COMBATING 

TERRORISM

State Should Enhance 

Its Performance 

Measures for 

Assessing Efforts in 

Pakistan to Counter 

Improvised Explosive 

Devices

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Near Eastern and South and Central 

Asian Affairs, Committee on Foreign 

Relations, U.S. Senate

May 2012

GAO-12-614

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 

United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-614, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Near Eastern 

and South and Central Asian Affairs, 

Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate

May 2012

COMBATING TERRORISM

State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for 

Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised 

Explosive Devices

Why GAO Did This Study

Improvised explosive devices have 

been a significant cause of fatalities 

among U.S. troops in Afghanistan. 

About 80 percent of the IEDs contain 

homemade explosives, primarily 

calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) 

fertilizer smuggled from Pakistan. U.S. 

officials recognize the threat posed by 

the smuggling of CAN and other IED 

precursors from Pakistan into 

Afghanistan, and State and other 

agencies are assisting Pakistan’s 

government to counter this threat. This 

report (1) describes the status of U.S. 

efforts to assist Pakistan in countering

IEDs and (2) reviews State’s tracking 

of U.S. assisted efforts in Pakistan to 

counter IEDs. To address these 

objectives, GAO reviewed agency

strategy and programmatic documents,

including State’s fiscal year 2013 

MSRP for Pakistan. GAO also met with 

U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., 

Arlington, Virginia, and Tampa, Florida; 

and met with U.S. and Pakistani 

officials in Islamabad, Pakistan.

What GAO Recommends

To improve State’s ability to track 

progress of efforts in Pakistan to 

counter IEDs, GAO recommends that 

the Secretary of State direct the U.S. 

Mission in Pakistan to enhance its 

counter-IED performance measures to 

cover the full range of U.S. assisted 

efforts. State concurred and committed 

to look for ways to broaden the scope 

of existing metrics in order to better 

reflect and evaluate interagency 

participation in counter-IED efforts.

What GAO Found

Multiple U.S. agencies and international partners are engaged in efforts to assist 

Pakistan in countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but face a variety of

ongoing challenges. The agencies providing counter-IED assistance to Pakistan 

are primarily the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Homeland 

Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ). The following table identifies the types of 

assistance these U.S. agencies have provided and the corresponding objectives 

of Pakistan’s National Counter-IED Strategy. According to U.S. officials, U.S. 

agencies have encountered ongoing challenges to their efforts to assist Pakistan, 

such as delays in obtaining visas and in the delivery of equipment. U.S. officials 

have also identified broader challenges to Pakistan’s ability to counter IEDs, 

including the extreme difficulty of interdicting smugglers along its porous border 

with Afghanistan. In addition, though Pakistan developed a National Counter-IED 

Strategy in June 2011, it has yet to finalize an implementation plan for carrying 

out the strategy. 

Types of U.S. Assistance to Pakistan to Counter IEDs

U.S. assistance efforts Objectives of Pakistan counter-IED strategy

Counter-IED training and/or equipment Engage the international community for equipment, 

training, and capacity building in the area of counter-IEDs

Counter-IED public awareness 

campaign 

Launch a vigorous counter-IED public awareness 

campaign 

Training of border officials Control cross-border movement of IEDs, accessories, 

smuggling of ammonium nitrate and other precursors

Legal assistance for laws and 

regulations to counter IEDs and IED 

precursors 

Modify the existing legislative framework by 

strengthening legislation on terrorism and explosives

Source: GAO analysis based on documents and interviews. 

The U.S. fiscal year 2013 Mission Strategic and Resource Plan (MSRP) for 

Pakistan includes a new performance indicator to track some of Pakistan’s efforts 

to counter IEDs, but the indicator and targets used to measure progress do not 

cover the full range of U.S. assisted efforts. The performance indicator focuses

on cross-border activities, specifically on Pakistan’s efforts to prevent illicit 

commerce in sensitive materials, including chemical precursors used to 

manufacture IEDs in Afghanistan. As such, progress of U.S. counter-IED 

assistance efforts not specifically linked to cross-border smuggling are not 

covered, such as counter-IED training and/or equipment, a counter-IED public 

awareness campaign, and legal assistance for laws and regulations to counterIEDs and IED precursors. Consequently, effects of key U.S. assisted counter-IED 

efforts are not tracked under the existing performance indicator and related 

targets. The absence of comprehensive performance measures that reflect the 

broad range of U.S. assisted counter-IED efforts limits State’s ability to track 

overall progress in Pakistan to counter IEDs and to determine the extent to which 

View GAO these counter-IED efforts are helping to achieve the U.S. goals. -12-614. View related video clip.

