J-S51015-15

________________________

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RBS CITIZENS, N.A. SUCCESSOR IN 

INTEREST TO CCO MORTGAGE 

CORPORATION

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC BRODIE AND ADINA BRODIE

Appellants No. 3316 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 21, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Civil Division at No(s): 2013-01556

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 14, 2015

Appellants, Eric Brodie and Adina Brodie (“the Brodies”), appeal from 

the summary judgment entered in the Bucks County Court of Common 

Pleas, in favor of Appellee, RBS Citizens, N.A. successor in interest to CCO 

Mortgage Corporation (“RBS Citizens”), in this mortgage foreclosure action. 

We affirm. 

The trial court opinion fully sets forth the relevant facts and procedural 

history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.1 

____________________________________________

1 The court granted summary judgment in favor of RBS Citizens by order 

dated October 20, 2014, entered on the docket on October 21, 2014, with 

notice sent on October 28, 2014. The Brodies timely filed a notice of appeal 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S51015-15

- 2 -

The Brodies raise the following issues for our review:

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW IN ITS 

GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THERE DID NOT 

EXIST A NOTE TRANSFER BY NEGOTIATION THROUGH THE 

CHAIN OF LOAN TITLE IN FAVOR OF [RBS CITIZENS] 

BELOW AND THERE WAS NO ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE 

LIKEWISE?

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW IN 

ADMITTING THE OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE AFFIDAVIT 

IN SUPPORT OF...[RBS CITIZENS’] MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AS WELL AS UPON THAT AFFIDAVIT’S 

LIKEWISE INADMISSIBLE FOUNDATION?

(The Brodies’ Brief at 8). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the comprehensive opinion of the Honorable Albert J. 

Cepparulo, we conclude the Brodies’ issues merit no relief. The trial court 

opinion discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. (See

Trial Court Opinion, filed January 20, 2015, at 6-8; 12-15) (finding: (1) CCO 

Mortgage Corporation is original mortgagee and lender; when court granted 

summary judgment, 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 1929 was controlling,2 which provided 

that, upon merger, surviving or new corporation succeeds to rights and 

liabilities of merged corporation; RBS Citizens produced Certificate of Merger 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

on November 20, 2014. On November 25, 2014, the court ordered the 

Brodies to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and the Brodies timely complied.

2 On October 22, 2014, the legislature repealed Section 1929, and recodified the statute at 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 336 (effective July 1, 2015). 
J-S51015-15

- 3 -

with official seal by Comptroller of Currency of Treasury Department, signed 

September 18, 2007 (effective September 1, 2007); official certification 

evidences that CCO merged into RBS Citizens, such that RBS Citizens 

assumed all of CCO’s assets and liabilities, including Brodies’ mortgage and 

note; thus, RBS Citizens did not have to produce assignment of mortgage, 

where merger effectively resulted in RBS Citizens’ assumption of mortgage; 

(2) RBS Citizens’ loan history records, obtained in regular course of 

business, did not trigger Nanty-Glo3rule because such evidence is not oral 

testimony or dependent upon credibility and demeanor of any witnesses; 

additionally, Brodies produced no evidence to refute computation of 

damages contained in affidavit by David Salley (officer and litigation 

manager of RBS Citizens) or accuracy of RBS Citizens’ loan history records, 

except to claim they are “indecipherable”; moreover, Brodies’ general 

denials to itemized list of amounts owed constituted admissions in mortgage 

foreclosure action).4 Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s 

opinion.

Judgment affirmed. 

____________________________________________

3 Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co. of New York, 309 Pa. 

236, 163 A. 523 (1932). 

4 The correct citation for LTV Steel Company, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Mozena)

is 562 Pa. 205, 754 A.2d 666 (2000). 
J-S51015-15

- 4 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/14/2015
® 

Page 1 of 15 

Property was attached to the complaint. The requisite Notice of Intention to Foreclose and 

Department of Treasury to their Motion. Motion Exh. A. A legal description of the Subject 

Merger which was recorded in the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, United States 

Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") at']{ 3, Exh. A. Plaintiff attached a Certificate of 

Plaintiff is the successor in interest to the original Mortgage holder- CCO Mortgage Corp. 

a Promissory Note in consideration of the loan on June 19, 2007. Compl. at 'I[ 4, Exh. B. 

Mortgage Book 5465, Page 1194. Compl. at TJ[ 3, 5, Exh. A. Additionally, Defendants executed 

was recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds in Bucks County on July 19, 2007 in 

Exh. A. The Mortgage applied to 41 Carol Lane, Richboro, PA 18954 ("Subject Property") and 

delivered a Mortgage to CCO Mortgage Corp. in the amount of $360,000.00. Complaint at']{ 3, 

On June 19, 2007, Eric Brodie and Adina Brodie ("Defendants") made, executed and 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

(Pa.R.A.P.) 1925(a). 

Judgment. We file this Opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

Pennsylvania from this Court's grant of Appellee/Plaintiff RBS Citizens' Motion for Summary 

Appellants/Defendants Eric Brodie and Adina Brodie appeal to the Superior Court of 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Code 5214 Judge:30 

Patricia L. Bachtle, Bucks County Prothonotary 

Rcpt Z1239909 1120/2015 1 :53:56 PM 

OPINION 

1111 J:f 1Wt1~,III Ill 

case#: 2013.01556 809 10770949 

ERIC BRODIE AND ADINA BRODIE 

vs. 

No. 2013-01556 

3316 EDA 2014 

RBS CITIZENS, N.A., SUCCESSOR IN 

INTEREST TOCCO MORTGAGE CORP. 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL DIVISION 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 2 of 15 

1 The principal balance owed was $339,663.83 with accrued but unpaid interest at $22,736.26 and fees and costs 

including accumulated late charges, property inspection fees, appraisal fees, hazard insurance, school tax, cost of 

suit, and attorney's fees totaling $7,928.67. See Compl. at 7 for an itemized list offees. 

2 Plaintiff complied with this Order and filed a Certificate of Service on July 5, 2013. 

Defendants were the Record Owners of the Subject Property. Answer at 16. However, 

On August 12, 2013 Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter. It was admitted that 

reinstated on June 13, 2013. 

Defendants' last known address- 41 Carol Lane, Richboro, PA 18954.2 The Complaint was 

Defendants with their complaint by posting the premises and via regular and certified mail to 

Procedure 430, which we granted on May 30, 2013. Our Order permitted Plaintiff to serve 

2013 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Alternative Service Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

response, left notices, and thereafter found the notices were removed. Therefore, on May 9, 

attempted to serve Defendants with Plaintiffs Complaint five (5) separate times and received no 

A Sheriff's Return filed on March 19, 2013 indicated that the Bucks County Sheriff 

Comp I. at 1 7. 

complaint in mortgage foreclosure seeking $370,328.76 as of March 1, 2013 plus interest.1 

itself ... " as "[t]he Mortgage is now in default. .. " Compl. at 113, 7. Therefore, Plaintiff filed a 

the Complaint, "Plaintiff brings this action to foreclose on the mortgage between Defendants and 

thereafter. Compl. at, 7, Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") at 7, Exh. B. Pursuant to 

make payments of principal and interest due on April 1, 2012 and any monthly payments 

The Complaint alleged that the Mortgage was in default because Defendants failed to 

91 "). Compl. at 1 10. Exh. C. 

Homeowner's Emergency Mortgage Assistance Act of 1983, 35 P.S. §§ 1680.401c et seq. ("Act 

pursuant to the Loan Interest and Protection Law 41 P.S. §§ 101 et seq. ("Act 6") and the 

Notice of Homeowners' Emergency Assistance was sent to both Defendants individually 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 3 of 15 

Defendants denied that they were in default under the terms of the Mortgage, and additionally 

alleged that" 'appraisal fees,' 'property inspection' and post-acceleration interest is either not 

chargeable and/or not incurred upon information and belief." Ans. at ,r 7. Defendants responded 

that both the Mortgage and the Note "speaks for itself in its entirety" and also alleged that this 

Court is without jurisdiction "for Plaintiff's non-compliance" in terms of the Act 6/91 Notices. 

Ans. at ,r,r 3, 4, 10. Furthermore, in terms of an itemization of amounts due in Paragraph 7 of 

Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendants responded that " ... after reasonable investigation, Defendants 

are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averment 

and therefore, said averment is expressly denied ... " Ans. at ,r 7. 

In their New Matter, Defendants allege that Plaintiff is without standing, is in violation of 

Act 6/91, is "barred by laches, estoppel, and its own unclean hands," and is "barred and/ or 

limited by its violations of the Truth-In-Lending Act ("TILA") and Real Estate Settlement 

Procedures Act ("RESPN'). New Matter at ,r,r 3, 4, 6, 7. Defendants further claim that 

Plaintiffs verification is defective and that Plaintiff is in violation of the Home Affordability 

Modification Program ("HAMP") as well as the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 

Law (''UTPCPL") and "such other and further government (federal or state) programs relevant 

herein." New Matter at ,r,r 8, 10, 11. Finally, Defendants assert that this Court is without 

jurisdiction. New Matter at ,r 5. 

On August 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant's New Matter, responding 

"Denied. Defendants' allegations are conclusions of law devoid of any allegations of fact; 

therefore, no response is required under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure" to each of 

Defendant's allegations. Plaintiff's Reply to New Matter at ,r,r 1- I 1. 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 4 of 15 

On February 10, 2014 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion"). This 

Motion was praeciped under Bucks County Rule of Civil Procedure ("B.C.R.C.P.") 208.3(b) 

and, thus, submitted for disposition. In its Motion, Plaintiff asserted that "[t]here is no genuine 

issue of material fact regarding the Defendants' default." Motion at ,r 12. Attached to this 

Motion is the Mortgage and Note, both of which were signed by Defendants on June 19, 2007. 

See Motion Exh. A, B. Plaintiff also attached the Certificate of Merger recorded in the Office of 

the Comptroller of Currency, United States Department of Treasury, reflecting Plaintiff as the 

record holder of both the Mortgage and Note. See Motion Exh. A. Furthermore, a redacted copy 

of Defendants' loan history and a letter sent to both Defendants individually notifying them of 

their default and of Plaintiffs intent to foreclose are attached. See Motion Exh. B. 

Plaintiff attached an Affidavit to the Motion, authored by David P. Salley, an officer and 

litigation manager of RBS Citizens, N.A. Successor in Interest to CCO Mortgage Corp. See 

Motion Exh. B. Mr. Salley asserted that, based on his personal knowledge and review of 

business records kept in the normal course of business, payments are due and owing and as of 

October 22, 2013 the total amount due on the Mortgage was $390,059.55, including interest at 

$62.81 per day. Motion Exh. B. The amount owed was itemized and listed with specificity in 

his affidavit. 

In terms of Defendants' Answer, Plaintiff asserted that Defendants offered only a general 

denial in response to Plaintiffs averment of default and the amount due and owing on the 

mortgage, and, therefore, pursuant to relevant Pennsylvania caselaw, such a denial constitutes an 

admission in a mortgage foreclosure action. Motion at ,r,r 12, 13. 

Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 

("Response") on March 12, 2014. In this response, Defendants "expressly denied" that 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 5 of15 

Defendants ever executed a mortgage or note in favor of Plaintiff. Response at fl 2-3. 

Furthermore, in terms of the amount due, Defendants deny that they are liable for "appraisal 

fees," "property inspection" and post-acceleration interest. Response at 14. Defendants aver 

that Mr. Salley's affidavit constitutes "inadmissible testimonial hearsay predicated upon an 

indecipherable 'payment history."? Response at~ 7. Defendants also claim that this court lacks 

jurisdiction relating to Plaintiffs "non-compliance" with Act 6/91. Response at 19. 

In Defendants' accompanying Memorandum of Law, Defendants first claim that 

"Plaintiff must be the negotiated transferee of the subject note as well as record assignee of the 

subject mortgage through the chain of loan title (as evidenced by negotiation/allonge and 

assignment of mortgage, respectively)." Defendants argue summary judgment was inappropriate 

as the note was still in the name of the original lender and Plaintiff failed to attach an assignment 

of mortgage. Furthermore, Defendants aver that Mr. Salley' s affidavit was in violation of the 

Nanty-Glo rule. 

On October 20, 2014, upon consideration of the foregoing, we issued an Order granting 

summary judgment for Plaintiffs and entering an in rem judgment against Defendant in the 

amount of $390,059.55 plus interest in the amount of $62.81 per day from October 23, 2014. 

On November 20, 2014, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court. 

III. MATTERS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL 

On November 25, 2014, we Ordered Defendants to file a concise statement of matters 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within twenty-one (21) days. On 

December 16, 2014, Defendants filed his l 925(b) statement raising the following claims, 

verbatim: 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 6 of15 

1) The Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff 

Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010). 

On appellate review, then, an appellate court may reverse a grant 

of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

But the issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to any material fact 

presents a question of law, and therefore, on that question 

our standard of review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the 

determinations made by the lower tribunals. To the extent that this Court must 

resolve a question of law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the 

context of the entire record. 

[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly 

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering a motion 

for summary judgment, the trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable 

inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. In so 

doing, the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue 

of material fact against the moving party, and, thus, may only 

grant summary judgment "where the right to such judgment is clear and free from 

all doubt. 

established: 

The Superior Court's standard of review of a court's grant of summary judgment is wellIV. ANALYSIS 

5) Whether the trial court erred in admitting otherwise objected to as inadmissible 

claimed "evidence"? 

3) Whether the trial court erred in finding Plaintiff has standing/authority to allow 

summary judgment? 

4) Whether the trial court erred in precluding requested discovery, oral argument, and 

evidentiary hearing? 

2) Whether the trial court erred in finding Plaintiff was the pre-judgment record assigned 

mortgagee and recipient of the negotiated transferred note through the chain of loan 

title such as to allow summary judgment? 

1) Whether the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff-Appellee's Motion for Summary 

Judgment per the arguments contrary thereto in Defendants-Appellants' response in 

opposition? 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 7 of 15 

All the property, real, personal and mixed, and franchises of each of the 

corporations parties to the merger or consolidation, and all debts due on whatever 

account to any of them ... shall be deemed to be vested in and shall belong to the 

surviving or new corporation, as the case may be, without further action, and the 

title to any real estate, or any interest therein, vested in any of the corporations 

shall not revert or be in any way impaired by reason of the merger or 

consolidation. The surviving or new corporation shall thenceforth be responsible 

for all the liabilities of each of the corporations so merged or consolidated. 

is as follows: 

of merger or consolidation") was controlling. Therefore, the effect of a merger or consolidation 

this case, Title 15 ("Corporations and Unincorporated Associations") Pa. C.S.A. § 1929 ("Effect 

is the original Mortgagee and Lender. However, at the time summary judgment was granted in 

reference an Assignment of Mortgage. Additionally, we recognize that the CCO Mortgage Corp. 

mortgagee and recipient of the Note. There is no dispute that Plaintiff did not produce or 

Defendant claims that this court erred in finding Plaintiff was the record assigned 

2) Plaintiff was the Pre-Judgment Record Assigned Mortgagee and Recipient of the 

Negotiated Transferred Note 

below. 

of these averments are wholly contained in Defendants' issues 2)- 5), we will address them 

the Nanty-Glo rule, and (3) the merger documents constitute inadmissible hearsay. Because all 

failed to attach or reference an Assignment of Mortgage and (2) the affidavit was in violation of 

be summarized as follows: (1) Plaintiff is not the record holder of the Mortgage and. Note and 

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment are three-fold as set forth above and can 

In regard to Defendants' first claim, the arguments made in Defendants' Response in 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 8 of 15 

3 We are aware that as of October 22, 2014 (two (2) days after our grant of Summary Judgment) the General 

Assembly repealed 15 Pa.C.S.A. 1929 in total. See 2014 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act2014- 172 (H.B. 2234). 

4 Defendants' executed the Mortgage and Note on June 19, 2007. 

challenging our jurisdiction to entertain this particular lawsuit generally or Plaintiff's lack of 

allow summary judgment." We are uncertain and it is unclear as to whether Defendants are 

Next, Defendants claim the trial court erred in "finding Plaintiff had standing/authority to 

3) The Trial Court had Jurisdiction to Adjudicate the Instant Litigation 

general statements that Plaintiff was not the record holder of the Mortgage and Note. 

Furthermore, Defendants failed to present evidence to the contrary, and simply rested on their 

unnecessary, as the merger effectively resulted in Plaintiffs assumption of the Mortgage. 

including the Mortgage and Note at issue here. As a result, an Assignment of Mortgage was 

resulted in RBS Citizens, N .A.' s assumption of all CCO Mortgage Corp.' s assets and liabilities, 

based on the language of the relevant statute in addition to the directives of caselaw, the merger 

Association." Motion Exh. A. Therefore, in granting summary judgment, we determined that 

merged into Citizens Bank, National Association "with the title RBS Citizens, National 

evidences that CCO Mortgage Corp. of Glen Allen, VA (among other distinct corporations) was 

indicated that the merger was effective as of September 1, 2007. This official certification 

Summary Judgment. Motion Exh. A. This Certificate was signed on September 18, 20074 and 

official seal by the Comptroller of the Currency with the Treasury Department to the Motion for 

corporation"). Here, Plaintiff attached a Certificate of Merger that was signed and bore an 

merge the surviving corporation succeeds to both the rights and liabilities of the constituent 

(Pa. 2013) (holding "It is well established law in the Commonwealth that when corporations 

15 Pa.C.S.A. § 1929(b).3 Accord LTV Steel Co., Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Mozena). 754 A.2d 666. 677 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 9 of 15 

5 Based on the foregoing and despite our efforts to address Defendants' claim, we are of the opinion that it is waived 

as vague pursuant to relevant law. Where a petitioner's Concise Statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. l 925(b) is not 

specific enough for a trial court to identify and address the issue the petitioner wishes to raise on appeal, the trial 

court may find waiver. Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. 2006). When a court must guess what 

issues are being appealed, petitioner has not presented enough for meaningful review. Id. When a petitioner fails to 

identify the issues he pursues on appeal, the court is impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis pertinent to those 

issues. Id. "In other words, a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised 

on appeal is the functional equivalent ofno Concise Statement at all." Id. (citing Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 

141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2006)). 

property was sold thereafter. Id. Mortgagor then filed a "Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 

pursuant to the settlement agreement and mortgagee filed a praecipe for writ of execution and the 

payments. Beneficial, 77 A.3d at 548. Thereafter, mortgagor defaulted on her obligations 

however, agreed not to execute on the judgment so long as mortgagor continued making regular 

in which mortgagee received judgment for the accelerated amount due on the mortgage, 

complaint in mortgage foreclosure against mortgagor, which resulted in a settlement agreement 

Consumer Discount Co. v. Vukman, 77 A.3d 547 (Pa. 2013). In this case, mortgagee filed a 

prerequisites has been previously adjudicated and decided by our Supreme Court in Beneficial 

Response at ,r 9. This issue of whether the Act 91 notice requirements impose jurisdictional 

court lacked jurisdiction "relating to Plaintiffs 'non-compliance' with Act 6/91. 

Furthermore, in Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion, Defendants claimed that this 

Bucks County, PA. 

land or a part of the land is located." There is no dispute that the Subject Property is located in 

states that a mortgage foreclosure action "may be brought in and only in a county in which the 

instant action is pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure ("Pa.R.C.P.") 1142, which 

Mortgage and Note. In addressing the former, we note that our jurisdiction to entertain the 

and, therefore, at the time summary judgment was granted Plaintiff was the holder of the 

have previously established that Plaintiff was the successor in interest to CCO Mortgage Corp. 

standing to bring the lawsuit for reasons set forth above.5 Regardless, in terms of the latter, we 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 10 of 15 

6 Although the Notices sent to Defendants individually by Plaintiff are entitled "Act 91 Notice," the dictates of Act 

91 (specifically 35 P.S. § 1680.403c(b)(l)) provide that a mortgagee shall prepare a notice pursuant to all of the 

information required by the statute in addition to that required by Act 6 (41 P.S. § 403). All of the information 

required by both Act 6 and Act 91 are contained therein. See Comp!. Exh. C; Motion Exh. B. 

was first filed on March 5, 2013 and Defendants had been in default under the terms of the 

of Plaintiffs affiant. First, it is important to note that the Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure 

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants "demanded" the deposition 

further discovery. However, in their Memorandum of Law in support of their Response in 

discretion and/or error as a matter oflaw because they did not have an opportunity to engage in 

Defendants question whether this Court's grant of summary judgment was an abuse of 

4) The Court Correctly Precluded Discovery, Oral Argument, and Evidentiary 

Hearings 

notice and, therefore, this claim is meritless. 

matter and, even so, Defendants do not point to any specific defect or omission in the combined 

Regardless, any failure to provide such notice in no way affects our jurisdiction to hear this 

regarding notice of default and their intention to foreclose. 6 See Compl. Exh. C, Motion Exh. B. 

Id. at 553. Here, we determined that Plaintiff provided adequate Act 6/91 Notice to Defendants 

The failure to pay the mortgage according to its terms gave [mortgagee] its cause 

of action. To act on that cause of action, it was required to give notice under Act 

91. As the notice it gave did not meet the requirements of the Act, it was 

defective and the procedural requirements for enforcement were not met; that 

defect, however, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court to hear the matter. 

[the] case." Id. at 549. The court reasoned and concluded as follows: 

notice was deficient, this fact did not extinguish the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over 

be waived." Id. Mortgagee filed a timely notice of appeal, raising the issue that "even if the 

deficient as a result and concluding "this stripped it of subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot 

mortgagor of an option available to her as of 2006. Id. The trial court found the notice was 

Sheriffs Sale" on the basis that the Act 91 Notice was deficient because it failed to inform 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 11 of15 

5) The Trial Court Correctly Considered Plainriff's Affidavit, Defendant's Loan 

History Documents, and the Merger Documents 

required to provide oral argument and was permitted to dispose of the matter by written order. 

satisfy the praecipe requirement of B.C.R.C.P. 208.3(b)(6). Therefore, this Court was not 

Response. Although Defendants may have desired oral argument, Defendants' request failed to 

written order .... " Defendants did not request oral argument via praecipe when they filed their 

within the IO-day period specified in subsection (2) hereof, the matter shall be disposed of by 

oral argument has been requested by the moving party in the praecipe, or by any other party 

required. Bucks County Rule of Civil Procedure ("B.C.R.C.P) 208.3(b)(6) states that "[ujnless 

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, neither party requested oral argument via praecipe as 

in the ad damnum clause of their Memorandum of Law in Support of their Opposition to 

In the instant case, although Defendants demanded an evidentiary hearing/oral argument 

order for this Court to rule on Motions for Summary Judgment. See Pa.R.C.P. § 1035.2(1). 

additional discovery .... " Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. Thus, discovery does not need to be completed in 

fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by 

Moreover, summary judgment may be granted "whenever there is no genuine issue of material 

record as it stands before us is devoid of any notice of intention to take such an oral deposition. 

allegations. There is no evidence that Defendants attempted to depose Plaintiffs "affiant," as the 

opportunity to conduct discovery to negate Plaintiffs assertions or support any defenses to the 

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants were afforded ample time and 

not receive it for review until May 6, 2014. It was not until October 20, 2014 that we granted 

August 12, 2013. This Motion was not praeciped for our disposal until April 7, 2014 and we did 

Mortgage and Note since April 1, 2012. Defendants filed their Answer and New Matter on 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 12 of 15 

Three (3) factors determine the applicability of the Nanty-Glo Rule: 

DeArmitt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 73 A.3d 578, 595 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

In determining the existence or non-existence of a genuine issue of a 

material fact, courts are bound to adhere to the rule of [Nanty-Glo] which holds 

that a court may not summarily enter a judgment where the evidence depends 

upon oral testimony. 

The function of the summary judgment proceedings is to avoid a useless 

trial but is not, and cannot, be used to provide for trial by affidavits or trial by 

depositions. That trial by testimonial affidavit is prohibited cannot be emphasized 

too strongly. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the lower court must 

examine the whole record, including the pleadings, any depositions, any answers 

to interrogatories, admissions of record, if any, and any affidavits filed by the 

parties. From this thorough examination the lower court will determine the 

question of whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. On this critical 

question, the party who brought the motion has the burden of proving that no 

genuine issue of fact exists. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a 

material fact are to be resolved against the granting of summary judgment. 

added). The Rule, as explicated by the Pennsylvania Superior Court: 

issues of material fact." Dudley v. USX Corp., 606 A.2d 916, 918 (Pa. Super. 1992) (emphasis 

affidavits or depositions, or those of its witnesses, to establish the non-existence of genuine 

" ... the party moving for summary judgment may not rely solely upon its own testimonial 

depositions) to determine the outcome of a case in motions practice. The Rule dictates that 

The Nanty-Glo rule governs the use of oral testimony (either through affidavits or 

dictates of Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., 163 A. 523 (Pa. 1932). 

merger documents. We will address the admissibility of each in turn, but will first set forth the 

Memorandum of Law including the affidavit of Mr. Smalley, the payment history, and the 

evidence attached to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as set forth in their responsive 

'evidence.'?' In addressing this issue, we assume that Defendant is again relying on the specific 

Defendants finally claim that this court erred in "admit[ing]" inadmissible "claimed 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 13 of 15 

Exh. A, Motion Exh. A. Furthermore, the Note, which was signed by Defendants, clearly states 

interest, these fees are specifically provided for in paragraph 14 of the Mortgage. See Compl. 

Plaintiffs Motion, including "appraisal fees," "property inspection" and post-acceleration 

Addressing the fees that Defendants deny they are liable for in their Response to 

"indecipherable." 

the accuracy of the loan history records, and only go so far as to conclude they are 

evidence to refute Mr. Smalley's computation of damages in the affidavit, nor have they refuted 

the amounts due and owing on the Mortgage. Furthermore, Defendants have not provided any 

provided any evidence to refute Plaintiffs accounting of damages. There is no discrepancy in 

Most importantly, in terms of the affidavit and loan history, Defendants have not 

demeanor of any witnesses. 

because this evidence is not oral testimony and is not dependent upon the credibility and 

Plaintiff in the regular course of business, do not trigger the applicability of the Nanty-Glo Rule 

that Defendants are in default of the Mortgage. Defendants' loan history records, obtained by 

by way of the pleadings and by way of Pa.R.C.P. 1029 ("Denials. Effect of Failure to Deny"), 

Applying the Nanty-Glo analysis to the instant case, Plaintiff has shown without doubt, 

genuine discrepancy or dispute as to a material fact. 

at 920. Therefore, in order for the Nanty-Glo Rule to apply in the instant case, there must exist a 

DeAnnitt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 73 A.3d at 594-95 citing Dudley v. USX Corp., 606 A.2d 

Initially, it must be determined whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to 

establish a prima facie case. If so, the second step is to determine whether there is 

any discrepancy as to any facts material to the case. Finally, it must be determined 

whether, in granting summary judgment, the trial court has usurped improperly 

the role of the [fact-finder] by resolving any material issues of fact. It is only 

when the third stage is reached that Nanty-Glo comes into play. 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 14 of 15 

that the interest rate is 6.750% annually upon the unpaid principal. The Note explicitly provides 

that this is the interest rate to be employed both before and after any default by Defendants. 

It is obvious that Plaintiff calculated the interest and fees based upon the information 

provided in the Mortgage and the Note, both of which were contractually agreed to by 

Defendants. Based upon the clearly delineated interest rate, amount of the monthly payments, 

late charges (five percent (5.000%) of the overdue payment) and the amount of unpaid principal 

on the loan, Defendants were fully capable of determining the amount of interest and late charges 

that accrued from the date of default to the filing of the Complaint. Because these documents 

speak for themselves in terms of the calculation of the interest, principal, and fees owed, Plaintiff 

is not required to provide a step-by-step computation. 

Furthermore, in terms of an itemization of amounts due in Paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs 

Complaint, Defendants responded that " ... after reasonable investigation, Defendants are without 

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averment and therefore, 

said averment is expressly denied ... " Ans. at ,r 7. Defendants also provided that the Mortgage 

and the Note are documents that "speak for [themselves] in [their] entirety" or "expressly 

denied" their existence. Ans. at ,r,r 3, 4; Response at ilil 2-3. 

When it is clear that a party must know whether a particular allegation is true or false, 

reliance on Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029(c) does not excuse a party's failure to 

admit or deny the allegation. Cercone v. Cercone, 386 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 1978); see also 

Pa.R.C.P 1029(c). Further, "in mortgage foreclosure actions, general denials by mortgagors that 

they are without information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of averments as to the 

principal and interest owing must be considered an admission of those facts." First Wisconsin 

Trust Co. v. Strausser, 653 A.2d 688, 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). Indeed, to date Defendant is 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Page 15 of 15 

RULO,JUDGE 

BY THE COURT: 

Court's granting of Summary Judgment for Plaintiff. 

The foregoing represents this Court's opinion regarding Defendants' appeal from the 

V. CONCLUSION 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Summary Judgment failed to create a genuine issue of material fact and, accordingly, Plaintiff is 

Ultimately, Defendants' Answer and New Matter and Response to Plaintiffs Motion for 

Exh. A, Motion Exh. A. 

sealed Certificate from the Comptroller of the Currency evidencing the merger. See Compl. 

by a certificate that the officer has the custody" of the document. Here, Plaintiff attached a 

attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied 

admission of documents located outside the Commonwealth is that it be evidenced by a "copy 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). Section 5328(a) provides that the prerequisite for the 

Finally, the Merger documents constitute an official record and are thus admissible 

Strausser, 653 A.2d at 692. 

associated with default of this Mortgage) contained in his Answer constitutes an admission. See 

general denials to Paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint (setting forth an itemized list of costs 

1987). Thus, in the absence of any evidence to refute Defendants' averments, Defendants' 

denial." New York Guardian Mortgage Coq,. v. Dietzel. 524 A.2d 951, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 

"the only part[y] who would have sufficient knowledge on which to base a specific 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM
Barbara A. Morris, 

Law Library 

BUCKS COUNTY COURTHOUSE 

55 East Court Street, 1st Floor 

Doylestown, PA 18901 

Janette Livezey, 

Managing Editor 

LAW REPORTER 

Bucks County Bar Association 

135 East State Street 

Doylestown, PA 18901 

Sean P. Mays, Esquire 

LAW OFFICES OF GREGORY JA V ARD IAN 

1310 Industrial Boulevard, Suite 101 

Southampton, PA 18966 

Counsel for Appellee 

Matthew B. Weisberg, Esquire 

WEISBERG LAW, PC 

7 South Morton Avenue 

Morton, PA 19070-1707 

Counsel for Appellant 

Copies Sent To: 

RBS CITIZENS VS. ERIC BRODIE 

No. 2013-01556 

3316 EDA 2014 

Circulated 09/03/2015 01:32 PM