alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
428 A.2d 607

#### COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Willie Ray SMITH, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted June 13, 1980.

Filed April 10, 1981.

*132John J. Cerra, Carbondale, for appellant.

Ernest D. Preate, Jr., District Attorney, Scranton, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before HESTER, CAVANAUGH and VAN der VOORT, JJ.

HESTER, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County dismissing appellant’s petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (P.C.H.A.), Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. 1580 (19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq.).

On June 1, 1977, appellant entered a plea of guilty to charges of robbery, burglary and assault. A sentence of 10-20 years was imposed. No post-trial motions were filed and no direct appeal was taken.

In June 1979, appellant filed a P.C.H.A. petition alleging that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced and that he was not represented by competent counsel. The P.C.H.A. hearing court denied relief stating that the above asserted issues had been waived. This appeal followed.

Appellant asserts that he has not waived the right to attack the validity of his guilty plea where such is grounded on the ineffectiveness of counsel.

Courts have often held that a knowing and understanding failure to take a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence will result in the waiver of all issues which could have been raised thereon, absent extraordinary circumstances. *Commonwealth v. Shore,*487 Pa. 534, 410 A.2d 740 (1980); *Commonwealth v. Newell,*486 Pa. 474, 406 A.2d 733 (1979).

Here trial counsel did not take a direct appeal on behalf of appellant. Because no testimony was taken below, we have *133no idea whether this failure to appeal resulted from a “knowing and intelligent” waiver.

Clearly, appellant has not waived his right to complain about trial errors precipitated by ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The failure to file a direct appeal and raise a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness does not constitute a waiver where appellant would be represented on appeal by his trial attorney. *Commonwealth v. Dimitris,*484 Pa. 153, 398 A.2d 990 (1979); *Commonwealth v. Foster,*276 Pa.Super. 144, 419 A.2d 137 (1980). The P.C.H.A. petition was the first proceeding in which appellant was represented by counsel other than trial counsel whose ineffectiveness is alleged, thus no waiver was effected. *Dimitris,*supra.

Since no hearing was held below on appellant’s assertion of error, we are constrained to remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel has merit.

Order dismissing appellant’s P.C.H.A. petition is reversed; case is remanded to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the above opinion.
Exhibit 32

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                              AS ADOPTED PUSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB
for the quarter ended July 31, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that
information contained in such Quarterly Report fairly presents in all material
respect the financial condition and results of operations of Vitro Diagnostics,
Inc.


Date:  September 14, 2006


                                             By: /s/ James R. Musick
                                             -----------------------
                                             James R. Musick, President, Chief
                                             Executive Officer, Chairman of the
                                             Board of Directors, and Principal
                                             Financial Officer
#### A. Joseph Kohl, Appellant, *v.*The Metropolitan Street Railway Co., Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the City Court of the city of New York in favor of defendant.

G. Washbourne Smith, for appellant.

Henry A. Robinson (John T. Little, Jr., of counsel), for respondent.

Fitzsimons, Ch. J.

The testimony of plaintiff, if not contradicted by defendant, would have entitled and justified the jury in rendering a verdict against defendant. It was error, therefore, to dismiss the complaint.

Judgment reversed, a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.

Conlan, J., concurs.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
§ 192.630 Eligibility of State-chartered savings bank for voluntary supervisory conversion. A State-chartered savings bank may be eligible to convert to a Federal stock savings bank under this subpart if: ( a ) The FDIC certifies under section 5(o)(2)(C) of the HOLA that severe financial conditions threaten the savings bank's stability and that the voluntary supervisory conversion is likely to improve its financial condition; or
( b ) The savings bank meets the following conditions: ( 1 ) The savings bank's liabilities exceed its assets, as calculated under generally accepted accounting principles, assuming the savings bank is a going concern; and
( 2 ) The savings bank will issue a sufficient amount of permanent capital stock to meet its applicable FDIC capital requirement immediately upon completion of the conversion, or the FDIC determines that the savings bank will achieve an acceptable capital level within an acceptable time period.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

REGION Ill 

1650 Arch Street 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-2029 

The Honorable Robert M. Summers, Secretary 

Mary land Department of the Environment 

1800 Washington Boulevard 

Baltimore, MD 21230 

Dear Secretary Summers: 

DEC 1 9 2012 

On November 19, 2012, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) received a 

revision to the Maryland State Implementation Plan (SIP) submitted by the Maryland _ 

Department ofEnvironment on November 15, 2012. This SIP revision (#12-05) pertains to the 

removal of the Mount Saint Mary's College 1979 Consent Order from the Maryland SIP. EPA 

has determined that the submittal is administratively and technically complete, and is reviewing 

it to prepare a Direct Final Rulemak:ing Notice (DFRN) action. 

If members of your staff have any questions, they may direct them to Maria Pirro, Office 

of Air Program Planning, at (215) 814-2181. She is the principal contact for this rulemaking. 

Sincerely, 

Diana Esher, Director 

Air Protection Division 

Customer Service Hotline: 1-800-438-2474
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 18
- 00306
- CV No. 10
- 18
- 0030 7
- CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A .K. AND A.J., CHILDR EN IN THE INTEREST OF A .J., A CHILD

From the 74th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No s . 2017
- 618
- 3 & 2017
- 1187
- 3

ORDER
By letter dated October 2 , 2018, appellant was notified by the Clerk that the se appeals were subject to dismissal because the notices of appeal appeared to be untimely filed by two days. Appellant was given 14 days to file a respon se showing grounds for continuing the appeal s . On October 4 , 2018, appellant responded and explained t hat the
date to file the notice s of appeal was mistakenly calculated by the date the trial court’s orders were filed instead of the date the orders were signed.
A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant acting in good faith files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by the Rules of Appellate
Procedure but within the fifteen

- day period in which the appellant would be entitled toIn the Interest of A.K. and A.J., Children

In the Interest of A.J., a Child Page 2 mov e to extend the filing deadline. See Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997)

. We find appellant filed his notices of appeal in good faith. Moreover, we find appellant’s explanation for the late filing of the notice s of appeal to be reasonable. Id

. ; T EX

. R. A PP
. P

. 10.5(b)(2)(A). Therefore, b ecause the notices of appeal were fi led within the fifteen

- day period in which appellant would be entitled to mov e to extend the filing deadline, we imply a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal in each case. Id

. See also
T EX

. R. A PP
. P . 26.3. Accordingly, appellant’s implied motions for extension of time are granted. The time for filing appellant’s notices of appeal is extended to September 30, 2018, and , therefore, appellant’s notices of appeal are timely filed.

PER CURIAM Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice D avis, and Justice Scoggins Motion granted Order issued and filed October 1 7 , 2018
Exhibit
32.2




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. §1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I,
Phillip B. Simons, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer, of Riviera Holdings
Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiaries (the “Company”), certify, pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
that:




1.
            The
      Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the annual period ended
      December 31, 2008 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of
      Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C 78m);
      and




2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




Date:  March
31, 2009




/s/ Phillip B. SimonsTreasurer
      and Chief Financial Officer





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NESTOR PAUL HERNANDEZMORALES,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-72198

Agency No. A074-319-906

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 6, 2012** 

Pasadena, California

Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, TROTT and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

1. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not err in finding that

Hernandez was statutorily ineligible for an adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1255. Because Hernandez entered the United States illegally, he does not meet

FILED

JUN 08 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

the requirement of § 1255(a) that an alien be “inspected and admitted or paroled”

into the country. Hernandez does not otherwise qualify as having been

“grandfathered” into the statute. See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.10; Landin-Molina v.

Holder, 580 F.3d 913, 915-17 (9th Cir. 2009). 

2. Hernandez was also not eligible for nunc pro tunc permission to

reapply for admission. Because Hernandez illegally returned to the United States

and remained in the country after having been deported, the BIA properly

concluded that he was among a class of “illegal entrants” who were “inadmissible

for being present without admission or parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A). 

3. The BIA did not err in finding Hernandez had failed to establish

extraordinary circumstances excusing his untimely filing as required by 8 U.S.C. §

1158(a)(2)(D). The failure of the border officials to refer him to an asylum officer

or immigration judge in 2007, two years before his most recent reentry, does not

rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance.

Similarly, the officers’ actions did not constitute affirmative misconduct

which would subject the government to equitable estoppel. Hernandez must show

more than official negligence, and nothing in the record suggests the officers

engaged in a “deliberate lie” or “pattern of false promises.” See Socop-Gonzalez v.

INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
3

4. We lack jurisdiction to consider Hernandez’s contention that the

immigration judge violated his right to due process and confrontation of witnesses. 

Hernandez’s counsel waived the claim before the IJ and also failed to exhaust the

issue before the BIA. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004).

PETITION DENIED.
HomeResources – Office of Overseas Schools...Education Associations

# 									Education Associations							

Office of Overseas Schools

December 10, 2018

## 								DISCLAIMER							

        -  The links below are not part of the U. S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Network, and the Department has no control over their content or availability. 

## International School Associations

        - Association for the Advancement of International Education (AAIE) 
        - Association of American Schools of Central America, Columbia-Caribbean, and Mexico (Tri-Association) 
        - Association of American Schools in South America (AASSA) 
        - Association of International Schools in Africa (AISA) 
        - Central and Eastern European Schools Association (CEESA) 
        - East Asia Regional Council of Overseas Schools (EARCOS) 
        - European Council of International Schools (ECIS) 
        - Mediterrenean Association of International Schools (MAIS) 
        - Near East South Asia Council of Overseas Schools (NESA) 

## Professional Associations

        - American Association of School Administrators 
        - American School Counselor Association 
        - Association for Middle Level Education 
        - Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development 
        - National Association for the Teaching of Young Children 
        - National Association of College Admission Counseling 
        - National Association of Elementary Schools Principals 
        - National Association of Independent Schools 
        - National Association of Secondary Schools Principals 
        - National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators 
        - National Council of Teachers of English 
        - National Council of Teachers of Mathematics 
        - National School Board Association 
        - The Professional Learning Association – Leaning Forward 
        - TESOL- International Association 

Back to Top
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 June 30, 2015

t0622

Order 

Clerk

June 30, 2015

150215

THERESA MODZELEWSKI-SHEKOSKI,

Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF

MICHAEL RAYMOND SHEKOSKI,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 150215

COA: 314830

Macomb CC: 2010-001959-NI

MICHAEL GARRETT BINDIG and ALLIED

EXCAVATION, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 18, 2014 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1

                       STERLING CHEMICALS HOLDINGS, INC.
          COMPUTATION OF PRIMARY AND FULLY DILUTED NET INCOME (LOSS)
                    PER COMMON AND COMMON EQUIVALENT SHARE
                 (Amounts in thousands, except per share data)


                                     THREE       THREE       NINE        NINE
                                     MONTHS      MONTHS      MONTHS      MONTHS
                                     ENDED       ENDED       ENDED       ENDED
                                     6/30/97     6/30/96     6/30/97     6/30/96
                                     -------     -------     -------     -------

  PRIMARY EARNINGS PER SHARE

Weighted average of common stock
 outstanding                          11,420      55,690      11,047      55,685

Total weighted average shares 
 outstanding used in primary
 earnings per share computation       11,420      55,690      11,047      55,685
                                     =======     =======    ========     =======

Net income (loss)                    $(9,377)    $16,420    $(24,386)    $35,634
Less: Preferred dividend 
 requirements                           (249)         --        (411)         --
                                     -------     -------    --------     -------

Net income (loss) used in primary
 earnings per share                  $(9,626)    $16,420    $(24,797)    $35,634
                                     =======     =======    ========     =======

     NET INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE     $ (0.84)    $  0.29    $  (2.24)    $  0.64
                                     =======     =======    ========     =======


  FULLY DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE

Weighted average of common stock
 outstanding                          11,420      55,690      11,047      55,685

Total weighted average shares 
 outstanding used in fully
 dilutive earnings per share
 computation                          11,420      55,690      11,047      55,685
                                     =======     =======    ========     =======

Net income (loss)                    $(9,377)    $16,420    $(24,386)    $35,634
Less: Preferred dividend
 requirements                           (249)         --        (411)         --
                                     -------     -------    --------     -------

Net income (loss) used in fully
 dilutive earnings per share         $(9,626)    $16,420    $(24,797)    $35,634
                                     =======     =======    ========     =======

     NET INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE     $ (0.84)    $  0.29    $  (2.24)    $  0.64
                                     =======     =======    ========     =======
#### § 228.44 Public notice by banks.

