UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JEFFREY ALLEN HOLDEN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

GEO GROUP PRIVATE PRISON 

CONTRACTORS; HECTOR RIOS, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 18-6156 

(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00479-F) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, MORITZ, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Jeffrey Allen Holden, an Oklahoma prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from 

the district court’s dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Exercising 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the dismissal of Holden’s claims, but 

we remand for the district court to clarify in its judgment that its dismissal of any 

state-law claims Holden intended to assert was without prejudice. 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 8, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

BACKGROUND 

 Holden has been incarcerated in the Oklahoma prison system for

approximately thirteen years, most recently at Lawton Correctional Facility (LCF). 

LCF is operated by an entity called GEO Group under a contract with the state of 

Oklahoma. Hector Rios is LCF’s Warden. 

Holden is a drug addict. In May 2018, he sued GEO Group and Rios under 

§ 1983, alleging that LCF refused to provide him drug treatment in violation of his 

rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Oklahoma constitution. Holden’s 

complaint also asserted that LCF was required, by its contract with the state, to 

provide drug treatment and mental health services. 

On initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the magistrate judge identified 

several deficiencies in Holden’s complaint and provided him an opportunity to file an 

amended complaint. Holden did not do so, instead filing an “Amendment to Claim 

and Brief in Support” in which he attempted to clarify his claims. Considering both 

the original complaint and the “Amendment to Claim,” the magistrate judge 

recommended that the district court dismiss the federal claims for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted and, to the extent Holden had intended to 

assert state-law claims, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. 

Over Holden’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation, dismissed the federal claims, and declined to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over any state-law claims that Holden had intended to assert. 
3 

DISCUSSION 

 We review de novo a § 1915A dismissal for failure to state a claim. Young v. 

Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). Because Holden proceeds pro se, we 

construe his filings liberally, but we do not act as his advocate. Requena v. Roberts, 

893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019). 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 

announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. “A pleading that 

offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid 

of further factual enhancement.” Id. (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In addition to the text of Holden’s complaint and his “Amendment to 

Claim,” we consider his exhibits in determining whether he stated a claim. See 

Requena, 893 F.3d at 1205. 

 The Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious 

medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs may be “manifested . . . by prison guards . . . intentionally 

denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with . . . 

treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05 (footnote omitted). As Holden urges, 
4 

medical care includes psychological and psychiatric care. Riddle v. Mondragon, 

83 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 1996). 

Deliberate indifference has both an objective and a subjective component. 

Requena, 893 F.3d at 1215. “First, [the inmate] must produce objective evidence that 

the deprivation at issue was in fact sufficiently serious.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Second, under the subjective component, [the inmate] must allege 

the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e. that the official 

knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. (brackets 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Holden states that LCF does not offer drug treatment. Further, from his 

pleadings and their attachments, it appears that no facility in the Oklahoma 

Department of Corrections (ODOC) offers drug treatment to any prisoner until they 

are within 2,000 days of release. Holden is approximately 5,500 days from release, 

so he is not yet eligible for any drug treatment program in ODOC. 

The magistrate judge assumed, without deciding, that the denial of drug 

treatment may trigger constitutional protection. But because ODOC’s drug treatment 

policy does make treatment available at some point, he recommended that Holden’s 

Eighth Amendment claim be considered as challenging a delay in treatment, rather 

than an outright denial of treatment. The district court adopted this recommendation, 

and we agree. Although Holden emphatically maintains that LCF does not offer drug 

treatment, the allegations indicate that Holden is precluded from drug treatment not 

simply because he is at LCF, but because he is not currently eligible for drug 
5 

treatment at any ODOC facility. In light of ODOC’s policy allowing drug treatment 

at some point in the future, Holden’s claim is more properly analyzed as a delay of 

treatment rather than a denial of treatment. 

 “Where a prisoner claims that harm was caused by a delay in medical 

treatment, he must show that the delay resulted in substantial harm in order to satisfy 

the objective prong of the deliberate indifference test.” Al-Turki v. Robinson, 

762 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We have 

held that the substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, 

permanent loss, or considerable pain.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see also Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 755 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that an inmate 

established objective harm by demonstrating unnecessary pain and a worsening in 

condition). We have also stated, however, that “not every twinge of pain suffered as 

the result of delay in medical care is actionable.” Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 

1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). 

The magistrate judge noted that “[Holden] alleges only that the delay in 

substance abuse treatment has resulted in mental anguish, stress, anxiety, 

hopelessness, depression, and ‘continual highs and lows of hope for relief to never 

come to fruition.’” R. at 45 (quoting id. at 6). Accordingly, he concluded that 

Holden “has not alleged facts from which to infer that Defendants’ inaction in 

delaying his receipt of substance abuse treatment has resulted in substantial harm.” 

Id. The district court adopted this analysis. On appeal, Holden again generally 
6 

identifies the types of harms the magistrate judge noted.1

 We agree with the district 

court that these allegations are insufficient to establish the substantial harm 

requirement. See Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1203-04 (stating, in holding that plaintiffs who 

sought specialized treatment for sex addiction failed to state an Eighth Amendment 

claim, that “[v]ague allegations of eroded self-esteem, apathy, fear and feelings of 

differentness, keeping a plaintiff in the ‘addictive cycle,’ do not amount to the basis 

for a constitutional claim”). 

 Contrary to Holden’s allegations on appeal, the district court gave him the 

benefit of liberal construction of his pleadings, considering both the allegations of the 

“Amendment to Claim” as well as the allegations in the original complaint. 

Moreover, regarding Holden’s assertion of failure to address his allegations of breach 

of contract, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

Holden’s state-law claims, leaving him free to pursue a breach of contract claim in 

state court if he chooses to do so.2

We note, however, that the district court did not specify whether its dismissal 

was with prejudice or without prejudice. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), that means the 

dismissal was with prejudice. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 

 1

 To the extent Holden’s opening brief may identify any additional harms, 

they are asserted only conclusorily, without explanation or elaboration. 

2

 On appeal, Holden suggests that he is a third-party beneficiary who can 

pursue a federal claim of breach of contract under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. But Holden did 

not mention § 1981 in the district court. And to the extent that Holden alleges that 

the district court should have identified a possible § 1981 claim through applying 

liberal construction, we disagree. Section 1981 addresses race discrimination, and 

Holden has failed to allege any facts regarding race discrimination. 
7 

492 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Because the district court in this case did not 

specify the nature of its dismissal order, we must rely on background principles under 

Rule 41(b), and they firmly instruct that ‘[u]nless the court in its order for dismissal 

otherwise specifies,’ a district court’s dismissal will be treated as adjudicating the 

merits of the action—and thus a dismissal with prejudice.”). Given that the district 

court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims, 

however, the dismissal of those claims should have been without prejudice. See Ball 

v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 1995). 

CONCLUSION 

The district court’s judgment is affirmed, but we remand for the district court 

to clarify in its judgment that its dismissal of any state-law claims is without 

prejudice. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge