaracterized the situation of the Commission. 

What is this letter about? This letter is about management actions that have significantly eroded the prized open and collaborative working environment of the NRC, our Nation’s nuclear safety agency. These actions have served to prevent the Commission 

from being fully informed of the NRC staff’s views and recommendations. 

It is about behavior that if exhibited by one of our NRC’s regulated licensees would be subject to investigation and potential enforcement action for a chilled work environment. It is about bullying and intimidating behavior toward NRC career staff that 

should not and cannot be tolerated. 

In light of our unanimous agreement that these actions cannot 

continue, the four of us fulfilled our oath of office and took what 

we viewed as appropriate action and wrote the White House. That 

letter clearly states our grave concerns. 

I appreciate this committee’s oversight role and look forward to 

your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Ostendorff follows:] 

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33 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Commissioner? 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings, 

and members of the committee, good morning. 

Management and operation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is an important subject. My perspective is grounded in my experience and observations as a member of the Commission since 

being sworn in on April 23, 2010, and my former role as a 15-year 

member and chairman for 2 years of the Advisory Committee on 

Reactor Safeguards, a statutory committee of technical experts. 

Management and operation of the Commission are carried out 

within an overall structure of law and policy. The Commission’s 

independent and multimember character, with staggered terms for 

its members, is designed to insulate regulatory decisions from political consideration and to provide stability for regulatory policy. Nuclear safety matters are technically complex. This Commission 

structure allows for a diversity of insights to be brought to bear in 

the Commission’s decision-making. 

Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980, the Commission as a 

whole formulates policy and regulations, issues orders, and conducts adjudication. Policy formulation includes major administrative decisions with policy implications. The Commission has ultimate authority to determine by a majority vote in an area of doubt 

whether any matter, action, question, or area of inquiry pertains 

to one of these functions. The Senate Committee on Governmental 

Affairs, in reporting on the reorganization plan, declared that, 

quote, ‘‘The committee also intends the Commission to exercise the 

authority to interpret the plan,’’ end quote. 

The legislative history of the plan and the Presidential messages 

to Congress in submitting the plan emphasize that the chairman 

is subject to the policies of the Commission and the oversight authority of the Commission. As principal executive officer of the 

Commission, the chairman has the ultimate responsibility to the 

Commission and the public for the proper day-to-day management 

and administration of the agency. However, the chairman is statutorily responsible to the Commission for assuring that the executive director of operations and the staff are responsive to the requirements of the Commission in the performance of its functions. 

The 1980 reorganization plan also provides that the heads of the 

offices of the general counsel, the Secretary of the Commission, and 

the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards shall continue to 

report directly to the Commission. 

The chairman and the executive director, through the chairman, 

are responsible for ensuring that the Commission is fully and currently informed about matters within the Commission’s functions. 

The reporting relationship of the executive director to the chairman 

is not intended to interfere with the ability of the EDO to make 

independent recommendations on matters that the Commission has 

delegated to him. While the chairman has special responsibility for 

policy planning and development for the Commission, the Commission could not function in any satisfactory way if the executive diVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:04 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75051.TXT APRIL
34 

rector or other senior managers were required to misrepresent or 

suppress their views or analyses. 

The Commission is well served by its dedicated staff, with many 

senior managers who bring long experience and advanced technical 

expertise. Their technical evaluations essential to informed Commission decision-making. The transmission of adequate information 

and unbiased perspectives to the Commission for its decision-making and oversight is essential to the agency’s mission of protecting 

public health and safety. 

I joined my fellow Commissioners to formally express our serious 

concerns regarding the chairman’s leadership. I regret that partisan or other ill motives have been ascribed to the action that we 

have taken. This could not be further from the truth. 

Thank you very much. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Apostolakis follows:] 

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37 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

I would like to thank all of you for staying well under the 5 minutes. And, again, all of your full written statements are, by committee rule, going to be in the record. 

I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Chairman, who is your board of directors? For the people out 

there in, sort of—you know, they don’t know government necessarily, what is the equivalent of your board of directors? Who do 

you report to? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I would say it is—I am responsible, as the 

chairman of the Commission, to carrying out the policies that the 

Commission as a whole—— 

Chairman ISSA. Well, no, I appreciate that, but are you the CEO, 

in your opinion? 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe the statute describes the chairman as a 

principal executive. So that would probably be the closest—— 

Chairman ISSA. So you view yourself as the chief executive officer—— 

Mr. JACZKO. Right. 

Chairman ISSA. —the chairman. Who is your board of directors? 

Mr. JACZKO. I would say it is probably a combination of the Commission but the Congress, as well, I think serves a role in its oversight capacity to oversee the operation—— 

Chairman ISSA. Do these gentlemen and lady sitting next to you, 

are they your board? 

Mr. JACZKO. I think, yeah, that is certainly one way to characterize the Commission as a structure that way, that they are responsible for establishing the policies of the agency, as I am a 

member of that as well. 

Chairman ISSA. Right, but if one of these four other members 

asks for a vote on something and four of them vote that what you 

are doing is wrong, do you consider that to be persuasive, interesting, or obligatory? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, certainly, if the Commission takes an action— 

and we have formal procedures to carry on our actions—then, of 

course, those are actions that I would follow. 

Chairman ISSA. So, if they ask to vote, not to be locked out of 

getting information, as has been alleged under oath here, would 

you consider that that was your responsibility, to ensure that they 

had full access to information and never again were in any way denied any information that you had? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yeah, I believe the Commission has provided a tremendous amount of information—— 

Chairman ISSA. No, no, no. Chairman, we are real funny about 

this here; we want the answer exactly to the question we asked. 

Is it true that any information that you had has ever been withheld from any of these people on your request? 

Mr. JACZKO. Not that I am aware of. 

Chairman ISSA. So you have never asked to have any information—so, basically, one of the Commissioners just lied under oath 

is what you are saying. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I work every day to ensure that the Commission has the information it needs to carry out its responsibilities—— 

38 

Chairman ISSA. No, no, no, not what it needs. If I understand the 

statute, they have full and unfettered, just as you do, rights to everything because they determine, as I understand it, as any Commission would—and we produce commissions here all the time— 

they have to have everything or at least everything they think they 

have. And what they don’t know they have a right to ask and know 

whether they really need to know it. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. And the Commission routinely asks for 

information, and that information is provided. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. Well, obviously, they disagree with you a 

little bit. 

You have a background—you are a physicist, not in nuclear but 

in interesting stuff that I don’t know anything about, so I will just 

figure you are smarter than me on anything related to the science. 

But have you ever run an organization of 4,000 people? 

Mr. JACZKO. No. This is the first time that I have done that. 

Chairman ISSA. What is the largest organization in which you 

were the CEO of in your career? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I was responsible for managing my personal 

staff as a Commissioner, and prior to that I served in policy capacities. 

Chairman ISSA. So, half a dozen or something like that. 

Mr. JACZKO. Yeah. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. 

Commissioner Ostendorff, as a Navy captain, how many people 

worked for you? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Chairman, I had several different jobs in the 

Navy. As a commanding officer of a submarine, I had 150 people; 

as the commanding officer of a nuclear attack submarine squadron, 

1,200. As principal deputy administrator at NSA, I was a chief operating officer for 2,500 personnel who were Feds and 32,000 people who were management and operating contractors. 

Chairman ISSA. And from your leadership training over 30 years, 

from your years in the Navy, an autocratic organization, an organization in which you can go to jail for not obeying the lawful order 

of the ship’s captain, you have said, signing on with the other Commissioners, that this chairman has exceeded any semblance of the 

kind of authority that you believe he should have in his conduct; 

that he has had conduct, if I understand correctly, that does—and 

I know there is some debate about this—that does endanger safety 

because it is conduct that is demoralizing to an organization that, 

in fact, if my nuclear power plants in my district, if they had somebody like Chairman Jaczko is alleged to be, you would shut down 

that site. You would view them as dysfunctional enough to be unsafe. 

Isn’t that true? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I would say, Chairman, that I think, if I understand your question correctly, that I do not believe that we have 

been kept fully informed of our staff’s views, their technical analysis, their recommendations on more than one issue here in the 

last few months that directly could impact how we proceed with respect to the Fukushima reactor accident. 

39 

Chairman ISSA. And I would ask unanimous consent for 30 more 

seconds to have Commissioner Magwood, who I think talked on the 

same subject, if he has anything to say. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. No, I think I would just simply add that there 

are clearly cases where my office has asked for information and 

been told we couldn’t have it. And it is just very black and white 

to me. 

Chairman ISSA. So the chairman was less than truthful in saying 

that he has provided you information you requested always. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Well, I don’t want to sit here and say that someone is not telling the truth. I just simply will tell what you my experience has been. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Maryland, the ranking member, is recognized for 5 minutes—or, actually, make that 6, please. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thanks. 

Commissioner Svinicki, first of all, I want to thank you for—I 

want to thank all of you for your testimony. 

You know, I am just sitting here and I am just wondering what 

is going to happen after you go back. You know, we have no—we 

are not experts up here on, you know, dysfunction. The country, at 

80 percent, says the Congress isn’t functioning very well at all. So 

I don’t want to sit here and tell you how to conduct your business. 

But I am concerned about some of the statements that have been 

made, particularly, Chairman Jaczko, with women feeling intimidated. That alarms me, as the father of two daughters. It does concern me. 

I want you to address that, please. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And how do you feel about that? Is it true? I 

mean, do you think that is true? 

Mr. JACZKO. I am very passionate about safety, and all the 

things that I do at the agency are directed toward doing what I 

think is the right thing for safety. 

I—when I heard the incident—about the incident that I believe 

Commissioner Svinicki is referring to, I tried to think through all 

the many meetings we had together where we had had very good 

discussions, sometimes disagreements about policy issues, and I believe there is one meeting that she may have been referring to. As 

I recall the meeting, I went to her office to speak with her about 

a letter, I believe it was. At a certain point, we were discussing it, 

and she became concerned. And I—as I recall, I simply motioned, 

I said, just sit down, let’s just calm down and let’s just work 

through it. We continued to discuss it, and then at some point I 

left. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Is this a situation, when you all go back—I 

mean, you have apologized, have you not? 

Mr. JACZKO. Certainly, if any—many of these instances, I—this 

is the first time I have heard many of these accusations. And, certainly, if there has ever been a time when I have made someone 

feel uncomfortable, I always like to know so that I can take whatever action is necessary to remedy that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah. 

40 

Commissioner Svinicki, you testified before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works that you were never told 

that the chairman was operating under his emergency authority 

until the NRC Office of Congressional Affairs informed the Senate. 

Do you remember exactly when that was? And how far after the 

earthquake and the tsunami did you find out? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I—I don’t recall the specific time period. 

If I recall the question that was posed before the Senate committee, I think it was, was I informed that the chairman had invoked his emergency authorities under Section 3(a), so it was a 

very specific question about invocation of a provision of law. And 

I indicated that I learned of that when the Office of Congressional 

Affairs responded to a committee request. 

I don’t recall how many months after the Fukushima event that 

was, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, our committee staff conducted a transcribed interview with the NRC general counsel, who took a different view, and this is what he said. He said, ‘‘I have heard testimony that they were not informed that the chairman was exercising his emergency power. However, the Commissioners all were 

informed that the operations center had gone into this monitoring 

mode soon after the Fukushima earthquake—and, actually, the beginning concerns for the reactors—Fukushima reactors that had occurred. That Saturday, March 12th, I sat in on a conference call 

in which the chairman told each of the Commissioners—I believe 

each one of them was on the conference call—was explaining what 

was going on with respect to the reactor.’’ 

Commissioner, were you on that call? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I was, sir. And if I may say that the general counsel’s response indicated that we were informed the agency was in 

the monitoring mode. The difference or the misunderstanding is 

that, in my view, that does not correlate directly to invocation of 

emergency authorities. The agency going into the monitoring mode 

does not necessarily invoke those emergency authorities under law. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And it seems fairly obvious that if the Commission was operating an emergency operations center, the Commission was responding to an emergency. That is not—do you disagree 

with that? 

Ms. SVINICKI. The agency has numerous times gone into the 

monitoring mode where the chairman of the agency has not invoked the emergency authorities. So I do not correlate being notified of being in the monitoring mode as an immediate invocation 

of those authorities, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. But you are—but there was an emergency 

operation; is that right? I know that I am—— 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes. And other than the term being the same, 

again—and I apologize if my answer is complicated—it is simply 

that the agency going into a monitoring mode does not necessarily 

correlate or immediately invoke those emergency authorities. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So is your main objection that you did not receive some sort of a paper stating explicitly, ‘‘Oh, by the way, we 

are having an emergency’’? Is that a fair statement? 

Ms. SVINICKI. The significance to me of the invocation of the 

emergency authorities is that, under the reorganization plan, at 

41 

that point the chairman has taken the authorities of the Commission as a whole, and then in an emergency he is able to exercise 

singularly the authorities of the Commission as a body. So I do see 

a distinction. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, perhaps, Chairman Jaczko, could you clear 

that up? When did you inform them that we were operating under 

the emergency provisions? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, the first action was very early on on March 

11th at about 9:43 in the morning. I believe one of my staff members indicated to their staff that we were entering monitoring 

mode. About 20 minutes later, a formal agency email went out. 

I then, later that evening—and this is all on the first day, March 

11th—sent an email to my colleagues informing them that we were 

in monitoring mode and talked about our response and what we 

were doing to the accident. 

From that point on, we had meetings at least three times a day, 

where their staff were briefed by members of the operations center 

about our activities and our status. I held, approximately once a 

day and starting on March 12th, briefing phone calls with them to 

describe our actions and indicate what we were doing as an agency 

to respond to the emergency. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I see my time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We will now go to the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Jordan, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JORDAN. I thank the chairman. 

Let me start with Mr. Ostendorff. On October 13th, you all sent 

a letter to the White House chief of staff. That seems pretty unprecedented to me, that you would have two Democrats, two Republicans on a commission send a letter to the chief of staff of the 

White House about the activities of the chairman of this Commission. 

Do you know if there are any other examples of that happening, 

other commissions where the same kind of action was taken, a letter sent to the White House chief of staff? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Mr. Jordan, I agree it is an unprecedented action. I am not aware of any other similar situation. 

Mr. JORDAN. So you guys knew that this was something that had 

not been done before, this was pretty unprecedented. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I think the four of us were not aware of any 

circumstance in which a similar action was taken by independent 

regulatory commission members. 

Mr. JORDAN. And my guess is you had several discussions 

amongst the four of you about taking this unprecedented action. 

Can you elaborate on that? Was there a time frame where over a 

period of months, maybe even longer, where weeks or months or 

longer you talked about taking this unprecedented action? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. We’ve had significant concerns for a number of 

months, and this was the committee’s report that’s in our letter to 

the White House concern on withdrawal of the SECY paper back 

in July, associated with staff recommendations on how the 

Fukushima report should be evaluated and prioritized by our staff. 

That paper was withdrawn by the chairman. It caused significant concern among the four of us. We discussed our concerns with 

42 

the chairman. We saw attempts to remove the executive director 

for operations, the EDO, which is a significant personnel step to remove the senior career person in the agency. 

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. We saw the October 5 meeting that Commissioner Svinicki referred to where the chairman made statements to 

senior executives in our agency that appeared to undermine the 

commission. That was the crossing line for, at least from my own 

standpoint, and I think my colleagues, and I asked them agreed 

and that was what—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Safe to say, well thought out, over a period of time, 

discussed thoroughly, and you said that the situation warrants us 

taking this unprecedented action? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. We had seen that our attempts to talk to the 

chairman about our concerns on various matters had not yielded 

any difference in behavior or actions on his part. We felt that as 

a commission, we had an obligation to the United States to do this. 

Mr. JORDAN. And can I go down the line, Commissioner, with 

each of you? Would you agree with the assessment given by Mr. 

Ostendorff? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, sir, I would. And I would add that we had engaged, as I said, in protracted efforts to attempt, through our own 

procedures, to try to resolve some of these issues that had not 

borne any fruit. 

Mr. JORDAN. Commissioner Magwood, accurate? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, very accurate. 

Mr. JORDAN. And Commissioner Apostolakis? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes, it is accurate. 

Mr. JORDAN. And, Mr. Ostendorff, we have a chart here in our 

material of the five Commissioners, the professional staff, this 

chart here was, I’m guessing, maybe 30 different folks here, and 

obviously you can’t testify for them, but is it fair to say that the 

staff that’s on this page had real concerns about the leadership 

style of Mr. Jaczko? This was part of your assessment and the evaluation before you sent the correspondence, the letter to the chief 

of staff? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Mr. Jordan, I can tell that you that prior to 

signing the letter, I think, I will speak for myself, but I think my 

other three colleagues would say the same thing, that we had significant feedback from the senior career leadership of the agency 

expressing great concerns on there being a chilled environment, a 

lack of open and collaborative work environment in their interface 

with the chairman. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay, and just one question for you and the same 

question of the other Commissioners. 

You stated in your testimony that it bothers you that some are 

alleging that the action that the four of you have taken are somehow politically motivated. I think it’s certainly a stretch in the fact 

that it’s two Democrats to a Republican, but I want to ask, do you 

think the actions of the chairman have been politically motivated, 

his style of leadership, what he is doing, do you think those are politically driven? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. That’s a difficult question, Mr. Jordan. I personally can’t tell that you I think his actions are politically motiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:04 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75051.TXT APRIL
43 

vated. I have no evidence that they are. I will just tell that you we 

have seen significant issues under his leadership and management 

that we think are unacceptable. 

Mr. JORDAN. Commissioner Svinicki, I’m sorry. I think I did a 

better job on the name than the chairman, but I’m sure I got it 

wrong. Go ahead. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I will not testify to political motivations of Chairman Jaczko. I would describe my motivation in signing that letter 

was more on the basic conduct issues. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay, okay, fair enough. Mr. Magwood. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I think I would answer the question the same 

way and would not describe political motivations. 

Mr. JORDAN. Okay. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. My motivation was not political. 

Mr. JORDAN. I understand that. Do you think the chairman’s 

was. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. I have no evidence that it was. I think it’s 

more his interpretation of his role as a chairman that was driving 

his actions. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. We now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Kucinich, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members 

of the committee, I want to quote from an article on Politico today 

on their front page. It says, ‘‘Behind closed doors, they snipe at 

each other. In public, they question each other’s motives. And in 

front of Congress they hang each other out to dry.’’ 

That’s life on the Federal Election Commission, not the NRC, but 

the FEC. 

I would imagine that if we called up one Commission after another in front of this Congress, you’d probably have some complaints that may not be dissimilar than what we have here. The 

difference is, though, that 104 nuclear power plants in various 

stages of relicensing, some of which have some questions related to 

safety, post-Fukushima 7 months ago, March 11, 2011, or May 11, 

2011. I’m, frankly, you know, wondering why you’re here. I appreciate the chairman calling the hearing, this is all very interesting. 

Mr. JORDAN. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. KUCINICH. I would certainly yield. 

Mr. JORDAN. Well, I would just make one point that I made in 

my remarks, the one big difference is, I’m sure you have some of 

those actions taking place inside the FEC, but no Commission has 

taken the unprecedented action of having four members sign a letter and send it to the White House chief of staff. That’s the difference and that’s why the chairman has called this hearing. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, you know, I thank the chairman for calling 

the hearing and I thank my friend for pointing that out. But I also 

think that it’s important for us to look beyond what we see and 

consider that, you know, we have an industry that’s in trouble. 

Wall Street won’t invest in nuclear power. The nuclear industry 

came to this government and looked for a $60 billion-plus loan 

guarantee. The industry’s in trouble. 

So the Commissioners are going to reflect what’s going on in the 

industry. I mean, I would expect that’s what’s happening here, and 

44 

that’s why we need to look deeper into what we’re hearing about 

the NRC and ask what’s going on with the industry, what do the 

titans of the industry have to say about the chairman? 

Now, Mr. Jaczko, an Associated Press story reported that you 

were worried that the U.S. nuclear plant operators may have become complacent following the disaster in Japan. And according to 

a press account, you said that recent instances of human error and 

other problems have threatened the safety of some of the Nation’s 

nuclear facilities. It was reported, for example, that incidents at 

nuclear plants in Ohio and Nebraska, ‘‘almost led to workers getting very, very significant doses’’ of radiation. 

The article also reports that in addition to these events, three 

other plants were shut down for safety reasons. This apparently 

marks the first time in more than a decade that several plants in 

the U.S. have been shut down at the same time. 

Can you elaborate, Mr. Chairman, on some of these specific 

events that have occurred recently and which ones trouble you the 

most and why? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, Congressman, the events in particular with 

the potential worker exposures were, in my mind, very significant 

events because they appear to indicate a lack of adherence to procedures. And after I made those comments, I heard from industry 

officials, and while they may have not necessarily agreed with my 

assessment of complacency, they did acknowledge that there is a 

change in the workforce right now in the nuclear industry, there 

is new workers, and we are seeing some of these incidents in which 

the new workers may not have a full appreciation of the procedures 

and the need for adherence to certain processes that ultimately ensure safety. 

So it’s an important signal. It’s not clear yet that we’re seeing a 

true decline in safety, but it’s an important signal that we need to 

make sure we keep a close eye on as the year goes on and as we 

continue our oversight of these plants. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Is safety your top concern? 

Mr. JACZKO. Safety has been my number one priority since I 

came to the Commission. 

Mr. KUCINICH. And after Fukushima, what went on in your mind 

about safety and nuclear power plants in this country? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, first and foremost, I was proud of the staff at 

the NRC, that we have worked very hard for a long time to be focused on safety, but that accident, I think, really reminded us that 

there is no way to rule out accidents, there is no way to prevent, 

ultimately, all kinds of serious incidents, so we have to be even 

more vigilant and dedicated to safety than we’ve ever been. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

I ask unanimous consent to place in the record a staff report called 

Regulatory Meltdown. 

Chairman ISSA. Whose staff report? 

Mr. KUCINICH. A staff report by Mr. Markey. 

Chairman ISSA. I’ll reserve, but only for a very short period of 

time, because it is another committee’s report. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, I would appreciate your—— 

Chairman ISSA. It will only take a couple of minutes for staff to 

review it. 

45 

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. We recognize the gentleman from Utah, a State 

that gives us uranium, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

Chairman Jaczko, you are undoubtedly aware of the letter that 

was sent to the White House to the Chief of Staff dated October 

13, 2011. There’s five very serious charges in there. Number one, 

intimidating and bullying senior career staff. True or false? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have not bullied and intimidated career staff. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. True or false, ordered staff to withhold their 

modified policy information and recommendations intended for 

transmission to the Commission? 

Mr. JACZKO. There is one occasion which I discussed with a very 

senior manager, a recommendation that he wanted to make on an 

issue. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So only one time in the history of your time 

there? 

Mr. JACZKO. Correct. And I have—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Next one, true or false, attempted to intimidate 

the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a legislative—anyway, it goes on, true or false? 

Mr. JACZKO. False. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. True or false, ignored the will of the majority of 

the Commission contrary to the statutory functions of the Commission? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have never ignored the will of the Commission in 

an area that is a commission—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I will take that as a false. True or false, 

interacted with us, his fellow Commissioners, with such intemperance and disrespect that the Commission no longer functions as effectively as it should? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I’m—I’m a very passionate person about safety. And I often engage my colleagues in discussions about safety. 

And that’s been my style and my practice. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So, in other words, in other words, they’re all 

wrong, and you’re exactly right. 

Mr. JACZKO. I’ve listened very carefully to the concerns of my colleagues. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And you’ve done nothing wrong? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have listened very carefully to the concerns of my 

colleagues, and I’m certainly very interested in continuing the dialogue with them to better understand how we are not communicating effectively. 

And, in fact, as I believe Mr.—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let me continue, my time is short and I appreciate that, but it doesn’t seem like any sort of repentance or concern for this. 

Now, are you telling me that the—there was an Office of the Inspector General did a report dated June 6, 2011, page 44, and I’m 

extracting a quote out of it a portion of a sentence, ‘‘He strategically provided three of the four Commissioners with varying 

amounts of information.’’ 

Would you disagree with that? 

46 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, the Inspector General found ultimately that 

my actions were consistent with the law, they were consistent with 

Commission policy. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. But do you agree or disagree with the Inspector 

General, who is an independent person, who came in and looked 

at this and said you gave people varying amounts of information? 

Mr. JACZKO. I disagree with that assessment. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I’ve got to tell you, and to my colleagues on the other side, we talk about the safety, the security of 

this Nation, the importance of the nuclear situation in this country, 

this should be bipartisan. The Commission is bipartisan. We’ve got 

people who are suffering under this gentleman right here. He is not 

living up to the duties. 

I don’t believe you. I think the safety and security of this Nation 

is too important. I think you should resign. I believe in these Commissioners, and God bless you for the job that you’re doing and for 

stepping up and telling it like it is. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I will not, I will not. It is too important to get this 

right. I find it very hard to believe that the distinguished careers 

of two Democrats, two Republicans, the host of staff that stands behind it and an the Inspector General that goes out and looks at 

this, and you’re telling me, they’re all wrong and you’re right. That, 

to me, is a lack of leadership, and I hope—I hope that there’s some 

sort of change, and if you’re going to do the right thing for your 

country and for this Commission, you should step down. I yield 

back. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Will about the gentleman yield? 

Chairman ISSA. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. I recognize that there could be disagreement on 

this, but I do have the basic question for you: In light of this accusation, do you believe, chairman, that you need to make changes 

in your management and style and how you deal with your Commissioners and how you keep them informed? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, certainly, I’m very interested in improving the 

communication among the five of us. 

Chairman ISSA. And if you had to do it again, would you have 

invoked emergency powers without consultation with this Commission? 

Mr. JACZKO. All the actions that I took in regard to the 50 mile, 

or the Japan response in general, I’m very comfortable with. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay, so you’re comfortable with an event on the 

other side of the world, taking away these people’s rights to have 

full and complete access and a vote, you’re comfortable doing that 

without consultation even though, in fact, it was no direct threat 

to the United States, and they were available? You’re comfortable 

with not consulting with them? 

Mr. JACZKO. The—— 

Chairman ISSA. Okay, that says it all. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Will the gentleman yield? 

Chairman ISSA. Actually the time has expired. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Isn’t that interesting? 

47 

Chairman ISSA. The time has expired. No, no. Did you finish answering? No, no, no, no, I didn’t cut him off. If you have further 

to answer you are welcome. 

Mr. JACZKO. I wasn’t sure if you were asking me a question or 

if you wanted a response. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, I asked you if you were comfortable, on the 

gentleman’s time, I asked you if were comfortable with not consulting, and you said you were comfortable with not consulting. 

You were comfortable with what you did when, in fact, it was pretty extraordinary and it was an event on the other side of the world 

and these lady and gentlemen were available, and yet they didn’t 

even seem to know that their powers had been usurped so that you 

could run the show even though none—you’re not a nuclear engineer and several of these people are. 

So are you still comfortable with that? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I am very comfortable with the actions that 

we took as an agency, and I did provide tremendous amounts of information to my colleagues, including personally briefing them 

about the status of our response and the issues that we were looking at. Their staff was fully aware in multiple briefings that they 

were provided, sometimes up to four times a day, on all of the 

issues that we were looking at. And, again, when we’re in an emergency situation like this, the authorities are transferred to the 

chairman in order to assure effective and timely decisionmaking. 

And the events in Japan, I think, demonstrated that that was the 

appropriate way to respond. 

Chairman ISSA. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. And just a comment to my colleague 

from Utah who, we generally get along pretty well. When there’s 

a minute and 28 seconds left on the clock and somebody has asked 

you to yield and you deny the yield but give it to somebody in your 

own party, it doesn’t really speak to bipartisanship approach on a 

hearing like this. 

And I was going to ask you whether or not you totally disregard 

the Inspector General’s findings and wish us to. Since there was 

going to be a bipartisan hearing, then I would think we would put 

some weight on the Inspector General’s report and conclusions, 

which are contrary to your recommendations 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Will the gentleman yield? Will the gentleman 

yield? 

Mr. TIERNEY. Yes, I will yield. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The chairman said he disagreed with the Inspector General, the Inspector General was wrong. 

Mr. TIERNEY. I think, I would reclaim my time, and I note that 

he disagreed with him on one quote of that report but agreed with 

him quite fully on the conclusions of the final report itself. 

But from what I am reading in statute on this section 3, it says, 

notwithstanding sections 1 and 2 of this reorganization plan, there 

are hereby transferred to the chairman all the functions vested in 

the Commission pertaining to an emergency concerning a particular facility or materials licensed or regulated by the Commission, including the functions of declaring, responding, issuing orders, determining specific policies, advising the civil authorities 

48 

and the public, directing and coordinating actions relative to such 

emergency incident. 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. TIERNEY. At the end I will if I have time. 

In 1980, Congress enacted legislation on this and said the chairman will be the official spokesman of the Commission. There are 

hereby transferred to the chairman all those functions that I read. 

To the maximum extent possible under the emergency conditions, 

the chairman or other member of the Commission delegated authority under the subsection B shall inform the Commission of actions taken relative to the emergency, and following the conclusion 

of the emergency the chairman or a member of the Commission 

delegated to the emergency functions shall render a complete and 

timely report. 

Mr. Chairman, did you do those things that the statute set out? 

Mr. JACZKO. I did and I believe I did much more. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Okay. Now I am concerned that what’s probably 

going on in large part here is a disagreement in the interpretation 

of what powers the chairman has under the statute. That seems to 

be the underlying fact here, and that’s not a new disagreement. 

I go all the way back to a 1999 report, a 1998 report on this ambiguity regarding the chairman’s role and the Commissioners’ role 

continues. And it goes on in that basis. It lays a less than harmonious interaction. It seems that members of the Commission always think they have more responsibility, chair people, particularly 

new ones always think they have an enlarged role, and that policy 

resides with the full Commission and management resides with the 

chairman. It seems to me the same thing’s going on here. 

I look at a report done by our colleague over on the Energy and 

Commerce Committee, Mr. Markey, and I’m troubled, I’m troubled 

by the fact that his conclusion in that report draws some very concerning points. He says that after reviewing all of the records that 

he asked for, voting records, reports, emails, correspondence, 

memoranda, phone or meeting minutes or other materials related 

to the events at Fukushima or the NRC’s response to it, he says 

that four NRC Commissioners attempted to delay or otherwise impede the creation of the NRC near-term task force on Fukushima. 

He says that four NRC Commissioners conspired with each other 

and with senior NRC staff to delay the release of and alter the 

NRC near-term task force report on Fukushima. He says that the 

other NRC Commissioners attempted to slow down, or otherwise 

impede the adoption of the safety recommendations made by the 

NRC near-term task force on Fukushima. 

He says the NRC chairman, Greg Jaczko, kept the other four 

NRC Commissioners fully informed regarding the Japanese Emergency Commissioners, despite claims to the contrary made by these 

commissioners. He said that a review of emails and other documents indicates high levels of suspicion and hostility directed at 

the chairman. 

He said the consideration of Fukushima safety upgrades is not 

the only safety-related issue that the other NRC Commissioners 

have opposed. That concerns me. It concerns me when four members have findings like this by another member on his committee 

with his staff, and we come in here and sort of bear up on one, it 

49 

seems to we’ve got a problem with everybody here. You know, people have to work together in some respect. It is unprecedented that 

a Commission would send a letter to the White House chief of staff. 

I’m not sure it’s a good precedent to set as opposed to trying to 

work things out. 

Mr. Chairman, do any of those six items that I just read, do they 

seem to you to be accurate? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, it has been challenging, I think, to move forward on some of the task force recommendations. And again, I 

wouldn’t want to assign motives or any other ill intention to my 

colleagues, but I think we have had some challenges. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you feel that the things, that there was an attempt to slow down the release of that report on Fukushima? 

Mr. JACZKO. There was definitely an attempt to prevent the release of the report. 

Mr. TIERNEY. So do you think it was an attempt to make things 

more transparent and to provide to the public and Congress information that was important for them to have? 

Mr. JACZKO. There was certainly a disagreement on the Commission about providing it, transparently, to the public. In the end, the 

majority of the Commission wound up providing the report, but 

there was a lot of internal disagreement about that on the Commission. 

Mr. TIERNEY. I yield to the chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Now, your time—the time is expired, you didn’t 

give me any, and I understand how important your questioning 

was. 

With that, we go to the gentleman from Oklahoma. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, thanks for 

being here. And as others have mentioned before, Mr. Cummings, 

this is a tough spot to be able to come to be able to talk about trying to work out functioning conversations, because we have a tough 

time within Congress ourselves. 

The issue still remains though, the day-to-day operation of nuclear safety, and the decisions that you make are significant in 

this. And I want you to know we appreciate the work that you do 

from day to day, keeping us safe, but this has got to be worked out, 

as you know well. And it is an unprecedented action to say this 

could affect safety long term if we don’t work this out, and so 

thanks for coming forward on it, thanks for working together and 

let’s try to resolve this. 

With that, Mr. Magwood, let me ask you a question, you made 

a statement that safety is the top concern. Some of your nuclear 

background, and just a brief statement on it. I have your bio but 

make a brief statement about your nuclear background. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Well, most of my nuclear background is in government. I worked at the Department of Energy for 11 years as a 

political appointee. I was in charge of the nuclear infrastructure associated with the civilian nuclear technology program, which includes the Idaho National Laboratory and, I guess 2,500-odd contractors. I was responsible for overseeing the management of reactor operations—— 

Mr. LANKFORD. Okay. In any of those operations, any of those environments, I assume you’ve got very competent people around you 

50 

that are all well-studied, all well-researched and you have disagreements on things. Has something like this occurred in other 

groups that you’ve worked with in other places to say we have four 

or five colleagues, we disagree and it breaks out in something like 

this? So have you seen something like this in the past? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. No, I have not seen that. 

Mr. LANKFORD. My concern is this is not just a disagreement on 

colleagues that are all competent on the issue. My concern is this 

becomes a management conversation to say how are things led by 

one individual or another, and how do we come to conclusions because, Mr. Jaczko, I appreciate your statement saying you’re passionate about safety and that all of these arguments and these disagreements and lack of communication breaks down to the fact 

that you’re passionate about safety, but that definitely alludes to 

the fact that you’re more passionate about safety than everyone 

else is, and so it just becomes more heated to you or more significant. 

And my concern is, is there an impression in your mind that 

you’re more competent and more passionate about safety than the 

other Commissioners? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, Congressman, I’m committed to safety. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Are you more competent and more passionate 

about safety in these areas than the other Commissioners? 

Mr. JACZKO. That’s certainly not a judgment that I would make, 

but I am passionate about safety. 

Mr. LANKFORD. That’s more so than the others around you, so 

there’s five of you, and you look at and you know the meetings that 

you are in, and you look at them and you say, well, they’re not— 

they’re a little more, they lean in other directions besides safety, 

but I’m more passionate about safety. Is that your concern? 

Mr. JACZKO. I would leave it to others to judge the various—— 

Mr. LANKFORD. I’m asking your opinion because it affects your 

management style. 

Mr. JACZKO. I treat all of my colleagues as equal members and 

equal—— 

Mr. LANKFORD. Do you consider yourself more passionate about 

safety than your colleagues, yes or no? 

Mr. JACZKO. I’m not sure how I would describe more or less passionate, but I am passionate about safety and I think that’s the 

best I can tell you. 

Mr. LANKFORD. That’s a nice safe answer. I’m just asking a direct 

question because it affects—the reason I say that is, is because if 

in the back of your mind you’re thinking if this is really going to 

be done right, I’m going to have to do it, because they’re not as passionate as I am, because I’m am trying to figure out why some people get some information and some people don’t, and why recommendations come from staff, and they get filtered through to try 

to determine what gets out to different people. 

Because if you have in the back of your mind, I’m concerned for 

our nuclear safety, so I need to make sure our filter, what gets to 

them, because it may not be right, I just wanted to know, because 

that does affect your own record. 

51 

So yes or no, are you more passionate about safety than others, 

or do you have a concern that some other Commissioner is not as 

passionate about safety as you are? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I—in regard to the information coming to the 

Commission, I think that’s the basis for your question, the Commission gets policy matters that come to the Commission for voting, information is provided as part of those, and I am rarely, if 

ever, involved in the provision of that information. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Let me ask you a quick question separate from 

that and there’s also a concern, there’s a statement that’s been 

made that you reportedly at one moment said about the two different other Democrat appointees that we Democrats have to stick 

together on a vote. Was that a statement that you’ve made? 

Mr. JACZKO. I don’t recall making that statement. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Okay. My time has expired. 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. LANKFORD. Yes, I would. 

Chairman ISSA. Do you have sourcing for that statement? 

Mr. LANKFORD. My time has expired on that one. I would be glad 

to be able to take it—— 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. If you would provide it, I would appreciate 

it. 

Chairman, a piece of administrative business for a moment. The 

gentleman from Ohio has asked to have an individual Member’s report from Ed Markey placed in the record. I have no objections. I 

do have a request that goes with it. 

In reviewing it, you delivered to an individual Member, to Ed 

Markey, one of your former employers, you delivered him 

unredacted information and additional information beyond what 

this committee received through our request. 

Would you pledge today to deliver us in the same unredacted 

form everything, I repeat, everything that was responsive to Mr. 

Markey? 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. And, Mr. Chairman, I think, as you 

know, we’ve provided a large number of documents to your staff. 

Chairman ISSA. I appreciate that, but discovering that he received documents less redacted than we did, as an individual Member, and produced a report, I have no problem with this being 

placed in the record. But in order to make the record complete, we 

would need to have the same information, which we do not have 

today, and, quite frankly, we expect, normally, that what is redacted is redacted for good and proper reasons, and there should 

be no difference whatsoever unless, in fact, a committee demands 

unredaction, not an individual Member. 

So if you agree to that, I withdraw my reserve and we now recognize—— 

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the chair for including that in the 

record, and I agree with him that we should be able to receive this 

additional information. 

Chairman ISSA. I think members on both sides would like to see 

it. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JACZKO. I would just note that I can only speak for the documents that were in my possession. Some of those other documents 

may have been provided by other members of the Commission, so 

52 

I am certainly not aware of any documents that were redacted any 

differently. But, again, I can only speak for those that are in mine. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, and the good news is that one thing I know 

about the executive branch is you guys authenticate very carefully 

what you give to people. So I’m sure we won’t have a problem in 

getting the same information. And sometimes people interpret 

what somebody wants differently than somebody else. In this case, 

we want everything that Mr. Markey wanted for the same reason 

of doing our job. 

With that, we recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Connolly, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to say it 

is quite a spectacle to have five members of the Commission arguing about management style before a committee of Congress. That, 

in and of itself, in some ways, erodes confidence and the function 

of the Commission. 

One does not know who did what to whom and how important 

it is. The suggestion, obviously, by having a hearing of such prominence has the potential effect of undermining that confidence and 

obviously the chairman of the Commission is the target. 

I regret that because I think we are at risk, perhaps, of 

trivializing your mission. The real conversation that ought to be 

taking place here may be less about management style, although 

that can be important, and more about mission and how well or 

poorly historically the NRC has carried out that mission; its cozy 

relationship with industry; its ability to cogently take lessons 

learned from tragedies such as Fukushima; its ability to reassure 

the public of safety and safety standards at nuclear power plants; 

and its ability to show demonstrable clear independence from the 

industry it regulates. 

It is just as viable to posit that what’s going on here is that we 

have a chairman who takes the mission seriously as it is to say we 

have a chairman who bullies his fellow Commissioners in a voice. 

I don’t know what the truth is, but I do think this hearing ought 

to get at it. 

Chairman Jaczko, do you see a philosophical difference between 

yourself and your fellow Commissioners with respect to the mission 

of the NRC and how to go about it? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, but we do have different approaches to what 

we believe is safe and how we define safety. I think that’s clear in 

the different votes that we cast and the positions that we take as 

Commissioners. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, specifically, hone in on Fukushima. You answered a question about Fukushima just a little while ago to one 

of my colleagues and you confirmed that, in fact, there was an attempt by four fellow Commissioners to perhaps bury some of the 

findings of that study and/or to aggressively look at lessons learned 

from the single worst nuclear disaster in world history. 

Mr. JACZKO. We did have a disagreement—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You did? 

Mr. JACZKO. —on the release of—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You did; is that what you said? 

Mr. JACZKO. That’s correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, go ahead. 

53 

Mr. JACZKO. About the release of the report and whether or not 

it should be reviewed by the Commission prior to ever being released publicly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What was the nature of that dispute? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, it was simply, I believed the report, once it 

was completed, should be made publicly available and so the public 

could see what the views of—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Your Commissioners disagreed with that? 

Mr. JACZKO. There were some who did disagree and wanted the 

report to be reviewed, and perhaps, acted on by the Commission 

and changed before it was released publicly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. On August 23, we had a major earthquake here 

in the east coast, surprised everybody, including in my home State 

of Virginia. We had a close call at the North Anna nuclear power 

plant as a result of that earthquake, which did generally cosmetic, 

some minor structural damage up and down the east coast. But it 

was a reminder that nuclear power can be vulnerable to seismic activity. 

That plant was deemed as exceeding its design basis. Could you 

explain what that means to us, Chairman Jaczko, and what was 

the nature of the concern at the time after the August 23 earthquake? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, when plants are originally built and designed, 

they pick out the characteristics of an earthquake, and they build 

all of the structures in the plant to be able to withstand that type 

of an event. And the earthquake, in fact, was bigger than the 

earthquake that was hypothesized in the original design of the facility, so there were some shaking of the building that was larger 

than what originally in the—in the original analysis for the plant. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Potentially compromising safety? 

Mr. JACZKO. Certainly it had the potential to compromise safety. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Were there other power plants in the east coast 

that were similarly affected or could have been? 

Mr. JACZKO. We didn’t see any that were directly impacted because that plant was very close to the center of the earthquake. 

But it was certainly possible that other plants could have experience effects from the earthquake. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Post August 23 earthquake, what action did the 

NRC take and was the Commission in agreement, or also in disagreement about those actions? 

Mr. JACZKO. The Commission now, or the agency really, reviewed 

the safety of the facility. Ultimately it was a staff decision to determine whether or not the facility should restart, and I was very 

clear with the staff that they needed to do what they felt was appropriate for safety and, in fact, the Commission held an information briefing because there was interest among my colleagues in 

hearing and understanding what we were doing, and I think it was 

a very productive meeting and a very strong show, I think, of the 

Commission working and functioning as a body. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Consensually. 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. My time has expired. I hope we get a chance to 

explore that some more. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

54 

Mr. GOWDY. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman. I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. 

I’m going to ask the non-chairman Commissioners a series of 

what I hope are quick questions and expectation hopefully of quick 

answer. 

Ms. Svinicki, is the chairman’s behavior affecting your ability to 

discharge the duties for which you took an oath to discharge? 

Ms. SVINICKI. To this point, I believe that I have had access to 

what I need to faithfully execute my duties. However, I’m concerned that we’re at the point where that is being compromised. 

Mr. GOWDY. Have you lost confidence in his ability to lead? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes, on the basis of his interpersonal conduct, I 

have. 

Mr. GOWDY. Commissioner Magwood, same two questions to you, 

do you believe his behavior is impacting your ability to do your job, 

and have you lost confidence in his ability to lead? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. It’s a very complicated question. It’s hard to answer yes or no. Let me answer it this way. I think that—I’m 

sorry—I think that over the time I have been a Commissioner, I 

have been able to get information that gives me enough confidence 

to make votes and to make decisions. 

There have been times when getting the information has been 

more difficult than I think it should have been. My biggest concern 

is there are always, is the chance that there’s some piece of information I just didn’t even know existed that never got to me. 

So as far as I know, I have had the ability to make decisions, 

fully informed. I have questions, I have doubts, and I have concerns. 

Mr. GOWDY. Commissioner Ostendorff? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. My concerns with respect to the chairman’s 

style have been primarily that his interface with our NRC staff has 

been abrasive, he uses the term ‘‘passionate.’’ I’d say it has prevented staff from feeling comfortable they can bring forth their best 

views and recommendations to the Commission. From that standpoint, I think it’s a grave concern. 

Mr. GOWDY. Have you lost confidence in his ability to lead? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. At this stage, I have, yes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Commissioner Apostolakis? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. So far, my votes could mean—have not been 

affected adversely by any actions by the chairman. In fact, in the 

letter to the chief of staff, we said that there may, there may be 

some harm in the future if this continues. 

I believe if the chairman lets the staff send us their true views 

when various issues come before the Commission, and if he also 

controls his temper a little bit, he can continue to lead the Commission. 

Mr. GOWDY. Chairman, there was an apology issued, I don’t 

whether you drafted it or the White House drafted it. Who drafted 

your apology? 

Mr. JACZKO. I prepared a letter that I sent to Mr. Daley. I’m not 

sure if that’s the letter you are referring to. 

Mr. GOWDY. Have you apologized more than once? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have indicated to Mr. Daley in that letter that I 

was sorry for the distraction that this has caused. 

55 

Mr. GOWDY. Is that the only thing you’re sorry for is the distraction? Do you admit any of the conduct that’s been alleged this 

morning? 

Mr. JACZKO. If—again, many of these accusations I’m hearing for 

the first time. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, that doesn’t impact whether they’re true or 

not. The fact that you haven’t heard them yet doesn’t mean they’re 

not true. My question is simple, are they true? 

Mr. JACZKO. I don’t believe that they are true. 

Mr. GOWDY. What does that mean, I don’t believe that they are 

true? Have you been verbally abusive to female staff. 

Mr. JACZKO. No, I have not. 

Mr. GOWDY. Have you withheld information from your fellow 

Commissioners? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have not. 

Mr. GOWDY. Have you asked anyone are they on your team? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have never said something like that. 

Mr. GOWDY. Chairman, let me tell you what it looks likes from 

my vantage point, which my background is not in nuclear science. 

When you have four eyewitnesses that testify to something under 

oath, you know what they call the defendant after that? An inmate. 

Four eyewitnesses to the conduct. 

It is unprecedented to me to have colleagues criticize one another 

privately. To do it publicly and to have to sit on either side of you 

to do it before a committee of Congress to me is unprecedented. 

None of the allegations they have made are accurate. Is that 

your testimony? 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe that on many of these instances that they 

are referring to have been misconstrued. And as I have indicated, 

that there are issues where I think we can improve our communication. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, what did you apologize for? 

Mr. JACZKO. I apologize, as I indicated, for the distractions this 

caused. 

Mr. GOWDY. For their misunderstanding? Did you apologize because they misunderstood what you did? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have offered to my colleagues that we sit down 

with a third party, someone that we all could agree on to talk 

about these issues. 

Mr. GOWDY. We really need a counselor for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? We need a counselor for that? 

Mr. JACZKO. I’m very interested in improving the communication 

because I think it’s vital. 

Mr. GOWDY. Does it matter to you that the four of them either 

have or are either rapidly losing confidence in your leadership? 

Does that matter to you? 

Mr. JACZKO. That’s very important to me, and it’s something that 

I am very interested in working on. 

Mr. GOWDY. But you deny the allegations that they testified to 

under oath? 

Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, I believe I have answered this question. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, do it again for me. Do you deny them? 

56 

Mr. JACZKO. As I said, I believe I have answered this question 

very well to the best of my ability here. 

Mr. GOWDY. I would recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 

yield 30 seconds to my colleague from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich. 

Mr. KUCINICH. With all due respect to my good friend, the chair, 

these allegations are not allegations of criminal misconduct or anything like that, they are allegations that he doesn’t get along with 

his Commissioners. That’s not a basis for either imprisonment or 

for having the chairman resign. 

So I think that we have to put this in perspective and continue 

to insist that the Commission focus on safety, and I want to take 

this opportunity to wish all of the members of the Commission a 

Happy New Year. 

Mr. DAVIS. Reclaiming my time, thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Let me first of all thank the witnesses for appearing, I’m going 

to shift gears a little bit. 

In July, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a report entitled ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Power After Fukushima, Commonsense Recommendations for Safety and Security.’’ 

This report includes recommendations for changes that the NRC 

should make to improve the safety and security of U.S. nuclear 

plants. One recommendation made by UCS was that NRC regulations should be extended to cover severe accidents. This is what the 

UCS report states. 

The NRC defines severe accidents as those more serious than the 

so-called design basis accidents that U.S. reactors are designed to 

withstand. While unlikely severe accidents can occur, as in 

Fukushima, and cause substantial damage to the reactor core and 

failure of the containment building, leading to large releases of radiation, for example, the agency does not evaluate or test the severe accident management guidelines that reactor owners voluntarily develop, so neither the NRC nor the public can be confident 

these guidelines would be effective. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand that there has to be a reasonable 

limit on what licensees are required to do and that every plant 

can’t be fully prepared for every imaginable worst-case scenario. 

However, Fukushima should provide a wake-up call that severe 

accidents can and do happen. The Gulf oil spill is a prime example. 

That was the worst-case scenario, industry wasn’t prepared, and it 

resulted in the worst environmental disaster in our Nation’s history; would you agree with that statement? 

Mr. JACZKO. Yes, it’s a very fair statement. 

Chairman ISSA. [Presiding.] Would the gentleman suspend for 

just a moment. We have stopped the clock. 

We’re going to have a minority hearing in a few moments, because that’s a right. And I want to make sure that everyone understands, I have been very tolerant, but this hearing is not on nuclear safety, and we are not a committee with nuclear safety as a 

direct oversight. 

This is on the leadership of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

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utes, I’ve always been very understanding, I would caution all 

members on both sides of the aisle that this is about a concern that 

has been legitimately raised all the way to the White House, that 

the committee believes is well within our unique jurisdiction as the 

Oversight Committee. We’re not the Energy and Commerce Committee, we’re not some of the Science Committee and so on. 

So I just, the gentleman can continue, the chairman can answer, 

but if we’re going to make this about nuclear safety, then we’ve essentially hijacked a legitimate issue and anyone who does it, shame 

on you. The ranking member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, just a clarification, I didn’t hear 

the question that the gentleman asked, but part of this hearing 

goes to safety and whether this Commission can function and carry 

out its safety responsibilities. As a matter of fact, there has been, 

the majority report that came out, talked about a catastrophe, and 

I use that word, because of what was said at the Commission and 

that they would not be able to function properly. So I don’t whether 

that question goes to safety and whether or not they are able to 

periodically—— 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield, and I thank the 

ranking member. 

I was cautioning members because Mr. Davis was probably the 

best example of I know he was well intentioned, but nothing in his 

comment and nothing in his questions seem to go to the management and the questions of the management and capability to manage. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Hold on. The fact is I respect every member of 

this committee. I have always said—and I wasn’t that way when 

we were in the minority in a couple of cases. Mr. McHenry vividly 

remembers being shut up because he was, quote, off subject. Use 

your 5 minutes any way you want, but I would caution members 

that, in fact, our jurisdiction, our legitimate jurisdiction is not over 

directly second guessing safety but, in fact, our oversight of the entire Federal workforce, all commissions, all agencies. 

And so I only would ask that we do as much as we can to recognize that if there’s an additional hearing, and if we legitimately can 

hold a hearing on the safety of our nuclear facilities more broadly, 

that’s a legitimate hearing to ask for. 

This hearing was very narrow, and it had to do exactly with why 

these five Commissioners are here today. The ranking member. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Just briefly, just briefly, there’s two points I want 

to make briefly. First of all, thank you for holding this hearing. I 

think it’s important at this time and place that we have the hearing. 

And the second thing that relates to Mr. Davis’ concerns, if, for 

example, the industry is upset with this chairman and they would 

go through the members of the Commission to try to get at the 

chairman, the industry might be upset because they are concerned 

of pressure on safety. This is just a hypothetical, so I think that 

there might be a connection here is what I’m saying. 

Chairman ISSA. And, Mr. Kucinich, I completely agree with you 

that if, in fact, the line of questioning goes toward, quite frankly, 

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lican appointees, somehow, making an objection that is not based 

on the failure of, you know, the allegation of mismanagement or 

particularly of outbursts and erratic behavior, you’re absolutely 

right. Those kinds of questions certainly fall within the question of 

management at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and would be 

in order. 

And, Mr. Davis, I apologize. If you want to take additional time 

to restate your question. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the manner in which you have conducted this hearing, I appreciate it, and 

I’m very grateful. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and with all 

due respect, and the comments of the ranking member, those of the 

ranking member of the subcommittee. 

Understanding in any way shape form or fashion and quite 

frankly, we haven’t gotten to my question yet, his comment is second; the mission of the regulatory agency is very important to me, 

the mission, and the outcome of the decisions that are made. 

No matter how much you may disagree or bicker, or have difficulty with management style and with personality differences, in 

the end, the bottom line is do we make the best and most effective 

decisions for the people of this country and all the environments 

that are impacted and affected by those decisions? 

And so, Mr. Chairman, my question is, do you feel that the interaction between yourself and other Commissioners have had any 

negative impact relative to decisions that the Commission has 

made? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, no, I don’t think it has. I think certainly I 

want to work to improve the communication but, for example, since 

this letter was worked on, the Commission has held nine meetings 

where we’ve gotten together and been briefed on a variety of different issues. 

We have held one of our significant hearings related to new reactor licensing. We have held three of our formal voting-type sessions 

where we formalized legal opinions of the Commission. And as I 

said, yesterday we held a meeting on a very important safety issue 

related to fire protection. 

The Commission has also held at least two agenda sessions, 

which I had held routinely every month, and that was, in particular, one of the suggestions and recommendations from that 

1999 Inspector General report that the Commission have regular 

sessions to talk about agenda, and that’s something that I have instituted. 

Mr. DAVIS. Well, your answer is no. Let me just, Mr. Chairman, 

with your indulgence, could I ask if the other Commissioners would 

just respond quickly to that? 

Chairman ISSA. I would ask unanimous consent for an additional 

30 seconds for the gentleman, without objection. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. The decisions have not been affected by the 

management issues that we have raised. I believe all the decisions 

that have been made, having in mind the safety and the adequate 

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fended by the suggestion that I am an instrument of the industry 

in its efforts to overthrow the chairman. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I agree with Mr. Apostolakis. I am also offended by the implication of Mr. Kucinich’s statement. I assure this 

committee—— 

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to respond. 

Chairman ISSA. Please continue, sir. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. With respect to Mr. Davis’ statement, I could 

not more wholeheartedly agree with your emphasis on nuclear safety. 

I agree with my colleague, Commissioner Apostolakis, that we 

have done our very best. We are making good decisions. That said, 

we are still operating under a very difficult environment that does 

not give me confidence that our staff feels free to bring us the best 

information uninfluenced. 

Mr. KUCINICH. A point of personal privilege. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman may continue. The gentleman is 

trying to get answers from each of the Commissioners, and I would 

like to have that in order first. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I agree with my colleagues, I think that we’ve 

been able to continue the people’s business very well under the circumstances. I think the senior staff has managed to keep the agency focused during whatever conflicts have been occurring. The staff 

of the NRC has been focused on their mission of safety. I believe 

that the agency is functioning at the bottom line protecting health 

and safety as well as it ever has. That doesn’t mean it’s been easy. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I agree with Commissioner Magwood’s response. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate 

that. 

Chairman ISSA. Would you yield to the gentleman from Ohio for 

a second. 

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. 

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Commissioner 

Ostendorff, I didn’t call your name, I gave a hypothetical about the 

potential influence of the industry on members of the Commission. 

But since you objected to that, I find that very instructive. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. DAVIS. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the gentleman from Michigan—oh, I’m sorry, I now go to the gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Ross, the Republican on the Democratic side. Mr. 

Ross. 

Mr. ROSS. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Commissioner Magwood, I 

am very impressed with your experience, not only in the nuclear 

industry, but also as an administrator. And I read your testimony, 

opening testimony, and you talk about some incidents involving 

some abusive behavior with female employees that you had encountered and, in fact, I think you indicated that nevertheless I found 

their misogynistic behavior entirely unacceptable and personally offensive and you immediately let these supervisors go. That behavior that those people that you let go, does that compare in any way 

to the behavior expressed by Chairman Jaczko? 

60 

Mr. MAGWOOD. It was similar in the fact that it was verbal 

abuse. It was, it involved screaming and, you know, just a lot of 

pointed language that the women involved found very, very emotionally straining. 

Mr. ROSS. And when you let go in your previous situation, when 

you let those supervisors go that were being the abusers, that 

changed, didn’t it? It improved the situation? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Well, let me emphasize that it was within the 

Federal government, so I didn’t have the ability to simply fire these 

people. I would have liked to have fired them. 

Mr. ROSS. But you eliminated the distraction? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Absolutely. I immediately, the very day I found 

out, they were removed from their supervisory responsibilities and 

geographically relocated. 

Mr. ROSS. And do you believe that removing Chairman Jaczko 

may be appropriate to protect any further abuse to the female 

members of the NRC? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. I suspected that a question like that might come 

up. I have decided to simply present the facts as I understand them 

and let others make that decision. It’s not within my power to appoint or remove a chairman, but I think that these are—this is information that people—— 

Mr. ROSS. But it rose to the level of abuse that you had seen in 

the past? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. It was very similar. The stories I heard were very 

similar to what I heard in the past. 

Mr. ROSS. And removing that abuse corrected the problem? 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes, it did. 

Mr. ROSS. Okay, and that has been your experience. 

Ms. Svinicki, you talked about lack of confidence. Do you feel 

there’s any way to repair the confidence in this chairman? 

Ms. SVINICKI. If the conduct were to be completely changed, there 

is always the potential to rehabilitate relationships. 

Mr. ROSS. Commissioner Ostendorff, how do you feel? Do you feel 

that your lack of confidence at this point is reparable or do you feel 

that it’s just lost? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Sorry—I would have to agree with Commissioner Svinicki that it’s been severely damaged, and once there’s an 

erosion of trust, it’s extraordinarily difficult to regain that trust. 

I’m not going to say it’s going to be impossible or would be impossible, but it would be extraordinary difficult to regain. 

Mr. ROSS. Thank you. And, chairman, I can’t help but sit here 

and think of the kids watching the movie ‘‘The Caine Mutiny’’ contain with Humphrey Bogart and him being put on trial, and by his 

crew members in a very serious situation. So, I mean, it begs the 

question, Captain—I mean, Chairman Jaczko, how has the crew— 

the voyage been so far? 

We’re at a point now where you have made an apology. And specifically what I am asking is what did you apologize for? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, as I’ve indicated in a letter to Mr. Daley, I 

apologized for the distraction, and I look forward to discussions 

with my colleagues about ways that we can further enhance and 

improve our communication and trust. 

61 

Mr. ROSS. And one of those suggestions is that you have a third 

party, I would assume a facilitator, to try to reopen lines of communications with your fellow Commissioners. My concern is, is that if 

the issue becomes more of maintaining your position, as opposed to 

restoring the integrity of the NRC, what is your course of action? 

Are you considering a resignation? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have no plans to resign. 

Mr. ROSS. Okay, even if it means more to focus on keeping your 

job than to restoring the NRC? 

Mr. JACZKO. I have no plans to resign because I continue to believe that under my leadership the agency has performed very well. 

We have committed ourselves to safety, and I believe my record 

shows that. 

Mr. ROSS. But it’s unprecedented where we are today when you 

have the four Commissioners who have made these allegations. 

And as a student of management myself, I can only suggest to you 

that management by intimidation may have some short-term goals, 

but some long-term effects, that are very adverse. Management by 

motivation is probably the only way you are going to restore the 

integrity of this organization. 

So I implore you, I beg of you, if it is your position you seek to 

keep, then it is the integrity of this organization that must be foremost, and it must be done so through not only a facilitator—if 

that’s what you believe—but more importantly, through motivating 

these people to be the best that they have been able to be, for what 

is at stake here is not only the 4,000 employees, but the nuclear 

safety of this entire country. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. ROSS. I’ll yield. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, wouldn’t you agree that what’s going on here 

today and what’s been going on for months now clearly hurts your 

ability to retain, recruit, retain many of those 4,000 people and to 

motivate them to do their best job? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I have, I have not seen any drop-off in any of 

those areas. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. So none of this has any effect on 4,000 

people. 

Mr. JACZKO. As I’ve indicated, I think it’s unfortunate that we 

have this distraction, but the men and women at the NRC are professionals and they’ll will continue to do their jobs effectively. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. We now go to the gentleman, Mr. Welch. 

Mr. WELCH. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling 

this hearing, a couple of points. Number one, I regret, obviously, 

that we’re here. This is not a personnel committee, and it is regrettable that there is this conflict at the senior level of the Commissioners. 

Number two, I don’t think that Congress is the place to go to resolve this. 

Number three, I assume that each one of the members of the 

Commission is professional and makes decisions based on each of 

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lenges that you face, professional and personal, notwithstanding, 

and I think we all owe you that debt of gratitude. 

The concerns I have are less about trying to resolve something 

that I don’t believe is within the capacity of a congressional committee to resolve, it has to do with the safety and the focus on safety, and I say that as a representative from the State of Vermont 

where we have had an ongoing, and somewhat contentious situation involving our local nuclear reactor. 

When things like a cooling tower fall down and the reaction on 

the part of the company that runs it is that it’s not really a big 

deal, that doesn’t provide great assurance to the people of Vermont. 

When there is discovered leaking underground, reactive material 

and the response of the nuclear power company is that they don’t 

have underground pipes, and it turns out, in fact, they do have underground pipes, that posits significant concerns, a concern by 

Vermonters. 

There is litigation now, and we understand that this body voted 

between the State of Vermont and Entergy about its future, and we 

understand that the Commission voted by a 3–2 margin to come in 

as a friend on the side of Entergy against this litigation. 

Mr. WELCH. That causes us some concern. So safety is my concern. And I know that safety is your concern, but I just have a few 

questions that caused me some concern about how active and aggressive the Commission is on coming to a conclusion about some 

safety standards. The most recent NRC fire protection standards 

were promulgated in 2004. Earlier standards that applied had not 

been met for 25 years. And as I understand it currently, 47 nuclear 

power plants are still not in compliance and they are requesting 

yet another 12-year delay. And my understanding is the Commission is basically accommodating a 12-year delay on top of a 25-year 

delay. Commissioner Apostolakis, can you address that. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. The reason why the new regulation was 

promulgated in the 2000’s is that because of the large number of 

exemptions of requests for exemptions that we received regarding 

the area, we decided that stuff—we decided this was not working 

very well. But I would like to point out when we say 47 plants or 

units do not comply, they have been—they have implemented compensatory measures. They don’t comply with some provisions of the 

original rule, but they have done something else to meet the intent 

of their rule. So it’s not that they are unsafe or anything, and this 

new rule now—— 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you, I only have a few minutes. I appreciate 

your response. I guess what I will have it do because I can’t ask 

a whole lot of questions is to express to each of you the concern 

about what appears to be a very slow turnaround on the implementation of safety standards. And you know full well that if you’re living in shadow the of a nuclear plant, the closer you are, the more 

anxious you are. But we have examples, and this is what’s so profoundly important about the safety focus is that if something can 

go wrong, even when we think it won’t, it probably at some point 

will go wrong and that’s what we saw in Japan. 

And if something goes wrong the consequences of an event are 

so catastrophic, and I’m preaching to the choir here, I know. But 

I’m doing it because this is the anxiety we live with in Vermont. 

63 

And when we have a nuclear power plant that the cooling tower 

collapses and we’re told not to worry about it, that’s hard to be 

comfortable. And when there is leaking pipes and we are told there 

are no pipes, and upon investigation there is. We really need to see 

a sense of urgency. In some cases, some penalties associated with 

wrong information being provided and failure to comply with safety 

standards, because some of these things that happen in the beginning that fortunately don’t cause harm give you some apprehension 

that an event will occur that does cause harm. So thank you very 

much. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. We now go to the gentleman from 

Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

panel for being here. This is truly not a hearing that I ever expected to be a part of as a Member of Congress, and certainly not 

with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But I think it’s a hearing 

that apparently is very well positioned and important to have. 

When I read through the letter that was sent to Chief of Staff 

Daley, and I read bullet points in that letter, and I’d like any Commissioners that would be willing to comment. The question that I 

will have from this, where it says that the chairman intimidated 

and bullied senior career staff, that he interacted with us, his fellow Commissioners, with such intemperance and disrespect that 

the Commission no longer functions as effectively as it should. 

That’s strong language in a letter, an unprecedented letter that 

has been sent to this administration. And I would—I would surmise that if this administration, from this hearing, understands 

the gravity of this situation and how that, with no pun, intended 

this could blow up still further to a regulatory agency of an amazing importance to us. That strong language is telling. Can you, any 

of the Commissioners, explain to me why this language was included with specific illustrations? I don’t want to pick on a University of Michigan grad, but Commissioner Svincki, why was the language included and what are the some of the key illustrations that 

you’d give for its importance? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I would state that I realize the significance of putting my hand to that language. I did not do so lightly. I would 

characterize that I did it very reluctantly, candid and candidly I 

would state realizing that ultimately it could bring us the kind of 

event that we’re holding this morning. And I regret that, but that 

language at that time I supported that, I was comfortable in support of it, but realized the significance of my action. 

Mr. WALBERG. Any significant illustrations of what you put in 

that language, examples? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I think a number of the events have already been 

testified to this morning regarding interactions between the chairman and the professional staff of the agency. There also have been 

very tense interactions in meetings between the chairman and 

members, other members of the Commission. And again, I think 

people can be passionate about issues without fundamentally the 

kind of conduct that I’ve observed. 

Mr. WALBERG. Any other Commissioners’ response to that? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir, I will comment specifically that senior 

staff has complained to me personally about the chairman taking 

64 

an approach that led them to believe that they were not in a free 

environment to bring forth their best views with respect to how 

SECY paper 11–0093 the near-term task force report from Japan 

where there is a paper that was acknowledged to have been withdrawn back in July. There’s also staff complained to me about how 

the chairman’s office and chairman responded to their content of 

the 21-day report with respect to short-term actions to be taken as 

a result of Fukushima. 

Mr. WALBERG. So this goes to safety? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Those two reports dealt with how the Commission would take actions in response to the Fukushima event. 

Mr. WALBERG. Any other Commissioner’s response to that? Mr. 

Chairman, I want to yield to you some time, but I do have one final 

question so would be glad to yield this if you will then allow me 

to finish with one—— 

Chairman ISSA. I will be very brief. For each of the Commissioners, do you believe that employees, professional staff of the 

NRC have experienced intimidation, hostile or offensive conduct on 

behalf of the—by the chairman, anything that would be considered 

to be intimidating, hostile or offensive by the chairman, any professional staff experience that? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Yes. 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Yes. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. Ladies and gentlemen, that’s the definition of 

harassment. I hope that we can all agree that that’s why we put 

it in the statute. I yield back. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Recently Dale Klein, 

former commissioner and colleague suggested that the chairman 

does not need to be removed from the panel, but could instead be 

demoted by the President. A new chairman be chosen from among 

the existing members. Would anyone on the panel like to comment 

on this potential solution? 

Chairman ISSA. I don’t think you will get someone who wants to 

say they want to be chairman here today. I ask unanimous consent 

the gentleman have an additional 30 seconds. 

Mr. WALBERG. I guess that’s my point, Mr. Chairman. I probably 

didn’t expect someone to answer and say, yeah, I would like to be 

the chairman. Or I will appoint that or I will suggest someone. But 

I think this certainly indicates a very significant problem with this 

Commission being able to function together for the best interest of 

this country, the citizens it serves, the regulatory responsibility 

they have. And that indeed, if this is the problem, to this extent 

and the administration’s willing to let it go on, we in America have 

concerns beyond simple management styles, but the function of this 

regulatory agency and the responsibility to the American people. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. JACZKO. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. If the gentleman would 

like to respond. 

Mr. JACZKO. Yeah, could I make a comment please? I appreciate 

the opportunity. My colleague mentioned a meeting or a phone conversation I’d had on the development of the so-called 21-day paper. 

65 

I believe the committee has an audio recording of that conversation. And I’m certainly comfortable with that audio being made 

publicly available. I believe it characterizes my passion and demonstrates my commitment to open discussions among members of 

the staff, and my strong interest in them providing me with their 

candid views. So that if nothing else, I can ensure that the Commission is informed with the information it needs. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. Can I get a nodding of 

heads by all the Commissioners that the release of audio that has 

been recorded can be made available to the committee? Hearing no 

objections, I assume they will be delivered to us. With that, we recognize the gentleman from Idaho, Mr. Labrador, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I especially want to 

welcome Commissioner Magwood who worked diligently at the 

Idaho National Laboratory. And I believe Commissioner Svinicki 

worked for one of our senators, so thank you for being here. 

This has been truly one of the most frustrating hearings I’ve ever 

participated in, because I’ve never seen such self deluded behavior 

by any individual in probably my entire life. The lack of awareness 

of what’s happening here in the Commission is truly astounding to 

me. To watch an individual sit here and say that the only thing 

he is responsible for, and he’s sorry about is that the distraction 

that has been caused by your behavior. It is truly just embarrassing just to watch you this entire time that I’ve been here. 

So let’s really just get down to what’s happening here. You believe, and you did not answer this question when my good colleague over here asked you the question. But you believe that you 

are more passionate than the other four individuals sitting here 

about nuclear safety; is that not true? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. Just answer the question yes or no, you can say 

yes, you can say no. Are you more passionate, are you less passionate or are you equally passionate? It’s a simple question. 

Mr. JACZKO. My voting record, I think, shows that I have taken 

positions on safety—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. So are you more passionate, is that what you believe? 

Mr. JACZKO. I would say my position—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. And you also believe you have better judgment 

than these four individuals, is that not true? 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe that I—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. Yes or no, simple question. 

Mr. JACZKO. I believe I have very good judgment as a safety—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. And your judgment is better than the four individuals here combined, isn’t that true, according to your own opinion? 

Mr. JACZKO. It’s up to others to determine—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. No, it’s up to you because you’re the one who’s 

making decisions that is making their life a living hell. So you tell 

me do you have more passion, do you have better judgment, yes or 

no? 

Mr. JACZKO. I feel very strongly that I have an appropriate judgment—— 

66 

Mr. LABRADOR. You have better judgment than the other four individuals sitting here correct according to you? 

Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, as I said many times, I’m—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. Okay, you’re not going to answer the question 

when it is clearly from your statement, from your actions that you 

believe that your judgment and your passion surpasses the four of 

them combined. 

So your distraction that’s being caused—it is interesting to me, 

I have managed an organization, I had a law firm for a while. Now 

I have to manage my congressional office. Your management style 

is bringing some problems that are being brought here to the fore, 

and you’re saying that you’re willing to work with them, but you’re 

not willing to admit that you have done anything wrong, that’s 

what I cannot understand. The only way you’re going to be able to 

work with these individuals and actually change your management 

style is by admitting that you actually screwed up, that you actually did something wrong. 

Are you not willing to admit that there is something in your 

management style that has brought us to a congressional hearing 

that is unprecedented in American history? 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, Congressman, I take responsibility—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. Yes or no. 

Mr. JACZKO. —for this agency. And as I’ve indicated, I’m willing 

to discuss these issues with my colleagues and figure out how we 

can better communicate. 

Mr. LABRADOR. But you haven’t done anything wrong. What are 

you going to discuss that they are wrong and you’re right, correct? 

Mr. JACZKO. I would like to discuss these communication issues 

and some of the misunderstanding. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Have you done anything wrong in your management of this agency? 

Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, as I said, I take full responsibility. 

Mr. LABRADOR. For what? 

Mr. JACZKO. For this organization. 

Mr. LABRADOR. No. For what in your behavior are you taking responsibility for? Just name one thing, just one thing that you admit 

that you have done wrong because I don’t believe these four individuals would come here if you haven’t done a single thing wrong. 

Just name one thing that you’ve done wrong. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, Congressman as I said, I’m very passionate 

about safety and—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. So it is wrong for you to be passionate about safety is that what you’re telling the American people right now? 

Mr. JACZKO. Congressman—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. Is that wrong to be passionate about safety and 

they are not passionate about safety, right? 

Mr. JACZKO. Congressman, as I said, I’m very passionate about 

safety, if that’s ever been misconstrued by my colleagues, that’s 

something I would like to discuss. 

Mr. LABRADOR. But what is in your passion, in your passionate 

statements, what’s wrong would bring us to a moment that we 

have to have these four individuals, these four Commissioners who 

have dedicated their entire life to the public safety of our Nation, 

what in your behavior is wrong? Just name one thing, that’s all I’m 

67 

asking. I can name 20 things that I have done wrong in my life 

if somebody asked me the question. You can’t name one thing. 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, Congressman, as indicated, it’s a conversation 

I think I would like to have with my colleagues to better understand—— 

Mr. LABRADOR. This is ridiculous. Your answers today have been 

totally ridiculous. Because there’s no way that these individuals 

who have the same passion, the same commitment to the safety of 

the United States would be sitting here complaining about you, 

complaining about the staff unless you had done something wrong. 

And it’s absolutely ridiculous for us to think that under any circumstance, you’re going to change your behavior because you’re not 

even willing to admit that you did one thing wrong. That’s just incredulous to anybody who is watching this meeting. 

Mr. Chairman, I’ve run out of time. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Guinta, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GUINTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just have 

a couple of quick questions. For anyone on the panel other than the 

chairman, can anybody talk to me about the first IG report and 

what conclusions it made relative to this issue? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I—sir, I will attempt just broadly. The NRC inspector general has testified, I believe, before the House Energy 

and Commerce Committee earlier this year on the content and conclusions of his report. That report focused—it covered a number of 

issues, but it spent much of its content on the decisionmaking 

around the Yucca Mountain related activities at NRC. There were 

some other more broad findings about the relationship on the Commission and I would like to reacquaint myself with those findings 

rather than testify then generally. 

Mr. GUINTA. Okay. To the chairman, I see a letter hear dated 

December 12th from the President’s Chief of Staff, and it’s issued 

to Chairman Issa. And in it, it says, the fourth paragraph down, 

‘‘He has indicated his intention to reach out to his fellow Commission colleagues for that purpose,’’ he’s—referring to you. On the 

back of the letter he talks about the development of any recommendations to improve the circumstance. So it sounds like what 

he’s saying here is that the President’s not going to take action, 

that he’d prefer these issues be resolved by you and the Commission. Is that your understanding of—— 

Mr. JACZKO. Well, I don’t want to speak for—certainly for the administration, but as I read the letter what I saw was that the Chief 

of Staff would be looking at the situation and would be looking to 

inspector general’s report to get some guidance on ways to improve 

the organization. 

Mr. GUINTA. Would you agree with the assessment in this letter 

that the disagreements amongst the Commission are over policy 

matters? 

Mr. JACZKO. I certainly think we have policy disagreements, but 

I think there are also, I believe, organizational miscommunications 

and misunderstandings about roles and responsibilities. 

Mr. GUINTA. To me, it appears that the IG’s report has really not 

improved things. As a matter of fact, from what I read and heard, 

you can make an argument of things further deteriorating. So I apVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:04 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75051.TXT APRIL
68 

preciate your interest in wanting to work with your colleagues, but 

it seems like that point has come and gone. And as stated by other 

members of this committee, I think there is growing frustration 

that we’re at this level of inquiry. 

So I would prefer that this be handled in one of two ways, but 

have you yourself, you say you take full responsibility for actions 

of the committee. Would you consider stepping down as chairman. 

Mr. JACZKO. I have no intention to resign. 

Mr. GUINTA. I would yield back the remainder of my time. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman yields. Thank you. I think it is 

clear, the chairman is making no apologies for misconduct, only for 

the lack of harmonious life among the five of you. I asked the 

chairman who his Board of Directors is. I asked him about collaborative and normally consensus-type activity. For each of the Commissioners, when the chairman was not the chairman, do any of 

you believe that he would have accepted one of you treating him 

the way he is now treating you? 

Ms. SVINICKI. Sir—— 

Chairman ISSA. No? 

Ms. SVINICKI. I believe I’m the only member of the Commission 

who served with Chairman Jaczko when he was then a Commissioner, we were both Commissioners when I began my service on 

the Commission. And I would characterize that I actually, when I 

was new to the Commission, found very helpful that he tutored me 

in many of the ways of insisting upon the role of individual Commissioners that they have an important contribution to make. I 

considered that I learned many of those points from him. 

Chairman ISSA. So when he was a Commissioner, life was collaborative, he got it, he was a former staffer to House and Senate 

people, he kind of got the idea that you all had to work together 

and reach, at least the 3–2 vote, and hopefully 4–1 or a 5–0 whenever possible. So this is a very capable Commissioner, just not a 

good chairman in your opinion, a terrible chairman in your opinion. 

Ms. SVINICKI. I would characterize that during that period it 

really was limited to policy differences at times and not the differences we see now. 

Chairman ISSA. I ask unanimous consent for just 30 more seconds for a single question because one half of this has been asked 

repeatedly. For each of the Commissioners, now I’m not looking at 

you as Republicans or Democrats, Democratic members, because as 

far as I can tell, none of you are partisans in your background, certainly career Navy officers and so on. So you’ve been accused sort 

of, of being lapdogs for industry, not caring enough about safety. 

There has been some insinuation that that could be the case. 

Would each of you just briefly tell me about your view, your passion about safety and how that brings you to each of your votes 

when you are given an opportunity, please? 

Ms. SVINICKI. My sole motivation in serving on the NRC is to 

work on issues of advanced nuclear safety and security for the 

country. I have many family members in Wisconsin and Michigan 

that live near nuclear power plants, and so I’m concerned for all 

Americans and think and am motivated even my own family in 

their protection and safety. 

Chairman ISSA. Commissioner Magwood. 

69 

Mr. MAGWOOD. Mr. Chairman, as someone who’s spent really my 

entire professional career working in the nuclear field, I have a 

very deep appreciation for the hazards presented by handling of 

nuclear materials, I’ve overseen it for many years at DOE. As a result, I view any nuclear activity as a matter of great responsibility. 

I think that anyone who is involved in that activity should be held 

to a very, very, very high standard, and I expect the best of everyone involved. Thank you. 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Mr. Chairman, I have a record going back to 

1976 for being involved in nuclear power issues, nuclear weapons 

issues. I assure you that having operated and trained others to operate, supervise and maintain nuclear power plants and submarines that I have a very rigid sense of safety and am very concerned on safety issues. And I welcome anybody to examine and 

discuss my voting record with me on safety issues at NRC. 

Chairman ISSA. Commissioner? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Mr. Chairman, I have spent my entire professional career working on nuclear safety issues and I was elected to 

the National Academy of Engineering on the basis of my contributions. 

Chairman ISSA. I will yield the same amount of time to the ranking member as I’m going over so I will be very brief. Commissioner 

Ostendorff, as a former Navy officer, from your experience, not just 

within your commands, but within your military service, which is 

much longer than mine, don’t you have countless examples you’ve 

seen of fine officers who were competent, technically capable who 

were relieved because, in fact, they exhibited behavior that lost the 

confidence of the men and women that worked for them? 

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. I yield to the ranking member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I’m sitting here and I’m listening to all of this 

and I swear to God, this is incredible to me. We are better than 

this, and, you know, I feel like I’m sitting here trying to referee a 

fight. And I said from the beginning, I’m not a referee, I haven’t 

done that since my kids were tiny and now they are adults. 

Chairman Jaczko, let me tell you. I do appreciate the fact that 

you’re willing to sit down with your colleagues. I don’t want you 

to quit. I do not want to you quit. I want you to continue to fight 

for the American people and do what’s right for them. And I don’t 

think your passion and your commitment and your expertise is any 

greater than the other Commissioners. I think all of you are very 

wonderful, strong Americans, very committed to our safety. And I 

believe you’ve given everything, you’ve giving everything you’ve got 

to make things work. But we’ve got to do better than this. 

There is no reason, I think, why this should have risen to this 

level. And Commissioner, I know people have been trying to get 

you to admit you that you’ve done things wrong. I would imagine 

that people up here would have a difficulty admitting that they 

were wrong when they’ve got opinions saying they operated within 

the law and what have you. I don’t know what they would say to 

be frank with you. But I do know one thing, that—and I—after 61 

years on this earth I have come to realize something that’s very 

significant, one of the best ways not to achieve a goal is to be distracted. I mean, if you look at people who have not achieved the 

70 

things that they tried to achieve in life, a lot of times, it is because 

they got distracted. 

I have not come to ask you—all five of you, I’ve come to beg you 

to work this thing out. I mean, to sit down like reasonable people 

and work it out. The American people are tired of dysfunction. 

They are really tired of us. And we—what you all are doing is so 

very, very important. I listen to everybody and Commissioner 

Apostolakis, I’m getting there. 

Chairman ISSA. When you get to know him better, his name is 

George. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You know, I heard what you said. I think you 

summarized it better than anybody else. When asked whether you 

lost confidence, did this Commissioner, Mr. Jaczko, could do the 

job, you said, you know, I think he can do it, but he’s got to change 

his attitude a little bit. Is that pretty much—I don’t want to take 

words out of your mouth. That’s pretty much what you said, is that 

right? Come on, talk to me. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. That’s a summary of what I said. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Say it, tell me. I don’t want to misstate you. 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. He should control his temper and let the staff 

send us their frank views. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Stop doing what? 

Mr. APOSTOLAKIS. Frank views, opinions, the staff. The staff 

should communicate to the Commissioners their candid opinions. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Can you live with that, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. JACZKO. Absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yeah. I mean I keep thinking, you know, you 

guys have to go back. You know, all the press, you see all them 

press people? They are loaded up over there, they are typing away, 

look at them. You know why, because they like controversy. They 

want to make—they are Tweeting and twitting and doing all kinds 

of things right now so that—and you all have been elevated, all of 

you, now everybody knows your names. But I’m telling you, when 

all of this is over, you’ve got to go back. The President is not going 

to get rid of you. You’re doing a great job. It may not be attitude— 

I think you need to change some of these attitudinal things that 

you’re dealing with, but you have to do that. 

So I beg you for the sake of the American people to please sit 

down, work this thing out. I mean, sharing information with your 

fellow Commissioners, do what you’ve got to do, but make it work. 

That’s all I have to say. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the ranking member. As I close the first 

panel, I would like to make it very clear that if this does not get 

resolved, this is not the last time this committee will come to a full 

committee hearing to review the status of management at the 

NRC. Additionally, we are the personnel committee of the Congress 

to a great extent. We do look at the management structure. We do 

so like a Board of Directors, it is not ours to tell you what to do. 

It is ours to find out whether it is being done as is prescribed by 

law and as the executive branches said they want to do. 

We will retain continuing jurisdiction, we will expect all of the 

promises made here today of material to be added to our discovery. 

We will, in fact, also remind everyone, we’re the whistleblower 

committee, people come to us on our lines, on the Internet by the 

71 

hundreds per week. Those people expect that if they give us information, there will be no retaliation within any agency of government. We will strictly enforce and protect anyone who comes before 

this committee at any time, and I know in the opening statement 

that was mentioned. People who come before us come protected 

from the moment they come to tell us something. The only time 

they are not protected is if they are not telling the truth, to use 

a double negative. 

We will continue to look. We will not tolerate harassment, we 

will not tolerate retribution. Now the ranking member said it more 

eloquently than I could, we want you to resolve this. It is not the 

kind of thing that comes before Congress, and it is not particularly 

good other than fodder for the press. So as we continue to retain 

jurisdiction and oversight, bear in mind we will be looking at every 

action of all of you. We want you to do everything you can to live 

up to your oaths. 

And Chairman, I would hope that as you work with Chief of Staff 

Daley, that you recognize that this is an extraordinary opportunity 

if the President retains confidence in you to change dramatically 

how these four men and women believe you are working. And I 

think certainly at least one Commissioner has said very well that 

he believes that change can happen, and the others, to a certain 

extent, did too. 

We’re not your CEO. We are ultimately America, the American 

stockholders, Board of Directors and we will assert our rights and 

obligations if we do not see this resolved, and that’s something that 

I’m positive will come from both sides of the aisle. So I thank you, 

we are going to break briefly for a second panel. We thank you for 

your testimony and we stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman ISSA. The committee will come to order. I’d now like 

to recognize our second panel of witnesses. Mr. William Borchardt, 

Executive Director of operations at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Mr. Steven Burns is general counsel for the NRC. 

Chairman ISSA. Gentlemen, I know you have been sitting 

through the first panel so pursuant to our rules, would you please 

rise to take the oath? 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give 

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? 

Let the record indicate both answered in the affirmative, and Mr. 

Borchardt, is that correct pronunciation? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. One of my best friends is Bob Borchardt formerly 

of New York of Recoton company, so it is the only reason I didn’t 

mess your name up. You’re recognized to give your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BORCHARDT 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Thank you very much, Chairman Issa, good 

afternoon. As you mentioned, my name is Bill Borchardt, I have 

served as the executive director for operations at the NRC since 

May of 2008. I began my NRC career in 1983 after serving 5 years 

in the U.S. submarine force. As the executive director for operVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:04 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75051.TXT APRIL
72 

ations, I am the senior staff member responsible for the operational 

and administrative functions necessary for the day-to-day operations of the agency. This includes supervising and coordinating 

agency operational activities, policy proposal development, and implementation of Commission policy directives. Approximately 3,500 

of the 4,000 staff members of the NRC report through the EDO. 

The staff of the NRC is fully committed to the agency’s mission 

to protect public health and safety as well as protection of the environment. This is a 24–7 responsibility. Accomplishment of this mission requires the dedicated and interdependent efforts of every employee. For more than 35 years, NRC experts have had a singular 

focus on our safety and security mission. We strive to be tough, but 

fair and reliable regulators, and to be an organization that continues to learn from experience. 

Learning from operating experience is frequently resulted in the 

imposition of new regulatory requirements and corresponding safety improvements at the facilities we regulate, as well as improvements to our own operations. The events at Fukushima are providing to us today a new opportunity to learn from operating experience and to improve our regulatory structure. Our safety and security mission has been and will always remain our top priorities. 

In addition to a clear mission, I believe any organization involved 

in nuclear safety, especially the safety regulator must have a robust safety culture, the NRC staff safety culture embodies the principles of an open and collaborative work environment, the agency’s 

principles of good regulation which are independence, openness, 

sufficiency, clarity, and reliability, and a commitment to live by a 

set of organizational values, and at the NRC, they integrity, service, openness, commitment, cooperation, excellence and respect. 

These principles are critically important to the success of our 

safety mission. They continue to guide our interactions within the 

staff, and with our regulated community, and with all other stakeholders. They are part of the staff’s daily life at the NRC and promote mutual support, open communications, and a fully-engaged 

staff. I believe an open and collaborative work environment encourages interdependence among the staff and promotes open discussion to help us make good decisions and provide the Commission 

with our best recommendations, and to best serve the American 

public. 

The NRC has a long tradition of valuing diversity of ideas, different opinions and questioning the status quo. In fact, we have a 

number of formal and informal programs that encourage the staff 

to raise differing views so that those views can be addressed in an 

open and transparent manner. We have demonstrated the differences of opinion within the staff can be addressed in a respectful 

and constructive manner. These differing views are frequently provided to the Commission for their consideration. It is through this 

open discussion that we most effectively execute our nuclear safety 

responsibilities. 

The staff is responsible for keeping the Commission completely 

and currently informed on all relevant matters. We accomplish this 

through a series of formal and informal mechanisms, including 

memoranda to the Commission, Commission papers, status reports 

73 

and oral briefings. The Commission provides direction to the staff 

through budget decisions and staff memoranda. 

You have already been made aware of the results of the 2011 Office of Personnel Management Federal employees viewpoint survey. 

This survey measured employees’ perceptions of whether and to 

what extent their organizations have the type of characteristics 

typically associated with high-performing successful organizations. 

The fact that the NRC ranked first in all four categories examined 

by the survey is a result of the collective efforts of the entire staff 

to adhere to the principles that I just mentioned. 

I am extremely proud of the skilled and contentious staff with 

whom I work at the NRC. They have maintained their focus on our 

mission, and the fundamentals essential to doing an excellent job. 

It is because of our dedicated technical and administrative staff 

that we are the preeminent nuclear regulator in the world. And 

through our combined efforts, we strive to serve the American public in the best way we can. This concludes my testimony, thank 

you. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. Mr. Burns. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN BURNS 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member 

Cummings. I’m pleased to be here before you today as the committee examines the management structure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As general counsel, I supervise the staff of approximately 110 people. My office reports to the full Commission 

and provides a full range of legal services, including counsel and 

representation to both the Commission and to the offices that report to the Commission or NRC chairman, and to the offices that 

report to Mr. Borchardt the executive director for operations, often 

referred to as the NRC staff. 

As general counsel, I’m responsible for providing legal counsel to 

the chairman and the other Commissioners as well as the senior 

agency staff. I often interact with the chairman and with the other 

Commissioners, and I strive to be fully responsive to the needs of 

all Commissioners in carrying out these responsibilities. 

I’ve been a career employee with the NRC since 1978. I began 

my legal career as an attorney in what was then called the Office 

of Executive Legal Director where my initial duties primarily involved enforcement and oversight. 

I then served as a legal assistant and then executive assistant 

to vice admiral retired Kenneth M. Carr, who is a Commissioner 

and then later chairman of the agency from 1989 to 1991. Upon 

conclusion of Chairman Carr’s term, I became the director of the 

Commission’s Office of Appellate Adjudication, the office that drafts 

the Commission’s adjudicatory orders. Subsequently, I served for 

more than a decade as the agency’s deputy general counsel where 

my responsibilities included overseeing legal representation of the 

staff and NRC administrative proceedings. 

In April 2009, former Chairman Klein initiated my appointment 

to serve as general counsel, which was subsequently approved by 

the Commission. These diverse positions have given me substantial 

understanding of the legal framework governing Commission operVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:04 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75051.TXT APRIL
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ations, particularly the Atomic Energy Act, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and the Reorganization Plan Number 1 of 1980. 

The Energy Reorganization Act, of course, establishes the Commission and with respect to its members, provides that each shall 

have equal responsibility and authority in all decisions and actions 

of the Commission, shall have full access to information relating to 

the performance of the duties or responsibilities, and shall have 

one vote. 

The chairman is granted particular duties as the official spokesperson of the agency, and as the principal executive officer with respect to the agency’s executive and administrative functions and as 

reflected in the reorganization plan. 

In carrying out these duties, the Energy Reorganization Act instructs the chairman to see that the faithful execution of the policies and decisions of the Commission and that he shall be governed 

by the general policies of the Commission and by such regulatory 

decisions, findings and determinations as the Commission may be, 

by law, be authorized to make. 

As I have advised the Commission, the NRC’s enabling legislation reflects that the structure of the agency is framed around two 

core principles, the rule of the majority, and the delegation of executive leadership to the chairman, which includes carrying out the 

Commission’s policies. In providing legal advice and counsel to the 

Commission, I’m ever mindful of these principles and believe they 

were intended to work in harmony to ensure the effective operation 

of the NRC. I’d be pleased to answer any questions that the committee may have. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you, and I will recognize myself for the 

first round for 5 minutes. Mr. Borchardt, the—earlier testimony, 

I’m going to follow up on that quickly, have you ever been asked 

to withhold, limit, edit any information given to the other four 

Commissioners that the chairman has? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. There have been Commission papers and some 

budget proposal documents that have been altered under the chairman’s direction, yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. Were those alterations in detail, made available 

so that the Commissioners could understand that or were they 

withheld? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. The original staff proposal you’re asking about? 

Chairman ISSA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Eventually I believe it was made available to 

the Commission. 

Chairman ISSA. Eventually doesn’t quite get it. Were they initially denied? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Some of these documents were draft documents 

that the chairman’s office had seen and provided direction on how 

the final document should be prepared. 

Chairman ISSA. So the chairman spoon feeds the Commissioners 

what he wants them to see, is that maybe a little excess, but basically a direction? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. I would describe it as the chairman influences 

the information and the timing of the information that is provided 

to the Commission on occasion. 

75 

Chairman ISSA. So he lied to us, he told us that he never did 

that, he told us he didn’t withhold information and he said they 

had full and complete, although he used some interesting words a 

couple of times, but I held him back and you were both here, to 

make sure that he said that. But you’re telling me here today is 

that the Commissioners, the four Commissioners do not have equal 

and unfettered access to the same information, even though they 

are asked to make decisions based on the information they receive; 

is that correct? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. I would say the chairman influences the timing 

of the information that’s provided. 

Chairman ISSA. Oh, so he knows about it sooner and they know 

about it when he’s ready for them to know about it. 

Mr. BORCHARDT. On occasion, yes. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. Is that open and collaborative? Is that 

consistent with the 3,500 people that you fall under you and the 

way things work? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. It is not a practice we use within the staff, no, 

sir. 

Chairman ISSA. And there’s been allegations of what under the 

definition that the Federal Government uses of intimidation, harassment—intimidation and a hostile environment existed at the 

NRC. In one or more cases, has that been exhibited by the chairman? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. But he doesn’t have—never mind, I won’t go into 

it, he doesn’t have anything to apologize. Mr. Burns, you did a very 

good job in your opening statement of explaining that for whatever 

reason, Congress gave incredible authority to ignore the other four 

Commissioners to the chairman, right? 

Mr. BURNS. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. What? 

Chairman ISSA. That the powers, the executive powers are virtually everything for the chairman. You know, that is basically 

what you said in your opening statement. 

Mr. BURNS. I don’t think that is what I said. I said that there 

are two principles at play. The one principle, majority rules; and 

the other one, that executive leadership has been focused through 

the reorganization plan in the chairman. Now, in doing that—— 

Chairman ISSA. But executive leadership in a normal company is 

anything that the majority of the board thinks is wrong by the executive is, in fact, second-guessable by the board. In this case, you 

are saying that is not the case. 

Mr. BURNS. I don’t believe I said that at all. And if I—— 

Chairman ISSA. Well, but you are the legal definer. If three of 

the Commissioners think the chairman is dead-wrong in administration, executive, or other activities—in this case, four of them 

think he is wrong on many occasions—shouldn’t that, in fact, be determinative of his behavior? Or are you saying that he has the authority to ignore them in his dealing with ordering staff, you know, 

some 4,000 staff around? 

Mr. BURNS. I am not going to comment on the chairman’s behavior—— 

Chairman ISSA. No, no, I am not asking for the behavior. I am 

asking about authority. 

76 

Mr. BURNS. With respect to his authority, a majority of the Commission, particularly in policy matters, adjudications, and rulemaking, set the policy of the agency, and the chairman is honorbound to carry that out. 

With respect to administrative matters, for the most part administrative matters are delegated to the chairman. There are some 

specific examples or exceptions within the reorg plan. Appointments, for example Mr. Borchardt’s appointment and my appointment, he initiates but the full Commission approves—— 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. So there are a few times in which he has 

to go to his board. The rest of the time, he runs the show. 

Mr. BURNS. And that is the contemplation under the reorganization plan. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. 

Clearly, today, we were mostly talking about his management 

failures, at least relative to the 4,000 staff members and the four 

commissioners. But one very quick question. 

I heard Mr. Tierney read verbatim the law that allowed this 

emergency powers. Was Japan under the regulation of this Commission? 

Mr. BURNS. No. And I don’t think—— 

Chairman ISSA. So you issued an opinion that everything he did 

was legal and within his jurisdiction. And I heard the verbatim— 

now, I am a layperson, so I want to be told why I didn’t understand. But I heard, I think, the complete phrase of authority. And 

we are talking about halfway around the world a nuclear power 

plant and, actually, several reactors were in distress, and he asserted unilateral rights to completely dismiss any participation by 

his Commission. 

That power, under what was read to us today—and I am not an 

expert on it; you are—that power was limited to the 102 sites in 

the U.S. Nowhere did it appear—and I guess some other sites—but 

nowhere did it appear to have anything to do with a foreign, sovereign nation and their reactors, did it? The intent of that statute, 

that right. 

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, the interpretation I gave to that statute and to those provisions in the reorg plan were not that the 

chairman was suddenly the nuclear regulator of the country of 

Japan. What it had to do with is that the question I was asked during the course of the accident was, when the emergency center was 

stood up and the chairman was in the ops center and the United 

States Nuclear Regulatory Commission was asked for information 

regarding recommendations to protect U.S. citizens in Japan and 

U.S. servicemen through the Ambassador and through the administration, he asked me—what the question was, was it within his 

purview to communicate that information? I gave him the opinion 

that, yes, it was. This was not an usurpation of all the powers—— 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. And my time has long expired. I wanted 

to just make clear that you gave him an opinion, so it is not him 

asserting some unilateral—but you are telling him that that 

phrase, that part of the law, gave him the authority to lock out his 

four Commissioners? 

That wasn’t the main reason—today we were talking about management. So it is important for me to understand that, because 

77 

that action, which was not the focus of this hearing, if there is a 

mistake, it is yours, not his. 

Mr. BURNS. Yes. And there was no mistake on my part. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, I think there was a big damn mistake, but 

that is—— 

Mr. BURNS. Well, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, there was not. 

Chairman ISSA. But that is a judgment call, not a legal call. 

And—— 

Mr. BURNS. That is right. That is a legal judgment call. In my 

legal judgment, given the intention of the President of the United 

States in 1980 in issuing the plan and providing for the concentration under emergency circumstances of power into the chairman, 

that the chairman acted reasonably. 

I have had no Commissioner tell me that my view is wrong. I followed the opinion of my predecessor advising Chairman Meserve 

after 9/11, when there was not a particular threat to a U.S. power 

plant or facility. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

The ranking member is recognized. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. May I have 8 minutes, 

Mr. Chairman? Thank you very much. 

Following the Fukushima disaster, the NRC took a number of actions related to the emergency, including ensuring that two U.S. 

west coast nuclear plants would remain safe from possible tsunami 

effects and standing up an emergency operations center at the 

NRC to monitor events as they unfolded in Japan. The operations 

center remained in monitoring mode to assist Japan and the multitude of U.S. citizens in that country and to deal with the ongoing 

emergency at the Fukushima plant. 

Mr. Burns, as the NRC general counsel, you wrote a memo on 

March 17, 2011, and your memo concludes that the chairman had 

the legal authority under his emergency powers to issue the press 

release that provided the 50-mile protective guidance for United 

States residents and other interests in Japan. 

In that memo, you said this, and I quote: ‘‘The chairman’s actions 

fit within his authorities under Section 3 of the reorganization 

plan, under which all authorities vested in the Commission pertaining to an emergency are transferred to the chairman.’’ 

Mr. Burns, is that correct? 

Mr. BURNS. That is correct. That is in my memorandum. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And can you tell us simply how the chairman’s 

actions were proper under current law? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes. And, Ranking Member Cummings, the other 

things I would emphasize, it was not only, I think, a reasonable 

representation of the emergency powers, but as the official spokesperson of the agency, he had information that was developed by the 

staff and communicated that. So even if you disagree with respect 

to emergency powers, I think as a spokesman he could do that. 

The point I made—and I actually think you read the quote from 

President Carter during the testimony of the Commissioners—is 

that the purpose of the plan in Section 3 was to focus the emergency response responsibility into a single person, the chairman. 

That was a finding coming out of the Three Mile Island accident. 

78 

And that is—and looking at that and, again, looking at the memo 

of my predecessor to Chairman Meserve, I felt, though it was a 

novel question, which I acknowledge in the memo, I thought that 

was a reasonable judgment. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you were using your legal judgment, your 

legal expertise; is that correct? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, I was, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Some have alleged that the chairman should not 

have used his emergency authorities to respond to the Fukushima 

crisis because the incident did not—and I think this is what Chairman Issa was going to—did not involve a U.S. nuclear facility or 

materials licensed or regulated by the Commission. 

But in your memo you obviously disagree. You said that you do 

not view the language of the reorganization act of 1980 as—and I 

quote, I am quoting you—‘‘limiting the scope of the chairman’s 

emergency response authority only to incidents involving particular 

NRC-licensed facilities,’’ end of quote. Is that right? 

Mr. BURNS. That is correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And in your memo you pointed to an opinion by 

the former NRC general counsel following the attacks on 9/11. Here 

is what you said, and I quote: ‘‘I know that former General Counsel 

Cyr gave a similar opinion in the context of an agency response to 

the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks in determining that the absence of 

an actual event or damage to a nuclear facility or materials did not 

limit the chairman’s authority to exercise his emergency powers.’’ 

Mr. Burns, can you explain what that 2001 opinion said and why 

it is useful for understanding how the chairman exercised his authorities during the Fukushima crisis? 

Mr. BURNS. Certainly. 

Briefly stated, after the 9/11 attacks, the NRC again stood up its 

emergency center I think primarily in a monitoring mode or an enhanced monitoring mode. There was, again, no specific threat to a 

particular U.S. facility. It kept in that operation for a few months. 

And the chairman, Meserve at the time, I think some of his Commissioners wondered, well, how long is this going to go on? And I 

think he asked the general counsel, General Counsel Cyr, to give 

an opinion. And her opinion—again, she said, we understand 

what—you know, in terms of the text in the reorg plans. But, she 

said, looking at it again at President Carter’s transmittal statement and looking at the general purpose is to focus the emergency 

response responsibility into a single official, that that was a reasonable action on her part to do—I mean, it was a reasonable action 

on the part of Chairman Meserve in the 9/11 context to do. And 

I adapted that. 

And, again, you know, I concede, it was a novel question. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. Burns, it has been alleged that the 

chairman, in violation of his statutory responsibilities, does not 

keep the Commission properly informed. In your transcribed interview with the committee staff, however, you stated that the individual Commissioners have a wide variety of ways to get information they need to do their jobs. For example, any Commissioner can 

ask agency staff for information, and each Commissioner holds regular meetings with senior NRC staff. Is that correct? 

Mr. BURNS. That is correct. 

79 

Mr. CUMMINGS. In your interview, you said this, and I quote: 

‘‘The Commission can ask for information within its functions, and 

it is not restricted to asking for the information that the chairman 

thinks that the Commissioners ought to have. They could ask for 

anything within those functions. There is some balancing, again, 

about potential burdens and all that, but essentially that is a fairly 

powerful tool,’’ end of quote. 

Is it fair to say that each Commissioner has tools at his or her 

disposal to keep themselves informed? 

Mr. BURNS. I think it is. And I think that is what both the Energy Reorganization Act and the reorganization plan provide. 

Could I make—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Please do. 

Mr. BURNS. Just one footnote I would add to that, Mr. 

Cummings, and that is this. In matters involving the budget, the 

chairman is responsible for budget presentation and budget development. And so, actually, the view that we have is that, in terms 

of the timing, there is some influence in terms of the timing. It 

doesn’t mean that the Commission can’t get the information, but it 

is not realtime because, again, the contemplation of the reorg plan 

is that the chairman presents a budget. Once it is presented, then 

information is fair game to the Commissioner. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, did you also say that—did you inform committee staff during your transcribed interview that you were unaware of any instances in which the chairman withheld information or failed to inform the Commission, in breach of his statutory 

responsibilities? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, I am not aware of any. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Is it fair to say that each Commissioner—Mr. Burns, can you describe to the committee what you believe the statute requires of the chairman in terms of keeping the 

Commission informed? 

Mr. BURNS. I think the reorganization plan in Section 2, 2(c) or 

2(d), talks about the chairman’s responsibility and the EDO 

through the chairman. It defines or outlines that responsibility. 

And with respect to that, that can be implemented through the 

Commission’s internal procedures, in terms of information flow and 

the like. And as you describe from my interview, is that Commissioners can ask staff for information. 

The last thing I would note is that the statute also provides, in 

effect, a safety valve; that if any employee or officer of the Commission believes that there is critical safety information or security information the Commission should be aware of, it can communicate 

with the Commission. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Finally, do you believe that individual Commissioners have any obligation to seek out information they believe 

they need? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think that each Commissioner has to decide 

for themselves what information they need in carrying out their responsibilities. And I think just as a matter of their functioning, 

they have an obligation and, I think, an ability to do that. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. 

Mr. PLATTS. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman. 

I yield myself 5 minutes for the purpose of questions. 

80 

I thank both of you for your service at the NRC and your testimony here today. 

Mr. Borchardt, the issue of information-sharing certainly is critical for the Commission doing its job well; if the Commission is 

going to take a vote, that they all have the ability to make informed decisions and all have the same information. 

In your opinion as the senior staff member, do you feel that the 

staff feels comfortable sharing information? Because it has been 

made a point that all of the Commissioners have the right to ask 

for information. But do the staff subordinate to you feel comfortable in sharing information with the other Commissioners if it 

is contrary to a view they know that the chairman holds? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Well, I think there has been a longstanding 

practice that the staff is responsive to individual Commissioners’ 

requests for information through oral conversations. That continues. 

There is a higher degree of apprehension, though, today under 

the current environment, as the first panel discussed, that has, at 

least for me, a concern that there could possibly be some reluctance 

to provide information as timely and as candidly. 

Mr. PLATTS. And with that, you reference in response to a request for information. And I guess if there is not a request for information from a Commissioner but staff has information they 

think is relevant, do they feel like they, one, have to wait to be 

asked about it and even then are hesitant? Or do they, you know, 

feel free to share what they know, even if it has not been asked, 

because it is relevant to something that is going to come before the 

Commission? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Well, I think, you know, it is informative to separate these discussions into two different types. 

There is an informal conversation that occurs between an individual Commissioner and perhaps an individual office director that 

reports to me. That is a casual conversation that has a free flow 

of information. Normally, both parties would raise topics of interest. 

The other methods of communication are far more formal. Those 

are documents that are typically signed out either by myself or by 

the office director to provide the status of an activity or perhaps 

to raise a potential policy issue to the Commission. Those discussions are much more formalized into written correspondence. 

Mr. PLATTS. And in both there is a chilling aspect today because 

of the current environment of the staff sharing information, whether it is informal or formal? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. There is a change in practice, I think, that goes 

to the discussion from the earlier panel. And that is, the historical 

practice, as I understood it through my 28 years at the NRC, is 

that if the staff felt that there was information that would be of 

interest to the Commission, that the staff would fault to the side 

of providing that information in some kind of a written document 

so the Commission could decide whether or not it was of interest 

to them and whether or not they wanted to adopt it as a policy 

issue for their consideration. 

Now what has happened more on occasion is that the chairman’s 

office has made a decision as to the timing of when that informaVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:04 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\75051.TXT APRIL
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tion would go forward. So that was a fairly significant, from the 

staff’s perspective, change in practice. 

Mr. PLATTS. And, clearly, then, an intent to control the information that is provided to the other Commissioners? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Or to control, as the chairman has described it 

in the past, control the agenda of the Commission so that he could 

monitor the Commission’s activities. And by Commission, I mean 

the five Commissioners that were at the first panel, not the staff, 

technical staff’s activities. 

Mr. PLATTS. And when you say monitor the Commission, do you 

think there is precedent for the chairman having the appropriateness of monitoring the efforts of the other Commissioners versus 

just setting the agenda? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Well, I think perhaps my choice of words, saying ‘‘monitoring,’’ was not quite right. What I meant to say is probably better to use your words, which was to set the agenda, to have 

the Commission agree as to what topics would be raised, when the 

Commission would issue directions to the staff on which topics. 

At any given time, we may have quite a few documents and decisions before the Commission that we are waiting for guidance on. 

Mr. PLATTS. In your own capacity, have you been reprimanded 

or in any way had action taken against you by the chairman for 

sharing information with other Commission members? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Well, I would put myself in the same category 

as a number of the other senior managers within the staff that 

have, you know, received, you know, a form of verbal direction and 

verbal counseling that, at least in my view, was not consistent with 

the NRC values that we endeavor to perform our own behavior 

with. 

Mr. PLATTS. And that was where your intent was to share what 

you thought was relevant information with the other Commissioners and the chairman took exception to that? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Yes, I mean, that would be an example. Another 

would be just on the development of a staff position, a recommendation that we would provide to the Commission. 

Mr. PLATTS. In your role as senior staff, would you tolerate that 

type of conduct from a subordinate of yours? 

Mr. BORCHARDT. No. And in my testimony that is the point I was 

trying to make, that the organizational values that we endeavor to 

live by that I think are the reason the NRC has been such a strong 

regulator and such a good place to work for our employees, that 

that kind of behavior is inconsistent with what we expect from the 

staff. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you again for your testimony. 

My time has expired. I yield to the chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. 

I thank you both for being here today. As often happens with a 

second panel, people burn themselves on the first panel. I would 

ask if both of you would be willing to take additional questions 

from Members in writing. 

Mr. BORCHARDT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

82 

Then, without exception, that will be allowed for—Mr. 

Cummings, can we leave the record open for 2 weeks to allow 

Members to put in questions and have them respond? 

Okay. Without objection, the record will be held for that purpose 

for 2 weeks. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank you again for your testimony. 

And we stand adjourned on this hearing. 

And I would just announce that we have votes imminent, so immediately following this set of votes, we will begin the minority 

hearing. 

Thank you. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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Æ 


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