J-S65026-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: W.P.J.K., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.K., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1026 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered, May 30, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): 86417.

IN RE: E.J.K., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.W.K., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1027 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered, May 30, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): 86416.

IN RE: K.J.K., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.K., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1028 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 30, 2019
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in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): 86415.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2020

J.W.K. (Father) appeals from the decrees entered by the Berks County 

Orphans’ Court, which involuntarily terminated his parental rights to three of 

his children (four-year-daughter K.J.K, two-year-daughter E.J.K., and oneyear-son W.P.J.K.) pursuant to the Adoption Act. 1

 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). Upon review, we affirm.

The orphans’ court summarized the factual and procedural history of 

this matter as follows:

[Father] and [Mother] (collectively “Parents”) are the 

natural parents of K.J.K. (born October [] 2014), E.J.K. 

(born January [] 2017) and W.P.[J.]K. (born January [] 

2018) (collectively “the Children”). Mother and Father were 

not married when the Children were born. Mother has three 

additional children who do not reside with her and Father 

has two additional children that do not reside with him.

Berks County Children and Youth Services (“BCCYS”) first 

engaged Parents and Children (“the Family”) in 2013, 

though services were discontinued when Parents moved into 

Montgomery County. In November of 2015, upon referral 

from BCCYS and the Family moving into Montgomery 

County, Montgomery County Children and Youth Services 

(“MCCYS”) became involved in funding services and 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of J.L.C. (Mother). 

She filed a separate appeal, which is also before this panel.
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supervision of the case due to ongoing mental health, 

domestic violence and housing stability issues.

In 2017, upon referral from MCCYS indicating that the 

Family had moved back into Berks County, BCCYS was reengaged with the Family in order to address ongoing issues 

with both Mother and Father. After several months within 

which several incidents and continuing issues prompted 

safety plans from BCCYS, but the safety plans were 

repeatedly broken. On October 12, 2017, BCCYS filed an 

emergency petition for custody of K.J.K. and E.J.K. that was 

granted by the court. BCCYS then filed a dependency 

petition for K.J.K. and E.J.K., and upon a hearing before this 

court, legal custody was transferred to BCCYS for placement 

purposes. The primary established goal was return of K.J.K. 

and E.J.K. to the most appropriate parent with a concurrent 

goal of adoption.

Mother gave birth to W.[P.]J.K. [i]n January [] 2018. After 

no reported prenatal care and both Mother and W.[P.]J.K. 

tested positive for methamphetamines, BCCYS filed a 

petition on March 13, 2018 seeking dependency of 

W.[P.]J.K. The court ordered that W.[P.]J.K. would remain 

with Parents as he was still hospitalized, but also ordered 

that foster parents were allowed to visit W.[P.]J.K. due to 

Parents’ inconsistent visits. Upon his discharge from the 

hospital, BCCYS filed for emergency custody of W.[P.]J.K. 

and after a hearing, legal custody was transferred to BCCYS 

on March 28, 2018.

[***]

On October 31, 2018, [BCCYS] filed a petition for the 

involuntary termination of the parental rights of both Mother 

and Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

and (8). The petition cited the same following factual 

support for grounds for termination:

a. Failure of Mother and Father to obtain and maintain a 

legal/stable source of income;

b. Failure of Mother and Father to obtain and maintain 

stable and appropriate housing;

c. Inability of Mother and Father to appropriately parent 

the Children;
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d. Failure of Mother and Father to show progress with 

parenting skills;

e. Failure of Mother and Father to remediate substance 

abuse issues;

f. Concerns remaining regarding Mother’s and Father’s 

mental health; and

g. Concerns remaining regarding issues of domestic 

violence.

A hearing on the petition was held on May 13, 2019 and 

continued for a second day on May 23, 2019.

[***]

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter 

under advisement. Thereafter, [the court] filed separate 

orders dated May 30, 2019 terminating the parental rights 

of both Mother and Father as to K.J.K., E.J.K., and 

W.[P.]J.K.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/19, at 1-16 (citations to the record omitted). 

Father filed this timely appeal, wherein he presents two interconnected 

issues for our review:

1. Whether the orphans’ court erred in involuntarily

terminating Father’s parental rights between K.J.K. 

and him, where there was a strong emotional and 

parental bond between him and K.J.K., which would 

have had a negative effect on the child if the parental 

bond was permanently severed?

2. Whether the orphans’ court erred in involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights to W.P.J.K. and 

E.J.K., where there was a strong emotional and 

parental bond between Father and K.J.K., which would 

have a negative effect on the younger children if the 

bond was permanently severed and it would be 

detrimental to sever the ties between the three 

children who are extremely bonded as siblings?
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Father’s Brief at 5. (Edited for clarity.)

Initially, we note Father’s second issue depends on the success of his 

first. Father all but concedes he does not have a strong parental bond with 

the younger children (E.J.K. and W.P.J.K.). But, he argues, the younger 

children’s sibling bond with the eldest child (K.J.K.) is so essential that if his 

rights to K.J.K. should not be terminated, neither should his rights to the E.J.K. 

and W.P.J.K.

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting In 

re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 
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termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant 

to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare 

of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

The petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 

asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are 

valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

When terminating parental rights under section 2511(a), this court has 

stated that the focus is on the parent; but under section 2511(b), the focus in 

on the child. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under 

section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], 

this Court held that the determination of the child's “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 

the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 
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evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and 

make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances...where direct 

observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not 

necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are also a relevant part of this analysis. 

See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008). Thus, the court 

may emphasize the safety needs of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 

763 (affirming involuntary termination of parental rights, despite existence of 

some bond, where placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best 

interests). “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing 

of ... her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill ... her parental duties, to 

the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] 

potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 

847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

Instantly, Father limits his appeal to the second prong of the termination 

analysis, section 2511(b). Thus, we accept the orphans’ court determination 

that termination was warranted under section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8), 

and we narrow our focus on section 2511(b). Regarding section 2511(b), 

Father argues that he regularly visited K.J.K. during the dependency case, and 

that during those visits, he demonstrated appropriate parenting by completing 

such tasks as feeding and diaper changing. He highlights the testimony of a 
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MCCYS caseworker who opined that Father cared for Children and did a good 

job with them. Similarly, Father directs us to the testimony of another service 

provider, who stated that K.J.K. is attached to Father. Finally, Father argues 

that since he ended his relationship with Mother, he has placed himself in a 

position where he could care for the Children full-time. See Father’s Brief at 

11-12.

Regarding the section 2511(b) analysis, we observe that the orphans’ 

court made extensive findings to support its ultimate determination that 

termination of Father’s rights was warranted:

Dr. Richard Small, who was qualified as an expert in the field 

of psychology, testified that he performed forensic 

valuations of both Father and Mother. Dr. Small’s 

evaluation of Father performed in March of 2018 and Father 

presented as exhibiting self-centered and anti-social 

behavior. Dr. Small noted that Father’s relationship with 

Mother included verbal and physical violence, including a 

PFA, and that the relationship between the two was difficult. 

Father admitted no issues and indicated that any problems 

were the fault of other people without accepting any 

responsibility of his own.

In relation to Father’s prospect of change, Dr. Small opined 

that he sees Father’s prospect of change as “not very good,” 

due to Father’s personality disorder and because Father 

maintains that he has done nothing wrong and viewing 

himself as superior to others. Initially, Father refused to 

admit any drug use, but then slowly provided further details 

on his drug use. When Dr. Small asked how Father could 

maintain clean urine samples, Father indicated that he knew 

how to game the system. Further, Father demonstrated no 

view of problematic drug use other than perhaps the legal 

consequences arising therefrom.

[***]
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Dr. Small opined that he had great concern regarding the 

combustible relationship between Father and Mother and 

the negative effect on the needs of the Children. Dr. Small 

further indicated that it is common to observe intermittent 

periods of engagement with individuals in which it appears 

that the individuals are cooperating and recognizing issues, 

but then the progress falls apart. When it came to the 

Children, Dr. Small noted that Father spoke about the 

Children with affection, while Mother was much more 

focused on herself without much mention of the Children. 

However, Dr. Small concluded that he had strong doubts as 

to whether Father or Mother could provide a consistent safe, 

nurturing and stable environment for the Children.

[***]

After issues with Parents arriving late for visitation 

appointments, BCCYS implemented and the court later 

ordered, the Parents arrive one hour prior to the visitation 

appointments. As was noted, both Parents missed or 

cancelled appointments throughout. When Father 

requested separate visitation times, visitation was reduced 

from twice a week for two hours with both Parents to once 

a week for two hours with Mother and the same with Father.

[The permanency and adoption supervisor with BCCYS] 

noted that K.J.K. demonstrated no negative effects resulting 

from the reduction in visitation time. K.J.K. does not ask 

for Parents while at the home of foster parents between 

visitation periods and there is no indication of effect or 

statements from K.J.K. when Parents have cancelled or 

failed to show up for visitation appointments.

[***]

[The permanency and adoption supervisor with BCCYS] 

indicated that she saw no detriment to the Children in 

terminating parental rights. W.[P.]J.K. has been in the care 

of the foster parents since shortly after his birth and is 

primary attached to the foster parents. E.J.K. has formed a 

secure attachment to the foster parents, seeking and 

receiving comfort, support and fulfillment of her needs. 

K.J.K. has expressed that she didn’t want to go back to the 

foster home or daycare following some visits, but she is 

easily redirected and is responsive to the comfort. K.J.K. 

refers to foster parents as mom and dad.
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[The permanency and adoption supervisor with BCCYS] 

explained that BCCYS is seeking termination of parental 

rights due to the age and vulnerability of the Children, the 

length of time within which Parents have been afforded the 

opportunity to engage in services, the span of the case 

across two counties and the lack of progress and 

consistency from Parents. The needs of the Children for 

stability in living arrangements and in environment and the 

need for consistent and stable caregiving demonstrate that 

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the 

Children.

[Legal Counsel for the Children] testified that he had the 

opportunity to meet with foster parents and with the 

Children. Legal Counsel observed the foster parents to [be] 

engaging, caring and attentive to the needs of the Children 

and indicated that the foster parents share an attachment 

with the Children. Since E.J.K. and W.[P.]J.K. were too 

young to engage in dialogue with Legal Counsel, he had a 

conversation with K.J.K. K.J.K. told Legal Counsel that she 

loves the foster parents, but indicated to Legal Counsel that 

she wanted to live with “old mommy and daddy,” meaning 

Parents.

[The GAL for the Children] testified that in reviewing the 

reports, it is reported that K.J.K., though crying when she 

needed to leave visits with Parents, also cried when she was 

dropped off by the foster mom. K.J.K. loves both Parents 

and foster parents. K.J.K. did not indicate to the GAL a 

preference of where she wanted to live. The GAL observed 

a strong bond between K.J.K. and the foster parents and 

noted the stability that foster parents offer in relation to the 

lack of stability K.J.K. had experienced with Parents. The 

GAL also expressed the importance of keeping K.J.K. with 

her siblings. The GAL concluded that it is in the best 

interests of the Children to terminate the parental rights of 

both Mother and Father, indicating that the bond with the 

foster parents is healthier and much more critical than that 

with Parents. 

T.C.O. at 8-16 (citations to the record omitted).
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These findings, which are supported by the record, reveal that Father’s 

arguments are without merit. Father claims he maintained and formed 

parental bonds through visitation. The record reveals that his visitation was 

not consistent. Even if it were, the record also shows that visitation alone did 

not nurture a parental bond worth preserving. By not appealing the first prong 

of the termination analysis, Father concedes that he was unable to parent the 

Children. What he fails to realize is that because he could not parent the 

Children, they began to form primary attachments to their primary caregivers, 

the foster parents. In other words, even the most consistent visitation would 

not necessarily prevent the Children from becoming bonded to foster parents.

We certainly recognize an atypical facet of this case, namely, that the 

four-year-old K.J.K. had somewhat conflicting interests. In terms of her legal 

interests, i.e., her preferred outcome,2 she expressed a desire to return to her

biological parents’ care. But on the other hand, K.J.K.’s best interests 

mandated that she remain safe and secure with the foster parents. On this 

point, we note that K.J.K.’s preference to return to Father was not exactly 

unequivocal. She demonstrated distress when she left the care of whichever 

parent (foster or biological) she was with. She referred to both sets as “mom 

and dad.” She indicated that she had love for both sets, as well. Had there 

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2

In In Re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) a fractured 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) to mean that 

a child involved in a contested termination hearing must be afforded counsel 

to represent her “legal interests,” or preferred outcome of the litigation. We 

note that K.J.K. was represented by separate legal counsel in this case.
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been evidence that K.J.K.’s success in the foster parents’ home would be 

jeopardized by her strong desire to return to Father’s care, then the conflict 

between her “best interests” and her “legal interests” would be more 

concerning. But because the record clearly indicates that K.J.K. was also 

strongly bonded to the foster parents, the record supports the orphans’ court 

determination that K.J.K.’s legal interests (to live with Father) did not

outweigh her best interests (to remain with the foster parents).

K.J.K.’s legal interests aside, Father argues that it was in K.J.K.’s best 

interests to deny the termination, because she had a “strong bond” with 

Father. Father’s Brief at 12. Whether K.J.K. did, in fact, share a strong bond 

with Father is debatable, but even if their bond was strong, it was not the type 

worth preserving.

To explain:

When examining the effect upon a child of severing a bond, 

courts must examine whether termination of parental rights 

will destroy a “necessary and beneficial relationship,”

thereby causing the child to suffer “extreme emotional 

consequences.” (Citation omitted). In the case of an 

unhealthy bond, “attention must be paid to the pain that 

inevitably results from breaking a child’s bond to a biological 

parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we must weigh 

that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left 

intact. In re T.S.M., [supra] 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 944 (Pa. Super. 2018).

We also note that courts may consider the totality of the circumstances 

when performing the needs and welfare analysis under section 2511(b). 
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J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 946 (citing In re Coast 561 A.2d 762, 771 (Pa. Super. 

1989) (en banc)).

Instantly, Father has evinced an inability to parent. Even if the orphans’ 

court was inclined to deny the termination petition, Father would not even be 

in a position to enjoy unsupervised visitation, much less reunification with 

K.J.K. K.J.K.’s instability would persist, which, in turn, would result in 

detrimental consequences. Thus, the bond K.J.K. shares with Father is clearly 

an unhealthy one. The only remaining question is whether K.J.K. would suffer 

an injury if this unhealthy bond was severed.

The record supports the orphans’ court determination that K.J.K. would 

not. Although she was upset after leaving her visits with Father, she was 

easily redirected and responsive to the foster parents’ comfort. K.J.K. did not 

ask about Father either between visits or when those visits were cancelled for 

Father’s failure to show up. She experienced no negative consequences with 

her visits with Father were reduced. Importantly, K.J.K. also has a bond with 

foster parents, one that is much more stable and secure.

Because we conclude that termination of Father’s rights to K.J.K. was 

warranted, we need not discuss Father’s second issue, the hypothetical effect 

that splitting up the siblings would have on their respective best interests. 

However, we note that “the goal of preserving the family unit cannot be 

elevated above all other factors when considering the best interests of the 

children, but must be weighed in conjunction with other factors.” In re K.D., 
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144 A.3d 145, 153 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing In re Adoption of G.R.L., 26 

A.3d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2011).

In sum, the record supports the thorough and extensive findings made 

by the orphans’ court. Thus, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

commit an abuse of discretion when it granted the termination petition filed 

by BCCYS.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2020