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64–603 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–451 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

H.R. 2017 

AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2012, 

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

Department of Homeland Security 

Nondepartmental witnesses 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=senate&committee=appropriations 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BEN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MARK KIRK, Illinois 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

CHARLES J. HOUY, Staff Director 

BRUCE EVANS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, Vice Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

JON TESTER, Montana 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

Professional Staff 

CHARLES KIEFFER

CHIP WALGREN

SCOTT NANCE

DRENAN E. DUDLEY

REBECCA DAVIES (Minority) 

CAROL CRIBBS (Minority) 

Administrative Support 

NORA MARTIN

COURTNEY STEVENS (Minority) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2011 

Page 

Department of Homeland Security ......................................................................... 1 

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011 

Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Coast Guard ......................................... 155 

Nondepartmental Witnesses ................................................................................... 195 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD–138, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Mary L. Landrieu (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Landrieu, Lautenberg, Coats, Cochran, Murkowski, and Moran. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

STATEMENT OF HON. JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Senator LANDRIEU. Good morning. I would like to call our subcommittee to order for the purpose of considering the Department’s 

budget for 2012. 

Let me first welcome our new ranking member, Senator Coats. 

I am pleased to work with Senator Coats in the next 2 years and 

really appreciate his leadership in this area. 

Welcome, Madam Secretary. We are happy to have you present 

your budget this morning. You lead a Department of 221,000 men 

and women who are on the front lines every day protecting our Nation and our citizens. And we commend those employees for their 

dedication and their hard work. They are in our airports, our ports, 

along our borders, considering the intelligence coming in all over 

our country, we appreciate their work and we appreciate your leadership. 

My goal is to produce a bipartisan, fiscally responsible Homeland 

Security bill for fiscal year 2012 that provides this Department 

with the resources it needs to prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from all threats, manmade and natural. I share your commitment 

to the goals established in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: preventing terrorism, securing our borders, enforcing our immigration laws, safeguarding cyberspace, and ensuring resiliency in 

the face of natural or manmade disasters. 

Securing this Nation is not just, as you know, Madam Secretary, 

a Federal Government responsibility. State and local governments 

share that responsibility, and frankly, as well as many of our corporations who are doing their part and individual citizens as they 

are trained to recognize threats that potentially are occurring in 
2 

their local communities. This Department must—I believe—serve 

as leaders and educators in helping our State and local governments and corporations, serving as a model for them, as well as encouraging our private citizens to do their part. 

As we approach the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the 8th 

anniversary of the creation of the Department, and the 6th anniversary of the catastrophic levee failures which caused horrific destruction in and around the city of New Orleans, the hurricanes of 

Katrina and Rita along the gulf coast, we must not let our guard 

down. We must remember the lessons of those horrific events and, 

even without the imminent threat right before us, not fail to remember what we learned on those terrible occasions. We must 

have the fortitude and the discipline and the tenacity I think, Senator Coats and others, to continue to fund adequately this effort 

and not become lax or distracted. 

In the State of the Union Address, the President said that al 

Qaeda and its affiliates continue to plan attacks against us. He 

said, ‘‘as extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities and 

with respect to the rule of law.’’ Secretary Napolitano, you have 

stated that the terrorism threat is at the highest level since 9/11. 

That is a statement that we should pay attention to. 

We will be mindful of those statements as we consider the President’s request for this 2012 year. I am supportive of reducing 

spending where we can, obviously eliminating mediocre programs 

or duplicative programs. But I do not believe the notion of reducing 

spending arbitrarily to a 2008 level for this Department makes any 

sense. 

The Coast Guard would have to eliminate 2,400 personnel and 

its recapitalization program would be terminated. We saw what the 

Coast Guard did in responding to the BP oil spill. I do not believe 

a cutback there is smart. 

We would have to eliminate the national security cutter (NSC), 

the fast response cutter (FRC), and the marine patrol aircraft. The 

number of customs officers at our ports of entry would be reduced 

by more than 1,600. The number of Border Patrol agents—Senator 

McCain has fought very hard, along with others, to secure more 

personnel at our borders, not less, and I will not support a budget 

that reduces that number by 3,500. 

Reducing funding for the Transportation Security Administration 

to levels before the Christmas Day bombing attempt would be reckless. We know that there are attempts to take down aircraft in 

America that are ongoing. We have been successful in preventing 

it so far. This budget supports our effort to continue to be successful. 

We would have 775 fewer scanners at our airports, 4,000 fewer 

screeners, 330 fewer air cargo inspectors, and 235 fewer canine 

teams. Under my leadership, we will not go in that direction. 

I believe the President has submitted a fiscally responsible budget for this Department. Of course, we will have some issues within 

the Department. I look forward to working with my ranking member to find a way forward that provides the resources necessary, 

however, to keep our Nation and our citizens safe. 
3 

PREPARED STATEMENT

Following Senator Coats’s opening statement, we will hear from 

you Madam Secretary, because our schedule has changed. I wanted 

the members to have time for opening statements, but I am going 

to ask them to submit them for the record because a vote has been 

called for 11 o’clock. 

But let me turn to my ranking member and thank Senator Cochran for joining us this morning. 

[The prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Good morning. 

Secretary Napolitano, you lead a Department of 221,000 men and women who are 

on the front lines every day protecting our citizens. We commend those employees 

for their dedication and their service and we welcome you to this subcommittee 

hearing today. I also welcome Senator Dan Coats, our new ranking member. I look 

forward to working with you and hearing from all of our subcommittee members 

this year. 

My goal is to produce a bipartisan, fiscally responsible Homeland Security bill for 

fiscal year 2012 that provides the Department with the resources it needs to prepare 

for, respond to, and recover from all threats, both man-made and natural. I share 

your commitment to the goals established in the Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review, preventing terrorism, securing the borders, enforcing our immigration laws, 

safeguarding cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters. 

Securing this Nation is not just about the Federal Government. We must also 

serve as leaders and educators in helping State and local governments, the private 

and nonprofit sectors, and our citizens in achieving these goals. 

As we approach the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the 8th anniversary of 

the creation of this Department, and the 6th anniversary of Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita, we must all learn from history while confronting the evolving threats to this 

Nation. 

In the State of the Union Address, the President said that al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to plan attacks against us. He said, ‘‘as extremists try to inspire acts 

of violence within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities, and with respect for the rule of law’’. Secretary Napolitano, you have stated 

that the terrorism threat is at its highest level since 9/11. 

We will be mindful of those statements as we consider the President’s request for 

fiscal year 2012. While I am supportive of reducing spending, I do not believe the 

notion of reducing spending to 2008 levels is either appropriate or responsible for 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Coast Guard would have to eliminate 2,400 personnel and its recapitalization program would be terminated, including the national security cutter, the fast response cutter, and the maritime patrol 

aircraft. The number of Customs officers at our ports of entry would be reduced by 

more than 1,600, reducing security and extending wait times. The number of Border 

Patrol agents would be reduced by more than 3,500, reversing the progress we have 

made in securing our borders. Reducing funding for the Transportation Security Administration to levels before the Christmas Day bombing attempt would be absurd. 

We would have 775 fewer scanners at our airports, 4,000 fewer screeners, 330 fewer 

air cargo inspectors, and 235 fewer canine teams. Under my leadership, we will not 

go down that road. 

I believe the President has submitted a responsible, fiscally prudent budget for 

DHS. Of course, we have some issues with the budget which we will discuss today, 

and I look forward to hearing from the Secretary. 

Following Senator Coats’ opening statement, each member will be recognized for 

up to 3 minutes for opening remarks. After the opening remarks, we will hear from 

Secretary Napolitano. After, we hear from the Secretary, each member will be recognized, based on order of arrival, for up to 5 minutes for questions. I now recognize 

Senator Coats for any opening remarks he may wish to make. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL COATS

Senator COATS. Madam Chairman, thank you. I am pleased to 

join you on this subcommittee, my first venture here. So I will 
4 

probably have more questions than answers, but I look forward to 

the testimony. 

Secretary Napolitano, thank you for being here this morning and 

reaching out yesterday with a courtesy call for me and being willing to sit down and talk through difficult, challenging issues at a 

difficult, challenging time. So I appreciate that very much. 

I never thought I would be sitting in a superior position to Senator Cochran on any committee anywhere, including lunch. But it 

is a pleasure to be with you, Thad, and I appreciate your leadership over the years of this subcommittee and ranking membership 

is duly noted. 

Madam Secretary, I do not think any of us question that we are 

in difficult fiscal times. Also no one questions whether or not we 

have security threats that we need to address and need to protect 

the American people from incursions and unwanted terrorist activity and to do everything we can to provide for homeland security. 

So there comes the challenge for all of us. 

The current budget that the President has announced is an increase over previous years. As you know, the Congress is looking 

for ways to try to do more with less. The question I think comes 

in terms of how we can provide effective service and fulfill our obligations in providing for the security of our country, at the same 

time trying to do it in a more efficient way. We are not asking for 

no Government here. We are asking for more efficient Government, 

and working together, I think, to try to achieve that should be one 

of our goals. 

As I look at your budget, a couple of things come to mind, and 

I just might mention those and we can discuss them during the 

hearing and afterwards. 

The budget indicates—I think assumes—that there will be an increase in aviation passenger security fees and that those fees will 

start rolling in in the third quarter of fiscal year 2012. Yet, none 

of that is assured yet, and I am told that that is a mark of nearly 

$590 million in additional collections. And so I would like to pursue 

that question with you. 

Second, the budget continues to request operations for disaster 

relief based on historical obligations for noncatastrophic events and 

assumes that large catastrophic events are rare and should be 

funded strictly by supplemental emergency appropriations. As you 

know, the reality is that those large catastrophic events result in 

year after year after year of follow-up funding, and whether that 

should be done by emergency supplemental or budgeted is, I think, 

a fundamental question that we have to address. My understanding is that for fiscal year 2011, the amount necessary to provide for continuing work post-Katrina, post other catastrophic occurrences is $1.6 billion, an amount that is not put into the President’s budget. And so when you add all this up, I think it totals 

around $3 billion not included in the 2012 request. How we are 

going to reconcile that, I think, is going to be a challenge for us 

all. 

And of course, those assumptions often come in low. We have 

seen occurrences of more and more violent storms and catastrophic 

events, whether it is flooding, wildfires, hurricanes, or other disasters. 
5 

There are a couple of other areas that I would like to talk about, 

but we can wait until question time. Again, I thank you for being 

here and look forward to a year of good, solid work in terms of trying to do more with less funds, but do it more efficiently. Every 

family in America, every business in America, almost every State 

in the Union has had to face up to this challenge, and the Federal 

Government is going to need to do so also. 

Thank you. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator, for those remarks. 

I want to acknowledge Senator Lautenberg who has joined us. 

He chaired this subcommittee in the interim after the death of 

Chairman Byrd, and Senator, thank you for your leadership. 

DISASTER RELIEF FUND

We are going to go right into questions in the order of appearance. Let me begin following up on what Senator Coats said about 

the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), Madam Secretary, which is particularly of interest to gulf coast leaders. But frankly, with the catastrophes in Rhode Island, the flooding in Tennessee, and fires 

and tornadoes in other parts of the country, there are many members that are very concerned. 

For fiscal year 2011, the current year we are in, we are facing 

a $1.6 billion gap in the DRF. If the President does not request and 

the Congress does not approve supplemental funding, that account 

under our calculations will literally run out of money in June, only 

a few months from now, just as we are entering hurricane season. 

For fiscal year 2012, the problem is even worse because we are 

facing a $3 billion gap based on known costs. These are not projections or speculations. These are known costs of past disasters. 

In fiscal year 2010, there was a similar shortfall. The Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had to stop providing assistance for rebuilding and recovery projects. Many of those were 

in my home State. Some of them were in Senator Cochran’s home 

State of Mississippi, but they were all over the country. Unfortunately, this problem looks like it is repeating itself, and I would 

like to head it off, if we can, at the pass. 

During the last hearing before the authorizing committee, you 

said it is ‘‘really nonnegotiable’’ when asked about the looming crisis. You said we have to pay for these disasters. It is our responsibility. 

Do you believe that the President is going to send up a supplemental to request this funding, and if so, when? Because if we have 

to cut $1.6 billion out of the base Homeland Security budget, that 

will cut the Coast Guard, that will cut FEMA, that will cut grants 

to State and local responders, and basically, we will be cutting current disaster response teams to pay for past disasters. To me that 

does not make any sense. Do you think the President will send up 

a supplemental and would you support it? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank you 

for this hearing. I am pleased to be here before you, Ranking Member Coats, other members of the subcommittee. 

I do have an opening statement and I will just simply ask that 

that be inserted. 
6 

Senator LANDRIEU. Please go right ahead with your opening 

statement. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I am happy to go right to questions, 

if you want to do that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. No, no, no. You go right to your opening 

statement. I am very sorry. And then you can take that question. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. All right. 

Senator COATS. Maybe it will be happier. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Yes. Maybe it will be easier than my question. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Go right ahead. 

Senator COATS. Whatever works best. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, why don’t I answer the question 

and then I will give the opening statement? 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. You have identified one of the issues that 

we will have to work together on and we look forward to working 

with the subcommittee on. 

One of the things that the numbers do not reflect yet is our effort 

to deobligate funds that have been set aside to pay for past disasters that no longer are necessary. In other words, we have been 

able to go backwards and say, well, we set aside this amount and 

in fact we did not need that amount of money. So in fiscal year 

2010, for example, we restored $2 billion to the DRF by process of 

deobligation. That is what it is called. And so we look forward to 

continuing that strategy as we move forward to refill the DRF with 

deobligated funds. 

Now, will that be enough to cover expenses for fiscal year 2011 

and fiscal year 2012? Probably not without a supplemental of some 

sort. So we anticipate that the administration will submit a supplemental for the DRF. This has been the historical practice under Republican and Democratic administrations. I think the reason the 

practice started was because of the difficulty of predicting ultimately what the DRF will be required to cover. So the administration has carried forward with that historical practice, but nonetheless, I think it is fair to say, Madam Chair, that a supplemental 

will be necessary. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you and please go on with your opening statement. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF JANET NAPOLITANO

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, let me begin again by thanking you 

for the opportunity to discuss the President’s fiscal year 2012 budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

I think it is fair to say that the demands on DHS have never 

been greater. This is especially true as we remember those at the 

Department who have given their lives in service of the mission of 

securing our country, including just in the past weeks and months, 

Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent Jaime Zapata. 

Now, Mexico is leading the investigation into the death of Agent 

Zapata. We are supporting them through a joint Department of 

Justice (DOJ)/DHS task force that the Attorney General and I announced 2 weeks ago. Recently, Mexican authorities have appre-
7 

hended some of the alleged killers of Agent Zapata, and we are conducting a number of operations in the United States related to the 

drug cartels that plague that country. 

I can speak for the entire administration when I say we are not 

only saddened by the loss of an agent, we are outraged by this act 

of violence against an officer of the United States. And make no 

mistake, justice will be brought to all of those involved. We owe 

nothing less to the memory of our agent, Agent Zapata, and to 

those who are still on the job in Mexico. 

But the loss of these great agents is a stark reminder of the sacrifices made by the men and women of DHS every day. It also 

strengthens our resolve to continue to do everything in our power 

to protect against, mitigate, and respond to threats and to make 

our Nation more resilient for years to come. 

Today’s threat picture features adversaries who evolve quickly 

and are determined to strike us here at home—from the aviation 

system and the global supply chain to surface transportation, critical infrastructure, and our cyber networks. 

We are leading the administration’s unprecedented effort to secure our Southwest Border, coupled with a smart and effective approach to enforcing immigration laws in the interior of our country. 

And we continue to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters of all types. 

President Obama’s fiscal year 2012 budget for the Department 

allows us to continue to meet these evolving threats and challenges 

by prioritizing our essential operational requirements while reflecting an unprecedented commitment to fiscal discipline that maximizes the effectiveness of every security dollar that we receive. 

Reflecting the current fiscal environment, in building the fiscal 

year 2012 budget, all DHS components identified savings associated with the Department’s 33 efficiency review initiatives, and we 

cut administration and overhead, including my own office’s budget, 

by more than $800 million. Savings were realized through efficiencies in acquisition, asset, and real property management, as 

well as employee vetting and credentialing, hiring and on-boarding, 

and information technology. We cut professional services contracts, 

travel, and nonmission-critical training. 

We also delayed construction of FEMA at the new DHS headquarters at St. Elizabeths and deferred office collocations, as well 

as building maintenance and enhancements. 

My written statement includes a comprehensive list of the operational priorities in the budget request, and today I would like to 

highlight a few of them for you here, even as I request that the full 

statement be admitted in your record. 

First, preventing terrorism and enhancing security was the 

founding mission of DHS. It remains our top priority today. This 

budget safeguards transportation modes through a layered detection system, including the deployment of additional transportation 

security officers, behavioral detection officers, canine teams, and 

advanced imaging technology machines at domestic airports while 

expanding watch list vetting through the secure flight program and 

enhancing screening and targeting of international travelers before 

they board U.S.-bound flights through the immigration advisory 

program. 
8 

The budget also strengthens surface transportation security by 

supporting 12 new multimodal VIPR teams. The acronym stands 

for visible intermodal prevention and response. These teams conduct operations throughout the transportation sector to prevent potential terrorist activity. 

The request also provides funding for the Securing the Cities program to protect our highest risk cities from a radiological or a nuclear attack and makes a significant investment in the National 

Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility which will provide enhanced diagnostic capabilities to protect our country from foreign animal and 

emerging diseases. 

The request expands support for the national network of State 

and local fusion centers to enhance baseline capabilities and local 

law enforcement with the tools they need to address threats in 

their communities. 

Now, to secure and manage our borders, the request continues 

the administration’s historic border security efforts by supporting 

21,370 Border Patrol agents and 21,186 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, both all-time highs. The budget also includes 

$242 million for the continued deployment of proven, effective surveillance technology along the highest trafficked areas of the 

Southwest Border to better meet the operational requirements of 

our agents on the front lines. 

For the Northern Border, this budget request supports investments in technology tailored to the maritime and cold weather environment, including proven standalone technology to provide immediate operational benefits. 

And for our Nation’s maritime borders, this budget includes 

funding to continue the essential NSC program and makes historic 

investments to recapitalize the Coast Guard’s aging assets, including 6 FRCs, 40 response boats, as well as a sizable investment in 

the renovation and restoration of aging shore facilities. 

The budget request also continues the Department’s focus on 

smart and effective enforcement of our U.S. immigration laws, 

while streamlining and facilitating the legal immigration process. 

Building on our record over the past 2 years, the Department will 

continue to prioritize the identification and removal of criminal 

aliens who pose a threat to public safety, and target employers who 

knowingly and repeatedly break the law. This request enables ICE 

to fund 33,400 detention beds, remove more than 200,000 criminal 

aliens, and deploy Secure Communities to 96 percent of all jurisdictions nationally in fiscal year 2012, while promoting compliance 

with worksite-related laws through criminal prosecution of egregious employers. Form I–9 inspections and continued expansion 

and enhancements of E-Verify are included. 

The request funds integration efforts, including programs supporting English-language and citizenship education, and continues 

detention reform efforts currently underway. 

Now, to safeguard and secure cyberspace, the budget increases 

resources to identify and reduce vulnerabilities in our Nation’s key 

cyber networks. It includes significant investments to expedite the 

deployment of Einstein 3 to prevent and detect intrusions on Government computer systems, increase Federal network security of 

large and small agencies, and continue to develop a robust cyberse-
9 

curity workforce to protect against and respond to cybersecurity 

threats. The budget also focuses on combating cyber crime and preventing attacks against United States critical infrastructure. 

Now, to ensure resilience to disasters, as you mentioned, Madam 

Chair, the budget request focuses on moving resources out of 

Washington, DC, and into the hands of State and local responders 

who are often best positioned to detect and respond to terrorism, 

to natural disasters, and to other threats by sustaining Federal 

funding for State and local preparedness grants, providing $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2012. The funding also includes $670 million for 

assistance to firefighter grants, including $420 million to rehire an 

estimated 2,300 laid-off firefighters and retain veteran first responders. 

Now, to lead and support essential national security and economic security efforts, the budget expands the Coast Guard’s operational capacity by funding 50,682 military and civilian positions 

and establishing the Coast Guard’s first incident management assistance team, which will be deployed rapidly to support incidents 

of national significance. 

It also continues to support ICE and CBP’s enforcement and investigative efforts to protect U.S. intellectual property rights, as 

well as the Secret Service’s state-of-the-art forensic support for the 

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. 

Madam Chair, this budget is the culmination of a major, first-ofits-kind effort by the Department through the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and the associated Bottom-Up Review to 

align our resources with a comprehensive strategy to ensure a safe, 

secure, and resilient homeland while making an unprecedented 

commitment to fiscal discipline. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

I would be remiss, however, if I did not note all of this progress 

is at risk in the continuing resolution passed by the House. This 

is the full fiscal year 2011 resolution. That proposal cuts technology 

investments and security improvements on the Southwest and 

Northern Borders. It cuts aviation security measures. It cuts funding to sustain the progress that has been made in enforcing the 

Nation’s immigration laws. It cuts critical cybersecurity tools and 

operations. It cuts intelligence personnel. It cuts Coast Guard funding to support our war efforts abroad, and it cuts grants that support counter-terrorism and disaster response capabilities at the 

local level. 

Chairman Landrieu, Senator Coats, members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. I am happy to 

continue to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SECRETARY JANET NAPOLITANO

Chairman Landrieu, Ranking Member Coats, and members of the subcommittee: 

Let me begin by saying thank you to this subcommittee for the strong support you 

have provided me and the Department over the past 2 years. I look forward to continuing to work with you in the coming year to protect the homeland and the American people. 
10 

1For purposes of comparison to prior year funding levels, funding for overseas contingency operations and National Science Foundation transfers are not included in these figures. 

I am pleased to appear before the subcommittee today to present President 

Obama’s fiscal year 2012 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). 

The demands on DHS have never been greater and the threats we face pose new 

challenges that require an innovative and focused response. Today’s threat picture 

features an adversary who evolves and adapts quickly and who is determined to 

strike us here at home—from the aviation system and the global supply chain to 

surface transportation systems, critical infrastructure, and cyber networks. The Department’s fiscal year 2012 budget allows us to continue to meet these evolving 

threats and challenges by prioritizing our essential operational requirements—while 

reflecting an unprecedented commitment to fiscal discipline that maximizes the effectiveness of every security dollar we receive. 

Reflecting the current economic environment, we are preserving essential frontline operations and bolstering our operational strength by decreasing administration 

and overhead, including the overall budget for the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management. All DHS components identified reductions associated with the 

Efficiency Review initiatives currently underway as well as administrative savings 

totaling nearly $800 million to strengthen mission-critical activities across the Department. Savings were accomplished through efficiencies in acquisition, asset, and 

real property management as well as employee vetting/credentialing, hiring/onboarding, and information technology; and administrative savings through reductions to professional services contracts, printing, supplies and materials, travel, and 

training. The Department also proposes to delay construction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) headquarters at St. Elizabeths as well as the 

deferral of other office colocations, and building maintenance and enhancements to 

prioritize frontline security operations. 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST

The fiscal year 2012 budget request for DHS is $57.0 billion in total funding, 

$47.4 billion in gross discretionary funding, and $43.2 billion in net discretionary 

funding.1

DHS’s fiscal year 2012 budget request is the culmination of a major, first of its 

kind effort undertaken by the Department to align DHS resources with a comprehensive strategy to meet our Nation’s homeland security needs. Last year, DHS 

completed the first ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which established a unified, strategic framework for Homeland Security missions and goals, 

as well as the first ever Bottom-Up Review (BUR), which aligned DHS’ programmatic activities and organizational structure to better serve those missions and 

goals. The third and final step of this process is the fiscal year 2012 budget submission, which begins the next phase in strengthening DHS efforts to ensure a safe, 

secure, and resilient homeland. 

This process identified six DHS missions, each of which is strengthened by this 

budget: 

Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security.—Protecting the 

United States from terrorism is the cornerstone of Homeland Security. DHS’s 

counterterrorism responsibilities focus on three goals: 

—preventing terrorist attacks; 

—preventing the unauthorized acquisition, importation, movement, or use of 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials and capabilities within the United States; and 

—reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and key resources, essential leadership, and major events to terrorist attacks and other hazards. 

Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Borders.—DHS secures the Nation’s 

air, land, and sea borders to prevent illegal activity while facilitating lawful 

travel and trade. The Department’s border security and management efforts 

focus on three interrelated goals: 

—effectively securing U.S. air, land, and sea borders; 

—safeguarding and streamlining lawful trade and travel; and 

—disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal and terrorist organizations. 

Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws.—DHS is focused on smart and effective enforcement of U.S. immigration laws while 

streamlining and facilitating the legal immigration process. The Department 

has fundamentally reformed immigration enforcement, focusing on identifying 
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and removing criminal aliens who pose a threat to public safety and targeting 

employers who knowingly and repeatedly break the law. 

Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace.—By statute and Presidential Directive, DHS has the lead for the Federal Government to secure civilian government computer systems and works with industry and State, local, 

tribal, and territorial governments to secure critical infrastructure and information systems. DHS analyzes and reduces cyber threats and vulnerabilities; distributes threat warnings; and coordinates the response to cyber incidents to ensure that our computers, networks, and cyber systems remain safe. 

Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters.—DHS provides the coordinated, 

comprehensive Federal response in the event of a terrorist attack, natural disaster or other large-scale emergency while working with Federal, State, local, 

and private sector partners to ensure a swift and effective recovery effort. The 

Department’s efforts to build a ready and resilient Nation include fostering a 

community-oriented approach; bolstering information sharing; improving the capability to plan; and providing grants and training to our Homeland Security 

and law enforcement partners. 

Mission 6: Providing Essential Support to National and Economic Security.— 

DHS leads and supports many activities that provide essential support to national and economic security including, but not limited to: 

—maximizing collection of customs revenue; 

—maintaining the safety of the marine transportation system; 

—preventing the exploitation of children; 

—providing law enforcement training; and 

—coordinating the Federal Government’s response to global intellectual property theft. DHS contributes in many ways to these elements of broader U.S. 

national and economic security while fulfilling its other five Homeland Security missions. 

The following are highlights of the fiscal year 2012 budget: 

PREVENTING TERRORISM AND ENHANCING SECURITY

Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT).—$105.2 million and 535 positions are included for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to purchase, install, 

and operate 275 AITs at airport checkpoints. The fiscal year 2012 request, combined 

with prior requests, will result in 1,275 AIT units deployed by the end of 2012. The 

requested funding covers the cost of new Transportation Screening officers and managers to operate the new AITs, as well as the associated support and airport management costs. Continuing to increase AIT deployments while ensuring privacy safeguards are in place is critical to address the current threat by safely screening passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats—including weapons, explosives and 

other objects concealed under layers of clothing. 

Explosives Detection Systems (EDS).—$273 million is requested to support the recapitalization and deployment of state-of-the-art EDS for checked baggage to efficiently screen baggage for explosives, reducing the number of rescans and physical 

bag searches. Beginning in fiscal year 2012, more than 800 EDS in our largest airports will exceed their planned 10-year service life. 

Assistant Field Security Directors-Law Enforcement (AFSD–LEs).—Requested 

funding of $22.5 million supports 82 AFSD–LEs currently deployed and provides 22 

additional AFSD–LEs for major airports, where they serve as the primary liaison 

to local law enforcement as AIT expansion continues. 

Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).—The fiscal year 2012 budget requests funds 

to maintain the FAMS surge deployment levels for domestic and international flight 

coverage that began in response to the attempted terrorist attack on December 25, 

2009. Members of the FAMS, TSA’s law enforcement entity, are deployed on flights 

around the world and the United States based on risk in order to detect, deter, and 

defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers, and crews. 

Enhanced Watchlist Vetting.—$12.4 million is proposed for maintaining the expanded watchlist vetting initiative, which, through the Secure Flight program, enables TSA to identify individuals who may present a threat to passenger air travel. 

Through Secure Flight, TSA prescreens passenger name, date of birth, and gender 

against terrorist watchlists before passengers receive their boarding passes. In addition to facilitating secure travel for all passengers, the program helps prevent the 

misidentification of passengers who have names similar to individuals on government watchlists. 

Immigration Advisory Program (IAP).—A total request of $14.1 million will permit the IAP to expand in Paris, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Amman. IAP is a part of 

Custom and Border Protection’s (CBP) layered risk-based security approach, which 
12 

includes working with international partners to post CBP officers at foreign airports 

and use advanced targeting and passenger analysis information to identify high-risk 

travelers at foreign airports before they board U.S.-bound flights. 

Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs).—The fiscal year 2012 budget request of 

$236.9 million funds 3,336 BDOs, which includes 350 new positions. BDOs serve as 

an additional layer of security in airports by providing a nonintrusive means of 

identifying individuals who may pose a risk of terrorism or criminal activity. 

Canine Teams.—Requested funding of $125.7 million allows TSA to sustain the 

deployment of 900 canine teams supported by reallocations made under the continuing resolution, providing an important layer of security to complement passenger checkpoint screening at airports, assist in air cargo screening and enhance 

security in the mass transit environment. 

Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams.—$109 million requested supports 37 VIPR teams and includes 12 new multi-modal VIPR Teams proposed in the fiscal year 2012 request in addition to the 10 existing teams in Aviation 

and the 15 VIPR teams dedicated to surface transportation added in the fiscal year 

2010 budget. VIPR teams are comprised of personnel with expertise in inspection, 

behavior detection, security screening, and law enforcement for random, unpredictable deployments throughout the transportation sector to deter potential terrorist 

and criminal acts. 

Passenger Security Fee.—The fiscal year 2012 budget reflects a proposal to increase the Aviation Passenger Security Fee by $1.50 per enplanement beginning in 

2012. The Aviation Passenger Security fee has not changed since the TSA was established following the events of 9/11, even though the overall cost of aviation security has grown by more than 400 percent. The administration’s proposal makes 

progress toward fulfilling the intent of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

to cover the costs of aviation security through fees and not by the general taxpayers. 

BioWatch Gen 1/2.—$90 million is requested to continue operating the Gen 1/2 

BioWatch detection network, a federally managed, locally operated, nationwide biosurveillance system designed to detect the intentional release of aerosolized biological agents in more than 30 cities. 

BioWatch Gen-3.—The fiscal year 2012 budget provides $25 million to continue 

Gen-3 development, which is expected to significantly reduce the time between a release of a biothreat agent and confirmation of that release by BioWatch technology. 

Operational testing and evaluation of Gen-3 technology will begin in 1-of-4 test cities in fiscal year 2012 with full deployment expected in fiscal year 2014. 

Securing the Cities.—$27 million is requested for Securing the Cities to continue 

the build-out of the domestic portion of the global nuclear detection architecture, the 

multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to 

enhance the Nation’s ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack 

in our highest risk cities. 

Radiological/Nuclear Detection Systems.—The fiscal year 2012 budget requests 

$57 million for the procurement and deployment of radiation portal monitors and 

human portable radiation detection systems, providing vital detection equipment to 

CBP and the Coast Guard to scan for radiological and nuclear threats. 

Countermeasures and 2012 Presidential Candidate Nominee Protection.—The fiscal year 2012 request funds critical Secret Service operations and countermeasures 

to protect the first family and visiting dignitaries, including the 2012 presidential 

campaign and three anticipated National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The 

budget also restores the Secret Service’s base funding—supporting the replacement 

of protective equipment, vehicles, training of personnel, and other infrastructure to 

allow the Secret Service to improve the execution of its protective and investigatory 

missions. 

National Network of Fusion Centers.—The fiscal year 2012 budget expands support for the national network of fusion centers in order to provide State and local 

law enforcement with the tools they need to address threats in their communities. 

The request focuses on integrating and coordinating cross-department and cross-government interaction with fusion centers focused on enhancing baseline capabilities. 

State and Local Law Enforcement Training.—The fiscal year 2012 budget provides 

funding to train 64,000 individual Federal, State, and local law enforcement personnel through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and its total budget 

of $276 million. 

National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF).—$150 million is requested to 

begin construction of the NBAF, which will serve as a new, state-of-the-art biosafety 

level 3 and 4 facility. Work performed at NBAF will lead to the development of vaccines and antivirals and enhanced diagnostic capabilities for protecting our country 

from numerous foreign animal and emerging diseases. 
13 

SECURING AND MANAGING OUR BORDERS

CBP Law Enforcement.—The fiscal year 2012 budget supports 21,370 Border Patrol agents and 21,186 CBP officers at our ports of entry who work 24/7 with State, 

local, and Federal law enforcement in targeting illicit networks trafficking in people, 

drugs, illegal weapons, and money. This reflects the largest deployment of law enforcement officers to the front line in the agency’s history. The request annualizes 

positions supported by the fiscal year 2010 Emergency Border Security Supplemental for the Southwest Border, including 1,000 Border Patrol agents and 250 

CBP officers. Funding is provided to support 300 new CBP officers above the fiscal 

year 2011 budget and additional canine assets to support Port of Entry operations. 

The request supports the mobile response surge teams created with the supplemental funding to respond rapidly to emergent situations without depleting Border 

Patrol staffing from other locations. 

New Southwest Border Technology.—$242 million is requested to support the continued deployment of proven, effective surveillance technology along the highest 

trafficked areas of the Southwest Border. Funds will be used to procure and deploy 

commercially available technology tailored to the operational requirements of the 

Border Patrol, distinct terrain, and population density of each border region. These 

funds will allow CBP to fully deploy a mix of integrated fixed towers and other mobile equipment in three of the five Border Patrol stations’ areas of responsibility in 

Arizona. 

Northern Border Technology.—The request includes $55 million to support investments in technology systems which address security needs for the Northern Border 

maritime and cold weather environment, as well as innovative technology pilots. It 

will also deploy proven, standalone technology that provides immediate operational 

benefits. These demonstrations and deployments explore how best to integrate various sensors, border security organizations, and mission operations in order to optimize border security in this challenging environment. 

CBP Journeyman.—The request includes $229 million to fully fund the increase 

in journeyman grade level for frontline CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and CBP 

agricultural specialists from GS–11 to GS–12. 

Tactical Communications (TACCOM).—The fiscal year 2012 budget includes $40 

million to continue the transition of the TACCOM program to a robust, open architecture system that will increase interoperability with other law enforcement, expand coverage, and improve agent safety in the Houlton, El Paso, Laredo, and Rio 

Grande Valley sectors. 

National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC–P).—A total of $47 million is requested to enhance CBP’s ability to interdict dangerous individuals or terrorists 

traveling from foreign locations before boarding flights destined for the United 

States. The funds will be used to hire additional staff and implement enhancements 

in targeting priorities. 

U.S. Coast Guard Recapitalization.—The fiscal year 2012 request fully funds the 

fifth national security cutter (NSC), supports 40 response boats and 6 fast response 

cutters, as well as a sizable investment in the renovation and restoration of shore 

facilities. The budget also provides resources to ensure that the Coast Guard’s aviation fleet is mission-ready through the acquisition of two maritime patrol aircraft, 

one HH–60 helicopter, and conversion and sustainment projects of multiple aircraft. 

Funding for the NSC underscores the Department’s support of this program which 

is important to the Coast Guard’s long-term recapitalization effort and, most importantly, to allow the Coast Guard to replace its aged, obsolete high endurance cutter 

fleet as quickly as possible. The total request for Coast Guard acquisition, construction, and improvements is $1.4 billion. 

Maritime Safety and Response.—$115.5 million remains in the Coast Guard’s base 

resources for 11 maritime safety and security teams and their associated 921 personnel, who conduct port security activities and provide support to NSSEs. 

ENFORCING AND ADMINISTERING OUR IMMIGRATION LAWS

Detention Beds.—The fiscal year 2012 budget increases Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) Custody Operations funding by $157.7 million to support 33,400 

detention beds and remove more than 200,000 criminal aliens in fiscal year 2012. 

Detention Reform.—ICE plans to continue building on its detention reform efforts 

in fiscal year 2012 by improving detainee access to quality healthcare, reducing the 

average length of stay, and facilitating access to family members and legal representation by adding functionality to the recently released online detainee locator system. 

Worksite Enforcement.—Requested funds continue the Department’s focus on 

worksite enforcement, promoting compliance with worksite-related laws through 
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criminal prosecutions of egregious employers, Form I–9 inspections, civil fines, and 

debarment, as well as education and compliance tools. 

E-Verify.—The fiscal year 2012 request continues support for E-Verify operations 

and enhancements, including continued funding for new monitoring, compliance, 

and outreach positions necessitated by program expansion. The continued success 

of E-Verify demonstrated by recent independent reports reflect the administration’s 

commitment to smart, tough, and effective strategies that build a strong foundation 

upon which immigrants can exercise their rights and responsibilities as Americans. 

Secure Communities.—A total of $184 million is requested for Secure Communities—which uses biometric information and services to identify and remove criminal aliens in State prisons and local jails. The $64 million program increase will expand deployment to 96 percent of all jurisdictions nationally in fiscal year 2012 and 

provide resources to confirm the identification of an estimated 199,000 more criminal aliens through interoperability in fiscal year 2012 than fiscal year 2010 and 

transport more than 44,000 criminal aliens from State and local jails into the custody of ICE following the completion of their sentences. ICE will work with DHS’s 

Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Department of Justice to develop 

a robust oversight and evaluation process of Secure Communities and to provide 

training to State and local law enforcement. Secure Communities is on track for nationwide deployment by 2013. 

Visa Security Program.—The budget requests $29 million to continue the Visa Security Program at current locations. This program enhances national security by 

preventing terrorists, criminals, and other ineligible applicants from receiving visas. 

Immigrant Integration.—The fiscal year 2012 request expands U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) effort to support immigrant integration efforts, 

including funding for new programs supporting English language acquisition and 

citizenship education. 

Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE).—The fiscal year 2012 request continues support for USCIS SAVE operations and enhancements to assist 

State, local, and Federal agencies in determining individuals’ eligibility for public 

benefits based on their immigration status. 

USCIS Business Transformation.—The fiscal year 2012 request continues the 

multi-year effort to transform USCIS from a paper-based filing system to a customer-focused electronic filing system. 

SAFEGUARDING AND SECURING CYBERSPACE

Federal Network Protection.—$233.6 million is requested to expedite the deployment of Einstein 3 to prevent and detect intrusions on computer systems and to upgrade the National Cyber Security Protection System, building an intrusion detection capability and analysis capabilities to protect Federal networks. 

Federal IT Security Assessments.—A total of $40.9 million in requested funds will 

support the Department’s efforts to strengthen Federal network security of large 

and small agencies by conducting an estimated 66 network assessments to improve 

security across the Federal executive branch. 

Cybersecurity Workforce Needs.—$24.5 million is proposed to provide high-quality, 

cost-effective virtual cybersecurity education and training to develop and grow a robust cybersecurity workforce that is able to protect against and respond to national 

cybersecurity threats and hazards. 

Cyber Investigations.—The fiscal year 2012 budget continues to support cyber investigations conducted through the Secret Service and ICE, targeting large-scale 

producers and distributors of child pornography and preventing attacks against U.S. 

critical infrastructure through financial crimes task forces. 

Cyber Mission Integration.—The fiscal year 2012 request includes $1.3 million to 

enable DHS to coordinate national cybersecurity operations and interface with the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, 

Maryland. This funding will support a landmark memorandum of agreement signed 

by Secretary Napolitano and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that aligns and enhances America’s capabilities to protect against threats to critical civilian and military computer systems and networks. 

Cybersecurity Research.—The fiscal year 2012 request includes an increase of $18 

million for the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative to support research 

and development projects focused on strengthening the Nation’s cybersecurity. 

ENSURING RESILIENCE TO DISASTERS

State and Local Grants.—The fiscal year 2012 request sustains Federal funding 

for State and local preparedness grants totaling more than $3.8 billion, highlighting 

the Department’s commitment to moving resources out of Washington, DC and into 
15 

the hands of State and local first responders who are often best positioned to detect 

and respond to terrorism, other threats, and natural disasters. 

Assistance to Firefighters Grants.—The fiscal year 2012 request includes $670 mil- lion. Included in this amount are $420 million for Staffing for Adequate Fire and 

Emergency Response (SAFER) grants to rehire laid off firefighters and retain veteran first responders—totaling 2,300 firefighter positions—and $250 million for 

equipment, training, vehicles, and related materials. 

Disaster Relief Fund.—$1.8 billion is requested for the DRF to allow FEMA to 

continue to address the impacts of a disaster on individuals and communities across 

the Nation. The DRF provides a significant portion of the total Federal response to 

victims in presidentially declared disasters or emergencies. 

Regional Catastrophic Event Planning.—$8.5 million is requested to continue development of catastrophic plans, with a focus on plans for response to biological 

events and earthquakes. 

National Exercises.—FEMA’s participation in National Level Exercise-12, an exercise to test FEMA’s ability to respond to a catastrophic cyber attack, is funded with 

$3 million through the request. 

Emergency Management Oversight.—The fiscal year 2012 request includes $20 

million for the Office of the Inspector General to continue its Emergency Management Oversight operations. 

PROVIDING ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO NATIONAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

Patrolling the Exclusive Economic Zone.—The Coast Guard patrols the U.S. exclusive economic zone boundary areas to reduce the threat of foreign poaching of U.S. 

fish stocks and ensure compliance with international living marine resource agreements. The budget includes $47 million to extend the service life of five medium endurance cutters critical in support of this mission. 

U.S. Coast Guard Staffing.—The request strengthens the Coast Guard’s operational capacity by funding a total of 50,682 civilian and military personnel in fiscal 

year 2012. 

Enhancing Maritime Safety.—The fiscal year 2012 budget requests $686.3 million 

and 4,717 full-time equivalents (FTEs) for the Coast Guard’s maritime safety activities. The fiscal year 2012 budget provides 105 new Marine Safety Inspectors and 

Investigators to staff ship inspections and post-incident investigations. 

Enhancing Marine Environmental Protection and Response.—The fiscal year 2012 

budget requests $225.2 million and 1,362 FTE to enable the Coast Guard to conduct 

Marine Environmental Response. This includes 87 new environmental response personnel and creates the Coast Guard’s first incident management assistance team, 

a highly trained team that will be deployed rapidly to augment the Coast Guard 

command structure when an incident of national significance occurs. 

Investigate Cultural Antiquity Trafficking and Coordinate Repatriation.—The fiscal year 2012 budget continues to support ICE seizures and repatriation of cultural 

property, art and antiquities illegally imported into the United States and the investigation of illegal trafficking of artwork, especially works that have been reported 

lost or stolen. 

Forensic Support for Missing and Exploited Children.—Funding is requested for 

the Secret Service to provide forensic support to the National Center for Missing 

and Exploited Children, which provides state-of-the-art forensics support for investigations involving missing and exploited children and grant funds for activities related to the investigations of missing and exploited children. 

Collect Customs Revenue.—Funds are requested to support CBP’s role as a revenue collector for the U.S. Treasury—customs revenue remains the second-largest 

source of revenue for the U.S. Government. CBP has set revenue collection as a priority trade issue to ensure effective internal controls that protect the duties and 

taxes (more than $29 billion in 2009) collected for the U.S. Government. 

Protect U.S. Intellectual Property Rights.—The fiscal year 2012 budget request 

funds to support CBP’s enforcement program to prevent trade in counterfeit and pirated goods, and enforce exclusion orders on patent-infringing and other intellectual 

property rights violative goods. The ICE HSI Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Center investigates the smuggling and distribution of counterfeit goods and products 

that pose risks to public safety and security. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals and critical technology components, such as computer chips for defense systems and airplane equipment, were among the top seized commodities in IPR investigations. 

MATURING AND STRENGTHENING THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE

Maturing and strengthening the Homeland Security enterprise—the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, non-
16 

governmental, and private-sector partners, as well as individuals, families, and communities—is critical to the Department’s success in carrying out its core missions 

and operational objectives. This includes enhancing shared awareness of risks and 

threats, building capable communities, and fostering innovative approaches and solutions through cutting-edge science and technology, while continuing to foster a culture of efficiency, sustainability in accordance with Executive Order 13514 and fiscal 

responsibility and streamline management across the Department. 

While the Department proposes significant cuts to administrative support across 

all components in order to maintain frontline operations, the following activities are 

supported through the fiscal year 2012 budget: 

St. Elizabeths.—$159.7 million is requested for the St. Elizabeths project. 

This funding enables DHS to complete the Coast Guard headquarters facility 

and to continue work on the National Operations Center. The request, however, 

will defer the FEMA headquarters consolidation. 

Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC).—The fiscal year 2012 

budget proposes $11 million to fund the TASC program, which supports the 

modernization of the Department’s financial, asset, and acquisition management systems—a key priority for the Department and a step toward addressing 

recommendations on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) high-risk list. 

Acquisition Workforce.—$24.2 million in requested funds will increase the Department’s acquisition workforce capacity by 150 positions, including additional 

systems engineers, program managers, logisticians and business cost estimators, to ensure operational requirements are properly developed and included 

in DHS contracts and to provide greater oversight and accountability. This too, 

is consistent with previous recommendations from GAO and the Inspector General. 

Information Security and Infrastructure.—$32.3 million is requested to establish a unified email network for DHS-wide use, and provide Single Sign-On and 

other capabilities. These activities will leverage technologies to strengthen DHS 

operations and enhance communications with Federal, State, local, and private 

sector partners. 

U.S. Coast Guard Housing and Child Care.—The health and welfare of military families is the heart of Coast Guard operational readiness. The fiscal year 

2012 budget includes $29 million to address critical housing shortfalls and improve access to affordable, quality childcare. These initiatives will ensure Coast 

Guard members can maintain both strong families and a high state of readiness. 

CONCLUSION

The fiscal year 2012 budget proposal reflects this administration’s strong commitment to protecting the homeland and the American people through the effective and 

efficient use of DHS resources. As outlined in my testimony today, the Department 

will continue to build upon past successes in several areas including securing U.S. 

air, land, and sea borders; safeguarding lawful trade and travel; securing Federal 

networks; and disrupting and dismantling transnational criminal and terrorist organizations that engage in cross-border criminal activity while maximizing every taxpayer dollar we receive. 

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I look forward to answering 

your questions and to working with you on the Department’s fiscal year 2012 budget 

request and other Homeland Security issues. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

And since I have asked one question, I am just going to ask two 

additional ones and then turn it over to my co-chair, to the ranking 

member. 

CONTINUING RESOLUTION

I want to follow up on just your last statement—the House recently passed a continuing resolution that cut funding by $2.5 billion in this Department, which is 6 percent below the fiscal year 

2010 budget. As you stated, it cuts port security grants, deep cuts 

to the Coast Guard, which are particularly troubling to myself and 

I think Senator Cochran as well. And there are other aspects. 
17 

Could you give a little bit more detail, if we are not able to modify some of these cuts, what consequences it will actually have in 

your Department? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Madam Chair, here are a few of the details. It cuts the number of advanced imaging technology (AIT) machines we can deploy to our Nation’s airports. And these are necessary because our adversaries, al Qaeda/al Qaeda-related, continue to seek aviation as a target and continue to target it by 

means other than something that would be picked only by a magnetometer. So we need to move to the next generation, and that is 

the AIT machine. It cuts those by 250 and the 500 requested, cuts 

the number of portable ETD machines, explosive trace detection 

machines, by one-half. It cuts the number of canine teams by twothirds. It cuts the personnel responsible for background investigations, intelligence redress, and air cargo and surface inspections. It 

will probably result in an increase in wait times for passengers in 

the air environment, and those could be significant. 

It cuts the deployment of intelligence personnel to State and 

local fusion centers. This is a network of 72 centers that we have 

installed as really the portals of entry through which intelligence 

can be shared at the Secret and above level out to our States and 

localities, and intelligence can be received back so that we really 

have a Homeland Security intelligence capability. It cuts that very, 

very deeply. 

In addition, it cuts funding for at least 250 ICE agents along the 

border. Agent Zapata, by the way, the agent who was just murdered in Mexico, was an ICE special agent. It eliminates or if the 

cuts are annualized in the 2012—and that is a concern I have that 

the House continuing resolution for 2011 then becomes the budget 

for 2012. If it does that, it will not annualize the additional Border 

Patrol agents this Congress approved of in a supplemental not too 

long ago. So those will go away. 

I could go into more detail, Madam Chair, but you get a sense 

of what this would do to us. 

Senator LANDRIEU. It gives us a sense of what the challenge is. 

And as I was with you just yesterday at Georgetown for that really 

remarkable gathering of the past two Homeland Security Secretaries, as we saw, Secretary Ridge, Secretary Chertoff, and yourself 

there, it reminded me that this was the largest reorganization of 

the Federal Government since President Harry S. Truman organized the aspects of the military, the branches of the military, into 

the Department of Defense (DOD). And so this is the youngest of 

all the Federal Departments. 

So as we are looking, Senator Coats, for efficiencies, which we all 

want to look for in streamlining, we have to be mindful that we are 

building, not streamlining this Department. We are building and 

potentially streamlining, but we are not taking down. We are building this agency, and that takes investments and resources. 

AIRLINE FEES

My final question, if you could answer this very shortly. I have 

been becoming very concerned with the airlines and the charges 

that they are charging to passengers. And particularly, I know this 

is under the Department of Commerce, but under our jurisdiction 
18 

is the way it affects TSA. And I have asked the staff to get some 

information. 

Checked baggage fees are increasing. It looks like, the cost to 

TSA is also increasing because people do not want to pay the fees. 

So they are not checking bags, putting more on the planes, slowing 

down actually the seating, of course. But I understand that it is a 

$250 million annual cost to TSA because of those extra bags. 

My question is, do the taxpayers have to pick up this cost or 

should we be looking to the airlines to give us some of the profits 

that they are making from these fees to offset the cost to the taxpayer? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Madam Chair, the answer is that when 

you have to pay to check a bag, it increases carry-on luggage, and 

that means that there is more to inspect at the gate and so forth 

for passengers getting on the planes. We do have an estimate. That 

is roughly $260 million. 

One of the reasons we requested the ability to charge a security 

fee for travelers—I think, Senator Coats, you referenced that in 

your statement—was because we need to be able to pay for this additional security that TSA must have. And if we do not have the 

ability to have a security fee, which by the way has not been adjusted since 2002, that is at least a $600 million bite that we have 

to eat somewhere. And as you can tell from my opening statement, 

everywhere you hit in this Department, it is going to have an operational impact. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Thank you. 

CONTINUING RESOLUTION

I have got some specific questions here, but really in looking at 

the larger picture, the reality is that we do have this significant 

deficit problem and it is going to be addressed one way or another. 

The Congress can address it as it has done through current efforts 

on the continuing resolution for the remainder of the current fiscal 

year, but also structuring how next year’s functions of Government 

will be funded. 

The reality is, I think, that no one is going to get everything that 

they would like to get. And the question I have for you is—and I 

know you have scrubbed your budget—but if you start with the assumption that you may not get in your budget all the requests that 

have been made, have you scrubbed the system to, in a sense, categorize those requests? If you have to come back to us and say, 

okay, this is all we are going to get—have you scrubbed your budget in a way that you could say we deem these to be absolutely essential? We have the next category that are very important but not 

absolutely essential; another category that says these potentially 

can be deferred until revenues increase or we are able to do better 

with the budget; and these are ones that we think could be nice 

to have but not really necessary to have and could potentially be 

terminated to gain those savings. It might be accompanied with, 

say, a provision which you just discussed, an increase in fees on the 

enplaning. 
19 

But I guess my question is, have you done this? Do you contemplate having to move to a plan B should the Congress not be 

able to fund the budget as presented? And if you have, can you 

share that with us? And if you have not, is that something in the 

plans? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, Senator Coats, we went through 

that analysis in working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on what the President’s budget request would be and 

finding places or things that could be put off or delayed. 

For example, postponing the move to a real Department headquarters at St. Elizabeths was something that we recommended, 

going through kind of the analysis you just suggested. Now, if you 

saw where our headquarters are now and the office that I have and 

others have, you would know that we made a tough choice there. 

That means that we cannot have all our components collocated. It 

means that from a managerial standpoint, we still are spread out. 

We postponed all collocations in other cities across the country because of the associated costs of moving people, and that has a managerial impact to it as well. 

So I believe the President’s budget reflects the analysis that you 

have just suggested and that real choices have been made in it already. 

BUDGET

Senator COATS. Well, I am sure that is what the President’s 

budget projects and thinks, but I mean, obviously, we are going to 

have a congressional budget I hope. And we are certainly going to 

have congressional appropriations, and they may not match what 

the President has proposed. Every agency is going to come here 

and say exactly what you have said. We are cut to the bone. The 

President’s budget is as low as we can go. The reality in this Congress is that we are going to appropriate—I believe, going to end 

up appropriating less than what that budget asks for. 

And so it seems to me that it would be prudent for every agency 

to simply kind of red team your current budget and basically say 

if what happens probably happens, then where do we go? Will we 

have something that we can bring back to the Congress and 

present and say we do not like it, but these are the consequences, 

but this is what we will have to do if we come in at this number? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We look forward to, Senator, to working 

with you on the budget. I just would respectfully suggest that this 

Department is somewhat unique. It is new. It is virtually all operations. And so when you look at this budget, it really is tied to the 

five priorities I identified for you in my opening statement. 

Senator COATS. Well, I agree with that. I mean, along with national defense, homeland security, a couple of others are essential 

functions of the U.S. Government. I could not agree more. But 

there just are fiscal realities that we have to deal with, and I think 

right now the method going forward is to take a look at every area 

to see if we can find efficiencies. 

Doing as much or more with less is something, again, that all of 

America has had to do in these last 2 years, and it is easier for 

some than others. But everyone has been forced to make those 
20 

hard decisions, and I think in this case the reality is that there will 

probably be some hard decisions that will have to be made. 

I do not look forward to working on this together; it is not something either of us relish, but I think it is something that we are 

going to have to do. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, I think, first of all, we are always willing to supply information. As you go through the budget 

request and have questions about things, we are more than happy 

to work with you on that. 

Senator COATS. My time is about to expire. Given the fact that 

we have a vote coming up and some other members may want to 

talk, I will wait. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator Coats. 

Senator Cochran. 

Senator COCHRAN. Madam Chairman, thank you. Congratulations on your leadership of this subcommittee. 

Madam Secretary, welcome. We look forward to working closely 

with you to identify our budget needs and to try to respond to them 

in a thoughtful and expeditious manner. 

One of the difficulties I know that you face is the lack of predictability about when funds are available for this program or that. I 

wonder if you could share with us some specific examples of what 

problems you might encounter if we do not move quickly to provide 

you certainty with respect to your budget needs. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I think from a management perspective, managing by small continuing resolutions is very difficult. 

It affects your ability to undertake key acquisitions. It affects your 

ability to hire personnel. It affects your ability to make investments in things that you kind of think will be ultimately in the 

budget, but those funds are not yet available. So from a management perspective, it makes a difficult management job even more 

difficult. 

COAST GUARD SHIPBUILDING

Senator COCHRAN. One of the things we are proud of in our State 

is the fact we have a shipbuilding capability on the Mississippi gulf 

coast at Pascagoula, and part of the mission there is to fulfill contracts that are made with the Department that you lead for Coast 

Guard cutters. What is the status of our shipbuilding progress in 

meeting those needs, and what can we do to work more effectively 

with you predicting what the future is going to hold? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Here is what we are requesting for the 

Coast Guard, that ultimately we have eight large NSCs. The budget between 2011 and 2012 fully funds cutter No. 5. We do not provide in the 2012 budget what is called long lead funding for No. 

6. We have instead a commitment—I think it is actually in writing—by OMB that we will fund No. 6, but those funds will not be 

spent until fiscal year 2013. So we did not park them in fiscal year 

2012. We did not think that was an efficient use of them. 

So we fully expect to build out the eight cutters. In exchange for 

not funding lead time for No. 6 in 2012, we buy a combination of 

46 smaller vessels, FRCs and so forth, that could be used in other 

missions for the Coast Guard and for their lay-down. And then 
21 

there is some funding in there for aircraft, but those are not made 

in Mississippi. 

DISASTER RELIEF FUND

Senator COCHRAN. Are you satisfied with the request being submitted to the Congress for funding that the FEMA DRF will have 

money to respond to emergencies that occur? We think of the hurricanes that hit the Gulf of Mexico, the oil spill that occurred down 

there. We have had some really serious challenges in that part of 

the country. What about that disaster fund? Do we have enough 

money requested in here to meet your needs? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. The disaster fund request for 2012 is 

based on the historical practice which is to take a 5-year average 

of noncatastrophic disasters and roll that forward as the number 

and then rely on a supplemental for catastrophic disasters. So the 

fiscal year 2012 budget would cover that practice. 

As the chair noted earlier this morning, we do have some costs 

that will necessitate a supplemental. We have been deobligating 

money. We have been repaying money into the DRF. So what the 

amount of that supplemental ultimately will need to be I cannot 

tell you right now. 

Senator COCHRAN. Madam Chairman, I think I will reserve the 

balance of my time. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, I talk to you now as the vice chairman of this 

subcommittee, and I am happy to serve in that capacity. 

You have unique experience. You have been on the front lines in 

terms of your past service as Governor and know how important 

security, law enforcement is. 

FUNDING CUTS

We face urgent threats to our homeland security. It comes from 

our friends in the House who want to cut funding for programs at 

DHS to keep us safe. While the Republicans want to make unreasonable cuts to Government, the fact of the matter is when it hits 

people’s lives, it makes a huge difference, and their plan would 

slash funding for valuable Homeland Security grant programs like 

port security, public transportation security by 66 percent. These 

funds go to our States, cities, and towns. They are the front lines 

of protecting our homeland. Cuts to these two programs alone 

would mean approximately $60 million in Homeland Security support would vanish in my State of New Jersey. 

And New Jersey is home to what law enforcement has identified 

as the country’s most at-risk 2-mile area for terrorists, the stretch 

between the Port of Newark and the Newark Liberty International 

Airport. It is a region that has contact with 12 million persons, and 

it is irresponsible to take vital resources away from our most 

threatened area. 

Now, President Obama and you, Madam Secretary, recognize 

this, and the administration’s request takes a more thoughtful approach to funding DHS. The budget recommends slight increases 

for urban area security initiatives, State Homeland Security grant 
22 

programs. These provide vital support to keep our residents safe. 

But the budget request level for funding port security and a slight 

decrease for rail transit and bus security accompanies the fact that 

the Coast Guard, one of our most valuable resources in our need 

to protect ourselves, also continues to be asked to do more with 

less. And we have got to provide the Coast Guard with the resources it needs to effectively handle its many missions. 

Although I have some concerns about the request I am going to 

address in my questions, it will go to you in writing. We are very 

much out of time. We will go as far as we can right now, however. 

This is not a time to cut back on our homeland security. We have 

seen an increased risk of homegrown terrorism, the Fort Hood massacre, the Time Square bombing attempt, and the New York City 

subway plot, which was uncovered by our law enforcement people. 

Incidents like this remind us that the threat of terrorism is as real 

as ever and we are doing more than skimping on public safety. Are 

we simply cutting resources or are we cutting the throats of the 

people in our society? 

So, Madam Secretary, I ask how we can continue our work to 

make vital investments in homeland security. 

We talked about the bag charges and what burdens that imposes 

on the screening process. I look at Newark Airport, one of the largest in the country, and there have been six security breaches at 

Newark Airport in the last couple of months. Now, I understand 

that TSA is almost 70 employees short of its allocated number for 

Newark Airport. What is DHS doing to fully staff Newark Airport 

and give transportation security officers and managers the training 

they need? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I will respond in writing to the specific question on Newark Airport. 

[The information follows:] 

In close coordination with the Federal Security Director and staff at Newark Airport (EWR), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has initiated a robust and multi-layered effort to address EWR staffing vacancies. EWR is currently 

scheduled to reach near-100 percent staffing by May 1, and, in the interim, TSA has 

been providing additional resources as needed. For example, TSA deployed additional supervisory training instructors to train new hires, additional AIT-certified 

transportation security officers (TSOs) to conduct daily operations while EWR TSOs 

are being trained, and additional staff resources to assist in human resources and 

training operations. 

Following a breach, a complete review of the incident is conducted and each action 

is broken down in detail to ascertain the reasons behind the breach. Every TSA individual involved in the activity and their response is included in this review. TSA 

employees identified as not having followed standard operating procedures or whose 

actions are the result of inattention to duty are immediately removed from their position, and can only return to their positions if retraining and recertification for 

their positions is determined sufficient and is satisfactorily accomplished. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. But, Senator Lautenberg, I think that 

the President’s budget request was designed to meet the threats as 

we see the threats. One of the things we ask for in there to achieve 

an efficiency is combining or consolidating grant programs. We 

have 17 grant programs. We would like to consolidate that significantly to reduce overhead to the grantees, as well as to the grantor. 

That was something we asked for last year. We did not achieve it, 

but it is a suggestion that we make to the subcommittee as one 

area where we could possibly achieve some savings and yet oper-
23 

ationally make sure that we are getting money to where it is needed. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, that is a big stretch. Having to do 

more with less is something we have gotten accustomed to here in 

these years of difficulty. But we also have to recognize that there 

are some minimum resources that we have to have to assure the 

public that we are taking care of their safety. 

The House Republicans have proposed cutting port security by 

two-thirds—the grants. The Port of New York/New Jersey, the 

largest port on the east coast, the second-largest port in the country, directly linked to what the FBI deemed the most dangerous 

area in America for terrorist attack, and yet we lose $33 million 

in security funding under the House bill. What would be the impact on the New Jersey and New York region on our Nation’s economy if there was to be a terrorist attack on one of our largest 

ports? It is almost unimaginable. The financial center of the world 

is included in that circumference, as I mentioned before, 12 million 

people, a large presence of chemical manufacturing in this area, 

very, very dangerous to the surrounding population. And what are 

we doing about that? How can we assure the public that they are 

being well protected, Madam Secretary? 

Because time is precious and fleeting here, I will take an answer 

in writing, and I will have a couple of other questions that I will 

submit to you and ask for a prompt response, please. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, all I can say about the House 

budget for fiscal year 2011 is that it is not a good budget for security. It will have impacts on things like protecting the critical infrastructure along that mile in New Jersey through reductions in 

grants, through reductions in our personnel. And if that budget becomes the basis for the fiscal year 2012 budget, then I think the 

Congress needs to understand—and I think my job is to help it understand—that that in all likelihood will have a security impact. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Senator Moran. 

Senator MORAN. Chairperson Landrieu, thank you very much for 

the opportunity to join you and Mr. Coats and other members of 

the subcommittee. 

Secretary Napolitano, thank you for your testimony. I look forward to being a responsible and diligent member of this subcommittee and the Appropriations Committee, and I am honored to 

be here today. 

NATIONAL BIO- AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY

In the short time that I have, I wanted to highlight one of the 

things that is included in your budget that I am very supportive 

of and want to give you the chance to comment on. You mentioned 

in your written, as well as your verbal testimony about the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). It is my understanding that the request was initially for $200 million, now in 

your budget, having been scrubbed by OMB, at $150 million. And 

I would like to express my support and willingness to work with 

you to see that that is accomplished. 
24 

I represent a State in which we are often thought of as the 

Wheat State, and we are clearly that. But we are very much a livestock, particularly a cattle, State, and we have genuine concern 

recognized by DHS about the possibility of animal diseases. Whether they are naturally occurring, accidental, or intentional, they 

have a dramatic impact upon the economy of Kansas and certainly 

the country. 

We have a very aging facility located on Plum Island that your 

Department, through a selection process, has concluded a site. In 

fact, I was there at the announcement in December 2008 about the 

site for this new facility. And I want to make certain that this Congress and this administration finally fulfill the next step toward 

building that facility for the safety and security of the American 

consumer and citizen in light of the risk that we face in this country. 

So I just would like to have you reiterate the Department’s position, your position, express to the Congress the value of this facility, and how important the timing is for its completion. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, Senator Moran, first of all, the 

NBAF is something that we are very supportive of. In fact, I saw 

Governor Brownback Sunday evening and we talked about it and 

our support for this again. 

I would note, however, for you that the House continuing resolution for fiscal year 2011—the part of our Department that is hit the 

hardest in that resolution is the Science and Technology Directorate. That is where NBAF is located in our budget. It is reduced 

by one-half in that House continuing resolution. That is also where 

we are doing research on new breathing apparatuses for firefighters and research with our national labs on an airport checkpoint of the future, you know, trying to design something so that 

people do not have to take off their shoes and limit the amount of 

liquid they can carry on, that sort of thing. But the NBAF is in 

there as well. 

We are very supportive. Plum Island does not meet the Nation’s 

needs in this area. Kansas was the winner of a very highly contested peer-reviewed competition, and we look forward to its continued construction in Kansas. But I must share with you that things 

are at risk based on the House budget. 

Senator MORAN. I would respond, Madam Secretary, that a piece 

of good news in the debate on the House floor in discussing H.R. 

1, the amendment was made to provide that no funding be authorized for this project, and that amendment was defeated. So I was 

pleased to see the support by a majority of House Members for this 

project. 

I also would add that the State of Kansas has already committed 

dollars, has already expended resources, and I would guess that 

there is a bit of reluctance on our part to continue the funding. We 

have committed $140 million toward the completion of this project, 

and we would have—I cannot speak for Senator Brownback, but I 

know that there would be reticence on the part of many in Kansas 

in continuing to fund this project in the absence of the Federal 

commitment. We are anxious for the day in which the first shovelful of dirt—we would love to have you there and join us with the 

shovels that begin the Federal commitment on that day. 
25 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. And, Senator, I think we share that commitment. We believe in the NBAF, and it should be in Kansas, and 

we need to get on with it. 

Senator MORAN. I appreciate those sentiments and I thank the 

chairperson for allowing me to have this conversation. 

COAST GUARD CUTS

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator. 

Madam Secretary, the DOD budget this year is being increased 

by $23 billion, a 4-percent increase, and that is excluding the cost 

of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The Coast Guard’s discretionary budget has increased less than 

1 percent. The Coast Guard is 1-of-the-5 armed forces of the United 

States. Some of us are having difficulty understanding how it can 

be treated almost as a stepchild given the work that it is asked to 

do in direct protection of our Nation, whether it is intercepting 

drugs, responding to disasters, responding to catastrophic oil pollution incidents, which just occurred. 

Can you shed any light as to why the sixth security cutter was 

deferred? I mean, I understand we have budget constraints but 

could you comment just about the importance of maintaining Coast 

Guard operations for the security of our Nation? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, Senator, the sixth security cutter 

was not deferred in the sense of unnecessarily delayed, but the 

plain fact of the matter is that by the time we actually need to expend money for six, given the time it will take to finish four and 

five, we will be into fiscal year 2013. And our plan is rather than 

set aside unusable money for six in fiscal year 2012, that we would 

request the amount in the year we needed to expend it, which 

would be fiscal year 2013. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Okay. Well, let us continue to focus on that. 

GULF COAST DUMPING

Another issue that is of particular interest—and I hate to be so 

parochial because I do have my eyes on the whole country. But 

right now along the gulf coast, we are having such serious issues, 

you know, with the moratorium, the gulf coast spill, still recovering 

from Katrina and Rita, and this is the whole gulf coast from Florida to Texas. 

But another issue—and it may be affecting some of the other 

coastal States as well—is the illegal dumping of seafood wrecking 

our domestic markets. We are having a terrible time in this area. 

Customs in my view is simply not doing enough to collect the 

dumping duties that importers owe to the Federal Government. 

Since 2005, for example, importers of shrimp from China have 

failed to pay more than $58 million in dumping duties. 

So, Senator Coats, when we are looking for some additional funding, we could be more efficiently collecting some of the money that 

China or Vietnam or others owe us, using that money to invest or 

support or give, if not rebates—according to WTO, that may be inappropriate—but in some way capturing those funds. 

So could you comment on what is in your budget to enforce these 

antidumping rules and regulations on that subject? 
26 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, I think it would be better if we addressed those in writing for you. I know there was some concern. 

I believe there is a rule on crawfish, if I am not mistaken, among 

other types of seafood. I would like to discuss with my component 

heads what the problem is, if there is a problem, and come back 

to you with a detailed answer. 

[The information follows:] 

Antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) enforcement is a priority trade 

issue (PTI) for Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP takes a concerted, systematic approach to detect and deter circumvention of the AD/CVD law, administer 

entries of AD/CVD merchandise, and to issue and collect bills for AD/CVD duties 

owed to the U.S. Government. CBP coordinates its AD/CVD enforcement activities 

through an intra-office AD/CVD PTI Working Group. CBP works closely with the 

Department of Commerce, the administering authority for AD/CVD determinations 

under U.S. law, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to enforce AD/ 

CVD laws and regulations. 

When CBP issues a bill for final AD/CVD duties, CBP makes every effort to collect all duties, taxes, and fees legally due to the Government. However, some importers, or their agents, are unable to pay the final duties. In addition, at least two 

sureties issuing bonds covering substantial amounts of AD/CVD duties are currently 

in receivership, further complicating collection. Other importers are simply unwilling to pay, or no longer exist by the time CBP issues a bill. CBP pursues collection 

action against importers and sureties who are simply unwilling to pay. CBP’s Revenue Division in the Office of Administration initiates an administrative collections 

process in order to recover past-due amounts from the importers and sureties. This 

process may include dunning letters and the suspension of the immediate delivery 

process, among other steps. Ultimately, those debts for which the Revenue Division’s 

collections process is ineffective are referred to CBP’s Office of Chief Counsel. 

The Office of Chief Counsel pursues collection from both the importers and sureties, after completing a legal review of the underlying debt. Further, a review is 

done to determine if there is a viable importer (or available surety coverage) from 

which the debt may be recovered. In part, this is done through dunning letters, 

searches of electronic databases and internal systems, and pursuing available leads. 

In addition, CBP can assess civil penalties pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1592 against any 

party who, by fraud, gross negligence, or negligence submits a material false statement or omission on importation into the United States, including those cases in 

which a false statement or omission is made concerning the applicability of an antidumping duty order to a particular entry. If administrative attempts to collect the 

debt are unsuccessful and a viable importer and/or surety can be found, the Office 

of Chief Counsel drafts a complaint and refers the matter to the Department of Justice for possible litigation in the Court of International Trade. If the Office of Chief 

Counsel is not successful in locating a viable entity to be pursued, the matter will 

be referred back to the Revenue Division for appropriate action. This may include 

referral to ICE for further investigation. If the debt is without legal merit or no viable entity can be located to pursue further collection action, CBP may ultimately be 

forced to write off the debt. 

CBP has taken steps to specifically improve the collection of AD/CVD duties on 

shrimp imports and continues to explore statutory and nonstatutory changes to enhance bonding requirements. CBP is also actively pursuing collection of the balance 

of the open bills against delinquent importers and sureties. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 

And I want to submit for the record—then I will turn it over to 

Senator Coats. I think he may have another question or two. Senator Murkowski has joined us—but for the record about the DRF. 

I asked the staff to provide—and I am going to submit for the 

record—a 20-year history of emergency supplemental funding. Out 

of the $128 billion that has been allocated by the Federal Government for emergency response to all sorts of disasters, $110 billion 

has been appropriated through the supplemental process. So $110 

billion out of $128 billion. 

And when you look at this list, you can understand why that occurs because these sums range from a low of $143 million budgeted 
27 

one year to $50 billion another year. So there are wild fluctuations 

and very difficult to predict what is going to happen. And as Senator Coats and I were saying, these storms seem to be getting more 

frequent, flooding more frequent, levels of flooding higher, more aggressive kind of storms and weather patterns. 

So I submit this for the record because I actually think this subcommittee is going to have to push hard to get this emergency 

funding in a supplemental and use the base funding of Homeland 

Security to manage the operations of this important function of 

Government. So if I can have unanimous consent to submit that to 

the record. 

[The information follows:] 

DISASTER RELIEF NONEMERGENCY/EMERGENCY HISTORY 

Fiscal year Public Law Annual or supplemental 

Amount 

Nonemergency Emergency 

1992 ....................... 102–139 .......................... Annual .............................. $185,000,000 ..................................

1992 ....................... 102–229 .......................... Supplemental ................... 800,000,000 $143,000,000 

1992 ....................... 102–302 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 300,000,000 

1992 ....................... 102–368 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 2,893,000,000 

1993 ....................... 102–389 .......................... Annual .............................. 292,095,000 ..................................

1993 ....................... 103–75 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 2,000,000,000 

1994 ....................... 103–124 .......................... Annual .............................. 292,000,000 ..................................

1994 ....................... 103–211 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 4,709,000,000 

1995 ....................... 103–327 .......................... Annual .............................. 320,000,000 ..................................

1995 ....................... 104–19 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 3,275,000,000 

1996 ....................... 104–134 .......................... Annual .............................. 222,000,000 ..................................

1996 ....................... 104–19 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 3,275,000,000 

1996 ....................... 104–134 .......................... Annual (rescission) .......... ................................ (1,000,000,000 ) 

1997 ....................... 104–204 .......................... Annual .............................. 1,320,000,000 ..................................

1997 ....................... 105–18 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 3,300,000,000 

1998 ....................... 105–65 ............................ Annual .............................. 320,000,000 ..................................

1998 ....................... 105–174 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 1,600,000,000 

1999 ....................... 105–276 .......................... Annual .............................. 307,745,000 ..................................

1999 ....................... 105–277 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 906,000,000 

1999 ....................... 106–31 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 900,000,000 

2000 ....................... 106–74 ............................ Annual .............................. 300,000,000 ..................................

2000 ....................... 106–74 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 2,480,425,000 

2001 ....................... 106–377 (H.R. 5482) ...... Annual .............................. 300,000,000 1,300,000,000 

2001 ....................... 107–38 1 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 1,791,000,000 

2002 ....................... 107–73 ............................ Annual .............................. 664,000,000 1,500,000,000 

2002 ....................... 107–117 2 ........................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 4,356,871,000 

2002 ....................... 107–206 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 2,650,700,000 

2002 ....................... 107–206 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 23,200,000 

2003 ....................... 108–7 .............................. Annual .............................. 800,000,000 ..................................

2003 ....................... 108–69 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 983,600,000 

2004 ....................... 108–90 ............................ Annual .............................. 1,800,000,000 ..................................

2004 ....................... 108–83 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 441,700,000 

2004 ....................... 108–106 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 500,000,000 

2004 ....................... 108–303 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 2,000,000,000 

2005 ....................... 108–334 .......................... Annual .............................. 2,042,380,000 ..................................

2005 ....................... 108–324 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 6,500,000,000 

2005 ....................... 109–61 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 10,000,000,000 

2005 ....................... 109–62 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 50,000,000,000 

2005 ....................... 109–148 .......................... Supplemental (rescission) ................................ (23,409,300,000 ) 

2006 ....................... 109–90 ............................ Annual .............................. 1,770,000,000 ..................................

2006 ....................... 109–234 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 6,000,000,000 

2007 ....................... 109–295 .......................... Annual .............................. 1,500,000,000 ..................................

2007 ....................... 110–28 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 3,400,000,000 

2007 ....................... 110–28 ............................ Supplemental ................... ................................ 710,000,000 

2008 ....................... 110–161 .......................... Annual .............................. 1,400,000,000 ..................................

2008 ....................... 110–116 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 2,900,000,000 
28 

DISASTER RELIEF NONEMERGENCY/EMERGENCY HISTORY—Continued 

Fiscal year Public Law Annual or supplemental 

Amount 

Nonemergency Emergency 

2008 ....................... 110–252 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 897,000,000 

2008 ....................... 110–329 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 7,960,000,000 

2009 ....................... 110–329 .......................... Annual .............................. 1,400,000,000 ..................................

2010 ....................... 111–83 ............................ Annual .............................. 1,600,000,000 ..................................

2010 ....................... 111–212 .......................... Supplemental ................... ................................ 5,100,000,000 

Total .......... .......................................... .......................................... 17,635,220,000 110,386,196,000 

1 Amount provided by FEMA law is not specific by agency. 

2 From amounts appropriated but not originally specified in Public Law 107–38. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me recognize Senator Coats for a second 

round, then Senator Murkowski, and then Senator Moran. 

Senator COATS. Madam Chairman, thank you. Just one question 

and then I will submit some questions also for you to respond back. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And then we are going to have a break in 

about 5 minutes to—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I will try to keep my answers short. 

Senator COATS. I will try to keep my question short. 

STATE AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES, GRANTS

Looking at the grants to States and local communities, I think 

the total in the budget request is $3.8 billion, which is about 9 percent of the Department’s total discretionary request. That will be 

in addition to $28 billion, as I understand it, that has been appropriated since fiscal year 2004. 

The question is, it is my understanding that we have not really 

been able to fully assess—although FEMA is undertaking something to this effect—how effective these are and particularly whether the distribution of these funds is appropriate. The problem usually arises on grants and distributions as the political animal raises 

its head and basically says I got to get my share. 

So I am sympathetic to what Senator Lautenberg was saying relative to representing an area that is a significantly high-threat 

area with the consequences being very, very significant. That obviously is going to be a more significant and higher priority area 

than several of my rural towns or New Jersey’s rural towns. 

But if we keep insisting on a revenue-sharing program in which 

everybody gets a slice, it may be that given this fairly extraordinary amount of money that has been spent to upgrade and prepare local responders and so forth needs to be triaged in a more 

effective way. 

Now, I say that meaning that there may be some communities 

in Indiana that might not get what they otherwise would have gotten in deference to the fact that we have identified some morehighly targeted, more-significant consequences if we have an attack 

here or in a particular area and so forth. 

Could you comment on that in terms of, one, how we best assess the impact and the effectiveness of that $28 billion that has already been spent and whether or not we need to make an effort 

at looking at prioritizing or triaging areas which ought to get more 

funds and others that should get less? 
29 

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me interrupt just 1 minute. In the spirit 

of bipartisanship, I am actually going to pass the gavel to Senator 

Coats so he can continue. I am going to go vote and in 5 minutes 

you all could take a recess, and then I will be right back. But you 

all continue. 

Senator COATS [presiding]. All right. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I am glad because this requires a longer 

answer I think than perhaps the buzzer would permit. 

In the area of grants, one of the things we need to do as a country is—I call it a homeland security architecture that begins with 

small towns, cities, States, et cetera. The Federal Government cannot do it by itself. And I think the theory underlying a lot of the 

grants is that being the case, we need to make sure that there is 

a certain baseline capability throughout the country. 

And then second, in the area of focusing Federal grants on the 

areas of highest risk, there I think there needs to be and can be 

and should be a dialogue with the executive branch and the legislative branch. I will share with you, Senator, that one person’s rural 

community is another person’s—subject to an ag or a bio-attack 

and the need to have things like the NBAF located there. 

So on the issue of interoperability of emergency response equipment, rural America is the toughest problem. In urban areas, interoperability can be achieved and is being achieved because the lines 

are there, the towers are there, and so forth. In rural America or 

the area along the Southwest Border or along the Northern Border, 

it is some of our most difficult areas to cover just because of the 

lack of capital and infrastructure. So these are kind of the nuts and 

bolts things we are going through when we talk about awarding 

grants for interoperability or for this or for that. 

But I think you are right to suggest that there can be a useful 

dialogue on how grants are done. That is why we have recommended that some of these programs be consolidated because we 

think that that would be a better way to manage them and so 

forth. So we look forward to working with the subcommittee on 

that. 

Senator COATS. Thank you. 

Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Senator Coats. 

Secretary, welcome. I apologize I was not here for the full hearing. I will make my comments quick, hopefully, and will get out of 

here to the vote. And I do not know whether you have to stay until 

we get back or not. But let me go very, very quickly. 

TSA PAT-DOWNS

I was up in Alaska this past weekend, and all of the news was 

centered around one of our State House Representatives, Representative Sharon Cissna, a woman that I have served with, a 

woman who has undergone breast cancer and had a mastectomy. 

And you do not need to know her personal history, but her personal 

history is now part of the discussion in Alaska because she was 

subjected to what she felt was a very intrusive pat-down coming 

back from Seattle to go to work in Juneau after her medical appointments. And apparently the full-body scanners detected some 

scars, and apparently State Representative Cissna is not the only 
30 

individual where scars from medical procedures are picked up and 

the individual is subjected to what is described as a very intrusive 

pat-down. 

She had made the determination that she was not going to put 

herself through this again. She had done it once. And as a consequence, this individual, in order to get back to work, drove a car, 

took a small airplane, went through Canada, and eventually got 

onto the ferry. It took her 4 days to get from Seattle to Juneau. 

Our State’s capital is on an island in Alaska. We cannot get anywhere without flying. 

I have sent a letter to the Administrator of the TSA asking him 

for clarification as to what the process will be for those that have 

had medical procedures, those that have prosthetics that go 

through this screening process where they are subjected to enhanced pat-downs and the intrusion on their dignity is such that 

they are making choices like Representative Cissna did to not fly. 

In my State, as you know, that is a pretty difficult decision to 

make. 

I have not heard anything back from the Administrator about 

this yet, but it is an issue that as we work to protect the safety 

of all Americans and the safety of our skies, the safety of our Nation, there is that balancing between how we ensure for that and 

how we ensure for an individual’s privacy and dignity. 

I wanted to make sure that you were fully aware of this because 

this is an issue that has taken on a life beyond its own. And I do 

not know whether you have an answer for me today in terms of 

what those protocols may be, but it is something that I believe the 

issue will not die down until there is a better resolve than what 

we saw happen, at least with one particular constituent in the Seattle Airport. 

Senator COATS. Madam Secretary, if I could, just in the interest 

of time here, I am going to pass the gavel to my colleague and let 

you answer her. I think by the time Senator Murkowski is done, 

the chairman will be back. I just got a note she is returning. So 

if there is a little break, we will just take a temporary recess. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Fair enough. 

Senator MURKOWSKI [presiding]. Thank you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I can chair the subcommittee if you want. 

Just kidding. 

All right. First of all, Senator, we will look into this particular 

matter. It strikes me as a highly unique one, but we will—— 

Senator MURKOWSKI. I am told it is not and that is why—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, we will find out. 

Senator MURKOWSKI [continuing]. So I think it is important. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We will find out—— 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Good. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO [continuing]. Because I will share with 

you that this is not designed to be invasive in the sense of unnecessary or a harassment of any sort. And we want to make sure we 

work through this particular issue. So we will do that. 

I will also share with you, however, that overall we are finding 

that the AIT process, which is the new technology we are using— 

99.9 percent of the passengers who have been through it since 

Thanksgiving have gone through it, no opt-outs, no anything. Peo-
31 

ple with artificial joints, artificial hips, for example, love it because 

it can clearly distinguish that versus the magnetometer where they 

always were getting pulled aside. 

The particular issue you raised—this is something that I am 

more than prepared to look into. We will provide you with a response. No one with a medical condition should feel like every time 

they have to go through the screener, they are going to get pulled 

aside because of their medical condition. What we want to pull 

aside are individuals for whom we cannot resolve an anomaly on 

the screen. This is our last line of protection for an aircraft. There 

are a lot of things that go on before you get to that point, but that 

is our last line. So we will get back to you on that. 

[The information follows:] 

TSA SCREENING PROCESS FOR PERSONS WHO HAVE HAD MEDICAL PROCEDURES

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) spoke with Senator Murkowski’s staff and discussed TSA’s working relationships with groups like Susan G. 

Komen for the Cure to address issues raised by Alaska Representative Cissna for 

women who’ve undergone mastectomies and how TSA integrates their suggestions 

into training. Also shared were TSA’s conference calls and other outreach with Representative Cissna about her experience. The following summarizes this information: 

Does scarring from a mastectomy regularly cause an advanced imaging technology 

(AIT) alarm? 

There are many possible factors that may generate anomalies during an AIT 

screening, including breast prosthetics or surgical scarring. 

When an anomaly is discovered during AIT screening, the transportation security 

officer (TSO) must resolve the alarm using additional screening procedures. TSA’s 

procedures do not require that passengers remove their breast prosthesis as part of 

the security screening process. If a pat-down is required to resolve the anomaly, it 

may be done in a private screening area and will be performed by an officer of the 

same gender. A TSA witness will be present if the pat-down is conducted in the private screening area. The passenger may have a witness of their choosing accompany 

them throughout the screening process regardless of whether the screening occurs 

in the public or a private screening area. 

What training do TSOs receive related to this issue? 

TSOs are instructed, as part of their training and standard operating procedures, 

to use extreme care and sensitivity when screening or performing pat-downs of sensitive or painful areas. We also urge travelers to tell TSOs about any specific issues 

TSOs should be aware of before such screening measures begin, including painful 

or sore areas, or past and current medical conditions. To ensure the greatest level 

of privacy possible while conveying sensitive information, TSA has also made a notification template available for passengers to discreetly provide information about 

their medical condition or disability to TSOs at airports. The template is available 

at TSA.gov and TSA has proactively shared it with a coalition of 70 advocacy groups 

representing a variety of segments of the population with whom TSA maintains an 

ongoing dialogue. A number of cancer-related groups have been a part of the coalition, including Susan G. Komen for the Cure and Cancer Treatment Centers of 

America. Based on input we received from groups such as these over the last year, 

we have augmented the training provided to our TSOs to make them better attuned 

to the needs of cancer survivors and those who have recently undergone cancer 

treatment. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. And I appreciate you looking into that. The 

Alaska State legislature—excuse me—the House of Representatives 

has passed a resolution in support of Representative Cissna’s effort 

to get some clarification to the process. I will forward all of this to 

you and look forward to working with you, sharing some of the information that I have raised. 
32 

COAST GUARD ICEBREAKERS

Very quickly then a second question, and then I will submit a 

third for the record. This is as it relates to our Coast Guard to our 

ability to respond in an ever-growing Arctic. I was pleased to see 

that the fiscal year 2012 budget restored the funding for the operational control for our icebreaker fleet to the Coast Guard. I think 

that that makes sense. That is important. 

But contained within that budget is the decommissioning of the 

Polar Sea in fiscal year 2011. It provides for completion for the 

maintenance of the Polar Star, but that will not be complete until 

2013. So we have got a situation here where at least for the next 

couple years we have the Healy out there in the waters, but we do 

not have any polar class icebreakers, and it leaves us without the 

capacity to do any heavy icebreaking capability until then. 

So the question to you is with the fact that the Coast Guard will 

only have one heavy icebreaker once the Polar Sea is down and the 

Polar Star is up, what are the Department’s plans? What are the 

Coast Guard’s plans for the future of this country’s heavy 

icebreaking fleet? If you can give me the status of the Coast 

Guard’s high-latitude study and when you might expect that that 

might be available for release to us here in the Congress. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Indeed. First of all, my understanding is 

the Healy, which is a medium-sized cutter, will remain operational 

in 2011–2012. The problem is you have the Polar Star and the 

Polar Sea, both of which are old vessels and need to have heavy 

maintenance. And so you have this—it looks like a bare period in 

fiscal year 2012. 

Our plan is during that period for the National Science Foundation to lease a heavy icebreaker to take the place—— 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Who do we lease from? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. There are at least two countries that we 

can lease from. I would prefer to give that to you in writing—or 

not in writing, but not in an open session. But we have identified 

at least two countries that we could lease from during that fiscal 

year 2012 period. 

[The information follows:] 

The National Science Foundation (NSF) has leased polar icebreakers from both 

Russia and Sweden in the past. NSF is continuing to negotiate their specific polar 

icebreaking requirements lease plans for 2012 and the details of that lease should 

be directed to NSF. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Now, as you said in your question, you 

got the funding for operational control up there, $39 million moved 

over to the Coast Guard. That is where it should go. 

We also have in the fiscal year 2012 budget a sum set aside for 

an Arctic study. One of the things this country really needs is to 

really look at the Arctic and what is necessary to protect U.S. interests there. So that is in the Coast Guard budget as well. 

With respect to the work—you wanted to know when the other 

study would be finished. Let me check with the Commandant and 

we will get you the date. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. I appreciate that. 

And I appreciate the information on what we do to fill the gap 

here with the heavy icebreaker. I do hope that we are not moving 
33 

in a direction where we view that as our option to lease basically 

commercially. I think we need to remember that we are an Arctic 

nation. The United States is an Arctic nation, and the fact that we 

have just barely one-and-a-half icebreakers, if you will, when you 

think about the medium and the heavy, it is a situation where we 

look to our ability to respond as an Arctic nation whether it is the 

level of shipping traffic that we are seeing going on up north, the 

level of exploration activity that may be at hand. We have got 

cruise ships going back and forth up in the Arctic right now. We 

are woefully unprepared, I believe, at this point in time. So I would 

love to discuss kind of the future of where we go and how we build 

this out so that we are able to respond as necessary. But again, we 

are behaving as an Arctic nation and assuming that international 

role that I think that we should as a Nation. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I could not agree more. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

And I guess we are at ease until Senator Landrieu comes back. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator LANDRIEU [presiding]. Our meeting will come back to 

order after a brief recess, Homeland Security Subcommittee Appropriations meeting. 

GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN

Let me begin with just another question about the potential— 

and I hope we can avoid this, Madam Secretary, but the potential 

shutdown of the Government and what that might mean for DHS. 

The Government was shut down for 27 days in 1995 and 1996. The 

front-line personnel for Customs Service, Border Patrol, and Secret 

Service continued to work, but their workers were not immediately 

paid. I understand their support operations or administrative operations did not continue to work. So you have to question how effective their work can be without any back-office support. 

But if the Government were to shut down again—and again, we 

are all working hard to see that that does not happen and coming 

to some compromise with the House on this—what would be the 

impacts to the Department? I am sure you have given some 

thought to this. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Yes, I have in 

part because this Department did not exist in 1995 during the 

prior shut-downs, and so we have had to be looking at this afresh, 

anew because the Department is only 8 years old. 

Thank you again, by the way, for coming to the program yesterday. It was really great to see you there. 

I think you put your finger on one of the important points. The 

front-line personnel who are related to security would fall within 

the exception of the shutdown and they would stay on duty, but the 

back-room personnel that are necessary to fully utilize the frontline personnel would not in all likelihood. And our TSOs, our transportation security officers, our front-line personnel, tend to be at 

the lower end of the pay scale and tend to be ones that I would 

be very concerned about having to live paycheck-to-paycheck. And 

so you would have your front-line personnel who were working but 

not getting paid and being under some financial duress because of 

that. So we have parts of the Department that would probably 
34 

have to shut down virtually 100 percent, but the security-related 

part would operate, but as you say, they would not have the full 

backing of the Department that they would otherwise have. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. I do think that is something that 

we need to keep in mind as we press forward on these negotiations. 

OFFICER CORRUPTION

My next question—I only have three additional questions, and I 

think we can get through them in the next few minutes—is about 

the officer integrity, the issue of integrity in our operations. I think 

not only in trying to streamline where we can is important without 

undercutting our defense and homeland security, but also we want 

to have an honest and open and transparent Government, which is 

always so important. And of course, America is really a model in 

the world. We are proud of that. We are not perfect, but we are 

a model in that regard. 

But there have been some concerns that this subcommittee has 

expressed, and I want to just state that with the support of this 

subcommittee, CBP has hired 16,000 new employees, a 37-percent 

increase in the last 5 years. ICE has hired more than 8,200 new 

personnel. This has been required to stand up this Department and 

meet the goals and objectives of securing our borders and enforcing 

our immigration laws. 

This subcommittee has been concerned, however, due to the 

rapid hiring, that there is a potential increase for officer corruption. So toward this end, the subcommittee has provided additional 

resources for integrity training, investigations, conducting hearings 

about misconduct, background investigations. I am pleased to see 

your budget requests an additional $26 million for this. This is the 

right thing to do. I support the funding. 

But it is our understanding that some of the people in charge of 

this from CBP to ICE and the Inspector General are experiencing 

some difficulty working together. Could you comment about if you 

are aware of this situation? Do you agree that it is somewhat of 

a problem? And if so, what are you doing to correct it? Will you and 

the Deputy Secretary work with me on establishing clear lines of 

authority for these important internal investigations? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Madam Chair, I think that it is fair to 

say that with that rapid increase, we need to have appropriate 

oversight and supervision for a number of reasons, one of which is 

related to officer integrity. And so we have ramped up efforts there. 

I think it is also accurate to say that we have been working both 

with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and with CBP on 

the implementation of appropriate oversight, what does that mean, 

who does what when. How do we make sure that cases are resolved 

swiftly so that agents are not unduly impugned or taken off the 

line and that if and when we find an agent who has become corrupt, that we deal with that immediately and very firmly? We will 

not stand for corruption among our troops and we do not want that 

bad seed to take root in this staffing increase. So we are all very 

committed to that goal. 

The issue is how do you operationalize that between the OIG and 

what the CBP does and what ICE does, and that is an issue of 
35 

which I am very aware, have been personally involved in, and we 

continue to work on. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And do you have the money and resources 

you need for the polygraph and the initial checks before hiring people? Are you able to process your hirees pretty quickly, do you believe? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. The President’s budget contains adequate 

resources for that, yes. 

MEXICO

Senator LANDRIEU. My next question—and this is a growing concern among, I think, people in our country, and that is the escalating violence in Mexico. You alluded to, of course, we lost one of 

our special agents, Zapata, just recently and another was wounded. 

This really brought to light the fact that our agents are prohibited 

from carrying service weapons in their defense, which is a side 

issue. 

But the more important issue—and that is important as well— 

is that 33,000 Mexican citizens have died during the Mexican Government’s admirable, but very difficult campaign against drug trafficking. But what are the top one, two, or three directives that you 

are taking to try to contain this violence? And when we are sending 

agents, is it appropriate to send agents into Mexico without being 

able to defend themselves? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, first of all, I would suggest, Madam 

Chair, that some of this be discussed in a classified setting and 

that includes how the agents are armed and under what circumstances. 

I will say that the violence in Mexico is something we are very 

concerned about. It is one of the things that we work on very closely with Mexico. President Calderon is scheduled for a visit to the 

United States this week. I believe that will be something that he 

and President Obama discuss. And it is something that we are 

working with Mexico on. 

Some of our priorities are to assist Mexico in any way that we 

can and as requested to defeat the cartels. 

Second, to make sure that we have adequate resources along our 

Southwest Border to prevent the cartels from bringing their violence over and trying to take over areas along the Southwest Border, so preventing spillover violence. 

And then third, making sure that we have adequate manpower, 

technology, and infrastructure along the Southwest Border as a 

whole so that it can be a safe and secure zone for the trade and 

travel that has to occur between Mexico and the United States. 

This is something that often gets overlooked in the discussion, but 

Mexico is the No. 1 or 2 trading partner of something like 23 

States in the United States. There are a lot of jobs associated with 

that commerce with Mexico. So both countries need to work to 

make sure that the travel and trade that occurs can go smoothly 

and efficiently through the ports of entry. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 
36 

CYBER THREAT

I think my last question will be about the cyber threat, which is 

something that I am not sure that the public really sees. I think 

they see and read about the violence in Mexico. I think they understand some of the border issues. I think they understand the challenges of immigration. I think they most certainly can understand 

the airline attacks and the New York incident. But cyber is something that I am not sure the public really can understand the consequences, really, of such an attack, should it occur in a more successful way because we are actually being attacked through this 

new method. 

So my question is, President Obama said that cyber threat is one 

of the most serious economic and national security challenges that 

we face. I actually agree with that. You included safeguarding and 

securing cyberspace as 1 of the 5 missions. This budget request appears to respond to this alarm by requesting a robust level of funding for U.S. operations, Federal network, security network, and security deployment. These are important areas. I was pleased to see 

some of the upticks that you have. 

As you know, there are several locations around the country that 

are really leaning toward actually working in conjunction with nonFederal partners. Corporations have really stepped up. The National Guard has shown an inclination to put some resources toward this. 

We have created in Louisiana—in Shreveport, in Bossier Parish 

to be exact, in the northwest corner of Louisiana—the Cyber Innovation Center. The center has built a strong regional network 

among universities and colleges to leverage cybersecurity systems. 

I would like to ask you for a general comment about the cyber 

threat and then ask you if you would join me for a trip there and 

to perhaps a few other locations around the country to see what 

some of the new initiatives are to actually stand up the technology 

and personnel necessary to respond to this very serious and I think 

underestimated threat to our country. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Madam Chair, yes, we have increased 

our cyber budget. Between DHS and DOD, you really have between 

those two Departments 95 percent of the cybersecurity responsibilities identified by the President’s cyber review. So you have seen 

that area of DHS expand fairly dramatically over the last 2 years. 

This is another area where we believe that the United States has 

real security interests involved. We are working with the private 

sector on this. We also are working with the universities on this, 

and we are increasing our outreach trying to identify persons who 

have a cyber background to come work at DHS. That is one of our 

key challenges is to get enough personnel who are cyber-experienced to work in the public service as opposed to the private sector. 

So that is underway as well. 

With respect to your invitation to come to Shreveport and to do 

some other cyber site visits, I would be happy to do so, particularly 

if there is a good Louisiana meal involved. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I think we can 

rustle one up for you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. There you go. 
37 

CLOSING

Senator LANDRIEU. I am going to end the meeting, but I do want 

to comment that there are a few other issues that our subcommittee is going to be focused on. 

The TSA screener cap provision at 46,000. I do not know if that 

is going to be effective. 

International adoptions is an important issue to me to make sure 

that we are doing the very best we can in customs to support the 

great work that our nonprofits and individual citizens are doing in 

that humanitarian area. 

Improving the entry process for visitors to the United States I 

think is important, whether they are just tourists or whether they 

are business people traveling because of just the economy of the 

world, and we have just got to be a very forward-leaning service 

agency to support that work. 

The flood maps are of great concern to myself, Senator Cochran, 

and other Senators up along the Mississippi River which comes 

under this subcommittee’s jurisdiction. 

So those are some questions that I will defer and submit to you 

in writing. 

And I believe that will end our session for today. I thank you for 

your testimony and for your patience during the floor vote. 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator LANDRIEU. Other questions for the record should be submitted to the subcommittee staff by close of business on Thursday. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

DEPARTMENTAL ACQUISITIONS

Question. For each of fiscal year’s 2010–2012, how much funding is dedicated to 

major acquisitions? For each year, provide details on the classification level of each 

acquisition, i.e., how many are designated as level 1, level 2, or level 3 as defined 

by the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) acquisition management directive? Provide a DHS major acquisition status tracking chart listing each program 

and milestone necessary to achieve approval for full-scale procurement. 

Answer. 

Fiscal year 2010 Fiscal year 2011 Fiscal year 2012 

Funding dedicated to major acquisitions ............ $11,671,000,000 $11,068,000,000 $10,457,000,000 

Level 1 .................................................................. 46 programs ........ 45 programs ........ Information not yet available. 

Level 2 .................................................................. 40 programs ........ 37 programs ........ Information not yet available. 

Level 3 .................................................................. Not reported 1 ...... Not reported 1 ...... Information not yet available. 

1 In accordance with Directive 102–01 (D 102–01), non-IT level 3 programs are not reported; however, guidance will be changed April 30, 

2011, to require inclusion of all level 1, 2, and 3 acquisition programs in the Next Generation Periodic Reporting System (nPRS). 

The following chart lists the 82 DHS level 1 and 2 programs along with their current phase in the acquisition life cycle. Programs in phase 4 should be considered 

approved for ‘‘full-scale production’’. 

The phases as defined in the D 102–01 are: 

—Phase 1. Need. 

—Phase 2. Analyze/Select. 

—Phase 3. Obtain. —Phase 4. Produce/Deploy/Support. 

Please note that the list identifies many programs as being in multiple stages. 

Typically, these programs are comprised of smaller projects and these projects are 
38 

in various stages. Accordingly the list identifies such programs as being ‘‘mixed’’ and 

the lists identifies each stage the program is in. 

Program-Project-Service 

Phase 

1 2 3 4 

CBP—Advance Passenger Information (APIS) (P) 1 ..................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

CBP—Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)/International Trade Data System (ITDS) 

(P) ............................................................................................................................................. ........ ........ x x 

CBP—Automated Targeting System (ATS) Maintenance (P) ....................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

CBP—Border Patrol Facilities (P) ................................................................................................ ........ ........ x x 

CBP—Facilities Management and Engineering Tactical Infrastructure (FM&E TI) (P) .............. ........ ........ x x 

CBP—Fleet Management (FMP) (P) ............................................................................................. ........ ........ ........ x 

CBP—Land Ports of Entry Modernization (P) .............................................................................. ........ ........ x x 

CBP—Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Systems Program (P) ........................................................ ........ ........ x x 

CBP—SAP (P) ............................................................................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

CBP—Strategic Air and Marine Plan (P) .................................................................................... ........ ........ x x 

CBP—Tactical Communication (TAC–COM) (P) .......................................................................... x ........ ........ x 

CBP—TECS Modernization (P) ..................................................................................................... ........ ........ x x 

CBP—Transportation (P) .............................................................................................................. ........ ........ ........ x 

CBP—Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) (P) .............................................................. ........ ........ ........ x 

DHS—A&O—Common Operational Picture (COP) (P) ................................................................. ........ ........ x x 

DHS—A&O—Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) (P) .............................................. ........ ........ x x 

DHS—CAO—Electronic Records Management System (ERMS) (P) ............................................ x ........ ........ ........

DHS—CAO—St. Elizabeths (P) .................................................................................................... ........ ........ x ........

DHS—CFO—Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC) (P) ......................................... ........ x ........ ........

DHS—CHCO—HR–IT (P) .............................................................................................................. ........ ........ x x 

DHS—CIO—Infrastructure Transformation Program (ITP) (P) .................................................... ........ ........ x x 

DNDO—Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) Program (P) ........................................................ ........ ........ x ........

FEMA—Grants Management Integrated Environment (GMIE) (P) ............................................... ........ x ........ ........

FEMA—Housing Inspection Services (HIS) (P) ............................................................................ ........ ........ x x 

FEMA—Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) (P) .............................................. x ........ ........ ........

FEMA—Logistics Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS) (previously TAV) (P) ................. ........ x ........ ........

FEMA—Risk Mapping, Analysis and Planning (Risk Map) (P) ................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

A&O—National Security System Program (NSSP) (P) ................................................................. ........ x ........ ........

A&O—Online Tracking Information System (OTIS) 2 (S) 3 ........................................................... ........ ........ x x 

ICE—Atlas (P) .............................................................................................................................. ........ ........ x ........

ICE—Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) (S) ................................................................... ........ x ........ ........

ICE—Detention and Removal Operations Modernization (DROM) (P) ......................................... ........ ........ x x 

ICE—DRO Electronic Health Record (EHR) System (P) ............................................................... x ........ ........ ........

ICE—Enforcement Information Sharing (EIS) (P) ........................................................................ x ........ ........ ........

ICE—Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS I and II) (P) (SEVIS I=4, 

SEVIS II=2) ............................................................................................................................... ........ x ........ x 

ICE—Tactical Communication (TAC–COM) (P) ............................................................................ ........ ........ x ........

ICE—TECS Modernization (P) ...................................................................................................... ........ x ........ ........

NPPD—Federal Protective Services (S) ........................................................................................ ........ ........ ........ x 

NPPD—IICV (Infrastructure Information Collection Program and Visualization)—IICP (P) ....... ........ ........ x x 

NPPD—National Cybersecurity and Protection System (NCPS) (P) ............................................. ........ ........ x x 

NPPD—Next Generation Network (NGN) (P) ................................................................................. ........ x x ........

NPPD—United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) (P) ........ x ........ x x 

OHA—Bio Watch Gen–3 (P) ......................................................................................................... ........ x ........ ........

S&T—National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) (P) .......................................................... ........ x ........ ........

S&T—National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) Facility (P) .......... ........ ........ x ........

TSA—Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) (P) .......................................................... ........ ........ x x 

TSA—Field Real Estate Management (FREM) (P) ....................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

TSA—HR Access (P) ..................................................................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

TSA—Information Technology Infrastructure Program (ITIP) (P) ................................................. ........ ........ ........ x 

TSA—National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (K9) System (P) ............................ ........ ........ ........ x 

TSA—Passenger Screening Program (PSP) (P) ........................................................................... ........ ........ x x 

TSA—Screening Partnership Program (P) ................................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

TSA—Secure Flight (P) ................................................................................................................ ........ ........ x ........

TSA—Security Technology Integrated Program (STIP) (P) ........................................................... ........ ........ x x 

TSA—Specialized Training (P) ..................................................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

TSA—Transportation Worker Identification Credentialing (TWIC) (P) ......................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

TSA—TTAC Infrastructure Modernization Program (TIM) (P) ....................................................... ........ x ........ ........

USCG—C4ISR (P) ......................................................................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

USCG—CG Logistics Information Management System (CG–LIMS) (P) ...................................... ........ x ........ ........

USCG—Coastal Patrol Boat (P) ................................................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 
39 

Program-Project-Service 

Phase 

1 2 3 4 

USCG—Core Accounting System (CAS) (P) ................................................................................. ........ ........ ........ x 

USCG—Fast Response Cutter (FRC) (P) ...................................................................................... ........ ........ x ........

USCG—HC–130H Conversion/Sustainment Projects (P) ............................................................. ........ ........ x ........

USCG—HC–130J Fleet Introduction (P) ....................................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

USCG—HC–144A Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) (P) ................................................................. ........ ........ x ........

USCG—HH–60 Conversion Projects (P) ....................................................................................... ........ ........ x ........

USCG—HH–65 Conversion/Sustainment Projects (P) .................................................................. ........ ........ x ........

USCG—Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) (P) ....................................................................... ........ x ........ ........

USCG—Medium Endurance Cutter Sustainment (P) ................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

USCG—National Security Cutter (NSC) (P) ................................................................................. ........ ........ x ........

USCG—Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS) (P) ................................................. ........ ........ x x 

USCG—Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) (P) ..................................................................................... ........ x ........ ........

USCG—Patrol Boats Sustainment (P) ......................................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

USCG—Rescue 21 (P) .................................................................................................................. ........ ........ ........ x 

USCG—Response Boat—Medium (RB–M) (P) ............................................................................ ........ ........ ........ x 

USCG—Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) (P) ........................................................................... x ........ ........ ........

USCIS—Application Support Centers (ASC) (P) .......................................................................... ........ x ........ ........

USCIS—Benefits Provision—Verification Information System (VIS) (P) ..................................... ........ ........ x x 

USCIS—Integration Document Production (IDP) (P) .................................................................... ........ ........ ........ x 

USCIS—Transformation (P) .......................................................................................................... ........ x ........ ........

USSS—IT Modernization (ITM) (P) ............................................................................................... x ........ ........ ........

1 (P) indicates Program. 

2 (S) indicates Services. 

3 Per I&A, OTIS Program has been canceled. 

Question. The request includes $24.2 million and 150 positions to strengthen the 

Department’s acquisition workforce. Based on the Department’s assessment of its 

acquisition workforce, does the request completely fill the gap in acquisition workforce needs? What is the long-term plan to address known gaps? 

Answer. The 150 positions are based on a survey conducted in fiscal year 2010 

of the major acquisition programs and acquisition oversight offices to identify gaps 

in the acquisition workforce and represent the number of positions required to fill 

gaps to ensure successful program execution, including risk mitigation. 

DHS continues our concerted recruitment efforts with the use of direct hire authority and centralized vacancy announcements. As of December 31, 2010, these efforts have resulted in a 136 percent increase in our contracting specialists. We are 

also graduating the first 30 Acquisition Professional Career Program participants in 

fiscal year 2011 who will be trained, certified contracting specialists and placed 

within the Department’s nine contracting activities throughout fiscal year 2011. Additionally, we have expanded the Acquisition Professional Career Program to include additional fields in program management, business cost estimating, systems 

engineering, life-cycle logistics, and information technology. DHS has also established new certification programs for the test and evaluation (T&E), logistics, business cost estimating, and acquisition financial management career fields, and will 

have new programs in place in fiscal year 2012 for systems engineers and information technology specialists. 

Question. What is the status of the Department’s plans to develop a formal Technology Readiness Level (TRL) process? The purpose of the process is to require TRL 

assessments of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear detection, and other technologies prior to appropriate acquisition decision points. Has a management directive on this initiative been finalized? If so, provide a copy to the subcommittee. 

Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate Office of Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis is dedicated to assisting the DHS components with 

their acquisition programs, including T&E master plans, systems integration and 

technology maturity assessments. This office is charged with engaging the components and executing S&T’s portions of Acquisition Directive 102–01 and facilitating 

the deployment of technology. There is no current plan to create a separate TRL 

Management Directive. 

—DHS S&T Test and Evaluation and Standards Division/Director of Operational 

Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has been closely involved with SBInet throughout the acquisition process: 

—Assisted with developing an integrated T&E strategy for SBInet as codified 

in the DHS DOT&E’s approved T&E master plan. 

—Assisted with selection of, and ultimately approved the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) as the Operational Test Agent (OTA), an agency 
40 

with demonstrated capabilities in the T&E of command and control and surveillance systems. 

—Observed SBInet user assessment testing at Playas, New Mexico. Reviewed 

developmental testing documentation related to T&E at the system and subsystem levels, to help ensure both the credibility of T&E results and the confidence in the understanding of system performance and overall system maturity. 

—Participated in SBInet monthly program reviews. 

—Member of the SBInet AoA Executive Leadership Team and Working Group. 

—Participated in SBInet’s operational test readiness review and Acquisition Review Board providing risk information to program executives and decisionmakers. 

—Approved ATECs operational test plan for SBInet Tucson One sector. 

—Observed and monitored SBInet TUS1 Operational Testing (OT) and OT dry 

run (mid-October 2010 through mid-November 2010. 

—Participated in ATEC’s OT emerging results briefing on March 2, 2011. The 

final OT evaluation report is due early April 2011. 

—Drafting DOT&E’s Letter of Assessment (LOA) that assesses the adequacy of 

the Army’s independent operational T&E results. This LOA will be submitted 

to the Under Secretary for Management and used to support future decisions 

on border technologies. 

—Currently working with Customs and Border Patrol on the Land Border Integrated Fixed Tower program to ensure adequate T&E is planned, executed and 

reported as required by DHS directive. 

WORKFORCE BALANCING

Question. What is the total number of contractor full-time equivalents (FTEs) providing services in support of DHS programs? Across departmental components, the 

request proposes to move resources from contract service providers to in-house staff. 

Provide a departmentwide chart for this effort by component for fiscal year 2011 

and fiscal year 2012, including the shift in personnel from contractor to Federal 

FTE and associated cost savings. Since the Balanced Workforce Strategy began, how 

many contractor conversions has the Department realized? How will you measure 

the success of the Balanced Workforce Strategy? 

Answer. After the Balanced Workforce Strategy (BWS) Departmental Working 

Group was formed, it reviewed information provided by the firm (LMI) that developed the algorithm and identified a math error that caused the number of contractors to be significantly overstated. The Department worked with the firm to reexamine the algorithm and assumptions. The firm informed the Department that the initial 210,000 contractor work-year equivalent estimate was overstated by 100,000 or 

more. 

The BWS Tool, an automated survey that leads a component official through the 

analysis process of the Department’s contracts and mission needs, is a key element 

of our strategy to reduce expenditures on professional services contracts in order to 

more effectively and efficiently achieve our mission. 

Some of the results of our efforts thus far include reducing spending on professional services contracts by 11 percent, or $420 million, from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2010. The Department’s fiscal year 2012 budget request includes an additional $106 million in cuts to professional services contracts across the Department, 

demonstrating our commitment to better managing contracts and ensuring the appropriate mix of personnel. 

Ultimately, the BWS will be considered successful if it: 

—Ensures compliance with current statutes, regulations, and Government and 

DHS policies by documenting components’ reviews of current contracts; and 

—Objectively assesses the proper sourcing decisions for performing work that advances the mission of DHS. 

SMALL BOAT STRATEGY

Question. The Department released its small vessel security strategy on April 28, 

2008. Nearly 3 years later, an implementation plan to carry out the strategy has 

not been released. In response to a question for the record from the Secretary’s 2010 

budget hearing, the subcommittee was informed that DHS Small Vessel Security 

Implementation Plan was to be released in 2010. When will the implementation 

plan be provided to the Congress? 

Answer. The Small Vessel Security Strategy Implementation Plan was released 

on March 11, 2011. The public report is available on the DHS Web site at: http:// 

www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gcl1299623119339.shtm. 
41 

AIR DOMAIN AWARENESS—C2 GAP FILLER

Question. The request includes $11 million for an air domain awareness initiative 

called C2 Gap Filler. Does this program replicate existing DHS capabilities? If not, 

what additional benefits to DHS would this program provide if successful? The total 

DHS contribution to this multi-agency effort is $16 million, but only $11 million has 

been identified. The Operations Coordination budget request indicates that the $11 

million is a ‘‘one-time’’ cost. How will the Department pay for the remaining $5 million? If approved, what are the additional costs in fiscal years 2013–2016? 

Answer. [Follows:] 

State and Local Efforts 

DHS’s National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) collaborates with State, local, 

tribal, and territorial governments to share and implement sound cybersecurity policies, practices, and strategies to improve preparedness against cyber threats and attacks. 

Due to the increasingly important role of State, local, tribal, and territorial governments in cybersecurity, NCSD has resources committed solely to interacting with 

officials at these levels. The mission of NCSD’s State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial 

(SLTT) Engagement program is to build partnerships with non-Federal public stakeholders, including each State’s Homeland Security Advisor, Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The following provides an 

overview of NCSD interactions with States. 

United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) maintains 

a formal relationship and works closely with mission partners, including State and 

local governments, on a daily basis to resolve threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents. 

US-CERT provides a variety of daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly communication exchanges to maintain situational awareness and share critical information 

with collective cybersecurity partners. Federal and SLTT incident response personnel have access to the Government Forum of Incident Response and Security 

Teams (GFIRST) portal for information sharing and discussion. 

US-CERT also sponsors the GFIRST National Conference, a forum that promotes 

cooperation among Federal agencies, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, the private sector, and international partners across the cybersecurity spectrum, from preparedness and prevention to incident response. The conference supports the dissemination and promulgation of proactive and preventive security practices. US-CERT funding is executed toward planning, preparation, communication, 

and coordination of this conference and other conference expos. Specifically, $1.55 

million is directed to support requirements such as administration, logistics, and security. Additional funding (approximately $3 million) provides support to the interactive demonstration system at the GFIRST National Conference. 

US-CERT also provides support ($1 million annually) to the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology, which provides system integration and product development support for enhancement of the National Vulnerability Database and search engine. This database enables US-CERT partners, including State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, to secure government systems. 

Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

Created in 2003, the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS– 

ISAC) is an invaluable tool when dealing with SLTT governments. The MS–ISAC 

supports NCSD’s efforts to secure cyberspace by disseminating early warnings of 

cyber threats to SLTT governments. In addition, the MS–ISAC shares security incident information, identifies trends, and conducts other analysis for security planning. NCSD provides programmatic support ($3.55 million for the 12-month period 

from August 1, 2010, to July 31, 2011) to the MS–ISAC. The fiscal year 2010 DHS 

appropriations act provided an additional $3 million for DHS to fund and work with 

the MS–ISAC to provide managed security services (e.g., intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems firewalls) for 18 State and local governments. 

The MS–ISAC has selected State, county, and local governments for participation. 

The MS–ISAC, consistent with the objectives of NCSD, provides a common mechanism for raising the level of SLTT government cybersecurity readiness and response. 

It is a central resource for gathering information regarding cyber threats to critical 

infrastructure facilities. Other MS–ISAC programs/activities include: 

—Operation of a 24/7 Cyber Security and Analysis Center.—The MS–ISAC runs 

a 24-hour watch and warning Security Operations Center (SOC) that provides 

real-time network monitoring, dissemination of early cyber threat warnings, 
42 

and vulnerability identification and mitigation, along with education and outreach aimed at reducing risk to the Nation’s SLTT government cyber domain. 

The SOC shares and coordinates real-time risk information to support national 

cybersecurity situational awareness with DHS (NCSD and US-CERT). 

The SOC performs 24/7 monitoring of the Internet and other sources, including incident reports received from members and others regarding cybersecurity 

threats and vulnerabilities. The SOC staff evaluates and correlates information 

and distributes advisories and bulletins as appropriate, including mitigation 

strategies and steps that can be taken to protect critical infrastructure. 

—Managed and Monitored Security Services.—The MS–ISAC contracts with the 

States of Alaska, Montana, and New York, along with the Los Angeles World 

Airports, to provide cybersecurity monitoring and managed services. This collective view across multiple entities helps enhance situational awareness regarding cyber threats. 

During 2010, the MS–ISAC reviewed more than 78 billion logs through the 

24/7 operations center. Approximately 138 MS–ISAC advisories were issued. 

Additionally, through funding in the fiscal year 2010 DHS appropriations act, 

the MS–ISAC is expanding its monitoring services with an additional 10 State 

governments, 7 local governments, and 1 territorial government. This expanded 

infrastructure will provide a representative sample of system and network activity for enhancing situational awareness of SLTT government networks across 

the country. It will also improve cyber incident identification and response 

while providing more resources for developing and implementing appropriate 

mitigation strategies tailored specifically to SLTT government cyber resources. 

—Participation in Cyber Security Exercises—Cyber Storm I, II, and III.—The MS– 

ISAC has participated in each of the three Cyber Storm exercises, most recently 

Cyber Storm III in September 2010. The MS–ISAC was a full player during the 

Cyber Storm III exercise; its SOC was active, and it coordinated with 11 States 

that participated in the exercise. The MS–ISAC hosted 19 visitors from five 

States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York State law enforcement, 

Homeland Security and military personnel, and observers from the University 

of Texas at San Antonio. 

National Cyber Incident Response Plan 

The President’s Cybersecurity Policy Review called for ‘‘a comprehensive framework to facilitate coordinated responses by Government, the private sector, and allies to a significant cyber incident.’’ DHS coordinated the interagency, State and 

local government, and private-sector working group that developed the National 

Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP). The plan provides a framework for effective 

incident response capabilities and coordination among Federal agencies, State and 

local governments, the private sector, and international partners during significant 

cyber incidents. It is designed to be flexible and adaptable to allow synchronization 

of response activities across jurisdictional lines. 

The NCIRP is undergoing final DHS review to incorporate lessons learned during 

the Cyber Storm III exercise. Upon conclusion of this review, DHS will send the 

NCIRP out to State, local, and private-sector partners (including the National Governors Association and the MS–ISAC) for review. DHS will work with State and 

local partners (and partners in the private sector) to align their incident response 

plans and procedures with the NCIRP. The MS–ISAC and National Governors Association will be key partners in this effort. 

DHS has designated the MS–ISAC as the ISAC for SLTT governments and has 

identified the MS–ISAC as a key stakeholder in the development and implementation of the NCIRP. 

NCSD Cyber Security Evaluation Program 

Under the 2009 Appropriations Act, NCSD’s Cyber Security Evaluation Program 

(CSEP) was tasked with completing a Nationwide Cyber Security Review (NCSR). 

The NCSR is a voluntary self-assessment of State and major urban area government Information Technology (IT) services and is designed to measure cybersecurity 

preparedness and resilience. Through the NCSR, CSEP examines relationships, 

interactions, and processes governing IT management and the ability to manage 

operational risk effectively. CSEP also conducts voluntary cybersecurity assessments 

to evaluate and enhance the implementation of key cybersecurity capacities and capabilities of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) Sector members. This 

assessment is the Cyber Resilience Review, which is designed for each of the 18 

CIKR sectors and for use within SLTT governments. Since fiscal year 2009, CSEP 

has completed 45 cyber resilience reviews with SLTT partners. 
43 

NCSD Cyber Exercise Program 

NCSD’s Cyber Exercise Program (CEP) works with Federal, State, local, international, and private sector partners to conduct regional and sector-specific exercises designed to develop and improve the capabilities of DHS and its infrastructure 

partners. Such exercises aid participants in preparing for, preventing, mitigating, 

responding to, and recovering from cyber incidents. NCSD plans, coordinates, and 

conducts cyber exercises to develop, evaluate, improve, and refine the capabilities 

of State and local partners. CEP assists State and local partners by facilitating the 

design of tabletop and functional exercises at the State and local levels. 

DHS hosted Cyber Storm III from September 26, 2010, through October 1, 2010. 

The Cyber Storm exercise series is a key element of ongoing efforts to assess cyber 

preparedness; examine incident response processes, procedures, and information 

sharing mechanisms; and identify areas for improvement absent the consequences 

of an actual incident. Cyber Storm III included participation from 11 States. 

In 2009 and 2010, NCSD, the MS–ISAC, and the Microsoft Corporation jointly 

sponsored the Defend the Flag Exercises to provide State government network security professionals greater technical security skills and practical experience with implementing the principles of defense-in-depth while securing Windows-based operating systems. Thirteen States participated from 2009–2010. 

Grants 

DHS provides grants for cybersecurity through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), such as the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), 

which provides States the opportunity to work with DHS to acquire cybersecurity 

capabilities. During the last 2 years, NCSD has worked with FEMA to modify the 

language in the HSGP to better clarify how funds can be used to improve cybersecurity. 

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 

DHS is engaged in the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), 

leading Track 1 (Cybersecurity Awareness), leading Track 3 (Cybersecurity Workforce Structure), and coleading Track 4 (Cybersecurity Workforce Training and Professional Development). Through NICE, DHS is reaching out across the cybersecurity community—including academia, the private sector, and Federal, State, local, 

tribal, and territorial partners—to integrate current efforts into a foundation of information that creates mutual understanding and partnerships across all aspects of 

national cybersecurity. 

In fiscal year 2010, DHS facilitated the efforts of six State government CIOs to 

develop a State government workforce development model, based on the existing 

DHS-issued Essential Body of Knowledge. This State government model was presented to the MS–ISAC, which included the model in its membership-based portal 

and on its public Web site. 

Other NCSD SLTT Programs/Activities 

—National Cyber Security Awareness Month.—To recognize the importance of cybersecurity awareness, October is designated as National Cyber Security 

Awareness Month. NCSD, with the help of the MS–ISAC, works with funded 

partners and other parties to sponsor events and activities throughout the country and disseminate Awareness Month key messages and event information to 

State and local partners. Due to the efforts of NCSD and MS–ISAC, in 2009 

and 2010, all of the Nation’s Governors signed letters officially proclaiming October as National Cyber Security Awareness Month. 

—Stop. Think. Connect. Campaign.—DHS bears primary responsibility for raising 

public awareness about threats to the Nation’s cyber systems and networks. To 

that end, in October 2010, DHS launched the National Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign, Stop. Think. Connect. It is a national public-education effort to 

engage and empower Americans to take charge of their online safety and security. By providing Americans with easy-to-understand online safety tips and resources, the campaign is helping them establish smart habits that will lead to 

increased protection online. Stop. Think. Connect. fulfills a key element of 

President Obama’s 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review, which tasked DHS to develop a public-awareness campaign to inform Americans about ways to use technology safely. 

—Security Clearances for State Information Security Officers.—NCSD, in partnership with colleagues from DHS Office of Security, initiated a plan to clear, starting at the Secret level, each State CIO and CISO, and the MS–ISAC executive 

committee. NCSD is confident this is an important step in sharing valuable sensitive information with State partners. 
44 

—Cyber Partner Local Access Plan.—NCSD, in cooperation with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, developed the Cybersecurity Partner Local Access Plan 

(CPLAP) to share classified cybersecurity threat information with cleared State 

cybersecurity officials and private-sector partners at State and major urban 

area fusion centers nationwide. The CPLAP enables more effective and efficient 

classified cybersecurity information sharing among Federal, SLTT, and privatesector partners, and supports an information-sharing model that eliminates 

partners’ air travel to and from the Washington, DC, area to receive classified 

cybersecurity briefings. The CPLAP will be piloted at five fusion centers by mid2011, with plans to expand the program to a broader audience and additional 

fusion centers on a regional basis by the end of 2011. 

—Cyber Summits.—In an effort to educate SLTT leaders and the public, NCSD 

coordinates and plans Cyber Summits. These summits, which are held regularly 

throughout the year and hosted across the country, focus on opportunities and 

vulnerabilities to promote discussion on how public and private-sector officials 

can best leverage technology to reduce risk. Frequent attendance and contribution by nongovernmental cyber associations, such as the MS–ISAC and National 

Association of State Chief Information Officers, significantly contributes to the 

information sharing, capacity building, and coordination efforts necessary to develop robust and effective cybersecurity capabilities on all levels. DHS identified 

cybersecurity as a top departmental priority, and Federal, State, and local government officials share a responsibility to promote a healthy cyber ecosystem 

and to encourage individuals to protect themselves and their families at home, 

work, and school. 

—Virginia Operational Integration Cybersecurity Center of Excellence.—NCSD is 

helping the Virginia Operational Integration Cyber Center of Excellence 

(VOICCE) create a Municipal Cyber Lab that will be used to support and train 

SLTT government officials to better understand cybersecurity issues. VOICCE 

focuses on incorporating cyber attacks into the mainstream of emergency operations at the local level and creating a virtual municipality of randomly generated Internet protocol addresses. The concept will allow for development of 

vital cybersecurity capabilities, processes, and procedures. The VOICCE node or 

laboratory will allow local governments and first responders to plug into State 

and Federal entities and participate in simulated cyber attacks. The lab will be 

both physical and virtual in structure, allowing many types of simulation and 

providing an effective environment to share ideas among stakeholders across 

the Nation. Participants will brainstorm, identify, and respond to diverse cyber 

attack scenarios. 

This activity was required by the fiscal year 2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act. 

NCSD will continue many of the programs listed above. In addition, in fiscal year 

2012, NCSD will commit funding to expand the MS–ISAC’s managed and monitor 

security services. 

Curricula 

The Software Assurance (SwA) curriculum project, which produced the Masters 

of Software Assurance (MSwA) curriculum and associated undergraduate course 

outlines, is a recent NCSD effort to cosponsor public-private collaboration for government, industry, and academia through its SwA forum. To facilitate implementation, the MSwA project team is offering assistance, free of charge, to educational institutions looking to launch an MSwA degree program. 

Through the Software Assurance (SwA) forum, the SwA program has encouraged 

Federal, State, and local involvement in public-private collaboration efforts associated with the advancement of SwA resources. As part of that collaboration, the SwA 

curriculum project released the Masters of Software Assurance (MSwA) reference 

curriculum and nine-course syllabi for public use. The MSwA curriculum is recognized by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Computer Society and the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM) as the first curriculum of 

its kind to focus on assuring the functionality, dependability, and security of software and systems. The materials are available at http://www.cert.org/mswa/. 

More information on the SwA Curriculum Project and the MSwA is available at 

https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/1165-BSI.html. 

Virtual Education 

The SwA forum, sponsored by NCSD’s SwA program, posts Web casts of SwA tutorials and pocket guides that are publicly available for free online use, including 

links via virtual training environments. 
45 

One aspect under NICE track 4 is functional area 4, which concerns specialized 

cybersecurity operations. The scope of this effort includes those Federal civilian employees, members of the uniformed services, and contractor personnel employed by 

departments and agencies who are engaged in highly specialized and largely classified cybersecurity operations. Work associated with this functional area is classified, 

but a classified briefing to discuss the work associated with this topic can be arranged upon request. 

HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK

Question. Please describe the Department’s efforts to consolidate DHS information 

portals into the Homeland Security Information Network. How many portals will 

migrate to HSIN in fiscal year 2011 and how many are anticipated to migrate in 

fiscal year 2012? What are the cost savings associated with the migrations in fiscal 

year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 as well as the long-term cost savings for other portals? 

Answer. The Department plans to migrate three portals in fiscal year 2011, and 

seven portals in fiscal year 2012. Details on the portals to be consolidated, as well 

as 1-year savings and the 5-year savings by portal are provided below. We continue 

to evaluate other portals for migration to HSIN. 

HSIN PORTAL CONSOLIDATION AND PROJECTED COST-SAVINGS 

Portal name Year 1 savings Total 5-year 

savings Target year 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 

Fire Services Portal ......................................................................... $200,000 $1,000,000 Fiscal year 2011 

(completed) 

TSA—Exercise Information System (EXIS) ..................................... 132,760 1,075,092 Fiscal year 2011 

NPPD—Federal Protective Service (FPS) Secure Portal ................. (350,284 ) 2,310,491 Fiscal year 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 

I&A—Homeland Security—State and Local Intel Community 

(HS-SLIC).

673,368 6,428,728 Fiscal year 2012 

NPPD—National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) ............ 1,410,103 10,941,546 Fiscal year 2012 

FLETC—FLETC Partners and FLETC Registration 1 ........................ (1,563,498 ) (659,896 ) Fiscal year 2012 

DNDO—Joint Analysis Center Collaborative Information System 

(JACCIS)—Partial Consolidation.

500,000 1,300,000 Fiscal year 2012 

FEMA—Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program—Corrective Action Planning System (HSEEP—CAPS).2,148,402 5,713,724 Fiscal year 2012 

NPPD—Technical Resource for Incident Prevention (TRIPwire) .... (1,575,548 ) 2,125,952 Fiscal year 2012 

USCG—HomePort Portal ................................................................. (680,232 ) 12,412,802 Fiscal year 2012 

Totals ................................................................................. 895,072 42,648,440 

1 Pending verification of FLETC portals budget figures. 

FINANCIAL SYSTEMS CONSOLIDATION

Question. Please provide an update on the Department’s efforts to implement the 

recommendations made in the July 2010 Inspector General’s report on the transformation and systems consolidation effort. 

Answer. Through extensive efforts with the Chief Financial Officer, Chief Procurement Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief Administrative Officer, and DHS components over the past year, we have made significant progress in DHS’s integrated 

financial acquisition strategy. 

The Department has clearly defined and documented its strategy, plan, and concept of operations in the Transformation and Systems Consolidation (TASC) program management documentation. To help ensure the success of the program, the 

Department formulated a number of cross-functional oversight and management 

mechanisms for TASC, including the TASC Executive Steering Committee which is 

chaired by the Undersecretary for Management, that serves as the governing board 

regarding strategy, policy, funding, and risks for the TASC program. 

The TASC procurement strategy was a single-award indefinite delivery/indefinite 

quantity (IDIQ) contract allowing multiple contract types for task orders (firm fixed 

price, time and materials, cost plus award fee, and cost plus fixed fee). 

On November 19, 2010, DHS issued a contract for the TASC program. However, 

on March 9, 2011, DHS received the decision from the Government Accountability 
46 

Office (GAO) that while two protests to the TASC contract had been dismissed, one 

had been upheld. In light of GAO ruling a stop work order was issued for the TASC 

IDIQ contract and for the first task order on that contract. We are currently assessing GAO’s findings and recommendations to determine the appropriate way forward. 

ICEBREAKING ACQUISITIONS ANALYSIS

Question. The funding request for the icebreaking acquisition analysis will not be 

considered until the Polar High Latitude Study is submitted to the subcommittee. 

Please provide a summary of the ‘‘numerous existing and ongoing studies’’ referenced in the budget request. How will this study be different than those studies? 

What is the $5 million request based on? How will the funding be used? Why has 

the High Latitude Study, which was funded in the fiscal year 2009 budget request, 

been delayed? When will it be submitted to the subcommittee? 

Answer. The most recent of the studies referenced in the budget justification was 

completed in 2007 at the request of the Coast Guard by the National Academy of 

Sciences sponsored by the National Research Council. This study’s objective was to 

assess the Coast Guard’s polar icebreaker roles and future needs. Additionally, 

DHS’s Office of Inspector General recently completed an analysis to assess the 

Coast Guard’s polar icebreaking missions. 

This polar icebreaking analysis will differ from those studies by taking a broader 

look at polar icebreaking requirements across all Federal agencies, and by taking 

a deeper look at operational alternatives to determine the best method to deliver 

the required capability. The closest model for this effort is the Polar Icebreaker Requirements Report prepared for the President in 1990. Fiscal year 2012 funding will 

support an interagency working group to define Terms of Reference and the approach to be used for the preacquisition analysis of 21st century icebreaking capabilities. The working group will be under the direction of the Under Secretary for 

Management. 

The $5 million request for the Icebreaker Acquisition Analysis is based on historical costs of analyses with similar size and scope. 

The results of the High Latitude Study have been compiled by the Coast Guard 

and their summary report is currently in the final stages of review and will be provided to the subcommittee in the near future. 

Question. Included in the amount appropriated in fiscal year 2010 for Polar Icebreaker Sustainment was funding for the Coast Guard to begin a business case 

analysis for either a new heavy polar icebreaker class or a major service life extension project for exiting polar icebreakers. What is the status of this effort? 

Answer. Coast Guard-specific business case analysis directed in the fiscal year 

2010 appropriation is in final review. The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request includes funding for the completion of a Government-wide analysis for future 

icebreaking requirements in the polar regions. Acquisition of 21st century 

icebreaking capabilities will be based on these final requirements. 

OFFICER INTEGRITY

Question. Since fiscal year 2006, with the support of this subcommittee, Customs 

and Border Protection (CBP) has hired 16,000 new employees—a 37 percent increase. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has hired more than 8,200 

new personnel—a 31 percent increase. This subcommittee has been concerned that 

due to the rapid hiring at CBP and ICE, there is a potential for increased opportunities for officer corruption. Toward that end, for the past 3 years, this subcommittee 

has provided additional resources for integrity training, investigations of misconduct 

allegations, and background investigations. I am pleased to see that your budget requests an additional $26 million for CBP to address these efforts and meet the legislative mandate of the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010. 

This is the right thing to do and I support this funding. However, I understand 

that CBP, ICE, and the Inspector General are experiencing difficulties working together on workforce integrity because of an apparent lack of clear lines of authority 

regarding which departmental entity is to conduct differing types of investigations 

and when. There have been reports that a Border Patrol agent was charged with 

harboring illegal aliens but because the DHS Inspector General chose not to participate in a specific Border Corruption Task Force (BCTF), the investigation into the 

alleged activity was impeded. 

The American taxpayer’s trust in the integrity of Federal law enforcement officers 

is too important to be subject to stovepipes and petty bureaucratic behavior in 

Washington. In your response to my question during the hearing, you indicated that 

this was a priority for your Department and that you and the Deputy Secretary 
47 

would commit to work with me on establishing clear lines of authority for integrity 

investigations. 

What specific steps have been taken in this regard to date and what further actions can your Department take to improve this process? Please provide a schedule 

for this review and a date by which you or the Deputy Secretary will report back 

to the subcommittee on the recommendations to improve the process. What additional funds beyond the $26 million requested in the fiscal year 2012 request are 

required for full implementation of the Anti-Border Corruption Act? 

Answer. We are fully committed to fighting corruption and maintaining the integrity of our workforce across the Department. The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget 

request provides sufficient funding for workforce integrity in support of the AntiBorder Corruption Act (Public Law 111–376). The request includes a $26 million enhancement for CBP to enhance its polygraph program and ensure timely background and periodic reinvestigations as mandated by the Anti-Border Corruption 

Act of 2010 while maintaining all other aspects of CBP’s integrity programs, including oversight of CBP operations, personnel, and facilities. Resources will also be 

used to improve the Office of Internal Affairs’ ability to detect and deter insider and 

cyber threats, including the growing threats posed by Foreign Intelligence Services, 

terrorists, and foreign criminal organizations. Additionally, the base budget requests 

for CBP and ICE include $142 million and $94 million, respectively, to support 

anticorruption activities. 

DHS and our components have taken several actions to ensure that all parts of 

the Department are working together effectively to fight corruption. 

First, in 2004, CBP and ICE created the Joint Intake Center (JIC), which was 

designed to serve as the central clearinghouse for receiving, documenting, and processing all allegations of misconduct involving ICE and CBP employees and to ensure 

that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) receives appropriate and timely notification through the Joint Integrity Case Management System (JICMS). 

Second, I have directed CBP and ICE to adhere to the DHS Management directive, which requires CBP and ICE to promptly advise the OIG regarding allegations 

of employee misconduct. CBP leadership has taken prompt action to ensure strong 

cooperation between CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs (CBP IA) and OIG. In October 

2009 and July 2010, CBP IA issued guidance to all CBP IA special agents-in-charge 

requiring that detailed information regarding any allegation of wrongdoing on the 

part of a CBP employee be entered into JICMS on the same day or the day after 

receiving the information. The guidance extends specifically to CBP IA agents serving on BCTFs. 

Third, this past January, CBP and ICE entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing a program whereby CBP would augment ICE investigations of criminal misconduct by CBP employees through the detail of CBP IA 

agents to ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility. Since the MOU became effective on January 1, 2011, CBP has detailed 24 special agents to ICE OPR. Pursuant 

to the MOU, CBP IA has begun working collaboratively with ICE OPR on 160 potential criminal cases targeting CBP personnel. 

The Department will continue to work closely with its components and OIG to ensure allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as allegations of corruption within the DHS workforce, are addressed in an effective and timely manner. We will 

continually review our processes for ensuring officer integrity, and make any adjustments to those processes as necessary. 

REAL ID ACT COMPLIANCE

Question. This subcommittee has committed significant resources to make driver’s 

licenses and identification cards more secure. This security measure was recommended by the 9/11 Commission and is required through the REAL ID Act. Of 

the $190 million appropriated to FEMA for REAL ID-related grants to date, approximately $161.2 million has been obligated to individual States for security improvements to individual State credentials and licensing processes and $28.8 million 

to information sharing and verification capability improvements. Of the $60 million 

appropriated to USCIS, approximately $6.3 million has been obligated by USCIS to 

immigration status verification projects and $28.5 million has been obligated to 

FEMA to supplement existing FEMA grants for information sharing and verification 

capability improvements. On March 7, 2011, the date for final compliance with the 

REAL ID Act was changed from May 11, 2011, to January 15, 2013, through a Federal Register notice. The change was made citing the difficulty States are still having meeting all of the statutory requirements. The notice also recognizes significant 

progress has been made by States in some areas. 

Please provide a copy of the notice for the record. 
48 

How many States are currently in compliance with the act, how many are expected to be in compliance this fiscal year, and how many are estimated to be in 

compliance in fiscal year 2012? 

Please outline why the Nation is safer because of the investments and progress 

made to date and detail how the fiscal year 2012 budget request continues the 

progress of this effort. Will the Department resubmit PASS ID? 

Answer. [The final rule is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-03- 

07/pdf/2011-5002.pdf (Federal Register/Monday, March 7, 2011/Vol. 76/No. 44/pgs 

12269–12271/Rules and Regulations).] 

To address concerns raised by the States over various aspects of REAL ID, DHS 

supported PASS ID legislation introduced in the last Congress. PASS ID would have 

made a number of changes to the REAL ID Act to facilitate State compliance. Since 

this bill was not approved by the Congress we have made considerable progress in 

implementing REAL ID. 

To date, five States have submitted for DHS review, full-compliance certification 

packages. Additionally, a number of States are making progress in meeting the requirements of the REAL ID Act. A majority of States have self-certified that they 

either already or plan to: verify lawful status using the Systematic Alien 

Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system; conduct background checks and fraudulent document training for employees; incorporate safeguards to improve the physical security of driver’s license production facilities; and implement technology linking DMV employees to the credentials they issue. Moreover, by the end of 2011, 

nearly all of the reporting States will have implemented additional security enhancements related to DMV employees, physical security, technology, and card security. By implementing these security enhancements, States can more effectively 

mitigate fraud associated with State-issued credentials, and make it more difficult 

for individuals to obtain identity documents they are not entitled to. 

REAL ID STATUS OF STATES AS OF MARCH 29, 2011 1

States that have submitted full compliance certification 

packages to DHS (5).

Maryland, Tennessee, Connecticut, South Dakota, Delaware. 

States issuing materially compliant documents with gold 

star (4) (Self-certified).

Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Utah. 

States that are materially compliant but not issuing 

compliant gold star documents (7) (Self-certified).

Arkansas, District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 

Mississippi, New Jersey. 

States committed to meet material compliance but need 

additional time (12).

Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Nebraska, Ohio, Puerto Rico, 

Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. 

States with comparable EDL programs (4) ....................... New York (issues EDL), Michigan (issues EDL), Vermont 

(issues EDL), Washington (issues EDL). 

States committed to meet 15 of 18 benchmarks (12) .... Arizona, California, Georgia, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, 

Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virgin Islands. 

States that have indicated they will not meet four or 

more benchmarks within the next 12 months (12).

Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Idaho, Louisiana, 

Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Northern Marianas. 

1 This information was compiled from documentation submitted by the States in response to DHS requirement to submit Material 

Compliance benchmark data or Full Compliance Certification information. All of the information is self-reported by the States so all 

conclusions based on this information may not accurately reflect a State’s actual progress in complying with the requirements of 

the REAL ID regulation. 

NOTE.—Italic text denotes States with legislation preventing REAL ID compliance. 

States may use funds provided through the State Homeland Security Grants Program to continue to improve the security of their driver’s license program. 

COORDINATION OF FEDERAL CHEMICAL SECURITY EFFORTS

Question. The Senate Report (111–31) accompanying the fiscal year 2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (Public Law 111–83) directed the 

Department to report quarterly on its efforts to coordinate chemical security across 

departments. The fourth quarter report received on March 4, 2011, outlines several 

memorandums of agreements, regulatory reviews, and regulatory amendments that 

are under development. Please provide a specific timeline for each of these efforts 

and identify any obstacles to meeting the timelines expeditiously. In particular, 

please update the subcommittee on efforts to establish standardized risk assess-
49 

ments for facilities under the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards. 

Answer. [Follows:] 

Infrastructure Protection/Coast Guard Coordination 

The National Protection and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) and the Coast Guard continue to work toward harmonization 

of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) and Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) regulatory programs under the auspices of the chartered CFATS–MTSA Harmonization Working Group. In November 2010, senior 

leadership from NPPD and the Coast Guard signed the charter. As stated in the 

activities detailed in the Fourth Quarter Report to Congress, the CFATS–MTSA 

Working Group continued ‘‘the development of a full regulatory review of the security regimes established under MTSA and CFATS.’’ 

In November 2010, the Working Group presented a comprehensive regulatory review to NPPD Under Secretary Rand Beers and Rear Admiral (RADM) Brian 

Salerno, the Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations. This review was designed to inform leadership regarding options for seeking consistency of security 

across all high-risk chemical facilities. The findings of this review have been approved by NPPD/IP and Coast Guard leadership; NPPD/IP’s Infrastructure Security 

Compliance Division (ISCD) and the Coast Guard are currently working to further 

a number of initiatives both independently and through the Working Group and 

designated subgroups. Also noted in the Fourth Quarter Report to Congress, NPPD 

and the Coast Guard are working toward the ‘‘Refinement of a [memorandum of 

agreement (MOA)] to enable data sharing and sharing of risk methodologies between ISCD’s Chemical Security Assessment Tool and the Coast Guard’s Maritime 

Security Risk Analysis Model . . . ’’ Consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Working Group, NPPD and the Coast Guard are establishing a Risk and 

Information Sharing Sub-Group designed to complete development of the referenced 

MOA, which will relate to the exchange of specific risk information and an assessment of the approaches to risk management currently employed by ISCD and the 

Coast Guard for their respective programs. Execution of the MOA is expected by 

summer 2011. 

In order to help DHS develop a more comprehensive picture of security issues at 

the Nation’s chemical facilities, and to help DHS evaluate whether any regulatory 

gaps exist that may pose an unacceptable security risk, the Department has begun 

the process, with close cooperation between NPPD and the Coast Guard, for determining whether and how to require MTSA-covered facilities that possess CFATS 

chemicals of interest to complete and submit CFATS Top-Screens. 

DHS/Federal Bureau of Investigation Coordination.—With regard to the Department’s efforts to coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), NPPD 

is developing an operational-level MOA with the FBI specific to chemical security 

and related national security issues. As noted in the Fourth Quarterly Report to 

Congress, ‘‘This MOA will establish proactive guidelines that build upon our current 

working relationships and allow for additional interagency activities (such as information sharing on high-risk chemical facilities and field component interaction) and 

will resolve any potential jurisdictional issues proactively.’’ As the MOA is developed, NPPD/IP and the FBI are also leveraging a formal agreement, entered into 

between the Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the FBI in September 2010, regarding the development of joint intelligence products (such as intelligence bulletins). NPPD/IP and the FBI are currently leveraging this agreement in 

relation to products jointly developed for chemical security-related issues. 

DHS/Nuclear Regulatory Commission Coordination 

As stated in the Fourth Quarterly Report to Congress, ‘‘At the staff level, DHS 

and the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)] finalized and submitted to DHS 

and NRC leadership for review and execution a jointly developed draft MOU designed to help define the types of facilities that are wholly or partially exempt from 

CFATS due to NRC-regulatory authority, as well as processes for identifying those 

facilities.’’ NPPD Under Secretary Rand Beers formally endorsed the DHS–NRC 

MOU in August 2010, and the MOU is currently with NRC senior leadership for 

final review and execution. 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Question. In January 2011, a San Diego-area Border Patrol agent, Marcos 

Manzano was arrested for harboring illegal immigrants. One of OIG’s missions is 

to investigate allegations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving 

DHS employees, and to work with the U.S. Attorneys, other law enforcement agen-
50 

cies, and investigate activities of DHS Internal Affairs offices to ensure violators are 

prosecuted, fined, and/or civil action is taken. In this particular case, the FBI BCTF 

had the lead on the investigation, but reports show that the DHS OIG was not involved due to the fact that the OIG has not signed on to the BCTF MOU. 

Why isn’t the DHS OIG part of the BCTF? 

Answer. Despite the lack of any formal written agreement, DHS OIG has always 

tried to participate fully with the BCTF. Since its beginning in 2003, DHS OIG has 

worked cooperatively with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies on border 

corruption matters involving DHS employees without any formal written agreement. 

In March 2010, DHS OIG assigned a Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Investigations to act as a liaison to the FBI’s National BCTF in an effort to achieve full 

participation in all of the FBI BCTF’s investigations. In addition, this Deputy Assistant Inspector General was tasked with negotiating an MOU that reflects the 

OIG’s statutory responsibilities with respect to: 

—Investigating allegations of criminal misconduct against DHS employees and 

—Providing oversight of the internal affairs offices within DHS, while ensuring 

the representation of departmental interests in the course of these investigations. 

In May 2010, the FBI in San Diego presented the OIG with an MOU that contained provisions that place significant restrictions on the OIG’s independence, and 

were therefore unacceptable. We worked locally and at FBI headquarters to resolve 

differences and craft language to which all parties could agree. In November 2010, 

we proposed alternative language for the local BCTF MOU that both recognized the 

significance of border corruption offenses committed by DHS employees and respected the legislated authorities that define and govern roles and responsibilities 

of the member agencies that include the FBI, CBP Internal Affairs (IA), CBP Office 

of Field Operations (OPO), Border Patrol, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Office of Investigations. 

Our proposal was rejected by the FBI because the FBI failed to recognize that 

DHS has a system of tiered authority with respect to the investigation of allegations 

of criminal misconduct against DHS employees and that, within that system of 

tiered authority, OIG has primacy. Moreover, we were asked to remove the agent 

we had assigned to the San Diego task force because we had not signed the version 

of the MOU that was unilaterally drafted by the FBI. We honored the FBI’s request 

and removed our agent on November 12, 2010. Since that time, several significant 

border corruption cases that DHS OIG has presented to the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

(USAO) in San Diego have been declined because the investigations were not conducted by the local BCTF. 

The OIG has been prevented from participating in the FBI BCTF in San Diego 

because of the insistence that we sign an agreement we consider to be fundamentally flawed, and in conflict with our legislated mandate as the primary authority 

within DHS for investigating allegations that DHS employees have committed 

criminal misconduct. This authority is clearly specified in the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended, and further articulated in the Secretary of Homeland Security’s Management Directive (MD) 0810.1. 

We have continued to negotiate with the USAO in San Diego to reach accord on 

an MOU that will preserve the OIG’s independence and authority, but otherwise 

satisfies the general terms of the BCTF MOU. OIG continues to open and aggressively investigate all allegations relating to the corruption of DHS employees or the 

compromise of systems related to the security of our borders and transportation networks. 

Question.Why hasn’t the OIG signed the MOU? Is there something in the MOU 

that is counter to the Inspector General Act or DHS Management Directive? 

Answer. The BCTF MOU places serious limitations on the independence of the 

OIG. First it requires that all allegations of DHS employee corruption, without exception, be referred to the BCTF. Second, it fails to address the authority within 

DHS to investigate allegations of criminal misconduct by DHS employees and the 

role of the OIG in oversight of DHS component internal affairs offices. 

Inspectors General play a critical role in assuring transparent, honest, effective, 

and accountable government. Both the personal and organizational independence of 

OIG investigators is essential to maintaining the public trust in not only the work 

of the OIG, but also in the DHS workforce as a whole. The American public wants 

to know that Government employees are held accountable for their misconduct by 

an independent fact finder, such as the OIG. 

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002, as amended, establish a clear line of authority for investigating allegations 

of criminal misconduct by DHS employees. The statutes vest primary criminal investigative authority for employee misconduct with DHS OIG. Within DHS, Man-
51 

agement Directive 0810.1 outlines the roles of the various offices of internal affairs 

with respect to support for the OIG, including investigation of noncriminal misconduct allegations. 

In contrast, the BCTF MOU specifies that each participating DHS agency is an 

equal partner that shares overall responsibility for policy, operation, and direction 

of the BCTF; coordination of investigations; and for providing management and 

oversight of the BCTF. The San Diego BCTF includes the field operational elements 

of CBP and Border Patrol, in addition to CBP internal affairs and TSA’s internal 

affairs. In fact, in the investigation of Border Patrol Agent Manzano, the FBI assigned a Border Patrol agent member of the BCTF to work as the co-case agent 

along with the FBI. 

This shared management responsibility between DHS OIG and internal affairs 

units (and operational units) of other DHS components usurps the OIG’s statutory 

responsibility for supervising, leading, and coordinating criminal investigations of 

DHS employees and interferes with our oversight responsibility with respect to component internal affairs units. Many aspects of the MOU interfere with the OIG’s 

ability to investigate cases independently of the DHS component members of the 

BCTFs. 

With respect to information sharing, the OIG and FBI have a mutual responsibility under the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Offices of Inspector General with 

Statutory Law Enforcement Authority to promptly notify one another upon initiation of any criminal investigation, a responsibility the OIG meets in a timely way. 

Within DHS, all allegations of criminal misconduct by employees must be referred 

to OIG. The MOU would require DHS participating agencies to provide the same 

information directly to the FBI. This duplication in reporting is not an efficient use 

of DHS or FBI resources, and opens the door for dual parallel investigations. 

The MOU contains a provision under which the Executive Board, which is comprised of representatives of all participating agencies (in this case DHS components), who vote on whether or not the OIG could investigate an allegation unilaterally. Allowing DHS components to vote on whether and how the OIG pursues an 

investigation is contrary to the concept of statutory independence, and would result 

in the erosion of public confidence in any outcome. 

Question. Describe the OIG’s leadership role as it relates to the internal affairs 

division of each of the Department’s agencies. 

Answer. DHS OIG has strong working relationships with most offices of internal 

affairs within DHS. We communicate daily on allegations and ongoing cases, and 

routinely work collaboratively. DHS OIG has an established inspection process for 

reviewing the work of the internal affairs units at least once every 3 years. The inspections review compliance with investigative standards, personnel training and 

qualifications, and investigative case files in order to ensure that the work of the 

internal affairs units reflects the quality expected by DHS senior leadership, the 

Congress, and the public. Each inspection results in a written report and if recommendations are made for corrective actions or improvements, OIG follows up to 

confirm that the recommendations in fact have been implemented. 

An OIG agent is assigned as a desk officer to each component internal affairs office and reviews allegations referred to OIG by that internal affairs office. OIG refers allegations that are purely administrative in nature back to the component, 

who then takes lead on the investigation. In certain instances of sensitive or significant matters, we exercise active oversight of a case referred back to the component 

and review the findings. DHS OIG also recently initiated a program to review case 

management statistics from each of the internal affairs units in order to reconcile 

OIG’s case management records with those of the components, to track trends and 

patterns in allegations, and to ensure that components take appropriate action 

when misconduct is found. 

Question. Should all internal affairs personnel work for the DHS OIG? 

Answer. When the DHS was initially organized, it was done so on the basis of 

realignment of existing governmental resources. The premise was that the DHS 

would streamline operations by eliminating redundancies while increasing communication, information sharing, transparency, and accountability. Since that time, the 

component elements have inappropriately stratified operations by devoting personnel and resources that compete with, rather than compliment, the OIG. Although 

the internal affairs offices have an important mission to conduct noncriminal misconduct inquiries, pre-employment screening of applicants, and background investigations of employees and provide integrity and security briefings that help employees recognize corruption signs and dangers, transferring some number of experienced criminal investigators from the internal affairs offices to DHS OIG would 

allow OIG to more effectively address its workload growth resulting from increases 

in DHS component workforces. It is our belief that a realignment of these resources 
52 

by transfer of the positions to the OIG would be responsible stewardship. Alternatively, funding for increased OIG staffing that reflects the growth within the DHS 

workforce is needed. 

The Department was also founded with intent to forsake jurisdictional rivalries 

in favor of operational efficiency. Just as DHS presents one face at the border, the 

Homeland Security Act mandates one face when dealing with criminal allegations 

against departmental employees. The OIG, which has primary authority to investigative those criminal misconduct allegations, should be the single point of contact 

with regard to those allegations. 

One of the most important factors in detecting, deterring, and discouraging corruption is employee awareness of where and how to report and their comfort in 

doing so. Centralizing complaint intake in the OIG, as a separate office from a complainant’s agency of employment, would provide DHS employees with increased assurance that their information will be treated confidentially and acted upon professionally; eliminate redundancies in the reporting of allegations; and ensure the 

timely reporting of employee complaints to the OIG hotline would more effectively 

direct resources to combat corruption and would promote better intelligence, trend 

analysis, and prioritization of investigative leads. 

The OIG continues to work the vast majority of allegations of the most serious 

criminal misconduct and corruption, and has accounted for an overwhelming majority of all arrests and convictions of DHS employees since 2003. We believe that 

DHS’s criminal investigative resources should be deployed accordingly. 

CBP—CONTAINER SECURITY

Question. The 9/11 Act requires 100 percent of U.S.-bound maritime cargo to be 

scanned before departing to our ports. In testimony before the Congress last year, 

CBP Commissioner Bersin stated that only 4 percent to 5 percent of cargo is currently scanned. The act allows the Secretary to waive this 2012 requirement in a 

2-year increment if conditions indicate this requirement cannot be met, and you 

have indicated that you will do so. However, even before you have officially waived 

these requirements, the budget request for fiscal year 2012—and the realities in this 

fiscal year—show significant reductions to the international cargo screening programs. Funds have been eliminated for Secure Freight pilots in all places except 

Pakistan and CBP has closed or is ceasing operations at many of the 58 Container 

Security Initiative (CSI) ports. In fiscal year 2009, there were 167 CBP officials located overseas at CSI ports. By the end of fiscal year 2010—and continuing today— 

the number of individuals has dropped to 86. 

With overseas personnel for this effort essentially cut in one-half, how does this 

increase cargo security at the same time it appears that no real steps are being 

taken to meet a legislative mandate that the Department has known has been coming since September 2006—more than 4 years ago? 

Much of this scanning will be handled domestically by the targeting center. However, the 2012 budget includes $7.5 million to fund the implementation of two pilots 

to test the 100-percent scanning mandate. In fact, one of the proposed pilots appears 

to replicate the Secure Freight Initiative model used in Pakistan in a different, 

high-threat corridor—likely on the Arabian Peninsula. 

What new information does the Department believe it can obtain by repeating the 

same project in a different location? How will this information be used to determine 

the best steps to meet the scanning requirement? What developments in scanning 

technology might lead DHS to decide to implement the overseas scanning requirement called for in the 9/11 Act? 

Answer. Presently, and as required by the SAFE Port Act, DHS and other Federal 

partners are working collaboratively with the National Security Staff to develop a 

national-level strategy that will provide a unified vision that the U.S. Government 

sees for global supply chain security across air, land, and sea modes of transportation, which will also address the necessary level of cargo scanned to provide effective detection and deterrence. The administration anticipates completing this strategy development effort in 2011 and DHS remains confident that it will include guidance and additional details on how DHS, other Departments, and agencies will address the 100 percent cargo scanning provision. 

Throughout this process, we will remain mindful of our need to properly balance 

security concerns with facilitating the flow of commerce. The President’s fiscal year 

2012 budget requests funding for CBP to conduct a cargo screening pilot to assess 

alternatives to the 100 percent maritime cargo scanning, enabling CBP to test alternatives to extend the zone of security beyond our physical borders, strengthen global 

supply chain security, and enhance CBP’s multi-layered security strategy. CBP is 

in a unique position to work toward deterring malicious actors from exploiting the 
53 

system, protecting infrastructure and embedding resilience in the system to aid in 

recovering from disruptions by virtue of having access to vast amounts of historical 

and transactional data from all modes of cargo shipments. This data includes the 

parties involved, trade routes and other information which can be used in assessing 

risk. Coupled with this is CBP’s expertise in risk targeting that has been developed 

over the past decade. The proposed Supply Chain Security Pilot would include nextgeneration targeting to employ predictive models to assess threats and detect anomalies in the supply chain; and the utilization of tools and technologies that are currently not in use at the National Targeting Center. For example, analysts will be 

provided analytic tools that allow them to perform link analysis, commodity analysis, and entity resolution, along with visualization tools to represent vessel movements, geo-location of addresses, and social network diagrams. 

CBP’s multi-layered security strategy seeks to identify high-risk cargo as early as 

possible in the supply chain. The Trade Act of 2002 and its implementing regulations require industry to submit electronic manifest data to CBP 24 hours prior to 

the cargo being laden on a vessel destined for the United States. CBP’s 

predeparture manifest data was enhanced further with the implementation of the 

Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier requirements, commonly known as 

‘‘10∂2,’’ which requires importers to provide specific information on their cargo 

prior to arrival in the United States. CBP also utilizes the Automated Targeting 

System (ATS) to screen advanced manifest data and assist CBP officers in identifying high-risk cargo. Upon screening, CBP can issue ‘‘Do Not Load’’ messages for 

shipments deemed high-risk until the risk can be mitigated or resolved. 

Through the CSI, CBP works to identify and inspect high-risk cargo before it is 

laden on a vessel destined for the United States. As a result of new and improved 

technology and increased international partnerships, CBP is now able to conduct a 

greater portion of the CSI targeting from the National Targeting Center-Cargo 

(NTC–C)—increasing efficiency and reducing cost. As a result, in early fiscal year 

2009, CSI began reducing the number of CBP officers deployed to foreign seaports. 

While there has been decrease in the staffing of CSI officers abroad, CSI has increased the staffing level at the NTC–C to support targeting functions in overseas 

ports. The decrease in the CSI staffing at foreign locations has not compromised the 

CSI mission because CBP has been able to accomplish the CSI mission more efficiently and in a more cost-effective manner through the increased staffing and resources at the NTC–C. The fiscal year 2012 budget continues to fund CSI at the 

same level. 

CBP and DHS are committed to ensuring the security of the international supply 

chain and will work to support the global supply chain security strategy utilizing 

a risk-based, multi-layered approach across all modes of transit. 

AIR CARGO SCREENING

Question. What specific steps is the Department taking to improve the screening 

of articles entering the United States via air? Is the Department taking steps to 

have shipping manifest requirements for air cargo more closely match the current 

ones for seaborne cargo? Can CBP ensure that all cargo information requiring a 

shippers’ export declaration is provided to CBP within a reasonable security timeframe? If so, what is that timeframe? Does CBP currently have the ability to enforce 

a no-load decision or require additional screening for any U.S.-bound air cargo? 

Answer. Today, 100 percent of high-risk cargo on international flights bound for 

the United States is prohibited from being transported on passenger aircraft and 

goes through enhanced security procedures before being shipped on all cargo aircraft. DHS and TSA recently announced a proposed deadline of December 31, 2011, 

for industry to screen 100 percent of air cargo on international inbound passenger 

aircraft—2 years earlier than previously anticipated. 

DHS is also working closely with industry and international partners to expedite 

the receipt of advanced cargo data for international flights to the United States 

prior to departure in order to identify and screen items based on risk and current 

intelligence before they are airborne. In December 2010, CBP, TSA, and the air 

cargo industry launched a new joint technology pilot project to enhance the sharing 

of electronic shipping information to improve the identification of high-risk shipments. 

Further, in January, I announced a new partnership with the World Customs Organization to enlist other nations, international bodies, and the private sector in increasing the security of the global supply chain—outlining a series of new initiatives 

to make the system stronger, smarter and more resilient. 

CBP exercises the same border authority over exports and imports and has the 

authority to inspect and detain goods and order their redelivery from any person, 
54 

such as the carrier, in possession of the goods. CBP is currently collaborating with 

TSA to utilize their regulatory authority to have high-risk shipments screened prior 

to being laden at last port of departure. 

Question. The Department has been working with industry to develop a process 

for receiving air cargo manifest information prior to departure. What is the status 

of this effort? When will the system be operational? What resources are required 

by CBP and TSA to develop and operate this system? Are funds requested in the 

fiscal year 2012 budget for this effort? 

