79–006

106TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 106–620

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR

2001

MAY 16, 2000.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of

the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. GOSS, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H.R. 4392]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was

referred the bill (H.R. 4392) to authorize appropriations for fiscal

year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the

United States Government, the Community Management Account,

and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill

as amended do pass.

CONTENTS

Page

The bill as reported ................................................................................................. 2

Purpose ..................................................................................................................... 6

Overall perspective on the intelligence budget and committee intent ................ 7

Scope of committee review ...................................................................................... 7

Committee findings and recommendations ........................................................... 8

Areas of Special Interest ......................................................................................... 10

State Department Security Concerns ............................................................. 10

Analyst Collocation ........................................................................................... 14

Oversight of NSA Modernization .................................................................... 15

Collaboration ..................................................................................................... 17

Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination ................................. 18

IC Communications Architect/Architecture .................................................... 19

State of Defense Human Intelligence ............................................................. 22

Military Pay and Civilian Pay ......................................................................... 23

NFIP Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJBs) ............................ 24

Reprogramming and Transfers Within CIA ................................................... 25

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) ................................ 27

Joint Military Intelligence Program ....................................................................... 27

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Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities .......................................................... 35

Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported ............................................. 40

Title I—Intelligence Activities ......................................................................... 40

Section 101—Authorization of Appropriations ....................................... 40

Section 102—Classified Schedule of Authorizations .............................. 40

Section 103—Personnel Ceiling Adjustments ......................................... 40

Section 104—Community Management Account .................................... 40

Section 105—Transfer Authority of the Director of Central Intelligence ..................................................................................................... 41

Title II—Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System ... 42

Section 201—Authorization of Appropriations ....................................... 42

Title III—General Provisions .......................................................................... 42

Section 301—Increase in Employee Compensation and Benefits Authorized by Law ..................................................................................... 42

Section 302—Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence Activities ............. 42

Section 303—Sense of Congress on Intelligence Community Contracting ................................................................................................... 42

Section 304—Authorization for Travel on any Common Carrier for

Certain Intelligence Collection Personnel ........................................... 42

Section 305—Reports on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions ..... 43

Title IV—Central Intelligence Agency ............................................................ 43

Section 401—Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency’s Central

Services Program ................................................................................... 43

Section 402—Technical Corrections ......................................................... 43

Title V—Department of Defense ..................................................................... 43

Section 501—Three-year Extension of Authority to Engage in Commercial Activities as Security for Intelligence Activities .................... 43

Section 502—Contracting Authority for the National Reconnaissance

Office ....................................................................................................... 44

Committee Position and Record Votes Taken ....................................................... 44

Findings and Recommendations of the Committee on Government Reform ...... 45

Oversight Findings .................................................................................................. 45

Fiscal Year Cost Projections ................................................................................... 45

Congressional Budget Office Estimates ................................................................. 45

Committee Cost Estimates ...................................................................................... 48

Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of this Legislation ........................................................................................................................ 48

Changes to Existing Law ........................................................................................ 48

The amendment is as follows:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof

the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Intelligence Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2001’’.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.

Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.

Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.

Sec. 104. Intelligence community management account.

Sec. 105. Transfer authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.

Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

Sec. 303. Sense of the Congress on intelligence community contracting.

Sec. 304. Authorization for travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection personnel.

Sec. 305. Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced

conventional munitions.

TITLE IV—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency’s central services program.

Sec. 402. Technical corrections.

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TITLE V—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. Three-year extension of authority to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence

collection activities.

Sec. 502. Contracting authority for the National Reconnaissance Office.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2001 for the

conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) The Department of Defense.

(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

(4) The National Security Agency.

(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the

Department of the Air Force.

(6) The Department of State.

(7) The Department of the Treasury.

(8) The Department of Energy.

(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.

(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS AND PERSONNEL CEILINGS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as

of September 30, 2001, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related

activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified

Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4392 of the One

Hundred Sixth Congress.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—The Schedule of

Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the

Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the

Schedule, within the executive branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR ADJUSTMENTS.—With the approval of the Director of the Office

of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year

2001 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that

such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized

under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed

two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for

such element.

(b) NOTICE TO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The Director of Central Intelligence

shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House

of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever

the Director exercises the authority granted by this section.

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated

for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2001 the sum of $144,231,000. Within such amount, funds

identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a)

for the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available

until September 30, 2002.

(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized

356 full-time personnel as of September 30, 2001. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community Management

Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to

be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account by subVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:27 May 17, 2000 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\HR620.XXX pfrm03 PsN: HR620
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section (a), there are also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence

Community Management Account for fiscal year 2001 such additional amounts

as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain available until September 30,

2002.

(2) AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL.—In addition to the personnel authorized

by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 2001, there are hereby authorized such additional

personnel for such elements as of that date as are specified in the classified

Schedule of Authorizations.

(d) REIMBURSEMENT.—Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security

Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2001, any officer or employee of the

United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the

Intelligence Community Management Account from another element of the United

States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such

officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required

by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(e) NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in subsection

(a), $28,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center.

Within such amount, funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2002, and funds

provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30,

2003.

(2) TRANSFER OF FUNDS.—The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer

to the Attorney General funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred

for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

(3) LIMITATION.—Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center

may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the

National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(d)(1)).

(4) AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney

General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

SEC. 105. TRANSFER AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

(a) LIMITATION ON DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY OF DEPARTMENTS TO OBJECT TO

TRANSFERS.—Section 104(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–

4(d)(2)) is amended—

(1) by inserting ‘‘(A)’’ after ‘‘(2)’’;

(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) as clauses (i),

(ii), (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively;

(3) in clause (v), as so redesignated, by striking ‘‘the Secretary or head’’ and

inserting ‘‘subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary or head’’; and

(4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

‘‘(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority to object to a transfer under

subparagraph (A)(v) may not be delegated by the Secretary or head of the department involved.

‘‘(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the authority to object to such

a transfer may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense, but only to the Deputy

Secretary of Defense.

‘‘(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) shall have no effect unless submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence in writing.’’.

(b) LIMITATION ON DELEGATION OF DUTIES OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.—Section 104(d)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403–4(d)(1)) is amended—

(1) by inserting ‘‘(A)’’ after ‘‘(1)’’; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

‘‘(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority given the Director

under this subsection to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community

Management.’’.

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TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2001 the sum of $216,000,000.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental

amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute

authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.

It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should

continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible

with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and

where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the

United States.

SEC. 304. AUTHORIZATION FOR TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et

seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

‘‘TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

PERSONNEL

‘‘SEC. 116. (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize travel on any common carrier that, in

the discretion of the Director, would by its use maintain or enhance the protection

of sources or methods of intelligence collection or maintain or enhance the security

of personnel of the intelligence community carrying out intelligence collection activities.

‘‘(b) AUTHORIZED DELEGATION OF DUTY.—The Director may only delegate the authority granted by this section to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, or

with respect to employees of the Central Intelligence Agency the Director may delegate such authority to the Deputy Director for Operations.’’.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the National Security Act

of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 115 the following

new item:

‘‘Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection personnel.’’.

SEC. 305. REPORTS ON ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS.

Section 721(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (50

U.S.C. 2366) (Public Law 104–293, 110 Stat. 3474) is amended—

(1) by striking ‘‘Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of

this Act, and every 6 months thereafter,’’ and inserting ‘‘Not later than March

1, 2001, and every March 1 thereafter,’’; and

(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘6 months’’ and inserting ‘‘year’’.

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TITLE IV—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SEC. 401. MODIFICATIONS TO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.

Section 21(c)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.

403u(c)(2)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (G); and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new subparagraph:

‘‘(F) Receipts from miscellaneous reimbursements from individuals and receipts from the rental of property and equipment to employees and detailees.’’.

SEC. 402. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.

(a) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Section 17(d)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency

Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)) is amended—

(1) by adding ‘‘and’’ at the end of subparagraph (D);

(2) by striking subparagraph (E); and

(3) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (E).

(b) TERMINOLOGY WITH RESPECT TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.—Section 17(e)(8) of

the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(8)) is amended by

striking ‘‘Federal’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘Government’’.

TITLE V—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 501. THREE-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

AS SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

Section 431(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘December

31, 2000’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2003’’.

SEC. 502. CONTRACTING AUTHORITY FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The National Reconnaissance Office (‘‘NRO’’) shall negotiate,

write, and manage vehicle acquisition or launch contracts that affect or bind the

NRO and to which the United States is a party.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall apply to any contract for NRO vehicle acquisition or launch, as described in subsection (a), that is negotiated, written, or executed after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) RETROACTIVITY.—This section shall not apply to any contracts, as described in

subsection (a), in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

PURPOSE

The bill would:

(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for (a) the

intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community Management Account, and (c) the

Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System;

(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 2001

for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the

U.S. Government and permit the Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel ceilings in Fiscal Year 2001 for

any intelligence element up to two percent above the authorized levels, with the approval of the Director of the Office of

Management and Budget;

(3) Authorize $28 million for the National Drug Intelligence

Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;

(4) Authorize intelligence collection personnel of the Intelligence Community to use any common carrier for travel during the course of their intelligence collection activities;

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(5) Permit deposit of certain miscellaneous receipts into the

Central Intelligence Agency’s Working Capital Fund of the

Central Services Program;

(6) Extend the Department of Defense’s authority to engage

in commercial activities as security for intelligence collection

activities;

(7) Limit the authority of the National Reconnaissance Office

to use external contracting offices to negotiate, write, and manage launch vehicle acquisition and launch services contracts.

OVERALL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTELLIGENCE BUDGET AND

COMMITTEE INTENT

The classified Annex to this public report includes the classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated language.

The committee views the classified Annex as an integral part

of this legislation. The classified Annex contains a thorough

discussion of all budget issues considered by the committee,

which underlies the funding authorization found in the Schedule of Authorizations. The committee intends that all intelligence programs and intelligence-related activities discussed

in the classified Annex to this report be conducted in accord

with the guidance and limitations set forth as associate language therein. The classified Schedule is incorporated directly

into this legislation by virtue of section 102 of the bill. The

classified Annex is available for review by all Members of the

House of Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause

13 of Rule XXIV of the House.

SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW

U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under the jurisdiction of the committee include the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related

Activities (TIARA) and the Joint Military Intelligence Program

(JMIP) of the Department of Defense.

The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central Intelligence

Agency, as well as those national foreign intelligence and/or counterintelligence programs conducted by: (1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security

Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5)

the Department of State; (6) the Department of the Treasury; (7)

the Department of Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(9) the National Reconnaissance Office; and (10) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

The Department of Defense TIARA is a diverse array of reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a functional

part of the basic military force structure and provide direct information support to military operations. TIARA, as defined by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, include those

military intelligence activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program that respond to the needs of military commanders

for operational support information, as well as to national command, control, and intelligence requirements. The Armed Services

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Committee in the House of Representatives has joint oversight and

authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising TIARA.

The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated program

management of defense intelligence elements that support defensewide or theater-level consumers. Included within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency and characterized by

similarity, either in intelligence discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence

(SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite

support, aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2)

the Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP), which

itself includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program

(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP), (c)

the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program (DISTP), (d)

the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program (DICP), and (e) the

Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (DSRP). As with TIARA

programs, the Armed Services Committee in the House of Representatives has joint oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the

programs comprising the JMIP.

COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee completed its review of the President’s fiscal year

2001 intelligence budget, carrying out its annual responsibility to

prepare an authorization based on close examination of intelligence

programs and proposed expenditures. The review reflected the

Committee’s continuing belief that intelligence activities must be

examined by program, as well as by function. The committee held

eleven committee budget-related hearings, principally on a program

level, including Covert Action. A separate hearing was on support

to military operations. Likewise, a hearing was held addressing the

Director of Central Intelligence’s (DCI) overall budget submission,

the state of health of the Intelligence Community, and to examine

the DCI’s views and plans for the future of intelligence and the Intelligence Community. There were, in addition, numerous individual briefings of Members and over 200 staff briefings on programs, specific activities, and budget requests.

In the schedule of authorizations and the accompanying explanatory language, the Committee has discussed numerous specific

matters related to the fiscal year 2001 budget. In the following section, the Committee addresses several issues that it believes are

particularly important where it has been no direct budgetary action.

Taken as a whole, the Committee’s budgetary actions and general provisions reflect the Committee’s concern that the United

States is placing undue risks on its armed forces and its national

security interests by not redressing the many crucial problems facing the Intelligence Community.

• In the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) arena, poor planning,

infrastructure problems, extended requirements for military force

protection, and unexpected contingency operations have all worked

to take money from the ‘‘front line’’ field officers, thus limiting our

efforts to rebuild our ‘‘eyes and ears’’ around the globe.

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• In the area of imagery intelligence (IMINT), despite the oversight committees’ exhortations, we are still faced with totally inadequate systems planning and investment for the tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) of the imagery collection capabilities we are building, let alone the capabilities of

other future collectors.

• In the area of space-based collection, unanticipated technical

problems with some satellite programs in development will likely

cause scheduling delays and cost increases. Moreover, an insufficient priority on developing cutting-edge technologies ensures that

the core mission of space intelligence—to collect secrets—will continue to languish and become increasing limited.

