IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 25, 2019

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD TURNER

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

Nos. 105481, 105636 Steven Wayne Sword, Judge

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No. E2018-01642-CCA-R3-CD

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The Appellant, Ronald Turner, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s imposing a 

ten-year sentence for possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to 

deliver in case number 105636 and a twelve-year sentence for attempted second degree 

murder in case number 105481. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by not 

sentencing him to the minimum punishment in the range, eight years, for the offenses, 

Class B felonies. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the sentences 

but remand the case to the trial court for correction of judgments of conviction.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed, 

Case Remanded

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.

MONTGOMERY, JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

J. Liddell Kirk (on appeal and at resentencing) and Michael A. Graves (at trial), 

Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ronald Turner.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Ta Kisha Monette 

Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

On December 10, 2014, the Appellant fired a gun through a glass door toward 

three people: his three-year-old son; the child’s mother, Jahdaiah Cody; and the mother’s 

roommate, Bredaisha Walden. State v. Ronald Turner, No. E2016-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 

2017 WL 1830106, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, May 5, 2017), perm. app.

11/01/2019
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denied, (Tenn. Apr. 19, 2018). On January 3, 2015, a police officer began following a 

Ford Crown Victoria in which the Appellant was a passenger. State v. Ronald Turner, 

No. E2016-00790-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1379999, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at 

Knoxville, Apr. 13, 2017), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Apr. 18, 2018).

1

 The car passed by 

a preschool, and the officer stopped the driver for speeding. Id. at *1, 2. During the stop, 

a backup officer arrived and found a loaded nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun and 

.87 grams of crack cocaine base on the Appellant’s person. Id. 

In May 2015, the Knox County Grand Jury indicted the Appellant in case number 

105481 for the attempted first degree premeditated murders of Ms. Cody (count one), the 

Appellant’s son (count three), and Ms. Walden (count five); three corresponding counts 

of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (counts two, four, 

and six); and one count of unlawful possession of a handgun while at a public place

(count nine). The grand jury also indicted the Appellant under the gang enhancement 

statute for the three counts of attempted first degree murder and the unlawful possession 

of a handgun. In June 2015, the grand jury indicted the Appellant in case number 105636 

for one count of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver 

within 1,000 feet of a preschool (count one), one count of possession of one-half gram or 

more of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a preschool (count two), two 

corresponding counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous 

felony (counts three and four), one count of theft of property valued $500 or less (count 

five), and one count of unlawful possession of a handgun while at a public place (count 

six). The grand jury also indicted the Appellant under the gang enhancement statute for

the two drug charges and the unlawful possession of a handgun. 

The Appellant was tried first in case number 105636, and the jury found him 

guilty of the two drug charges and the three weapons charges but not guilty of the theft 

charge. During the second phase of the trial, the State presented evidence that the 

Appellant was a member of the Vice Lords gang, and the jury found that the gang 

enhancement applied to the three underlying offenses. Id. at *2. 

At the Appellant’s January 2016 sentencing hearing in case number 105636, the 

State introduced the Appellant’s presentence report into evidence. According to the 

report, the Appellant was nineteen years old and left Austin-East High School in 2014 for 

“disciplinary” reasons. The Appellant claimed in the report that he obtained his high 

school diploma while incarcerated at Mountain View Youth Development Center, but the 

investigating officer was unable to verify the claim. In the report, the Appellant 

 

1 We note that both of this court’s opinions have been designated “Not for Citation” by our

supreme court. Therefore, they have no precedential value. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(E)(1). However, we can 

cite to the opinions because they are relevant to this opinion, which involves the same defendant. See

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(E)(2).
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described his mental health as “fair” and said that he was taking medication for anxiety 

and depression. He described his physical health as “excellent” and did not report any 

medical issues. The Appellant said in the report that he began “heavy” use of alcohol 

when he was sixteen years old, that he began “heavy” use of marijuana when he was 

thirteen, and that he smoked eight “blunts” per day. The report showed that he worked at 

Red Lobster as a dishwasher for two months in 2014, that he quit the job due to 

transportation problems, and that he did not have any other employment. The report did 

not show any adult criminal history for the Appellant. However, as a juvenile, he was

adjudicated delinquent of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, possession of a weapon 

with the intent to go armed, and reckless endangerment. 

