COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

WASHINGTOt'& DC 20510 6175 

The Honorable Lisa Jackson 

Administrator 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

1200 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 

Washington, DC 20460 

Dear Administrator Jackson: 

I hold serious concerns about the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) recent rulemaking 

activity under Title II of the Clean Air Act (CAA). From all indications, EPA is recklessly 

pursuing its global warming agenda to the detriment of its goals as it relates to real pollution and 

our nation's energy security objectives. Indeed, the Agency's proposal is contrary to the spirit 

and intent of the Clean Air Act, resulting in increased public exposure to harmful pollutants. It 

also undermines the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) effort to 

promote the use of clean-burning alternative fuels and compressed natural gas (CNG). I am 

therefore seeking information regarding Agency actions that contribute to air pollution and 

EPA's conflict with NHTSA on the subject of fuel economy regulation and incentivization. 

Recently, EPA and NHTSA jointly proposed new greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 

corporate average fuel economy standards for light-duty vehicles, 2017 and Later Model Year 

Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,854 (Dec. 1, 2011). These standards would impose substantial costs 

upon car buyers. According to EPA's analysis, compliance with the newly proposed GHG 

standards would add an average of $2,000 to the cost of new cars in 2016, in addition to 

hundreds of dollars already added to the cost of each new car by the EPA's OHO standards for 

previous model years.' Unfortunately, EPA severely limited the opportunity for public comment 

on these rules: originally the Agency allowed only sixty days afier December 1 for comments, 

including the holidays. Later, when it extended the deadline, EPA allowed only two more weeks 

—far too brief for the public and affected constituencies to review and meaningfully comment on 

rules that will shape the automobile industry for years to come. 

As EPA stresses in the proposed rulemaking, the new GHG emissions requirements are 

"designed to promote advanced technologies that have the potential to provide 'game changing'
The Honorable Lisa Jackson 

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February 28, 2012 

GFIG emissions reductions in the future." 2 But in so doing, at least two aspects of the joint EPANFITSA proposal raise substantial questions of the agencies' adherence to the objectives of two 

important federal statutes: 

First, the GHG standards would, by EPA's admission, increase the emission of "fine 

particulate matter' (PM2 ), a National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) criteria pollutant 

that most of us would agree should be reduced, not increased. Unlike emissions of carbon 

dioxide, PM25 emissions actually do affect public health. 

Second, EPA's ORG standards conflict with NHTSA's implementation of the Energy 

Policy and Conservation Act, as amended by the Energy Independence arid Security Act of 2007 

(EISA), by silently limiting NHTSA's incentive structure for cars fueled by alternative fuels. 

I question EPA's judgment and authority in exacerbating air pollution and nullifying NHTSA's 

administration of that Agency's statutory responsibilities. We certainly should not allow EPA's 

global warming agenda to reduce our nation's potential to displace foreign oil 

1. EPA's Global Warming Agenda Increases PM25 Emissions that Harm Public 

Health 

In EPA's Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis, the Agency explains atlength its understanding of 

the health effects of exposure to PM2, 5 . But despite EPA' s awareness of those effects, its GHG 

regulations would, by its estimation, increase downstream tailpipe PM25 emissions, by 

nearly 20,000 tons by 2025 This increase would owe in part to the "rebound effect" 

improvements in fuel efficiency will encourage people to drive more.3 

In addition, the EPA recognized that an increase in downstream tailpipe PM 2, 5 emissions could 

be still further exacerbated by EPA's attempt to promote advanced engine technologies By 

imposing increasingly stnct ORG emissions requirements, EPA seeks to promote development 

of improved engine technologies, such as "gasoline direct injection fuel systems "' But while 

direct injection systems may well reduce ORG emissions, they :ncreace PM25 emissions The 

California Air Resources Board, for example, recently projected that increased use of fuelefficient technologies would increase PM emissions substantially between 2015 and 2040, so 

much so that California sees a need to counteract that effect with its own separate program of 

anti-PM2, 5 regulations.5 

2 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,012. 

See Joint TSD at pp. 4-3 to 4-4. " 

See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,086; see also EPA, Draft Joint Technical Support Document: 

Proposed Rulemaking for 2017-2025 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards 

and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards at p. 3-85 (Nov. 2011) ("Joint TSD"). 

California Air Resources Board, LEV III PM Technical Support Document: Development of 

Particulate Matter Mass Standards for Future Light-Duty Vehicles, Appendix P, p. P-52 (Dec. 7, 

2011),
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February 28, 2012 

In short, EPA's attempt to regulate GHG emissions will increase PM 2.5 emissions. And while 

EPA seems to suggest that reductions in upstream emissions will more than offset the 

downstream tailpipe increases, 6 the upstream emissions are materially different and do not 

present the same population-weighted exposure.7 

Finally, I am concerned that a major reason why EPA is planning on promulgating Tier 3 

regulations, which are discretionary, is to hide the increase in PM2, 5 emissions that are created by 

its global warming agenda Fuel manufacturers have already reduced sulfur content by 90 

percent. A recent study by Baker & O'Brien estimates that capital costs associated with 

implementing the Tier 3 standard could be as high as $17 billion, with annual reoccurring 

operational costs of$13 billion. These unnecessary costs could add up to 25 cents per gallon to 

the cost of gasoline for consumers at a time when gas prices are currently at a winter month high 

and are expected to increase. This is an incredibly high price to pay to disguise the hidden 

pollution produced by EPA's GHG standards. 

2. EPA's Global Warming Agenda Undermines U.S. Energy Security 

Objectives 

As EPA and NHTSA stress throughout the notice of proposed rulemaking, the agencies are 

jointly implementing two separate statutes: EPA is implementing Title II of the CAA, 8 while 

NHTSA is implementing the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as amended by the Energy 

Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).9 

As the agencies recognize, these are very different statutory frameworks, with distinct 

requirements, policies, and prohibitions.' 0 Nevertheless, EPA and NHTSA assert that "there is no 

reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid 

inconsistency."1' 

But in fact, the two agencies' respective regulatory proposals are at odds in at least one important 

way. NHTSA, in an effort to promote conservation, cleaner fuel, and reduced consumption of 

foreign oil,' 2 proposes to continue to use a 0.15 "multiplier" to adjust the nominal fuel economy 

of vehicles fueled by CNG or alternative fuels.' 3 With that adjustment, a vehicle is deemed to use 

6 See 76 Fed. Reg. at 75,100-01 ("we estimate net reductions [in PM25 emissions] because the 

net emissions reductions from reduced fuel refining, distribution and transport is larger than the 

emission increases due to increased VMT and increased electricity production."). 

See A. Carlton, et al,, "To What Extent Can Biogenic SOA be Controlled?", Environmental 

Science & Technology, v. 44, no. 9, p. 3379 (2010) ("Species with substantial emissions 

contributions from mobile sources ... affect the population-weighted averages of PM 2 , 5 more 

strongly than domain-average estimates."). 

8 See 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,900-902 

See Id. at 74,896-900. 

See id. at 74,902-04. 

" Id. at 74,903 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007)). 

12 Id. at 74,898. ' Id. at 75,341-43.
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only fifteen percent of the fuel that it actually uses, substantially boosting the vehicles' fuel 

economy and thus relaxing the necessary fuel economy requirements for the remainder of the 

auto manufacturer's production line. 

EPA, by contrast, proposes no corresponding "multiplier" for CNG and alternative fuel vehicles 

in its own UHO regulations This results in a situation where auto companies can use NHTSA's 

0.15 "multiplier" only to the extent that their fleet remains compliant with EPA's GHU 

restrictions. EPA is thus undermining NHTSA's effort to promote displacement of imported 

petroleum because the Agency's GHG standards indirectly caps the number of natural gas 

vehicles that a company can produce. 

This is precisely the type of conflict that EPA forewarned in its brief before the Supreme Court 

in Massachusetts v EPA, explaining that adoption of GHG rules "would subvert the 

implementation by the Department of Transportation (DOT) of the Energy Policy and 

Conservation Act (EPCA), 49 U.S.C. 3290l-329l9." As EPA further explained in that brief, 

"EPCA offers automakers substantial flexibility to choose appropriate met hodc of meeting 

fleeswzde standards, and it provides for congressional oversight of standards promulgated by 

DOT pursuant to the statute."15 

In its decision, the Court concluded that EPA's and NHTSA's administration of their respective 

statutes "may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two agencies cannot both administer 

their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency." 6 That may be true, but only if EPA and NHTSA 

take care to avoid inconsistency. In this case, EPA has done precisely the opposite. 

Instead of taking all steps necessary to align its rules with NHTSA's statutory obligations, EPA's 

proposed 0110 regulations under the CAA sharply conflict with NUTSA's administration of the 

Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the EISA. EPA appears to have undertaken no effort to 

address this noteworthy conflict, which prevents NHTSA from providing (as EPA described in 

its Massachusetts v EPA bnef) "substantial flexibility to choose appropriate methods of meeting 

fleet-wide standards"—an incentive that Congress and the President reconfirmed in the EISA.'7 

The Supreme Court may have authorized the EPA to promulgate GHG regulations so long as 

those regulations are consistent with NHTSA's policy and obligations, but it certainly did not 

authorize EPA to negate NHTSA's administration of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 

which predates Massachusetts v EPA, or the EISA, which postdates it 

For these reasons, I am concerned that EPA's focus on ORG emissions will directly undermine 

implementation of two important federal policies embodied by federal law: (I) to reduce, or at 

least not exacerbate, PM25 emissions; and (2) to promote the use of CNG and alternative fuels 

for transportation. Therefore, I request the following information in order to determine whether 

EPA is complying with or counteracting the requirements and policies of the CAA and Energy 

Policy and Conservation Act (as amended by the EISA): 

' EPA Br., Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1 120, at pp. 24-25 (Oct. 2006). 

Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 

16 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2006). 

' See Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 109 (amending 49 U.S.C. § 32906).
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1. On what basis does EPA conclude that its proposed rule's deleterious effect on 

PM2 , 5 emissions will be offset within the proposed GHG regulations? 

2. If the OHO regulations will not themselves offset EPA's own increase in PM2.5 

emissions, then on what basis does EPA have authority to increase public exposure to this 

pollutant?

3. How much of the PM2.5 emissions problem created by EPA's OHO standards will 

be offset by the proposed Tier 3 fuel regulations? 

4. On what basis can EPA guarantee that its GHG regulations, lacking a "0.15 

multiplier" for CNG and alternative fuel vehicles, will not limit auto companies' utilization of 

NHTSA's own proposed 0.15 "multiplier?" 

5. If there is a residual possibility for conflict between EPA's and NHTSA's 

proposed rules, with respect to NHTSA's 0.15 "multiplier," then on what basis does EPA have 

authority to limit NHTSA's implementation of Congress's statutes and policies favoring that 

incentive program for CNG and alternative fuel vehicles? 

EPA should not be pursuing a global warming crusade, regardless of the impact on the health of 

our citizens and our nation's energy security. Certainly, such action would further undermine the 

credibility of the EPA and the federal government in the eyes of millions of Americans. Due to 

the important nature of my concerns I ask that you respond to my questions in writing within 14 

business days of receipt of this letter. If you have any questions please contact Todd Johnston or 

J.W. Hackett with the Committee on Environment and Public Works at (202) 224-6176. 

CC: The Honorable David L. Strickland, Administrator, National Highway Transportation 

Safety Administration 

Jeffrey Zients, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget