NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 1 9

- 2672

___________ JAMES A. CARSON, JR. ,

Appellant

v. DETECTIVE JESSICA M. AURAND, in her indiv idual an d official capacity as a detective for Mifflin County Regional Police Department; JOHN DOES 1

- 10

____________________________________ On A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1

- 17

- cv - 0 126 3 ) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

N o v e m b e r 1 0 , 2 0 2 0 Before: G R E E N A W A Y , J R

. , K R A U S E a n d B I B A S , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed December 9, 202 0 )

_________ OPINION *

_________ P ER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an o pin ion of t he full C ou rt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

Pro se appellant James Carson, Jr. , appeals from an order granting summary judgment to the defendant

. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment

. I. With the assistance of counsel, Carson filed a complaint against Detective Jessica
Au rand, th e M ifflin County Regional Police Department, Mifflin County, and several John Doe defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various state laws . After Mifflin County moved to dismiss the complaint, Carson filed an amended complaint naming only Aurand a nd “John Does 1

- 10,” and claiming malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment and state law. Aurand is the Department’s only police detective. Carson’s claim s arose from his prosecution for the alleged sexual assault of his minor niece, “S.W. ,” who l ive d with Carson and his girlfriend for several weeks in 2013

. The following year, S.W. disclosed to Dauphin County Children and Youth Services (“DCCYS”) that she had been sexually assaulted. She contacted DCCYS on three separate occasions, ident ifying f irs t her father, then her mother, and then Carson as her abusers. In January 2015, Mifflin County Children and Youth Services (“MCCYS”) sent a report to Aurand de scribing S.W.’s allegations and naming Carson as the alleged perpetrator. Aurand ini tiated a n i nvestigation. Thereafter, MCCYS conducted a medical examination of S.W.

— which revealed no evidence of an assault or previous
intercourse

— as well as a forensic interview. Aurand observed the interview, during3

which S.W. made several statements that ide nti fied Carson by name and described the alleged incident in detail. Carson was arrested in March 2015 pursuant to a warrant obtained by Aurand. He was charged wi th Rape of a Child, Statutory Sexual Assault, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, and Agg rav ated Indecent Assault on a Chil d, but h e was acquitted of all charges . He subsequently sued Aurand, alleging malicious prosecution . Aurand moved for summary j udgment, arguing, among other things, that that she was entitled to judgment as a mat ter of l aw . The District Court granted Aurand’s motion , reasoning that
because Aurand had probable cause to arrest Carson that there was no constitutional violation , and, besides, that Aurand was immune from suit

. 1 Carson appealed.
II. We have jurisdicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the District Court. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. , 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the recor d in th e light mos t favorable to Carson , there is no genuine issue of
material fact and Aurand is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Giles v. Kearney , 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). Aurand is entitled to

1 The District Court also terminated the John Doe defendants from the case, not ing that discovery had not revealed any additional defendants. We will not review thi s r uling be cause Carso n does not challenge it on appeal. See In re Wettach , 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that arguments not developed in an appellant’s openi ng brief are forfeited).4

judgment as a matter of law i f C arson failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of his case . See Holloway v. Att’y Gen. of U.S. , 948 F.3d 164, 168 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020)

. III. To make a claim for malicious prosecution under both federal and state law,
Carson mu st show, am ong other things, that Aurand initiated the proceeding against him without probable cause. See Allen v. N.J. State Police , 974 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2020) (fe deral law); Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist. , 211 F.3d 782, 791 (3d Cir. 2000) ( stat e law). Be cause the undisputed evidence shows that Aurand had probable cause to arrest Carson , his malicious prosecution claim fails. Probable cause “ exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themse lves to war rant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested

. ” Merkle , 211 F.3d at 788 ( internal quotati on marks omitted ). A plaintiff arrested on a valid warrant 2 must make two showings to ch allenge pro bable cause: (1) that the officer, with at least a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions in the warrant application, and (2) that those statements or omissions were necessary to the finding of probable cause. See Andrews v. Scuilli , 853 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 2017).

2 Carson does not challenge the validity of his arrest warran t.5

Carson’s argument that Aurand ’s investigation was unconstitutional because it was limited to her interview with S.W

. is unavailing

. “W hen a police officer has received a reliable identification by a vi ctim of his or her attacker, the police have probable cause

to arrest .” Sharrar v. Felsing , 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) , abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem , 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007)

. Thus, S.W.’s identification of
Carso n was sufficient to provi de probable cause. See Aurand Dep., ECF No. 32

- 6 at 2 5

– 26 (explaining that Aurand believed S.W. to be credible).
Moreover , the record evidence shows that Aurand made no reckless or material
factual omissions in obtaining the arrest warrant . Durin g the pr eli minary hearing, she admitted that her investigation consisted solely of her observation of S.W.’s interview, despite knowing about S.W.’s medical examination. See ECF No. 36

- 5 at 14 . A urand stated in her deposition that, in her professional ex perience , i t is not uncommon for children (who heal faster than adults) to show no signs of sexual abuse upon examination, especially when the exam is conducted more than a year past the date of the alleged abuse. See , e.g. , E CF No. 32

- 6 at 24

– 25. Thus , she cons ide red the medical examination to be inconclusive, rather than exonerating, evidence. This interpretation was corroborated by the medical examiner. See ECF No. 46 at 99

– 100. Carson’s other arguments are likewise witho ut merit. The fact s that Car son was

arr ested without DNA evidence, that Aurand did not speak to certain witnesses, and that there were other possible suspects at the time Carson was arrested do not negate Aurand’s6

reasonable belief that he had committed t he alleged offense

. Orsatti v. N.J. Sta te Police , 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995 ) (explaining that “ for Fourth Amendment purposes, the issue is not whether the information on which police officers base their request for an arrest warrant resulted from a p rofessionally executed invest igation; ra ther, the issue is whether that information would warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested ”). Nor does the record support Carson’s assertion s that Aurand stated under oat h that s he knew that he was innocent before arresting him and that the Mifflin County Police Department sent him a “threatening letter.” Carson Br. at 2. 3
IV. For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of th e District Court.

3 Becaus e we agree with the District Court that Carson’s claim is meritless, we need not reach the question whether Aurand is protected by qualified immunity.