NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Juan Pablo Ramos-Sanchez,

 Petitioner,

 v.

Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney 

General,

 Respondent.

No. 21-393

Agency No. A098-697-697

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 13, 3023**

Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Juan Pablo Ramos-Sanchez seeks review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his motion to reopen. We review 

this decision under the “highly deferential” abuse of discretion standard, 

reversing only if the BIA acted “arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.” 

Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2022). “Where the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not 

precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 17 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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BIA issues its own decision but relies in part on the immigration judge’s 

reasoning, we review both decisions.” Id. at 702 (citation omitted); see also 

Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019) (we review both the BIA 

and immigration judge’s (IJ’s) decision to the extent that the BIA decision 

“adopts or relies on” the IJ’s reasoning). To the extent that we have jurisdiction, 

it is under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition.

1. Motion to Reopen. We reject Ramos-Sanchez’s argument that 

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), and Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S.

Ct. 1474 (2021), constitute a change in the law applicable to his case that entitles 

him to equitable tolling of the deadline to file a motion to reopen. Both cases 

concerned the stop-time rule for cancellation of removal and did not address the 

immigration court’s jurisdiction, which is the basis of Ramos-Sanchez’s equitable 

tolling argument. Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1479–86; Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109–

10; see also United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 

2022) (en banc) (“Although the statutory definition of an NTA requires that it 

contain the date and time of the removal hearing, this provision chiefly concerns 

the notice the government must provide noncitizens regarding their removal 

proceedings, not the authority of immigration courts to conduct those 

proceedings.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, Ramos-Sanchez is not entitled to 

equitable tolling based on a change in the law because neither Pereira nor NizChavez apply to his case. See Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(Tolling is available “in cases where the petitioner seeks excusal from 

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untimeliness based on a change in the law that invalidates the original basis for 

removal.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C). Moreover, even if his motion was timely, 

Ramos-Sanchez cannot establish prima facie eligibility for the relief that he seeks

because Pereira and Niz-Chavez are inapplicable. See Tzompantzi-Salazar, 32 

F.4th at 703–04.

2. Sua Sponte Reopening. We lack jurisdiction to review RamosSanchez’s claim that the BIA erred by not sua sponte reopening his immigration 

proceedings because the BIA declined to exercise its sua sponte authority as an 

exercise of its discretion, not because “it lack[ed] the authority to reopen.” Singh 

v. Holder, 771 F.3d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Lona, 958 F.3d at 1227.

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

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