J-S26002-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.E.C, MINOR 

CHILD

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: L.D., MOTHER

No. 1964 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree October 16, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 18-2014

BEFORE: OTT, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2015

L.D. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree entered October 16, 2014, in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County, which involuntarily 

terminated her parental rights to her minor daughter, A.E.C. (“Child”).1 We 

affirm.

The record reveals the relevant factual and procedural history, as 

follows. Northumberland County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) 

received a referral regarding the birth of Child in December of 2012. N.T., 

10/8/2014 (Part 1), at 17. At the time Child was born, Mother tested 

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1 By separate decree entered that same day, the orphans’ court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, J.C., Jr. (“Father”), from 

which he filed a notice of appeal. The disposition of Father’s appeal is by 

separate memorandum.
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positive for opiates and morphine, while Child tested positive for opiates and 

amphetamines. Id. Mother later admitted that she used heroin during her 

pregnancy, and that she received little, if any, prenatal care. Id. at 19. 

Child initially was scheduled to be released from the hospital in early January 

of 2013. Id. at 20. However, Child’s discharge was delayed because she 

was diagnosed with congenital nephrotic syndrome, a severe kidney 

condition. Id. Child began receiving infusions of albumin, and had a kidney 

removed when she was approximately two months old. Id. at 21. Child 

began dialysis treatments when she was several months old. Id.

When Child was about four months old, she was discharged from the 

hospital and returned to the care of Mother and Father, who began residing 

in the home of Child’s paternal grandfather and his wife. Id. However, 

Child was not gaining the desired amount of weight, and Mother claimed 

repeatedly that she was unable to provide a urine sample so that CYS could 

perform drug screens. Id. at 22-23. Mother and Father also failed to bring 

Child to two of her appointments, and were late in bringing Child to a third. 

Id. at 23-24, 26-27. Ultimately, Mother signed a voluntary entrustment 

agreement placing Child in the care of CYS on May 3, 2013. Id. at 22. 

Child was adjudicated dependent on June 6, 2013.2

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2 The date of Child’s adjudication of dependency is not clear from the 

certified record on appeal. June 6, 2013, is the date provided by the 

orphans’ court in its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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On May 29, 2014, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to Child.3 A termination hearing was held on 

October 8, 2014, during which the orphans’ court heard the testimony of 

CYS caseworkers Jennifer Riley, Courtney Underkoffler, and Leslee Maturani. 

The court heard further testimony from Child’s foster father, C.Y. (“Foster 

Father”), and Mother.4 The court entered its decree terminating Mother’s 

parental rights on October 16, 2014. On November 14, 2014, Mother timely 

filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

Mother now presents the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in determining that [CYS] 

presented clear and convincing evidence that grounds for 

involuntary termination exist? 

II. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in determining that the 

best interests of the Child would be served by terminating 

parental rights?

Mother’s brief at 7 (orphans’ court answers and unnecessary capitalization 

omitted).

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3

In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the orphans’ court states that 

CYS filed its termination petition on June 3, 2014. However, the petition is 

stamped as having been filed on May 29, 2014. On June 3, 2014, the court 

entered an order scheduling the termination hearing, and issued notice of 

the hearing.

4 The termination hearing was split into two parts. CYS presented its 

evidence with respect to Mother during the first part of the hearing, and then 

presented its evidence with respect to Father during the second part.
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We review this appeal according to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 

A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because 

the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 

[613] Pa. [371], [455,] 34 A.3d 1, 51 (2011); Christianson v. 

Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying 

an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d 

at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–27 (Pa. 2012).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:
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Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). This Court need only 

agree with any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), in addition to 

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 

A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we conclude that the orphans’ court properly 

terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1) and 

(b), which provide as follows:
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(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall 

not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1) and (b). 

With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six 

months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled 

intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citing In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. Super. 2006)). 

Further,

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 
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contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 

Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 

1998)).

