Filed 3/7/23 Quintero v. Dolgen California, LLC CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JAZMINE QUINTERO,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DOLGEN CALIFORNIA, LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

F083769

(Super. Ct. No. VCU287566)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

It is hereby ordered that the nonpublished opinion filed herein on February 10, 

2023, be modified as follows:

1. On page 2, the following citation is added to the end of the first full 

paragraph, beginning “Based on Viking River...” 

(See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (Feb. 2, 2023, F082404) 

__ Cal.App.5th __ [2023 Cal.App. Lexis 129].)

2. On page 4, in the third sentence of the last paragraph, the phrase 

“Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (Feb. 2, 2023, F082404), which we did not 

publish because it will soon be superseded by the decision in Adolph” is deleted 

and replaced with “Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (Feb. 2, 2023, F082404) 

__ Cal.App.5th __ [2023 Cal.App. Lexis 129]” so the sentence now reads:

“We have already decided that and other issues involving Dollar General’s 

arbitration agreement in Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (Feb. 2, 2023, 

F082404) ___ Cal.App.5th __ [2023 Cal.App. Lexis 129].” 
2.

Except for the modification set forth, the opinion previously filed remains 

unchanged. This modification does not effect a change in the judgment. 

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, J.

SNAUFFER, J. 
Filed 2/10/23 Quintero v. Dolgen California, LLC CA5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JAZMINE QUINTERO,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DOLGEN CALIFORNIA, LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

F083769

(Super. Ct. No. VCU287566)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan D. Ide, 

Judge.

McGuire Woods and Sabrina A. Beldner for Defendant and Appellant.

Potter Handy, Mark D. Potter, and James Michael Treglio for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

-ooOooPlaintiff Jazmine Quintero sued her former employer, Dolgen California, LLC 

(Dollar General), to recover civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 

2004 (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)1for various Labor Code violations suffered by 

* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Snauffer, J.

1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Labor Code. 
2.

her or by other employees. Dollar General moved to compel arbitration, which the 

superior court denied. 

Based on Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 

1906] (Viking River) and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.), we 

conclude the parties’ agreement requires arbitration of plaintiff’s PAGA claims that seek 

to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations suffered by plaintiff. On an issue of 

California law currently pending before the California Supreme Court, we conclude 

plaintiff’s PAGA claims that seek to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations 

suffered by employees other than plaintiff may be pursued by plaintiff in the superior 

court.

Therefore, the order denying Dollar General’s motion to compel arbitration is 

reversed in part and affirmed in part. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In December 2019, plaintiff applied for employment with Dolgen California, LLC 

(Dollar General), a wholly owned subsidiary of Dollar General Corporation. She was 

employed by Dollar General from December 14, 2019, until January 4, 2021, when she 

resigned. 

As part of the application and hiring process, plaintiff accessed Dollar General’s

web-based Express Hiring system, which allows persons to receive, review, and 

acknowledge documents related to their hiring and employment. On December 5, 2019, 

plaintiff electronically signed Dollar General’s arbitration agreement. She also marked 

the box stating she agreed to its terms and understood that by checking the box, both 

Dollar General and she would be bound by the arbitration agreement’s terms. The 

agreement also contained an opt-out provision. Plaintiff did not opt out. 

The arbitration agreement stated Dollar General “has a process for resolving 

employment related legal disputes with employees that involves binding arbitration.” It 

also stated:
3.

“You agree that, with the exception of certain excluded claims described 

below, any legal claims or disputes that you may have against Dollar 

General ... arising out of your employment with Dollar General or 

termination of employment with Dollar General (“Covered Claim” or 

“Covered Claims”) will be addressed in the manner described in this 

Agreement. You also understand that any Covered Claims that Dollar 

General may have against you related to your employment will be 

addressed in the manner described in this Agreement. 

“Class and Collective Action Waiver: You and Dollar General may not 

assert any class action, collective action, or representative action claims 

in any arbitration pursuant to this Agreement or in any other forum. 

You and Dollar General may bring individual claims or multi-plaintiff 

claims joining together not more than three plaintiffs, provided that 

the claims are not asserted as a class, collective or representative 

action. Non-representative, multi-plaintiff arbitrations (up to the 

three-plaintiff limit) may only be filed if each of the plaintiff’s claims: 

(1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 

transactions or occurrences; (2) arises out of the same work location; 

and (3) presents a common question of law or fact. A challenge to a 

multi-plaintiff action can be initiated by any party by filing a motion to 

dismiss or sever one or more parties. The arbitrator shall rule upon 

the motion to dismiss or sever based upon the standards set forth in 

this Paragraph. NOTE: This waiver does not apply to claims under 

the National Labor Relations Act.” 

The arbitration agreement stated its procedures “will be the exclusive means of 

resolving Covered Claims relating to or arising out of your employment or termination of 

employment with Dollar General.” The covered claims included “claims alleging 

violations of wage and hour laws ... and claims alleging violation of any other state or 

federal laws, except claims that are prohibited by law from being decided in arbitration.” 

The agreement’s severability clause stated: “If any parts of this Agreement are found to 

be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable, the validity, legality, and/or enforceability of the 

remaining provisions will not be affected by that decision, and any invalid, illegal or 

unenforceable provisions shall be modified or stricken.” 

In April 2021, plaintiff’s attorney mailed a written notice to the Labor and 

Workforce Development Agency and defendant pursuant to section 2699.3 that identified 
4.

claims for violations of sections 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 226, 226.7, 227.3, 512, 1194, 

1194.2, 1197, 1197.1, 1198, 1199, 2802, and IWC Wage Order No. 5-2001. Over 65 

days passed without the agency responding to plaintiff’s notice.

PROCEEDINGS

In June 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking civil penalties under PAGA for 

violations of the Labor Code sections identified in her section 2699.3 notice. 

In August 2021, Dollar General filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the 

proceeding pending a ruling on the motion and completion of arbitration. The motion 

was supported by a declaration of Debbie Roach, “a Senior Manager, HR Shared 

Services, for Dollar General Corporation,” and a declaration of Mia Sovaloja, “the Senior 

Director for Store Operations Planning and Communication for Dollar General 

Corporation.” Dollar General argued that plaintiff must individually arbitrate the alleged 

wage and hour violations that involved her and asserted plaintiff had strategically filed an 

action with only PAGA claims to avoid her contractual obligation to arbitrate those 

alleged violations. 

In November 2021, the superior court held a hearing and counsel appeared using 

CourtCall. The court adopted its tentative ruling to deny the motion and stated: “As 

California law stands at present, however, plaintiff’s PAGA claims are not waivable and 

she cannot be compelled to arbitrate them.” Dollar General appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

An issue in this appeal is whether plaintiff’s PAGA claims seeking civil penalties 

for Labor Code violations suffered by employees other than plaintiff may be pursued by 

plaintiff in court. The issue is pending before the California Supreme Court. (Adolph v. 

Uber Technologies, Inc. (2022) (Aug. 1, 2022, S274671) [2022 Cal. Lexis 5021].) We 

have already decided that and other issues involving Dollar General’s arbitration 

agreement in Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (Feb. 2, 2023, F082404), which we did 

not publish because it soon will be superseded by the decision in Adolph. We note, in 
5.

Silva v. Dolgen California, LLC (Oct. 21, 2022, E078185) review granted Jan. 25, 2023, 

S277538—another case involving Dollar General’s arbitration agreement—our Supreme 

Court granted review and deferred briefing pending a decision in Adolph, which suggests 

the court will do the same in Galarsa and this case. 

Consequently, there is no need for this opinion to contain a detailed discussion of 

the issues. Instead, a disposition by a memorandum opinion in accordance with the 

California Standards of Judicial Administration, Standard 8.1 is appropriate. (See People 

v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 850–855 [use of memorandum opinions]; Cal. 

Const., art. VI, § 14 [appellate decisions “shall be in writing with reasons stated”].)

Conclusion One: Viking River and the FAA (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) do not 

invalidate the rule of California law that a provision in an arbitration agreement 

purporting to waive an employee’s right to pursue representative actions is not 

enforceable as to representative claims pursued under PAGA.

2

 (See Iskanian v. CLS 

Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 360 [“an arbitration agreement 

requiring an employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to bring 

representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public policy”], abrogated on

another ground by Viking River, supra, 142 S.Ct. 1906.) 

Conclusion Two: The severability clause in the arbitration agreement allows the 

unenforceable waiver provision to be stricken from the agreement. (Viking River, supra, 

142 S.Ct. at p. 1925.)

Conclusion Three: The provisions of the arbitration agreement remaining after the 

invalid waiver of representative claims is stricken cover the PAGA claims that seek to 

recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations suffered by plaintiff. Consequently, 

2 All claims pursued by a plaintiff employee under PAGA are “representative” and 

seek the recovery of civil penalties that must be distributed 75 percent to the Labor and

Workforce Development Agency and 25 percent to the employee aggrieved by the Labor 

Code violation. (§ 2699, subd. (i).)
6.

those claims must be sent to arbitration in accordance with the principles established by 

Viking River.

3

 

Conclusion Four: Plaintiff’s PAGA claims that seek to recover civil penalties for 

Labor Code violations suffered by employees other than plaintiff may be pursued by 

plaintiff in court. Based on our interpretation of PAGA, plaintiff is an “aggrieved 

employee” with PAGA standing (§ 2699, subd. (c)). Also, California’s general rule 

against splitting a cause of action does not prevent PAGA claims involving Labor Code 

violations suffered by plaintiff from being arbitrated while PAGA claims involving Labor 

Code violations suffered by other employees are pursued in court because the two 

categories of claims did not seek to vindicate the same primary right.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is reversed in part and 

affirmed in part. The order is reversed as to plaintiff’s PAGA claims that seek to recover 

civil penalties for Labor Code violations suffered by plaintiff; those claims must be sent 

to arbitration. The order is affirmed as to plaintiff’s PAGA claims that seek to recover 

civil penalties for Labor Code violations suffered by employees other than plaintiff; those 

claims may be pursued in the superior court. 

In the interest of justice, no party shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

3 We reject plaintiff’s argument that the PAGA claims are excluded from the 

agreement to arbitrate by the clause that excludes “claims that are prohibited by law from 

being decided in arbitration.” First, the PAGA claims seeking civil penalties for Labor 

Code violations suffered by plaintiff are required to be arbitrated by the predispute 

arbitration agreement and the FAA, as interpreted in Viking River. Second, the remaining 

PAGA claims seeking civil penalties for Labor Code violations suffered by employees 

other than the plaintiff are not necessarily prohibited by law from being arbitrated. In 

particular, plaintiff has not demonstrated that California law prohibits an aggrieved 

employee, after becoming an authorized representative of the state, from agreeing with 

an employer to arbitrate the remaining PAGA claims seeking civil penalties for Labor 

Code violations suffered by other employees.