SECURITY

PROTECTION

Standardization

Issues Regarding

Protection of

Executive Branch

Officials

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Criminal Justice Oversight

Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. Senate

July 2000

GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139

United States General Accounting Office General Government Division

Washington, D.C. 20548

Page 1 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

B-283892

July 11, 2000

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight

Committee on the Judiciary

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you requested, this report updates our December 1994 report in which

we reviewed security protection for officials at 10 of the 14 Cabinet-level

departments.1 You asked that we expand our 1994 report by addressing

standardization and centralization issues regarding security protection. As

agreed with the Subcommittee, this report includes data on the protection

of all civilian executive branch officials except the President, Vice

President, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials, and U.S.

ambassadors to foreign countries.

This report provides information from agency security officials and

protected officials on the following questions pertaining to fiscal years

1997 through 1999: (1) How many federal government officials were

protected, who protected them, and how many security personnel

protected them? (2) How much did it cost to protect these officials? (3)

Under what legal authorities were agencies providing security protection?

(4) Under what circumstances were officials protected? (5) How were

agencies preparing threat assessments, and what are the implications of

standardizing and centralizing threat assessments? (6) What training did

protective personnel receive, and what are the implications of

standardizing and centralizing security protection training? (7) What are

the implications of centralizing protection services under one agency? and

(8) What are the views of the protected officials regarding the need for and

adequacy of their protection?

We collected this information by asking security officials from the 27

agencies that provided the protection to complete detailed questionnaires

on these issues, reviewing documents, and visiting protection training

facilities. We also sent letters directly to officials who were protected

from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 requesting their views on their

1

Security Protection: Costs of Services Provided for Selected Cabinet Officials (GAO/GGD-95-50,

December 30, 1994).
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protection and security standardization issues. Although we asked

agencies for the bases of their decisions to protect officials, we did not

independently assess whether particular officials should be protected or

whether the level of protection being provided and resources being

expended were appropriate.

Due to the sensitive nature of this information, we agreed to respond in

two reports. This report addresses all eight questions by providing

aggregate data. It does not provide information by agency or identify

specific protected officials. A separate, classified report addressed to you

on May 31, 2000, provided specific information on the security provided by

position held and agency.

From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, agency security officials said that

security protection was provided to officials holding 42 executive branch

positions at 31 executive branch agencies. These officials included all 14

Cabinet secretaries, 4 deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other highranking officials (mainly heads of agencies). The 42 officials were

protected by personnel from 27 different agencies. Thirty-six officials

were protected by personnel from their own agencies or departments; and

6 officials were protected by personnel from other agencies or

departments, such as the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Marshals

Service.

Agencies reported that the number of full-time protective personnel

increased by 73 percent from fiscal years 1997 through 1999. The 27

agencies also reported spending a total of at least $73.7 million to protect

those officials during that 3-year period. The agencies reported they spent

$19.1 million in fiscal year 1997, $26.1 million in fiscal year 1998, and $28.5

million in fiscal year 1999—a 49-percent increase between those 3 years.

The agencies with the largest increases in costs and full-time protective

personnel during those 3 years generally said that these increases were the

result of increased travel by the protected officials and the provision of

enhanced security to respond to potential terrorist threats.

Only two agencies—the Secret Service and the State Department—had

specific statutory authority to protect executive branch officials. The

other agencies relied on a variety of other authorities in providing

protection to officials, such as having their protective personnel deputized

by the U.S. Marshals Service to provide them with law enforcement

authority.

Results in Brief
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Agencies reported that their officials received different levels and

frequencies of protection and that protection was needed to respond to

possible and actual threats. According to agencies with security

protection as one of their primary missions, threat assessments form the

basis for determining the need and scope of protection. However, nearly

three-fourths of the agencies that provided protection said they had not

prepared detailed, written threat analyses justifying their decisions to

apply certain levels of protection and expend resources. Security

personnel generally reported that their ability to prepare threat

assessments depended in part on their access to information from other

agencies about potential and actual threats against their officials, known

as protective intelligence.2

Three agencies cited specific examples of when

they had been unable to obtain needed intelligence from another agency

about potential threats against their officials.

With regard to standardizing threat assessments, it is uncertain how

agencies could obtain the protective intelligence they need from

governmentwide sources to prepare the assessments and who would

prepare them. Most agencies favored establishing a central repository of

protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of threat information about

their officials. Security officials said the implications of establishing a

central repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of such

information among agencies would involve determining who should

administer the repository, how it would operate, whether specific statutory

authority would be needed, and the cost of establishing and administering

it.

The agencies in our review reported that their protective personnel

received different amounts of protection training and from different

sources. Generally, protective personnel from the agencies with security

protection as one of their primary missions reported having more training

than those employed by the other agencies. The agencies with security

protection as one of their primary missions reported that their training

consisted of instruction in firearms; threat assessments; emergency

medical training; practical protection exercises; security advance,

motorcade, airport, and foreign travel procedures; defensive driving skills,

defensive tactics, and legal authorities. Further, several agencies reported

that their field staff, who provided protection as part of their collateral

duties, received less protection training than the agencies’ full-time

protective personnel based in Washington, D.C., or that their field staff had

2

A Secret Service official defined protective intelligence as the programs and efforts that seek to

identify, assess, and manage persons and/or groups who make or pose threats to public officials.
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received no protection training. Six agencies said they had difficulty

obtaining protection training for their personnel because of class

availability, funding, or workload problems.

Most agencies favored establishing a standardized protection training

program so that different agencies’ protective personnel would be trained

in the same procedures and would react in a similar manner in case of an

emergency. With regard to standardizing training for protective personnel,

the implications of what subjects the training should include, what agency

should provide the training, and the cost would need to be considered.

Security officials at most of the agencies in our review said they opposed

centralizing security protection under one agency. They said it was more

effective to use protective personnel who were employed by the officials’

own agencies because the personnel were knowledgeable about the

agencies’ culture and operations. Protected officials who responded to our

queries about the adequacy of their protection generally said they were

satisfied with their protection and would like to continue with the current

arrangements. The implications of centralizing security protection

governmentwide involve many issues, including who would decide who is

to be protected and the level of protection to be provided; who would

provide the services; whether Congress would need to grant statutory

authorities; and whether centralization would be the most cost-efficient

and effective way of providing these services over the current, more

decentralized approach.

We found that no single agency or official was responsible for handling

issues relating to the routine protection of executive branch officials. This

fragmentation of protective responsibilities among multiple executive

branch agencies has implications regarding the functioning of government,

in part, because 14 of the protected officials are in the line of presidential

succession. Moreover, the lack of thorough threat assessments

documenting the level of protection needed makes it difficult to determine

the basis for and reasonableness of the protection being given, especially

considering the growth in the costs of protection in recent years.

We are recommending that the Director of the Office of Management and

Budget (OMB), in consultation with the President, designate an official or

group to assess how protective intelligence should be shared among

agencies, how best to link threat assessment with the need for protection

and level of protection provided, who should provide protection, whether

agencies should be provided with specific statutory authority to provide

protection, what training should be provided to personnel protecting
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federal officials, and who should provide it. We are also recommending

that this official or group report its findings to the OMB Director and that

the Director report his recommendations on these subjects to Congress.

Once the Director submits his recommendations to Congress, Congress

should enact legislation that would enable whatever agency or agencies

that provide protection to have appropriate statutory authority and

consider making the necessary resources available to effectively carry out

these responsibilities.

According to the Secret Service, assassination of political leaders and

other public figures has been a significant problem in the United States.

Since 1835, 11 attacks on U.S. presidents have occurred, 4 of them

resulting in the death of the president. In the past half-century, two

presidential candidates and two Members of Congress have been attacked;

several national political leaders have been assassinated; several state and

federal judges have been murdered; and several celebrities, business

leaders, and state and local elected officials have been attacked. In

addition, an unknown number of would-be attackers have been deterred

from carrying out harm through the intervention of law enforcement and

security personnel. Recent terrorist incidents in the United States have

also heightened concern about protecting high-ranking government

officials.

Historical data on assassinations and assassination attempts against

federal officials suggest that elected officials have been victims of attack

more frequently than those holding high appointed positions.3 We found

only one instance in U.S. history when a Cabinet secretary was physically

harmed as part of an assassination attempt, which occurred when thenSecretary of State William Seward was attacked in his home by one of the

Lincoln assassination conspirators in 1865. More recently, in 1987, a man

was arrested in Washington, D.C., for threatening to kill the President and

the U.S. Secretary of State. He was found in possession of a cache of

weapons. And in 1988, a bomb exploded alongside a motorcade carrying

the Secretary of State in Bolivia. The Secretary of State was not injured in

that bombing incident.

3 A 1998 Marshals Service report, Hunters and Howlers, Threats and Violence Against Federal Judicial

Officials in the United States, 1789-1993, quoted a 1970 report on political violence (commissioned by

President Johnson after the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy) indicating that “the more powerful

and prestigious the office, the greater the likelihood of assassination....[T]here is a much greater

likelihood that the occupant of or aspirant to an elected public office will be the victim of an

assassination than will the occupant of an appointed position, even though the position may be a

powerful one, such as Secretary of State, Justice of the Supreme Court, or Attorney General.” In its

report, the Marshals Service said that “[t]wenty years later and three assassinated federal judges later,

it is doubtful that the commission would change its conclusions.”

Background
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Although we did not find that top appointed federal officials historically

have been frequent victims of harm, security officials stressed that

effective security protection serves as a deterrent to harm. Moreover,

research on threat assessments suggests that top appointed federal

officials may be vulnerable to attack. In 1998, the U.S. Secret Service

published a report on its study of the thinking and behavior of people who

were known to have attacked or approached to attack public officials in

the United States from 1949 to 1996.4The study found that many attackers

and would-be attackers considered more than one target before attacking.

Assailants often made final decisions about whom to attack because an

opportunity presented itself or because they perceived another target was

unapproachable, the study indicated. These findings have implications for

high-ranking government officials, who may become targets of attack by

potentially dangerous individuals who transfer their focus among different

government officials. In addition, security protection for Cabinet

secretaries has national security implications because they are in the line

of presidential succession.5

We asked the agencies in our review to indicate the number of direct

threats (e.g., threat of direct physical harm, kidnapping, extortion, etc.)

they had received against their officials from fiscal years 1997 through

1999 and the number of arrests that were made to protect their officials.

Of the 27 agencies in our review that provided protection, 18 agencies

reported having received at least 1 direct threat against their protected

officials during this 3-year period. The agencies reported receiving a total

of 134 direct threats from fiscal years 1997 through 1999--72 in fiscal year

1997, 33 in fiscal year 1998, and 29 in fiscal year 1999. During the 3-year

period, six arrests were made for threatening three of the protected

officials.

Generally, personal security protection consists of having armed personnel

within the vicinity of an official and in locations where the official plans to

4

Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations, U.S. Secret Service, July 1998. One

Cabinet secretary was identified in the study as the victim of a near-lethal approacher—the Secretary

of State in the 1987 incident described above. The study was funded by the National Institute of

Justice.

5

Under 3 U.S.C. 19, the line of presidential succession is as follows: Vice President, Speaker of the

House of Representatives, President pro tempore of the Senate, Secretary of State, Secretary of the

Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture,

Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of

Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of

Education, and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
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travel. In addition, protection involves making related security plans and

analyzing possible and actual threats.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the heads of all of

the agencies that either provided protection services or had protected

officials during fiscal years 1997 through 1999, the OMB Director, the

Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), and

the Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs and Cabinet Secretary.

Comments from the agencies that chose to provide them are discussed at

the conclusion of this report. The written comments we received are

contained in appendixes II through XI. We did our work in the

Washington, D.C., area; Beltsville, MD; and at FLETC in Glynco, GA, from

September 1999 through May 2000. We performed our audit work in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Our

investigative work was done in accordance with investigative standards

established by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. Our

detailed scope and methodology for this review are contained in appendix

I.

From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, security protection was provided on

at least 1 occasion to officials holding 42 different positions at 31 executive

branch agencies. These officials included all 14 Cabinet secretaries, 4

deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking officials (mainly

heads of agencies). 6 The 42 officials were protected by personnel from 27

different agencies. Protection was provided to officials holding 34

positions in fiscal year 1997, 37 positions in fiscal year 1998, and 39

positions in fiscal year 1999.

Thirty-six officials were protected by personnel from their own agencies or

departments (primarily within offices of security or Inspectors General);

and 6 officials were protected by personnel employed by other agencies

(the Secret Service, State Department, Marshals Service, and Federal

Protective Service).7

To avoid possibly compromising their security, we

are not providing specific information in this report about which officials

were protected, who protected them, or how many security personnel

protected them.

6

We counted each of the Cabinet departments and their respective agencies separately in the total

number of agencies. Several positions were held by different individuals during the 3-year period, so

we counted the number of protected positions, not officials.

7 Another agency had a private security firm on retainer if it needed additional protective services.

How Many Officials

Were Protected, Who

Protected Them, and

How Many Protected

Them
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Agencies reported that the number of full-time protective personnel

increased by 73 percent from fiscal years 1997 through 1999. Information

regarding the number of part-time protective personnel and the amount of

time they spent on protection could not be quantified governmentwide.8

In

our 1994 report, 10 Cabinet departments reported that they employed a

total of 11 full-time personnel to protect their officials.9

Our review found

that those same 10 Cabinet departments employed substantially more fulltime protective personnel in fiscal year 1999. We are not disclosing in this

report the number of employees being used to provide protection to avoid

possibly compromising the officials’ security.

Protective personnel at the 27 agencies that provided protection were

employed by 6 offices of security, 5 offices of investigation, 3 offices of

Inspectors General, 3 police offices, and 10 other offices. Fourteen

agencies primarily employed criminal investigators (job classification

1811) to protect their officials; 6 agencies primarily employed security

specialists (job classification 0080); and the remaining 7 agencies primarily

employed protective personnel with other job classifications.

Security officials at two agencies that employed security specialists said

they would prefer to hire criminal investigators to protect their officials,

but that Office of Personnel Management (OPM) personnel rules

prohibited them from hiring criminal investigators for this purpose. These

officials said that being able to hire criminal investigators as protective

personnel would help in recruiting and retaining those employees because

criminal investigators have better pay and retirement benefits, compared

to the security specialists. In addition, these officials said they could

impose physical fitness standards on criminal investigators that they could

not impose on security specialists, and that criminal investigators

generally have better investigative and analytical skills than security

specialists do.

We asked the 27 agencies in our review to provide data on the protection

costs that they incurred for salaries and overtime of security personnel;

travel; special executive protection training; and other expenses, such as

equipment and residential security. They reported spending a total of at

8

Many of the agencies reported using employees, mainly in the field, to assist in providing protection

as part of their collateral duties.

9

This included four departments with full-time protective personnel and six departments that used

personnel who provided protection as part of their collateral duties. The 1994 report excluded data on

protection provided at the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury.

Costs of Protection
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least $73.7 million from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 to protect officials

holding 42 positions from fiscal years 1997 through 1999.

Agencies reported that the amount of money spent to protect officials that

they were able to identify increased by 49 percent from fiscal year 1997 to

fiscal year 1999 (a 46-percent increase in 1999 dollars). To protect these

officials, agencies reported they spent $19.1 million in fiscal year 1997

($19.5 million in 1999 dollars), $26.1 million in fiscal year 1998 ($26.4

million in 1999 dollars), and $28.5 million in fiscal year 1999. However,

these figures are understated because some agencies said they did not

record and could not reconstruct certain protection costs. The agencies

with the largest increases in costs and full-time protective personnel

during those 3 years generally said that the increases were the result of

increased travel by the protected officials and the provision of enhanced

security to respond to potential terrorist threats, in light of international

terrorist incidents.

Costs varied substantially among agencies because of the different levels

of protection provided and other factors, such as the amount of foreign

travel. Salaries and travel expenses represented the greatest portions of

the total expenses. We are not disclosing in this report how much was

being spent to protect specific officials to prevent the cost data from being

extrapolated to possibly determine the level of protection being provided.

A comparison of costs incurred by 10 Cabinet departments for security

protection that were included in our 1994 report showed that their costs of

protection nearly tripled from fiscal years 1992 to 1999, after being

adjusted for inflation. In 1994, we reported that 10 Cabinet departments

(the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury were

excluded) spent a total of $1.5 million in fiscal year 1992, $1.6 million in

fiscal year 1993, and $2 million during the first 9 months of fiscal year 1994.

(In 1999 dollars, the value of $1.5 million in 1992 would be $1.7 million; the

value of $1.6 million in 1993 would be $1.8 million; and the value of $2

million in 1994 would be $2.2 million.) By contrast, these same 10 Cabinet

departments spent a total $2.8 million in fiscal year 1997 ($2.8 million in

1999 dollars), $3.6 million in fiscal year 1998 (also $3.6 million in 1999

dollars), and $4.6 million on protection in fiscal year 1999.10 These 10

10 In 1986, we reported that 15 agencies (including 8 of the 10 Cabinet departments in the 1994 report)

indicated they spent a total of $1.6 million to protect officials in each of fiscal years 1984 and 1985, and

estimated they would spend $1.6 million in fiscal year 1986. (In 1999 dollars, the value of $1.6 million

in 1984 would be $2.4 million, and the value of $1.6 million in 1985 and 1986 would be $2.3 million.)

See Bodyguard Services: Protective Services Provided Selected Federal Officials (GAO/GGD-86-55FS,

Feb. 28, 1986). The 1986 report excluded the costs of protecting officials at the Departments of

Defense, State, and the Treasury.
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Cabinet departments represented 16 percent of the total expenditures for

protection incurred by all of the executive branch agencies in our review

in fiscal year 1999.

We asked agencies to provide their legal authorities for providing personal

security protection. In response, agencies cited various legal authorities

that they believed gave them the authority to provide such protection.

Some agencies cited the Inspector General Act of 1978,11 the general

authority of agency heads to issue regulations,12 a 1972 letter from the

Secretary of the Treasury to Cabinet secretaries,13 a 1970 memorandum

from the White House Counsel to a Cabinet department,14 special

deputation from the Marshals Service,15 and a specific delegation of

authority set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations.16 The Marshals

Service, through its Deputy U.S. Marshals, is authorized by statute17 to

provide security in various U.S. courts and to provide personal protection

of certain government officials and other individuals in certain

11 5 U.S.C., App. 3.

12 5 U.S.C. 301.

13 The November 27, 1972, letter from Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz to all Cabinet heads

renewed an offer to have the Secret Service provide training for the departments’ protective personnel.

The memo also indicated that following a discussion at the White House, “it was decided that each

Department would provide and maintain a protective force, composed of their own employees. At the

same time the President offered the assistance of [the] Secret Service in making available a protective

training course for applicable personnel from other Departments....”

14 The December 1, 1970, memorandum from White House Counsel John Dean to a Cabinet department

indicated that the Secret Service planned to conduct a training session for executive departments’

protective personnel.

15 Special Deputy U.S. Marshals are appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 561 (g) (the Marshals Service “shall

command all necessary assistance to execute its duties” and 28 C.F.R. 0.112. See also 7 OLC 86 (1983).

Special Deputy U.S. Marshals are sworn and appointed to perform specific functions and have federal

law enforcement authority to perform those functions. According to Marshals Service policy directive

99-13, issued February 5, 1999, deputized U.S. Marshals may, among other things, seek and execute

arrest and search warrants; make arrests without warrant if there are reasonable grounds to believe

that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a violation of federal law; serve

subpoenas and other legal writs; and carry firearms for personal protection or the protection of

persons covered under the federal assault statutes. However, the policy also states that agency

personnel who receive special deputation for personal protection do not have general arrest authority.

The policy directive also indicates that applicants for deputation must, among other requirements, be

employed by a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency or an agency approved by the

Department of Justice; have successfully completed a basic law enforcement program; have previous

law enforcement experience; qualify with firearms; and agree to comply with the sponsoring agencies’

or the Department of Justice’s policy on use of deadly force.

16 Under 7 C.F.R. 2.33 (a)(2), the Secretary of Agriculture delegated authority to protect the Secretary

and Deputy Secretary to the Department’s Office of Inspector General.

17 28 U.S.C. 566 (a), (e)(1)(B).

Legal Authorities for

Providing Protection
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circumstances.18 However, beyond protection of federal judges and

government witnesses, the Marshals Service relies upon the direction of

the Attorney General before undertaking personal protection details for

other persons. The Marshals Service cites an 1890 Supreme Court

decision19 as supporting its inherent authority to provide personal

protection to persons as directed by the Attorney General to assure the

faithful execution of the federal law, even in the absence of a specific

federal authorizing statute. The Marshals Service also cites a recent

memorandum from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel as

further supporting its authority to protect agency officials.20

Only two executive branch agencies in our review—the Secret Service21

and the State Department22—had specific statutory authority to protect

executive branch officials, including the authority to carry firearms in

carrying out their protective responsibilities. The Secret Service has broad

authority to make arrests in connection with its protective functions, but

the State Department told us that its protective agents can make such

arrests only for crimes committed in their presence. Although none of the

other agencies cited specific statutory authority to protect their officials,

that does not mean that the agencies are not authorized to provide such

services. In decisions of the Comptroller General, we have recognized that

under certain circumstances, agencies can expend appropriated funds to

18 Under 28 U.S.C. 566(a), the Marshals Service provides for the “security” of the U.S. District Courts,

U.S. Court of Appeals, and the Court of International Trade. Under 28 U.S.C. 566 (e)(1)(A), the

Marshals Service may protect “Federal jurists, court officers, witnesses, and other threatened persons

in the interests of justice where criminal intimidation impedes on the functioning of the judicial

process or any other official proceeding.” In addition, under 18 U.S.C. 3053, U.S. Marshals may carry

firearms and make arrests without warrants for “any offense against the United States committed in

their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable

grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony.”

19 The case is Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).

20 March 23, 2000, memorandum from Daniel Koffsky, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to

Deborah Westbrook, General Counsel, U.S. Marshals Service.

21 Under 18 U.S.C. 3056, the Secret Service may protect the President, Vice President (or other official

next in the order of succession to the President), the President-elect, the Vice President-elect, former

presidents, and their immediate families; visiting heads of foreign states or foreign governments; “other

distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States

performing special missions abroad” when directed by the President; and major presidential and vice

presidential candidates. Under this same statute, the President, Vice President (or other official next in

the order of succession to the President), the President-elect, and the Vice President-elect may not

decline this protection.

22 Under 22 U.S.C. 2709, the State Department may protect the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary

of State, official representatives of the U.S. Government in the United States or abroad; heads of a

foreign state; official representatives of a foreign government; “other distinguished visitors to the

United States;” and to the immediate families of all of the preceding; and foreign missions within the

United States.
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protect their officials as a necessary expense.23 Such protection is

warranted if it is administratively determined that the efficiency of the

agencies would be affected because of threats or other legitimate concerns

over the safety of officials that would impair their abilities to carry out

their duties.

When agencies provide protection to their officials without specific

statutory authority to do so, potential problems can arise, particularly with

respect to whether their protective personnel have the necessary law

enforcement authorities to make arrests, conduct investigations, and use

force. The military agencies in our review, for example, indicated that

their protective personnel had the authority to arrest military personnel,

but not civilians, and that they had only the authority to detain civilians

who constitute an immediate threat to the safety of a protected official. A

security official at another agency said that the Marshals Service

deputations of some of his protective personnel had expired, so that if

these personnel needed to make an arrest, they would have to make a

“citizen’s arrest” and contact the local police.24 Eight agencies also said

that they did not have the authority to investigate threats against their

protected officials. Those agencies said that they referred threats to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other agencies for investigation.

A security official at one agency that did not have specific statutory

authority to provide protection said that he was concerned about potential

legal liabilities if his personnel would have to use force, including the use

of firearms, to protect the head of his agency. This official said that being

given specific statutory authority by Congress to provide security

protection would give his agency and personnel more protection against

possible lawsuits associated with the use of force. In addition, this official

said that being given specific statutory authority to provide protection

would help his agency obtain authority from OPM to hire criminal

investigators to provide protection, rather than security specialists.

Similarly, the Marshals Service advised us that to avoid potential problems

in providing protection, agencies should have specific statutory authority

to do so whenever possible. The Marshals Service also said that a

statutory change would be necessary if the responsibility for investigating

23 54 Comp. Gen. 624 (1975), as modified, 55 Comp. Gen. 578 (1975).

24 The official in charge of security protection at that agency said that the Marshals Service deputations

of his personnel had not yet been renewed because the Marshals Service had imposed a new

requirement that the personnel receive law enforcement training, which some of his personnel had not

received. This official said that he planned to have these personnel receive this training.
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threats related to protecting executive branch officials became a

permanent part of the Service’s mission. Further, the Marshals Service

said that to provide and plan protection, agencies need to have arrest and

threat investigation authority.

The primary protective personnel employed at 11 agencies, including 2

offices of Inspectors General, were deputized as U.S. Marshals to provide

them with needed law enforcement authorities. Agencies must apply to

the Marshals Service to deputize their protective personnel and renew the

deputations periodically.25 According to Marshals Service officials, the

Marshals Service may not renew these deputations after January 1, 2001, to

highlight the need for Congress to provide agencies’ offices of Inspectors

General with their own statutory authority to provide protection. Marshals

Service officials said that if Congress does not provide statutory law

enforcement authority to those agencies by January 1, 2001, it might be

appropriate for the Marshals Service to assume those agencies’ protective

responsibilities at that time. Further, the Deputy Director of the Marshals

Service said the issue regarding some agencies’ lack of statutory authority

to provide protection has not received severe scrutiny because no

incidents have occurred that would bring this matter to the forefront.

We contacted an Associate Deputy Attorney General about this issue, who

said that the administration sent a proposal to Congress that would

provide statutory law enforcement authority to the 18 presidentially

appointed Inspectors General if they met certain conditions regarding

training, firearms, and operating procedures. However, the Associate

Deputy Attorney General said that this legislative proposal would not

provide specific authority to offices of Inspectors General to provide

protection. He said that specific statutory authority for the Inspectors

General to provide protection could be provided only by amending the

Inspector General Act.

In providing comments on a draft of this report, three agencies expressed

concern about how their protective operations would be affected if the

Marshals Service deputations of their protective personnel were not

renewed. One of those agencies, for example, said that nonrenewal of

Marshals Service deputations would make it impossible for agencies to

carry out their protective responsibilities by eliminating the law

25 Marshals Service policy provides different periods of expiration for special deputation. Deputation

for Special Agents employed by Offices of Inspectors General and federal security and protection

agencies expires after 3 years.
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enforcement powers of their protective personnel to carry firearms and

make arrests.

The agencies in our review reported that their officials received different

levels and frequencies of protection, which generally included protection

while they worked in their offices, attended public events, and traveled on

official business. Certain officials were also protected during private time.

To avoid compromising their security, we are not disclosing any specific

information about when the officials were protected.

Security officials generally said they determined their officials needed

protection as a result of possible threats and actual threats received from

individuals who were (1) opposed to the policies and issues being handled

by their agencies, (2) apparently suffering from mental problems, (3)

opposed to the officials personally, and (4) terrorists. Security officials

also said the level of protection provided was determined by a variety of

factors, including the sensitivity of issues being handled by the agency, the

visibility of the protected officials to the public, travel needs, and the

officials’ personal preferences.

According to the Secret Service, threat assessment is “the process of

gathering and assessing information about persons who may have the

interest, motive, intention, and capability of mounting attacks against

public officials and figures.”26 The Secret Service believes that gauging the

potential threat to and vulnerability of a targeted individual is key to

preventing violence. The Air Force, which requires that detailed, written

threat assessments be prepared regarding its protected officials, indicates

that the assessment is “the initial element of any protective operation. It

forms the basis for determining the need and scope of a formal protective

service operation.”27 Air Force policy requires that threat assessments

include a discussion of risk factors, including the officials’ visibility,

vulnerability to attack, and threat motivation factors; a categorization of

the types of threats; and a discussion of procedures for the collection and

evaluation of protective intelligence.

The agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions (the

Secret Service, Marshals Service, and the State Department’s Diplomatic

Security Service) and most of the Department of Defense (DOD) agencies

had prepared written, detailed threat assessments regarding their

26 Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations, U.S. Secret Service, July 1998.

27 Air Force Office of Special Investigations Policy Manual 71-123, Volume 2, February 18, 1997.

Circumstances Under

Which Officials Were

Protected

How Agencies Were

Preparing Threat

Assessments and the

Implications of

Standardizing and

Centralizing Threat

Assessments
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protected officials. We reviewed threat assessments prepared by the seven

agencies in our review that had detailed, written threat assessments on

their protected officials. These assessments generally contained

discussions of the officials’ backgrounds, their visibility to the public,

potential threats to the officials posed by individuals and groups, current

events affecting the agencies, and other data. Some agencies also rated

the levels of threat against their officials in low, medium, or high

categories, both overall, and for specific trips that the protected officials

planned to take. Officials at some of those agencies told us that threat

assessments should be prepared when protective assignments begin and

be a continuous process of gathering and analyzing information about

potential threats against the protected officials and the locations they plan

to visit.

However, 20 of the 27 agencies said they had no detailed, written threat

assessments on their protected officials or documentation of their

decisions to provide certain levels of protection. Security officials at

agencies without such documentation said that protection was provided to

respond to specific or perceived threats, available protective intelligence,

and the protected officials’ wishes. In addition, the seven agencies that did

have written threat assessments did not detail how decisions were made

regarding the size of the protective force needed. Without assessments

that link the level of threat to the size of the protective force, it would be

difficult to determine whether the level of protection provided and the

amount of money spent on protection were appropriate.28

At least two agencies protected officials only after their officials received

direct threats. However, research on protective intelligence and threat

assessments suggests that the number of threats received against

protected officials may not be the most accurate measure of the level of

threat against officials. According to the Secret Service, persons who pose

actual threats often do not make threats, especially direct threats. In the

Secret Service’s study of the 83 attackers and near-lethal approachers of

prominent public officials and figures from 1949 to 1996, less than one28 We have also stressed the government’s need to prepare thorough risk assessments with respect to

combating terrorism and information security as a means of ensuring that expenditures are justified.

See Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and

Biological Attacks (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 14, 1999); Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk

Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, April 9, 1998);

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and

Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997) and Information Security Risk Assessment: Practices

of Leading Organizations (GAO/AIMD-00-33, Nov.1999).
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tenth communicated a direct threat to the target or to a law enforcement

agency.29

Who decided the level of protection to be applied varied from agency to

agency. Security officials at 6 of the 27 agencies indicated that the

protected officials decided their overall level of protection on the basis of

their personal preferences and sometimes upon the recommendations of

their security staffs. At eight agencies, security officials said the level of

protection provided was decided jointly by them and the protected

officials on the basis of actual and perceived levels of threat against the

agencies and the protected officials. With regard to the other 13 agencies

that provided protection, including the agencies with security protection

as one of their primary missions, security officials said they, and

occasionally with input from other staff, decided the level of protection on

the basis of protective intelligence.

Several agencies with protective responsibilities did not have the authority

and resources to gather protective intelligence nationwide. Without such

information, the Secret Service said, a competent threat assessment

cannot be done regarding a person’s capacity and intent to act violently

toward a public official. Security officials at three agencies provided

specific examples of when they had not received timely protective

intelligence from another agency about potential threats against their

officials.

The Secret Service indicated that it would be helpful for agencies to share

information about people who come to their attention because of

inappropriate behavior or communication. According to the Secret

Service’s 1998 study, attackers and would-be attackers often consider

multiple targets, who may live in different jurisdictions with various law

enforcement agencies and security agencies responsible for physical

protection and protective intelligence. To facilitate the detection of

patterns of behavior in known would-be attackers, the study said, law

enforcement agencies should implement information-sharing programs

with other such agencies.

To facilitate this sharing of protective intelligence, the Secret Service is

considering the creation of a protective intelligence repository, which

would permit agencies to determine whether a person of possible

protective concern to them had previously come to the attention of any

other agency for protective reasons. According to the Secret Service, each

29 Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations, U.S. Secret Service, July 1998.
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protective agency would share information with other agencies consistent

with its own protocols.30 However, Secret Service officials said that a

protective intelligence repository would have to be designed with privacy

and other legal considerations in mind. A Secret Service official said the

agency may not be able to release all of the information it has if it involves

individuals’ medical records, for example.

The Secret Service also said that it already has been sharing protective

intelligence with agencies. It recently formed the Protective Detail

Intelligence Network, consisting of protective personnel from all agencies,

to formalize the sharing of protective intelligence. The Network, led by the

Secret Service, plans to meet quarterly to discuss protection issues and

share protective intelligence.31

In our discussions with security officials, the issue of standardizing threat

assessments focused on how agencies can obtain the protective

intelligence they needed from governmentwide sources to prepare

thorough analyses. One means discussed to facilitate the sharing of such

information involved the idea of establishing a central repository of

protective intelligence. The implications of establishing a central

repository of protective intelligence primarily involved issues of control

and legal authority. On one hand, security officials said that establishing a

central repository for protective intelligence could provide a formal

mechanism for sharing threat data, which could give agencies additional

information about threats against their officials and other individuals who

may be in the officials’ presence. On the other hand, some security

officials feared that a central protective intelligence repository could result

in the creation of a new bureaucracy and said that privacy and

recordkeeping concerns would need to be taken into consideration in the

design of the repository. Additional considerations involve whether

legislation would be needed to authorize an agency to establish the

repository and the costs of establishing and administering it.

We asked the 27 agencies that provided protection whether they favored

the establishment of a central repository of protective intelligence as a

means of facilitating the sharing of threat information among agencies.

30 Proposed legislation in the 106th Congress, H.R. 3048, would authorize the Secret Service to establish

a National Threat Assessment Center to facilitate the sharing of threat information by federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies with protective responsibilities. This bill passed the House of

Representatives on June 26, 2000.

31 The Network held its first meeting in February 2000. It held a second meeting in April 2000 to share

protective intelligence relating to, among other things, the International Monetary Fund and World

Bank meeting in Washington, D.C.

Implications of

Standardizing and

Centralizing Threat

Assessments
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Page 18 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

Security officials at 18 of the 27 agencies that provided protection said

they favored the establishment of a central protective intelligence

repository, security officials at 4 agencies said they did not favor it, and 5

had no opinion. Security personnel at agencies favoring the establishment

of a central protective intelligence repository said it would (1) allow

access to protective intelligence by agencies that cannot afford to establish

their own intelligence-gathering operations, (2) provide uniformity in the

dissemination and access to intelligence, and (3) allow agencies to be

informed about threats against other individuals who are in the presence

of their officials.

Security officials at seven agencies said the Secret Service should be given

the responsibility of administering a central protective intelligence

repository. Some of these officials said the Secret Service should

administer the repository because it already has a database of such

information regarding its protected officials.32 Security officials at three

agencies said that the repository should be administered by the FBI, which

collects information on potential terrorist activity through its Terrorism

Task Force. At three other agencies, security officials suggested that

administering a repository of protective intelligence should be an

interagency effort.

In providing comments on a draft of this report, the Marshals Service said

that a central repository of protective intelligence would be a valuable

resource. However, the Marshals Service said that an evaluation of

controversial issues and events outside the normal realm of law

enforcement data would need to be included to make the database

applicable to a wide range of protected officials. The Marshals Service

said that representatives from executive branch agencies would need to

routinely update intelligence managers on issues, policies, and events that

could trigger controversy among groups or individuals.

Security officials at the three agencies that did not favor the establishment

of a protective intelligence repository gave several reasons. An official at

one agency said such a repository probably would become a bureaucratic

clearinghouse through which important information could easily “slip

through the cracks” because the personnel might not recognize something

that would be of interest to a particular agency. An official at another

agency said it did not need access to a protective intelligence repository

32 Security officials at two additional agencies suggested that the Secret Service administer the

repository with the FBI. A security official at one of those agencies said administering the repository

should be an interagency effort.
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because that agency was already part of the government’s intelligence

community. An official at the third agency questioned whether all

agencies would share protective intelligence, given certain legal

restrictions on the disclosure of information regarding their clients.

We did not identify any governmentwide standards or criteria for training

federal protective personnel. The 27 agencies that provided protection

generally required their full-time protective personnel to receive basic

military or law enforcement training, plus specific protection training.33

However, the amount of protection-related training received by protective

personnel governmentwide varied considerably. In addition, some

agencies that did not provide their own protection training reported

difficulty in obtaining training they needed from other sources.

Eleven of the 27 agencies reported that they provided some or all of their

own protection training to their personnel in the form of initial instruction

or annual refresher training, or both. The other 16 agencies obtained their

protection training from other sources. The Secret Service, Marshals

Service, State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS),34 and the

Army35 were the primary providers of protection training for federal

protective personnel. These agencies’ protection training consisted of

instruction in firearms; threat assessments; emergency medical training;

practical protection exercises; security advance, motorcade, airport, and

foreign travel procedures; defensive driving skills, defensive tactics, and

legal authorities.36 Table 1 shows the amounts of training protection

training provided by the Secret Service, Marshals Service, State

Department, and the Army to their protective personnel.

Agency Initial protection training Annual refresher training

Secret Service 7.8 weeksa 3 to 5 days

Marshals Service 7.6 weeks 2 to 3 daysb

State Department 3 weeksc 2 to 5 days

Army 6 weeksd2 to 3 days

33 Twenty-four of the 27 agencies reported that their primary protective personnel received basic

military or law enforcement training. At 1 of the agencies that employed security specialists to provide

protection as collateral duties, 4 of the 12 employees had not received basic military or law

enforcement training. At another agency, two of the three security specialists had not received basic

military or law enforcement training.

34 DSS is the State Department bureau responsible for providing security protection.

35 The Navy’s protective personnel also receive their protection training from the Army.

36 Seven other agencies offered initial or refresher training that lasted between 2 days to 3 weeks.

What Training Did

Protective Personnel

Receive and What Are

the Implications of

Standardizing and

Centralizing Protection

Training

Table 1: Amounts of Protection Training

Provided by the Secret Service,

Marshals Service, State Department, and

the Army
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Page 20 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

a

The Secret Service indicated that its full-time protective personnel received about 11 weeks of

agency-oriented training on the agency's dual missions relating to protection and counterfeiting. The

agency reported that 71 percent of this training was devoted to protection, or 7.8 weeks. Secret

Service special agents who protect the President and Vice President receive continuous advanced

protection training. Secret Service agents who protect former Presidents, presidential and vice

presidential candidates, and foreign dignitaries also received annual refresher training. In addition,

Secret Service agents in field offices received annual refresher protection training.

b

Amount of refresher training received by U.S. Marshals who protect an executive branch official fulltime. In addition, the Marshals who protect the executive branch official received 2 weeks of

advanced training every 4 years.

c

The State Department reported that its full-time protective personnel received 15 weeks of training, 3

weeks of which is protection-related. In addition, all of the DSS agents receive 2 weeks of refresher

training every 5 years, 2-1⁄2 days of which is protection-related.

d

The Army reported that its protective personnel received 8 weeks of basic military training; 16 weeks

of criminal investigative training, 1 week of which is protection-related; 3 weeks of protection training;

4 days of antiterrorism evasive driving training; 1 week of training in combating terrorism on military

installations; and 1 week of combat lifesaver training.

Sources: Secret Service, Marshals Service, State Department, and the Army.

Security personnel at six agencies reported difficulty in obtaining training

because of class availability, funding, or workload problems. Some

security officials said they had to rely on personal contacts with agencies

that offered protection training to secure the training needed by their

personnel or obtain training outside the Washington, D.C., area. Because

of the lack of available executive protection training in the Washington,

D.C., area, for example, one agency sent its protective personnel to West

Sacramento, CA, to receive training by the California Highway Patrol.37 A

law enforcement agency received protection training from a diverse array

of sources, including the CIA and Scotland Yard in Great Britain; and

another agency had its protective personnel trained by a private security

company. Security officials at five agencies also said they had hired

personnel who had previous protection training and work experience at

the Secret Service, State Department, or Marshals Service.

Twenty of the 27 agencies that provided protection said they relied on

their field personnel to provide or supplement protection when their

protected officials leave the Washington, D.C., area. Security officials said

the number of field staff who supplemented protection ranged from 3 at 1

agency to about 250 at another. The amount of protection training

received by field personnel who provided protection varied considerably

among the 27 agencies. Agencies with security protection as one of their

primary missions indicated that their field personnel received more

training and protection experience than field agents at some other

agencies.

37 The California Highway Patrol protects California state officials.
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Security officials at one agency that did not have security protection as

one of its primary missions and used many field staff for protection said it

was too expensive to provide the same level of protection training to field

personnel that is provided to the full-time staff based in Washington, D.C.

Several agencies did not provide specific data on the amount of protection

training that their field staff had received, if any; but two agencies without

security protection as one of their primary missions indicated that their

field personnel received about 2 to 3 days of protection training.38 Three

agencies reported that their field personnel who were used to provide

protection had received no protection training.39

We did not conduct an exhaustive analysis of the content of courses that

protective personnel in our review had received because some of the

courses were taken several years ago and because some agencies did not

maintain records of the specific courses that their protective personnel

had received. However, as examples of protection-related skills in two

areas, we specifically asked agencies about whether their protective

personnel were tested regularly in firearms proficiency and were trained in

emergency medical treatment. All of the agencies said they required their

personnel to requalify regarding firearms proficiency at least annually.40

With respect to emergency medical treatment, 2 of the 27 agencies

reported that none of their primary protective personnel were trained in

cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). At 12 agencies, none of the primary

protective personnel were trained in the use of a First Aid Trauma (FAT)

kit or a defibrillator. By contrast, the Secret Service, Marshals Service, and

DSS reported that all of their primary protective personnel had received

training in CPR and using the defibrillator, and most had received training

in using the FAT kit.

A 1985 report on security issues at the Department of State41 recommended

that 12 to 15 percent of diplomatic protective personnel’s time be devoted

38 One agency said that it assists the Secret Service every 4 years in protecting presidential candidates.

This agency reported that in 1998, 450 of its criminal investigators received 2 days of protection

training, and 12 criminal investigators received 7 days of protection training from the Secret Service.

The agency indicated that these personnel are also used to help protect its top official when that

official travels outside of Washington, D.C. That agency also reported that all of its criminal

investigators receive 8 hours of protection training as part of their basic training.

39 At one of these three agencies, the official in charge of protection indicated that these field agents

had received Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) training, which he considered to suffice as

protection training.

40 Over half of the agencies said they required their protective personnel to requalify with firearms

proficiency at least quarterly.

41 Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, (“The Inman Report”), June

1985.
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to training. In January 2000, the Commission on the Advancement of

Federal Law Enforcement, an independent advisory body established

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, criticized

the lack of standardized training for federal law enforcement officers,

which includes protective personnel.42 The Commission recommended

that a Federal Law Enforcement Officer Training Board, consisting of law

enforcement experts from federal, state, and local agencies, among

others, review training, certify the adequacy of both basic and in-service

training programs, identify innovative training programs and curricula, and

recommend needed additional training programs to agencies.

Security officials said the implications of establishing a standardized

protection-training program involve questions of whether providing the

same training to all federal protective personnel would result in more

consistency of protection procedures governmentwide and whether

particular agencies’ special training needs would be addressed. In

addition, if a standardized protection-training program were established, it

is uncertain what it would cost in terms of facilities and human resources

or which agency should provide the training. The issue of centralizing

protection training involves whether one agency should provide a standard

protection-training program and, if so, who should provide it, and how

would the additional capacity needed be funded.

We asked the 27 agencies that provided protection whether they favored

the establishment of a standardized protection training program for all

federal protective personnel. Security officials at 21 of the 27 agencies

said that they favored the establishment of a standard protection training

program for all federal agencies, security officials at 2 agencies said they

did not favor it, and security officials at 4 other agencies had no opinion.

The agencies favoring a standard protection training program said it would

provide consistency in training curricula, including protection concepts

and terminology; that it would train protective personnel to perform their

duties in a uniform fashion and react the same way in case of emergency;

and would make protection training more available. Security officials from

the Marshals Service, the Secret Service, and DSS, who favored the

establishment of a standard protection training program for federal

agencies, said they have observed a lack of uniformity in how other federal

agencies’ security personnel protected their officials in terms of advance

work and operating procedures.

42 Law Enforcement in a New Century and a Changing World: Improving the Administration of Federal

Law Enforcement, Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement, January 2000.

Implications of

Standardizing and

Centralizing Protection

Training
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Security officials at the two agencies who did not favor a standardized

training program said that training was important, but that they preferred

to conduct their own training tailored to address their own needs and

unique environments. One of those agencies, for example, said that as a

military organization, it must train its personnel to provide protection in

combat situations.

Security officials at 12 agencies favored having the Secret Service conduct

a standard protection training program. Some of these officials said they

favored having the Secret Service conduct the training because of its

expertise in the field and its existing training facilities.43 At three agencies,

security officials suggested that the State Department conduct the training

because of its experience with protecting foreign dignitaries, which

generally involves using fewer resources than the Secret Service uses to

protect the President and Vice President; its training may be more

pertinent to protecting Cabinet officials; and because the State Department

has experience providing protection overseas.44

The Secret Service said that it was interested in providing standardized

protection training for federal agencies. Although the Secret Service said

that its current protective training curriculum is focused on providing

protection with a large number of personnel, such as that provided for the

President, when requested, it has provided protective detail training on a

smaller scale for other federal agencies.45 If given responsibility for

providing protection training to other federal agencies, the Secret Service

said it would consult with the participating agencies and modify its

curricula accordingly. It also said that additional employees and funding

would be required to create an adequate infrastructure to support such an

effort. We toured the Secret Service’s training facility in Beltsville, MD, to

learn about its protection training curricula. An official at that facility said

that standardized protection training for all federal protective personnel

would enhance operational cooperation and develop the skills needed for

personnel to react the same way in emergencies.

43 Security officials at four additional agencies suggested that the Secret Service conduct a standardized

protection training program with other agencies, including the State Department, the Marshals Service,

and FLETC.

44 Security officials at two additional agencies suggested that the State Department conduct a

standardized protection training program with other agencies, including the Secret Service and FLETC.

45 The Secret Service said it also provides protection for other officials using fewer resources than

those used to protect the President, such as for former presidents.
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Officials from the Marshals Service said it could conduct training for

personnel protecting agency heads at FLETC46 in Glynco, GA, but thought

that the training should take place near Washington, D.C., where most of

the protective personnel are located. The FLETC Director told us that

FLETC currently does not have the facilities, expertise, or funding to train

all federal personal security personnel at its Glynco facility. However, the

Director also expressed an interest in having FLETC coordinate personal

security training at a new facility in the Washington, D.C., area. He said

that one site that is being considered for such a facility is located at an

abandoned Navy facility in Indian Head, MD.

A State Department training official suggested that a standard protection

training program be conducted by FLETC with input from the State

Department, because of its experience in providing protection overseas,

and the Secret Service, because of its experience in providing protection

domestically.47 The official also said that the State Department, which

currently trains its protective personnel at facilities in Dunn Loring, VA,

and Summit Point, WV,48 could train other agencies’ protective personnel at

the proposed Center for Anti-terrorism and Security Training, an

interagency facility planned for the Washington, D.C., area to be managed

jointly by DSS and the U.S. Capitol Police. The official estimated that to

accommodate protection training for other agencies at the Indian Head

site, for example, it would cost at least $13 million over and above the $30

million that is being proposed to build the antiterrorism facility.49

The State Department indicated that if it were to conduct a standardized

protection training program for federal agencies, it would offer a 3-week

entry-level protection course for protective personnel who have not

received formal protection training. The course would consist of training

in firearms; first aid; chemical/biological weapons; legal issues; driving;

motorcades; and fundamentals of protection, including a 2-day practical

protection exercise. The Department would also offer a 2-week

intermediate class for protective personnel who have had some formal

protection training or had considerable on-the-job experience. This course

46 FLETC is a Treasury agency that conducts law enforcement training for 73 federal agencies.

47 The State Department official said the Department would need to add about 15 full-time equivalents

to provide this training for other federal agencies if it were a FLETC program with input from State.

48 The State Department uses office space in Dunn Loring, VA, for classroom instruction and a privately

owned facility in Summit Point, WV, for its practical protection and driving training.

49 This official said that the actual costs of developing the Indian Head site are unknown and could be

higher. A State Department budget official said that $30 million for the antiterrorism facility was

included in the President’s fiscal year 2001 budget submission.
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would be devoted primarily to specialized areas, such as preparing

advance work for major events, surveillance detection, and chemical and

biological weapons countermeasures. Finally, it would offer a 1-week

refresher course on the subjects covered in the basic and intermediate

courses.

We asked a random sample of four agencies that did not offer their own

protection training what issues they would like included in a standard

protection training program. They generally said the curriculum should

include, but not be limited to, security advance procedures, air travel,

protection in foreign countries, defensive driving skills, motorcade

procedures, emergency medical treatment, protective technology,

protective intelligence, and threat assessments.

We also contacted six state and local law enforcement agencies that

protect governors or mayors about their protection training needs.50

Officials from five of six agencies (the California Highway Patrol operated

its own protection training program) said that a national protection

training program should be established because protection training was

not readily available for their personnel. We also contacted the National

Governors’ Security Association, an association of law enforcement

officials from all 50 states involved in protecting governors, which

recommended the establishment of a national protection training program.

The implications of centralizing security protection governmentwide

involve many issues, including who would decide who is to be protected

and the level of protection to be provided; who would provide the services;

whether Congress would need to grant statutory authorities; and whether

centralization would be the most cost-efficient and effective way of

providing these services over the current, more decentralized approach.

The agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions said

they could not precisely predict the level of protection they would provide,

if they were given the responsibility of protecting officials

governmentwide, without having specific protective intelligence regarding

all of the potential protected officials. Further, the cost implications could

not be determined without the agencies knowing the level of protection

that would be provided and number of protected officials.

Security officials at 20 of the 27 protective agencies said they did not favor

centralizing security protection under 1 agency and preferred to retain

50 We judgmentally selected these six agencies to provide a mix of jurisdictions with small, medium,

and large populations.

Implications of

Centralizing Security

Protection Under One

Agency
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responsibility for protecting their officials. The Marshals Service was the

only agency that favored centralizing security protection services. The

Marshals Service said it was interested in assuming responsibility for

protecting agency officials, provided that it received the needed resources

to accomplish this mission.51 Security officials at six agencies that

provided protection did not offer an opinion on centralizing security

protection services governmentwide.

The agencies that did not favor centralizing security protection generally

said each agency has its own needs and unique environments where they

protect their officials. They said it was advantageous for them, as

employees of the protected officials’ agencies, to know the policies,

programs, and culture of those agencies and how to coordinate protection

internally within the organizations. Further, some of these security

officials said that if protection were transferred to another agency, (1) the

protected officials would lose some control over their own protection, (2)

the existing professional relationships that the protected officials currently

have with the protective personnel would be disrupted, and (3) a new

bureaucracy would be created in the form of the agency that would

provide the protection. Another security official said that if protection

were centralized under one law enforcement agency, protection might be

based on the protected official’s office, rather than the actual threat, for

resource allocation purposes.

We met with the Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs and Cabinet

Secretary to determine whether the administration had adopted any

policies regarding the routine protection of Cabinet secretaries. This

White House official said that to his knowledge, no such policy had been

adopted governmentwide and that individual agencies may decide the level

of protection needed for their officials. He added that the government

could benefit from coordinating protection among agencies, particularly

when protected officials are in the same locations.

Marshals Service officials said that if they were tasked with the

responsibility for protecting other agency officials, they would use welltrained protective personnel who would operate in a consistent and

coordinated fashion governmentwide and could provide certain economies

of scale in terms of resources and equipment. In addition, the officials said

the Marshals Service could draw on a pool of personnel to supplement

51 One agency that protected an official during fiscal years 1997, 1998, and part of 1999, before those

protective responsibilities were transferred to another agency, said it favored standardizing security

protection under one agency because it would result in uniformity of training, equipment, and radio

frequencies.
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protection in certain threat situations. Moreover, the Marshals Service

stressed that it has nationwide law enforcement authority.

We met with senior aides to an executive branch official who is protected

by the Marshals Service.52 The aides said that the protected official was

very satisfied with the Marshals Service’s training, access to intelligence,

legal authorities, and ability to respond rapidly to threat situations. In

addition, these aides said that it was not necessary for the Marshals

Service’s protective personnel to be knowledgeable about that agency’s

programs to effectively protect the agency head. Representatives of

officials who were protected by the Secret Service and State Department

also expressed satisfaction with their training, legal authorities, resources,

and access to protective intelligence.

The Secret Service, which protects the President, Vice President, and other

individuals, said it was not currently interested in assuming responsibility

for protecting all agency heads. However, the Secret Service said an

advantage of centralizing security protection services would be

streamlined communications among different protection details and with

the White House and the establishment of a focal point for funding and

inquiries. At the same time, the Secret Service said that effective

protection requires close proximity of the protected officials and their

protective personnel, facilitated by the trust and confidence developed

between them. The Secret Service said that its experience has shown that

a bond of trust is greater when security personnel are from the official’s

department and that a direct correlation exists between the trust and

confidence and the effectiveness of the security detail.

A security official at one agency did not provide a definitive opinion on

whether security protection services should be centralized under one

agency but offered opinions on some advantages and disadvantages. This

official said an advantage would be that the agency would not have to be

concerned about staffing and training its own protective personnel, and

the resources of another agency such as the Secret Service would be

available across the country. On the other hand, this security official said,

giving protective responsibility to another agency would result in the loss

of his agency’s control over that protection. He also questioned whether

another agency would provide sufficient resources to protect his agency’s

official.

52 This agency reimburses the Marshals Service for the cost of providing protective services.
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A security official at an agency that did not provide protection during the

period of our review, but has protective personnel available if needed, said

he would favor having another agency provide protection when required.53

According to that security official, a single agency could provide a welltrained cadre of security personnel who are good at their jobs and become

better through experience. That same official said a disadvantage would

be that the personnel from another agency would have to work with many

different protected officials and develop a working relationship with each

of them. However, the Marshals Service said that protected officials of

other agencies would become comfortable with their protective personnel

because the protected officials would be confident about the Marshals’

training.

Marshals Service officials said that if they assumed responsibility for

protecting agency heads, they would need to enhance their own

intelligence-gathering operations. At the same time, Marshals Service

officials said, agencies with substantial intelligence-gathering capabilities,

such as the State Department, could continue to gather intelligence and

share that information with the Marshals Service. Further, Marshals

Service officials said that protection training and experience are more

important than knowledge about agencies’ particular issues or programs.

The State Department official in charge of protection said that in an ideal

situation, it would be beneficial for one agency to provide protection

because all of the protective personnel would have received the same

training. But the official also said that it would not work because the

agencies would want to continue using their own employees. This official

also said that if the State Department received the necessary resources, it

might be interested in protecting Cabinet secretaries. The official stressed

the State Department’s protection expertise, especially internationally,

with agents in place worldwide to assist, and the Department’s domestic

field offices. This State Department official said that if security protection

were centralized under one agency, Cabinet departments might feel more

comfortable with DSS providing the protection, compared to a traditional

law enforcement agency.

For comparison purposes, we contacted security officials from five other

democratic, industrialized countries to determine whether their highest

53 The official said that with the change in the administration next year, the next head of that agency

may choose to be protected, as previous heads of that agency had.
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officials received security protection and, if so, who protected them.54

Security officials in all five countries reported that their Cabinet ministers

and heads of state were protected at various levels by special units within

their countries’ national police agencies. They said the level of protection

provided to these officials depended on their positions in government and

that special units within the national police agencies investigated threats

made against their officials. These officials said that they consulted with

the Secret Service in formulating their protection training curricula.

Some security officials expressed a concern about having personnel from

agencies’ offices of Inspectors General providing protection because of a

potential conflict of interest. They said if offices of Inspectors General

were investigating officials whom they also were protecting, it could result

in an atmosphere of distrust between the protective personnel and the

officials. However, security officials from the three offices of Inspectors

General with protective responsibilities disagreed. Security officials at

two of those agencies that employed criminal investigators for protection

said their offices’ protective responsibilities were separate from their

investigative functions, which removed a potential conflict of interest. An

official at the third agency said a potential conflict of interest did not exist

because its protective personnel were employed as miscellaneous

administrative staff (job classification 0301), not as criminal investigators.

In providing comments on a draft of this report, the Marshals Service

provided a March 2000 legal memorandum from the Department of

Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)55 regarding special deputation of

Inspector General personnel to protect agency heads that addressed this

issue. The memorandum indicated that:

“In effectively allowing IG agents to participate in program operating responsibilities, these

temporary [protection] details arguably could compromise the IG’s independence and

objectivity in performing an agency watchdog function. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine

a situation in which these internal details would give rise to at least an appearance of

conflict of interest for an IG. The IG may be responsible, for example, for investigating

alleged fraud in the security office to which IG agents have been detailed or for auditing the

costs, including those of a detailed IG security agent, associated with a trip taken by the

Agency head. In those instances, because of conflicting loyalties, the IG conceivably might

prove less aggressive in carrying out his or her statutory responsibility of uncovering fraud,

abuse, waste, and mismanagement. Even in situations that do not involve actual conflicts,

the appearance of conflicts could undermine the effectiveness of an IG in pursuing his or

54 We chose these five countries because they were also democratic, industrialized nations and because

we had contacts with the police liaison officers in their embassies.

55 March 23, 2000, memorandum from Daniel Koffsky, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to

Deborah Westbrook, General Counsel, U.S. Marshals Service.

Protective Responsibilities of

Offices of Inspectors General
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her mission. Such an arrangement, however, might be acceptable in the short term to

address the immediate dangers facing agency officials, especially if, in any subsequent

investigation by the IG of the office responsible for security, IG personnel detailed to that

office were recused from taking part. We would, however, caution against using this sort of

arrangement on a long-term basis because it might appear to circumvent Congress’

prohibition against vesting program operating responsibilities in the IGs. If the Department

and Agencies wish to continue to rely on these special deputations, we recommend that

they seek legislation to expand the scope of IG authority.”

We were unable to determine how the costs of protection would be

affected if a single agency protected agency heads because of the number

of variables involved, such as the threat level against different protected

officials and the protected officials’ preferences regarding their protection.

The Secret Service said that it could not provide a meaningful estimate of

the costs of protecting other officials without having specific protective

intelligence about them. In addition, the Secret Service said that any single

agency that would be given full responsibility for the training, intelligence

assessments, and protection of all Cabinet-level officials would require

significant increases in funding and staffing and substantial lead time.

According to the Secret Service, this would enable the agency to properly

develop an infrastructure to adequately support this activity. The Marshals

Service provided an estimate of the number of protective personnel it

believed it would need to protect agency heads governmentwide, which we

are not disclosing in this report for security reasons.

From our review of data provided on agencies’ protective personnel, we

observed that Marshals Service personnel who were protecting an

executive branch official were mainly employed at the GS-12 level,

compared to protective personnel at the Secret Service, who were

generally employed at the GS-13 level. This would suggest that the

Marshals Service might have lower personnel costs for protection.

However, the Marshals Service also said that it would probably provide a

level of protection to agency heads that exceeds what is currently being

provided to some officials by their own agencies, which could increase

costs.

We asked the protected officials in our study whether they believed that

security protection should be provided automatically to the persons

holding their positions, and why or why not. In addition, we asked them

whether they believed their protective personnel have adequate resources,

training, legal authorities, and access to protective intelligence to protect

them. We also asked the officials who were not protected by one of the

agencies with security protection as one of their primary missions whether

they believed it would be better to have the Secret Service, Marshals

Cost Implications of

Standardizing Security

Protection Services

Views of the Protected

Officials Regarding

Their Protection and

Standardization Issues
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Service, or State Department protect them, and why or why not. Twentyone protected officials or members of their immediate staffs responded to

our queries.56

Most of the protected officials or their staffs said the individuals holding

these positions automatically should receive security protection because

of their visibility and the types of issues that they handled. They said that

officials who deal with the public—particularly those charged with

enforcing laws and regulations—are potential targets for harm. In

addition, they said they needed to travel to parts of the country where

conflict and controversy existed over the proper role of the federal

government. The officials also said they traveled sometimes or frequently

to foreign countries with a high risk of threat.

Top aides to some agency heads who responded to our queries said that

the functioning of government and the economy could be negatively

affected if the officials were harmed. According to one agency’s Chief of

Staff, “the potential of a threat to the safety and security of the government

and its leaders by terrorists, subversive groups, and members of the public

is a reality. An attack on the chief official of an agency could seriously

affect public confidence in the [agency’s program].” A top aide to a

military official said that this official holds one of the most visible subCabinet positions in government; and because of his authorities and

responsibilities, he is often perceived as being responsible for government

actions and decisions affecting individuals, corporations, and foreign

governments, including judicial punishment for personal misconduct,

adverse personnel actions, corporate financial problems, and foreign

military defeats.

One official who is the head of a law enforcement agency said there was

an inherent threat to the person holding that position. The official said

that if harm would come to the person holding that position, “it would

bring embarrassment and disruption to [the agency’s] mission, [the

department], the government in general, and to the health, safety, and

welfare of the public.” The Chief of Staff for another law enforcement

agency head said that his agency is involved in investigating “some of the

most violent criminal organizations in the world,” which have threatened

agency heads in the past, and therefore the agency head is entitled to

56 We sent letters to 33 officials who were protected from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and were still

serving in office during our review. We asked that if the officials designated someone on their

immediate staffs to respond, they not be directly involved in the officials’ protection. Four of the

officials met with us or sent us letters directly, and 17 officials responded to us through their

designees.
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security protection. Presidential succession was cited as another reason

for protecting Cabinet secretaries. By contrast, an aide to another official

said that agency’s top official did not need regular protection because that

agency’s mission is not as controversial, compared to other agencies’

missions. That aide said it was a personal decision of the agency head

whether to receive security protection.

The protected officials or members of their staffs who responded to our

queries generally said they believed their protective personnel had

adequate training, access to intelligence, and legal authorities to carry out

their jobs.57 Officials who were protected by personnel from their own

agencies that did not have security protection as one of their primary

missions said they would like to continue having their own agencies’

personnel protect them. The head of one agency, for example, said that he

would like to continue having his agency’s personnel protect him because

his protection is tailored to his needs and preferences. Other respondents

said that it was advantageous for protective personnel to be employed by

the protected officials’ respective agencies because the protective

personnel had a greater personal interest and sense of loyalty to the

agencies and the protected officials and were knowledgeable about the

organizations’ missions, cultures and operations.

We met with one Cabinet secretary who said that personal security

protection must be balanced with a need for privacy. At the same time,

this Cabinet secretary said that for someone in that position, the question

about whether to be protected was not entirely a personal decision, and

protection for Cabinet secretaries governmentwide needed to be assessed

considering presidential succession issues.

The safety of the government’s highest officials is important to maintain

the orderly functioning of the government. Individuals serving in the

government’s highest offices can be vulnerable to threats from individuals

who are opposed to their agencies’ policies and actions, emotionally

unstable people, and terrorists. Because 14 of the protected officials in

our review are in the line of presidential succession, their protection has

national security implications. At the same time, protection for federal

57 An aide to one agency head said that his agency lacked the personnel and proper training to

effectively protect that official on a continuous basis, but U.S. Marshals were used to augment

protection when needed. An aide to another official who had been protected temporarily by the

Federal Protective Service (FPS) because that official’s agency had no protective personnel said the

agency probably would use FPS in the future if needed. However, an FPS official said that it did not

have the resources to provide protection on a regular basis. Another protected official said that he was

“personally unaware” of whether his agency’s protective personnel have adequate resources, training,

legal authorities, and access to intelligence.

Conclusions
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officials should be based on thorough threat assessments using protective

intelligence from governmentwide sources documenting the need and plan

for protection. Threat assessments should also show linkages between

identified threats and the nature and level of protection to be provided.

Moreover, thorough threat analyses should be conducted regarding the

need and plan for protection for all officials who routinely receive security

protection, regardless of whether the officials are in the line of presidential

succession.

Our review indicated that some of the government’s highest officials were

being protected by personnel who said they did not have sufficient access

to protective intelligence and protection training. Further, some agencies

said they lacked the legal authority to make arrests and conduct threat

investigations to protect their officials. Additional sharing of protective

intelligence, establishing a standardized protection training program, and

providing agencies with specific statutory authority to provide protection

could help enhance security protection for top federal officials.

Access to protective intelligence among agencies is an essential element in

preparing threat analyses. Without assessments that link the level of

threat to the size of the protective force, it would be difficult to determine

whether the level of protection provided and the amount of money spent

on protection were appropriate. Further, a standardized security

protection training program could instruct federal protective personnel in

the same basic techniques and procedures, which would help to ensure

effective coordination of protection when protective personnel from

multiple agencies are working at the same events. However, it is less clear

what the training curricula should be, who would provide that training, or

whether a central threat repository is the best means of sharing protective

intelligence among agencies. It is also not clear whether centralizing

security protection under one agency would be more cost-effective or

would better address the needs of the protected officials than the current

arrangements. In addition, some security officials questioned whether

offices of Inspectors General should protect agency heads because of a

potential conflict of interest between investigative and protective

responsibilities.

It is important that the government is assured that it has a reasoned

approach to protecting its highest officials, considering the national

security implications of protecting officials who are in the line of

presidential succession and the substantial recent increases in resources

being expended to protect them. However, no one in the executive branch

is currently responsible for handling issues relating to the routine
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protection of executive branch officials. Because the protection of

executive branch officials involves the expenditure of substantial amounts

of appropriated funds and considering the national security implications

involving presidential succession, we believe that the OMB Director, in

consultation with the President, should designate an appropriate official or

group to assess issues relating to security protection for executive branch

officials. These issues should include how protective intelligence should

be shared among agencies, how best to link threat assessment with the

need for protection and the level of protection provided, what training

should be provided to federal protective personnel and who should

provide it, who should provide protection, and whether agencies and/or

Offices of Inspectors General should be provided with specific statutory

authority to provide protection. The designated official or group could

provide the information needed for the OMB Director to act or to make

recommendations to the next administration and Congress on issues that

cannot be addressed during this administration or that would require

legislation or additional funding.

We recommend that the OMB Director, in consultation with the President,

designate an appropriate official or group to assess security protection

issues for top-level federal officials. At a minimum, this assessment should

include such issues as

• how agencies can best obtain protective intelligence from governmentwide

sources needed to prepare thorough threat assessments, including an

assessment of whether a central protective intelligence repository should

be established and, if so, who should administer it;

• how best to ensure that a clear linkage exists between the documented

threat assessments and the need for and level of protection for the routine

protection of top executive branch officials;

• what training should be provided to federal protective personnel, to what

extent the training should be standardized, and who should provide it;

• whether security protection should be centralized under one agency or, if

not, whether any changes in the way protection is currently being provided

should be made;

• whether agencies and/or offices of Inspectors General should be provided

with specific statutory authority to provide protection, and whether the

Marshals Service should continue to renew its deputation of agencies’

Recommendations
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protective personnel;

• whether the administration should adopt a policy regarding the routine

protection of top executive branch officials; and

• whether an official or group should be designated to oversee security

protection issues for top executive branch officials on an ongoing basis.

To ensure that the benefits of this assessment are realized, we further

recommend that the individual or group conducting the assessment

produce an action plan that identifies any issues requiring congressional

action.

Once the OMB Director has submitted his recommendations to Congress,

Congress should consider enacting legislation that would provide

whatever agency or agencies that provide protection with specific

statutory authority to effectively carry out these responsibilities. In

addition, should it be determined that centralized protection training,

threat assessment, or protection services are appropriate, Congress should

consider making the resources available to the appropriate agency or

agencies that are designated to provide these services and provide any

needed legislative changes.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the heads of

agencies with protected officials and agencies that provided protection,

the OMB Director, FLETC, and the Assistant to the President for Cabinet

Affairs and Cabinet Secretary. We received written comments on the

report from the Departments of Commerce, Education, and Energy;

FLETC; the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the

Marshals Service; the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) of

the Executive Office of the President; the Secret Service; the Tennessee

Valley Authority (TVA); and the U.S. Agency for International

Development. We received oral comments from the Federal Protective

Service (FPS); from OMB’s General Counsel and from security officials at

the Department of Agriculture (USDA), DOD and the Department of

Veterans Affairs (VA). The State Department, the White House, and the

remaining agencies that had protected officials did not provide comments

on the report. The agencies that provided comments generally agreed with

the report’s conclusions and recommendations.

On June 23, OMB’s General Counsel provided oral comments on the draft

report. He said that OMB concurred with the recommendations, with

three conditions. First, he said that OMB would need sufficient resources

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation
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to conduct the assessment, which could include retaining a panel of

outside experts. Second, OMB would need more time to complete the

assessment than the December 31, 2000, time frame that we proposed in

our draft report. And finally, the General Counsel said that as an outcome

of the assessment, OMB could (1) develop the process and broad

principles that agencies should follow in determining whether and how

much protection should be provided to executive branch officials and (2)

address the other issues that we recommended OMB should assess.

However, the General Counsel said that OMB would not be in a position to

determine whether particular officials should be protected or the level of

protection they should receive.

We believe that OMB’s comments are reasonable and recognize that OMB

would need sufficient resources to conduct the assessment and that it may

take longer than December 31, 2000, to complete the assessment. We

revised the report to remove mention of a specific time frame to complete

the assessment, but believe that the assessment should be completed as

soon as practical. Although we did not recommend that OMB determine

whether particular officials should be protected or the level of protection

that should be provided, we believe the specific information that we

provided in our classified report regarding the protection of executive

branch officials should be helpful to OMB in its overall assessment.

Further, we believe that the process and principles that OMB develops

through its assessment should be helpful to those executive branch

officials who make and review decisions regarding who should be

protected and how much protection they should receive, as well as to

Congress in carrying out its legislative and oversight functions.

The Secret Service Director said the report incorporated all of the relevant

issues related to security protection. The Director also said that he firmly

believed that one agency should be responsible for the overall threat

assessment of all executive-level and Cabinet-level officials and for the

training of the personnel who protect those officials. In addition, the

Director said that the Service leaves to the discretion of the White House

and OMB whether one agency or various agencies should provide

protection for all executive and Cabinet-level officials.

The Marshals Service Director said that the draft report was well

researched and is a fair assessment of the current state of executive level

personal protection. The Director also provided some comments and

clarifications regarding the implications of standardizing and centralizing

threat assessments, the amount of training that its protective personnel

received, and the potential conflict of interest involved in using deputized
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U.S. Marshals in agencies’ offices of Inspectors General to provide

protection. We incorporated those comments and clarifications in the

report.

The Marshals Service also provided some additional information about its

legal authority to provide protection, which we generally incorporated.

The Marshals Service cited an 1890 Supreme Court decision as supporting

its inherent authority to provide personal protection to persons as directed

by the Attorney General to ensure the faithful execution of federal law,

even in the absence of a specific federal authorizing statute. It also cited a

recent OLC memorandum as further supporting its authority to protect

agency officials. The OLC memorandum concluded that under federal

statutes criminalizing attacks on agency officials, the performance of

protective functions for agency heads falls within the mandate of the

Marshals Service.

We noted the Marshals Service’s interpretation of the Supreme Court

decision in the report. Although it is not clear to us that the Supreme

Court’s 1890 decision should be interpreted as authorizing the Marshals

Service to protect officials who are outside of the judicial branch of

government, we believe that the rationale of the cited OLC opinion

provides an adequate basis for the Marshals Service’s authority to perform

protective functions for executive branch officials. The OLC

memorandum also addressed the use of protective personnel from

agencies’ offices of Inspectors General. We have included an excerpt from

that memorandum in the final report. We also revised our

recommendation to OMB that it assess whether agencies should be

provided with specific statutory authority to provide protection to also

include an assessment of whether statutory authority to provide protection

should be provided to offices of Inspectors General.

The Secretary of Commerce said that the Commerce Department was

concerned about its lack of specific statutory authority to provide

protection to the Secretary. He said that the Department relies on

Marshals Service deputation of security specialists and that if the

deputation is not renewed after January 1, 2001, the Department would be

without authority. The Secretary said that the Department would like to

retain its protective responsibilities and therefore supports the

establishment of appropriate legislative authority. The Secretary also said

that the Department supports legislation that would authorize the Secret

Service to maintain a repository of protective intelligence and share the

information with participating agencies.
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The Secretary of Commerce also said the Department supports the

development of government standards or criteria for training federal

protective personnel. He said that creating a standardized protection

training curriculum for non-law enforcement agencies at FLETC or the

Secret Service’s training facility in Beltsville, MD, would significantly

enhance the skills of the Department’s personnel. He added that a joint

agency training effort by the Secret Service, Department of State, and the

Marshals Service is a viable option, but if a single agency is designated as

the training provider, the Department believes the Secret Service is best

suited for that assignment. The Secretary also said that the Department

does not support the centralization of Secretarial protection under one

agency. He said that as long as the Department continues to receive

external protective intelligence and training support, it believes that its

security detail should be staffed from within the Department, which would

allow it to have the flexibility and institutional knowledge afforded by its

own personnel.

The Department of Education’s Executive Officer said that the Department

agreed with the information contained in the report.

The Department of Energy’s Director of the Office of Security and

Emergency and Operations said the report was a thoughtful treatment of

the major issues facing federal executive protection programs and that the

Department was in complete agreement with the issues raised in the report

as well as with the recommendations for addressing them.

FLETC’s Senior Associate Director, Washington Operations, said that the

report accurately reflected the information provided by its officials.

FLETC indicated that although it does not have the facilities, expertise, or

funding to conduct standard protection training, it does offer several law

enforcement courses that include protection issues. In addition, FLETC

noted that the section of the report containing the agencies’ views on

establishing a standardized protection training program were statements

of opinion and priority related to the various needs and desires of the

agencies that were interviewed. FLETC said that the agencies’ statements

should be considered in light of the fact that they may be driven by each

agency’s particular agenda.

We recognize that the security officials who provided their views on the

standardization issues could be making statements on the basis of their

agencies’ agendas, as FLETC indicated, or could be affected by their

personal interests. We attempted to balance the security officials’ opinions
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with views from multiple sources, including the protected officials and

White House officials.

The Staff Director for Management of the Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System said that the Board generally concurred with the

report’s conclusions and recommendations and emphasized that it would

like to continue protecting its own officials. The Board said that

protection is best achieved when protective personnel are within the

agency’s chain of command and are subject to its rules of procedure. The

Board also said that it was concerned that the report indicated that the

Marshals Service may not renew the deputations of protective personnel

after January 1, 2001. The Board said that nonrenewal of deputations

would eliminate the law enforcement powers of its protective personnel

and would make it impossible for the agency to carry out its protective

responsibilities.

ONDCP’s Deputy Chief of Staff said the Office did not believe that

centralizing security protection under one agency is needed or beneficial.

It said that centralizing security protection would raise too many questions

about the scope and power the single agency would have and would limit

the flexibility of high level appointed officials over their own security

needs. ONDCP said that if a single agency were to assume responsibility

for protecting all Cabinet-level officials, a substantial amount of funding

and resources would be required to accomplish this. Further, ONDCP said

that a standardized protection training program and facility would be

beneficial and economical for the government, and it agreed with the idea

of establishing a protective intelligence repository. ONDCP noted that

Congress would need to provide a protection training facility and

protective intelligence repository with sufficient funding.

TVA’s Chief Administrative Officer and Executive Vice President, Business

Services, said that TVA concurred with the general consensus of the

survey results that agencies with sworn officers should continue to

provide protection for the presidential appointees of their respective

agencies. The official also said that TVA agrees with the agencies that

recommended that the Secret Service provide standardized training for

executive protection and develop a repository of threat information for use

by all federal agencies with protective responsibilities. In addition, he said

that Congress should provide statutory authority to agencies that provide

executive protection.

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s Acting Assistant

Administrator, Bureau for Management, said that the report represented a
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balanced and thoughtful evaluation of the subject and endorsed the

recommendations.

In providing oral comments on the draft report, the Special Agent in

Charge, Investigative Operations Division, Office of Inspector General, at

USDA said on June 27, 2000, that the report may have inaccurately

conveyed the impression that appointed Cabinet officials did not face a

serious level of threat, compared to the level faced by elected officials.

This official said that the Secretary of Agriculture had been described

recently in a national news report as being the most attacked Cabinet-level

official; has been assaulted four times in recent years; and has been the

target of 78 written, verbal, and physical threats since 1995. In addition, he

said that in January 1999, a heavily armed individual was arrested for

repeatedly threatening to use deadly force against the Secretary or any

other government employee who attempted to foreclose on his farm.58

With regard to the level of threat faced by Cabinet officials, we note that

the report discusses (1) the finding of the Secret Service’s 1998 study that

many attackers and would-be attackers considered more than one target

before attacking, which suggests that high-ranking government officials

may become targets of attack by potentially dangerous individuals who

transfer their focus among different government officials; (2) the number

of direct threats received against executive branch officials during a 3-year

period; and (3) the views of the protected officials on their need for

protection.

The USDA official also said the Department supported centralized

protection training to enhance the effectiveness of joint operations

conducted with other agencies. In addition, the official asked that we note

that the authority of USDA’s Office of Inspector General to provide

protection is based on a delegation of authority from the Secretary of

Agriculture set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, which we

included in the report.

In oral comments, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Personal

Security said on June 16, 2000, that the Department generally agreed with

the content of the report and emphasized DOD’s opposition to centralizing

security protection services under one agency. This official said that

protecting DOD officials is unique and indigenous to the defense

environment and agenda. He said that DOD protective personnel

frequently must operate in hostile fire zones and military environments.

58 According to the Agriculture Department, this individual pled guilty to felony charges and served 13

months in a federal psychiatric facility.
B-283892

Page 41 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

Thus, he said these personnel are selected, trained, and employed in much

different circumstances compared to what might be expected for

protective personnel of other top-level federal officials. In addition, he

said that the same DOD personnel who protect the Department’s civilian

officials also protect the senior military leadership; and continuity of

personnel, training background, communications, and operability is

integral to the protective mission. Further, the official said that DOD’s

protected officials are satisfied with the quality and level of protection

being provided and that training and development of the Department’s

protective personnel is highly adequate. He said that the protective

support mechanism at DOD has been in place for over 30 years and is

considered to be both highly effective and cost efficient.

The General Services Administration’s (GSA) Deputy Assistant

Commissioner, Office of the Federal Protective Service (FPS), said in oral

comments on June 16, 2000, that FPS provides protection to thousands of

government buildings, federal courthouses, and their occupants;

investigates threats against public officials that occur within GSA

properties; protects officials when requested by the threatened individuals

or other federal law enforcement agencies; and protects public officials

when the President, Vice President, and other high-ranking officials visit

federal buildings. The FPS official said that if centralized or specialized

training for protective personnel is developed, the agency would like that

training to be made available to its special agents. In addition, he said that

if legislation is developed to correct any deficiencies in the law, FPS would

like its special agents to be consulted and included in any corrective

legislation.

On June 8, 2000, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security and Law

Enforcement at VA provided oral comments and said the report was fair

and candid, and he agreed with the recommendations. This official was

concerned about how the Department’s protective operations would be

affected if the Marshals Service did not renew the deputations of VA’s

protective personnel after Janaury 1, 2001. The official added that he

believed that agencies’ offices of Inspectors General should not be

responsible for protecting officials because of potential conflicts of

interest that could arise from having protective and investigative

responsibilities part of the same office.

We modified the report to reflect some agencies’ concern that the Marshals

Service may not renew the deputations of their protective personnel after

January 1, 2001, and about whether potential conflicts of interest existed

between investigative and protective responsibilities of offices of
B-283892

Page 42 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

Inspectors General. We also revised our recommendation to OMB that it

assess whether agencies should be provided with specific statutory

authority to provide protection by adding that the assessment should also

include the issues of whether the renewal of Marshal Service deputations

of agencies’ protective personnel should continue and whether statutory

authority to provide protection should be provided to offices of Inspectors

General.

Agencies’ comments generally supported the report’s conclusions, which

indicated that a standardized security protection training program could

help to ensure effective coordination of protection when protective

personnel from multiple agencies are working at the same events. In

addition, USDA, the Secret Service, ONDCP, and TVA specifically

mentioned their support for centralizing or standardizing protection

training in their comments. Therefore, we included in our

recommendation to OMB that it also assess the extent to which training

should be standardized.

With regard to the several agencies that indicated in their comments that

they believed security protection services should continue to be provided

in the current, decentralized fashion, we believe that OMB should consider

those views, as well as the government’s overall security and financial

interests.

As agreed with the Subcommittee, unless you publicly announce its

contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days

after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the

President; the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director of OMB; Senator Charles

Schumer, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice

Oversight, Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Representative Henry Hyde,

Chairman, and Representative John Conyers, Ranking Minority Member of

the House Committee on the Judiciary; and to the heads of the agencies

covered in our review. Copies will be made available to others upon

request.
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Page 43 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

Key contributors were Robert G. Homan of the General Government

Division and Thomas J. Wiley and Patrick F. Sullivan of the Office of

Special Investigations. Please contact me on (202) 512-8387 or Robert

Hast on (202) 512-7455 if you have any questions about this report.

Sincerely yours,

Bernard L. Ungar

Director, Government Business

Operations Issues

Robert H. Hast

Acting Assistant Comptroller General

for Special Investigations
Page 44 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

Contents

1 Letter

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 46

Appendix II: Comments From the Secret Service 50

Appendix III: Comments From the Marshals Service 51

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of

Commerce

54

Appendix V: Comments From the Department of

Education

56

Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Energy 57

Appendix VII: Comments From the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center

58

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Board of Governors

of the Federal Reserve System

61

Appendix IX: Comments From the Office of National

Drug Control Policy

62

Appendix X: Comments From the Tennessee Valley

Authority

64

Appendix XI: Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

65

Appendixes

Table 1: Amounts of Protection Training Provided by the

Secret Service, Marshals Service, State Department,

and the Army

19 Tables
Page 45 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 46 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

We initiated this review by sending questionnaires to all executive branch

agencies and departments asking whether any of their officials received

security protection from fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and, if so, who

protected them.1

We then contacted security officials from the agencies

that provided the protection and asked them to complete detailed

questionnaires about their legal authorities to provide protection; threat

assessment procedures; the circumstances and type of protection

provided; number and training of protective personnel; security equipment;

costs of protection; and views on standardization and centralization of

security protection threat assessment, training, and protection services.

We did not obtain information on the protection of the President, Vice

President, Central Intelligence Agency officials, U.S. ambassadors to other

countries, uniformed military officials, or officials working in the judicial

or legislative branches of government.

For background information on security protection for federal officials, we

reviewed relevant reports issued by GAO, the Department of Justice,

Secret Service, State Department, Congressional Research Service,

Marshals Service, and Commission on the Advancement of Law

Enforcement. We also reviewed historical literature on assassinations and

assassination attempts against federal officials. In addition, we analyzed

the legal authorities that the agencies cited for providing security

protection and related legislative material.

For comparison purposes, we also contacted security officials from five

other countries to determine whether their top officials received security

protection and, if so, who protected them. We obtained information from

those countries because they were also democratic, industrialized nations

and because we had contacts with the police liaison officers in their

embassies. We also contacted law enforcement agencies in 4 states and 2

large cities. These six agencies were judgmentally selected to provide a

mix of jurisdictions with small, medium, and large populations. We

recognize that this information is not projectable to all countries, states, or

cities. In addition, we contacted the National Governors’ Security

Association (NGSA) to ask about protection training needs because NGSA

1

We obtained information that an agency that was abolished in December 1999 protected two of its

officials during fiscal years 1997 through 1999, but we were unable to obtain cost information or views

on security standardization issues from that agency because it no longer exists. Therefore, this report

contains a discussion of information about protected officials from 31 agencies, rather than 32,

regarding 42 officials, rather than 44. We also refer to views obtained from security officials at 27

agencies that provided protection, rather than 28. Some agencies protected more than one official. We

counted officials who had been protected at least on one occasion during that 3-year period lasting at

least 1 day.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 47 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

represented security officials involved in protecting governors in all 50

states.

To determine the costs of protecting federal officials, we asked agencies to

provide data on salaries, overtime, and travel of protective personnel;

special executive protection training; equipment; and residential security

costs. We asked the agencies to provide costs in these categories, based

on records of actual costs incurred in those categories, or estimates if

actual cost data were not available. Agencies that used part-time staff to

protect their officials were asked to provide the number of protective

personnel used, by fiscal year, and to provide prorated shares of their

salaries based on timekeeping records or estimates of the amount of time

spent on protection. We included the salaries of the protectees’ drivers if

they were members of the protection unit, were law enforcement

personnel, or had received special protection-related driving training.

We asked agencies to provide information on travel expenses (per diem

and transportation expenses) incurred by security personnel while

protecting officials and to include the cost of vehicles only if the

protectees were transported in armored vehicles. In instances when

Department of Defense (DOD) officials were transported in DOD aircraft,

agencies did not report their operating costs. Instead, DOD reported only

the costs incurred by protective personnel traveling on commercial

carriers.

Training costs included tuition and related travel expenses for specialized,

executive protection courses. Costs for residential security consisted of

expenses incurred for the installation of command posts and security

systems and security system monitoring. Agencies also reported other

costs for security equipment acquired during the period, such as radios

and ammunition, which we included. We did not verify the accuracy of the

cost data provided. In this report, we report the aggregate costs of

protection governmentwide. We did not report the costs incurred by

specific agencies to avoid compromising their security.

With regard to threat assessment procedures, we reviewed the threat

assessments that seven agencies2

had prepared regarding their protected

officials to determine what factors were considered. We also collected

data from agencies about the number of direct threats that their officials

2

These were the seven agencies in our review that had prepared detailed, written threat assessments

regarding protected officials.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 48 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

had received during the 3-year period. We defined direct threats as threats

of direct physical harm, kidnapping, and extortion.

To assess what training federal protective personnel had received, we

asked agencies to provide specific information on what training their

protective personnel had received, including the training providers, names

of the courses, dates when the courses were taken, and the number of

course hours. We also asked a random sample of four agencies that did

not have security protection as one of their primary missions what

subjects they believed a standardized training protection program should

include. We also visited the Secret Service’s training facility in Beltsville,

MD; the State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service’s facilities in

Dunn Loring, VA, and Summit Point, WV; and the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA, to observe their

executive protection training and review their training curricula.

We reported on the implications of standardizing threat assessment,

training, and protection services by asking each of the agencies providing

protection for their views on these issues and from using our own analysis

of the data provided. In addition, we sent letters to 33 officials who

received security protection during fiscal years 1997 through 1999 and

were still serving in those positions during our review. In our letters to the

protected officials, we asked whether they believed that security

protection should be provided automatically to the persons hold their

positions, and why or why not. In addition, we asked them whether they

believed their protective personnel had adequate resources, training, legal

authorities, and access to protective intelligence to protect them. For

those protected officials who were not protected by one of the agencies

with security protection as a primary mission (Secret Service, Marshals

Service, and State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service), we asked

whether they believed it would be better to be protected by one of those

agencies, and why or why not. We asked these officials whether they

would like to meet with us without their security staffs to discuss their

protection, designate someone such as their Chiefs of Staff who was not

directly involved in their protection to meet with us, or provide comments

in writing. Twenty-one of 33 protected officials, or their designees, met

with us or responded in writing to our letters. We also met with White

House officials to ask about the administration’s policy on security

protection for Cabinet officials.

We did our work from September 1999 through May 2000 in the

Washington, D.C., area; Beltsville, MD; Summit Point, WV; and Glynco, GA,

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 49 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

Our investigative work was done in accordance with investigative

standards established by the President’s Council on Integrity and

Efficiency. We provided a draft of this report to each agency that provided

protection services or had officials who were protected during fiscal years

1997 through 1999, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,

the Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs and Cabinet Secretary,

and the FLETC Director.
Appendix II

Comments From the Secret Service

Page 50 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix III

Comments From the Marshals Service

Page 51 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix III

Comments From the Marshals Service

Page 52 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix III

Comments From the Marshals Service

Page 53 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials

Enclosure not included.
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of

Commerce

Page 54 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Commerce

Page 55 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix V

Comments From the Department of

Education

Page 56 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 57 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix VII

Comments From the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center

Page 58 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix VII

Comments From the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Page 59 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix VII

Comments From the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Page 60 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix VIII

Comments From the Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System

Page 61 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix IX

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Page 62 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix IX

Comments From the Office of National Drug Control Policy

Page 63 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix X

Comments From the Tennessee Valley

Authority

Page 64 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Appendix XI

Comments From the U.S. Agency for

International Development

Page 65 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Page 66 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
Page 67 GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139 Protection of Executive Branch Officials
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