In In re Adoption of S.P., supra, our Supreme Court discussed In 

re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652 (Pa. 1975), a case wherein the 

Court considered the issue of the termination of parental rights of 

incarcerated persons involving abandonment, which is currently codified at 

Section 2511(a)(1). The S.P. Court stated:

Applying in McCray the provision for termination of 

parental rights based upon abandonment, now codified as § 

2511(a)(1), we noted that a parent “has an affirmative duty to 

love, protect and support his child and to make an effort to 

maintain communication and association with that child.” Id. at 

655. We observed that the father’s incarceration made his 

performance of this duty “more difficult.” Id.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828. The S.P. Court continued:

[A] parent’s absence and/or failure to support due to 

incarceration is not conclusive on the issue of 

abandonment. Nevertheless, we are not willing to 

completely toll a parent’s responsibilities during his 

or her incarceration. Rather, we must inquire 

whether the parent has utilized those resources at 

his or her command while in prison in continuing a 

close relationship with the child. Where the parent 

does not exercise reasonable firmness in declining to 

yield to obstacles, his other rights may be forfeited.

[McCray] at 655 (footnotes and internal quotation marks 

omitted). . . . 
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In re Adoption of S.P., supra; see also In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 

(Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (internal 

citations omitted) (stating that a parent does not perform his or her parental 

duties by displaying a “merely passive interest in the development of the 

child”). 

With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has explained the requisite 

analysis as follows: 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

On appeal, Mother argues that her parental rights should not have 

been terminated because she has remedied her drug addiction, and because 

she will be able to obtain housing and employment within two to three 

months. Mother’s brief at 12-14. Mother also contends that she is willing to 

receive the medical training necessary to care for Child. Id. at 14. 
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In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the orphans’ court found 

as follows: 

The Petition for Termination of Parental Rights was filed on 

June 3, 2014. The six months immediately preceding this date 

correspond with a time period during which [] Mother was 

almost entirely out of contact with [CYS] and . . . Child. A 

caseworker was able to contact her on February 10, 2014 at the 

time and place scheduled for a custody hearing for [] Mother’s 

other child. At that time, [] Mother did submit to drug testing, 

and the results were positive, however she failed to seek 

inpatient treatment as ordered by the [c]ourt in the various 

permanency review orders. In fact, she did not seek such 

treatment until after her arrest in May of [2014], less than a 

month prior to the filing of the termination petition, and [CYS] 

was unaware of this until they made contact with her probation 

officer. She was discharged from rehabilitation on September 23 

of [2014]. [] Mother provided no housing, financial support, or 

medical care for . . . Child during this time period. It is unknown 

whether she had employment or independent housing during this 

time period. She attended two supervised visits on November 

12 and December 3 of 2013. She may have visited . . . Child 

during an extended hospitalization period between December 17, 

2013 and January 17, 2014. [] Mother sent no correspondence 

to . . . Child during this time period.

Also during this time period . . . [C]hild was hospitalized 

several times and required daily medical care while out of the 

hospital. [] Mother did not even attempt to attend medical 

training to learn how to address . . . Child’s medical concerns 

(despite having been court-ordered to do so), let alone actually 

provide any medical support or care for . . . Child. This inaction 

on the part of . . . Mother points to both a settled purpose of 

relinquishment and a failure to perform parental duties during 

the relevant six month period.

Further, an Aggravated Circumstances Order was entered 

on July 18, 2014, citing the failure of both [] Father and [] 

Mother to maintain substantial and continuing contact with . . . 

Child for a period of six months. During much of this time 

period, . . . Mother’s whereabouts were unknown, as she failed 

to maintain contact with [CYS]. 
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Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/6/2014, at 5-6 (citations to the record omitted). 

The testimonial evidence supports the court’s findings, as follows.

