Filed 3/23/23 Soni v. Cartograph CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

SURJIT P. SONI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CARTOGRAPH, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B316270

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct.

 No. EC063728)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Ralph C. Hofer, Judge. Affirmed.

The Soni Law Firm and Leo E. Lundbert, Jr., for Plaintiff

and Appellant.

Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Rex S. Heinke and 

Jessica M. Weisel for Defendants and Respondents.

——————————
2

Plaintiff and appellant Surjit P. Soni, doing business as 

The Soni Law Firm (collectively Soni), appeals from a judgment 

awarding attorney fees under the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act 

(MFAA) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6200 et seq.)1 in favor of 

defendants and respondents Timothy Tierney and Cartograph, 

Inc., formerly known as Simplelayers, Inc. (collectively Tierney). 

On appeal, Soni contends: he was the prevailing party for the 

purposes of an attorney fees award under sections 6203 and 6204; 

he was also the prevailing party under the parties’ contractual 

attorney fees provisions; he was entitled to an award of attorney 

fees, because he was not a self-represented litigant; and even if 

Tierney were entitled to fees, the amount was excessive. We 

conclude the provisions of sections 6203 and 6204 govern the 

award of attorney fees. Tierney was the prevailing party for 

purposes of an award of attorney fees under either statute, and 

no abuse of discretion has been shown as to the amount of 

attorney fees awarded. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Arbitration, Trial, and Prior Appeal

This portion of the facts is derived from our published 

opinion in the parties’ prior appeal in this case, Soni v. 

SimpleLayers, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1078–1094. Soni 

operates his legal practice as a sole proprietorship and hires 

attorneys to work for him. Tierney engaged Soni, through 

1 All further statutory references are to the Business and 

Professions Code, unless otherwise stated.
3

attorney Ron Perez, to work on certain publicity and patent 

claims. Tierney and Soni executed an attorney-client agreement. 

Perez stopped working with Soni, but correspondence was 

received from the United States Patent and Trademark Offices 

that required responses from Tierney in August and September 

2013. Soni offered three options: continue using Soni’s legal 

services; terminate the relationship with Soni and engage Perez 

directly; or find a different law firm for his legal work. Tierney 

said he would advise Soni of his decision, and instructed Soni to 

do no further work until hearing from him. Soni asked attorney 

Michael Long to review Tierney’s files and complete the work 

indicated. At the end of July 2013, Tierney told Soni that he 

planned to continue working with Perez, and he agreed to pay the 

outstanding balance owed on his account. In October 2013, Soni 

notified Tierney that the outstanding balance on his account was 

$7,211. Tierney paid $3,531, but disputed that he authorized the 

services performed by Long.

Tierney submitted a petition for fee arbitration to Los 

Angeles County Bar Association (LACBA) under the MFAA. 

Tierney challenged charges of $3,720 that he had not authorized. 

The arbitrator concluded Tierney was not liable for the fees 

charged for work performed by Long. During the arbitration, 

Tierney agreed not to dispute $380 associated with transferring 

his file to Perez, and the parties stipulated that Tierney had a 

credit balance of $140 as to the undisputed fees. The arbitrator 

allocated the initial arbitration fee of $242.50 to Soni and an 

amended arbitration fee of $26 to Tierney. Based solely on the 

charge of $380 that Tierney had not disputed, the allocation of 

arbitration filing fees, and the credit for Tierney’s overpayment of 
4

undisputed fees, the arbitrator awarded a net amount of $2.50 to 

Soni.

On March 18, 2015, 33 days after service of the arbitration 

award, attorneys associated with Soni, including Long, filed a 

complaint on Soni’s behalf against Tierney for breach of contract, 

quantum meruit, money had and received, book account, 

fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent 

inducement to enter into a contract, and breach of guaranty. 

Soni sought $3,580 in fees and $23,898 for collection expenses.

Tierney filed a petition in the pending action to confirm the 

arbitration award, which the trial court denied. After a bench 

trial, the trial court found Tierney was responsible for the 

charges associated with Long’s work, because professional and 

fiduciary duties compelled Soni to review Tierney’s file under the 

circumstances of the case. In addition, the court found the 

attorneys representing Soni in the fee collection matter were 

independent contractors, so Soni was entitled to an award of 

attorney fees. Judgment was entered in the amount of $2,890 in 

favor of Soni, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs 

to be determined. Soni requested attorney fees of $281,191.65, 

which the trial court reduced to $79,898 due to the nature of the 

dispute. Tierney appealed the judgment and the postjudgment 

order awarding attorney fees.

In a published opinion, this appellate court concluded the 

arbitration award was binding, because Soni failed to file an 

action within 30 days after service of the award, and therefore, 

the petition to confirm the award should have been granted. 

(Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1077.) 

We reversed the judgment and the order denying the petition to 

confirm the arbitration award, with directions to the trial court to 
5

confirm the arbitration award. Tierney was awarded costs on 

appeal.

Proceedings After Remand

On July 16, 2020, after remand, the trial court granted the 

petition to confirm the arbitration award. On August 24, 2020, 

Soni filed a motion in the trial court seeking attorney fees of 

$543,365 based on approximately 1,400 hours of work. Soni 

argued that he was the prevailing party under the attorney fees 

provision of the parties’ contract based on his net monetary 

recovery under the arbitration award, as confirmed by the trial 

court.

Tierney filed a motion for attorney fees seeking $339,603 

for 731.8 hours of work as the prevailing party under the parties’ 

contract and under section 6203, subdivision (c).

A hearing was held on the attorney fees motions on July 2, 

2021. The trial court concluded that the specific statutory 

provisions of section 6203, subdivision (c), and section 6204, 

subdivision (d), governed the award of attorney fees, rather than 

the general contractual attorney fees provisions of Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1032 and Civil Code section 1717. The court 

found Tierney was the prevailing party under Business and 

Professions Code sections 6203 and 6204, because Soni could not

establish that he obtained a judgment after trial more favorable 

than the arbitration award. The trial court concluded charges of 

$11,436.50 by one of Tierney’s attorney were likely duplicative, so 

reduced the amount of fees accordingly. The court awarded 

attorney fees of $328,166.50 to Tierney. The court denied Soni’s 

motion. 
6

On August 16, 2021, the court entered a judgment 

confirming the February 11, 2015 arbitration award and 

awarding Tierney $334,458.41 in attorney fees and costs. Soni 

filed a timely notice of appeal.2

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

“ ‘Generally, the trial court’s determination of the

prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees is an 

exercise of discretion, which should not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. [Citation.] But the

determination of the legal basis for an attorney fee award is 

subject to independent review. [Citation.] In such a case, the 

issue involves the application of the law to undisputed facts.

[Citation.]” [Citation.] Further, where an issue of entitlement to 

attorney fees and costs depends on the interpretation of a statute, 

our review is de novo.” (Wohlgemuth v. Caterpillar Inc. (2012) 

207 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258.)

“ ‘A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a 

court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to 

effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In construing a 

statute, our first task is to look to the language of the statute 

itself. [Citation.] When the language is clear and there is no 

uncertainty as to the legislative intent, we look no further and 

2 We deny the motion for judicial notice that Soni filed with 

this court on June 27, 2022, because the documents submitted 

are not relevant to the issues on appeal.
7

simply enforce the statute according to its terms. [Citations.] [¶] 

Additionally, however, we must consider the [statutory language] 

in the context of the entire statute [citation] and the statutory 

scheme of which it is a part. “We are required to give effect to 

statutes ‘according to the usual, ordinary import of the language 

employed in framing them.’ [Citations.]” [Citations.] “ ‘If 

possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, 

sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative 

purpose.’ [Citation.] . . . . ‘When used in a statute [words] must 

be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious 

purpose of the statute where they appear.’ [Citations.] 

Moreover, the various parts of a statutory enactment must be 

harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the 

context of the statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ” (Phelps v. 

Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32 (Phelps).)

Attorney Fees Provisions of the MFAA

Under certain circumstances, the MFAA provides for an 

award of attorney fees to a prevailing party. Soni contends he 

was the prevailing party for the purposes of an award of attorney 

fees under section 6203, subdivision (c), and section 6204, 

subdivision (d). We conclude that the trial court properly found

Tierney was the prevailing party under both section 6203 and 

section 6204 of the MFAA.
8

A. Attorney Fees After Confirmation of Arbitration 

Award

Section 6203, subdivision (c), provides the trial court 

discretion to award attorney fees and costs to a party who obtains 

a judgment confirming, correcting, or vacating an arbitration 

award as follows: “Neither party to the arbitration may recover 

costs or attorney’s fees incurred in preparation for or in the 

course of the fee arbitration proceeding with the exception of the 

filing fee paid pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section. 

However, a court confirming, correcting, or vacating an award

under this section may award to the prevailing party reasonable

fees and costs incurred in obtaining confirmation, correction, or 

vacation of the award including, if applicable, fees and costs on 

appeal. The party obtaining judgment confirming, correcting, or 

vacating the award shall be the prevailing party except that,

without regard to consideration of who the prevailing party may 

be, if a party did not appear at the arbitration hearing in the 

manner provided by the rules adopted by the board of trustees, 

that party shall not be entitled to attorney’s fees or costs upon

confirmation, correction, or vacation of the award.”

The plain language of the statute states that the prevailing 

party for purposes of an award of attorney fees under section 

6203, subdivision (c), is the party obtaining a judgment 

confirming, correcting, or vacating the arbitration award. 

Tierney obtain a judgment confirming the arbitration award. 

The trial court properly exercised its discretion to find Tierney 

was the prevailing party under section 6203, subdivision (c), for 

purposes of an attorney fees award.
9

Soni contends that the trial court should have found he was 

the prevailing party under section 6203, subdivision (c), because 

the trial court initially vacated the arbitration award, which was 

reversed on appeal solely on procedural grounds. This is 

incorrect. Soni did not file a petition to vacate the arbitration 

award and there was no order vacating the arbitration award; 

rather, Soni purported to initiate a trial after arbitration 

pursuant to section 6204, subdivisions (a) and (c). Moreover, the 

judgment from the trial has no effect on the issue of attorney fees, 

because the judgment was reversed on appeal. There is only one 

final judgment in an action. (Nicholson v. Henderson (1944) 

25 Cal.2d 375, 378.) Until a judgment becomes final because it is 

affirmed on appeal or the time to take an appeal has lapsed, the 

judgment is not admissible in evidence and cannot be relied upon 

to enforce the rights declared in the judgment. (Thomas v. 

Lavery (1932) 125 Cal.App. 666, 668.) The “reversal of the

judgment places the parties in the trial court in the same position 

as if the cause had never been tried, with the exception that the 

opinion of the court on appeal must be followed so far as 

applicable.” (Id. at p. 669.) There was no order vacating the 

arbitration award, and the final judgment in this case confirmed 

the arbitration award. Therefore, Tierney was the prevailing 

party for purposes of section 6203, subdivision (c).

B. Effect of Seeking Trial After Arbitration

Soni contends the trial court should have found he was the 

prevailing party for the purposes of an attorney fees award under 

section 6204, subdivision (d). This is incorrect as well.
10

When parties to arbitration under the MFAA have not 

agreed in writing to binding arbitration, either party may seek a 

trial within 30 days after service of notice of the award. (§ 6204, 

subd. (a).) If a party seeks a trial after arbitration, section 6204, 

subdivision (d), allows the trial court to award attorney fees as 

follows: “The party seeking a trial after arbitration shall be the

prevailing party if that party obtains a judgment more favorable 

than that provided by the arbitration award, and in all other 

cases the other party shall be the prevailing party. The

prevailing party may, in the discretion of the court, be entitled to 

an allowance for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in 

the trial after arbitration, which allowance shall be fixed by the 

court. In fixing the attorney’s fees, the court shall consider the

award and determinations of the arbitrators, in addition to any 

other relevant evidence.”

The plain language of the statute again governs the 

outcome. Soni was the party who sought a trial after arbitration. 

The final judgment confirmed the arbitration award; it was not 

more favorable than the arbitration award. Because the party 

who sought a trial after arbitration did not obtain a more 

favorable judgment than had been provided by the arbitration 

award, the other party, Tierney, was the prevailing party for the 

purposes of an attorney fees award under section 6204, 

subdivision (d).

C. Effect of Contractual Attorney Fees Provision

Soni contends that he is entitled to recover his attorney 

fees as the prevailing party under Civil Code section 1717, based 

on the attorney fees provision of the parties’ contract and his 
11

recovery of $2.50. We conclude that the attorney fees provided 

for by the MFAA control over the parties’ contract provision.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 allows parties to enter 

into agreements for the payment of attorney fees, except when 

attorney fees are specifically provided for by statute. Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1021 states: “Except as attorney’s fees 

are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of 

compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the 

agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to 

actions or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter 

provided.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), which 

governs the allocation of costs, also does not apply when another 

statute expressly provides for costs. Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1032, subdivision (b), states: “Except as otherwise 

expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a 

matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” The 

items recoverable as costs include attorney fees authorized by 

contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, 

subd. (a)(10).)

When attorney fees are specifically provided for by statute, 

“the question is whether the statutory attorney fees provision 

expressly, or the policy of the statute implicitly, overrides the 

freedom to contract for a different outcome.” (County of 

Sacramento v. Sandison (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 646, 651.) “The

MFAA was enacted to eliminate a disparity in bargaining power 

between attorneys and clients attempting to resolve disputes 

about attorney fees. [Citation.] The Legislature recognized that 

many clients were infrequent consumers of legal services and 

would need to hire separate lawyers to litigate fee agreement 
12

disputes. [Citation.] Proponents of the legislation at the time 

observed that the cost of a second lawyer was prohibitive because 

it would often equal or exceed the value of the fees in dispute.” 

(Dorit v. Noe (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 458, 467.)

We conclude that the policies underlying the attorney fees 

provisions of section 6203, subdivision (c) and section 6204, 

subdivision (d), preclude the application of contractual attorney 

fee provisions. The purpose of the attorney fees provisions of the 

MFAA is to promote the finality of arbitration awards and 

discourage frivolous additional litigation by either party. Section 

6203, subdivision (c), expressly prohibits parties to an MFAA 

arbitration from recovering any attorney fees or costs for the 

arbitration. (See Dorit v. Noe, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 467

[arbitrators cannot award attorney fees or costs for MFAA 

arbitration, regardless of provisions of parties’ contract].) Section 

6203, subdivision (c), allows the trial court to award attorney fees 

incurred in connection with a successful petition to confirm, 

correct, or vacate an MFAA arbitration award. The statute 

encourages parties to avoid further litigation by allowing 

recovery of attorney fees only for meritorious petitions to confirm, 

correct, or vacate an MFAA arbitration award. The policy would 

be undermined if contractual attorney fee provisions governed in 

such proceedings, allowing attorney fees to be awarded in 

connection with unmeritorious petitions. 

The policy underlying section 6204, subdivision (d), 

similarly precludes an award of contractual attorney fees. 

Arbitration under the MFAA is nonbinding. Dissatisfied parties 

are guaranteed their day in court by electing a trial de novo. To 

discourage parties from seeking trials de novo, however, section 

6204, subdivision (d), allows the trial court discretion to award 
13

attorney fees to the party seeking a trial after arbitration only if 

that party obtains a judgment more favorable than the recovery

provided by the arbitration award. If the party seeking a trial 

after arbitration does not obtain a more favorable award, the 

other party is the prevailing party for the purposes of an attorney 

fee award. The policy underlying section 6204, subdivision (d), 

would be thwarted if the parties’ contractual attorney fees 

provision prevailed.

In the analogous context of judicial arbitration, courts have 

considered language in Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.21 

that is similar to Business and Professions Code section 6204, 

subdivision (d), and concluded that the Legislature’s intent was 

to discourage trial de novo. “ ‘Unlike commercial or true

arbitration, judicial arbitration is not binding, since any party 

dissatisfied with an award may elect trial de novo. [Fn. omitted.] 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1141.20.) The Legislature, however, seeking 

to encourage finality of judicial arbitration awards, enacted 

disincentives to trial de novo.” (Bhullar v. Tayyab (1996) 

46 Cal.App.4th 582, 589.) “To encourage parties to accept 

reasonable arbitration awards, the Legislature enacted Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1141.21, which provides that if a party 

elects a trial de novo following judicial arbitration, and fails to 

obtain a judgment that is more favorable than the arbitration 

award, that party shall pay the costs incurred by the opposing 

party following the election of the trial de novo and shall not 

recover his or her own costs incurred following the election of the 

trial de novo. Section 1141.21[, subd.] (a)(ii) creates an exception 

to the usual rule that the prevailing party in an action ‘is 

entitled . . . to recover costs.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).)” 

(Phelps, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 29, fn. omitted.)
14

“The purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.21 is 

to discourage trials de novo. [Citation.] ‘ “While there is no 

specific legislative language to that effect, it is apparent that the 

[L]egislature desired alternative, not cumulative, dispute 

resolution . . . and that the disincentive of . . . Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 1141.21 . . . reflect[s] that underlying purpose.” ’ ” (Phelps,

supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 29.) “ ‘Discouraging trial de novo is 

essential to the proper functioning of the judicial arbitration

system. Along with its goal of resolving small claims efficiently 

and affordably, judicial arbitration is intended to ease court case 

loads. [Citation.] The success of judicial arbitration in achieving 

these goals is dependent on a small incidence of trial de novo

election.’ ” (Bhullar v. Tayyab, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 589.)

We conclude that the statutory attorney fees provisions of 

sections 6203 and 6204 govern, rather than the attorney fees 

provision of the parties’ contract. The trial court properly 

awarded attorney fees to Tierney as the prevailing party under 

sections 6203 and 6204.

Amount of Fees 

Soni contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

awarding fees based on hourly rates in excess of rates that the 

court had previously found reasonable for a simple collection 

matter. We find no abuse of discretion.

We review the amount of attorney fees awarded for an 

abuse of discretion. (Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc.

(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 743.) “An experienced trial judge is in 

the best position to evaluate the value of professional services 

rendered in the trial court. We presume the fee approved by the
15

trial court is reasonable. We will not disturb the trial court’s

judgment unless it is clearly wrong. The burden is on the 

objector to show error.” (Id. at p. 743.)

The issues presented after the trial de novo in this case 

were not simple fee collections issues. The issues required the 

services of specialized appellate attorneys and resulted in a 

published opinion on novel issues. Tierney’s attorneys worked 

half as many hours as Soni’s attorneys on the matters at issue, 

and Tierney’s attorneys billed substantially lower total fees than 

the charges that Soni incurred and sought to recover in his 

competing motion for attorney fees. The trial court examined the 

bills carefully and reduced the amount awarded to Tierney for 

duplicative work by one attorney. No abuse of discretion has 

been shown as to the amount of fees awarded.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents Timothy Tierney 

and Cartograph, Inc., formerly known as Simplelayers, Inc., are

awarded their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J. KIM, J.