Answer. DHS is working closely with industry and international partners to expedite the receipt of advanced cargo data for international flights to the United States 

prior to departure in order to identify and screen items based on risk and current 

intelligence before they are airborne. In December 2010, CBP, TSA, and the air 

cargo industry launched a new joint technology pilot project (the Air Cargo Advance 

Screening Pilot) to enhance the sharing of electronic shipping information to improve the identification of high-risk shipments. 

CBP and TSA have made significant progress on this pilot and expect to have the 

first phase—which focuses on the express consignment environment—fully operational in the late spring 2011. The passenger phase of the pilot is tentatively 

scheduled for implementation in early summer 2011. 

CBP and TSA estimate that the total costs for the development and maintenance 

of the Air Cargo Advance Screening system and staffing through fiscal year 2012 

will be approximately $20 million. Funding is included within the CBP salaries and 

expenses appropriation, specifically in the Inspections, Trade and Travel, and Trusted Traveler Program PPAs, in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. 

IMPACT OF CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT ON THE SEAFOOD INDUSTRY

Question. When foreign producers send dumped or unfairly subsidized goods into 

our country, vigorous enforcement of our trade laws is the only way that American 

businesses can compete on a level playing field. 

In Louisiana and the gulf region, the domestic shrimp industry is fighting a tough 

battle against unfairly dumped shrimp imports, and they won antidumping orders 

against shrimp from six countries in 2005. 

Unfortunately, Customs is simply not doing enough to collect the dumping duties 

that importers owe to the Federal Government. Since 2005, for example, importers 

of shrimp from China have failed to pay more than $58 million in dumping duties, 

some of which is supposed to be redistributed to injured shrimp producers here in 

the United States. Continued failure to collect these duties is fiscally irresponsible, 

and it further threatens a vulnerable gulf seafood industry that is struggling to recover from the impact of four major hurricanes and a devastating oil spill. 

How can Customs improve its performance to ensure that our laws are fully enforced and that importers are held accountable for all of the duties they owe? Could 

we enforce duty payment requirements on individuals, rather than companies that 

often go bankrupt? Will you work with me to increase transparency so that domestic 

producers can track the enforcement actions Customs is undertaking against importers and the results of those actions? 

Answer. Antidumping/countervailing duty (AD/CVD) enforcement is a priority 

trade issue (PTI) for CBP. CBP takes a concerted, systematic approach to detect and 

deter circumvention of the AD/CVD law, administer entries of AD/CVD merchandise, and to issue and collect bills for AD/CVD duties owed to the U.S. Government. 

CBP coordinates its AD/CVD enforcement activities through an intra-office AD/CVD 

PTI Working Group. CBP works closely with the Department of Commerce (DOC), 

the administering authority for AD/CVD determinations under U.S. law, and ICE 

to enforce AD/CVD laws and regulations. 

When CBP issues a bill for final AD/CVD duties, CBP makes every effort to collect all duties, taxes and fees legally due to the Government. However, some importers, or their agents, are unable to pay the final duties. In addition, at least two 

sureties issuing bonds covering substantial amounts of AD/CVD duties are currently 

in receivership, further complicating collection. Other importers are simply unwilling to pay, or no longer exist by the time CBP issues a bill. CBP pursues collection 

action against importers and sureties who are simply unwilling to pay. CBP’s Revenue Division in the Office of Administration initiates an administrative collections 

process in order to recover past-due amounts from the importers and sureties. This 

process may include dunning letters and the suspension of the immediate delivery 

process, among other steps. Ultimately, those debts for which the Revenue Division’s 

collections process is ineffective are referred to CBP’s Office of Chief Counsel. 

The Office of Chief Counsel pursues collection from both the importers and sureties, after completing a legal review of the underlying debt. Further, a review is 
55 

done to determine if there is a viable importer (or available surety coverage) from 

which the debt may be recovered. In part, this is done through dunning letters, 

searches of electronic databases and internal systems, and pursuing available leads. 

In addition, CBP can assess civil penalties pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1592 against any 

party who, by fraud, gross negligence, or negligence submits a material false statement or omission on importation into the United States, including those cases in 

which a false statement or omission is made concerning the applicability of an antidumping duty order to a particular entry. If administrative attempts to collect the 

debt are unsuccessful and a viable importer and/or surety can be found, the Office 

of Chief Counsel drafts a complaint and refers the matter to the Department of Justice for possible litigation in the Court of International Trade. If the Office of Chief 

Counsel is not successful in locating a viable entity to be pursued, the matter will 

be referred back to the Revenue Division for appropriate action. This may include 

referral to ICE for further investigation. If the debt is without legal merit or no viable entity can be located to pursue further collection action, CBP may ultimately be 

forced to write off the debt. 

CBP has taken steps to specifically improve the collection of AD/CVD duties on 

shrimp imports and continues to explore statutory and nonstatutory changes to enhance bonding requirements. CBP is also actively pursuing collection of the balance 

of the open bills against delinquent importers and sureties. 

ANTIDUMPING AUTHORITIES

Question. Please detail the legal process for antidumping activities (claims, investigations, collections, etc.) under the specific jurisdiction of CBP from beginning of 

the process to final resolution. 

What parts of this process are not under the control or jurisdiction of CBP? What 

roles do other U.S. agencies or departments play in this process and at what intervals? How long can the duty collection process take once a determination is made 

that a shipper has ‘‘dumped’’ goods adversely affecting a U.S. producer? What legal 

impediments, if any, prevent CBP from being able to use a portion of the fines it 

collects to cover the costs of increased investigations? Are all antidumping fines collected distributed to dumped-upon U.S. producers and/or companies? 

Under current law, the U.S. Government assesses antidumping fines against a 

particular company or corporation. What prevents our Government from going after 

the individual owner(s) of the company or corporation? If there is a legal prohibition 

in doing so, what specific law prohibits it? 

Answer. [Follows:] 

Legal Process for Antidumping Activities 

Once DOC makes an affirmative determination in an Antidumping or Countervailing Duty (AD/CVD) investigation, it issues instructions to CBP specifically identifying the covered product and requiring the applicable AD/CVD duty rates for each 

foreign producer. An importer must indicate that its entry is covered by an antidumping duty or countervailing duty order on its entry forms and deposit the applicable cash deposit. Because the United States has a retrospective system for determining antidumping and countervailing duties, the liquidation of these entries is 

suspended until DOC reaches a final decision of the rate of antidumping or countervailing duty. Thus, the amount deposited at the time of entry is only an estimate 

of what duties may ultimately be owed. 

Once DOC sends CBP liquidation instructions indicating the final rate of duty 

that is owed on these entries, CBP liquidates them in accordance with those instructions. If additional duties are owed, the importer must pay them at that time, with 

interest. Conversely, if the rate of duty decreased, the importer would receive a refund with any applicable interest. CBP’s role in this process is purely ministerial 

as CBP implements the instructions received from DOC. 

An importer who disagrees with the imposition of antidumping or countervailing 

duties may file a protest with CBP that concerns a decision that was made by CBP 

at the time of entry (not the underlying determination by DOC). Such a protest 

must be filed with the port within 180 days of liquidation. 

If the protest includes a request for further review that satisfies 19 CFR 174.24, 

CBP headquarters reviews the protest and issues a binding decision. If the port improperly denied the request for further review, the protestant may seek to have the 

denial set aside. Alternatively, if a protest is denied, the protestant may file suit 

in the Court of International Trade, which is the U.S. Court with subject matter 

jurisdiction over these matters. 

If the protestant does not seek judicial review of a denied protest (or if no protest 

was filed), CBP’s Revenue Division in the Office of Administration initiates an administrative collections process in order to recover past-due amounts from the im-
56 

porters and sureties. This process may include dunning letters and the suspension 

of immediate delivery process, among other steps. Ultimately, those debts for which 

the Revenue Division’s collections process is ineffective are referred to CBP’s Office 

of Chief Counsel. 

The Office of Chief Counsel pursues collection from both the importers and sureties, after completing a legal review of the underlying debt. Further, a review is 

done to determine if there is a viable importer (or available surety coverage) from 

which the debt may be recovered. In part, this is done through dunning letters, 

searches of electronic databases and internal systems, and pursuing available leads. 

If administrative attempts to collect the debt are unsuccessful and a viable importer 

and/or surety can be found, the Office of Chief Counsel drafts a complaint and refers 

the matter to the Department of Justice for possible litigation in the Court of International Trade. If the Office of Chief Counsel is not successful in locating a viable 

entity to be pursued, the matter will be referred back to the Revenue Division for 

appropriate action. This may include referral to ICE for further investigation. 

Parts of the Process Not Under the Control or Jurisdiction of CBP 

CBP’s role in administering the antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders 

is purely ministerial. DOC establishes which products are covered by the orders and 

what the applicable duty rates are for foreign producers and U.S. importers. CBP 

is in charge of the collection of the cash deposits, reviewing entries to ensure that 

importers are properly reporting their goods as subject to an order and paying the 

correct rate of duty, and liquidating those entries and assessing the final duty rate 

that is owed for those entries. CBP does not, however, liquidate any entry subject 

to an antidumping duty or countervailing duty order until it receives specific instructions from DOC indicating that it is appropriate to do so. 

Roles Other U.S. Agencies Play 

DOC, the AD/CVD administering authority under U.S. law, and the U.S. International Trade Commission are responsible for investigating petitions alleging that 

goods being imported into the United States are dumped or subsidized. DOC determines at what rate the goods are being dumped or subsidized and the International 

Trade Commission determines whether the U.S. industry has been injured or 

whether there is threat of injury resulting from the importation of these dumped 

or subsidized goods. If both agencies make affirmative preliminary determinations, 

DOC issues instructions to CBP specifically identifying the covered product and the 

applicable required duty rates for each foreign producer. After both agencies make 

affirmative final determinations, DOC publishes an antidumping duty order and/or 

countervailing duty order in the Federal Register. Thereafter, DOC may conduct annual administrative reviews to determine the actual rate of dumping or subsidization of the previous year’s entries. 

Every 5 years, DOC and the International Trade Commission conduct sunset reviews of AD/CVD orders to determine if a case should be continued or revoked, and 

DOC instructs CBP accordingly if a case is revoked. DOC also has other ad hoc proceedings that may result in instructions to CBP to begin or stop collecting AD/CVD 

duties on specified subcategories of merchandise or specific companies. 

ICE investigates criminal violations of AD/CVD laws. CBP works closely with ICE 

and regularly refers suspected criminal violations involving AD/CVD circumvention 

and fraud to ICE for investigation. In addition, CBP can assess civil penalties pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1592 against any party who, by fraud, gross negligence, or negligence, submits or aids and abets another in submitting a material false statement 

or omission on importation into the United States, including those cases in which 

a false statement or omission is made concerning the applicability of an antidumping duty order to a particular entry. 

Steps in the Process Once a Determination Is Made 

As soon as DOC instructs CBP to collect estimated AD/CVD duties for a commodity from a specified country, CBP will collect these estimated duties upon entries of the merchandise into the United States. CBP will then hold these entries 

in suspension until DOC instructs CBP to collect the final amount of duties due on 

these entries. CBP often does not receive these final liquidation instructions from 

DOC for several years after the original entry of merchandise. CBP then works to 

take timely action to apply the liquidation instructions and bill the importers for 

the final AD/CVD duties due. Importers may legally protest the liquidation of an 

entry and delay paying a bill until the protest is decided. If a protest is denied, the 

protestant may file suit in the Court of International Trade. 
57 

Fines as a Funding Source 

Generally speaking, fines must be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3302(b). Absent statutory authority, CBP’s use of these 

funds to cover the costs of investigations would constitute an improper augmentation of CBP’s appropriations. Where goods are seized and forfeited for AD related 

violations, those proceeds from the sale of forfeited goods are deposited in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund and available for reimbursing costs of the investigations, among 

other uses. 

Distribution of Fines 

The ‘‘Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000’’ was enacted on October 

28, 2000, as part of the ‘‘Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act’’. The act was repealed by section 

7601(a) of the ‘‘Deficit Reduction Act of 2005’’, but remains in place for AD/CVD duties collected on entries made before October 1, 2007. 

Money collected on an entry filed before October 1, 2007, will continue to be subject to the distribution procedures under former section 1675c. The duty on an entry 

is not available for distribution until the entry is liquidated pursuant to the direction of DOC and the duty is collected and deposited into the special account; therefore, the distribution process will continue until all entries made before October 1, 

2007 are liquidated and the duties are collected. As a result of the statutory constraints in the assessment of antidumping and countervailing duties, the distribution process will continue for an undetermined period; however, the amount of 

money available for distribution can be expected to diminish over time. 

Enforcement on Individuals Rather Than Companies 

The law makes it difficult to impose personal liability. While there is no express 

legal prohibition against taking collection action against individuals involved with 

corporate importers that incur dumping duty debts, most individuals involved with 

such debtor corporations are in other countries outside the jurisdiction of the United 

States, as is their valuable real and personal property. 

However, CBP does have the authority to assess civil penalties against individual 

owners of particular companies or corporations. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1592, CBP 

is authorized to assess penalties and recover lost duties (including antidumping duties) against any party who, by fraud, gross negligence, or negligence, enters or introduces, or attempts to enter or introduce, any merchandise into the commerce of 

the United States by means of a false statement or omission, or aids or abets another person to do so. See 19 U.S.C. 1592(a)–(d). CBP may exercise this authority 

in cases in which a false statement or omission is made on an entry involving merchandise subject to an antidumping duty order. 

IMPROVED ANTIDUMPING REVENUE COLLECTIONS

Question. In March 2008, GAO reported that, as of September 2007, CBP has 

been unable to collect more than $600 million owed in antidumping and countervailing duties imposed to remedy injurious unfair foreign trade practices. These include duties imposed on products exported to the United States at unfairly low 

prices (i.e., dumped) and duties on products exported to the United States that were 

subsidized by foreign governments. In addition to the substantial amount of lost revenue, the uncollected duties cause concern that the U.S. Government has not fully 

remedied the unfair trade practices. 

Since 2005, GAO has reported several times on the U.S. Government’s inability 

to collect substantial amounts of antidumping and countervailing duties and, in 

2008, proposed a variety of options for improving the system for collecting these duties. Two key components of the antidumping and countervailing duty system have 

received particular attention. One is its retrospective nature, which means that— 

though importers pay estimated duties at the time of importation—final duties are 

not assessed until after products enter the country. Another component is the ‘‘new 

shipper’’ review process that allows new manufacturers or exporters to petition for 

their own separate antidumping and countervailing duty rate. Despite other efforts 

by the Congress and CBP, these components of the system have not been addressed 

and the collection of antidumping and countervailing duties remains a problem. 

The March 2008, GAO report identified several options for the Congress to consider for improving the collection of antidumping and countervailing duties. And by 

adjusting features of the antidumping or countervailing duty system that create the 

risk that companies can evade paying duties, the Congress could further protect 

Government revenue, while also minimizing incentives for companies to pursue unfair trade practices. These options included eliminating the retrospective component 
58 

of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty system and adjusting requirements 

for new shipper reviews. 

What specific laws does CBP recommend should be changed or amended to enhance CBP’s antidumping investigations and increase antidumping collections? Can 

CBP take administrative actions to improve antidumping collections in the absence 

of legislation? In the absence of changes in legislative authorities to existing laws 

and practices, can CBP do more to collect and distribute antidumping receipts to 

injured U.S. businesses if it was provided with additional resources? If so, what resources would be required and what more could be achieved? 

Answer. CBP has a longstanding administrative collection process that employs 

all of the authority available to CBP. CBP makes every effort to collect all duties, 

taxes and fees legally due to the Government. 

In appendix V of the March 2008, GAO report, DHS commented that of the options identified by GAO to improve the collection of AD/CVD duties, the first option 

CBP preferred for addressing uncollected AD/CVD duties would be for the U.S. Congress to change U.S. law to eliminate the retrospective component of the U.S. AD/ 

CVD system and make the U.S. AD/CVD system prospective. DHS noted that a prospective AD/CVD system would alleviate the collection issues faced by CBP since 

the amount of duty assessed at entry would be the final amount owed. This would 

also substantially alleviate the administrative burden on CBP resources associated 

with a retrospective system, and allow CBP resources to more fully focus on AD/ 

CVD enforcement issues, such as circumvention of the AD/CVD law. In this appendix to the March 2008, GAO report, DHS also commented that the majority of the 

other options identified by GAO to improve the collection of AD/CVD duties would 

perpetuate and exacerbate the shortcomings of the U.S. retrospective system. 

JONES ACT ENFORCEMENT

Question. CBP is charged with enforcing our Nation’s cabotage laws, including the 

Jones Act, which requires that any goods transported by water between two coastwise points in the United States must be carried on ships that are built in America 

and crewed by Americans. This law promotes our economic and national security 

by ensuring the existence of a robust merchant marine fleet. 

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1974 extended Jones Act requirements 

to offshore points within the exclusive economic zone of the United States. It is 

therefore imperative that CBP have both the resources and the authorities it needs 

to enforce the Jones Act offshore, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico, where more 

than 25 percent of America’s domestic energy production occurs. 

Does CBP have the resources, authorities, and information it needs to investigate 

alleged Jones Act violations offshore? How is CBP partnering with the Offshore Supply Vessel (OSV) industry, which supports offshore energy facilities and operations, 

to carry out its enforcement mission? 

Answer. Yes, CBP has the resources, authorities, and information needed to take 

appropriate action for alleged Jones Act violations committed offshore. 

AIR AND MARINE

Question. What are the operational impacts on performing CBP’s mission of the 

CBP plan to retire 18 single-engine, fixed wing aircraft in fiscal year 2011? 

Answer. CBP is scheduled to retire 16 single-engine, fixed wing aircraft, 15 PA– 

18s and 1 C–172 in fiscal year–2011. The decision to retire these aircraft was based 

on their advanced age and the desire to operate more efficient, effective, and capably 

equipped aircraft. The PA–18 and C–172 have limited capability to fly low-level missions over hazardous terrain during the day and virtually no capability for operational missions at night. Recently purchased light enforcement helicopters (AS– 

350) are equipped with sophisticated sensors and are considerably better suited to 

perform the variety of required law enforcement missions supported by OAM. 

WHEN WILL WE KNOW THE BORDER IS SECURE?

Question. Debates have raged in the Congress and around the country over how 

secure our border is—especially our border with Mexico. Many people assert that 

they will not support immigration reform until they are confident the borders are 

‘‘secure’’. I look forward to visiting the border this spring to see what has been accomplished and to listen to the men and women who work to secure the border 

about what more needs to be done. 

But there appears to be no consensus on what constitutes a secure border. As I 

understand it, the Border Patrol for years has used metrics such as ‘‘effective control’’ or ‘‘less monitored’’ in defining border security. Approximately 657 miles of 

fencing and vehicle barriers have been constructed along the Southwest Border to 
59 

date. And as of June 30, 2010, the Border Patrol determined that 774 miles of that 

border were under ‘‘effective control’’. 

In testimony earlier this year, you stated ‘‘the term ‘operational control’ is a very 

narrow term of art, and it does not reflect the infrastructure and technology and 

all the other things that happen at the border’’. I would assume that 657 miles of 

fencing would certainly contribute to control of the border. 

Are you modifying the metrics used to define ‘‘border control’’? Do you believe our 

borders are secure? Which agency or entity determines where, how much, and what 

kind of tactical infrastructure is required to obtain control of our borders? What is 

the required number of miles of fencing to be constructed mandated by the Secure 

Fence Act, as amended? 

Answer. The ‘‘Operational Control’’ measure did not accurately represent the Border Patrol’s significant investments in personnel, technology, and resources or the 

efforts of other DHS components who are engaged in border security such as ICE 

and the Coast Guard. The Border Patrol is currently taking steps to replace this 

outdated measure with performance metrics that more accurately depict the state 

of border security. 

This administration has made unprecedented investments in border security and 

on every metric that measures progress, we’re heading in the right direction. Apprehensions are down and seizures—across the board—are up. 

The types, amount and location of tactical infrastructure are determined through 

a combination of the operational assessment made by Border Patrol agents conducting daily operations in the field, available funding, and an overall determination 

of current operational priorities. 

To date, DHS/CBP has constructed a total of 649 miles out of nearly 652 miles 

required by the Congress. The fence mileage language of the Secure Fence Act, as 

amended, is currently the subject of pending litigation (United States v. The State 

of Arizona; United States District Court, District of Arizona; Case No. 10-cv-01413). 

BORDER PATROL AGENTS

Question. Your budget request supports funding to sustain the 21,370 Border Patrol agents which CBP intends to hire by the end of this fiscal year. This number 

reflects the additional 1,000 agents the Congress funded as part of the Fiscal Year 

2010 Emergency Border Security Supplemental Appropriations Act enacted last August. No new agents, however, are requested in the President’s budget. 

Are 21,370 Border Patrol agents the right number of agents needed to protect our 

borders? What happens when the 1,200 National Guardsmen and women currently 

assisting our border agencies along the Southwest Border leave as planned this 

summer? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 budget request supports 21,370 Border Patrol agents 

and 21,186 CBP officers—the largest deployment of law enforcement officers to the 

front line in the agency’s history. The request annualizes positions supported by the 

fiscal year 2010 Southwest Border supplemental, including 1,000 new Border Patrol 

agents and 250 new CBP officers. Additional funding is provided to support 300 

more CBP officers and canine assets at ports of entry. The request also supports 

the mobile response surge teams created with the supplemental funding to respond 

rapidly to emergent situations without depleting Border Patrol staffing from other 

locations. The 1,200 National Guard deployed to the Southwest Border have been 

contributing additional capabilities and capacity to assist law enforcement agencies 

including providing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and counternarcotics 

enforcement support as CBP hires and deploys the 1,000 BP agents included in the 

Southwest Border supplemental. 

IMPROVING THE ENTRY PROCESS FOR VISITORS TO THE UNITED STATES

Question. In your statement, you say the second Homeland Security mission is to 

secure the Nation’s borders ‘‘to prevent illegal activity while facilitating lawful travel and trade.’’ We want to welcome visitors to the United States, but I frequently 

hear from constituents who travel internationally that the entry process coming into 

this country is lengthy and daunting. It often takes hours for passengers to be processed once arriving at an airport. There are long lines, not all lanes are open and 

staffed, and the information provided to arriving passengers is often confusing. I understand that your Department has initiated a few programs to try and address 

some of these symptoms, such as the Model Ports of Entry program and the Global 

Entry Program. 

Your budget proposes funding to add more than 300 new CBP officers to staff 

newly opened or expanded land border ports. What is being done to make the entry 

process for visitors and U.S. citizens more welcoming without degrading security? 
60 

Please explain how these existing programs, and others, have reduced wait times 

and made the process more welcoming for travelers. How much money has been directed to these improved entry programs for each of fiscal years 2008–2011, and 

how much is requested for these and other programs for 2012? 

The Department has implemented a number of the recommendations proposed by 

the Secure Borders and Open Doors Advisory Committee (SBODAC)—such as the 

International Registered Traveler program and those programs listed above. In an 

October, 28, 2008, letter to now former Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, 

Rice and Chertoff, respectively, the SBODAC urged that additional actions recommended in the Committee’s January 2008 report also be implemented. 

Has the Department implemented any additional recommendations of that Committee since 2008? If so, please describe them. If not, please explain why it has not? 

One of the frequent complaints made by visitors to the United States, especially 

in the air environment, concerns the way they are treated by CBP officers upon arrival at the airport. The visitors are often tired and there may be language barriers, 

but unfortunately what makes the media reports is that the CBP officers are 

brusque and treat the visitor as if he or she is guilty while performing the entry 

inspection. Understanding that the CBP officers’ primary duty is security and ensuring that the individual before them is eligible for entry into the country, the officer is also the first impression the traveler has of America and Americans. 

Please describe the training CBPOs are provided regarding ‘‘welcoming’’ visitors 

as they are being processed. Are aspects of courtesy and customer service, in addition to security, stressed as part of their training? Are they instructed to greet the 

visitor with a statement such as ‘‘Welcome to the United States’’ as the traveler approaches the inspection kiosk? If not, are there reasons why the officer should not 

be provided such instruction? 

Answer. [Follows:] 

Programs To Welcome Travelers 

CBP developed the Model Ports Initiative in partnership with industry stakeholders, launching the pilot program in 2007 at Washington/Dulles and Houston 

International Airports. The program expanded to 18 additional model ports in 2008, 

including Atlanta, Boston, Dallas/Fort Worth, Chicago, Detroit, Fort Lauderdale, 

Honolulu, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New York (JFK), Orlando, 

Philadelphia, Sanford (FL), San Juan, San Francisco, and Seattle airports. 

The Model Ports Initiative is the key component of efforts to strengthen border 

security through advanced technologies and procedures while providing a more welcoming experience, reduced wait times and better customer service. CBP has increased staffing and professional training at ports of entry, installed new bilingual 

signage, updated the travel section of its public Web site and introduced a variety 

of trusted traveler programs, such as Global Entry, to expedite entry into the country. 

The Passenger Service Manager (PSM) program continues to be an important 

focus of the Model Ports Initiative to welcome travelers, provide appropriate assistance, and explain CBP procedures in order to minimize wait times. 

All Model Ports signage have been completed and delivered. These signs inform 

travelers of the CBP mission, pledge to treat people with respect and provide clear 

directions to travelers to minimize delays. 

The audio and video displays which run the updated ‘‘Welcome to the United 

States’’ video, and a 1-minute Global Entry promotional video, have been installed 

at all locations. These videos provide a welcome experience to arriving travelers, inform them of CBP procedures to reduce delays and burdens for legitimate travelers, 

and promote the Global Entry program to reduce wait times. Global Entry, one of 

CBP’s trusted traveler programs designed to expedite clearance of preapproved, lowrisk, recurrently vetted air travelers entering the United States, is available at all 

20 model ports. This program utilizes automated kiosks that scan members’ fingerprints to bypass the regular passport control queues (unless chosen for a selective 

or random secondary referral). 

In order to make meaningful and responsive changes to the arrivals processes 

where practical, and apply resources where needed, CBP is conducting a traveler 

satisfaction survey in the spring of 2011 to benchmark passenger satisfaction at the 

20 model ports of entry. 

Working with the Department of State, CBP improved the diplomatic arrival processes and has ensured that every model airport and terminal has dedicated diplomatic processing lanes to welcome and expedite the entry of foreign dignitaries and 

diplomats. This represents at least 36 dedicated passport primary lanes at the Nation’s airports. 
61 

As part of the emergency border security appropriations in fiscal year 2008 CBP 

received $40 million for the Model Ports of Entry program, which included 235 additional CBP officers, and funding for overtime, video equipment, and services at the 

model ports. CBP spent $22,900,000 to hire the additional staff, $2.1 million for 

training, $8.5 million for equipment and $6.5 million for overtime at the model 

ports. Excluding the continuing resources used to maintain the additional CBP officers, CBP spent approximately $692,000 for Model Ports program in fiscal year 2009 

and an additional $250,000 in fiscal year 2010. For fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 

2012 there is an annualization in the base for the position costs as well as $1.3 million for nonpersonnel costs for Model Ports. 

For Global Entry, CBP spent approximately $800,000 in fiscal year 2009 and $1.7 

million in fiscal year 2010, including for kiosks, IT, and video. In addition, CBP 

spent $2.1 million for fiscal year 2008–2009 for fingerprinting applicants for all 

Trusted Traveler programs. The cost for fingerprinting for Trusted Traveler programs was $4.1 million in fiscal year 2010, and CBP anticipates it will cost approximately $5 million in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012. Although CBP recovers 

a portion of the costs in the fees for this program, it does not recover the full 

amount. 

In November 2009, CBP issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that established 

an application fee for participants in the Global Entry program. This fee was authorized to recover the full cost of processing an application. The chart below shows 

the collections from Global Entry applicants in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 

and projected revenues in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012. 

—Fiscal year 2009 actual: $1,993,546. 

—Fiscal year 2010 actual: $4,989,847. 

—Fiscal year 2011 (estimate): $5,099,624. 

—Fiscal year 2012 (estimate): $5,201,616. 

Secure Border and Open Doors Advisory Committee 

The Secure Border and Open Doors Advisory Committee (SBODAC) was an ad 

hoc subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), an advisory 

body to the Secretary of Homeland Security that was established under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. Appendix). The SBODAC 

prepared and provided reports to the HSAC on important issues that affect our 

country’s ability to attract and treat visitors in a secure and welcoming manner, 

completing its work on December 1, 2008. The HSAC recommended, and DHS is 

continuing to implement, recommendations from the HSAC’s final report, including: 

Visa Policy and Processing 

—The Departments of Homeland Security and State should fix a longstanding obstacle to reliable business traveler entry from Canada by increasing visa training for CBP officers and establishing an optional pretravel approval process for 

qualified Canadian business visa applicants. 

Status.—The NEXUS program allows prescreened travelers expedited processing by United States (CBP) and Canadian (Canada Border Services Agency) 

officials at dedicated processing lanes at designated Northern Border ports of 

entry, at NEXUS kiosks at Canadian preclearance airports, and at marine reporting locations. Individuals approved to participate in NEXUS receive an 

identification card. 

—The Departments of Homeland Security and State should continue to improve 

the reliability, responsiveness, and integration of processes to ensure that visarelated errors in the consular and port-of-entry systems are corrected in a timely and effective manner. 

Status.—DHS has a strong relationship with the Department of State and the 

two agencies continue to work together to improve the systems that transmit 

and receive visa data. Errors in transmission are quickly detected and resolved 

through interagency technical working groups. 

Ports of Entry 

—Airports.—DHS should establish a pilot program for International Registered 

Travelers as soon as possible and promptly expand the program to the top 20 

international airports. 

Status.—CBP has established and currently operates such an international 

trusted traveler pilot program: Global Entry. Global Entry began operations on 

June 6, 2008 at 3 airports, and has since been expanded by CBP to the top 20 

U.S. airports. Additionally, CBP has implemented arrangements with the Governments of the Netherlands and Mexico to expand eligibility for Global Entry 

to qualified citizens of those countries who meet program requirements, as well 
62 

provided access to Global Entry benefits to Canadians who are members of the 

NEXUS trusted traveler program. 

CBP has enrolled more than 120,000 participants, as well as 390,000 persons 

able to use Global Entry as members of NEXUS and 89,000 as members of Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI). 

DHS conducted a statistical analysis of wait times for Global Entry pilot participants, which indicated that Global Entry reduces a passenger’s wait time by 

up to 70 percent—or an estimated 7 minutes on average. Wait time is defined 

as the time interval between the arrival of the aircraft (the block time) and the 

processing of the passenger by a CBP officer at the primary booth, less the walk 

time. —Airports.—DHS and State should accelerate and expand the Model Ports program and fully include TSA to eliminate redundant rescreening of baggage and 

passengers. 

Status.—CBP continues to expand the Model Ports program, which provides 

a more welcoming arrival experience at the 20 top U.S. airports for international arrival. Since the SBODAC report was issued, the Model Ports program has launched and expanded several initiatives. Improved signage communicates clear, accessible instructions to incoming passengers as they enter the 

CBP area. A new, improved airport wait-time monitoring system gives the traveling public better information on expected wait times upon arriving at the airport. CBP has deployed additional officers at the Model Ports, as well as provided enhanced professionalism training as part of the officer academy and field 

refresher training curricula. CBP has deployed Passenger Service Managers to 

greet travelers and serve as a point of contact at the airport to deal with passenger complaints and concerns. CBP has completed deployment of audio and 

video equipment that displays a welcome video donated by Walt Disney Parks 

and Resorts called ‘‘Welcome: Portraits of America’’ and a CBP instructional 

video called ‘‘Welcome to the United States: Simple as 1, 2, 3.’’ CBP continues 

to collaborate with its partners in the private sector, municipalities, and the 

Federal Government to improve the entire arrivals process, including making 

the queuing area more welcoming, improving wait-times and baggage delivery 

and being available to address travelers’ questions and concerns. —Airports.—DHS should continue to improve security performance while reducing 

the average amount of time CBP officers spend with each traveler to less than 

pre-September 11 levels and staff ports of entry sufficiently to complete primary 

inspection of foreign passengers in less than 30 minutes by December 2009. 

Status.—CBP is committed to processing incoming travelers as efficiently as 

possible consistent with meeting the Nation’s security needs. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2011, the vast majority of air passengers admitted into the 

United States experienced wait times of less than 30 minutes at the CBP inspection area. 

—Land Borders.—CBP should increase the effectiveness of NEXUS, SENTRI, and 

FAST trusted traveler programs. 

Status.—Our NEXUS, Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), and Fast and Secure Trade (FAST) trusted traveler programs 

are very effective, and enrollment has been growing. CBP has increased effectiveness by harmonizing enrollment infrastructure, as well as expanding membership benefits. All programs use the Global Enrollment System, as well as 

harmonized requirements for enrollment data, vetting, and disqualifying offenses. TSA now recognizes trusted traveler identity documents at domestic airport checkpoints. NEXUS and SENTRI members can automatically use Global 

Entry kiosks, where available, when entering the United States by air. 

—Land Borders.—The Departments should implement the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative (WHTI) and US-VISIT on the land border without degrading 

the travel experience. 

Status.—DHS implemented WHTI at the land ports of entry in June 2009. 

Compliance with document requirements is high, and many individuals (almost 

9 million so far) are obtaining documents enhanced by radio frequency identification (RFID) technology that increases the efficiency of the inspection process. 

This technology allows law enforcement queries 60 percent faster than relying 

on manual entry and 20 percent faster than ‘‘swiping’’ the document’s machine 

readable zone. New license plate readers have been installed, reducing erroneous reads and saving 10 million manual corrections per year. WHTI also supports lane flow optimization that can adapt to traffic patterns and port needs, 

is installing new signage to help travelers advance more smoothly, and is instituting ‘‘ready lanes’’ used by travelers with RFID-enabled documents to further 

facilitate border crossing. 
63 

Implementation of WHTI has made travel more secure by limiting the number of documents that can be presented at the port of entry and allowing CBP 

to conduct law enforcement queries on an increased number of higher risk travelers. 

—DHS should assess its traveler screening programs within 9 months to share 

and harmonize best practices and technology among agencies. 

Status.—DHS continually reviews its traveler screening programs to ensure 

that the business processes and underlying systems support the mission needs 

and to pursue harmonization. In July 2006, DHS established the Screening Coordination Office (SCO) in the Office of Policy to identify and promote best practices and ensure a coordinated approach to investments in screening programs. 

Training 

CBP officers receive extensive training on professionalism and cultural diversity 

awareness, including appropriately greeting travelers, to ensure they interact with 

the traveling public with courtesy and respect. This begins as soon as new hires 

enter on duty and continues throughout their career. Incumbent officers and supervisory officers are reminded of these core values through Web-based training, classroom training, and musters to ensure personnel treat travelers with dignity and respect. Professionalism is also a performance evaluation measure for the officer position. Officers are instructed through training and musters to be courteous to the 

traveler, emphasizing establishment of rapport as a key interview and observation 

techniques tools for the detection of admissibility, counter-terrorism, and/or smuggling issues. 

OVERTIME PAY REFORM

Question. The budget includes a placeholder for a legislative proposal to reform 

overtime pay for CBP. This is an authorization issue which must first be addressed 

by the appropriate authorizing committees. 

Please provide a copy of the legislative proposal. Please provide copies of any formal requests to the authorizing committees to take action on this proposal. What 

is the long-term impact on agents of implementing this proposal? Will implementation of this proposal have cascading effects on future pay costs for agents or other 

CBP or DHS personnel in the out-years and have any impacts been considering in 

formulating this proposal? What cuts to the budget, if any, would you propose be 

made if overtime pay reform is not enacted? 

Answer. The administration continues to work to develop the legislative proposal 

referenced in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2012 regarding CBP’s 

personnel system. The reforms being proposed eliminate redundancies and other inefficiencies that resulted from merging three different workforces from three different legacy agencies and make it easier for CBP employees to take positions across 

the agency, ensuring that CBP makes the most efficient use of taxpayer dollars. 

DHS will provide the legislative proposal as soon as it is finalized. 

BORDER PATROL CONSTRUCTION

Question. Are any funds requested in the budget for construction of new Border 

Patrol facilities, including checkpoints? 

Answer. Fiscal year 2012 budget does not include resources for the construction 

of new facilities. 

ADVANCED TRAINING CENTER

Question. How much is requested in the President’s budget for training activities 

and training operations at the Advanced Training Center (ATC) in fiscal year 2012? 

Also, what is the staffing target for the ATC? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 projected programmatic expenses for the ATC total $47,663,341, which includes salaries and benefits and other programmatic expenses. 

The fiscal year 2012 staffing target is 157 positions. 

AIR AND MARINE

Question. What specific types of aircraft and in what quantities are proposed to 

be procured by this budget request? Will all of the previously funded unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) be fully outfitted with prior year funds and the funds requested in this budget? If not, what additional funds are required to make these 

systems fully operational? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 proposed budget provides funding for two P–3 replacement wing sets in continuation of the P–3 Service Life Extension Program, six 

AS–350 light enforcement helicopters, and to induct two UH60 Black Hawk heli-
64 

copters in the A to L model conversion program. The two replacement wing sets 

funded in the fiscal year 2012 budget will complete the acquisition objective for 14 

new sets for the 16 P–3 aircraft in the OAM fleet. 

In addition, funds provided in the fiscal year 2010 Southwest Border supplemental are being used to acquire two additional UASs. The fiscal year 2012 budget 

request includes $4 million to complete this acquisition. The first of the two Predator B UASs purchased with the supplemental funding should be delivered in October 2011. 

ICE—VIOLENCE IN MEXICO

Question. The tragic and senseless murder of ICE Special Agent Zapata and the 

wounding of his partner Special Agent Avila on February 15, brought to light the 

fact that our agents are prohibited from carrying service weapons for their own defense. More than 33,400 Mexican citizens have died during the Mexican Government’s admirable campaign against the drug trafficking organizations. It is our Government’s policy to assist the Mexicans in this effort. But as we put United States 

personnel in Mexico to help that government, our people can become targets. 

Why are our special agents and other personnel not allowed to carry weapons to 

protect themselves? Is this prohibition limited to ICE personnel, all Homeland Security personnel, or does it apply to all American Government law enforcement working with Mexican authorities in that country? I want to ensure that the same rules 

apply to all U.S. law enforcement. Do ICE special agents receive hazardous duty pay 

during their assignment in Mexico, the way that other United States law enforcement do when working in war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan? Are special 

agents permitted to turn down overseas assignments such as these if they fear for 

their personal safety? What has been the special agent force reaction to serving in 

Mexico since the Zapata killing? Media reports claim that the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) estimates that 90 percent of the guns 

seized by the Mexican Government are eventually found to have been purchased in 

the United States. Is this a valid statistic? Does this represent all guns seized by 

the Mexican Government, or only the portion of seized guns United States officials 

are given access to? Are guns used by the drug cartels found to come from countries 

other than the United States? If so, from which countries are these guns coming? 

Answer. Sadly, the tragedy you mention involving two special agents assigned to 

ICE’s attache` office in Mexico City is a stark reminder of the dangers confronted 

and the sacrifices made every day by our Nation’s law enforcement officers. Special 

Agent Jaime J. Zapata lost his life and Special Agent Victor Avila, Jr. was critically 

injured in service of our country. While these remain ongoing investigations, Mexican authorities have apprehended some of the individuals involved in the murder 

of ICE Agent Jaime Zapata. We will continue to assist the ongoing Mexican investigation with every resource at our disposal and to ensure that all those responsible 

for these murders face justice. In coordination with the Departments of State and 

Justice, we have announced a reward of up to $5 million for information leading 

to the arrest and/or conviction of additional individuals responsible for the murder 

of Special Agent Jaime Zapata and the attempted murder of Special Agent Victor 

Avila. In addition, the FBI, in conjunction with ICE, has established a 24-hour tip 

line based in the United States to process the information. 

It is our understanding that, in general, the Department of State (DOS), through 

the Chief of Mission (Ambassador), determines whether U.S. law enforcement officers may carry firearms overseas and under what conditions, in accordance with 22 

U.S.C. 3927 and host country laws and agreements, and that the Chief of Mission’s 

authority would apply to all American law enforcement personnel. 

While DOS is the authority on specific questions regarding their policy for hazardous duty pay in war zones, ICE personnel do receive the same hardship pay as 

other United States civilian personnel in Mexico. However, ICE personnel only receive danger pay in certain locations in Mexico (Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and 

Monterrey). Location based danger pay varies among the United States law enforcement agencies with personnel in Mexico due to the statutory authority for danger 

pay allowance, which is set forth in 5 U.S.C. 5928. Currently, there are locations 

in Mexico, specifically Mexico City and Hermosillo, where Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel receive 

danger pay and ICE personnel do not. The following table shows the current rates 

established by DOS of hardship pay and danger pay received by personnel assigned 

to Mexico: 
65 

Location 

Post (hardship) 

differential 

percent of basic 

compensation 

Danger pay 

percent of basic 

compensation 

Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico ......................................................................................... 10 20 

Mexico City, D.F., Mexico ......................................................................................................... 15 ........................

Tijuana, Mexico ....................................................................................................................... 5 15 

Hermosillo, Mexico ................................................................................................................... 15 ........................

Monterrey, Mexico .................................................................................................................... 5 20 

All ICE overseas positions are considered voluntary. ICE posts announcements to 

advertise overseas positions and interested personnel respond to the announcements 

and undergo the necessary application procedures. Applicants may withdraw from 

the selection process at any time. 

In response to Special Agent Zapata’s murder, ICE has sent 29 special agents, 1 

criminal research specialist, 2 victim/witness counselors, and 2 technical enforcement officers on temporary duty assignments to Mexico City and Monterrey to directly assist the FBI and the Government of Mexico in the investigation. ICE personnel in Mexico also implemented rigorous security measures designed to protect 

ICE employees and their families. Additionally, ICE met with other Federal, State, 

and local law enforcement agencies in the United States to coordinate a domestic 

investigative and law enforcement response against the organization believed to be 

responsible for the attack, and its criminal associates. 

In regard to the ATF statistic, we respectfully defer to the ATF. 

REMOVAL STATISTICS

Question. Some have called the administration’s claim of achieving a ‘‘record’’ 

number of deportations for fiscal year 2010 inflated, citing findings from the Center 

for Investigative Reporting. Those findings allege that ICE included 19,000 immigrants who departed the previous year, and 6,500 from a Mexican repatriation program that ran 5 weeks longer than it had previously. They also claim that nearly 

65,000 of the deportations were voluntary and that the agency pushed the voluntary-departure option in deportation figures just long enough to make its annual 

goal for removals. 

Are these allegations accurate? Please provide the statistics for each of these categories for fiscal years 2008–2010. Also, please provide the metrics used by the administration to measure increased rates of removal for the same 3 fiscal years. 

Answer. In fiscal year 2010, ICE set a record for overall removals of illegal aliens, 

with more than 392,000 removals nationwide. One-half of those removed—more 

than 195,000—were convicted criminals. The fiscal year 2010 statistics represent increases of more than 23,000 removals overall and 81,000 criminal removals compared to fiscal year 2008—a more than 70 percent increase in removal of criminal 

aliens from the previous administration. 

When compared to fiscal year 2009, ICE returned 6,527 more aliens through fiscal 

year 2010’s Mexican Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP). Since 2008, MIRP statistics have been included in ICE’s overall removal numbers. MIRP is a seasonal 

program designed to run during the summer months; however, the actual dates of 

the program fluctuate each year dependent upon completion of annual negotiations 

between DHS and the Government of Mexico, and the identification of requisite 

funding. 
66 

Please see the charts below which address statistics for removal categories in fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010 and metrics used by the administration to 

measure increased rates of removal for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2010. 

Fiscal year 2008 Fiscal year 2009 Fiscal year 2010 

BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL ICE REMOVALS/RETURNS 

Actual Fiscal Year Removals/Returns ....................................................... $369,221 $387,790 $373,440 

Case Closure Lag 1 .................................................................................... ( 2 ) 2,044 19,422 

Total ICE Removals/Returns ...................................................................... 369,221 389,834 392,862 

HISTORICAL STATISTICS FOR VOLUNTARY RETURNS AND THE MEXICAN INTERIOR REPATRIATION PROGRAM 

(Voluntary returns and Mexican repatriation program removals/returns are a subset of the actual fiscal year removals/ 

returns included in the previous chart.) 

Voluntary Returns ...................................................................................... 84,466 70,211 64,876 

Mexican Interior Repatriation Program Removals/Returns ....................... 18,464 10,560 23,384 

Fiscal years 2008–2010 data is historical and remains static. Fiscal year 2010 data is as of October 5, 2010. 

1 Fiscal year data lag/case closure lag is defined as the physical removal of an alien that occurs in a given fiscal year but the information is not recorded in EARM nor is the case closed in EARM during that fiscal year. Because the data in EARM is locked at the end of each 

fiscal year, the removal is recorded for the month the case was closed but reported in the following fiscal year removals. 2 Not available. 

SECURE COMMUNITIES

Question. There is confusion as to whether ICE considers local participation in Secure Communities mandatory. What is your policy? If it is not mandatory, on what 

basis do you assert that all communities will be enrolled by 2013? 

Answer. There has been confusion as to what is meant by ‘‘opting out’’ in the context of Secure Communities and whether ‘‘opting out’’ is possible. Once a State signs 

an agreement with ICE to implement Secure Communities, it is mandatory that all 

fingerprints collected by law enforcement agencies in that State and submitted to 

the FBI be shared with ICE. Once Secure Communities is activated in a jurisdiction, 

the fingerprints that jurisdiction submits to the Department of Justice’s biometric 

system to check for criminal history records are automatically sent to DHS’s biometric system to check against its immigration and law enforcement records. The U.S. 

Government has determined that a jurisdiction cannot choose to have the fingerprints it submits to the Federal Government processed only for criminal history 

checks. Nor can a jurisdiction demand that the identifications that result from 

DHS’s processing of the fingerprints be withheld from local ICE field offices in that 

jurisdiction. The ICE local field office, and not the State or local law enforcement 

agency, determines what immigration enforcement action, if any, is appropriate. 

A jurisdiction may, however, choose not to receive the identifications that result 

from processing the fingerprints through DHS’s biometric system. A jurisdiction’s 

decision not to receive this information does not affect whether the local ICE field 

office in that jurisdiction will or will not take enforcement action based on those 

identifications. In that sense, jurisdictions may ‘‘opt out’’ of receiving the results of 

Secure Communities biometrics checks. 

DETENTION REFORM

Question. The Department has made impressive gains in detaining and removing 

criminal aliens who pose a danger to people lawfully present in the United States. 

I understand your budget request provides sufficient funds to maintain the mandated level of 33,400 detention beds. And the request also includes an increase of 

$6.5 million for the alternatives to detention program to expand the number of individuals who need to be monitored but not necessarily held in custody prior to resolution of their immigration status. But while the administration has claimed it is pursuing detention reform, your budget for this activity is essentially flat. 

How can you achieve improvements in meeting your third mission goal—enforcing 

and administering our immigration laws—if your budget request remains flat for a 

third year in a row? How does the administration define ‘‘detention reform’’ and 

what specific programs, changes, and other activities does the administration are directed to implement detention reform? What specific increases in the ICE budget 

does the administration count as meeting the planned detention reforms? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes the resources necessary to 

meet ICE detention and removal goals, including detention reform. In order to make 

the most efficient use of taxpayer resources, ICE is seeking efficiencies in detention 

and removal through targeted efforts that allow ICE to use its resources as effi-
67 

ciently and effectively as possible. These efficiencies include the suspension of detention operations at costly facilities, converting contractors to Federal staff where this 

will improve service and cut costs, and reducing the average length of stay to allow 

more detainees to be removed using the same number of beds. 

Detention reforms facilitate the detention of individual aliens in settings commensurate with factors such as threat to the community, criminal history, risk of flight, 

immigration status, stage in the removal process, and medical and mental health. 

ICE has made substantial progress in a number of critical areas, including access 

to family and legal visitation, consolidation of facilities, aligning bed space with apprehensions, reducing transfers, improving medical delivery, reducing costs, and developing safe and secure civil detention principles. The following reflect accomplishments and continuing work on detention reform: 

—Established an Office of Detention Policy and Planning (ODPP) to plan and design a detention system better tailored to ICE’s needs and reforms. 

—Consolidated the number of facilities at which ICE detains individuals from 341 

to 270 based on state-of-the-art forecasting tools. 

—Developed a procurement plan to ensure that future bed space is aligned with 

apprehensions, thus limiting the need for transfers and ensuring detainees remain closer to their families and attorneys. 

—Launched the online detainee locator system, a public, easy to use Internetbased tool designed to assist family members, attorneys and other interested 

parties in locating detained aliens in ICE custody. 

—Hired and trained 42 full-time equivalent (FTE) detention service managers to 

monitor conditions at detention facilities, which house 85 percent of the detained population. 

—Improved medical services by simplifying the process for the delivery and auditing of authorized healthcare treatments. 

—Initiated the creation of a new civil detention facility in Karnes County, Texas, 

through an intergovernmental service agreement, incorporating new civil detention principles. 

—Opened two new facilities in Orange County, California, to reduce the number, 

costs, and deportation delays associated with detainee transfers. 

—Formed two advisory groups of local and national organizations that are stakeholders in the immigration detention system to provide feedback and input to 

the ICE Director. 

—Established an ICE Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) within the Office of 

Professional Responsibility (OPR). ODO has regional offices to ensure agents 

and personnel have more ready access to facilities to conduct routine and random inspections more frequently. 

—Evaluated and initiated procurements for securing new detention bed space 

where it is needed most. 

—Designed and tested a new detainee intake risk assessment process to provide 

transparency and uniformity in the detention and classification processes to ensure the prioritization of detention resources. 

—Drafted a policy to reduce out-of-region transfers of detainees who have community ties or attorneys of record. 

—Drafted revised performance-based national detention standards, in collaboration with members of the Assistant Secretary’s Detention Advisory Group, 

which detail guidelines for the custody and care of ICE detainees. 

ICE is committed to instituting detention reform in a fiscally responsible manner 

that represents the most efficient use of taxpayer resources. 

WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

Question. The administration claims that significant strides have been taken in 

the past 2 years to increase worksite enforcement efforts. These have focused almost 

exclusively on the so-called I–9 (employment form) document inspections. While it 

is important to target and take punitive legal action against unscrupulous employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens, this is largely a paper-based enforcement 

process. In many cases, the employers claim innocence and fire the undocumented 

workers. But as one employer commented to the media during the recent investigations of a national fast food company’s hiring practices, ‘‘The illegal workers just go 

down the street and get a job at the next food place.’’ In order to ensure that enforcement serves as a deterrent, the administration must also take action against 

the illegal workers as well as those who seek to knowingly employ them. 

Please describe the I–9 process. For the record, please describe the difference between a criminal and administrative arrest in the context of worksite enforcement. 

How many of each occurred in fiscal years 2006–2010, and how many are estimated 
68 

to occur in fiscal years 2011 and 2012? How many employers received jail time/sentences as a result of these actions in each of these fiscal years? How many workers 

were removed or otherwise left the country as a result of these actions in each of 

these fiscal years (estimates, if necessary). How much in fines was collected as a 

result of these actions in each of these fiscal years? For fiscal year 2010, the Congress directed ICE to achieve a level of worksite enforcement effort of $134 million. 

Is it ICE’s intention to meet this goal in fiscal year 2011 as well? Please describe 

how the agents achieve this level of effort? 

Answer. [Follows:] 

Form I–9 Inspection Overview 

Section 274A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified in 8 U.S.C. 

1324a (b), requires employers to verify the identity and employment eligibility of all 

individuals hired in the United States after November 6, 1986. 8 C.F.R. 274a.2 designates the Employment Eligibility Verification Form I–9 (Form I–9) as the means 

of documenting this verification. Employers are required by law to maintain for inspection original Forms I–9 for all current employees. In the case of former employees, retention of Forms I–9 are required for a period of at least 3 years from the 

date of hire or 1 year after the employee is no longer employed, whichever is longer. 

The administrative inspection process is initiated by the service of a Notice of Inspection (NOI) upon an employer resulting in the facilitation of Forms I–9 to ICE 

officials. ICE typically will allow the employer 3 business days to present the Forms 

I–9. Often, ICE will request the employer provide supporting documentation, which 

may include a copy of the payroll, list of current employees, Articles of Incorporation, and business licenses. 

ICE agents or auditors then conduct an inspection of the Forms I–9 for compliance. When technical or procedural violations are found, an employer is given 10 

business days to make corrections. An employer may receive a monetary fine for all 

substantive and uncorrected technical violations. 

Employers determined to have knowingly hired or continued to employ unauthorized workers will be required to cease the unlawful activity, may be fined, and may 

be prosecuted criminally. Additionally, an employer found to have knowingly hired 

or continued to employ unauthorized workers may be subject to debarment by ICE, 

meaning that the employer will be prevented from participating in future Federal 

contracts and from receiving other Government benefits. Monetary penalties for 

knowingly hire and continuing to employ violations range from $375 to $16,000 per 

violation, with repeat offenders receiving penalties at the higher end. Penalties for 

substantive violations, including the failure to produce a Form I–9, range from $110 

to $1,100 per violation. In determining penalty amounts, ICE considers five factors: 

—the size of the business; 

—good faith effort to comply; 

—seriousness of violation; 

—whether the violation involved unauthorized workers, and 

—history of previous violations. 

ICE will notify the audited party, in writing, of the results of the inspection once 

completed. 

In instances where a Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF) is served, charging documents 

will be provided specifying the violations committed by the employer. The employer 

has the opportunity to either negotiate a settlement with ICE or request a hearing 

before the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) within 30 

days of receipt of the NIF. If the employer takes no action after receiving a NIF, 

ICE will issue a Final Order. If a hearing is requested, OCAHO assigns the case 

to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and sends all parties a copy of a Notice of 

Hearing and Government’s complaint, thus setting the adjudicative process in motion. 

The Notice of Hearing spells out the procedural requirements for answering the 

complaint and the potential consequences of failure to file a timely response. Many 

OCAHO cases never reach the evidentiary hearing stage because the parties either 

reach a settlement, subject to the approval of the ALJ, or the ALJ reaches a decision 

on the merits through dispositive prehearing rulings. Employers determined to have 

knowingly hire or continuing to employ violations shall be required to cease the unlawful activity and may be fined. 

Employer Arrests 

ICE tracks criminal arrests of employers (inclusive of managers, supervisors, and 

owners) for worksite enforcement related crimes: 

—Fiscal year 2010 = 196 criminally arrested. 

—Fiscal year 2009 = 114 criminally arrested. 
69 

—Fiscal year 2008 = 135 criminally arrested. 

—Fiscal year 2007 = 92 criminally arrested. 

—Fiscal year 2006 = 110 criminally arrested. 

In fiscal year 2010, ICE’s Office of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) arrested 196 employers for worksite related crimes. As of February 8, 2011: 

—42 were sentenced to prison. Sentences ranged from time served to 42 months. 

—NOTE.—125 cases are still pending a disposition. 

DHS defers to the Department of Justice to answer jail time/sentences prior to 

fiscal year 2010, as criminal sentencing falls under the auspices of the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and ICE did not track sentencing of worksite enforcement violators 

prior to fiscal year 2010. 

Removals 

ICE does not track the specific number of illegal aliens removed as a result of 

being identified during a worksite enforcement operations. Due to the complexity of 

analyzing the data—hand tabulation and manually crosschecking against several 

unique law enforcement databases—identifying the removals that resulted from 

worksite enforcement actions is not available to be included in this response. 

Fines Collected 

Civil fines resulting from Form I–9 inspections (the final judgment is referred to 

as a Final Order). 

—Fiscal year 2010 = 237 Final Orders $6,956,026. 

—Fiscal year 2009 = 52 Final Orders $1,033,291. 

—Fiscal year 2008 = 18 Final Orders $675,209. 

—Fiscal year 2007 = 2 Final Orders $26,560. 

—Fiscal year 2006 = 0. 

Criminal investigations worked in coordination with the Department of Justice, 

(worksite judicial fines, forfeitures, or restitutions). 

—Fiscal year 2010 = $36,611,320. 

—Fiscal year 2009 = $32,578,945. 

—Fiscal year 2008 = $21,978,917. 

—Fiscal year 2007 = $31,426,443. 

—Fiscal year 2006 = $233,044. 

Worksite Enforcement 

Since January 2009, ICE has audited more than 4,600 employers suspected of hiring illegal labor, debarred more than 315 companies and individuals, and imposed 

approximately $59 million in financial sanctions—more than the total amount of audits and debarments than during the entire previous administration. 

ICE expended $127,436,000 for worksite enforcement related investigations in fiscal year 2010. ICE is projecting for fiscal year 2011 it will expend approximately 

$135.2 million. ICE has communicated to the field that worksite enforcement is a 

high investigative priority for fiscal year 2011. 

TSA SCREENER CAP

Question. The House passed a continuing resolution for fiscal year 2011 includes 

a provision that would limit the number of TSA screeners at 46,000 FTE screeners. 

The budget request for fiscal year 2012 includes 48,537 FTE screeners, not including 

managers. How would this cap limit TSA’s ability to provide security at airports? 

Explain how advances in technology have allowed screener resources to be used 

more efficiently. Please quantify how screeners have been reassigned to other security duties as a result of these efficiency gains. 

Answer. The continuing resolution for fiscal year 2011 contains a provision limiting the number of FTEs and does not include part-time personnel. Since TSA employs a substantial number of part-time personnel, its fiscal year 2012 budget request for additional transportation security officers (TSOs) to staff advanced imaging technology (AIT) machines will not be affected. Future growth of full-time personnel may be limited because of the cap, thus restricting TSA’s options to reduce 

attrition and improve the workforce. 

Advances in technology most often result in improved effectiveness of the TSOs 

more so than improved efficiency. One area that TSA has seen improvements in effectiveness and efficiency is the installation of inline baggage screening systems. 

Inline explosive detection systems are the main technology used in the checked baggage screening process. This equipment automates what was previously a manually 

intensive baggage inspection, allowing faster bag throughput (up to 300 percent) 

and improved threat detection capabilities. These savings have been used to fund 

other security initiatives and have been considered in the budget request. 
70 

The below reflects examples of other security initiatives that efficiency savings 

have been applied as of fiscal year 2010: 

Total 

budgeted FTE 

Self-funded FTE 

Percent of FTE self-funded 

Travel Document Checker .................................................................................................. 2,001 1,086 54 

Target Random Security Plays ........................................................................................... 1,654 904 55 

Behavior Detection Officers ............................................................................................... 2,986 2,326 78 

Bomb Appraisal Officers .................................................................................................... 352 297 84 

Total ...................................................................................................................... 6,993 4,613 66 

AUTOMATED TARGET RECOGNITION

Question. TSA has a delicate balance to maintain when it comes to security and 

maintaining the privacy of passengers. According to TSA, AIT units being deployed 

to airports across the country are the most effective passenger screening technology 

currently available because they can detect metallic and nonmetallic threats. However, the images these machines produce of the human body are revealing. TSA is 

testing a software upgrade to the AIT machines, called Automated Target Recognition (ATR), that would do away with the more revealing image and replace it with 

a generic outline of a person. How is this testing progressing and when do you expect this software to be deployed to airports? TSA’s budget request includes funding 

for 275 additional AIT units in fiscal year 2012 for a total of 1,275. What percentage 

of passengers will be screened by AIT if the request is funded? 

Answer. ATR is currently being tested at Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (LAS), Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA), and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 

International Airport (ATL). This testing allows TSA to ensure the new software 

continues to provide a high level of security, while further enhancing privacy protections. By the end of fiscal year 2012, TSA estimates that 1,275 AITs will be deployed. 

BAGGAGE FEES

Question. In recent years, airlines began to charge fees for services that did not 

previously exist, such as charges for checked baggage. As a result of the new 

checked baggage fees, more passengers are opting to carry their bags onboard the 

aircraft causing a strain on security operations at airport checkpoints. 

When you testified before the subcommittee, you mentioned that the cost of additional staffing and equipment required to handle the increase in carry-on bags is 

approximately $260 million annually. I asked if you thought the airlines should help 

defray the additional security costs associated with their baggage fees. You responded by saying passenger security fees needed to be adjusted upward. What is 

your position on whether the airlines should help defray the additional security 

costs associated with their baggage fees? Without adding more staff and equipment 

to handle the increase in carry-on bags, will wait times increase because of the baggage fees? 

Answer. TSA agrees that increased aviation security costs should not be paid solely by air travelers. When TSA was created, the Congress authorized the establishment of two separate security fees to fund the Federal aviation security costs. One 

fee was to be paid by air passengers and the other paid by air carriers. 

The September 11th Security Fee (Passenger Fee), to be paid by air passengers, 

was authorized by the Congress to not exceed $2.50 per enplanement. The revenue 

generated from this security fee was intended to offset the Federal cost for passenger and property screening. To the extent that revenue derived from the Passenger Fee was not sufficient to cover the Federal cost of passenger and property 

screening, the Congress authorized the collection of a second security fee to be paid 

by air carriers. 

The Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee (Carrier Fee) was authorized in an 

amount not to exceed the costs air carriers incurred for passenger and property 

screening in calendar year 2000. That exact cost total, which TSA originally estimated at $750 million, has been the subject of much debate and multiple legal proceedings. After an April 2005 GAO review of the costs in question, TSA established 

the overall cap of the Carrier Fee at $448 million. The Congress then made this 

TSA determination subject to judicial review. TSA is still working through the 

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to achieve a 
71 

final resolution of the overall Air Carrier Fee industry cap that currently stands at 

$420 million. 

With respect to adjusting the Air Carrier Fee, it is clear that the aviation security 

enhancements implemented by the TSA since 2001 have made commercial air travel 

safer for passengers, air carriers and the United States in general. Further, TSA 

has seen a notable change in carryon baggage volume—increasing checkpoint requirements and processing times—since baggage fees were introduced by air carriers. Under TSA’s current staffing model, wait times will likely increase and remain above historical levels that were achieved prior to airline baggage fees. This 

air carrier action could result in growing passenger wait times and larger concentrations of passengers waiting at checkpoint. To sustain passenger throughput, TSA 

would need to divert resources from other important security layers or add new personnel to open lanes faster and keep them open longer. TSA has taken some steps 

to assist in managing wait times. TSA estimates it would cost approximately $260 

million in additional resources to support passenger throughput rates and not detract from other security programs. 

DHS FEE PROPOSALS

Question. The President’s budget proposes that the Appropriations Committee increase aviation security fees on airline passengers by $590 million and border inspection fees by $110 million. Both of these are legislative matters under the jurisdiction of other committees. 

Your entire $459 million proposed increase for TSA and $55 million of your CBP 

budget are predicated on our approving these requests. 

If the House fails to include these fee increases in their bill, our entire bill would 

be out of order on the Senate floor if we approved them. The border inspection fee 

could result in our bill being blue-slipped in the House. 

This is a high-risk strategy to support needed security improvements, such as additional AIT machines at our airports and improved passenger and cargo inspections 

on our borders. 

What specific steps are you taking to get the House and Senate authorizing committees to request that the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees to approve these legislative proposals? 

If the authorizing committees object to our approving these changes in law, will 

you modify your budget requests to either provide more funding or identify proposed 

cuts? 

Please submit for the record the letters written to the committees of jurisdiction 

requesting the legislative changes for these requests. 

Answer. The President’s budget request includes closely related fiscal and policy 

matters for the Congress’s consideration, and the Department looks forward to 

working with the Congress to provide funding to meet these important security 

needs. 

I fully appreciate the constraints of the current fiscal environment, and it is precisely because of the current economic situation that nothing should be left off the 

table to fund the Department’s critical frontline operations. While airlines have increased fees across the board—from checked baggage and extra leg room to refreshments, we have never adjusted how we fund security measures to protect the traveling public. 

Despite the Congress’s original intent that the Security Fee covers nearly all costs 

related to passenger and property screening, the fee currently offsets less than onethird of the total cost of aviation security. At the same time, costs of security have 

continued to increase. In 2000, it cost less than $1 to screen each passenger. In fiscal year 2010, the average cost for TSA to screen a passenger and baggage has increased to nearly $9, in part to airline imposed checked baggage fees that have resulted in TSA screening 56 million additional carry-on bags at airport checkpoints 

annually. 

As such, I have personally discussed with members of congressional authorizing 

committees the request to permit DHS to increase the Security Fee, and the Department will continue this outreach. The Department will also continue to engage 

members of the authorizing committees on all legislative provisions necessary to 

support the budget request to ensure passage of stand alone legislation or to help 

secure support for provisions which may be carried in appropriations measures, 

whichever occurs first. 

With regard to the proposed CBP fee change, the country exemptions currently 

in place for Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean cost the Government $110 million 

annually in user fees that would otherwise be collected for customs inspections at 

the border. While travelers from other countries are subject to this fee, the costs 
72 

of processing the travelers coming from Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean are subsidized by United States taxpayers. CBP’s budget assumes elimination of these exemptions by the third quarter of fiscal year 2012, equating to $55 million in fiscal 

year 2012 (half-year cost). 

AVIATION SECURITY CAPITAL FUND

Question. The request includes a legislative proposal to alter the manner in which 

offsetting collections from the Aviation Security Capital Fund are allocated. Has the 

Department made a request to the subcommittee with jurisdiction over this matter? 

If so, please submit the request for the record. The language states that the funds 

‘‘may be distributed in any manner deemed necessary to ensure aviation security.’’ 

Would any of these funds be used for purposes other than checked baggage security? 

Please be more specific on how the funds would be distributed to support aviation 

security in fiscal year 2012. What is the impact of not receiving this language adjustment in fiscal year 2012? 

Answer. The Department’s request for this legislative proposal to provide the Department with the required flexibility to sustain current security measures and 

adapt to emerging threats was transmitted to each committee with oversight of 

DHS along with the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget request. Due to the importance of this proposal, I have had discussions with members of the authorizing committees and representatives of the Department’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer 

have briefed committee staff on the request to permit the Department to increase 

the Security Fee. We will continue to engage members of the authorizing committees on all legislative provisions necessary to support the budget request as long as 

necessary to ensure passage of stand alone legislation or to help secure support for 

provisions which may be carried in appropriations measures, whichever occurs first. 

The current law requires that the first $250 million derived from passenger and 

air carrier security fees in each of the fiscal years 2004 through 2028 be deposited 

in an Aviation Security Capital Fund (ASCF) to be available for grants to airport 

sponsors for airport security improvement projects such as facility modifications. 

The language currently does not allow for the procurement and installation of EDS 

equipment for the security improvement projects. The legislative proposal included 

in the fiscal year 2012 budget request would permit approximately $125 million of 

the ASCF to support the recapitalization and deployment of state-of-the-art EDS for 

checked baggage to efficiently screen baggage for explosives, reducing the number 

of rescans and physical bag searches. The remaining $125 million would be used for 

airport facility modification projects. The current notional plan is summarized in the 

following table: 

BREAKDOWN OF PLANNED ACSF OBLIGATIONS 1

[Dollars in millions] 

Projects/equipment Amount 

Medium Speed EDS Purchase ...................................................................................................................................... 94 

Medium Speed EDS Installation .................................................................................................................................. 31 

Facility Modifications ................................................................................................................................................... 125 

Total ................................................................................................................................................................ 250 

1 Numbers based on notional plans as of February 9, 2011, and are subject to change. 

By 2013, nearly one-half of the 2,000 EDS units deployed nationwide will have 

exceeded their planned 10-year service life. Limiting TSA’s ability to purchase and 

install equipment as needed could increase the risk of equipment failure and lead 

to increased delays at airports due to the need to rescan baggage and conduct physical bag searches. 

EXPLOSIVES DETECTION SYSTEMS

Question. The request states that of the 2,000 explosives detection system units 

currently deployed nationwide, almost one-half will have reached the end of their 

useful life of 10 years by 2013. How much of the $273 million discretionary request 

for explosives detection systems would be used for this purpose in fiscal year 2012. 

How many machines would be replaced? If the legislative proposal to adjust the 

manner in which offsetting collections from the Aviation Security Capital Fund are 

allocated is approved, how much of the $250 million would be used for this purpose 

in fiscal year 2012. How many machines would be replaced? 
73 

Answer. Of the $273 million in discretionary funding requested in fiscal year 2012, TSA would use $14 million to replace 26 reduced size explosives detection system (EDS) units that have reached the end of their useful life. With approval of the 

Aviation Security Capital Fund (ASCF) legislative proposal, TSA would use $125 

million of the $250 million fund to replace the 63 medium-speed EDS units that 

have reached the end of their useful life. 

The remaining $259 million of the EDS discretionary funds would be used for the 

following manner: —$130 million for the purchase and installation equipment for facility modifications that have already been executed or plan to be executed in fiscal year 2012. —$129 million for technology and engineering initiatives and program operations and management (PO&M) support, which includes $40 million for testing and 

engineering support; $24 million for program support to include warehouse leasing and TSIF operations; $18 million to support cargo and surface; and $19 million for Federal personnel compensation and benefits. 

If the legislative proposal is not adopted TSA’s recapitalization of equipment 

would be delayed. 

Question. The budget request indicates that 55 of the top 85 airports had optimal 

checked baggage screening systems throughout the entire airport and another 22 

have optimal screening systems in some part of the airport. With the $523 million 

in discretionary and mandatory funds requested in 2012, how will these figures 

change? When does TSA estimate having optimal systems at all 85 airports? What 

are the main drivers preventing completion of systems at the remaining airports? 

Answer. Given that more than two-thirds of the explosives detection systems 

(EDS) in the field will reach the end of their useful life in the next 5 years, TSA 

has shifted its priorities from completing optimal systems to the recapitalization of 

the aging EDS fleet. The $523 million in fiscal year 2012 funding and prior year 

carryover funds will primarily be used to accommodate airport growth, recapitalization and/or optimization of existing equipment at multiple airports. Optimal systems 

are expected to be completed at two additional category X and I airports with fiscal 

year 2012 and prior year funds. 

BEHAVIOR DETECTION OFFICERS

Question. The request includes funding for an additional 350 Behavior Detection 

Officers (BDOs). GAO released a critical report on this program in 2010. Please explain the steps TSA has taken to address the concerns raised by GAO. 

Answer. TSA’s BDOs are an important layer of aviation security. Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) builds on and is based on other established, successful behavioral analysis programs that have been employed by law enforcement and security personnel both in the United States and around the world. 

DHS’s S&T Directorate led a comprehensive study to validate the validity of TSA’s 

SPOT Referral Report. Data collection was completed by TSA in late 2010 and provided to the American Institutes for Research for analysis and reporting. The validation study report is undergoing final review and S&T testified before the House 

Science, Space, and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Investigations and 

Oversight on this topic on April 6. Preliminary briefings on the validation study 

data indicated that SPOT identifies high-risk travelers at a significantly higher rate 

than random selection. 

Additionally, TSA’s risk analysis of SPOT indicates that the program can be effective in multiple threat scenarios and expanding the SPOT program increases TSA’s 

ability to adapt to evolving threats. S&T completed a preliminary study on suicide 

bomber indicators in July 2009 that illustrates overlap between some operationally 

reported suicide bomber indicators and certain TSA SPOT behaviors. As such, SPOT 

represents the best practices from defense, intelligence, and law enforcement organizations. 

TSA also began piloting SPOT refresher training for BDOs in March 2011 and 

plans to deploy this training to all BDOs during fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 

2012. 

SCREENING PROCEDURES

Question. The Administrator has said publicly that he intends to introduce new 

screening measures this year that would be different than the ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach. Does the fiscal year 2012 budget request account for these changes? Please 

explain in more detail how this new screening process will work and the schedule 

to implement it. 

Answer. TSA will introduce new risk-based screening procedures and enhance 

current technology for passenger screening as it continually evolves its layered ap-
74 

proach to transportation security. TSA is exploring the possibility of piloting these 

concepts later this year. The fiscal year 2012 budget request will not require adjustment to incorporate additional risk-based screening principles. 

CHECKPOINT SECURITY

Question. TSA is in the process of updated its checkpoint security strategic plan. 

What is the timeline for its completion? 

Answer. TSA anticipates completing the updated Passenger Screening Program 

Strategic Plan by summer 2011. 

CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Question. What is the funding level and associated staffing for TSA’s Office for 

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties? Describe TSA’s coordination with the Department’s 

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties? How many civil rights and civil liberties 

investigations did TSA conduct in 2010? How many of those investigations were conducted jointly with the Department Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties? What 

training standards must a TSO meet with regard to civil rights and civil liberties? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $8.7 million total funding for TSA’s 

Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (OCRL) which demonstrates our commitment to ensuring the traveling public’s civil rights and civil liberties are protected 

throughout the screening process. The TSA OCRL coordinates closely with DHS 

CRCL to address concerns and complaints of the traveling public through meetings 

with community groups, employee training, policy reviews, and investigations into 

traveler complaints. In fiscal year 2010, TSA conducted 217 internal investigations 

and 42 external investigations. There were no investigations conducted jointly in fiscal year 2010 by the Department and TSA. To date in fiscal year 2011, there are 

four joint investigations open. TSOs must complete training annually focusing on 

cultural awareness, civil rights and civil liberties. Additionally, No FEAR Act Training must be completed within 90 days of entering service. This training is required 

pursuant to the Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 and provides an overview of Federal antidiscrimination and whistleblower protection laws. This training regimen is repeated every 2 years. 

TSA INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Question. How many people are in TSA’s Internal Affairs Office? Is TSA adding 

new positions in fiscal year 2011? Are any new positions requested in the President’s budget for fiscal year 2012? Is TSA creating an Office of Professional Responsibility? What role will this office serve? How is TSA funding this effort and how 

many people will staff the office? 

Answer. TSA currently has 130 personnel that conduct internal investigations in 

the Office of Inspection (OOI). Under the proposed fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution, no new positions will be funded and there are no new positions requested 

for the OOI in the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget. 

TSA established the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) in the fall of 2010 

to provide greater consistency in misconduct penalty determinations and a more expeditious and standardized adjudication process. Through a combination of adjudication and oversight, OPR ensures that discipline is appropriate and fair for all TSA 

employees, regardless of the assignment or seniority of the employee involved. 

In addition, to promote consistency, TSA is transferring to OPR from the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) the responsibility for resolving TSO’s appeals of adverse 

actions, including suspensions of 15 days or greater, removal, or reduction in pay 

band or basic rate of pay. This will preserve the rights of TSOs to appeal actions 

taken by management while enabling OPR to ensure that discipline is consistent 

across the board, from senior-level officials to TSOs. 

TSA is funding OPR from within existing sources. OPR has 15 positions that are 

being filled through a combination of vacancy announcements and internal detail 

opportunities. OPR is also absorbing four positions from the Disciplinary Review 

Board, for a total of 19 OPR positions. 

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION

Question. How much of TSA’s surface transportation appropriation is dedicated to 

each surface transportation mode for fiscal year 2011 compared to the fiscal year 

2012 estimate? 

Answer. Under the funding that is currently available, the TSA surface transportation appropriation is dedicated to each surface mode in the following ways: 

—28 percent to surface inspectors and program oversight; 
75 

—25 percent to visible intermodal prevention and response teams; 

—13 percent to freight rail and pipeline; 

—12 percent to ports (maritime) and intermodal security; 

—11 percent to highway and motor carrier; 

—8 percent to mass transit; and 

—3 percent to other services. 

The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget request includes $134.7 million to support TSA’s surface transportation efforts and also includes $300 million for the Transit 

Security Grant Program (TSGP) to support State and local surface transportation 

efforts. TSA will allocate the funding to each surface transportation mode based on 

current security efforts to reduce risk once the funds have been appropriated. 

Question. How much of TSA’s budget in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 was 

dedicated to mass transit enhanced screening? Where the pilots successful? Does 

TSA have plans to continue the pilots? Does the fiscal year 2012 budget include 

funding for this purpose? Answer. In fiscal year 2010, the Congress provided TSA $25 million for partial 

year funding to stand-up an additional 15 visible intermodal prevention and response (VIPR) teams for dedicated surface transportation operations. This was in 

addition to TSA’s 10 multimodal VIPR teams already operational. During fiscal year 

2010, approximately 51 percent of TSA’s VIPR resources were spent conducting operations in the surface modes of transportation, which equates to approximately $22 

million. The primary objective of VIPR operations is to prevent acts of terrorism 

through the exercise of random, unpredictable security asset deployments in all 

modes of transportation and this may include mass transit enhanced screening. 

In fiscal year 2010, TSA entered into an agreement with New York City to conduct pilot or proof of concept operations with New York City law enforcement for 

mass transit screening. This effort involved approximately 35 TSA TSOs teamed 

with New York City law enforcement officers operating in shifts with approximately 

3 TSOs. This proof of concept was successful in terms of demonstrating the ability 

to work together in teams and build expertise in the environment to allow for improved security in response to specific threats requiring surge operations or in response operations. TSA has no plans to continue or expand this proof of concept. 

Such efforts will continue to be supported by other TSA surface transportation initiatives, including the additional VIPR teams and funding available through the 

TSGP, which supports local efforts to conduct enhanced screening. Such physical 

screening can be conducted as necessary by applicable State, local, or private personnel with equipment available through the TSGP (e.g., explosives trace detection 

equipment). 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request seeks funding for 12 new multi-modal VIPR 

teams. With these additional teams, the VIPR program anticipates an increase in 

tempo for a total number of 11,500 operations to be conducted annually beginning 

with fiscal year 2013. These operations would be conducted throughout the transportation sector to deter potential terrorist acts. 

FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS

Question. Please provide the most recent definitions of high-risk flight categories 

for flights covered by Federal Air Marshals (FAMs). Are these definitions being revised, and if so, how will the changes impact the deployment of FAMs. 

On March 8, 2011, the Department submitted a report on Federal Air Marshals 

(FAMS) long-term staffing levels in response to a fiscal year 2010 congressional requirement in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the fiscal year 2010 

DHS Appropriations Act. The report failed to address the congressional requirements for a long-term staffing plan and pointed to an assessment TSA will undertake to review FAMS risk-level definitions in order to inform an assessment of the 

long-term staffing needs of the FAMS. When will this assessment be completed? The 

results of this assessment and associated staffing impacts are to be supplied to the 

subcommittee expeditiously. 

Answer. The TSA has commenced a review of FAMS risk-level definitions, which 

will be provided to the subcommittee upon its completion. The review will inform 

any decisions pertaining to the long-term staffing levels needed in the future. 

COAST GUARD—ADMINISTRATIVE SAVINGS

Question. The fiscal year 2012 request for the Coast Guard’s operating budget includes a reduction of $83.5 million as part of the Department’s Administrative Savings Initiative. When you read the fine print, the Coast Guard’s budget states that 

these cuts ‘‘do not come without impact to readiness and operations.’’ The Coast 

Guard is already facing readiness challenges and operational shortfalls. How are 
76 

these cuts prudent? Can you provide more specifics on how these cuts will impact 

readiness and operations? 

Answer. The Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2012 budget leverages savings generated 

through management efficiencies and offsets to prioritize frontline operations and 

investments in vital recapitalization projects. The Coast Guard will not reduce 

front-line operations to achieve these savings. The fiscal year 2012 budget request 

addresses the long-term recapitalization needs of the Coast Guard and expands its 

operational capacity by funding 50,682 military and civilian positions, including additional personnel focused on strengthening Marine Safety inspections and investigations as well as a new Incident Management Assistance Team, which will be deployed rapidly to support large-scale emergencies. 

IMPACT OF 2010 COAST GUARD SURGE OPERATIONS

Question. In 2010, the Coast Guard’s operational budget was stretched with two 

significant surge operations, the Haiti earthquake and Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 

Given the size of these surge operations, what was the impact on spending for other 

priorities? What was deferred or eliminated to pay for these response efforts? 

Answer. The Coast Guard allocates its multi-mission assets to the Nation’s highest order needs. In the cases of the operational responses to the Haiti earthquake 

and Deepwater Horizon oil spill, assets were diverted from other lower priority mission assignments at the time to provide the initial search and rescue response and 

long-term mission support for the disasters. 

The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111–212) provided $50 

million in operating expenses for the Coast Guard related to expenses for disaster 

response activities for the Haiti earthquake. The funding provided relief to the 

Coast Guard for operating and personnel costs expended for the response. 

For the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Coast Guard’s direct costs, including 

supplies purchased for the spill, contractors hired, travel orders, and reservist pay 

and benefits were reimbursed from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) 

Emergency Fund and the Fund recovered those costs from the Responsible Party. 

Consistent with the Coast Guard’s multi-mission responsibilities, costs to operate 

assets diverted from regular operations to the oil spill response were funded by regular appropriations. Due to the unusually long engagement period for response, regular maintenance for some assets was deferred, which could result in higher maintenance costs. 

COAST GUARD ASSET DECOMMISSIONINGS

Question. Provide a chart of all assets proposed to be decommissioned in the fiscal 

year 2012 budget, including the name and location of each asset and timeline for 

decommissioning. 

Answer. The chart below depicts Coast Guard assets proposed for decommissioning in fiscal year 2012 President’s budget. 

Asset type Vessel name Homeport Decommissioning date 

179-ft patrol coastal (WPC) 1 ...... USCGC Shamal .......

USCGC Tornado 

USCGC Zephyr 

Pascagoula, Mississippi.WPCs will be returned to the United 

States Navy no later than October 1, 

2011. 

378-ft high endurance cutter 

(WHEC) 2.

To be determined .... To be determined .... To be determined. 

1 Three vessels are being decommissioned per a signed memorandum of agreement with the Navy in January 2007. 

2 The Coast Guard is conducting and updated engineering assessment on the 10 remaining WHECs (2 decommissioned in fiscal year 2011) 

to determine which WHEC will be decommissioned in fiscal year 2012. Factors being considered include operational capabilities and effectiveness of the current fleet and existing structural and engineering conditions of the ships. 

POLAR ICEBREAKERS

Question. The budget request includes $39 million for operations and maintenance 

of the Coast Guard’s polar icebreaking fleet. The Commandant of the Coast Guard 

has expressed concern that he doesn’t have the resources to respond to a major 

emergency in the Arctic. He has publicly stated that funding is needed to repair or 

replace its two heavy icebreakers that are currently out of service. But the Coast 

Guard’s budget indicates that one of the Coast Guard’s two heavy polar icebreakers, 

the Polar Sea, will be decommissioned in fiscal year 2011. The other heavy polar 

icebreaker, the Polar Star, is not scheduled to be reactivated until 2013. Why is the 

Department planning to decommission the Polar Sea when long-term requirements 

for the polar regions have not been determined? If an emergency occurs in the Arctic, is the Coast Guard prepared to respond? What other response capabilities exist? 
77 

Has the Coast Guard considered leasing polar icebreakers to meet mission requirements? 

Answer. Based on current Federal requirements, maintaining and operating one 

icebreaker (U.S. Coast Guard cutter (USCGC) Healy) will allow the Coast Guard to 

meet current operational requirements in the Arctic. Based on the rising costs to 

maintain the polar icebreakers, which have exceeded their life expectancy, the current condition of USCGC Polar Sea and her limited remaining service life, 

leveraging resources to reactivate USCGC Polar Star as a backup is the proper 

course of action until long-term requirements decisions are made and capabilities 

are acquired. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes $5 million for an analysis of Government-wide icebreaking requirements in the polar regions. 

DEPLOYABLE SECURITY TEAMS

Question. Section 804 of the Fiscal Year 2010 Coast Guard Authorization Act requires no less than two enhanced deployable security teams. The Coast Guard currently has one maritime security response team located in Portsmouth, Virginia. 

What are the Coast Guard’s plans to comply with section 804? Has a second location 

been determined? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has not determined a location for a second enhanced 

team. 

CANINE TEAMS

Question. What is the Coast Guard doing to comply with section 805 of the 2010 

Coast Guard Authorization Act regarding canine teams? How many certified canine 

teams does the Coast Guard currently have and where are they located? Does the 

Coast Guard have plans to increase capacity in fiscal year 2012? If so, what locations will receive additional canine teams? 

Answer. There are currently 12 canine teams certified for duty in the Coast 

Guard. The Coast Guard has programmed for 14 canine teams that are located in 

pairs at seven locations: 

—MSST Seattle, Washington. 

—MSST San Francisco, California. 

—MSST Los Angeles, California. 

—MSST Galveston, Texas. 

—MSST King’s Bay, Georgia. 

—MSRT Chesapeake, Virginia. 

—MSST New York, New York. 

Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs) San Francisco and King’s Bay currently have one of their two teams certified. Expected completion of training and 

certification for the remaining two teams is early calendar year 2012. The Coast 

Guard does not have plans to increase canine capacity beyond these levels in fiscal 

year 2012. 

MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Question. Please provide more details on the Coast Guard’s investment in the National Center of Expertise. How much of the $11.5 million increase for Marine Environmental Protection is dedicated for this purpose? How is the funding for the National Center of Expertise allocated in the request, to what organization, and where? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes funding to establish the National Incident Management Assist Team (IMAT). Although the National IMAT 

could be a core component of a future MER National Center of Expertise (NCOE), 

as a stand-alone unit, the National IMAT will also significantly enhance the Coast 

Guard’s ability to respond to complex, large-scale events in the maritime domain. 

Specifically, the IMAT investment provides dedicated, trained, and experienced personnel to directly respond to oil and hazardous substance spill incidents, and to support the Coast Guard Federal On Scene Coordinators during such incidents. They 

will also provide planning, training, and exercise support across the Coast Guard. 

Through establishment of the IMAT, the Coast Guard will improve standardization 

and proficiency in MER across the Coast Guard and its partners. 

The fiscal year 2012 cost of the IMAT enhancement is approximately $5.5 million. 

Of that, approximately $3 million will be budgeted to cover personnel expenses associated with 33 full-time positions, and $2.5 million will be budgeted for operations 

and maintenance. 
78 

PORT SECURITY TRAINING

Question. Describe the process for complying with section 821 of the Coast Guard 

Authorization Act regarding port security training and certification. 

Answer. The Coast Guard plans to implement the training provisions discussed 

in section 821 via the rulemaking process, pending DHS’s review and approval to 

the Updates to Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations Subchapter H—Maritime Security Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). The NPRM is scheduled for publication in calendar year 2011. Once published, the Final Rule, along with clarifying 

guidance from the Coast Guard, will be the basis for third party providers’ course 

development and Quality Standards System review and acceptance on behalf of the 

Coast Guard. 

COAST GUARD ACQUISITIONS

Question. The budget request includes a significant increase for shore facilities 

improvements when compared to previous requests. The Coast Guard estimates that 

the current backlog of shore facility infrastructure improvements is $600 million. Is 

the entire request associated with this backlog? Answer. $94.5 million of this request is to support shore facility infrastructure 

modifications and construction associated with the delivery of new cutters, boats, 

and aircraft. The remaining $99,200,000 of the $193.7 million request for shore facilities, plus the $20 million requested for military family housing, help address the 

backlog in the prioritized Shore Facility Requirements List. 

Question. The budget proposes to eliminate the Integrated Deepwater Construct. 

Is there a plan for tracking the Coast Guard’s ongoing acquisition costs in relation 

to the original Deepwater baseline? If so, what assets will be included in the baseline? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget proposes the elimination and 

disaggregation of the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) subappropriation from the 

Coast Guard’s Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC&I) appropriation. 

The restructuring of this appropriation better enables the service to justify and meet 

a sustainable, stable, and continuous recapitalization program while effectively 

managing cost, schedule, and performance of individual asset-based acquisitions. 

Enacting this proposal will further enhance acquisition management and accountability by aligning the appropriations structure with how the projects are managed. 

This initiative improves transparency and accountability by establishing a stronger 

linkage between appropriations and specific asset acquisition projects, and will better enable the Coast Guard, DHS headquarters, and the Congress to monitor cost, 

schedule and performance of individual projects. Finally, disaggregation of the IDS 

subappropriation will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of cross-cutting functions, such as systems integration, testing, and performance monitoring, enabling 

uniformity across all acquisition projects. The Coast Guard will retain its ability to 

track to the Deepwater baseline in aggregate. 

Question. What is the rationale for changing funding availability for all Acquisition, Construction and Improvements appropriations to 5 years? 

Answer. The Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) appropriation (which included 

‘‘deepwater’’ vessels, aircraft and other equipment), was available for 5 years. The 

proposal to disaggregate the IDS subappropriation in fiscal year 2012 is intended 

to standardize funds availability for each of the individual vessel, aircraft, other and 

shore subappropriations, which will ensure consistency in funds availability across 

the entire portfolio of projects, and enhance the Coast Guard’s ability to maintain 

project cost, schedule and performance goals. 

Specifically, the Coast Guard has increased its use of fixed-price contracts for 

major acquisitions, moving away from cost-reimbursement contracts. This change in 

strategy decreases overall risk to the Government, but requires the Coast Guard to 

set aside funds for antecedent liability (a requirement that does not exist for costreimbursement contracts). GAO’s Redbook cites that fixed-price contract antecedent 

liabilities shall be funded by the appropriation that funded the original transaction, 

to cover within-scope changes associated with the original contract. The amount of 

unobligated funding (set aside for antecedent liability) can be adjusted and reallocated over time as the contract nears completion, provided that the funds are used 

within the scope of the project and Congressional intent. The net effect is to avoid 

the need for additional future appropriations by minimizing expired, unused funds. 

Moreover, given the complexity of many of the Coast Guard’s vessel, shore, aircraft 

and electronics systems acquisitions, 5-year availability is particularly beneficial 

considering the time it takes to design, contract, and deliver these assets. 

Question. Has the Coast Guard spent any of the $45 million anticipated for the 

offshore patrol cutter (OPC) in fiscal year 2011? Is it premature to fund another $25 
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million in fiscal year 2012 if none of the fiscal year 2011 money has been obligated? 

Is the Coast Guard on track to release the request for proposal for the preliminary 

contract and design in fiscal year 2011? 

Answer. The offshore patrol cutter (OPC) is a critical aspect of the Coast Guard’s 

long-term recapitalization plan. Of the funding made available to the OPC project 

to date under the current series of continuing resolutions, $1 million has been obligated. The majority of the fiscal year 2011 funding, approximately $36 million, will 

support preliminary and contract designs; the remaining funding will support 

project management activities, acquisition studies and life-cycle cost analysis still 

planned in fiscal year 2011. The fiscal year 2012 budget request of $25 million will 

support the award of Preliminary and Contract Design contracts to three industry 

teams in fiscal year 2012. The Coast Guard plans to release a draft Request for Proposal in fiscal year 2011. 

Question. Will DHS’ requirement for the Coast Guard to conduct a verification 

study of the OPC requirements affect the timeframe for the request for proposal? 

Answer. No, the project has proceeded in parallel with the verification study of 

OPC requirements. 

Question. Based on the fiscal year 2012 Capital Improvement Plan (CIP), the cost 

of the OPC is $640 million in fiscal year 2015 and $760 million in fiscal year 2016. 

Provide a breakdown of the OPC costs in those budget estimates? Why is the second 

OPC planned to cost $120 million more than the lead ship? 

Answer. The program amounts shown in the fiscal year 2012–2016 Capital Investment Plan for the OPC are planning estimates. These planning estimates may 

change as DHS completes the fiscal year HSP. 

Question. In the fiscal year 2011 CIP, the Coast Guard estimated the national security cutter’s (NSC) completion date as 2016. In this year’s CIP, the Coast Guard 

is estimating a completion date of 2018. What are the main drivers behind this 2- 

year delay? To what extent is the decision to not request long-lead time materials 

(LLTM) for NSC No. 6 in fiscal year 2012 contributing to this delay? Would there 

be cost savings if LLTM were funded in fiscal year 2012? If so, provide the estimated savings. 

Answer. The project completion dates shown in the fiscal year 2012–2016 CIP are 

estimated for planning purposes, based on best available data at the time of budget 

preparation. The NSC schedule is derived from the Deepwater Implementation Plan 

Review Report to Congress, dated May 13, 2010, which contains a more recent assessment of NSC delivery schedules, considering actual appropriations and acquisition status to the date of the report. One factor in the delay in the NSC acquisition 

was the transition from a cost-plus contract to a fixed-price construct. The Coast 

Guard spent nearly a year negotiating the production contract for NSC No. 4, which 

was awarded in November 2010. As a result of this negotiation and successful transition to a fixed-price construct, the Coast Guard believes it is now in a position in 

which future costs are more predictable than they have ever been, which is in the 

best interests of the program and of taxpayers. 

The funding associated with NSC No. 6 is not required until fiscal year 2013. 

Question. At the hearing, you made reference to a letter from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that committed funding for NSC No. 6. Please provide 

the letter for the record. 

Answer. In accordance with the requirements of Public Law 111–83, the Coast 

Guard submits a future-years capital investment plan at the time that the President’s budget is submitted. This plan, the fiscal year 2012–2016 CIP, was included 

in the fiscal year 2012 Coast Guard Congressional Justification within the Acquisition, Construction and Improvements (AC&I) appropriation request. The CIP 

projects planned AC&I funding levels from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016 

for the program of record for each AC&I program, including the NSC program. 

These estimates are in accordance with the latest DHS-approved Acquisition Program Baseline. As noted in the CIP footnotes, fiscal year 2013–2016 funding levels 

are subject to change based upon adjustment to out-year fiscal guidance and finalization of the fiscal year 2012–2016 Future Year Homeland Security Program. 

Question. Based on the fiscal year 2012–2016 CIP, the Coast Guard is planning 

the budget for NSC to be $775 million in fiscal year 2013, $795 million in fiscal year 

2014, and $853 million in fiscal year 2015. Provide a breakdown of the NSC costs 

in those budget estimates? Why are NSC costs becoming more expensive for each 

cutter in the outyears? 

Answer. The program amounts shown in the fiscal year 2012–2016 Capital Investment Plan are planning estimates and subject to change as DHS completes the fiscal year HSP. The following table shows the estimated costs used as the basis for 

NSC projections: 
80 

[Dollars in millions] 

NSC cost categories 

Fiscal year 2013 Fiscal year 2014 Fiscal year 2015 

NSC No. 6 NSC No. 7 NSC No. 8 NSC No. 1/No. 2 

Long-lead time materials (LLTM) ................................. 114 119 124 ........................

Production contract ...................................................... 578 587 598 ........................

Production (noncontract) and post delivery activities ........................................................................... 83 89 93 ........................

Structural enhancement (NSC No. 1 and No. 2 only) ........................ ........................ ........................ 38 

Total ................................................................ 775 795 815 38 

Assuming the new fixed-price construct, the budget estimates for NSCs No. 6–8 

are estimated as the production cost for NSC No. 4 adjusted for inflation. NSC No. 

7 and No. 8 costs are projected to continue to increase due to labor and material 

inflation and increases in projected overhead rates. 

Question. The budget proposes to fund production of both the NSC and OPC in 

fiscal year 2015. Is this a realistic request given the current fiscal environment? 

Answer. DHS is committed to recapitalizing the Coast Guard’s cutter fleet as 

quickly as possible through the acquisition of NSC and OPC and fast response cutters (FRCs). 

Question. The original plan for the NSC included ship-based UAS to expand the 

NSC’s coverage capabilities. The Coast Guard’s Capital Investment Plan for fiscal 

years 2012–2016 includes no UAS funding. Has the Coast Guard abandoned this effort? What over the horizon search capabilities does the NSC provide over that of 

a WHEC without UAS? The Coast Guard expected to complete the UAS ‘‘Need 

Phase’’ (Acquisition Decision Event-1) in fiscal year 2011. What is the status of this 

effort and, if completed, what were the conclusions from this event? 

Answer. DHS and the Coast Guard remain committed to employing both land and 

cutter-based UAS to meet mission requirements. The Coast Guard is in the 

preacquisition need phase of the UAS acquisition, which works to define the problem through a mission needs statement and the development of a Concept of Operations. In addition, the Coast Guard is currently leveraging prior-year Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation funding to continue UAS technology demonstration. Further, within the Federal Government, the Coast Guard has established formal partnerships with CBP to collaborate with their maritime Predator UAS 

(Guardian) program and the Navy’s UAS program offices to collaborate on the Fire 

Scout program. 

An NSC without a UAS, relying solely on its organic detection equipment and 

manned aircraft patrols, has a far greater surveillance area than that of a high endurance cutter (WHEC). The NSC has the following organic surveillance capabilities 

that exceed those of the WHEC: 

—Ability to operate with a HH–60 enabling greater cutter-based surveillance 

range and on scene time. 

—Ability to deploy and operate with two HH–65 aircraft instead of one from a 

WHEC. 

—Two over-the-horizon (OTH) small boats instead of one from a WHEC. 

—Three-dimensional capable air search radar instead of WHEC’s two dimensional 

air search radar. 

—Sensitive compartmentalized intelligence facility (SCIF) to improve sensor and 

intelligence analysis and fusion. 

—Enhanced electronics surveillance measures (ESM). 

Question. Compare the availability of the national security cutters (Bertholf/ 

Waesche) to the 12 WHECs in terms of days away from homeport (DAFHP). 

Answer. The operational target for the WHEC fleet is 185 DAFHP annually per 

cutter. In fiscal year 2010, the WHEC fleet achieved 137 DAFHP primarily as a result of casualties to hull and mechanical systems. 

There is not yet substantive DAFHP data for USCGC Bertholf and USCGC 

Waesche. In fiscal year 2010, both assets spent time in planned inport availabilities 

for Secure Compartmentalized Intelligence Facility installations and Ready for Operations preparations. The Coast Guard will have operational availability data for 

USCGC Bertholf after it completes its first full year of operations in fiscal year 2011 

for which it is programmed to achieve 185 DAFHP. 

Question. In fiscal year 2010, because of delays in the planned delivery of national 

security cutters, the Congress provided $4 million for the Coast Guard to conduct 

a preacquisition survey and design to determine the requirements for a maintenance 

effectiveness project for the Coast Guard’s legacy high endurance cutters. What is 
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the status of this effort and has any of the $4 million been obligated? What is the 

timeline for completing this effort? 

Answer. A total of $468,819 has been obligated through March 10, 2011. This 

funding will be used to adequately assess current WHEC material condition, assess 

requirements of a potential future sustainment project and inform decisions pertaining to the WHEC decommissioning sequence, and evaluate cutter safety conditions. The Coast Guard anticipates it will take approximately 2 years to complete 

this effort. 

Question. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes $129.5 million for two maritime 

patrol aircraft (MPA) airframes and five mission system pallets (MSPs) and spares. 

Does the Coast Guard plan to buys these pallets through the ICGS contract, use 

another contracting source, or build them in-house? What is the cost difference for 

each option? 

Answer. The Coast Guard contract with Integrated Coast Guard Systems expired 

in January 2011 and no additional MSPs will be procured using that contract vehicle. The Coast Guard does not currently possess sufficient in-house processes and 

capabilities to be able to produce MSPs ‘‘in-house’’ by 2012. Therefore, acquiring 

MSPs through a commercial source is the preferred option. 

Question. The fiscal year 2012 CIP indicates a 5-year delay in completing procurement of the MPAs when compared to the fiscal year 2011 CIP. What is the cause 

of this delay? 

Answer. The project completion dates for the MPA shown in the fiscal year 2012– 

2016 CIP are estimated for planning purposes, based on best available data at the 

time of budget preparation. The MPA schedule is derived from the Deepwater Implementation Plan Review Report to Congress, dated May 13, 2010, which contains 

a more recent assessment of MPA delivery schedules. 

Question. The request includes funding for five MPA mission pallets. What is the 

cost savings from purchasing multiple mission pallets in fiscal year 2012? 

Answer. Ordering five MSPs instead of two is estimated to reduce the MSP unit 

price by as much as 30–35 percent based upon previous negotiations. 

Question. Does purchasing six FRCs in fiscal year 2012 maximize the contract? 

What is the cost savings by maximizing the contract in fiscal year 2012? 

Answer. Yes, procuring six FRCs in fiscal year 2012 maximizes the contract. The 

average cost savings per hull is approximately $5 million including production costs, 

economic price adjustments associated with spare parts, antecedent liabilities and 

other scalable program costs (e.g., project management, testing, certification, etc.). 

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE—PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

Question. Provide the number of candidates and number of protection days for 

Presidential campaigns going back to 1996, including costs. 

Answer. [Follows:] 

Campaign (fiscal year) Protection days Candidates/ 

nominees 

Spouses/adult 

children Cost 1

2008 .............................................................................. 1,115 5 6 $70,304,000 

2004 .............................................................................. 454 3 2 38,686,000 

2000 .............................................................................. 452 4 3 27,787,000 

1996 .............................................................................. 364 4 2 16,459,000 

1 Presidential campaign costs do not reflect the ‘‘labor shift’’ of existing base resources from investigative programs to support the protection demands of the campaign. 

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION SUMMIT COSTS

Question. Provide detail on how much funding is needed in fiscal year 2011 for 

the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Honolulu, Hawaii. 

Answer. Total estimated cost that the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) will incur in fiscal year 2011 for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit is $5.4 million. These cost include airfare, vehicle rental, housing, and per diem cost of personnel who have been temporarily reassigned (TDY) to Honolulu, Hawaii since October 2010 to prepare for this National Special Security Event (NSSE). Additionally, 

these costs include the rental/build-out cost of the Multi-Agency Communications 

Center (MACC), the Coordinating Center and Credentialing Center. 

The USSS will not be able to utilize the Presidential Assistance Act and therefore 

will not have access to military aircraft to transport vehicles, critical protective 

equipment and IT assets to this location. We will have to contract with a commercial vendor to transport these critical assets and ensure that they are available. 
82 

INFORMATION INTEGRATION AND TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM

Question. Provide a detailed crosswalk of the original modernization plan (schedule and budget) for the Information Integration and Transformation Program versus 

where we are with the program at current funding levels. Please detail any modernization funds that have been redirected for other purposes, including the amount 

and why they were redirected. 

Answer. [The response is For Official Use Only and Procurement Sensitive—See 

FAR 3.104 and the answer will be submitted under a separate cover.] 

OPERATIONAL MISSION SUPPORT

Question. Please prioritize your Operational Mission Support requests ($65 million). 

Answer. Here is a list of the highest-priority operational mission support requirements. Each of these protective counter measures addresses a specific vulnerability 

or known threat that requires mitigation in order to provide a safe environment for 

the President and other national leaders. The protective counter measures are used 

individually and in combination to address specific types of threats, creating a high 

level of interdependence between the proposed systems. The counter measures provide enhanced security surveillance capabilities and defenses to known threats for 

the President at the White House and while traveling throughout the world. These 

assets will provide not only enhanced situational awareness capabilities, but also 

will enable notification systems to share critical information and activate emergency 

response protocols. They are listed below: 

—Enhanced explosive detection systems, $8,683,000 (51 positions). 

—Enhanced chemical, biological, and radiological detection systems, $4,626,000 (3 

positions). 

—White House physical protection upgrades, $12,826,000 (3 positions). 

—Enhanced White House camera system, $6,375,000 (1 position). 

—Development of next generation Presidential limousine, $10,226,000 (3 positions). 

—Presidential audio countermeasures, $2,451,000 (2 positions). 

—Cyber protection activities, $12,775,000 (1 position). 

—National master plan studies, $1,375,000 (1 position). 

—Protective systems and weapons testing program, $6,477,000 (5 positions). 

ANTICOUNTERFEIT OPERATIONS IN COLOMBIA AND PERU

Question. Please describe current anticounterfeit operations in Colombia and 

Peru. Has counterfeiting in Colombia decreased since the inception of USSS cooperative presence with the Colombian Government? Is opening an overseas office in 

Peru under consideration? 

Answer. [Follows:] 

Colombia.—The USSS Bogota Resident Office currently oversees the Vetted AntiCounterfeit Force (VACF) composed of approximately 50 Colombian law enforcement 

officers divided among 8 offices in Bogota, Pereira, Cali, and Medellin. In addition, 

two Colombian district attorneys are exclusively working United States currency 

counterfeiting cases in conjunction with the VACF and USSS. 

While overall statistics indicate steady attempts at counterfeit production within 

Colombia, the combined efforts of the USSS and Colombian VACF have been able 

to greatly reduce or interdict the export to, and subsequent passing of counterfeit 

within, the United States. Passing activity has decreased 81 percent since the inception of the USSS/Colombian cooperative anticounterfeiting effort. 

Peru.—The Peru Counterfeit Task Force (PCTF) was formed in March 2009 and 

is currently working directly with the Peru National Police (PNP). The task force 

is composed of two agents on 2-week TDY assignment rotations. The USSS also 

started the process of selecting Peru National Police (PNP) officers with the goal of 

making a vetted anticounterfeit unit that closely mirrors the Colombian model. To 

date, PCTF efforts have led to the arrests of 50 suspects, the suppression of 22 counterfeit plant operations, and the seizure of more than $36 million in counterfeit currency. 

On February 15, 2011, DHS approved the National Security Decision Directive 

(NSDD) 38 related to the opening of the Lima, Peru office. On March 7, 2011, the 

NSDD 38 was officially submitted to the U.S. State Department. At this time, the 

USSS is awaiting review and approval from the U.S. State Department. 
83 

STATE AND LOCAL CYBER ACTIVITY

Question. President Obama has said, ‘‘the cyber threat is one of the most serious 

economic and national security challenges we face’’. Secretary Napolitano, you included safeguarding and securing cyberspace as 1 of the 5 missions defined in the 

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request appears to respond to this alarm by requesting a robust level of funding for US-CERT operations; Federal network security; and 

network security deployment. These are important areas to invest in and I take this 

request seriously. I was especially pleased to see that there is a $9 million increase 

for outreach, education, and training activities. Many State, local, and private sector 

entities are struggling with and finding solutions to the same issues the Federal 

Government faces. Sharing solutions and expertise is imperative to our defense. 

Please describe each cyber program underway that includes State and local efforts 

in fiscal year 2010, fiscal year 2011, and proposed programs for fiscal year 2012. 

Further, what is the current status of cybersecurity and systems assurance curricula; and what capacity does DHS currently have to provide virtual education for 

specialized and classified education requirements? 

Answer. DHS’s National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) collaborates with State, 

local, tribal, and territorial governments to share and implement sound cybersecurity policies, practices, and strategies to improve preparedness against cyber threats 

and attacks. 

Due to the increasingly important role of State, local, tribal, and territorial governments in cybersecurity, NCSD has resources committed solely to interacting with 

officials at these levels. The mission of NCSD’s State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial 

(SLTT) Engagement program is to build partnerships with non-Federal public stakeholders, including each State’s Homeland Security Advisor, Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). The following provides an 

overview of NCSD interactions with States. 

United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team 

The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) maintains 

a formal relationship and works closely with mission partners, including State and 

local governments, on a daily basis to resolve threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents. 

US-CERT provides a variety of daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly communication exchanges to maintain situational awareness and share critical information 

with collective cybersecurity partners. Federal and SLTT incident response personnel have access to the Government Forum of Incident Response and Security 

Teams (GFIRST) portal for information sharing and discussion. 

US-CERT also sponsors the GFIRST National Conference, a forum that promotes 

cooperation among Federal agencies, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, the private sector, and international partners across the cybersecurity spectrum, from preparedness and prevention to incident response. The conference supports the dissemination and promulgation of proactive and preventive security practices. US-CERT funding is executed toward planning, preparation, communication, 

and coordination of this conference and other conference expos. Specifically, $1.55 

million is directed to support requirements such as administration, logistics, and security. Additional funding (approximately $3 million) provides support to the interactive demonstration system at the GFIRST National Conference. US-CERT also provides support ($1 million annually) to the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology, which provides system integration and product development support for enhancement of the National Vulnerability Database and search engine. This database enables US-CERT partners, including State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, to secure government systems. 

Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

Created in 2003, the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS– 

ISAC) is an invaluable tool when dealing with SLTT governments. The MS–ISAC 

supports NCSD’s efforts to secure cyberspace by disseminating early warnings of 

cyber threats to SLTT governments. In addition, the MS–ISAC shares security incident information, identifies trends, and conducts other analysis for security planning. NCSD provides programmatic support ($3.55 million for the 12-month period 

from August 1, 2010, to July 31, 2011) to the MS–ISAC. The fiscal year 2010 DHS 

Appropriations Act provided an additional $3 million for DHS to fund and work 

with the MS–ISAC to provide managed security services (e.g., intrusion detection 

systems, intrusion prevention systems firewalls) for 18 State and local governments. 

The MS–ISAC has selected State, county, and local governments for participation. 

The MS–ISAC, consistent with the objectives of NCSD, provides a common mecha-
84 

nism for raising the level of SLTT government cybersecurity readiness and response. 

It is a central resource for gathering information regarding cyber threats to critical 

infrastructure facilities. Other MS–ISAC programs/activities include: 

Operation of a 24/7 Cyber Security and Analysis Center 

The MS–ISAC runs a 24-hour watch and warning Security Operations Center 

(SOC) that provides real-time network monitoring, dissemination of early cyber 

threat warnings, and vulnerability identification and mitigation, along with education and outreach aimed at reducing risk to the Nation’s SLTT government cyber 

domain. The SOC shares and coordinates real-time risk information to support national cybersecurity situational awareness with DHS (NCSD and US-CERT). 

The SOC performs 24/7 monitoring of the Internet and other sources, including 

incident reports received from members and others regarding cybersecurity threats 

and vulnerabilities. The SOC staff evaluates and correlates information and distributes advisories and bulletins as appropriate, including mitigation strategies and 

steps that can be taken to protect critical infrastructure. 

Managed and Monitored Security Services 

The MS–ISAC contracts with the States of Alaska, Montana, and New York, along 

with the Los Angeles World Airports, to provide cybersecurity monitoring and managed services. This collective view across multiple entities helps enhance situational 

awareness regarding cyber threats. 

During 2010, the MS–ISAC reviewed more than 78 billion logs through the 24/ 

7 operations center. Approximately 138 MS–ISAC advisories were issued. 

Additionally, through funding in the fiscal year 2010 DHS Appropriations Act, the 

MS–ISAC is expanding its monitoring services with an additional 10 State governments, 7 local governments, and 1 territorial government. This expanded infrastructure will provide a representative sample of system and network activity for enhancing situational awareness of SLTT government networks across the country. It will 

also improve cyber incident identification and response while providing more resources for developing and implementing appropriate mitigation strategies tailored 

specifically to SLTT government cyber resources. 

Participation in Cyber Security Exercises—Cyber Storm I, II, and III 

The MS–ISAC has participated in each of the three Cyber Storm exercises, most 

recently Cyber Storm III in September 2010. The MS–ISAC was a full player during 

the Cyber Storm III exercise; its SOC was active, and it coordinated with 11 States 

that participated in the exercise. The MS–ISAC hosted 19 visitors from five States, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York State law enforcement, Homeland 

Security and military personnel, and observers from the University of Texas at San 

Antonio. 

National Cyber Incident Response Plan 

The President’s Cybersecurity Policy Review called for ‘‘a comprehensive framework to facilitate coordinated responses by Government, the private sector, and allies to a significant cyber incident.’’ DHS coordinated the interagency, State and 

local government, and private-sector working group that developed the National 

Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP). The Plan provides a framework for effective 

incident response capabilities and coordination among Federal agencies, State and 

local governments, the private sector, and international partners during significant 

cyber incidents. It is designed to be flexible and adaptable to allow synchronization 

of response activities across jurisdictional lines. 

The NCIRP is undergoing final DHS review to incorporate lessons learned during 

the Cyber Storm III exercise. Upon conclusion of this review, DHS will send the 

NCIRP out to State, local and private-sector partners (including the National Governors Association and the MS–ISAC) for review. DHS will work with State and 

local partners (and partners in the private sector) to align their incident response 

plans and procedures with the NCIRP. The MS–ISAC and National Governors Association will be key partners in this effort. 

DHS has designated the MS–ISAC as the ISAC for SLTT governments and has 

identified the MS–ISAC as a key stakeholder in the development and implementation of the NCIRP. 

NCSD Cyber Security Evaluation Program 

Under the 2009 appropriations act, NCSD’s Cyber Security Evaluation Program 

(CSEP) was tasked with completing a Nationwide Cyber Security Review (NCSR). 

The NCSR is a voluntary self-assessment of State and major urban area government information technology (IT) services and is designed to measure cybersecurity 

preparedness and resilience. Through the NCSR, CSEP examines relationships, 
85 

interactions, and processes governing IT management and the ability to manage 

operational risk effectively. CSEP also conducts voluntary cybersecurity assessments 

to evaluate and enhance the implementation of key cybersecurity capacities and capabilities of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) sector members. This 

assessment is the Cyber Resilience Review, which is designed for each of the 18 

CIKR sectors and for use within SLTT governments. Since fiscal year 2009, CSEP 

has completed 45 cyber resilience reviews with SLTT partners. 

NCSD Cyber Exercise Program 

NCSD’s Cyber Exercise Program (CEP) works with Federal, State, local, international, and private sector partners to conduct regional and sector-specific exercises designed to develop and improve the capabilities of DHS and its infrastructure 

partners. Such exercises aid participants in preparing for, preventing, mitigating, 

responding to, and recovering from cyber incidents. NCSD plans, coordinates, and 

conducts cyber exercises to develop, evaluate, improve, and refine the capabilities 

of State and local partners. CEP assists State and local partners by facilitating the 

design of tabletop and functional exercises at the State and local levels. 

DHS hosted Cyber Storm III from September 26 through October 1, 2010. The 

Cyber Storm exercise series is a key element of ongoing efforts to assess cyber preparedness; examine incident response processes, procedures, and information sharing mechanisms; and identify areas for improvement absent the consequences of an 

actual incident. Cyber Storm III included participation from 11 States. 

In 2009 and 2010, NCSD, the MS–ISAC, and the Microsoft Corporation jointly 

sponsored the Defend the Flag Exercises to provide State government network security professionals greater technical security skills and practical experience with implementing the principles of defense-in-depth while securing Windows-based operating systems. Thirteen States participated from 2009–2010. 

Grants 

DHS provides grants for cybersecurity through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), such as the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), 

which provides States the opportunity to work with DHS to acquire cybersecurity 

capabilities. During the last 2 years, NCSD has worked with FEMA to modify the 

language in the HSGP to better clarify how funds can be used to improve cybersecurity. 

National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education 

DHS is engaged in the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), 

leading Track 1 (Cybersecurity Awareness), leading Track 3 (Cybersecurity Workforce Structure), and coleading Track 4 (Cybersecurity Workforce Training and Professional Development). Through NICE, DHS is reaching out across the cybersecurity community—including academia, the private sector, and Federal, State, local, 

tribal, and territorial partners—to integrate current efforts into a foundation of information that creates mutual understanding and partnerships across all aspects of 

national cybersecurity. 

In fiscal year 2010, DHS facilitated the efforts of six State government CIOs to 

develop a State government workforce development model, based on the existing 

DHS-issued Essential Body of Knowledge. This State government model was presented to the MS–ISAC, which included the model in its membership-based portal 

and on its public Web site. 

Other NCSD SLTT Programs/Activities 

National Cyber Security Awareness Month 

To recognize the importance of cybersecurity awareness, October is designated as 

National Cyber Security Awareness Month. NCSD, with the help of the MS–ISAC, 

works with funded partners and other parties to sponsor events and activities 

throughout the country and disseminate Awareness Month key messages and event 

information to State and local partners. Due to the efforts of NCSD and MS ISAC, 

in 2009 and 2010, all of the Nation’s governors signed letters officially proclaiming 

October as National Cyber Security Awareness Month. 

Stop. Think. Connect. Campaign 

DHS bears primary responsibility for raising public awareness about threats to 

the Nation’s cyber systems and networks. To that end, in October 2010, DHS 

launched the National Cybersecurity Awareness Campaign, Stop. Think. Connect. 

It is a national public-education effort to engage and empower Americans to take 

charge of their online safety and security. By providing Americans with easy-to-understand online safety tips and resources, the campaign is helping them establish 

smart habits that will lead to increased protection online. Stop. Think. Connect. ful-
86 

fills a key element of President Obama’s 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review, which 

tasked DHS to develop a public-awareness campaign to inform Americans about 

ways to use technology safely. 

Security Clearances for State Information Security Officers 

NCSD, in partnership with colleagues from DHS Office of Security, initiated a 

plan to clear, starting at the Secret level, each State CIO and CISO, and the MS– 

ISAC executive committee. NCSD is confident this is an important step in sharing 

valuable sensitive information with State partners. 

Cyber Partner Local Access Plan 

NCSD, in cooperation with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, developed the 

Cybersecurity Partner Local Access Plan (CPLAP) to share classified cybersecurity 

threat information with cleared State cybersecurity officials and private-sector partners at State and major urban area fusion centers nationwide. The CPLAP enables 

more effective and efficient classified cybersecurity information sharing among Federal, SLTT, and private-sector partners, and supports an information-sharing model 

that eliminates partners’ air travel to and from the Washington, DC, area to receive 

classified cybersecurity briefings. The CPLAP will be piloted at five fusion centers 

by mid-2011, with plans to expand the program to a broader audience and additional fusion centers on a regional basis by the end of 2011. 

Cyber Summits 

In an effort to educate SLTT leaders and the public, NCSD coordinates and plans 

Cyber Summits. These summits, which are held regularly throughout the year and 

hosted across the country, focus on opportunities and vulnerabilities to promote discussion on how public and private-sector officials can best leverage technology to reduce risk. Frequent attendance and contribution by nongovernmental cyber associations, such as the MS–ISAC and National Association of State Chief Information Officers, significantly contributes to the information sharing, capacity building, and coordination efforts necessary to develop robust and effective cybersecurity capabilities 

on all levels. DHS identified cybersecurity as a top departmental priority, and Federal, State, and local government officials share a responsibility to promote a 

healthy cyber ecosystem and to encourage individuals to protect themselves and 

their families at home, work, and school. 

Virginia Operational Integration Cybersecurity Center of Excellence 

NCSD is helping the Virginia Operational Integration Cyber Center of Excellence 

(VOICCE) create a Municipal Cyber Lab that will be used to support and train 

SLTT government officials to better understand cybersecurity issues. VOICCE focuses on incorporating cyber attacks into the mainstream of emergency operations 

at the local level and creating a virtual municipality of randomly generated Internet 

protocol addresses. The concept will allow for development of vital cybersecurity capabilities, processes, and procedures. The VOICCE node or laboratory will allow 

local governments and first responders to plug into State and Federal entities and 

participate in simulated cyber attacks. The lab will be both physical and virtual in 

structure, allowing many types of simulation and providing an effective environment 

to share ideas among stakeholders across the Nation. Participants will brainstorm, 

identify, and respond to diverse cyber attack scenarios. 

This activity was required by the fiscal year 2010 DHS Appropriations Act. 

NCSD will continue many of the programs listed above. In addition, in fiscal year 

2012, NCSD will commit funding to expand the MS–ISAC’s managed and monitor 

security services. 

Curricula 

The Software Assurance (SwA) curriculum project, which produced the Masters 

of Software Assurance (MSwA) curriculum and associated undergraduate course 

outlines, is a recent NCSD effort to cosponsor public-private collaboration for government, industry, and academia through its SwA Forum. To facilitate implementation, the MSwA project team is offering assistance, free of charge, to educational institutions looking to launch an MSwA degree program. 

Through the Software Assurance (SwA) forum, the SwA program has encouraged 

Federal, State, and local involvement in public-private collaboration efforts associated with the advancement of SwA resources. As part of that collaboration, the SwA 

curriculum project released the Masters of Software Assurance (MSwA) reference 

curriculum and nine-course syllabi for public use. The MSwA curriculum is recognized by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Computer Society and the Association of Computing Machinery (ACM) as the first curriculum of 
87 

its kind to focus on assuring the functionality, dependability, and security of software and systems. The materials are available at http://www.cert.org/mswa/. 

More information on the SwA curriculum project and the MSwA is available at 

https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/1165-BSI.html. 

Virtual Education 

The SwA Forum, sponsored by NCSD’s SwA Program, posts Web casts of SwA tutorials and pocket guides that are publicly available for free online use, including 

links via virtual training environments. 

One aspect under NICE Track 4 is Functional Area 4, which concerns Specialized 

Cybersecurity Operations. The scope of this effort includes those Federal civilian 

employees, members of the uniformed services, and contractor personnel employed 

by departments and agencies who are engaged in highly specialized and largely classified cybersecurity operations. Work associated with this functional area is classified, but a classified briefing to discuss the work associated with this topic can be 

arranged upon request. 

RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS FOR INFORMED DECISION MAKING

Question. NPPD began development of the Risk Assessment Process for Informed 

Decision Making (RAPID) to aid the Department in making policy and budgetary 

decisions based on risk. Which DHS components (or other entities) have used 

RAPID to date? What impact did it have on operations? What proposals in the fiscal 

year 2012 budget used RAPID as the foundation for the request? What is the next 

phase for RAPID and when will it be used departmentwide? 

Answer. [Follows:] 

Components That Have Used RAPID to Date 

The Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision Making (RAPID) is the Federal Government’s first quantitative, multi-mission, multi-hazards assessment of 

homeland security risk. RAPID assesses the risk of various types of terrorism, natural disasters, and transnational crimes in terms of annualized expected fatalities 

and economic losses. The goal of RAPID is to provide information about these homeland security risks and the extent to which DHS programs and activities contribute 

to the reduction of these risks to support DHS leadership decisionmaking during the 

annual planning, programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) process cycle and 

supporting processes. 

To date, RAPID analysis has supported the planning phase of the annual DHS 

PPBE cycle through the development of the Office of Policy’s Integrated Planning 

Guidance by highlighting key risks and providing qualitative analysis of possible 

risk-mitigation strategies. In addition, RAPID analysis has proven helpful in facilitating more robust evaluation of alternatives within the Program Review Board 

issue teams. 

In addition to supporting the departmentwide PPBE process, RAPID has supported a number of DHS components in prioritizing their activities, as described 

below. 

Coast Guard Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security Program 

The Coast Guard’s ports, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS) risk-based performance module has been developed to: 

—Assess risk in the PWCS mission; 

—Evaluate Coast Guard performance within the mission; and 

—Evaluate the effectiveness of Coast Guard planning, programming, and budgeting recommendations in terms of risk reduction. 

To achieve those objectives, the model considers a wide array of maritime terrorism scenarios. The risk data for the vast majority of scenarios comes directly 

from the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model; however, the risk 

of transferring terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) through the 

maritime domain is currently outside of the model’s scope. 

To establish the risk associated with these scenarios, the Coast Guard/PWCS 

team requested RAPID data from the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s (NPPD) Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) related to the following: 

—Frequency estimates from RAPID’s structured elicitation of the intelligence 

community in the following areas: 

—Maritime-related WMD transfers, both through ports of entry and between 

ports of entry; 

—Maritime-related terrorist transfers, both through ports of entry and between 

ports of entry; 
88 

—Maritime-related direct attacks; and 

—Maritime-related direct exploitation attacks. 

—Casualty and economic consequence estimates for a variety of WMD attacks. 

DHS Office of Policy’s Office of Strategic Plans 

The Office of Strategic Plans within the Department’s Office of Policy requested 

information and analysis related to: 

—The overall flows of four types of drugs that malefactors are attempting to introduce into the United States; 

—Estimates of drugs seized based on the reported sources; and 

—How these reported estimates compare with RAPID estimates. 

In response to this request, RMA provided overall drug-flow estimates, as well as 

drug-seizure estimates from both RAPID and other reported sources. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations 

In response to the GAO report, ‘‘Better Management Practices Could Enhance 

DHS’s Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources’’ (GAO–06–462T), the Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations has been seeking a way to use risk management to inform its resource allocation decisions (i.e., 

analyze its primary enforcement areas and allocate its resources according to the 

likelihood of potential consequences to the United States). As a result, ICE developed a strategic risk assessment whose methodology was peer-reviewed at multiple 

stages by RMA, and RMA provided RAPID analysis for use in this assessment. Specifically, RMA provided RAPID analysis of residual drug-flow estimates, consequences as a result of foreign-produced drugs, and consequences due to illegal migration. ICE used the RAPID data to augment and validate its own estimates. 

CBP Agro/Bio-Terror Countermeasures 

RMA has been asked by CBP’s Agro/Bio-Terror Countermeasures (ABTC) to provide bioterrorism/agroterrorism risk information to inform its targeting processes. 

Specifically, ABTC is interested in using RAPID in the following areas: 

—Assist in improved use of targeting resources by either: 

—Using existing RAPID risk results tailored to provide information regarding 

risk by ‘‘mode and point of entry’’ for biological material to inform ABTC’s decisions regarding the allocation of its resources among air, land, and sea border crossings; or 

—Building a new ‘‘risk factor’’ category into ABTC’s existing targeting rulesets 

that includes RAPID ‘‘mode and point of entry’’ risk data; and 

—Help design probabilistic red-team scenarios to test targeting and response procedures. 

Impact on Operations 

As noted in the Secretary’s policy statement on Integrated Risk Management 

signed in May 2010, DHS uses risk information and analysis: 

‘‘. . . to inform decisionmaking, striving to better understand risks and capabilities 

to manage them, while remaining flexible to changing risks. Homeland security 

risks are inherently uncertain, and risk analysis will not always yield precise answers. The Department uses risk information and analysis to make its assumptions 

more transparent, encourage creative thinking, and provide defensible decisions, 

made with the best available tools and information, for the best achievable outcomes.’’ 

Using risk analysis to inform decisions, particularly operational ones, is a complicated process that involves making difficult tradeoffs among often highly uncertain risk reduction benefits, costs, the unique risk tolerance of the decisionmaker, 

logistical constraints, and policy priorities. Terrorism risk analysis in particular involves a great deal of uncertainty that affects our ability to estimate the range of 

potential benefits of different alternatives. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Proposals That Used RAPID as the Foundation for the Request 

During the fiscal year 2012 budget build, RAPID was not completed in time to 

serve as the foundation for any specific budget requests. It is expected in the future, 

however, that RAPID will reach a sufficient level of maturity to be leveraged more 

broadly and will increasingly provide greater input into the budgeting process. 

Next Phase for RAPID 

Following the execution of RAPID 2010, NPPD/RMA conducted a formal lessonslearned process to prioritize enhancements to future iterations of the assessment. 

This process led to a formal confirmation of strategic requirements and reinforced 

the focus for RAPID in 2011–2012 to better understand customer needs and the de-
89 

cision environment. Initial RAPID 2010 analysis provides a baseline view of homeland security risk and risk reduction across the Department’s mission-oriented programs, portfolios, and activities. In 2011, RMA plans to invest most of its effort in 

improving model and data quality, bringing all RAPID analysis in house so that it 

can be conducted by Federal staff on Federal computing equipment, and conducting 

tailored analysis to support the fiscal year 2013–2017 budget build, including support to NPPD’s budget request, study of the effectiveness of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures, and more effective allocation of aviation security and air domain awareness resources. 

PROGRESS IN INTEROPERABILITY

Question. The 10th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 

is only 6 months away. The failure of communications during that incident has been 

cited in the 9/11 Commission report and has been the subject of many recommendations for improvement. During Hurricane Katrina, we once again witnessed a failure 

in communications during a catastrophe. The Federal Government and DHS have 

devoted significant resources to solving the interoperable communications problem; 

more than $4.5 billion in Federal homeland security grants alone. State and local 

governments have contributed an untold amount. Progress has been made; however, 

interoperable emergency communications remain inadequate. 

The emergence of broadband services provides emergency responders with new opportunities to improve communications. Despite this potential, public safety officials 

face several challenges in integrating new technologies and proving their reliability. 

What progress has been made since September 11, 2001, to improve emergency communications and what challenges lie ahead? Does the National Emergency Communications Plan need to be updated for emerging technologies and services? What is 

the plan to develop and disseminate training and best practices on governance, 

standard operating procedures, equipment purchases, and related issues for emerging technologies and services and to deliver technical assistance to public safety 

agencies on broadband technologies? 

Answer. [Follows:] 

Progress Made Since September 11, 2001 

Improving communications for the Nation’s emergency responders has been a top 

priority for DHS. Since its establishment, DHS has worked with its partners at the 

Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial levels to build and sustain the communications capabilities that public safety personnel require at all times to coordinate 

response and recovery operations effectively. Creation of the Office of Emergency 

Communications (OEC) within the National Protection and Programs Directorate in 

2007 and its subsequent release of the National Emergency Communications Plan 

(NECP) have been key drivers of progress in this mission. To date, the Department 

has achieved 78 of the 92 milestones in the NECP, or 85 percent. 

The Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) within the S&T Directorate was created in 2004 to strengthen and integrate interoperable communications. Working closely with the emergency response community, OIC developed 

foundational tools, methodologies, and standards to strengthen interoperability. For 

example, OIC improved command-level interoperability capabilities in 10 highthreat urban areas through the RapidCom initiative. OIC also supported RapidCom 

2 which accelerated the completion of Tactical Interoperability Communications 

Plans in the largest 75 urban/metropolitan areas across the Nation. A scorecard was 

developed to help all levels of government measure their current state of interoperability and lay the foundation for establishing accountability for future progress. Additionally, OIC launched two regional communications interoperability pilots in Nevada and Kentucky which resulted in guidance documents on governance, funding, 

and procurement that now serve as tools for States and territories in support of 

their statewide planning efforts. 

Prior to the creation of OEC and release of the NECP, emergency response agencies often pursued disparate emergency communications activities and lacked coordinated solutions and protocols. Few plans existed at the State level to guide activities 

within or across States and with Federal efforts, and inter-agency coordination at 

the Federal level was not as effective as it needed to be. In addition, Federal grant 

programs supported the acquisition of communications equipment—but without 

common governance and statewide plans in place, individual communities often 

made equipment investments without coordinating with their neighboring communities or regions. 

To address these and other interoperability challenges, OEC developed the NECP 

in coordination with more than 150 representatives from all major emergency response organizations across the country, including the SAFECOM Executive Com-
90 

mittee/Emergency Response Council, Federal departments and agencies through the 

Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC), and private-sector and 

nongovernmental organizations. The NECP set out a clear strategy for building capabilities in key areas identified by public safety as needed for improving emergency 

communications and has since greatly influenced planning, governance, operating 

procedures, and training for responders nationwide. 

Indicators of Emergency Communications Progress 

NPPD/OEC’s efforts to coordinate with stakeholders from the Federal, State, local, 

tribal, and territorial responder communities and the private sector to improve 

interoperable emergency communications capabilities have resulted in: —Enhanced Statewide Coordination.—The creation of 56 statewide communication interoperability plans (SCIPs) and 44 statewide interoperability coordinators (SWICs) is improving coordination of emergency communications activities 

and investments throughout all 56 States and territories. All 56 States and territories have identified a point of contact for statewide interoperability coordination, and 44 States and territories have full-time SWIC or equivalent positions. 

These important leadership roles and planning mechanisms are critical for the 

continued funding, accountability, and execution of emergency communications 

activities at the State, local, tribal, and territorial levels. —Common Plans and Procedures.—The creation and increased use of standardized plans, protocols, and procedures is driving improved command, control, and 

communications among emergency response agencies in the field. NPPD/OEC 

and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have worked with 

more than 140 jurisdictions to develop Tactical Interoperable Communications 

Plans (TICPs) that document formalized interoperability governance groups, 

standardized policies and procedures, and emergency communications equipment inventories. DHS continues to work with stakeholders to update, implement, and develop new TICPs as part of the NECP. In addition, more than 30 

States are implementing plain-language protocols to simplify and standardize 

the language used to share information and communicate during an emergency. 

—Targeted Technical Assistance.—As part of the NECP, NPPD/OEC has implemented a technical assistance strategy to ensure that all States and territories 

can request and receive emergency communications assistance while also focusing support on the States and urban areas most in need. This technical support 

provides improvements in all areas of emergency communications, including the 

development of governance structures, tactical and strategic planning, and a variety of engineering services. Since 2008, the 56 States and territories have requested more than 750 individual technical assistance services from NPPD/ 

OEC. These services support the priorities in each State or territory’s SCIP and 

the objectives of the NECP. 

The 2011 Technical Assistance Catalog has 13 new or updated offerings to 

provide support to States across the entire Interoperability Continuum, one of 

which is focused on the planning for and incorporation of 700MHz Wireless 

Broadband technologies into the Public Safety community. In addition, NPPD/ 

OEC is conducting at least five focused Technical Assistance engagements with 

jurisdictions granted waivers by the Federal Communications Commission for 

conditional use of currently allocated 700 MHz spectrum to help them migrate 

to the new 700MHz Long-Term Evolution network and share best practices with 

the Nation. Last, NPPD/OEC facilitates a weekly call with the Public Safety 

Spectrum Trust Operator Advisory Committee, a group comprising all the jurisdictions receiving such FCC waivers, to encourage information sharing and collaboration. 

—Increased Training Opportunities.—To improve emergency responders’ capabilities in this area, OEC’s communications unit leader (COML) training program 

has resulted in the training of more than 3,500 responders, technicians, and 

planners to lead communications during incidents across the Nation, including 

local floods, blizzards, and wildfires. Effective training and exercise programs 

can increase emergency responders’ proficiency with equipment and help them 

coordinate roles and responsibilities more effectively during an event. Trained 

COMLs also contributed to recovery efforts outside of the United States, such 

as the response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. 

—Improved Governance and Coordination.—Building on the success of governance 

and coordination mechanisms such as the SAFECOM Executive Committee/ 

Emergency Response Council, NPPD/OEC has worked with Federal, State, 

local, tribal, and territorial agencies to stand up formal decisionmaking structures that increase coordination, information sharing, and oversight of interoperability: 
91 

—Statewide Interoperability Governing Bodies now exist in every State and territory and include representatives from all levels of government to coordinate 

and support statewide interoperability. In addition, many States have created 

regional interoperability committees to provide insight into the statewide 

strategy from an operational perspective. 

—NPPD/OEC established the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators to serve as a governing body for SWICs. The council meets twice 

a year to share best practices, lessons learned, successes, and challenges related to SCIP implementation. 

—DHS established Regional Emergency Communications Coordination Working 

Groups and placed individual regional coordinators from FEMA, NPPD/OEC, 

and the National Communications System in each of the 10 FEMA regions 

to coordinate interstate emergency communications efforts. 

—The Emergency Communications Preparedness Center represents the Federal 

Government’s broad role in emergency communications, including regulation, 

policy, operations, and grants. The ECPC, which comprises members from 14 

Federal departments and agencies, is driving more effective coordination of 

grants, technical assistance, and planning activities for emergency communications. 

NECP Goals Performance Measurement.—The NECP goals serve as performance 

benchmarks for assessing public safety agencies’ progress toward achieving a baseline-level of interoperable emergency communications. OEC is measuring them 

through a process that engages Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial emergency responders. The three NECP goals are as follows: 

Goal 1.—By the end of 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated 

within the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) can demonstrate response-level 

emergency communications within 1 hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies. 

Goal 2.—By the end of 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions can demonstrate response-level emergency communications within 1 hour for routine events 

involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies. 

Goal 3.—By the end of 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions can demonstrate response-level emergency communications within 3 hours of a significant event, as 

outlined in the department’s national planning scenarios. 

—To evaluate NECP goal 1, NPPD/OEC conducted an assessment of responselevel emergency communications among public safety agencies during a planned 

event held in each UASI region. Based on the interoperable communications capabilities documented at each event, all 60 UASI regions were able to demonstrate response level communications, achieving NECP goal 1. The goal 1 assessments also identified areas for continued improvement. NPPD/OEC will use 

the results of the goal assessments—including goal 2, scheduled for completion 

in 2011 and goal 3, scheduled for completion in 2013—to better target resources, such as training and planning, for improving interoperable emergency 

communications nationwide. 

Updating the National Emergency Communications Plan 

NPPD/OEC is leading efforts to update the NECP to address the integration of 

broadband with traditional Land Mobile Radio (LMR) technologies. OEC is coordinating with Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies, major public-safety 

organizations, and the private sector to develop a strategy for incorporating new 

technology, such as broadband, while maintaining the mission-critical voice-over 

LMR that responders use every day to save lives. The NECP update will focus on 

key issues that must be addressed, such as partnerships, planning, user requirements, standards, research and development, and funding. 

Acceleration of Standards and Technology Developments 

OIC has worked to provide stakeholders (local, State, and Federal), with the optimal mix of standards, tools, technologies, methodologies, and guidance to enable improved communications interoperability at all levels. For example, OIC facilitates 

the development of Emergency Data Exchange Language (EDXL) standards through 

a practitioner-driven approach. These standards enable the emergency response 

community to share data seamlessly and securely during an incident. Once standardized, any technology vendor or organization can easily develop EDXL-based applications and products to facilitate information exchange across disparate public 

safety systems across local, tribal, State, Federal, and nongovernmental emergency 

response and management disciplines. The EDXL family of standards is developed 

through input from the OIC-Sponsored Practitioner Steering Group (PSG) and 

Standards Working Group (SWG). The PSG and SWG represent multiple dis-
92 

ciplines, ensuring that the requirements reflect an all-hazards perspective. The 

standards are then vetted by an international standards development organization. 

The EDXL project is a public-private partnership established to create an information sharing capability between disparate emergency response software applications, 

systems, and devices. 

An example of the Department’s promotion of voice standards is OIC’s Project 25 

Compliance Assessment Program (P25 CAP), which established a process for ensuring that emergency communications equipment complies with P25 standards and is 

capable of interoperating across manufacturers. P25 standards make it possible for 

radios to interoperate regardless of manufacturer, enabling emergency responders to 

communicate. Currently, P25 CAP has 12 participating manufacturers, representing 

more than 80 percent of the land mobile radio market. The program, a partnership 

between DHS S&T and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, provides local, State, and Federal emergency responders with an independent and 

transparent process to formally assess communications equipment against a select 

group of requirements within the suite of P25 standards. The results from this testing are published on FEMA’s Responder Knowledge Base Web site. The P25 CAP 

will allow emergency responders to purchase and use P25-compliant products. 

Recognizing the emergency response community’s need for standards-based, Internet protocol-enabled backbones that improve mission-critical information sharing 

and allows for the interconnection of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) based networks with neighboring agencies, OIC established a Public Safety VoIP Working 

Group. This Working Group, consisting of public safety practitioners, industry representatives, and Federal partners, created the Bridging System Interface (BSI) core 

profile. The BSI allows emergency response agencies to seamlessly connect radio 

systems over an IP network—regardless of the manufacturer. Thirteen manufacturers voluntarily adopted the BSI platform and others have committed to doing so in 

their next product cycle. Ultimately, the BSI core profile provides emergency response agencies with a reduction in cost for system design and installation. 

The introduction of Multi-Band Radio (MBR) technology to the emergency response community offers an opportunity to improve interoperability across agencies, 

disciplines, and jurisdictions by providing the capability to communicate on all public safety radio bands. OIC’s MBR technology project evaluates, tests, demonstrates, 

and pilots MBR technology to ensure that equipment meets the mission requirements identified by the emergency response community. Finally, compiling the data 

and user feedback from the T&E phases, OIC will produce a detailed procurement 

guide that will assist emergency response agencies in the identification of equipment functionality offered by various manufacturers that meets their radio communication interoperability requirements. DHS believes that their efforts with this 

project will continue to stimulate the marketplace and encourage additional manufacturers to research, develop, design, and manufacture similar technology. 

OIC also developed a Technology Roadmap for Interoperable Communications to 

provide stakeholders with a strategy to incorporate new and emerging technologies 

into existing communications capabilities. 

Broadband 

DHS is deeply involved in coordinating public-safety broadband efforts at the Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial levels. NPPD/OEC is helping to set the broad 

policy framework for public-safety broadband networks and ensuring that it aligns 

with existing emergency communications policy. NPPD/OEC is offering technical assistance to the jurisdictions that received FCC waivers to allow early deployment 

of broadband public safety facilities and other early adopters of broadband solutions 

to ensure that their activities remain aligned with the vision of a nationally interoperable network. NPPD/OEC is also developing guidance documents geared toward 

elected officials, SWICs, and UASI/regional coordinators within a State to provide 

an overview of broadband technology, guidance on interoperability planning for 

broadband, best practices from the waiver jurisdictions, and regional governance 

considerations. NPPD/OEC is also coordinating Federal broadband efforts to develop 

requirements and influence standards associated with potential Federal user participation in the National Public Safety Broadband Network. 

PRIVATE SECTOR COORDINATION AND INFORMATION SHARING

Question. NPPD has various methods for coordinating and sharing information 

with the private sector related to critical infrastructure. The fiscal year 2012 budget 

proposal indicates that NPPD will streamline the process. Please provide a list of 

each coordination group (i.e., national infrastructure protection plan management, 

critical infrastructure key resources coordination, sector-specific agency management); their authority or reason for creation (law, regulation, Presidential directive, 
93 

department initiative); how often each group meets; and what each produces or accomplishes. Please describe in detail how the fiscal year 2012 budget will streamline 

the current process and how it will be coordinated with the private sector coordination office in FEMA. 

Answer. The following chart lists each coordination group, authority, engagement 

frequency, products/accomplishments, and membership. In addition, the Partnerships project has tracked the following growth in the use of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) partnership structures: 

Fiscal year 2008 Fiscal year 2009 Fiscal year 2010 

Partnership member institutions ....................................................................................... 492 643 861 

Partnership councils and working groups ......................................................................... 57 78 79 

Individual meeting participants ........................................................................................ 1,530 1,723 2,197 

Council and working group meetings ............................................................................... 258 475 628 
94 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION GROUPS 

Organization Authority Engagement frequency Products and accomplishments Membership 

Education, training and outreach awareness working group. National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Meets three times per year ........... Information sharing with sector-specific agencies (SSAs) on education, training 

and outreach activities.

DHS and SSAs 

IP–SSA biweekly coordination call ............. Department initiative supporting HSPD– 

7, NIPP.

Occurs every other Thursday ......... Regular communication and coordination 

mechanism between IP and the SSAs to discuss ongoing initiatives and issues.

SSA representatives 

Risk Management Enhancement Initiative 

Working Group.

Department initiative supporting HSPD– 

7, NIPP.

Monthly .......................................... Supports the development of the improved NAR/SARs/metrics, the new 

Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Plan (CIRMP), and the National Risk Profile (NRP).

SSA representatives 

North American Electric Reliability Corp 

(NERC) Pilot Program.

Supports NIPP and HSPD–7 reporting requirements. Ad hoc ........................................... Provides insight into measuring and evaluating resilience within the electric industry. DHS, NERC 

Sector Annual Report/National Annual Report (SAR/NAR) technical assistance 

sessions (for each sector-specific agency).

Supports NIPP and HSPD–7 reporting requirements. Annually ......................................... Meetings are conducted at the beginning of the SAR/NAR reporting cycle in 

order to discuss sector writing, development, and metrics guidance as it applies.

DHS, SSA representatives 

SLTTGCC and RCCC technical assistance 

sessions.

Supports NIPP and HSPD–7 reporting requirements. Annually ......................................... Meetings are conducted to discuss SLTT writing, development, and metrics 

guidance.

DHS, SLTTGCC, RCCC representatives 

Federal Senior Leadership Council meetings. HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Quarterly ........................................ Cross-sector coordination ......................... SSA leadership or their representatives CIKR Cross-Sector Council meetings ......... HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Quarterly ........................................ Cross-sector coordination ......................... SCC leadership Agriculture and food sector .......................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: Trade Associations and Owner/Operators GCC: government representatives 

Banking and finance sector ......................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 
95 

Chemical sector .........................................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Commercial facilities sector ......................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Communications sector ..............................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Critical Manufacturing sector ....................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Dam, Locks, and Levees sector .................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Defense Industrial Base sector ..................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Emergency Services sector .........................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Energy sector ..............................................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Healthcare and Public Health sector .........SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Information Technology sector ...................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 
96 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION GROUPS—Continued 

Organization Authority Engagement frequency Products and accomplishments Membership 

Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste 

sector.

SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Postal and shipping sector ........................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Transportation systems sector ...................SCC meetings (sub-SCCs for aviation, 

maritime, rail, highway and motor carrier) 

GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

Water sector ...............................................SCC meetings GCC meetings Joint SCC, GCC CIPAC 

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

SCC: trade associations and owner/operators GCC: government representatives 

National monuments and icons sector 

GCC.

HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

Government representatives 

Government facilities sector GCC .............. HSPD–7, NIPP ........................................... Each quarterly at minimum .......... Various sector products (annual report, 

sector roadmaps, etc.).

Government representatives 

State, local, tribal, and territorial government coordinating council meetings. NIPP, NIPP ................................................ Biannual ........................................ Various products (annual report, etc.) .... Representatives from State, local, tribal, and territorial governments Regional Consortium Coordinating Council 

meetings.

NIPP, NIPP ................................................ Ad hoc ........................................... Various products (annual report, etc.) .... Members of regional consortiums with 

missions related to critical infrastructure protection and resilience 

National Council of Information Sharing 

and Analysis Centers (NCI) meetings.

NIPP .......................................................... Monthly .......................................... ................................................................... Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 

National Infrastructure Advisory Council 

(NIAC) meetings.

NIAC Charter (Presidential) ...................... Quarterly ........................................ 19 reports since inception ....................... Critical infrastructure stakeholders 
97 

Regarding the fiscal year 2012 budget, information sharing and coordination activities for the National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) planned for fiscal year 2012 are designed to improve the effectiveness and coordination of the councils and expand the participation in information-sharing activities by critical infrastructure stakeholders. One key aspect is enhancing the critical infrastructure information sharing environment and the use of 

the Homeland Security Information Network-Critical Sectors. 

NPPD/IP routinely coordinates with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Private Sector Division and others, especially related to training and education 

activities that are appropriate for the full private-sector community. In addition, 

NPPD/IP, in coordination with DHS’s Private Sector Office and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, began a private-sector information-sharing improvement initiative in the spring of 2010. The initiative focuses on adopting a ‘‘One DHS’’ private-sector information-sharing approach and seeks to: 

—Enhance strategic communications coordination; 

—Strengthen regionally focused information-sharing efforts; and 

—Enhance information sharing and accountability. 

Through this initiative, DHS will work to increase coordination with interagency 

private-sector information-sharing efforts, evaluate and enhance existing processes 

and methods of information sharing with critical infrastructure owners and operators, and improve cross-sector information visibility and collaboration within the 

Critical Infrastructure Key Resources Information Sharing Environment. All DHS 

components with private-sector information-sharing activities are participating in 

this initiative. 

FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE WORKFORCE ANALYSIS

Question. Recent events demonstrate that Federal employees are at greater risk. 

The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is charged with protecting employees on Federal property from those who threaten harm to the workforce. Yet, FPS has struggled with providing optimal service. Balancing its workforce needs against risk is 

critical to ensuring FPS evolves into a premier agency. Senate Report 111–222, accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2011 directs 

the National Protection and Programs Directorate to provide a workforce staffing 

model to the subcommittee and to GAO within 45 days. To date, the staffing model 

as not been provided. Please provide a copy of the staffing model to the subcommittee and to GAO. 

Answer. The National Protection and Programs Directorate prepared a Federal 

Protective Service staffing plan which is currently being finalized. 

US-VISIT—CARRYOVER BALANCES

Question. A portion of the fiscal year 2012 budget request assumes that a significant level of carryover balances of prior year funds will be available to hire staff 

and perform other activities. 

What impact will there be on US-VISIT if the assumed carryover balances are not 

available for these intended purposes? What changes to the program or to US-VISIT 

operations will have to be made? 

Answer. In this fiscally constrained environment, some difficult choices had to be made—one of which was to use the $25.642 million as an offset to provide funding 

for other departmental priorities. Looking toward fiscal year 2012, a realignment of 

funds will be necessary in order to enhance the collection and use of biographic exit 

data and the review of potential overstay records—both of which will increase our 

current capabilities and lay a strong foundation for other exit measures in the future. The President’s budget proposes the realignment of $24.358 million in carryover balance in order to hire temporary staff to eliminate the existing overstay backlog, as a prerequisite for any future biometric exit capability. If the carryover balances were not available for this purpose, US-VISIT will not be able to clear the 

existing backlog. 

FEMA—DISASTER RELIEF

Question. The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) provides financial support for both response and recovery in States that are overwhelmed by the devastation of a disaster. For fiscal year 2011, we are facing a $1.6 billion gap in the DRF. If the President does not request and the Congress does not approve supplemental funding, the 

account will run out of money in June, just as we are entering the hurricane season. 

For fiscal year 2012, the problem is even worse because we are facing a $3 billion 

gap between the President’s request and the known costs of past disasters. These 

shortfalls are specifically the result of past major disasters, such as Hurricanes 
98 

Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike, the Midwest floods of 2008, and the Tennessee 

floods of 2010. 

In fiscal year 2010, there was a similar shortfall. FEMA had to stop providing assistance for rebuilding and recovery projects to ensure it had enough for immediate 

needs for disaster response to new events. For 5 months, recovery projects all over 

the Nation stopped. In this economy it was not welcome news. Plus, the delays only 

make the projects more expensive. 

Unfortunately, history is repeating itself. 

Please provide a report with quarterly estimates of funding requirements for the 

DRF for the current fiscal year, fiscal year 2012, and fiscal year 2013. The report 

should include an estimate for the costs of all previously designated disasters by 

quarter; the cost of future disasters based on a 5-year average, excluding catastrophic disasters, by quarter; and a projected date on which the DRF will reach 

a balance of $500 million. 

When will the President submit an emergency supplemental request for the 

known shortfalls? 

In lieu of a supplemental request, the House responded to this shortfall by cutting 

$1.6 billion out of the base Homeland Security budget in H.R. 1. They cut the Coast 

Guard. They cut FEMA. They cut grants to State and local first responders and 

emergency managers. Do you believe the House approach to funding the shortfall 

is the right approach? 

If we do not receive an emergency supplemental request, what specific cuts will 

the President propose below his requests for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 

to pay for this shortfall? Or is it your policy that FEMA should do what it did last 

year and simply stop making recovery payments? 

Answer. The $1.8 billion requested for the DRF, per standard annual practice, reflects the 5-year rolling average of historical obligations for noncatastrophic events 

(those less than $500 million in estimated obligations), less estimated recoveries for 

fiscal year 2012. This methodology is one that the administration has proposed in 

its fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 budgets and represents the best use of 

available information in developing the DRF request. We also have a robust strategy in place to deobligate funds from past contracts and projects that are now complete and where we did not spend all the money originally obligated. Based on our 

experience in actively managing the unliquidated contract obligations in fiscal year 

2010, we are taking the same approach for Individual Assistance and Public Assistance grants in fiscal year 2011, and anticipate that our projected recoveries may be 

higher than previously estimated. Regardless, we are committed to working with the 

Congress to ensure that the DRF remains solvent through fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012. 

PROPOSED CUTS TO FEMA

Question. I am very pleased to see that you have taken a hard look at the budget 

and found places to save on administrative cost such as travel and supplies. While 

I encourage you to continue to find ways to create efficiencies, I am concerned that 

some areas go beyond efficiencies and become deep cuts that inhibit performance. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget proposes a $68 million cut to FEMA’s Management 

and Administration account (including all transfers). No other component in the Department was subjected to such a significant cut to its base operations. This proposal looks like the beginning of a trend of previous cycles that FEMA has been 

through. In tough budget times and when major disaster responses are a distance 

memory—at least for some inside the beltway—we trim back our readiness efforts. 

The budget proposal cites cuts to facility improvements, information systems, and 

communications systems. Deferred maintenance of facilities, turns into deferred 

maintenance of programs, turns into deferred capabilities. Unfortunately, this has 

not worked well in the past. 

In fact, there are a series of reports that show a disturbing cycle of building up 

an emergency management capacity after a failed disaster response, letting the capacity wither away when there hasn’t been a major event for awhile, and then 

building the capacity back up again after another failed response. 

For example, in 1983, a GAO report found that FEMA suffered from a variety of 

management and program problems. Ten years later and after the devastation of 

Hurricane Andrew, the National Academy of Public Administration—citing the 1983 

GAO report—found many of the same problems. Twelve years after Hurricane Andrew, a myriad of reports found that the very same problems crippled the response 

to Hurricane Katrina. 

Immediately after each of these disasters, FEMA improved only to devolve again 

within a 10-year period. This is a costly way to do business. 
99 

This subcommittee has done its part to ensure the resources FEMA needs to rebuild itself once again have been provided since Hurricane Katrina. Since 2005, 

FEMA’s workforce has been increased by 50 percent to 4,700 strong. Catastrophic 

planning is more integrated among the levels of government. Shelter facility data 

is better managed between the public and private sectors. The disaster contract acquisition process is now proactive, not reactive. 

But we have to maintain these improvements. And we still have serious work to 

do—FEMA is not done rebuilding itself. The national disaster recovery framework 

has not been completed; an effective risk and preparedness assessment system is 

not in place; FEMA information systems are not sufficient; and the human resources 

study is not complete. 

While not all of these are big expenses, each effort requires a strong FEMA base. 

I am afraid this budget marks the beginning of letting FEMA wither on the vine 

again—just as it did before Hurricane Katrina. 

Please provide a complete breakdown of the cuts by FEMA component, an explanation of the impact, and a distinction between which cuts are onetime costs from 

fiscal year 2010 and which cuts will delay programs and by how long. Why are you 

satisfied that FEMA can sustain such cuts and not only maintain its recent improvements but also keep pace with evolving risks? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget provides the resources required 

to support the Agency’s ability to fulfill its emergency management mission. In light 

of the current fiscal climate and through pursuit of identified efficiencies, FEMA cut 

administrative costs and professional services contracts by streamlining current 

business processes, harnessing the use of innovative technologies, and eliminating 

nonmission-critical spending in order to preserve essential operational activities. 

For example, the proposed decrease of $1.6 million in fiscal year 2012 to FEMA’s 

Office of the Chief Component Human Capital Officer (OCCHCO) programs in the 

Management and Administration (M&A) account will not adversely affect the regional offices’ abilities to handle the expected workloads with regard to hazard mitigation or grants management activities, nor does the decrease directly affect any 

staffing levels in the agency. 

Specifically, $900,000 of the decrease represents the elimination of funding for the 

Building Engagement, Strengths, and Talent (BEST) contract. FEMA found that the 

data garnered from the BEST surveys and analysis is available from other agency 

workforce development data sources. 

The balance of the budget cuts are split equally between the following three areas: 

—Finding general operational efficiencies within less costly general operational 

requirements, such as enhanced use of video teleconferencing vs. travel expenditures; 

—Leveraging training cost savings by deconflicting separate but similar agency 

training offered in the separate FEMA Qualification System training programs; 

and 

—By shifting contract support costs, which directly support the disaster workforce, to the DRF appropriation. 

The proposed funding in the fiscal year 2012 budget request supports robust oversight of emergency management operations; national-level exercises to test FEMA’s 

ability to respond to a catastrophic cyber attack; the development of catastrophic 

plans focused on response to biological events and earthquakes; and emergency preparedness, coordination, and planning at the local level. 
100 

The following chart provides the requested information. Unless otherwise noted, 

all cuts are reoccurring. 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION REDUCTIONS 

[In thousands of dollars] 

Directorate/office 

Fiscal year 

2011 to fiscal 

year 2012 

reductions 

Impact statement 

Office of Response and Recovery 

(ORR)—Front Office: 

Disaster Management Support Environment (DMSE).(2,690) FEMA will move as much of the activity as possible to 

other sources of funding, leveraging the assistance of 

DHS S&T, and sharing the burden across applicable 

appropriations. 

Response: 

Travel ............................................. (2,645) While mission-critical travel will not be affected, this cut 

will reduce general and conference attendance by 

leveraging Web conferencing and other technology 

tools. 

Contracts ....................................... (5,562) In-source several Directorate-wide contracts and convert 

onsite contractor support positions to FTEs. 

Recovery: 

Travel ............................................. (812) Eliminate nonmission-critical travel; maximize use of conference calls and Web-based training and meetings. 

Contracts ....................................... (6,578) Reduce selected projects funding through efficiencies. 

Equipment ...................................... (454) $453,800 reductions to Quality Assurance Recording System (QARS) because procurement is complete. 

Salary ............................................. (2,437) Reduce overtime and level of awards, specifically funding 

for merit promotions and regional overtime. 

Logistics: 

Contracts ....................................... (2,360) No anticipated impact due to significant progress made 

in enhancing logistics capability. 

Salary ............................................. (1,626) Institute systemwide salary cap, limiting overtime, 

awards, etc. 

Mitigation: 

Contracts ....................................... (2,524) While this will not impact operations, this cut will reduce 

research, assessment, technology, and support contracts. 

Grants/cooperative agreements .... (826) Reduce dam safety and earthquake assistance funding. 

Salary ............................................. (1,624) Institute systemwide salary cap, limiting overtime, 

awards, etc. 

National continuity programs: 

Travel ............................................. (760) Reduce general and conference travel. 

Contracts ....................................... (13,740) Nonrecur funding for one-time costs for IPAWS and classified program; reduce program support to discussion—based exercises. 

Office of the Administrator: 

Travel ............................................. (1,816) Reduce general and conference travel by leveraging Web 

conferencing and other technology tools to continue 

outreach activities and sustain training with State and 

local partners. 

Contracts ....................................... (2,046) Reduce program support contract and professional services, specifically for OCFO by leveraging existing inhouse capabilities. 

Equipment ...................................... (596) Reduce nonmission-critical equipment purchases. 

Salary ............................................. (236) Institute system wide salary cap, limiting overtime, 

awards, etc. 

Mission Support Bureau: 

Facilities enhancement .................. (23,300) Nonrecur one-time increase. 

Business systems investment ....... (5,000) Reduce investment—operate in maintenance mode. 

Contractual in-sourcing ................ (7,503) Convert contracts to permanent positions/in-source. 

Travel ............................................. (1,428) Reduce general and conference travel by leveraging Web 

conferencing and other technology tools to continue 

outreach activities and sustain training with State and 

local partners. 
101 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION REDUCTIONS—Continued 

[In thousands of dollars] 

Directorate/office 

Fiscal year 

2011 to fiscal 

year 2012 

reductions 

Impact statement 

Contracts ....................................... (5,808) Reduce program office support and contract services by 

leveraging existing in-house capabilities. 

Equipment ...................................... (4,106) Reduce non mission-critical equipment purchases; institute telecommunications efficiencies. 

Office of National Capital Region Coordination: 

Contracts ....................................... (1,200) Nonrecur funding for the completion of knowledge management system (a la Wikipedia) for risk and reduce 

contracts. 

Salary ............................................. (302) Institute system-wide salary cap, limiting overtime, 

awards, etc. 

NOTE.—Annual national level exercises may be funded differently depending upon the exercise. Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) retrofitting would be delayed. 

FEMA STAFFING

Question. What method is used to calculate FEMA full-time equivalent (FTE) 

usage? Does it vary from the simple calculation of number of hours worked divided 

by an FTE? Is there a unique calculation for FTE usage funded from disaster relief? 

Answer. FEMA FTE usage is based upon actuals (for fiscal year 2010) and projections (for fiscal year 2011 and 2012) of hours worked divided by the number of hours 

for one FTE. There is no unique calculation for FTE usage funded from the DRF. 

CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE FOR GRANT PROGRAMS

Question. For the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), the Port Security Grant Program, and the Public Transportation Security Assistance Program please provide the amount spent in each capability category such as communications; planning; chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) detection; intelligence and information sharing; 

and volunteer management and donations for fiscal years 2005–2009. 

Answer. The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), UASI, Transit Security 

Grant Program (TSGP), TSGP Supplemental, and TSGP ferry grant funding are 

comprised of 38 principal capabilities that provided more than $6.5 billion in funding from fiscal year 2006–2009. 

The table below provides the information requested to the extent possible under 

the Grant Reporting Tool: 

SELECT GRANT PROGRAMS TARGET CAPABILITY FUNDING REPORT 

Capabilities 1

Fiscal year 

2006–2009 

Funding amount 

Animal disease emergency support ............................................................................................................... $20,743,442.08 

CBRNE detection ............................................................................................................................................ 386,704,474.13 

Citizen evacuation and shelter-in-place ....................................................................................................... 31,075,070.88 

Communications ............................................................................................................................................. 1,367,698,117.53 

Community preparedness and participation ................................................................................................. 185,274,333.67 

Counter-terror investigation and law enforcement ....................................................................................... 304,083,757.85 

Critical infrastructure protection ................................................................................................................... 1,116,113,358.21 

Critical resource logistics and distribution ................................................................................................... 75,601,714.40 

Economic and community recovery ................................................................................................................ 10,568,637.65 

Emergency operations center management ................................................................................................... 191,436,101.57 

Emergency public information and warning ................................................................................................. 41,524,731.18 

Emergency public safety and security ........................................................................................................... 248,819,560.09 

Emergency triage and pre-hospital treatment .............................................................................................. 25,344,823.98 

Environmental health ..................................................................................................................................... 1,764,190.73 

Epidemiological surveillance and investigation ............................................................................................ 11,453,350.84 

Explosive device response operations ............................................................................................................ 138,614,977.97 

Fatality management ..................................................................................................................................... 13,842,672.26 

Fire incident response support ...................................................................................................................... 133,775,284.91 
102 

SELECT GRANT PROGRAMS TARGET CAPABILITY FUNDING REPORT—Continued 

Capabilities 1

Fiscal year 

2006–2009 

Funding amount 

Food and agriculture safety and defense ..................................................................................................... 18,742,044.82 

Information gathering and recognition of indicators and warnings ............................................................ 68,173,961.12 

Intelligence analysis and production ............................................................................................................. 98,482,865.34 

Intelligence and information sharing and dissemination ............................................................................. 282,124,151.92 

Isolation and quarantine ............................................................................................................................... 3,479,732.45 

Laboratory testing .......................................................................................................................................... 4,893,098.88 

Mass care (sheltering, feeding, and related services) ................................................................................. 46,925,998.01 

Mass prophylaxis ............................................................................................................................................ 28,444,288.70 

Medical supplies management and distribution ........................................................................................... 25,236,254.98 

Medical surge ................................................................................................................................................. 92,422,098.42 

Onsite incident management ......................................................................................................................... 169,964,547.36 

Planning ......................................................................................................................................................... 898,629,834.82 

Responder safety and health ......................................................................................................................... 54,272,195.33 

Restoration of lifelines ................................................................................................................................... 6,585,975.25 

Risk management .......................................................................................................................................... 33,036,019.11 

Search and rescue (land-based) ................................................................................................................... 70,162,612.74 

Structural damage assessment ..................................................................................................................... 1,039,802.34 

Volunteer management and donations .......................................................................................................... 4,143,404.68 

Weapons of mass destruction and hazardous materials response and decontamination ........................... 307,023,005.21 

Grand total ....................................................................................................................................... 6,518,220,491.41 

1 This table includes FEMA SHSP and UASI. 

GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

Question. In this Nation we have set up a system whereby, the smallest level of 

government is responsible for responding to a disaster until it is overwhelmed and 

then it must work with other communities, States, the private sector, and the Federal Government depending on the size of the disaster. No doubt, State and local 

first responders will be the first on the scene during an incident. When there is a 

catastrophic event, the whole Nation will have to respond. Because of this, few disagree that each level of government has to contribute resources to prepare for, respond to, mitigate against, and recover from such events. However, many disagree 

on how much should be contributed and from what entity. This disagreement has 

been further highlighted as resources at all levels become more limited. Each year 

the President’s budget is submitted with the same proposal purporting to streamline 

grant programs. Each time that proposal has been rejected due to a lack of understanding of how it will actually be implemented, its inconsistency with the underlying authorization law, and concerns from stakeholders. Further, the Department 

has yet to submit a metric to demonstrate how the grants are best targeted to needed capabilities. Since our emergency management environment is continually evolving, the issue of Federal grants to support State and local preparedness is also dynamic. For this reason, the report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 created a preparedness task force which made specific 

recommendations related to funding grants and measuring their performance. Further, the specific authorized funding levels for many of the grant programs authorized in the 9/11 Act will end in fiscal year 2012. The next step is for the executive 

branch to provide leadership for an innovative approach to grant programs that can 

be supported by stakeholders. Yet there is very little evidence that a commitment 

to this effort is real by FEMA or the Department. Secretary Napolitano, this issue 

is not only one of citizen safety and security but it is also an economic imperative 

to make the Nation more resilient through better preparedness and more efficient 

recovery. 

Will the Department propose legislation to reform the grant programs? 

What innovative approaches can you introduce which will also be supported by 

stakeholders, to ensure our State and local partners in homeland security and emergency management are sustaining the right capabilities for our known and anticipated risks? 

Who specifically in your agency is responsible to lead the issue of preparedness 

and Federal grants and what products will you require of them in fiscal year 2011 

and fiscal year 2012 to ensure policy and requested funds are meeting the Nation’s 

needs? What timeframe will you hold them to on these products? 
103 

Answer. In its last two budgets, the administration has proposed consolidating 

grant programs where activities are allowable under multiple grants. Specifically, 

the fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budgets propose to consolidate a number of individual 

grant programs (including driver’s license security/REAL ID, interoperable emergency communications, emergency operations centers, and buses) and make them 

part of larger/broader grant programs such as UASI and SHSP. This consolidation 

will reduce the number of separate grant programs, which provides the Secretary 

flexibility to direct funding to the most urgent priorities and reduces the number 

of applications a State will need to submit and that FEMA will need to process. 

FEMA agrees with recommendation No. 14 in the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force’s report to the Congress, which calls for ‘‘Threat and 

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at all levels of government to establish a foundation to justify preparedness improvements.’’ The detailed recommendation came directly from the stakeholder community. 

FEMA’s Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness (PNP), 

Timothy Manning, is responsible for the Agency’s preparedness and Federal grant 

responsibilities. Within FEMA/PNP, the Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) is responsible for the administration of preparedness grants; and the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) is responsible for preparedness activities, including individual and community preparedness, planning guidance, technical assistance, training, exercises, preparedness doctrine and policy, and preparedness assessments. 

FEMA has taken the recommendations from the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal 

Preparedness Task Force report into consideration while working to improve coordination and consolidation of FEMA’s grant programs, including coordinating interagency grant programs and more closely linking capability assessments to grant activities. FEMA has also contracted with the National Association of Public Administration (NAPA) to conduct a study to develop a core set of performance measures 

that can be used to track performance of the SHSP and UASI grants. 

NATIONAL DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS CONSORTIUM

Question. The President’s budget request proposes deep cuts, 56 percent, to first 

responder training through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium 

(NDPC). It proposes to cut funding for four members of the NDPC who train emergency personnel from all over the country to respond to weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives attacks. 

Further, it completely eliminates funding for two members: one that provides training for response to natural disasters and one that provides training specific to transit related incidents. I do not understand these cuts, especially when the NDPC uses 

a cost-effective model that sends instructors to the community receiving training 

when possible reducing the travel, accommodations, and backfill expenses of first responders. What is the Department’s justification for cutting funding to this highly 

regarded training for first responders? Further, in light of the fact that the United 

States was struck by more than 106 natural disasters last year and there have been 

more than 1,300 attacks, killing or injuring more than 18,000 people worldwide on 

trains and subways over the last 7 years worldwide why is training funding eliminated for natural disaster response training and transit response training when 

these are clearly known risks? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget is consistent with the fiscal year 

2010 and fiscal year 2011 proposals, and the resources requested are sufficient to 

meet training needs. The two recipients whose funding was eliminated represent 

congressional earmarks. In addition, States are assuming increased responsibility 

for awareness level, refresher, and sustainment training, allowing our institutional 

partners to focus resources on more advanced, specialized training consistent with 

their respective expertise. Further, States are permitted to support hazard-specific 

training efforts with SHSP and UASI grant programs funds, both subject to proposed fiscal year 2012 increases overall. 

URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE

Question. The House fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution includes a provision 

that limits the number of UASI grant recipients to 25. Some argue that the list 

should be even shorter and only support the cities in the top tier of risk. The 9/ 

11 Act requires the FEMA Administrator to complete an annual risk assessment of 

the 100 most populous urban areas and to determine grant awards based on that 

risk review. Last year 64 urban areas received funding based on your risk assessment. 

What specifically led you to determine that risk is more widespread than some 

others believe? What is your position on the House amendment to reduce the num-
104 

ber of urban areas from 64 to 25? How will the House amendment impact how risk 

is addressed in the Nation? 

Answer. Historically, al Qaeda has focused on prominent political, economic, and 

infrastructure targets to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and fear among the population. The UASI program 

was authorized and implemented to reduce the vulnerabilities of our key metropolitan areas to these types of terrorist threats. While mostly outside the scope of the 

UASI program, recent events suggest a trend in which terrorists seek to conduct 

smaller, more achievable attacks against easily accessible targets. Within the past 

year, attempted attacks and plots in the United States progressed to an advanced 

stage largely because of these groups’ ability to use operatives that have access to 

and familiarity with the United States as well as their use of new and varied attack 

patterns. 

DHS and FEMA leadership have awarded grants to UASI-eligible cities using an 

allocation methodology that was a continuation of prior approaches to awarding 

these types of grants. To determine the UASI-eligible cities, DHS and FEMA apply 

a risk formula that incorporates threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The administration is committed to working with the Congress, as it seeks to improve upon 

current risk-informed approaches. 

The fiscal year 2011 Homeland Security full-year appropriations bill did not limit 

the number of eligible UASI cities to 25. As directed in section 101 of the 9/11 Act, 

which amends title XX, sections 2003 and 2007 of the Homeland Security Act, 

FEMA will continue to assess on an annual basis the relative risk of the 100 most 

populous metropolitan statistical areas. 

EMERGENCY FOOD AND SHELTER PROGRAM

Question. I understand the Emergency Food and Shelter Program uses a very specific formula to distribute funding based on unemployment data and poverty figures. 

While there are signs that the economy is improving, the recovery has not yet 

reached those who are the hurting the most the unemployed and the poor. What 

economic data was used as the basis for the proposed reduction to $100 million? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget for the Emergency Food and 

Shelter (EFS) Program at the $100 million level is consistent with the level requested in the President’s budget for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011. 

FEMA awards the total funds appropriated by the Congress to the National Board 

for the EFS Program, as required by the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act. 

The National Board then allocates the funding to approximately 2,500 local jurisdictions in all States and territories using a formula based on the latest 12-month statistical data on national unemployment and poverty provided by the Bureau of 

Labor Statistics. 

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM AND FLOOD MAPS

Question. Annual flood losses in the United States total more than $2.4 billion. 

More than 5.5 million people currently hold flood insurance policies in more than 

20,500 communities across the United States. 

The Nation’s flood maps, managed by FEMA, help us assess the risk a community 

faces and determine how to insure against that risk. Unfortunately, the process 

used to develop these maps is cumbersome and lacks an ability to apply common 

sense solutions to a community’s unique factors. I understand that we have to insure against floods, but in this day and time, it also has to be affordable. 

Recognizing that the Congress, through the Banking Committee which has jurisdiction over this matter, is considering significant reform to the National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA began a critical review of the program. The review is projected to be completed as late as June 2012. I just don’t think people can wait that 

long for reform. The National Committee on Levee Safety, which was established 

by the Congress and includes representatives from FEMA and the Corps of Engineers, issued recommendations for reforms back in January 2009. Some have called 

for stopping the mapping process altogether and others want to move forward but 

include measures that improve local capacity and map accuracy. Twenty-seven Senators, including myself, and 49 House Members, wrote to you last month to express 

concerns about the program and to propose specific reforms. 

Are you satisfied that the Nation is moving as quickly as possible on this matter? 

What can be done to expedite the executive branch’s proposal for reform? 

Answer. Currently, FEMA is executing the National Flood Insurance Program 

(NFIP) Reform work plan, and is evaluating changes to the program. This process 

was designed to engage program stakeholders from a variety of perspectives, and 
105 

to date has included hundreds of stakeholders in a series of public meetings and 

generated thousands of public comments on reform possibilities. 

The original NFIP reform work plan envisioned an 18-month process, to ensure 

thorough and transparent engagement with a wide variety of program stakeholders. 

Based on feedback from the Congress, FEMA has accelerated this schedule, and 

hopes to report findings before the end of this 18 months timeframe. This will allow 

for consideration of program reforms by decisionmakers prior to the expiration of 

the current NFIP authorization in September 2011. 

FLOOD HAZARD MAP RISK ANALYSIS AND MODERNIZATION

Question. To date, $1.65 billion has been provided to digitize flood maps, and in 

many cases, improve the data used to create maps. How many maps, by State, still 

need to have significantly improved engineering data/validated data added to the 

maps? Please provide a comparison of the number of maps that will be produced 

if the budget request of $103 million is provided for Flood Hazard Map Risk Analysis (FHMRA) compared to the fiscal year 2010 level. 

Answer. FEMA tracks the flood hazard inventory by stream and coastal miles. 

Our total modernized inventory is comprised of about 900,000 miles. The national 

need stands at 59 percent of stream miles (currently 41-percent valid). This means 

about 530,000 miles of the inventory needs updating to reach 100 percent valid. The 

goal in the Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) Multi-Year Plan 

was to reach 80 percent valid. This equates to 350,000 miles. As a percentage of 

the modernized map inventory of about 100,000 maps, about 59,000 maps need updating to reach 100 percent, 39,000 maps need updating to reach 80 percent valid. 

At the fiscal year 2010 funding level, FEMA would begin updating 9,000–12,000 

maps. Under the proposed funding level for fiscal year 2012, FEMA estimates 6,000 

to 8,400 maps less per year will be produced. FEMA will adapt its project sequencing process in an aim to keep pace with the eroding reliability of the flood hazard 

analyses and maps. 

The data presented below is from a data collection done on January 28, 2011, and 

shows the percentage of miles by State that are currently invalid. This information 

is improving regularly. The national need stands at 59 percent of stream miles (currently 41-percent valid). 

FEMA NATIONAL FLOOD HAZARD INVENTORY 

[Percentage of stream and coastal miles by State currently needing updates] 

State 

Percentage of 

miles needing 

significantly 

improved 

engineering data/ 

validated data 

Alabama ............................................................................................................................................................. 42 

Alaska ................................................................................................................................................................. ( 1 ) 

Arizona ................................................................................................................................................................ 99 

Arkansas ............................................................................................................................................................. 69 

California ............................................................................................................................................................ 93 

Colorado ............................................................................................................................................................. 70 

Connecticut ........................................................................................................................................................ 98 

District of Columbia ........................................................................................................................................... 12 

Delaware ............................................................................................................................................................. 58 

Florida ................................................................................................................................................................ 88 

Georgia ............................................................................................................................................................... 39 

Hawaii ................................................................................................................................................................ 99 

Idaho .................................................................................................................................................................. 99 

Illinois ................................................................................................................................................................. 93 

Indiana ............................................................................................................................................................... 85 

Iowa .................................................................................................................................................................... 13 

Kansas ................................................................................................................................................................ 30 

Kentucky ............................................................................................................................................................. 14 

Louisiana ............................................................................................................................................................ 86 

Maine .................................................................................................................................................................. 99 

Maryland ............................................................................................................................................................. 37 

Massachusetts ................................................................................................................................................... 98 

Michigan ............................................................................................................................................................. 30 

Minnesota ........................................................................................................................................................... 37 

Mississippi ......................................................................................................................................................... 51 
106 

FEMA NATIONAL FLOOD HAZARD INVENTORY—Continued 

[Percentage of stream and coastal miles by State currently needing updates] 

State 

Percentage of 

miles needing 

significantly 

improved 

engineering data/ 

validated data 

Missouri .............................................................................................................................................................. 47 

Montana ............................................................................................................................................................. 81 

Nebraska ............................................................................................................................................................ 10 

Nevada ............................................................................................................................................................... 92 

New Hampshire .................................................................................................................................................. 96 

New Jersey .......................................................................................................................................................... 73 

New Mexico ......................................................................................................................................................... 43 

New York ............................................................................................................................................................ 38 

North Carolina .................................................................................................................................................... 57 

North Dakota ...................................................................................................................................................... 72 

Ohio .................................................................................................................................................................... 39 

Oklahoma ........................................................................................................................................................... 60 

Oregon ................................................................................................................................................................ 95 

Pennsylvania ...................................................................................................................................................... 38 

Rhode Island ...................................................................................................................................................... 98 

South Carolina ................................................................................................................................................... 37 

South Dakota ...................................................................................................................................................... 92 

Tennessee ........................................................................................................................................................... 23 

Texas .................................................................................................................................................................. 83 

Utah .................................................................................................................................................................... 94 

Vermont .............................................................................................................................................................. 94 

Virginia ............................................................................................................................................................... 79 

Washington ......................................................................................................................................................... 95 

West Virginia ...................................................................................................................................................... 75 

Wisconsin ........................................................................................................................................................... 83 

Wyoming ............................................................................................................................................................. 99 

1 Not yet available. 

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES—INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS—HAITI

Question. The Help HAITI Act, which was enacted in December 2010, responded 

to the need for the families of the 1,400 Haitian orphans who were granted humanitarian parole in the aftermath of the January, 2010, earthquake, to immediately 

apply to adjust the immigration status from parolee to legal permanent resident. 

Prior to the enactment of the Help HAITI Act, these orphans, upon finalizing their 

adoptions by American families in U.S. State courts, would have had to wait for 2 

or more years to adjust their immigration status to legal permanent resident. During this 2-year period, these vulnerable children would have remained in limbo, 

leaving them with fewer legal protections, potentially ineligible for critical resources, 

and at risk of being returned to Haiti. 

Several Members, including myself, sent you a letter asking for the swift implementation of the Help HAITI law, to ensure that families are able to move toward 

naturalization as soon as possible. You responded to our letter on February 7, 2011, 

and noted that many of the suggestions we had made to streamline the process for 

the adoptive families have already been implemented by the Department. I appreciate what has been done to date in this regard. 

Can you please identify the specific steps you have taken toward the implementation of the Help HAITI Act? Are there additional steps that the Congress needs to 

take legislatively to assist these families with these adoptions? 

As you know, I am deeply concerned about how the Congress can work with your 

Department—and other Departments involved in the international adoption process—to safely and efficiently improve this process so that adoptive parents can be 

joined with children eligible for adoption. I hope you will commit to working with 

me on this issue. 

Answer. The following is a timeline of steps U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS) took to implement this law: 

—Sent a letter to each of the parents/sponsors of paroled Haitian children to advise them of the passage of the act. The letter also informed them that addi-
107 

tional information would be sent to them and that the USCIS Web site would 

be updated with information about filing under the act. (12/16/2010) 

—Implemented an interim policy for implementation of the act. (12/21/2010) 

—USCIS Web site announcement posted about the act’s implementation. (1/3/ 

2011) 

—Filing instructions posted on the USCIS Web site. (1/4/2011) 

—A follow-up letter was sent out to the parents/sponsors of paroled Haitian children with instructions on how to apply under the act. (1/5/2011) 

—Teleconference held for families of paroled Haitian children and other external 

stakeholders. (2/9/2011) 

—USCIS systems updated to produce the Green Cards reflecting the newly established class of admission code HH–6. (2/27/2011) 

Through March 14, 2011, approximately 30 individuals had filed applications to 

adjust status under the act. The act established a cap of 1,400 through December 

9, 2013. USCIS is closely monitoring the number of applicants and approvals. 

USCIS will contact at a later date the parents/sponsors of the children that have 

not yet filed to remind them of the act. 

As the provisions of the act will permit all children authorized parole under the 

Special Humanitarian Parole Program to obtain lawful permanent status in the 

United States, the Department does not believe additional steps or legislation is 

needed. 

INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS—CAMBODIA AND NEPAL

Question. USCIS has played a central role in the processing of orphan visas for 

the nearly approximately 200,000 children adopted by United States citizens over 

the last decade. I know that this role is not one that is taken lightly and appreciate 

the work that you and your Department have done to make the adoption of children 

from other countries both efficient and ethical. That being said, I remain concerned 

that USCIS has felt there was no alternative in at least two countries, almost 10 

years ago in Cambodia and most recently in Nepal, than to suspend orphan visa 

processing altogether. To me, suspending adoptions in response to allegations of 

fraud is like shutting down the international banking system because of a bank robbery. We need to find a better more targeted way of using the law to preventing 

abuse and then actively prosecuting those who abuse the law. 

Please provide the subcommittee with examples of ways we might work together 

to provide the Department with alternative measures to protect children, their birth 

families, and their potential adoptive families? 

Answer. The Department believes that the best way to respond to concerns about 

abuse in the intercountry adoption context is through implementing better safeguards and protections in the process. I share your concerns about the total suspension adoption processing in certain countries. Where possible, the better approach 

is to identify and seek to address specific problems in adoption programs without 

suspending them completely. The Hague Adoption Convention, which entered into 

force for the United States in 2008, implements procedures for intercountry adoption processing that include many important safeguards helping guarantee the 

transparency and integrity of the adoptions process. 

The Department supports a U.S. Government approach of working proactively 

with countries of origin that have not yet signed or ratified the Hague Adoption 

Convention to assist them in developing the appropriate child welfare infrastructure 

needed for Hague implementation. In the meantime, DHS also supports making 

changes to U.S. non-Hague adoption immigration processing policy and procedures 

that include some of the protections of Hague policy and processing, particularly 

those that enhance transparency and integrity in intercountry adoption. 

In August 2010, the Department of State (DOS) identified a serious concern in 

the processing of adoption cases from Nepal involving children presented as abandoned—namely that the documentation provided by the Nepali police validating the 

abandonments of the children was unreliable and not credible. DOS and USCIS conducted a joint investigation which resulted in the suspension of processing of new 

abandonment cases for Nepali children. Since then, DOS and USCIS have been 

processing the 64 abandonment cases that were already in progress as of the suspension date, all but 6 of which have required detailed Requests for Additional Evidence because the initial documentation provided with the adoption petitions failed 

to establish that the children could be defined as orphans under U.S. law. This suspension affected only abandonment cases in Nepal, and the program remains open 

for cases involving relinquished children. The processing of the 64 abandonment 

cases is ongoing. 
108 

The Department will continue to look for ways to strengthen international adoption policies and operational practices to the benefit of children and families, and 

looks forward to working with closely with the Subcommittee on this issue. 

E-VERIFY

Question. What activities did funds provided to E-Verify for Monitoring and Compliance support in fiscal year 2010? What metrics are in place to track the success 

of the Monitoring and Compliance division in ensuring employer compliance with 

system rules? 

What steps can a worker currently take to challenge an erroneous final nonconfirmation? Are there any forms of redress, reconsideration, or protections in place 

for workers who lose their job as a result of an erroneous final nonconfirmation? 

What is the estimated cost of making E-Verify mandatory nationally? 

A recent GAO report called USCIS’s prior cost estimate ‘‘minimally credible’’. 

What steps are being taken to further improve the accuracy of cost assessments? 

What fiscal impact would making E-Verify mandatory have on small businesses? 

Bloomberg Government reported that if E-Verify had been mandatory for all employers in 2010, it would have cost businesses $2.7–$2.6 billion of which would have 

been borne by the small businesses that drive our economy. Does USCIS concur in 

that estimate? If not, please explain why? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2010, the E-Verify Monitoring and Compliance (M&C) program continued to expand in terms of capacity, compliance and initiatives to enhance the integrity of the E-Verify system. Hiring and recruitment were underway 

for an additional 44 M&C staff. As of the beginning of March 2011, 13 were on 

board and 20 are in clearance. To increase M&C staff’s capacity to process more 

cases, an enhancement was made to the Compliance Tracking and Management 

System, which helped to streamline processing and decrease manual data entry. 

System requirements for an enhanced data analytics tool were completed in fiscal 

year 2010 in anticipation of fiscal year 2011 procurement, allowing more detailed 

and full analysis of employer behavior. In terms of compliance activities, M&C contacted approximately 15,000 employers related to noncompliance. 

M&C also started tracking additional employer actions. These actions include 

monitoring for: 

—Duplicate Social Security numbers (two reports); 

—Verifying employees hired before November 7, 1986 (employers must complete 

the Form I–9 before using E-Verify, and employers may not use the Form I– 

9 for employees hired before November 7, 1986); 

—Nonuse of E-Verify; 

—Terminating employees following a Tentative Nonconfirmation (TNC); 

—Verifying an employee more than 3 days after he or she was hired; and 

—Verifying existing employees. 

M&C also executed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to sharing 

of information and monitoring employer actions referred to it by the Department of 

Justice Civil Rights Division’s Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices. 

More than 45,000 employers who have signed new agreements with E-Verify have 

been vetted through Dun & Bradstreet to ensure that companies enrolling in EVerify are legal and active corporate entities. This further strengthens the integrity 

of the system by verifying the legitimacy of employers using the system. USCIS 

plans to ensure all of the 250,000 employers are vetted in the coming year. 

E-Verify system enhancements have also included new closure codes to be used 

by employers to ensure resources are devoted to cases that may point to possible 

misuse of the system. For example, this change helps M&C analysts have more insight as to whether an employee run through E-Verify was terminated as a result 

of an E-Verify finding or if they quit voluntarily. 

An important enhancement to E-Verify was the addition of passport data and 

photos as part of our continuing efforts to address identity fraud and employee use 

of falsified documents. 

Regarding metrics, M&C monitors employers who were subject to compliance action. Fiscal year 2010 data indicate that 90 percent of employers corrected past 

processes and are now in compliance with E-Verify program rules and policies for 

which they received compliance assistance. 

USCIS is committed to ensuring that workers who receive a final nonconfirmation 

in error are treated equitably. Even if an employee receives a final nonconfirmation, 

the employer may retain the employee provided that it notifies DHS. Section c.6 of 

the E-Verify MOU signed by the employer states, ‘‘The employer must notify DHS 

if it continues to employ any employee after receiving a final nonconfirmation, and 
109 

is subject to a civil penalty between $550 and $1,100 for each failure to notify DHS 

of continued employment following a final nonconfirmation.’’ The employer may notify DHS by selecting the following option when closing out the case in the E-Verify 

system: 

—The employee continues to work for the employer after receiving a final nonconfirmation result. E-Verify cannot verify that this employee is authorized to work 

in the United States. The employee had contested the tentative nonconfirmation, but was unable to resolve it. The employer chooses to exercise its legal 

right to allow the employee to continue to work. 

Employees who believe that they received a final nonconfirmation in error have 

called either the E-Verify employee hotline or the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) 

for Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices. USCIS and OSC have a coordinated process for intervening on the employees’ behalf. Both telephone numbers 

are found on employee tentative nonconfirmation notices and referral letters. 

E-Verify staff will assist the small number of employees who receive a final nonconfirmation in error and intervene on their behalf. Specifically, USCIS and OSC 

have helped employees return to their jobs after they were terminated for receiving 

a final nonconfirmation by contacting their employers and explaining to them that 

the final nonconfirmation was issued in error. In a minority of overturned final nonconfirmation cases, OSC was also able to get back pay for employees in addition to 

getting them reinstated. 

To help employees avoid the adverse consequences associated with erroneous final 

nonconfirmations, USCIS will begin a phased deployment of Self Check in March, 

2011. Self Check provides individuals with the ability to confirm their own employment eligibility status. For those individuals who will be working for an E-Verify 

employer, Self Check will enable them to identify any potential data mismatches before employment begins and the employer runs an E-Verify check. E-Verify Self 

Check is not for employer use. Employers may not require workers to use Self 

Check or show Self Check results. 

The estimated cost of making E-Verify mandatory would depend on the details of 

legislation making the system mandatory, fully considering all relevant factors and 

cost drivers. 

The recent GAO findings were based solely on cost estimates related to the 

Verification Information System’s (VIS—the IT system that supports E-Verify) Life 

Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCE). Significant revisions have been made since the review 

by GAO. In addition to performing sensitivity and risk analyses of the data, an independent reviewer (i.e., the MITRE Corporation) analyzed the revisions to determine 

whether the new estimates possessed the four characteristics identified by GAO as 

being reliable cost estimates: 

—Comprehensive.—According to MITRE’s analysis, the current version of the estimate now breaks each enhancement project into smaller elements using the 

phases of the Systems Engineering Life Cycle (SELC) as a model. The estimate 

now incorporates historical cost data, but still does not include some external 

program costs for activities such as Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and security costs which are funded by the USCIS Office of Information Technology 

(OIT). There is ongoing effort related to this evaluation to include these costs. 

—Well Documented.—Methods used to develop the estimate are now clearly documented and presented in a manner as to be recreated by someone unfamiliar 

with the estimate. The current version of the estimate now contains an accompanying workbook detailing the data and calculations used in deriving all estimates and a risk register was created that identifies specific program risks. 

—Accurate.—The current LCCE has been updated to reflect programmatic 

changes as of the second quarter of fiscal year 2011, including actual Social Security Administration (SSA) cost projections. 

—Credible.—The estimate now contains both sensitivity and risk analysis sections 

consistent with best practices outlined by GAO. The MITRE review also found 

that an underestimation of the cost risk. This issue has been addressed and a 

more realistic method of correlation estimation has been used. 

Regarding the fiscal impact on small businesses of making E-Verify mandatory, 

at this time, USCIS does not have data and analysis that would specify the potential impact. USCIS will consider conducting analysis on this matter in the future. 

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER

Question. At the February 17, 2011, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

hearing, the Secretary said the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) 

recently piloted a test curriculum on homegrown violent extremism with participation from local police and sheriff departments. Please provide more information 
110 

about this pilot program. How will this change or expand FLETC’s current missions 

and curricula focus? What is the plan to continue pilot testing, rolling out the program? Who will the training focus on? State and local? Rural, urban, Federal law 

enforcement? 

Answer. In February 2010, I tasked the Homeland Security Advisory Council 

(HSAC) to work with State and local law enforcement as well as relevant community groups to develop recommendations on how the Department can better support 

community-based efforts to combat violent extremism domestically. To this end, 

HSAC established a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) working group consisting 

of law enforcement, community leaders, State and local government officials, youth 

leaders, academic leaders, and other subject-matter experts to provide a series of 

recommendations. 

In response to these recommendations, DHS has been working with Federal partners as well as State and local law enforcement organizations to develop guidance 

for the development of CVE training. 

A proof of concept session, based on the newly drafted curriculum guidance, was 

hosted at FLETC in Glynco, Georgia from February 8–10 and included State, local, 

and tribal law enforcement officials from around the country. Participants received 

preexisting FLETC CVE related training, after which they discussed the training 

and provided feedback. A training needs assessment was conducted during the session to identify the appropriate scope and direction of the CVE training. Findings 

were compared against nationally recognized and emergent best practices for similar 

topics. The participants identified four crucial topical areas: 

—Community-oriented policing; 

—Cultural awareness; 

—Information sharing, including suspicious activity reporting and intelligence-related information processes; and 

—Civil rights and privacy. 

In addition, the participants identified the need for at least two versions of the 

CVE training: an executive level course, targeting command level law enforcement 

leadership; and a line officers course, targeting patrol officers and investigators. 

As a result of the curriculum development session, the FLETC will develop the 

Countering Violent Extremism Training Program (CVETP), in collaboration with 

State and local police stakeholders and subject matter experts. The training will 

focus on State, local, and tribal law enforcement officers who serve in urban and/ 

or rural environments. In addition, CVE training will be incorporated into existing 

training programs for Federal officers and agents conducted at the FLETC. 

Next steps in rolling out the program include the Design Phase, which involves 

a Curriculum Development Conference (CDC) to finalize training topics, write performance objectives and outline the training schedule; the Development Phase, 

which will encompass resource identification, lesson plan and training materials development, and determination of instructional methodologies; and the pilot program, 

which will test the validity of the established CVETP goals and objectives. Delivery 

of the pilot program is expected within 120 days following the CDC. 

Following delivery of the pilot program, the CVETP will begin the Evaluation 

Phase to determine program content and criterion validity. Participant feedback will 

be collected, instructors will be evaluated, and any adjustments to the curriculum 

identified as a result of the delivery of the pilot will be incorporated into the CVETP 

prior to full implementation. Using a combination of delivery mechanisms, 400–600 

students are expected to be trained during fiscal year 2011 and 2,400–3,600 in fiscal 

year 2012. By fiscal year 2013, instructor-led content will be converted to a digital 

format to allow interactive delivery using an electronic learning portal. As a result, 

an unlimited number of law enforcement students can potentially be trained using 

available technologies. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—LABORATORY FACILITIES

Question. Provide the distribution of the $276.5 million request for laboratory facilities, by facility and purpose. 

Answer. The table below provides the distribution of the $276.5 million request 

for laboratory facilities, by facility and purpose. 
111 

[In thousands of dollars] 

Fiscal year 2012 

President’s 

budget request 

Construction: 

Infrastructure upgrades 1 ............................................................................................................................ 18.2 

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) ......................................................................................... 150.0 

Operations: 

Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) ................................................................................................. 0.8 

National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) ........................................................................... 2.3 

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) ............................................................................................. 40.8 

Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) .................................................................................................... 13.4 

National Biodefense and Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) ............................................... 30.9 

Laboratory salaries and benefits ......................................................................................................................... 20.1 

Total ........................................................................................................................................................ 276.5 

1 In fiscal year 2012, S&T plans infrastructure upgrades at TSL. 

AVIATION SECURITY RESEARCH—AUTOMATED TARGET RECOGNITION

Question. Provide an assessment by the S&T Directorate of the Automated Target 

Resolution (ATR) technology that is being tested as a software upgrade to advanced 

imaging technology units? Based on S&T’s assessment of this technology, will it be 

ready for deployment in fiscal year 2011? What is the schedule for certification? 

Answer. The S&T Directorate’s Automated Target Recognition (ATR) project develops advanced software capabilities for AIT units to detect explosives and concealed weapons. This project also will introduce new standalone or adjunct imaging 

technologies, such as computed tomography, to continue the improvement of detection performance and the detection of novel explosives. This is critical to improve 

detection, lower false alarm rates, and reduce privacy concerns. S&T is currently 

evaluating advanced threat recognition software to guide further enhancements to 

reach full-scale development and deployment. 

One millimeter-wave based ATR system recently completed qualification testing 

at the DHS Transportation Security Laboratory. Based on these results, the TSA 

granted authority to pilot the system for passenger screening purposes at three 

aviation checkpoint test sites (Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, 

Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, and Las Vegas-McCarran International Airport). S&T has approved the system’s T&E master plan addendum and 

the operational test plan. TSA has concluded operational testing and evaluation and 

the results are currently being compiled and reviewed. The final operational test report is scheduled for May 2011. Once all reports are received, S&T will complete 

a letter of assessment for the testing. 

DNDO—RADIATION PORTAL MONITOR PROGRAM

Question. Provide a status update of Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) requirements by vector including total RPMs required by vector, systems deployed, and the 

percentage completed. Indicate gaps where solutions do not exist. The request includes $37.4 million for RPM acquisitions. How will this money, in addition to unobligated balances, reduce the gap in RPMs necessary at each vector? Provide a plan 

for RPM unobligated balances and the $37.4 million requested for fiscal year 2012. 

Distinguish between current generation and ASP deployments. How is the Helium3 shortage impacting this program? Has a solution been identified? 

Answer. The response to this question is designated as For Official Use Only. The 

Department will submit the response under separate cover. 

HUMAN PORTABLE RADIATION DETECTION SYSTEMS

Question. For Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems (HPRDS), provide a 

chart showing the notional fiscal year 2012 acquisition plan by technology, the 

quantity, and by DHS component. What is the total number of HPRDS needed by 

each component? 

Answer. The chart below provides the notional fiscal year 2012 acquisition plan 

by technology, the quantity, and by DHS component. 
112 

Fiscal year 2012 Cost Quantity Total (in millions of 

dollars) 

CBP: 

(LaBr) next generation handhelds .............................................. $30,000 340 $10 .0 

(HPGe) next generation advanced handheld (upgrade) ............. 100,000 2 0 .20 

USCG: 

(LaBr) next generation handhelds .............................................. 30,000 100 3 .00 

Personal radiation detectors ....................................................... 2,800 700 1 .94 

DNDO: 

TSA-VIPR Procurement: 1

Recapitalization .......................................................................... ........................ ........................ 1 .00 

MDDP Procurement: 

Radio-Isotope Identification Devices (RIID) handhelds .............. 23,000 51 1 .17 

Personal radiation detectors ....................................................... 2,800 72 0 .20 

Backpacks ................................................................................... 34,000 33 1 .12 

Communication equipment ......................................................... ........................ ........................ 0 .37 3 He Procurement ................................................................................. ........................ ........................ 1 .00 

Total ........................................................................................ ........................ ........................ 20 .00 

1 Equipment replacement is due to damage. If substantive damage does not occur, new next gen handhelds will be procured. 

Based on present requests, the following is the estimated number of HPRDS needed by component and type of equipment for fiscal year 2011–2017: 

Fiscal year 

2011–2017 

CBP: 

Next generation advanced handhelds ........................................................................................... 20

Next generation advanced handheld (upgrades) .......................................................................... 2 

Next generation handhelds ............................................................................................................ 3,200 

Personal radiation detectors ......................................................................................................... 4,400 

HPT 1 ............................................................................................................................................... 150 

TSA: 

Backpacks ...................................................................................................................................... 80 

Next generation handhelds ............................................................................................................ 160 

Personal radiation detectors ......................................................................................................... 300 

HPT 1 ............................................................................................................................................... 150 

USCG: 

Next generation advanced handheld (upgrades) .......................................................................... 8 

Next generation handhelds ............................................................................................................ 1,000 

Personal radiation detectors ......................................................................................................... 4,000 

Backpacks ...................................................................................................................................... 250 

HPT 1 ............................................................................................................................................... 1,600 

DNDO (MDDP): Upgrade equipment (number of teams) 3 

1 NOTE.—Human Portable Tripwire (HPT).—The current-generation of human portable systems is predominantly composed of personal radiation detectors (PRDs). The tripwire role is intended to increase the opportunity and likelihood of detecting radiological 

and nuclear materials (rad/nuc) through constant, nondeliberate rad/nuc scans. HPT detection systems used to perform passive 

monitoring should be considered standard operational equipment capable of being worn by operators at all times. These systems 

should also be easy to use and cost-effective so they can be easily deployed to a large number of operators, increasing the oppor- tunity for detection. These units will likely occur between fiscal year 2011–2017, subsequent to the completion of HPT development efforts. 

SMALL BOAT STAND-OFF DETECTION SYSTEM/ON-DOCK RAIL PROGRAM

Question. According to the request, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO) will complete an Alternatives of Analysis (AoA) for the Small Boat StandOff Detection system and the On-Dock Rail (ODR) program in fiscal year 2011. 

When will the AoA be completed? If completed, provide a summary of the AoA findings. 

Answer. The Small Vessel Stand-Off Detection (SVSD) AoA is scheduled for completion in December 2011. Due to funding delays associated with the continuing resolutions for fiscal year 2011, this project was delayed by 3 months. 

As described in DNDO’s CJ, the ODR AoA is planned for completion in fiscal year 

2012 and is currently scheduled to be completed on March 2012. 

RADIATION DETECTION STRADDLE CARRIER

Question. According to the request, DNDO will complete an Operational Assessment of a Radiation Detection Straddle Carrier at the Port of Tacoma, Washington 
113 

in fiscal year 2011. Has this assessment been completed? What did DNDO conclude 

from this assessment? 

Answer. DNDO is poised to begin this assessment immediately, pending settlement of final support details with operational users. Once begun, the assessment 

will last about 6 weeks. DNDO will provide the results of this assessment when 

completed. 

RADIATION DETECTION FOR AIR CARGO AND CHECKED BAGGAGE

Question. Describe the work DNDO is conducting with TSA or on behalf of TSA 

to detect illicit nuclear material in air cargo and baggage. 

Answer. In close collaboration with the DHS S&T Directorate’s Transportation Security Laboratory, DNDO is evaluating whether computed tomography (CT) x ray 

systems, currently deployed throughout aviation pathways to detect explosives, can 

also be used to detect radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) materials in baggage and 

small cargo. The program will begin with a baseline system evaluation to determine 

the basic technical feasibility of supporting our rad/nuc mission. The initial tests, 

currently underway, will focus on determining if the existing, certified CT systems 

may be able to be leveraged to also detect rad/nuc materials and test objects of interest. Following analysis of test data and determination of feasibility, DNDO, S&T, 

and TSA will discuss options for potential next steps. 

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT SUMMARIES

Question. For each individual project funded under DNDO’s Research, Development, and Operations appropriation, submit quad charts that include a project description, the technology readiness level, planned demos and deliverables, and a 

timeline for transition. 

Answer. Research and development project summaries follow. 

DNDO—SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROGRAM

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—This program provides assistance to maintain the high 

quality and consistency of the application of systems engineering principles across 

the multiple DNDO programs, and in implementing both the DHS acquisition directive 102–1 and DNDO’s solutions development process. This includes program management, financial administration, customer service and quality assurance tasks, as 

well as an on-site liaison to facilitate customer service and coordination for the Systems Engineering Support Program contract. 

Objectives: 

—Institutionalize a systems engineering mindset across DNDO programs and 

mission areas. 

—Assist DNDO program managers and mission area managers in compliance 

with systems engineering requirements found in DHS Acquisition Directive 

102–01. 

—Provide engineering support for Aviation Ports of Entry (APOEs). 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones 

Key Deliverables: 

—Leadership and administration will satisfy the commitments of the systems engineering support contract. 

—Development of alternatives analysis and operational requirements document 

for limited deployment of existing technologies to APOEs. 

—Conduct analysis of alternatives, characterization testing, and modeling and 

simulation activities for development of systems for other APOE operational environments. 
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RD&O—Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.—Systems engineering program, $5,400,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment: 

—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 9.3. 

—This task supports all GNDA detection development and deployment goals. 

DNDO—RAD/NUC DETECTION STANDARDS

Program Description 

Program Description.—Support for the development and maintenance of domestic 

and international consensus standards as well as Government-unique standards for 

rad/nuc detection systems. DNDO was directed by the Safe Port Act of 2006 to collaborate with NIST and develop Technical Capability Standards (TCS) for nonintrusive imaging and radiation detection equipment to be published by the Secretary of 

Homeland Security as Government-unique standards. TCS focus on the capability 

to detect special nuclear material. DNDO and NIST lead an inter-agency standards 

working group that aims to produce a suite of TCS for various detection systems. 

Objectives: 

—Aid U.S. Government leadership in the development of national and international standards relating to rad/nuc detection. 

—Develop Government-unique TCS for nonintrusive imaging and rad/nuc detection systems. 

—Develop and maintain national consensus standards for rad/nuc detection systems. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones 

Key Deliverables.—Guidance on required rad/nuc detection capability for users 

and development programs. Informed by classified threat information not available 

to entire consensus standard community. 

Schedule Goals: 

—Develop and revise rad/nuc consensus standards as appropriate. 

—Draft two technical capability standards annually until all required standards 

are published (estimate approximately 12 needed). 

—Goal is to complete each TCS in 2 years. 
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RD&O—Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.—Rad/Nuc detection standards, $1,840,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 1.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, and 

9.3. 

DNDO—INFORMATION SHARING, MISSION CRITICAL MESSAGING

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—The DNDO Information Sharing Program establishes and 

maintains the necessary enterprise and data architectures that enable programs in 

DNDO, DHS, and our Federal, State, local, and commercial partners to effectively 

share rad/nuc information for the purpose of preventing terrorism and enhancing 

National Security. Mission Critical Messaging (MCM) will connect Federal, State, 

local, and tribal radiological and nuclear detection systems to share information for 
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the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of counter terrorism capabilities and facilitate the development of a rad/nuc information-sharing environment. MCM will 

leverage existing information sharing standards, commercially available technology, 

and DNDO’s Joint Analysis Center Collaborative Information System (JACCIS) to 

connect elements of the GNDA together to share situational awareness and enable 

a managed coordinated response. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones 

Key Deliverables: 

—Create and update cost-effective, compliant enterprise architecture, data management, and systems engineering artifacts. 

—Update and maintain the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear domain, in conjunction with the domain 

co-steward. 

—Update and maintain Information Exchange Package Documentation (IEPD) 

N.25 standard for rad/nuc information exchange. 

—Stand-up the Mission Critical Messaging Project: Plan, analyze, and develop the 

project approach. 

—Establish a test interface between the DNDO Joint Analysis Center (JAC) and 

at least one Federal, State, local or tribal entity. 

Objectives: 

—Provide architecture guidance and support to the DNDO programs that support 

GNDA definition and implementation. 

—Improve rad/nuc threat situational awareness among Federal, State, local, and 

tribal partners. 

—Enhance system interoperability to enable faster mission-critical integration. 

RD&O—Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.—Information sharing, MCM, $5,160,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—TRL will be assessed as part of SDP stage 2a. 

Timeline for Transition.—Stage 2a scheduled for fiscal year 2012. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 4.2, 5.2, 6.3, 7.1, and 7.2. 

DNDO—GNDA DEVELOPMENT: ANNUAL PLANNING, MODELING, AND ANALYSIS

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Strategic planning and evolving risk evaluations contribute 

to an a Joint Inter-agency Annual Review and Annual Report on the GNDA that 

provides: 

—Status of current detection architecture capabilities. 
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—Strategic direction for further GNDA enhancements. 

Objectives.—The strategic planning, modeling and risk analyses are intended to: 

—Reduce the technical and programmatic risk of new efforts. 

—Enhance the integration and interoperability of new efforts within the GNDA. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Annual GNDA development study plan. 

—Update GNDA ‘‘baseline’’ architecture. 

—Implement Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) process: 

—Study plan; 

—Inter-agency working group meetings; and 

—Gaps and solutions. 

—Risk-based architecture gaps and solutions prioritization. 

—Joint Annual Review and Annual Report. 

—Update GNDA strategic plan as required. 

RD&O—Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.—Annual planning, modeling, 

and analysis, $5,100,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 1 through 10. 

DNDO—GNDA DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—The goal of the international layer is to improve the ability 

to detect nuclear and other radioactive materials by increasing the national and regional-level detection capability efforts and encouraging the development and implementation of PRND capabilities in other countries. Emphasis is placed on detection 

efforts in all pathways (air, land, maritime, commercial, and private transportation). 

International engagement fosters national-level detection architectures in other 

countries/regions that compliment and reinforce the detection capabilities of the 

United States. 

Objectives: 

—Foster bilateral and multilateral relationships to enhance national and regionallevel architecture development and PRND capabilities. 

—Build on U.S. Government and international assistance efforts to create a multilayered rad/nuc detection capability. 

—Leverage international engagement efforts to further enhance the domestic implementation of more robust rad/nuc detection architectures that contribute to 

an expanded GNDA. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Conduct two ‘‘Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Implementation 

Workshops’’ to follow on Model Guidelines Document (MGD) development and 

implementation. 

—Conduct one regional GNDA workshop. 

—Conduct three regional architectural analyses. 
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—Continue bilateral and multilateral engagements with key foreign partners on 

nuclear detection architectures, to include the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and other partners. 

International GNDA Studies 

Work on international geographical architectural analyses to recommend improvements in our national or regional-level detection capacity in foreign countries is expanding. 

International engagements are prioritized and conducted in both bilateral and 

multilateral fora through agreements and arrangements (e.g., S&T Agreements, 

UNSCR 1540, GICNT) and with existing institutions (e.g., IAEA, World Customs 

Organization, Interpol, International Civil Aviation Organization, International 

Maritime Organization, etc) as a means to bolster the GNDA. 

RD&O—Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.—GNDA development—international, $3,530,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. 

DNDO—GNDA DEVELOPMENT: LAND BORDER DOMAIN

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—DNDO develops time-phased strategies and plans for improving the probability of preventing and deterring rad/nuc attacks through the 

land border pathway. In general, studies will be commissioned to identify and characterize trade-offs, risks, and costs before deciding on specific implementation paths. 

DNDO works with our front-line end-user components to assess and implement solutions to mitigate these threats. 

Objectives: 

—Continue to support analyses of detection strategies between the Ports of Entry 

(POEs) and remaining vulnerabilities at POEs. 

—Continue to support modeling and risk assessments focused on characterizing 

the threat and identifying opportunities for detection and interdiction at the 

border. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones 

Land Border GNDA Requirements Development Studies: 

—Complete the Land Border Optimum POE Strategy study. 

—Document gaps and priorities based on the Land Border Optimum POE Strategy study and the Probability of Encounter study. 

Land Border Pathways: 

—Develop supporting documentation (e.g., mission needs statement) for at least 

one concept, including giving consideration to those concepts for which analysis 

plans were developed in fiscal year 2011. 

—Develop a final report describing radiation detector types, operational procedures, and policy provisions that might be suitable for improving the land border elements of the GNDA. 

Land Border GNDA Studies 

The Land Border Pathways is an iterative program that leverages existing and 

emerging technologies and findings from laboratory and field evaluations against capability gaps and mission requirements generated from studies and direct input 

from user representatives. 

Objective.—Continue to support the CBP Office of Border Patrol (OBP) with improvements to its rad/nuc detection capabilities, both in developing the next generation of detectors as well as procuring detectors for OBP, as funds are available. 

RD&O—Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.—GNDA development—Land 

border pathways, $3,330,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2 and 3. 

DNDO—GNDA DEVELOPMENT: AVIATION DOMAIN

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—This effort determines the bounding requirements for critical Aviation mission area projects to optimize mobility, agility, and adversary cost; 

to develop holistic airport solutions; and to address International General Aviation 

(IGA) and domestic general aviation scanning. 
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Objectives: 

—Examine the intersection of International Commercial Aviation (ICA) Pax/Bag, 

ICA Air Cargo, and IGA pathways, including the commonality of systems and 

processes that can be leveraged and shared. 

—Reduce long-term burdens of system acquisition, maintenance, and operation by 

seeking cumulative benefits gained from enhanced efficiencies across national 

and global operations. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Begin regional, cross-border aircraft vulnerability mitigation analysis of Northern Border and Caribbean aviation traffic. 

—Assess feasibility of developing software that will assist operations centers in 

detecting flight anomalies that pose direct-to-target threats. 

—Begin development of IGA security gap solutions (for inbound IGA). 

—Complete DHS–AMD–102–1 activities to document capability gaps for domestic 

APOEs, and document solution options. 

RD&O—Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.—GNDA development—Aviation domain, $2,470,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, and 5.1. 

DNDO—GNDA DEVELOPMENT: MARITIME DOMAIN

Program Description/Objectives 

Maritime GNDA Requirements Development Program Description.—Conduct architectural studies and Capability-Based Assessments (CBAs) to ascertain gaps and define the interagency PRND capabilities needed to strengthen maritime pathways 

against rad/nuc threats (materials, weapons, and conveyances) and formulate recommendations to mitigate waterway/seaport vulnerabilities to achieve the maximum 

risk reduction within the constraints of the available budget. 

Objectives: 

—Determine gaps and vulnerabilities. 

—Formulate recommendations and plans to deny entry of unauthorized rad/nuc 

materials and weapons into the United States at seaports, waterways, and between POEs. 

—Develop a well-coordinated network to integrate the GNDA with the national 

plan to achieve maritime domain awareness (MDA) and understand interrelationships within the multi-layered structure of GNDA. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 
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—Continue MDA CBAs that design and integrate maritime PRND data and information into the MDA enterprise-wide network; recommend options that improve 

small vessel surveillance, detection, analysis, and awareness of incidents and 

activities. 

—Initiate CBA of the cruise line industry (cruise ships and terminal operations). 

—Continue maritime modeling and operations analysis framework that integrates 

a wide range of threats and countermeasures; conduct tradeoff studies to support future planning decisions; and integrate estimates of detection/interdiction 

probabilities and consequences of attack. 

Maritime Capability Development Program Description.—This program builds on 

lessons learned from the West Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) to develop or enhance 

State, local, and tribal PRND capabilities. Programmatic support includes CONOPS 

and SOP development, training program assistance, exercise and drill support, and 

assistance with equipment selection decisions. 

Objectives: 

—Assist Federal, State, local, and tribal government stakeholders and area maritime security committees on operational protocols, training, and exercises that 

support small vessel PRND capabilities. 

—Assess geographic port configurations to maximize interdiction. 

—Improve scanning of small maritime craft by planning to increase detection systems for maritime forces. 

—Increase port security grant requests for PRND programs. 

RD&O—Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.—GNDA development—Maritime domain, maritime PA, $3,350,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2 through 10. 

DNDO—GNDA DEVELOPMENT: INTERIOR DOMAIN

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Guided by the GNDA, DNDO supports the assessment and 

mitigation of threats in the land borders, aviation, maritime and interior mission 

areas through the development of specific architecture studies, CONOPS analyses, 

detector modeling studies, and enterprise architecture support that are specific to 

each mission area. These studies typically focus on specific programs and directly 

support DNDO pilot and Research and Development (R&D) initiatives. These preliminary studies are intended to reduce the technical and programmatic risk of new 

efforts and enhance their integration and interoperability with the overall GNDA. 

Objectives: 

—Determine gaps and vulnerabilities and formulate recommendations and plans 

to mitigate them. 

—Develop a well-defined and carefully coordinated network of interrelationships 

by studying the multi-layered structure of the rad/nuc detection architecture. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Conduct three foundational analyses on the application of PRND capabilities, 

including whether or where to employ 100 percent or randomized screening concepts at strategic locations. Three studies related to the domestic layer are expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2012. 

—Continue work on detection modeling, data fusion, and analysis to enhance detection capabilities in support of various fixed and mobile operational detection 

programs and in the support of ‘‘surge’’ operations. 

Interior Studies: 

—DNDO will focus efforts to develop capabilities to detect threats with limited or 

imperfect intelligence. 

—These capabilities rely on the multiple State and local law enforcement agencies 

that are available to perform rad/nuc detection operations using mobile and 

human-portable sensors. 

—U.S. Government surge efforts will require interactions with relevant State and 

local and Federal agency activities to develop coordinated architectures and 

CONOPs. 

—Foundational architecture analyses will be performed to identify and prioritize 

PRND capabilities and deployment and search strategies based on the effectiveness of each. 

RD&O—Systems Engineering and Architecture PPA.—GNDA development—Interior domain, $1,680,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 
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GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2 through 10. 

DNDO—STATE AND LOCAL INITIATIVES RAD/NUC CHALLENGE

Program Description/Objective 

Program Description.—The SAFE Port Act charges DNDO with enhancing and coordinating the nuclear detection efforts of Federal, State, and local officials in order 

to ensure a managed, coordinated adjudication of rad/nuc threats. 

DNDO is promoting an opportunity to emphasize the rad/nuc detection capabilities and operations at the State, local, and tribal levels through a competition 

among the PRND community, with industry demonstrations and information exchange forums. 

Objective.—Measurably advance the operational expertise and technical capabilities of those assets that would be involved in coordinated surge or intelligence informed deployments. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones 

Competition Rodeo.—Creates productive, spirited competition among individuals 

and teams at all levels of the PRND community. 

Information Exchange Forum.—Scheduled activities including workshops, briefings, panel meetings, and the presentation of case studies and other papers sponsored by members of the PRND community who wish to share their lessons learned, 

ideas, and insights. 

System/Capability Expo.—Includes exhibit booths, system, and CONOPS demonstrations, hands-on experiences, and showcases. 

Projected Outcomes: 

—Sharing of successes and lessons learned. 

—Shaping independent research and development programs by exposing industry 

and academia to the Government’s needs and upcoming opportunities. 

—Encouraging a dialog between the equipment development community and 

State, local, and tribal law enforcement and first responders involved in PRND. 

—Fostering more effective community-wide competition and advancement by establishing a greater awareness of the current state-of-the-art technology and 

CONOPS. 

RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—Rad/Nuc challenge, $2,630,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 4 and 7. 

DNDO—HUMAN PORTABLE TRIPWIRE

Program Description/Objective 

Program Description.—Investigates the technology around small, wearable systems that provide passive monitoring capability to increase the likelihood of detecting rad/nuc material through constant, nondeliberate rad/nuc scans. The human 

portable tripwire (HPT) detection system should be considered standard operating 

equipment capable of being worn by key operators at all times, cost-effective and 

deployed to a large number of operators to increase the opportunity for detection. 

The proposed HPT concept has improved performance and added capabilities over 

commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) personal radiation detectors currently used by law 

enforcement in the field. Additionally, it will have capabilities such as isotope identification and data communication. The device will also have the capability of 

‘‘wired’’ and ‘‘wireless’’ interface to networks, laptops, satellite phones, and other devices as required. HPT will build on lessons learned from the Intelligent Personnel 

Radiation Locator Advanced Technology Demonstration, in addition to many other 

support COTS technologies such as handheld data processor devices, communications and data transfer. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Initiate the development of an HPT system designed to meet user requirements. 

—Conduct data collection efforts against special nuclear material (SNM) to improve algorithm performance of HPT systems. 

—Conduct an Early Operational Assessment of the HPT system in a simulated 

operational environment. 

Objectives.—Develop a low-cost approach to increase passive, nondeliberate detection, and provide spectroscopic identification and data transfer. 
122 

RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—HPT, $9,060,000. 

Technology Readiness Level: 

—Basic Technology Readiness Level (TRL) is 9. 

—Application to this mission is at TRL 4. 

Timeline for Transition.—Transition to full-scale development, TRL 7, is funding 

dependant, but considered feasible by 2014. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, 5.1, 6.1, and 6.3. 

DNDO—CARGO IMAGING FOR SHIELDED NUCLEAR THREATS

Program Description/Objective 

Program Description.—Program will evaluate and develop as appropriate nonintrusive inspection radiography capability that can identify and discriminate special nuclear materials and shielded material contained in full-size trucks, cargo containers, and rail cars. In doing so, cargo imaging for shielded nuclear threats 

(CISNT) will leverage the findings from past and current Transformational Applied 

Research programs. This program was initiated as the Advanced Cargo Imaging 

program and included in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011. The 

name change reflects the objectives of the program. 

Objective.—To develop a capability to identify shielded nuclear material in cargo 

to act as a companion capability with passive radiation portal monitors. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Refine operational requirements and perform an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). 

—Begin the technology demonstration and characterization (TD&C) process for a 

selected set of systems; collect data to characterize the operational environment; 

and determine the limits of technical approach. 

—Complete draft AoA for CISNT. 

—Continue to evaluate competing alternatives. 

—Develop an operational requirements document leveraging lessons learned from 

previous related programs and TD&C. 
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RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—CISNT, $13,470,000. 

Technology Readiness Level: 

—Basic TRL is 9. 

—Application to this mission is at TRL 6. 

Timeline for Transition.—Transition to full-scale development, TRL 7, is funding 

dependant, but considered feasible by 2013. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, 6.1, and 6.3. 

DNDO—LONG-RANGE RADIATION DETECTION

Program Description/Objective 

Program Description.—Determine if a passive long-range rad/nuc detection system 

should be developed and fielded, building upon technologies demonstrated by StandOff Radiation Detection System and Roadside Tracker. To avoid redundancies with 

preexisting programs, long-range radiation detection (LRRD) is focused on Interior 

needs and stakeholders. 

Objective.—Provide detectors with better sensitivity, and with ability to identify 

and localize sources. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Develop operational requirements document. 

—Develop concepts of operations. 

—Develop integrated logistics support plan. 

—Develop the acquisition program baseline. 

—Develop the LRRD T&E master plan. 

—Finalize LRRD limited use experiment final report. 
124 

RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—LRRD, $5,480,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—TRL will be assessed as part of stage 2a. 

Timeline for Transition.—Stage 2a scheduled for fiscal year 2012. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 4.1 and 5.1. 

DNDO—INTERNATIONAL RAIL PROGRAM

Program Description/Objective 

Program Description.—International Rail is referenced in Public Law 110–28 and 

Public Law 110–53. Previous efforts characterized the rail operating environment, 

identified user needs, conducted stream of commerce data collection efforts at a 

lower volume POE site, and conducted evaluations of architecture alternatives. Current efforts are focused on an additional stream of commerce characterization, Acquisition Management Directive 102–01 documentation development, and detector 

testing. 

Objective.—Develop implementable solution to detect and identify illicit rad/nuc 

materials entering the United States via freight rail cargo through the 31 POEs 

identified in the Trade Act of 2002. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Complete an analysis of alternatives for the Rail Cargo Scanning project for 

International Rail. 

—Continue implementation of any cooperative project(s) identified as working in 

concert with Second Line of Defense. 

—Document—in concert with CBP—lessons learned from operational experiences 

with rad/nuc detection system(s) utilizing passive and active detection at rail 

crossings. 

—Document the performance of candidate international rail systems. 
125 

RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—International rail, $3,120,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—No specific technology has been identified for this 

mission; TRL is undetermined. 

Timeline for Transition.—Identification of appropriate technology and its transition to full-scale development, TRL 7, is projected to occur by 2015. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, and 9.3. 

DNDO—ON-DOCK RAIL PROGRAM

Program Description/Objective 

Program Description.—The On-Dock Rail (ODR) program analyzes alternative solutions for scanning the 2 percent of intermodal cargo containers arriving in the 

United States via ship that are directly transferred to rail cars at the ports. These 

containers are currently being scanned by mobile radiation portal monitors, which 

involves a time-consuming process of unstacking and restacking the containers. The 

other 98 percent of ship cargo is transferred directly to trucks which are subsequently scanned at the exit gates by radiation portal monitors. 

Objective.—To develop a capability to effectively and efficiently scan containerized 

cargo that is transferred directly from ship to rail at sea ports of entry, without an 

adverse impact to the flow of commerce. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Collect straddle portal prototype stream-of-commerce data. 

—Complete alternatives analysis. 

—Perform the system engineering review. 

—Transition from requirements and alternatives analysis to solution development. 
126 

RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—ODR, $10,280,000. 

Technology Readiness Level: 

—Basic TRL is 7. 

—Application to this mission is TRL 7. 

Timeline for Transition.—Transition to full-scale development is projected to occur 

in 2012. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 2.2, 6.1, and 6.3. 

DNDO—SMALL VESSEL STAND-OFF DETECTION PROGRAM

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Seeks to develop and field a capability to provide standoff 

boat-to-boat, aerial, and fixed-site rad/nuc detection systems in U.S. port areas and 

maritime regions. This program will address the need of Federal, State, and local 

maritime officers to conduct PRND screening missions against the small vessel 

threat without the need to board each encountered vessel. 

Objectives: 

—Initially develop a capability for scanning small vessels from maritime law enforcement vessels on the water. 

—Follow-on projects will address aerial and land-based deployment of sensors to 

complement the boat-to-boat system. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Complete Acquisition Management Directive (AMD) 102–01 activities to receive 

milestone 2B approval for boat-to-boat systems. Systems delivered to the Coast 

Guard and CBP Office of Air and Marine for operational evaluation. 

—Complete AMD 102–01 activities to receive milestone 1 approval for aerialmounted systems. 
127 

RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—SVSD, $6,610,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—TRL will be assessed as part of stage 2a. 

Timeline for Transition.—Stage 2a scheduled for fiscal year 2014. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 3.2 and 5.1. 

DNDO—NON-HELIUM-3 NEUTRON DETECTION ALTERNATIVES PROGRAM

Program Description/Objective 

Program Description.—Addresses the impact of the shortage of Helium-3 (3 He) 

upon the cost and availability of rad/nuc detection systems. Current efforts are focused on the Neutron Detector Replacement Project (NDRP), qualifying near-term 

technologies as suitable to replace 3 He for Neutron Detection Modules (NDM) in 

various applications, including Radiation Portal Monitor Systems (RPMS) and backpack systems. 

Objective.—To develop cost-effective alternatives to 3 He for broad-based neutron 

detection applications. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Conduct market research and release a request for information (RFI) on backpack systems under development for commercial application using non-3 Hebased neutron detectors. 

—Conduct testing of products responding to the RFI and release results of tests 

to vendors to accelerate non-3 HE based neutron detection technology for backpack systems. 
128 

RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—Neutron detector replacement, $5,180,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—Several TRL 6 and 7 approaches are available. 

Timeline for Transition.—Transition of selected approaches to full-scale development is funding dependant. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 3.1, 5.1, and 6.1. 

DNDO—AVIATION MULTI-PATHWAY SCANNING INTEGRATION

Program Description/Objective 

Program Description.—The first component of the program is the holistic airport 

deployments effort, which examines international air cargo (IAC) and international 

general aviation (IGA) pathways at domestic air POEs. The second component involves evaluating the feasibility of using computed tomography (CT) and advanced 

technology (AT) x ray systems, currently deployed throughout aviation pathways to 

detect explosives, to detect rad/nuc materials in baggage and small cargo. 

Objective.—Identify options for the aviation pathway to leverage existing capabilities, and to improve deterrence against aviation threats. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Complete analysis for the deployment of RPMs to a limited number of APOEs 

for targeted air cargo scanning. 

—Initiate Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) process for APOEs, addressing the full 

scope of APOE operations. 

—Initiate modeling/simulation activities to support AoA process. 

—Initiate characterization testing of detection systems to support AoA process 

and modeling/simulation activities. 

—Pending feasibility results of baseline CT/AT tests, continue partnering with 

S&T and TSA on path forward. 
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RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—Aviation multi-pathway scanning integration, $9,660,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—TRL will be assessed as part of stage 2a. 

Timeline for Transition.—Stage 2a scheduled after fiscal year 2016. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, and 9.3. 

DNDO—ALGORITHM IMPROVEMENT

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Improves overall mission performance of algorithms employed in rad/nuc detection and reporting systems. The current effort focuses on developing, deploying and maintaining the DHS isotope ID reach-back analysis tool, 

which enables field agents to quickly and easily engage on-call scientific experts to 

identify isotopes that cannot be identified on location. Current efforts also include 

energy windowing and injection studies. Future efforts are planned to drive the creation of more robust algorithms by challenging industry partners to identify specific 

isotopes against known spectra and have the ability to score their performance. 

Objectives: 

—To cost effectively ensure that rad/nuc detection algorithms are improved to remain current with emerging technologies and concepts of operations. 
130 

—Provide an infrastructure that makes gamma spectra benchmarks available to 

develop new (or upgrade) isotope identification algorithms while allowing the 

Government to score algorithms objectively. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones 

—Define benchmarks to measure algorithm performance. 

—With high-purity Germanium (HPGe) and Sodium Iodide (NaI) detectors, collect 

and validate source spectra for open and closed benchmark data sets to develop 

new algorithms and score existing ones. 

—Promulgate benchmarks throughout Government, assess existing algorithms, 

and target improvements. 

—Define algorithm replay tool interface requirements, reference electronic packages, isotopes of interest, and algorithm scoring criteria. 

RD&O—Systems Development PPA.—Algorithm improvement, $4,200,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—Basic TRL is 9. 

Timeline for Transition.—Initial solutions are deployed. Spiral advancements continue. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 3.1, 5.1, and 6.1. 

DNDO—T&E OPERATIONS

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Provide operational capabilities needed to plan and execute 

the DNDO T&E program. Capability includes working with subject matter experts 

from national laboratories to ensure scientifically defensible test designs and engineering support to plan and execute tests, including formal test milestone reviews, 

oversight of field test activities, and analysis support to evaluate performance and 

write test high-quality reports. 

Objectives: 

—Develop timely and credible T&E campaigns in support of internal and external 

(international, Federal, State, local, and other entities) customers’ rad/nuc detection requirements. 
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—Develop repeatable, evolutionary, and controlled processes for planning and conducting tests. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones 

—Maintain the expertise and resources necessary to plan and execute up to 15 

individual test campaigns. 

—Document formal test milestone reviews. 

—Issue test reports within 90 days of completion of data validation. 

RD&O—Assessments PPA.—T&E operations, $8,390,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goal 9.3 (also supports 3.1, 3.2, and 5.1). 

DNDO—T&E INFRASTRUCTURE

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Provide development, operation, and maintenance of the 

infrastructure required to execute DNDO T&E efforts including facilities, technical 

support staff, test equipment, data collection technology, and design and fabrication 

of SNM test objects. DNDO test facilities include the Rad/Nuc Countermeasures 

Test and Evaluation Complex (RNCTEC) at the Nevada National Security Site 

(N2S2), the Rail Test Center (RTC) at the Port of Tacoma, and other limited-term 

infrastructure needs at test locations across the national laboratory complex. 

Objectives: 

—Establish and develop an integrated T&E infrastructure of facilities, equipment, 

test objects, processes, and personnel to meet U.S. Government rad/nuc T&E 

needs. 

—Engage the multi-agency rad/nuc community for future test instrumentation 

and infrastructure needs. 

—Design and fabricate appropriate SNM and radiological sources and materials 

for realistic threat-based testing. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—O&M of RNCTEC and RTC. 

—Continue physical security upgrades, including procurement and deployment of 

sensors, vehicle barriers, and perimeter fencing to RNCTEC to reduce costs for 

force protection in preparation for testing activities using category I and II SNM 

sources. 

—Complete fabrication SNM test sources: 

—Two additional sizes (No. 3 and No. 4) of HEU spheres; 

—Two reactor grade Pu sealed sources; and 

—Four additional sizes of weapons grade Pu sealed sources. 
132 

RD&O—Assessments PPA.—T&E infrastructure, $9,500,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goal 9.3. 

DNDO—T&E DATA MANAGEMENT AND ALGORITHM TEST BED

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Provides for the collection, analysis, reporting, and 

archiving of test data collected during DNDO test campaigns, as well as the collection of similar test reports by other agencies. Includes maintaining and enhancing 

two data management systems: Archive and Retrieval Management System (ARMS) 

and Report Analysis and Archive System (RAAS). 

The Algorithm Test Bed (ATB) provides the capability to evaluate the baseline 

performance of detector algorithms, and compare new and existing detector algorithms against standardized sets of both modeled and measured threats in a virtual 

environment. 

Objectives: 

—Develop an independent and peer-reviewed framework for evaluating performance of detection and identification algorithms for all handheld, mobile, and 

fixed systems against realistic operational threats. 

—Develop, operate and maintain the ARMS and the RAAS. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Continue to perform ATB studies that allow programs to make informed program-wide decisions for increased performance and deployment of detection systems. 

—Accept spectroscopic algorithms from developers and assess using the generic algorithm test bed. 

—Review, evaluate, and add 150 radiation and radiograph reports to expand the 

content of RAAS. 

—Continue information sharing of test data, analysis, studies, and tools to expand 

the content and capabilities of ARMS across the DNDO user community and 

with peer organizations. 
133 

RD&O—Assessments PPA.—T&E data management and algorithm test bed, 

$4,200,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 3.1, 3.2, 5.1, and 9.3. 

DNDO—T&E-DIRECTED TEST

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Planning and execution of test campaigns to characterize 

currently available equipment in operationally relevant environments and CONOPS 

to inform State and local entities in the development of effective Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection (PRND) programs at the State, local, and tribal level. 

Objectives: 

—Provide comprehensive performance data on rad/nuc detection systems, based 

on operationally relevant threats and scenarios, to State, local, and tribal users. 

—Provide opportunities for State, local, and tribal users to learn from hands-on 

operation of rad/nuc detections systems against actual SNM threat sources in 

operationally relevant conditions and scenarios. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Complete test and final report for Gryphon test campaign to inform Federal, 

State, and local operational entities of the performance of aerial detection systems. 

—Complete testing and produce joint European Union/United States Illicit Trafficking Radiological Assessment Program (ITRAP) ∂10 report. 

—Initiate the next directed test dependent on highest priority determined in fiscal 

year 2011. 
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RD&O—Assessments PPA.—T&E-directed test, $4,810,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 4.1 and 9.3. 

DNDO—GRADUATED RAD/NUC DETECTOR EVALUATION AND REPORTING (GRADER SM) 

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Provide a vendor-driven framework to independently test 

commercially available radiation detection and identification products against standards to help Federal, State, and local stakeholders make informed PRND equipment 

procurements. 

Objectives: 

—Standardize instrument testing and test results reporting to assure valid comparisons. 

—Inform State, local, and tribal entities on performance of COTS systems in making FEMA grant purchases of rad/nuc detection systems. 

—Encourage vendors to develop better radiation detection and identification products. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Initiate Phase II of GRaDER and begin testing against Technical Capability 

Standards. 

—Continue Phase I of the GRaDER program for manufacturer-financed testing of 

COTS rad/nuc detection systems by National Voluntary Laboratory Accredited 

Program accredited laboratories. 

—Maintain the GRaDER Evaluated Equipment List on the FEMA Responder 

Knowledge Base. 

—Begin implementing the GRaDER postmarket surveillance program to verify 

continued compliance for previously tested COTS instruments. 

RD&O—Assessments PPA.—GRaDER, $820,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 4.1 and 9.3. 
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DNDO—PRND PILOT PROGRAMS

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—Provide a defensible and repeatable framework to evaluate 

operational utility of mature rad/nuc detection technology in new operational environments. Assists users to establish venue specific CONOPs and procedures, command and control, and technical reachback protocols. Provides an initial set of appropriate rad/nuc detection systems to establish an initial operating capability. 

Objectives.—Develop and execute a repeatable and defensible pilot program that 

provides technical and operational assessments resulting in the transition of new 

and improved operational capabilities for preventative rad/nuc detection to Federal, 

State, local, and tribal users. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones.—In coordination with 

stakeholders, conduct a series of exercises including drills, functional exercises, and 

full-scale exercises to train, test and evaluate CONOPS. Training and equipment deployed during the pilot will be provided to the stakeholders. 

RD&O—Assessments PPA.—PRND pilot programs, $3,930,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, and 9.3. 

DNDO—RED TEAM AND NET ASSESSMENTS

Program Description/Objective 

Red Team Program Description.—Conducts adversarial-based assessments from 

an outside perspective without using any ‘‘inside’’ information of current or planned 

capabilities. Executes overt and covert tests to intentionally introduce radioactive 

sources against known defenses to assess the performance of fielded technology, 

training, and protocols. 

Net Assessments Program Description.—Assesses the effectiveness of planned and 

deployed elements of the GNDA and supporting programs. 

Objective.—Identify vulnerabilities and best practices in deployed PRND systems 

and DNDO programs to include technologies, procedures, training, and communication pathways. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones 

Fiscal Year 2012 Focus.—Under IAW Director DNDO Guidance, RTNA will work 

to increase support to State and local PRND programs. 
136 

RD&O—Assessments PPA.—RTNA, $11,460,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

Timeline for Transition.—N/A—Not a systems development effort. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 7.3, and 9.2. 

DNDO—JOINT ANALYSIS CENTER

Program Description/Objective 

Program Description.—Interagency coordination mechanism and central monitoring point for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, maintains situational 

awareness for the GNDA—to include status of radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) detection assets, visibility into the status of rad/nuc alarms, and awareness of rad/nucrelated incidents and events. 

Secondary Reachback (SRB).—Accurate and actionable assessments of illicit nuclear trafficking events and trends, the credibility of nuclear threat communications 

and other nuclear terrorism indicators. The project serves DNDO’s entire community of interest and also provides deep dive on topics of interest for internal use. 

Objective.—To provide integrated and centralized alarm adjudication, data collection, and information-sharing services. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Sustained capability. 

—Service metrics (as applicable). 

—Responsiveness to adjudication, responsiveness to RFI, proactive event situational awareness, rapid situational awareness of given incidents. 

—Support the radiation detection community with rapid spectral data analysis 

and reports. 

—Prepare up to 10 technical reports that inform PRND community on detector 

performance, detection phenomena trends, triggers that may indicate threat 

material is present and operational aspects of detector performance. 
137 

RD&O—Operations Support PPA.—JAC Ops, NAP, and SRB, $15,850,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—This is an analytical capability in place, TRL 8. 

Timeline for Transition.—Sustained capability. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals 4.1, 4.2, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7.1, 

7.2, 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3. 

DNDO—JOINT ANALYSIS CENTER COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION SYSTEM

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—To maintain threat-space awareness and execute the operational analysis and reporting function of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. 

Goals.—Analyze, process, and synthesize information collected through all detection mechanisms and related intelligence. 

Objectives: 

—Assist State, local, and tribal governments in analyzing and reporting on any 

unauthorized nuclear and radiological materials in their jurisdictions. 

—Process and synthesize information collected through detection mechanisms. 

—Receive information from, and disseminate information to relevant authorities. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Complete development. 

—Testing (OT). 

—System migration (SPAWAR to DC2). 

—Test bed migration to DC–2. 

Key performance parameters 

Baseline 

Threshold Objective 

#1 Simultaneous users ..................................................................... 15 users ........................... 75 users 

#2 Number of Detector Systems Connected ..................................... 1 ....................................... 2 

#3 Number of Situation Awareness Display Systems Connected .... 1 ....................................... 2 

#4 Mean Time Between Operational Failure (MTBF) (Minimum of 1 

year of monitoring to verify threshold. To be annually assessed.).

4,000 hours (approximately 5.6 months).20,000 hours (approximately 2.3 years) 
138 

Key performance parameters 

Baseline 

Threshold Objective 

#5 Operational Availability ............................................................... 99% .................................. 99.9% 

RD&O—Operations support PPA.—JACCIS, $5,030,000. 

Technology Readiness Level: 

—All COTs software, DHS Technology Reference Model (TRM) approved TRL8. 

—Basic TRL is 8. 

Timeline for Transition: 

—JACCIS program delivered to user in second quarter fiscal year 2011. 

—IOC—fiscal year 2011 third quarter. 

—Formal operational testing is planned for first quarter fiscal year 2012. 

GNDA Alignment: 

—GNDA performance objectives 1, 2, 3, and 4. 

—GNDA performance goals 4.1, 4.2, 5.2, 7.1, 7.2, and 8.1. 

DNDO—PRND TRAINING AND EXERCISES PROGRAM

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—The Training and Exercises Program develops and implements rad/nuc training and exercise execution for Federal, State, and local law enforcement and public safety professionals to increase PRND operational capabilities. 

Objectives.—The program’s main objectives are: 

—Increase operational capabilities for Federal, State, and local users. 

—Develop and exercise protocols and standards for effective use of radiation detection equipment and associated alarm resolution and reporting processes. 

—Develop training curricula for emerging detection technologies. 

—Foster organic capabilities by assisting Federal, State, and local agencies in institutionalizing training courses in their academies. 

—Support national security special events, DHS special events, and elevated 

threat conditions, as required. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones: 

—Computer-based training (CBT) for PRD and RIIDs in July 11. 

—Complete curricula for sbile systems (PRDs, RIIDs, backpacks, vehicle model) 

and fixed systems by end of calendar year 2012. 

—Annually: 

—Directly and indirectly train 5,000 participants in rad/nuc detection operations. 

—Assist States in establishing PRND exercise programs. 

—Participate in the Federal national level exercise. 

—Provide domestic State and local exercise support as requested. 
139 

RD&O—Operations Support PPA.—PRND training and exercises, $8,100,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—These are current services, TRL 8. 

Timeline for Transition.—Services currently in-place, improving and expanding 

over time. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance objectives 1, 2, 3, and 4. 

DNDO—INTERIOR CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—The Interior Capability Development (ICD) program utilizes various levels of engagement and program assistance to develop PRND capability among State, local, and tribal jurisdictions. Our goal is to provide program assistance and engagements that work with all other jurisdictions. 

The SLSWG supports the development of DNDO programs and products and 

serves as the principle collaboration opportunity for members of the PRND community to share best practices and lessons learned. 

Objectives.—To catalyze and increase PRND capability nationwide, thereby increasing probability of encountering and detecting rad/nuc materials. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones.—The National Capitol 

Region is on the verge of purchasing approximately $3.5 million worth of PRND 

equipment using HSPG funds and standing up a regional data sharing network for 

alarm adjudication and tracking. Through facilitated workshops, subject matter expertise, and lessons learned from other programs across the Nation, DNDO is enabling the NCR to execute a program that meets the specific jurisdictional needs that 

is also interoperable with other Federal, State, and local PRND programs. 
140 

RD&O—Operations Support PPA.—Interior capability development, $5,120,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—This is a current program development service. 

Timeline for Transition.—Currently engage in ICD activities in Florida, Georgia, 

South Carolina, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Texas, Arizona, 

New Mexico, California, and Washington, and reaching out to other States and cities interested in developing PRND capabilities. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance objectives 4.1, 4.2, and 7.1. 

DNDO—MOBILE DETECTION DEPLOYMENT PROGRAM

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—In conjunction with DOE/Radiological Assistance Program 

(RAP), provide Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP) assets as a national 

nuclear detection ‘‘surge’’ capability to provide increased security in periods of 

heightened alert or if specific threats are identified. There are currently five MDDP 

response systems collocated with DOE RAP teams. 

Objectives.—To develop specialized capabilities to augment State and local operations, and to foster and develop comprehensive, integrated, and regional approaches to PRND programs, including surge and intelligence informed events. 

Fiscal Year 2012 Planned Accomplishments/Milestones.—Upgrade three small 

MDDP systems and add additional equipment. Additional funds requested to upgrade RIIDS as part of fiscal year 2012 State and local options. 

Relevant R&D Programs: 

—Human-portable systems (including tripwire). 

—Long-Range Radiation Detection program. 

—PRND target capability and NIMS resource typing. 

—3 He alternative development. 
141 

RD&O—Operations Support PPA.—MDDP (sustainment), $2,740,000. 

Technology Readiness Level.—MDDP is a current operational support capability, 

TRL 8. 

Timeline for Transition.—Five MDDUs will be operational and stationed across 

the Nation by the end of fiscal year 2011. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance objectives 5.1 and 5.2. 

DNDO—NATIONAL TECHNICAL NUCLEAR FORENSICS CENTER—TECHNOLOGY

ADVANCEMENT

Program Description/Objectives 

Program Description.—National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) 

leads the development of the U.S. Government capability to rapidly, accurately, and 

credibly identify the origin and history of rad/nuc materials obtained or intercepted 

before a detonation. 

Objectives.—Our focus: 

—Advancing and validating lab analysis methods. 

—Identifying discriminating signatures. 

—Creating foundational standard reference materials. 

—Developing tools to interpret and link lab measurements. 

—Developing predictive models. 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 PLANNED ACCOMPLISHMENTS/MILESTONES

—Develop standard reference materials that will aid in the validation of analytical methodologies, including the standard for trace actinides in bulk SNM. 

—Continue development of benchmark analytical methodologies for determining 

trace actinides in bulk SNM. 

—Continue to develop and validate predictive models and techniques to improve 

understanding of how lab-scale uranium processing capability for signature development and modeling purposes becomes operational. 

GNDA Alignment.—GNDA performance goals—Aligns to national strategic 5-year 

plan for improving the nuclear forensics attribution capabilities of the United States 

(signed by the President April 30, 2010). 
142 

Methodology Benchmarking 

RD&O—NTNFC PPA 

—Technology advancement, $14,670,000. 

—Operational readiness, $4,360,000. (Not a systems development effort.) 

—Expertise development, $5,740,000. (Not a systems development effort.) 

Technology Readiness Level.—All activities within the methodology development 

and signature development areas of Technology Advancement fall within TRL 3–7. 

Most of the activities fall within TRL 4–6, with transition to DOE or other interagency partners upon completion. 

Timeline for Transition: 

—One analytical method is scheduled for transition to operational use per year 

over the next 5 years. 

—Uranium processing for signature development is scheduled for operational implementation in fiscal year 2012. 

—Plutonium processing for signature development is scheduled for operational 

implementation in fiscal year 2016. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Question. There have been at least six security breaches at Newark Airport 

(EWR) in the last 2 months. I understand that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is almost 70 employees short of its allocated number for EWR. What 

is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) doing to fully staff EWR? Based on 

these incidents, what steps has TSA taken to improve training for transportation 

security officers and managers? 

Answer. In close partnership with the Federal Security Director and staff at 

EWR, TSA has initiated a robust and comprehensive effort to address EWR staffing 

vacancies, and EWR is currently scheduled to reach near-100 percent staffing by 

May 1. In the interim, TSA has been providing additional resources as needed. For 

example, TSA deployed additional Supervisory Training Instructors to train new— 

hires, additional advanced imaging technology (AIT)-certified transportation security 

officers (TSOs) to conduct daily operations while EWR TSOs are being trained, and 

additional staff resources to assist in human resources and training operations. 

Following a breach, a complete review of the incident is conducted and each action 

is broken down in detail to ascertain the reasons behind the breach. Every TSA individual involved in the activity and their response is included in this review. TSA 

employees identified as not having followed standard operating procedures or whose 
143 

actions are the result of inattention to duty are immediately removed from their position, and can only return to their positions if retraining and recertification for 

their positions is determined sufficient and is satisfactorily accomplished. 

Question. TSA recently participated in a program at EWR to help autistic children 

and their families prepare for air travel. The program included a flight simulation 

for the families as well as a well-attended voluntary training to increase autism 

awareness among TSOs and airline personnel. Currently, I understand that TSA 

provides 3 hours of disability-related training for new hires. Does TSA have any 

plans to improve coverage of autism and other types of neurodevelopmental disorders and cognitive disabilities in the new-hire and ongoing training for TSOs? 

What steps will be taken to improve the travel experience for passengers with autism and other types of neurodevelopmental disorders or cognitive disabilities? 

Answer. TSA is in the process of updating all of its training with regard to persons with disabilities. In addition, TSA is working with Autism Explores and other 

similar programs to develop core training on autism for our screening personnel. 

This training focuses on the skills to screen those with disabilities with compassion, 

respect, and sensitivity while maintaining transportation security. TSA is also working with the Administration on Developmental Disabilities to ensure that information about TSA’s screening procedures is accessible to people with cognitive disabilities. 

MASS TRANSIT

Question. The Department’s assessment of the Nation’s passenger rail and mass 

transit systems—completed in October 2010—found that a significant security risk 

exists. Yet, surface transportation security continues to make up a very small percentage of the TSA’s overall budget. Why doesn’t the budget request for TSA reflect 

the risk to rail and transit? 

Answer. In the aviation sector, the Federal Government has the primary role to 

provide security. This is accomplished primarily by funneling traffic at security 

checkpoints and by screening the passengers and baggage. In the surface modes, the 

primary responsibility of providing security rests with the local responders and the 

system operators, who are supported by TSA. 

The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget includes funding to enhance TSA’s surface 

transportation efforts. The budget supports programs that are designed to assist the 

industry and State and local governments and transportation authorities to identify 

their vulnerabilities and provide guidance and tools to help close critical security 

gaps in high-risk systems. Specifically, the fiscal year 2012 request includes $109 

million to support 37 visible intermodal prevention and response teams, including 

15 teams dedicated to surface transportation security. The request also includes 

$300 million for the Transit Security Grant Program to support State and local surface transportation efforts. 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY LABORATORY

Question. The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) in Atlantic City, New 

Jersey creates technology to mitigate impacts of potential terrorist attacks against 

our transportation system, but it is currently operating beyond its maximum designed capacity. While the budget requests $18 million for facility renovations, the 

TSL needs additional funds to complete the renovations. Will you commit to providing all of the funds necessary to upgrade this facility and help TSA meet its safety mandates? 

Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has a long-term plan for 

completing necessary upgrades to TSL. S&T’s 5-year plan for TSL upgrades began 

in fiscal year 2010 and will continue through fiscal year 2014, pending available appropriations. The high-priority upgrades are targeted for completion first. The 5- 

year program will provide TSL with the critical infrastructure needed to ensure its 

role as a leader in transportation security, and to meet its mission of researching, 

developing, engineering, testing, and evaluating solutions to detect and mitigate the 

explosives threat and weapons used against our Nation’s transportation systems. 

PORT SECURITY GRANTS

Question. House Republicans have proposed cutting port security grants by twothirds. The Port of New York/New Jersey is the largest port on the east coast and 

the second-largest port in the country. It is directly linked to what the FBI deemed 

the most dangerous area in America for a terrorist attack. Yet it would lose $33 

million in security funding under the House bill. What would be the impact on the 

New Jersey-New York region and our Nation’s economy if there were to be a terrorist attack on one of our largest ports? 
144 

Answer. Various studies indicate that the economic impact of a major terrorist attack on one of the Nation’s largest ports could total in the tens of billions of dollars—though the impact would depend on the degree and severity of a terrorist attack. The goal of the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) is to mitigate port security risks and address the gaps and vulnerabilities that may expose our ports to terrorist attack. Toward that end, the program has been highly successful; all large 

ports have made substantial progress toward addressing the risks identified in their 

port-wide risk management plans. Under significant budgetary constraints, DHS 

must prioritize funding allocation to those areas where it is most needed. 

In 2007, our Nation’s largest ports areas having the most risk developed port-wide 

risk management plans with PSGP dollars. These plans were developed to support 

the area maritime security plans and facility security plans. Through these plans, 

security vulnerabilities were identified and prioritized lists of projects to reduce 

these vulnerabilities were developed (spend plan). More than $1 billion in PSGP 

funding has been allocated to planning and executing projects from these plans, 

with many more security risk mitigation projects yet to start and urgently dependent on future year funding. While the majority of PSGP funding goes to the largest 

port areas the program is equally vital to the smaller port areas and facilities to 

offset their associated security costs as well. 

Below are examples of security activities and security risk mitigation projects that 

will be in jeopardy if funding is reduced: 

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) response vehicles, the most common being small boats and the associated equipment, such 

as Forward Looking Infrared Radar. 

—Increasing the security of facilities by improving access control systems, monitoring and recording devices such as CCTV, fencing, bollards, and other perimeter security measures. 

—Providing new capabilities for maritime law enforcement, including K–9 explosives detection teams, maritime security training, and patrol vessel tactical operations. 

—Specialized maritime training and exercises such as dive training, suicide bomber, and active shooter training, and CBRNE response. 

—Interoperable communications projects, including infrastructure upgrades, and 

mobile, portable, and base communications. 

—Creating and enhancing interagency operations centers. 

STATE AND LOCAL GRANTS

Question. The State and local grant programs put funding where it is most critical—on the front lines in the hands of first responders. I was pleased to see an increase in both of these programs in the President’s request, but I was concerned 

that the House proposal for fiscal year 2011 would make cuts to both the Urban 

Area Security Initiative (UASI) and the State Homeland Security Grant Program. 

What kinds of homeland security programs would receive less funding if those cuts 

were to take place? 

Answer. There are two issues related to a potential reduction in funding for the 

UASI and the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) grants. First, because 

there are statutory minimum allocations in the SHSP grants, funding for the highest-risk States could be reduced. Furthermore, any reduction in funding for these 

programs will result in the reduction or elimination of funding that historically goes 

toward planning, intelligence analysts, equipment (such as interoperable communications equipment), first responder training, and exercises. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL COATS

AVIATION SECURITY FEES

Question. The budget proposes a new general appropriations bill provision to 

amend current law to allow aviation passenger security fees to be increased above 

the current statutory maximums. The fiscal year 2012 budget assumes the enactment of this provision and a fee increase of $1.50 per enplanement beginning the 

third quarter of the fiscal year generating an additional $589,940,000 in offsetting 

collections. Even if the requested authority was granted to you by the start of the 

new fiscal year, how realistic is it that a rulemaking could be executed and completed in time to enable an additional $589,940,000 in fee collections to be generated 

in fiscal year 2012? 

If the requested authority to allow you to increase the fee amount is not provided, 

what impact will this have on your fiscal year 2012 request? What specific reduc-
145 

tions would you propose from the levels requested to make up for this nearly $590 

million budget shortfall? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2012 budget request proposes the fee increase in the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2012 to provide sufficient time for the rulemaking process, assuming the Congress passes this proposal prior to end of fiscal year 2011. 

Despite the Congress’s original intent that the security fee covers nearly all costs 

related to passenger and property screening, the fee currently offsets less than onethird of the total cost of aviation security. At the same time, costs of security have 

continued to increase. In 2000, it cost less than $1 to screen each passenger. In fiscal year 2010, the average cost for the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) to screen a passenger and baggage has increased to nearly $9, in part to airline imposed checked baggage fees that have resulted in TSA screening 56 million 

additional carry-on bags at airport checkpoints annually. 

I fully appreciate the constraints of the current fiscal environment, and it is precisely because of the current economic situation that I feel nothing should be left 

off the table to fund the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) critical frontline 

operations. While airlines have increased fees across the board—from checked baggage and extra leg room to refreshments, we have never adjusted how we fund security measures to protect the traveling public. 

I ask for your support of the administration’s proposal to ensure that we are able 

to continue the significant progress we have made in enhancing aviation security 

while fulfilling the Congress’s intent to do so in a fiscally responsible manner that 

does not penalize American taxpayers. I look forward to working with you on this 

matter in the coming months. 

GRANTS EFFECTIVENESS

Question. What steps has the Department taken and planning to implement the 

recommendations made by the local, State, tribal, and Federal preparedness task 

force regarding developing measurements of the effectiveness of grants? 

Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) agrees with recommendation No. 14 in the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task 

Force’s report to the Congress, which calls for ‘‘Threat and Hazard Identification 

and Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at all levels of government to establish a 

foundation to justify preparedness improvements.’’ The detailed recommendation 

came directly from the stakeholder community. 

FEMA has taken the recommendations from the local, State, tribal, and Federal 

preparedness task force report into consideration while working to improve coordination and consolidation of FEMA’s grant programs, including coordinating interagency grant programs and more closely linking capability assessments to grant activities. FEMA has also contracted with the National Association of Public Administration (NAPA) to conduct a study to develop a core set of performance measures 

that can be used to track performance of the State Homeland Security Program 

(SHSP) and UASI grants. 

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM/BIOMETRIC AIR EXIT IMPLEMENTATION

Question. When does the administration plan to make a decision on implementing 

biometric air exit, or will it be officially proposing to repeal the biometric air exit 

requirement currently in statute? 

Answer. Since the Congress enacted the statute that included a mandate for biometric air exit, DHS has implemented several automated systems based on biographic data that much more effectively capture arrival and exit information as 

compared to the processes in use at the time. 

Additionally, DHS has conducted a number of pilots and studies since 2003 to assess options on how to meet the biometric exit mandate. The pilots have demonstrated that while the technology exists to collect biometrics—the costs associated 

with the operational facilities and staffing needs necessary to achieve effective compliance with biometric air exit requirements using currently available technology 

and processes are quite high, particularly when compared to any potential security 

gains. DHS does not invest money into solutions where the benefits are not commensurate with the costs incurred. 

Accordingly, DHS will explore new biometric exit solutions that can be implemented in a cost-effective way, while simultaneously implementing enhancements 

to existing biographic exit systems. These enhancements will focus on strengthening 

Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Advance Passenger Information System 

(APIS) information collection and carrier compliance auditing; enhancing US-VISIT’s automated matching of arrival and departure records, review of records of potential overstays, and posting of ‘‘lookouts’’ for those who have overstayed. 
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Question. On December 8, 2010, President Obama met with Polish President 

Komorowski. During a press availability after the meeting, the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) came up. President Obama said: ‘‘I am well aware that this is a source 

of irritation between two great friends and allies, and we should resolve it. The challenge I have right now is, is that there is a congressional law that prevents my administration from taking unilateral executive action. So we’re going to have to work 

with the Congress to make some modifications potentially on the law. In the meantime, what I indicated to President Komorowski is that I am going to make this a 

priority. And I want to solve this issue before very long. My expectation is, is that 

this problem will be solved during my presidency.’’ How does the administration 

plan to fulfill the commitment President Obama made to the President of Poland 

in December 2010—to resolve the issues preventing Poland’s entry into VWP—with 

the fiscal year 2012 budget proposal of no funding for biometric air exit? 

Answer. As the President stated, the administration supports the inclusion of Poland in VWP. However, as the President also indicated, the administration cannot 

take unilateral action on including Poland in VWP due to the current rate of visa 

refusals from Poland pursuant to section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality 

Act. In addition, Poland has not yet met the other important requirements for designation in VWP, such as concluding agreements to share criminal and terrorism 

screening data with the United States and entering into an agreement on reporting 

lost and stolen passports to Interpol. 

RECAPITALIZATION OF THE CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION AIR AND MARINE FLEET

Question. At the level of funding requested for fiscal year 2012 which funds two 

UH–60 helicopter conversions, CBP will still have to take as many as nine UH–60 

helicopters out of service by 2014 due to age. What is DHS doing to mitigate this 

situation? Will other assets be redeployed? 

Answer. CBP is continuing to pursue the aged aircraft engineering analyses, 

physical inspections, and service life risk assessments initiated in late fiscal year 

2009 to determine how to keep the aircraft flying safely beyond current projections. 

Through this initiative, each aircraft is evaluated to determine if additional maintenance can extend the service life the aircraft beyond current projections. CBP is also 

considering an expansion of the mandatory 720-flight-hour inspection to include the 

inspection or replacement of selected high stress components and structural components to keep the aircraft in service longer. If an aircraft is not operational, it will 

be placed in controlled storage until it can be inducted into the Army conversion 

line, and the remaining assets will be reallocated to the agency’s highest-priority 

missions. 

Question. What number of UH–60s would need to be converted from A to L in 

fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 to eliminate the need to take out of service 

nine UH–60 helicopters due to age in 2014? 

Answer. CBP will continue its aged aircraft engineering analyses, physical inspections, and service life risk assessments to determine how to keep the aircraft flying 

safely beyond current projections. At CBP’s request, the Army recently provided updated costs and possible induction schedules to mitigate the impact of the projected 

groundings. Based on the Army estimates, it is possible to induct up to three aircraft per year without a negative impact to the factory production schedule. 

Question. What are the results of the investigations conducted by CBP into the 

age-related problems of the UH–60s? Are there revised estimates as to the cost of 

converting two UH–60s from A to L? 

Answer. The Army has recently provided updated costs and possible induction 

schedules to mitigate the impact of the aged-aircraft situation. The costs are based 

on the age of CBP’s UH–60 Black Hawks and actual experience gained during the 

conversion of the first two aircraft over the past 2 years. The quantity of aircraft 

per year shows how CBPs assets might fit into the planned factory production 

schedule without an impact on the Army’s helicopter program. This accelerated 

schedule is expected to reduce the number of age-related groundings of CBP aircraft. 

TACTICAL BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. In January of this year, the decision was made not to extend the Boeing 

contract for SBInet. Yet, the budget requests funds for three additional deployments 

of integrated towers with cameras and radars for fiscal year 2012. Are the contracts 

in place today to acquire these systems and deploy them? 

Answer. The Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems are not ‘‘additional deployments’’ of the SBInet Block 1 system that was procured under the Boeing contract. 

Following a departmentwide review of the SBInet program, I directed CBP to end 
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SBInet as originally conceived and implement a new border security technology plan 

that will utilize existing, proven technology tailored to the distinct terrain and population density of each border region. Where appropriate, this technology plan will 

include elements of the former SBInet program that have proven successful, such 

as stationary radar and infrared and optical sensor towers. The Department does 

not intend to use the existing Boeing contract for procurement of any of the technology systems included in the new Southwest Border technology plan. In the future, the Department will conduct full and open competition of the elements in the 

new border security plan, including any expansion of the integrated fixed towers. 

Question. If no contracts are in place now, is there a high level of risk that CBP 

will not be able to execute three deployments in fiscal year 2012? 

Answer. There are certainly normal risks associated with awarding any contract, 

but we do not believe there is a high risk to being able to award the new Integrated 

Fixed Tower system contract during fiscal year 2012. Program planning is under 

way and CBP has already engaged industry and has conducted a significant amount 

of market research. There are multiple companies who have an integrated tower 

system already designed, developed, and in use today. 

DHS HEADQUARTERS CONSOLIDATION

Question. What is the General Services Administration (GSA) cost associated with 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) building at St. Elizabeths? 

What is the DHS fiscal year 2012 cost being deferred? Show original project phases 

and funding estimates and how these will change with the deferral of the FEMA 

project. What is the impact of deferring the FEMA building? Provide the total current estimate of the St. Elizabeths DHS headquarters consolidation project. Is it 

still $3.4 billion or has the estimate been revised? 

Answer. The GSA costs for the FEMA building excluding parking and infrastructure on the east campus is approximately $215 million, which includes design and 

management and inspection (M&I). 

The Department deferred $108 million of the DHS costs associated directly with 

FEMA headquarters on the east campus in order to fund frontline operations within 

the current budget environment. 

The current St. Elizabeths development estimate is $3.56 billion ($1.37 billion for 

DHS and $2.19 billion for GSA), subject to receipt of fiscal year 2011 appropriations 

as requested. This is a revision of the earlier development estimated costs and is 

based on the GSA prospectus submission for fiscal year 2011. 

While the DHS estimate remains within the original programmatic estimate, GSA 

costs have increased from $2.04 billion to $2.19 billion due to the following: 

—Stabilization of buildings as part of the site’s designation as a National Historic 

Landmark; 

—Additional east campus infrastructure to disperse the density originally planned 

for the west campus as requested by consulting parties; 

—Malcolm X/Interstate-295 highway interchange; 

—Historic preservation measures per the programmatic agreement signed with 

consulting parties; 

—New energy target mandates that were not required when the original cost estimates were made. 

Significant delays caused by a lack of funding in fiscal year 2011 are expected to 

increase St. Elizabeths project costs GSA and DHS continue to evaluate ongoing 

construction activities in light of resources provided in 2011 and will be able to provide new project cost estimates at a later date. Without full funding of the President’s fiscal year 2012 request, the cost and schedule impacts will be even greater. 
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DEVELOPMENT ESTIMATE AT THE INITIATION OF CONSTRUCTION FUNDING WITH FISCAL YEAR 2009 APPROPRIATIONS 

[In thousands of dollars] 

Prior Fiscal year 2009 ARRA Fiscal year 2010 Fiscal year 2011 Fiscal year 2012 Fiscal year 2013 Fiscal year 2014 Fiscal year 2015 Fiscal year 2016 Total Notes 

GSA ..................................... 64,447 346,639 .................... 447,773 277,875 312,875 288,375 298,375 .................... .................... 2,036,359 ( 1 )DHS ..................................... .................... 100,278 .................... 248,116 347,575 209,734 277,860 203,839 9,754 19,405 1,416,561 ( 1 2 ) 

Total ...................... 64,447 446,917 .................... .................... 625,450 522,609 566,235 502,214 9,754 19,405 3,452,920 ( 1 ) 

Phase 1 .............................. .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... ( 6 ) Phase 2A ............................ .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... ( 7 ) Phase 2B ............................ .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... ( 8 ) Phase 3 .............................. .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... ( 9 ) 

REVISED DEVELOPMENT ESTIMATE BASED UPON FISCAL YEAR 2011 PROSPECTUS AND FISCAL YEAR 2012 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET SUBMISSION 

GSA ..................................... 64,447 346,639 450,000 .................... 380,296 217,706 440,101 290,561 .................... .................... 2,189,750 (135) 

DHS ..................................... .................... 100,278 200,000 .................... 287,800 159,643 396,090 211,854 3,508 13,438 1,372,611 (1345) 

Total ...................... 64,447 446,917 650,000 .................... 668,096 377,349 836,191 502,415 3,508 13,438 3,562,361 (1) 

Phase 1 .............................. .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... (6) Phase 2A ............................ .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... (7) Phase 2B ............................ .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... (8) Phase 3 .............................. .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... .................... (9) 

1 Indicates appropriations received prior fiscal year’s through ARRA. 2 Fiscal year 2009 DHS budget request was $120 million. Received $97.578 million in the Coast Guard and $2.7 million in DHS appropriations. 3 Outyear estimates were adjusted based on receipt of ARRA funding. 4 DHS reduction from 2009 to current result of project team salaries and benefits moved to the CAO base. 5 Fiscal year 2012 President’s request deferred FEMA by 1 year. 6 Indicates Phase 1 (Coast Guard) completion schedule. 7 Indicates Phase 2A (DHS HQ and DHS operations centers (DOC)) facility completion schedule. 8 Indicates Phase 2B (FEMA) completion schedule. 9 Indicates Phase 3 (remaining components) completion schedule. 
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DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE

Question. The fiscal year 2012 President’s budget request again proposes to transfer the funding for Transformational Research and Development from the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to the S&T Directorate. In addition, there have 

been a number of critical assessments of DNDO over the years, including its management of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program and the Cargo Advanced 

Automated Radiography System (CAARS). Given the difficulties that DNDO has 

had in the past with project management, what steps have been taken to improve 

project management at DNDO? 

Answer. Over the last 2 years, DNDO has implemented a new process called the 

Solution Development Process (SDP) to implement DHS Acquisition Directive (AD) 

102–01. The SDP provides an effective strategy for program oversight by aligning 

strategic analysis, planning, and investment decisionmaking with a complementary 

process to design, develop, test, and deploy specific detection solutions. All of the 

projects within DNDO are being formally reviewed by DNDO senior management 

as part of the SDP process. The reviews are chaired by the DNDO Deputy Director, 

who also serves as the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE). These reviews address issues related to funding, staffing, scheduling, technical development, and 

risk. A formal SDP training program has been developed by DNDO so that all Program Managers fully understand the SDP and implement it correctly to ensure improved oversight and governance. The SDP, which is both calendar and milestone 

driven, comprises a series of development stages separated by formal stage gate decision reviews. 

—Stage 0.—Key strategic planning and gap identification. 

—Stage 1a.—DNDO-wide budgeting and needs prioritization. 

—Stage 1b.—Needs justification and capabilities development planning. 

—Stage 2a.—Alternatives analysis, piloting, operational requirements, and solution selection. 

—Stage 2b.—Detailed program planning and cost estimation. 

—Stage 3.—Detailed solution design, development, and testing. 

—Stage 4.—Production, deployment, and operation. 

The first two stages (stage 0 and 1a) are conducted annually when the gaps in 

the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) are reviewed and needs are identified. The remaining stages are milestone driven and are not completed until all 

of the requirements of their respective stage gates are met. Detailed worksheets inform efforts at each stage to ensure that all aspects of the program are properly 

evaluated. The SDP accommodates materiel and nonmateriel solutions. 

Additionally, DHS has implemented a departmentwide initiative to ensure that 

Program Managers are trained and certified at levels commensurate with the size, 

funding, and complexity of the programs they manage. This effort, intended to create a cadre of officially certified Program Management Professionals, is embraced 

by DNDO and enhanced thought the SDP reviews. Achieving and maintaining the 

appropriate certification is included in the DNDO Program Managers performance 

goals. The combination of increased individual skill of those engaged in the acquisition process along with more rigorous procedures and oversight, as directed by DHS 

AD 102–01 and DNDO’s SDP, help to ensure that DNDO’s project management capabilities continue to improve. 

Question. How will DNDO formalize the relationship with S&T to competently 

handle the movement of programs from Transformation Research and Development 

to Systems Development, which will remain with DNDO? 

Answer. In order to maintain and improve the current levels of integration for 

transformational research and development activities and transitions of technologies 

for use by operators, DNDO will work closely with S&T to ensure that the pipeline 

for technological advancements remains coordinated to address gaps in the Global 

Nuclear Detection Architecture and operational needs by utilizing the integrated 

project team process to integrate research projects into future acquisition plans and 

develop formal technology transition agreements (TTAs). TTAs define the level of 

maturity of the technology at transition, ranging from commercially available to less 

mature stages, and solidify the expectations of the technology developer and the 

component who receives the technology. This arrangement will ensure a smooth integration of S&T developed technologies into the DNDO systems development process. 
150 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

DEPARTMENTAL MANAGEMENT

Question. Your Department has been operating under a continuing resolution for 

5 months. Yesterday, Department of Defense (DOD) officials testified to our subcommittee that operating in such a manner has ‘‘brutal’’ effects on the readiness of 

our Nation’s defense. Like DOD, your Department’s ability to operate efficiently also 

has significant implications on our Nation’s security interests. What types of effects 

has operating under a continuing resolution for so long had on your Department? 

Answer. The Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act 

enacted on April 15, 2011, provides resources to the Department for the rest of the 

fiscal year. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will be able to accomplish 

its mission within the funding levels provided in the continuing resolution. 

Question. If the Congress is unable to enact some form of a Homeland Security 

appropriations bill for fiscal year 2011, what are some of the specific effects operating under a year-long continuing resolution would have on your Department’s missions? 

Answer. The Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act 

enacted on April 15, 2011, provides resources to the Department for the rest of the 

fiscal year. 

COAST GUARD

Question. The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request included funding to 

complete the fifth national security cutter (NSC), yet there are funds requested in 

the fiscal year 2012 budget to finish out NSC No. 5. If there was a certainty that 

the Congress would appropriate these funds by October 1 of this year, this might 

be a reasonable plan. But understanding our current condition and recent history, 

would getting NSC No. 5 under contract before the end of fiscal year 2011 as previously planned create efficiencies and savings in the shipbuilding process? 

Answer. The Coast Guard is prepared to efficiently complete a contract for construction of NSC No. 5 as soon as full funding authority is enacted by the Congress. 

NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER

Question. What does the timely acquisition of NSCs mean to the Coast Guard’s 

fleet in terms of the retirement of other vessels, operations and maintenance costs, 

and personnel costs? How have the current NSCs improved your capabilities? 

Answer. The Coast Guard is committed to meeting its surface operational hours 

baseline to execute statutorily required missions in the deepwater environment. The 

Coast Guard is able to meet this baseline through the delivery of new assets to replace aging cutters. The sooner the Coast Guard can bring NSCs, offshore patrol 

cutters (OPCs) and fast response cutters (FRCs) online, the sooner it can decommission its aging, legacy cutters. Furthermore, maintenance and repairs that are increasingly above programmed levels draw critical depot level maintenance funds 

from other assets, thereby impacting readiness across the fleet. 

The following specific, unique and improved, operational features and capabilities 

allow NSCs to execute required missions: 

—Long-range exclusive economic zone and border enforcement capability, with the 

endurance to remain on station for extended periods along with the speed and 

range to reach any area of operation. 

—Long-range, high-speed counterterrorism, counter-drug intercept capability. 

—Capabilities for continued operations in a contaminated environment (e.g., 

chemical, radiation). 

—Three dimensional capable air-search radar, providing the capability to manage 

the air domain during regular or disaster operations. 

—Three cutter boats. The stern ramp allows for extremely quick launching with 

only one or two persons on deck to conduct the launch. Fast action response 

teams are ready to respond to a tactical situation with very little advance notice. 

—Two aircraft hangars allow the cutter to deploy with two aircraft, increasing 

aviation capabilities for prolonged aviation presence and increased redundancy 

for continued operations. 

—Ability to exploit information on-scene, and exchange secure data to and from 

the national intelligence network. This capability is critical in conducting homeland security missions, including interdicting drug and human smuggling networks that benefit from increasing sophistication of IT systems. 

As an example of the capabilities of the NSC, during her first patrol, utilizing advanced sensors, communications, and onboard cutter boats, the NSC Bertholf inter-
151 

dicted 12,500 kilograms of cocaine with a street value of nearly $400 million and 

detained nine suspected drug smugglers in the Eastern Pacific. 

ACQUISITION LONG-LEAD TIME MATERIAL

Question. How would acquisition of long-lead time materials (LLTM) for NSC No. 

6 during fiscal year 2012 affect overall acquisition efficiency and contractor workload? Does the current plan to buy LLTM in fiscal year 2013 at the same time you 

buy the ship itself and conceivably sign a construction contract reduce or raise the 

overall price of the ship as opposed to buying LLTM in advance? 

Answer. The funding associated with the sixth NSC is not required until fiscal 

year 2013. 

DISASTER RELIEF

Question. Over the past 20 years, more than $4 out of every $5 appropriated by 

the Congress to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) have been provided through supplemental appropriations bills. Over the past 20 years, an average of nearly $7 billion 

annually has been appropriated for disaster relief, yet you requested only $1.95 billion for fiscal year 2011 and $1.8 billion for fiscal year 2012. Your budget documents 

state that these requested funds are only for ‘‘noncatastrophic disaster activity.’’ 

Many experts I’ve talked to say that true catastrophes only occur once every 20– 

25 years. What is your definition of catastrophe? Does it match the definition of catastrophe as provided in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act? 

How often do catastrophes occur in your mind? Are we budgeting wisely for disasters? 

Answer. A total of 22 events that qualify as catastrophes have occurred in 14 of 

the last 23 fiscal years. While no hard definition currently exists, FEMA currently 

believes that an event qualifies as a catastrophe if the estimated cost-threshold to 

the Federal Government is more than $500 million. 

The $1.8 billion requested for the DRF, per standard annual practice, reflects the 

5-year rolling average of historical obligations for noncatastrophic events (those less 

than $500 million in estimated obligations), less estimated recoveries for fiscal year 

2012. This methodology is one that the administration has proposed in its fiscal 

year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 budgets and represents the best use of available information in developing the DRF request. We also have a robust strategy in place 

to deobligate funds from past contracts and projects that are now complete and 

where we did not spend all the money originally obligated. Based on our experience 

in actively managing the unliquidated contract obligations in fiscal year 2010, we 

are taking the same approach for individual assistance and public assistance grants 

in fiscal year 2011, and anticipate that our projected recoveries may be higher than 

previously estimated. Regardless, we are committed to working with the Congress 

to ensure that the DRF remains solvent through fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 

2012. 

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES—DATA CENTER CONSOLIDATION

Question. Your Department has received recognition for its data center consolidation efforts. These efforts are particularly impressive when considering the number 

of previously unaffiliated agencies your Department has brought together. 

What types of efficiencies will your Department gain from these efforts? Can you 

quantify current or future taxpayer savings as a result of these efforts? 

Answer. The following are types of efficiencies that DHS expects to gain from the 

data center consolidation efforts: 

—Provide operational efficiencies and economies of scale through the consolidation 

of more than 30 locations to 2; 

—Facilitate management, sharing and dissemination of data; 

—Provide improved disaster recovery and continuity of operations (COOP) capabilities; 

—Enhance Department’s ability to quickly launch new departmentwide capabilities; 

—Provide components single storefront for ordering of services; 

—Improve server (CPU) utilization (percent); rack space utilization (percent); rack 

floor utilization (percent); power usage/square foot; and power usage effectiveness; 

—Standardize IT resource acquisitions across components, as well as streamline 

maintenance and support contracts that will allow for less complex vendor support to expedite response times in the event of an emergency. 

To date, five legacy data centers have completed their migrations to the DHS Enterprise Data Centers of a total of 43 identified primary sites for a combined short- 
152 

term savings of $16.3 million/year. The long-term return on investment (ROI) analysis, which factors in legacy data center costs, costs to migrate to the two DHS data 

centers, and projected operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, anticipates cumulative savings/cost avoidance from our Break Even Point in fiscal year 2017 through 

fiscal year 2030 of $4.8 billion. 

COAST GUARD UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Question. With the successes of unmanned systems in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, why doesn’t your fiscal year 2012 budget request contain funding to 

move the Coast Guard closer to using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in its operations? 

Answer. The Coast Guard continues to work with the Navy and Customs and Border Protection to advance application of these capabilities in the maritime domain. 

As these technologies and capabilities are further researched and developed for maritime applications, the Coast Guard is focusing capital resources toward high priorities within the Coast Guard Air Domain, including extending service life and enhancing the capability of current airframes such as the H–65, H–60, and C–130H 

as well as recapitalizing aged air assets (e.g., replacing the HU–25 Falcon with the 

HC–144A Ocean Sentry). 

Question. As the Coast Guard continues to analyze options for land-based UAVs, 

has it considered any fee-for-service maritime surveillance UAV options as demonstrated in SOUTHCOM’s Project Cazador that could mitigate immediate risk to 

the Coast Guard with regard to acquisition, training, basing, and the like? 

Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard had representatives from the Research and Development and Requirement and Capabilities staffs on site during the 2010 Project 

Cazador and considers fee-for-service to be one of several means to conduct a landbased unmanned aircraft system (UAS) technology demonstration. The Coast Guard 

continues to work with DHS partners to leverage their experience and investments 

in land-based UAS technology. 

TSA ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY

Question. Following the Christmas Day bombing attempt of 2009, your Department moved quickly to aggressively procure advanced imaging technology (AIT) in 

an attempt to keep up with current air travel threats. Could you update the subcommittee on the progress of that effort and whether these machines are providing 

both enhanced detection capability and sufficient passenger privacy? 

Answer. AIT units detect a wide range of metallic and nonmetallic threats, including explosives, on passengers. By the end of fiscal year 2012, assuming full funding 

of the Department’s fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budget requests, TSA estimates that 1,275 AITs will be deployed. 

Rigorous privacy safeguards are also in place to protect the traveling public. All 

images generated by imaging technology are viewed in a walled-off location not visible to the public. The officer assisting the passenger never sees the image, and the 

officer viewing the image never interacts with the passenger. The imaging technology that TSA uses cannot store, export, print, or transmit images. Furthermore, 

to further enhance privacy protections in place for AIT screening, TSA is currently 

testing Automated Target Recognition technology, which generates a generic outline 

of a person and identifies the approximate area on the figure where an anomaly is 

detected. 

FEMA’S MAP MODERNIZATION

Question. As you know, much of my State of Mississippi and Senator Landrieu’s 

State of Louisiana is protected from flood waters by levees. Having intimately experienced Hurricane Katrina, we take seriously the need of the National Flood Insurance Program to accurately reflect risk to the public. However, Senators from all 

over the Nation are hearing from their constituents regarding FEMA’s Map Modernization efforts. Do you share my view there are practical changes we can make 

to FEMA policy that might mitigate some of the concerns of communities without 

adversely affecting risk identification or the solvency of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)? 

Answer. Since fiscal year 2009, we have been implementing the Risk Mapping, 

Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) program, which not only addresses gaps in 

flood hazard data, but uses that updated data to form a solid foundation for risk 

assessment and floodplain management, and to provide State, local, and tribal entities with information needed to mitigate flood related risks. Risk MAP is introducing new products and services extending beyond the traditional digital flood 

maps produced in Flood Map Modernization, including visual illustration of flood 
153 

risk, analysis of the probability of flooding, economic consequences of flooding, and 

greater public engagement tools. FEMA is increasing its work with officials to help 

use flood risk data and tools to effectively communicate risk to citizens, and enable 

communities to enhance their mitigation plans. 

Currently, FEMA is executing the NFIP reform work plan, and is considering proposed legislative, regulatory, and administrative changes to the program. This process was designed to engage program stakeholders from a variety of perspectives, 

and to date has included hundreds of stakeholders in a series of public meetings 

and generated thousands of public comments on reform possibilities. 

The original NFIP reform work plan envisioned an 18-month process, to ensure 

thorough and transparent engagement with a wide variety of program stakeholders. 

Based on feedback from the Congress, FEMA has accelerated this schedule by 6 

months, and expects to report findings by the end of the fiscal year. This will allow 

for consideration of program reforms by decisionmakers prior to the expiration of 

the current NFIP authorization in September 2011. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LISA MURKOWSKI

COAST GUARD MARITIME COVERAGE IN ALASKA

Question. In Alaska, we are very concerned with the President’s decision to decommission another high endurance cutter in the fiscal year 2012 budget. Given the 

vast maritime environment that the Coast Guard is responsible for protecting in 

Alaska, I am concerned that the decommissioning of these cutters will have significantly negative impacts on the safety and security of the Alaskan commercial fishing industry. The Coast Guard is tasked with conducting operations in Alaska that 

encompasses more than 3.8 million square miles, which is larger than the land mass 

of the continental United States, and more than 33,000 miles of coastline. With the 

Alaskan fishing industry producing more than 60 percent of the national fishing totals each year, the cumulative loss of another cutter potentially from the west coast 

could place a significant portion of the Alaskan fishing fleet that routinely operate 

in the Bering Sea and gulf of Alaska in danger as well as preventing the Coast 

Guard from effectively ensuring that the safety and commercial fisheries regulations 

are adequately enforced. 

Previously you testified that your Department and the Coast Guard were committed to a plan to recapitalize the current high endurance cutter (WHEC) fleet 

with new national security cutters (NSCs), an effort that was designed to maintain 

current cutter coverage levels while quickly brining the new class of cutters online. 

However, the fiscal year 2012 proposed budget does not have any funding for the 

long-lead time items for the sixth national security cutter. Yet your Department 

supports the President’s proposed budget to decommission another high endurance 

cutter before a suitable replacement comes online. By delaying the purchase of the 

long lead time items, it appears to me that your Department and the administration 

are not fully committed to the Coast Guard’s recapitalization efforts. It seems 

unfeasible for the Coast Guard to be able to protect the maritime public of Alaska 

with the continued pace of their cutter decommissionings. What plan do you have 

in place to assure that there is adequate cutter coverage in Alaska? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has and will continue to serve in Alaska with the existing fleet of WHECs and new NSCs. The U.S. Coast Guard cutter (USCGC) Bertholf 

has been certified ready for operations and is conducting its first 110-day patrol in 

Alaska this spring. USCGC Waesche will be ready for operations by November 2011. 

USCGC Stratton will be delivered in September 2011 and ready for operations in 

the spring of 2013. These NSCs will be homeported on the west coast and will provide greater operational availability than the aging WHEC hulls they are replacing. 

The Coast Guard will leverage these and other assets to meet Bering Sea presence 

requirements in order to execute critical living marine resources, other law enforcement, and search and rescue missions. 

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator LANDRIEU. Unless there are further comments or questions, which I do not think there will be, this meeting is recessed. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., Wednesday, March 2, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the 

Chair.] 

(155) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 10:01 a.m., in room SD–138, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Mary Landrieu (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Landrieu, Lautenberg, Coats, and Cochran. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

U.S. COAST GUARD

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR., COMMANDANT 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Senator LANDRIEU. Good morning. I’d like to call our subcommittee to order. 

And the purpose of this meeting is to review the Coast Guard 

budget and priorities for the coming year. 

And I welcome Admiral Robert Papp to discuss these issues. And, 

thank you, Admiral, for being with us today. I’m joined by my 

ranking member, Senator Coats, and the vice chair of the subcommittee, Senator Lautenberg. So, I’m really pleased to welcome 

you this morning. 

This is to review the budget request and examine the agency’s 

operations and recapitalization requirements. 

This is your first appearance before this subcommittee, so, welcome, and congratulations on your new role as Commandant of the 

Coast Guard. 

The importance of the Coast Guard to our Nation cannot be overstated. It’s 1 of the 5 branches of the military and is responsible 

for the safety and security of our maritime interest in U.S. ports, 

waterways, and on the high seas. 

We will never forget—and, particularly, this Senator—the heroic 

efforts of the Coast Guard men and women who came to our aid 

after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita along the gulf coast and rescued 

33,000 citizens during the largest search and rescue mission in the 

Coast Guard’s history. Last year the Coast Guard was first on the 

scene in response to the earthquake in Haiti, coordinated the response and cleanup efforts following the explosion of the Deepwater 

Horizon rig and subsequent oil spill, which was also the largest of 

its kind in the history of our country. The Coast Guard—gentlemen 
156 

that I serve with—has been extremely busy in missions along the 

southern part of our State and all over the United States. 

However, the Coast Guard’s ability to fulfill its mission requirements has reached a critical juncture due to deteriorating assets, 

aging infrastructure, and workforce gaps. The former Commandant, Admiral Thad W. Allen, who I had a tremendous amount 

of respect for, said, ‘‘With every passing year, our operating capacity erodes, putting our people at risk and endangering our ability 

to execute our statutory responsibilities.’’ 

Admiral Papp has been equally candid about the state of the 

Coast Guard and recently said, ‘‘We may need to reduce the number and range of our capabilities we’ve added since 9/11 until properly resourced.’’ 

Frankly, the Coast Guard has not been properly resourced in its 

budget requests to the Congress. This has been a failure of both 

the current and previous administrations. Over the past 5 years, 

this subcommittee, with my support, has increased the Coast 

Guard budget by $160 million annually above the White House request levels to fill operation recapitalization shortfalls. 

However, continuing such increases may not be sustainable in today’s constrained fiscal environments, of which we’re all aware, 

and this subcommittee intends to do what it can to eliminate the 

waste and the fat, and focus on our central missions. However, 

we’ve been calling on the Coast Guard to do more and more things 

with less and less. At some point, which you’re going to see in this 

hearing, things start to deteriorate. 

With that in mind, today we focus on the Coast Guard’s 2012 request, which is only a 1-percent increase above last year. Specifically, we’ll be examining whether the Coast Guard is properly 

resourced to execute its many missions. 

Before turning to Senator Coats, I want to take this opportunity 

to stress my concern about the status of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). For several months I’ve been pressing the White House on the need to 

submit to the Congress an emergency funding request for the DRF. 

There is currently a $3 billion shortfall for 2012. If the President 

does not seek emergency funding, it is likely that this fund will be 

exhausted in spring 2012, stopping disaster recovery efforts in 49 

States, including the States impacted by the devastating and historic recent tornadoes, primarily in the South, but in other States 

as well, particularly in the State of Alabama that was so hard-hit, 

and by States currently facing historic flooding along the Mississippi River, which is truly the breadth and the width of our 

country. 

It makes no sense to cut funding for agencies that prepare for 

and respond to future disasters to pay for the cost of past disasters. 

Those are clearly emergencies. They are over the allotted base 

amount that we allocate to the best of our judgment on a 5-year 

average. We cannot predict disasters. There is no crystal ball sitting on this desk. I cannot predict where future storms will be. I 

could not predict the recent tornadoes. I could not predict the Mississippi River flooding. All I can do is budget a reasonable amount 

of money based on a 5-year average and then expect that the Presi-
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dent will send an emergency request when it truly is needed. I believe the evidence is in to support that action. 

Following Senator Coats’ remarks, we’ll go to Vice Chairman 

Lautenberg, and then other members will be recognized as they 

come in. 

I thank our ranking member for his support and his cooperation. 

He too is a great supporter of the Coast Guard, and I appreciate 

that. 

Senator Coats. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL COATS

Senator COATS. Madam Chair, thank you very much. 

Admiral, thank you—first, for your call a few weeks ago, and the 

opportunity to work with you. 

I did have the privilege of serving for 10 years on the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, and I always viewed the Coast Guard 

as the fifth service. But it’s as essential as the first four. And I 

think since 9/11 you’ve had to take on even greater responsibilities. 

So, I commend the Coast Guard for its participation in our Nation’s 

defense, and wish you the best in your leadership. 

I’m sure that you breathed at least a sharp sigh of relief when 

the Congress finally gave you some direction on what your funding 

would be for the remainder of fiscal year 2011. Unfortunately, we 

may be in a situation for the 2012 budget that again leaves some 

uncertainty in terms of just exactly what the funding will be. I’m 

sorry for that, and I know it makes it difficult in terms of planning 

and preparing your goals, and meeting those goals. 

In any event, you’re pretty much faced with a no-growth budget 

for this next year. I’m looking forward to your testimony in terms 

of outlining how you’re going to have to manage your priorities as 

a result of that. And if you don’t mind, I’ll give you a little spiel 

that I’ve said several times. I’m sure the chair is tired of hearing 

me say this, but we face the kind of debt and deficit situation today 

that I think none of us had anticipated, and it’s going to require 

some pretty serious action in terms of how we deal with it. 

My concern has been, and continues to be, that we are limiting 

our focus on just a small part of the overall budget, and therefore, 

the discretionary—including defense—spending is subject to taking 

a disproportionate share of the burden of addressing this debt and 

deficit problem. So, I’ve been trying to encourage a so-called ‘‘Coalition of the Discretionary’’ that will encourage Members of the Congress and the executive branch to broaden the look in dealing with 

the real drivers of our deficit and debt, and that’s some of the mandatory spending. 

I know this is outside your jurisdiction. I’m just raising the point 

here that you are the recipient of, perhaps, a disproportionate 

share of the burden, and lower funding than you need to accomplish some of your priorities, because we have not yet come to a 

consensus in terms of moving forward on mandatory spending, so 

that the focus has continued to be on a slice of the budget of which 

you are a part. 

So, I just say that for the record. I’m not asking you to necessarily do anything about that. But I do look forward to your testimony. 
158 

Madam Chair, thank you for your leadership with this. You certainly have much more at stake relative to the Coast Guard than 

the State of Indiana does. But I do want to state for the record that 

we do have a Coast Guard station in Michigan City—small, but 

necessary. And we’re glad to be a State that participates just a little bit in the efforts of the Coast Guard. Thank you. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you very much, Senator Coats. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, Admiral Papp, and all of your colleagues for the 

wonderful service the Coast Guard gives the country. I think it’s 

well-known that in all of my years in the U.S. Senate, the Coast 

Guard has been a principal focus of my views about what we ought 

to do to take care of our security—so many other responsibilities 

that the Coast Guard has—I don’t know whether it goes from fish 

to fowl. But I start out with safeguarding our supplies, fish, protecting the quality of the water, being there for security duty. 

It’s just an amazing thing, Madam Chair. The Coast Guard is 

one of those organizations that, the more good they do, the less we 

give them. And it’s the kind of contrast that gives me some cause 

of concern. 

We are all so proud of what our people did when they went to 

get Osama bin Laden, and proud of the President’s decision and 

courage to take that kind of a chance. Because obviously, great personal feeling goes along with putting people in harm’s way. But 

there we are. And we learned one thing: When we put the resources into a mission, we can succeed. And this is a mission—the 

attack on Osama bin Laden was in the works for years. 

So when I look at the things that we’re asking the Coast Guard 

to do, and see that prior to 9/11 the Coast Guard invested only 2 

percent of its operating budget in security activities—immediately 

following 9/11, it shifted its resources dramatically, spending approximately 50 percent of its operating budget on a security mission—there are lots of positive things in the budget for the Coast 

Guard, including the funding to modernize the aging fleet and bolster its ability to respond to disasters. I’m also pleased that the 

budget includes funding to rebuild the dilapidated pier port at the 

Coast Guard Training Center in Cape May, New Jersey. The facility supports the patrol boats that protect our coastline, and trains 

Coast Guard recruits. I hope we can provide the resources the 

training center desperately needs. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

And Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent that the aforementioned statement would go in the record. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Madam Chairman, Osama bin Laden is dead—but the fight against terrorists who 

want to harm us is far from over. We must remain vigilant and keep our defenses 
159 

strong to prevent another terrorist attack in our country. The Coast Guard is vital 

to fulfilling that mission of protecting our shores. 

This is particularly important in my home State of New Jersey, which is a tempting target for our enemies. We are home to the most at-risk area in the country 

for a terrorist attack: A stretch that includes Newark Liberty International Airport, 

the Port of Newark, chemical plants, refineries, railways, and more. Protecting this 

region also protects the economy: The Port of New York and New Jersey—the largest on the east coast—handled more than $140 billion in cargo last year. 

There are a lot of positives in the President’s proposed budget for the Coast 

Guard, including funding to modernize its aging fleet and bolster its ability to respond to disasters. I am also pleased that the budget includes funding to rebuild 

the dilapidated pier 4 at the Coast Guard Training Center in Cape May, New Jersey. This facility supports the patrol boats that protect our coastline and trains the 

Coast Guard’s recruits. I hope we can provide the resources the training center deserves. 

Despite the funding for these projects, the administration’s overall budget plan 

doesn’t go far enough. The Coast Guard is consistently put at the back of the line 

for resources—and is consistently forced to do more with less. The men and women 

of the Coast Guard are America’s eyes and ears on the seas, and we remain safe 

because of them. 

So, I look forward to working with this subcommittee to make sure the Coast 

Guard has the funding it needs to keep up the great job that it does each day. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And I would just say that my respect for 

the Coast Guard continues to evolve. I look from the window of my 

apartment in New Jersey, and I see a small patrol boat going 

around to make sure that things are all right in the Hudson River 

and the harbor, and I can imagine what it’s like to have to take 

care of all the ports, the security duties, and the military duties. 

Frankly, the Coast Guard is required to do so. Thank you. And 

we’re going to work hard to make sure you have the resources. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Cochran. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Madam Chair, thank you very much for convening this hearing. 

I want to join you and the other members of the subcommittee 

in welcoming the Commandant to review the budget request for the 

next fiscal year. 

The Coast Guard is really front and center right now on 

everybody’s mind and on everybody’s TV screen, with activities of 

search and rescue, protecting our coastlines, our inlet waterway entrances into our country—a very complex challenge that the Coast 

Guard is facing. 

But from my vantage point, I’ve been very pleased and impressed 

with the leadership and the hard work that’s being devoted to the 

mission of the Coast Guard by everyone involved, from the Commandant, throughout the corps of people—men and women—who 

serve so gallantly and impressively in our Coast Guard today. 

I look forward to your comments about the budget request, and 

taking our questions that we may have. 

Thank you. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator. 

Admiral, proceed, please. 
160 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR. 

Admiral PAPP. Good morning, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member Coats, and also, two longtime supporters of the Coast Guard— 

Senator Lautenberg and Senator Cochran. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today before you, 

and thank you for your unwavering support of the men and women 

of the Coast Guard. 

It’s my great honor and privilege to represent and lead these outstanding patriots. 

America is a maritime Nation. Ninety percent of our goods arrive 

by or are shipped by sea. The safety and security of our maritime 

impacts the daily lives of every American, regardless of whether 

they live on or near the water. 

In the past year our citizens have witnessed the Coast Guard in 

action like never before. The Coast Guard has been conducting 

drug and migrant interdictions in the Caribbean, and instantly 

transitioned to respond to the devastating Haitian earthquake. 

Then, with the dust of Haiti still on its boots, it responded with 

agility to the unprecedented Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion 

and spill. These all-hands-on-deck evolutions demonstrated the 

value of our unique, versatile, and adaptable maritime multi-mission and military capabilities. 

While we surged to meet these challenges, we continued to perform our many other persistent missions, just as thousands of 

coastguardsmen are doing today as we speak. In the flood-ravaged 

Ohio and Mississippi River valleys, Coast Guard personnel are assisting State and local officials to protect our citizens. On the Great 

Lakes, Coast Guard icebreakers freed the flow of $2 billion worth 

of job-sustaining commerce, facilitating, among other things, the 

start of the 41st international shipping season into the port of Indiana Burns Harbor, allowing stevedores, longshoremen, truckers, 

and small businessmen to get back to work. 

Deep in the eastern Pacific Ocean, the cutter Midgett—one of our 

40-year-old high endurance cutters (WHECs) based in Seattle— 

interdicted a drug submarine loaded with 6.6 tons of cocaine worth 

$138 million. In the Arabian Gulf, several hundred of our coastguardsmen serve, including six patrol boats and a port security 

unit, and they’re protecting the oil platforms that provide 85 percent of Iraq’s revenue. 

Coastguardsmen are also deployed off the coast of Africa as part 

of the joint anti-piracy task force. And in Alaska, Coast Guard helicopter crews deployed from Kodiak, Alaska to Cordova for the 

spring and summer fishing season have rescued four people in two 

separate plane crashes just this week. And as I speak this morning, the cutter Campbell is off the coast of Honduras with a fishing 

vessel on the Caribbean, and they just located 31 bales of cocaine 

aboard the boat. 

These coastguardsmen, as their predecessors have done for more 

than 220 years, are working tirelessly to safeguard our Nation’s 

maritime interests on our rivers, our ports, along our coasts, and 

on the high seas. 

Yet today, we find our Coast Guard at a critical inflection point 

in its history. I’m well aware of our Nation’s current economic and 
161 

budget challenges. However, I also know that decisions made today 

will do one of two things: They’ll either sustain a Coast Guard capable of meeting its missions and responding to future manmade 

or natural disasters. And as you mentioned, Madam Chair, we 

can’t predict where and when they will happen, so it takes our 

versatile and adaptable forces, in sufficient quantities, to be prepared for those unpredictable events. 

The other result could be a Coast Guard that is less capable and 

diminished in force. 

Your steadfast support, as most recently demonstrated to the fiscal year 2011 appropriation, enables us to continue to perform our 

challenging maritime missions at the level the Nation demands. 

Senator Coats, you said I must have breathed a sigh of relief. 

Quite frankly, I wanted to do a high five when I got this budget, 

because it addresses our most pressing requirements—the major 

cutter recapitalization, and sustaining current operations. By fully 

funding national security cutter No. 5, you enabled us to deliver 

the ship up to 1 year earlier, potentially saving taxpayers millions 

of dollars. 

It was ironic that this morning when I did my daily readings, 

there was a quote in there that says, ‘‘When we pay later, the price 

is greater.’’ And certainly, when we buy it earlier, we get it at a 

better price, and we will have savings for our taxpayers. 

Our acquisitions momentum must continue. Gaps in funding our 

recapitalization are costly and jeopardize our ability to protect the 

Nation’s high seas sovereignty. 

The 2012 budget request responds to our Nation’s budget challenges. I had to make some tough tradeoffs, and I directed management efficiencies, reductions in administrative costs, and professional services, totaling about $140 million. I will reinvest these 

savings into sustaining our frontline operations as the American 

citizens expect, to rebuilding the Coast Guard, enhancing our maritime incident prevention and response, and supporting our Coast 

Guard families. 

I’m requesting more than $1.4 billion to continue our recapitalization effort, including funding for national security cutters 

(NSCs), fast response cutters (FRCs), response boats, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), and sustainment of our aging ships and aircraft. 

I recently decommissioned two antiquated WHECs and our oldest 

commissioned cutter—affectionately known as the Queen of the 

Fleet—Acushnet, which was almost 68 years old. Now, this allowed 

me the privilege of bestowing the Queen of the Fleet status to another Coast Guard cutter, Smilax, which is merely 67 years old. 

But at some point it becomes unfair to keep asking our crews to 

expend countless hours fixing old machinery. Our crews deserve 

state-of-the-art equipment and decent living conditions to do their 

jobs. And the American people deserve the capability of a modern 

Coast Guard fleet to preserve and protect our maritime sovereignty. 

The good news is, because of your support, our recapitalization 

is starting to pay dividends. The first of our eight NSCs, the cutter 

Bertholf, is currently conducting its first Alaska patrol. Bertholf’s 

patrol marks the beginning of decades of service the NSC fleet will 
162 

provide in the Bering Sea and throughout the vast maritime approaches to our shores. And the first of 58 FRCs, our new patrol 

boat fleet, was just launched in Lockport, Louisiana. This is a critical step toward replacing our tired but venerable workforce, the 

Iowa-class patrol boat fleet. The fiscal year 2012 budget also invests $22.7 million to ensure 

the safe and efficient flow of commerce, protecting our natural resources, and effectively managing pollution incidents when they 

occur. 

Finally, you can’t have a strong military workforce without 

healthy families. This budget also requests funding for military 

housing projects and increases access to childcare services for Coast 

Guard families. 

As the maritime component of DHS, the 2012 budget will ensure 

the Coast Guard is able to continue to perform our vital maritime 

missions. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR. 

Good morning Madam Chair and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for the continuing support you have shown to the men and women of 

the Coast Guard, including the recent passage of the fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution, which provided full-year resources for the Coast Guard. 

I am here today to discuss the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2012 budget request. Before I discuss the details of the request, I would like to take this opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard’s value and role, some of our recent operations, including our 

recent response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the current budget environment. 

For more than 220 years, the Coast Guard has safeguarded the Nation’s maritime 

interests and natural resources on our rivers and ports, in the littoral regions, on 

the high seas, and around the world. The Coast Guard saves those in peril and protects the Nation’s maritime border, marine transportation system, natural resources, and the environment. Over the past year, Coast Guard men and women— 

active duty, reserve, civilian, and auxiliarists alike—continued to deliver premier 

service to the public. They saved more than 4,000 lives, protected our borders by 

stopping the flow of drugs and illegal migrants, and performed admirably in response to the largest spill in our Nation’s history—the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 

How does the Coast Guard operating model serve our public? The Coast Guard 

is an adaptable, responsive, military force of maritime professionals whose broad 

legal authorities, assets, geographic diversity, and expansive partnerships provide a 

persistent presence in the inland waters, ports, coastal regions, and far offshore 

areas of operations. This presence, coupled with more than 220 years of experience 

as the Nation’s maritime first responder, provides our Nation with tremendous 

value in service to the public. 

The Coast Guard’s value and role: 

—We protect those on the sea: Leading responses to maritime disasters and 

threats, ensuring a safe and secure maritime transportation system, preventing 

incidents, and rescuing those in distress. 

—We protect America from threats delivered by sea: Enforcing laws and treaties, 

securing our ocean resources, and ensuring the integrity of our maritime domain from illegal activity. 

—We protect the sea itself: Regulating hazardous cargo transportation, holding 

responsible parties accountable for environmental damage and cleanup, and 

protecting living marine and natural resources. 

The Coast Guard, working through DHS, led the administration’s response to the 

BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the first-ever Spill of National Significance, 

leveraging resources from across the country and around the world. The Coast 

Guard was the first agency on scene the night the mobile offshore drilling unit 
163 

Deepwater Horizon exploded, searching for those in distress and providing Federal 

on-scene presence. During the response, the Coast Guard worked closely with our 

Federal partners and industry to leverage resources where needed while carrying 

out our other missions throughout the world. From nearly every corner of the country, the Coast Guard surged more than 7,000 people, including members of the 

Coast Guard Reserve and Auxiliary, to support the response. Coast Guard members 

served in cutters and boats, in fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, and in the shore-side 

incident command system. The Coast Guard’s adaptive operational model allowed 

for the: 

—Integration of Government and industry to contain the spill, recover more than 

34.7 million gallons of oil-water mix, and perform controlled burns to remove 

more than 11 million gallons of oil from open water to protect the shoreline and 

wildlife. 

—Deployment of 46 cutters and 22 aircraft. Surface assets included medium endurance cutters (210-ft and 270-ft); sea-going and coastal buoy tenders (225-ft 

and 175-ft); ice-breaking tugs (140-ft); and patrol boats (179-ft, 110-ft and 87- 

ft). Air assets included long- and medium-range surveillance aircraft (HC–130 

and HC–144A) and short- and medium-range helicopters (HH–60 and HH–65). 

While 2010 was another exceptional ‘‘operational year’’ by any standard, these operations further stressed existing aged and obsolete cutters, boats, aircraft, and support infrastructure that are in dire need of recapitalization. Furthermore, these extended surge operations strained workforce readiness due to increased op-tempo and 

deferred training. Even in the current fiscal environment where resources are 

scarce, we must continue to rebuild the Coast Guard, support frontline operations, 
164 

invest in our people and families, and enhance maritime incident prevention and 

response capabilities to meet mission demands and ensure resiliency in the maritime domain. 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 REQUEST

In fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard will focus resources to advance strategic priorities. Through tough decisions and resource trade-offs, the Coast Guard’s fiscal 

year 2012 budget leverages savings generated through management efficiencies and 

offsets, and allocates funding toward higher order needs to support frontline operations. These offsets and reductions supported implementation of the following fiscal 

year 2012 budget priorities: 

—Rebuild the Coast Guard; 

—Sustain frontline operations; 

—Enhance maritime incident prevention and response; and 

—Support military families. 

Highlights from our request are included in appendix I. 

Rebuild the Coast Guard 

The Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2012 budget requests $1.4 billion to continue recapitalization of cutters; boats; aircraft; command, control, communications, computers, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; and infrastructure 

to improve mission readiness by replacing aged, obsolete, and unreliable assets. The 

fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for 40 response boats and 6 fast response 

cutters (FRCs), as well as a sizable investment in the renovation and restoration 

of shore facilities. This budget also provides resources to ensure that the Coast 

Guard’s aviation fleet is mission-ready through the acquisition of two maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), one HH–60 helicopter, and conversion and sustainment projects 

of multiple aircraft. Investment in Coast Guard recapitalization is essential to mission execution. 
165 

SUSTAIN FRONTLINE OPERATIONS

To ensure the Coast Guard is able to meet the needs of the Nation, the fiscal year 

2012 budget balances resources between investments in capital assets, initiatives to 

sustain frontline operations, and measures to enhance mission execution. The fiscal 

year 2012 budget requests $67.7 million to operate new assets delivered through 

asset recapitalization programs and provides funding to support personnel and in- 
166 

service assets. Moreover, funding is included to operate U.S. Coast Guard cutter 

(USCGC) Healy and support the operational reactivation of USCGC Polar Star. The 

Coast Guard plans to decommission USCGC Polar Sea in fiscal year 2011 and transition her crew to USCGC Polar Star, enabling orderly transition to USCGC Polar 

Star and facilitating her return to operations in fiscal year 2013. 

ENHANCE MARITIME INCIDENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Coast Guard marine safety and environmental response personnel promote safe 

and efficient travel, facilitate the flow of commerce in the maritime domain, and 

protect our natural resources. The fiscal year 2012 budget requests $22.2 million to 

advance implementation of the Coast Guard’s marine safety performance plan and 

marine environmental response mission performance plan. During the response to 

the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Coast Guard incident responders established 

and executed the Incident Command System to lead an effective, unified effort. The 

Coast Guard will enhance these core competencies in fiscal year 2012 to keep pace 

with an ever-growing and evolving maritime industry and ensure continued 

proactive leadership to prevent disasters on the Nation’s waters and remain ready 

to respond if they occur. Additionally, funding requested in the fiscal year 2012 

budget will assist in meeting Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 requirements 

regarding dockside examinations by adding examiners to improve fishing vessel 

safety. 

SUPPORT MILITARY FAMILIES

The administration is committed to improving the quality of life for military members and their families. The health and welfare of families is the heart of operational readiness. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes $29.3 million to address critical housing shortfalls and improve access to affordable, quality childcare. These initiatives will ensure Coast Guard members are semper paratus for all hazards and 

all threats. 

CONCLUSION

The demands on the Coast Guard remain high. As we have for more than 220 

years, we remain ready to meet the Nation’s many maritime needs supported by the 

fiscal year 2012 request. We will always fulfill our duties and obligations to the 

American people, true to ‘‘semper paratus, always ready.’’ I request your full support 

for the President’s fiscal year 2012 request. Again, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify before you today. I am pleased to answer your questions. 

APPENDIX I—FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST

REBUILD THE COAST GUARD

Surface Assets—$642 Million (0 FTE) 

The budget provides $642 million for surface asset recapitalization and 

sustainment initiatives, including: 

—National Security Cutter (NSC).—Fully funds NSC–5 (anticipates $615 million 

provided for NSC–5 in 2011). The NSC is replacing the high endurance class. 

—Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC).—Sustains initial acquisition work and design of 

the OPC. The OPC will replace the medium endurance cutter class to conduct 

missions on the high seas and coastal approaches. 

—Fast Response Cutter (FRC).—Provides production funding for six FRCs to replace the 110-foot island class patrol boat. 

—Response Boat-Medium (RB–M).—Provides production funding for 40 boats. 

—Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC).—Provides for operational enhancement of 

five WMECs at the Coast Guard Yard through the Mission Effectiveness Program. 

Air Assets—$289.9 Million (0 FTE) 

The budget provides $289.9 million for the following air asset recapitalization or 

enhancement initiatives, including: 

—MH–60T—Replaces one Jayhawk lost in an operational crash in 2010. 

—HC–144—Funds production of two MPA and procurement of up to five mission 

system pallets and associated spare parts to complete outfitting of the fleet. 

—HH–60—Funds service life extension and component upgrades for eight aircraft. 

—HH–65—Funds sustainment of key components. 

—HC–130H—Funds avionics upgrade and center wing box (CWB) replacements. 
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Asset Recapitalization—Other—$166.1 Million (0 FTE) 

The budget provides $166.1 million for the following equipment and services: 

—Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (C4ISR).—Deploys standardized C4ISR capability to newly 

fielded NSCs and MPAs, and develops C4ISR capability for the OPC. Interoperable and integrated C4ISR is essential to the efficient and effective operation 

of these assets. —CG–Logistics Information Management System (CG–LIMS).—Continues development and prototype deployment to Coast Guard operational assets and support 

facilities. —Rescue 21.—Completes deployment at Sectors Lake Michigan; San Juan, Puerto 

Rico; Honolulu, Hawaii; Guam—and continues replacement of legacy VHF systems in the Western Rivers. —Interagency Operations Center (IOC).—Deploys WatchKeeper information-sharing capability to three IOC locations. Commences deployment of the sensor 

management capability; resulting in improved capability to see, understand, 

and share tactical information critical to security and interagency coordination 

in vulnerable ports and coastal areas. 

Shore Units and Aids to Navigation (ATON)—$193.7 Million (0 FTE) 

The budget provides $193.7 million to recapitalize shore infrastructure for safe, 

functional, and modern shore facilities that effectively support Coast Guard assets 

and personnel: —Cape May, New Jersey.—Replaces a condemned pier critical to execution of patrol boat missions. —Corpus Christi, Texas.—Implements Sector/Air Station Corpus Christi consolidation in order to properly hangar, maintain and operate MPA, and enhance 

mission effectiveness. —Chase Hall Barracks, New London, Connecticut.—Continues renovations at the 

Coast Guard Academy by modernizing cadet barracks. 

—Commences construction of Nos. 3–6 FRC homeports, C4ISR training facility, 

and continues modifications to Air Station Miami to accommodate new MPA. 

—Station Memensha Boathouse, Chilmark, Massachusetts.—Replaces the boathouse destroyed by a fire in July 2010 essential to supporting coastal law enforcement, security, and safety operations. 

—TRACEN Petaluma, California Wastewater Treatment Plant.—Recapitalizes and 

expands the capability of the Wastewater Treatment Plant to ensure compliance 

with environmental regulations. 

—Station Fairport, Ohio.—Recapitalizes multi-mission boat station, originally constructed in 1918, to facilitate current-day operations. 

—ATON Infrastructure.—Improves short-range aids and infrastructure to promote 

the safety of maritime transportation. 

Personnel and Management—$110.2 Million (794 FTE) 

The budget provides $110.2 million to provide pay and benefits for the Coast 

Guard’s acquisition workforce. The budget includes additional resources to support 

the governmentwide Acquisition Workforce Initiative to bolster the professional development and capacity of the acquisition workforce. 

SUSTAIN FRONTLINE OPERATIONS

Pay and Allowances—$66.1 Million (0 FTE) 

The budget provides $66.1 million to maintain parity of military pay, allowances, 

and healthcare with the Department of Defense (DOD). As a branch of the Armed 

Forces of the United States, the Coast Guard is subject to the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which includes pay and personnel benefits for the military workforce. 

Annualization of Fiscal Year 2011—$53.9 Million (194 FTE) 

The budget provides $53.9 million to continue new initiatives begun in the prior 

year, including increased counternarcotics enforcement through enhanced Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) capacity and follow-on funding for new assets (e.g., 

NSC, FRC, MPA, etc.). 

Surface and Air Asset Follow-on—$50.8 Million (220 FTE) 

The budget provides a total of $50.8 million to fund operations and maintenance 

of cutters, boats, aircraft, and associated subsystems delivered through major cutter, 

aircraft, and associated C4ISR acquisition efforts. Funding is requested for the following assets: 
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—RB–M.—Funding for maintenance, repair, and operational costs. —FRC.—Operating and maintenance funding for FRC Nos. 6–8 and funding for 

crew Nos. 9–10. These assets will be homeported in Miami and Key West, Florida. Funding is also requested for shore-side maintenance personnel needed to 

support FRCs. —NSC.—Signals intelligence capability follow-on and crew rotational concept implementation for three NSCs located in Alameda, California. —HC–144A MPA.—Operating and maintenance funding for aircraft No. 14; support and maintenance of mission system pallets 1–12. —C4ISR Follow-on.—Funding to maintain more than 200 C4ISR systems deployed and delivered by the Coast Guard C4ISR program. —Helicopter Systems.—Funding to operate and maintain communications and 

sensor systems for HH–60 and HH–65 helicopters. —Asset Training System Engineering Personnel.—Funding to support NSC and 

FRC training requirements at training center Yorktown. 

Polar Icebreaking Program—$39 Million (180 FTE) 

The budget requests $39 million in polar icebreaking budget authority. Funding 

will support the operation and maintenance of U.S. Coast Guard cutter (USCGC) 

Healy and prepare for the operational reactivation of USCGC Polar Star. The Coast 

Guard plans to decommission USCGC Polar Sea in fiscal year 2011 and transition 

her crew to USCGC Polar Star, enabling efficient transition to USCGC Polar Star 

and facilitating her return to operations in fiscal year 2013. 

Critical Depot Level Maintenance—$28.7 Million (0 FTE) 

The budget provides $28.7 million for critical depot level maintenance and asset 

sustainment for vessels, aircraft, and shore infrastructure. Funding will increase 

support levels for the 140-, 175-, and 225-foot classes of cutters, restore aircraft 

spare parts, and provide sustainment for aging shore infrastructure. 

Distress Alerting Satellite System (DASS)—$6.3 Million (1 FTE) 

The budget provides $6.3 million to begin replacement of the Search and Rescue 

Satellite Aided Tracking (SARSAT) system with DASS. This multi-agency partnership also includes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the U.S. Air Force 

(USAF). Recapitalization of the SARSAT system beginning in fiscal year 2012 is 

critical to ensure no loss of coverage in distress notification and life saving response 

during the planned deactivation of the legacy SARSAT system. 

Coast Guard Network Security—$8.6 Million (0 FTE) 

The budget provides funding for the Coast Guard to transition from its commercially provided Internet Access Points (IAPs) to DOD IAPs via the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to ensure security of vital networks and meet cybersecurity requirements. 

ENHANCE MARITIME INCIDENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Marine Safety Enhancement—$10.7 Million (53 FTE) 

The budget provides $10.7 million and 105 personnel to implement the next segment of the marine safety performance plan by investing in marine safety inspectors, investigators, and fishing vessel safety examiners at Coast Guard sectors. This 

initiative furthers the Coast Guard’s efforts to achieve an appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel with the necessary skill sets and experience to perform 

marine safety inspections and investigations. 

Marine Environmental Response Enhancement—$11.5 Million (44 FTE) 

The budget provides $11.5 million and 87 personnel to enhance Marine Environmental Response (MER) capacity. This initiative supports the marine environmental 

protection mission by providing funding for an MER Incident Management and Assist Team (IMAT) and increasing technical expertise and strengthening MER career 

paths at Coast Guard sectors and strike teams. The request is the initial investment 

in the Coast Guard’s initiative to improve mission performance in accordance with 

the MER mission performance plan. 

SUPPORT MILITARY FAMILIES

Child Development Services—$9.3 Million (6 FTE) 

The budget provides $9.3 million to increase access to childcare services for Coast 

Guard families with dependents under the age of 12, better aligning the Coast 

Guard with the DOD childcare standards. Additionally, this request funds 12 new 
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positions critical to ensuring continued accreditation of the Coast Guard’s nine child 

development centers by the National Association for the Education of Young Children. 

Military Housing—$20 Million (0 FTE) 

The budget provides $20 million to build family housing units at Sector Columbia 

River and recapitalize the Air Station Cape Cod unaccompanied personnel housing, 

the highest priority housing projects, critical to the well-being of military personnel 

and their families assigned to these geographic regions. 

DECOMMISSIONINGS, EFFICIENCIES, AND SAVINGS

High Endurance Cutter Decommissioning—¥$6.7 Million (¥92 FTE) 

As part of its long-term recapitalization plan, the Coast Guard is decommissioning 

high endurance cutters (WHECs) as NSCs are delivered and made operational. The 

average age of the WHEC fleet is 43 years and these assets are failing at an increased rate resulting in lost operational days and increased maintenance costs. The 

Coast Guard will decommission one WHEC in fiscal year 2012. 

PC–179 Patrol Coastal Decommissioning—¥$16.4 Million (¥108 FTE) 

The three remaining 179-foot patrol coastal (PC) vessels will be decommissioned 

per a January 2007, memorandum of agreement with the U.S. Navy. These vessels 

will be returned to the U.S. Navy in fiscal year 2012. 

Standard Workstation Help Desk Consolidation—¥$6.9 Million (0 FTE) 

Consolidates computer workstation support into two regional centers, eliminating 

56 contractors. 

Program Support Reduction—¥$13.6 Million (0 FTE) 

Reduction in programmatic support across the Coast Guard including support reductions for: 

—small boat replacement, 

—reservist, and 

—contract support for audit remediation, innovation program funding, recruiting, 

and training opportunities. 

ADMINISTRATIVE SAVINGS INITIATIVES

In fiscal year 2012 the Coast Guard will seek efficiencies and make targeted reductions in order to sustain frontline operational capacity and invest in critical recapitalization initiatives. 

Management Efficiencies—¥$61.1 Million (0 FTE) 

Consistent with the Secretary of Homeland Security’s efficiency review and building upon efforts in previous fiscal years, efficiencies will be generated by leveraging 

centralized purchasing and software licensing agreements, reductions in printing 

and publications, reductions in shipping and the transportation of things, reductions 

in advisory and assistance contracts, minimizing purchases of supplies and materials, office equipment consolidation, implementing automation and energy conservation/savings measures, and limiting Government usage of commercial facilities. 

Professional Services Reduction—¥$15.2 Million (0 FTE) 

A reduction in professional services contracts for enterprisewide mission support 

and operational support activities. 

Nonoperational Travel Reduction—¥$10 Million (0 FTE) 

A 25-percent reduction in Coast Guard-wide nonoperational travel, including travel for training, professional development, conferences, and international engagement. 

COAST GUARD CAPABILITIES

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Admiral, very much, and I appreciate it. 

It’s also, I think, appropriate to note Coast Guard facts and figures that are available on its Web site, some of the extraordinary 

work that you just touched on in your opening remarks about what 

the Coast Guard accomplishes in an average day. Just to say a few, 

the Coast Guard saves 13 lives, responds to 65 search and rescue 
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cases, provides a presence in all major ports, and screens 679 commercial vessels and 170,000 crew passengers. It tracked 1,200 icebergs that had drifted in the transatlantic shipping lanes last year. 

I could go on and on. And other testimony the Commandant has 

put into the record. 

I recently gave a speech on these capabilities, and it was an impressive part of what was prepared for me. It really is quite amazing, Admiral, the breadth of services the Coast Guard provides to 

our country on a daily basis and looking back over last year. We 

commend you. 

Let me start with a few questions. 

You have publicly expressed, despite your very positive statement this morning, some concerns about the Coast Guard’s ability 

to carry out its 11 statutory missions. Recently, in February you 

said, ‘‘We need to reduce the number and range of capabilities, unless we’re properly resourced.’’ 

I know that you’re pleased with several aspects of the budget. 

Can you elaborate on the capabilities to which you were referring 

in that statement? You’ve ordered a stem-to-stern review of Coast 

Guard capabilities. When will this review be completed? 

And if provided additional resources above the requested level, 

where would you invest your next dollar? 

So, it’s three questions in one: Elaborate on the capability shortfalls, if you would. You’ve ordered a stem-to-stern review. When 

will that review be completed, and when will those recommendations be reported to this subcommittee? And if additional resources 

became available, where would you invest your next dollar? 

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, ma’am. Those are three great questions, the first of which is this review of capabilities and whether 

we need to cut back on some of those capabilities. 

I think we generally acknowledge across the board that prior to 

9/11, the Coast Guard was under-resourced to do all the missions 

it had then. And since 9/11 we’ve picked up additional responsibilities through the Maritime Transportation Safety Act and the Safe 

Port Act. And we’re grateful to the Congress for the increase of people, first of all. We gained about 6,000 people total, which has 

brought us back up to where the service was in approximately 

1990. But we’ve also picked up these additional duties. 

Also culturally, this service, bless it, has this attitude of ‘‘can do’’, 

and it’s both a blessing and a curse. And as we have looked across 

the security responsibilities and the threats facing our country, oftentimes because of this can-do attitude, we start doing things that 

no one really asked us to do. Examples of that would be, in some 

cases, rotary-wing air intercept in which we’re now training our 

helicopter pilots to intercept low, slow threats that might approach 

a national security event. We are resourced to do that in the Washington, DC area, but we’re not resourced to do it elsewhere. Yet, 

we’re doing it. 

Vertical insertion of coastguardsmen onto ships is among other 

tactical operations that we’ve looked at, perceived a need, and 

started doing on our own, without the proper resources to do it. 

And, unfortunately, we’ve experienced some accidents over the last 

couple of years as we’ve trained for these activities. 
171 

This has given me cause for concern and to take a pause, and 

to order this stem-to-stern review, which will look at all the capabilities out there, decide which ones are absolutely the highest priority, then make sure that we’re properly resourced to carry out 

those activities, and properly trained to be the best possible to do 

those things. 

Inevitably, we will find some gaps that exist. And if it’s a job 

that the Coast Guard should be doing, it’s my responsibility to 

identify that to the administration and to the Congress, and to seek 

the proper resources to do it. If it’s something that can be filled by 

another Government agency working through partnerships, then I 

think it’s reasonable to go out to other Government agencies and 

ask them to fill that void in cooperation with the Coast Guard. 

That’s the two first questions I think I’ve answered. And then 

last is, where would I invest my next dollar? Clearly, in recapitalization. We cannot continue to ask these young patriots to go out 

to sea in 40-year-old ships, living in conditions that were World 

War II vintage and stacked three-high in berthing areas where 

there’s condensation, darkness, and extremes of heat and cold. 

Plus, we need to give them the proper tools to work effectively 

out there. New sensors, new radars, and survivable ships that will 

take them out in these very dangerous conditions, like the Bering 

Sea, the Gulf of Alaska, the vast reaches of the Pacific. We need 

to be about the business of getting those ships built as quickly as 

possible. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And Admiral, I understand that the average 

age of a Navy ship is 14 years, but the average age of a Coast 

Guard ship is 40. Is that correct? 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma’am. Generally the Navy plans on a 20- 

year service life, generally. In fact, our WHECs, the Hamilton 

class, were used as a model for the Spruance class for the United 

States Navy, which was built years later. And all the Spruance 

class have been decommissioned. We’re still running our original 

12 WHECs, with the exception of the two—Hamilton and Chase— 

that we just decommissioned. 

OIL SPILLS

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me ask you one other question. We have 

many, so this will be the first round. Coast Guard policy requires 

an incident-specific preparedness review to assess lessons learned 

from major oil spills. The 2010 review was recently completed in 

March. However, it is reported that many lessons learned from 

prior spills, such as the 2008 Cosco Busan spill, and the Cape Mohican spill 11 years earlier, had not been addressed or implemented before the Deepwater Horizon spill. So now we have those 

two previous spills, which were much smaller; now Deepwater Horizon. 

Where are you in your review of what it’s going to take? Because 

it is a priority for, I think, the majority of the Members of the Senate—maybe not everyone, but the majority—to get deepwater drilling back up and operational in the Gulf of Mexico as soon as possible, recognizing that there are some additional safety requirements. Where are you in that task? And can you explain briefly the 
172 

role of the Coast Guard in making sure that spills are prevented 

and then responded to adequately? 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma’am. I’m very proud of the Incident Specific Performance Review (ISPR). As you’ve mentioned, we did it for 

Cosco Busan, and we’ve done it now for the Deepwater Horizon 

spill. It’s an introspective review that I order for our service to take 

a look at how we did the job, and to reveal all the challenges, problems, and shortfalls that we might have. 

I just received that report, and we’re in the process of evaluating 

that. We also need to make comparisons to the President’s Commission report and other reports that are being prepared, including 

our marine casualty investigation, which has just been wrapped up. 

We will look across all those reports and come up with a comprehensive plan on what we need to do. But we’re not sitting back, 

waiting on that. We’re already moving ahead. In fact, the $22.7 

million that we put in the fiscal year 2012 budget builds on a plan 

that we already started after Cosco Busan, which is to enhance our 

marine safety program with additional inspectors, marine environmental responders, and other people. It’s a measured look, making 

sure that we grow slowly to make sure that we’re doing the right 

thing. And the 2012 budget continues that process and, in addition, 

puts in there an incident management assist team of about 33 people, which we will forward deploy when a spill happens. 

One of the things that came across very clearly in the Deepwater 

Horizon spill is the lack of capacity that we have for a sustained 

operation like that. 

We’re also not sitting back in terms of our efforts. We’ve directed 

all our Captains of the Port to review all their spill plans, particularly for those facilities that are offshore, and do a complete review 

of those. We’re working with our area committees to look at worstcase scenarios and how we bring industry, Federal, State, and local 

together to combat those things. 

And all these things are in progress as we continue to evaluate 

and—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. And finally, and specifically, when will you 

have that report to us? Do you think it will be 30 or 60 days in 

time for us to consider it in this budget cycle? 

Admiral PAPP. I think, certainly, the report has been published. 

It’s out there. We made sure that the report itself went out. And 

it has a number of recommendations there. Clearly, I can’t do every 

recommendation that’s in the report, but we’re going to assign 

some priorities to those. But the report is available, and we’ll make 

sure you get a copy. 

Senator LANDRIEU. As soon as you assign your priorities, let us 

know. 

Senator Coats. 

BUDGET CUTS

Senator COATS. Thank you. 

Admiral, thanks for your testimony. 

You mentioned tough tradeoffs, and garnering $140 million in 

savings, which you had to and that you tried to reinvest in frontline operations. Give me some examples of those tough tradeoffs, 
173 

particularly that generated that $140 million. What did you have 

to take away? 

Admiral PAPP. Sir, we really need to go back to the 2011 budget. 

Once again, I have to thank this subcommittee for restoring money 

in the 2011 budget. We were facing some rather drastic cuts in 

there, including maritime safety and security teams and cutters. 

That’s a quick way to get savings, but it unfortunately cuts back 

on your frontline operations. 

As we went into the 2012 budget cycle—my first budget in preparation to go forward—my guiding principal was, ‘‘We will sustain 

our frontline operations.’’ I don’t want to lose any Coast Guard people or any Coast Guard resources that deliver services to the American people. So, we would look at administrative overhead, where 

we could find redundancies and some fat to carve away. We didn’t 

find a lot of fat. We’re scraping a little bit of the muscle. But most 

of it is in administrative services, operational support reductions, 

travel, conferences, and other things that are enhancements that 

we would like to be doing—because I think it helps us to keep a 

healthy workforce—but the alternative is to cut back operations or 

cut back aircraft and ships. And I just don’t want to do that. 

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Senator COATS. We’ve had a lot of interest here, obviously, in 

strengthening the Border Patrol regarding illegal immigration. 

There have been some significant successes at a considerable cost. 

There is some thought that, as we strengthen our border security 

on illegal immigration, there may be more attempts to use the 

oceans and the seas as entering points. Is this something that 

you’ve looked at, and that you anticipate more responsibilities coming your way? 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. It’s like squeezing the balloon. If you 

make the border, the land border, more secure, there is the possibility of going around it by going out to sea. But we’ve got that fairly well covered by a persistent presence, both on the gulf and Pacific sides of the Mexican-American border. We have patrol boats 

out there, and we have larger cutters further out to sea. 

Frankly, most of our migrant vectors are down in terms of numbers of people. We’ve seen a slight rise in the last few months in 

Haitians. But whether it’s Cubans, Dominicans, Haitians, or migrants from across the Pacific, all those numbers are down. I believe everything points back to us having a persistent presence out 

there, maintaining those cutters and aircraft out there. And people 

know they’re there—and a policy of returning migrants to their 

home country when we pick them up. The Coast Guard is very 

good at doing this, but we’re finding ourselves increasingly challenged because of the difficulty in keeping these old ships running 

out there and keeping them out on station. 

Senator COATS. Describe the process for me, if you would. You’re 

in the gulf, you come across a makeshift boat. There are 45 illegal 

immigrants trying to reach land. You intercept that. 

What happens from that point forward in terms of those individuals? They’re brought on the boat? They’re brought on shore? 

Where are they detained? How are they? What’s the process that 

you have to go through? 
174 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. That is the value of these multi-mission 

cutters we have that have flight decks for landing helicopters, but 

we also can accommodate large groups of migrants. 

It’s not unusual, first, to find a group of 45, whether it’s Cubans 

or Haitians. What we do is we bring them aboard; we treat them 

humanely; we feed them; we make sure they have facilities to protect them; and we have agreements in place with both Cuba and 

Haiti to repatriate them to their countries. 

We also interview these migrants to make sure there are not any 

articulable concerns about political repression or punishment that 

they might receive when they go back. Sometimes there are people 

that may have some political concerns in terms of going back. We 

interview these people, and if we find that there’s an articulable 

threat or belief, then we will work with Customs and Border Patrol, or Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and bring them 

back, and they’ll get further interviews. 

But for the most part, we repatriate them to their countries. 

Senator COATS. I’m new to the subcommittee, so I don’t know the 

answer to this, but when you repatriate those immigrants, illegal 

immigrants, you take them back yourself? Or do they go through 

some process system on land first? 

Admiral PAPP. No, sir. If they are interdicted at sea we bring 

them on; we treat them; and then we bring them back directly. For 

Haiti, we take our ships into Cap-Haı ̈tien, which is a delivery point 

when we turn them over to Haitian officials overseen by United 

Nations people who are there and working with the Red Cross. And 

we have an agreement with Cuba. We generally have to transfer 

them to a smaller Coast Guard cutter to go into the Port of Cabanas, which is on the north coast of Cuba, to return them there. 

Just this morning, though, we had four Cubans who were able 

to voice what they perceived as a threat. What we did was, we took 

them around to Guanta ́namo Bay and delivered them there. And 

we have a migrant holding facility that does further interviews on 

shore to decide whether they go back to Cuba or they are brought 

to the United States. 

Senator COATS. I have more questions. But I think we’ll do a second round, so—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. Yes, we will. Thank you. Senator—— 

Senator COATS. Thank you. 

Senator LANDRIEU [continuing]. Lautenberg. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Admiral, you’re now a seasoned Commandant, and I can tell you 

that you have won respect for the kind of leadership that you have 

shown with the Coast Guard since the time that you have become 

the Commandant, and we thank you—— 

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, sir. 

Senator LAUTENBERG [continuing]. For that. 

TERRORIST ATTACKS

According to the FBI, New Jersey is home for the most at-risk 

terrorist attack in the United States. The area has targets ranging 

from a port, to airports, and chlorine gas plants. An attack in this 

area could endanger 12 million who live within a fairly short radius. 
175 

With the administration’s decreased budget requests, will any efforts in the Port of New York and New Jersey area be affected in 

terms of its supervision by the Coast Guard? 

Admiral PAPP. No, Senator. As I said earlier, my emphasis on the 

2012 budget is sustaining at the current level our operations in the 

field, delivering those services that the American citizens expect of 

our Coast Guard. 

New York, I believe, is well covered. As you know, we have Sector New York, which is one of our most robust sectors in the Coast 

Guard, located out on Staten Island; Station New York, where over 

the last 10 years we’ve basically doubled the number of boats and 

the number of people at the station; and the Maritime Safety and 

Security Team New York, which is there to provide response to terrorist events or provide additional security when there are security 

events in process. 

The other thing that’s very important, though, is the active partnerships that we have. Through our Area Maritime Security Committee, we bring together all the State and local port partners, plus 

industry. And I would say probably one of the biggest allies is Commissioner Ray Kelly of the city of New York. They have pretty robust services themselves. But they’re all complementary. We try 

not to be redundant. And I think New York is well covered. 

CAPE MAY TRAINING CENTER PIER RECONSTRUCTION

Senator LAUTENBERG. The pier, port, the Cape May Coast Guard 

Training Center is in pretty bad shape. It presents a safety hazard. 

The pier supports patrol boats that are responsible for performing 

the critical safety and security missions in the mid-Atlantic region. 

Your budget request includes $11 million for the reconstruction of 

that pier. 

What kind of an impediment might follow on, to a lack of funding 

for that mission? 

Admiral PAPP. I’ve been up there, and I’ve walked that pier, sir, 

and we cannot take heavy equipment out there. We have two major 

cutters that call that home port. And ultimately, you need to take 

cranes out there to do work on the ships when they’re in port. As 

it stands right now, you can’t move heavy equipment out there, so 

you actually have to move the ships in order to get any work done. 

And it affects daily work like delivering supplies and things if you 

can’t take a truck down the pier. 

So, getting that replaced and giving us the versatility to be able 

to do pier-side work, keeping our cutters sustained that are in 

home port there, and not having to put extra burdens on our people 

to have to move the ship if work is to be done after they’ve already 

come in off long patrols are of great benefit to us. 

PIRATE ATTACKS

Senator LAUTENBERG. Admiral, you know the Coast Guard represents the United States before the International Maritime Organization in our efforts to prevent and respond to acts of piracy. Pirate attacks have been rising steadily in recent months, leading to 

some call for the increased use of arms on merchant ships. 

What’s the Coast Guard thinking about that? It sounds like our 

ships ought to be able to defend themselves. 
176 

Admiral PAPP. What we do know, sir, is that I think the pirates 

are 0 for 12, 13, or 14 whenever they’ve tried to attack and take 

a ship that has a security team onboard. So, we have evidence to 

validate the fact that if you have a security team onboard, you’re 

most likely going to survive. 

How those security teams are provided is what the real question 

is, and some countries still prohibit the use of security teams onboard ships that fly their flag. There are some shipping companies 

that are actually changing their flag to other countries now so that 

they can bring security teams aboard. And there seems to be a fairly robust activity out there in terms of companies that are willing 

to provide those services, and the shipping companies seem to be 

able to afford them. 

I encourage the use of security teams. But we also have other 

measures that work, as well, including safety procedures for the 

crews that are onboard; increasing speed; and trying to make the 

ship less accessible to pirates coming aboard. It’s a full range of activities that you can do. But ultimately what we’ve found is, security teams work. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. And I close with this, Madam Chair. 

I would hope that you wouldn’t keep using a reference to ‘‘as old 

as World War II.’’ 

Some of the parts that still remain are functioning quite well. 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg. 

Senator Cochran. 

NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER

Senator COCHRAN. Welcome again, Commandant, to our hearing. 

We appreciate the fact that in our State of Mississippi we’re building Coast Guard vessels, and we’re very proud of the fact that 

Ingalls Shipbuilding has produced two cutters—I think cutter Nos. 

5 and 6—and they’re looking to continue the construction of these 

cutters. And my question is, what is your assessment of the workman contribution to this project? And what are your assessments 

of the efficiencies that are gained by long lead procurement of these 

vessels? 

Admiral PAPP. Sir, that’s a great question. I have been out to 

San Francisco just a few weeks ago, and I spent a full day riding 

NSC No. 2, the Waesche. It is an outstanding ship. I am almost 

willing to give up these stripes if I could get that job to be the captain of one of those ships. It is that outstanding. 

On the other hand, it’s not extravagant, either. It gives us enhanced capabilities to better carry out our mission in a broader 

range of weather conditions, a longer range, and speed, and to do 

it more economically with fewer crew members, better fuel efficiency, and better environmental conditions as well. 

I was totally impressed with the smooth functioning of that ship 

and the capabilities that it brings to bear for all Coast Guard missions. 

Proving it is another thing. And right now, the cutter Bertholf— 

the first—is up in the Bering Sea. I read a report from its commanding officer, Captain John Prince, just this morning. They are 

out in 20-foot seas with up to 60 knots of wind, and still are able 
177 

to launch and recover their helicopter—unheard of in the past to 

be able to do that from one of our WHECs up in the Bering Sea. 

They are launching boats in worse conditions than we were able to 

in the past because of the stern-launch capability. They are able to 

stay out there longer because the engines are more economical to 

run—even at higher speeds—than the ships that it replaces. We’re 

doing it with about 40 fewer people in the crew. They’re living better. The ship rides better because we have segregated ballast tanks 

now, instead of fuel tanks that you had to mix water in before, 

which gives you a better, more stable ride. It is proving the solid 

design and all the work that went in. And I couldn’t be more 

pleased with these ships. 

No. 3 is nearing completion—the Dorothy Stratton. And she’ll be 

delivered to the Coast Guard later this year. We were able to 

award the contract on No. 4 just recently, and because of the generosity and the work of this subcommittee, we have the money in 

the 2011 budget now to award the contract on No. 5. 

And to your final question on long-lead time materials, whenever 

we can keep a stable and predictable flow of funding going, the 

shipyard gains confidence, we gain confidence, prices are lower, 

and we save money in the long run. 

Senator COCHRAN. That’s a very impressive report. And it makes 

me very proud of the workers and officials of Ingalls, and the Coast 

Guard, who’ve devoted such a strong workman-like performance 

into the building of these ships, and getting them to sea where we 

need them operating. 

I know too that there are plans to build additional cutters, and 

long-lead-time materials are needed for those ships. Are those requests contained in your budget request before the subcommittee? 

Or do we need to have a conference with you to see what you need, 

what you can use, and what would be efficient and appropriate for 

this subcommittee to support? 

Admiral PAPP. Sir, ultimately, in my original plans and in the 

Coast Guard’s overall plans, we would have liked to have requested 

funding for NSC No. 6 in this budget that’s going forward. 

We were confronted with a very difficult situation. I will admit 

that we had some problems early on because we had a lead systems integrator, and we ran into difficulties there. We took the contract in-house for the Coast Guard. And the first thing we needed 

to do was negotiate a fixed-price contract for cutter Nos. 4–8. It 

took us a little long to hammer out that deal, to get the fixed-price 

contract. Ultimately, I believe we came up with a good price on No. 

4. And the shipyard, I think, is negotiating in very good faith on 

No. 5, which we’ll see awarded here very soon. 

But because we didn’t have a price for No. 4, we were uncertain 

what it would cost, what No. 5 would cost, and we thought that we 

would need some additional money, given our estimates for NSC 

No. 5. We could not fit that additional money for No. 5 plus the 

full cost of No. 6 in the 2012 budget. 

So, I made what I thought was a reasonable decision at the time, 

which was just to ask for the additional money to complete NSC 

No. 5, and we would defer the full funding. 

What I’m confronted with now is OMB Circular A–11 requires 

full funding, long-lead production, and postproduction costs all in 
178 

the same year. This is a challenge for us, because it eats up almost 

one-half our acquisition budget. So, I can’t fit that in until the 2013 

budget. Now, we did ask for $77 million in the 2012 budget to complete 

No. 5. You gave us the money within the 2011 budget, so that 

leaves a little bit of a bogey there in the 2012 budget as it goes 

forward. The current fixed-price contract is for NSC Nos. 4 and 5, 

and long-lead time materials for NSC No. 6. 

Senator COCHRAN. What is a fogey bear? What? 

Admiral PAPP. I said, a little—a bogey is a target of either opportunity or a problem. 

Senator COCHRAN. Okay. 

Admiral PAPP. Because it sits there, originally, as the President’s budget goes forward, it’s $77 million to complete the funding for 

NSC No. 5. So, it sits there right now with no assignment. 

Senator COCHRAN. I hope the subcommittee can work with you 

and your team, the House, and our House counterparts to try to 

figure out the most efficient and effective thing we can do in this 

cycle. But you’re open to further consultation and discussion of this 

issue, I hope. 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. 

UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

Senator COCHRAN. Madam Chair, I have other questions, but 

particularly, I’m impressed. If I have time to ask about the unmanned aerial systems, the Coast Guard’s been analyzing various 

unmanned aerial systems. I wonder what the status is of potential 

requests for next year’s budget, or a supplemental request dealing 

with unmanned aerial assets. 

Admiral PAPP. Clearly, when we devised the system of cutters 

and aircraft, unmanned aerial systems was a part of that—to make 

it, to enhance the effectiveness of the system, and to compensate 

for having, ultimately, fewer ships out there. 

Right now I am searching for room on where we might fit that 

in. Plus, I have to look at other partnerships as well to see if we 

might leverage them. The Navy is experimenting with a tactical 

ship-launched unmanned aircraft system (UAS), Fire Scout, which 

I think holds promise. But I don’t have the money to move forward 

with that right now. So, we’re leveraging off the Navy’s work, and 

we’re hopeful that they will work with us to experiment with one 

of the NSCs to see if that’s the direction to go. 

The other is more a Predator-type UAS that would cover, which 

would do wide-area coverage. And right now, Customs and Border 

Protection is working with some Predators. We’re experimenting 

with them, using some Coast Guard pilots to look at the effectiveness of that system and how it might be employed with our ships 

and cutters. 

Right now ultimately, we’re doing better because the NSC gives 

us better sensors and coverage, and working with our current 

manned aircraft, it makes us no less capable than we have been 

in the past. But we would look forward to the future when we can 

identify the systems we need and then work them into our budget. 

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 
179 

DRUG INTERDICTION

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 

Let me just follow up on that. The question is, what is the most 

effective way to catch the bad guys? You know, is it with ship patrols? Is it with unmanned aircraft? 

I’m concerned about the increased reliance by these major drug 

dealers to basically build their own submarines. 

Without going into classified information, what is the Coast 

Guard’s current response to some of these new, emerging, and 

more sophisticated operations? 

Admiral PAPP. They’re clearly presenting us with a challenge. 

But the drug trafficking organizations are still using a wide range 

of conveyances. Sometimes just slow fishing vessels—sometimes gofasts. They’re also, as we know, using semi-submersibles, and now 

fully submersibles. They will move depending—it’s basically a 

chess game. And when we come up with a new tactic, they will 

move to another new tactic, and we have to react to that. 

When you ask, what’s the most effective? It’s really a combination of all those things, and then another element, which you didn’t 

mention, is intelligence. We can’t do nearly as well as we do now 

if it was not for active intelligence, working with our partners, bilateral and multilateral agreements that we have with South and 

Central American countries that allow us to share information, 

work together, train together, and also actually, conduct operations 

together on the water, and sometimes even allow us to go into 

other sovereign waters based upon the agreements that we’ve come 

up with. 

So, intelligence is probably one of the most important things for 

us, because it will tell us oftentimes not only where to go, but what 

ship to look at and oftentimes what compartment in that ship to 

look at. 

I’m not divulging—I’m talking in generalities; that’s how sophisticated our intelligence is. And it’s a combination of that with our 

operational assets that are out there. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I’m so glad you mentioned that, Admiral. Because I was recently down in Guatemala on a trip focused on another issue, but took the opportunity to get a security briefing by 

our Embassy, and this is exactly what they were talking about. The 

Guatemalan Government was very complimentary of the Coast 

Guard and your partnerships. I want this subcommittee to know 

that we just can’t stop drugs at the border, along the Southwest 

Border. They’re coming through maritime channels, ship channels, 

oceans, and bayous. 

And getting the right intelligence before they leave the ports or 

intercepting them well before they get into our ports is a smart 

strategy. It’s a combination of the right kind of materials and platforms. The intelligence aspect and the partnership with some of 

these governments, such as Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and 

El Salvador are extremely important. And do you want to comment 

on that? And I have one more question—— 

Admiral PAPP. Just to—— 

Senator LANDRIEU [continuing]. And then I’ll go to Senator 

Coats. 
180 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma’am. Just a quick one, as well. But another thing that I’d like to brag a little bit about is that it’s not 

just the Coast Guard cooperating with those South and Central 

American countries. We also facilitate cooperation among Federal 

agencies as well. One of my collateral duties is the chairman of the 

Interdiction Committee, where we bring together Justice, the Department of Defense, and a full range of the interagency to share 

and to work together, and to come up with strategies. 

At our last meeting we brought in General Fraser, who’s the 

Commander of SouthCom. He has a deep and abiding interest in 

what goes on in Central America. 

But at the end of the day, you’re absolutely right. We need to 

stop these drugs in the transit zone where we can pick up that 6.6 

million tons of cocaine at one time, before it gets ashore in Central 

America, is broken down into thousands of packages to come across 

our border at various locations, and of course, also fueling the violence that we’re seeing down there in Mexico. 

AVIATION SAFETY

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 

And one more question. Since 2008—and you slightly touched on 

this, but I want to go a little deeper—14 Coast Guard aviators have 

died in recent accidents while conducting routine missions. Keeping 

the men and women of the Coast Guard safe, I’m sure, is your 

highest priority. I understand the Coast Guard has reviewed the 

cause of these incidents, the adequacy of aviation training, and 

operational maintenance. But what recommendations are you making in this budget? What have you recommended that we can support in our efforts to keep these men and women safe on these routine training missions? 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for that. I was asked a 

couple of days ago, ‘‘What keeps you awake at night?’’ And I said, 

‘‘Actually, I sleep pretty good. We’ve got good Coast Guard people 

out there, and good leaders that are getting the job done.’’ But one 

of the sleepless nights that I can count is the loss of our helicopter 

6017 very shortly after I became Commandant. 

Fortunately, we had already started our aviation safety study. 

And we are well along in terms of—and I want to thank Senator 

Lautenberg for calling me at the time and pointing us toward an 

investigation that the Army did on some helicopter losses. 

What we found out is that there was not a connection. The Army 

was mostly mechanical. Ours is really head work. And what I 

mean by that is, we’ve seen a lot of rapid cultural change within 

our aviation community over the last 10 years. We’ve picked up additional new responsibilities. The rotary wing air intercept that I 

talked about—tactical vertical insertion and other things, other 

than search and rescue, that we didn’t do 10 years ago. 

You can’t necessarily point it on just that either. We’ve also gone 

through a rapid progression of upgrades and instrument and equipment changes within our helicopters. So, there’s been change there. 

And I think also perhaps a little bit of complacency has slipped into 

our aviation culture across the Coast Guard; perhaps a diversion 

of focus away from safety concerns, leaders getting out on the flight 

deck and spending time with their young pilots, having them fo-
181 

cused on their qualifications, and crew management within the 

cockpit. It’s a whole collection of things that came together and resulted in what were very, very unfortunate accidents under very 

routine circumstances. And it was not mechanical. It was human 

failure. 

We’re working very hard right now, taking our most senior aviators and going around to every air station. And we’ve got a number of other things in the works to improve upon an aviation culture in the Coast Guard that has produced the best maritime pilots 

in the world, making them even better. 

There’s no cost in the budget for this. It’s something we have to 

take on as leaders, and we’re about the business of doing that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Admiral. 

Senator Coats. 

PERSONAL LOCATOR DEVICES

Senator COATS. Thank you. 

Admiral, I’m aware that the Navy has placed on every ship 

afloat, and every sailor on that ship, a locating device that if 

there’s a man overboard, woman overboard, they have an instant 

alert and GPS location. I mean, we all think of going out on a Sunday in the Chesapeake Bay, and someone falls overboard, and the 

boat just simply turns around and picks them up. But, obviously 

that’s not the case in the open ocean. 

Do you have a similar system in place? 

Admiral PAPP. What we have—— 

Senator COATS. With your guardsmen. 

Admiral PAPP. I’m not sure if we have something similar because 

I’m not familiar with the system that the Navy has employed, and 

I haven’t read anything about that. 

There are a number of small personal systems that are out there 

on the market right now. In fact, we just did a rescue in Alaska 

where an airplane crashed, and somebody was able to light off 

their personal device, which gave us an alert and—— 

Senator COATS. A vector. 

Admiral PAPP [continuing]. Vectored us into it. 

We put a number of what we call personal protective equipment 

on our people whenever they’re involved in dangerous operations. 

There are a full range of things from signaling devices to strobe 

lights and other things. What I’ll have to do is look at a comparison 

of what the Navy is issuing right now and see if there are any enhancements that we can do for our people as well. 

Senator COATS. Yes. I don’t even know the name of it, the company, or what the market is. It’s just that I’ve run into someone 

that told me about it, and he indicated that there’s been a dramatic 

reduction in sailors lost at sea as a result of this thing. 

Admiral PAPP. I’ll look it up, sir, and we’ll get back to you. 

[The information follows:] 

The Navy’s utilizes the Man Overboard Indicator (MOBI). The MOBI is a wateror manually activated personal alarm system designed to improve the safety of sailors involved in operational situations with the potential for falling overboard. MOBI 

uses a transmitter to aid in the detection, location, and recovery of sailors who fall 

overboard. MOBI is a Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)-managed program. 

While the Coast Guard does not utilize the Navy’s MOBI, we do utilize a similar 

device, the Personal Locator Beacon (PLB) or Personnel Electronic Position Indi-
182 

cating Radio Beacon (P–EPIRB). These devices are worn on the boat crew survival 

vest by all coxswains, crewmembers, boarding officers, and boarding team members 

in accordance with the Rescue and Survival Systems Manual (COMDTINST 

M10740.10F). 

LIVING CONDITIONS

Senator COATS. Talk a little bit to me about your living conditions. What percent of your forces are married? 

Admiral PAPP. We are one of the highest, and I don’t have the 

exact figure, but my recollection is, it’s up close to 50 percent, 

which we actually have the highest rate of people that are married, 

compared to the other four services. 

Senator COATS. And married with children, I assume. 

Admiral PAPP. Most of them. Yes, sir. 

Senator COATS. I mentioned then your concerns about housing, 

adequate housing, and childcare. Where are you in that process? 

And where do you rank? We all know the Air Force has the best 

facilities, including golf courses. We all know that the Navy does 

pretty well, and the Army has improved dramatically. Marines are 

happy with a slab of cement and a tarp. But where does the Coast 

Guard fit in the list of services here in terms of what you would 

call the kind of housing that you’re proud to have your people live 

in? Are you really deficient? Are you bottom of the ladder or—— 

Admiral PAPP. We’re clearly at the bottom of the ladder. But 

what I have to qualify that with is that we have fewer people who 

live on big bases. We are locally dispersed, and it’s very hard to 

come up with Coast Guard housing because we’re at so many small 

stations around the country. So, we look at a combination of Government leases. 

We, of course, have housing allowances for all of our people. One 

of the things that we have picked up—I declared this during my 

state of the Coast Guard speech. This is the year of the Coast 

Guard family. And my wife Linda and I have traveled around. 

She’s met with literally thousands of Coast Guard people. We’ve 

chosen to focus on those things we think we can make a difference 

on, which is housing, childcare, ombudsman services, and spouses 

helping spouses. 

Housing is a challenge for us because where we do have bases— 

for instance, Cape May, New Jersey, or Kodiak, Alaska—we have 

done okay in terms of trying to maintain them. But they’re very 

costly. 

The other services were facing the same challenges, and they got 

authorities and the money to enter into public-private ventures. 

That is—— 

Senator COATS. Do you have that authority? 

Admiral PAPP. We do not have that authority. Also, we’ve had it 

in the past, but it requires us to escrow a large amount of money, 

which we never are able to get in our budget. 

So what we’ve done, sir, is we’ve actually leveraged off the other 

services. Out in Hawaii what we did was we ceded some of our 

land that we had for our old housing to the Army. They brought 

in their public-private authorities and built houses, which now our 

Coast Guard takes part in. 

At the other end of the spectrum, I actually live in a privatized 

house over at Bolling Air Force Base right now. We’re selling the 
183 

Commandant’s house, which we owned for 40 years, in Chevy 

Chase because it costs a lot of money, and we do have authorities 

to take the proceeds from those sales and turn them back into 

housing for our servicemembers. 

So, we’re selling the Commandant’s house, and I’ve moved into 

a place that I pay rent on to a private company on Bolling Air 

Force Base, and it is up to Air Force standards, sir. 

That’s what we need to do for the rest of our workforce. I’d love 

to be able to have those public-private venture authorities, but it 

costs a lot, so what we’re doing is, we’ve got a mixture of Coast 

Guard-supported housing; we’re looking where we can leverage off 

the other services, to take advantage of their authorities; and we’re 

coming up with a comprehensive plan on the way ahead. 

Senator COATS. I think you should keep us advised. I mean, morale and quality of service are directly related to the quality of life 

that is provided for family and children. Your people are out doing 

dangerous work and away from home. And they want, they need, 

to have some sense of comfort that their loved ones are taken care 

of. 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. Absolutely. 

Senator COATS. Thank you. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator. 

I’d like to follow up on that as well, and I’ll recognize Senator 

Lautenberg in a moment. 

I helped to lead the effort to privatize the Army housing, which 

has been really successful with the family housing. And at one 

point, Senators, it was estimated that it would take nearly, at the 

rate we were going, 200 years or more to provide housing for some 

of our men and women in uniform, according to what the budgets 

look like. So, we had to change the paradigm. And this private 

housing has been phenomenally successful. I’m a member of the 

Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and 

Related Agencies. 

So perhaps, Senator Coats, you and I could really work together 

on this subcommittee to see new strategies that we might be able 

to employ—the partnerships you suggested and other avenues to 

provide really stepped-up housing opportunities for our men and 

women in the Coast Guard. And I’d like to commit to you to try 

to do that with your help and assistance. 

Senator Lautenberg. 

RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

I can tell you that for the people in the Coast Guard who are at 

Cape May, New Jersey, that it’s a wonderful place to be. If we 

could enlarge that facility, then we could take care of more. And 

then this summer—that’s right on the beach—we could put up 

some tents and accommodate people, and then the rest of the year 

they’d have the—it’s wonderful. 

They deserve better. I can tell you that. And when I look at the 

deteriorated situation with the quarters there now, that makes me 

unhappy. I’m so proud that you’re so able to do the recruiting that 

you have to do, as mentioned earlier. 
184 

I want to go on to something a little touchy, Admiral Papp. The 

recent report on the Coast Guard’s response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill found that the Coast Guard’s ability to respond to environmental disasters had ‘‘atrophied over the past decade.’’ How has 

the Coast Guard planned? How do you respond to that? And what 

can you do to improve your plans for better security missions and 

the need to improve the environmental response? 

Admiral PAPP. Sir, I agree that it had atrophied over the last, 

probably, decade to 20 years. And part of that is because we’ve 

been very good at prevention. You have prevention and response. 

You hope that you don’t have to respond because you’ve prevented 

the spills from happening in the first place. And we’ve been so good 

at the prevention side that I think, I don’t know whether we just 

became complacent—part of it is complacency. And once complacency slips in, perhaps you’re not looking as far forward in terms 

of new technology and other things that might be able to help you 

in the future for a response. 

I think that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 placed most of the responsibility for maintaining equipment with private industry, and 

I don’t think private industry has looked that far forward either, 

or considered the implications of a worst-case scenario spill like we 

experienced in Deepwater Horizon. 

So, I think it’s incumbent upon us to take a look at what’s the 

proper balance between Federal and industry, in terms of maintaining equipment and preparation. Ultimately, the answer is, 

working together. 

The Coast Guard has already started—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Forgive the interruption. Does that include 

developing better specs for drilling and accident prevention? Is that 

something the Coast Guard would be taking on? I don’t know how 

you do the preventive side and make it the rule. 

Admiral PAPP. Organic to the Coast Guard, we do not have the 

expertise in terms of drilling. 

I think we all learned an awful lot through that. That falls under 

the Department of the Interior right now. And what we’re doing is 

we’re working very close with the Department of the Interior to 

make sure that we collaborate as we go forward. 

The Coast Guard has expertise in firefighting, stability, construction of the mobile platforms, and other things. But we’ve got zero 

organic technical expertise in the drilling operations, particularly 

in the deep sea. 

I’m unwilling to volunteer to take on additional responsibilities 

to bring that organic technical expertise to the Coast Guard. I 

think it exists within the Department of the Interior. And what we 

need to do is make sure we’re doing exactly what we do now, which 

is we work very close with our Federal partners—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. So you can encourage them to participate 

more actively in the prevention side. 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, sir. 

MARINE ECOLOGY

Senator LAUTENBERG. I want to ask you this. We’ve seen incredible changes in our marine ecology as a result of changing temperatures. Does the Coast Guard have the ability to either recognize 
185 

changes in marine functioning—the fish, the undersea plants, 

coral, and those kinds of things that all make part of the ecology. 

Is there any awareness of the Coast Guard about what is taking 

place as a result of what is obviously the climate change that we’re 

seeing? 

Admiral PAPP. We’re certainly interested in it. And no, we don’t 

have organic expertise or staffs that are applied to that. We’re 

more reactive in nature in terms of carrying out our current authorities when, for instance, in the Arctic we have much more open 

water now, and the potential for commerce and shipping to increase in those areas. We rely upon the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and other Government agencies that do 

have that focus of the scientific study of our waters and the 

changes that are happening. The results of those changes are something that we have to deal with. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Now, it’s just that you have so many people on the sea, and there are changes that are occurring. And I 

don’t know whether you see these changes in makeup, quantity, or 

things that just fall your way. I know that when we put an embargo on striped bass years ago and so forth, the Coast Guard had 

some part in maintaining the rules for catches. And it worked wonders. I mean, we replaced the quantity, and it improved the quality 

as well. 

So, I ask that because I’m like all of us that are concerned about 

what is taking place in the environments and the climate change. 

And if there’s any way that there is information flow without giving you another task because you’re so close to the reality out in 

the sea. 

Thanks very much, Madam Chair. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Senator Cochran. 

Senator COCHRAN. I have no further—— 

OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTER

Senator LANDRIEU. Okay. Thank you. 

I think we’re about complete. If you all would just be patient, one 

more question from me, then we’re going to end the meeting. 

You recently released a draft request for information for the offshore patrol cutter (OPC). I understand this is arguably the most 

important acquisition for these particular boats—the backbone of 

the Coast Guard. 

Your future-years capital investment budget includes funding for 

both the OPC and the NSC. It reaches almost $2.3 billion. You’ve 

never requested more than $1.4 billion in any fiscal year. Can you 

just briefly comment? And we’ll use that question to close the meeting. 

Admiral PAPP. Yes, ma’am. It’s an interesting turn of events because I’ve watched Commandants come up here for years and always being accused of not asking for what they need or not asking 

for enough. 

We’re asking for what we need. And we need to be about the 

business of designing and selecting, and then building those 

OPCs—25 of them in our project baseline. They will provide the capabilities—the NSC is the high end, with the most capabilities. 
186 

And then of course, the FRC, our patrol boat, which will be 

inshore, doesn’t have a flight deck and is less capable. 

The OPC will provide the connection between those two and in 

the outer zone of our defenses for security as you come to the country. It’s got to be capable, though, of operating in the north Atlantic, the Bering Sea, and the Gulf of Alaska, which most of our medium endurance cutters (WMECs) do not right now. They are just 

not stout or capable enough to survive those types of elements. 

So, we need something that’s going to probably perform in about 

Sea State 5, be able to launch helicopters, and recover boats in 

more challenging conditions. The OPC is that ship. I’ve looked at 

the basic specs that we’ve put out recently. I think it will be a very 

good ship to provide that, to fill that gap. We also have to be mindful that ultimately, with the 8 NSCs and the 25 OPCs, that’s 33 

ships replacing the 41 that we have right now. 

So, we’re pressing ahead. My job is to identify what we need in 

those years. And the administration signed off on our capital investment plan so I’m very hopeful we’ll follow through with that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Admiral. And again, thank you 

for your testimony today, for your forthrightness, for asking for 

what you really need. We look forward to working with you. And 

thank you for what your men and women do, amazing work every 

day. Thank you. 

Admiral PAPP. Thank you, ma’am. 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

2010 OIL SPILL—INCIDENT-SPECIFIC PREPAREDNESS REVIEW

Question. Coast Guard policy requires an incident-specific preparedness review to 

assess lessons learned from major spill events. The review of the 2010 oil spill in 

the gulf was recently completed in March. A primary conclusion of the independent 

review was that ‘‘the Coast Guard’s Marine Environmental Response (MER) preparedness and response programs have atrophied over the past decade’’. It found 

that the Coast Guard’s area contingency plans were inadequate, there was a lack 

of engagement with State and local governments on national contingency plan responsibilities, environmentally sensitive areas were given uneven and inadequate 

attention in area contingency plans, and more research is necessary for alternative 

response technologies. The report also noted that many lessons learned from prior 

spills, such as the 2008 Cosco Busan spill and the Cape Mohican spill 11 years earlier, have not been addressed or implemented effectively by the Coast Guard. 

What is the Coast Guard doing to implement the recommendations of the review 

and ensure the lessons learned are institutionalized? 

How will you oversee and measure the effectiveness of these changes? 

The budget request includes $11.5 million to enhance MER capacity. Your written 

testimony notes this is an ‘‘initial investment’’. Do you have a long-term financial 

plan for this effort? Please provide the plan to the subcommittee when it is completed. 

Answer. While the report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Coast 

Guard, the Incident Specific Preparedness Review’s (ISPR) process of critical analysis, review, and outside perspective will be a useful tool in helping the Coast Guard 

continuously improve coastal oil spill response for the American people. The ISPR 

is one of several reports that have been completed following the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. The Coast Guard is also conducting a comprehensive review of the 

President’s National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and offshore 

drilling’s findings, the National Incident Commander’s Report along with the other 
187 

Deepwater Horizon reports that provide a body of lessons learned, perspectives, and 

opinions. The Coast Guard is carefully reviewing these reports to identify areas of 

positive and effective preparedness improvements to develop effective and appropriate national implementation strategies. The Coast Guard has already taken several actions to address areas where planning and preparedness will be improved, 

including directing Captains of the Port to review oil spill response plans for offshore facilities, requiring area committees to include worst case discharge scenarios 

for offshore facilities in their respective area contingency plans, increasing State and 

local outreach and participation in area committee meetings and activities, and participating in a Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Environmental Protection Agency workgroup to develop recommendations to harmonize the 

national contingency plan and national response framework governance constructs. 

The Coast Guard is carefully evaluating the body of perspectives and opinions 

provided in the various reports. As changes are implemented, the Coast Guard will 

use a formal lessons learned program that is designed to document, assess, and implement lessons learned from oil spill exercises and real events, including the BP 

Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Coast Guard leadership will leverage this program to 

monitor execution of any changes resulting from the ongoing reviews. Developing 

measures of effectiveness is an important part of evaluating and implementing proposed changes. However, effective response is only part of the equation. Due to the 

progress the Coast Guard has made as a result of prevention efforts, there has been 

a consistent reduction in the average number of chemical discharge incidents and 

oil spills in the maritime environment between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2010. 

The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget request includes funding to immediately 

increase the Coast Guard’s marine environmental response and marine safety capabilities. Included in the fiscal year 2012 request are 87 marine environmental response personnel, including 33 personnel dedicated to an incident management assist team (IMAT), additional marine environmental responders at sectors, and additional strike team personnel. As part of these efforts, the Coast Guard will fully develop an investment plan to ensure these new resources are effectively installed. 

The nature of future investment will depend on how the Coast Guard decides to address the recommendations put forth in Deepwater Horizon after action reports and 

to implement the lessons learned from other past response efforts. The Coast Guard 

will work diligently within the organization and with government partners and industry to implement meaningful improvements for future oil spill planning, preparedness, organization, and response. 

FLEET MIX ANALYSIS

Question. The Coast Guard recently completed the first phase of a study called 

the Fleet Mix Analysis (FMA) that updated the mix of offshore assets necessary to 

meet mission performance requirements. The study took an unconstrained resource 

approach, resulting in an increase in total assets with a cost approaching $65 billion, nearly $40 billion higher than the current estimate. A second FMA is underway that considers the effects of fiscal constraints. 

According to recent testimony by the Government Accountability Office, the second analysis being conducted will not assess options lower than the current mix of 

assets the Coast Guard determined as necessary in 2004. With Federal agencies facing a much leaner fiscal future, don’t you think it would be wise to fully understand 

the trade-offs above and below the current mix? 

I understand that the Department of Homeland Security is conducting its own 

study called the Cutter Fleet Mix Analysis. This appears to be a redundant effort 

to the Coast Guard’s FMA. Why are multiple studies being conducted, when will the 

results be shared with the Congress, and how will the Coast Guard use the results 

of the studies? 

Answer. FMA phase 2 was developed to validate key assumptions in FMA phase 

1 and to take a very specific look at the performance of the Program of Record under 

constrained investment levels. The analysis of trade-offs is the focus of the Department of Homeland Security Cutter Study. 

While the FMA analyzes the current program, the Department of Homeland Security Cutter Study includes an analysis of trade-offs under various assumptions for 

the mission requirements of the fleet. The Department of Homeland Security Cutter 

Study benefits from the FMA validation of modeling methodologies and will be used 

to inform near-term investment decisions. The results of these studies do not stand 

alone, but taken together they inform the Department’s acquisition analysis and will 

be reflected in fiscal year 2013 and future years’ budget requests. 
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HIGH ENDURANCE CUTTER DECOMMISSIONING

Question. Your budget proposes to decommission a third high endurance cutter 

(WHEC) in fiscal year 2012, but the third national security cutter (NSC) won’t be 

ready for operations until fiscal year 2013. That equates to a net loss of 3,300 operational hours or 185 steaming days. 

How will this impact the Coast Guard’s ability to conduct critical missions, such 

as drug interdiction and migrant interdiction? 

Answer. The fleet of WHECs is achieving approximately 140 of their programmed 

185 patrol days per year, which is unsustainable for the long-term as the costs to 

keep these vessels operational continually increase. The Coast Guard is currently 

expending more than three times what is budgeted to maintain them with diminishing returns on investment. The Coast Guard will replace these assets with NSCs 

as soon as possible. 

NSCs offer improved capability over the legacy WHECs. Currently, there are two 

NSCs in service—U.S. Coast Guard cutter (USCGC) Bertholf and USCGC Waesche. In April 2011, USCGC Bertholf commenced its first patrol in the Bering Sea. 

USCGC Waesche is currently completing ready for operations testing and evaluation, and will be ready to join the fleet very soon. USCGC Stratton is nearly complete and we anticipate it will be ready for operations in spring 2013. The introduction of NSCs will improve operational availability of the major cutter fleet as aged 

and obsolete WHECs are decommissioned. 

The Coast Guard will leverage these and the remaining WHECs and medium endurance cutters (WMECs) to meet all statutory mission requirements, including 

drug and migrant interdiction. 

BUDGET PLANNING

Question. The Coast Guard’s Blueprint for Continuous Improvement includes an 

action item that the Coast Guard develop a list of priorities for major acquisitions. 

What steps has the Coast Guard taken to develop this priority list, and how will 

the Coast Guard use it? 

Will the Coast Guard’s acquisition, resources, and capabilities directorates all be 

involved equally? 

What additional major investments are on the horizon that will need to be 

factored into Coast Guard acquisition budgets over the next 5 years? 

Answer. The Coast Guard’s Acquisition Blueprint requires completion of a project 

priority list to assist with management of acquisition resources and activities within 

the Acquisition Directorate. The assigned completion date for the acquisition project 

priority list is fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

A separate but linked resource governance process, overseen by the Coast Guard’s 

most senior leadership, is used to prioritize resources needs including requests for 

acquisition, construction and improvements (AC&I) funding, across the entire service. This is an ongoing effort, and is part of the Coast Guard’s planning, programming, budgeting, and execution cycle. Coast Guard recapitalization priorities are included in the fiscal years 2012–2016 Capital Investment Plan (CIP). 

Yes, the linked resource governance process, overseen by the Coast Guard’s most 

senior leadership with equal representation across all Coast Guard directorates, is 

used to prioritize resources needs including requests for AC&I funding, across the 

entire service. 

Based on the best available information used to develop the Coast Guard’s fiscal 

years 2012–2016 CIP, there are no new assets expected to join the major acquisition 

queue beyond those that are already specified in the Coast Guard’s Program of 

Record. 

FAST RESPONSE CUTTER

Question. If fiscal year 2012 funding is provided for four FRCs, instead of six as 

requested, would that increase the costs of each FRC? What would be the increased 

cost per ship? 

Answer. Yes. Overall, the average cost increase per hull is approximately $5 million, including production costs, economic price adjustments associated with spare 

parts, antecedent liabilities, and other scalable program costs (e.g., project management, testing, certification, etc.). 

VESSEL SECURITY

Question. Please describe Coast Guard activities (assets used, location, and associated costs) in support of the mission to protect tankers and other vessels in foreign 

waters. 
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Answer. The Coast Guard conducts domestic operations to protect tankers or 

other vessels in or near U.S. ports. However, it does not have the authority to conduct such operations in foreign waters. The primary responsibility for the protection 

of tankers and other vessels in foreign waters is the port state receiving these vessels. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

Question. Admiral Papp, the fiscal year 2012 budget justification documents indicate that the United States will remove one of our heavy polar icebreakers from 

service and return to contracting with other nations for icebreaking operations. As 

the melting of the polar ice caps in the summer months reveals new natural resources, navigational routes and introduces new national security considerations, 

the United States will be subcontracting critical icebreaking duties with nations 

who may ultimately be in direct competition with us for these resources. Furthermore, we continue to operate without a comprehensive assessment or a workable 

plan to address this lack of a strategic asset. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request indicates that ‘‘[t]o help define the capability 

that is needed to meet long-term Federal needs in the changing Arctic environment, 

Coast Guard will participate in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-led 

interagency working group, funded in fiscal year 2012 to develop final requirements 

for acquisition of the 21st century icebreaking capability.’’ As far back as 2008, the 

Coast Guard has indicated that it is assessing the United States’ national interests 

in the arctic regions and the corresponding capabilities needed in the region. Most 

notable among these efforts is the High Latitude Study, which the Coast Guard has 

not yet released. 

What is the status of the High Latitude Study, as well as the polar business case 

analysis, and is there a timeframe when these reports will be completed and available? 

What are the key differences between the composition of and the anticipated outcomes of this working group and the various studies, including the High Latitude 

Study, that the Coast Guard has already been tasked to produce? 

Answer. The Coast Guard’s contractor has completed the High Latitude Study 

and it will be transmitted to the Congress to meet the reporting requirement set 

forth in Public Law 111–281. In accordance with Public Law 111–281, the Coast 

Guard is conducting a polar business case analysis. 

The High Latitude Study is a Coast Guard-sponsored assessment of Arctic and 

Antarctic mission requirements, including the polar icebreaking needs. 

The DHS-led acquisition analysis will consider the icebreaking requirements 

across the Government and analyze agency-specific solutions, such as those identified by the High Latitude Study, to determine whether a coordinated acquisition of 

new icebreaking capability would provide greater benefit to the Nation. The analysis 

will consider a broader set of alternatives, including the mode of icebreaker operation and functional ownership across the Federal Government. The results of this 

effort will produce the acquisition strategy and funding plan for procuring 21st century icebreaking capability. 

Question. The Coast Guard anticipates relying on foreign nations to perform icebreaking duties, some of which may be in competition with the United States for 

energy resources, fishing rights, navigational lanes, and national security. This is 

not the first time that the United States has been forced to rely on foreign nations. 

In the past, what was the annual cost to the United States to contract polar 

icebreaking services with a foreign entity? 

What is the estimated annual cost for this activity under the President’s budget 

proposal? 

In previous testimony, Secretary Napolitano referenced two countries with which 

we could contract our icebreaking operations. Would you please advise the subcommittee of the two countries by name and give us your assessment of any conflicting interests they may have with the United States in the polar regions, specifically referencing energy resources, navigation, fishing rights, and national security? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has not historically contracted polar icebreaking services with a foreign entity. The National Science Foundation (NSF) has done so the 

past 4 years to provide the McMurdo break-out in Antarctica in support of scientific 

activities and for other scientific studies, and for scientific studies in the Arctic 

Ocean. 

There are no funds included in the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2012 budget proposal 

to lease foreign icebreakers. Specific questions on icebreaker leasing should be directed to NSF. 
190 

The two countries referenced by Secretary Napolitano are Russia and Sweden. No 

U.S. agency has contracted polar icebreaking services to perform duties, to the extent they exist, related to energy resources, fishing rights, navigational lanes, and 

national security. The Coast Guard is not in a position to comment on specific competing interests that foreign countries may have with the United States in the Arctic. This question would be better addressed by the State Department. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Question. Please describe the ways in which the Coast Guard is involved in response to the ongoing Mississippi River flooding. 

Answer. The Coast Guard continues to conduct statutory missions on the Western 

Rivers and respond to ongoing flooding events. To date, the Coast Guard has activated 47 reservists to support 2011 flood response operations. During the most recent Mississippi River flooding, the Coast Guard has deployed assets (e.g., personnel, boats, aircraft) in support of Search and Rescue (SAR), Marine Environmental Response (MER), and Aids to Navigation (ATON) missions. The Coast Guard 

is coordinating with Federal, State, local, and tribal organizations to render assistance to persons in distress, as well as to protect property. 

The Coast Guard Marine Transportation Recovery Unit (MTSRU) monitored impacts and kept the maritime industry appraised and briefed on developments 

through the dissemination of a daily summary report. The Coast Guard was very 

proactive in coordinating all potential actions with industry through daily River Industry Executive Task Force, New Orleans Port Coordination Team, and Lower Mississippi River Commission conference calls. 

Additionally, Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTP) are continually reviewing 

and implementing, when necessary, safety zones. The COTP are also issuing marine 

safety information bulletins to ensure the safe navigation of marine traffic. The 

Coast Guard continues to monitor the water levels and is implementing river closures and re-openings, as appropriate, and working closely with the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers as they manage their responsibilities for flood control. 

Question. Please describe the ways in which Coast Guard assets were used to respond to the Deepwater Horizon incident. 

Answer. The Coast Guard was involved in every phase of the response to the 

Deepwater Horizon incident, including the initial SAR response. Sixty Coast Guard 

vessels were used to respond to the Deepwater Horizon incident. These vessels included 210-foot and 270-foot WMECs, sea-going and coastal buoy tenders, 

icebreaking tugs, and patrol boats. After the explosion, Coast Guard vessels were 

engaged in SAR operations. When operations shifted from rescue to oil spill response, Coast Guard vessels were used in the recovery of oil, using onboard assets 

such as the Spilled Oil Recovery System (SORS) and Vessel of Opportunity Skimming System (VOSS). 

Twenty-two Coast Guard aircraft, including long- and medium-range surveillance 

aircraft and short- and medium-range helicopters, were used to respond to the Deepwater Horizon incident. Initially, as with Coast Guard vessels, Coast Guard aircraft 

were used in SAR operations, evacuating injured crew members and searching for 

missing crew members. During the aircraft SAR operations, the first evidence of oil 

sheen was observed. Coast Guard aircraft were then used for surveillance, oil spotting, and overflights. 

More than 7,000 Coast Guard personnel, including active duty, reserve, auxiliary, 

and civilians, participated in all phases of the response. Today, almost 200 Coast 

Guard personnel continue to support oil spill recovery operations in the gulf. Coast 

Guard personnel were involved in SAR operations, Incident Command System (ICS) 

coordination and staffing, oversight of offshore and onshore cleanup activities, public 

affairs, coordination with Federal, State, and local officials, and many other aspects 

of the response. Specialized personnel and equipment were also deployed from the 

Coast Guard’s National Strike Force and other deployable support forces. 

Question. Are there any particular stories of heroic activities by your men and 

women during the Deepwater Horizon response that you would like to share with 

the subcommittee? 

Answer. Yes. In particular, the Coast Guard would like to share the story of the 

first men and women on the scene of the Deepwater Horizon incident—helicopter 

pilot Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Tom Hickey, Coast Guard rescue swimmer 

Aviation Survival Technician Third Class (AST3) Dustin Bernatovich and the air 

crews of Coast Guard number (CGNR) helicopters 6605, 6508, and 6576. The following is a summary of their actions on the evening of April 20, 2010, following the 
191 

catastrophic explosion on the Deepwater Horizon mobile offshore drilling unit, 110 

miles southeast of New Orleans, Louisiana. 

After a failure of the rig’s drilling systems 5,000 feet below the sea surface, a rush 

of oil and flammable gas surfaced and ignited the platform, ultimately crippling the 

structure, killing 11 and forcing workers onboard to abandon the rig. The aircrews 

aboard the CGNR 6605, 6508, and 6576, led by LCDR Hickey, immediately assumed 

on-scene coordinator duties for numerous aircraft and vessels converging on the disaster site. They quickly determined that the offshore supply vessel Damon B. 

Bankston had embarked 115 rig workers in need of rescue. Rescue swimmer AST3 

Bernatovich was deployed to the vessel, and LCDR Hickey then tasked seven additional arriving aircraft to conduct search patterns around the rig, and sequenced 

helicopters to the Damon B. Bankston to evacuate the most severely wounded victims. Despite 600-foot flames, explosions on the rig, and intense heat felt in the 

cabin, the crews of the CGNR 6605, 6508, and 6576 made numerous low passes 

within 150 feet of the rig to search for any possible survivors as the rescue swimmer 

conducted triage of the injured mariners. While communicating constantly with the 

other aircraft, LCDR Hickey provided critical safety pilot duties as Coast Guard helicopters hoisted five survivors and transferred them to awaiting paramedics back at 

Air Station New Orleans. The leadership and superior actions of LCDR Hickey, 

AST3 Banatovich, and the aircrews of the CGNR 6605, 6508, and 6576 ensured the 

success of a major rescue operation, which saved 14 lives and assisted 101 others. 

Question. If the Congress provided you with the flexibility of multi-year procurement authority and then adequate follow-on appropriations, could it provide for savings to the taxpayer in the acquisition of NCSs Nos. 6–8? 

Answer. We cannot execute the NSC project under a multi-year procurement construct given the current NSC contract structure. 

Question. What are the specific advantages of purchasing long-lead time materials 

(LLTM) in advance of the construction of a Coast Guard vessel? 

Answer. Purchasing these materials in advance allows for optimal sequencing of 

production activities by ensuring that LLTM will be on hand when needed. 

Question. The Congress provided funding to complete NSC No. 5 in fiscal year 

2011, rather than in fiscal year 2012 as assumed in the budget request. Understanding this change, if the Congress were to instead provide funding for LLTM for 

NSC No. 6 in fiscal year 2012, would the Coast Guard be able to purchase these 

materials in fiscal year 2012 and take advantage of the resulting efficiencies? 

Answer. If NSC No. 6 were fully funded in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard could 

award NSC No. 6 LLTM in fiscal year 2012. 

Question. Could you characterize the current operations and maintenance costs 

associated with the WHECs you plan to retire as you acquire NSCs? 

Answer. The programmed cost to operate and maintain each WHEC is approxi- mately $20 million. Of the $20 million, $1.2 million is programmed for depot level 

maintenance. In fiscal year 2010, the WHEC fleet expended, on average, $3.96 million per hull on depot level maintenance, or $2.76 million above programmed levels. 

Question. Do the Bertholf’s recent operations around Alaska provide you with additional confidence in the NSC’s ability to operate in arctic areas of responsibility? 

Answer. Yes. The U.S. Coast Guard cutter (USCGC) Bertholf’s current Alaskan 

patrol has subjected the cutter to 20-foot seas, 60 knot winds and temperatures 

below freezing, all testing the NSC’s operational capabilities in Arctic sea conditions. USCGC Bertholf’s economical propulsion plant and enhanced endurance allowed for 24 days at sea without replenishment and provided for sustained cutter 

presence offshore. The large flight deck and stable sea keeping capabilities allowed 

for a broad weather envelope to launch and recover aircraft, and also supported 

more than 20 safe and effective law enforcement boardings in seas up to 8 feet. The 

Coast Guard is very pleased with the operational performance of the NSC in the 

Bering Sea thus far. 

Question. I understand that the Coast Guard has been analyzing various unmanned aerial systems to determine which existing systems might provide a solution for both your land-based and ship-based aerial missions. What added capabilities and cost avoidance could these unmanned systems provide that current manned 

aircraft platforms are not providing? 

Answer. Aircraft persistence; sensor payloads; and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) suites 

unique to unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) are expected to significantly increase 

maritime surveillance and detection capability for strategic and tactical commanders. Additionally, unmanned capabilities may permit the Coast Guard to employ airborne sensors when and where they are needed most, and for extended periods, regardless of risks that would prevent the employment of manned aircraft (e.g., 

areas where chemical, biological, radioactive, and other hazards are present). Fi-
192 

nally, UASs allow more versatile manned aircraft to be employed elsewhere to maximize mission outcomes. By one estimate, the UAS has a lower life-cycle cost when 

compared to manned aircraft operations (‘‘Cost Comparison Potential of Coast 

Guard Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Coast Guard Manned Aircraft Systems’’ 

study, prepared by Wyle Laboratories, Inc., in support of the Coast Guard Office of 

Aviation Acquisition (CG–931), in August 2010). This study estimates a cost per 

flight hour savings of 15 percent for ship-based UAS as compared to the H–65 and 

50 percent for land-based UAS, as compared to C–130H. 

Question. Do you believe that it is important to make these assets available to 

the Coast Guard as soon as possible? 

Answer. Yes. The UAS acquisition is a significant component of the Coast Guard’s 

solution to eliminate the current MPA gap. However, while UAS is a priority for 

the Coast Guard, the highest priorities of Coast Guard Air Domain are to extend 

current aircraft service life, enhance the capability of current airframes, and recapitalize aged and obsolete air assets. 

Question. What specific funds are requested in the fiscal year 2012 budget that 

would move the Coast Guard closer to the acquisition of its own unmanned aerial 

assets? 

Answer. The Coast Guard continues to advance its plan for UAS acquisition 

through its partnerships with other Government agencies that are developing and 

implementing the UAS concept of operations. In 2012, Coast Guard will apply multiyear funds to continue its UAS acquisition research projects. 

Question. What is the Coast Guard’s assessment of SouthCom’s Project Cazador, 

which was carried out in cooperation with Panama? 

Answer. The Coast Guard did not have any direct involvement with the planning 

and execution phases of Project Cazador; this was a SouthCom-led initiative that 

occurred in summer 2010 over a 120-day period. The project was conducted in cooperation with Panama and provided additional Detection and Monitoring (D&M) 

capacity along the littorals of Panama. The program complemented Joint Interagency Task Force South’s D&M efforts that occurred further offshore, which the 

Coast Guard plays a substantial role in. Initiatives such as Project Cazador are considered of high value to the Coast Guard given the synergy with the aforementioned 

Coast Guard operations. The UAS, Heron I, was demonstrated during Project 

Cazador. Coast Guard personnel deployed to observe Heron I gained valuable UAS 

experience. It was observed that Heron I’s slow cruise speed is both a strength and 

weakness. It was observed that Heron I is very capable of long-endurance missions 

in limited areas or over a specific target. When attempting to classify and identify 

targets at the outer edge of its radar range, it was observed that airspeed was a 

limiting factor. As such, Heron I would likely have limited operational effectiveness 

when patrolling the extensive smuggling routes south of Panama. 

Question. How do the illicit cargo interdicted during Project Cazador compare to 

amounts seized in recent Coast Guard operations? 

Answer. During the same 4-month period (June 2010 through September 2010), 

the Coast Guard sized 28 metric tons (MT) of cocaine in the transit zone, while 

Project Cazador seized a total of 10 MT of cocaine. 

Question. If Coast Guard assets had not been tied up responding so bravely to the 

Deepwater Horizon incident, do you believe Project Cazador would have yielded additional interdiction of illicit cargo? 

Answer. Project Cazador could have possibly yielded additional interdictions had 

the Coast Guard not diverted assets to support Deepwater Horizon operations. During much of Deepwater Horizon, Airborne Use of Force (AUF) helicopters were diverted from counter drug deployments to support the response efforts. In one specific case, a Project Cazador detection and monitoring asset located and tracked a 

‘‘go-fast’’ in the Western Caribbean near Costa Rica. A Coast Guard cutter conducting a Joint Interagency Task Force South patrol was diverted to intercept the 

‘‘go-fast’’, which was suspected of trafficking cocaine. The Coast Guard cutter did not 

have an AUF capable helicopter deployed onboard, and the ‘‘go-fast’’ evaded the cutter and escaped into Costa Rican territorial waters. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LISA MURKOWSKI

COAST GUARD MARITIME COVERAGE IN ALASKA

Question. In Alaska, we are very concerned with the President’s decision to decommission another high endurance cutter (WHEC) in the fiscal year 2012 budget. 

Given the vast maritime environment that the Coast Guard is responsible for protecting in Alaska, I am concerned that the decommissioning of these cutters will 
193 

have significantly negative impacts on the safety and security of the Alaskan commercial fishing industry. The Coast Guard is tasked with conducting operations in 

Alaska that encompasses more than 3.8 million square miles, which is larger than 

the land mass of the continental United States, and more than 33,000 miles of 

coastline. With the Alaskan fishing industry producing more than 50 percent of the 

national fishing totals each year, the cumulative loss of another cutter from the 

Coast Guard’s fleet could place a significant portion of the Alaskan fishing fleet that 

routinely operate in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska in danger as well as preventing the Coast Guard from effectively ensuring that the safety and commercial 

fisheries regulations are adequately enforced. 

Previously you testified that the Coast Guard was committed to a plan to recapitalize the current WHEC fleet with new NSCs, an effort that was designed to maintain current cutter coverage levels while quickly bringing the new class of cutters 

online. However, the fiscal year 2012 proposed budget does not have any funding 

for long-lead time materials (LLTM) for the sixth NSC. During Secretary 

Napolitano’s fiscal year 2012 budget hearing in March, she emphasized her commitment to building out eight NSCs. NSC No. 5 is now fully funded. However, I note 

that there is no funding for NSC No. 6 in the fiscal year 2012 request. The Coast 

Guard previously funded LLTM for the NSC in advance of production. Would the 

total cost of NSC No. 6 be reduced if LLTM are funded in fiscal year 2012 versus 

fiscal year 2013? If so, by how much? Also, what plan do you have in place to assure 

that there is adequate cutter coverage in Alaska? 

As you are aware, there are only seven HH–60 helicopters in Alaska—four in Kodiak and three in Sitka. These assets, given their durability in harsh weather environments, are essential to the Coast Guard’s ability to rescue those in need in Alaska. However, each year helicopters are repositioned in Alaska to cover the fishing 

fleets in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. That repositioning moves assets from 

other Coast Guard facilities, leaving those areas with resource gaps. What is the 

Coast Guard’s plan to close this aviation resource gap? Does the Coast Guard have 

the aviation assets it requires to complete is missions in Alaska and the rest of the 

United States? 

Answer. If NSC No. 6 were fully funded in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard could 

award NSC No. 6 LLTM in fiscal year 2012. The possibility for total cost savings 

would depend on several factors. 

The Coast Guard has a proud history of serving the maritime interests in Alaska 

and will continue to do so, including maintaining a major flight deck equipped cutter presence in the Bering Sea. The NSC will replace the aging and obsolete WHECs 

and provide greater operational availability to the fleet of major cutters. NSCs are 

already having an operational impact. In fact, the first NSC, USCGC Bertholf (maritime security cutter large (WMSL) 750), commenced its first patrol in Alaska in 

April 2011. Additionally, USCGC Waesche (WMSL 751), also home-ported on the 

west coast, will be ready for operations by November 2011 and available for worldwide assignment. Moreover, USCGC Stratton (WMSL 752) will be delivered in September 2011 and ready for operations in spring 2013. Patrolling Alaskan waters remains a high priority and the Coast Guard is committed to providing coverage to 

meet the most-pressing operational needs, including coverage for missions in the 

Bering Sea. 

The Coast Guard has partnered with the U.S. Navy Sundown program to receive, 

at no cost, retired H–60F model airframes, which can be converted to Coast Guard 

MH–60T helicopters. Funding was provided in the Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs 

Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–222) to convert one Navy H–60F airframe to a Coast 

Guard MH–60T helicopter as a replacement for one of two HH–60J Coast Guard 

helicopters (CGNR 6028 and 6017) lost in operational crashes. This conversion is 

expected to be completed in November 2011. Funding has been requested in the 

Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2012 budget to convert a second H–60F airframe, completing the restoration of HH–60 capacity. The Coast Guard continues to balance 

rotary wing needs based on operational risks, which is why the Coast Guard continues to rotate HH–60s to Alaska during critical fishing and crabbing seasons. 

Of the four rotary-wing aircraft lost due to mishaps in the past 3 years, to date 

one has been funded for replacement, and the second is requested in the fiscal year 

2012 President’s budget. With these planned replacements, there remains a two aircraft gap in the aviation fleet. However, the Coast Guard moves assets to ensure 

coverage for highest priority missions. 

CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS

Senator LANDRIEU. The subcommittee stands in recess, subject to 

the call of the Chair. 
194 

[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., Tuesday, May 10, the hearings were 

concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.] 
(195) 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES 

[The following testimonies were received by the Subcommittee on 

Homeland Security for inclusion in the record. The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2012 budget request for programs 

within the subcommittee’s jurisdiction.] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION

OVERVIEW

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity 

to submit written testimony to the subcommittee on the fiscal year 2012 funding 

needs for public transportation security within the budgets of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) State and local grants program, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Transportation Sector Network Management Mass Transit Division, and throughout the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) urges the Congress 

to increase appropriations for the fiscal year 2012 Rail and Public Transportation 

Security grants within the FEMA State and local grants. Past appropriations have 

not come close to the levels authorized under the Implementing Recommendations 

of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110–53). We appreciate the funding 

that the Congress has provided to date, but at the recent levels, grant allocations 

to regions, and ultimately the awards to the individual transit agencies are inadequate. 

Recent cuts to the public transportation security grant program continue a disappointing trend on support for surface transportation security programs. These 

grants are critical to transit agencies in meeting security improvement needs. Transit provides 18 times as many passenger trips as aviation, but aviation receives 12 

times as much security funding as surface transportation security. Spending per 

passenger for transit security is 4 cents; for aviation it’s $8.67. Aviation security receives 215 times as much Federal funding per passenger as transit. Threats to public transportation continue to exist as we were reminded again last week with the 

terrorist bombing of the subway in Minsk, Belarus. Public transportation security 

investment should be increased, not decreased and I urge the Congress to find the 

resources to appropriate to levels consistent with those authorized in the 9/11 Commission Act. 

ABOUT APTA

APTA is a nonprofit international association of nearly 1,500 public and privatemember organizations, including transit systems and commuter, intercity and highspeed rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product and 

service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and State departments 

of transportation. APTA members serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical public transportation services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using public transportation in the United States and Canada are 

served by APTA-member systems. In accordance with the National Infrastructure 
196 

Protection Plan, APTA is recognized by DHS as serving in the capacity of the Mass 

Transit Sector Coordinating Council. 

GREATER INVESTMENTS IN TRANSIT SECURITY ARE REQUIRED

Safety and security have always been the top priority of the public transportation 

industry. Since 9/11, transit systems have taken many steps to further improve security. Public transit agencies with State and local governments, have invested billions of dollars on security and emergency preparedness programs. While we recognize that as an open public infrastructure there are limitations on what specific 

steps can be taken to secure transit facilities and operations, I want to emphasize 

that there are still many steps that must be taken and many security improvements 

that can be made to improve the security of our systems and enhance the safety 

of our Nation’s transit riders. 

I have testified on numerous occasions of the well-established and significant 

risks that transportation and public transportation specifically, continue to face. As 

detailed below, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Mineta Transportation Institute have chronicled the history of attacks on public transportation 

and the members of the subcommittee are certainly well aware of the history of attacks and the thwarted plots and continuing investigations that clearly make the 

case. However, the Congress continues to look at the issue of transportation security 

in the rigid structure of agency budget silos. I urge the subcommittee to evaluate 

the modal security needs independent of history or agency budget structure. While 

$5.1 billion in budgetary resources are directed toward aviation security within the 

budget of the TSA, the priority budget for public transportation is within the FEMA 

State and local programs account. The Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) is 

the principal source of security assistance for transit agencies and these grant funds 

can do more to enhance security than additional funds directed to the Federal agencies. At a level of $250 million in fiscal year 2011, the commitment to surface transportation security does not register a fair comparison, even when including the TSA 

Surface Transportation account and excluding aviation security fees. The Congress 

seems to have locked Rail and Public Transportation Security grants into a budgetary pattern that is not based in any true evaluation of risk or need. 

As I have testified previously, a study released by APTA in 2010 showed U.S. 

transit security needs nationwide at $6.4 billion. Despite billions of dollars already 

invested from Federal, State, and local sources, these needs persist as our understanding of risk, consequence, response and recovery has changed, and technology 

and operational approaches are also different today. 

Despite wide recognition of the risk to surface transportation and public transportation security, only $1.25 billion of the $3.4 billion authorized by the 9/11 act for 

public transportation security improvements has been appropriated. That legislation 

authorized $3.4 billion and authorized additional funding for the security of rail carriers (freight, passenger, and commuter rail) over a 4-year period. Again, we find 

ourselves asking, why are important public transportation security needs going unfunded? 

In 2010, Americans took more than 10.2 billion transit trips. People use public 

transportation vehicles more than 35 million times each weekday. As previously 

stated, this is 18 times the number of daily boardings on the Nation’s domestic airlines. The consequences of a successful terrorist attack on a single high-capacity 

urban rail system during peak travel time will result in a devastating number of 

fatalities and injuries. It will have a crippling affect on the economy of that entire 

metropolitan area, with a potential ripple effect nationwide. We cannot avoid talking about the consequences, as the resources are not being dedicated where our 

needs truly exist. 

TRANSIT SECURITY NEEDS ARE REAL AND REQUIRE ATTENTION

As we have stated before, and as the members of this subcommittee well know, 

authoritative sources have acknowledged that the risk to public transportation systems is real, and it has not diminished: 

—GAO released a 2002 report stating ‘‘about one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most 

commonly attacked.’’ 

—In 2007, GAO reported to the Congress that ‘‘the characteristics of some passenger rail systems—high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)— 

make them attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for mass 

casualties and economic damage and disruption.’’ 
197 

—On February 29, 2008, the Office of Intelligence of TSA released a report concluding that public transportation in America remains vulnerable to terrorist 

attack. The report states: ‘‘The volume of previous attacks and recent plotting 

against mass transit systems overseas demonstrates continued strong terrorist 

interest in targeting this sector.’’ The report further states that: ‘‘Previous rail 

attacks in Madrid, London, and Mumbai could inspire terrorists to conduct 

similar attacks in the United States.’’ 

—On September 30, 2009, the Honorable Michael E. Leiter, Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center, testified in the Senate that ‘‘al-Qa‘ida continues to 

pursue plans for Homeland attacks and is likely focusing on prominent political, 

economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among 

the population. The group also likely remains interested in targeting mass transit systems, and other public venues, viewed as relatively soft targets as evidenced by past al-Qa‘ida attacks in London.’’ 

—The federally funded and chartered, independent Mineta Transportation Institute has collected data on worldwide terror incidents and found more than 2,000 

separate attacks on surface transportation—1,223 involving bombs and incendiaries—since 1970. These attacks caused 6,190 deaths and approximately 19,000 

injuries. 

This history calls for continued vigilance and continued investments in surface 

transportation security. 

GRANT PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND OTHER RESOURCE NEEDS

We once again ask that the subcommittee include language that directs DHS to 

award funds directly to transit agencies and prohibits DHS from imposing a local 

match requirement, consistent with congressional intent expressed in the conference 

report of the 9/11 act. APTA has no objection to language included in the fiscal year 

2010 conference report which directed FEMA to allow transit agencies to permit 

States to act as subgrantees. We believe that as long as transit agencies affirmatively choose to have their grants administered by their State administrative agencies, they should have that option. 

Fiscal Year 2011 TSGP Grant Guidance 

It is important that we emphasize here that there exist significant concerns 

among our Nation’s transit providers concerning the direction of the draft fiscal year 

2011 TSGP Grant Guidance. APTA believes that a proposal to shift the grant program to an approach that targets a pre-designated list of specific critical infrastructures is ill-advised, and would preclude important system-wide security improvements, while also undermining the regional collaboration that exists under the current grant program. APTA and its members have urged the TSA to reconsider this 

proposal. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, once again we find ourselves calling attention to another major 

terrorist attack against mass transit riders. The deadly bombing of the subway in 

Minsk, Belarus has left security experts confused given the lack of significant ethnic 

or religious divides, nor history of violent political upheaval. Yet, unknown terrorists 

chose to set off a bomb in a crowded metro station in Minsk last week killing 12 

people and wounding more than 150. We urge the subcommittee to never forget the 

several foiled plots against U.S. public transportation systems and the attacks on 

Madrid’s commuter trains, on London’s subways, or the seven bombs on Mumbai’s 

commuter trains. Those three international incidents alone resulted in 452 deaths 

and 3,000 injuries. We should not ignore those potential incidents that we have been 

fortunate to thwart here in the United States and we urge the Congress to recognize 

the need for continued vigilance in surface transportation security, by appropriating 

funds consistent with the levels authorized under the 9/11 Commission Act. 

I thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify and we look forward to 

working with you and the Congress to advance our mutual goals of safety and security for the traveling public. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION

OVERVIEW

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony to the subcommittee on the fiscal year 2011 funding needs for public transportation security 
198 

within the budgets of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) State 

and local grants program, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 

Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) Mass Transit Division, and 

throughout the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The American Public 

Transportation Association (APTA) asks the subcommittee to provide appropriations 

for the fiscal year 2011 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) in the amount of 

$1.1 billion, the level authorized under the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110–53). We appreciate the funding that 

this subcommittee has provided, but at the recent levels, grant allocations to regions, and ultimately the awards to the individual transit agencies have limited 

what projects can be pursued and implemented. We urge the Congress to find the 

resources to appropriate the levels authorized in the 9/11 act. 

ABOUT APTA

APTA is a nonprofit international association of nearly 1,500 public and privatemember organizations, including transit systems and commuter, intercity, and highspeed rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product and 

service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and State departments 

of transportation. APTA members serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical public transportation services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using public transportation in the United States and Canada are 

served by APTA-member systems. In accordance with the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan, APTA is recognized by DHS as serving in the capacity of the Mass 

Transit Sector Coordinating Council. 

GREATER INVESTMENTS IN TRANSIT SECURITY ARE REQUIRED

As I will discuss later in my testimony, it is well established that transportation 

and public transportation specifically, continue to face significant security risks. One 

only needs to look to the recent attacks in Moscow and the ongoing investigation 

and prosecution of conspirators in New York to be reminded of this. Safety and security have always been the top priority of the public transportation industry. Since 

9/11, transit systems have taken many steps to further improve security. Public 

transit agencies with State and local governments, have invested billions of dollars 

on security and emergency preparedness programs. While we recognize that as an 

open public infrastructure there are limitations on what specific steps can be taken 

to secure transit facilities and operations, I want to emphasize that there are still 

many steps that must be taken and many security improvements that can be made 

to improve the security of our systems and enhance the safety of our Nation’s transit riders. 

In 2009, APTA conducted a new survey of U.S. transit agencies to update their 

security investment needs and their experience with the current program. The results of the survey demonstrate that security investment needs persist nationwide, 

with total needs for all transit agencies exceeding $6.4 billion. Our previous survey 

in 2004 identified needs in excess of $6 billion. Despite billions of dollars already 

invested from Federal, State, and local sources, it is important to understand that 

facilities have changed and expanded; our understanding of risk, consequence, response, and recovery has changed; and technology and operational approaches are 

also different than they were in 2004. 

The Congress recognized the need to enhance the focus of DHS on surface transportation and public transportation security when it enacted the 9/11 act. That legislation authorized $3.4 billion for public transportation security improvements, and 

authorized additional funding for the security of rail carriers (freight, passenger, 

and commuter rail) over a 4-year period. And yet, over the period covered by the 

9/11 act authorizations, only $1.25 billion of the $3.4 billion authorized has been appropriated, and even less has ultimately been directed in grants to transit agencies. 

This is simply unacceptable. We must increase investments and meet our security 

needs now—before we are forced to ask the question ‘‘what could have been done?’’ 

The legislation also set in place a number of the structural elements that APTA 

and the Nation’s transit systems continue to emphasize as priorities, including 

broad eligibility for capital and operational improvements, a rejection of a ‘‘one-size 

fits all’’ approach to transit security, a recognition of the open nature of transit facilities and services, interagency coordination between DHS and the Department of 

Transportation (DOT), consultation and coordination at all levels of government and 

with industry stakeholders, and support for information sharing and intelligence 

analysis, standard development, and research and technology development. 
199 

TRANSIT SECURITY NEEDS ARE REAL AND REQUIRE ATTENTION

As we have stated before, and as the members of this subcommittee well know, 

authoritative sources have acknowledged that the risk to public transportation systems is real, and it has not diminished: 

—The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a 2002 report stating 

‘‘about one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, 

and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked.’’ 

—In 2007, GAO reported to the Congress that ‘‘the characteristics of some passenger rail systems—high ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)— 

make them attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for mass 

casualties and economic damage and disruption.’’ 

—On February 29, 2008, the Office of Intelligence of TSA released a report concluding that public transportation in America remains vulnerable to terrorist 

attack. The report states: ‘‘The volume of previous attacks and recent plotting 

against mass transit systems overseas demonstrates continued strong terrorist 

interest in targeting this sector.’’ The report further states that: ‘‘Previous rail 

attacks in Madrid, London, and Mumbai could inspire terrorists to conduct 

similar attacks in the United States.’’ 

—On September 30, 2009, the Honorable Michael E. Leiter, Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center testified in the Senate that ‘‘al-Qa‘ida continues to 

pursue plans for Homeland attacks and is likely focusing on prominent political, 

economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among 

the population. The group also likely remains interested in targeting mass transit systems, and other public venues, viewed as relatively soft targets as evidenced by past al-Qa‘ida attacks in London.’’ 

—The TSA Office of the Inspector General released a March 2010 report highlighting the need for greater attention by TSA in surface transportation emergency planning and response capabilities. 

—The federally funded and chartered, independent Mineta Transportation Institute has collected data on worldwide terror incidents and found more than 2,000 

separate attacks on surface transportation—1,223 involving bombs and incendiaries—since 1970. These attacks caused 6,190 deaths and approximately 19,000 

injuries. 

DHS has the responsibility to ensure the safety and security. All of the official 

Government and independent analyses of risk and threat cite transportation modes 

as a potential target for terrorism. As a result, it is the mission of the TSA to protect ‘‘the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people 

and commerce.’’ We couldn’t agree more vigorously with that mission statement! 

However, one only needs to look at the TSA Web site to realize that the agency continues to focus in a sizable and disproportionate manner on one mode of transportation above all others. There is no mention of surface transportation anywhere to 

be found at the forefront of the TSA Web site. 

Let me be very clear—and we have been consistent in our views on this—no one 

questions the security requirements of our Nation’s aviation system. But the scope 

and scale of the disproportionate attention and dedication of resources to one mode 

of travel over all others is hard to ignore. In 2009, Americans took more than 10.2 

billion transit trips. People use public transportation vehicles more than 35 million 

times each weekday. This is 18 times the number of daily boardings on the Nation’s 

domestic airlines. Make no mistake; a successful terrorist attack on a single high 

capacity urban rail system during peak travel time could result in a devastating 

number of fatalities and injuries. In addition, it would have a crippling affect on the 

economy of that entire metropolitan area, with a potential ripple effect nationwide. 

We do not want to scare anyone, but at the same time we cannot continue to avoid 

talking about the consequences, as the resources are not being dedicated where our 

needs truly exist. 

OTHER PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND RESOURCE NEEDS

We further ask that you again include language that directs DHS to award funds 

directly to transit agencies and prohibits DHS from imposing a local match requirement, consistent with congressional intent expressed in the conference report of the 

9/11 act. APTA has no objection to language included in last year’s conference report 

which directed FEMA to allow transit agencies to permit States to act as subgrantees. We believe that as long as transit agencies affirmatively choose to have 

their grants administered by their State administrative agencies, they should have 

that option. 
200 

We are pleased that many steps have been taken at FEMA and TSA to improve 

the TSGP application and award process, and we appreciate the attention that the 

Congress has placed on the difficulties inherent in this process. However, we urge 

your continued oversight and attention to opportunities to simplify and streamline 

the process. We are hopeful that the oversight efforts of the Congress, which have 

led to recent proposed reforms in the TSGP grant process, will achieve the desired 

results and expedite the delivery of funds to transit agencies with security improvement needs. 

In addition to grant funding, we urge the Congress to provide $600,000 to TSA 

TSNM Mass Transit Division for the continued operations of the Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC). Funding for this program was authorized in the 9/11 act bill under section 1410 (d), which provides for the sharing of 

security information between transit agencies and DHS. The ability to share vital 

information is crucial in preventing and mitigating potential terrorist attacks. We 

have been advised by TSA that resources for the Public Transit ISAC are part of 

the TSA budget for TSNM. Further, a joint industry/government working group 

formed under the auspices of the Mass Transit SCC/Government Coordinating 

Council is currently refining a proposal for security information sharing that would 

look to the PT–ISAC to becoming a permanent, expanded system that would coordinate the dissemination of all relevant security information to the public transit industry. 

We also urge the Congress to provide $500,000 to DHS for the development of 

transit security standards. Over the last several years, APTA has worked closely 

with DOT, DHS, and industry leaders to develop standards that help transit agencies use available resources as effectively as possible. It is our understanding that 

resources are factored into the TSA budget for this continuing effort, but we urge 

the subcommittee to support the TSA in this regard. The ISAC and security standards are two important national programs that, although modest in funding needs, 

can significantly enhance transit security at the local level. 

Finally, with regard to technology research and development, resource allocation 

issues within DHS have failed to adequately address the research and development 

needs of transit. In September 2008, the Mass Transit SCC Security Technology 

Working Group issued draft recommendations which identified concerns over the 

lack of a formal structure that brings the Federal Government and transit industry 

together to discuss transit security technology priorities, needs and areas of potential interest for technology advancement and research. There is a general view that 

TSA research and development, and DHS science and technology do not conduct 

adequate early outreach with the industry to determine needs ahead of actual technology development and deployment efforts. Transit security professionals believe 

that early and active engagement of industry could lead to a better understanding 

of varying transit agency needs, as well as better research and development overall. 

Finally, resources such as technical assistance and the like may be necessary for 

support of transit industry efforts in the area of cybersecurity. Concerns over cybersecurity have increased across the Federal Government and throughout the country 

over recent years, and transit agencies are no different. As significant users of 

power and computerized control systems, cybersecurity will remain a significant 

concern for an industry responsible for the safe and secure movement of 35 million 

daily riders. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, the recent suicide bomb attacks in Moscow provided an unwanted 

but graphic reminder of the threats our industry continues to face. We cannot forget 

the attacks on Madrid’s commuter trains, on London’s subways, or the seven bombs 

on Mumbai’s commuter trains. Those three incidents alone resulted in 452 deaths 

and 3,000 injuries. We should also not ignore those potential incidents that we have 

been fortunate to thwart. More details have emerged about the plans involved in 

the al Qaeda-inspired New York subway bomb plot, and the reports surrounding 

this plot alone should emphasize the need for continued vigilance in surface transportation security. 

I thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify and we look forward to 

working with you and the Congress to advance our mutual goals of safety and security for the traveling public. 
201 

ATTACHMENT, APTA SURVEY OF UNITED STATES TRANSIT SYSTEM SECURITY NEEDS

SUMMARY AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) conducted a survey of 35 

of its transit agency members during 2009 and early 2010 to determine agency security funding requirements, grants received in prior fiscal years, and the projects advanced through prior year grants. The participating transit systems were selected 

from APTA members who are eligible recipients of Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) funding. Additional estimates of national needs were expanded beyond the survey respondents based on the 

portion of transit operations represented by the responding systems in six categories 

that represent equipment, infrastructure, and activity that requires security efforts. 

The principal findings of that survey are: 

—Total security needs far surpass funding provided to date. Transit agency security-related investment needs are $6.4 billion. This amount is a 5-year estimate 

and includes $4.4 billion for transit agency security-related capital investment 

plus $2 billion for security-related personnel and other security-related operational expenses. Federal funding provided in fiscal year 2010 for public transportation security was $253 million. 

—Capital security needs remain a top priority, but many agencies cite operating 

needs. Respondents to the survey estimated capital needs as exceeding operating needs by more than a 3-to-1 ratio. Disparities in priorities between large 

and small systems are indicative of the differences in infrastructure and assets 

requiring protection. Security operations needs are more likely to comprise a 

larger percentage of need for smaller systems. 

—Transit security priorities vary from agency to agency. Survey responses demonstrate that security priorities are unique to each individual agency, just as 

each individual agency’s infrastructure, operations and governance is unique. 

Transit agencies seek more flexibility in the uses of funds and a streamlined 

application process. A broad list of eligible projects formed the basis for the National Transit Systems Security Act of 2007 as contained within the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (Public Law 110–53). 

—Transit security resources are required beyond grant funds. Beyond the grant 

funding sought by transit agencies, resources are needed in a variety of components within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including funding 

for information sharing and intelligence, security standards development, research and technology development, technical assistance, and the broader approaches towards cybersecurity and resiliency (all-hazards response). 

APTA SURVEY OF UNITED STATES TRANSIT SYSTEM SECURITY NEEDS

APTA conducted a survey of 35 of its transit agency members during 2009 and 

early 2010 to determine agency security funding requirements, grants received in 

prior fiscal years, and the projects advanced through prior year grants. The participating transit systems were selected from APTA members who are eligible recipients of FEMA TSGP funding. The sample of systems operates 43.0 percent of all 

transit vehicles that were reported in the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) National Transit Database in 2008, operates 52.4 percent of all revenue vehicle miles, 

operates 64.0 percent of all passenger stations and 62.9 percent of all rail transit 

right-of-way measured by directional-route miles, and carries 71.8 percent of all passenger trips and 68.1 percent of all passenger miles of travel. 

TRANSIT FUNDING NEEDS

Respondents were asked to report their 5-year security funding needs for capital 

and for operations. Table 1 shows those needs as reported by the participating agency and expanded to include other transit agencies. 

TABLE 1.—FIVE-YEAR SECURITY FUNDING NEEDS 

[Millions of dollars] 

Transit systems included in estimate 

Five-year funding needs 

Capital Operating Total 

Respondents to survey for these questions .............................................. 2,204 655 2,859 

Systems eligible for TSGP funds ............................................................... 3,286 1,518 4,804 

All transit agencies in any location .......................................................... 4,419 2,018 6,437 
202 

The security funding needs over the next 5 years for all transit systems are $6.4 billion, $4.4 billion for capital, and $2.0 billion for operating. Among all transit systems eligible for TSGP funding these needs are $4.8 billion, $3.3 billion for capital, 

and $1.5 billion for operations. 

These needs are based on the 34 survey respondents who were able to forecast 

capital funding needs and the 33 who were able to forecast operating funding needs. 

Respondents which provided needs estimates found a total security-related funding 

need of $2.9 billion for their systems, $2.2 billion for capital uses, and $0.7 billion 

for operations. The responses were expanded to estimate needs for other transit 

agencies. The expansions were based on the portion of transit operations represented by the responding systems in six categories that represent equipment, infrastructure, and activity that requires security efforts. These categories are the following: 

—total vehicles operated, 

—vehicle miles in revenue service, 

—unlinked passenger trips, 

—passenger miles, 

—stations, and 

—directional miles of rail routes. 

Data are taken from the 2008 National Transit Database and APTA’s 2009 Public 

Transportation Fact Book. 

APTA published a survey of transit systems security needs in April 2004. That 

survey was used to project security funding needs for the entire transit industry. 

Capital needs to ‘‘maintain, modernize, and expand’’ the security function were $5.2 

billion without a specified time period. Annual operating needs were $800 million 

which included existing security operating expenses. Those needs are most comparable to the $6.4 billion need for all agencies for the next 5 years estimated in 

this survey. 

SECURITY FUNDS RECEIVED DURING THE PAST 3 YEARS

Respondents were asked the amount of funds they received during each of fiscal 

years 2006, 2007, and 2008 for security-related projects regardless of the source. Because these amounts are not expected to be of a similar amount for nonparticipating 

systems in any consistent manner, no funding estimates are made for nonparticipating systems. Transit security grants were also distributed during fiscal years 

2003, 2004, and 2005; however, this survey limited the request to the most recent 

3 fiscal years for ease of reporting. Data regarding fiscal year 2009 grants was not 

available at the time of this survey. 

TABLE 2.—SECURITY PROJECT FUNDING FOR SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 

[Millions of dollars] 

Funding source 

Funding amount for participating systems only 

Fiscal year 2006 Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2008 

TSGP grants ............................................................................................... 103.8 146.3 143.2 

Agency match for TSGP grants ................................................................. 0.6 5.5 4.8 

State, local security grants ....................................................................... 46.6 41.5 41.1 

Agency match for State, local grants ....................................................... 26.7 19.7 18.2 

Total security funding .................................................................. 177.7 213.0 207.3 

USE OF FUNDS DEFINED BY PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS GROUP DESCRIPTIONS

FEMA groups security projects into five categories termed project effectiveness 

group descriptions (PEGD) which are used to prioritize investments. The five groups 

and the project types they include, as described in the fiscal year 2010 Transit Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit December 2009, are: 

—Priority group A, ‘‘training, operational deterrence, drills, and public awareness 

activities’’ which includes: developing security plans; training (basic before follow-on) for security awareness, DHS-approved behavior recognition detection 

courses, counter-surveillance and immediate actions for security threats/incidents; operational deterrence for canine teams, mobile explosives screening 

teams, and anti-terrorism teams; crowd assessment; and public awareness. 

—Priority group B, ‘‘multi-user high-density key infrastructure protection’’ which 

includes: anti-terrorism security enhancement measures, such as intrusion detection, visual surveillance with live monitoring, alarms tied to visual surveil-
203 

lance system, recognition software, tunnel ventilation and drainage system protection, flood gates and plugs, portal lighting, and similar hardening actions for: 

tunnel hardening; high-density elevated operations, multi-user high-density stations, and hardening of supervisory control and data acquisition systems. 

—Priority group C, ‘‘single-user high-density key infrastructure protection’’ which 

includes: anti-terrorism security enhancement measures for high-density stations, and high-density bridges. 

—Priority group D, ‘‘key operating asset protection’’ which includes: physical hardening/security of control centers; secure stored/parked trains, engines, and 

buses; bus/rail yards; and maintenance facilities. 

—Priority group E, ‘‘other mitigation activities’’ which includes interoperable communications, evacuation plans, and anti-terrorism security enhancement measures for low-density stations. 

In addition, larger systems in high-risk areas meeting activity criteria are eligible 

for funding for operational activities with Operational Package (OPack) funds. 

Table 3 reports the number of agencies in the sample which received TSGP funds 

and matching funds for use for each PEGD category for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 

2008 in the columns to the left and the use of funds from other sources in similar 

categories for the same years in the columns to the right. Thirty-five systems answered each question. 

TABLE 3.—USE OF FUNDS BY PEGD CATEGORY 

Project effectiveness group description category 

Use of TSGP—number of grants by 

category 

Use of non-Federal funding sources, 

number of grants using funds by 

category 

Fiscal year 

2006 

Fiscal year 

2007 

Fiscal year 

2008 Fiscal year 

2006 

Fiscal year 

2007 

Fiscal year 

2008 

Training, operational deference, drill, public 

awareness ...................................................... 8 24 20 6 8 8 

Multi-user high-density key infrastructure protection ............................................................ 12 13 16 8 8 8 

Single-user high density key infrastructure protection ............................................................ 7 5 5 5 5 7 

Key operating asset protection .......................... 19 16 11 11 12 10 

Other mitigation activities ................................. 5 6 7 7 9 8 

Operational Packages (OPacks) ......................... ................ 8 5 5 6 5 

USE OF FUNDS BY PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS

Participating transit systems were asked an open-ended question to list examples 

of the types of projects for which they used security funding. The question was repeated for each year for both TSGP and matching funds and State and local funding. Table 4 counts those answers in generalized categories into which they appeared to fit. Not all answers are included and many participants did not answer 

for each year. This table is thus a list of project types and should not be considered 

a count of the number of each project type actually undertaken. 

TABLE 4.—GENERAL TYPES OF PROJECTS REPORTED BY PARTICIPANTS 

Type of project 

Projects implemented—categorized by general types (open-ended question, not all 

systems answered question for each year and not all uses were listed) 

TSGP and matching funds State and local funding 

Fiscal year 

2006 

Fiscal year 

2007 

Fiscal year 

2008 

Fiscal year 

2006 

Fiscal year 

2007 

Fiscal year 

2008 

Closed circuit TV and CCTV support ................. 15 7 10 7 7 7 

Access control .................................................... 5 2 3 2 3 2 

Intrusion/perimeter monitoring/protection .......... 2 6 4 2 4 2 

Chemical detection equipment .......................... 2 ................ ................ ................ ................ ................

Awareness training ............................................. 4 1 2 ................ ................ ................

Behavior recognition software ............................ 1 ................ ................ ................ ................ ................

K–9 related equipment/training ......................... 1 ................ ................ 1 1 2 

Training and exercises ....................................... 7 14 15 ................ ................ 1 

Public awareness ............................................... 1 2 3 ................ ................ ................

Communications improvements and equipment 

upgrades ........................................................ 3 ................ 2 2 1 5 
204 

1 NOTE.—Changes to TSGP administration have been implemented in response to grantee concerns since APTA’s survey was conducted, some of which are reflected in the Fiscal Year 2010 

Grant Guidance. 

TABLE 4.—GENERAL TYPES OF PROJECTS REPORTED BY PARTICIPANTS—Continued 

Type of project 

Projects implemented—categorized by general types (open-ended question, not all 

systems answered question for each year and not all uses were listed) 

TSGP and matching funds State and local funding 

Fiscal year 2006 Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2008 Fiscal year 2006 Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2008 

Tunnel communications ..................................... 1 ................ ................ ................ ................ ................

Security planning ............................................... 1 1 3 ................ 1 ................

Infrastructure protection/fencing/lighting .......... 1 ................ ................ 2 2 3 

Control center and control equipment redundancy/improvement ........................................ 2 1 ................ ................ ................ ................

Tunnel protection and tunnel access equipment ............................................................... 2 3 2 ................ ................ ................

Vehicle location system ...................................... 1 ................ ................ ................ ................ ................

Portal security .................................................... 1 ................ 2 ................ ................ ................

Station security .................................................. 1 1 1 1 1 ................

Passenger information systems ......................... ................ 1 ................ ................ ................ ................

Risk assessment ................................................ ................ 1 3 ................ ................ ................

License plate recognition equipment ................. ................ ................ 1 ................ ................ ................

Electronic security .............................................. ................ ................ 1 ................ ................ ................

Guards, police .................................................... ................ ................ ................ 4 4 4 

USE OF FUNDS VS. ACTUAL NEEDS

It is important to note that survey responses on funding uses should not be seen 

as indicators of transit agency security funding priorities. Instead they are provided 

to simply demonstrate where funding has been spent. APTA and many of its members continue to have concerns that the categorical prioritization of funding within 

the TSGP unnecessarily restricts agencies from applying for security grants for 

projects they would otherwise deem more important to their specific agency security 

mission. The statutory provisions of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/ 

11 Commission Act which outlined the eligible use of funds did so in a broad and 

generic manner in order to specify the wide range of eligible uses, and not in the 

restrictive and prioritized manner prescribed by TSGP grant guidance. 

RESPONDENTS VIEWS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TSGP 1

The administration of the TSGP has been of significant concern to the transit industry over the last several years, with changes to policy and priorities occurring 

each year creating challenges for grantees to implement their own security budgets, 

plans and programs in a consistent manner. APTA’s survey asked open-ended questions regarding grantees views on the TSGP administration. 

Many agencies sought additional availability of funds for operational security 

needs, while other agencies felt the program should be limited to capital security 

improvements. It was widely viewed that TSGP grants should be comprised of 100 

percent Federal funding, so as not to jeopardize important security projects because 

of other budget limitations. Multiple comments were received calling for operating 

and maintenance costs of TSGP-funded equipment to be considered an eligible expense. 

The grant process timeline was widely perceived as too long and time consuming 

given the amount of funds available to agencies. Early release of grant guidance was 

a recommendation that would allow for timelier grant application submission. 

Concerns were expressed that the TSGP did not allow ‘‘pre-award’’ authority. This 

inconsistency with Federal Transit Program grants not only added to confusion in 

agency dealings with FEMA and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 

but also had the potential to lead certain project expenditures to be ineligible because of relatively minor administrative details, thereby affecting the transit agency’s ability to expend the funds as programmed. 

A variety of administrative process recommendations were made in the comments 

section, such as urging DHS to follow the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 

practice of utilizing annual audits for agencies with certified grantees business sys-
205 

tems and practices. Many of the paperwork requirements and record keeping processes in place were seen as duplicative. 

Additional projects that have been excluded or overly restricted include consequence management projects, continued sustenance and life-cycle maintenance of 

security projects, interoperable communications, and redundant power systems. Current allocations for management and administration are not sufficient for long-term 

capital endeavors. Agencies require more flexibility in the assignment of in-house 

flagging and escort crews for work tied to security projects. Some agencies argued 

for allowable costs to include program administration and project management. Several respondents argued that the guidance was unnecessarily restrictive as to the 

use of funds, since threats and technology are regularly subject to change. As well, 

needs vary from transit agency to transit agency according to inherent risk exposures and current state of infrastructure and technological applications. 

Many agencies commented that operational funding should be available for 

projects and purposes other than the currently defined OPacks. Not all transit agencies control their own sworn law enforcement, and as such often contract for services—often with private contractors or sworn forces of surrounding jurisdictions. The 

unavailability of funds for these purposes is seen as an unnecessary restriction. 

Some agencies felt that the current grouping of agencies into tiers did not adequately correlate their tier to their risk, due to perceived unique regional security 

concerns. Smaller systems complained that despite their eligibility under the tier 

system, they either had not been successful at obtaining grant funding. Some smaller agencies felt that minimum project amounts should be eliminated. 

The wide variety of comments from agencies supports APTA’s consistent call for 

less restrictive security grants and for a process that avoid the one-size-fits-all approach. 

OTHER SECURITY NEEDS NOT IDENTIFIED IN THIS SURVEY

The funding needs and uses identified through this survey do not include Department-centric budgetary resources, such as those required for intelligence and information sharing, security standards development, and research and development. 

Information and Intelligence 

A high priority for the transit industry in the area of information sharing and intelligence is the continuation of a small but critical amount of annual funding for 

the annual maintenance of the Public Transportation Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center (PT–ISAC). Established in response to Presidential Decision Directive 63 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD–7), the PT ISAC is 

seen by transit security professionals as a highly valuable interactive resource for 

the dissemination and sharing of industry specific information and intelligence. A 

joint industry/government working group formed under the auspices of the Mass 

Transit Sector Coordinating Council (SCC)/Government Coordinating Council (GCC) 

is currently refining a proposal for security information sharing that would look to 

the PT–ISAC to becoming a permanent, expanded system that would coordinate the 

dissemination of all relevant security information to the public transit industry. 

Security Standards 

A similar high priority for the industry requiring continued, but relatively small 

amounts of funding is the transit security standards development program. Produced through the consensus-based process recommended by the American National 

Standards Institute and fully inclusive of Federal stakeholders including the TSA, 

FTA, and Federal Railroad Administration, the transit security standards program 

serves an extremely important guiding role for future policies and investments in 

transit security. 

Research and Development 

Additionally, resource allocation issues within DHS have failed to adequately address the research and development needs of transit. In September 2008, the Mass 

Transit SCC Security Technology Working Group issued draft recommendations 

which identified concerns over the lack of a formal structure that brings the Federal 

Government and transit industry together to discuss transit security technology priorities, needs, and areas of potential interest for technology advancement and research. There is a general view that TSA research and development, and DHS 

science and technology do not conduct adequate early outreach with the industry to 

determine needs ahead of actual technology development and deployment efforts. 

Transit security professionals believe that early and active engagement of industry 

could lead to a better understanding of varying transit agency needs, as well as better research and development overall. 
206 

Cybersecurity 

Also, resources such as technical assistance and the like may be necessary for 

support of transit industry efforts in the area of cybersecurity. Concerns over cybersecurity have increased across the Federal Government and throughout the country 

over recent years, and transit agencies are no different. As significant users of 

power and computerized control systems, cybersecurity will remain a significant 

concern for an industry responsible for the safe and secure movement of 35 million 

daily riders. 

Technical Support 

Since September 11, 2001, the FTA initially and DHS subsequently have offered 

technical support from time to time to assist transit agencies in the ongoing development and strengthening of their security plans, processes, procedures and resources. This level of Federal support continues to be an imperative need and necessitates DHS to ensure that such technical assistance is appropriately funded. 

Resiliency and All-Hazards 

Finally, as DHS and many others in the homeland security policy arena discuss 

issues of resiliency and ‘‘all hazards’’ approaches to security and emergency management policy, transit agencies are increasingly looked to as instruments for disaster 

response and evacuation, and as such have repeatedly responded to major incidents 

ranging from 9/11 to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Views on the resources made 

available to the Department for its overall budget should not overlook the potential 

transit needs in ‘‘all-hazards’’ response to the resiliency question. 

ABOUT PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States transit industry carries more than 10 billion riders a year for 

more than 50 billion passengers miles. In 2008, 7.2 million people used transit as 

their primary means of commuting to work, 23 percent more than commuted on 

transit in 2000. 

Transit service is provided by more than 387,000 employees operating 137,000 vehicles in the peak service period each weekday. Transit rail cars, buses, and vans 

provide 4.6 billion miles of revenue service in a year. Twenty-six commuter rail systems, 15 heavy rail systems, and 35 light rail systems provide service more than 

11,270 directional miles of routes, and along with bus service stop at 4,500 stations 

and numerous street locations. 

APTA’s Security Affairs Steering Committee serves in the role of the Mass Transit 

SCC. 

LETTER FROM MARINE CONSERVATION BIOLOGY INSTITUTE

APRIL 19, 2011. 

Hon. MARY L. LANDRIEU, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MADAM CHAIRWOMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE: Marine Conservation Biology Institute (MCBI), based in Bellevue, WA, is a nonprofit conservation organization whose mission is to protect ocean ecosystems. We use science to 

identify places in peril and advocate for bountiful, healthy oceans for current and 

future generations. I wish to thank the members of the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee for the opportunity to submit written testimony on the fiscal year 2012 appropriations for the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). MCBI recommends 

$10.791 billion for the USCG in fiscal year 2012. This amount would reinstate fiscal 

year 2010 funding levels, with an additional $2 million to combat marine debris as 

mandated by law. 

The USCG is a multi-mission agency, stretched by many demands. MCBI supports the USCG in their efforts to reach their goals in providing maritime safety, 

security, mobility, national defense, and protection of natural resources. The fiscal 

year 2012 President’s request has decreased the USCG’s overall budget by more 

than $450 million, including a decrease of $147 million for marine environmental 

protection, one of the USCG’s 11 missions. We are concerned about this decrease 

and what it portends in terms of the further degradation our oceans. 

MARINE DEBRIS

Marine debris has become one of the most widespread pollution problems affecting 

the world’s oceans and coasts. As highlighted by the ‘‘Great Pacific Garbage Patch’’ 

in the North Pacific Ocean, and garbage patch in the Atlantic Ocean, marine debris 
207 

1 NAPHSIS represents the 57 vital records jurisdictions that collect, process, and issue birth 

and death records in the United States and its territories, including the 50 States, New York 

City, the District of Columbia, and the five territories. NAPHSIS coordinates and enhances the 

Continued 

is a growing problem that is manifesting itself in all United States waters, including 

in Hawaii, Alaska, Louisiana, and the Caribbean. Research has shown that debris 

seriously effects the marine environment, marine wildlife, the economy, and human 

health and safety. 

Marine debris harms marine and coastal communities by damaging marine habitat like coral reefs, transporting non-native and invasive species to new habitats, 

causing navigational hazards and vessel damage, and harming and entangling wildlife. Some of the most common types of marine debris are discarded or lost fishing 

lines and nets, household plastics such as disposable lighters, six-pack rings, plastic 

bags, and Styrofoam pellets. The number of marine debris-related entanglement 

deaths of endangered and threatened seals, sea turtles, and seabirds continues to 

grow. For example, entanglement in debris is major cause of death for Hawaiian 

monk seals (population estimate: <1,200). 

To combat marine debris, the Congress responded in a bipartisan manner and enacted the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act in 2006 which established national efforts to identify, assess, reduce, and prevent marine debris and 

its effects on the marine environment. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the USCG work together to undertake these activities. 

The USCG’s marine debris efforts fall under its marine environmental protection 

mission, 1 of 11 missions. 

The USCG plays a crucial role combating marine debris by monitoring and enforcing compliance with MARPOL Annex V and the Act to Prevent Pollution from 

Ships. Under this authority, the USCG monitors discharge of waste from ships and 

oversees port waste receptor facilities. In addition, the USCG provides critical support and leadership for a variety of anti-marine debris activities. For example, the 

USCG has partnered primarily with NOAA, starting in 1998, to remove an estimated 667 metric tons (mt) of marine debris (mostly derelict fishing gear) from the 

Northwestern Hawaiian Islands where marine debris kills endangered Hawaiian 

monk seals and seabirds. In 2009, NOAA and the USCG removed an estimated 68 

mt of debris. With the recent earthquake in Japan, an influx of debris has been introduced to the marine environment. University of Hawaii scientists believe that we 

will start to see the impacts of this debris in the Hawaiian Islands in about 18 

months. 

The Marine Debris Act authorizes $10 million annually for NOAA’s Marine Debris 

Program and $2 million for the USCG’s marine debris efforts. NOAA has been level 

funded at $4 million since 2008, but the USCG has never requested nor received 

any direct funding for its marine debris efforts. 

As the Nation continues to deal with economic challenges, MCBI recognizes that 

allocating new funds for projects may be difficult. However, the economic costs of 

marine debris on our marine resources, tourism, human health and safety far outweigh the cost of marine debris removal activities. Therefore, we encourage the subcommittee to minimally reinstate the USGS funding levels to fiscal year 2010 enacted levels to maintain the service’s operating capabilities, and include an additional $2 million for the USCG to meet its responsibilities under the Marine Debris 

Act. Adequate and sustained funding is needed to maintain and enhance the ability 

of the USCG to support current removal projects, develop best management practices, reduce derelict fishing gear, and conduct education and outreach measures. 

In summary, MCBI respectfully requests that the subcommittee augment the 

USCG funding to support the critical role it plays in fighting marine debris. 

Sincerely, 

WILLIAM CHANDLER, 

Vice President for Government Affairs, 

Marine Conservation Biology Institute. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC HEALTH

STATISTICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems 

(NAPHSIS) welcomes the opportunity to provide this written statement for the public record as the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee prepares its fiscal 

year 2012 appropriations legislation.1 In 2005, the Congress passed the REAL ID 
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activities of the vital records jurisdictions by developing standards, promoting consistent policies, working with Federal partners, and providing technical assistance. 2The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

upon the United States, July 2004, p. 390. 3Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Birth Certificate 

Fraud, Sept. 2009 (OEI–07–99–00570). 4Government Accountability Office, Department of State: Undercover Tests Reveal Significant 

Vulnerabilities in State’s Passport Issuance Process, Mar. 2009 (GAO–09–447) and State Department: Undercover Tests Show Passport Issuance Process Remains Vulnerable to Fraud, July 

2010 (GAO–10–922T). 

Act in response to the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations that the Federal Government ensure a person ‘‘is who they claim to be’’ when applying for an official ID. 

Yet, 6 years later implementation remains stalled due to strained State budgets and 

a lack of Federal investment. As the nonprofit, national association for the 57 vital 

records offices that are critical partners in the security of our homeland, NAPHSIS 

recommends you provide the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) $100 

million over a period of 3–5 years to modernize vital records in support of REAL 

ID through grants to States. 

PREVENTING FRAUD, IDENTITY THEFT, AND TERRORISM THROUGH VERIFICATION

Prior to the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, all but 

one of the terrorist hijackers acquired some form of identification document, some 

by fraud, and used these forms of identification to assist them in boarding commercial flights, renting cars, and other necessary activities leading up to the attacks. 

In its final report, the 9/11 Commission recommended implementing more secure 

sources of identification, stating that ‘‘Federal Government should set standards for 

the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as driver’s licenses. Fraud in identification documents is no longer just a problem of theft. At 

many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, 

sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they 

say they are and to check whether they are terrorists.’’ 2

Heeding the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Congress enacted the 

REAL ID Act in May 2005. Among other provisions, the REAL ID Act and its corresponding regulations (6 CFR part 37) require that applicants for a driver’s license 

present their birth certificate to the motor vehicle agency to validate their U.S. citizenship and their date of birth, and that birth certificates must be verified by the 

State. Section 37.13 of the identification standards regulations recommends that 

States through their departments of motor vehicles (DMV) should use the Electronic 

Verification of Vital Events (EVVE) system, operated by NAPHSIS, to verify birth 

certificates presented by applicants. 

EVVE is an online system operated by NAPHSIS that verifies birth certificate information. It provides authorized users at participating agencies with a single interface to quickly, reliably, and securely validate birth and death information at any 

jurisdiction in the country. In so doing, no personal information is divulged to the 

person verifying information—EVVE simply relays a message that there was or was 

not a match with the birth and death records maintained by the State, city, or territory. 

NEED FOR VERIFICATION PERSISTS

Many Federal and State agencies rely on birth certificates for proof of age, proof 

of citizenship, identification for employment purposes, to issue benefits or other documents (e.g., driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, and passports), and to assist 

in determining eligibility for public programs or benefits (e.g., Medicaid). Unfortunately, there are cases where individuals have obtained birth certificates of deceased 

persons and assumed their identity, created fraudulent birth certificates, and altered the information on a birth certificate, as documented in a Department of 

Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General Report of 2000.3

In 2009 and 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) documented several cases in which investigators created fraudulent birth certificates and were able 

to obtain passports based upon the fraudulent records because the passport office 

did not verify the birth certificate information.4 Just recently, the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) arrested Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari for ‘‘attempted use of a 

weapon of mass destruction’’. When the FBI searched Aldawsari’s apartment, agents 

discovered that Aldawsari had plans to obtain a forged U.S. birth certificate and obtain multiple drivers’ licenses for the purpose of renting several different cars to 
209 

carry out his attacks. Aldawsari recognized that birth certificates can be used to obtain multiple identification documents such as passports and driver’s licenses. 

Passport fraud prevention managers commenced using the EVVE system in 

March 2009 for birth certificate verifications. In their first 6 weeks of use, there 

were two instances where the fraud prevention managers used the EVVE system 

to electronically verify the birth certificates, and EVVE returned a ‘‘no match’’. Upon 

further follow up with the vital records offices that ‘‘issued’’ the birth certificates it 

was determined that indeed the birth certificates presented with those passport applications were fraudulent. Based on these and other successes, NAPHSIS is working with the Department of State to integrate EVVE into the standard passport adjudication process. 

STATES NEED FEDERAL SUPPORT TO IMPLEMENT REAL ID

EVVE is now installed in 30 vital records jurisdictions and is used by select State 

DMVs and Medicaid Offices, the Social Security Administration, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Department of State fraud prevention managers in select jurisdictions. Users of EVVE are enthusiastic about the system, citing its capacity for: 

—Providing protection against the potential use of birth certificates for fraudulent 

activities. 

—Improving customer service by facilitating rapid access to accurate and 

verifiable vital record data in real-time. 

—Safeguarding the confidentiality of birth and death data. 

—Offering a secure mechanism for communication between agencies and vital 

records offices via the Internet. 

—Easily integrating with current legacy systems that the Federal or State agencies may already be using, and for serving as a user-friendly interface for agencies that seek a stand-alone query system. 

NAPHSIS has completed upgrades to the EVVE system to meet the REAL ID requirements and is working to install EVVE in the remaining 27 jurisdictions before 

the now extended, REAL ID deadline. NAPHSIS has also procured a data analysis 

and quality control tool that all jurisdictions can utilize to analyze their EVVE database for anomalies, inconsistencies, accuracy, and completeness. This tool and the 

analysis of EVVE data has been completed in 17 jurisdictions to-date. 

Despite EVVE’s security, speed, and ease of use, the system is only as good as 

the underlying data infrastructure upon which it relies. Digitizing paper-based birth 

and death records, then cleaning and linking those records, will provide for secure, 

reliable, real-time identity verification using EVVE. Specifically, 

—The majority of the 57 vital records jurisdictions have electronic birth records 

that extend back more than 7 decades. To recognize EVVE’s full potential to 

verify birth certificates, 100 percent of jurisdictions should have their records 

in electronic form. 

—There are cases where an individual has assumed a false identity by obtaining 

a birth certificate of a person who has died. Therefore, it is also important that 

all jurisdictions’ death and birth records be linked to flag individuals who are 

deceased and identify fraudulent birth documentation. 

RECOMMENDED ACTION: INVEST IN INFRASTRUCTURE TO FACILITATE ID VERIFICATION

The jurisdictions’ efforts to digitize, clean, and link vital records have been hindered by State budget shortfalls. In short, the jurisdictions need the Federal Government’s help to complete building a secure data infrastructure and support identity verification required by REAL ID. Under the current authority established 

through REAL ID, we ask that the Congress provide $100 million to FEMA to support a new grants-to-States program for the purpose of modernizing vital records. 

Specifically, these funds would be used by vital records jurisdictions to digitize their 

birth records back to 1945, to clean these data to support electronic queries, and 

link birth and death records. We recommend the funding be appropriated over time 

according to one of two schedules: 

—Option 1.—$33 million per year over 3 years. This option would provide roughly 

$580,000 in fiscal year 2012 to each vital records jurisdiction, on average. 

—Option 2.—$20 million per year over 5 years, providing roughly $350,000 in fiscal year 2012 to each vital records jurisdiction, on average. The vital records 

modernization would progress more slowly than under option 1, but the funding 

would nevertheless significantly enhance the ability of States and territories to 

support the goals of REAL ID. 

The terrorist attack the FBI thwarted in the apprehension of Khalid Ali-M 

Aldawsari brings to mind the September 11 tragedy, and reminds us of the need 
210 

to secure official forms of identification. We feel strongly that an investment of $100 

million is a small price to pay to strengthen Americans’ safety and security by accurately, efficiently, and securely verifying birth data on the 245 million driver’s licenses issued annually. Six years after REAL ID’s enactment, isn’t it time to implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations and invest in the goals of REAL ID 

and identity verification? 

NAPHSIS appreciates the opportunity to submit this statement for the record and 

looks forward to working with the subcommittee. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

INTRODUCTION

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement for the record regarding 

the fiscal year 2012 budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As 

president of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) I represent 

the emergency management directors of all 50 States, territories, and the District 

of Columbia. Members of NEMA are responsible to the Governors for myriad responsibilities including emergency preparedness, homeland security, mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural or terrorism-related disasters. 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS

The highest priority for NEMA within the President’s request is funding for the 

Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG). EMPG assists State and 

local governments in managing a variety of disasters and hazards providing the only 

source of Federal assistance to State and local government for all-hazards emergency management capacity building. Grantees utilize EMPG funds for personnel, 

planning, training, exercises, warning systems, public outreach, and other essential 

functions in establishing effective preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. 

This program is of considerable economic value to the Federal Government as all 

Federal funds are matched 50–50 by State and local governments. Such a matching 

requirement increases accountability and supplements the impact of valuable Federal dollars. 

This year, NEMA fully supports the President’s requested funding level and House Appropriations Committee recommendation of $350 million for EMPG. We 

appreciate the resource constrained environment, but when compared to other grant 

programs, the 50–50 match allows EMPG to stand alone as a worthwhile investment of Federal funds. In many ways, EMPG offers a cost-savings by allowing 

States to manage disasters which would otherwise need to be addressed by the Federal Government. 

NEMA, in conjunction with the International Association of Emergency Managers, 

has taken the most significant step forward to-date in attempting to measure the 

effectiveness of EMPG. In March 2011, the two associations combined to release 

Emergency Management Performance Grants: Providing Returns on a Nation’s Investment. The report measures the effectiveness of funding provided EMPG in fiscal 

year 2010. It also ties individual State and local efforts into the far larger picture 

of overall preparedness by demonstrating how a truly national emergency management system is developed and supported. 

A copy of the report is available online at: http://www.nemaweb.org/index.php? 

option=comlpollydoc&format=raw&id=2583&view=doc 

HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM

NEMA members remain alarmed at the significant cuts proposed by the House 

Appropriations Committee to the State Homeland Security Grant Program 

(SHSGP). This program provides funds to build capabilities at the State and local 

levels and to implement the goals and objectives included in State homeland security strategies and initiatives in the State Preparedness Report. Funding amounts 

must remain at pre-consolidation levels, and these grants must be used in support 

of building an all-hazard capability. Furthermore, providing sole discretion to the 

Secretary of Homeland Security allows far too many opportunities for ‘‘politics’’ to 

be played with these critical grant programs. While in theory, combining grant programs and consolidation may appear sound; in practice such efforts remain impractical. 

We urge the subcommittee to provide States greater flexibility in use of homeland 

security funds for all-hazards activities. Such flexibility allows the grant funding to 

be utilized by each State according to need, existing resources, and capabilities. This 

flexibility will serve to increase preparedness for all hazards including terrorism. 
211 

The effort to enhance and build the national emergency response system is a national effort and Federal resources should continue at the current level to maintain 

effectiveness. As the subcommittee considers funding for the SHSGP, NEMA urges 

sustained appropriations levels on a multi-year basis to allow for long-range planning, maintenance, implementation, and measurement. 

PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION

The administration’s request of $85 million for the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) 

grant program reflects the amount normally available for programmatic activities 

after congressionally directed funding has been allocated out of a $100 million appropriation. Since fiscal year 2002, PDM has been a competitively awarded grant 

program. The PDM program continues to be over-subscribed as more projects become eligible than can be funded in any given fiscal year at present funding levels. 

NEMA supports the President’s request of $85 million provided the ban on congressionally directed funding from the recent reauthorization language is followed. 

Should targeted funding continue to be a part of this program, we would request 

appropriate funds above the $85 million to off-set the programmatic impacts. 

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS

There remains a shortfall in the ability for States to build, retrofit, and upgrade 

primary and alternate emergency operations centers (EOC). According to the 2010 

NEMA Biennial Survey, an estimated $398 million in requirements exist to bridge 

the shortfall. The current EOC Grant Program is intended to improve emergency 

management and preparedness capabilities by supporting flexible, sustainable, secure, and interoperable EOCs with a focus on addressing identified deficiencies and 

needs. Fully capable emergency operations facilities at the State and local levels 

stand as an essential element of a comprehensive national emergency management 

system and are necessary to ensure continuity of operations and continuity of government in major disasters caused by any hazard. The continued viability of a 

strong and robust EOC Grant Program remains in the Nation’s best interest. 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT

Finally, I wish to address funding for the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact (EMAC). When States and the U.S. territories joined together and the Congress ratified EMAC (Public Law 104–321) in 1996, it created a legal and procedural 

mechanism whereby emergency response resources such as urban search and rescue 

teams can quickly move throughout the country to meet disaster needs. All 50 

States, the District of Columbia, and three territories are members of EMAC and 

have committed their emergency resources in helping neighboring States and territories. 

EMAC has grown significantly in size, volume, and the type of resources it provides over the years. Since 2004, the volume and types of resources requested under 

EMAC has grown considerably. For example, 26 emergency management personnel 

responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Conversely, more than 

66,000 personnel from a variety of disciplines deployed to the gulf coast in response 

to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and 12,279 personnel to Texas and Louisiana during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. The 2009 spring flooding in North Dakota and Minnesota resulted in States deploying equipment, sandbags, and 1,029 personnel to 

North Dakota. In all, 727 National Guard personnel and 302 civilians were sent to 

assist via the compact. 

The capabilities of EMAC remain sustained by the efforts of all the States and 

would be bolstered by direct support of EMAC. While EMAC currently receives 

FEMA grant funding, fulfilling NEMA’s request for a $2 million line item appropriation would codify the program for use in future disasters. In the past, NEMA has 

advocated for $4 million of 2-year funding, but pursuant to an agreement with 

FEMA programmatic personnel, our position is now one of single-year funding of $2 

million. Please note these funds do not represent an earmark as they provide numerous benefits directly to the States to build and maintain a national mutual aid 

system. 

As the opportunity is afforded, EMAC intends to develop, maintain, and exercise 

State and regional mutual aid capabilities, train State and local emergency response 

personnel who may be deployed through EMAC, support the development of specialized emergency response capabilities among the regions, and ensure EMAC remains 

a viable resource for the States now and in the future. In my opinion, $2 million 

in Federal funds stands as a minimal investment for maintaining a proven national 

emergency response capacity that day-to-day is equipped, trained, and ready to pro-
212 

vide critical disaster response resources and support between States. All members 

of EMAC rely on this asset as a critical tool in their response and recovery arsenal. 

CONCLUSION

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address these issues critical to the emergency management community. This subcommittee regularly affirms support for ensuring preparedness for our Nation’s vulnerabilities against all-hazards with additional investments in EMPG and EOCs. As you develop the fiscal year 2012 budget 

for DHS, we encourage you to utilize our membership as a resource and continue 

efforts to build a strong and robust emergency management baseline in our country. 

Together, we will carry-on the initiatives so thoughtfully developed by this subcommittee over the years. I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of 

NEMA and appreciate your continued partnership. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION

Chairman Landrieu, Ranking Member Coats, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony. As president of 

the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), I have the honor of leading a 

union that represents more than 24,000 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, agriculture specialists, and trade enforcement and compliance specialists who 

are stationed at 331 land, sea, and air ports of entry across the United States. 

CBP entry specialists, import specialists, paralegal specialists that determines 

fines, penalties and forfeitures, customs auditors and attorneys and other trade compliance personnel are the frontline of defense against illegal imports and contraband. These employees enforce more than 400 U.S. trade and tariff laws and regulations in order to ensure a fair and competitive trade environment pursuant to existing international agreements and treaties, as well as stemming the flow of illegal 

imports, such as pirated intellectual property and counterfeit goods, and contraband 

such as child pornography, illegal arms, weapons of mass destruction, and 

laundered money. CBP is also a revenue collection agency—collecting $32 billion in 

duties and fees on imports valued at more than $2 trillion in 2007. 

Along with facilitating legitimate trade and enforcing trade and security laws, 

CBP trade personnel are responsible for stopping illegal transshipments, goods with 

falsified country of origin, goods that are misclassified and for collecting antidumping and countervailing duties. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Customs Revenue Functions (GAO–07–529), CBP collected 

nearly $30 billion customs duties in fiscal year 2006, but did not collect approximately $150 million in antidumping duties alone in 2006. In addition, it is estimated that $500 million in antidumping duties were left uncollected between 2001 

and 2006. (See GAO–07–529, page 23 and pages 29–30.) 

TRADE ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE STAFFING

When CBP was created, it was given a dual mission of not only safeguarding our 

Nation’s borders and ports from terrorist attacks, but also the mission of regulating 

and facilitating international trade. CBP is responsible for collecting import duties 

and ensuring importers fully comply with applicable laws, regulations, quotas, Free 

Trade Agreement requirements, and intellectual property provisions. 

Customs revenues are the second largest source of Federal revenues collected by 

the U.S. Government after tax revenues. This revenue funds other Federal priority 

programs. NTEU is deeply concerned with the lack of resources, both in dollars and 

manpower, devoted to CBP’s trade functions. Lack of sufficient focus and resources 

costs the U.S. Treasury in terms of customs duties and revenue loss and costs American companies in terms of lost business to unlawful imports. 

Because of continuing staffing shortages, inequitable compensation, and lack of 

mission focus, experienced CBP commercial operations professionals at all levels, 

who long have made the system work, are leaving or have left the agency. Twentyfive percent of CBP import specialists will retire or be eligible to retire within the 

next few years. 

When the Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 

House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees included section 412(b) in 

the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 (Public Law 107–296). This section mandates that ‘‘the Secretary [of Homeland Security] may not consolidate, discontinue, 

or diminish those functions... performed by the United States Customs 

Service . . . on or after the effective date of this [a]ct, reduce the staffing level, or 

reduce the resources attributable to such functions, and the Secretary shall ensure 
213 

that an appropriate management structure is implemented to carry out such functions’’. 

In October 2006, the Congress enacted the Security and Accountability For Every 

(SAFE) Port Act (Public Law 109–347). Section 401(b)(4) of the SAFE Port Act directed the DHS Secretary to ensure that requirements of section 412(b) of the HSA 

(6 U.S.C. 212(b)) are fully satisfied. 

CBP satisfied this statutory requirement by freezing the number of many maintenance of revenue function positions at the level in effect on the date of creation of 

the agency in March 2003. As you know, CBP was created by the merger of the 

former U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the 

Animal, Plant, Health Inspection Service (APHIS). In March 2003, the number of 

commercial operations employees at the former U.S. Customs Service was significantly less than prior to 9/11 and significantly less than the need as stated in the 

U.S. Customs Service Optimal Staffing Levels Fiscal Years 2000–2002 (February 25, 

2000), known as the resource allocation model (RAM). 

For example, according to the U.S. Customs RAM, in fiscal year 1998, the optimal 

staffing level for import specialists at the U.S. Customs Service was 1,249, and 

based on workload in fiscal year 2002, the optimal staffing level for import specialists was 1,489 (pages 2, A–1 and M–1 through M–12). 

In actuality, in March 2003 when CBP stood up, there were only 984 import specialists on-board. That is 265 import specialist positions less than the 1998 base 

total, and 505 less than the fiscal year 2002 import specialists optimal staffing level. 

A significant reduction in the number of revenue maintenance function positions 

had occurred at the U.S. Customs Service between 9/11 and March 2003 when CBP 

stood up. Section 412(b) of the HSA reflected the Congress’s concern regarding this 

diminishment in the number of customs revenue function positions versus customs 

security function positions at the U.S. Customs Service and fear that it would continue and be exacerbated by its merger into CBP. 

Even though CBP complied with the letter of section 401(b)(4) of the SAFE Port 

Act, it appears to NTEU that CBP views the ‘‘March fiscal year 2003 Staff OnBoard’’ numbers of revenue maintenance function positions (see appendix I), including such vital trade facilitation and enforcement positions as entry and import specialists, as a ceiling rather than a floor. 

CBP’S RESOURCE ALLOCATION/OPTIMIZATION MODEL

CBP’s adherence to the March 2003 import specialist employment number as a 

ceiling has become evident in the most recent iteration of the SAFE Port Act mandated RAM. Section 403 of the SAFE Port Act required CBP to complete a RAM 

by June 2007, and every 2 years thereafter, to determine optimal staffing for commercial and revenue functions. It directed that the model must comply with the requirements of section 412(b) of the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 and required the CBP Commissioner, not later than September 30, 2007, to ensure that 

the requirements of 412(b) of the HSA were fully satisfied. The CBP positions covered by section 412(b) include entry specialists, import specialists, drawback specialists, national import specialists, fines and penalty specialists, attorneys at the Office 

of Regulations and Rulings, customs auditors, international trade specialists, and financial systems specialists. 

The rationale for this provision arose from a GAO report (GAO–05–663) that stated, ‘‘as of June 2003, CBP has not increased staffing levels [at the POEs]’’ and ‘‘CBP 

does not systematically assess the number of staff required to accomplish its mission 

at ports and airports nationwide . . . ’’ Further, GAO observed that ‘‘not identifying optimal staffing levels prevents CBP from performing workforce gap analyses, 

which could be used to justify budget and staffing requests.’’ 

The former U.S. Customs Service’s last internal review of staffing for fiscal years 

2000–2002, dated February 25, 2000, shows that the U.S. Customs Service needed 

more than 14,776 new hires just to fulfill its basic mission (U.S. Customs RAM, 

page 2 and A–1)—and that was before 9/11. Since then, DHS was created and the 

U.S. Customs Service was merged with the Immigration and Nationalization Service 

and parts of APHIS to create CBP. CBP was given an expanded mission of providing for both the first line of defense against domestic terrorism and making sure 

trade laws are enforced and trade revenue collected. 

The first section 403 RAM, dated July 6, 2007, stated that ‘‘CBP has over 8,200 

employees that are involved in commercial trade operations. The model suggests 

that to carry out these commercial operations and to adequately staff the needs for 

priority trade functions, the optimal level of staff in fiscal year 2008 would be over 

10,000 employees’’ (page 12 of CBP Report to Congress on Trade Resource Allocation 

Model.) According to the 2007 RAM, 1,100 import specialists would be needed for 
214 

optimal performance in fiscal year 2010, an increase of 116 more than the HSA 

Floor (see page 16). 

In 2009, CBP renamed the section 403 resource allocation model (RAM) (the 

SAFE Port Act mandated Report to Congress). It is now called the resource optimization model (ROM). The fiscal year 2009 ROM reduces the fiscal year 2010 optimal 

staffing levels for some revenue maintenance function positions, specifically the 

entry and import specialist positions (see appendix II). For example, the fiscal year 

2009 ROM puts the number of import specialist positions needed in fiscal year 2010 

at the HSA floor number of 984, rather than 1,100 as stated in the fiscal year 2007 

RAM. 

IMPORT SPECIALIST ALLOCATION MODEL

In 2009, CBP Office of Field Operations updated its import specialist allocation 

model (ISAM), ‘‘a decision support tool in the allocation of resources’’. The number 

of import specialists allocated for staffing the ports of entry, however, was determined to be 984 prior to the compiling of the ISAM. The allocation model was done 

with the staffing number outcome already pre-determined. 

In the ISAM, CBP states that the Office of Field Operations ‘‘manages a set allocation of 984 for import specialists, which is the minimum staffing requirement set 

forth by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.’’ Since the number of import specialist 

positions is frozen at 984 nationwide, CBP’s ISAM proposed a net reduction of 52 

import specialist positions (from 179 to 127) at New York City area ports, shifting 

those positions to other ports (see appendix III) in order to handle current workload. 

CBP plans to eliminate positions at the ports with the highest number of import 

specialists—primarily the New York City region—to fill needs in other ports. NTEU 

is concerned that the ISAM is a zero-sum model that does not address actual staffing needs. 

Ports specialize in different areas of trade compliance and have different needs 

depending on the operation—air, sea, or land ports. Larger ports handle all areas 

of trade compliance whereas smaller ports might see a large amount of one type of 

commodity or only deal with a small range of trade compliance issues. 

Because of these differences between the ports of entry, rather than using a onesize-fits-all metric to determine allocation of import specialists, the data elements 

and factors that CBP weighs in determining allocation of import specialists should 

be different for each port depending on what type of operation it is and what the 

prevalent trade issues are at that port. Then, staffing should be decided using a 

work-to-staff ratio based on a formula and weighting of the elements for that port 

specifically. 

‘‘Informed compliance’’ is not given any weight at all when determining import 

specialist staffing needs at individual ports. Authorized by the Customs Modernization Act (Mod act), ‘‘informed compliance’’ plays a major role in CBP’s trade enforcement and compliance operations. Two new concepts that emerged from the Mod act 

are ‘‘informed compliance’’ and ‘‘shared responsibility,’’ which are premised on the 

idea that in order to maximize voluntary compliance with trade laws and regulations, the trade community needs to be clearly and completely informed of its legal 

obligations. 

Accordingly, the Mod act imposes a greater obligation on CBP to provide the public with improved information concerning the trade community’s rights and responsibilities under customs regulations and related laws. Both the trade and CBP share 

responsibility for carrying out these requirements. For example, under section 484 

of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1484), the importer of record is 

responsible for using reasonable care to enter, classify, and determine the value of 

imported merchandise and to provide any other information necessary to enable 

CBP to properly assess duties, collect accurate statistics, and determine whether 

other applicable legal requirements, if any, have been met. CBP is then responsible 

for fixing the final classification and value of the merchandise. An importer of 

record’s failure to exercise reasonable care could delay release of the merchandise 

and, in some cases, could result in the imposition of penalties. 

It is the responsibility of the importers of record to make sure that what they submit to CBP is correct and it is the job of the import specialist, through informed 

compliance, to verify that what is being submitted is correct. Therefore, when considering import specialist staffing allocations at each port, the time the import specialist spends meeting with and educating the importing community should be part 

of the equation. NTEU believes that if done in this manner, CBP’s import specialist 

staffing allocations would require increased import specialist staffing levels nationally. 
215 

TARIFF SHARING

Last year, in response to an import specialists staffing shortage and pursuant to 

the 2009 ISAM, CBP is implementing at certain ports a tariff-sharing scheme. For 

example, because CBP has frozen at 984 nationwide the total number of import specialist positions, CBP is in the process of reducing by 52 positions (from 179 to 127) 

the number of import specialists at the New York City-area ports (see appendix III) 

and shifting those positions to other ports. To address the loss of 52 import specialist positions at New York City area ports of entry (New York-Newark gains 3 

import specialist positions, but JFK loses 55 import specialist positions), CBP has 

implemented tariff sharing between the ports of New York and Newark and JFK 

Airport. Until last year, each port (Newark and JFK) processed all types of entries 

and all types of commodities via the harmonized tariff schedule (HTS). In other 

words, each port had full tariff coverage. 

Because of this reduction in trade personnel, each port has now been assigned 

only parts of the HTS, not the entire HTS, and each port only processes only onehalf the commodities entering its port. Tariff sharing presents a number of operational problems. Because the HTS will be split, each port will have one-half the 

number of commodities teams (staffed by import specialists) than they currently 

have. Certain kinds of merchandise will continue to be unloaded at the port of Newark, but the only commodity team that is trained to process it will be at JFK. And 

other merchandise will continue to be unloaded at JFK, but the only commodity 

team trained to process it will be in Newark. CBP has directed import specialists 

to, in these cases where there is no longer the appropriate commodity team present 

at the port to do a physical examination, take digital photos of the merchandise and 

email the photos to the other port. A digital photo cannot determine lead levels in 

toys or thread count in textiles. This is a short-sighted solution to an import specialist staffing shortage that will affect taxpayers, trade compliant importers, and 

the Federal Treasury. 

Rather than hire additional import specialists at ports of entry where they are 

needed, CBP instead is shortchanging the New York City trade community. It is 

clear that the fiscal year 2009 ROM, that states that only 984 import specialists are 

needed nationwide, does not adequately reflect the optimal staffing levels for import 

specialists as evidenced by the need to implement a tariff-sharing scheme at New 

York City region ports of entry. 

TARIFF SHARING AND ANTIDUMPING ORDERS

Tariff sharing significantly affects import specialists’ timely disposition of antidumping orders. The problems that arise from tariff-sharing centers around the 

movement of entries between JFK and Newark. When liquidation orders are published in the Federal Register, CBP has 6 months to liquidate and process those entries. There is almost always a certain amount of lag time between when the liquidation orders are published in the Federal Register and when the import specialists on the commodity team associated with that merchandise are actually made 

aware of the liquidation orders. In actuality, the import specialist rarely has the full 

6-month period to liquidate and process these order. 

Prior to the Federal Register posting, the entries are kept in files with the commodity team that handles the merchandise. For example, under tariff sharing, the 

entry paperwork of commodities that are received at JFK, but are inspected by a 

commodity team at Newark, is supposed to be transferred to Newark and not filed 

at JFK. In many cases, however, when the liquidation order is issued, the commodity team in Newark goes through their files of antidumping entries. Frequently, 

there are JFK entries missing that were lost in transportation. At that point, Newark import specialists contact JFK to see if they can find the lost files. If the lost 

files can’t be found, the Newark import specialist makes an inquiry to the Records 

Department to try and to retrieve these entries, which takes time. 

Pressed for time, import specialists then call the broker to ask the broker to reconstruct the entries and send these reconstructed entries to the commodity team. 

The commodity team then reviews these reconstructed entries to make sure that the 

entry type codes are the correct type for antidumping entries and that the entries 

were put on hold and not previously liquidated. If this happens, CBP could lose its 

ability to liquidate at the antidumping rates that are applied via the liquidation 

order and the extra duties cannot be collected. Recently in Newark, CBP lost the 

extra duty on 17 entries due to this very scenario. These liquidation orders encompass hundreds of entries. Conversely, JFK has the same problem on their end when 

they have antidumping entries to deal with. This same problem with disposition of 

antidumping orders is occurring at the ports of Detroit and Port Huron where CBP 

has also implemented tariff sharing. 
216 

Under tariff sharing, revenue from antidumping orders is being lost. Again, it is 

clear that the fiscal year 2009 ROM, that states that only 984 import specialists are 

needed nationwide, does not adequately reflect the optimal staffing levels for import 

specialists that process antidumping orders. 

Finally, NTEU has just learned that because the import specialists at the ports 

of New York and New Jersey are overwhelmed with work due to the loss of the 52 

trade positions (that has resulted CBP implementing tariff sharing at these ports), 

CBP has begun assigning audits to import specialists at other ports, even though 

the majority of the merchandise and entries associated with the importer being audited come into the ports of New York and New Jersey. 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 CBP BUDGET REQUEST

Several years ago, pursuant to the provisions of the SAFE Port Act, there was 

a small increase in the number of CBP trade enforcement and compliance personnel. 

There was no increase in funding for CBP trade operations staffing in the fiscal year 

2010 DHS appropriations bill and again, the fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution 

has no increase in full-time equivalents (FTEs) for CBP trade operations personnel. 

In effect, there has been a CBP trade staffing freeze at March 2003 levels and, 

as a result, CBP’s revenue function has suffered. The fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for CBP’s enforcement program to ‘‘prevent trade in counterfeit and 

pirated goods, and enforce exclusion orders on patent-infringing and other intellectual property rights violative goods.’’ This request, however, includes no increase in 

CBP trade operations staff at the POEs to implement this trade enforcement program. NTEU urges the subcommittee to appropriate funding to hire additional trade 

enforcement and compliance personnel, including import specialists, at the POEs to 

enhance trade revenue collection. 

CBP CAREER LADDER PAY INCREASE

NTEU commends DHS for the recent increase in journeyman pay for CBP officers 

and agriculture specialists. Unfortunately, many deserving CBP trade and security 

positions were left out of this pay increase, which has significantly damaged morale. 

The 23,450 armed, uniformed CBP officers and uniformed CBP agriculture specialist 

will be eligible for the increase, but the approximately 2,000 non-uniformed CBP 

commercials operations employees will not. 

NTEU strongly supports extending this same career ladder increase, from GS–11 

to GS–12, to additional CBP positions, including CBP entry, import and paralegal 

specialists and CBP-seized property specialists. The journeyman pay level for the 

CBP technicians who perform important commercial trade and administrative duties should also be increased from GS–7 to GS–9. These upgrades are long overdue 

and would show CBP trade personnel that the Congress recognizes the high level 

of expertise that these employees possess. 

STUDY OF DEDICATED FUNDING

In 2007, the total value of all imports into the United States was more than $2 

trillion. Processing these imports meant handling 22 million entry summaries by 

CBP entry specialists, import specialists, and support staff. In addition to its security and trade missions, CBP works with more than 40 Federal agencies to help enforce a wide range of laws from consumer product and food safety, to environmental 

protection. It is clear that additional CBP commercial operations staffing and training funds are needed. Multiple proposals to increase customs fees are currently 

being promoted to support a great variety of proposed programs. Security needs, 

along with important national trade policy goals, require additional financial resources. NTEU encourages the subcommittee to request a study of the setting, collection, and utilization of these customs and user fees. This study should determine 

the relationship between current fees and monies allocated for CBP services and assess the need for additional fees. 

CONCLUSION

Customs revenues are the second largest source of Federal revenues that are collected by the U.S. Government. The Congress depends on this revenue source to 

fund priority programs. The subcommittee should be concerned as to how much CBP 

trade enforcement staffing shortages cost in terms of revenue loss to the U.S. Treasury. 

And most importantly, for the purposes of this hearing, CBP trade personnel are 

responsible for stopping illegal transshipments, goods with falsified country of origin, goods that are misclassified and for collecting antidumping and countervailing 
217 

duties. The ongoing freeze in the number of CBP trade compliance and enforcement 

staff undermines this mission. 

In order to prevent customs fraud and duty evasion, NTEU urges the Congress 

to increase the number of trade compliance and enforcement staff responsible for 

enforcing antidumping and countervailing duty orders issued under title VII of the 

Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.) and preventing the importation of merchandise in a manner that evades that antidumping and countervailing duty orders 

issued under title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671 et seq.)—a responsibility that falls solely on the shoulders of CBP import specialists. 

NTEU urges the subcommittee to fund the hiring of additional needed CBP trade 

staff to enforce the more than 400 U.S. trade and tariff laws and regulations for 

which they are responsible, to end the current practice of tariff sharing at several 

major ports of entry, and to ensure full tariff coverage at all major trade ports of 

entries listed on the ISAM (appendix III.) 

The more than 24,000 CBP employees represented by the NTEU are proud of 

their part in keeping our country free from terrorism, our neighborhoods safe from 

drugs, and our economy safe from illegal trade. 

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony on their behalf. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE U.S. COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

EMERGENCY MANAGERS

Chairman Landrieu, Ranking Member Coats, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I am Eddie Hicks, the director of emergency management for Morgan 

County, Alabama. I serve as the president of the U.S. Council of the International 

Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM–USA) and am providing, on their behalf, this statement on critical budget and policy issues for the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA). I have been a local government emergency manager 

for 31 years. I also served three terms as president of the Alabama Association of 

Emergency Managers. We support funding the Emergency Management Performance Grant at $350 million, the Emergency Management Institute at $11.9 million, 

and Pre-Disaster Mitigation at $84.9 million in the budget for FEMA. 

IAEM is our Nation’s largest association of emergency management professionals, 

with 5,000 members including emergency managers at the State and local government levels, tribal nations, the military, colleges and universities, private business, 

and the nonprofit sector. Most of our members are U.S. city and county emergency 

managers who perform the crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover 

from all types of disasters including terrorist attacks. We deeply appreciate the support this subcommittee has provided to the emergency management community over 

the past few years, particularly your support for the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) as well as strengthening FEMA. 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS

We respectfully urge that the subcommittee approve the President’s request of 

$350 million for EMPG, but reject combining it with other accounts. EMPG is fundamentally different than the post-September 11, 2001 Homeland Security grants 

because of its 50-percent Federal and 50-percent State- and local-matching requirements and established performance measures. It also pre-dates the Homeland Security grants by more than 50 years. We also request that language be included continuing to make it clear the funding is for all hazards and can be used for personnel. 

The program is authorized at $950 million for fiscal year 2012 in Public Law 110– 

53. 

EMPG which has been called ‘‘the backbone of the Nation’s emergency management system’’ in an Appropriations Conference Report constitutes the only source 

of direct Federal funding for State and local governments to provide basic emergency coordination and planning capabilities for all hazards including those related 

to homeland security. The program supports State and local initiatives for planning, 

training, exercise, mitigation, public education, as well as response and recovery coordination during actual events. All disasters start and end at the local level, which 

emphasizes the importance of building this capacity at the local level. Funding from 

EMPG frequently makes a difference as to whether or not a qualified person is 

present to perform these duties in a local jurisdiction. 

The legislation creating EMPG is purposefully broad to allow jurisdictions to focus 

their attention on customizing their capabilities. Therefore it is important that 

FEMA guidance not try to make one size fit all, but is written so as to allow max-
218 

imum flexibility in meeting the specific capability requirements within each local jurisdiction. 

Funding from EMPG has always been important to local government emergency 

management offices, and is even more vital during the current economic downturn. 

The programs of many of our local emergency managers have faced or will be facing 

budget reductions resulting in reduced staffing, reduced training, reduced public 

outreach, and reduced support to volunteers. Some elected officials are considering 

reducing their commitment from a full-time emergency manager to a part-time 

emergency manager, or moving the emergency management functions as added duties to other departments. This has the effect of actually reducing emergency management services—and potentially preparedness—in many areas of the country at 

a time when disasters and emergencies threaten more people and property than 

ever before. Simply receiving the entire 50-percent Federal match of their contributions would make a big difference in maintaining their programs. It should be noted 

that many local emergency management programs have historically provided significantly more than the 50-percent match that is required for their EMPG allocations. 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE

We respectfully urge the subcommittee to increase the funding for the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) to $11.9 million. The fiscal year 2010 enacted amount 

for EMI was $9 million. It is our understanding that the request amount for fiscal 

year 2012 for EMI is $9 million although it is not specifically mentioned in the 

President’s request. We urge you to again specifically designate funding for EMI in 

your subcommittee report and to require FEMA to include a specific request in the 

budget documents. The $2.9 million increase over fiscal year 2010 would support speeding the development and implementation of the Foundational Academy; continued updating and 

development of the field (G) and on-campus (E) courses; and, the development of 

other vital programs especially an Executive Emergency Management Program for 

State, local, and tribal emergency managers. 

Our disasters and emergencies are becoming more complex, and our State, local, 

and tribal emergency management officials continue to assume additional duties 

and responsibilities. 

To meet these emerging challenges, new and updated training from EMI is imperative. Lessons are being learned which must be incorporated into our professional 

body of knowledge. We are extremely encouraged by the renewed focus and efforts 

to update and enhance training programs over the past year with the funding support of the Congress. We continue to support the highly successful Emergency Management Higher Education Program at EMI which has produced significant improvements in the preparation of emergency managers at more than 232 college and 

university programs. 

DISASTER MITIGATION

We support the President’s budget request of $84,937,000. A congressionally mandated independent study by the Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council, a council of the 

National Institute of Building Sciences, showed that on the average, $1 spent by 

FEMA on hazard mitigation (actions to reduce disaster losses) provides the Nation 

about $4 in future benefits. 

STRENGTHENING FEMA

IAEM–USA continues to strongly support the full implementation of Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA), Public Law 109–205, and we urge 

the subcommittee to continue insisting on its implementation. The momentum returning FEMA to long-established principles of emergency management—all hazards, integrated, all phases (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery)— 

must continue. The FEMA Administrator should be clearly responsible for the coordination of the Federal response to disasters and have the maximum amount of 

access to the White House as the legislation clearly requires. We are still reviewing 

Presidential Policy Directive-8, but are pleased that it included language that the 

directive shall be implemented consistent with relevant authorities, including 

PKEMRA and its assignment of responsibilities with respect to the Administrator 

of FEMA (PPD–8, page 5). 

We remain concerned that FEMA functions should not be duplicated in other 

parts of DHS. For example, the DHS Office of Operations Coordination, created 

shortly after the enactment of PKEMRA, appears to be assigned functions that duplicate or compete with those of FEMA such as coordinating activities related to incident management and response. 
219 

FEMA RESPONSE IN ALABAMA

Morgan County, Alabama—my jurisdiction—was one of the 41 counties impacted 

by the Alabama tornadoes that happened on April 27, 2011. We were fortunate that 

we did not receive the same level of destruction which occurred in many other counties however we still have sufficient damage to have been included in the declaration. Alabama has a total of 67 counties. 

We have an emergency management system in Alabama—a system of strong local 

programs working with a strong State program, coupled with a restored, more confident and nimble FEMA that is making a real difference in the lives of our citizens. 

The foundation of this strong local capability is the exercising, training, planning, 

and experienced personnel provided through EMPG. One thing we would like to remark on is the restoration of a past practice of assigning a FEMA person to serve 

as a ‘‘county liaison’’ for one or more counties included in the declaration. This person serves as a conduit to brief us on the latest developments related to the Federal 

portion of the recovery. In turn, this person can also field questions or resolve issues 

related to the Federal recovery. We think this is a potential ‘‘best practice’’. Some 

of our citizens who lost their homes have already been in temporary (mobile home) 

housing for 1 week or more—and this is just more than 1 month after our tornado 

event. This is a nimble response by FEMA, and it represents a real improvement 

from the past. 

PRINCIPAL FEDERAL OFFICIAL

We would urge the subcommittee to include bill language prohibiting the funding 

of any position designated as a principal Federal official (PFO) for a Stafford Act 

event. IAEM has consistently opposed the appointment of PFOs. It leads to confusion. Instead, our members want the Federal coordinating officer to have unambiguous authority to direct and manage the Federal response in the field. It is absolutely critical for State and local officials to have one person empowered to make 

decisions and coordinate the Federal response in support of the State. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we urge the subcommittee to continue to build emergency management capacity by funding EMPG at $350 million. We urge increasing funding for 

EMI to $11.9 million. We urge elimination of the PFO for Stafford Act events. 

We urge the subcommittee to continue its efforts to strengthen FEMA and to insist on the full implementation of the provisions of PKEMRA. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony. 

(i) 

LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND 

PREPARED STATEMENTS 

Page 

American Public Transportation Association: 

Attachment, APTA Survey of United States Transit System Security 

Needs ............................................................................................................. 201 

Prepared Statements of the ....................................................................... 195, 197 

Coats, Senator Daniel, U.S. Senator From Indiana: 

Questions Submitted by ................................................................................... 144 

Statements of .................................................................................................. 3, 157 

Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi: 

Questions Submitted by ............................................................................. 150, 190 

Statement of ...................................................................................................... 159 

Landrieu, Senator Mary L., U.S. Senator From Louisiana: 

Opening Statements of ................................................................................... 1, 155 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 3 

Questions Submitted by ............................................................................... 37, 186 

Lautenberg, Senator Frank R., U.S. Senator From New Jersey: 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 158 

Questions Submitted by ................................................................................... 142 

Statement of ...................................................................................................... 158 

Marine Conservation Biology Institute, Letter From the .................................... 206 

Murkowski, Senator Lisa, U.S. Senator From Alaska, Questions Submitted 

by ..................................................................................................................... 153, 192

Murray, Senator Patty, U.S. Senator From Washington, Questions Submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 189 

Napolitano, Hon. Janet, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Prepared Statement of ............................................................................................... 9 

Summary Statement of .................................................................................... 6 

National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems, 

Prepared Statement of the .................................................................................. 207 

National Emergency Management Association, Prepared Statement of the ...... 210 

National Treasury Employees Union, Prepared Statement of the ...................... 212 

Papp, Admiral Robert J., Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Prepared 

Statement of ......................................................................................................... 162 

Summary Statement of .................................................................................... 160 

U.S. Council of the International Association of Emergency Managers, Prepared Statement of the ........................................................................................ 217 

(iii) 

SUBJECT INDEX 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECUITY 

Page 

Acquisition Long-Lead Time Material (LLTM) ..................................................... 151 

Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 37 

Advanced Training Center (ATC) ........................................................................... 63 

Air: 

And Marine...................................................................................................... 58, 63 

Cargo Screening ................................................................................................ 53 

Domain Awareness—C2 Gap Filler ................................................................ 41 

Airline Fees .............................................................................................................. 17 

Anticounterfeit Operations in Colombia and Peru ............................................... 82 

Antidumping Authorities ........................................................................................ 55 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit Costs ................................................ 81 

Automated Target Recognition (ATR) .................................................................... 70 

Aviation Security: 

Capital Fund ..................................................................................................... 72 

Fees .................................................................................................................... 144 

Research—ATR ................................................................................................. 111 

Baggage Fees ........................................................................................................... 70 

Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) ....................................................................... 73 

Border Patrol: 

Agents ................................................................................................................ 59 

Construction ...................................................................................................... 63 

Budget ....................................................................................................................... 19 

Canine Teams .......................................................................................................... 77 

Categories of Expenditure for Grant Programs .................................................... 101 

CBP—Container Security ....................................................................................... 52 

Checkpoint Security ................................................................................................ 74 

Citizenship and Immigration Services: 

Data Center Consolidation .............................................................................. 151 

International Adoptions—Haiti ....................................................................... 106 

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties .............................................................................. 74 

Coast Guard ............................................................................................................. 150 

Acquisitions ....................................................................................................... 78 

Administrative Savings .................................................................................... 75 

Asset Decommissionings .................................................................................. 76 

Cuts ................................................................................................................... 25 

Icebreakers ........................................................................................................ 31 

Maritime Coverage in Alaska .......................................................................... 153 

Shipbuilding ...................................................................................................... 20 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) ................................................................. 152 

Continuing Resolution ........................................................................................... 16, 18 

Coordination of Federal Chemical Security Efforts .............................................. 48 

Cyber Threat ............................................................................................................ 36 

Departmental: 

Acquisitions ....................................................................................................... 37 

Management ..................................................................................................... 150 

Deployable Security Teams ..................................................................................... 77 

Detention Reform ..................................................................................................... 66 

DHS: 

Fee Proposals .................................................................................................... 71 

Headquarters Consolidation ............................................................................ 147 

Disaster Relief .......................................................................................................... 151 

Fund (DRF)........................................................................................................ 5, 21 
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Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) .......................................................... 149 

Algorithm Improvement ................................................................................... 129 

Aviation Multi-Pathway Scanning Integration .............................................. 128 

Cargo Imaging for Shielded Nuclear Threats (CISNT) ................................. 122 

Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) Development: 

Annual Planning, Modeling, and Analysis .............................................. 116 

Aviation Domain ........................................................................................ 118 

Interior Domain ......................................................................................... 120 

International Domain ............................................................................... 117 

Land Border Domain ................................................................................. 118 

Maritime Domain ...................................................................................... 119 

Graduated Rad/Nuc Detector Evaluation and Reporting (GRaDER SM) ...... 134 

Human Portable Tripwire (HPT) .................................................................... 121 

Information Sharing, Mission Critical Messaging ......................................... 115 

Interior Capability Development (ICD) .......................................................... 139 

International Rail Program ............................................................................. 124 

Joint Analysis Center (JAC) ............................................................................ 136 

Collaborative Information System (JACCIS) .......................................... 137 

Long-Range Radiation Detection (LRRD) ....................................................... 123 

Mobile Detection Deployment Program (MDDP) ........................................... 140 

National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC)—Technology Advancement ...................................................................................................... 141 

Non-Helium-3 (3 He) Neutron Detection Alternatives Program ................... 127 

On-Dock Rail (ODR) Program ......................................................................... 125 

Preventive Radiological and Nuclear Detection (PRND): 

Pilot Programs ........................................................................................... 135 

Training and Exercises Program ............................................................. 138 

Rad/Nuc Detection Standards ......................................................................... 114 

Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) Program ..................................................... 111 

Red Team and Net Assessments ..................................................................... 135 

Small Vessel Stand-Off Detection (SVSD) Program ...................................... 126 

State and Local Initiatives Rad/Nuc Challenge ............................................. 121 

Systems Engineering Program ........................................................................ 113 

Test and Evaluation (T&E): 

Data Management and Algorithm Test Bed ........................................... 132 

Directed Test ............................................................................................. 133 

Infrastructure ............................................................................................ 131 

Operations .................................................................................................. 130 

Emergency Food and Shelter Program .................................................................. 104 

Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws .......................................... 13 

Ensuring Resilience to Disasters ............................................................................ 14 

E-Verify .................................................................................................................... 108 

Explosives Detection Systems ................................................................................. 72 

Federal: 

Air Marshals ..................................................................................................... 75 

Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) ................................................. 109 

Protective Service Workforce Analysis ........................................................... 97 

FEMA: 

Disaster Relief .................................................................................................. 97 

Map Modernization .......................................................................................... 152 

Staffing .............................................................................................................. 101 

Financial Systems Consolidation ............................................................................ 45 

Fiscal Year 2012: 

Budget Request ................................................................................................. 10 

Planned Accomplishments/Milestones ............................................................ 141 

Flood Hazard Map Risk Analysis (FHMRA) and Modernization ........................ 105 

Funding Cuts ........................................................................................................... 21 

Government Shutdown ............................................................................................ 33 

Grants: 

Effectiveness ..................................................................................................... 145 

To State and Local Governments for First Responders ................................ 102 

Gulf Coast Dumping ................................................................................................ 25 

Homeland Security Information Network ............................................................. 45 

Human Portable Radiation Detection Systems ..................................................... 111 

ICE—Violence in Mexico ......................................................................................... 64 

Icebreaking Acquisitions Analysis .......................................................................... 46 

Impact of: 

Customs Enforcement on the Seafood Industry ............................................. 54 
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Impact of—Continued 

2010 Coast Guard Surge Operations .............................................................. 76 

Improved Antidumping Revenue Collections ........................................................ 57 

Improving the Entry Process for Visitors to the United States ........................... 59 

Information Integration and Transformation Program ........................................ 82 

International Adoptions—Cambodia and Nepal ................................................... 107 

Jones Act Enforcement ............................................................................................ 58 

Marine Environmental Protection .......................................................................... 77 

Mass Transit ............................................................................................................ 143 

Maturing and Strengthening the Homeland Security Enterprise ....................... 15 

Mexico ....................................................................................................................... 35 

National: 

Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) .......................................................... 23 

Domestic Preparedness Consortium ............................................................... 103 

Flood Insurance Program and Flood Maps .................................................... 104 

Security Cutter (NSC) ...................................................................................... 150 

Office of the Inspector General (OIG) .................................................................... 49 

Officer: 

Corruption ......................................................................................................... 34 

Integrity ............................................................................................................ 46 

Operational Mission Support .................................................................................. 82 

Overtime Pay Reform .............................................................................................. 63 

Polar Icebreakers ..................................................................................................... 76 

Port Security: 

Grants ................................................................................................................ 143 

Training ............................................................................................................. 78 

Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security .................................................... 11 

Private Sector Coordination and Information Sharing ......................................... 92 

Progress in Interoperability .................................................................................... 89 

Proposed Cuts to FEMA .......................................................................................... 98 

Providing Essential Support to National and Economic Security ....................... 15 

Radiation Detection: 

For Air Cargo and Checked Baggage .............................................................. 113 

Straddle Carrier ............................................................................................... 112 

REAL ID Act Compliance ....................................................................................... 47 

Recapitalization of the Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine Fleet .. 146 

Removal Statistics ................................................................................................... 65 

Research and Development Project Summaries .................................................... 113 

Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision Making (RAPID) ..................... 87 

Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace ................................................................. 14 

Science and Technology (S&T)—Laboratory Facilities ......................................... 110 

Screening Procedures .............................................................................................. 73 

Secure Communities ................................................................................................ 66 

Securing and Managing Our Borders .................................................................... 12 

Small Boat: 

Stand-off Detection System/On-Dock Rail (ODR) Program .......................... 112 

Strategy ............................................................................................................. 40 

State and Local: 

Communities, Grants ....................................................................................... 28 

Cyber Activity ................................................................................................... 83 

Grants ................................................................................................................ 144 

Surface Transportation ........................................................................................... 74 

Tactical Border Infrastructure ................................................................................ 146 

Transportation Security Laboratory ...................................................................... 143 

TSA ........................................................................................................................... 142 

Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) .............................................................. 152 

Internal Affairs ................................................................................................. 74 

Pat-Downs ......................................................................................................... 29 

Screener Cap ..................................................................................................... 69 

Screening Process for Persons Who Have Had Medical Procedures ............ 31 

United States Secret Service (USSS)—Presidential Campaigns ......................... 81 

Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) .................................................................. 103 

US-VISIT—Carryover Balances ............................................................................. 97 

Visa Waiver Program/Biometric Air Exit Implementation .................................. 145 

When Will We Know the Border Is Secure? .......................................................... 58 

Workforce Balancing ............................................................................................... 40 

Worksite Enforcement ............................................................................................. 67 
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U.S. COAST GUARD

Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 186 

Administrative Savings Initiatives ......................................................................... 169 

Appendix I—Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request .................................................... 166 

Aviation Safety ......................................................................................................... 180 

Budget: 

Cuts ................................................................................................................... 172 

Planning ............................................................................................................ 188 

Cape May Training Center Pier Reconstruction ................................................... 175 

Coast Guard: 

Capabilities ....................................................................................................... 169 

Maritime Coverage in Alaska .......................................................................... 192 

Decommissionings, Efficiencies, and Savings ........................................................ 169 

Drug Interdiction ..................................................................................................... 179 

Enhance Maritime Incident Prevention and Response................................... 166, 168 

Fast Response Cutter (FRC) ................................................................................... 188 

Fiscal Year 2012 Request ........................................................................................ 163 

Fleet Mix Analysis (FMA) ....................................................................................... 187 

High Endurance Cutter (WHEC) Decommissioning ............................................. 188 

Illegal Immigration .................................................................................................. 173 

Living Conditions ..................................................................................................... 182 

Marine Ecology ........................................................................................................ 184 

National Security Cutter (NSC) ............................................................................. 176 

Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) ................................................................................. 185 

Oil Spills ................................................................................................................... 171 

Personal Locator Devices ........................................................................................ 181 

Pirate Attacks .......................................................................................................... 175 

Rebuild the Coast Guard ......................................................................................... 166 

Response to Environmental Disasters ................................................................... 183 

Support Military Families ................................................................................. 166, 168 

Sustain Frontline Operations............................................................................ 165, 167 

Terrorist Attacks ...................................................................................................... 174 

2010 Oil Spill—Incident-Specific Preparedness Review ....................................... 186 

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) .......................................................................... 178 

Vessel Security ......................................................................................................... 188 

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