CYS caseworker, Jennifer Riley, testified concerning the circumstances 

leading up to Child’s placement in foster care, discussed supra. N.T., 

10/8/2014 (Part 1), at 17-30. After being removed from the care of Mother 

and Father on May 3, 2013, Child was hospitalized for approximately 10 

days. Id. at 30-31, 33. Mother did not visit with Child during this time, 

despite being offered transportation. Id. at 31. After Child was discharged 

from the hospital, Mother participated in weekly visitation for a period of two 

hours in the maternal grandmother’s home. Id. Mother attended these 

visits on a “fairly regular” basis. Id. at 32. Mother also attended group 

outpatient counseling. Id. at 33. 

Ms. Courtney Underkoffler testified that she was the caseworker

assigned to this matter from July of 2013 until October of 2013. Id. at 37. 

During this time, Mother continued to claim that she was unable to produce 

a urine sample so that she could be drug tested. Id. at 38. Mother also was 

offered biweekly supervised visitation at CYS, but missed “some” of the 

visits. Id. at 38-39. Ms. Underkoffler noted that Mother was not visiting 

with Child at the hospital as consistently as CYS would have liked. Id. at 39.

Ms. Leslee Maturani testified that she took over as Child’s caseworker 

in late October or early November of 2013, and that she has been assigned 

to this matter ever since. Id. at 42. During Ms. Maturani’s assignment to 
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this case, Mother continued to refuse to provide urine samples. Id. at 43-

44. Finally, Mother produced a urine sample on February 10, 2014, which 

tested positive for “oxyies and opiates.” Id. at 44. Ms. Maturani requested 

that Mother attend inpatient rehabilitation, and Mother stated that she would 

consider it. Id. at 44. Mother was arrested in May of 2014, and 

incarcerated. Id. at 44-45. Mother then attended two rehabilitation 

programs. Id. at 45. On July 17, 2014, an order was entered finding 

aggravated circumstances as to Mother, due to her failure to maintain 

substantial and continuing contact with Child for a period of six months. Id.

at 52-53. Mother was released from rehabilitation on September 23, 2014. 

Id.

Ms. Maturani further testified that she has supervised two visits 

between Mother and Child, which took place on November 12, 2013, and 

December 3, 2013. Id. at 46. Tragically, Child suffered a stroke and was 

hospitalized on December 4, 2013. Id. Mother visited Child at the hospital 

on December 5, 2013, December 6, 2013, and December 8, 2013, which 

was Mother’s last documented visit. Id. at 48-50. Child was discharged 

from the hospital on approximately December 10, 2013, but was readmitted 

on December 17, 2013. Id. at 46, 49. Child remained at the hospital until 

January 17, 2014. Id. Ms. Maturani did not have a record of whether or not 

Mother visited with Child during this time. Id. Ms. Maturani noted that 
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Mother has not requested a visit since that time, and that Mother never 

completed the medical training necessary to care for Child.5 Id. at 45, 51.

Mother testified that she did not disagree with any of the prior 

witnesses’ testimony. Id. at 71. When asked what she had been doing for 

the last six months, Mother responded, “Drugs, rehab, incarceration. I was 

out for two days, overdosed, back into jail, incarcerated, and rehab.” Id. at 

71. Mother stated that she did not learn anything during her first two stays 

in rehabilitation programs, but that her most recent stay was very helpful. 

Id. at 71-72. Mother claimed that she has been clean for 145 days, and

that she currently is attending intensive outpatient treatment three days per 

week, inter alia. Id. at 72. Mother indicated that she has not visited with 

Child because of her addiction. Id. at 76. Mother admitted that she has the 

phone number for CYS, and that she lives only a five-minute walk away from 

CYS. Id. at 75-76. Still, Mother acknowledged that she did not contact CYS 

in order to have contact with Child. Id. at 76.

Mother further testified that she is “not looking to get [Child] back 

right now like today. All I’m looking for is a chance.” Id. at 73. Mother 

admitted that she could not safely provide for Child without the proper 

medical training, and that “it’s going to take time” before she is able to care 

____________________________________________

5

Foster Father stated that he has never spoken with Mother, and that 

Mother has not sent anything to Child since she has been in his care. N.T., 

10/8/2014 (Part 1), at 62, 65-66.
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for Child. Id. at 77. Mother predicted that she would be able to care for 

Child as soon as she acquires “a job and a house.” Id. at 73. Mother hoped 

that this would take “no more than three months.” Id. at 78. 

Thus, the testimonial evidence demonstrates that Mother refused or 

failed to perform parental duties for a period of at least six months prior to 

the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights on May 29, 2014. 

Mother’s last documented visit with Child took place on December 8, 2013, 

during the beginning of the relevant six-month period. Since that time, it 

appears that Mother has made no effort to maintain contact with Child or a 

place of importance in Child’s life. Moreover, Mother has never completed 

the necessary medical training that she would need to care for Child. 

Mother’s actions demonstrate a “merely passive interest” in Child, at best. 

B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 855. As such, Mother’s conduct warrants termination 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).

Having determined that the orphans’ court properly terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), we now review the 

order pursuant to Section 2511(b). The orphans’ court found as follows:

Here, the [c]ourt examined the existence and quality of 

the bond between [] Mother and . . . Child. As the [c]ourt stated 

in its order of October 15, 2014:

The [c]ourt has examined whether there is an 

emotional bond between the parent and the child 

and if severing that bond would negatively affect the 

child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs. 

The [c]ourt finds that the mother has had no visits 

with her child since December of 2013. The child 
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was placed in an approved foster care home on May 

3, 2013, . . . . From that time until December 8, 

2013, the mother visited her child ten (10) times. 

There have been no visits by the mother with her 

child in ten (10) months. Based on the forgoing, 

there is no evidence presented of any emotional 

bond between the parent and the child. The [c]ourt 

therefore finds that there is no emotional bond 

between the parent and child.

There was no evidence of any bond presented, and in the 

absence of such evidence, the [c]ourt reasonably inferred that 

no such bond exists between [] Mother and [] Child. Further, 

. . . Child has established a firm bond with her foster family, a 

family with whom she has lived since January of 2014 and that is 

willing to provide permanency for . . . Child. The pairing of . . . 

Child with this foster family is particularly fortuitous when one 

recalls that these foster parents have attended medical trainings 

specific to the medical issues experienced on a daily basis by . . . 

Child (to say nothing of their independent medical training as 

EMTs) and have been steadfast in their attentiveness and 

responsiveness to all of her medical needs since her arrival in 

their home. The best interests of . . . Child would be served by 

termination of [] Mother’s parental rights. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, at 9-10 (citation to the record omitted). Again, the 

testimonial evidence supports the court’s findings.

Ms. Maturani testified that Child has resided with her current foster 

family since January 17, 2014. N.T., 10/8/2014 (Part I), at 58. Child’s 

foster parents are “very active” in Child’s treatment. Id. Ms. Maturani 

stated that Child views her foster parents as her parents, due to her lack of 

contact with Mother and Father, and looks to them for comfort. Id. at 59. 

Foster Father testified that he is a certified paramedic. Id. at 62. 

Foster Father stated that Child is generally unable to make it through the 

night without medical attention, and requires care 24 hours per day. Id. at 
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68-69. Foster Father explained that Child does not have kidneys and 

receives nightly dialysis. Id. at 63. Child also has a feeding tube and 

receives injections of Procrit. Id. Child suffers from chronic vomiting, sleep 

apnea, and anemia issues, and has experienced an episode of congestive 

heart failure. Id. at 63-64. Foster Father noted that Child is only 

comfortable around him and her foster mother, and that Child “does not deal 

well with going with other people,” including nurses. Id. at 67. 

Based upon this evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion by the 

orphans’ court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(b). It was reasonable for the court to infer that there is no bond 

between Mother and Child, given Child’s age and Mother’s lack of recent 

visits. In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d at 324. In addition, Child’s 

extensive medical needs are being met in her current foster placement. 

Where, as here, the petitioner is an agency it is not necessary that an 

adoption is presently contemplated nor that a person with a present 

intention to adopt exists. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b).

Accordingly, we affirm the decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (b).
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Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/30/2015