A bank must provide in the public area of its main office and each of its branches the appropriate public notice set forth in appendix F to this part. Only a branch of a bank having more than one facility-based assessment area must include the bracketed material in the notice for branch offices. Only a bank that is an affiliate of a holding company must include the next to the last sentence of the notices. A bank must include the last sentence of the notices only if it is an affiliate of a holding company that is not prevented by statute from acquiring additional depository institutions.
**M L** **P** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 2 2 - 0 722 STATE OF MONTANA ,

Plaintiff and Appellee , v. BRYAN ARVIDSON ,

Defendant and Appellant .

**GRANT OF EXTENSION** Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30 - day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is gran ted an extension of time to and including August 5 , 20 2 4 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court July 1 2024

07/01/2024

Case Number: DA 22-0722
42722.

#### LITTLEJOHN v. CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA.

Argued April 3, 1967

Decided April 24, 1967.

*Franklin H. Pierce,*for appellant.

*Henry J. Heffernan,*for appellee.

Felton, Chief Judge.

The only enumeration of error in this appeal which is argued and insisted on is whether the trial judge *647erred in admitting testimony of comparable sales of parcels of land within the urban renewal area, the purpose of which testimony was to show that the market value of the property sought to be condemned was less than the market value contended for by the condemnee. The admission of the testimony for such general purpose was timely and properly objected to by condemnee’s attorney and the objections were overruled and the testimony was admitted for the general purpose for which it was introduced. Near the very last of the charge the court charged the jury as follows: “I charge you further, gentlemen of the jury, that you have heard the testimony of expert witnesses both for the plaintiff and the defendant in this case, and they have testified regarding the sales price of other properties regarded by them to be comparable to the property in this case. I charge you that the testimony of these expert witnesses as to these sales should not be taken or considered by you as evidence of the actual market value of the property being condemned but solely for the purpose of determining how well qualified the expert witnesses may have been when they gave their opinion as to the market value of the property in question.” The effect of this charge was to reverse the ruling on the admissibility of the testimony objected to by the condemnee and to sustain the condemnee’s objection to the testimony, the only objection being that the testimony was inadmissible for the general purpose for which it was offered. If the court had ruled at the time the testimony was objected to that it was not admissible for the general purpose for which it was offered but it would be admitted for the limited purpose of testing the qualifications of the expert witness it would have been incumbent upon counsel for the condemnee to interpose an objection to the admission of the testimony for the limited purpose stated by the court; otherwise he would have acquiesced in the ruling and waived his objection. The court’s charge, above quoted, had the effect of sustaining the objection of the condemnee to the testimony but declaring it admissible for the limited purpose. In such circumstances we think that it was incumbent upon the condemnee to except to the court’s admission of the testimony in the charge for the limited purpose and to enumerate the charge as error, for which provision is clearly made by the Appellate Procedure Act. The con*648demnee took her chances on the outcome of the trial without objecting to the limited consideration of the testimony and is now precluded from urging the point.

The court did not err in rendering the judgment complained of or in overruling the amended motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Hall and Eberhardt, JJ., concur.*
# C_2023329EN.01000101.xml

| 18.9.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 329/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 329/1

---

Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2023/C 329/01)

Last publication

Last publication

OJ C 321, 11.9.2023

Past publications

Past publications

OJ C 314, 4.9.2023

OJ C 304, 28.8.2023

OJ C 296, 21.8.2023

OJ C 286, 14.8.2023

OJ C 278, 7.8.2023

OJ C 271, 31.7.2023

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

---
**Exhibit 14.2**

 

# **CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

 

In connection with theannual report of Corimon, C.A., on Form 20-F for the period endedNovember 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (the “Report”), I, Laura Emperador, Chief Financial Officer ofCorimon, C.A., certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2) The informationcontained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of Corimon, C.A.

 

Date:December 19, 2003

 

LauraEmperador

ChiefFinancial Officer

 

----