• In the area of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

(ISR) assets, we continue to see extensive over-utilization of very

limited, but critical airborne assets, with little relief in sight. While

planning for deployment of new ISR airborne capabilities into the

theaters, the Department of Defense has taken money from existing, supposedly complementary, platforms to pay for future capabilities. The result: our overall ISR capabilities and resources are

decreasing at a time when our military forces are relying on them

more and more.

• The most serious, immediate problem is with signals intelligence (SIGINT) resources. The January ‘‘crash’’ of National Security Agency (NSA) computers was not the result of a terrorist attack or hacker gamesmanship. The problem resulted from NSA’s

lack of resources for new infrastructure needs, the mismanagement

of outdated Information Technology (IT) resources, and the lack of

sufficient acquisition processes and expertise. This should have

come as a surprise to no one. Indeed, the Committee has, for at

least three years, warned NSA and the Intelligence Community of

concerns in these areas. The Director of NSA has begun efforts to

address these issues, and his efforts have the Committee’s support.

Likewise, the Committee has taken specific actions within this bill

to begin to address these issues.

The Committee’s review of this year’s budget request has included testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),

his senior leadership and the managers of individual programs and

agencies, as well as leaders from the Department of Defense and

the military services who use and rely on intelligence systems and

information on a daily basis. Their message has been unanimous

and crystal clear: there are not enough intelligence resources to

meet the immediate needs of national security, let alone future

needs.

For the past five years, the Committee and Congress have sought

to increase the ‘‘top line,’’ or overall funding level for the Intelligence Community. These increases have ranged from significant,

to more modest amounts, such as that found in this year’s recommended authorization. Although Congress has acted, it is the

Administration’s responsibility to build each year a healthy intelligence budget that meets national security needs. With this in

mind, the Committee has also attempted to prod the President, the

Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to reexamine the basic process used to put the yearly budget request together.

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The United States cannot continue to use the same processes to

build the intelligence budgets of the 21st century that were used

in the Cold War. American interests have changed, new threats

have evolved and the priority placed on intelligence and the role of

the Intelligence Community has grown. For the President and senior policymakers, intelligence often forms the basis for key foreign

policy strategies and decisions, and can provide insights as to the

effect of such decisions. At its best, intelligence provides key indications and warning (I&W) information that can direct attention to

issues and areas before crises occur, to allow for appropriate actions to provide stability and, hopefully, deter or avoid conflict. Yet,

despite the need to supply this information, our intelligence resources are primarily directed toward the most important issues,

leaving fewer resources for the critical I&W function, especially in

areas of the world that could erupt overnight.

For the military, intelligence is now the basis for and organic to

everything it does. HUMINT and SIGINT, in particular, provide direct and immediate threat data to personnel engaged in activities

that risk their lives on a daily basis: our ground forces in Kosovo,

our pilots conducting Northern and Southern Watch missions in

Iraq, our troops on the border between North and South Korea, our

forces engaged in counternarcotics operations in Latin America,

and our Special Operations personnel who must enter an area unannounced and undetected, and require the friendly face of an intelligence officer to give them ‘‘ground truth.’’

As these critical requirements have grown at a rapid pace, the

intelligence budget has become more and more inadequate, with

existing resources increasingly drawn off to meet day- to-day tactical requirements. Global coverage and predictive, strategic intelligence have, as a result, suffered. This translates into the lack of

warning of nuclear tests in India, our inability to monitor key facilities suspected of producing weapons of mass destruction because

assets are focused on crisis areas, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the extreme shortage of ISR assets in key areas

of the world.

Intelligence should be the first line of defense, yet, it is not treated as such. Remedying this situation, however, is not a task that

Congress can, or should, take on alone. Along with a new approach

to budgeting by the Administration, there also must be a Community-wide effort actually to work as a ‘‘community.’’

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY CONCERNS

The Committee is deeply disturbed over the loss of a laptop computer from the allegedly secure workspace of the Office of Strategic

Proliferation and Military Affairs of the Bureau of Intelligence and

Research of the Department of State (INR). The laptop contained

highly classified compartmented information.

The State Department failed to notify the FBI about the loss of

the computer until March 22, 2000. On April 17, 2000, an article

appeared in the Washington Post detailing the disappearance of

the laptop. Prior to the news story, neither the House, nor the Senate, intelligence committees were notified of the loss and the potenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:27 May 17, 2000 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR620.XXX pfrm03 PsN: HR620
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tial compromise of highly classified intelligence information, as required by § 502(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The delayed notice (up to two months) to the FBI hindered the

Bureau’s investigation. The Committee does not believe that the

failure by the Department of State and the Central Intelligence

Agency to provide the required notification was justified.

The Committee is also troubled by a pattern of problems at the

Department of State regarding matters of security.

In February 1998, an unknown man in a tweed sport coat was

watched as he entered the ‘‘secure’’ area of the office of the Executive Secretary, which is physically located within the Secretary of

State’s office suite, and walked away with more than a few documents containing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) material. Although the FBI was advised in a timely manner of that

theft, the intelligence oversight committees were notified by INR of

the matter only after news stories concerning the incident were

published by Time magazine and the Washington Post.

In September 1998, the State Department’s Inspector General

documented a failure of the State Department to protect classified

intelligence information. State Department officials have not responded fully to the Inspector General’s recommendations. In the

Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999, Congress directed the Inspector General to perform a review of the Department’s procedures for protecting intelligence information within

headquarters. The Inspector General was also asked to make recommendations based on her findings to enhance security.

In September 1999, the intelligence committees received that report. The Inspector General concluded that ‘‘the Department of

State is substantially not in compliance with the DCIDs (Director

of Central Intelligence Directives) that govern the handling of SCI.’’

The Inspector General described a situation where unescorted foreign visitors are permitted access to the Department. Uncleared

maintenance, repair, and char force personnel were permitted

unescorted access to areas where classified intelligence information

is handled, processed, stored, and discussed.

Substantial security enhancements were recommended by the Inspector General. Most significantly, the Inspector General urged

the implementation of a visitor escort policy. It was noted in the

September 1999 audit that although the Bureau of Diplomatic Security published visitor escort requirements on November 17, 1998,

these were rescinded on November 23, 1998, on the direct order of

the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. By the time of the

publication of the Inspector General report, a new escort policy was

in effect, but the Committee has continuing concerns about its

scope and enforcement. Additionally, the Inspector General called

for better control mechanisms for intelligence information, noting

that the State Department was not in full compliance with the applicable DCIDs regarding SCI material.

In December 1999, a Russian diplomat was arrested outside the

State Department in connection with the discovery of a Russian

bugging device in the chairrail of a seventh floor conference room

in the Main State building.

Were intelligence information not so important for the State Department for the conduct of informed foreign policy, the Committee

12

would likely be advocating drastic measures cutting off access to

highly classified materials. After all, the unauthorized disclosure of

intelligence information jeopardizes lives of intelligence officers and

assets and compromise multi-billion dollar secret intelligence capabilities. Nevertheless, the Committee is hopeful that measured responses can accomplish the objective of improving security practices at Main State and throughout the Department. Serious and

meaningful action, however, must be taken and compliance with

DCID procedures by State Department employees and officials

must be verified. Moreover, accountability for security failures

must be real.

In this regard, the Committee notes that on April 24, 2000, Secretary Albright transferred responsibility for protection of SCI material from INR to the Diplomatic Security Bureau, which was suggested by the State Inspector General in September 1999. This

step, and others announced by the Secretary, may need to be reviewed, but they are at least a recognition that a serious situation

exists at the State Department with respect to its cavalier attitude

toward security generally and particularly toward intelligence information. It is unconscionable that, as the Inspector General

found, security of intelligence information within INR was not a

priority.

Although ample criticism can be directed toward State Department officials, the Committee also notes that the DCI has not exercised his authorities in this regard to his utmost. The Committee

finds it necessary to emphasize again that the DCI is obligated

under law to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure (50 U.S.C. § 403–3(c)(6)) and, further, is responsible for ensuring the establishment of security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information, and products (Exec. Order 12333 Part 1.5(g) and (h), respectively). In this regard, the Committee appreciates the DCI’s recent commitment to form ‘‘an Agency task force to conduct a

prompt and thorough inventory, review, and risk-assessment of the

information resident on the missing laptop’s hard-drive.’’ (DCI letter to the Secretary of State, 2 May 2000). Additionally, the Committee looks forward to the DCI’s evaluation of ‘‘the need for additional improvements in the handling and accountability for classified information, particularly Sensitive Compartmented Information, in the Intelligence Community.’’ The Committee fully expects

the DCI to focus considerable attention on the State Department,

in this regard.

The Committee also expects the DCI, as part of this evaluation,

to review and make recommendations about the number of positions at the State Department that require SCI-level clearances

and the appropriate number of SCI facilities (SCIF) within the

State Department. The Committee requests that the DCI submit

these recommendations to the Committee prior to conference on

this bill.

The Committee also requests that the DCI certify to the Committee, in writing, that the State Department is in full compliance

with all of the DCIDs concerning information security, counterintelligence measures, and personnel security, as well as any execVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:27 May 17, 2000 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR620.XXX pfrm03 PsN: HR620
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utive orders, regulations, or policy directives affecting the protection and handling of classified intelligence information.

Pending the receipt of the DCI’s report, including the results of

his review and recommendations, and receipt of the certification of

compliance with the DCIDs, the Committee recommends a fence of

a portion of those funds authorized to be appropriated for INR’s activities in this bill, and a fence of a portion of those funds authorized to be appropriated by this bill to the Office of the DCI. The

Committee, likewise, recommends that additional funding be transferred to the CIA to help fund infrastructure needs associated with

the detailing of INR analysts to the Directorate of Intelligence of

the CIA, and to reimburse the Department of State for such analysts who will be co-located at the CIA. For further elucidation of

the issues relating to the detailing and colocation of INR analysts,

see the budget language relating to the CIAP and the general provisions section, supra. Finally, because of the attitudes related to

security procedures and awareness, as previously described, and

based on several Committee inquiries while visiting diplomatic

posts throughout the world, the Committee is also taking steps to

reorganize the management, operations and security of diplomatic

telecommunications. A discussion of these steps can be found within the classified annex.

It should be noted that the Committee will be conducting an investigation of security of classified intelligence information at the

Department of State. Indeed, the Committee has engaged the services of a security and counter-intelligence expert to assist in this

investigation. The consultant and other participants in the investigation will:

1. Undertake field inspection visits on behalf of the Committee to those State Department components responsible for

counterintelligence, protection of intelligence sources and

methods, and related security issues;

2. Review compliance by the State Department with applicable laws, regulations, executive orders, and policy guidance

pertaining to counterintelligence, protection of intelligence

sources and methods, and related security issues;

3. Interview personnel from the State Department and other

intelligence community elements concerning the effectiveness

of counterintelligence, protection of intelligence sources and

methods, and related security issue reforms being implemented

by the Department of State;

4. Provide a written report on the materials, measures, and

capabilities currently available, and planned to be made available, to the State Department concerning counterintelligence,

protection of intelligence sources and methods, and related security issues;

5. Provide a written report on the status of and implementation of reforms concerning counterintelligence, protection of intelligence sources and methods, and related security issues at

the Department of State; and

6. Recommend to the Committee, in writing, any additional

measures that would improve counterintelligence, protection of

intelligence sources and methods, and related security issues

at the State Department.

14

The Committee expects that the report of the investigation will

consider whether an intelligence information security office (IISO)

should be established within INR to manage intelligence information security practices. Such an office could perform the following

functions: ensure compliance with the DCIDs and all other laws,

regulations, and executive orders relating to the protection of intelligence information; implement and enforce necessary control

mechanisms relating to access to classified intelligence information;

undertake counterintelligence measures that enhance the protection of the intelligence information and the sources and methods of

intelligence collection, such as the implementation of counterintelligence polygraph examinations; report in a timely fashion to the

appropriate government entities, including the intelligence oversight committees, of any violation of security measures that are designed to protect SCI material and sources and methods. The office

could report to the Secretary and the DCI through the Assistant

Secretary for INR and be comprised of officers detailed from CIA,

NSA, and the FBI, who are experienced professionals with significant backgrounds in security and counterintelligence matters.

The Committee looks forward to the conclusion in the report on

whether the creation of an IISO is useful or wise, and whether, if

created, it would be effective at improving what has been characterized by the DCI and Secretary of State as a ‘‘cultural attitude’’

of disinterest in security within the Department of State. Such an

attitude has over time minimized the importance of security, which

is ‘‘an inherent, inextricable, and indispensable component of all

jobs’’ at the Department of State (Secretary Albright at DoS, 3 May

2000).

The Secretary of State declared to the employees of the Department of State on May 3, 2000, ‘‘If you are not a professional about

security, you are a failure.’’ The Committee could not agree more

strongly. Actions, however, will be the true test of the Department’s commitment to improve security, a commitment to which

the Secretary has personally associated herself.

ANALYST COLLOCATION

All-source analysis is the sine qua non of intelligence production.

This category includes intelligence products that have been written

by analysts who have access to all available intelligence information collected on a particular issue or area, including human intelligence, imagery, signals intelligence, open-source information, and

any other data collected through other specific technical programs

or special platforms. All-source intelligence can provide the highest

quality, most complete assessment of a situation for the military

commanders and policy makers who face critical decisions.

