DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

DHS’ Progress In Addressing 

Coordination Challenges Between 

Customs and Border Protection and 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

OIG-07-38 April 2007
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

April 13, 2007 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report evaluates DHS’ progress in addressing coordination challenges between Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) identified in our initial 

report—An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04, November 2005. It also analyzes DHS’ April 2006 response 

and action plan for each of the 14 recommendations made in the November 2005 report. It is based 

on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and a review of applicable 

department records and documents. 

The analysis herein has been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and has been 

discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this report will 

result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all of 

those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

 Executive Summary.........................................................................................................................1 

Background......................................................................................................................................2 

Results of Review ............................................................................................................................3 

Actions Taken to Improve CBP and ICE Coordination..........................................................3 

Roles, Responsibilities, and Communication ........................................................................8 

 Strategic Planning ................................................................................................................11 

CBP and ICE Resource Planning .........................................................................................13 

 Operational Coordination and Conflict Resolution .............................................................13 

Intelligence and Information Sharing ..................................................................................14 

 Establishing Performance Metrics and Standards ................................................................16 

Efforts to Effect Change ......................................................................................................18 

 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..................................................................................19 

Appendices 

Appendix A: OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge 

CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 ..................................................................................29 

 Appendix B: Continuing Recommendations .............................................................................39 

Appendix C: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .......................................................................40 

Appendix D: Management Response to Draft Report ...............................................................41

Appendix E: Major Contributors to This Report.......................................................................51 

Appendix F: Report Distribution...............................................................................................52 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 
Table of Contents 

Abbreviations 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IEA Immigration Enforcement Agent 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SBI Secure Border Initiative 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 
OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

We reviewed the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) progress in 

addressing coordination challenges between Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In our report, An 

Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04, November 2005, we 

addressed several coordination challenges confronting CBP and ICE. In April 

2006, the DHS Deputy Secretary responded by outlining the activities and 

programs the department intends to implement to address the 14 

recommendations we made to improve coordination between CBP and ICE 

and enhance interoperability at the field level. In Appendix A, we provide our 

analysis of DHS’ response and action plan for each of the 14 

recommendations. 

DHS has made significant progress toward improving coordination and 

interoperability between CBP and ICE. DHS made organizational changes 

within the department, including creating the Offices of Policy, Operations 

Coordination, and Intelligence and Analysis. Senior officials of CBP and ICE 

created the ICE-CBP Coordination Council to provide a forum to address 

CBP and ICE policy and operational coordination issues. In addition, the 

department established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) and Border 

Enforcement Task Forces. 

However, additional work is necessary. Most notably, CBP and ICE can 

address the remaining challenges by placing increased emphasis on (1) 

improving communication between CBP and ICE headquarters elements and 

all levels of field personnel; (2) improving intelligence and information 

sharing; (3) strengthening performance measures; and, (4) addressing ongoing 

relational issues among some elements of the two components. 

CBP and ICE agree with our overall observation that better coordination is 

needed between the two organizations. Both components provided a joint 

response addressing the remaining open recommendations from the initial 

November 2005 report. We agree with the actions taken and consider all 14 

recommendations resolved, however, 2 recommendations remain open. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 1 
Background 

Initial Review of Proposal to Merge CBP and ICE 

In February 2005, at the request of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, we began a review to 

determine and make a recommendation as to whether CBP and ICE should 

merge. We identified a division between CBP and ICE that created 

breakdowns in coordination among apprehension, detention, and removal 

efforts; interdiction and investigative work; and intelligence activities. Also, 

new organizational obstacles developed, which undermined information 

sharing. Finally, the organizational structure fostered an environment of 

uncertainty and mistrust between CBP and ICE personnel. Collegial 

interactions ought to characterize relations among the organizations, but 

competition and interference were common. The Border and Transportation 

Security Directorate was responsible for overseeing and integrating CBP and 

ICE actions; however, the Directorate’s need for adequate staff and authority 

over CBP and ICE hampered its effectiveness in achieving those goals. 

Consequently, the Border and Transportation Security Directorate’s leadership 

was not successful in preventing CBP and ICE from working against one 

another in performing respective mission objectives, intervening to 

synchronize CBP and ICE operations effectively, and resolving conflicts 

timely. 

We concluded that a consolidated border security agency with a single chain 

of command would better coordinate mission, priorities, and resources to 

facilitate a comprehensive border security program. If CBP and ICE merged, 

the Border and Transportation Security Directorate’s role would become 

superfluous, and, in our November 2005 report, we recommended that it be 

disbanded. 

In July 2005, the Secretary announced the results of a top-to-bottom review of 

the department’s organizational structure, referred to as the Second Stage 

Review. As a result of the Second Stage Review, the Secretary decided not to 

merge CBP and ICE, but instead eliminated the Border and Transportation 

Security Directorate. Subsequently, CBP and ICE became direct reports to 

the Secretary, an effort to streamline management and increase accountability. 

We determined that even with the reorganization, critical issues were 

identified that required the attention of DHS leadership. In November 2005, 

we issued our report, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and 

Border Protection with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

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We made 14 recommendations to overcome interagency coordination and 

integration challenges confronting CBP and ICE. Those recommendations 

covered four areas, including: 

1) Defining and communicating roles and responsibilities with respect to 

policy and operational coordination between DHS headquarters, CBP, 

and ICE; 

2) Conducting integrated planning and coordination of policies and 

resources; 

3) Reviewing, developing, and implementing policies and procedures to 

improve and enhance operational coordination between CBP and ICE; 

and 

4) Providing oversight and implementing metrics and performance 

measures to ensure that the actions and initiatives taken or proposed 

achieve intended results. 

Results of Review 

Coordination, interoperability, and relations between CBP and ICE have 

improved. Both components have made progress in defining respective roles 

and responsibilities and how personnel of each organization are to work 

together. However, communication and cross-component understanding of 

roles and responsibilities do not appear to have reached all levels of CBP and 

ICE. In addition, both components share intelligence and information using 

many methods. In some locations, ongoing information sharing and 

cooperative efforts occur; however, in other locations, information sharing 

between CBP and ICE needs improvement. Further, we observed that DHS is 

committed to building performance measurement and the standard 

infrastructure needed to accurately track program performance across the 

department. Finally, co-location of joint task forces and cross-training 

opportunities appear to be improving relations between CBP and ICE; 

however, both components need continued emphasis on improving the 

relationship and increasing cross-component understanding of policies and 

procedures between CBP and ICE headquarters and field operational 

elements. 

Actions Taken to Improve CBP and ICE Coordination 

DHS has taken several actions to improve coordination, interoperability, and 

relations between CBP and ICE. DHS made organizational changes within 

the department following the Secretary’s Second Stage Review. In addition to 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

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eliminating the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, DHS took 

further action to improve operational coordination between CBP and ICE and, 

across the department, by creating the Offices of Policy, Operations 

Coordination, and Intelligence and Analysis. At the Secretary’s direction, 

CBP and ICE senior officials created the ICE-CBP Coordination Council. 

The department established SBI and Border Enforcement Security Task 

Forces, and revised the Investment Review Process to monitor and align 

budget priorities across DHS. 

ICE-CBP Coordination Council 

Created in December 2005, the ICE-CBP Coordination Council provides 

senior CBP and ICE officials with a forum to proactively address and resolve 

challenges hampering the components’ ability to effectively coordinate 

operations and share information. Members of the Council include the 

Commissioner for Customs and Border Protection, the Assistant Secretary for 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other senior-level officials of 

both organizations. The Council meets as necessary to discuss and resolve 

issues involving CBP and ICE policies and operational coordination. The 

Council has issued joint memoranda regarding specific roles and 

responsibilities and operational coordination. 

Many Council issues are first discussed in lower level working groups, such 

as the CBP Field Operations/ICE Investigations Working Group, the CBP 

Border Patrol/ICE Investigations Working Group, the Technology Solutions 

Working Group, and other working groups looking at specific issues such as 

intelligence sharing. CBP and ICE personnel work together to identify and 

agree on solutions for the Council’s review. For example, the CBP Border 

Patrol/ICE Investigations Working Group drafted an addendum to the 

November 2004 Border Patrol/Investigations Memorandum of Understanding 

(MOU), which is intended to clarify and provide guidance on remaining and 

new issues affecting interactions between Border Patrol and Investigations. 

However, during our review, senior CBP and ICE officials had not approved 

the addendum. 

Secure Border Initiative 

Announced by DHS in November 2005, SBI is a comprehensive multi-year 

plan to control U.S. borders and reduce illegal immigration. The goal of SBI 

is to link technology, infrastructure, command and control, communications, 

and personnel into a comprehensive border enforcement approach. DHS’ 

vision for SBI includes increasing staffing for CBP and ICE; expanding 

detention and removal capabilities; upgrading and expanding use of 

technology; enhancing infrastructure improvements along the border; and 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

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increasing interior enforcement. With SBI, DHS plans to have operational 

control of the northern and southern borders within five years. 

Within its first year, SBI has had some notable successes. For example, 

through increased detention capabilities and expanded use of expedited 

removal, DHS has made significant progress toward ending its past practice of 

“catch and release.” Under SBI, ICE’s Detention and Removal Operations 

has added 6,300 beds, including 500 beds for family units, in detention 

facilities along the southern border since November 2005. The increased bed 

space has allowed almost all illegal aliens apprehended along the southern 

border to be detained pending removal proceedings. In addition, the use of 

expedited removal has decreased the time it takes to return most non-Mexican 

aliens to their country of origin from 90 days to 21 days or less. As a result, 

by August 2006, 99% of apprehended illegal aliens were being detained and 

processed for removal. 

Expedited removal allows authorized CBP staff to issue a removal order 

without presenting the case to an immigration judge. In the past, due to high 

numbers of individuals being apprehended along the U.S. border and 

limitations on DHS’ ability to detain and return illegal aliens to their country 

of origin, most apprehended illegal aliens were not detained. Instead, most 

apprehended illegal aliens were processed, issued a notice to appear before an 

immigration judge, and released into the United States. However, most illegal 

aliens never return for their hearing and continue to live illegally in the United 

States. Now, aliens in the expedited removal process must be detained until 

they are removed, unless they have been determined to have a credible fear of 

persecution upon return to their country of origin.1 

Use of expedited removal with Salvadorans is hindered by the Orantes 

permanent injunction, issued in 1988, which requires the U.S. Government to 

notify apprehended Salvadorans of their right to a hearing before an 

immigration judge. It also limits transferring a detained, unrepresented 

Salvadoran out of the jurisdiction of apprehension for seven days.2 In 

addition, Cubans arriving by air at ports of entry, unaccompanied minors, and 

Salvadorans and Guatemalans who were members of the Class Action 

Settlement in American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh3 are not subject to 

expedited removal.4 

1 8 USC § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). 2 Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F.Supp 1488 (C.D. Cal 1988); as modified by 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95388

(October 11, 2006). 3

 760 F.Supp 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 4 69 Fed. Reg. 48877, August 11, 2004. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

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In May 2006, the President announced Operation Jump Start. This effort 

supports Border Patrol operations by assigning National Guard troops to nonlaw enforcement duties along the southwest border. Operation Jump Start was 

intended to be a two-year program to provide up to 6,000 National Guard 

troops in the first year, and up to 3,000 National Guard troops in the second 

year, along the U.S. – Mexican border to support Border Patrol operations 

while Border Patrol hires and trains 6,000 new agents. 

Under Operation Jump Start, National Guard troops perform non-law 

enforcement duties that Border Patrol agents usually perform. Such duties 

include operating surveillance cameras and communications equipment, 

manning Entry Identification Teams, performing vehicle maintenance, and 

assisting with tactical infrastructure enhancements, such as building or 

maintaining border roads and the placement of ground sensors. As of July 

2006, because of Operation Jump Start, 250 Border Patrol agents were able to 

return to direct law enforcement activities on the southwest border. 

SBInet, a key element of SBI, intends to integrate cross-organizational 

technological operations. Specifically, SBInet is to integrate technological 

tools to detect, characterize, and identify intrusions, and allow for real-time 

communication with Border Patrol agents to determine the most effective way 

to interdict and apprehend individuals who illegally cross our borders. When 

fully developed, SBInet should provide a common operational picture to 

facilitate collaborative planning and enhance awareness of requirements and 

trends at the border. The initial focus of SBInet will be deterrence efforts 

between ports of entry along the southwest border. In the long-run, SBInet 

should be an effective tool to assist high-level decision makers in developing 

strategic, tactical, and operational plans, and prioritizing and aligning policies 

with resources. On September 21, 2006, DHS announced that The Boeing 

Company would be the prime contractor and integrator for SBInet. CBP’s 

SBI Program Management Office will lead, manage, and work with Boeing to 

develop, implement, and manage SBInet. 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces are intelligence-driven units whose 

mission is to combat cross-border criminal activity. Border Enforcement 

Security Task Forces include personnel from ICE, CBP, and DHS’ Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis, other federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies, and representatives from the Mexican government. By integrating 

intelligence, investigative, and interdiction efforts, Border Enforcement 

Security Task Forces share information, identify and develop suspects or 

potential targets for investigation, and execute coordinated law enforcement 

operations to decrease cross-border crime and enhance border security. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

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The Border Enforcement Security Task Force concept originated with 

Operation Black Jack, a local initiative started in Laredo, Texas, to combat 

cross-border violence related to drug and gang activities. Operation Black 

Jack became the first Border Enforcement Security Task Force, and has been 

successful in addressing cross-border violence and criminal activity, such as 

narcotics and currency smuggling. Building upon the Laredo Border 

Enforcement Security Task Force successes, DHS is establishing a second 

Border Enforcement Security Task Force in Tucson, Arizona, that will focus 

on specific vulnerabilities and threats identified along that part of the 

southwest border. 

While initial Border Enforcement Security Task Forces will focus efforts 

along the southwest border, future Border Enforcement Security Task Forces 

will be established in locations where specific vulnerabilities exist based on 

threat assessments, including along the northern border or in the interior of the 

United States. Along the northern border, it is not clear how a Border 

Enforcement Security Task Force would operate differently from Integrated 

Border Enforcement Teams, which jointly investigate cross-border criminal 

and terrorist activity along the U.S. – Canadian border. They are cooperative, 

intelligence-driven efforts that support border integrity and security by 

identifying, investigating, and interdicting persons and organizations that pose 

a threat to national security or are engaged in other organized criminal 

activities between ports of entry. On December 21, 2001, the United States 

and Canada signed the Smart Border Declaration, a plan to enhance security 

while facilitating the legitimate flow of people and goods on the northern 

border. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams operate in 15 regions along the 

northern border. 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces will work in conjunction with other 

existing task forces, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-led Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), which are multi-agency task forces with the 

mandate to investigate and respond to terrorism and its financing. However, 

care should be taken to avoid duplication of efforts with Integrated Border 

Enforcement Teams along the northern border. 

Investment Review Process 

Through the Investment Review Process, DHS monitors and guides the 

overall balance between CBP and ICE regarding resources and budget 

requirements. The revised Interim Management Directive 1400, signed by the 

Chief Financial Officer on March 3, 2006, governs the Investment Review 

Process. While not published in the department’s Management Directive 

System, it is the current effective version. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

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The Investment Review Process facilitates collaboration among the Under 

Secretary for Management, the Chief Financial Officer, CBP, and ICE on 

budget formulation and strategic planning to ensure alignment with the 

department’s strategic plans and mission. According to DHS budget 

personnel, the Chief Financial Officer is responsible for developing an 

integrated budget reflecting requirements across DHS, not just CBP and ICE. 

DHS achieves its oversight and management objectives through the 

Investment Review Board and the Joint Requirements Council. The 

Investment Review Board reviews investments for proper management, 

oversight, accountability, and alignment with DHS strategic goals, and is the 

approval authority for contracts exceeding $100 million. The Deputy 

Secretary chairs the Investment Review Board, which comprises senior DHS 

management officials. The Joint Requirements Council approves contracts 

between $50 million to $100 million, and makes recommendations to the 

Investment Review Board regarding contracts exceeding $100 million. The 

Joint Requirements Council comprises senior managers from each DHS 

component. 

Roles, Responsibilities, and Communication 

CBP and ICE have made progress in defining roles and responsibilities, and 

how personnel of each organization are to work together. Joint memoranda 

directed to field components have clarified and provided guidance regarding 

responsibilities. However, communication and cross-component 

understanding of roles and responsibilities do not appear to have reached all 

levels of CBP and ICE. Further, differences in how senior management 

officials in the field interpret some joint directives issued by CBP and ICE 

headquarters appear to have contributed to different implementation of those 

directives. 

Relationship Between CBP Field Operations and ICE Investigations 

For example, a December 8, 2005, memorandum issued by senior officials of 

both CBP Field Operations and ICE Investigations recognized ICE 

Investigations as the primary investigative arm for CBP Field Operations, and 

CBP Field Operations as responsible for interdictions within each port of 

entry’s area of jurisdiction. The memorandum provided guidance on a 

number of issues, including intelligence and information sharing, the Third 

Party Rule, and the exchange of information between Investigations and Field 

Operations regarding case outcomes. Agencies must follow specific 

procedures when sharing information or intelligence with a third-party 

agency. CBP’s Office of Regulations and Rulings determined that any entity 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 8 
under the umbrella of DHS is not considered a third-party agency. Therefore, 

as noted in the memorandum, DHS components, such as CBP and ICE, are 

allowed to share information or intelligence with each other on a “need to 

know basis,” except for European Union Passenger Name Record data. 

Field personnel in some locations we visited said appropriate information 

could be shared between CBP and ICE freely and that third-party issues have 

been resolved. In other locations visited, CBP and ICE field personnel said 

CBP can provide information to ICE agents, but that printouts of the 

information and documents cannot be provided or have to be redacted before 

being given to ICE. Also, both CBP and ICE field personnel said there is no 

formal method to exchange information on case outcomes, and unless an 

individual officer or an agent involved in the case follows up personally, 

information usually is not shared. An information exchange loop between 

CBP and ICE field personnel would greatly increase understanding of each 

other’s operational roles and responsibilities. 

Referrals from CBP to ICE Clarified 

A May 10, 2006, memorandum issued by CBP’s Acting Commissioner and 

ICE’s Assistant Secretary provided clarification and guidance on referrals 

from CBP to ICE. When CBP apprehends illegal aliens or seizes contraband, 

it refers the information to ICE for further investigation of potential 

smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, or other criminal activity. 

Many CBP and ICE field personnel said they did not feel the topics addressed 

in the memorandum were issues in their location. For example, CBP and ICE 

field personnel in many locations said CBP already notifies ICE of all 

apprehensions or seizures in which CBP is required to notify a different 

agency or task force for follow up investigation. However, in other locations, 

field personnel said the memorandum provided much needed clarification and 

helped resolve outstanding issues in those locations. For example, an ICE 

agent in one location said the memo resolved differences of interpretation 

between the leadership in that location, and allowed agents to point to a 

document that clarified the party responsible for a particular task. 

Effectiveness of Memoranda of Understanding 

Existing MOUs continue to guide Border Patrol’s interactions with ICE’s 

Office of Investigations. We received mixed reactions and opinions in the 

field regarding the effectiveness of the November 2004 MOU between CBP’s 

Border Patrol and ICE’s Investigations. Some field personnel said the MOU 

helped resolve issues of responsibility and that the relationship between 

Border Patrol and Investigations is improving. Others said differences in 

interpreting the MOU have raised new issues regarding Border Patrol agent 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 9 
and ICE agent roles and responsibilities, and the relationship has not changed. 

For example, an ICE agent in one location said there is now more friction 

regarding who is responsible for what tasks. Additionally, lower level Border 

Patrol agents do not appear to know of the MOU. A Senior Border Patrol 

agent in the same sector said the MOU has not had an effect on interactions 

with ICE Investigations and that the agencies are operating in the same 

manner as before. In addition, Border Patrol is still governed by a pre-DHS 

MOU with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which requires 

Border Patrol to refer its narcotics seizures to DEA for investigative follow 

up. As a result, Border Patrol provides notification to ICE of seizures, but 

must continue to refer narcotics seizures to DEA even though ICE 

Investigations is the investigative arm for Border Patrol. Many CBP and ICE 

officials said the Border Patrol-DEA MOU should be reviewed; however, at 

the time of our review, DHS had no formal plan to review the MOU. 

Transportation of Detained Illegal Aliens 

In many locations where ICE’s Detention and Removal Operations does not 

have sufficient resources to conduct all necessary transportation, CBP’s Field 

Operations or Border Patrol continue to assist. As a result, CBP officers and 

Border Patrol agents are pulled from their duties at ports of entry or along the 

border to transport illegal aliens to detention facilities. To free officers and 

agents from transportation duties and allow them to remain on the border or at 

ports of entry, CBP established a contract to provide land transportation 

services for Border Patrol in the nine southwest border sectors. 

Role of Immigration Enforcement Agents 

In addition, Immigration Enforcement Agents (IEA) assigned to Border Patrol 

stations continue to be limited to transportation duties even though all IEAs 

assigned to Border Patrol have received training to perform all duties of the 

position. For administrative purposes—i.e., salary, leave approval, 

performance appraisals, and disciplinary actions—these IEAs remain ICE 

employees; however, for day-to-day duties, they report to Border Patrol 

supervisors. At times, reporting to two supervisors has led to confusion and 

low morale among these IEAs. For example, a Border Patrol supervisor 

would not have the authority to discipline an IEA directly, but an ICE 

supervisor might be hesitant to discipline an IEA not under their direct 

supervision. Senior CBP and ICE officials said they are working on a plan to 

return IEAs assigned to Border Patrol stations along the southern border to 

Detention and Removal Operations, which should occur after the CBP 

transportation contracts are completed. Field personnel expect northern 

border IEAs to return to Detention and Removal Operations also, but it was 

unclear when this would occur. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

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Use of Air and Marine Resources 

CBP’s Air and Marine Operations supports CBP, ICE, and other federal, state, 

and local law enforcement agencies. During our fieldwork, we were told of 

concerns about both air and marine operations. For example, because many 

air assets have been temporarily assigned to Arizona to support the Arizona 

Border Control Initiative, other sectors, such as Laredo, Texas, do not have 

the air resources to support operations within their sector. The Arizona 

Border Control Initiative, implemented in March 2004, is an effort to reduce 

illegal aliens and contraband flowing across the Arizona border from Mexico. 

Additionally, Border Patrol maintains tactical control of air operations and all 

marine operations except for those in coastal sectors. ICE field personnel said 

Border Patrol’s tactical control of air operations has made it difficult for ICE 

to receive support for long-range air operations because each sector chief and 

CBP headquarters must approve the use of air assets within each sector. For 

example, if ICE requests air support to transport people or narcotics from the 

Tucson Sector to the Laredo Sector, all sector chiefs between Tucson and 

Laredo—Tucson, El Paso, Marfa, Del Rio, and Laredo—and CBP 

headquarters would need to approve the use of such air support before ICE 

could receive it. When timeliness is critical for an operation, this approval 

process has resulted in ICE operations not receiving air support. As a result, 

several ICE agents said they have stopped requesting air support from CBP’s 

Air and Marine Operations. According to CBP headquarters, the Border 

Patrol sector chief is usually the CBP official who approves aviation support 

to ICE's Office of Investigations. Additionally, only the Border Patrol sector 

chief in the sending sector is required to approve air support, and the receiving 

sector may be notified as a courtesy. While a review of CBP’s Air and 

Marine Operations is not within the scope of this review, we believe several 

coordination issues raised warrant further attention and review by our office. 

CBP and ICE should jointly pursue clarification of or an alternative to the 

current approval process that sufficiently addresses this situation. 

Strategic Planning 

DHS headquarters, CBP, and ICE have conducted strategic planning to align 

priorities with the overall department mission and ensure policies are 

coordinated between CBP and ICE. The DHS strategic plan calls for 

increasing internal coordination to foster cross-component initiatives and 

integrate common administrative and information systems in DHS. CBP and 

ICE strategic plans reference current and future interagency coordination. 

This forward-looking planning targets strengthened immigration enforcement, 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 11 
enhanced coordination of seizures, detention, and removal operations, and 

increased participation at the National Targeting Center. 

The National Targeting Center is the coordination point for all CBP antiterrorism efforts. It uses sophisticated information-gathering techniques and 

intelligence to provide target-specific information to field offices. The 

National Targeting Center works with CBP Intelligence and ICE agents to 

share information and issue advisories on immediate threats to ports of entry 

and the U.S. border. 

Strategic Planning Efforts 

DHS’ work in securing the border is mostly done through existing operational 

components and support staff. The DHS Secretary has created a Secure 

Border Coordination Council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary, which 

includes six senior DHS executives responsible for border security. The 

Executive Director at the CBP SBI Program Management Office also serves 

as the Executive Director for the Council. This Council focuses DHS’ 

leadership team on progress required of SBI to achieve the comprehensive 

immigration reform and homeland security priorities described in the Secure 

Border Strategic Plan. 

Dissemination of Results 

Although issues are often decided upon at the CBP and ICE headquarters 

levels, resolution is not always effectively relayed to field officers and agents. 

For example, a second line supervisor at an ICE field office strongly 

recommended to us that CBP and ICE agree that ICE is the investigative arm 

for border enforcement activities. That supervisor was unaware that CBP and 

ICE senior headquarters officials had already issued joint memoranda 

recognizing ICE Investigations as the investigative arm for CBP Field 

Operations and Border Patrol, respectively. 

Electronic media, such as email, or personal contact in musters are the most 

common methods for relaying updates and changes in policies and procedures 

to field personnel. Some officers and agents said those avenues are not an 

effective means to convey policy or procedural changes or issue resolution 

because there is limited follow up regarding policy or procedural changes 

distributed through those avenues. For example, several officers and agents 

indicated they receive multiple emails distributing new policies or directives 

daily, and they are unable to recall later whether they received a specific 

directive. Further, we were told that these avenues might not convey fully the 

actions taken by CBP and ICE headquarters to resolve issues. Reinforcement 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

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and better dissemination mechanisms for resolutions, policies, and procedures 

could enhance the relationship between CBP and ICE at the field level. 

CBP and ICE Resource Planning 

CBP and ICE compete for finite departmental resources. Although CBP and 

ICE develop separate budgets, through joint planning of resources and 

operations, CBP and ICE are better able to fully employ their operational 

abilities to achieve both interconnected missions. DHS plans to ensure 

collaboration on budgeting and resource planning through its Chief Financial 

Officer, the Investment Review Process, and the SBI Program Executive 

Office. 

Although DHS proposes the Investment Review Process as a solution to 

monitor and align budget priorities, program officials responsible for 

coordinating the process were not able to provide us with CBP- and ICEspecific issues addressed through the Investment Review Process. However, 

senior DHS officials said CBP and ICE have participated on the Investment 

Review Board and the Joint Requirements Council. Further, even though 

CBP and ICE do not jointly develop or exchange budgets, both do have the 

opportunity to review and comment, as well as influence one another’s 

funding priorities through the Investment Review Process. 

The SBI Program Executive Office has encouraged and facilitated exchange 

and resource planning between CBP and ICE. The SBI strategy proposes a 

comprehensive, systematic approach to border security by controlling and 

securing the borders and enforcing immigration laws. Both CBP and ICE, 

with their respective and mutually dependent charges of border and 

immigration enforcement, are key to SBI. Each is actively involved in 

requirements development and planning for SBInet. Although CBP is 

administering the development of the SBInet contract, ICE also is involved in 

conveying requirements. We are encouraged by the initial coordination and 

planning efforts that CBP and ICE have exhibited to further SBI and leverage 

finite departmental resources. 

Operational Coordination and Conflict Resolution 

DHS has made significant progress in enhancing operational coordination 

between CBP and ICE. Several successful joint operations have been 

conducted. The ICE-CBP Coordination Council was established to coordinate 

policies and operations and resolve disputes at the headquarters level. While 

formal processes are not in place in the field, conflicts regarding policies or 

operations appear to be resolved more effectively through existing chains of 

command. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 13 
Joint Operations 

CBP and ICE have coordinated effectively to conduct several successful joint 

operations. Border Patrol and Detention and Removal Operations coordinated 

and successfully conducted Operation Texas Hold’em. This 60-day effort 

addressed an increase in illegal border crossings within Border Patrol’s Rio 

Grande Valley Sector by detaining and processing for expedited removal all 

illegal Brazilian nationals. The operation resulted in a 90% decrease in the 

number of Brazilian nationals attempting to cross the border illegally into the 

Rio Grande Valley Sector, establishing a deterrent effect that has been 

maintained. As a result, the operation was expanded, and as of July 2006, it 

covers all nationalities except Cubans and El Salvadorans.5 In addition, in 

several locations, CBP and ICE personnel coordinate to conduct joint 

outbound operations at airports to detect large amounts of currency or other 

contraband leaving the United States. 

Dispute Resolution 

The ICE-CBP Coordination Council has been an effective forum for resolving 

disputes between both organizations at the headquarters level. Issues that 

cannot be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of CBP and ICE leadership are 

elevated to DHS’ Secretary for further direction or resolution. One such issue 

has been referred to the Secretary. While there is no formal dispute resolution 

mechanism in place at the field level, field personnel at all levels said most 

issues are resolved informally and in a timely manner, often relying on 

personal relationships. Issues not resolved at the agent-to-agent or supervisorto-supervisor level are raised through the respective chains of command as 

necessary until resolved. Field personnel said very few issues remain 

unresolved in the field requiring referral to headquarters for resolution. 

However, some field personnel did express a desire for a procedure to allow 

concerns to be raised anonymously, due to fears of retaliation. CBP and ICE 

should jointly pursue a method that addresses this concern. 

Intelligence and Information Sharing 

CBP and ICE share intelligence and information using many methods, 

including intelligence reports issued by DHS intelligence centers, joint task 

5

 Most Cubans are not detained pursuant to the Administration’s “wet feet/dry feet” policy with regard to apprehended 

Cubans. Cubans, who do not reach the U.S. shore–“wet feet,”–are returned to Cuba unless they cite fears of persecution. 

Cubans, who successfully reach the U.S. shore–“dry feet,”–are inspected by DHS, allowed to remain in the United 

States, and qualify for expedited legal permanent resident status after one year. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 14 
forces and intelligence groups, data systems such as the Treasury Enforcement 

Communications System, and informal conversations between staff. In some 

locations, on-going sharing and cooperative efforts occur, such as Intelligence 

Collection and Analysis Teams. Intelligence Collection and Analysis Teams 

are ICE intelligence units that collect and analyze all-source tactical and 

operational intelligence on narcotics smuggling and money laundering for 

front line CBP officers and ICE agents. Senior CBP and ICE officials said 

effective information sharing often depends on pre-DHS working 

relationships. Many CBP and ICE employees worked with one another at 

legacy agencies and continue to maintain professional ties. In other locations, 

however, information sharing between CBP and ICE is ineffective. For 

example, CBP officials in Chicago, Illinois, executed an operation targeting 

fraudulent documents; however, CBP did not inform ICE agents of the 

operation prior to its start. As a result, the unexpected increase of seizures and 

cases being referred for investigation overwhelmed ICE agents. While CBP 

and ICE officials quickly resolved the issue, better information sharing would 

have facilitated ICE’s preparation for a large influx of new cases. 

Senior officials cited efforts to improve information sharing not only between 

CBP and ICE, but also with other DHS components. In those cases, 

information sharing occurred informally or in working groups. For example, 

in some locations, high-level field personnel participate in monthly DHS 

partners meetings where CBP and ICE are able to establish and build 

relationships with their counterparts and informally address issues of mutual 

concern. In addition, when necessary, CBP Field Operations, Border Patrol, 

and ICE managers in Laredo and Brownsville, Texas, meet informally to 

share information and resolve operational differences. 

Co-location and the development of joint work teams also appear to be key to 

improving information sharing between CBP and ICE. Examples of 

collaboration include forums such as Intelligence Collection and Analysis 

Teams, JTTFs, Border Enforcement Security Task Forces, Integrated Border 

Intelligence Teams, and Border Intelligence Centers. Integrated Border 

Intelligence Teams are intelligence-driven law enforcement teams, comprised 

of U.S. and Canadian officials, which produce intelligence to support 

Integrated Border Enforcement Teams along the northern border. Border 

Intelligence Centers, formerly Command and Control Intelligence 

Coordination Centers, are Border Patrol-led centers that process immigration 

and customs intelligence. Border Patrol has invited ICE to participate in 

Border Intelligence Centers; however, because of resource constraints, ICE 

has not been able to provide a representative in all locations. 

We were told that having both CBP and ICE representatives assigned to a 

JTTF facilitates information flow between CBP and ICE in that location. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 15 
DHS, CBP, and ICE headquarters senior level officials should ensure that 

joint task forces and intelligence groups are effectively staffed with both CBP 

and ICE representatives, and other DHS components as necessary. 

While information sharing is improving in some areas, in many instances, 

more could be done to facilitate sharing and cooperative efforts between CBP 

and ICE. Both CBP and ICE officials said they occasionally receive 

intelligence or operational information regarding each other’s activities from 

other law enforcement agencies outside of DHS. ICE officials said it is not 

unusual for agents to learn about a narcotics seizure at the border from DEA 

rather than from Border Patrol. CBP officials cited numerous examples of 

ICE not informing them of investigative operations within their area of 

responsibility. A CBP official said these unknown investigative operations 

create a concern for officer safety, especially in remote areas. At times, CBP 

and ICE would find that both were investigating the same targets, but neither 

would know of this beforehand. For example, CBP officials in Miami, 

Florida, said they occasionally interdict boats used to smuggle aliens or 

narcotics and discover the boat was being tracked as part of an ICE 

investigation. CBP and ICE should jointly pursue a process that sufficiently 

addresses this concern with an abundance of concern for officer safety. 

Establishing Performance Metrics and Standards 

Departmental officials have been active and effective in establishing both 

formal and informal procedures to provide coordinated program oversight and 

accountability for CBP and ICE components. The department has made 

significant progress since November 2005 developing its strategic plan, which 

is in the final drafting stages. We observed that DHS is committed to building 

performance measurement and the standard infrastructure needed to 

accurately track program performance across the department. Current 

performance metrics are being used primarily as a quantitative measuring tool, 

and do not include qualitative measures to verify and validate performance 

data provided by components. 

Also, improvements to the current system require integration of predictive 

modeling capabilities that would provide decision makers with the ability to 

pose theoretical queries and forecast probable outcomes, so that department 

resources could be aligned accordingly. For example, had such capabilities 

existed during the planning stages of the Arizona Border Control Initiative, 

decision makers could have been able to predict the effect of large increases in 

apprehensions on available detention space; or, the effect of transferring air 

assets to the Tucson Sector on other sectors’ ability to provide air support for 

ICE Investigations when requested. Additionally, because there are no 

department-wide standards, components such as CBP and ICE are using a 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 16 
number of quantitative measures to monitor program progress and success. 

Ideally, a system should be established to measure and monitor department 

performance, starting with program processes and inputs, and extending to 

outputs, outcomes, and long-term effects. 

As discussed in its April 2006 response, in the near term, the department is 

focusing on performance management efforts to improve the collection, 

verification, and validation of performance data; strengthen the number of 

goals and measures in its strategic plans; and improve coordination and 

alignment between its planning, financial, and budget processes. However, 

several steps have been taken to address reported shortcomings. For example, 

a Special Assistant to the Secretary has been hired to oversee department-wide 

performance metrics implementation, monitoring, and reporting. The Special 

Assistant is responsible for coordinating and implementing new metrics and 

monitoring program performance against established objectives. 

The department is working with components, such as CBP and ICE, to 

address some of the more complex crosscutting issues associated with SBI 

activities and requirements. For example, Border Patrol and Detention and 

Removal Operations are developing an automated data sharing architecture 

for SBI-related issues, which is intended to improve existing processes and 

result in faster processing of illegal aliens. This integrated approach allows 

ICE to detain more aliens within current resource capabilities and supports the 

Secretary’s goal to end catch and release. 

Further, Detention and Removal Operations created a Technology Solutions 

Working Group to establish specific metrics related to SBI goals. The 

working group consists of representatives from Border Patrol, Investigations, 

and Detention and Removal Operations, and is working to assess the 

capabilities of existing ICE information systems to provide valid and reliable 

SBI performance metrics. Also, this working group is developing and 

identifying performance measures that could be used to determine the 

effectiveness of specific SBI related goals—SBI Metrics. 

Both CBP and ICE are actively engaged in the collection and analysis of data 

to document achievement of key goals and other operational plans, and to 

report on the return on investment of particular programs. For example, 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces provide weekly statistical reports to 

CBP and ICE headquarters on the progress related to border and cross-border 

criminal activities, and CBP’s Air Operations provides data on the number of 

missions it conducts in support of Border Patrol and ICE operations. Border 

Patrol has firmly embraced the concept of performance metrics by initiating 

its own Measurement Implementation Plan related to Border Patrol 

checkpoint operations throughout the United States. The overall strategy of 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 17 
the plan is to establish measurement activities within Border Patrol that are 

aligned with Border Patrol goals and priorities, while meeting information 

needs for operations and senior level management oversight.6 

Efforts to Effect Change 

Co-location of joint task forces and cross training opportunities appear to be 

improving relations between CBP and ICE. Continued emphasis on 

improving the relationship and increasing transparency between CBP and ICE 

headquarters and field operational elements should promote positive change 

and improve coordination, interoperability in the field, and relationships in the 

areas of apprehension, detention, and removal; interdiction and investigation; 

and intelligence activities for both components. 

However, some ICE agents have not fully embraced the coordination 

necessary to conduct business effectively, and new policies have not been 

institutionalized. Also, some ICE agents are reluctant to execute both 

immigration and customs authorities, as some legacy customs agents continue 

to want to focus exclusively on customs cases because that is why they joined 

ICE. Some of those agents feel promotional potential will decline if they 

work on immigration cases instead of complex customs investigations. Some 

CBP and ICE officials said legacy customs agents are not able to prosecute 

immigration violations because they do not have immigration experience. In 

addition, some legacy immigration agents said they always get “stuck” with 

immigration cases and receive few customs investigations. 

Further, in some locations, the relationship between CBP Border Patrol and 

ICE Investigations continues to be strained, as has been the situation in the 

past. To some extent, the strained relationship can be attributed to the 

different actions required to meet both respective missions. For example, 

Border Patrol needs to deter, detect, and interdict illegal border crossings; ICE 

needs some contraband and smugglers to be allowed into the country for 

investigative purposes. Border Patrol agents said that ICE does not routinely 

share actionable intelligence, but that ICE then says that contraband seized by 

Border Patrol often is related to a pending ICE investigation. In addition, ICE 

agents said that when information on pending investigations is provided to 

Border Patrol, Border Patrol uses it to interdict incoming contraband or 

smugglers, which disrupts the ICE investigation. 

In locations where field commanders had established strong, collaborative 

relationships with local counterparts, relationships between line personnel in 

6

 Office of Border Patrol Measurement Implementation Plan Checkpoint Measures, Overall Strategy and Objective, 

March 27, 2006. Version 1.0 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

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those locations were positive. The converse is true for relationships between 

line personnel in field locations where relations among local leadership were 

less positive and collaborative. Co-location of CBP and ICE personnel in 

intelligence groups or joint task forces, such as the Laredo Border 

Enforcement Security Task Force, also appear to improve relations between 

CBP and ICE in those locations. In addition, in some locations, CBP and ICE 

personnel have attended joint training or provided instruction to their 

counterparts on procedures, such as processing of illegal aliens, which appears 

to increase understanding of the counterpart’s roles and responsibilities. 

Many field personnel—particularly line officers and agents—are uninformed 

of headquarters efforts to resolve issues between CBP and ICE. To be 

successful in its efforts to effect change within CBP and ICE, DHS must 

ensure that field directors, supervisors, and agents are made aware of new 

protocols and policies timely. Further, DHS should ensure that field directors 

and supervisors understand the functions and purposes of newly established 

councils and working groups, and encourage them to seek the advice of their 

respective members on local issues needing attention or clarification. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP and ICE responded jointly to address each of the six remaining open 

recommendations. See Appendix D to review their joint response. Following 

our review of the response, we consider the six remaining recommendations 

resolved, however, two recommendations remain open. 

Several issues were nearing resolution when our draft report was issued. 

Some of these issues have since been finalized. For example, a $50 million 

contract was awarded to provide Border Patrol with land transportation 

services. As a result, Border Patrol agents have been relieved of 

transportation assignments and have returned to traditional border 

enforcement operations. 

In addition, CBP and ICE have negotiated the return of ICE IEAs temporarily 

assigned to the Border Patrol on the southern border, the coastal and northern 

sectors, and at the Tucson Transition Center, which is a joint Border Patrol 

and ICE detention and processing facility. These IEAs returned to the 

operational control of their respective ICE field offices effective December 

10, 2006. ICE agreed to continue providing services performed by the 

returning IEAs through September 30, 2007, including detention 

responsibilities at the Tucson Transition Center and transportation duties for 

the northern and coastal border sectors. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 19 
Further, the Secure Border Coordination Council, created by DHS’ Secretary 

and chaired by the Deputy Secretary, focuses DHS’ leadership team on 

progress required of SBI to achieve the comprehensive immigration reform 

and homeland security priorities described in the Secure Border Strategic 

Plan. 

Recommendation 2: Develop a vision of how ICE and CBP are to work 

together and contribute to the overall DHS mission. Consistent with this 

vision, the Operations Coordination Office and Under Secretary for Policy 

should work with CBP and ICE to define and set their respective roles and 

responsibilities. At minimum, clarification needs to be provided in the 

following areas: 

• ICE’s role at ports of entry and the establishment of its jurisdictional 

authorities in consideration of CBP authorities. 

• CBP’s role in referring case leads to ICE; ICE’s role in responding to 

case referrals from CBP. 

• ICE’s Detention and Removal Operations transportation and CBP 

support roles. 

CBP and ICE Update: CBP and ICE concur and believe that both remaining 

issues have been resolved. 

1. Status of the CBP Office of Border Patrol and ICE Office of Investigations 

MOU addendum. 

CBP’s Office of Border Patrol and ICE’s Office of Investigations referred the 

addendum to the ICE/CBP Council for review in November 2006. The 

ICE/CBP Council directed that Border Patrol and ICE’s Office of 

Investigations continue to work to resolve one outstanding issue. The 

necessary modifications to the addendum were completed and the Assistant 

Secretary for ICE and the Commissioner of CBP signed the addendum. 

2. Land Transportation Contracts. 

On August 29, 2006, The Wackenhut Corporation was awarded a $50 million 

contract to provide Border Patrol land transportation service for the nine 

southwest border sectors. The contract has four option years with a potential 

total cost of $250 million. By providing contract transportation officers, 

Border Patrol agents have been relieved of transportation assignments and 

have returned to traditional border enforcement operations. 

Pursuant to the MOU, ICE and CBP have also successfully negotiated the 

return of ICE IEAs temporarily assigned to the Border Patrol on the southern 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 20 
border, the coastal and northern sectors, as well as the Tucson Transition 

Center. These IEAs were returned to the operational control of their 

respective ICE field offices effective December 10, 2006. As part of the 

negotiation, ICE agreed to maintain responsibilities consistent with the 

services performed by the returning IEAs through September 30, 2007, to 

include detention responsibilities at the Tucson Transition Center that were 

provided by approximately 23 IEAs and transportation duties for the northern 

and coastal border sectors that were provided by approximately 43 IEAs. 

Accordingly, CBP and ICE request that this recommendation be deemed 

resolved and closed. 

OIG Analysis of CBP and ICE Update: We concur with the additional 

actions taken by CBP and ICE. This recommendation is resolved and closed. 

No further reporting is necessary. 

Recommendation 3: Communicate roles and responsibilities to all levels of 

CBP and ICE so that they are understood throughout the organizations. It is 

paramount that CBP and ICE employees understand their individual and 

institutional roles and responsibilities and the relationship of these to the roles 

and responsibilities of those of the other agency. 

CBP and ICE Update: CBP and ICE concur and believe that this 

recommendation has been resolved. Seamless cooperation and 

communication, from both an inter- and intra-component perspective, are 

attainable hallmarks as both components strive to achieve a single DHS 

culture. Greater cooperative efforts between CBP and ICE have been 

achieved through joint initiatives and training, in furtherance of the DHS’ 

mission “to lead the unified effort to secure America.” 

For example, the addendum to the CBP Office of Border Patrol and ICE 

Office of Investigations MOU promotes occupational awareness and 

orientation among field elements of ICE and CBP personnel. These efforts 

include providing orientation to each other’s personnel on operational 

priorities, programmatic areas of concern, evidence handling, and other 

related matters. This initial orientation will be tailored to meet the identified 

needs of ICE and CBP personnel. Joint trade enforcement training has 

already taken place. In FY 2006, ICE conducted two Advanced Fraud 

Investigations courses at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center for 36 

ICE and 24 CBP personnel. The joint classes allow field personnel to interact 

and better understand the work, authorities, and responsibilities of their 

counterparts. ICE and CBP also conducted joint training for 20 ICE and 9 

CBP personnel assigned to Textile Production Verification Teams. Textile 

Production Verification Teams are tasked with visits to foreign textile 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 21 
production facilities to verify their capability and capacity to produce textiles 

reported as imported into the United States. These teams also identify 

instances of transshipment or false country-of-origin claims. 

Horizontal and vertical communications are critical to the successful 

implementation of policies, procedures, and practices, as well as to ensure 

dissemination of new developments and goals. Issues resolved at the 

headquarters level are communicated to the field in a number of ways 

depending on the nature and scope of the issues. Complex issues involving 

modifications of policies and procedures often require the issuance of new or 

revised policies or standard operating procedures. Resolutions that provide 

clarification of roles and responsibilities are typically communicated through 

memoranda. 

For example, ICE and CBP jointly issued a memorandum on 

November 20, 2006, entitled, “Re-Energizing the CBP and ICE Trade Fraud 

Program,” emphasizing the commitment of both agencies to energize trade 

fraud enforcement efforts. This memorandum was issued to all CBP and ICE 

field offices. To demonstrate the benefits of collaborative efforts and timely 

communication, the memorandum cited examples of trade enforcement 

successes achieved through effective communication between CBP and ICE, 

while also discussing the joint CBP and ICE Commercial Enforcement 

Analysis and Response process. The Commercial Enforcement Analysis and 

Response process was created to establish uniform standards to respond to 

commercial violations in all service ports. CBP and ICE have convened 

varied working groups to discuss joint investigative projects. 

Specifically, at CBP, depending on the significance and applicability to 

operations, resolutions are presented and discussed during musters. Border 

Patrol is currently developing a quarterly newsletter that will be distributed to 

all sectors and stations. These methods of communication will be another 

viable vehicle for dissemination of headquarters resolutions to the field. At 

ICE, communications to field units are accomplished in a variety of other 

methods, including ICE Broadcast messages from the Assistant Secretary or 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary, bi-monthly Special Agent in Charge 

conference calls, and weekly Ombudsman email summaries, while 

memoranda and procedures are posted and accessible on the ICE Office of 

Investigations proprietary website. 

Accordingly, CBP and ICE request that this recommendation be deemed 

resolved and closed. 

OIG Analysis of CBP and ICE Update: We concur with CBP and ICE 

efforts to improve communication and cross-component understanding 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 22 
regarding respective roles and responsibilities. This recommendation is 

resolved and closed. No further reporting is necessary. 

Recommendation 4: Monitor CBP and ICE field performance to ensure 

adherence to DHS’ vision and guidance, and accountability to related goals. 

To support this accountability, DHS leadership should develop performance 

measures and a reporting mechanism that convey an accurate picture of 

current operations to senior managers. In addition to performance metrics to 

measure internal CBP and ICE operations, a set of joint performance metrics 

should be developed to gauge the extent of interaction and coordination 

between CBP and ICE, as well as the level of support each organization 

extends the other. Resulting metrics should assist the organizations in arriving 

at shared expectations about their respective obligations and level of support. 

CBP and ICE Update: ICE and CBP concur with our analysis. DHS is 

developing a more disciplined and analytical methodology for measuring 

border security. Once completed, DHS will have a systematic performance 

reporting framework that will measure its efforts between the ports of entry, at 

the ports of entry, with investigations, and other operations aimed at the 

continuum of border security. 

In FY 2007, as DHS is implementing its border security initiatives, it will 

develop and refine detailed performance measures for a full range of 

performance goals, including valid and reliable data collection procedures and 

baselines. Meanwhile, the data provided in the Bi-Monthly Status Report on 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Border Security Performance and 

Resources provides key performance indicators for the Secure Border 

Initiative. 

OIG Analysis of CBP and ICE Update: We agree with the actions DHS is 

taking to develop an appropriate methodology for measuring border security. 

A systematic performance measurement framework will allow DHS to 

measure and analyze CBP and ICE performance and border security 

operations, as well as identifying trends. Although the proposed methodology 

has not been fully developed and implemented, DHS’ planned actions are 

responsive to the intent of our recommendation. In support of its actions, 

DHS has implemented a Secure Border Strategic Plan and is nearing 

completion on a CBP SBInet Strategic Plan. This recommendation is 

resolved, but remains open pending our receipt of additional information on 

DHS’ progress to develop a more disciplined and analytical methodology for 

measuring border security. 

Recommendation 12: Develop dispute arbitration and resolution 

mechanisms at the field level. These mechanisms should be available for 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 23 
airing both routine and extraordinary interagency operational concerns and 

recommending remedial actions, and they should be designed to minimize the 

risk of retaliation against employees who raise concerns. When the resulting 

field-level arbitration mechanisms result in the resolution of a dispute, 

headquarters should be notified of the issue and resolution. 

CBP and ICE Update: CBP and ICE concur with our initial 

recommendation. However, ICE and CBP do not concur with our subsequent 

analysis. As stated in the analysis, field level disputes are usually resolved in 

a timely manner and therefore, ICE and CBP believe an anonymous reporting 

procedure, both for airing and resolving interagency operational concerns, is 

unnecessary. In the vast majority of cases ICE and CBP operational field 

managers resolve issues and disputes at the field level. In those instances in 

which issues or disputes cannot be resolved at the field level, there are 

successful developed mechanisms for elevated review by ICE and CBP 

headquarters managers. Finally, ICE and CBP can use the resources of the 

ICE/CBP Coordination Council to address potential conflicts that cannot be 

resolved at the field or headquarters level. 

As CBP and ICE have existing management structures that are responsible 

and accountable for identifying and resolving such concerns, the creation of a 

formal arbitration and resolution mechanism merely serves to transfer 

accountability from identified individuals in the components’ respective 

management chains to a non-descript process. The draft report fails to cite a 

single instance in which CBP or ICE took retaliatory or adverse action against 

an employee for raising an operational concern or conflict. CBP and ICE are 

unaware of any such instances. 

Moreover, the creation of such a process, fueled by anonymous “complaints” 

regarding both routine and extraordinary interagency operational concerns, 

could have the opposite effect of the one intended, i.e., it could actually 

decrease candor both between CBP and ICE and between the components’ 

management and non-management workforces. For example, rather than 

encouraging CBP officers to “tell it like it is” to their supervisors, such 

officers could view their duty to bring concerns to their management chain as 

being accomplished simply by making an anonymous phone call to a 

“hotline,” with the added result of increasing the time between problem 

identification and resolution. Further, ICE and CBP employees may report 

issues outside of their chains-of-command to the DHS OIG Hotline or the 

Joint Intake Center if they fear retaliation. Also, ICE maintains an email 

“Suggestion Box” that allows employees and members of the public to submit 

suggestions, complaints, or concerns directly to ICE headquarters. In 

addition, CBP maintains an email and telephone “Contact Center,” which 

handles complaints, inquiries and comments from both the general public and 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 24 
CBP employees. Because these protective mechanisms are available for 

employees to report and resolve issues, an additional process is not needed. 

Accordingly, CBP and ICE recommend that this recommendation be deemed 

resolved and closed. 

OIG Analysis of CBP and ICE Update: DHS has demonstrated that field 

level disputes are usually resolved in a timely manner at the field line or 

supervisory level. In those instances where a dispute cannot be resolved at the 

field level, ICE and CBP headquarters managers have developed mechanisms 

for elevated review. The ICE-CBP Coordination Council also addresses 

potential conflicts that cannot be resolved at the field or headquarters level. 

On at least three occasions during our site visits, ICE and CBP personnel 

expressed fear of retaliation for raising operational concerns or conflicts up 

their chains of command. CBP and ICE note several additional methods 

through which CBP and ICE personnel can report concerns. We are satisfied 

with the variety of reporting methods available. This recommendation is 

resolved and closed. No further reporting is necessary. 

Recommendation 13: Develop an operating environment that facilitates 

collaborative intelligence activities. Such an environment should promote 

ICE-CBP staff co-location when possible and where appropriate. In addition, 

CBP and ICE should pursue the development of joint intelligence products to 

reflect a more comprehensive picture of border security. Finally, CBP and 

ICE should jointly employ new technology systems for the exchange and 

analysis of intelligence information that facilitate these activities. 

CBP and ICE Update: CBP and ICE concur and believe that this 

recommendation has been resolved. Both components share information 

through the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, which allows 

both agencies to view intelligence reports, releasable investigative 

information, and subject records. CBP and ICE also use an Intel Fusion 

website to share information in the following categories: terrorist-threat, 

officer-safety, be-on-lookout, intelligence reporting system, immigrationlookout, and gang-lookout. ICE/Intel and CBP further share intelligence 

through the ICE Southwest Field Intelligence Unit and the Albuquerque 

Special Operations Center. ICE and CBP are currently discussing the shared 

use of the ICE Pattern Analysis Information Collection Tool, which will allow 

both agencies to perform entity resolution analysis on disparate data. 

Other intelligence dissemination measures and initiatives are underway. The 

DHS Intelligence Systems Board aims to unify the intelligence program 

throughout DHS through an enterprise approach to information sharing and 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 25 
the application of common systems. The DHS Science & Technology 

directorate is working to develop a single web-based application that would be 

used by DHS components to share intelligence information, such as Field 

Intelligence Reports, associated with criminal activity and activity with a 

possible nexus to terrorism. The web-based application, when ultimately 

implemented, will be readily compatible and conducive to information sharing 

with other federal agencies and state fusion centers. 

Accordingly, CBP and ICE request that this recommendation be deemed 

resolved and closed. 

OIG Analysis of CBP and ICE Update: The addendum to the MOU 

between CBP’s Office of Border Patrol and ICE’s Office of Investigations 

outlines the progress being made toward developing a seamless, real-time 

operational partnership. New avenues of communication have effectively 

facilitated operational awareness and mission success. Additionally, systems 

such as the Treasury Enforcement Communications System and 

ENFORCE/IDENT have helped coordinate law enforcement actions between 

CBP’s Office of Border Patrol and ICE’s Office of Investigations. Joint 

enforcement operations have bolstered the working relationship between the 

two components and have allowed each to bring its respective skills and 

abilities to bear on enforcement issues. 

Co-location between intelligence personnel has increased. The MOU 

addendum has laid the foundation for continued collaboration. CBP and ICE 

need to continue to pursue filling vacancies within joint units, such as JTTFs, 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces, Integrated Border Intelligence 

Teams, and the National Targeting Center. This recommendation is resolved, 

but remains open pending our receipt of additional information regarding the 

progress CBP and ICE have made to promote staff co-location and the 

development of joint intelligence products. 

Recommendation 14: Address the prevalent and growing contentiousness 

between CBP and ICE. Competition is natural between two groups, but ICE 

and CBP leadership should develop programs and policies to encourage 

mutual respect. Field level activities must be monitored more closely to 

ensure that border security is not compromised by organizational antagonisms 

mentality. Likewise, DHS leadership should take action to develop a 

corporate culture in which all CBP and ICE employees believe that they have 

a vested stake in each other’s mission and in the overall DHS mission. 

CBP and ICE Update: CBP and ICE believe that the measures described 

throughout this memorandum support the conclusion that this 

recommendation has been satisfactorily resolved. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 26 
Through personnel exchanges and extensive joint planning, CBP and ICE are 

thoroughly coordinating on a full range of operational and information sharing 

activities. The DHS reorganization following Secretary Chertoff’s Second 

Stage Review provided DHS leadership with direct component oversight to 

further ensure the two agencies focus effectively on their respective core 

missions, interdiction and investigation, while mutually supporting each other 

where missions overlap. By implementing numerous institutionalized 

arrangements for cooperation and joint planning, with a transparent 

atmosphere that allows senior DHS leadership to resolve any issues, the 

current organizational arrangements are optimized to ensure that ICE and CBP 

are making the maximum contribution to the nation’s security. 

Cross training, as previously described, has yielded positive results. For 

example, a recent intellectual property rights undercover investigation 

identified individuals and methods of smuggling counterfeit footwear into the 

United States. Using investigative information supplied by ICE, CBP 

identified a large number of other containers of counterfeit footwear that had 

already arrived in the United States or were arriving imminently. As a result, 

ICE and CBP seized 77 containers of these counterfeit goods with a total 

value of over $65 million. This was one of the largest seizures of counterfeit 

goods in U.S. history. In addition, after the Textile Production Verification 

Teams training, ICE and CBP jointly visited 13 countries in 2006. The 

Textile Production Verification Teams found a non-compliance rate of over 

50% and discerned other information that will help inform future 

investigations and seizures. 

Furthermore, as stated in the recently approved addendum to the CBP Office 

of Border Patrol and ICE Office of Investigations MOU, ICE and CBP agreed 

to co-locate intelligence personnel in eleven specified sites throughout the 

United States if resources permit. If resources allow, additional co-locations 

may occur. Upon the co-location of intelligence personnel, CBP and ICE will 

immediately direct the development of a joint intelligence reporting process 

specific to the needs and requirements of each area of responsibility. The colocation of select Border Patrol and ICE Office of Investigations intelligence 

personnel will improve the ability of both components to actively and 

consistently share information and intelligence relating to each other's shared 

missions. 

Since the first report was issued in November 2005, cooperation between the 

two agencies has vastly improved, due in large measure to greater 

communication and joint training efforts. As these cooperative partnerships 

yield further successes, any remaining perceived contentiousness should cease 

to exist. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 27 
Accordingly, CBP and ICE request that this recommendation be deemed 

resolved and closed. 

OIG Analysis of CBP and ICE Update: We agree with the actions CBP and 

ICE have taken to address issues of mistrust and contentiousness between the 

organizations. CBP and ICE efforts to increase and continue co-location, 

awareness of each other’s missions and activities, and cross-training are 

improving relations between CBP and ICE personnel. Continued efforts in 

those areas should promote continued improvement in the relationship 

between the organizations. This recommendation is resolved and closed. No 

further reporting is necessary. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 28 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

In November 2005, we issued our initial report, An Assessment of the 

Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04. In April 2006, we received DHS’ 

response outlining the activities and programs it intends to implement to 

address the 14 recommendations we made to improve coordination between 

CBP and ICE and enhance interoperability at the field level. We consider 

eight recommendations resolved and closed; however, six recommendations 

remain resolved and open. 

Following is our analysis of DHS’ response to our initial report. 

Recommendation 1: Establish that the Under Secretary for Policy and the 

Director of Operations Coordination have authority over CBP and ICE with 

respect to policy and operational coordination. These offices’ purview must 

be re-enforced by the Secretary and Deputy Secretary’s actions. Accordingly, 

it will be essential for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to channel related 

discussions and decisions with CBP and ICE through these offices. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs in part with the recommendation. In 

November 2005, following the Second Stage Review, DHS’ Secretary 

implemented several organizational changes. CBP and ICE became direct 

reports to the Secretary, and the Border and Transportation Security 

Directorate was eliminated in an effort to streamline management and increase 

accountability. In addition, the department-wide Office of Policy, Office of 

Operations Coordination, and Office of Intelligence and Analysis were created 

and charged with using the tools of all DHS components to address the 

department’s homeland security mission. While these offices do not have 

direct authority over CBP and ICE, officials within each office regularly 

interact with their CBP and ICE counterparts, such as in consultations to 

develop legislative and regulatory immigration and border security proposals, 

and at weekly SBI meetings involving the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary 

for Policy, the heads of ICE, CBP, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services, the Director of Operations Coordination, and others. 

Also, CBP and ICE, under the Secretary’s direction, created the ICE-CBP 

Coordination Council to consider, coordinate, and resolve operational and 

policy issues between the organizations. The Council reports to the Secretary 

on outstanding issues, resolutions, and disagreements requiring further 

direction or deconfliction. The Council also interacts closely with the 

Assistant Secretary for Policy and the Director of Operations Coordination. 

OIG Analysis: We concur with the actions taken by DHS to facilitate and 

ensure coordination between CBP and ICE, as well as with other DHS 

components, on border security and immigration-related policy and 

operational issues. Although the recommendation was not adopted as 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 29 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

proposed, the department did recognize the need for proactive and systematic 

methods to monitor and ensure CBP and ICE work together to accomplish the 

Secretary’s goals. The realignment of CBP and ICE as direct reports to the 

Secretary ought to strengthen institutional and personal accountability at all 

levels. This recommendation is resolved and closed. No further reporting is 

necessary. 

Recommendation 2: Develop a vision of how ICE and CBP are to work 

together and contribute to the overall DHS mission. Consistent with this 

vision, the Operations Coordination Office and Under Secretary for Policy 

should work with CBP and ICE to define and set their respective roles and 

responsibilities. At minimum, clarification needs to be provided in the 

following areas: 

• ICE’s role at ports of entry and the establishment of its jurisdictional 

authorities in consideration of CBP authorities. 

• CBP’s role in referring case leads to ICE; ICE’s role in responding to 

case referrals from CBP. 

• ICE’s Detention and Removal Operations transportation and CBP 

support roles. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs in part with the recommendation. The 

department has taken actions to enhance coordination and achieve measurable 

border security and interior enforcement-related results. The Secretary 

established SBI to improve department-wide coordination in the apprehension 

and detention and referral areas. Also, DHS established Border Enforcement 

Security Task Forces to combat cross-border violence along the southwest 

U.S. border. In addition, the ICE-CBP Coordination Council was established 

to provide a forum for CBP and ICE to proactively coordinate and address 

operational and policy issues related to border security and interior 

enforcement. 

OIG Analysis: We concur with the actions DHS, CBP, and ICE have taken 

to define and clarify their respective authorities, roles, and responsibilities. 

CBP and ICE joint memoranda provided additional guidance regarding 

authorities, policies, and procedures. An addendum to the CBP Border Patrol 

– ICE Investigations MOU has been drafted to further clarify roles and 

responsibilities between the two organizations; the addendum is in the 

approval process with senior CBP and ICE officials. In addition, CBP 

transportation contracts are pending. When Detention and Removal 

Operations personnel are not able to provide transportation, these contracts 

will allow CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents to remain at ports of entry 

or on the border rather than transporting detained illegal aliens to detention 

facilities. Upon completion and review of documentation for both of these 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 30 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

actions, we will consider closing the recommendation. This recommendation 

is resolved, but remains open. 

Recommendation 3: Communicate roles and responsibilities to all levels of 

CBP and ICE so that they are understood throughout the organizations. It is 

paramount that CBP and ICE employees understand their individual and 

institutional roles and responsibilities and the relationship of these to the roles 

and responsibilities of those of the other agency. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the recommendation. At the 

headquarters level, issues between CBP and ICE are addressed through the 

ICE-CBP Coordination Council. The Council has issued joint memoranda to 

communicate CBP and ICE roles and responsibilities to field personnel. 

Communication at the field level is a priority and occurs through regular 

contact between the principal field officers, supervisory personnel, and line 

personnel of CBP and ICE. 

OIG Analysis: We concur with CBP and ICE actions to address and 

communicate roles and responsibilities at the headquarters and field levels. 

However, our fieldwork demonstrates that resolutions at the headquarters 

level are not reaching all field personnel. A better procedure is needed to 

ensure resolutions are communicated and reinforced in a manner that reaches 

all field personnel. 

In addition, for many locations, CBP and ICE field personnel do not have a 

clear understanding of roles and responsibilities. In some locations, 

supervisory and line personnel said more knowledge of CBP and ICE roles 

and responsibilities would enhance their understanding of support 

requirements and improve job performance. For example, if CBP understood 

ICE responsibilities regarding evidence handling better, errors involving 

evidence handling during seizures could decline, and could assist ICE in 

presenting stronger, and potentially more cases for prosecution. A training 

course on basic CBP and ICE roles and responsibilities would improve the 

knowledge of both and facilitate operations and interactions between the 

organizations. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. 

Recommendation 4: Monitor CBP and ICE field performance to ensure 

adherence to DHS’ vision and guidance, and accountability to related goals. 

To support this accountability, DHS leadership should develop performance 

measures and a reporting mechanism that convey an accurate picture of 

current operations to senior managers. In addition to performance metrics to 

measure internal CBP and ICE operations, a set of joint performance metrics 

should be developed to gauge the extent of interaction and coordination 

between CBP and ICE, as well as the level of support each organization 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 31 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

extends the other. Resulting metrics should assist the organizations in arriving 

at shared expectations about their respective obligations and level of support. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the recommendation. One of the 

Secretary’s top priorities for SBI was establishing metrics to monitor program 

progress and to provide information and a clear overall picture to decision 

makers. ICE’s Detention and Removal Operations and CBP’s Border Patrol 

are developing an automated data sharing architecture for SBI related issues, 

which is improving existing processes and resulting in faster processing of 

illegal aliens. Further, ICE has detained more aliens in support of the 

Secretary’s goal of ending catch and release along the southwest border. 

A Technology Solutions Work Group, consisting of CBP Border Patrol, ICE 

Investigations, and ICE Detention and Removal Operations representatives, 

has made progress in establishing metrics related to SBI goals. The working 

group is to assess the reporting capabilities of existing ICE information 

systems, develop methods for improving the quality of information supporting 

SBI performance metrics and the reporting process, and create a baseline for 

the implementation of a permanent information technology solution. The 

solution is to bridge information contained in the various systems used by 

CBP Border Patrol, ICE Investigations, and ICE Detention and Removal 

Operations. 

In addition, the Secretary hired a new Special Assistant, who will oversee 

DHS-wide performance metrics implementation, monitoring, and reporting. 

The Special Assistant will coordinate and implement new metrics to monitor 

performance against the Secretary’s goals. 

OIG Analysis: DHS has taken appropriate action to align CBP and ICE 

performance with department goals. DHS has required CBP and ICE to 

provide data on SBI-related program successes. However, the data is solely 

quantitative in nature and does not include any qualitative measures. DHS is 

in the process of implementing SBInet and establishing specific SBI-related 

metrics. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. 

Recommendation 5: Develop a formal mechanism to assure that the Under 

Secretary for Management and the Chief Financial Officer collaborate with 

ICE and CBP management to develop a process for CBP and ICE to increase 

participation in one another’s budget formulation and strategic planning 

processes. This budgeting and planning interaction should include avenues 

for CBP and ICE to comment on and influence one another’s budgets and 

strategic plans. These efforts should be pursued with the aim of achieving an 

effective balance of resources and ensuring adequate support for major 

operational initiatives across institutional boundaries. In addition, the Chief 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 32 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

Financial Officer should track budget execution to guarantee compliance with 

agreed-to budget and plans. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the intent of the recommendation. 

Through the Investment Review Board and the Joint Requirements Council, 

DHS guides CBP and ICE budgeting and strategic planning to ensure 

activities are aligned with DHS’ overall strategy. In addition, the SBI 

Program Executive Office is responsible for coordinating border resources 

between DHS components, particularly CBP and ICE, including the formation 

of budget requests and the operational implementation of appropriated 

resources. DHS’ Chief Financial Officer meets regularly with both CBP and 

ICE on planning and budget execution, and both components meet with the 

Chief Financial Officer for mid-year financial reviews. 

OIG Analysis: We concur with the actions taken. Through the Investment 

Review Board, Joint Requirements Council, SBI Program Executive Office, 

and DHS’ Chief Financial Officer, the department has addressed our 

recommendation to facilitate and encourage CBP and ICE collaboration in 

budgeting and strategic planning. This recommendation is resolved and 

closed. No further reporting is necessary. 

Recommendation 6: Direct the Operations Coordination Office to undertake 

an interagency procedural review process to ensure that ICE and CBP 

procedures support agreed upon roles and responsibilities and are compatible 

with one another at touch points. Where necessary procedures do not exist, 

the Operations Coordination Office should direct development of needed 

procedures, and notification and information exchange protocols. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the intent of the recommendation. The 

ICE-CBP Coordination Council was formed to address compatibility of roles 

and responsibilities. It provides national-level review for issues involving 

both CBP and ICE that are raised internally or from the field level, such as 

clarifying existing policies for how CBP refers cases to ICE for investigation. 

OIG Analysis: We concur with the action taken by DHS. The department 

did not adopt the recommendation as proposed, but did agree with the need for 

a procedure to provide guidance and clarification to CBP and ICE on their 

roles and responsibilities. The ICE-CBP Coordination Council has effectively 

addressed a number of interagency issues, clarified existing policies and 

procedures, and provided a forum for the components to address issues of 

mutual concern. This recommendation is resolved and closed. No further 

reporting necessary. 

Recommendation 7: Ensure that the Operations Coordination Office closely 

monitors the development of redundant capabilities within CBP and ICE as 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 33 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

indications that resource sharing arrangements are not proceeding smoothly. 

Attention should be given to: 

• CBP’s plans to expand the number of enforcement officers and enlarge 

their jurisdiction. 

• CBP’s use of Border Patrol agents in an investigative capacity. 

• CBP’s fraudulent document analysis capability. 

• CBP’s expanding intelligence apparatus. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the intent of the recommendation. DHS 

has commissioned oversight groups such as the Joint Requirements Council, 

the Investment Review Board, Chief Information Officer’s Council, and the 

ICE-CBP Coordination Council to ensure component capabilities are within 

their scope of authorities and responsibilities. DHS reports that similar 

capabilities resident in the separate organizations are not necessarily 

redundant, and therefore, are not inefficient or ineffective. DHS will continue 

to sustain mutually reinforcing capabilities of CBP, ICE, and other component 

agencies, and will work to ensure that capabilities are complementary, 

aligned, and consistent with organizational mission accomplishment. 

To facilitate intelligence sharing, CBP and ICE coordinate with DHS’ Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis, and ICE has assigned an ICE liaison to CBP’s 

National Targeting Center to ensure effective communication and information 

sharing between CBP and ICE. In addition, the ICE-CBP Coordination 

Council is reviewing national policy and will issue guidance reaffirming the 

roles and responsibilities of CBP Border Patrol and ICE Investigations. CBP 

Border Patrol Chief Patrol Agents and ICE Special Agents in Charge have 

been empowered to implement local notification thresholds and protocols to 

address their individual operational environments and requirements. 

OIG Analysis: We consider the actions taken by DHS to be responsive to the 

intent of the recommendation. The department has implemented several 

methods to ensure effective coordination of resources across DHS 

components, including between CBP and ICE, and especially where the 

potential for redundant capabilities might exist. Through the establishment of 

the ICE-CBP Coordination Council, assignment of liaisons, and co-location of 

CBP and ICE personnel, DHS has increased and improved information and 

intelligence sharing between the two components. This recommendation is 

resolved and closed. No further reporting is necessary. 

Recommendation 8: Require that the Policy Office engage in coordination 

with CBP and ICE to align priorities with an interagency bearing (e.g., 

detention bed space, investigative case selection) through a consultative 

process. Pursuant to this process, the Policy Office should monitor 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 34 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

implementation of these priorities through performance tracking and periodic 

interagency reviews including assessments of related resource deployments. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs in part with the recommendation. CBP and 

ICE work together to align interagency priorities through the ICE-CBP 

Coordination Council. The SBI Program Executive Office facilitates CBP 

and ICE coordination to ensure a systems management approach to border 

security and interior enforcement initiatives, integrates CBP and ICE 

capabilities, and promotes effective resource utilization and prioritization. 

OIG Analysis: We concur with the actions taken by DHS. CBP and ICE 

senior officials actively participate in ICE-CBP Coordination Council 

meetings. In addition, the SBI Program Executive Office, within DHS’ Office 

of Policy, and weekly SBI meetings with the Secretary and other DHS senior 

officials facilitate collaboration between CBP and ICE. This recommendation 

is resolved and closed. No further reporting is necessary. 

Recommendation 9: Establish a forum for coordinating among staff from 

the Secretary and Deputy Secretary’s Office, Under Secretary for 

Management, Chief Financial Officer, Under Secretary for Policy, Director of 

Operations Coordination, CBP Commissioner, and ICE Assistant Secretary to 

discuss issues related to the CBP-ICE relationship. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the recommendation. DHS established a 

forum for senior-level discussion on the CBP-ICE relationship by holding 

weekly meetings with the Secretary and agency heads and by developing the 

ICE-CBP Coordination Council. 

OIG Analysis: We concur with the actions taken by DHS. The Secretary’s 

weekly meetings and the ICE-CBP Coordination Council have been effective 

in addressing issues and resolving disputes between CBP and ICE at the 

headquarters level, and have clarified policies and procedures for operational 

coordination. In addition, the Investment Review Process provides a 

mechanism for coordination with the Under Secretary for Management and 

the Chief Financial Officer. This recommendation is resolved and closed. No 

further reporting is necessary. 

Recommendation 10: Create joint CBP-ICE bodies to oversee the 

implementation of interagency coordination efforts and MOUs. These bodies 

could respond to requests to deviate from plans, make adjustments, provide 

clarification, and resolve different interpretations of related guidance. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the recommendation. Efforts to improve 

coordination and intelligence and information sharing between CBP and ICE 

have led to the establishment of several interagency working groups, such as 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 35 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

the CBP Field Operations/ICE Investigations Working Group, which 

addressed several priority issues between the two organizations. In addition, 

the SBI Program Executive Office and the ICE-CBP Coordination Council 

were created to coordinate interagency efforts and MOUs. Also, DHS is 

establishing Border Enforcement Security Task Forces to focus on crossborder crimes, working in conjunction with existing task forces to enhance 

intelligence and information sharing. 

OIG Analysis: We concur with the actions taken by DHS. This 

recommendation is resolved and closed. No further reporting is necessary. 

Recommendation 11: Develop a headquarters-level joint CBP-ICE standing 

committee to manage the relationship between the two. This committee could 

address a revolving agenda on CBP-ICE touch points and develop interagency 

policies and procedures to guide CBP and ICE operations. The committee 

should document and distribute information on dispute scenarios and 

resolutions to help foster greater uniformity in interpreting policies and 

procedures and resolving related disputes. To resolve disputes at both the 

headquarters and field levels, CBP and ICE should create a strictly proscribed 

time standard for disposition, as the dynamic nature of the enforcement 

environment requires swift decisions to accomplish the mission. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the recommendation. The ICE-CBP 

Coordination Council has been established to manage the relationship 

between CBP and ICE and proactively facilitate their coordination efforts. 

The ICE-CBP Coordination Council has addressed issues such as CBP Border 

Patrol and ICE Investigations referral policy, CBP Air deployment plans, 

single journey boarding letters, ICE Detention and Removal Operations 

detailees, and intelligence and information sharing. 

OIG Analysis: The ICE-CBP Coordination Council is an effective forum for 

coordinating among CBP and ICE senior officials and addressing interagency 

policies and procedures. Joint memoranda and MOUs have been distributed 

to provide clarification and guidance on interagency policies and procedures. 

Neither CBP nor ICE has established a time standard for resolving disputes in 

the operational law enforcement environment; however, our fieldwork 

demonstrates that most disputes in the operational environment at both the 

headquarters and field levels are resolved quickly using the respective chains 

of command. This recommendation is resolved and closed. No further 

reporting is necessary. 

Recommendation 12: Develop dispute arbitration and resolution 

mechanisms at the field level. These mechanisms should be available for 

airing both routine and extraordinary interagency operational concerns and 

recommending remedial actions, and they should be designed to minimize the 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 36 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

risk of retaliation against employees who raise concerns. When the resulting 

field-level arbitration mechanisms result in the resolution of a dispute, 

headquarters should be notified of the issue and resolution. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the recommendation. On 

December 8, 2005, a joint memorandum directed CBP Field Operations and 

ICE Investigations field offices to develop local communication mechanisms 

to ensure that enforcement actions are routinely and effectively shared 

between CBP and ICE. Both agencies are confident in the ability of their 

operational commanders in the field to resolve issues and disputes. Issues not 

resolved will be elevated to the headquarters level and will be addressed by 

the ICE-CBP Coordination Council. 

OIG Analysis: While DHS has not developed a formal dispute resolution 

process at the field level, field level disputes usually are resolved in a timely 

manner at the field line or supervisory level. Disputes are raised through the 

respective CBP and ICE chains of command, as necessary, to the CBP and 

ICE field operational commanders until resolved. However, a procedure to 

allow personnel to raise concerns anonymously has not been established. 

Employees who raise concerns do so on a face-to-face level with their 

counterparts at CBP or ICE or within their own chain of command. CBP and 

ICE should jointly pursue a method to address this concern. This 

recommendation is resolved, but remains open. 

Recommendation 13: Develop an operating environment that facilitates 

collaborative intelligence activities. Such an environment should promote 

ICE-CBP staff co-location when possible and where appropriate. In addition, 

CBP and ICE should pursue the development of joint intelligence products to 

reflect a more comprehensive picture of border security. Finally, CBP and 

ICE should jointly employ new technology systems for the exchange and 

analysis of intelligence information that facilitate these activities. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the recommendation. The ICE-CBP 

Coordination Council is addressing coordination of intelligence and 

information sharing opportunities, and has established a working group to 

propose solutions. The department reports that improved coordination 

mechanisms are already in place, such as co-locating an ICE representative at 

the National Targeting Center. In addition, pending a departmental national 

intelligence sharing directive and other DHS-wide intelligence initiatives, 

CBP and ICE components will continue to develop jointly processes and 

procedures to improve information sharing and intelligence activities. 

OIG Analysis: DHS has made progress in improving intelligence and 

information sharing between CBP and ICE. Co-locating CBP and ICE 

personnel, such as with JTTFs, Border Enforcement Security Task Forces, 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 37 
Appendix A 

OIG Analysis of DHS Response to An Assessment 

of the Proposal to Merge CBP with ICE, OIG-06-04 

Integrated Border Intelligence Teams, and the National Targeting Center, has 

facilitated and improved information sharing between the two organizations. 

In addition, a CBP-ICE working group is developing, formalizing, and 

documenting initiatives and procedures to promote efficient and timely 

intelligence sharing between CBP and ICE. The working group reported to 

the ICE-CBP Coordination Council in March 2006, and continues to address 

these issues. A departmental national intelligence sharing directive is 

pending. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. 

Recommendation 14: Address the prevalent and growing contentiousness 

between CBP and ICE. Competition is natural between two groups, but ICE 

and CBP leadership should develop programs and policies to encourage 

mutual respect. Field level activities must be monitored more closely to 

ensure that border security is not compromised by organizational antagonisms 

mentality. Likewise, DHS leadership should take action to develop a 

corporate culture in which all CBP and ICE employees believe that they have 

a vested stake in each other’s mission and in the overall DHS mission. 

DHS Response: DHS concurs with the recommendation. The Secretary’s 

vision is to develop a single DHS culture combining the individual cultures of 

its component agencies while embracing a single team oriented focus on the 

department’s mission. DHS has established the Organizational 

Transformation Team to address management and human resource issues 

affecting CBP and ICE, as well as other issues. 

OIG Analysis: The ICE-CBP Coordination Council has addressed some 

issues of contentiousness between CBP and ICE personnel; however, poor 

relationships continue in some field locations. Co-location and joint training 

appear to improve relations and increase understanding between CBP and ICE 

personnel in locations where they are used. However, many field personnel 

are unaware of headquarters’ efforts to resolve issues between CBP and ICE. 

Increased transparency between headquarters and all field levels, joint 

training, cross-training, continued co-location, and additional efforts are 

needed to address the resistance, mistrust, and contentiousness between some 

CBP and ICE personnel. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 38 
Appendix B 

Continuing Recommendations 

Continuing Recommendations 

Recommendation 

Former 

Number Status Actions/Plans To Be Addressed 

Recommendation 1: 

Monitor CBP and ICE field performance to ensure 

adherence to DHS’ vision and guidance, and 

accountability to related goals. To support this 

accountability, DHS leadership should develop 

performance measures and a reporting mechanism 

that convey an accurate picture of current operations 

to senior managers. In addition to performance 

metrics to measure internal CBP and ICE 

operations, a set of joint performance metrics should 

be developed to gauge the extent of interaction and 

coordination between CBP and ICE, as well as the 

level of support each organization extends the other. 

Resulting metrics should assist the organizations in 

arriving at shared expectations about their 

respective obligations and level of support. 

4 Resolved 

Open 

Additional information on DHS’ progress 

to develop a more disciplined and 

analytical methodology for measuring 

border security. 

Recommendation 2: Develop an operating 

environment that facilitates collaborative 

intelligence activities. Such an environment should 

promote ICE-CBP staff co-location when possible 

and where appropriate. In addition, CBP and ICE 

should pursue the development of joint intelligence 

products to reflect a more comprehensive picture of 

border security. Finally, CBP and ICE should 

jointly employ new technology systems for the 

exchange and analysis of intelligence information 

that facilitate these activities. 

13 Resolved 

Open 

Additional information regarding the 

progress CBP and ICE have made to 

promote staff co-location and the 

development of joint intelligence 

products. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 39 
Appendix C 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The department’s April 2006 response served as the framework for our follow 

up review. We assessed the progress made in improving CBP and ICE 

coordination, interoperability, and relationships in apprehension, detention, 

and removal efforts, interdiction and investigative work, and intelligence 

activities. We interviewed officials within the Management Directorate and 

the Office of Policy, CBP and ICE officials at headquarters, and personnel at 

all levels from CBP’s Offices of Field Operations, Border Patrol, and Air and 

Marine Operations, and in ICE’s Offices of Investigations and Detention and 

Removal Operations. We conducted field visits to Chicago, Illinois; San 

Antonio, Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville, Texas; Miami, Marathon, and 

Key West, Florida; and Seattle, Blaine, and Bellingham, Washington. We 

also reviewed department records and documents to determine whether 

actions taken or planned effectively address our recommendations. Our 

fieldwork was conducted from June 2006 to October 2006. 

This review was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections 

issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 40 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 41 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 42 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 43 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 44 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 45 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 46 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 47 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 48 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 49 
Appendix D 

Management Response to Draft Report 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 50 
Appendix E 

Major Contributors to the Report 

Major Contributors to the Report 

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections 

Jennifer A. Lindsey, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

Carolyn Aya Johnson, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

Levar Cole, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

McKay Smith, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 51 
Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection 

Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Under Secretary for Management 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 

Director of Operations Coordination 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

CBP Audit Liaison 

ICE Audit Liaison 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS Program Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

DHS’ Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between CBP and ICE 

Page 52 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 

254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or 

noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG Hotline 

at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, 

Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG seeks to 

protect the identity of each writer and caller.