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i 

73–429 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–103] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 17, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Friday, February 17, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the Department of the Army .......................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Friday, February 17, 2012 ...................................................................................... 43 

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

McHugh, Hon. John, Secretary of the Army ......................................................... 4 

Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ............................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McHugh, Hon. John, joint with GEN Raymond T. Odierno ......................... 50 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 47 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 49 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 107 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 114 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 120 

Mr. Critz ............................................................................................................ 122 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 115 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 115 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 111 

Mr. McKeon, Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Reyes, and Mr. Brooks ................................ 112 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 121 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 127 

Ms. Pingree ....................................................................................................... 118 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 127 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 114 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Runyan ....................................................................................................... 124 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 123 

Mr. Schilling ..................................................................................................... 123 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 127 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 118 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 112 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 116 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 113 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 121 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE ARMY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 16, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We just got 

notice that the rule was voice voted. They were going to have a 

vote about 10:00. So they said final votes will be at about 10:45. 

So we will start to get as far as into it as we can, and then we will 

go vote, and with your patience, we will be back as quickly as we 

can. 

Good morning. Thank you for joining us today as we consider the 

President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Department of 

the Army. 

Secretary McHugh, General Odierno, thank you for being here. 

Secretary McHugh, it is great to see you again. Thank you for 

your continued service. 

General Odierno, the 38th Chief of Staff of the Army, welcome 

to your first of many posture hearings. I am sure you are glad to 

hear that. Our Nation is very fortunate to have the two of you leading our Army during these challenging times. 

We clearly understand the challenges the Department of Army 

faced in crafting this budget request, and we know you probably 

wouldn’t be here if you didn’t strongly support it. 

What it boils down to is, based on this budget request, what is 

the risk associated with the Army’s ability to meet the National security needs of this Nation? This is what we need your help with; 

not only the risks, but the critical assumptions behind these risks. 

Many years ago, the Army testified in front of the House Subcommittee on Armed Services. I would like to read three quotes 

from the Army’s testimony: 

‘‘We have the best men in the Army today that we have ever 

had in peacetime. And although we have a number of critical 

equipment problems yet to solve, I can assure you that our 

troops, with the equipment they have, would give a good account of themselves if called upon.’’ 
2 

‘‘Within a fixed budget, the Army can obtain greatest effectiveness only by maintaining a delicate balance between personnel and equipment.’’ 

‘‘We are supporting this budget that will provide only 10 divisions because we realize the necessity to integrate Army requirements with those of the other services within our national budget. And we will, of course, do everything within 

our power to lessen the risk that such a reduction must by necessity entail.’’ 

These statements were made in January 1950. Six months later, 

a 500-man battalion-sized task force from the 24th Infantry Division, under Lieutenant Colonel Charles Smith, Task Force Smith 

was rushed to Korea on transport planes to block the North Korean 

advance. You know the rest of the story. Task Force Smith was 

outnumbered 10 to 1, and although they inflicted 127 casualties, 

the task force suffered 181 casualties. 

It is worth noting that more soldiers weren’t sent with Task 

Force Smith because the Air Force didn’t have enough transport 

planes. It is worth noting that 2.36-inch bazookas that Task Force 

Smith fired at the North Korean T–34 tanks just bounced off and 

had no effect. The modernized 3.5 bazooka had been developed at 

the end of World War II but was terminated because of budget 

cuts. 

The point is that you can have a well-led, trained and equipped 

force, and it can still be hollow if it isn’t properly modernized and 

if you can’t get it to the right place at the right time. Please help 

the members of this committee understand how, under the context 

of the budget before us, the Army is prepared to avoid the mistakes 

that led to Task Force Smith. 

Finally, and I really mean this, I can’t think of a better team 

than Secretary McHugh, and General Odierno to lead our Army 

during these challenges times. 

Again, thank you both for your selfless service, and I look forward to your testimony. Member—Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, want to join you in your thanks and praise for General 

Odierno and Secretary McHugh. We cannot possibly have two more 

capable folks leading the Army. I appreciate your hard work on behalf of our country, and we particularly appreciate all of the hard 

work that our soldiers have done over the course of last 10 years 

fighting two major ground wars and then fighting them very, very 

well. They performed at the expectations, and I am sure we all had 

for them, but still very, very high level. We appreciate the sacrifices that all of the soldiers have made in the last 10 years and 

their families. 

And I believe the Chairman laid out correctly the challenge that 

we face as we have now drawn down in Iraq and we begin to draw 

down in Afghanistan, that means major changes for all of the serv-
3 

ices certainly, but for the Army in particularly, as the largest force 

that was, and is, deployed in those two locations. 

How do we do that responsibly? How do we make sure that as 

we change the size of force, as we change where they are deployed, 

we meet the requirements of our strategy and of our national security needs. And I completely agree with the Chairman that that is 

most what this committee wants to hear from you and what we are 

most focused on working with you on in the months ahead as we 

put together this budget and get ready for those changes. 

Now, I think the reality is, and we have this debate in this committee, is this being driven by budget or driven by strategy? I suspect that will come up a time or two during the course of the questioning, and of course, the truth of the matter is, as with any 

project that involves money, it is driven by both. You have your 

strategy, and you have your budget. I have not yet come across the 

group that has an infinite budget. You have to live within what the 

budget is and figure out how to make the strategy work. But I do 

believe the services did this the right way. They really started 

thinking about this 6 months to a year ago, putting together a comprehensive strategy in light of many of the facts that both the 

Chairman and I have talked about, and put together a strategy 

that makes as great deal of sense. And it fits the budget. 

Now, you would like to have more money. We would all like to have more money. But we don’t. We ran a $1.3 trillion deficit last 

year, and that is about 38 percent of the budget, and that is an 

enormous challenge; not something that can be ignored. And it is 

also a threat to our national security. 

As you go back through history, you can see many examples of 

nations that ultimately lost wars because they didn’t have the economic wherewithal to fight them. Yes, we would like to be absolutely 100 percent ready for everything that could possibly happen. 

Now, I don’t think anybody in the history of the world has ever 

been 100 percent ready for anything that could possibly happen. 

But we also have to understand if we spend ourselves in such a 

massive deficit and economically weak condition, we then won’t 

even be able to respond when the crisis has come, because the rest 

of the story, obviously, from Korea, is that we did respond. We 

grew the Army. We built more equipment, just like we have done 

in World War II; just like we have done in every war we have 

fought. We did not anticipate too many of them, if any of them. We 

have to be in a position to economically respond; to build the equipment and grow the force to meet that challenge. 

So we have to do both, and I recognize that you gentlemen are 

trying to balance those two legitimate needs; meet the strategy but 

also make sure that we have a budget that is going to work economically in this country so that we don’t so weaken ourselves economically that we are not in a position to fight our wars and protect ourselves. 

That is a difficult challenge in this current environment. But as 

the Chairman said, and I will end on this note of agreement, we 

couldn’t ask for two better people to help us meet that challenge. 

We look forward to your testimony and to your answers to our 

questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
4 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY 

Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman 

McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the 

committee. First of all, I am humbled by your kind comments, and 

I will try to work as hard as I possibly can to measure up to even 

half of them. But I am deeply appreciative, and it is great to be 

back in this room—although those chairs are far more comfortable 

than these chairs are, I found, but nevertheless, this is always an 

honor for me, and I am honored to be here. 

I want to add my words to yours, Mr. Chairman, of appreciation 

and welcome to our 38th Chief of Staff of the Army. I hope I can 

keep this one longer than I kept the last one, but even in the relatively short time that General Odierno has been with us, he has 

shown that he is more than up to the task, and it is a pleasure to 

work with him each and every day. And I think, as you have said, 

both you, and Mr. Smith, that we are blessed to have such a great 

leader at such an important time. 

And while I am on the matter of thanks, I certainly would be remiss if I didn’t thank each and every one of you. I may be somewhat biased, but after 17 years on this side of the Potomac, and 

now nearly 21⁄2 on the other, I think I have a great appreciation, 

and I know I have a deep admiration for the incredible work that 

this committee does, for the vital role that it plays, and building 

our national defense, and of course, in the Army’s case, making 

sure that we have the processes, the procedures, the rules, the 

laws, the money to do the right thing by these amazing men and 

women, some 1.1 million strong. 

Today, as has been noted more than ever, our demanding fiscal 

environment requires us to have an even stronger partnership with 

this committee, with this Congress, and I promise you, we will do 

everything we can to see that that happens. 

We have a shared responsibility: One, to make sure that we have 

the right resources to defeat our enemies, to supply, and protect, 

and support our allies, and make sure that our homeland remains 

safe; and we need to do it responsibly, decisively, and yes, we need 

to do it affordably. And the budget that you have before you supports these goals by laying the foundation for a gradual reduction 

of our military and civilian end strength, while at the same time 

supporting the vital modernization training, soldier and family programs necessary so that the Army, though smaller, remains the 

strongest, and most capable, most lethal land force anywhere in the 

world. 

As we implement what I believe can be fairly described as a bold 

new security strategy, I want to be clear: The Army’s combat expertise, adaptability, and strategic reach will be more vital than ever 

before. Over the last year, the Army has continued to be the decisive hand of American foreign policy and the helping hand of 

Americans facing the devastation of natural disasters. From Iraq 

and its deserts, to the Afghan mountains, to the Philippine jungles 
5 

and Korean peninsula, our soldiers, Active, Guard, and Reserve, 

have continued to fight insurgents, defeat terrorists, stabilize governments, and support our allies. 

In December, after some 8 years of combat and stability efforts, 

the Army successfully concluded Operation New Dawn, leaving behind the fledgling democracy in a nation that once knew only tyranny. In an unprecedented logistical feed, our soldiers completed 

one of the largest retrograde operations in the history of warfare, 

removing over 3.4 million pieces of equipment. 

Moreover, we continue to support the efforts of the State Department as it works closely with the Iraqi government to further bolster freedom, prosperity and stability in that nation. 

In Afghanistan, the Army has made steady progress in fighting 

Al Qaeda terrorists, and Taliban insurgents, as well as training 

thousands of Afghan security forces. From conducting extensive 

regular and special operations, to providing essential logistics, 

transportation, medical, and communication support for the entire 

Joint Force, soldiers are at the forefront of the U.S. operations and 

success. 

But over the last year, your Army did even more. The soldiers 

deployed on six of seven continents and more than 150 nations 

around the world. Beyond that, in 2011, we saw our citizens experience some of the worst natural disasters in our Nation’s history; 

from responding to wildfires and floods, to hurricanes and tornadoes, our soldiers and civilians from all Components were there to 

help, protect, rescue, and rebuild. 

Simply put, our soldiers, civilians, and their families have once 

again proven why the United States Army is the most capable, 

versatile, and successful land force on earth. And it is this ability 

to adapt to a myriad of unpredictable threats, both at home and 

abroad, that we will maintain as we move forward in this new security and fiscal environment. 

This year’s budget portrays an Army fully embracing change by 

making hard decisions now to lay the right foundation for the future. First, we are implementing a sweeping new defense strategy 

which emphasizes even greater engagement in the Asia-Pacific region in the development of smaller, more agile land forces. 

Under this framework, which was developed collaboratively with 

the top military and civilian officials in our Department, the Army 

clearly remains a decisive arm of the U.S. combat power. Our balanced and transformed force will continue to be the most capable 

anywhere in the world. That is our standard. That is what the 

strategy requires, and that is what this budget supports. 

Second, we are implementing this new paradigm under the significant cuts directed by the Budget Control Act. In doing so, we 

made tough decisions, but we are guided always by the following 

principles: One, we will fully support the current fight by providing 

the operational commanders in Afghanistan and other theaters 

with the best trained and ready land forces in the world. This remains our top priority. Two, we will not sacrifice readiness for force 

structure. We must responsibly reduce our end strength in a manner that fully supports the new strategy but also provides the sufficient time to properly balance our training, equipment, infrastruc-
6 

ture, and soldier and family support programs with our mission requirements. 

Next, we will be able to build force structure and capabilities to 

handle unforeseen changes to global security. The Army must be 

able to hedge risk through an efficient and effective force generation process and access to a strong operationalized Reserve Component. 

Next, we will maintain and enhance the Army’s extensive commitments in the Pacific. 

Finally, we will not let the Budget Control Act cuts be taken on 

the backs of our soldiers or their families. Although we have and 

will continue to examine all of our programs, we will fully fund 

those support systems that work with special emphasis on wounded warrior, suicide prevention, behavioral health, and sexual assault programs. Based on these principles, our budget minimizes 

end-strength reductions in 2013 to support the current fight, emphasizing continued investments and vital modernization programs, such at the network, ground combat vehicle, and joint light 

tactical vehicle; delays or eliminates programs which no longer 

meet urgent needs in support of our new strategy or transforming 

force and defers certain military construction programs. 

The Army, at its core, is not programmed in systems; it is people. 

Each time before you, I come not just as a Secretary but humbly 

as the representative of our soldiers, civilians, and their families. 

As every one of us in this room knows so well, these brave men 

and women who have endured so much over the past decade depend upon a variety of programs, policies, and facilities to cope 

with the stress, injuries, and family separation caused by war. 

Sadly, tragically, our suicide and substance abuse rates remain 

unacceptably high, and we are aggressively pursuing multiple avenues to provide our personnel with the best medical and behavioral 

health support available. We must never forget that our success in 

both Iraq and Afghanistan has come with an incredibly high price 

to our Army family. 

Providing the means and resources for whatever challenges they 

now face, is in my opinion, the very least we can, we must do. 

As a final note, regarding our Army family, I would be remiss if 

I failed to mention the devastating impact that sequestration would 

have, not only on the Army’s programs, systems, and readiness, but 

also on our soldiers, civilians, and their families. Sadly, they, too, 

would bear the cost of continued inaction leading to sequestration. 

To use an axe to cut a half a trillion dollars from defense spending 

would be perilous enough, but to do so without providing the Department with any means of managing those reductions, would be 

beyond risky. To say this would be unacceptable is, at least in my 

opinion, an understatement. 

In conclusion, on behalf of the men and women of our Army, let 

me thank you again for your thoughtful oversight, unwavering support, and proud partnership. Today, your Army has succeeded in 

Iraq, is making progress in Afghanistan, and as this budget, I feel, 

demonstrates, is poised to transform into a new, smaller, and more 

balanced force, ready to meet the needs, all the needs, of this Nation’s national defense. 
7 

I want to be clear, very clear. These are extraordinarily challenging times, globally, and fiscally. Our strategy in this budget reflect very hard decisions that will impact communities, industry, 

and people. We know that. We know it well. But I promise you, we 

will do everything we can to minimize these effects, but in the end, 

to make a properly balanced Army that can stay ahead of our competitors and support our greatest asset, our soldiers, we must restructure, we must reprioritize. We have begun this effort, and 

with your continued leadership and help, we will succeed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and General 

Odierno can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

General Odierno. 

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor 

to be here in front of you today and I want to first thank you for 

the incredible support you have continued to give our soldiers today 

and over the past 10 years specifically, as we fought in wars in 

Iraq and Afghanistan and around the world. We couldn’t have done 

it without your support, your guidance, and your partnership that 

we have had. 

I appreciate the vote of confidence from Secretary McHugh, but 

in reality, it was I relying strongly on his wisdom and experience 

to guide me through my first posture hearings as the Chief. We are 

very fortunate to have Secretary McHugh leading our Army. He 

deeply cares about our institution and its role in providing our Nation’s security, and I could not ask for a better boss. 

So together here today, both of us, it is a true honor to be here 

today, representing our 1.1 million soldiers and our nearly 280,000 

Department of the Army civilians, and their 1.4 million family 

members. I am extremely proud of the commitment, professionalism, and dedication of our soldiers and their sacrifice and accomplishments. Today they continue to be in over 150 countries 

around the world. Collectively, they are a truly globally engaged 

Army with 95,000 soldiers deployed and another 96,000 soldiers 

forward-stationed, conducting a broad range of missions. 

But our Army’s primary purpose is steadfast and resolute to fight 

and win our Nation’s wars. As the Army continues its transition, 

we will ensure the President’s 2012 defense strategic priorities are 

implemented by first meeting our current commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere by ensuring a highly trained, well-manned, and 

equipped force. 

Now that operations in Iraq are complete and we continue surge 

recovery in Afghanistan, we will help shape the regional environs 

in support of the combatant commanders as well as our strategic 

environment. 

In the Asia-Pacific, which is home to 7 out of the 10 largest land 

armies in the world, we will have provided an array of tools 

through rotational forces, multilateral exercises, and other innovative engagements with our allies and new partners. We currently 
8 

have some 66,000 soldiers, and almost 10,000 civilians in this region. 

In the Middle East, we continue our strong commitment to sustaining and building partner capacity to ensure stability. 

And in Europe, as we decrease our footprint by two brigade combat teams, we will use a series of engagement tools that will include rotational forces to conduct training and combined readiness 

exercises with our allies. This will serve as a model on how I see 

us doing things in the future, using a low-cost, small-footprint approach by utilizing rotational, regionally-aligned forces and 

prepositioned stocks. 

As we move forward, we will ensure our National Guard and 

Army Reserves remain resourced at an appropriate level to build 

on the competencies and experiences that have been gained over 

the past several years. We are committed to maintaining an operational reserve to meet future security requirements. We will adapt 

our progressive readiness model to do that. We will build on the 

integration and synchronization gain over the past 10 years between our conventional and Special Operations Forces. The Army’s 

investment in our Special Operations community in 

counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, and other key operational matters is significant, going onwards to 35,000 elite warriors that provide specialized and unique capabilities. 

As we look forward, and the Secretary already touched on this 

a bit, there are several focus areas that will help us guide the way 

ahead. Foremost, we will remain committed to our 67,000 

warfighters in Afghanistan and continue to provide trained and 

ready-equipped soldiers to win that fight. 

We will be responsible governmental stewards through energy 

cost-savings and institutional and acquisition reform. And we will 

continue our equipment reset program to restore unit equipment to 

desired level of capability that is commensurate with their future 

missions. There have been over 1.8 million pieces of equipment 

reset to date, which equates to approximately 31 brigade equivalents annually. 

And finally, we will become leaner. With a leaner Army, we have 

to prioritize, yet we must never sacrifice our capability of meeting 

a wide range of security requirements. This requires a delicate balance of end strength, modernization, and readiness, as we cannot 

afford to reduce too much too soon. 

With the end of Operation New Dawn and new defense priorities, 

we will reduce our end strength and force structure in the Active 

Army from 570,000 to 490,000; from 358,000 to 353,500 in the 

Army National Guard; and from 206,000 to 205,000 in the Army 

Reserve. 

It is imperative for us to sustain a gradual ramp that will allow 

us to take care of our soldiers, continue to provide forces for Afghanistan, and facilitate reversibility, if necessary, over the next 5 

years. This helps mitigate strategic risks as we continue current 

operations and simultaneously reset for the future. 

We will also reduce our end strength by a minimum of eight brigade combat teams in the Active Component. This drawdown, 

based on our national strategic objectives, will be done with deliberate consideration to the impacts on combatant commander re-
9 

quirements, as well as considerations on local communities and infrastructure. 

We are in the process of reviewing our brigade combat team design as we analyze lessons learned from the past 10 years of combat and look to what future capabilities we will need to be successful. 

While we are a few months away from decision, initial analysis 

indicates we can eliminate some unnecessary overhead while sustaining more robust, flexible, adaptable brigade combat teams. This 

could result in additional BCT headquarters reductions while sustaining combat capability at the battalion level. Army unit readiness is measured by the level of its manning, training, and equipping. As a component of readiness, we will continue to provide 

first-rate support for all of our family’s, wounded warriors, and our 

Veterans. 

Additionally, the Secretary and I pledge our support for the proposed reforms in military compensation programs. We are reinforcing the professional ethics centered around trust and respect in 

order to establish a climate where sexual harassment, sexual assault, and hazing will not be tolerated. This misconduct is inconsistent with the core values of our profession. Accountability will 

be enforced at all levels. 

Similarly, the Secretary and I are relooking at the role of women 

in combat as they comprise 15.6 percent of our Active Duty workforce. This will start with the opportunity for women to serve in 

their designated field, regardless the type of unit. It is about managing talent and putting our best people in critical and developmental positions. 

As we continue to transform our modernization practices through 

a holistic bottom-up approach, we must achieve our priorities of the 

network, which is critical to our ability to manage information and 

command our forces at all levels both home and abroad. The 

ground combat vehicle, the replacement for our infantry fighting 

vehicle that can accommodate an infantry squad and balance mobility and survivability and provide unmatched lethality on the battlefield against current and future threats. The more mobile, survivable network-integrated joint light tactical vehicle, which both 

myself and General Amos agree is necessary, given the last 10 

years of fighting and what future operations may entail. And finally, we must have continued efforts to give our squad superiority 

on the battlefield with advanced soldier systems, in weapons, communications, and protections. 

The Secretary and I will continue to assess and make adjustments to our budget strategy while addressing any potential risk 

incurred as we adjust our force posture. 

I would like to leave you with one last thought. Sequestration is 

not in the best interest, in my opinion, of our National security. 

The impact to the Army would be severe reductions in the Active 

and Reserve Component end strength. It would significantly decrease our readiness, and detrimentally impact our modernization 

programs. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you again 

for the opportunity to speak here today. This committee affords our 
10 

all-volunteer Army the most decisive land force in the world, and 

we could not do it without the support you give us. 

It is an honor to serve this great Nation and stand beside the 

dedicated professionals of our Army. The strength of our Nation is 

our Army. The strength of our Army is our soldiers. And the 

strength of our soldiers are our families. And this is what makes 

us Army strong. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Odierno and Secretary 

McHugh can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General, and Mr. Secretary. 

Last year we passed the Deficit Reduction Act that took a twopronged approach to attack the huge deficit problem that we have 

built over decades of making promises that would be difficult to 

keep and spending money that we had to borrow to spend. 

The first prong was the almost trillion dollars that was supposed 

to come out of discretionary spending. There was a call after the 

last election that everything should be on the table, and I understand that defense was a big target, and I have repeatedly said, if 

we could not find some savings within a budget of $600 billion 

plus, shame on us. 

And I think you have done a great job on that, beginning with 

the $100 billion of efficiencies, and then the $78 billion, and then 

the what we find now is $487 billion. The second part of that, we 

had, through the legislation, assigned the supercommittee to come 

up with savings, hopefully out of the entitlement programs. Because if we don’t address the entitlement programs, if we eliminate 

the total discretionary budget, we still run a deficit of about a half 

trillion dollars a year. So we could totally wipe out the discretionary budget and not solve the problem, not even really attack 

the real problem. 

But we are facing that now. You have done a great job working 

for months on coming up with the strategies, and using the money 

that you have remaining after these cuts to get us through this 

problem. 

The second part of the second prong of that attack when the 

‘‘super committee’’ [Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] 

was unable to perform its work, is known as sequestration, and 

that will be another $1.1 to $1.2 trillion that takes effect next January 1st. Again, half of that comes out of defense. Now, defense 

only accounts for 20 percent of our budget, but the first tranche, 

50 percent of the savings came out of defense; the second tranche, 

another 50 percent of the savings is slated to come out of defense. 

So that we could look out 10 years and be talking about $100 billion a year cut on defense out of what had been projected in previous budgets. 

To me, the most pressing need right now is, we need to fix the 

sequestration. If we allow that to move forward and hit us next 

January 1st, the way it is currently drafted, just across-the-board 

cuts of either 8 percent, 12 percent, depending on if personnel are 

taken out of the equation, thinking of all of the multiple contracts. 

I don’t know how many contracts you have out, Mr. Secretary, but 
11 

I am sure it is in the hundreds, if not thousands, that would have 

to be rewritten, renegotiated. I just see total chaos on January 1st 

of next year if this has not been fixed. 

I would like to ask you, General, what you are doing, what you 

are contemplating doing, what planning you may be doing to prepare for the problem that may confront us if we do not address this 

issue before next January 1st. What will you be doing? 

General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, first, we will continue to wait 

for guidance from the Secretary of Defense in order to move forward on very specific planning for sequestration. But as I think 

through this, and as we think through the potential that this could 

have, what I would tell you is that it would result in us having to 

relook fundamentally how we do business. The reductions that 

would be required in both our Active Component and Reserve Components would be significant. Our readiness profiles would be affected, and so how would we be able to sustain readiness so we 

could avoid Task Force Smiths would be critical as we move forward. And then, finally, it would significantly delay any modernization efforts we have that could fundamentally really keep us from 

providing what we believe is necessary to properly modernize the 

force. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, may I just add a few words. 

The Chief is absolutely right. We are not doing as yet any hard 

planning. That would probably happen later in the summer, would 

it go to that extent. But just some back-of-the-envelope math can 

tell you if the Army receives and apportions share amongst the 

services of that cut, it would be about 26 percent. I think that is 

probably best-case scenario for us. That is $134 billion through 

2017. To take that kind of additional cut through the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan], as the Chief said, would leave virtually 

no activity the Army undertakes untouched. You mentioned contracts. The Army has open contracts totaling since 2000, 96,000 in 

number at the moment. Not all of those would be affected but a 

great number of them would. In some cases, if we interrupt the 

program, we have to pay closeout costs on those contracts. I worry 

about, as I know you do, Mr. Chairman, what do the manufacturing interests, what do our industrial-based interest do the further we get into the year? They have employees. They have to plan. 

Some have shareholders. The uncertainty, I think, is something 

that, the sooner it can be cleared up, the better it will serve all. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I share your concerns and 

these gentlemen’s concerns about sequestration. I think it is imperative that we avoid it for many of the reasons that have been stated. 

And I think the big problem with our budget approach is there 

are three basic pieces of trying to deal with the deficit here. There 

is the mandatory spending. There is the discretionary spending, 

and then there is the revenue, all of the money that comes in. You 

know, I mean, in all of those areas, we have seen spending go up 

significantly in both mandatory and discretionary, and we have 

seen revenue go down significantly in the last 10 years by over 30 

percent, you know, in large part because of the sheer number of tax 
12 

cuts that we have passed over the course of the last 10 years and 

then the ups and downs in the economy. 

All three of those pieces have to be on the table if we are going 

to seriously deal with this, and unfortunately, as the chairman 

points out, the Budget Control Act only dealt with one, and then 

sort of on a wing and a prayer said, well, we hope the super committee will figure out the other two, which didn’t happen. 

And I think the overall problem here is the depth of denial in 

this country, not just in this town, about where the deficit is at, 

and what is going to be required to respond to it is unprecedented. 

What we do is, you know, every person or elected official has their 

area of the budget that they care about, and they will fight to the 

death to defend it and then say, yeah, the deficit is a problem, but 

deal with it someplace else. 

You know, that is why we need a comprehensive approach that 

looks at revenue, mandatory spending, and discretionary. And yet, 

you know, it is really not happening. All we are really hearing is, 

you know, defend our portion of the budget. You know, we hear it 

on this committee. Defense is our thing. We defend it. You don’t 

hear people saying here is what we ought to cut for mandatory 

spending, or well, other than me and a few others, here is what 

ought to raise in taxes—I am willing to raise those taxes to make 

sure that we don’t have to do the cuts necessary. And that is the 

key to this. 

You know, if we want to protect defense from sequestration or 

even from the size of the cuts that it is facing, then we have to put 

specific proposals on the table to either raise revenue or make cuts 

in mandatory spending, and until we do that, we are going to be 

vulnerable. 

You know, and we have got a bill coming up here in about a halfhour that is going to add another hundred some odd billion dollars 

to the problem. So, you know, we are going in the wrong direction, 

and I share the Chairman’s concerns about the impact that will 

have on defense. It is our responsibility, and not just to complain 

about the cuts that are happening to defense but to look at those 

other two pieces of the equation, the revenue, and the mandatory 

spending, to make sure that discretionary spending is protected. 

That is our responsibility, not yours. And it is one that thus far, 

we are failing to meet. And if we really want to protect defense, 

we better change that. 

I want to ask quickly about some of the sexual assault language 

that has been in previous legislation and your efforts within the 

Army to step up and deal with what is a fairly sizeable problem 

and concerns about how sexual assault charges are handled. We 

have passed legislation, under the leadership of Ms. Davis, Ms. 

Sanchez, and Ms. Tsongas and others on this committee to, you 

know, try to better address that issue. 

There are some proposals that go further. I think the biggest proposal is the idea of taking sexual assault outside the normal chain 

of command, and in terms of charging, I know there are deep concerns within the military about that, so if you could do two things: 

One, tell us about the progress that is being made with some of the 

changes we have done, and then explain, you know, your concerns 

about going outside the chain of command for sexual assault cases. 
13 

But the big thing is, to avoid that second one, we have to have 

some confidence that the first one is making a real difference. 

Secretary MCHUGH. And we deeply appreciate the leadership 

that many of the members on this committee have brought to the 

issue. And I just want to assure you, having worked on this matter 

as Personnel Subcommittee chairman and ranking member in my 

time here, there are few things that are more in contrast to the 

basic Army values and few things that happen within our ranks 

that we are more concerned about and that we are not trying every 

day to become better. 

As to our responses, as you know, Mr. Smith, we have a taken 

a holistic approach to this from both the counseling, pre-counseling, 

encouraging victims to come forward to report, trying to provide 

them the assurances necessary, both within their command and 

within the larger Army, that they won’t be victimized again; that 

coming forward, and talking about these things will not be a career-killer for them. But beyond that, what we are also trying to 

do, is bring sensitivity to our youngest soldiers and bringing responsibility to our NCO [Noncommissioned Officer] core and to our 

leaders. 

We have instituted constant training programs from the basic 

level training courses through the drill sergeants course through 

the basic officer leader course. We have instituted training programs into the JAG [Judge Advocate General] schools, so that our 

Army attorneys understand the special way in which these matters 

need to be handled, both socially as well as legally. We have tried 

to, in fact have, greatly increased the resourcing that is necessary 

to provide lab examiners. We have hired more of those to provide 

special investigators. We have hired six highly qualified experts in 

sexual assault and harassment to come into our ranks to guide us 

in terms of program development, but also to help our prosecutors 

and to help our investigators, make sure that they are up to the 

latest developments that come about. 

We have mobile training teams that go out and go to every unit 

in the Army, conducting specialized training for our on-post camp 

and station investigators, as well. I think if you look at the data, 

they are still too high and they are unacceptable, but we do have 

some glimmer of progress. Our report rate is 33 percent. I view 

that as abysmal. But in the civilian sector, the report rate is 18 

percent. We refer some 60 percent of all cases of actual rape and 

assault brought to our officials for court marshal. And our conviction rates have gone as high as 78 percent, and not every one of 

those data points have a similar data point within the civilian sector, but we are doing better in some cases, better than the civilian 

sector. 

But better is not good enough. We have to get this to a point 

where one instance is one too many, and that is our objective. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I appreciate that, and it is 

worth noting that this is not just a problem in the military, and 

I hope we do understand that. 

General. 

General ODIERNO. I would just like to add that as I mentioned 

in my opening statement, there is institutional and operational capabilities that we have to establish and the Secretary covered most 
14 

of those. The one thing I really want to focus on is the cultural and 

institutional issues we have here. We get soldiers from all different 

parts of society, all different parts of the country. It is important 

for us as we initially bring them in to ensure that we foster a climate of trust and respect that we expect within our own institution. And that will start early on. 

We now have courses, when you are going through basic training, when you go to your first officer courses, whether you are in 

officer development training, and it is going to be inculcated in everything that we do, because that is how important it is. 

Our female population plays an incredible role in our Army. And 

we have to ensure that they have the environment that they can 

operate in properly, and so we take this very seriously. 

If I can just make a short comment about the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice. I think it is important that we work carefully 

about this. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides us with 

incredible flexibility to operate across a wide range of sexual assault, sexual harassment initiatives that we do not want to lose. 

And so it is important that we continue to have discussions about 

this. And I am adamant that with hard work, we will ensure that 

the chain of command is able to use the administrative and UCMJ 

[Uniform Code of Military Justice] authorities they have to help us 

to enforce this program. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, our chairman mentioned Task Force 

Smith. Regarding the lessons learned from Task Force Smith, one 

of the reasons why the Army couldn’t get enough soldiers and 

equipment into the initial action was because there was a limited 

number of transport aircraft. 

I understand that the Air Force has decided to not procure any 

more C–27 J aircraft and will be retiring some C–130s. I realize 

that you have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding 

with the Air Force, but when it comes to providing support after 

the last tactical mile, are you convinced that the Air Force will be 

able to meet all of your needs, and if they don’t, will the Army have 

to increase its use rates for other assets, such as the CH–47 helicopter? I think everybody knows that the Air Force was never very 

enthusiastic about the C–27 J. They didn’t even want the plane. 

And the logic that I had some trouble understanding, the Pentagon 

assigned the plane to the Air Force, and then asked them to be at 

the beck and call of the Army when the Army needed that support. 

I didn’t think this was a prescription for a really effective military. 

And I understand now that because of limitations in airstrips in 

Afghanistan, that we don’t have enough C–27 Js, and one source 

said you are flying the blades off the 47 to meet the demand there. 

How sure are you that if we are involved in conflicts like Afghanistan in the future, that you are going to be able, the Air Force is 

going to be able to meet your needs? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, sir. 

First, in terms of our—and you are touching on our intratheater 

lift in terms of strategic lift. We are confident in C–5 Mikes, and 
15 

the C–17s that will be able to help us to move our forces strategically around the globe in order to meet our requirements. 

In terms of intratheater, which is the subject you focused on is, 

it is important that we have the capability to move in intratheater. 

When I was the commander in Iraq, we had conducted the test for 

the C–130 that was then attached to the Army in order to meet its 

missions, and we found it to be an incredibly successful program, 

where we controlled where it went, we controlled the loads and it 

enabled us to get what we needed in intratheater lift where we 

needed it on time. 

And that is the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding that 

has been now signed between us and the Air Force, based on the 

tests that we conducted in Iraq. 

Afghanistan, as you have said, has very difficult terrain. So it is 

a very specific case, and yes, we have had to fly significant amount 

of CH–47 hours in Afghanistan in order to provide support to our 

disparate bases, but we have also done other things like air drop. 

We have significantly invested in our ability to more accurately air 

drop supplies and other things to remote locations, which has 

helped us solve some of these issues. The C–27 has performed very 

well in Afghanistan. I visited them personally. They are in high 

operational readiness rate. They have provided a capability that 

has been helpful in Afghanistan. I would just say that I think with 

choices that have to be made, one of the choices the Air Force 

made, was to reduce that capability. So what we are now trying to 

do is we will continue to increase the use of the C–130 to support 

our intratheater lift, as well as, as I pointed out, more precise air 

drop capabilities and we will continue to work on that as we move 

forward. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Another area of considerable concern to me is 

lightening the load on the soldier. 

General, in your opinion, do we need to shift the balance in the 

operational requirements process from a higher priority on aircraft 

and vehicles to more emphasis on soldier focus. As an example, 

how can we help you to speed up the rapid innovation process for 

weight reduction initiatives for individual soldier systems. In a 

120-degree temperature, they are caring 150 pounds. Now, that is 

just unacceptable, isn’t it? 

General ODIERNO. We have actually made, in my opinion, great 

progress in this area. Now, what we now look at is as a squad; it 

is about what the squad can carry together in a load. Now what 

has happened is we have made some significant improvements in 

reducing the weight of what they were carrying, but now what we 

are doing is, we are finding that we are carrying more things. It 

gives them the capability to have more and provide more capability 

in the squad as it moves forward. So we have to now work through 

and understand what specifically we think a squad needs for it to 

be successful. Because as we have lightened the load, we have 

added more things to the squad. And so what we have to do is invest in deciding what are the absolute, optimal loads that we have, 

and continue to look at the technologies to reduce body armor. We 

have made some good progress there, but we still want to continue 

to looking at decreasing the weight of our body armor, while increasing the amount of protection. 
16 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning. I know we 

have talked about the impact that these cutbacks can potentially 

have on the industrial base. I am particularly concerned about the 

ground combat vehicle. This is a basic staple of the ability of the 

Army to fight. The current plan, according to the budget submitted, 

calls for a total shutdown of the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker production lines for 3 to 4 years, which starts in fiscal year 2014. 

I just want to get it on the record, how can the Army be sure 

that the production lines and, in particular, the skilled workers, because in a recent visit to my colleague, Mr. Critz’s district, that 

both Chairman Bartlett and I went to, that is a very real concern 

on behalf of industry that the skilled workers are not going to be 

there after such a—such a lengthy shutdown. So after going cold 

for 3 to 4 years, how can we be sure that that capacity will be able 

to regenerate itself? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, it is a great question. It is one we are 

very concerned about, and very focused on, as well. What we have 

attempted to do at this point, is really a two-pronged approach. 

First of all, the Department of Defense is leading what is called the 

S2–T2, sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis of all of our industrial 

partners to try to assess those greatest vulnerabilities, the kinds of 

things that you mentioned, Mr. Reyes, and to figure a path forward 

for all of the services jointly as to how we might lessen that challenge and burden on the individual locations. 

Beyond that, the Army itself is doing an industrial baseline. Our 

folks in our acquisition community are looking at those things. By 

way of example, you mentioned the Abrams shutdown in Ohio. 

What we are doing with GDLS, General Dynamics Land Systems, 

the contractor on site, is trying to ensure that, through particularly 

their FMS [Future Military Sales] sales, their foreign military 

sales, which they are beginning to line up and which the Department of Defense is attempting to assist them, provides that core 

ability for those particularly highly skilled engineer positions to retain employment until we begin our recapitalization program in 

2017 of the M1A2 sub-V Abrams. So this is something that is of 

great interest. It is something, as I said, we are looking at very 

hard. And there are no guarantees. But whether it is a PPPs, public-private partnerships, or other kinds of approaches, as far as we 

are concerned, we are willing to pursue any reasonable path to ensure that those particularly critical jobs remain viable. 

Mr. REYES. Is there—and I am sure you have given it thought, 

but is there any way to keep some kind of a minimum production 

capacity for the Army during these partnerships? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, every facility has a minimum sustain 

rate. For the Abrams, I believe it is 70 tanks a year, which is far 

beyond our—not just our fiscal ability; it is far beyond our need. 

But as those minimum sustain rates are figured through, we try 

to, as I say, meet them through other means, public-private partnerships, FMS, and any other way by which we can assist. So those 

are part of the calculation. 
17 

Mr. REYES. General. 

General ODIERNO. I would just add that we are being aggressive 

with our foreign military sales program in identifying potential 

suitors who need this type of equipment. And so we think there is 

some potential there, and that is something we will continue to 

work very hard, just to add to what the Secretary said. But for example, Lima, it would cost us $2.8 billion just to keep that open. 

And we—and our tank fleet is in good shape. And we don’t need 

to—because the great support we have gotten over the last few 

years, and we are not going to need to start recap or resend of that 

until 2017. So we have to fill that gap between the end of 2014 and 

2017, and we will try to use FMS where we can to do this. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, it is an honor to have both of you here 

today. 

We appreciate your service, and as you know, we are often here 

a very bipartisan committee, and I agree very much with the distinguished ranking member when he indicates that we simply, as 

a Congress, can’t spend $800 billion on a stimulus package, almost 

twice the cuts that we are now placing in defense, or pass a massive health care act without having consequences. Two of those consequences are that we either have to ask hard-working taxpayers 

in America to spend more of their money to help cover our spending problem or we have to cut the defense of the Nation that they 

love. And neither of those consequences are good. 

If we could consider all of that in here, then the sign outside 

would say House of Representatives, but it doesn’t. It says House 

Committee on Armed Services. So I am going to focus on our military concerns. 

And General, specifically for you, you have been working, I know, 

to articulate the role the Army can play in our Asia-Pacific defense 

plans. And when it comes to maintaining operational access in a 

theater where the threat of ballistic missiles is growing, it would 

seem to me the Army could play a larger role in providing theater 

missile defense to our forward-deployed personnel and facilities and 

provide a means of alleviating some of the missile defense burden 

on the Navy. 

However, in the fiscal year 2013 budget there are cuts to the 

THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] program and the 

Patriot programs, and I am concerned about the Army end-strength 

reductions and how they could effect this mission. Could you just 

tell us and discuss maybe a little bit the role the Army foresees for 

itself in providing theater missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region? And then the Secretary might add something to that, if he 

would. 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congressman. 

First, we do play a significant role in the Pacific region air missile defense command. We have—our major command is in Hawaii, 

who manages air and missile defense for the region. We have Patriot battalions forward-deployed in the Asia-Pacific region. And we 
18 

have tactical operation strategic radars that are being deployed 

into the region to continue to supplement the current air and missile defense capabilities that we have. We are very focused on forward air and missile defense capability in our key theaters, both 

Asia-Pacific and other areas, to include the Middle East, and we 

will continue to do and fund that. And we have the capability to 

do that. We have the force structure to do that. So I feel confident 

that we will continue to be involved with that. 

I would also say there is many other roles that the Army can 

play in anti-access capabilities as we look at ground opportunities 

for entry and other things. And our ability, because of the large influence that the armies have in the Pacific region, we can help to 

develop systems and capabilities, multilateral systems and capabilities, that would help us in our anti-access campaign. And so I 

think in the Joint Operational Access Capability Assessment that 

the Joint Staff is doing, the Army will play a significant role in this 

as we move forward to build on the capabilities of the Navy and 

Air Force. And I think it is that joint concept and joint operational 

concept that will help us to have and work on the anti-access capabilities. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. 

I think the Chief laid down very well our current posture there. 

I would just say from a budgetary perspective, while your observation is absolutely right, there are cuts in the funding line to the 

entire program, and all of the accounts in the Asia-Pacific region 

for Army were protected. We haven’t diminished any of those. 

I get a little red behind the ears when I hear so many people— 

you did not—but I hear so many people refer to the Asia-Pacific region as strictly Naval and Air. There is a lot of air there and there 

is a lot of water there, but there is a heck of a lot of people there 

as well. 

And the fact of the matter is the Army has long been a dominant 

posture in the Pacific, over 76,000 troops. We had 120-plus activities and other kinds of operations with our Pacific-Asia partners. 

We are looking to grow those. The Chief just got back from visits 

to Japan and Korea. And as we develop jointly into our new strategy, again, as the Chief suggested, the Army has expertise in those 

missile defense platforms, and if we can fulfill an expanded role in 

that mission, that would be something we would want to pursue 

very anxiously. 

Mr. FORBES. We want to thank you both for your service, but 

also for the great men and women that you constantly turn out 

that serve our country. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, and General, for being here, and 

for your service. 

I wanted to go back to the sexual assault question for a second, 

because I don’t know if you had as much time, General, to respond 

to the chain of command issue. 

And perhaps, Mr. McHugh, you would like to weigh in as well. 
19 

As you know, there are a lot of victims and people who are concerned that the chain of command has not allowed victims to have 

the kind of access to help that perhaps they have needed, particularly in the past, but even today. Could you comment on that a little bit more and why you feel that it does serve best? 

I would say for myself I think this is a leadership issue. And so 

I think it is very important that leadership take responsibility and 

accountability. But on the other hand, we know that there are 

quite a number of instances when that has not worked. 

General ODIERNO. Thank you. And I don’t disagree with your 

statement. It absolutely is a leadership issue. It is a commander’s 

issue, as we would call it. And it is something that we have to continue to work. And again, it is even with our—you know, it is about 

continued education. It is about making sure that we have a message that goes through the chain of command that this is something that is incredibly important to the welfare of the Army, the 

welfare of our profession. And we will continue to do that. 

What I have found over my years of experience with these types 

of issues is, first off, you have to have a couple things. You have 

to have the ability for the victims to—some victims do not—it is 

about the victims feeling comfortable how they report and who they 

report to. So you have got to have a variety of ways for them to 

report. That is why it is important that we continue to have them, 

if they want to, not use the chain of command to report, and report 

outside of the chain of command. And we are establishing—we 

have established and will continue to emphasize that if that is 

what they feel comfortable doing. 

But it is also important for us to ensure to the chain of command 

that this is an important issue for morale. It is an important issue 

for our ability to execute our mission on a day-to-day basis. And 

it is also important for them to understand and help train them on 

what is available in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and other 

means in order to hold people accountable, and that in fact, as we 

do in everything we do, we will hold our commanders accountable 

for the discipline and morale of their units. And it is important 

that they will understand this as we go forward. 

So what we have done is we are increasing emphasis within our 

Judge Advocate General Corps to help train our commanders to ensure they understand what they can and what they can’t do. And 

also it is important for us, working through the chain of command, 

to emphasize the importance of this. We now, we talk to every battalion and brigade commander at Fort Leavenworth. They come 

through there every month for a pre-command course. We have 

added a portion specifically dedicated to this subject so they understand the importance of this. And in fact, the Vice Chief of Staff 

of the Army with a group is headed out there next week to talk 

about a variety of subjects, this being one of the main subjects, that 

we talk about. So I think it is things like that that will help us 

to emphasize in the chain of command their responsibilities. 

The other thing is to make sure that we have enough oversight 

where we disconnect a bit, be able to look at it from a little higher 

level from the chain of command. In other words, people who are 

not so close to the incident. And we have ways to do that. And we 
20 

are working as well as—using that as a technique as well. So, 

again, we are focused on this, ma’am. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I want to thank this committee and this 

Congress, because I think you passed some very important legislation in the last session that sets some requirements as to Sexual 

Assaults Response Coordinators, SARCs, and victims’ advocates. 

And the Army had already started on that, but you raised the bar 

as to a requirement that the SARCs be at the brigade level, the victims’ advocates, we have two VAs at every battalion level and company level. And that provides the kind of alternative that the Chief 

had just spoken about if the victim feels uncomfortable going to 

their chain of command. 

But that really, as you noted, Mrs. Davis, that is the critical part 

of fixing this more fully, making those commanders sensitive, making them understand that if they don’t get it right they are not 

going to be in this Army much longer. 

As to the UCMJ, it provides the prosecutors the opportunity to 

take action against people who are perhaps not violent sexual offenders, but inappropriate touching, the kinds of actions that probably in the civilian sector, nothing is done. And we take action 

against them as well, whether it is an article 15, or a holding off 

of promotion, or pay cuts. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

My time is about up. I did want to make one comment, if the 

chairman would let me. I think one of the things I have heard is 

that if women are serving up and down the commands and across 

the spectrum of the services, then in many ways, we will have less 

of this. So I just wanted to share my somewhat disappointment I 

think with the latest report that came out on women in combat and 

hope that we can work together to make sure that there is a process in place to be able to really determine the physical standards 

that are needed and how we are going to get to that, particularly 

for women who want to serve in those commands. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. 

As an Army veteran, I am particularly happy to see the venue 

today. Additionally, I am very grateful to represent Fort Jackson. 

I soon will be having a geographic presence adjacent to Fort Gordon. It is really exciting. And then I have got three sons serving 

in the Army National Guard. So I appreciate your service. 

And Mr. Secretary, I am very grateful to be seated in the John 

McHugh seat, chair. So it is a great honor to follow you in supporting military personnel. So thank you so much for your service. 

And General Odierno, one of the highlights of my congressional 

service, we knew of your success in Iraq. But when we came to be 

briefed and you came up with a diagram what appeared to be the 

State of Virginia, and you explained that this indicates a high level 

of violence where Northern Virginia would be the height, but then 

the surge, and then it led to the Eastern Shore. And so it was a 

diagram that could be understood by anyone. And so your success 

is just greatly appreciated by me. 
21 

With that, though, I am really concerned about the Administration’s budget, and in particular, Mr. Secretary, the extraordinary 

fee increases in regard to TRICARE [DOD health care program]. 

We have commitments to our service members, our veterans. And 

the service that our young people make is just extraordinary, and 

their families. And sadly, the administration is proposing a 

TRICARE fee increase of fiscal year 2013, 30 to 78 percent; and 

then over the next 5 years, from 94 percent to 345 percent. To me, 

this is a great concern for the people I represent. And in fact, I am 

very concerned, and I would like to know how you feel this will affect recruiting, retention. And then what message does this send to 

our young people who are in the field today? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I think you have to remember as to recruiting and retention, none of these increases would affect those who 

are currently serving. So the increases would only be effected on 

those retirees under the age of 65 who are out of the military, obviously, and working by and large. 

This was not an easy decision. But it is something that this committee has talked about for a good number of years. And it is simply the fact that the health care system within the military services, just as it is within the civilian sector, from a price perspective, 

is out of control. While the percentage of these increases over time 

in some of the categories sound to be quite large, the fact of the 

matter is, A, these are the first increases since the program was 

put into place in the mid-1990s; and B, from a comparative perspective in relation to the civilian community, the TRICARE program will still be very, very beneficial, and in most cases, a far 

more generous program than you can find in the private sector. 

So the interest here, and it is shared amongst the NCOs, senior 

NCOs, amongst all the service chiefs, and all the service secretaries, is that we have to do something now to ensure that this program remains viable for those great men and women in uniform 

and their families who have served. And the reality is the longer 

we wait, as in so many of the other problems that this Congress 

is attempting to deal with, the answer gets harder and harder, and 

the increases will get larger and larger. So we think the time to 

act is now. Maintaining a highly generous program. And certainly 

those great men and women in uniform have earned it. 

Mr. WILSON. And TRICARE is so appreciated. 

A concern I have is hollowing out of the military. First of all, I 

want to thank you both for your courage in regard to speaking out 

in regard to sequestration. There are different definitions of 

hollowing out. My concern is for senior NCOs and junior officers 

who have combat experience. This is invaluable. How are we going 

to address this? Is there a preference? Is there protection? What 

will we be doing to maintain people with combat experience? 

General ODIERNO. Well, first off, that is why for me, as we come 

down in size, it is about the length of the ramp over 5 years. That 

is what is so key to that. Because if we can do it over a 5-year period, as we have asked for, that enables us to keep the best, to ensure we keep the combat-tested, the combat-experienced officers 

and noncommissioned officers we have. If we are asked to do it 

more quickly than that, then we will lose many of our combat-tested and noncommissioned leaders, both officer and noncommissioned 
22 

officer. So that is why this 5-year period is so important for us as 

we look at drawing down the Army. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thanks to both of you for your service. As I have discussed 

with both of you many times in the past, in various venues, as you 

will recall, I strongly believe that a key to the reversibility that is 

built into defense strategy, and a key to ensuring that our country 

is able to rapidly equip our soldiers in the event of future contingencies, is our organic industrial base. 

I am very pleased that Congressman Schilling and I were able 

to expand the ability of our arsenals to enter into public-private 

partnerships through last year’s NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. And I believe that those partnerships, as does Congressman Schilling, will be key to maintaining the readiness for 

our arsenals. 

However, I also believe the Army must do its part. And I do believe that the Army must actively support the readiness of our organic industrial base. Specifically, my question then regarding this 

particular issue is what is the Army’s plan to workload the organic 

industrial base, including our organic manufacturing base through 

the arsenals to ensure really that its capabilities are maintained in 

order to respond in case we do have another OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] at some point down the road? And if there is 

a plan, how will it be implemented to ensure that these critical capabilities are maintained? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you for your concerns, and on a very 

important area. Generally, when people talk about so-called reversibility, I think they perhaps naturally think about reversing our 

end strength numbers. That is something we spent a lot of time on. 

And I think one of the more important components of the way in 

which the Army has shaped itself through this budget is we retain 

those NCOs, senior NCO positions, and particularly field grade officers who would be so critical to expanding our numbers. But there 

is another component to that reversibility as well, as you noted, sir, 

and that is our ability to produce the products, the weapons, the 

platforms that are necessary when we send our warfighters out to 

do the hard work of freedom. 

I mentioned earlier one of the critical components of how we are 

going forward right now are the various analyses that both the Department of Defense and the Army are conducting sector-by-sector, 

tier-by-tier analysis through DOD [Department of Defense] and an 

Army baseline industrial capability analysis trying to both identify 

where our major risk lies, where the single point of failures exist, 

and also to try establish a strategy where we can do as much as 

we possibly can, whether it is through PPPs, as Rock Island I think 

has done very, very effectively, or through increased FMS to keep 

those work lines busy and open. 

This is going to be a very difficult challenge. These are in large 

measure highly skilled workers. And that is certainly true at Rock 

Island. I have had the pleasure of visiting there. We have a similar 

hard metal facility in Watervliet and Albany. And those two do 
23 

some pretty important things. So this is an ongoing effort, and we 

recognize it. And frankly, if all of our locations were as aggressive 

and forward-leaning as Rock Island has been to go out and to develop partnerships, we would be a little less challenged. So I appreciate yours and Senator Durbin’s and the entire delegation’s vigilance on that matter. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you. 

General. 

General ODIERNO. If I could, Congressman, as you stated, the organic industrial base is key to our ability to continue to be capable 

not only of reversibility, but to sustain the force as we move forward. It has been for the last several years. What we have done 

is we have developed core functions at many of these areas, which 

will enable us to sustain what we need, enabling these core functions. We will have to continue to assess, as we look at our budgets 

in the future, to see do we have to redesignate some core functions 

or combine some? But I am confident that we have a good program 

in place to take advantage of these core functions that we have established at many of these arsenals, depots, et cetera. 

As you know, there will be some reduced—for the next few years, 

I think we will sustain a fairly high rate, but as we move forward 

and we continue to finish the reset coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan, we will have to start to reduce some of the capacity. But we 

will try to keep the expertise necessary to sustain these core functions that we will need over the long haul. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. And I think from a national security standpoint, 

I think we can all agree, too, that should we have another overseas 

contingency operation at some point, we don’t want to be in a situation where it takes some time to ramp up the production of whatever it is that the arsenals are actually producing at that time. As 

was already mentioned, make sure that we do provide for our 

troops when they go overseas on whatever mission it may be that 

they are trying to perform. 

And I do have one question for the record I would like to submit 

having to do with our Reserve Components as well, if I may do that 

as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The vote has been called. I plan on 

trying to get in two more questioners before, and then we will recess and come back as soon as we can. 

Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for being here and 

for your service. 

Mr. Secretary, I have a two-part question for you. I see that in 

this year’s budget, you submitted a request for approval to enter 

into a second multiyear contract for the CH–47 Chinook helicopter. 

Since you have been using the multiyear for Chinooks for the past 

5 years, and I understand that one will expire this year, what have 

you seen as the biggest benefit for you and the taxpayer of having 

the authority that has led you to request a second multiyear contract? 

And the second part of it, Mr. Secretary, is, is the Armed Aerial 

Scout program an Army priority? 
24 

Secretary MCHUGH. As to the CH–47, we have found that 

multiyear contract to be very efficient. We are very, very pleased 

with the product and the product line. And as we have looked hard 

at our acquisition strategies, both successes and failures over the 

last several years, the CH–47 contract as it is currently configured 

seems to have embodied a lot of the answers and a lot of the solutions to some of our challenges. So we thought it was in the best 

interests, both in terms of the production line, but most importantly for the taxpayer and for the Army, to extend that contract. 

And I am hoping that that comes through to fruition. 

As to the Armed Aerial Scout, it is still a priority for us. We are 

looking at an analysis of our way forward. As you know, for now 

we are dealing with the Chinooks and the CASUP [Cockpit and 

Sensor Upgrade Program] program, the cockpit upgrade program 

as a bridge to that. And the Chinook will be a part of our inventory 

probably until at least 2025. But we still believe we need an Armed 

Aerial Scout program, and we are pursuing it as an important priority. 

General ODIERNO. If I could just add to the last piece, the Armed 

Aerial Scout is important for us. It is an important capability that 

we have to sustain. And as the Secretary said, we are doing an 

analysis of alternatives that will be done in 2013. And once we do 

that, we will have to make a decision whether we go to a new aircraft, or do we continue then to keep the Kiowa Warrior and upgrade the Kiowa Warrior? That will be a decision that is made next 

year. And right now we expect to have the Kiowas, as the Secretary just said, the Kiowa Warrior through 2025. So this is an incredibly important program. We will look at the analysis of these 

alternatives that we have next year, and then we will decide on 

how we want to move forward. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I said Chinook. Obviously, Kiowa Warrior. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Mr. Secretary and General, thank 

you. 

General, can you tell us what you believe the status and readiness of the Army’s current inventory of prepositioned equipment is? 

General ODIERNO. I feel very confident with it. In fact, we have 

just actually issued our predeployment equipment in Kuwait to the 

brigade that moved out of there from Iraq. And they have been exercising with it. And it was in very good condition. It is important 

for us to sustain our prepositioned fleet in very good condition. 

Now, we are going to continue to review this. As we now look at 

this change in strategy, we will look at, do we have to make some 

minor adjustments in prepositioned fleets? Are they in the right 

place? Do we need some training preposition stocks to do multilateral training in the Pacific, to do rotational training in Europe? 

And we will take a look at that. And as we are downsizing, we 

have an opportunity here to use some of the equipment that were 

in some of our forces potentially to use in these prepositioned sites. 

So that will be a continued analysis that we conduct. It is a very 

important program. And it is going to become more important as 

we move to the future. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
25 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Secretary and General, thank you all for being here 

today. 

Obviously, time is an issue right now. I was wanting to hear a 

little bit more about the importance of a rampdown in attrition. 

But I think, General, you mentioned that, that that 5-year plan is 

so important to what we are doing to be able to keep the best of 

the best. I also wanted to talk more about equipment. And I know 

in one of our readiness hearings a while back, we were discussing 

about where do we go with equipment? How tied down are we to 

equipment we might have versus what we think we might need 

and some of the future challenges we have. 

So the two questions I want to zero in on, I am going to be 

spending quite a bit of time next week with a lot of our Reserve 

and Guard Components in North Carolina. Just what do you all 

anticipate the role of the Guard and Reserve being and how we are 

going to balance that out toward the challenges we have? 

General ODIERNO. I will take that first. 

In terms of the Guard and Reserve, first, the lessons we have 

learned here is that we have to have a total Army. We have to 

have certain capabilities in the Active Component, but we have to 

have ready capabilities in the Reserve Component for us to be successful as an Army, especially as we continue to downsize. So what 

we want do is take advantage of the experience that we have 

gained in our Reserve Component, as they have been a significant 

part of our deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. So what we are 

going to do is we are going to set up a progressive readiness model 

that will enable us to attempt to sustain key components of the Reserve Component and continue to sustain an operational Reserve. 

It won’t obviously be as big as it is now because of the requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, but what we will do is rotate units 

through and provide them more dollars in order to sustain a readiness level that will enable them to continue to contribute on a rotational basis operationally. And I think in the long term, that will 

help us to sustain a higher readiness rate within the Reserve Component. So we are very focused on that. 

Secretary MCHUGH. If I could add, Mr. Kissell, we worked very 

hard over recent years to try to upgrade the level of equipment 

within the Reserve Component, both the Reserve and the Guard. 

And I think the data points suggest we have come a long ways. 

For example, the equipment on hand ratings right now for the 

Active Component is 87 percent. The National Guard is also 87 

percent. And the Reserve is 86 percent. And based on this budget 

and the FYDP in which it lies, we hope to grow the AC [Active 

Component] to 94 percent, the Guard to 92 percent, and the Reserve to 90 percent by just the end of 2013. So, the challenge, as 

the Chief noted going forward, is to make sure we maintain that 

level, both in the readiness side and the equipment part of that 

rating and also of course the personnel. And how we do that is 

something that I want to give a tip of the hat to the Chief and to 

the leadership of both the Guard and Reserve Components are 

working together to make sure we have a readiness model that 

works and everybody agrees upon. 
26 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, gentlemen. And one quick question, research and development. Do you feel comfortable that we have 

enough moneys allocated for that to keep us ahead of the fight in 

all situations? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, as Mr. Smith said, would I take more 

money? And the answer is sure. But within this budget construct 

that I think we all agree is achievable and is viable, the R&D [research and development] I think line is sufficient to keep us where 

we need to be. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

At this point, we will recess. And maybe they will just have one 

vote anyway. We are going to expedite, and hopefully the recess 

will be as short as we can make it. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank the witnesses for being here. I appreciate you and 

your service. The budget that we just had proposed cuts Army 

depot expenditures in 2013 by 50 percent. Could you explain to me 

this drastic cut, how you arrived at 50 percent, particularly since 

the budget document itself says that we have a backlog of equipment that has to be reset? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, we do have a backlog, as we 

retrograded—we retrograde out of one theater and retrograde out 

of the other. But we had to fit in the reset program within our entire budget allocation. We tried to do it in a way that would ensure 

that the rates are sustainable, so at least in the near term we are 

not causing any work disruption or work interruptions. So it was 

both a strategy but also a budget decision that was one of those 

hard ones that I spoke about. But we think it will keep the lines 

open and progressing as we go through this FYDP. 

Mr. ROGERS. Fifty percent we will be able to keep the lines moving? That is a steep hill to go off. 

General ODIERNO. In the base budget, we sustain 50 percent. But 

there is also a piece of OCO that will be used to fund this. I think 

that is where the rest of this will come. It will come out of Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. I share the sentiments of Mr. Reyes when he 

talked about not letting this base go cold and what it can mean to 

us. As you know, the Anniston Army Depot has the largest publicprivate partnerships of any installation in the country. And we 

worry very much, when you talk about Stryker being one of those 

lines that would go cold, about losing those folks. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I was just, I am sorry, I didn’t mean to interrupt you, Mr. Rogers, but the Chief makes a good point. A lot 

of what we need to do, a lot of what we hope to be able to do will 

be dependent not just after—or up until drawing out of the theater 

in Afghanistan, but for 2 to 3 years afterwards in terms of sustaining OCO. And it is not just in the kinds of things that people 

often think about. It is critical for our depots to have those funds 
27 

available for our reset of equipment as we draw out of Afghanistan 

as well. 

Mr. ROGERS. So, based on this budget, this core budget and OCO 

funding, do you believe you are going to be able to meet your requirements as outlined in Title 10 for combat vehicles? 

General ODIERNO. The issue becomes that OCO is a 1-year—we 

don’t know what we get from year to year. What we are getting in 

2013, we have enough to do what I think we need do. What we 

don’t know is what the OCO would be in 2014, 2015, 2016 and we 

would say probably 2017, 2 to 3 years after we finish coming out 

of Afghanistan. We are making it clear that we need support for 

reset in those years in order to not only—it would not only support 

the depots, but it also is about the readiness of our capabilities. 

Mr. ROGERS. I have had several conversations with General 

Dunwoody and General Stein about my concerns about our depot 

network and our readiness. As the Secretary notes, because he was 

on this committee at the time, when we went into Iraq and Afghanistan, our depots were not up to speed. And it took us 18 months. 

And General Dunwoody has assured me that you all have learned 

those lessons and will not let that happen again. 

But when I look at these numbers, it worries me. Because you 

all know we could be in Iran or somewhere over there in the next 

6 months for all we know. And I want to make sure that you are 

confident that you have got what you need for a surge capability. 

Nobody knows a surge capability more than you. And if these numbers aren’t working for you, you have got to tell us. Because if it 

is affecting us, that is our problem; that is not your problem. So 

we count on you to tell us what you need to be ready. 

When you made your comments about being leaner going forward, and you outlined your numbers for end strength, let me ask 

do you think you are going to be prepared to deal with another theater of war that may open up in 3 years at those numbers? 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, I do. I think with the size of the 

force we have, we will be able to conduct combat operations. We 

will have the capability to do that. Where we have a little bit of 

risk is if it gets extended. So what we are not—what we don’t have 

is a force that could do long-term stability operations over a long 

period of time. So if that occurs, we are going to have to relook 

growing the force again. But we will use the Reserve Component 

as a buffer in order to have them help us to give us the time to 

grow the force if we get engaged in another major theater of war. 

Mr. ROGERS. Good. And I do hope that you all vigorously pursue 

the FMS, because I think that is a great way for us to keep some 

of these lines hot. 

Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And gentlemen, thanks for being here. I appreciate that. I want 

to just make kind of a gratuitous comment. I appreciate the continued commitment to the WIN–T [Warfighter Information NetworkTactical] program and the JTRS [Joint Tactical Radio System] communications programs because I do think those are important to 

leaner and more agile, and all those kind of adjectives that we 
28 

throw at it. But those are the tools I think that allow you to go 

to that. Following up on Mr. Rogers’ comments, and perhaps—on 

page 7 of your summary listing Army components, you list the Reserve Component as one unit. And maybe today or soon we can 

start that arduous conversation about why we have a Reserve and 

a Guard—not today—but it may make sense, given that, to look at 

it. I was here in 2005 and on, and watched some of the struggles 

of converting the Guard and Reserve from a strategic force with a 

domestic mission, to a tactical force that was used extensively, to 

today downrange, you can’t tell—unless you know the patches and 

understand the org [organizational] chart, you can’t tell the difference between a Guard unit and an Active Duty unit. So General, 

over the next 5 to 10 years, will you have in place the right readiness matrix to make sure that that Guard and Reserve Component 

stays ready for the fight? And how will you look at rotating the, 

for lack of a better phrase, quick reaction force? Because if you do 

that extended deal, somebody has got to be first. And how do you 

keep those guys ready, and how do you rotate that readiness issue 

through that system in order to make sure that we don’t have 

those growing pains we experienced in the original conversion? 

General ODIERNO. As we went through it, I think as most of you 

are aware, as we went through this process, continuing to go meet 

our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we developed what we 

called Army Force Generation Model, which put both Active and 

Reserve Component units, National Guard, Army Reserve, Active, 

through a sequence of preparing themselves to get mobilized, to get 

ready, and then to deploy. 

As we come out of Iraq and Afghanistan, we are going to adjust 

that process. We are not going to walk away from it, we are going 

to adjust it. And we are going to keep a process where Active and 

Reserve Component units will be in a reset phrase, a training 

phase, and an available phase. We are still working on—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. When you said Reserve, that includes the—— 

General ODIERNO. National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

General ODIERNO. And what we will do is, for an Active unit, for 

example, a cycle would be 24 months, and they spend 6 months in 

reset, 10 months in training, 12 months available, whatever time 

it is. And then for the Reserve Component, it would be a bit expanded because maybe over a 60-month period, but allow them to 

rotate through, so we would always have a portion of the National 

Guard and U.S. Army Reserves ready to go. And what it also does 

is it will enable us to sustain readiness across the force over a long 

period of time. So that is the intent of our process. We are working 

through the details of this and how it is funded and how we sustain them over time. And I think we are going to be able do this. 

We are working very closely with mainly the National Guard, but 

also the U.S. Army Reserve on this concept. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Will the readiness reporting program that you 

have morph into something that will be able to show us, this side 

of the table, where we are at any one point in time with respect 

to those? 

General ODIERNO. It is going to have to. And it is going to have 

do it for the total Army. 
29 

Mr. CONAWAY. Right. Right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your service, and General Odierno 

for your service and for your family’s sacrifice, as well as your own. 

There is one thing that both of you mentioned, the JLTV [Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicle]. I want to run through a few things. The 

new requirements don’t require blast or underbody protection to 

the same stringent requirements that they were originally stated. 

First question is, why relax the requirements? And I am going 

to keep going, if you don’t mind. Why did we relax the requirements? Why did we relax the weight limit? If you go over 13,000 

pounds, as you know, it makes you less mobile, whether it is air 

mobile or if you are putting them on—if you are putting these— 

because the Marine Corps is going to use them, too, they are going 

to be on ships; they are going to be heavier on the ships as well. 

From what I could see from all of the different people, all of the 

different vendors that are applying for this, their vehicles come in 

around 13,000 to 16,000 pounds or more when you add their armor 

kit on, which makes them—you can’t carry them in fact then in a 

CH–46. 

My specific question is about Ford Motor Company. My district 

is in San Diego; Ford is not there. I have no dog in this fight, no 

horse in this race. Ford has offered to build the next ‘‘Humvee’’ 

[High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle]. They have offered 

to spend $400 million of their own money to do it. They have offered to come in with multiple prototypes to give you to say, here 

is what we have. This is the second largest car manufacturer in the 

Nation, a manufacturer that goes back, if you go back to World 

War II and Korea, making American products for American military personnel. 

Let me run through a few things on Ford. They can come out at 

$225,000 per vehicle. And what is more important, Ford estimates, 

because they make cars and trucks for a living, their estimates 

now, their original estimates will be within 4 percent of their actual production costs. So there is not going to, as we look at all 

these different programs, we all know it is pretty hard to get it 

within that 4 percent. Ford can do that. What they tell you now 

will be what the vehicle costs in the future. They can save us over 

$100 billion, taxpayers, Congress, and the Army and Marine Corps 

over lifecycle costs and production costs over the life of this vehicle. 

The most troubling aspect of this is this: This is a quote from DOD, 

talking about why the procurement date for this is set up for this 

June. The main question is Ford asked for an extra 12 months so 

they can compete for this. They were turned down by DOD. DOD 

said no. And here is what they told Ford. Ford, they could come 

in with more armor at less weight and provide more bang for the 

buck, basically. They said, in source selection, no credit will be 

given for proposed performance above the threshold or at objective 

levels. What that translates to is if you make something that is 

clearly superior in protection, maneuverability, and weight, we 

don’t really care; we are going to do this anyway. 
30 

The only reason that DOD says to exclude Ford that I have seen 

from all the documents that I have read on this is that the money 

may, it may be taken out of the budget by Congress. I think the 

Senate tried to kill this last year. It was a fight. The money was 

put in there anyway. So the only reason we are doing this now this 

year, even though the vehicles won’t be fielded until we are out of 

Afghanistan, is because the money may be taken out of the budget. 

I am not getting this at all. In this climate, with what is going on, 

we are going to be out of Afghanistan. We are going to need to be 

more maneuverable. I don’t see how we make a Humvee in the future that doesn’t have underbody protection and that can’t come in 

under 13,000 pounds, which Ford says—and theirs is called the 

Joint Marine-Army Vehicle, the JMAV or something. 

They say they can do all these things and all they are asking is 

for 12 months so they can compete. That is it. I mean, I guarantee 

you if you look at what was more people in this room, if you told 

them to just give us 12 more months, and we will give you something that costs a lot less and provides more bang for your buck, 

we could almost guarantee it because for God’s sake, it is Ford. 

Ford. And I don’t drive a Ford, by the way. So my dog is even more 

out of this fight. I drive a Chevy. I don’t understand. 

And I guess I am just asking for some clarification, explanation, 

or why can’t we just work together on this and get it right this 

time and show how you can be a shining example for the rest of 

DOD and the military procurement system and say, here is how we 

did it? 

Secretary MCHUGH. As you know, Congressman Hunter, the program and whatever changes are made in the requirements came 

about as a result of the discussions between the Marine Corps and 

the Army. There was a back and forth as to levels of protection, 

weight trade-offs, et cetera. And I would certainly defer to the 

Chief as to some of the specifics on that. 

I do drive a Ford. It is a great company. And it has done amazing 

things in difficult times. And frankly, when this RFP [Request For 

Proposal] first hit the street, we were very—I was very hopeful 

that they would choose to participate and to go ahead with the program. They chose not to. That was a disappointment to us. 

But we had set the ground rules. We had put out the RFPs. 

Every competitor, and we have had I believe six companies now 

that are all very credible and have played by the rules that were 

set out. And from a general acquisition perspective, I think, and I 

can’t speak for DOD, it would be a very tenuous decision to pull 

back an RFP based on a single manufacturer saying what they 

may or may not be able to do when they chose not to compete. 

Now, Ford can submit it any time during the process an unsolicited program that we will fully consider. But we can’t pull plugs 

on developmental programs where everybody else is playing by the 

same rules because a single competitor, as great as Ford is, says, 

here is what we promise you we are going to do. It is just I think 

would be a bad precedent to set. And that was part of our problem. 

I am not even sure, frankly, it would be legal. 

I don’t know if the Chief would want to add. 

The CHAIRMAN. I don’t think we are going to resolve this today. 

Let’s call this kind of an opening gambit. 
31 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for your service, General Odierno, Secretary 

McHugh. I am concerned about—I agree with you in the bottom 

line cuts. I believe cuts can be made to the Department of Defense. 

I don’t believe that—I believe the sequester goes way overboard. I 

don’t think there is any disagreement in that in this committee on 

either side. But let me just say, express to you some areas that I 

think that I would like you to look at. Because I am concerned that 

we are cutting capability, and by cutting capability, we are increasing risk to our national security. One is I just think that there is 

a top-heavy nature to our military across the board. 

I think if we look at the ratio of flag officers or general officers 

to the number of soldiers—and this is in every branch of the service, I believe—it is just—we are too top-heavy. And we really need 

to look at slimming that down. 

Next, I know there is talk about that we ought to slow down pay 

increases moving forward as a cost savings measure. I disagree 

with that. And let me give you another area that I would like you 

to look at. And that is slowing our promotion system down. I think 

that—first of all, I think it moves too fast. I think that we would 

increase—not only have a cost savings, but increase the professionalism of our military by slowing down the promotion system, 

allowing soldiers to spend more time in grade in their respective 

military occupation specialties before they move on. When you have 

an organization that has the kind of quality that the Army, United 

States Army has today, which is extraordinary, and you have the 

kind of retention with highly qualified soldiers wanting to remain 

in the Army, it only makes sense that we do the math, and we slow 

down the promotion system. 

Next, I think Guard and Reserve, I am very disappointed that we 

have cuts in the Guard and Reserve envisioned in your plan. 

Where I think what we ought to be doing is increasing the size of 

the Guard and Reserve, quite frankly, through reductions on the 

Active side. I mean, Secretary of Defense Gates before he left 

warned this committee repeatedly of the trajectory of personnel 

costs and how it was eating into acquisition costs, irrespective of 

the cuts that are before us now. And so to me, we can retain capability and do savings by looking at our force structure and more aggressively transferring units to the Guard and Reserve that we 

don’t need say expeditionary forces or forces that truly need to be 

on Active Duty. 

You know, next I am concerned about we are going to go through 

a BRAC round, a Base Realignment and Closure Commission, at 

the same time that we are still retaining permanent bases overseas 

without adequate participation of our allies. In NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], most of our NATO partners are spending less than 2 percent of their GDP [Gross Domestic Product] on 

defense. We are at about 4.7 percent right now. Yet we have 45,000 

troops in Germany, 79,000 troops, I think, in Europe all together. 

We are moving two Brigade Combat Teams, heavy Brigade Combat 

Teams, I understand, out of Germany out of that 45,000. But I 

think we ought to look at if they are not involved in the 

prepositioning of forces, if they are not expeditionary in nature, 
32 

they ought to come out of Europe. We can demonstrate our capability by doing some of the things you mentioned, having rotational 

forces. And certainly doing joint military exercises demonstrates 

our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

In South Korea, you mentioned 20,000 soldiers in South Korea. 

There are substantial—and this is obviously DOD—military construction programs going on. I believe it might be suspended, some 

of it might be suspended in terms of looking at bringing dependents over, but at a time when South Korea is spending 2.7 percent 

of their GDP. You know, so we are looking at closing bases down 

in the United States, and yet retaining overseas permanent military bases for allies that are spending much less on defense than 

we are. We need to get them to do more. 

So let me leave it open to you on those points. But I am disappointed in the direction of these cuts. And I think they compromise capability where I don’t think we need to. 

Secretary MCHUGH. First of all, and I will try to go as quickly 

as I can, we agree with you on general officers. And in fact, that 

was an initiative that Secretary Gates had already begun. General 

Odierno can speak very eloquently as to the closing down of a 

COCOM [United States Combatant Command] and JFCOM 

[United States Joint Forces Command], and elimination of a fourstar. We downgraded the number—the four-star to a three-star 

U.S. Army Europe, and on and on and on. 

Pay increases. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I would love to see what ratio you would come you 

with between flag officers and soldiers at the end of that. I am 

sorry that we are out of time. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. COFFMAN. If you could get to me on the record on any of 

these questions I would appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ranking Member. 

And also I want to thank the panel, Secretary McHugh. 

I would like to publicly recognize General Odierno, and thank 

you for the privilege and honor of serving as a battalion commander under your command of Fourth Infantry Division. 

And also to my brother red leg sitting back there, colonel Thompson, it is good to see you again. 

The question I have, you know, we have been down this road before. Mr. Wilson talked about Task Force Smith. When I look in the 

decrease of the combat brigade formations that we are having, can 

you talk to us about the ramifications you see as far as the combat 

tours of duty? Because I really believe some of these second and 

third order effects we see with some of these social issues that we 

had just talked about relates to the amount of tours that our young 

men and women are having to serve in these combat zones of operation. So, have we looked at the ramifications of what can happen 

with maybe increased tours in combat zones? 

General ODIERNO. Congressman, thank you very much. 

In terms of—we have looked very carefully at this as we have decided where to take force structure out. Because we are now out 

of Iraq, it has made a significant difference in the OPTEMPO 

[Operational Tempo] of our combat forces. And now that we are 
33 

starting to reduce our presence in Afghanistan, that has also impacted that. 

So we feel that as we grew the Army in the mid-2000s to meet 

those requirements, now that they are going away, we now have 

the right force structure to be asked to do what we currently are 

doing. As I said earlier, where we might incur some risk is if we 

got involved in two major theaters that were extended over a long 

period of time. 

For our initial combat operation, we have more than enough capability. We will have the competence to conduct those operations. 

So I feel comfortable with that. If they get extended again, that is 

where we run into some risk of the things you talked about, increased OPTEMPO on our soldiers and all the other things that go 

along with this that we are dealing with today. So we are very cognizant of that. That is why it is important to build some reversibility into what we are doing so we can, if necessary, increase immediately the size of the Army. 

And one of the things we will do is we are going to maintain officers and noncommissioned officers in our institutional Army. We 

have migrated them out over time. So we have more in the training 

base, we have more—so if we have to expand, we will be able to 

keep the expertise and then use them to help us expand, if necessary, as we move forward. 

Mr. WEST. Second question, we had a briefing earlier this week 

about operations in Afghanistan. 

And one of the things that I think was a very key lesson learned 

that we finally got to was the VSO program, the Village Stability 

Operations program. And of course, right now, they are looking to 

expand that VSO program. So when I look at the fact that we are 

talking about putting more responsibility and burden on our Special Operations, you know, are Special Operations Forces in the 

United States Army going to be capable of expanding and extending the VSO operations in Afghanistan? As well, do we see possibly 

our conventional forces having to augment the VSO programs? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congressman. 

We are in fact continuing to increase our Special Operations 

Forces throughout this budget. We will go up to 35,000 Special Operations Forces. We have increased in every area. We have increased Rangers. We have increased Special Forces battalions, the 

numbers, the companies involved. We are increasing their logistics 

capability. But as we are increasing VSO operations, we are also 

building on the relationships that have been built between the Special Operations and conventional Army. And as we do that in fact, 

you are going to see conventional forces pick up a piece of this mission. And in fact, you will see that in this year, that we are using 

conventional capabilities to help with these VSO operations. And I 

think it is important. We have learned that we can do that. And 

it is a good partnership in order to best utilize our Special Operations Forces in conjunction with the capabilities of our conventional forces to support them in these key operations. And I think 

you will see more of that as we move forward in Afghanistan. 

Mr. WEST. And last point, being from down in South Florida, I 

will tell you that I am quite concerned about the SOUTHCOM 

[Southern Command] AOR [Area of Responsibility]. The fact that 
34 

Ahmadinejad was visiting Cuba, and we have Hezbollah training 

camps down in South America in the tri-state area. So I would 

hope that we don’t forget that, and, you know, we can’t continue 

to see it as an economy of force operation. Because that is pretty 

near and dear to us. And I believe that the enemy is seeing that 

we don’t—are not portraying a very strong presence down in the 

SOUTHCOM AOR. 

So with that being said, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, for being 

here today, for your leadership, commitment to our troopers, families, and veterans. 

Let me just say from the outset that I am generally supportive 

of what you are doing here in the budget, particularly some of the 

major pieces of it. 

Notable exception, I associate myself with Mr. Coffman, a lot of 

his remarks with regard to positioning of our forces. But what I 

would like to explore here in the next few minutes is the nesting 

of operational concepts. Interested to know to what degree we use 

modeling and simulation. As you went through the strategic review, and particularly here at the joint operational concept that 

drives the Army operational concept, because so much of this leads 

to requirements and the need for structure and procurement, leader development and everything in that regard. 

Last time the Army operational concept was published in 2009, 

very aware of how all the ins and outs to make that happen. Certainly have no expectation that there is a new document on the 

street. But in your notes that you took as you went through the 

process of the strategic review, if you could share with me the notable points with regard to the 2009 document that you think may 

need to be readdressed in the current process of operational concept. And then other deductions and risks that you see in the force 

in relation to what we think we are going to need. 

General ODIERNO. As we have looked at it, first, it is about looking at the last 10 years and also trying to project out what think 

we will see in the future. Under the operational concept document, 

one of the key things is what we see the threat will be in the future 

and how we must respond to that threat. And it is a concept of the 

hybrid threat. It is a concept of the fact that we will face an adversary that has a combination of conventional, unconventional, regular, terrorist activities, criminality, and that we have a force that 

is being developed that can meet that spectrum of conflict. And oh, 

by the way, different pieces of it from the lowest end combined all 

the way up to the highest end, and that we don’t believe we will 

ever see a straight conventional conflict again in the future. That 

is one of the key pieces that we are using as we move forward. 

And if you have a chance to go out to our national training centers, you are going to start to see us, as we go through training rotations, that this will be part of this. Training and Doctrine Command is currently running a series of seminars that they are looking at how we develop leaders for this environment, how we develop tactical and operational concepts to operate in the future en-
35 

vironment, and how do we incorporate the lessons that we have 

learned over the last 10 years? 

So I think after we get the results of this work done by TRADOC 

[Training and Doctrine Command], we will then look at updating 

our operational concept and look at where we want to go. And the 

last point I would make—and I don’t want to take too much time— 

is then this relationship between conventional and Special Operations Forces, and how that has changed over time, and the benefits we have gotten through the integration and synchronization between conventional and Special Operations Forces, and how that 

fits into the operational concept. I think those are some of the 

things that we are going to focus on. 

Mr. GIBSON. So as you look left and right to your sister services 

and you think about it in view of the Joint Force, I will just share 

the concern that I have is that as we look at the joint operational 

concepts, we look at the potential employment, I am just concerned 

that we haven’t—and for good reason, over the last decade, we 

have been very involved in achieving these objectives in the Central Command AOR, but that we have actually done all the planning, the detailed planning have added up, have done the math to 

look at what is required to move the force, the risk associated, the 

timeline. And as I look at 301 platform United States Air Force 

and I consider the Navy’s dimension in this, and then I think about 

the Joint Force delivery if we ever—you know, we pray it isn’t the 

case that we have to deploy it for a major theater of war, but we 

know if we are ready, there is less chance that we will have to, particularly when we exercise it and demonstrate it to the world that 

we have that capability, I am just concerned we haven’t really done 

yet the detailed planning and then looked at the experimentation 

that is required, the exercising that is required, the information 

ops that would go with that, and would look to you to sort of assuage those concerns. 

General ODIERNO. I don’t disagree. 

In fact, a couple things let me just add. As I look back, it is about 

unity of effort. It is about understanding the different dimensions 

of warfare. I didn’t get into information operations, cyber warfare, 

all of those things that now must be incorporated in our joint operational concepts. We are currently doing that. It is about understanding how we develop these in training our headquarters at all 

variety of levels. And that is all part of this as well. And I concur 

with what you said. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield back. 

Mr. RUNYAN. [Presiding.] Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to talk with you a little bit about TRICARE 

and the proposed rate increases. Currently, our families are paying 

about $460 for the TRICARE Prime. By about 2017, that would 

move to $2,048 under the proposal. And this past year, if I am not 

mistaken, we asked that those rate increases be limited to the increases in the retirement plan. Is that not correct? 

Secretary MCHUGH. You have to restate. I am sorry, Mr. Scott, 

could you say that again? 
36 

Mr. SCOTT. The rate increases for the TRICARE Prime, you all 

have asked us to allow you to go from $460 to $2,048. That is a 

significant increase to people who have earned that benefit. And 

quite honestly, I come from a risk management background. To me, 

that seems like something that if industry did that, that would be 

an indication that they were trying to actually push people out of 

it and shut the program down. And I guess my question is, is that 

the intent of the significant rate increases? 

Secretary MCHUGH. No, absolutely not. 

And one of the critical parts of this to consider, if you will, even 

after the full increases are into effect at the end of 2017, that rate 

will by every reasonable projection still be a very generous rate 

compared to an equal policy in the private sector, if you could obtain such an equal policy. 

I said earlier this is not something that we are particularly 

happy to do. And it was not something that we didn’t do—that we 

did do, rather, without a great deal of thought and consideration. 

And after we talked about this amongst ourselves, all the service 

chiefs, all the service Secretaries, all the command sergeant majors, master chiefs of the Navy, we decided that this was absolutely 

essential to preserve the benefit. As we tried do is to tailor it and 

to layer it in a way that only those people who are of retired age 

under the age of 65 and are likely to be working, and based on 

their rank would receive the greater of those increases. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Secretary, if I could, I am sorry, I only get 5 minutes, so I don’t mean to interrupt. But you know, it amazes me that 

in this time that we are in, that we continue to take and take and 

take from the military under this administration. And yet for somebody who hasn’t paid their dues, if you will, like our military service members have, there is no proposed reductions for food stamps. 

And in fact, there is no meaningful reductions for any of the entitlement programs that truly are driving this country off a fiscal 

cliff. 

With that said, for the retirement changes that are proposed, you 

propose to go to a BRAC-like commission, which would be a 

straight up or down vote by the Congress and would essentially not 

allow for the individual input of the Members of Congress. Why do 

you believe that that that is a better route than to go through the 

normal committee process? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I am glad you used the word ‘‘better’’ 

and not ‘‘best,’’ because there is no good way to go about this. As 

Secretary Gates said as he looked at the retirement system the 

military currently employs, we ought to ask some questions about 

the fairness of it. We ought to ask some questions about perhaps 

configuring it in a way that would allow people to vest more early. 

Would that, in fact, help us to recruit and ultimately retain folks 

in a different and hopefully better fashion? 

It seems to me that the best way to go about that, as we saw 

through the BRAC process, is to do a true and independent body. 

If it is the opinion of this Congress to do it differently, well, that 

is something I am sure you can talk about with the Administration. 

Let me just say why we looked at this healthcare proposal. Number one—— 
37 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry. I am down to about 45 seconds, and I apologize. But again, it is a reduction in benefits to 

those who protect our personal freedoms, and individual liberties, 

and, quite honestly, economic opportunities for other Americans. 

But the President refused to make any proposal to deal with the 

entitlement benefits for those that aren’t contributing. 

One last thing. The traumatic brain injury is certainly an issue 

that we have done a better job of that. I want to commend you for 

the work that has been done there. Some of the gentlemen that I 

have met with spoke very positively about the use of the hyperbolic 

chambers, the same way you would treat bends, and the benefit 

that they had from using those machines, yet the VA [U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs] has refused to pay for that. 

I am out of time. I would appreciate it if you would work with 

us with the VA to make sure that those service members that do 

have that traumatic brain injury can receive that treatment. 

Secretary MCHUGH. We have five programs in the Department of 

Defense including the Army that are currently looking at the efficacy of that. I would say if those programs prove promising, I am 

not going to wait for the FDA [U.S. Food and Drug Administration] 

or anyone else. We will authorize those treatments. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Mr. Schilling. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Smith. 

First, I would like to thank you two gentlemen for your dedication to not only our country, but to our warfighters is greatly appreciated. 

Just a couple of things quickly. What I was wondering, Secretary 

McHugh, I have been aware of a study that has been ongoing to 

address the organic base in the future. And I was just wondering, 

do you know when we might see that plan or when it is going to 

be released? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I believe you are referring to the Department of Defense’s S2T2, sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis. That 

actually started in 2011. I do not believe DOD has placed a 

timeline on it, but obviously these issues are relevant and current, 

and we are working, as all of the services are, with DOD to bring 

it to a conclusion so we can make some decisions and plod our way 

forward. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Very good. Thank you, sir. 

And then, General, one of the things that I am concerned about 

is that as we do these, the cutbacks—and I am sure you are concerned also—but one of the things that is really important is the 

Rock Island Arsenal, which is one of the areas that myself and 

then Mr. Loebsack represent. But back in 2006, when our troops 

were faced with the IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] that 

would rip through the nonarmored doors in their vehicles, the arsenal was the group that were basically stepped up and took this 

challenge, and within 3 weeks they were able to turn these doors 

around. 

The FRAG [Fragmentary Armor] 5 kits is what they called them, 

and which allowed the private sector or the folks outside to get 

these things out. And that is one of the main concerns that we 

want to make sure is just because the turnaround was faster than 

the industry could ever do, and that is one of the things when it 
38 

comes to warfighters is to make sure that we keep those warmed 

up, of course. 

General ODIERNO. Again, it is about having that organic capacity 

that enables us to respond quickly, and it is about developing the 

core capabilities that we want to sustain within our organic capacity. And that is what we are watching. The Secretary and I watch 

that very carefully. General Dunwoody, Commander Army Materiel 

Command, watches this very carefully, and that is something we 

will not sacrifice and don’t want to as we move forward. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Awesome. Thank you for your service. 

I yield back. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Mr. Platts. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, General 

Odierno. Always a pleasure and privilege to be in your company; 

John, for your service here many years and allowed me to try to 

fill your shoes here on the committee when you went over to the 

Department. 

And, General Odierno, I think I first met you in Kirkuk many 

years back, and I have always been amazed at your great leadership, and humbled to be able to work in any capacity with you. We 

are a blessed Nation because of both of you in your service to the 

Nation, and to the men and women in the Army and their families. 

They are all in good hands because of both of your leaderships. 

I am going to try to be quick because I may be the last one holding you from getting out the door. And I think the gentleman from 

Texas, Mr. Reyes, may have raised the issue of the modernization 

of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. I say up front BAE is a great employer in my district and is a wonderful company to work with, but, 

more importantly, they build an incredible piece of equipment in 

the Bradley. 

And the concern that I think Mr. Reyes raised, I would just echo 

that. In looking at the 2013 budget request for the modernization 

of the Bradley, it looks like it would require a shutdown of the operating line at some point, and my worry is what the cost will be 

to restart it, but maybe even more importantly, the ability to restart it because of the loss of the skilled labor force that is incredible, including many veterans of Vietnam and wars since, including 

most recent. When I visit there at the plant, I usually run into 

some guardsmen who are now back on the line building the vehicles that, you know, they and others benefited from in the combat 

theater. 

So I guess I first would just echo his concern, and encourage any 

and all efforts that we can to find a way to not allow that line to 

shut down and the consequences that may come from that both financially, and again, most importantly, from the ability to restart 

it with the skilled labor force that is unmatched by any other. 

Related to that is it is my understanding also that the Army’s 

engineer forces, that their Bradleys are not, you know, the most 

upgraded and comparable to the Bradleys or M1 tanks that are 

found in the other elements of the Heavy Combat Brigade Team. 

And is it possible to look at those upgrades to bring them up to par 

and so we are all on the same level as also a way to then prevent 

that shutdown and, again, the consequences? 
39 

So, you know, I appreciate your consideration of those concerns 

as you look at how to balance the books and make it all work. And 

I know you have a difficult assignment and take that assignment 

very seriously. 

A final issue, if I can just put on your—related to upgrades is 

the 4-year testing schedule for the Paladin howitzer system, and if 

there is any ability to expedite that. That seems like a pretty 

lengthy process for what is basically an upgrade of a current system, not a new system, so—another concern. 

I appreciate your service and leadership, and having the privilege to represent the Army War College, and AHEC [Army Heritage and Education Center], you know, it has been a remarkable 

honor to serve on this committee. And my final years—I will leave 

Congress at the end of this year and see what happens next—but 

serving on this committee and having the privilege to interact with 

true American heroes such as both of you in your service has been 

something I will always treasure. 

If you would like to respond to any of those concerns, I would be, 

you know, really grateful. 

Secretary MCHUGH. First of all, I want to wish you on a personal 

level all of the best in the future. I have truly enjoyed the opportunity to serve with you, and you do great work. And, you know, 

Army-centric here, but your very effective representation was very 

moving to me personally. 

We share your concerns on the industrial base. We have talked 

about it several times. The Bradley program is turning down, and 

we are working as we are in other facilities to try to find ways to 

fill those gaps, particularly for the higher-end employee positions, 

the engineers, the highly trained technicians, et cetera, et cetera. 

And whether, as I mentioned before, through PPPs or through foreign military sales, you mentioned the other services, obviously we 

are willing to consider all kinds of solutions to this. 

And one of the reasons we are working with the Department so 

we can have an a cross-services approach to our industrial-based 

challenges, and the Secretary, Secretary Panetta, has made this a 

critical issue of his, and we are working with him very diligently 

to try to ensure that we have some answers. 

General ODIERNO. Just very quickly, again. Thank you for your 

service, your continued service, to our Nation and what you have 

done. I wish you the best of luck as you move forward. 

You know, some things we are looking at, you know, there are 

some programs, suspension track programs, that we are trying to 

put in there to help sustain that base, and we will continue to work 

with that over the next several years to make sure we sustain a 

readiness level there. 

With the Paladin program and the testing, this is something that 

the Secretary and I are looking at throughout all of our programs 

is the cost and amount of testing that we are doing, sometimes redundant, and so we are going to work very carefully with Congress 

in order to try to reduce the costs and length of some of our testing 

that is required. And we agree with your assessment of that. 

Mr. PLATTS. And as I said at the beginning, I know we are in 

good hands as you try to make this all fit and work, you know, to 

have the final product be what we need for our Army and ulti-
40 

mately for our Nation’s defense. And we do plan to be back in theater at least once or twice more. I think it would be number 9 to 

Afghanistan and 12 to Iraq, if that works out, even with the drawdown, so—— 

Secretary MCHUGH. Bring fudge. 

Mr. PLATTS. I will make a note. Next time I see you, I will have 

some of my mom’s peanut butter fudge. 

So, Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for joining us today. 

The new defense strategy and budget requests reflect the hard 

work and forward thinking of President Obama, our DOD civilian 

leaders, and our senior military commanders. I have been saying 

all week that ominous and exaggerated fears about the national security consequences of reduced growth in the defense budget are 

certainly unfounded. There is no way a 1 percent reduction in the 

Pentagon’s base budget from 2012 to 2013 could mean the difference between the greatest military known to man or a hollowedout force. And the American people, I think, understand that. In 

fact, I believe there is room for further savings in the Department’s 

budget, though I strongly oppose the across-the-board cuts that 

would be imposed by sequestration. 

General Odierno, is it your assessment that Afghan National Security Forces are on pace to self-sufficiently defend Afghan’s sovereignty and defeat insurgents by the end of 2014? 

And also, I would like for you to respond, General, to the February 1st quote of Secretary Panetta, when he said that hopefully 

we could reach a point in the latter part of 2013 that we could 

make the same kind of transition we made in Iraq, from a combat 

role to a training-and-assist role. What is your interpretation of 

Secretary Panetta’s remarks? 

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. 

First, I think that we have seen a continued increase in capabilities of the Afghan Security Force. I was there just the day—I got 

back the day before Christmas from there. I am encouraged by the 

progress that has been made by the Afghan Security Forces. 

I think as you see us move forward, we are going to—we are putting them more and more in front. I think we will continue to do 

that. As we learned in Iraq, it is important to do this slowly, do 

it right, but ensure that they are ready to take over so there is no 

backward movement. I think we are on the right track. 

In terms of Secretary Panetta’s comments, I would say all along 

our strategy is to turn over responsibility to the Afghan Security 

Forces. And I think that as we continue to make progress, General 

Allen and others on the ground will make the decision exactly 

when this happens. But I think we all agree with Secretary Panetta that over time we are going to turn responsibility over to Afghan Security Forces. We will move back from combat operations, 

allow them to take the lead, and we will do that when the time is 

right. The end of 2013 might be the time we do that, but that will 

be a continual assessment that goes on. 
41 

We have had open conversations with Secretary Panetta on this 

subject, and I know that is his judgment as well. And I think he 

was stating what his estimate would be right now. And we will 

continue to assess that as we move forward. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2011 defense authorization required the Department of Defense to provide Congress with a full 

analysis of alternatives for the Ground Combat Vehicle. We still 

have not received that analysis of the alternatives. And when will 

we get it? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, we are working through the dictates of 

the congressional mandate, but also what would be our normal procurement. And part of that, as you just noted, is analysis of alternatives, and also an analysis of nondevelopmental platforms as 

well. 

Our current plan, I think, calls for 2014 on the next step for that, 

so hopefully at the end of this year we will have some input for you 

to then get back to you. I don’t recall the legislation itself had a 

specific deadline. 

General ODIERNO. We are aggressively going after this. It is not 

only developmental, but we do want to look at nondevelopmental 

items in this, and that is clearly part of the process that we will 

go through. And once we meet milestone A, as part of that will be 

nondevelopmental potential capabilities that we could accept at 

that time. That is part of this open competition that we want to 

continue to have as we develop these systems and programs. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

And, General, how much is a Ground Combat Vehicle going to 

cost, and at what unit production cost would the GCV [Ground 

Combat Vehicle] become prohibitively expensive? 

General ODIERNO. I will have to get back to the prohibitive part. 

I am not sure yet. We will have to wait until they give us what 

we think the capabilities of those vehicles will be before we understand those costs. But I can give you more of a ballpark, and I can 

get back with you on that, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 107.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. And I will yield back. And 

thank you both for your service to the country. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The chair will now recognize himself for possibly the last question, as long as no one else walks in. But both of you, Secretary 

and General, thank you for being here and your testimony. 

I have kind of two questions, but they pertain generally to readiness and reset. And obviously, the first question is to what extent 

is it important to maintain the current funding level for reset of 

equipment for home-station training in places like in my district 

we have Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst? Now, despite the 

planned reduction in well over 100,000 Army and Marine troops— 

and the second question is—kind of relays into that—what is the 

rationale for the Army’s decision to increase reset funding over the 

fiscal year 2012 appropriated levels despite personnel reductions 

under the fiscal year 2012 budget? 
42 

General ODIERNO. A couple of things first. The increase has to 

do with as we reset, it is about resetting the equipment coming out 

of Iraq and Afghanistan, and that equipment will be used to continue to properly man and equip our Active and Reserve Component forces. So if we don’t reset this equipment properly, we will 

not—we will not be at the right readiness level. So it is absolutely 

essential that we get this reset dollars. 

And the reason it is increased is because of the coming out of 

Iraq, more equipment coming back; the equipment coming out of 

Afghanistan, coming back to the United States. So it is important 

that we have this funded this year. 

Mr. RUNYAN. It is up there on the priority list. 

General ODIERNO. It is very high on the priority list for us in 

order for us to stay in our overall range. 

Secretary MCHUGH. The other thing I would mention, Mr. Chairman, on training, we have some risk in training funding through 

this program through 2017. But one of the advantages of taking a 

5-year look is that each year we have the opportunity to reanalyze 

where we are to make sure that we are financed and resourced 

across the array of needs, and training is a very important part of 

that. So we are going to have to be working hard going into 2014, 

2015, and particularly 2015 and 2016. And we recognize that challenge out there, and it is something we are focused on very carefully. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Just to kind of piggyback off of that, though, as we 

have the need for the reset and, say, the mechanics to do that, and 

we are reducing personnel. Is that well within your vision? You are 

very aware of that? That could be a legitimate problem where you 

have a lot of equipment to fix, and you have the funding levels, and 

you don’t have the personnel to do the maintenance. 

General ODIERNO. Part of this is to fund it in our organic capability that we have within the Army at our depots and arsenals, 

and that is where we see most of the reset work being done. And 

that is why it is so critical to have the funding. So if we don’t get 

the appropriate funding, we will not have the people that will allow 

us to conduct this reset, but it would be done by mostly civilian 

governmental employees that operate within our depots, arsenals 

that will conduct the majority of the reset work. 

Secretary MCHUGH. That really goes back very effectively to the 

conversations we have had a number of times today with respect 

to how do we sustain our organic depots? How do we keep places 

like that employed and up to speed? 

It also underscores the need for OCO funding, because a great 

share of that reset money will come out of those OCO fund accounts, and not just while we are at theater war, as we have talked 

earlier today. We need that OCO line for at least 2 years, we hope 

2 to 3 years, after the cessation of hostilities. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, and that is all I have. We are all alone 

in here. I thank both of you for being here, taking the time out, 

your testimony. This committee looks forward to working with you 

as we service the men and women of our armed services. And with 

that being said, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 17, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 17, 2012 

(47) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the Department of the Army 

February 17, 2012 

Thank you for joining us today as we consider the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Department of the Army. Secretary McHugh, General Odierno, thank you for being here. Secretary McHugh, it’s great to see you again and thank you for your 

continued service. General Odierno, the 38th Chief of Staff of the 

Army, welcome to your first of many posture hearings. Our nation 

is very fortunate to have you two leading our Army during these 

challenging times. We clearly understand the challenges the Department of the Army faced in crafting this budget request. And we 

know you probably wouldn’t be here if you didn’t support it. 

What it boils down to is, based on this budget request, what is 

the risk associated with the Army’s ability to meet the national security needs of this Nation? This is what we need your help with; 

not only the risks, but the critical assumptions behind these risks. 

Many years ago the Army testified in front of the House Subcommittee on Armed Services. I’d like to read three quotes from the 

Army’s testimony: 

‘‘We have the best men in the Army today that we have ever 

had in peacetime. And although we have a number of critical 

equipment problems yet to solve, I can assure you that our 

troops, with the equipment they have, would give a good account of themselves if called upon.’’ 

‘‘Within a fixed budget, the Army can obtain greatest effectiveness only by maintaining a delicate balance between personnel and equipment.’’ 

‘‘We are supporting this budget that will provide only 10 divisions because we realize the necessity to integrate Army requirements with those of the other services within our national budget. And we will, of course, do everything within 

our power to lessen the risk that such a reduction must by necessity entail.’’ 

These statements were made in January 1950. Six months later 

a 500-man-battalion-sized task force from the 24th Infantry Division under Lt. Col. Charles Smith, Task Force Smith, was rushed 

to Korea on transport planes to block the North Korean advance. 

You know the rest of the story. Task Force Smith was out-
48 

numbered 10 to 1 and although they had inflicted 127 casualties, 

the task force suffered 181 casualties. It’s worth noting that more 

soldiers weren’t sent with Task Force Smith because the Air Force 

didn’t have enough transport planes. It’s also worth noting that the 

2.36-inch bazookas that Task Force Smith fired at the North Korean T-34 tanks just bounced off and had no effect. The modernized 

3.5 bazooka had been developed at the end of WWII, but was terminated because of budget cuts. 

The point is that you can have a well led, trained, and equipped 

force and it can still be ‘‘hollow’’ if it isn’t properly modernized and 

if you can’t get it to the right place at the right time. Please help 

the members of this committee understand how under the context 

of the budget before us, the Army is prepared to avoid the mistakes 

that led to Task Force Smith. 

Finally, and I really mean this, I can’t think of a better team 

than Secretary McHugh and General Odierno to lead our Army 

during these challenging times. Again, thank you both for your 

selfless service to our Nation. I look forward to your testimony. 
49 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the Department of the Army 

February 17, 2012 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I want 

to also thank the witnesses, Secretary of the Army John McHugh 

and Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno, for appearing here today and for their dedicated service to our country. 

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. While this strategic review appropriately places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, the 

Army will continue to play a key role in our national defense. 

First and foremost, the Army is still engaged in Afghanistan and 

other places around the world, where our troops continue to do a 

tremendous job. Over the last ten years, the Army has been an important part of our efforts to defeat violent extremists and ensure 

our national security. Moving forward, your role will be different, 

but no less important. The budget put forth this week affords the 

Army the opportunity to return to full-spectrum training, and ensure we are prepared to face the array of threats of the future. 

I have consistently said that we can rationally evaluate our national security strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current 

set of missions we ask the military to undertake and come up with 

a strategy that enhances national security by spending taxpayer 

dollars more wisely and effectively. I believe this budget meets that 

goal as well. 

Overall, the defense budget is also fully consistent with the funding levels set by the Budget Control Act passed by Congress. Although I did not support this act, many members of the House 

Armed Services Committee did, Congress passed it, and the Department of Defense has submitted a budget that complies with the 

congressionally mandated funding levels. 

Over the last few years, with the strong support of the Army, our 

military has put together a significant string of foreign policy successes, including the death of bin Laden, Anwar Al-Awlaki, the 

elimination of much of Al Qaeda’s leadership, the end of the war 

in Iraq, and supporting the uprising in Libya. The budget lays out 

a strategy that will enable the United States to build on those successes and confront the threats of today as well as in the future. 

I want to thank the witnesses again and I look forward to hearing their testimony. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 17, 2012 

(107) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army set an upper limit Average 

Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) for the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) to do Analysis of Alternatives at $13M. At this time, the program is still in the Technology 

Development phase. During this phase, the Army will continue to explore options 

to perform cost informed trades. These trades should reduce overall program life 

cycle costs and inform an updated cost position. The Army will reevaluate the GCV 

Program and affordability at the end of the Technology Development Phase. [See 

page 41.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 17, 2012 

(111) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. As a follow-up to my opening statement with regard to defining 

risk: I know both of you have pledged to avoid mistakes of past force reductions, 

when the Army fielded what were called ‘‘hollow’’ units without enough people and 

equipment to actually carry out their missions. I ask that you not share that burden 

alone and that you work closely with Congress to make sure that doesn’t happen. 

In your public and written statements you have said that your challenge is to adjust 

these rheostats—end strength, force structure, readiness, and modernization—in 

such a way where we sustain our technical advantage. Any concerns you may have 

about sequestration notwithstanding, and, with the operational and strategic lessons learned from Task Force Smith in mind, please describe to us the one risk that 

keeps you up at night (the most) within these rheostats that you must keep adjusting. Could you both take a shot at answering this? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army’s most challenging task will 

be to balance its grade structure to provide the right mix of leadership and technical 

capabilities, sustainable across a career span that will allow us to retain our most 

experienced and skilled inventory of officers serving today. We must keep a cadre 

of mid-grade officers and Non-Commissioned Officers who can provide the core for 

expansion of capability should the world situation demand wider engagement. However, the biggest risk of this structure is the increased personnel cost—higher 

grades cost more. As personnel costs increase, funds available for modernization, 

equipping, and stationing must decrease. How the Army will balance these requirements while sustaining as capable force will be our most significant challenge is still 

being determined. 

Mr. MCKEON. We’ve been told that the Army will eliminate at least 8 Brigade 

Combat Teams and that more could be possible. During the Cold War the Army was 

focused on large-scale maneuver operations in Europe. Over the last decade the 

Army has been largely focused on counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East. 

So how does the shift in strategic focus where there is more of an emphasis on the 

Pacific region affect Army concepts and operations. In other words, what is the 

Army’s role in this Pacific-focused strategy and what force structure does the Army 

need? The reason I ask is because I remain concerned about the plans to lower the 

Army’s end strength to pre-9/11 levels. General Odierno you spent I believe 54 

months in Iraq. You helped build up the Army to execute the surge. Even under 

the concept of ‘‘reversibility,’’ with such a large decrease in end strength, will the 

Army be able to conduct another ‘‘surge’’ in the future if needed? 

General ODIERNO. The Army has determined that it can meet the ground force 

requirements for any of the current warplans in the Pacific region under current 

planned end strength reductions with manageable risk and continued investment in 

readiness. This ensures that America can meet its long standing treaty obligations 

in the Pacific region and around the world. The Army’s regionally aligned forces 

concept will provide PACOM with a trained force to execute theater security cooperation activities and exercises with key and emerging partners. These forces, 

along with our surge force capacity, prevent conflict and shape the area of responsibility to advance mutual security interests. 

Two large scale long term contingency operations caused the need for end 

strength increases. With the end of our mission in Iraq and drawdown of forces we 

have conducted in Afghanistan, the Army can reduce end strength to ensure balance 

is maintained between end strength, readiness and modernization. The planned Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Army of 490,000 will be a much more capable force than the 

Army of 482,000 pre-9/11. Besides 10 years of hard-earned combat experience in our 

ranks, we continue to increase Special Operations capabilities, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, aviation enhancements, and we have invested in a more capable Cyber force along with other capabilities. We are reviewing 

and refining our organizational design, mission command, and training methods to 

institutionalize the lessons learned in combat. Should unforeseen contingencies 

arise, the Army maintains the capability to reverse the drawdown, and expand if 

needed. 
112 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON, MR. BARTLETT, MR. REYES, 

AND MR. BROOKS 

Mr. MCKEON, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. REYES, and Mr. BROOKS. The Army Improved 

Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) envisions a significantly more fuel-efficient and 

powerful engine for the Black Hawk and Apache helicopter fleet as well as the nextgeneration Joint Multi-Role helicopter. All too often, the Government makes premature selections that result in delays, cost increases, and cancelled programs. It 

is important that we manage the ITEP program correctly and competitively to ensure technical maturity and operational capability are proven before making a decision that will impact the current and future helicopter fleet for 40+ years. I believe 

that competition into EMD through Flight Demonstration will reduce risk and cost. 

In short, ‘‘fly before you buy’’ will be best for the warfighter and taxpayer as competition will incentivize industry to perform and provide the lowest cost and best 

engine to the Government. Can you please explain what measures the Army is taking in the ITEP acquisition strategy to ensure there is competition beyond the 

Science & Technology phase and into Engineering Manufacturing & Development 

(EMD)? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army agrees that competition in 

the EMD phase will incentivize industry to perform and provide the lowest cost and 

best product to the warfighter in the timeliest manner. Therefore, the Improved 

Turbine Engine Program acquisition strategy promotes competition throughout the 

EMD phase. The acquisition strategy includes a full and open competition approach 

with the intent of selecting two vendors for initial engine design and development. 

This will include ground operation in engine test stands and flight tests in Black 

Hawk and Apache aircraft. A final down select is planned for Milestone (MS) C, Low 

Rate Initial Production. However, if the competition through MS C becomes too costly or some of the offered solutions are not achievable, provisions will exist in the 

contract for a potential earlier down selection to one vendor. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. The Army’s Green Laser Interdiction System (GLIS), is a competitively awarded nonlethal weapon system currently in use in Afghanistan. What has 

been the Army’s experience with this weapon? In what way has this system aided 

our soldiers in this particular contingency operation? What is the Army’s acquisition 

strategy for the GLIS system? 

General ODIERNO. The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) fielded several Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) Green Lasers to units in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan based on Operational Need Statements. Post Combat Survey feedback Soldiers 

believed the green visible laser was an excellent nonlethal, escalation of force tool. 

The green laser serves as a warning and is a safe and effective tool that sends a 

strong message without the need to employ deadly force. 

The Army approved the transition of Green Laser Technology from the REF as 

a Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition Army Acquisition Program. Product Manager Soldier Maneuver Sensors (PM SMS) conducted a full and open competition for the GLIS program. There are two qualified GLIS configurations. The L– 

3/Insight Technology, Inc. Checkpoint Green Laser is designated as the GLIS LA– 

12/P. The B.E. Meyers Glare Mount Plus Green Laser is designated as the GLIS 

LA–13/P. In November 2011, a production contract was awarded to B.E. Meyers for 

12,542 GLIS systems. The first fielding event is scheduled for 3rd Quarter Fiscal 

Year 2012 (FY12) and will replace any REF fielded green lasers. In FY12, PM SMS 

will complete procurement of the GLIS requirement between the two qualified 

vendors. 

Mr. SMITH. The option of using nonlethal weapons in an escalation of force scenario appears to make sense for many reasons. Does the Army have a particular 

doctrine addressing escalation of force issues and the use of nonlethal weapons? Do 

you believe this is something that the Army should consider? 

General ODIERNO. Yes, the Army has current doctrine that addresses the escalation of force and the use of nonlethal weapons. The primary Field Manual that 

covers this topic is FM 3–22.40, ‘‘Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons’’ produced by the Air, Land, Sea 

Applications (ALSA) Center, dated October 2007. 
113 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. In a letter to Secretary Panetta on January 6 of this year, the Committee indicated its grave concerns with the Department’s apparent change in plans 

to equip the Afghan Security Forces (ASF). The Department initially requested $1.3 

billion to procure 6,372 HMMWVs for the ASF for Fiscal Year 2011, in addition to 

another $771 million for 3,514 vehicles in Fiscal Year 2012. Of the total of 9,886 

vehicles, it now appears that only 2,763 HMMWVs will be procured, an obvious significant reduction in the planned procurement of these vehicles. Congress approved 

this funding, understanding that it would be used to ensure the ASF are trained 

and equipped to adequately defend themselves, and an important part of this strategy was providing them with modern light tactical vehicles. 

The Committee is also aware that the Department chose to procure over 19,000 

Ford Rangers for the Afghan National Police (ANP) manufactured in a plant in 

Thailand (some sources report as many as twice that number of Thai pickups have 

been purchased). Instead of using funds appropriated by Congress to adequately 

equip the ANP and support jobs here in the U.S., the funding was used to procure 

foreign-made vehicles. 

How did the Department determine that these trucks should be procured from 

Thailand without first consulting the Committee? How can these Thai-built pickup 

trucks possibly give the Afghan forces the capability to defend themselves against 

a violent and determined enemy? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. ANSF operational requirements are 

determined through development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan 

National Police (ANP) Taskhil and Recapitalization Requirements documents. Since 

2006, ANSF requirements have been continuously reviewed to validate the appropriate number and type of vehicles. Most recently, from November 2011 to January 

2012, NTM–A and CSTC–A conducted an operational review which validated or adjusted all requirements based on current and projected inventories. HMMWVs and 

Light Tactical Vehicle (LTVs or up-armored Sport Utility Vehicle) are both used to 

fill various ANSF requirements. Since 2004, the HMMWV has been the primary vehicle required by the ANA and some specialized ANP units such (as the GDPSU, 

PRC, ANCOP, etc). The LTV has been the primary vehicle for the ANP because: 1) 

they are smaller and more maneuverable in congested urban areas and on small 

rural roads; 2) they present the desired appearance of a professional police force vice 

a para-military appearance; 3) ANP leadership continues to request LTVs as their 

preferred armored vehicle vice HMMWVs; 4) procurement, maintenance and fuel 

cost are lower than HMMWVs and 5) HMMWV maintenance and fuel are more complex then LTVs. Force protection is only one factor to consider in the procurement 

of LTVs versus HMMWVs. HMMWVs were selected for specific mission sets because 

of the force protection they provide; however, LTVs clearly meet the overall requirement of the country-wide poling mission. 

Mr. TURNER. One tenet of the Administration’s new defense strategy is reversibility. According to released documents, the new budget plan specifically sustains 

critical segments of the industrial base that cannot be duplicated or regenerated 

quickly. The strategy identifies some of these industries and talks about combat aircraft, bombers and of course shipbuilding, all hugely important aspects of national 

security and our economy. What I find puzzling is the lack of mention of the U.S. 

combat vehicle industrial base. My read of the Army’s FY 2013 budget request indicates zero procurement of existing combat vehicles such as the Abrams tank and 

Bradley Fighting Vehicles. 

Can you explain why the new National Defense Strategy ignores the combat vehicle industrial base? If a particular parts manufacturer goes out of business and they 

were the only producer of that part, how does ‘‘reversibility’’ take this into account? 

In some cases, depending on the complexity of the part, it can take over a year for 

a prime contractor to get another vendor qualified? What is the risk of increasing 

our vulnerability from an industrial base perspective where we will be forcing our 

prime contractors to depend on foreign sources to supply critical parts? Finally, if 

the Ground Combat Vehicle is the Army’s number one modernization program, who 

will build it when it enters production if both competitors are essentially out of the 

combat vehicle production business? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) 

is written in very broad terms; as the Army implements it, the combat vehicle industrial base is one of the key sectors being considered and thoroughly evaluated. 

Reductions in the Nation’s forces will be structured and paced in a way that will 

allow the Army to surge, regenerate, and mobilize the capabilities and materiel 

needed for any future contingency. In some cases, the Army will be reducing capabilities that are of a lower priority. In other cases, the Army will invest in new capa-
114 

bilities to maintain a decisive military edge against a growing array of threats. 

Building in reversibility and the ability to quickly mobilize will be very important. 

That means reexamining the mix of elements in the ground forces and preserving 

the health and viability of the nation’s defense industrial base to properly equip 

those ground forces. 

The combat vehicle industrial base is of significant concern to the U.S. Army. Accordingly, we are directing efforts to assess industrial base risks and develop various cost-informed mitigation strategies that ensure the continuous support to the 

Warfighter and the health of the ground combat vehicle industrial base. These strategies include a Department-wide effort to assess the health and risks to the industrial bases on a Sector by Sector, Tier by Tier (S2T2) basis. The Army is also incorporating mitigation strategies involving the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program 

to address identified risks. The S2T2 analysis seeks to identify critical areas that 

could constitute single points of failure and develop strategies to mitigate the risks 

identified. The FMS program allows our vendors to diversify and balance military 

with commercial business so they can weather the lean years and be in position to 

compete when we start investing in the next generation or recapitalize the vehicles 

we have. FMS sales also help sustain highly skilled jobs in the defense industrial 

base by extending production lines and lowering unit costs for key weapon systems. 

The Firm selected to provide the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), would be required to prove it can manufacture the vehicle on the timeline required by the 

Department. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. The C–27J is critical in supporting ground forces to meet the last 

tactical mile requirements. The Air Force has used a combination of larger C–130 

cargo planes in conjunction with Army CH–47 helicopters to support last tactical 

mile requirements, but these alternatives have shown that they are less than adequate to accomplish the mission. The C–27J also plays a critical role in our National 

Guard providing airlift capabilities in support of homeland defense mission. What 

is the Army’s plan to compensate or fill the gap for the loss of the C–27J platform? 

Will it increase the CH–47’s ops tempo, until a more adequate alternative is designed? Given the potential divesture of C–27J aircraft, what is the plan for filling 

the missions lost by the potential retirement of C–23 Sherpa aircraft? What impact 

would divesture of the C–27J have on the logistical supply chain in theater? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army has a capability requirement for intra-theater lift to be provided to ground forces, as the Army currently 

has in Afghanistan. CH–47s are used heavily and cannot bear the whole load. To 

assist us with our requirement, the Air Force has agreed to provide fixed wing aircraft for resupply. A Memorandum of Agreement signed by the Air Force and Army 

on 27JAN12 states ‘‘The Combatant Commander/Joint Force Commander should 

TACON (Tactical Control) an Expeditionary Airlift Squadron or Detachment to the 

Commander, Army Forces who will exercise Tactical Control through the Senior 

Army Aviation Authority. The dedicated Expeditionary Airlift Squadron may, at the 

discretion of the Combatant Commander/Joint Force Commander, collocate with an 

Army Combat Aviation Brigade or Task Force to provide tactical airlift for transport 

of Army Forces time sensitive/mission critical equipment, supplies and personnel.’’ 

The Air Force assures the Army it will be able to fulfill this requirement with their 

current C–130 fleet. The Air Force commitment to meet the Army’s intra-theater lift 

requirement using C–130 aircraft to support Army ground forces fulfills this requirement. The Army does not currently have or foresee any gaps or shortfalls for 

intra-theater lift requirements or theater logistical supply chain requirements based 

upon this agreement. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. We believe that increasing the overall Army RDT&E budget for 

Command, Control, and Communications Advanced Technology (Program Element 

0603006A) line by $40 million is a worthy investment in preventing a catastrophic 

degradation of our ability to defend our troops, our allies and our Nation if our 

weapons systems should sustain a cyberattack. The U.S. Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command’s role in developing advanced technologies for weapons systems, 

as well as their operational role in training soldiers to operate those systems provides a unique opportunity to test systems and train soldiers proactively vs. reactively to operate network embedded weapon systems in a hostile cyberspace environ-
115 

ment. Is the Army’s role in securing our cyber-dependent systems an area that is 

programmatically underfunded? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. Defending its networks and providing 

full spectrum cyber operations is a mission area the Army works diligently to accomplish every day. Army senior leadership is acutely aware that investments in 

the cyber mission area must be sufficient to address the current and growing threat 

and we believe the Army’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget request for cyber security is appropriately prioritized and balanced. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. In your joint testimony, you state that ‘‘the Army National Guard 

and Army Reserve have evolved into indispensible parts of our operational force and 

ones that we will continue to rely upon to provide depth and versatility to meet the 

complex demands of the future.’’ And, as Iowans know all too well, the Reserve 

Components play a critical role in homeland security and disaster response. 

Can you explain how the planned reductions in the National Guard and Reserve 

will be implemented through 2017? What criteria will be used in determining where, 

when, and how the reductions will be made? What role will DOD’s total force policy 

play in implementing the force reduction? Lastly, how will this plan for the force 

reductions maintain the experience and readiness of the operational reserve? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. Our Army has proven after more than 

ten years of war to be the most capable, sustainable and decisive land force in the 

world. The Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) 

have been employed as an ‘‘operational force,’’ providing critical land power and rotational capacity essential to our efforts. As the Army continues to shape its force 

mix to meet strategic demands, reduce capability shortfalls and balance force requirements across all three components, the DOD Total Force Policy help guide and 

inform our efforts. 

Announced reductions in the ARNG and USAR are expected to achieve through 

decreases in the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) overhead account in each component and by suspending planned Grow-the-Army increases in 

the USAR. No units will be inactivated to achieve the end strength goals (ARNG— 

350.3K/USAR—205K), thus maintaining combat-experienced units built over the 

last ten years of war. The ARNG will begin a phased reduction of its TTHS account 

in FY16 and complete it by FY19; the USAR will complete its reductions by FY14. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. In your joint statement you talk about ‘‘Garrison Energy’’ which is 

‘‘the energy required to power Army bases and conduct soldier training.’’ You say, 

‘‘Dependence on fossil fuels and a vulnerable electric power grid jeopardize the security of Army operating bases and mission capabilities.’’ However, your testimony 

does not enumerate what the electric power grid is vulnerable to. Many studies 

show our civilian power grid is critically vulnerable to both natural and manmade 

electromagnetic pulse. Furthermore, reports show that domestic military installations receive 99% of their electricity from the civilian power grid. But when I look 

in your summary for what the Army is doing to eliminate or mitigate vulnerabilities 

to electric power and our dependence on fossil fuels all I see are references to ‘‘cool 

roofs, solar power, storm water management, and water efficiency.’’ I don’t see any 

evidence in that proposed list of green initiative fixes that gives me any confidence 

that the Army really grasps the magnitude and the immediacy of catastrophic danger this Nation faces if the civilian power grid in this country went down for an 

extended period as a result of natural or manmade EMP. Does the Army know the 

magnitude of the challenges it would face in trying to carry out its core function 

of defending this Nation and its people if the civilian power grid or a substantial 

part of it went down for an extended period, say a month or longer, and has it 

planned for such an event due to natural or manmade EMP? Furthermore, since 

both the military and civilian society are dependent upon the civilian power grid, 

doesn’t it make sense that there should be more done to mitigate this vulnerability 

and achieve the security of the electric grid and other critical infrastructures that 

are indispensable to the survival of our civilian population and to DOD’s military 

bases alike? If so, how is the Army mitigating this vulnerability to their source of 

electricity? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army recognizes the threat to the energy grid as a significant vulnerability. To mitigate this risk of a power grid failure, it is implementing both doctrinal and technological solutions. Earlier this year, the Army 
116 

adopted energy security as a Campaign Objective of the Army Campaign Plan for 

the first time. By doing so, we are ensuring that energy security will be a consideration in everything the Army does. 

With regards to protection against Electromagnetic Pulses (EMPs), DOD Instruction 3150.09, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Survivability Policy, 

establishes the requirements for EMP survivability. Accordingly, critical infrastructure is designed and maintained with an appropriate level of resilience, through 

measures such as hardening. Broader installation capabilities are being developed 

as a part of Army’s efforts to increase energy security on its installations. 

Mr. FRANKS. In your joint statement you talk about ‘‘Garrison Energy’’ which is 

‘‘the energy required to power Army bases and conduct soldier training.’’ You say, 

‘‘Dependence on fossil fuels and a vulnerable electric power grid jeopardize the security of Army operating bases and mission capabilities.’’ However, your testimony 

does not enumerate what the electric power grid is vulnerable to. Many studies 

show our civilian power grid is critically vulnerable to both natural and manmade 

electromagnetic pulse. Furthermore, reports show that domestic military installations receive 99% of their electricity from the civilian power grid. But when I look 

in your summary for what the Army is doing to eliminate or mitigate vulnerabilities 

to electric power and our dependence on fossil fuels all I see are references to ‘‘cool 

roofs, solar power, storm water management, and water efficiency.’’ I don’t see any 

evidence in that proposed list of green initiative fixes that gives me any confidence 

that the Army really grasps the magnitude and the immediacy of catastrophic danger this Nation faces if the civilian power grid in this country went down for an 

extended period as a result of natural or manmade EMP. Does the Army know the 

magnitude of the challenges it would face in trying to carry out its core function 

of defending this Nation and its people if the civilian power grid or a substantial 

part of it went down for an extended period, say a month or longer, and has it 

planned for such an event due to natural or manmade EMP? Furthermore, since 

both the military and civilian society are dependent upon the civilian power grid, 

doesn’t it make sense that there should be more done to mitigate this vulnerability 

and achieve the security of the electric grid and other critical infrastructures that 

are indispensable to the survival of our civilian population and to DOD’s military 

bases alike? If so, how is the Army mitigating this vulnerability to their source of 

electricity? 

General ODIERNO. On our installations, we are aggressively working to improve 

energy security in three key areas. First, we are taking steps to reduce energy demand on Army facilities through energy efficient technologies and culture change. 

By reducing energy demand, our installations will be less vulnerable and require 

less backup power to operate in the case of a disruption. Second, we are planning 

to install on-site renewable energy generation and power storage to extend the current capabilities of our diesel generator backup power capabilities, which will allow 

extended operations in the event of a failure of the commercial electric grid. Finally, 

we are working to develop micro-grid technologies on our installations that will be 

able to prioritize and match critical loads with supply and continue operations in 

the event of a commercial power failure. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. The Army has announced cuts—in vehicles and ISR capabilities to 

name just two areas—that will have an immediate impact on troops deployed today. 

However, this budget asks for $400 million for the Medium Extended Air Defense 

System, or MEADS, which the Army has no plans to procure and field. 

In the FY 12 Defense Authorization Act, Congress required a report from the Secretary of Defense to Congress on the Department’s plan to use this year’s funds as 

a final obligation for either ‘‘(1) implementing a restructured program of reduced 

scope or (2) contract termination liability costs.’’ When can we expect to receive this 

report? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The report was delivered from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to 

Congress on 26 April 2012. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I am concerned about the number of injuries caused by soldiers carrying heavy loads in combat. Currently soldiers deployed in Afghanistan are outfitted with armor that weighs as much as 40 pounds. And, when combined with the 

gear that troops must carry in the field, the total weight our soldiers carry can exceed 120 pounds, causing skeletal injury just through the mere fact of carrying 

these materials. 
117 

I understand and appreciate that the Army has made efforts to reduce the total 

load carried in combat, however I am concerned by the fact that there is still no 

formal requirement for lighter-weight body armor. 

My question is: Who made the decision to use low-bid contracting for body armor 

and in doing so did they include both the human cost as well as the long-term financial cost? If these factors were not included in the decision, why not? 

General ODIERNO. The Army is taking a deliberate holistic approach to evaluating 

the requirements for Soldier Protection. The future for Soldier Protection is detailed 

in the Soldier Protection System (SPS) Capability Development Document (CDD). 

The SPS CDD provides requirements for the protection of the entire Soldier, from 

head to toe, and strives to reduce weight in all areas. This document is currently 

being staffed at Headquarters, Department of the Army, and is expected to be approved in early Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13). 

The Army has also taken steps to encourage vendors, through the contracting 

process, to lighten the weight of body armor. The Army achieved success in reducing 

the weight of the soft armor used in the Generation III (GEN III) Improved Outer 

Tactical Vest (IOTV) while retaining the improved fit for female Soldiers. The most 

recent procurement in FY11 resulted in achieving a reduction of 0.5 pounds (9 percent weight reduction). All Personal Protection Equipment currently under solicitation and in production requires a weight reduction from previous versions. In addition to the body armor, we are also addressing the weight of the combat helmet. 

The specification for the Advanced Combat Helmet, recently released to Defense Logistics Agency—Troop Support (DLA–TS), requires a weight reduction of 4 ounces 

(8 percent weight reduction). 

The Army is committed to reducing the weight of body armor and providing increased comfort for all Soldiers. We are pushing the limits of technology to do so 

while still providing excellent protection. 

These advancements to help lighten the load of our individual soldiers are one 

part of the Army’s total comprehensive efforts. The Army is now examining at how 

to distribute loads across a squad of soldiers to reduce overall weight of the entire 

team. This analysis will enable squads to carry the load smarter, while still maintaining their effectiveness as a fighting unit. 

The Army awards contracts based on best value and puts cost as the least important criteria for new body armor. For DLA–TS sustainment contracts, the vendors 

must meet the performance specifications which include specific weight limitations. 

Ms. TSONGAS. The Army is now approximately 14% female. Pursuant to the Department’s welcome review of the role of women in combat positions, an increasing 

percentage of women in the Army will need to wear body armor in the coming years. 

However, I remain concerned by the fact that our female service members are 

wearing armor which was not specifically designed to fit their anatomy. Because of 

their smaller stature, injuries resulting from the excessive weight may be even more 

severe. 

Last year, General Fuller, former PEO Soldier, told the Air/Land Subcommittee 

that the second-generation tactical vest is fairly adjustable and fits female service 

members better than previous iterations. Can you give me an update on any other 

developments pertaining to female body armor? Have there been any advances specifically with ceramics? Is the Department collecting and assessing data regarding 

the current armor’s use by women in the field which could be useful in developing 

female-tailored armor? 

General ODIERNO. Current ceramic technology is not able to produce multi-curve 

ballistic plates that can conform to the female anatomy while providing effective ballistic protection. However, Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering 

Center (NSRDEC) has a Science and Technology program called ‘‘Improved Geometry and Sizing for Ballistic Plates’’ that is researching how best to proceed. This 

effort is expected to provide a geometric database and a statistical analysis of body 

geometry and movement which will serve as the basis for establishing templates for 

the next generation ceramic body armor. The requirements gathered from the 

NSRDEC study will be incorporated into the Soldier Protection System, one of our 

future initiatives. 

From May 2009—April 2010, the Army conducted an anthropometric fit and 

sizing study of 200 female Soldiers that confirmed the extent and quality of the body 

armor fit issues and their adverse impact. To correct the issues found in that study, 

the Army made improvements to the Generation II (GEN II) Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV), fielded in June 2010. The GEN II IOTV answered most of the 

concerns that were raised by female Soldiers in 2009, including better adjustability 

in the shoulders and hips, to better fit all Soldiers. 

The Army continuously assesses data gathered from Combat Surveys and Soldier 

comments from the field. Improvements are being made incrementally to each new 
118 

revision of the IOTV. Recent improvements in Fiscal Year 2011 include procurement 

of IOTVs that have a weight reduction of 0.5 pounds (9 percent weight saving). Also, 

the Army is procuring narrower side plates which enable smaller Soldiers, including 

many females, to get a better fit. All Personal Protection Equipment currently under 

solicitation and in production requires a weight reduction from previous versions. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. I understand the USD–ATL is currently engaged in discussions 

with his German counterparts to negotiate the termination of the MEADS program. 

When can we expect a report from DOD on the program’s reduced scope? Last year’s 

Defense Authorization fenced 25% of funds for MEADS until such a report was delivered. Roughly, how much of the FY12 funding has been spent to date? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. a) According to OSD, the report required by Section 235 of the 2012 NDAA is expected to be delivered in April 2012. 

b) To date, the U.S. released $86.138M, approximately 25 percent of the FY12 

funds, to the NATO MEADS Management Agency, the executing agent for the 

MEADS program. 

The OSD-led team, including Army representation, continues to press the partners for a restructured program; however, Germany and Italy are very firm and consistent on their position to execute the Proof of Concept, current plan, approved in 

October 2011. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. PINGREE 

Ms. PINGREE. I am concerned about the recently issued Request for Proposal 

(RFP) for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) because it imposes severe time 

constraints for producing prototypes for testing. These time constraints preclude 

participation by essentially any contractor other than the traditional defense industry manufacturers that previously failed to deliver an acceptable vehicle during the 

technical demonstrator effort. For example, the RFP precludes an innovative group, 

led by Ford Motor Company and Future Force Innovations, and including Raytheon 

and others that was willing, without any Government funding, to invest $400 million of its own funds to produce prototypes for testing. Even companies that have 

been working on a JLTV for 5 or more years will have 1 year (or less) to redesign 

their vehicles and produce prototypes for testing. What are your reasons for employing severe time constraints in the RFP? Will you consider modifying the RFP to ease 

the time constraints for producing prototypes for testing so that nontraditional, yet 

highly qualified, groups have sufficient opportunity to participate and potentially 

deliver a superior result to that offered by traditional industry? In particular, as 

General Austin recently encased the Flag in Iraq and General Allen is scheduled 

to do the same in Afghanistan well before even the present schedule calls for the 

fielding of the JLTV, what is the urgent need that prevents an RFP that enhances 

competition and produces a better, lighter, and cheaper JLTV? 

General ODIERNO. The current JLTV strategy allows for full and open competition 

and is available to all offerors including vendors such as Ford that have not traditionally participated in the military vehicle marketplace. After extensive feedback 

from Industry and Congress, the Army and the United States Marine Corps agree 

that the current strategy maximizes competition and sets a level playing field 

among a wide range of no less than six extremely credible vendors. Delaying the 

RFP significantly to benefit one vendor gives the perception that the Army is giving 

preferential treatment to one particular vendor and is unfair to the other competitors that have invested significant time and resources. 

The JLTV program is well structured to maintain the competitive pressure that 

will constrain cost growth throughout the upcoming EMD phase. The strategy carries up to three vendors in a competitive environment into low rate initial production. In addition, the current acquisition strategy allows for vendors who are not selected or do not compete for EMD contracts to submit vehicles for testing, consistent 

with our current schedule for even broader competition during the LRIP downselect. 

Ms. PINGREE. The new JLTV acquisition strategy in the RFP relaxes the original 

protection, performance, and payload requirements for the vehicle. Why would you 

relax the base requirements for the JLTV below what was mandated in the prior 

failed effort when other groups appear able to meet or exceed the original base requirements in all respects at a price meeting the budget necessities of the Army and 

the Marine Corps? Furthermore, why, in these times of fiscal crisis, would you pro-
119 

vide $65 million to contractors that are being asked to reduce, not increase 

capability? 

General ODIERNO. The adjustments that were made to the requirements preserved the key core capabilities that JLTV must meets the needs of the warfighter 

by delivering significantly improved payload, protection, and performance over our 

current light tactical vehicle fleet, without paying a premium in terms of either cost 

or schedule for only marginally increased capabilities. The new JLTV acquisition 

strategy does not relax the original protection, performance or payload requirements 

for the vehicle. The protection level was actually doubled over the Technology Development phase vehicles. The payload remained the same, 3,500 pounds for the four 

door variant and 5,100 pounds for the two door variant. The only significant 

changes were a reduction in the threshold for reliability and adjustment of corresponding transportability requirements. 

For the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase, reliability was lowered to 2,400 mean miles between operational mission failures (MMBOMF). The 

JLTV schedule provides for over a year of additional reliability growth testing in 

the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase in order to continue our Reliability, 

Availability and Maintainability growth, and a plan to retrofit any Reliability 

Growth design changes into all the LRIP vehicles prior to fielding at Initial Operational Capability. By comparison, the current MMBOMF for the Up-Armored High 

Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle is 600–1,200. The reduced MMBOMF requirement for the JLTV is still set at a significantly higher performance level than 

the vehicle it is designed to replace. 

The increase in curb weight of approximately 1,000 pounds significantly reduced 

the estimated cost of the vehicle because it eliminates the need for exotic materials. 

Even with this increase, both Services will be able to use the JLTV for rotary wing 

lift operational requirements. 

The willingness of the Services to explore what industry could deliver in terms 

of demonstrated capability, and to adjust requirements and program plans to ensure 

an affordable and executable program, demonstrates the Services’ joint commitment 

to acquisition reform and affordable programs. 

The $65 million ceiling achieves a more appropriate balance of cost and risk for 

both Industry and the U.S. Government. This should substantially increase the competition during the EMD phase, further driving savings in production. 

Ms. PINGREE. The new JLTV RFP states that, ‘‘[i]n EMD Source Selection, no 

credit will be given for proposed performance above threshold or at objective levels.’’ 

This sentence was not in the draft RFP dated October 3, 2011, but was inserted 

into the final RFP. This change provides absolutely no incentive to design a JLTV 

that is better, lighter, and cheaper than the base requirements. This is a particularly puzzling development when the requirements of the RFP’s new acquisition 

strategy will permit prototypes that weigh substantially more and, in true combat 

configuration, cost substantially more than the original prototypes which, not too 

long ago, were rejected by the Services as too heavy and too expensive. Shouldn’t 

our goal be to enhance competition and produce a better, lighter, and cheaper 

JLTV? 

General ODIERNO. The final RFP does explicitly state that during the EMD source 

selection, proposals will not be given credit for performance above threshold values. 

However, the EMD selection criteria must be placed into the broader context of the 

overall acquisition and contracting strategy. The goal in the EMD is to pick up to 

three of the best vehicle designs to carry forward into the selection for production. 

The language in question is intended to limit vendor claims about performance, particularly claims that might exceed the approved thresholds for performance, because 

we are initially depending on paper proposals and design artifacts rather than demonstrated performance at the stage in the selection process. However, where vendors 

can show meaningful facts and data, their proposals would be evaluated as lower 

risk to achieve those thresholds. 

The program’s experience during the last phase showed that vendors claimed a 

high performance were not able to subsequently demonstrate that performance once 

they built hardware and began testing. Our criteria for EMD are focused on the maturity of the designs that are being bid, and the ability of those designs to meet at 

least threshold requirements. We want to avoid giving credit for ‘‘proposed performance’’ claims that vendors are not able to demonstrate during test. However, we do 

make it clear that the down-select into the Low Rate Initial Product will consider 

performance beyond the threshold for a number of factors, including reliability, mobility and curb weight. We say that explicitly in the executive summary, so that the 

vendors understand up-front that we are interested in the very best vehicle they can 

build within our cost limits. 
120 

Based on Technology Development (TD) results, we have adjusted performance requirements and used lessons learned to reduce vehicle costs. The vehicle coming out 

of the TD phase weighed approximately 24,000 pounds and had an average procurement unit cost of $475,000. The EMD vehicle should weigh approximately 19,500 

pounds and have an average procurement unit cost of $350,000. 

The current JLTV strategy allows for full and open competition and is available 

to all offerors including vendors such as Ford that have not traditionally participated in the military vehicle marketplace. After extensive feedback from industry 

and Congress, the Army and the United States Marine Corps agree the current 

strategy maximizes competition and sets a level playing field among a wide range 

of no less than six extremely credible vendors. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. On February 3rd, the subcommittee for oversight and investigation 

held a hearing on Arlington National Cemetery and some of the reforms that are 

ongoing there. Is the Army utilizing best practices from the civilian (cemetery) sector as lessons learned to avoid pitfalls in the future? 

Secretary MCHUGH. ANC has developed a mutually-beneficial relationship and 

works cooperatively to share best practices with the Veteran Administration (VA) 

National Cemeteries Administration (NCA). This relationship includes sending ANC 

personnel to the NCA National Training Center in St. Louis to receive training on 

various aspects of burial operations. We have sent more than 25 personnel to the 

NCA and private industry training centers (for operating heavy equipment). Recently ANC hosted the VA’s Deputy Undersecretary for Memorial Affairs and personnel from the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER) Program Management 

Office (PMO) at a demonstration of our GIS system and discussion of our case management methodology. ANC also formed a working group with NCA to bring together both organizations for continued engagement. During the first meeting, NCA 

representatives visited ANC to discuss the best sharing practices in the areas of 

streamlining ordering headstones, chain-of-custody procedures for remains and most 

effectively leveraging BOSS & ISS to manage cemetery operations. 

In addition to these interactions, we are working with American Battle Monument 

Commission, the National Funeral Directors Association and other private organizations to begin sharing best practices. 

Mr. CONAWAY. In the FY2013 President’s Budget Highlight paper the Army emphasizes the importance of ‘‘The Network’’ and states that the Network is the 

Army’s foremost investment priority in the 2013 budget. Your budget request includes significant funding for programs of record such as the JTRS Rifleman Radio 

and the WIN–T program. Can you expand on the importance of the Network Integration Evaluations conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas, and what lessons you have 

learned that are shaping your investment strategy? 

General ODIERNO. Our semi-annual Network Integration Evaluations (NIEs) have 

a two-fold purpose. The first is to remove the integration burden from the operational units; the second is to provide an operation venue to evaluate new technologies and network capabilities. The Army has learned significant lesions from the 

NIE in not only how well the individual systems perform, but how to optimize the 

entire network to harness its power for the Warfighter. 

The Army has already reaped substantial benefits from the NIEs, such as informing requirements aligning programs of record, integrating systems prior to deployment, and providing an avenue for industry to bring in mature capabilities for evaluation. Through the NIE process, the Army has successfully brought the operational 

test, acquisition, and requirements communities together to synchronized and 

streamline the evaluation and feedback approach, allowing for more useable test 

date and direct user feedback to acquisition and requirements communities. 

For example, by getting, WIN–T into the field in NIE 12.1, we were able to identify and correct numerous shortcomings with the system. In one instance, company 

commanders found receipt of data was slow or spotty when attempting to receive 

data on the move and it was recommended that more access point be provided 

throughout the battalion. By getting systems like WINI–T into Soldiers’ hands for 

their feedback we are reducing risk for Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 

(IOT&E). 

Following each NIE, Training and Doctrine Command and the Army Test and 

Evaluation Command examine capabilities evaluated during the NIEW across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and 

Facilities (DOTMLPF). When completed, this report will form the basis for Army de-
121 

cisions concerning acquisition, as well as identify gaps that can be satisfied with 

non-materiel solutions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. Secretary McHugh, you propose with this budget to reduce the number of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) by 8, with two coming from Europe. 

How far along is the Department in determining which U.S.-based BCTs will be 

drawn down, and when might your analysis of these decisions be made available 

to Members of Congress, Commanders at U.S.-based installations and the general 

public? Will Members or home installations have the opportunity to weigh in before 

these decisions go into effect? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army is considering a number of potential options, but 

no final decisions have been made as to which U.S. based BCTs will be drawn down. 

An announcement on specific force structure actions is expected sometime before, 

or in conjunction with, submission of the FY14 President’s Budget in early February 

2013. Subsequently, the Army will ensure that appropriate information regarding 

the draw down is timely and effectively communicated to member of Congress. 

Mr. OWENS. Secretary McHugh, it should come as no surprise that your request 

for additional BRAC authorizations has been met with some resistance from Members of Congress, including myself. I do appreciate General Odierno’s recent statements that closures of major installations are not in the works, and I believe many 

of us are willing to work with the Department if there is unused or otherwise excess 

real-estate on your books. Giving the Department carte blanche to begin a process 

for closing installations, however, is not something I for one am open to considering. 

I have concerns not only for major installations here in the U.S., but also for the 

costs generally associated with a BRAC request. Can you give us a range of the potential costs for a BRAC round, and are there any details available on where the 

money to pay for such an effort would come from? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The costs of a future BRAC are directly related to the recommendations made by DOD and approved by the BRAC Commission. The Army 

has conducted some preliminary planning however; absent new BRAC authority, no 

recommendation, specific analysis or cost projections will be completed. The Army 

supports additional BRAC authority to properly shape existing installation inventory to match our evolving strategic and mission requirements. Absent this authority, the Army may be forced to retain excess installation infrastructure potentially 

impacting spending on forces, training and modernization. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary McHugh, What role does the Army envision the Reserve 

Component playing under the new strategy and force structure? How does the Army 

intend to provide the ‘‘strong, steady-state force readiness’’ for the Nation as it rebalances its forces? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The DOD Total Force policy is a fundamental premise upon 

which our Nation’s military strategy is accomplished. In support of the new strategy, the Army is planning to use its active and reserve forces as an integrated force 

for operations and within prescribed goals for frequency of use and duration of involuntary activations of the National Guard and Army Reserve, as established by 

the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Army will evaluate the mix of operating 

and generating force capabilities between the Active Component (AC) and Reserve 

Component (RC) to support the planning objectives for using the Total Force established by the Secretary of Defense. Within the parameters of global security conditions and combatant commander requirements, the Army will use a common deployment cycle (Army Deployment Period) for named operations to facilitate the integration of AC and RC forces in support of operations. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, with the downsizing of 

the Active Duty Army, the Guard and the Reserve force will be in need of combat 

experienced mid-grade junior officers and NCOs to lead the force through the 21st 

century. What incentives is the Army utilizing in order to attract and keep our best, 

brightest, and most experienced Soldiers to the Reserve force as they transition out 

of the Active Duty Component? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The United States Army Reserve 

(USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) both have the authority to pay bonuses 

ranging up to the statutory maximum of $20,000 for enlisted Soldiers in critical 

skills that transfer from the Active Army to the Reserve Components. In addition 
122 

to cash incentives, some Soldiers also qualify for Student Loan Repayment up to 

$50,000 and The Montgomery GI Bill ‘‘Kicker’’ which adds up to $350 per month 

to the monthly GI Bill benefit. Active Army officers/Warrant Officers who affiliate 

with the Reserve Components are eligible for up to $10,000 when leaving the Active 

Army. 

Active Duty Soldiers must meet with a Reserve Component Career Counselor during transition from Active Duty. The Career Counselor discusses the benefits and 

opportunities available to continue to serve in the Reserve Component. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Odierno, earlier we talked to the Navy and Marine Corps 

team about how they plan to become more flexible and agile to execute this new 

defense strategy focused on the Asia-Pacific and Middle East. How does the Army 

plan to streamline its capabilities to respond to the threats of the future? Do you 

see more airborne infantry units? More Army Special Operations Forces? More 

Ranger Battalions? What are the risks associated with cutting conventional Army 

land forces when confronted with the strategy you have to execute? 

General ODIERNO. The Army will reduce conventional land forces, to reshape and 

transition, while maintaining the capacity to remain decisive. We will continue to 

provide the joint force with a scalable, trained, equipped, and ready ground force 

to meet contingencies and succeed in ongoing conflicts. The Army will preserve the 

current force disposition in the Pacific, while supporting all geographic combatant 

commanders’ security cooperation strategies with regionally aligned forces and capabilities. We will shape the environment through engagement, build and maintain 

global relationships, and increase partner capacity and regional security. The Army 

can meet the ground force requirements for any of the current war plans in the Pacific region, given continued investment in readiness. However, additional reductions of conventional land forces will create a smaller margin for error to keep sufficient forces prepared to meet requirements. The Army’s regionally aligned forces 

concept enables PACOM’s theater security cooperation activities and exercises with 

key and emerging partners. These forces, along with our surge force capacity, are 

key to deterrence in the Pacific region. They shape the region and advance the security interests of the United States and our allies. 

Army Special Operations Forces make up over 50% of the personnel assigned to 

Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Based on SOCOM and theater combatant 

commanders’ requirements, we are addressing the anticipated need to increase the 

mix of special operations forces. Over the past years, the Army has increased the 

capability of airborne infantry units and ranger battalions. In the future, we will 

continue to assess and refine the capabilities of these units to improve their ability 

to execute specialized missions. As a result of the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, the Army Special Operations Forces strength will grow from 32,000 

personnel to 35,000 by fiscal year 2015. This will complete the growth of Army Special Operations Forces from 26,000 in 2009. While the majority of the growth is 

within the five active component Special Forces Groups, all of the United States 

Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) operational formations either have 

received or are receiving additional growth in both operational and organic 

sustainment capabilities. In addition to the Army’s investment in Army specific special operations formations, the Army is also resourcing personnel across the same 

period into essential joint special operations command and control structures such 

as theater special operations commands. The recent re-emphasis on the role of special operations forces within the recently published strategic guidance re-confirms 

the need for this investment. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ 

Mr. CRITZ. Last October, I expressed my concern that the replacement vehicle for 

the Vietnam-era M113, which was terminated in 2007, was not scheduled to enter 

Low Rate Initial Production until 2016. I asked why the Army could not adopt a 

‘‘Stryker type acquisition’’ in which the Army was able to award a contract 13 

months after General Shinseki announced the Army’s desire to procure an Interim 

Armored Vehicle. The Army agreed that replacement of our M–113s should be accelerated. In fact, they stated that they would look to award a replacement vehicle 

more quickly than the 2016 that was planned at the time. As you also know, the 

NDAA conference report expressed concerns about the fact that many of the current 

tracked or wheeled vehicle systems currently in production are scheduled to end before 2016. Furthermore, the conference report expressed its support for AMP–V, 

stated concerns over the long timelines, and offered suggestions on how to accelerate 

the program. As such, I was disappointed to learn that the Army budget now doesn’t 

plan to reach Milestone C and L–RIP until 2017, a full year later than was proposed 
123 

last October. So my questions are: 1. Does the Army plan to replace the M113 in 

the Heavy Brigade Combat Team with a variant of a vehicle that is already currently in the Army inventory? 2. Last fall, I saw prototypes for both the MEDEVAC 

vehicle and the mortar carrier at AUSA; why can’t the Army adopt a Stryker type 

acquisition model where the Army calls for all candidate vehicles, tests and evaluates them, and awards a contract by 2014? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army plans to replace the M113 

with the AMPV in the HBCT. However, it has yet to be determined whether the 

vehicle will be a variant of a vehicle currently in the Army inventory. The acquisition model used during the Stryker program was conducted prior to the STET implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA). 

STET WSARA the Army is currently conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 

for this Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP). The Army is considering both 

modified and unmodified versions of vehicles that are currently in inventory as part 

of the AoA. 

MDAPs are now also required to go through a Materiel Development Decision, 

which initiates the AoA and completion of the Materiel Solution Analysis phase before consideration of an entry into the milestone process. WSARA also gave the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) the responsibility to ensure that consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives are conducted for joint military requirements, in consultation with the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

(CAPE). The results of these assessments cannot be completed until CAPE has certified the AoA results. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING 

Mr. SCHILLING. Secretary McHugh, I wrote a letter along with Congressman 

Loebsack to the Installation Command (IMCOM) asking for information about positions that were to be cut at the Rock Island Arsenal Garrison. This letter has not 

yet been answered and the Garrison is now facing not only a loss of institutional 

memory by those in senior positions retiring, but also the ability to make sure that 

the knowledge and capability cannot be passed on before those retirements because 

of a hiring freeze. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Can you clarify when IMCOM will come to a final decision 

on the position reductions at all facilities within the Army and specifically at Rock 

Island Arsenal? 

The IMCOM-wide force structure program review conducted January and February, 2012, rebalanced civilian resources across several IMCOM Garrisons, to include Rock Island Arsenal. As a result, the Rock Island Arsenal garrison received 

an additional 23 civilian OMA Direct-funded authorizations for a total of 258 authorizations. The rebalance right-sized the garrisons to support mission critical/mission essential tasks through FY2015 and will serve as the baseline. 

IMCOM Garrison Commanders are taking necessary actions to reshape and rebalance their civilian workforce to meet their civilian Operations and Maintenance; 

Army (OMA) authorized end-strength levels while mitigating adverse impact on the 

workforce and the accomplishment of the Garrison’s mission. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Secretary, the 2-star general that commanded 

RDECOM recently retired and was replaced with the civilian level equivalent. What 

was the rationale for this decision? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army leadership made the decision to turn over the U.S. 

Army Research, Development and Engineering Command to a civilian to enhance 

the continuity and stability of the organization and its workforce. A Senior Executive Service employee, Dale E. Ormond, succeeded Major General Nick Justice, the 

Commanding General, as RDECOM’s director on February 10, 2012. 

General officers were routinely assigned to RDECOM for one to two years. Such 

short tour lengths were not conducive for effecting the kind of enduring changes 

that could potentially benefit the Command. The leadership decision was also based 

on the Army’s recognition of a need for a developmental process to groom leaders 

to direct this technically complex R&D organization. Previously, commanders came 

from various backgrounds like Acquisition or Infantry. Continuity and stability are 

critical to the transformation and adaptation of RDECOM’s mission and to gain effi-
124 

ciencies. The Army leadership decided that a civilian director at the helm of 

RDECOM at this time would greatly aid in that effort. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. As you are aware, the GAO has found that the escrow account set up for Enhanced Use Leases is in violation of Section 2667 of Title 10 and 

the funds received from these EULs must be deposited into an account at the Treasury. It is my understanding that the funds in this account will be distributed at 

your discretion. Will these funds be used to augment the yearly funding that bases 

would receive or will it be distributed in addition to the yearly amount? 

Secretary MCHUGH. According to 10 USC 2667(e)(1), the Secretary shall deposit 

lease proceeds in a special account in the Treasury and such proceeds shall be available to the Secretary for the following: (i) Maintenance, protection, alteration, repair, improvement, or restoration (including environmental restoration) of property 

or facilities; (ii) Construction or acquisition of new facilities; (iii) Lease of facilities; 

(iv) Payment of utility services; (v) Real property maintenance services. At least 50 

percent of the proceeds deposited in the special account established for the Secretary 

concerned shall be available for the activities described above only at the military 

installation or Defense Agency locations where the proceeds were derived. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN 

Mr. RUNYAN. Mr. Secretary, I see that as part of this year’s budget, you have submitted a request for approval to enter a second multiyear contract for the H–47 Chinook helicopter. Since you’ve been using a multiyear for Chinooks for the past 5 

years and I understand that one will expire this year, what have you seen as the 

biggest benefits for you and the taxpayer of having this authority that has led you 

to request a second multiyear contract? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The biggest benefit from the multi-year contract was the real- ized savings of: $449 million on the base contract for 181 CH–47F aircraft for Fiscal 

Year 2008–2012. This firm fixed price multi-year contract has executed on cost and 

delivered on schedule. In addition to the base contract savings, the program office 

procured 34 option aircraft for an additional $86 million in savings. The second requested multi-year contract is projected to yield 10 percent savings, or $373 million. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Mr. Secretary, the Army’s use of dedicated airborne tactical ISR systems to maintain intelligence overmatch for counter-IED and counterinsurgency 

missions has been and continues to be vitally important to core BCT operational 

success. Have you resolved yet with the Air Force leadership, in your interdepartmental deliberations on roles and missions to maintain this critical capability within 

the Army? If so, what is the role of the Enhanced Medium Altitude Reconnaissance 

and Surveillance System (EMARSS) program of record in support of your strategy 

in this area? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army agrees that dedicated airborne tactical 1SR systems are critical to support IED and counterinsurgency mission. The Army has not 

yet resolved with the Air Force the roles and mission to maintain this capability 

and meet requirements. While the EMANSD program was terminated due to affordability, the Army must continue to assess other options and potential investment 

strategy to meet critical requirement. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Mr. Secretary, is the Armed Aerial Scout program an Army priority? 

Can you discuss the way ahead for an evaluation of the different capabilities available from industry? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) remains a top equipping modernization priority for the Army. The Army’s current armed scout helicopter, the 

OH–5SD Kiowa Warrior is more than forty years old and has been modified extensively over its lifetime. The OH–5SD is underpowered and becoming increasingly obsolete and difficult to upgrade, modify or modernize. 

In July 2009, the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) directed the Army to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to meet AAS capabilities requirements. Initial efforts for the AoA began in October 2009. Phase I determined that MannedUnmanned Team alternatives best filled the capability requirements for the AAS capability. The Phase II AoA includes further analysis that refines alternatives to inform competitive prototyping efforts. The results from Phase II of the AoA are expected to be released in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2012 and will inform the 

way ahead for evaluating capabilities available from industry. 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Odierno, for a number of years members of this committee 

have heard from Army leaders and soldiers that they need lighter-weight body 

armor. During testimony last year I was told that the Army was pursuing lighterweight body armor. I asked what steps are being taken to both reduce the weight 

of body armor and to develop products that better fit female soldiers. In my recent 
125 

conversations with industry I am told that the Army, despite years of talking about 

it, still has no requirement for either lighter-weight body armor or for armor that 

better fits female soldiers. I was also told that the military is entering into a longterm contract that has no incentive for lighter-weight body armor. Why is there no 

requirement for either lighter-weight body armor or armor tailored to female soldiers? Is this just inertia or is there a regulatory or legal obstacle? Who is responsible for the decision not to incentivize industry to develop lighter-weight body 

armor? 

General ODIERNO. The Army has been successful in providing better fit body 

armor for females as well as incrementally lightening the weight of body armor. 

Further, we have experienced no legal or regulatory obstacles to pursuing the best 

body armor for our Soldiers. Finally, the Army has taken steps to encourage vendors 

to develop lighter body armor. 

From May 2009—April 2010, the Army conducted an anthropometric fit and 

sizing study of 200 females Soldiers that confirmed the extent and quality of the 

body armor fit issues and their adverse impact. To correct the issues found in that 

study, the Army made improvements to the Generation (GEN) II Improved Outer 

Tactical Vest (IOTV), fielded in June 2010. The GEN II IOTV answered most of the 

concerns that were raised by female Soldiers in 2009, including better adjustability 

in the shoulders and hips, to better fit all Soldiers. The Army is also procuring narrower side plates which enable smaller Soldiers, including many females, to get a 

better fit. 

The Army also motivates vendors, through the contracting process, to lighten the 

weight of body armor. The Army also achieved success in reducing the weight of the 

soft armor used in the GEN III IOTV while retaining the improved fit for female 

Soldiers. The most recent procurement in Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) resulted in 

achieving a reduction of 0.5 pounds (9 percent weight reduction). All Personal Protection Equipment currently under solicitation and in production requires a weight 

reduction from previous versions. 

In addition to the body armor, we are also addressing the weight of the combat 

helmet. The specification for the Advanced Combat Helmet, recently released to Defense Logistics Agency—Troop Support (DLA–TS), requires a weight reduction of 4 

ounces (8 percent weight reduction). 

The Army is committed to reducing the weight of body armor and providing increased comfort for all Soldiers, and we are pushing the limits of technology to do 

so while still providing excellent protection. The Army is taking a deliberate holistic 

approach to evaluating the requirements for Soldier Protection. The future for Soldier Protection is detailed in the Soldier Protection System (SPS) Capability Development Document (CDD). The SPS CDD provides requirements for the protection 

of the entire Soldier, from head to toe, and strives to reduce weight in all areas. 

This document is currently being staffed at Headquarters, Department of the Army, 

and is expected to be approved in early FY13. The Army awards contracts based 

on best value and puts cost as the least important criteria for new body armor. For 

DLA–TS sustainment contracts, the vendors must meet the performance specifications which include specific weight limitations. 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Odierno, I believe the Army could keep this committee informed about military body armor—specifically small arms protective inserts 

(ESAPI), the hard body armor worn by our soldiers. For many years this committee 

has held hearings and legislated on body armor, yet despite our years of interest, 

I was recently informed by industry that the Army has a new requirement for body 

armor. Specifically I am told that the Army has determined that the product description for ESAPI was changed and a new threat round was added to the package 

of threats that ESAPI must defeat. I have also heard from industry that some of 

the manufacturers who have produced ESAPI do not have a solution for the new 

threat and that their previous ESAPI does not reliably stop the new threat. These 

are manufacturers who have fulfilled a significant part of the ESAPI requirement 

over the years. Interestingly, I understand that the Army, for what appears to be 

convenience, has decided not to change the name of ESAPI, the national stock number, or the color of the product. If there is a new threat and the Army is adopting 

to the realities of the battlefield I applaud you. My concern is that if this threat 

is real, how do we ensure that every soldier gets the ESAPI that stops the threats 

that the Army has identified on the battlefield and how long will it be before every 

soldier gets the new body armor? Also, do you have any concerns that a soldier may 

not get the best body armor because the supply sergeant is unable to tell the two 

ESAPIs apart? 

General ODIERNO. The Army has great confidence that currently fielded ESAPI 

plates protect Soldiers against small arms projectile threats on the battlefield. To 

our knowledge, the Interceptor Body Armor has never failed to stop a small arms 
126 

ballistic threat for which it was designed. The Army made the decision to update 

the small arms threat baseline to the current ESAPI performance specification because it gives us the opportunity to test against a round that is in U.S. inventory. 

This specification will better protect our Soldiers from fratricide, accidental discharges, and enemy capture of U.S. and similar NATO ammunition. Stopping the 

additional bullet in the threat baseline could stop a future enemy bullet of similar 

size and velocity. The name, stock number, and color are unchanged because most 

ESAPI plates currently in inventory and all ESAPI plates currently in production 

already stop the additional threat. Those in inventory that do not stop it are identified by visual inspection of the manufacturer and lot number during routine scanning before deployment and during mid-tour leave and set apart for training use 

only. We anticipate that all plates in theater will conform to the new standard by 

the 1st Quarter of Fiscal Year 2013. 

Mr. RUNYAN. General Odierno, as you may know I serve on this Committee and 

the Veterans Affairs Committee and I am concerned about the number of injuries 

caused by soldiers carrying heavy loads in combat. These heavy loads are injuring 

large number of soldiers at immeasurable human cost as well as a significant financial cost that will be borne by the Veterans Administration for generations as these 

people receive the care they deserve. I understand that the Army has made efforts 

to reduce the total load carried in combat, however I am concerned that the Army 

does not have an integrated approach to reducing the weight carried by soldiers. As 

an example, there is still no formal requirement for lighter-weight body armor. I am 

also told that the weight of body armor is increasing because manufacturers are 

using heavier, less expensive materials because of the military’s decision to award 

contracts based on lowest cost. Who made the decision to use low-bid contracting 

for body armor and in doing so did they include both the human cost as well as 

the long-term financial cost? If these factors were not included in the decision, why 

not? 

General ODIERNO. The Army does not base awards for new body armor on lowest 

cost, nor do they include ‘human cost’ as a criterion. These contract awards are 

based on best value and puts cost as the least important criteria. Once body armor 

is in sustainment, the Defense Logistics Agency requires vendors to meet the performance specifications which include specific weight limitations. 

The Army is committed to reducing the weight of body armor and providing increased comfort for all Soldiers. We are pushing the limits of technology to do so 

while still providing excellent protection. 

From May 2009–April 2010, the Army conducted an anthropometric fit and sizing 

study of 200 females Soldiers that confirmed the extent and quality of the body 

armor fit issues and their adverse impact. To correct the issues found in that study, 

the Army made improvements to the Generation (GEN) II Improved Outer Tactical 

Vest (IOTV), fielded in June 2010. The GEN II IOTV answered most of the concerns 

that were raised by female Soldiers in 2009, including better adjustability in the 

shoulders and hips, to better fit all Soldiers. The Army is also procuring narrower 

side plates which enable smaller Soldiers, including many females, to get a better 

fit. 

The Army also motivates vendors, through the contracting process, to lighten the 

weight of body armor. The Army also achieved success in reducing the weight of the 

soft armor used in the GEN III IOTV while retaining the improved fit for female 

Soldiers. The most recent procurement in Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) resulted in 

achieving a reduction of 0.5 pounds (9 percent weight reduction). All Personal Protection Equipment currently under solicitation and in production requires a weight 

reduction from previous versions. 

In addition to the body armor, we are also addressing the weight of the combat 

helmet. The specification for the Advanced Combat Helmet, recently released to Defense Logistics Agency, requires a weight reduction of 4 ounces (8 percent weight 

reduction). 

The Army is taking a deliberate holistic approach to evaluating the requirements 

for Soldier Protection. The future for Soldier Protection is detailed in the Soldier 

Protection System (SPS) Capability Development Document (CDD). The SPS CDD 

provides requirements for the protection of the entire Soldier, from head to toe, and 

strives to reduce weight in all areas. This document is currently being staffed at 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, and is expected to be approved in early Fiscal Year 2013. 
127 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you describe the relationship between the U.S. Army and 

the Republic of China Army? What impact does the ban on U.S. general officers visiting Taiwan have on enhancing and building upon this relationship? 

General ODIERNO. The U.S. Army and Taiwan Army currently enjoy a strong, stable, and mutually beneficial relationship. Within the long-standing constraints of 

this relationship, our two sides have managed to develop a wide array of security 

cooperation programs. The Taiwan Army’s acquisition of AH–64 Apache helicopters 

and the establishment of a pilot training detachment in the United States is one 

of our most recent and noticeable successes. Taiwan’s soldiers are also offered many 

other training opportunities at U.S. Army training institutions, including the U.S. 

Military Academy, the Army War College, and nearly every functional training center. The U.S. Army, Pacific, cooperates with the Taiwan Army to execute a series 

of annual military-to-military exchanges to share professional insights, tactics, techniques and procedures of mutual benefit. Despite the ban on U.S. general officers 

visiting Taiwan, we manage to maintain strong ties with Taiwan Army senior leaders and take maximum advantage of every Taiwan Army general officer visit to the 

U.S. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. Secretary McHugh, on January 5, the Secretary of Defense issued 

a new strategic plan entitled, ‘‘Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for a 21st 

Century Defense.’’ Several missions listed seem perfectly tailored for our National 

Guard and Reserve forces. 

Could you please explain what role DOD’s total force policy will play in implementing this new strategic policy? 

Do you think the Army budget submission reflects a true total force policy? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The DOD Total Force policy is a fundamental premise upon 

which our Nation’s military strategy is accomplished. The Army will use its active 

and reserve forces as an integrated force to support the Total Force Policy and New 

Strategy. 

The Army’s FY13 budget submission maintains a robust Reserve Component end 

strength with proportionally fewer cuts than that of the active component. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. Due to the need for reduction of forces in the Army, what will the 

Department of Army do to ensure as General Dempsey pointed out in his testimony 

earlier this week as need to ‘‘help our veterans find education opportunities, meaningful employment, and first class heath care.’’ He continued by saying that this is 

not ‘‘exclusive responsibility of the Services or veterans organizations.’’ 

What is the plan of the Army in both internally and across other Federal agencies 

to ensure that military personnel transitioning out of the military are equipped with 

the necessary training and education to obtain employment? I am particularly concerned since the unemployment rate for young Iraq and Afghanistan veterans is 

22% and for wounded veterans is 41%. 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The mandates of the Veterans Opportunity to Work Act of 2011(or VOW Ac) and the Presidential Task Force on Veteran 

Employment Initiatives which mandated the Transition Assistance Program (TAP) 

for all separating Soldiers will nearly triple the throughput of Soldiers in Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP). As such, we are looking internal to the Army 

and Department of Defense for the funds to support this effort. The Army is currently in the Budgetary Review Process to identify the resources requirements needed to implement a new transitions training and services delivery model. The training and support provided to transitioning Soldiers will ensure Army Veterans are 

‘‘career or education ready’’ prior to leaving active duty and that they have the skills 

they need and deserve when they return to civilian life. 

In order to meet the increased Soldier throughput and fulfill the VOW requirements, ACAP is addressing the situation from three avenues of approach. First, we 

will reinforce our existing infrastructure. We currently have 54 ACAP centers with 

200 counselors with a plan to increase the number counselors. Workload requirements dictate a need for several hundred counselors: however, leadership involvement and virtual usage will reduce that requirement. 

Next, we will utilize Forward/Mobile Transition Support Teams positioned away 

from Army installations to support Soldiers and units that are geographically dis-
128 

persed. Half of the transitioning Army force completes their transition away from 

an installation. Lastly, we have already stood up the virtual ACAP center with a 

24/7 call center where Soldiers may contact a certified transition counselor anytime 

from anywhere. Transition preparation can also take place in a virtual room where 

Soldiers may access online classes that are the same as the training at a physical 

ACAP center. 

Mrs. ROBY. How will this budget impact the need to modernize our current rotary 

wing fleet as well as the need to develop the next generation of rotary wing? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Fiscal Year 2013 President Budget 

(PB) (Base and Overseas Contingency Operations funding requests) requests $7.5B 

in Army Aviation and supports continued modernization of Army Aviation fleets. 

For example, the PB13 request procures 40 remanufactured and 10 new AH–64D 

Block III aircraft, 16 new OH–58D aircraft, 25 new CH–47F aircraft and 19 new 

CH–47F airframes with limited recap components, 35 new UH–60M and 24 new 

HH–60M aircraft. The procurement and recap programs will facilitate rotary wing 

modernization within the Army, but necessary fiscal constraints decrease our production plan and hence fielding by three to five years in the long term by reducing 

quantities in the near term. Additionally, we have accepted some operational risk 

since the reduced modernization rate will not afford us the ability to make-up for 

pre-existing fleet shortages for some time to come. 

Æ