Within the NFIP, all-source analysis is concentrated within the

Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency,

although the National Intelligence Council, the National Drug Intelligence Center, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence

and Research, and the Department of Energy all maintain allsource analysis capabilities. In addition, many analysts at the socalled ‘‘stovepipe’’ agencies—such as the National Security Agency

and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency—perform many allVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:27 May 17, 2000 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR620.XXX pfrm03 PsN: HR620
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source analytical functions, even if they are not classified specifically as ‘‘all source analysts.’’

The Committee has for many years promoted the concept of Intelligence Community ‘‘corporateness.’’ In the 1996 study IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, the Committee recommended a more corporate, consolidated approach to intelligence,

and the reinforcement of the CIA’s role as the premier all-source

analytical agency.

In order to foster a more corporate approach to all-source analysis and to support the DCI’s goals for developing new analytic

methods and investing in people and knowledge, the Committee

has transferred funds into the Central Intelligence Agency Program

for the collocation of analysts from State/INR at CIA. These analysts are to be located within the CIA’s DI on a reimbursable basis.

The Committee also believes that the Community’s all-source capabilities and expertise may also be enhanced with the collocation

of NSA SIGINT analysts within the CIA’s DI, in a similar fashion

to NIMA imagery analysts who are deployed there today. Therefore, the Committee directs the DCI and the Director, NSA, to

study the concept of moving some NSA analysts to the CIA’s DI

and to report to the Committee, prior to the submission of the fiscal year 2002 budget request, on steps that can be taken to effect

this. The Committee would prefer that such a program be implemented no later than in fiscal year 2002.

The Committee believes that all parties will benefit from this collocation. The CIA’s DI will benefit from the expertise in SIGINT

and diplomatic collection that the NSA and INR analysts will bring

with them. Likewise, the NSA and INR analysts and analysis can

draw upon the knowledge and resources of the DI.

OVERSIGHT OF NSA MODERNIZATION

As the Committee’s own investigations clearly indicate, and as

the analyses of the DCI’s Senior Acquisition Executive (SAE), outside experts, and the new NSA Director confirm, NSA is in very serious need of acquisition reform. Acquisition problems, in fact, may

prevent NSA from developing a good modernization plan, implementing, properly estimating the cost of modernization, and determining whether more money than currently programmed is needed

for the Agency and, if so, how much.

NSA was obviously extremely successful for many decades

against Cold War foes. The telecommunications sectors of these adversaries, however, tended to evolve relatively slowly, and older

forms of communication were rarely, if ever, discarded altogether.

The U.S. SIGINT enterprise successfully attacked these threats

with a decentralized resource management and allocation process;

decentralized, distributed tasking and processing; and sometimes

with large development programs involving industry. During the

1980’s budget increases, NSA decided to build up its in-house government scientists and engineers and the Agency now seems to believe that in-house talent can address the rapidly evolving signals

environment better than outsiders can. Budget problems and processes also contributed to the proliferation of small independent activities, and this evolution accentuated the traditional high degree

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tems across the SIGINT architecture. The culture demanded

compartmentation, valued hands-on technical work, and encouraged in-house prototyping. It placed little value on program management, contracting development work to industry, and the associated systems engineering skills.

Today, an entirely new orientation is required. NSA now faces

new, more robust challenges, thanks to the explosion of the technology and telecommunications industries. Each type of communication—radio, satellite, microwave, cellular, cable—is becoming

connected to all the others. Each new type of traffic shows up on

every type of communication. Unfortunately, as the global network

has become more integrated, NSA’s culture has evolved so that it

is seemingly incapable of responding in an integrated fashion.

To tackle this target, NSA cannot remain split into multiple, separate collection ‘‘stovepipes.’’ It cannot afford to allow multiple subcomponents to decide what capabilities to build, because the result

today can be wasteful duplication and crippling gaps in capability.

NSA must be organized and operated as a single, cohesive enterprise, within a common tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination framework. Building this new system is, by definition,

a major undertaking that requires careful preparation. NSA must

overcome its instinct to try to solve all its problems at once, by

launching out with a series of development efforts without first

doing the laborious work of defining requirements and developing

an architecture, end-to-end program planning, life-cycle costing,

and developing an acquisition strategy. NSA’s modernization must

result in a highly integrated system, and will require a very sophisticated systems engineering and program management capability—

the like of which NSA has not experienced in a very long time, if

ever. The acquisition model used by NSA must include spiral development to manage risk and keep up with the rapidly changing signals environment. NSA must also take a hard look at the extent

to which a relatively small number of government engineers, however talented, can be expected to keep up with the massive and dynamic commercial industry.

In summary, it seems clear to the Committee that NSA must

prepare itself for complex, prioritized, carefully timed and integrated systems acquisitions that, in aggregate, rival the complexity

of programs commonly managed by the NRO, the Defense Department, and commercial industry. NSA must quickly and effectively

position itself to make ruthlessly honest assessments about inhouse development versus contracting out. This effort will require

a very well thought out acquisition plan, so that capabilities can be

developed, delivered, and integrated as quickly and effectively as

possible. The Agency must rapidly enhance its program management and systems engineering skills and heed the dictates of these

disciplines, including looking at options to contract out for these

skills.

The Committee believes that the NSA Director and other elements of the Agency grasp these imperatives. General Hayden has

already taken some initial but important steps to implement them.

The Committee does not underestimate the complexity and sheer

magnitude of the problems involved in remaking an insular instituVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:27 May 17, 2000 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR620.XXX pfrm03 PsN: HR620
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tion that has always prided itself, with reason, on its ability to get

the job done its own way.

Due to the formidable nature of this problem and the potential

costs required, and given the stakes involved for the nation’s security, the Committee believes that a structure of competent external

oversight must be brought to bear on NSA’s modernization program. The Committee requests that the DCI’s SAE prepare and report to the congressional intelligence and defense committees, a

plan for review, approval and continued monitoring of NSA’s integrated modernization program. This plan should incorporate the

views and recommendations of the Independent Architecture Panel,

which should advise on the appropriate acquisition model, and the

SAE should participate in relevant panel deliberations. The Committee expects this oversight to include review of requirements definition, architecture, cost estimates, acquisition strategy (including

the role of industry), and program milestones. The Committee believes that such standing oversight should be tailored to NSA’s

needs and should be streamlined to a degree commensurate with

NSA’s demonstrated competence and internal controls. The acquisition model selected should enable rapid, perhaps sequential, fielding of the integrated architecture, bearing in mind the shortcomings in NSA’s current development methodology. Given the fast

turnover in technology, the Committee believes that proven commercial model could provide the basis for NSA’s approach. This report is requested by November 1, 2000.

This external oversight serves two major purposes. One, it can

help to force NSA to come to grips with its challenges and actually

make the reforms that most agree are necessary.

And two, with such an oversight structure in place, Congress and

the Executive Branch leadership can allocate scarce resources to

NSA with more confidence that funds will be expended effectively.

COLLABORATION

The Committee is frustrated with the Intelligence Community’s

funereal pace in the area of electronic collaboration. In startling

testimony, the DCI stated flatly that collaboration, which is one of

the major thrusts of his strategic intent, is being stymied by the

parochial interests of the intelligence agencies.

The Committee understands that there are real security issues

that must be resolved before the DCI’s goal of unfettered collaboration across the Intelligence Community can be achieved. However,

the Committee agrees with the DCI and his senior advisor for intelligence production, that these security issues are being used as

an excuse for inaction. In fact, the agencies’ torpor seems to be due

more to fears about sharing information and the possibility of relinquishing some bureaucratic control over the intelligence production

process. In all probability, another factor is the disregard organizations habitually display for techniques and systems that were invented or sponsored by others.

The Committee notes that DIA has a very successful and capable

collaboration system embedded in the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) that is being fielded within the defense intelligence community. A National Intelligence Council study from two

years ago all but endorsed this system as a Community standard,

18

and all analyses since clearly indicate that JIVA is the best of

breed and mature and affordable enough for proliferation across

the rest of the Intelligence Community. JIVA is based on COTS

tools, and is structured to ensure that the government can always

shift to the best commercial product and reap the benefits of commercial investment and competition.

The Committee does not have confidence that the current approach of attempting to engineer ‘‘interoperability’’ between disparate systems will produce more than minimal capabilities. In

fact, the Community’s current concept of waiting and working towards a ‘‘standard-based interoperability,’’ in the Committee’s view,

ignores the realities of commercial technology and its pace of development. As a result of these attitudes, the Committee doubts that

universal standards can be developed using the current approach.

The Committee is even less impressed with arguments promoting

long-term operational use of the CVW system built upon tools developed by the Mitre Corporation. Its president has indicated clearly that Mitre’s product is not suitable for an operational capability,

certainly not on an enterprise-wide basis.

Based on these factors, the Committee has taken specific actions

that can be found in the classified annex. The JIVA program manager is encouraged to pursue all reasonable means to meet the special needs of each customer, based on these actions, and to explore

all avenues for incorporating all the best commercial tools within

the JIVA suite, to provide customers, on a cost-effective basis, with

as many choices as possible for collaboration tools to meet their

needs, and to seek every possible means to reduce the cost of virtual collaboration. The JIVA program manager also needs to explore with industry ideas to overcome legitimate security issues

and to enable management to retain appropriate control over the

activities of subordinates and the quality of products. In this regard, the Committee notes that new business models, such as socalled application service provider schemes, might indeed provide

means to allow users to use multiple tools, as they see fit, while

at the same time greatly reducing enterprise-wide costs, security

risks, and the erosion of management controls over analyst interactions.

TASKING, PROCESSING, EXPLOITATION, AND DISSEMINATION

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 directed

the DCI and the Secretary of Defense to restructure the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) satellite program by reducing the number

of satellites in the planned constellation. Congress directed this action because ample testimony, briefings, and reports showed that

current plans for improving imagery tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) fell far short of the planned expansion of collection capacity, from both aircraft and satellites. The

report accompanying the Act pointed out that it would be a waste

of the taxpayers’ money to buy expensive satellites whose product

could not be fully utilized. The report indicated that the intelligence committees would reconsider the requirement to restructure

the FIA program based on the administration’s budget planning for

TPED as reflected in the fiscal year 2001 amendment to the fiscal

19

year 2000 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and in preliminary plans for the new fiscal year 2002 FYDP.

The administration has, indeed, added funding to the current

FYDP in the fiscal year 2001 budget request. The Committee

agrees that this figure represents a substantial investment. However, it is well short of the range of necessary investment reported

to Congress by the administration both last year and in testimony

this year. Moreover, the Deputy Secretary of Defense testified that,

despite general acknowledgment of the need for greater TPED investment, it will be difficult for the administration to come up with

the money, owing to competing priorities within the military services and the Intelligence Community. In addition, the Deputy Secretary noted that the last budget of an outgoing administration can

be expected to lack some rigor, and that in the last analysis it will

be up to the new President and his team to resolve difficult issues.

A final complicating factor is the DCI’s reticence about additional

major investment in imagery TPED. The DCI and his senior staff

have expressed concern about competing priorities, NIMA’s ability

to manage a large and complex systems acquisition, the share of

the TPED funding burden that should be assigned to the intelligence community vice the rest of the defense budget, and whether

the TPED requirements are, as yet, adequately defined.

With respect to NIMA’s acquisition management capabilities, the

DCI’s Senior Acquisition Executive, in conjunction with staff from

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, have concluded that NIMA

has a solid plan and foundation in place to remedy its weaknesses,

and that, if this plan is faithfully executed, NIMA should be able

to manage the TPED modernization program effectively. Executing

such a plan, however, is no small task as NIMA does not now have

the expertise required, and hiring this expertise will require significant effort and some changes to legislation.

The Committee expects that the DCI and the Secretary of Defense will ensure that imagery TPED funding requirements will be

a priority issue for their joint review in the IPRG and EDRB processes. The Committee expects also to be informed of the administration’s intentions with respect to TPED funding in the fiscal year

2002 FYDP prior to conference. Finally, the Committee hopes that

the new administration will take note of the seriousness of the

TPED issue, and will place a priority on increased investments in

this, and other, areas.

IC COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECT/ARCHITECTURE

The Committee continues to be frustrated by the lack of a coherent, cohesive, and productive approach to solving the Intelligence

Community’s (IC) systems interoperability and communications

problems. It is clear that the IC’s office of Chief Information Officer

has not been able to force the disparate IC organizations to work

together to develop a communications architecture plan that provides for a truly integrated communications network that relies on

commercial industry infrastructure, protocols and enforced standards.

The Committee believes the importance of a networked and

interoperable IC cannot be overstated. Every function of intelVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:27 May 17, 2000 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR620.XXX pfrm03 PsN: HR620
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ligence tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TPED)

relies on communications. The IC must have a communications architecture that provides the basis for inter-IC collaboration and the

framework from which intelligence consumers, such as the Department of Defense, can seamlessly ‘‘reach into’’ the community for intelligence support to their missions. The Committee believes that

the IC must rapidly adopt commercial systems and technologies to

create a common interoperable wide-area information transport

network to meet all Community needs.

Clearly, before the Community can bring together the various IC

organizations into such a network, a professional communications

architect must be designated and assigned. This architect must be

provided with the necessary resources and authorities to design,

construct and enforce the standards of an IC communications network. Such an architect’s responsibilities should include providing

the Community with a detailed communications architecture plan,

complete with transmission and interoperability standards, within

which each IC organization must operate.

The Committee believes that the resulting network must integrate all IC organizations and provide the physical and virtual

framework for the IC to conduct its various intelligence missions

and interface with its external customers. The Committee further

believes that the architect should determine whether the existing

Advanced Telecommunications Network (ATN) is compatible with

the future network architecture and whether it should be established quickly as a common initial communications baseline for all

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) agencies. However,

the Committee believes that the Intelligence Community Communications Architect (ICCA) should devise the most cost and performance effective communications network possible, using commercial telecommunications infrastructures where possible and logical. In this regard, the Committee urges the ICCA to examine

outsourcing the ATN network.

The Committee’s recommendations are based on the impressive

work done by the Defense Science Board task force on DoD communications. Their report of February 2000, concludes that existing

and future military communications will be incapable of meeting

DoD customer needs and makes a case that the government should

rapidly and competitively outsource its communications to commercial service providers, laying the foundation for full interoperability

and improving capabilities enormously. The task force report contends that the commercial sector is rapidly converging to a fully integrated, interoperable, multi-media (voice, data, video, etc.) network based on Internet Protocols (IP). The implication is that packet-switching technology and protocols will soon enable high-quality

real-time services (such as voice and video) and thereby eliminate

the need for any vestiges of point-to-point circuit- switched technology. In the words of the task force, ‘‘the shift from a point-topoint to a common-user infrastructure has become more aggressive.

As the Internet provides services to support both real-time and

non-real-time applications, the convergence of our national and

international telecommunications infrastructure to a common-user,

packet-switched, dynamically shared network of networks will accelerate.’’

21

The task force argues that this single dominant internet is robust and redundant, and that adequate security can be achieved

through the application of modern information security technology

and the use of virtual private networks.

Therefore, the Committee directs the DCI to create and staff the

position of IC Communications Architect (ICCA), providing this individual direction to determine whether and how the IC should implement the DSB’s commercial communications recommendations.

The DCI is to provide the necessary formal governance authorities

to the ICCA to plan the IC communications network and its associated commercially based standards and protocols. The ICCA is authorized to create a professional communications team.

No later than six months after the enactment of this act, no

funds for wide area communications shall be obligated or expended

by any program manager without the approval of the ICCA. A formal IC network design and plan to achieve such will be provided

to the Congress not later than February 1, 2002.

Although the Committee is not prepared, at this time, to direct

the DCI to empower the ICCA with specific responsibilities and authorities, it requests the DCI to provide the Committee with his

recommendations for such, prior to conference on the fiscal year

2001 bill. The Committee believes the ICCA, at a minimum,

should:

1. Have complete authority and control over expenditures for any

and all NFIP communications infrastructures to ensure the coordinated development and maintenance of an integrated IC communications network. The ICCA should, to the maximum extent possible, work with and include all tactical intelligence entities in the

development of the IC communications infrastructure.

2. Have complete authority and control over policies for any and

all Intelligence Community information management policies, relating to the wide area network.

3. Maintain and update the IC’s communications architectural

plan. The Architect should direct the commercial teams to develop

the initial architecture in close coordination with the NIMA TPED

Pre-Acquisition activities and with the CIA (see related text in the

classified annex), but should ensure the network solution satisfies

the broader SIGINT, MASINT, and other intelligence related communications requirements.

4. Address the Information Management requirements for the

community and include a plan for implementation.

5. Develop and implement central control authorities, management structures, processes, and mechanisms that ensure authorities and control can be effectively maintained. This should include

execution of commercial communications contracts for the common

good of the community.

6. Develop governing policies, promulgate guidance, and ensure

compliance with an IC Information Management System. The Architect should have the requisite authorities to carry out these duties for all aspects of Information Management for the network and

should ensure information can be efficiently exchanged and that

collaboration is enabled, etc.

7. Establish a senior advisory board that includes representatives

of ASD/C3I, CMS, CIO Executive Council, NSSA, NRO, NIMA,

22

*Office of the Secretary of Defense, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

(OSD/C31) Review of Defense Human Intellligence, March 2000. Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper

(USAF, Ret.) led the study team.

NSA, DIA, and CIA to ensure all communications network requirements are considered.

8. Establish a team to review expenditures for communications

between and among all intelligence community facilities. These

funds will be identified for consolidation and centralized execution.

9. Develop a centralized process for requirements development

and programmatic planning for the community.

The Committee believes this issue is a critical one and will monitor efforts in this area closely. Additional details related to this

issue can be found in the classified annex.

STATE OF DEFENSE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

The Defense HUMINT Service was established in 1995, consolidating almost all Department of Defense human intelligence activities—both clandestine and overt—into a single service. Five years

later, DHS has progressed beyond the ‘‘growing pains’’ stage and

can be considered an established, if not yet mature, organization.

Overall, the Committee finds that the state of defense HUMINT

is ‘‘acceptable’’ and improving. The Committee agrees with the authors of the recently released ‘‘Clapper Study’’* that DHS has overcome many organizational and resource-related hurdles to become

greater than the sum of its parts—although there are still many

problems and challenges facing defense HUMINT that the Intelligence Community must address.

On the positive side, DHS has provided a single point of planning

and coordination for almost all clandestine defense HUMINT. Several years ago, the Committee issued a study (IC21: Intelligence

Community in the 21st Century) that included a recommendation

to consolidate all U.S. clandestine human intelligence—including

clandestine defense HUMINT—into a single Clandestine Service.

Neither CIA nor DoD has taken the initiative to create such an organization, but the Committee has noticed a gradually improving

level of cooperation between the operational elements of CIA and

DHS—particularly among officers in the field.

The Committee believes, however, that in order to maintain a

viable defense human intelligence collection activity (not to mention improve its performance), a host of current and future problems must be resolved. Included in this list are issues specific to

DHS and DoD that were addressed in the Clapper Study—the

Committee believes that these are currently being addressed by the

appropriate elements within DoD—and the Committee will continue to follow the progress made on the 75 individual recommendations.

Further, the Committee believes there are several issues falling

outside the sole jurisdiction of DHS and DoD that the Intelligence

Community must address in order to ensure defense HUMINT viability.

The first of these is the level of support defense HUMINT provides to the military. As the testimony of the unified command J–

2’s before the Committee earlier this year indicates, human intelligence is highly valued, but HUMINT coverage is nonexistent or

23

in short supply in many areas of the world where the United

States may find it necessary to deploy troops.

Efforts to enhance HUMINT coverage are steps in the right direction, but, as testimony demonstrates, it’s just a start. The Committee believes that the need for additional DHS resources can be

better articulated and defended. At a time when some in Congress

are questioning the need for new DAOs and the coverage they will

provide, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and other seniors in the Intelligence Community must provide the leadership that has been lacking to this point.

Finally, the Committee believes that there needs to be a longterm strategic plan for defense human intelligence, and that this

must be part of the overall Intelligence Community strategic plan

for HUMINT. On one level, this involves DHS and DIA working

with the Secretary of Defense, the unified commands, and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. But the Director of Central Intelligence and the

CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations must fulfill their own responsibilities for leadership of the Intelligence Community and U.S.

HUMINT, respectively, and working with the Director of DHS develop a strategic plan for HUMINT that fully incorporates the requirements and collection capabilities of defense human intelligence.

MILITARY PAY AND CIVILIAN PAY

The fiscal year 2001 budget request for the NFIP includes requests for military and civilian pay that are grossly misleading.

Military pay costs are based on a specific authorized strength.

However, the actual fill rate of these billets has reached unacceptable levels, and the forecast is for continued decline. The Committee has examined in detail the fill rates in two accounts: the

General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), and the Consolidated Cryptographic Program (CCP). In the GDIP, the March 2000

reported fill rate was 85.6 percent—a significant decline from the

1998 level (94.2 percent). In the CCP, the March 2000 reported fill

rate was 88 percent, and the actual assigned rate was 81 percent.

The costs to the programs of these empty billets—which must still

be paid for—is significant.

In both accounts, the percentage of filled billets will continue to

decline due to decisions by the services to fill joint billets at substantially the same level as regular service positions. National-level

intelligence agencies draw a significant portion of their military

support from joint billets—billets the services had previously filled

at a higher level. The Committee is under no illusions that the intelligence community is alone in bearing the impact of hollow personnel authorizations—finding the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and

Air Force personnel to staff authorized positions is a serious problem for the services themselves and all of the defense-related organizations they support.

The Committee can accept—has accepted in the past—that authorized military positions within the NFIP will always outnumber

the actual personnel that fill them. An average fill rate of 90 percent or above is a risk that can be managed. The Committee will

not accept fill rates that are moving to the 75 percent level, or

lower, across the Intelligence Community.

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In response to the current problem (and the future trend) in this

area, the Director of Central Intelligence has directed those intelligence programs with large numbers of military personnel to look

at converting military billets into civilian billets where that is feasible. Although this action may be necessary to address the immediate crisis, the Committee is concerned about its long-term impact

on the Intelligence Community.

One problem associated with lowering the percentage of military

positions within the NFIP is the resulting loss of military knowledge and lines of communication (both official and unofficial). Any

erosion in these areas will only lead to intelligence gaps and future

failures.

A second problem with the proposed remedy is the civilian system itself. The Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain civilian personnel—especially in this economy. Add to this the fact

that the existing intelligence workforce is now crowded at the top

of the government grade scale, the rising costs of the Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) and health insurance—and the

result is a bill for civilian pay that is approaching (or in some

cases, exceeding) 50 percent of the total budget. This trend in civilian pay is not sustainable.

The Committee believes that a long-term effort is required to address this problem. Therefore, in order to assist its oversight in this

area the Committee has requested a report from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management on: (1) the

scope of the current problems in the NFIP associated with military

and civilian personnel structures; (2) the future trends for both; (3)

all possible remedies; and (4) the pros and cons of each. This report

is due no later than 1 January 2001.

NFIP CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION BOOKS (CBJB S)

The Committee has become increasingly frustrated with the lack

of detail provided in the project descriptions in the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) CBJBs. Further, the Committee

believes that the financial management practices at some NFIP

agencies are so inadequate that specific project-level financial information is not even well known corporately. For example, in preparation for the budget authorization, the Committee had to, once

again ask representatives from CIA and NSA to provide additional

programmatic information on their systems development activities—basic information that apparently was not readily available.

If NFIP agencies are unable to provide detailed financial data for

the congressional oversight process, the Committee questions

whether they have the detail necessary to make sound investment

decisions. Clearly, the NFIP agencies need greater insight into

their financial obligations and the capabilities that they are developing. NSA’s baseline activity, for example, identified many areas

of duplicative development, as well as lack of investment in key

strategic areas. Yet, due to the lack of detail, the CBJB did not provide this information. The Committee notes that, at least at some

agencies, internal financial management practices seriously complicate this process (see item on Reprogramming and Transfers).

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opment activities and their associated budget will benefit congressional oversight, the DCI budget management process, and internal

agency investment processes. The Committee believes the NFIP

CBJBs should more closely mirror the level of detail provided in

the Joint Military Intelligence Program Congressional Justification

Books and in the Department of Defense Justification of Estimates

documents.

The Committee, therefore, expects a change to the format and

content of the NFIP budget submission. Specifically, the Committee

wants all future NFIP CBJBs to provide the following information

on each project valued at $1.0 million or more (including systems

developed by government personnel): • project mission description and budget item justification; • key performance characteristics and requirements; • organizations providing management oversight; • customers and products associated with the project; • contract information; • budget breakout by program element number (RDT&E,

Procurement, O&M) for the two proceeding fiscal years, the

budget year, the FYDP, and cost to complete; • civilian and military manpower numbers and costs; • program highlights/planned program by type of funding

(RDT&E, Procurement, O&M) for the two preceding years, the

budget year, and one year beyond the budget year; • project budgetary change summary and explanation; • related program funding summary; and, • the project milestone schedule.

REPROGRAMMING AND TRANSFERS WITHIN CIA

This year, during the course of the Committee’s oversight of CIA

stations and bases overseas, significant and deleterious movements

of money from activities at stations and bases for initiatives at CIA

headquarters were discovered. The cumulative impact of these actions substantially changed the intent and the effect of the budget

for fiscal year 2000 as enacted.

The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), which

created CIA, imposed restrictions upon the movement of appropriated funds within and between intelligence accounts. The Committee is concerned that the practices of CIA may not comply with

the letter or the spirit of the Act. The Committee notes that similar

problems also are evident in other NFIP programs; however, the

impact seems to be most pervasive within the CIA, especially in

terms of the effect on ‘‘core’’ mission.

Reprogramming

For movement of funds from one intelligence activity to another

within an account, section 504(a)(3) (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) of the National Security Act requires that:

(A) the activity to be funded is a higher priority intelligence

or intelligence-related activity;

(B) the need for funds for such activity is based on unforeseen requirements; and

(C) the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, or the Attorney General, as appropriate, has notified the

26

appropriate congressional committees of the intent to make

such funds available for such activity.

The movement of money from one activity to another within an

intelligence account has been made subject to some accommodation

between the agencies and Congress. Heretofore, for example, Congress has allowed the reprogramming of money below a certain dollar threshold to proceed without formal notification to Congress.

The agencies, in turn, have solicited the approval of Congress for

certain reprogrammings that involve matters of specific congressional interest. On occasion, furthermore, Congress has exercised

its discretion to approve the reprogramming of funds under circumstances that do not meet the strict requirements of section 504.

Unlike the agencies, which are bound by the terms of that section,

Congress has constitutional authority for exercising such discretion.

This year, unfortunately, various CIA officials have attempted to

assert that the substantive requirements of section 504 may not

apply to reprogrammings below the monetary threshold for notification to Congress; that the exercise of congressional discretion in

certain reprogrammings has somehow excused CIA from compliance with section 504 in its own movements of money; and that the

plain meaning of the terms ‘‘unforeseen requirements’’ and ‘‘higher

priority’’ is beyond the ken of those in CIA charged with moving

money. These assertions threaten to disrupt the system for compliance with section 504 that, until recently, had appeared to work

easily and well. These assertions also challenge the ability of Congress to oversee the execution of an intelligence budget as enacted.

They invite a strong, corrective response.

The Committee has asked CIA’s Inspector General to investigate

whether CIA has complied with section 504 in its reprogramming

practices and procedures. In the meantime, to provide additional

clarification in this matter, the Committee notes that (a) at no time

has Congress authorized the CIA or any other intelligence agency

to ignore the requirements of section 504 that a reprogramming be

for a higher priority activity and that it be based upon unforeseen

requirements; (b) at no time has Congress designated the movement of money within the agencies as an ‘‘internal’’ matter beyond

congressional oversight authority; and (c) Congress remains responsible for ensuring that appropriated funds are executed by the intelligence agencies in a manner that is effective and lawful.

Transfers

The National Security Act also restricts the movement of appropriated funds between intelligence accounts. To transfer funds between accounts within the National Foreign Intelligence Program,

section 104(d) of that Act requires, among other things, that

(A) the funds * * * are being transferred to an activity that

is a higher priority intelligence activity; and

(B) the need for funds * * * for such activity is based on unforeseen requirements * * *.

Like reprogramming under section 504, transfers also require notice to Congress. The requirements for transfers, like those for reprogramming, provide some check on the movement of money and

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ments take place. The procedures for transfers under section 104(d)

have, until recently, worked easily and well.

This year, the Intelligence Community attempted to transfer

funds to CIA and to another agency under standards other than

those of section 104(d). The Committee received first notice of the

proposed transfer as a part of the general budget request for fiscal

year 2001. In a subsequent letter, the Community Management

Staff described the transfers as necessary for various ‘‘high priority’’ activities and requested that the Committee ‘‘formally endorse’’ the transfer in its report on the authorization bill for fiscal

year 2001. Nowhere in these communications, or in briefings on the

transfer, was there a basis provided for concluding, as required

under section 104(d), that these transfers are in response to unforeseen requirements. There was also no evidence provided that the

additional, procedural requirements of section 104(d) have been

satisfied.

The circumstances of this particular transfer are complicated and

unique. Some of this movement of money, for example, may actually be a reprogramming under section 504 and not a transfer. As

already noted, however, the National Security Act provides standards for the movement of funds within and between intelligence accounts. The standards for transfer, like those for reprogramming,

facilitate congressional oversight. Their abrogation in this case is

unjustified. For these reasons, and on substantive grounds, the

Committee has not approved this movement of money.

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA)

In response to a question from the Committee, the Department

of Defense stated ‘‘it may be appropriate to reexamine the reporting of selected DARPA projects under JMIP or TIARA, so as to

gain a better understanding of impending technologies and their

possible impacts on current programs. We would need to do an

evaluation to see what has changed and whether this would be

beneficial to all users.’’

The Committee agrees with this position and requests the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and

Intelligence) to conduct such an evaluation and report back to the

defense and intelligence committees no later than December 1,

2000. If the Department decides that it is appropriate to report

DARPA intelligence-related projects within the JMIP or TIARA accounts, the Committee asks these be appropriately identified in the

fiscal year 2002 intelligence budget request.

JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

RC–135 and U–2 operations and maintenance: No budgetary

change

The budget request contained a total of $373.1 million for operations and maintenance of the RC–135 and U–2 aircraft fleets.

The committee is concerned that funding for many Intelligence

Community programs, including intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft are regularly transferred from the programs for which funds were authorized and appropriated to fund

shortfalls in other programs, often not related to ISR requirements.

28

The committee understands the theater and functional Commanders in Chief have stated that their number one shortfall is in

ISR aircraft and systems. The committee is concerned that transferring funding, particularly O&M funding, from ISR aircraft to

fund non-intelligence programs exacerbates the CINCs’ ISR shortfalls.

Therefore the committee designates the RC–135 and U–2 programs as congressional interest items.

Commercial off-the-shelf-receiver development: +$1.0 million

The budget request included $95.7 million in PE 35885G for development of tactical cryptologic systems.

The committee is concerned by the lack of a true commercial offthe-shelf (COTS) signals intelligence (SIGINT) receiver that is

based on open-architecture standards established by the American

National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the 6U Versa Module Europa (VME) backplane. The Department of Defense has stated that

all future signals intelligence systems will be COTS based. However, most SIGINT developments the Department is pursuing are

based wholly, or in part, on custom approaches that are not interchangeable at the board level. The committee is further concerned

that use of these customized approaches discourages competition,

minimizes the impetus to utilize the COTS marketplace, reduces

the industrial base and forces more expensive solutions.

The committee is aware of a small business development that

has produced a true COTS receiver solution for several Defense

Cryptologic Program needs. The committee notes that this solution

is cost-effective and based completely on ANSI and VME standards,

thereby allowing for true ‘‘plug and play’’ use between systems. The

committee also notes that the Joint SIGINT Avionics Program Office has sought to use this technology as a commercial replacement

for one of its custom applications. However, there is no funding in

the budget request to pursue or procure this commercial solution.

The committee is aware of another innovative small business development using emerging commercial silicon germanium technology and supports rapid application of this leading-edge commercial technology for defense applications.

Therefore, the committee recommends an authorization of $97.7

million in PE 35885G, an increase of $1.0 million for development

of the COTS VME receiver technology for SIGINT applications, and

an increase of $1.0 million for development of commercial silicon

germanium integrated circuits for defense and intelligence applications.

Eagle vision commercial imagery: +$6.0 million

The budget request contained $10.0 million in operations and

maintenance, defense-wide, for the National Imagery and Mapping

Agency (NIMA) to purchase commercial data.

The committee notes the successful Air Force operation of the

Eagle Vision commercial imagery ground station, which has resulted in timely, unclassified imagery support to the theater commanders-in-chief (CINCs). Much of this imagery has been unique

and could not be provided by other technical means due to higher

priorities. The committee believes that there are insufficient funds

29

to meet the CINCs’ commercial image and mapping needs and,

therefore, recommends $16.0 million in operations and maintenance, defense-wide, an increase of $6.0 million, for purchasing

Eagle Vision commercial imagery.

Defense airborne reconnaissance program (DARP), line 56: +$78.1

million

The budget request contained $165.5 million for various RC–135

and U–2 aircraft modifications but included no funds for RC–135

trainer aircraft, an updated C–135 operational flight trainer, RC–

135 global air traffic management (GATM) upgrades, or the theater

airborne warning system (TAWS) for the RC–135 Rivet Joint (RJ).

The committee notes that the theater and functional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) have repeatedly testified that their intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements, particularly those met by ISR aircraft such as the RC–135 and U–2,

are not being satisfied due to the limited number of these aircraft.

The committee understands that the Air Force does not have a

dedicated RC–135 aircrew training aircraft and that this deficiency

contributes to the limited number of aircraft available to meet

CINC requirements. To increase the availability of RC–135 mission

aircraft to the CINCs, the committee recommends an increase of

$44.0 million to modify two C–135 aircraft into an RC–135 trainer

aircraft configuration.

The current C–135 operational flight trainer (OFT I) is the aircraft simulation training device for the RC-, OC-, WC-, and TC–135

pilots at Offutt Air Force Base. The committee understands that

OFT I is obsolete due to its outdated engine and aircraft avionics

configurations, and that an OFT II would provide training for aircrews to operate the re-engined and updated avionics C–135 model

aircraft. The committee notes that the Air Force Chief of Staff has

included the procurement of OFT II among his top five unfunded

requirements for fiscal year 2001. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $6.5 million for OFT II and $2.5 million

to equip OFT II with motion simulation thereby improving aircrew

training and readiness on the various C–135 aircraft models.

RC–135 GATM upgrades include: interference resistant navigational receivers, global positioning system upgrades, a traffic collision and avoidance system, radios to permit reduced vertical separation between aircraft during Atlantic Ocean transit, cockpit voice

recorders, and flight management system upgrades. The committee

understands that, without these upgrades, RC–135 aircraft will be

restricted from flying the most direct and fuel-efficient ocean routes

and altitudes, will be subject to critical landing-phase navigational

radio interference, and will not be equipped with the Secretary of

Defense-directed safety modifications until after fiscal year 2005.

To meet these vital needs, the committee notes that the Air Force

Chief of Staff has included RC-135 GATM upgrades among his unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2001, and consequently, recommends an increase of $28.4 million for this purpose.

The TAWS significantly improves the accuracy of ballistic missile

warning on RC–135 RJ, a tactical reconnaissance aircraft. In its report on H.R. 1401 (H. Rept. 106–162) for fiscal year 2000, the committee recommended an increase of $17.3 million for the RC–135

30

RJ TAWS and believes that continued integration of these suites

is critical to tactical missile defense warning. Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $10.0 million for continued procurement and installation of TAWS suites on the RC–135 RJ aircraft.

To consolidate RC–135 modifications in DARP, line 56, and U–

2 modifications in DARP, line 80, the committee recommends a

transfer of the $5.1 million budgeted for RC–135 aircraft modifications in DARP, line 80 into this budget line; and a transfer of the

$18.3 million budgeted for U–2 aircraft modifications in this line

into DARP, line 80. This transfer results in a $13.2 million decrease to this line and an increase of $13.2 million in DARP, line

80.

In total, the committee recommends $243.7 million for DARP,

line 56, an increase of $78.1 million for RC–135 modifications.

Finally, the committee is concerned about the Department of the

Air Force’s budget plan for the RC–135’s joint signals intelligence

avionics family (JSAF) upgrades and notes that the request would

budget for a single JSAF suite for the RC–135 but that additional

suites are not planned until fiscal year 2005. Without full and continuous funding for this upgrade, the committee understands the

first system, if installed onto the RC–135, would result in a unique

RC–135 aircraft configuration which would increase unit support

costs for that aircraft. Accordingly, the committee believes the new

JSAF system should continue development and testing in the RC–

135 systems integration laboratory and on the U–2 aircraft until

the Department of the Air Force budgets to upgrade all 16 RC–135

aircraft.

Rivet joint mission trainer: +$15.5 million

The budget request contained $12.8 million for RC–135 equipment procurement but included no funds to provide an enhanced

field exportable training system (EFETS). The committee understands that the procurement of an EFETS would improve training

and readiness by allowing RC–135 crews at forward operating

bases to use existing post-mission ground data processing system

equipment to function as a Rivet Joint Missions Trainer (RJMT).

Since procurement of an additional RJMT for these forward locations would not be required, the committee notes that EFETS

would save the Air Force $27.4 million. The committee notes that

the Air Force Chief of Staff has included $15.5 million for the

EFETS among his top five unfunded requirements for fiscal year

2001.

Consequently, the committee recommends $28.3 million, an increase of $15.5 million for procurement of an EFETS.

Army tactical unmanned aerial vehicles: +$4.0 million

The budget request contained $29.4 million in PE 35204A for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV).

The committee notes that the Army just completed a successful

competitive selection for an off-the-shelf TUAV. The committee

notes that the Army will place increasing reliance on its TUAV and

needs to field the best possible system including sensors.

31

The committee recommends authorization of $33.4 million in PE

35204A, an increase of $4.0 million for preplanned product improvements and sensor development.

Marine corps dragon warrior unmanned aerial vehicle: +$5.0 million

The budget request contained no funding in PE 35204M for Marine Corps close range tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

The committee notes that the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) is developing the Dragon Warrior, a low cost, small

UAV that combines the speed of a fixed-wing UAV with some operational characteristics of a rotary wing UAV. The committee is

aware that Dragon Warrior is being developed to carry a variety

of payloads that are currently being examined by the MCWL to

provide the Marine Corps with a highly flexible, close range reconnaissance capability that will enlarge the area of influence of a

small expeditionary force.

The committee recommends authorization of $5.0 million in PE

35204M, an increase of $5.0 million, for Dragon Warrior.

Manned reconnaissance systems: +$8.0 million

The budget request contained $27.5 million in PE 35207N for

manned reconnaissance systems, including $25.3 million for the development of the Shared airborne reconnaissance pod (SHARP)

electro-optic system and technologies.

The committee has fully supported the SHARP program to dramatically increase real-time tactical reconnaissance capabilities.

The committee is aware of commercial developments in large focal

length optics that will increase standoff ranges for tactical reconnaissance systems and developments in EO framing processing

techniques that will provide for real-time precision strike targeting.

The committee is also aware that emerging solid-state shutter technology can replace existing mechanical focal plane shutters to increase further existing and future EO camera performance and reliability while reducing operations and maintenance costs. The

committee believes this technology should be incorporated into all

SHARP camera applications.

Therefore, the committee recommends $35.5 million in PE

35207N, an increase of $5.0 million for long-range optical sensor

technology and precision strike improvements, and $3.0 million for

development of a solid-state shutter mechanism that can be retrofitted on current and built into future framing array cameras.

F–18 Shared airborne reconnaissance pod: +$18.0 million

The budget request contained $248.1 million in PE 24136N for

continued development of capabilities for the F/A–18 aircraft.

The committee has supported the Shared Airborne Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP) efforts to provide the F/A–18 aircraft with an

enhanced tactical reconnaissance capability that will also be applicable to other combat aircraft. The committee notes the recent successful demonstration of the SHARP risk-mitigation project for the

F–14 Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Podded System (TARPS)

Completely Digital (CD) system that was employed by the battle

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cated the force multiplying capability provided by real-time imagery system and the committee supports continuation of this effort.

The committee is concerned, however, that the funding requested

for SHARP is insufficient to support completion of sensors for the

fiscal year 2003 initial operational capability (IOC). The committee

notes that this shortfall in funding results in an increase in cost

of tactical reconnaissance support by extending use of the less capable F–14 TARPS.

Therefore, the committee recommends authorization of $266.1

million in PE 24136N, an increase of $18.0 million for the development of the SHARP F–18 tactical reconnaissance capability to

maintain the current IOC.

Global hawk: $12.0 million tuck

The budget request contained $109.2 million in PE 35205F for

endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), including $103.2 for

continued development of the Global Hawk UAV.

The committee supports the Global Hawk development and believes that this air vehicle has the potential for providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to military customers, complementing the current U–2 operations.

The committee notes that due to a crash of one air vehicle, and

a runway accident of another, there are no electro-optic/infra-red

(EO/IR) sensors to continue test and evaluation of the UAV. The

committee believes it is important to procure sensor sets to replace

those lost to the accidents. Further, the committee is aware of unobligated and unexpended funding from prior year endurance UAV

appropriations that can be used to purchase replacement sensors

and continue the Global Hawk engineering and development in fiscal year 2001.

Further, the committee is aware of new generation radar technologies that could vastly increase Global Hawk synthetic aperture

radar (SAR) imaging and moving target indicator (MTI) capabilities

at comparable costs to the current sensors. The committee is also

aware of digital recording devices that offer superior performance

and reliability over current devices. With respect to SAR and MTI

capabilities, current state-of-the-art active electronically steered

array (AESA) antenna developments offer a two-fold increase in

range, resolution, and revisit performance over the current Global

Hawk radar. Further, the cost of these new radars appears to be

comparable to the current phased array radars. In terms of recording systems for high volume imagery sensors such as those on the

Global Hawk, solid state devices have a major reliability advantage

over current tape recording devices. They have no moving parts,

nor do they require a tape that must be threaded around capstans.

The cost of solid state recording devices is dramatically decreasing

while the data recording rates and density are increasing. The committee believes that such devices should be integrated into the

Global Hawk at the earliest opportunity.

Therefore, the committee recommends authorization of $109.2

million in PE 35205F for endurance UAVs. Of the amount authorized, the committee directs the $12.0 million be used specifically for

purchasing two EO/IR replacement sensors for the Global Hawk

33

aircraft. Further, the committee directs that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence provide a report to the defense and intelligence committees assessing the utility of developing and integrating modular

AESA radars and solid state recording devices on the Global Hawk.

This report should be provided no later than 1 February 2001.

Multifunction self-aligned gate active array antenna: +$7.0 million

The budget request contained $113.1 million in PE 35204N for

tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, but included no funding to continue development of the multi-function self-aligned gate (MSAG).

The committee is aware that the MSAG technology successfully

demonstrated ability to transmit and receive full-motion video and

communication. This new form of antenna, with no moving parts,

offers reduced life-cycle costs and enables production of light, conformal, multi-beam antennas for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles

(TUAV) and associated systems.

The committee recommends authorization of $126.1 million, an

increase of $7.0 million to construct and test a line-of-sight array

for the tactical control system.

Multi-link antenna system: +$2.0 million

The budget request contained no funding in PE 35207F for

manned reconnaissance systems, including exploitation technologies for RC–135 aircraft.

In the ‘‘National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,’’

Congress provided funding for development and evaluation of the

multi-function, self-aligned gate (MSAG) active array antenna technology on the RC–135 aircraft. The conferees were convinced that

an MSAG application, called Multi-link Active System (MLAS), has

the potential for satisfying several RC–135 antenna deficiencies,

and also has the potential for reducing the size and number of antennas for many other applications. In fact, the committee is aware

that the Department of Defense has determined that the potential

for this technology has merited funding through an advanced concept technology demonstration.

The committee is aware that the fiscal year 2000 funding was insufficient to complete the fabrication, installation and evaluation of

an MLAS antenna on an RC–135. Therefore, the committee recommends an authorization of $2.0 million in PE 35207F for this

purpose.

Defense airborne reconnaissance program (DARP), line 80: +$34.2

million

The budget request contained $98.4 million in DARP, line 80, for

various U–2 and RC–135 aircraft modifications, including $1.8 million for Senior Year Electro-optic Reconnaissance System (SYERS)

spares and $17.0 million for a Joint Signals Intelligence Avionics

Family (JSAF) suite for the U–2. The request did not include any

funds for additional U–2ST trainer aircraft.

SYERS is an electro-optic camera system that provides real-time

imagery to national decision-makers and tactical forces. The committee understands that initial deployment spares for the SYERS

34

upgrade are underfunded in the budget request by $3.0 million,

and recommends an increase of this amount.

The JSAF provides an upgraded collection capability for the U–

2S. The committee understands that the budget request is insufficient to procure an entire JSAF suite and required spares and cabling. Accordingly, the committee recommends an increase of $8.0

million for this purpose.

The U–2ST is a two-seat trainer version of the single-seat U–2S

reconnaissance aircraft. The committee understands that there are

only four U–2STs, and that without an additional U–2ST, the U–

2S pilot production rate does not meet requirements to solve an existing U–2S pilot shortage. The committee notes that the Air Force

Chief of Staff has included an additional U–2ST among his top five

unfunded requirements in fiscal year 2001, and accordingly, recommends an increase of $10.0 million to convert a U–2S into a U–

2ST aircraft.

Including transfers between DARP lines 56 and 80 for the RC–

135 and U–2 respectively, the committee recommends $132.6 million, an increase of $34.2 million, for U–2 modifications.

Predator: +$12.0 million

The budget request contained $22.1 million for procurement of

the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system.

The committee understands that the Air Force is experiencing

vanishing vendor problems with some of the current hardware in

the Predator ground station and that there is a requirement to control multiple Predator aircraft simultaneously from a single ground

station. The committee is also aware that there are required air vehicle reliability and maintainability upgrades that have not been

funded.

Consequently, the committee recommends $32.1 million for the

Predator, an increase of $12.0 million for upgrading the current

ground stations with commercial hardware, for integrating the capability to control multiple UAVs simultaneously and for improving

air vehicle reliability and maintainability.

Finally, the committee is aware that a jointly funded effort between the contractor and NASA has developed a turbo-prop variant

of the Predator, to be followed by a jet-powered variant. Both of

these Predator-B variants use the current Predator ground station,

avionics, datalink, and control software, but provide major performance improvements over the current aircraft, including a maximum

speed in excess of 200 knots, and a service ceiling to 45,000 feet.

While the current Predator has clearly proven its military worth,

given these performance factors, a Predator-B would appear to satisfy many niche missions for which the current vehicle is not wellsuited. The committee believes that a Predator-B would be a valuable addition to the Predator fleet, and that a mix of Predator-A

and -B aircraft would cost effectively satisfy all Predator mission

requirements. Therefore, the committee requests the Secretary of

the Air Force to conduct an assessment of the utility of a PredatorB aircraft, including the benefits or problems of operating a mixed

Predator fleet. The committee requests the Secretary report his

findings to the defense and intelligence committees before the submission of the fiscal year 2002 budget request.

35

Defense space reconnaissance program: ¥$7.1 million

The budget requested contained $45.1 million in PE 35159F for

various projects within the Defense Space Reconnaissance program

(DSRP).

The committee recommends an authorization of $38.0 million, a

decrease of $7.1 million. This reduction is taken without prejudice.

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Cryptologic skills training: +$4.0 million

The budget request contained $1.3 million in operations and

maintenance, Army, for conducting cryptologic and language skills

training at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC).

The committee is aware of a unique Korean language training

program developed in-house at the USAIC. The committee believes

this computer-based tool has the potential of providing critical language maintenance training for many language specialists, and it

believes this effort should be expanded to other languages. Consequently, the committee recommends $5.3 million in oper- ations and maintenance, Army, an increase of $4.0 million, for continued development of this language training program into the

service’s seven core language requirements. The committee also

recommends that this program be provided to the other services for

language training maintenance.

Common ground station: ¥$7.9 million

The budget request contained $17.9 million in PE 64770A for

continued development of the Army’s Joint Surveillance and Target

Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Common Ground Station, including $2.0 million to develop the Army’s Distributed Common Ground

Station (DCGS–A) and $5.9 million to develop a next generation

wide-band datalink to provide connectivity to the JSTARS.

The committee notes that the DCGS–A development effort duplicates a similar effort being conducted within the Army’s Tactical

Exploitation of National Systems program, a funded program. Further, the committee notes the Air Force has not yet determined the

next generation JSTARS datalink and will not do so until at least

fiscal year 2002, thus making the Army’s development activities for

such communications connectivity premature. For these reasons, the committee recommends $10.0 million in

PE 64770A, a decrease of $7.9 million, to the common ground station program.

Guardrail common sensor: +$2.0 million

The budget request contained $11.3 million in PE 23744A for

continued development and modification of the Army’s Guardrail

Common Sensor aircraft and ground stations.

The committee notes that the Guardrail System 2 was recently

delivered to the Army after nearly ten years of modification. Unfortunately, this system was returned without being upgraded with

the ability to disseminate tactical intelligence information via the

Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS). TIBS is the baseline

for the Integrated Broadcast Service that is the DoD-mandated

world-wide tactical intelligence dissemination service.

36

The committee recommends $13.3 million in PE 23744A, an increase of $2.0 million to install the TIBS capability in this Guardrail system.

Semi-automated imagery processor: +$4.0 million

The budget request contained $57.4 million in PE 64766A, including funding for development of the Semi-automated imagery

processor (SAIP).

The SAIP will provide imagery analysts with an automated target recognition assistance capability, providing critical relief for a

low-density imagery analyst resources.

The committee recommends authorization of $61.4 million in PE

64766A, an increase of $4.0 million for continued development and

fielding of the SAIP.

Defense foreign language program: +$3.0 million

The budget request contained $61.9 million in operations and

maintenance, Army, for the Defense Language Institute (DLI).

The committee is very supportive of the DLI training efforts to

provide high quality linguists for the growing requirement of many

agencies and services but believes that its language laboratories

are in need of technical upgrades, to include new equipment and

access to the internet. The committee is aware of local area Marine

Corps self-help efforts that have done similar upgrades very cost effectively. The committee believes the Army should call on this

USMC self-help assistance to upgrade the DLI language laboratories.

Further, the committee is aware of an unfunded DLI initiative

to provide better language training by issuing laptop computers to

students. These computers would be used to provide language laboratory access to on-line language training materials, allow ‘‘after

hours’’ access from the institute’s dormitories, and access to ‘‘live’’

world-wide foreign training materials. The committee believes this

is a worthwhile effort that should be properly funded.

Therefore, the committee recommends $64.9 million in operations

and maintenance, Army, an increase of $3.0 million, for the Defense Foreign Language Program. Of this amount, $1.0 million is

for self-help upgrade of the language laboratories and $2.0 million

is for the laptop computer initiative.

Naval space surveillance: ¥$600 thousand

The budget request included $2.0 million in PE 35972N for the

Navy Space Surveillance network life extension activities.

The committee is aware of an accounting error that resulted in

a request for design concept activities that were actually funded in

fiscal year 2000. Therefore the committee recommends 1.4 million

in PE 35972N, a decrement of $600,000.

Joint tactical terminal: +$ 6.0 million

The budget request contained $32 thousand for the Joint Tactical

Terminal (JTT).

The committee is fully supportive of the Navy’s efforts to field

the JTT but is aware that the Navy has a shortfall in purchasing

the required number of terminals.

37

Accordingly, the committee recommends $6.0 million, an increase

of $6.0 million, to correct this deficiency.

F/A–18 reconnaissance capable: ¥$23.8 million

The budget request contained $212.6 million for F–18 series aircraft, including $24.5 million for the procurement of the Advanced

Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS).

The committee is aware that 14 of the currently planned 18–19

ATARS systems were purchased under low rate initial production

and that the remaining systems were to be purchased with fiscal

year 2000 funds after the completion of the operational evaluation

and milestone III decision. The committee is also aware that

ATARS did not pass its operational evaluation and understands

that this will preclude a procurement of the final ATARS systems.

This frees up the unobligated and unexpended FY2000 funding.

Therefore, the committee recommends $185.1 million, a decrease

of $23.8 million, to be taken only from ATARS procurement.

Tactical air reconnaissance podded system: +$7.0 million

The budget request contained $37.1 million in other production

charges, including $2.6 million for continuation of the F–14 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Podded System (TARPS) camera system.

The committee is aware of the recent successful deployment of

the TARPS Completely Digital (CD) system with the U.S.S. John

F. Kennedy battle group. TARPS CD is being employed as a risk

mitigation effort for the Shared Airborne Reconnaissance Pod

(SHARP) development. SHARP is the future non-dedicated reconnaissance system for naval tactical reconnaissance. The committee

commends the Navy for its successful integration of TARPS CD

and the demonstration of the force enhancement capabilities of this

a real-time tactical system.

The committee believes the Navy’s successful risk-mitigation efforts for electro-optical sensors provides a sufficient confidence level

to take the next step and move toward integration of a commercial

off-the-shelf synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sensor to provide allweather reconnaissance. The committee is aware that several,

small, very high resolution SAR sensors are available to do non-developmental test on TARPS CD. Since an all-weather reconnaissance is a requirement for SHARP, the committee believes completing risk mitigation on the TARPS CD is appropriate and will

not affect the current schedule for fielding SHARP with an EO-only

capability.

Therefore, the committee recommends $44.1 million, an increase

of $7.0 million for integrating and demonstrating commercial SAR

solutions into the TARPS CD.

Mobile electronic warfare support system: +$8.5 million

The budget request contained $96.2 million in PE 26313M, including $449 thousand for improvements to the Marine Corps’ mobile electronic warfare support system (MEWSS).

The committee notes that the Marine Corps’ MEWSS tactical reconnaissance system was a cooperative effort with the U.S. Army’s

ground based common sensor (GBCS) program. GBCS was terminated for lack of performance and all residual equipment was

38

transferred to the Marine Corps for use in the MEWSS. However,

no funding was provided to cross-deck and integrate GBCS components into the MEWSS vehicles or to maintain the limited rate initial procurement items.

Therefore, the committee recommends authorization of $104.7

million in PE 26313, an addition of $8.5 million specifically for the

purposes of transferring, integrating and maintaining the equipment gained from GBCS.

Hyper-spectral imagery system: +$4.0 million

The budget request contained $9.8 million in PE 27247F for Air

Force tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP)

projects.

Congress provides additional funding in fiscal year 2000 for continuing development of a hyper-spectral sensor for application on

Navy P–3 and Air Force unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The committee is aware that this initiative has resulted in a joint effort to

integrate and demonstrate a real-time hyper-spectral sensor on a

Predator UAV. The committee notes that no funding was provided

in the budget request to continue this effort through demonstration. The committee believes that a hyper-spectral sensor will drastically mitigate the problems of detecting and targeting camouflaged targets that hampered aerial targeting in past operations.

Therefore, the committee recommends an authorization of $13.8

million in PE 27247F, an addition of $4.0 million to continue this

demonstration with the goal of producing an operational real-time

hyper-spectral sensing system on UAVs and other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.

Senior scout: +$8.2 million

The budget request contained $5.5 million for procurement of intelligence communications equipment, including $2.0 million for

procurement of spares and replacement equipment for the Senior

Scout tactical reconnaissance aircraft.

The committee is pleased that the Air Force has decided to retain

the Senior Scout reconnaissance capability to augment the high demand/low density airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleets in the reserve component. However, the committee is disturbed that the Air Force has not added funding to upgrade the Senior Scout to more effectively interoperate with other

ISR aircraft and, more importantly, the combat aircraft it supports.

Therefore, the committee recommends $13.7 million for intelligence communications equipment, an increase of $8.2 million for

Senior Scout collection and dissemination upgrades and for the addition of a deployable ground data reduction system.

Air force/national reconnaissance office (NRO) partnership: ¥$2.0

million

The budget request contained $3.4 million in PE 63856F for the

Air Force/NRO partnership.

The committee understands that $2.0 million of the funding requested would be used for studies and analysis of synergies between the Air Force and the NRO. The committee notes that the

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rector of the NRO. The committee believes that coordination between the two organizations is inherently institutionalized, and

should be a matter of routine.

The committee recommends $1.4 million in PE 63856F, a reduction of $2.0 million.

Eagle vision: +$9.5 million

The budget request included no funds for procuring the processing hardware necessary to complete the Eagle Vision 4 imagery

system or to improve the Eagle Vision imagery ground station’s capability to receive and process new commercial imagery sources.

Eagle Vision is a ground station that receives and processes imagery from commercial remote sensing satellites. The committee

fully supports the Eagle Vision commercial imagery initiative,

which has provided unique, unclassified imagery support to meet

theater and service requirements that, due to higher priorities,

cannot be met by other technical means. The committee believes

that this initiative needs to be fully funded to continue such support. Further, the committee notes the recent successful launch and

initial operations of Ikonos II, the first high-resolution U.S. commercial imagery satellite, and that two other U.S. firms are soon

to launch their own high-resolution imagery satellites. The committee understands that the Eagle Vision ground station is currently capable of receiving and processing relatively low-resolution

imagery from Canadian and French commercial satellites. It is,

however, not able to process imagery from the higher-resolution

U.S. systems in, or soon to be in orbit.

Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million

in other procurement, Air Force, line 39A, for completing the Eagle

Vision 4 processor installation and an increase of $4.5 million in

PE 27277F to integrate into the Eagle Vision ground stations a receive and processing capability necessary to exploit current and future U.S. commercial satellite imaging systems.

Special operations tactical video system: +$2.0 million

The budget request contained $3.0 million in PE 116405BB for

Special Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence system developments,

including $100,000 for continued development of the Special Operations Tactical Video System (SOTVS).

SOTVS is a congressional interest item funded in the fiscal year

2000 budget. The committee notes that no commercial solution to

the SOF underwater camera requirements exists, and that a dedicated research and development program is necessary to satisfy

this critical mission requirement. Therefore, the committee is dismayed that the budget request is insufficient to develop and procure a replacement to the aging cameras currently in the inventory.

The committee recommends an authorization of $5.0 million in

this PE, an increase of $2.0 million to expedite the development of

the SOTVS camera.

40

SECTION-BY-SECTION OF THE BILL

TITLE I.—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101—authorization of appropriations

Section 101 lists those elements of the United States Government for whose intelligence and intelligence-related activities the

Act authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2001.

Section 102—classified schedule of authorizations

Section 102 incorporates by reference the classified Schedule of

Authorizations. That schedule sets forth the specific amounts authorized to be appropriated for specific intelligence and intelligence-related activities and personnel ceilings for fiscal year 2001

for those United States government elements listed in section 101.

The details of the Schedule are explained in the classified annex

to this report. The Schedule of Authorizations correlates to the

President’s budget request, which was submitted to Congress in

classified form.

Section 103—personnel ceiling adjustments

Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence, with

the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and

Budget, in fiscal year 2001, to exceed the personnel ceilings applicable to the components of the intelligence community under section 102 by an amount not to exceed two percent of the total of the

ceilings otherwise applicable under section 102. The Director may

exercise this authority only when necessary to the performance of

important intelligence functions. Any exercise of this authority

must be reported to the two intelligence committees of the Congress.

The committee emphasizes that the authority conferred by section 103 is not intended to permit the wholesale raising of personnel strength in any intelligence component. Rather, the section

provides the Director of Central Intelligence with flexibility to adjust personnel levels temporarily for contingencies, and for overages caused by an imbalance between hiring of new employees and

attrition of current employees. The committee does not expect the

Director of Central Intelligence to allow heads of intelligence components to plan to exceed levels set in the Schedule of Authorizations, except for the satisfaction of clearly identified hiring needs

that are consistent with the authorization of personnel strengths in

this legislation. In no case is this authority to be used to provide

for positions otherwise denied by Congress.

Section 104—intelligence community management account

Section 104 details the amount and composition of the Community Management Account (‘‘CMA’’) of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Subsection (a) of section 104 authorizes appropriations in the

amount of $144,231,000 for fiscal year 2001 for the staffing and administration of various components under the CMA. Subsection (a)

also authorizes funds identified for the Advanced Research and DeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:27 May 17, 2000 Jkt 079006 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR620.XXX pfrm03 PsN: HR620
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velopment Committee and the Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program to remain available for two years.

Subsection (b) authorizes 356 full-time personnel for elements

within the CMA for fiscal year 2001 and provides that such personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion of the

CMA.

Subsection (d) requires that personnel be detailed on a reimbursable basis, with certain exceptions.

Subsection (e) authorizes $28,000,000 of the amount authorized

for the CMA under subsection (a) to be made available to the Attorney General through the DCI for the National Drug Intelligence

Center (‘‘NDIC’’) in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. Subsection (e) requires the Director of Central Intelligence to transfer the

$28,000,000 to the Department of Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority of the Attorney General, and subject to

section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act. The NDIC is authorized $1,000,000 more than the amount authorized for the funding

of the NDIC for FY 2000. The Committee of Conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 directed that

$1,000,000 of the funds authorized to be appropriated to the Attorney General by the Act be made available to the Judicial Review

Commission on Foreign Asset Control, which was established in

section 810 of that Act. (P.L. 106–120). The additional $1,000,000

authorized for Fiscal Year 2001 is intended to replenish NDIC

funding made available to the Commission.

Section 105—transfer authority of the Director of Central Intelligence

Section 105 amends section 104(d)(1) of the National Security Act

of 1947 to authorize the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to

transfer funds appropriated for a program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) to another such program within

the NFIP, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, unless the Secretary of Defense, or other cabinet Secretary who has an affected Intelligence Community element within his or her department, submits a written objection to

the transfer. The Secretary of Defense may only delegate responsibility under this provision to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The

other department heads are not authorized under this provision to

delegate the authority to object to any such transfer sought by the

DCI.

The current section 104(d)(1) limits the DCI’s authority to transfer funds and personnel to transfers where the Secretary or head

of the affected department does not object to such transfer. The

committee understands that in practice Defense Department officials below the level of Secretary have taken action to block transfers within the NFIP sought by the DCI. The committee intends to

end this practice and require higher-level involvement in decisions

that countermand the DCI’s judgment on funding requirements of

NFIP programs. Just as the Secretary of Defense is limited in delegating any authority to object to these transfers to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DCI is limited in his authority to delegate

42

the transfer request authority only to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT

AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201—authorization of appropriations

Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of

$216,000,000 for fiscal year 2001 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 301—increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law

Section 301 provides that appropriations authorized by this Act

for salary, pay, retirement and other benefits for federal employees

may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as

may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits

authorized by law.

Section 302—restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

Section 302 provides that the authorization of appropriations

within the Act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any

intelligence activity that is precluded by the Constitution or other

laws of the United States.

Section 303—Sense of the Congress regarding intelligence community contracting

Section 303 expresses the sense of Congress that the DCI should

continue to direct elements of the intelligence community to award

contracts in a manner that would maximize the procurement of

products produced in the United States, when such action is compatible with the national security interests of the United States,

consistent with operational and security concerns, and fiscally

sound.

Section 304—authorization for travel on any common carrier for

certain intelligence collection personnel

Section 304 authorizes the DCI to permit intelligence community

employees, officers, or agents, carrying out intelligence collection

activities to utilize any common carrier, either foreign or domestically owned or operated, in limited circumstances, when flying directly to or from the United States on official business. The federal

government currently requires, to the extent practicable, government employees, officers, or agents, travelling directly to or from

the United States to utilize U.S. owned or operated common carriers for such travel. The committee has found, however, that from

time to time it would reduce the risk of disclosure of sources and

methods of intelligence collection if the DCI were authorized some

flexibility with respect to this otherwise well-founded requirement.

The committee notes that situations arise where the current requirement, and its inflexible application, create unnecessary risks

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promise of sources and methods. The committee believes that the

DCI should be given some latitude to maintain or enhance the security of intelligence collection operations and of the intelligence

collectors by waiving the requirement, on an as needed basis. The

committee expects that such a waiver will not be routine, but that

this provision will be invoked from time to time with positive results.

Section 305—reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions

Section 305 amends section 721(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104–293, 110 Stat. 3474). Section 721(a) required that an unclassified report on the acquisition

of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions be submitted to Congress every 6

months. This section would require a report to be submitted on an

annual basis. This will give the public the benefit of a full year of

substantive reporting, rather than a half year, which sometimes

can result in an incomplete view of the activity. The committee will

continue to receive classified briefings and intelligence reporting on

an on-going basis.

TITLE IV—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Section 401—modifications to Central Intelligence Agency’s Central

Services Program

Section 401 permits the deposit into the Central Service Program’s Working Capital Fund of the receipts from the miscellaneous reimbursements of individuals and the rental of property

and equipment to employees and detailees.

Section 402—technical corrections

Section 402 makes technical amendments to section 17 of the

Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. Section 402(a) strikes subparagraph (E) of section 17(d)(1), which directs the CIA Inspector

General to report to the intelligence committees those occasions

where his office was constrained from obtaining documentary evidence during the course of a CIA IG investigation due to the lack

of subpoena authority. The CIA IG was granted subpoena authority

to obtain documentary evidence in the Intelligence Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105–107). Thus, the reporting requirement in subparagraph (E) has been superceded by subsequent

legislation.

TITLE V—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

ACTIVITIES

Section 501—three year extension of authority to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence collection activities

This section amends section 431(a) of title 10, United States

Code, which expire on December 31, 2000. Section 431(a) permits

the Department of Defense to engage in commercial activities as

security for intelligence collection activities. This section extends

this authority until December 31, 2003.

44

Section 502—contracting authority for the National Reconnaissance

Office

Section 502 directs the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to

negotiate, write, and manage all future vehicle acquisition or

launch contracts that affect or bind the NRO and to which the

United States is a party.

The committee has been very frustrated with aspects of the

NRO’s launch program, particularly with Titan IV production. Consistently, this program has been excessively over-funded and has

resulted in large amounts of funds available for reprogramming.

The committee has had considerable difficulty holding the organization accountable for better program planning because the NRO

has had launch vehicle and launch services contracts written and

managed by non-NRO contracting offices. As a result, the NRO

does not have sufficient management responsibility for those contracts to be responsive to congressional concerns, or to take necessary corrective actions.

The NRO IG recently completed an investigation that identified

the vehicle acquisition and launch services type of contract, and the

relationship between the external contracting office and the NRO,

as the main factors contributing to the over-funding problem. The

committee notes that a re-negotiation of the contract structure is

being considered that would remove a penalty for future launch

failures, despite the NRO IG’s recommendation.

Section 502 will require that the NRO contract for vehicle acquisition and launch services directly with launch service providers.

The committee recognizes the need for the NRO to work closely

with outside contracting offices in many areas, for example, to develop standard interfaces and quality control process procedures.

The committee believes that NRO’s use of external contracting offices to negotiate, write, and manage vehicle acquisition and launch

contracts does not provide the NRO, nor the committee sufficient

insight into the contracting process. Additionally, more direct control by the NRO over its vehicle acquisition and launch contracts

is expected to increase the accountability for such projects within

the NRO.

COMMITTEE POSITION AND RECORD VOTES TAKEN

On May 10, 2000, in open session, a quorum being present, the

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by a recorded vote of

12 ayes to 0 noes, approved the bill, H.R. 4392, as amended by an

amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Chairman

Goss. By that vote, the committee ordered the bill reported favorably to the House, with an amendment. On that vote, the Members

present recorded their votes as follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)—aye;

Mr. McCollum—aye; Mr. Castle—aye; Mr. Boehlert—aye; Mr.

Bass—aye; Mr. Gibbons—aye; Mr. LaHood—aye; Ms. Wilson—aye;

Mr. Dixon—aye; Ms. Pelosi—aye; Mr. Condit—aye; Mr. Roemer—

aye.

During consideration of the bill, Mr. Roemer offered an amendment to the legislative provisions. The amendment would have directed the President to disclose annually the aggregate appropriation for the Intelligence Community for the previous fiscal year.

45

The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence rejected Mr. Roemer’s amendment by a vote of 5 ayes to 11 noes, a quorum being

present. On that vote, the Members present recorded their votes as

follows: Mr. Goss (Chairman)—no; Mr. Lewis—no; McCollum—no;

Mr. Castle—no; Mr. Boehlert—no; Mr. Bass—no; Mr. Gibbons—no;

Mr. LaHood—no; Ms. Wilson—no; Mr. Dixon—aye; Ms. Pelosi—

aye; Mr. Bishop—no; Mr. Sisisky—no; Mr. Condit—aye; Mr. Roemer—aye; Mr. Hastings—aye.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the House of Representatives, the committee is not subject to this requirement;

therefore, the committee has not received a report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight pertaining to the subject of this bill.

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, the committee held eleven hearings on

the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 4392. Testimony was

taken from the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management; the Director of the National Security Agency; the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Executive Director, and the Deputy Directors of the Operations, Intelligence, Administration, Science and Technology Directorates of the Central Intelligence Agency; the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office; and the Director of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; and various other knowledgeable witnesses from the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice,

and the Department of State regarding the activities and plans of

the intelligence community covered by the provisions and authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. The bill, as reported by the committee, reflects conclusions reached by the committee in light of

this oversight activity.

FISCAL YEAR COST PROJECTIONS

The committee has attempted, pursuant to clause 3(d)(2) of rule

XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, to ascertain the

outlays that will occur in fiscal year 2001 and the five years following, if the amounts authorized are appropriated. These estimates are contained in the classified annex and are in accordance

with those of the executive branch.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) and (3) of rule XIII of the Rules

of the House of Representatives, and pursuant to sections 308 and

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the committee submits the following estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget

Office:

46

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, DC, May 11, 2000.

Mr. DAN L. CRIPPEN,

Director Congressional Budget Office,

Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CRIPPEN: In compliance with the Rules of the House

of Representatives, I am writing to request a cost estimate of H.R.

4392, the ‘‘Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,’’

pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act

of 1974. I have attached a copy of the bill as approved by the House

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 10, 2000.

As I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor in the very

near term, I would very much appreciate an expedited response to

this request by the CBO’s staff. Should you have any questions related to this request, please contact Patrick B. Murray, the Committee’s Chief Counsel. Thank you in advance for your assistance

with this request.

Sincerely,

PORTER J. GOSS, Chairman.

Attachment.

U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Washington, DC, May 12, 2000.

Hon. PORTER J. GOSS,

Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of

Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Suinta D’Monte.

Sincerely,

BARRY B. ANDERSON

(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).

Enclosure.

H.R. 4392—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001

Summary: H.R. 4392 would authorize appropriations for fiscal

year 2001 for intelligence activities of the United States government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and the

Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System

(CIARDS).

This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of the bill.

On that limited basis, CBO estimates that implementing the bill

would cost $144 million over the 2001–2005 period, assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts. The bill would affect direct

spending by insignificant amounts; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures

would apply. H.R. 4392 contains no intergovernmental or privatesector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

47

(UMRA) and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal

governments.

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 4392 is shown in

the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary information

to estimate the costs for the entire bill because parts are classified

as a level above clearances held by CBO employees. For purposes

of this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted by October 1, 2000, and that the authorized amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2001. Estimated outlays are based on historical spending patterns. The costs of this legislation fall within

budget function 050 (national defense).

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars—

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Spending Under Current Law for Intelligence Community Management:

Budget Authority 1 ........................................................................... 157 0 0 0 0 0

Estimated Outlays ........................................................................... 135 47 9 3 0 0

Proposed Changes:

Authorization Level .......................................................................... 0 144 0 0 0 0

Estimated Outlays ........................................................................... 0 89 43 9 3 0

Spending Under H.R. 4392 for Intelligence Community Management:

Authorization Level 1 ........................................................................ 157 144 0 0 0 0

Estimated Outlays ........................................................................... 135 136 53 12 3 0

1 The 2000 level is the amount appropriated for that year.

Spending subject to appropriation

The bill would authorize appropriations of $144 million for the

Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds the coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management of the

intelligence agencies. Section 501 would extend through December

31, 2003, a program that allows the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence

collection. CBO does not have the necessary information to estimate the budgetary impact of this provision.

Direct spending

The bill would authorize $216 million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to military service and various unfunded liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and

the authorization under this bill would be the same as assumed in

the CBO baseline. Section 401 would expand a program that authorizes the CIA to provide goods and services on a reimbursable

basis by allowing the agency to rent property and equipment to its

employees and those on detail from other agencies. CBO estimates

that the costs of providing those services would be offset by the reimbursement and that this provision would have an insignificant

net impact each year and no net budgetary impact over the long

run.

Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act sets up pay-as-you-go procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or receipts. CBO estimates that

the net change in outlays that are subject to pay-as-you-go procedures would be insignificant for each year.

48

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 4392 contains

no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in

UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal

governments.

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Sunita D’Monte; Impact on

State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Leo Lex; and Impact on the

Private Sector: Eric Labs.

Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATES

The committee agrees with the estimate of the Congressional

Budget Office.

SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR CONGRESSIONAL

ENACTMENT OF THIS LEGISLATION

The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United

States government are carried out to support the national security

interests of the United States, to support and assist the armed

forces of the United States, and to support the President in the

execution of the foreign policy of the United States. Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States provides, in pertinent part, that ‘‘Congress shall have power * * * to pay the debts

and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the

United States; * * *’’; ‘‘to raise and support Armies, * * *’’ ‘‘to provide and maintain a Navy; * * *’’ and ‘‘to make all laws which

shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution * * * all

other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the

United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.’’ Therefore,

pursuant to such authority, Congress is empowered to enact this

legislation.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill,

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic,

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.

* * * * * * *

TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Sec. 101. National Security Council.

* * * * * * *

Sec. 116. Travel on any common carrier for certain intelligence collection personnel.

* * * * * * *

TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

* * * * * * *

49

AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SEC. 104. (a)***

* * * * * * *

(d) TRANSFER OF FUNDS OR PERSONNEL WITHIN THE NATIONAL

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.—(1)(A) In addition to any other

authorities available under law for such purposes, the Director of

Central Intelligence, with the approval of the Director of the Office

of Management and Budget, may transfer funds appropriated for

a program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program to another such program and, in accordance with procedures to be developed by the Director and the heads of affected departments and

agencies, may transfer personnel authorized for an element of the

intelligence community to another such element for periods up to

a year.

(B) The Director may only delegate any duty or authority given

the Director under this subsection to the Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence for Community Management.

(2)(A) A transfer of funds or personnel may be made under this

subsection only if—

ø(A)¿ (i) the funds or personnel are being transferred to an

activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity;

ø(B)¿ (ii) the need for funds or personnel for such activity is

based on unforeseen requirements;

ø(C)¿ (iii) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds

to the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central Intelligence

Agency;

ø(D)¿ (iv) the transfer does not involve a transfer of funds

or personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

ø(E)] (v) øthe Secretary or head¿ subject to subparagraph

(B), the Secretary or head of the department which contains the

affected element or elements of the intelligence community

does not object to such transfer.

(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the authority to object to

a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) may not be delegated by the

Secretary or head of the department involved.

(ii) With respect to the Department of Defense, the authority to object to such a transfer may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense,

but only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

(iii) An objection to a transfer under subparagraph (A)(v) shall

have no effect unless submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence in writing.

* * * * * * *

TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE

COLLECTION PERSONNEL

SEC. 116. (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision

of law, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize travel on

any common carrier that, in the discretion of the Director, would by

its use maintain or enhance the protection of sources or methods of

intelligence collection or maintain or enhance the security of personnel of the intelligence community carrying out intelligence collection activities.

50

(b) AUTHORIZED DELEGATION OF DUTY.—The Director may only

delegate the authority granted by this section to the Deputy Director

of Central Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central

Intelligence Agency the Director may delegate such authority to the

Deputy Director for Operations.

* * * * * * *

SECTION 721 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION

ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

SEC. 721. REPORTS ON ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS.

(a) REPORTS.—øNot later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter,¿ Not later than

March 1, 2001, and every March 1 thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on—

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding

ø6 months¿ year of dual-use and other technology useful for

the development or production of weapons of mass destruction

(including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological

weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries.

* * * * * * *

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949

* * * * * * *

SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.

(a) * * *

* * * * * * *

(d) SEMIANNUAL REPORTS; IMMEDIATE REPORTS OF SERIOUS OR

FLAGRANT PROBLEMS; REPORTS OF FUNCTIONAL PROBLEMS; REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON URGENT CONCERNS.—(1) The Inspector

General shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year,

prepare and submit to the Director of Central Intelligence a classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office during the immediately preceding six-month periods ending December

31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. Within thirty

days of receipt of such reports, the Director shall transmit such reports to the intelligence committees with any comments he may

deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a list

of the title or subject of each inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during the reporting period and—

(A) * * *

* * * * * * *

(D) a certification that the Inspector General has had full

and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of his functions; and

51

ø(E) a description of all cases occurring during the reporting

period where the Inspector General could not obtain documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or investigation

due to his lack of authority to subpoena such information; and¿

ø(F)¿ (E) such recommendations as the Inspector General

may wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy

and efficiency in the administration of programs and operations undertaken by the Agency, and to detect and eliminate

fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.

* * * * * * *

(e) AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.—(1)***

* * * * * * *

(8) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out his duties and responsibilities from any

øFederal¿ Government agency. Upon request of the Inspector General for such information or assistance, the head of the øFederal¿

Government agency involved shall, insofar as is practicable and not

in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation

of the øFederal¿ Government agency concerned, furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such information or

assistance.

* * * * * * *

CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM

SEC. 21. (a)***

* * * * * * *

(c) CENTRAL SERVICES WORKING CAPITAL FUND.—(1) There is established a fund to be known as the Central Services Working Capital Fund (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Fund’’). The purpose

of the Fund is to provide sums for activities under the program.

(2) There shall be deposited in the Fund the following:

(A) * * *

* * * * * * *

(F) Receipts from miscellaneous reimbursements from individuals and receipts from the rental of property and equipment

to employees and detailees.

ø(F)¿ (G) Such other amounts as the Director is authorized

to deposit in or transfer to the Fund.

* * * * * * *

SECTION 431 OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

§ 431. Authority to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence collection activities

(a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of Defense, subject to the provisions of this subchapter, may authorize the conduct of those commercial activities necessary to provide security for authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken by the Department

52

of Defense. No commercial activity may be initiated pursuant to

this subchapter after øDecember 31, 2000¿ December 31, 2003.

* * * * * * *

Æ