For more information, contact Charles Michael

Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or 

johnsoncm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

Letter 1 

Background 2

U. S. Agencies Face Ongoing Challenges Assisting Pakistan in 

Countering IEDs 7

State’s Strategic Document Includes Performance Measures for 

Some U.S. Assisted Counter-IED Efforts in Pakistan, but Other 

Key Areas Are Not Covered 13

Conclusions 15

Recommendation for Executive Action 15

Agency Comments 16

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 17

Appendix II Comments from the Department of State 19

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 21

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 22

Tables

Table 1: Objectives of Pakistan’s National Counter-IED Strategy 6

Table 2: Key U.S. Agency Roles for Counter-IED Efforts 6

Table 3: Types of U.S. Assistance to Pakistan to Counter IEDs 8

Figures

Figure 1: Bag of CAN Fertilizer 4

Figure 2: Map of Pakistan and Afghanistan Showing the Two 

Primary Border Crossings 5

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

Abbreviations

CAN calcium ammonium nitrate

CENTCOM Central Command

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

IED improvised explosive device

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

 Organization

MSRP Mission Strategic and Resource Plan

ODRP Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan

SOCOM Special Operations Command

State Department of State

View GAO-12-614 Component

Video showing the border region and activity at the primary border 

crossings. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

May 15, 2012

The Honorable Robert P. Casey, Jr.

Chairman

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 

 and Central Asian Affairs

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been a significant cause of 

fatalities among U.S. troops in Afghanistan. About 80 percent of the IEDs 

contain homemade explosives, primarily calcium ammonium nitrate 

(CAN) fertilizer smuggled from Pakistan. U.S. officials recognize the 

threat posed by the smuggling of CAN and other IED precursors from 

Pakistan into Afghanistan, and the Department of State (State) and other 

agencies are assisting Pakistan’s government to counter this threat. In 

addition, with the adoption in 2011 of its National Counter-IED Strategy, 

Pakistan recognized the importance of addressing the IED threat, both for 

its own security and stability goals, as well as for counterterrorism efforts 

in the region. Various insurgent groups in Pakistan regularly use IEDs, 

which have killed thousands of Pakistani civilians and security force 

members.

In your November 2010 hearing on this issue, officials from State and the 

Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS) testified 

about the flow of CAN from Pakistan into Afghanistan as well as the need 

for Pakistan to step up its efforts to address the IED threat. Since then, 

senior U.S. officials have continued to raise this issue with Pakistani 

counterparts. Recognizing the importance of this issue, you asked us to 

report on U.S. agencies’ efforts to provide counter-IED assistance to 

Pakistan, including development of Pakistan’s National Counter-IED 

Strategy and the follow-on plan to implement that strategy. In this report, 

we (1) describe the status of U.S. efforts to assist Pakistan in countering 

IEDs and (2) review State’s tracking of U.S. assisted efforts in Pakistan to 

counter IEDs.

To describe the status of U.S. efforts to assist Pakistan in countering 

IEDs, we reviewed documentation from multiple U.S. agencies to 

inventory and describe their relevant activities. In addition, we reviewed 

the Pakistan National Counter-IED Strategy and draft National 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

Implementation Plan to gain knowledge of the areas that Pakistan has 

focused on in seeking assistance from the international community. We 

analyzed U.S. agencies’ funding and program information on specific 

projects that assist Pakistan in these efforts and followed up with 

interviews with knowledgeable U.S. officials and international partners, 

including officials from State, DHS, and the Department Justice (DOJ) in 

Washington, D.C., and from DOD in Arlington, Virginia, and Tampa, 

Florida. We also interviewed representatives of all these agencies and the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. In 

addition, while conducting fieldwork in Pakistan, we interviewed Pakistani 

customs officials to obtain their perspective on counter-IED efforts and 

challenges, and we met with representatives of the Pakistan Trade 

Project and the Pakistan National Fertilizer Development Center. Finally, 

we also interviewed officials from the United Nations Office on Drugs and 

Crime, the British High Commission, and the International Security 

Assistance Force International Coordination Element–Pakistan.

To review State’s tracking of U.S. assisted efforts in Pakistan to counter 

IEDs, we reviewed State’s fiscal year 2013 Mission Strategic and 

Resource Plan (MSRP) for the U.S. Mission in Pakistan. Specifically, we 

reviewed goals, performance indicators, and targets for counterterrorism 

and counterinsurgency; regional security, stability, and nonproliferation; 

law enforcement reform and rule of law; and public diplomacy and 

strategic communications to identify the extent to which they covered 

counter-IED efforts. We also followed up with a State official at the U.S. 

Embassy in Pakistan with regard to how targets under the new counterIED performance indicator in the MSRP track progress of counter-IED 

efforts.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 to May 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Since 2001, Pakistan has been a U.S. ally in the fight against al Qaeda 

and a recipient of both civilian and military assistance. Key areas where

both countries share common concerns include IEDs, which not only 

cause the majority of fatalities among U.S. troops in Afghanistan but have 

also caused thousands of fatalities in Pakistan. According to DOD, about 

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

16,500 IEDs were detonated or discovered being used against U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan in 2011. About 80 percent of the IEDs used in 

Afghanistan have homemade explosives as the main charge, and more 

than 80 percent of these are derived from CAN fertilizer produced in 

Pakistan. The President of Afghanistan issued a decree outlawing CAN 

fertilizer in 2010.

According to DOD, CAN is produced in Pakistan at two factories, each 

generating between 463,000 and 496,000 tons1

 

1

U.S. tons.

annually. DOD estimates 

that as little as 240 tons of CAN—representing less than one-tenth of 1 

percent of the total annual production capacity of these two factories—is 

used to make IEDs in Afghanistan. According to officials from the National 

Fertilizer Development Center in Pakistan, less than 10 percent of the 

fertilizer used in Pakistan is CAN, but CAN is well suited for farmers in 

some areas. Figure 1 shows a bag of CAN, which is typically packaged in 

110-pound bags. When processed and mixed with fuel oil, CAN fertilizer 

becomes a powerful homemade explosive.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

Figure 1: Bag of CAN Fertilizer

According to U.S. Department of Agriculture officials, Pakistan prohibits 

fertilizer producers from exporting CAN to Afghanistan or any other 

country. According to these officials, because there is a demand for CAN 

in Afghanistan for use as fertilizer and for the manufacture of IEDs, it is 

smuggled into Afghanistan, for example, on trucks hidden under other 

goods. U.S. officials said that Pakistan maintains two primary border 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

crossings along the approximately 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan, 

and only a small percentage of the trucks crossing the border are 

inspected. U.S. officials also believe that CAN is smuggled into 

Afghanistan at multiple points along the porous border in the same way 

that other contraband, including consumer goods and narcotics, is 

trafficked across the border. See figure 2 for a map showing the 

Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the two primary border crossings. (See 

a video clip showing the border region and activity at the primary border 

crossings.) 

Figure 2: Map of Pakistan and Afghanistan Showing the Two Primary Border 

Crossings

In response to the threat that IEDs pose to both security forces and 

civilians, the Government of Pakistan adopted a National Counter-IED 

Strategy in June 2011. The strategy identifies objectives and specific 

areas of effort to counter IEDs and prevent the smuggling of CAN and 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

other precursors out of the country. Table 1 lists the objectives contained 

in Pakistan’s counter-IED strategy.

Table 1: Objectives of Pakistan’s National Counter-IED Strategy

Engage the international community for equipment, training, and capacity building in the 

area of counter-IEDs, (including the establishment of a National IED Exploitation 

Facility)

Launch a vigorous counter-IED public awareness campaign

a

Control cross-border movement of IEDs, accessories, smuggling of ammonium nitrate 

and other precursors (including attacking the insurgents’ network) 

Modify the existing legislative framework by strengthening legislation on terrorism and 

explosives

Carry out effective interagency coordination (Pakistani government)

Sources: GAO analysis of Government of Pakistan documents.

a

The National IED Exploitation Facility would be an advanced laboratory able to exploit chemical, 

technical, biometric, and documentary evidence.

Multiple U.S. agencies assist Pakistan in countering IEDs. Table 2 

summarizes the roles of the key agencies.

Table 2: Key U.S. Agency Roles for Counter-IED Efforts

Agency Role in counter-IED efforts in Pakistan

State Advocacy through diplomatic channels with various Pakistani ministries; 

training and infrastructure support; public diplomacy

DOD Training and equipping Pakistani forces to be able to interdict contraband 

(including IED precursors) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border

DHS Border management and customs investigation training 

DOJ Technical and legal expertise, forensic investigations, and criminal 

prosecutions

Agriculture Technical assistance, such as providing alternative fertilizers to CAN

Source: GAO analysis based on interviews with agency officials.

According to agency officials, U.S. agencies work through various 

organizations to share information in assisting Pakistan with counter-IED

efforts; officials provided the following information on them:

• U.S. Embassy-Pakistan Counter-IED Working Group helps keeps 

counter-IED efforts a priority. Coordinated by State, participants also 

include DOD (Office of Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP), 

and Special Interagency Assistance Team); DOJ (Federal Bureau of 

Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration); DHS; the 

Department of Agriculture; and the U.S. Agency for 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

International Development; as well as the British High Commission 

and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

• Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)2

• Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

participates in regular discussions on counter-IED issues with Central 

Command (CENTCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), 

JIEDDO, and the Counter-IED Working Group at the U.S. Embassy in 

Pakistan. In addition, officials from this office work with the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense for Policy to ensure that the highest levels in 

the U.S. and Pakistani governments remain focused on counter-IED 

issues, including efforts to disrupt the smuggling of CAN and other 

IED precursors from Pakistan to Afghanistan.

leads DOD’s counter-IED efforts by providing intelligence and 

expertise on IEDs. For example, JIEDDO hosted a conference on 

homemade explosives in Crystal City, Virginia, in fall 2011 that was 

attended by fertilizer producers and representatives from several 

agencies. JIEDDO conducted several studies and provided technical 

assistance to fertilizer producers on how they could identify the 

product to help inhibit smuggling.

• CENTCOM Interagency Action Group works with other agencies to 

coordinate activities with its antiterrorism activities, including counterIED efforts.

• SOCOM Interagency Task Force tracks trends that are collected by 

intelligence agencies, including the number of IED attacks, injuries, 

and deaths. In addition, the task force raises awareness of the issue 

of IEDs with multiple U.S. agencies to address the smuggling of CAN 

and other IED precursor materials.

Multiple U.S. agencies and international partners are engaged in efforts to 

assist Pakistan in countering IEDs but face various ongoing challenges. 

The U.S. agencies—primarily State, DHS, DOJ, and DOD—have 

provided counter-IED assistance to Pakistan, including counter-IED 

training and/or equipment, funding and development for a counter-IED 

public awareness campaign, training of border officials, and making legal 

advice available on drafting laws and regulations to counter IEDs. 

 

2

JIEDDO is an agency of DOD.

U. S. Agencies Face 

Ongoing Challenges 

Assisting Pakistan in 

Countering IEDs
 

Page 8 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

However, according to U.S. officials, these U.S. agencies have 

encountered ongoing challenges to their efforts to assist Pakistan, such 

as delays in obtaining visas and in the delivery of equipment. U.S. 

officials have also identified broader challenges to Pakistan’s ability to 

counter IEDs, including the extreme difficulty of interdicting smugglers 

along its porous border with Afghanistan. In addition, though Pakistan 

developed a National Counter-IED Strategy in June 2011, it has yet to 

finalize an implementation plan for carrying out the strategy.

Multiple U.S. agencies and international partners are providing assistance 

to Pakistan to counter IEDs. Table 3 identifies the types of assistance 

U.S. agencies have provided and the objectives of Pakistan’s National 

Counter-IED Strategy that these assistance efforts help address.

Table 3: Types of U.S. Assistance to Pakistan to Counter IEDs

U.S. assistance efforts

U.S. agencies providing 

assistance

Objectives of Pakistan’s National Counter-IED 

Strategy 

Counter-IED training and/or equipment State, DHS, DOJ, and DOD Engage the international community for equipment, 

training, and capacity building in the area of counterIEDs

Counter-IED public awareness campaign State Launch a vigorous counter-IED public awareness 

campaign 

Training of border officials State, DHS, and DOD Control cross-border movement of IEDs, 

accessories, smuggling of ammonium nitrate and 

other precursors

Legal assistance for laws and regulations to 

counter IEDs and IED precursors 

DOJ and DOD Modify the existing legislative framework by 

strengthening legislation on terrorism and explosives

Source: GAO analysis based on documents and interviews.

Counter-IED training and/or equipment. For example, DOD, through 

ODRP, is partnering with the United Kingdom to establish a counter-IED 

Center of Excellence at the Military College of Engineering in Risalpur, 

Pakistan. According to British officials, the Center would establish a “train 

the trainer” program to build the capacity of the Pakistan military and 

police forces to develop, gather, and use intelligence; attack networks; 

and search, dispose of, and study the forensics of IEDs. According to an 

ODRP official, the United Kingdom has already provided funding to 

establish the Center and provided the initial training portion of the 

Center’s program. According to DOD, State has allocated $25 million in 

training and equipment for the Center’s program. In addition ODRP 

purchased 110 IED jammers—devices that block the detonation of 

remote-controlled IEDs—for Pakistan, but the delivery of this equipment 

Multiple Agencies and 

International Partners Are 

Assisting Pakistan to 

Counter IEDs
 

Page 9 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

has been delayed. Other U.S. procured counter-IED equipment under 

review and still in U.S. storage includes kits for use by combined 

explosive exploitation cells, explosive ordnance disposal items, and 

portable trace explosive detectors. Additional counter-IED equipment 

procured by ODRP is still in production, such as counter-IED route 

clearance vehicles costing a total of about $63.9 million and additional 

remote controlled IED jammers costing about $12.1 million. Further, DOJ 

has also provided counter-IED training. For instance, DOJ’s Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) provided explosive ordnance disposal 

and IED identification training to a number of Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics 

Force Special Investigative Cell members in 2011. This training was 

provided by FBI’s Legal Attaché office in Pakistan. DEA has provided 

investigative training and mentors for Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force 

Special Investigative Cell investigators, who have uncovered some 

linkages to IED networks and other terrorist activities.

Counter-IED public awareness campaign. In November 2011, State’s 

Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan launched a $1.3 

million public awareness campaign using television, radio, and print 

media to communicate messages aimed at countering violent extremism 

and the use of IEDs in Pakistan. The campaign consisted of three 

phases: (1) define the IED problem, (2) create a forum to discuss the 

problem, and (3) empower citizens to detect and report threats to the 

local military and law enforcement authorities. According to State officials, 

the initial phase of the campaign focused on placing messages defining 

the IED problem on commercial stations, but Pakistan’s Ministry of 

Information and Broadcasting has also aired some of them on state-run 

media. According to State officials, the campaign may be extended 

beyond its initial 6-month time frame, which was to end in May 2012, due 

to the positive response of the Pakistani public.

Training of border officials. Multiple U.S. agencies have provided 

training to Pakistani border officials. For instance, DHS conducts joint 

regional training and operational exercises for both Pakistani and Afghan 

border officials, including international border interdiction training and 

cross-border financial investigation training. According to a State official, 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

DHS also plays a lead role in Program Global Shield3

Legal assistance for laws and regulations to counter-IEDs and IED 

precursors. DOD and DOJ have made available legal assistance to 

Pakistan to advance its efforts to counter IEDs. ODRP’s Strategic 

Interagency Assistance Team is prepared to provide legal advice in 

drafting laws and regulations with regard to the use, production, and 

transportation of IED precursor chemicals and other explosives, as well 

as in areas relating to the arrest and prosecution of persons engaged in 

the IED supply and production chain. According to DOJ officials, they are 

also available to provide additional legal assistance as needed.

to foster crossborder cooperation and initiate complementary border management and 

customs operations. In November 2011, DHS and State sponsored an 

International Visitors Leadership Program in the United States for 

Pakistani and Afghan border management and customs officials. 

According to ODRP officials, ODRP has provided training and equipment 

to Pakistani forces including Frontier Scouts active in the western border 

region, to enhance their capability to interdict contraband, including CAN 

and other IED precursor materials.

U.S. agencies have encountered some challenges to providing 

assistance to Pakistan to counter IEDs, and events over the past 6 

months have strained this important bilateral relationship. U.S. officials in

Washington, D.C., and Pakistan identified four key difficulties that hamper 

the provision of training and equipment.

• Obtaining visas for U.S. officials. We have previously reported that 

U.S. officials face delays in obtaining visas to travel to Pakistan.4

 

3

Program Global Shield is an international effort to counter the smuggling of chemical 

precursors that could be used to manufacture IEDs, including CAN. The World Customs 

Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Interpol, and DHS jointly 

initiated this project in 2010 and established it as a program in June 2011 with funding of 

about $5.9 million that State provided through its Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs, according to the Bureau’s Global Shield liaison officer. 

According to DHS, the main goals of Program Global Shield are (1) to identify and interdict 

falsely declared explosive precursor chemicals, (2) to initiate investigations of smuggled or 

illegally diverted IED materials, and (3) to uncover the smuggling and procurement 

networks that foster illicit trade. 

4

GAO, Accountability for U.S. Equipment Provided to Pakistani Security Forces in the 

Western Frontier Needs to Be Improved, GAO-11-156R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 

2011).

Agencies Face a Variety of 

Ongoing Challenges to 

Assisting Pakistan to 

Counter IEDs
 

Page 11 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

During our January 2012 meetings at the U.S. Embassy, officials from 

several agencies told us that it is difficult to obtain visas for U.S. 

officials to travel to Pakistan, including trainers. One official stated that 

obtaining Pakistani visas for contractors providing services, including 

training, is persistently a challenge. According to officials, visa 

renewals sometimes take up to 6 weeks, which can force trainers to 

leave the country until they get their visa renewed. This has 

sometimes resulted in disruptions and cancelled training courses that 

has slowed the progress of U.S. efforts to initiate training programs 

and strengthen working relationships with Pakistani counterparts.

• Vetting Pakistani officials to receive U.S. training. U.S. law requires 

that U.S. agencies determine whether there is credible evidence of 

gross violations of human rights by security force units or individuals 

slated to receive security assistance.5

• Ensuring timely delivery of equipment. Problems clearing customs 

and other issues have delayed the transfer of counter-IED equipment 

from the United States to Pakistani forces. For example, as of April 

2012, of the 110 IED jammers that ODRP procured in 2009 for 

Pakistan at a cost of about $22.8 million, 55 Jammers were still in 

Karachi awaiting release from Pakistani customs, and the remaining 

55 jammers were being kept in storage in the United States until the 

initial 55 were released.

According to U.S. officials, 

Pakistan must provide in advance the names of individuals who will 

be receiving U.S. training in order for them to be vetted. In addition 

U.S. officials stated that Pakistan has not always been timely in 

releasing the names of its officials who are to be the recipients of the 

training, which can create logistics and scheduling difficulties. For 

example, according to DHS officials, lack of sufficient time to complete 

the vetting process resulted in the cancellation of a Program Global 

Shield training session in October 2011.

• Reaching agreement on the specifics of U.S. assistance projects.

Efforts by the United States to reach agreement with Pakistan on the 

specific terms of assistance projects can be challenging, as illustrated 

by the breakdown in efforts to establish an advanced IED exploitation 

 

5

See 22 U.S.C. 2378d regarding assistance furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act or 

the Arms Export Control Act. For programs funded by DOD appropriations, the provision is 

limited to training programs and is incorporated annually in the Department of Defense 

Appropriations Act. See, for example, Pub. L. No. 112-10, Div. A. sec. 8058.
 

Page 12 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

facility. The United States and Pakistan planned to establish a facility 

capable of exploiting chemical, technical, biometric, and documentary 

evidence to enable Pakistan to disrupt insurgent networks. According 

to DOD officials, once it became clear that the United States and 

Pakistan could not reach agreement on joint use of the facility, DOD 

terminated its support for establishing this facility.

In addition to these challenges to U.S. efforts to assist Pakistan, U.S. 

officials identified several broader challenges to Pakistan’s ability to 

counter IEDs in general and, more specifically, to suppress the smuggling 

of CAN and other IED precursors across its border with Afghanistan.

• Finalizing Pakistan’s National Counter-IED Implementation Plan. 

While Pakistan’s Directorate General for Civil Defense has developed 

a National Counter-IED Implementation Plan as outlined in the 

National Counter-IED Strategy, as of April 2012, the plan had not 

been approved due to concerns over resourcing and other issues. 

This plan would establish the various provincial, divisional, and district 

counter-IED cells that would monitor, analyze, and disseminate 

information on IEDs at the national, regional, and local levels. 

Pakistan’s adoption of its implementation plan is needed to allow U.S. 

agencies to align their efforts with Pakistan’s. 

• History of smuggling across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The 

border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is approximately 1,500 

miles long and much of the rugged mountainous terrain along the 

central and northern border is difficult to patrol. There is a history of 

smuggling goods in both directions at many points along this porous 

border. According to those involved with monitoring or interdicting this 

covert movement of goods, it is likely that CAN and other IED 

precursors are viewed as illicit commodities, like narcotics, to be 

smuggled for financial gain.

• Small amount of CAN needed to make IEDs. DOD officials noted that 

only a small amount of CAN is required to make powerful IEDs. 

According to DOD, a 110-pound bag of CAN yields about 82 pounds 

of bomb-ready explosive material. Packed in palm oil jugs, this small 

quantity has the capacity to destroy an armored vehicle or detonate 

10 small blasts aimed at U.S. forces conducting foot patrols.

• Substitutes for CAN available to make IEDs. Even if the smuggling of 

CAN could be suppressed, insurgents could readily switch to another 

precursor chemical to make IEDs. According to DOD, other products 

available in Pakistan such as potassium chlorate, used in making 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

matches, and urea, which is another commonly used fertilizer, can 

also be used to produce IEDs. At a JIEDDO conference on 

homemade explosives, a panel of experts agreed that insurgents 

could easily substitute these commodities to make IEDs if it becomes 

more difficult for them to access CAN.

• IED precursors can be imported or smuggled into Afghanistan from 

other bordering countries. While Pakistan is the principal source of 

CAN coming into Afghanistan, China and Iran are also reported to be 

suppliers of IED precursor chemicals. According to State officials, 

other substitutes for CAN, including urea and potassium chlorate, are 

exported by countries other than Pakistan.

The U.S. fiscal year 2013 MSRP for Pakistan included a new 

performance indicator to track some of Pakistan’s efforts to counter IEDs, 

but the indicator and targets used to measure progress did not cover the 

full range of U.S. assisted efforts. According to State, each year every 

embassy develops its MSRP for the fiscal year two years out; this is done 

to facilitate long-term diplomatic and assistance planning.6

The MSRP for Pakistan included several goals, such as 

counterterrorism/counterinsurgency; regional security, stability, and 

nonproliferation; law enforcement reform and rule of law; and public 

diplomacy and strategic communications. Each of these goals included 

corresponding performance indicators and targets. In the MSRP for fiscal 

year 2013, State included—under its goal for regional security, stability, 

and nonproliferation—a new performance indicator and three targets to 

track some U.S. assisted Pakistani counter-IED efforts.

The MSRP 

lays out the U.S. vision for the bilateral relationship and identifies and 

establishes broad goals and corresponding performance indicators with 

specific targets for monitoring progress. State reports that its Washington, 

D.C.-based bureaus draw on MSRPs to gauge the effectiveness of 

policies and programs in the field and to formulate requests for resources.

Specifically, the fiscal year 2013 MSRP included a performance indicator 

to monitor Pakistan’s implementation of effective measures to prevent 

illicit commerce in sensitive materials, including chemical precursors used 

 

6

Thus, according to a State official, the fiscal year 2013 MSRP for Pakistan was finalized 

in 2011. 

State’s Strategic 

Document Includes 

Performance 

Measures for Some 

U.S. Assisted CounterIED Efforts in 

Pakistan, but Other 

Key Areas Are Not 

Covered 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

to make IEDs in Afghanistan. To measure progress toward this 

performance indicator, the fiscal year 2013 MSRP included three targets: 

(1) implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement 

for fiscal year 2011, (2) improved competency of Pakistani customs and 

border officials and improved monitoring at border stations for fiscal year 

2012, and (3) Pakistan’s implementation of a real-time truck-tracking 

system for fiscal year 2013. According to a State official at the U.S. 

Embassy in Pakistan, the 2013 MSRP’s inclusion of a target for 

implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement had 

implications for countering IEDs because the agreement included 

measures aimed at reducing smuggling.

While the inclusion of a counter-IED performance indicator and targets to 

measure progress toward the indicator in the fiscal year 2013 MSRP is a 

positive step, it does not reflect the broad range of U.S. assisted counterIED efforts in Pakistan. The existing performance indicator is focused on 

cross-border activities, specifically, Pakistan’s efforts to prevent illicit 

commerce in sensitive materials, including precursors used to 

manufacture IEDs in Afghanistan; however, the indicator does not 

explicitly address other key counter-IED efforts in Pakistan. Progress of 

U.S. counter-IED assistance efforts not specifically linked to cross-border 

smuggling are not covered, such as counter-IED training and/or 

equipment, a counter-IED public awareness campaign, and legal 

assistance for laws and regulations to counter-IEDs and IED precursors. 

For example, while some of these efforts are included in the MSRP under 

other goals, they are not tracked to gauge progress toward counter-IED 

objectives.7

The absence of comprehensive performance measures reflecting the 

broad range of U.S. assisted counter-IED efforts limits State’s ability to 

assess overall progress in Pakistan to counter IEDs and to determine the 

Consequently, the effects of key U.S. assisted counter-IED 

efforts, including the development of the Counter-IED Center of 

Excellence at the Military College of Engineering in Risalpur, Pakistan, 

and the provision of IED jammers, are not tracked under the existing 

performance indicators and targets. 

 

7

The fiscal year 2013 MSRP includes performance measures for a general public 

diplomacy campaign against violent extremism; however, targets did not include counterIED efforts. In addition, the MSRP included a target on police training, counternarcotics, 

and prison reform that referenced counter-IED efforts, but the target is used to track 

Pakistan’s progress on law enforcement reform.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

extent to which these counter-IED efforts help achieve the U.S. goal of 

regional security, stability, and nonproliferation in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s ability to stem the flow of CAN and other IED precursors is a 

life and death issue for U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan. Despite a 

broad range of U.S. assisted efforts undertaken by Pakistan, IEDs made 

from CAN and other precursor chemicals smuggled in from Pakistan 

continue to remain a significant cause of fatalities among U.S. troops in 

Afghanistan. Multiple U.S. agencies and international partners are 

assisting Pakistan in countering IEDs, and Pakistan has developed its 

own National Counter-IED Strategy. However, U.S. efforts to assist 

Pakistan in implementing effective measures to prevent illicit commerce in 

IED precursors, including CAN, continue to face a spectrum of 

challenges. Some difficulties are narrower in scope, such as delays in 

obtaining and renewing visas for U.S. officials and trainers or reaching 

agreement on the specific terms for key projects. Other challenges are 

broader and more complex, such as the porous border between Pakistan 

and Afghanistan and the ready availability of IED precursors that can be 

smuggled across that border, of which only a small amount is needed to 

produce multiple IEDs. These challenges highlight how critically important 

it is that Pakistan finalize its National Counter-IED Implementation Plan to 

facilitate concrete actions necessary to achieve the objectives outlined in 

its National Counter-IED Strategy.

State has demonstrated the depth of the U.S. commitment to assist 

Pakistan in countering IEDs, as evidenced by the fiscal year 2013 MSRP 

for Pakistan, which included a new performance indicator and some 

targets to track the progress of some of Pakistan’s counter-IED efforts. 

However, these performance metrics only partially capture the progress 

of counter-IED efforts in Pakistan. Enhancing performance measures to 

ensure that they provide a more comprehensive view of the progress and 

effect of U.S. assisted efforts could yield additional insights needed to 

refine the U.S. approach to assisting Pakistan in countering IEDs and to 

determine the extent to which these efforts further U.S. goals.

To improve State’s ability to track progress of efforts in Pakistan to 

counter IEDs, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the U.S. 

Mission in Pakistan to enhance its counter-IED performance measures to 

cover the full range of U.S. assisted efforts.

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action
 

Page 16 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

We provided a draft of this report to State, DHS, DOD, and DOJ. State 

and DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in 

appendixes II and III, respectively. State concurred with our 

recommendation and noted that comprehensive metrics would better 

enable evaluation of progress of counter-IED efforts in Pakistan. State 

committed to improve assessment of its programs by looking for ways to 

broaden the scope of existing metrics in order to better reflect and 

evaluate interagency participation in counter-IED efforts. In its comments, 

DHS noted that it is committed to working with interagency partners to 

improve abilities for tracking counter-IED efforts in Pakistan. DOD

provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. DOJ 

responded that it did not have any comments on the draft report.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretaries of State, Homeland Security, and Defense, 

as well as the Attorney General of the United States. In addition, the 

report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director

International Affairs and Trade

Agency Comments
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 17 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

To describe the status of U.S. efforts to assist Pakistan in countering 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs), we reviewed agency documentation 

of relevant activities since 2010. In addition, we reviewed the Pakistan 

National Counter-IED Strategy and draft National Implementation Plan to 

gain knowledge of the areas that Pakistan has focused on in seeking 

assistance from the international community. We inventoried and 

described the efforts of U.S. agencies to assist Pakistan in countering 

IEDs and preventing the smuggling of calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) 

and other IED precursors from Pakistan to Afghanistan. We analyzed

funding and program information on specific projects and activities and 

followed up with interviews with knowledgeable U.S. officials and 

international partners to obtain their views on efforts to assist Pakistan to 

counter IEDs and prevent the smuggling of CAN and other precursors. 

We interviewed officials from the Departments of (State), Homeland 

Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ), in Washington, D.C., and the 

Department of Defense (DOD) in Arlington, Virginia, and Tampa, Florida, 

as well as representatives of all these agencies at the U.S. Embassy in 

Pakistan. Specifically, in Pakistan we interviewed representatives from 

State’s Economic, Political, Narcotics Affairs, and Public Affairs sections; 

DHS’s Homeland Security Investigations office; DOJ’s, Drug Enforcement 

Administration and Legal Attaché; and DOD’s Office of Defense 

Representative, Pakistan, and Strategic Interagency Assistance Team. 

The international partners we interviewed included representatives from 

the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the British High 

Commission, and the International Security Assistance Force 

International Coordination Element–Pakistan. We also interviewed 

Pakistani customs officials from the Directorate General of the 

Intelligence and Investigations and the Federal Board of Revenue to 

obtain their perspective on counter-IED efforts and challenges. During our 

January 2012 trip to Pakistan to learn more about the use of CAN and 

other fertilizers, we met with U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service officials as well as with representatives of 

the Pakistan National Fertilizer Development Center, but we were unable 

to meet with other Pakistani officials or representatives of the Pakistani 

company that manufactures CAN fertilizer. To learn more about 

Afghanistan and Pakistan border issues, we met with representatives 

from the Pakistan Trade Project, a U.S. Agency for International 

Development partner who provided video footage of the Chaman and 

Torkham border crossings between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

To review State’s tracking of U.S. assisted efforts in Pakistan to counter 

IEDs, we reviewed State’s fiscal year 2013 Mission Strategic and 

Resource Plan for the U.S. Mission in Pakistan. Specifically, we reviewed 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 18 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

goals, performance indicators, and targets for counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency; regional security, stability, and nonproliferation; law 

enforcement reform and rule of law; and public diplomacy and strategic 

communications to identify the extent to which they covered counter-IED 

efforts. We also followed up with a State official at the U.S, Embassy in 

Pakistan with regard to how targets under the new counter-IED 

performance indicator in the MSRP track progress of counter-IED efforts.

The information on foreign law in this report is not the product of GAO’s 

original analysis, but is derived from interviews and secondary sources.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 to May 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 19 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of State

Page 20 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 21 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 22 GAO-12-614 Combating Terrorism

Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Jason Bair, Assistant Director; 

David Dayton, Eddie Uyekawa; and Tom Zingale made key contributions 

to this report. Alissa Czyz, David Dornisch, Mark Dowling, Carol E. 

Finkler, Brandon Hunt, Theresa Perkins, Cary Russell, Kira Self, and 

Yong Song provided additional support.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320872)
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