The trial court found that the Appellant was a Range I, standard offender. The 

court noted that the Appellant did not have any prior convictions but that he had “a rather 

lengthy juvenile delinquent history.” In mitigation, the trial court found that the 

Appellant was entitled to some consideration for his youth, because the drug offenses did 

not involve “a huge amount of drugs,” and because the drug offenses in the school zone 

“occurred passing through in a car.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113(13). The trial 

court stated that it did not think there was “any reason” to sentence the Appellant above 

the minimum punishment in the range for the Class A felonies. Accordingly, the trial 

court sentenced him to fifteen years for the convictions of possession of cocaine with 

intent to deliver and sell, which were elevated from Class B to Class A felonies pursuant 

to the preschool zone and the gang enhancements, and merged the convictions. The trial 

court sentenced him to four years for the convictions of possession of a firearm during 

the commission of a dangerous felony, Class D felonies, and merged the convictions. 

Finally, the court sentenced him to one year for unlawful possession of a handgun, a 

Class A misdemeanor that was elevated to a Class E felony pursuant to the gang 

enhancement. The trial court ordered that the Appellant serve the fifteen-year and oneyear sentences concurrently but that he serve the four-year sentence consecutive to the 

fifteen-year sentence by statute for a total effective sentence of nineteen years.

The Appellant was tried in February 2016 in case number 105481. At trial, Ms. 

Walden testified that while she and the Appellant’s son were standing at the glass door in 

the kitchen, the Appellant, who was outside, made eye contact with her, raised his gun, 

and shot toward her and his son. Ronald Turner, No. E2016-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 

WL 1830106, at *1. She also stated that Ms. Cody was standing behind them in another 

room and that the bullet hit a microwave but would have traveled toward Ms. Cody if the 

microwave had not stopped it. Id. The jury convicted the Appellant of three counts of 

attempted second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree 

murder and the four weapons charges. Id. at *3. During the second phase of the trial, the 

State presented evidence that the Appellant was a member of the Vice Lords gang, and 
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the jury found that the gang enhancement applied to the convictions of attempted second 

degree murder and unlawful possession of a handgun. See id. at *3-5.

At the Appellant’s March 2016 sentencing hearing in case number 105481, the 

trial court found that the Appellant was a Range I, standard offender and stated that he 

had “a lengthy involvement with Juvenile court.” Regarding enhancement, the trial court 

said, “I don’t think there’s anything that really carries a whole [lot] of weight with the 

Court other than the fact that he had this juvenile history and has used Marijuana most of 

his life.” In mitigation, the trial court determined that the Appellant’s was entitled to 

“some” mitigation for his young age but concluded that “it’s not quite as great as 

somebody who hadn’t had the history that [the Appellant] had already built up in his 

young life.” The trial court stated that it did not think there was “any need” to sentence 

the Appellant above the minimum punishment in the range for the Class A felonies. 

Thus, the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years for each conviction of attempted 

second degree murder, which was elevated from Class B to a Class A felony pursuant to 

the gang enhancement; six years for each corresponding conviction of employing a 

firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and one year for 

unlawful possession of a handgun, which was elevated from a Class A misdemeanor to a 

Class E felony pursuant to the gang enhancement. See id. at *5 & n.1. The trial court 

ordered that the Appellant serve the fifteen-year and one-year sentences concurrently and 

that he serve the six-year sentences concurrently with each other but consecutive to the 

underlying felonies by statute for an effective sentence of twenty-one years. Id. The trial 

court also ordered that the Appellant serve the effective twenty-one-year sentence 

consecutive to the effective nineteen-year sentence in case number 105636 for a total 

effective sentence of forty years.

On direct appeal of his convictions in case number 105636, this court found that 

the gang enhancement was imposed pursuant to an unconstitutional statutory provision 

and vacated the gang enhancement that was applied to three of the Appellant’s

convictions. Ronald Turner, No. E2016-00790-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1379999, at *9. 

Additionally, this court noted that while the Drug-Free School Zone Act required serving 

the minimum sentence in the range at one hundred percent, the requirement of 

“‘additional incarceration’” did not apply to preschools. Id. Thus, this court remanded 

the case to the trial court for resentencing for the Appellant’s convictions of possession of 

cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and unlawful 

possession of a handgun. Id. at *10.

On direct appeal of his convictions in case number 105481, this court affirmed the 

conviction for the attempted second degree murder of Ms. Walden but concluded that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for the attempted second degree 

murders of the Appellant’s son and Ms. Cody. Ronald Turner, No. E2016-00651-CCA-
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R3-CD, 2017 WL 1830106, at *10. Accordingly, this court reversed those two 

convictions and their corresponding weapons offenses. Id. This court also found that the 

version of the gang enhancement statute in effect at the time of the Appellant’s 

convictions was unconstitutional and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing 

for the Appellant’s convictions of attempted second degree murder of Ms. Walden and 

unlawful possession of a handgun. See id. at *5 n.1, 19.

The trial court held a resentencing hearing in both cases on August 10, 2018. At 

the outset of the hearing, defense counsel argued that because the trial court previously 

sentenced the Appellant to fifteen years, the minimum punishment in the range, for the 

Class A felonies, the trial court should resentence him to eight years, the minimum 

punishment in the range, for the Class B felonies. 

Regarding case number 105636, the trial court stated that due to “his prior history, 

nature of offenses, I don’t think maximum sentence is warranted, but I do think 

something above the minimum is appropriate.” The trial court sentenced the Appellant to 

ten years, the midpoint in the range, for his convictions of possession of cocaine with 

intent to deliver and sell, Class B felonies, and merged the convictions. The trial court 

noted that the Appellant’s new effective sentence in case number 105636 would be 

fourteen years. 

Regarding case number 105481, the trial court found that enhancement factor (10), 

that “[t]he defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to human 

life was high,” applied to the Appellant’s remaining conviction of attempted second 

degree murder because two people involved in the shooting were no longer named 

victims. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(10). The trial court found that the maximum 

punishment in the range, twelve years, was “warranted” due to the nature of the offense. 

In explaining why the trial court sentenced the Appellant to the minimum punishment for 

the Class A felonies previously, the trial court stated that “one of the things that I was 

concerned about if I gave him above the minimum on that and ran it consecutive to 

[105636] that it would be just too long of a sentence for somebody of his young age.” 

The trial court noted that the new effective sentence in case number 105481 would be 

eighteen years and ordered that the Appellant serve the sentence consecutive to the 

fourteen-year sentence for a total effective sentence of thirty-two years.

2

II. Analysis

 

2 The trial court did not address resentencing the Appellant for unlawful possession of a handgun 

in case number 105481 or case number 105636. However, amended judgments of conviction for the two 

offenses, dated August 10, 2018, are in the technical record and reflect sentences of eleven months, 

twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanors.
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On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not resentencing 

him to eight years, the minimum punishment in the range, for the Class B felonies of 

possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and attempted second degree murder because 

the trial court originally sentenced him to fifteen years, the minimum punishment in the 

range, when the offenses were Class A felonies. The State argues that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by sentencing the Appellant to the midpoint and the maximum 

punishments in the range for the convictions. We agree with the State.

This court reviews the length, range, and manner of service of a sentence imposed 

by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of 

reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). In sentencing a 

defendant, the trial court shall consider the following factors: (1) the evidence, if any, 

received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the 

principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and 

characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by 

the parties on enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statistical information 

provided by the administrative office of the courts as to sentencing practices for similar 

offenses in Tennessee; (7) any statement by the appellant in his own behalf; and (8) the 

potential for rehabilitation or treatment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210; 

see also State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991). The burden is on an 

appellant to demonstrate the impropriety of the sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts.

In determining a specific sentence within a range of punishment, the trial court 

should consider, but is not bound by, the following advisory guidelines:

(1) The minimum sentence within the range of

punishment is the sentence that should be imposed, because 

the general assembly set the minimum length of sentence for 

each felony class to reflect the relative seriousness of each 

criminal offense in the felony classifications; and

(2) The sentence length within the range should be 

adjusted, as appropriate, by the presence or absence of 

mitigating and enhancement factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 

and 40-35-114.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c).

Although the trial court should consider enhancement and mitigating factors, the 

statutory enhancement factors are advisory only. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114; see 
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also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 701; State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2008). Our 

supreme court has stated that “a trial court’s weighing of various mitigating and 

enhancement factors [is] left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 

345. In other words, “the trial court is free to select any sentence within the applicable 

range so long as the length of the sentence is ‘consistent with the purposes and principles 

of [the Sentencing Act].’” Id. at 343. Appellate courts are “bound by a trial court’s 

decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed in a manner 

consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections -102 and -103 of the 

Sentencing Act.” Id. at 346.

Turning to the instant case, the range of punishment for a Range I, standard 

offender convicted of a Class B felony is eight to twelve years. See Tenn. Code Ann. §

40-35-112(a)(2). The trial court enhanced the Appellant’s sentences for possession of 

cocaine with intent to deliver and sell in case number 105636 based on his “prior history, 

nature of offenses.” The record reflects that the Appellant began using marijuana when 

he was thirteen years old and that he smoked eight “blunts” per day. The trial court even 

referred to his use of the drug “most of his life” in a previous sentencing hearing. Thus, 

the trial court did not err in considering the Appellant’s admitted marijuana use. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1); State v. James Harding Dalton, No. M2012-01575-

CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 3754838, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 18, 2013); State v.

Derrick Lamont Parrish, No. M2010-02589-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 6147016, at *4 

(Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 7, 2011). The trial court enhanced the Appellant’s 

sentence for attempted second degree murder in case number 105481 based on its 

application of factor (10), that “[t]he defendant had no hesitation about committing a 

crime when the risk to human life was high.” The trial court also did not err by applying 

that factor because the Appellant shot at Ms. Walden while his son and Ms. Cody were 

nearby. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 312 (Tenn. 2002) (stating that “enhancement 

factor (10) may be applied where the defendant creates a high risk to the life of a person 

other than the named victim”). 

The Appellant does not contest the finding of enhancement factors by the trial 

court. Instead, his sole argument is that the trial court should have sentenced him to the 

minimum punishment in the range because the trial court did so in the previous 

sentencing hearings. However, the trial court has “broad discretion to impose a sentence 

anywhere within the applicable range, regardless of the presence or absence of 

enhancement or mitigating factors.” State v. Jack Austin, No. W2017-02042-CCA-R3-

CD, 2018 WL 4846366, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Oct. 4, 2018). The trial 

court found that the minimum punishment of eight years for the Class B felony offenses 

was not appropriate in this case, and we conclude that the trial court did not err by 

sentencing the Appellant to the midpoint and the maximum punishments in the range. 
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Nevertheless, we must remand the case to the trial court due to numerous errors on 

the amended judgments of conviction. First, the trial court mistakenly resentenced the 

Appellant for count one in case number 105481. However, that count related to the 

attempted second degree murder Ms. Cody, which this court reversed and dismissed, not 

the second degree murder of Ms. Walden, which this court affirmed and remanded for 

resentencing. Therefore, the trial court must correct the amended judgments to reflect 

that count one and its corresponding conviction of employing a firearm during the 

commission of a dangerous felony in count two were dismissed and that the Appellant 

received a twelve-year sentence for attempted second degree murder in count five and a 

six-year sentence for the corresponding conviction of employing a firearm during the 

commission of a dangerous felony in count six. Furthermore, in case number 105636, the 

amended judgment of conviction for count one reflects that the Appellant was charged 

and convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a 

preschool. However, he was charged and convicted of possession of cocaine with intent 

to deliver within 1,000 feet of a preschool in count one. Similarly, the amended 

judgment of conviction for count two reflects that the Appellant was charged and 

convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a preschool 

when he was charged and convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell within 

1,000 feet of a preschool. Therefore, the trial court also must correct those judgments.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the sentences imposed but 

remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgments.

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NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE