ACTIONS NEEDED TO MINIMIZE 

LONG, ON-BOARD FLIGHT DELAYS 

Office of the Secretary of Transportation 

Report Number: AV-2007-077 

Date Issued: September 25, 2007 
U.S. Department of 

Memorandum

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General 

Subject: ACTION: Actions Needed To Minimize Long, 

On-Board Flight Delays 

Office of the Secretary of Transportation 

Date: September 25, 2007 

Report Number AV-2007-077 

From: Calvin L. Scovel III 

Inspector General 

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-1 

To: Secretary of Transportation 

Thousands of passengers suffered long, on-board aircraft delays triggered by 

severe weather last winter, causing serious concerns about the airlines’ 

contingency planning for such situations. 

• On December 29, 2006, the Dallas-Fort Worth area experienced unseasonably 

severe weather that generated massive lightning storms and a tornado warning; 

this caused the airport to shut down operations several times over an 8-hour 

period. American Airlines (American) diverted over 100 flights, and many 

passengers on those flights were stranded on board aircraft on the tarmac for as 

long as 9 hours. The number of diversions on this date was second only to the 

number reached on September 11, 2001. 

• On February 14, 2007, snow and ice blanketed the northeastern United States. 

JetBlue Airways (JetBlue) stranded hundreds of passengers aboard its aircraft 

on the tarmac at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) for as long as 

10 and a half hours. At 1 point during that day, JetBlue had 52 aircraft on the 

ground with only 21 available gates. JetBlue has publicly admitted 

shortcomings in its systems that were in place at the time for handling such 

situations. 

This report presents the results of the review you requested in response to these 

incidents. Our audit objectives—based on your February 26, 2007, 

memorandum—were to: (1) look into the specific incidents involving American 

and JetBlue, during which passengers were stranded on board aircraft for extended 

i
periods of time; (2) examine the Air Transport Association’s (ATA)1

 member 

airlines’2

 customer service plans, contracts of carriage,3 and internal policies 

dealing with long, on-board delays; (3) highlight best practices that could help 

deal with these situations; and (4) provide recommendations on what airlines, 

airports, and the Government can do to prevent recurrence of such events. 

Other incidents in 2006 and 2007 highlight airline customer service issues and the 

need for coordinated contingency planning to prevent long, on-board delays: 

• On December 20, 2006, severe blizzards closed Denver’s airport, causing 

several flights to divert to other airports. United Airlines diverted two flights 

to Cheyenne, Wyoming. The following morning, United’s flight crew and 

attendants boarded the aircraft and departed, leaving all 110 passengers behind 

to take care of themselves. 

• On March 16, 2007, an ice storm hit the Northeast, causing numerous delays 

and cancellations and forcing passengers to endure long, on-board flight 

delays. In fact, several Office of Inspector General staff were flying that day 

and observed first-hand a 9-hour, on-board delay. 

• On July 29, 2007, because of severe weather, a Continental Airlines flight from 

Caracas, Venezuela, to Newark, New Jersey, was diverted to 

Baltimore-Washington International Airport, where passengers were stranded 

on the tarmac for over 4 hours. Because this was an international flight, 

Federal law prohibited Continental from allowing passengers off the plane; 

however, Continental could have provided for customers’ essential needs 

during this ordeal. 

• On August 9, 2007, severe, east-bound weather stranded hundreds of 

US Airways passengers on board aircraft at Philadelphia International Airport, 

some for up to 6 hours. 

• On August 11, 2007, at Los Angeles International Airport, more than 

17,000 in-bound passengers on 73 international flights were stranded on board 

aircraft or in the terminal holding area for 10 hours because U.S. Customs 

authorities were unable to screen them due to a computer outage. We note that 

in incidents involving international flights, airlines and airports have little, if 

 

1

 The Air Transport Association is the trade association for America’s largest air carriers. Its members transport over 

90 percent of all the passenger and cargo traffic in the United States. 2

 The 13 ATA member airlines included in our review were: Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines, American Airlines, ATA 

Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Hawaiian Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Midwest Airlines, Northwest 

Airlines, Southwest Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways. During our review, ATA Airlines terminated its 

membership in ATA. 3

 A contract of carriage is the document air carriers use to specify legal obligations to passengers. Each air carrier 

must provide a copy of its contract of carriage free of charge upon request. The contract of carriage is also available 

for public inspection at airports and ticket offices.

ii
any, control over the amount of time passengers are inconvenienced because 

passenger screening and processing is outside of their control. 

We conducted this review between March 2007 and September 2007, in 

accordance with generally accepted Government Auditing Standards as prescribed 

by the Comptroller General of the United States. To conduct our analysis, we 

requested a range of data from selected airlines related to weather, operations, and 

customer service. Exhibits A through D provide details on: (A) our objectives, 

scope and methodology, and related audits; (B) selected airlines’ terms and 

conditions for handling long, on-board delays; (C) selected airports’ policies for 

assisting in long, on-board delays; and (D) stakeholders visited or contacted. 

BACKGROUND 

Accommodating passengers during long, on-board delays is a major customer 

service challenge that airlines face. However, this is not a new problem for the 

airlines. Airline customer service first took center stage in January 1999, when 

hundreds of passengers remained in planes on snowbound Detroit runways for up 

to 8 and a half hours. After those events, both the House and Senate considered 

whether to enact a “passenger bill of rights.” 

Figure 1. Provisions of the Airline Customer 

Service Commitment

• Offer the lowest fare available. 

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Notify customers of known delays, cancellations, and diversions. 

Deliver baggage on time. 

Support an increase in the baggage liability limit. 

Allow reservations to be held or cancelled. 

Provide prompt ticket refunds. 

Properly accommodate disabled and special-needs passengers. 

Meet customers’ essential needs during long, on-aircraft delays. 

Handle “bumped” passengers with fairness and consistency. 

Disclose travel itinerary, cancellation policies, frequent flyer 

rules, and aircraft configuration. 

Ensure good customer service from code-share partners. 

Be more responsive to customer complaints. 

Source: Airline Customer Service Commitment, June 1999 

Following hearings after the 

January 1999 incident, Congress, 

the Department of Transportation 

(DOT), and ATA agreed that the 

air carriers should have an 

opportunity to improve their 

customer service without 

legislation. To demonstrate the 

airlines’ ongoing dedication to 

improving air travel, ATA and its 

member airlines executed the 

Airline Customer Service 

Commitment (the Commitment),4

on June 17, 1999. Each ATA 

airline agreed to prepare a 

customer service plan implementing the 12 provisions of the Commitment (see 

figure 1); including a provision to meet customers’ essential needs during long, 

on-aircraft delays; and prepare contingency plans to address such circumstances. 

 

4

 ATA signed the Commitment on behalf of the then 14 ATA member airlines (Alaska Airlines, Aloha Airlines, 

American Airlines, American Trans Air, America West Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Hawaiian 

Airlines, Midwest Express Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Airlines, 

and US Airways). JetBlue was not an airline or a member of ATA when ATA made its commitments. 

iii
Because aviation delays and cancellations continued to worsen, eventually 

reaching their peak during the summer of 2000, Congress directed our office to 

evaluate the effectiveness of the Commitment and the customer service plans of 

individual ATA airlines. We issued our final report5

 in February 2001. Although 

the ATA airlines made progress toward meeting the Commitment, we found that 

the Commitment did not directly address the underlying causes of deep-seated 

customer dissatisfaction—flight delays and cancellations. This is still the case 

today with record-breaking flight delays and cancellations leading to more long, 

on-board delays. 

Rising Flight Delays Are Leading to More Long, On-Board Delays 

Based on the first 7 months of the year, it is clear that 2007 may be the busiest6

travel period since the peak of 2000 and may surpass the 2000 record levels for 

flight delays, cancellations, and diversions. So far in 2007, nearly 28 percent of 

flights were delayed, cancelled, or diverted compared to about 24 percent during 

the same period in 2006. In 2006, nearly 25 percent of domestic flights were 

delayed, cancelled, or diverted, the highest percentage since peak year 2000, when 

it hit 27 percent. Figure 2 illustrates the changes in percentage of domestic flights 

delayed, cancelled, or diverted from 2000 to 2007. 

 

Figure 3. Average Length of Arrival Delays 

for Years 2000 to 2007

52.5

49.2 46.8 48.9 51.4 52.2 54.0 56.7

0

15

30

45

60

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*

Minutes

Figure 2. Percent of Flights Delayed, Cancelled, 

or Diverted for Years 2000 to 2007

27.4%

22.6%

17.9% 18.0%

21.9% 22.6%

24.6%

27.8%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*

Percent of Scheduled Flights

*January through July 

Source: BTS data 

*January through July 

Source: BTS data 

Not only are there more delays, but also longer delay durations. Of domestic 

flights arriving late in 2006, the average delay was a record-breaking 54 minutes. 

Figure 3 illustrates the changes in the average length of flight delays from 2000 to 

2007. Based on the first 7 months of data, it is clear that 2007 could be even 

 

5

 OIG Report Number AV-2001-020, “Final Report on Airline Customer Service Commitment,” February 12, 2001. 

OIG reports and testimonies are available on our website: www.oig.dot.gov. 6

 As measured by scheduled departures. 

iv
worse. For flights that arrived late, passengers experienced an average flight delay 

of nearly 57 minutes, up nearly 3 minutes from 2006.

These rising flight delays are leading to more on-board tarmac delays. Based on 

the first 7 months of 2007, over 54,000 scheduled flights—affecting nearly 

3.7 million passengers—experienced taxi-in and taxi-out times of 1 to 5 hours or 

more (see table 1). This is an increase of nearly 42 percent (from 38,076 to 

54,029) as compared to the same period in 2006. 

Table 1. Number of Flights With Long, On-Board Tarmac Delays of 

1 to 5+ Hours January Through July of 2006 and 2007 

Time Period 2006 2007 % Change 

1-2 Hrs. 33,438 47,558 42.23 

2-3 Hrs. 3,781 5,213 37.87 

3-4 Hrs. 710 1,025 44.37 

4-5 Hrs. 120 189 57.50 

5 or > Hrs. 27 44 62.96 

Total: 38,076 54,029 41.90 

Source: OIG analysis based on BTS data 

Rising Flight Delays Are Also Leading to More Air Traveler 

Complaints 

DOT’s Air Travel Consumer Reports disclosed that, for the first 7 months of 2007, 

complaints against U.S. airlines increased nearly 65 percent (3,947 to 6,504) over 

complaints during the same period in 2006, with complaints relating to flight 

problems (delays, cancellations, and missed connections) more than doubling 

(1,096 to 2,468) for the same period. Complaints in 2007 have already exceeded 

full-year 2006 complaint totals, including complaints about flight problems. 

Figure 4. Air Travel Consumer 

Complaints, 2006

Flight 

Problems

29%

Baggage

22%

Refunds

7%

Disability

6%

Reservations 

Ticketing & 

Boarding

11%

Customer 

Care

13%

Others

12%

Over the last several years, flight 

problems have ranked as the number 

one air traveler complaint to DOT, 

with baggage complaints and 

customer care7 ranked as number two 

and number three, respectively. As 

shown in figure 4, flight problems 

accounted for more than one-quarter 

of all complaints the Department 

received in 2006. So far, this year is 

Source: DOT’s Air Travel Consumer Reports for 2006 

7

 Complaints such as poor employee attitude, refusal to provide assistance, unsatisfactory seating, and unsatisfactory 

food service are categorized as customer care complaints. 

v
becoming a near record-breaking year percentage-wise for flight problem 

complaints, with those accounting for nearly 38 percent of all complaints the 

Department received in the first 7 months of 2007. 

Passengers’ Flight Experiences Are Further Complicated by Capacity 

and Demand Matters 

Air travelers’ dissatisfaction with flight problems, especially cancellations, is 

further compounded by reduced capacity and increased demand, which leads to 

fuller flights. Domestic-wide, the first 6 months of 2007 (the most recent data 

available) compared to the same period in peak-year 2000 show that: 

• The number of scheduled flights (capacity) decreased from 5.5 million in 2000 

to 5.0 million in 2007, a drop of 9 percent. Scheduled seats also declined by 

over 9 percent between 2000 and 2007, from 510 million to 462 million. 

• Even though the number of flights and seats declined, passenger enplanements 

went up over 12 percent, from 312 million passengers in 2000 to 350 million 

passengers in 2007. 

• Reduced capacity and increased demand led to fuller flights. For 2007, 

average load factors increased from 71.1 percent in 2000 to 79.7 percent in 

2007, with an unprecedented 86.1 percent in June. 

• Reduced capacity and higher load factors can also result in increased 

passenger inconvenience and dissatisfaction with customer service. With more 

seats filled, air carriers have fewer options to accommodate passengers from 

cancelled flights. 

The extent to which delays and cancellations will continue to impact passengers in 

2007 depends on several key factors, including weather conditions, the impact of 

the economy on air travel demand, and capacity management at already congested 

airports. 

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW 

Flight delays and cancellations continue as a major source of customer 

dissatisfaction. The severity of the on-board delays last winter drew national 

attention and demonstrated that airlines, airports, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), and DOT must work together to reduce long, on-board 

delays and minimize the impact on passengers when these delays occur. The 

winter events that received the most attention concerned two carriers: American 

and JetBlue. On December 29, 2006, American’s operations at Dallas-Fort Worth 

vi
International Airport (DFW) were severely affected by unprecedented weather 

leading to 654 flight cancellations, 124 diversions, and 44 long on-board delays 

exceeding 4 hours. The diversions to Austin-Bergstrom International Airport 

generated substantial interest because some of the lengthiest on-board delays 

occurred there—in one case, for over 9 hours. JetBlue’s JFK operations also 

suffered on February 14, 2007, when severe weather hit the northeastern United 

States, leading to 355 cancellations, 6 diversions; and 26 long, on-board delays 

exceeding 4 hours. 

While weather was the primary contributor to the extraordinary flight disruptions 

it was not the only factor in passengers being stranded on board aircraft for long 

periods of time. We found that neither airline had a system-wide policy or 

procedure in place to mitigate long, on-board delays and off-load passengers 

within a certain period of time. American also did not control the number of 

diverted flights to some airports, which overwhelmed its operations at Austin. 

JetBlue was committed to its long-standing practice of not cancelling flights. As a 

result, its personnel at JFK airport became overwhelmed with the sheer number of 

arriving and departing aircraft on the ground at the same time, with no gates 

available for deplaning passengers on arriving flights. 

We also found that other airlines experienced flight disruptions on those two dates; 

some were able to minimize the time passengers spent on-board aircraft while 

others experienced similar on-board delays. For example, Delta Airlines had more 

flights delayed at JFK than JetBlue on February 14, 2007, with a total of 54 flights 

being delayed more than 1 hour versus 43 for JetBlue.

We examined 13 airlines’ customer service plans, including customer service 

commitments, contracts of carriage, policies, and contingency plans dealing with 

extended ground delays aboard aircraft. In addition, we reviewed 13 selected 

airports’8

 contingency plans. We found that both airline and airport contingency 

plans are limited in addressing long, on-board delays. In fact, we found that there 

has been little improvement from what we reported in 2001—that only a few 

airlines’ contingency plans specified in any detail the efforts planned to get 

passengers off the aircraft when delayed for extended periods and that airlines had 

not clearly and consistently defined terms in the 1999 Commitment provision 

(such as what constitutes an “extended period of time” for meeting passengers 

essential needs or a “long, on-board delay” before deplaning passengers). 

 

8

 Austin-Bergstrom International, Chicago O’Hare International, Dallas/Fort Worth International, Dallas Love Field, 

General Mitchell International, George Bush Intercontinental, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International, Honolulu 

International, Indianapolis International, John F. Kennedy International, Minneapolis-St. Paul International, Phoenix 

Sky Harbor International, and Seattle-Tacoma International. 

vii
Our examination of the 13 airports, including 12 major hub airports, (see 

exhibit C) found that only 2 airports have a process for monitoring and mitigating 

long, on-board delays that involves contacting the airline to request a plan of 

action after an aircraft has remained for 2 hours on the tarmac. We also found that 

airports intervene only upon an airline’s request primarily because they do not 

have the authority to interfere with a carrier’s operations during long, on-board 

delays. 

Airport operators must collaborate with airlines to establish a policy for how long 

passengers can be kept aboard aircraft while on the ground during extraordinary 

flight disruptions. 

As requested, we also identified best practices and initiatives that could help deal 

with long on-board delays. For example, some airlines and airports keep gate 

space open for off-loading passengers in times of irregular operations. Some also 

constantly monitor aircraft on the tarmac so when an aircraft remains for more 

than a certain period of time (typically 2 hours), the airline manager can 

coordinate the aircraft’s return to a gate. Also, two major airport operators—the 

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 

International Airport—are looking into procedural improvements, such as more 

efficient use of the runways at JFK, and customer service improvements, such as 

best methods for getting passengers off aircraft and reducing the amount of time 

they are kept on aircraft. These practices are good steps, but, in our opinion, a 

more comprehensive plan of action is needed to mitigate long, on-board delays 

and should involve collaboration among airlines, airports, FAA, and DOT. 

We still maintain that all airlines’ customer service plans should specify in detail 

the efforts that will be made to get passengers off aircraft that are delayed for long 

periods, either before departure or after arrival. Airlines should also incorporate 

these policies in their contracts of carriage and post them on their Internet sites. 

To ensure adherence to the policies, airlines must resume efforts to self-audit their 

customer service plans. We recommended most of these actions in our 2001 

report, and the airlines agreed and stated plans to implement them. We realize that 

setting a time limit on delay durations will have to be tailored to individual airlines 

and airports and will heavily depend on the situation. Airlines and airports need to 

work together to determine the various situations that can occur and devise plans 

for handling those occurrences. 

The airlines also agreed to establish a task force of representatives from airlines, 

airports, and FAA to develop and coordinate contingency plans to deal with 

lengthy delays. Although the task force was formed, the effort never materialized 

as priorities shifted after September 11, 2001. In our testimony before the House 

viii
Subcommittee on Aviation in April 2007,9

 we recommended that the task force be 

reconvened, and, to date, there still has been no action to do so. Now is the time 

for airlines to reconvene a national task force and develop and coordinate 

contingency plans with local airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays. 

In addition, DOT should take a more active role in overseeing customer service 

issues to ensure that airlines comply with their policies governing long, on-board 

delays, especially in the event that health and safety hazards arise from such 

delays, and advise Congress if the airlines retreat from the commitment provisions 

or dilute the language in the current contracts of carriage. 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 

Our recommendations focus on actions that could help the Department, airlines, 

and airports improve customer service for air travelers; these include: 

• Defining what constitutes an “extended period of time” for meeting 

passengers’ essential needs and setting limits for delay durations. 

• Establishing specific targets for reducing chronically delayed or cancelled 

flights. 

• Disclosing on-time flight performance. 

• Requiring airports to establish a process for monitoring lengthy, on-board 

delays. 

• Establishing a national task force of airlines, airports, and FAA to develop and 

coordinate contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays. 

• Conducting incident investigations involving long, on-board ground delays. 

• Directing the Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings to ensure that 

airlines comply with their public policies governing long, on-board delays. 

A complete list of our recommendations can be found on pages 21 and 22. 

 

9

 OIG Testimony Number CC-2007-046, “Actions Needed To Improve Airline Customer Service,” April 20, 2007. 

ix
DEPARTMENT, AIRLINE, AND AIRPORT COMMENTS 

We provided American Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and Airports Council 

International-North America with various sections of our report related to their 

airline or organization and included their comments as appropriate. On 

September 19, 2007, we met with Air Transport Association and airline 

representatives to discuss our report. We provided the Office of the Secretary’s 

General Counsel and the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs 

Offices with our draft report. On September 20, 2007, we met with staff from 

General Counsel’s Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings and received 

their verbal comments. Their comments were incorporated into this report as 

appropriate. 

We also received a memorandum from the Secretary of Transportation on 

September 24, 2007, which stated that she is fully committed to improving the air 

travel environment for passengers. The Secretary has directed DOT staff to 

carefully consider the recommendations in this report, including those for 

improving the information provided to the public and the manner in which 

passengers are treated, including compliance by carriers with their own policies. 

The appendix to this report presents the full text of the Secretary’s memorandum. 

ACTION REQUIRED 

In accordance with Department of Transportation Order 8000.1C, within 

30 calendar days, please provide us with your formal written comments regarding 

the specific actions that DOT plans to take to implement our recommendations 

along with timeframes for completion. We will consider the recommendations 

unresolved until we receive the requested information. 

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of Department of Transportation and 

airlines’ and airports’ representatives during this audit. If you have any questions 

concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 366-1959 or Todd Zinser, 

Deputy Inspector General, at (202) 366-6767. 

# 

cc: Chief of Staff 

Office of General Counsel 

Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs 

Acting FAA Administrator 

x
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

FINDINGS .............................................................................................. 1

Lack of a System-Wide Policy Contributed to 

American’s and JetBlue’s Long, On-Board Delays ........................... 1

Airline and Airport Contingency Plans Are Still Not 

Adequate To Handle Long, On-Board Delays................................. 10

Ongoing Actions for Mitigating Long, On-Board Delays.................. 13

DOT, FAA, Airlines, and Airports Should Complete 

Actions on Outstanding Recommendations To Improve 

Airline Customer Service and Minimize Long, On-Board 

Delays ............................................................................................. 17

RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................ 21

EXHIBIT A. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND 

METHODOLOGY, AND RELATED AUDIT COVERAGE ................... 23

EXHIBIT B. SELECTED AIRLINES’ TERMS AND 

CONDITIONS FOR HANDLING LONG, ON-BOARD 

DELAYS............................................................................................... 28

EXHIBIT C. SELECTED AIRPORTS’ POLICIES FOR 

ASSISTING IN LONG, ON-BOARD DELAYS .................................... 29

EXHIBIT D. STAKEHOLDERS VISITED OR 

CONTACTED....................................................................................... 30

APPENDIX. DEPARTMENT COMMENTS......................................... 31
1

FINDINGS 

Airlines and airports continue to face challenges in mitigating extraordinary flight 

disruptions such as long, on-board delays during extreme weather. Based on BTS 

data, 659,988 flights were delayed in 2006 due to poor weather conditions

(9.2 percent of all commercial flights). Based on the first 7 months of 2007, the 

number of flights delayed due to poor weather conditions increased by nearly 

18 percent for the same period in 2006 and is on pace to exceed 2006 totals. 

These delays occurred throughout the system and at many airlines, and, after the 

severe long on-board delays that occurred last winter, the Secretary asked that we 

assess airlines’ contingency planning for such situations. Overall, we found that: 

(1) the on-board delays that passengers endured last winter were largely due to 

airlines’ lack of a system-wide policy to minimize such delays; (2) airlines’ and 

airports’ customer service contingency plans are still not adequate to handle these 

occurrences; (3) airlines and airports have best practices and are moving forward 

with other initiatives to help mitigate these delays; and (4) there are other actions 

that airlines, airports, FAA, and DOT can undertake immediately to address such 

situations. 

Lack of a System-Wide Policy Contributed to American’s and 

JetBlue’s Long, On-Board Delays 

While weather was the primary contributor to the extraordinary flight disruptions 

it was not the only factor in passengers being stranded on board aircraft for long 

periods of time. We found that American and JetBlue experienced long, on-board 

delays on December 29, 2006, and February 14, 2007, respectively, because they 

both lacked a system-wide policy and procedure to minimize long, on-board 

delays and off-load passengers within a certain period of time. American also did 

not control the number of diverted flights to some airports, which overwhelmed 

their operations. In Austin, some passengers experienced delays on the tarmac for 

over 9 hours under American’s “monitor and evaluate” approach. Contrary to 

some media reports, American did provide food, water, and tolerable restroom 

facilities on the aircraft delayed in Austin; however, some passengers felt 

American’s efforts were inadequate in that regard. 

JetBlue was committed to its long-standing practice of not cancelling flights 

whenever possible. As a result, its personnel at JFK airport in New York became 

overwhelmed with the sheer number of arriving and departing aircraft on the 

ground at the same time, with no gates available for deplaning passengers. Based 

on weather forecasts for that day, both airlines were optimistic that the severe 

weather would subside and that the delayed and diverted flights would be able to 

Findings 
2

depart, but the break in the weather never materialized. Since the incidents, both 

airlines have taken actions to facilitate better planning when these incidents occur. 

We also found that other airlines experienced flight disruptions on those two dates; 

some were able to minimize the time passengers spent on-board aircraft while 

others experienced similar on-board delays. 

Severe Weather in Texas Caused American To Divert an Extraordinary 

Number of Flights on December 29, Resulting in Thousands of 

Passengers Experiencing Long Delays on Aircraft 

On December 29, 2006, severe weather that generated massive lightning storms, 

and a tornado warning in the Dallas-Fort Worth area caused American to cancel, 

divert, or delay over 1,100 of its 1,600 (69 percent) scheduled flights into DFW, 

disrupting holiday travel plans for over 13,000 passengers system-wide. American 

diverted 130 flights; 124 flights were bound for DFW but had to be diverted to 

24 nearby airports. The number of diversions on December 29 ranked as the 

second largest in American’s history, the first being September 11, 2001. 

Table 2 shows the seven airports that accepted the majority (63 percent) of the 

DFW diversions on that day. Ultimately, out of the more than 314,000 passengers 

American carried that day, 4,738 American passengers on 44 diverted flights 

endured long, on-board delays of over 4 hours. 

Table 2. Seven Airports Accepting Most of American’s Diversions 

Airport Location No. of Diversions 

San Antonio Regional San Antonio, TX 13 

Shreveport Regional Shreveport, LA 12 

Adams Field Little Rock, AR 11 

Will Rogers World Oklahoma City, OK 11 

Austin-Bergstrom International Austin, TX 11 

Tulsa International Tulsa, OK 10 

Midland International Midland, TX 10 

Total 78 

 Source: OIG 

American’s Lack of System-Wide Policy, Diversion Recovery Approach, 

and Only Partial Adherence to Austin-Bergstrom Local Policy Caused 

Long, On-Board Delays 

American did not have a system-wide policy to minimize long, on-board delays or 

an established time and system for deplaning passengers in the event of 

extraordinary on-board (tarmac) delays. American also did not control the number 

of diverted flights to some airports, which overwhelmed their operations. We 

focused our review of the December 29 events on the 11 American flights that 

Findings 
3

were diverted to Austin, where some of the lengthiest on-board delays occurred. 

We found that American did not fully adhere to its local policy to deplane 

passengers upon request when a delayed or diverted flight is held for more than 

2 hours. 

Under its “monitor and evaluate” approach, American kept passengers on aircraft, 

intending for the diverted flights to re-depart and reach their ultimate destinations, 

but the severe weather conditions on that day prevented some of the diverted 

flights from doing that. For American, when severe weather hit, the normal 

practice was to divert aircraft to nearby airports not affected by the severe weather 

and wait out the storms. American usually diverted aircraft to a nearby airport 

without a plan to spread out its diversions. This practice heavily weighed down 

operations at Austin. At two points during that day, American’s pilots on the 

ground at Austin could not reach the local dispatcher to request a gate assignment 

and ended up contacting FAA air traffic controller for assistance who was also 

unsuccessful in contacting the local dispatcher. 

American also failed to deplane passengers upon request in Austin when the 

diverted flights were held for more than 2 hours. On 8 of the 11 diverted flights, 

74 of the 979 passengers, most of which had final destinations of Austin or San 

Antonio, were deplaned in Austin on December 29. However, several passengers 

we interviewed from two of the eights flights stated that they had requested to 

deplane but were not accommodated. 

Table 3 below shows the number of hours that each flight was on the ground in 

Austin. Some passengers were stranded on board for 6 hours or longer on 4 of the 

11 diverted flights, with the longest on-board delay reaching over 9 hours. For 

5 of the 11 diverted flights, with on-board delays of less than 2 and a half hours, 

American’s “monitor and evaluate” approach paid off with those flights reaching 

DFW the same day. The other six flights were not as fortunate, with passengers 

remaining overnight in Austin and arriving at DFW the next day. 

Findings 
4

Table 3. Length of On-Board Delay and Outcome of the 

11 Diverted Flights to Austin

Flight Origin City/Number Length of On-Board 

Delay 

Flight Outcome 

San Francisco, CA 

 Flight #1348 

9 hours 16 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/ 

arrived DFW next day 

Los Angeles, CA 

 Flight #2412 

7 hours 14 minutes Cancelled/rebooked/arrived DFW 

next day 

Oakland, CA 

 Flight #1008 

7 hours 6 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/ 

arrived DFW next day 

Fresno, CA 

 Flight #534 

6 hours 8 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/ 

arrived DFW next day 

Seattle, WA 

 Flight #2302 

2 hours 26 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day 

Fresno, CA 

 Flight #1372 

2 hours 16 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/ 

arrived DFW next day 

Vancouver, British Columbia 

 Flight #330 

2 hours 8 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day 

Salt Lake City, UT 

 Flight #1074 

2 hours 4 minutes Diverted/remained overnight/ 

arrived DFW next day 

San Jose, CA 

 Flight #1514 

1 hour 39 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day 

Orange County, CA 

 Flight #592 

1 hour 32 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day 

San Diego, CA 

 Flight #1708 

1 hour 31 minutes Diverted/arrived DFW same day 

 Source: OIG 

At Austin-Bergstrom Airport, Some Passengers Were Dissatisfied With 

American’s Attempts To Meet Their Needs During the Delays. We 

interviewed passengers from 2 of the 11 diverted flights—flights 1348 and 534—

to obtain passenger feedback on the events of the day at the Austin airport. 

Flight 1348 was scheduled to depart San Francisco at 6:05 a.m. Pacific Time, but, 

due to mechanical problems (the passengers had to change gates and aircraft), the 

flight did not depart until 7:10 a.m. Pacific Time, with 113 passengers on board. 

While en route to DFW, the flight was diverted to Austin because of the severe 

weather in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Several passengers with Austin and San 

Antonio as their final destinations were allowed to deplane and go to the airport 

terminal via bus. The remaining passengers stayed on board expecting to reach 

their final destinations or make their connecting flight at DFW. 

At 10:05 p.m. Central Time, after sitting on the ground in Austin for 9 hours, with 

a total on-board time of almost 13 hours, the passengers were finally deplaned and 

remained overnight in Austin. Although American offered vouchers for hotel 

accommodations and meals to passengers on flight 1348—36 hotel vouchers and 

Findings 
5

11 meal vouchers in total—not all passengers were accommodated. Those 

passengers may not have been aware that American was offering the vouchers or 

did not want to wait in line and found overnight accommodations on their own. 

The flight continued to DFW the following day. Passengers on this flight were 

later given flight vouchers valued up to $500 by American. 

Passengers on flight 534 from Fresno, California, experienced similar 

circumstances with a shorter on-board delay of 6 hours in Austin. Although the 

passengers on both flights confirmed that snacks and beverages were served and 

the restroom facilities were tolerable, passengers we interviewed felt that 

American’s efforts to meet their essential needs during the delays were insufficient 

given the length of the delays. 

American Has Since Instituted a System-Wide Policy Designed To Avoid 

Long, On-Board Delays 

After the December 29 incident, American instituted a new policy designed to 

prevent on-board delays from exceeding 4 hours and implemented an airborne 

diversion distribution plan aimed at spreading out its diversions to more airports to 

prevent overloading any given airport. American has also implemented decision 

assistance technology designed to “automatically track and monitor delayed and 

diverted flights and assist in creating a centralized approach for the prioritizing the 

handling of such flights.” 

American was able to demonstrate its new policy and plan during an incident that 

occurred on February 24, 2007. On that day, American’s operations at DFW were 

significantly affected by severe wind gusts of 37 to 47 knots (about 43 to 55 miles 

per hour), causing the airport to close for over 5 hours. American diverted 

76 flights bound for DFW to 32 airports, with no single airport handling more than 

9 diversions. This is in contrast to December 29, 2006, when 124 flights were 

diverted to 24 airports, with almost a third of them (7 airports) handling 10 or 

more diversions. 

While the February 24 disruption was the 7th worst diversion day in American’s 

history, only 1 flight (34 passengers) experienced on-board delays of over 4 hours 

versus the 44 flights (4,738 passengers) on December 29, 2006, and that was due 

to an absence of U.S. Customs officials at the diversion airport. According to 

American, the results of the February 24 experience indicate that its new 4-hour 

policy and diversion plan worked well to avoid long, on-board delays during 

extraordinary events. 

Findings 
6

JetBlue Ran Out of Gate Availability on February 14, Stranding Thousands 

of Passengers on Aircraft for Extended Periods of Time 

On February 14, 2007, a severe ice storm hit the northeastern United States, 

causing JetBlue to eventually cancel 355 departures and arrivals, incur 

6 diversions, and strand 

passengers on 26 flights 

for over 4 hours, all at its 

JFK hub. See table 4 for a 

breakdown of JetBlue’s 

long, on-board delays at 

JFK. Ultimately, 31,569 

JetBlue passengers were 

affected by cancellations, 

delays, or diversions at 

JFK between February 13 

and 20. 

Source: OIG 

Number of On-Board Delays Over 1 hour 43 

Number of On-Board Delays Over 4 hours 26 

Number of On-Board Delays Over 5 hours 21 

Number of Passengers That Endured 

On-Board Delays Over 4 hours 2,962 

Average Time Delay for Arrivals (in minutes) 265 

Average Time Delay for Departures (in minutes) 298 

Table 4. Breakdown of JetBlue’s 

Long, On-Board Arrival and Departure 

Delays at JFK 

Initial weather forecasts for JFK on February 14 predicted rain in the morning 

with temperatures slightly higher than 32 degrees; the weather was dramatically 

worse with freezing rain starting around 8:00 a.m. JetBlue’s flights continued to 

arrive at the airport, although flights could not depart—only 2 of the first 

13 scheduled morning flights departed—thereby causing gridlock on the airport 

tarmac. 

By 8:30 a.m., JetBlue ran out of gate space and asked FAA’s Air Traffic Control 

to issue a ground stop10 on all JetBlue flights headed for JFK. At 11:00 a.m., 

JetBlue requested that FAA issue a ground stop for all its flights system-wide 

whether or not they were heading to JFK—an unprecedented request according to 

FAA. This request was due to JetBlue’s operations control center being 

overwhelmed with the JFK situation. 

JetBlue officials stated that they contacted the Port Authority of New York and 

New Jersey (the Port Authority) at 1:30 p.m., asking for buses to off-load 

passengers from five aircraft stuck on the tarmac. By 3:00 p.m., the temperature 

still remained below freezing and airport surfaces were covered with ice. Around 

3:30 p.m., the Port Authority finally started to off-load passengers from the five 

stranded flights. 

By nightfall on February 14, JetBlue had 52 aircraft on the ground at JFK, instead 

of the usual 22, and only 21 gates. JetBlue called other airlines, including foreign 

 

10 During an FAA ground stop, flights destined to the affected airport are held at their departure point for the duration 

of the ground stop. 

Findings 
7

airlines, to see about available gates, but no gates were available. The airport also 

unsuccessfully tried to assist JetBlue in finding gates for its flights. Based on our 

review of the events of that day, it appears that the airlines and airports were trying 

to help each other; however, the severe weather hampered much movement of 

aircraft on the airfield. 

By the end of the day, JetBlue had cancelled 80 percent of its arrivals and 

89 percent of its departures for that day. JetBlue had to cancel another 55 percent 

of its scheduled arrivals and 50 percent of its departures on February 15. These 

cancellations were related to both the weather and the fact that JetBlue did not 

have crew and aircraft available. 

JetBlue’s Lack of Policy and Reluctance To Cancel Flights Caused Long, 

On-Board Delays 

JetBlue did not have a policy to minimize long, on-board delays or an established 

time and system for deplaning passengers in the event of extraordinary on-board 

(tarmac) delays. In addition, JetBlue was committed to its long-standing practice 

of not cancelling flights and had previously never dealt with extremely long, 

on-board delays. JetBlue was optimistic based on weather forecasts that the 

weather would break and eventually its flights would be able to depart. However, 

the break in the weather never materialized on February 14, and JetBlue personnel 

became overwhelmed with the sheer number of arriving and departing aircraft on 

the ground at the same time, with no gates available for deplaning passengers on 

flight arrivals. 

Our review of the February 14 events focused on JetBlue flights that experienced 

the worst tarmac delays at or traveling to JFK. As shown in table 5, 26 flights 

were on the tarmac for 4 hours or more, with 14 flights exceeding 6 hours. Eight 

of the flights were arrivals, with the worst on-board delay lasting over 9 hours. 

The remaining 18 were departing flights, with the worst on-board delay exceeding 

10 hours. Eight of the departing flights eventually took off but the other 10 were 

finally cancelled. 

Findings 
8

Table 5. Length and Outcome of JetBlue’s Long, On-Board Delays 

for Flights at or Traveling to JFK 

Flight Origin City Length of Delay Flight Outcome 

JFK Arrivals 

Ft. Myers, FL 9+ hours Deplaned 

Nashville, TN 8+ hours Deplaned 

Houston-Hobby, TX 7+ hours Deplaned 

Burbank, CA Almost 6 hours Diverted/ arrived JFK same day 

Austin, TX Almost 6 hours Deplaned 

Orlando, FL 5 3⁄4 hours Deplaned 

Long Beach, CA 5 hours Diverted/ arrived JFK same day 

Oakland, CA 4 3⁄4 hours Diverted/ arrived JFK same day 

Flight Destination City 

JFK Departures

Aruba 10 1⁄2 hours Cancelled 

Burbank, CA 9 hours Cancelled 

Cancun, Mexico Nearly 8 hours Cancelled 

Syracuse, NY 7 1⁄2 hours Cancelled 

Houston-Hobby, TX 7 1⁄4 hours Departed 

Buffalo, NY 7 1⁄4 hours Cancelled 

Boston, MA 7 hours Cancelled 

Orlando, FL Nearly 7 hours Cancelled 

Phoenix, AZ 6 3⁄4 hours Cancelled 

Burbank, CA 6 1⁄4 hours Departed 

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 6 1⁄4 hours Departed 

Tampa, FL 5 1⁄2 hours Departed 

New Orleans, LA 5 1⁄2 hours Cancelled 

Burbank, CA 5 1⁄4 hours Departed 

Buffalo, NY 5 hours Departed 

Seattle, WA 4 3⁄4 hours Departed 

Long Beach, CA 4 1⁄2 hours Cancelled 

Phoenix, AZ 4 hours Departed 

 Source: OIG 

JetBlue did not recover from the effects of February 14 until about 5 days later. 

While only one runway was open on both February 14 and 15, capacity issues 

were not a problem because so many of the other air carriers had pre-cancelled 

their flights. The downstream effect of the February 14 event resulted in JetBlue 

cancelling 1,204 flights through February 20, or 44 percent of its operations. 

JetBlue provided passengers with over $11 million in refunds for this incident. 

JetBlue Has Since Instituted a System-Wide Policy Designed To Avoid 

Long, On-Board Delays 

After the February 14 event, JetBlue set a 5-hour time limit for deplaning 

passengers delayed on the ground and established procedures to monitor delayed 

flights. Since then, JetBlue has demonstrated on at least one occasion that it is not 

Findings 
9

going to allow passengers to sit on aircraft for long periods of time during massive 

cancellations. For example, during the March 16, 2007, ice storm, JetBlue 

cancelled over 200 flights scheduled to fly in and out of JFK. 

Also, just a week after the February 14 incident (February 20), and before our 

March 2007 review, JetBlue published its own customer bill of rights. JetBlue 

plans to offer compensation in the form of vouchers for flight disruptions, such as 

cancellations. 

JetBlue Was Not the Only Airline To Experience Flight Disruptions on 

February 14, 2007 

While JetBlue received the most publicity for stranding its passengers on the 

tarmac at JFK on February 14, the weather also affected other airlines there—

nearly 97 percent of all scheduled flights at JFK were either delayed, cancelled, or 

diverted, with over 83 percent of those flights cancelled. 

Delta had more flights delayed at JFK than JetBlue on February 14, with 

15 arriving flights and 39 departing flights delayed over 1 hour. American had 

15 arrival delays and 8 departure delays of over 1 hour. However, the average 

delay length was worse for JetBlue, as shown in table 6. 

Table 6. Average On-Board Delays on February 14, 2007, 

at JFK for JetBlue, Delta, and American 

Airline No. of Flights 

Delayed 

> 1 Hour 

Average On 

Board Delay 

Longest Delay No. of Flights 

with Delays 

 > 3 hours 

Arrivals: 

 JetBlue 14 4 1⁄2 hours 9 hours 9 

 Delta 15 2 1⁄2 hours 4 1⁄4 hours 6 

 American 15 1 1⁄2 hours 2 3⁄4 hours 0 

Departures: 

 JetBlue 29 5 3⁄4 hours 10 1⁄4 hours 20 

 Delta 39 3 1⁄2 hours 7 1⁄4 hours 19 

 American 8 1 1⁄2 hours 4 1⁄4 hours 0 

Source: OIG 

All of the New York area airports were dramatically affected on 

February 14, 2007. New York’s LaGuardia Airport had 92 percent of its flights 

either delayed, cancelled, or diverted, and Newark International had 87 percent. 

While our audit did not examine operations at those airports, it is very likely that 

passengers on flights operating at these airports experienced long, on-board 

delays. 

Findings 
10

Airline and Airport Contingency Plans Are Still Not Adequate To 

Handle Long, On-Board Delays 

In response to the Secretary’s February 2007 request, we examined airlines’ 

customer service commitments, contracts of carriage, policies, and contingency 

plans dealing with extended ground delays aboard aircraft. We also reviewed 

airports’ contingency plans. We found that both air carriers’ and airports’ 

contingency plans are limited in addressing long, on-board delays. Overall, we 

found that there has been little improvement from what we reported in 2001—that 

only a few airlines’ contingency plans specified in any detail the efforts planned to 

get passengers off the aircraft when delayed for extended periods and that airlines 

had not clearly and consistently defined terms in the1999 Commitment provision. 

In 2001, we examined individual airlines’ customer service plans in order to 

evaluate the effectiveness of the Commitment provision, which states that airlines 

will: 

(1) make every reasonable effort to provide food, water, restroom facilities, 

and access to medical treatment for passengers aboard an aircraft that is on the 

ground for an extended period of time without access to the terminal, as 

consistent with passenger and employee safety and security concerns and 

(2) prepare contingency plans to address such circumstances and will work 

with carriers and the airport to share facilities and make gates available in an 

emergency. 

However, as we noted in our 2001 report, the airlines had not clearly and 

consistently defined terms in the Commitment provision such as “an extended 

period of time.” We also noted that only a few airlines’ contingency plans specify 

in any detail the efforts that will be made to get passengers off the aircraft when 

delayed for extended periods, either before departure or after arrival. We 

recommended that the airlines: 

• clarify, in their customer service plans, what is meant by an “extended period 

of time” and “emergency,” so that passengers will know what they can expect 

during extended on-aircraft delays. 

• ensure that comprehensive customer service contingency plans specify the 

efforts that will be made to get passengers off the aircraft when delayed for 

extended periods, either before departure or after arrival. 

In response to our 2001 report recommendations, the airlines agreed to: 

• clarify the terminology used in their customer service plans for extended 

delays. 

Findings 
11

• establish a task force to coordinate and develop contingency plans with local 

airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays. 

However, our 2007 review found that airlines still have neither clearly and 

consistently defined certain terminology in their customer service plans (such as 

what constitutes an “extended period of time” or a “long, on-board delay”) nor 

established a viable task force. Our opinion was then, as it is now, that this should 

be a top-priority area for the airlines when implementing their contingency plans, 

especially with long, on-board delays on the rise from 2006 to 2007—particularly 

those exceeding 4 hours.

Not All Airlines Have Established a Time Limit for On-Board Delays or 

Clearly and Consistently Defined Certain Terminology 

Few airlines have stated a specific time before efforts will be made to get 

passengers off the aircraft during long, on-board delays in their customer service 

commitments, contracts of carriage, policies, and contingency plans that deal with 

these delays. Prior to the American and JetBlue incidents, only 4 of the 13 airlines 

reviewed had an established time limit on the duration of tarmac delays (see 

exhibit B). After these incidents, eight airlines now have a set time limit on delay 

durations before deplaning passengers but five still do not. Also, seven airlines 

have not defined either what constitutes an extended period of time for meeting 

passengers’ essential needs or what constitutes a long, on-board delay before 

deplaning passengers. 

In addition, 

• of the airlines that have defined “an extended period of time,” the trigger 

thresholds for meeting passengers’ essential needs vary from 1 to 3 hours. We 

think it is unlikely that passengers’ definition of an extended period of time 

will vary depending upon which airline they are flying. A consistent policy 

across the airlines would be helpful to passengers. 

• of the airlines that have defined what constitutes a “long, on-board delay,” the 

trigger thresholds for deplaning passengers vary from 1 to 5 hours. 

All airlines need to specify in detail the efforts that will be made to get passengers 

off the aircraft when delayed for extended periods, either before departure or after 

arrival. Although the airlines formed a task force, the effort never materialized as 

priorities shifted after September 11, 2001. Our testimony before the House 

Subcommittee on Aviation in April 2007 recommended that the task force be 

reconvened, and, to date, there has been no action to do so. 

Findings 
12

Airports’ Contingency Plans Addressing Long, On-Board Delays Are Also 

Limited 

In addition to examining airline contingency plans for mitigating long, on-board 

delays as requested, we also examined contingency plans from selected major 

airports nationwide. We requested contingency plans from 13 airports, including 

12 hub airports (see exhibit C). We received plans or responses from all 

13 airports and found the following: 

• Only two airports have a process for monitoring and mitigating long, on-board 

delays that involves contacting the airline to request a plan of action after an 

aircraft has remained for 2 hours on the tarmac. 

• Airports intervene only upon an airline’s request primarily because they do not 

have the authority to interfere with a carrier’s operations during long, on-board 

delays. 

• Most plans address assisting airlines, when assistance is requested, during 

long, on-board delays. This includes providing gates to deplane passengers or, 

when a gate is not available, deplaning passengers using mobile air stairs, 

loading them onto buses, and returning to the terminal. 

Based on discussions with airline personnel, it appears that in the recent events 

that stranded passengers for extraordinarily long periods there was not a 

coordinated effort by the airlines, airport operators, and FAA to deal with such 

events. 

In our opinion, airport operators need to become more involved in contingency 

planning for extraordinary flight disruptions, including long, on-board delays 

during extreme weather or any other disruptive event. Airports are public 

agencies heavily supported by Federal funding to provide better service to the 

public. As recipients of Federal funds for airport improvement projects, airports 

have an obligation to increase airport efficiency, decrease delays, and transport 

passengers in the most efficient manner. 

Also, air travelers can still choose which connecting airport to fly through to get to 

their final destinations or take direct flights to avoid chronically delayed airports 

all together. If certain airports continue to maintain a reputation for long flight 

and tarmac delays, passengers may simply choose other airports whenever 

possible. 

Findings 
13

In our view, large- and medium-hub airport11 operators should establish a process 

for monitoring and mitigating long, on-board delays that involves contacting the 

airline to request a plan of action after an aircraft has remained for 2 hours on the 

tarmac. As part of the plan, the airport operators need to work with the airlines to 

ensure that the airlines’ deplaning policies are adhered to. Absent any airline 

policy, the airport operators should work with airlines to establish policies for 

deplaning passengers and ensure that these policies are adhered to. 

Ongoing Actions for Mitigating Long, On-Board Delays 

Secretary Peters asked that we highlight some of the best practices we found that 

could help in dealing with long, on-board delays. During our review of selected 

airlines and airports, we found several practices by some airlines and airports to 

mitigate the effects of these occurrences. Also, after our review began, some 

airports moved forward with other initiatives meant to assist the airlines in dealing 

with long, on-board delays. In addition, ATA announced a new initiative for 

dealing with such situations. FAA also expanded an existing initiative this 

summer to other parts of the National Airspace System to reduce the amount of 

time that flights sit on tarmacs waiting to depart. We have included these actions 

along with best practices identified during our review to provide an overall picture 

of the actions being taken across the industry that relate to the Secretary’s 

concerns. 

Airlines’ and Airports’ Best Practices and Ongoing Initiatives 

Best Practices: The best practices we identified during our review include the 

following: 

• Setting the maximum amount of time that passengers will remain on-board 

aircraft before deplaning them. An airline’s local contingency planning at one 

airport is to do everything reasonably possible to ensure that passengers do not 

remain on board aircraft for more than 1 hour. 

• “Intelligent cancelling”—cancelling flights most likely to be affected by the 

weather event without being too optimistic or pessimistic. Pre-cancelling 

flights before the passengers leave home keeps them away from the airport, 

thus reducing congestion. There are trade-offs when implementing this 

practice—passengers avoid experiencing long, on-board delays, but they need 

to be re-accommodated on later flights, optimally that same day. However, 

 

11 FAA defines (1) large hubs as those airports that each account for at least 1 percent of the total U.S. passenger 

enplanements and (2) medium hubs as those airports that each account for between .025 percent and 1 percent of the 

total passenger enplanements. Large-hub airports (30 in total) account for 69 percent of all passenger enplanements, 

while medium-hub airports (37 in total) account for 20 percent of all enplanements. 

Findings 
14

reduced capacity and higher load factors can result in increased passenger 

inconvenience and dissatisfaction with customer service. With more seats 

filled, air carriers have fewer options to accommodate passengers from 

cancelled flights. 

• Keeping gate space available for off-loading passengers in times of irregular 

operations. This could be done by the airport authority or the carriers. The gate 

would be available for arriving aircraft and solely for deplaning passengers. 

• Implementing programs that provide volunteer employees from throughout the 

airline’s system that are flown or driven to the destination needing assistance. 

These volunteers (i.e., customer service agents) act as additional help during 

irregular operations. The goal of the agents would be to separate and service 

passengers needing to be rebooked from those passengers arriving at the 

airport already ticketed for on-time flights or non-cancelled, operating flights. 

• Implementing flexible staffing arrangements and periodic duty rotations to 

meet the challenges during irregular operations. For example, certain noncustomer service employees have been cross-trained to assist in re-booking 

passengers whose flights have been cancelled. 

• Holding teleconferences before a known weather event (e.g., winter storm, 

hurricane, tropical depression, etc.) with potentially affected airports’ general 

managers. In addition to asking for recommendations from the general 

managers, they discuss the status of snow removal equipment, liquid de-icing 

amounts/availability, staffing, and possible scheduled operation (aircraft and 

passenger) reductions. Similar meetings are already held between FAA and 

airlines. 

• Using the Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting System 

(equipped on most commercial aircraft) to send a message to the airline’s 

Operations Control Center notifying the Center that the aircraft has been off 

the gate for more than 3 hours without departing. 

• Constantly monitoring aircraft on the tarmac; in cases of aircraft remaining for 

more than 2 hours, airport staff will contact the appropriate airline manager to 

coordinate the aircraft’s return to a gate. If necessary, airport staff will assist in 

deplaning an aircraft and provide an escort, buses, and mobile stairs. Finally, 

staff will ensure that airport services (e.g., concessions, security, and ground 

transportation) remain open during an irregular operation. 

The best practices we identified during our review are not all-inclusive, and the 

airlines or airports should consider incorporating them into their ongoing 

Findings 
15

operations, especially the best practice of setting the maximum amount of time 

that passengers will remain on board aircraft before deplaning. 

However, in our opinion, a more comprehensive national plan of action is needed 

to prevent and mitigate long, on-board delays and should involve collaboration 

among airlines, airports, FAA, and DOT. Therefore, a national task force of 

representatives from each of these groups should be established to develop and 

coordinate contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays. Although the airlines 

formed a task force in response to our 2001 report recommendations, the effort 

never materialized as priorities shifted after September 11, 2001. Now is the time 

to reconvene the task force. 

Airports’ Ongoing Initiatives To Address Long, On-Board Delays: During 

our review, two major airport operators put forth initiatives to address long, onboard delays. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey set up a task force 

to find ways to reduce flight delays at the region’s three main airports. The Port 

Authority; which operates JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark Liberty International 

Airports; leads the group. The task force includes airline executives and Federal, 

state, and city government officials. 

The task force convened its first meeting July 18, 2007, with 42 airline executives 

and Federal, state, and city government officials attending, including then FAA 

Administrator Blakey. The task force met a second time on September 18, and 

another meeting is scheduled for November 2007; conference calls are planned to 

occur periodically. The task force plans to issue a report by the end of 2007. 

The task force is addressing two main areas—technical issues and customer 

service. In the technical area, the Port Authority and FAA are working on 

procedural improvements, such as more efficient use of the runways at JFK. Also, 

work is being delegated to the airlines that are looking into ways that airports 

could be changed to reduce flight delays. In the customer service area, the focus is 

on best methods for getting passengers off aircraft and enhancements for reducing 

the amount of time they are kept on aircraft. 

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport is moving forward with a plan to 

cut gate delays for arriving passengers by busing people from planes directly to 

concourses when airline gates are full. The city of Atlanta, which operates the 

airport, approved a $2.5 million proposal for 4 new buses that can transport about 

80 passengers and their carry-on luggage. The plan also includes sets of mobile 

stairways that allow passengers to leave planes and another vehicle to help 

disabled passengers. Airlines requesting the service will reimburse the city for the 

use of the buses. 

Findings 
16

It is encouraging to see that some airport operators are becoming more involved in 

mitigating long, on-board delays. However, as passenger traffic continues to 

grow, airports will need to become more proactive in dealing with long, on-board 

delays, especially those airports with limited airfield or gate capacity. Airports 

will also need to proactively deal with in-terminal delays when multiple flights are 

cancelled and passengers are stranded in the gate areas where terminal capacity 

could be limited. 

ATA Initiative To Address Long, On-Board Delays 

On February 22, 2007, ATA announced an initiative for dealing with long, onboard delays and proposed the following course of action: 

• Each airline will continue to review and update its policies to ensure the safety, 

security, and comfort of customers. 

• Each airline will work with FAA to allow long-delayed flights to return to 

terminals in order to off-load passengers who choose to disembark without 

losing that flight’s position in the departure sequence. 

• ATA will ask the Department to review airline and airport emergency 

contingency plans to ensure that the plans effectively address weather 

emergencies in a coordinated manner and provide passengers with essential 

needs (i.e., food, water, lavatory facilities, and medical services). 

• ATA will ask the Department to promptly convene a meeting of air carrier, 

airport, and FAA representatives to discuss procedures to better respond to 

weather emergencies that result in lengthy flight delays. 

While we understand the current pressures that ATA and its member airlines face 

in maintaining profitability, we are concerned that the actions proposed merely 

shift responsibility from ATA to the Department. We agree that the Department 

must be an active partner, but ATA’s proposed course of action is not significantly 

different than what the airlines agreed to do in response to our 2001 

recommendations, such as “to establish a task force to coordinate and develop 

contingency plans with local airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays.” 

FAA’s Expanded Program To Reduce Flight Delays 

FAA is also taking action to minimize delays; the Agency expanded an existing 

initiative this summer to other parts of the National Airspace System to reduce the 

amount of time that flights sit on tarmacs waiting to depart. This initiative, known 

as the Airspace Flow Program, gives FAA and the airlines the capability to 

maximize the overall use of the National Airspace System while minimizing 

Findings 
17

delays and congestion. These efforts, which are managed by FAA’s Command 

Center, do not create additional capacity but limit the negative effects of bad 

weather. For instance, it gives airlines the option of either accepting delays for 

flights scheduled to fly through storms or flying longer routes to safely maneuver 

around them. 

The Agency successfully launched the program last year at seven locations in the 

Northeast. According to FAA, on bad weather days at major airports in the 

region, delays fell by 9 percent compared to the year before. Cost savings for the 

airlines and the flying public from the program were estimated to be $100 million 

annually. The number of Airspace Flow Program locations—chosen for their 

combination of heavy traffic and frequent bad weather—was expanded from 7 to 

18. The additional locations will ease delays for passengers flying through the 

southern and midwestern United States and for those on transcontinental flights. 

In the past, severe storms often forced FAA to ground flights at affected airports. 

This “penalized” flights whose scheduled paths would have taken them around the 

storm had they not been grounded with the flights directly affected by the storms. 

The Airspace Flow Program allows FAA to manage traffic fairly and efficiently 

by identifying only those flights scheduled to fly through storms and giving them 

estimated departure times. Airspace Flow Programs will also be used in 

conditions not related to weather, such as severe congestion near major cities. 

In another development, the Agency rolled out a new software program that is 

intended to ensure that airports affected by bad weather receive the maximum 

number of flights that can safely fly to them. During storms, arrival slots often 

open up due to delayed or cancelled flights. The new software program, called 

Adaptive Compression, would automatically fill those slots with the next available 

flight. The software tool, which was launched in March 2007, is intended to 

reduce delays, saving time and money for the airlines and passengers. 

While it is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of these ongoing initiatives, they 

all have merit and, if properly executed, should help in mitigating long, on-board 

delays in the immediate term. 

DOT, FAA, Airlines, and Airports Should Complete Actions on 

Outstanding Recommendations To Improve Airline Customer Service 

and Minimize Long, On-Board Delays 

Given the events of this past winter, DOT should take a more active role in 

overseeing customer service issues, and there are actions that the Department, the 

airlines, airports, and FAA can undertake immediately to do so. Many of the 

actions are not new and date back to recommendations in our 2001 report, which 

were directed at delay and cancellation problems—key drivers of customer 

Findings 
18

dissatisfaction with airlines. To improve the accountability, enforcement, and 

protection afforded to air travelers we recommend the following. 

Actions Needed From the Airlines and Airports 

• Clarify delay terminology and set limits for delay durations before 

deplaning passengers. Those airlines who have not already done so must: 

(1) define what constitutes an extended period of time for meeting passengers’ 

essential needs, (2) set a time limit on long, on-board delay durations before 

deplaning passengers, and (3) incorporate such policies in their contracts of 

carriage and post them on their Internet site. We recommended most of these 

actions in 2001, and the airlines agreed and stated plans to implement them. 

We realize that certain procedures may need to be tailored to individual airlines 

and airports and will heavily depend on the situation (e.g., setting a time limit 

on delay durations before returning to a gate or, when a gate is not available, 

deplaning passengers using mobile air stairs, loading them onto buses, and 

returning to the terminal). There may be situations or conditions that make it 

difficult to bring passengers back to a gate during long, on-board delays. Some 

of the main obstacles to this are the physical layouts of the airports. Some 

airports, by virtue of their design and modern facilities, may be able to safely 

accommodate aircraft movement. Other airports, because of their layout 

design (narrow taxiways), may not be able to accommodate aircraft moving 

about and off-loading passengers safely. 

Also, weather factors can limit off-loading options. For example, deplaning 

passengers onto metal mobile stairs is not feasible during a lightning storm. 

Likewise, it may not be necessary to deplane passengers at JFK after 2 hours, 

since typical Friday afternoon delays normally last that long. However, a 2-

hour, on-board delay at Austin might require deplaning activities to commence. 

Airlines and airports need to work together to determine the various situations 

that can occur and devise plans for handling those occurrences. 

• Establish specific targets for reducing chronically delayed or cancelled 

flights.12 In our 2001 report, we recommended that the airlines establish in the 

Commitment and their Customer Service Plans targets for reducing the number 

of flights chronically delayed (i.e., 30 minutes or longer) or cancelled 

40 percent or more of the time. 

In response to our recommendation, the airlines stated they were “willing to 

accept the challenge of reducing chronically delayed or cancelled flights, for 

 

12 We define chronically delayed or cancelled flights as those flights delayed 30 minutes or longer or cancelled at least 

40 percent of the time during a single month. 

Findings 
19

factors we can control, in order to relieve unneeded and unwanted passenger 

frustration.” However, there were no actions identified on how or when the 

airlines would go about implementing this challenge. After 

September 11, 2001, their focus shifted, but the problem has returned and must 

be resolved. 

• Disclose on-time flight performance. We recommended in our 2001 report 

that the airlines disclose to customers at the time of booking, without being 

asked, the prior month’s on-time performance rate for those flights that have 

been delayed (i.e., 30 minutes or longer) or cancelled 40 percent or more of the 

time. Currently, the airlines are required to disclose on-time performance only 

upon request from the customer. 

The ATA airlines disagreed with this recommendation and, as an alternative, 

agreed to make on-time performance data accessible to customers on the 

airlines’ Internet sites, on a link to the BTS Internet site, or through toll-free 

telephone reservation systems. 

However, in our 2006 review,13 only 5 of the 16 airlines we reviewed made 

on-time performance data available on their Internet sites. Given the ease of 

availability of this information to the airlines, we continue to believe that 

airlines should post on-time flight performance information on their Internet 

sites and make it available through their telephone reservation systems without 

being prompted. 

• Resume efforts to self-audit their customer service plans. We also 

recommended in 2001 that the airlines establish quality assurance and 

performance measurement systems and conduct internal audits to measure 

compliance with the Commitment provisions and customer service plans. The 

ATA airlines agreed with the recommendation. 

In June 2001, we confirmed that 12 of the 14 ATA airlines that were 

signatories to the Commitment had established and implemented their quality 

assurance and performance measurement systems. In our 2006 review, 

however, we found that the quality assurance and performance measurement 

systems were being implemented at just five of the ATA airlines. The other 

ATA airlines had either discontinued their systems after September 11, 2001, 

or combined them with operations or financial performance reviews where the 

Commitment provisions were overshadowed by those issues. 

The key to the success of the airlines’ new policies designed to prevent 

on-board delays is for each airline to (1) have a credible tracking system for 

 

13 OIG Report Number AV-2007-012, “Follow-Up Review: Performance of U.S. Airlines in Implementing Selected 

Provisions of the Airline Customer Service Commitment,” November 21, 2006. 

Findings 
20

compliance with its new policy and with all other Commitment provisions and 

(2) implement its customer service plan, reinforcing it with performance goals 

and measures. 

These systems and audit procedures will also help DOT to more efficiently 

review the airlines’ compliance with the Commitment provisions and ensure 

that airlines comply with their policies governing long, on-board delays, 

especially in the event that health and safety hazards arise from such delays. 

• Reconvene the task force. In response to our 2001 report recommendations, 

the airlines agreed to establish a task force of representatives from airlines, 

airports, and FAA to develop and coordinate contingency plans to deal with 

lengthy delays, such as working with carriers and the airports to share facilities 

and make gates available in an emergency. Although the airlines formed a task 

force, the effort never materialized because their priorities shifted after 

September 11, 2001. In our testimony before the House Subcommittee on 

Aviation in April 2007, we recommended that the task force be reconvened, to 

date, there still has been no action to do so. Now is the time for airlines to 

reconvene a national task force and develop and coordinate contingency plans 

with local airports and FAA to deal with lengthy delays. 

• Implement processes for monitoring lengthy delays. Large- and 

medium-hub airport operators should establish a process for monitoring and 

mitigating long, on-board delays that involves contacting the airline to request 

a plan of action after an aircraft has remained on the tarmac for 2 hours. As 

part of the plan, the airport operators need to work with the airlines to ensure 

that the airlines’ deplaning policies are adhered to. Absent any airline policy, 

the airports should establish their own policies for deplaning passengers. 

Actions Needed From DOT 

• Implement the necessary changes in the airlines’ on-time performance 

reporting to capture all long, on board delays. Under 14 Code of Federal 

Regulations Part 234, “Airline Service Quality Performance Reports,” air 

carriers that account for at least 1 percent of domestic scheduled passenger 

revenues must submit monthly reports to the BTS that include, among other 

things, the number of (1) flights that departed and arrived on time by airport; 

(2) flights delayed, cancelled, and diverted; and (3) flights delayed or cancelled 

by cause. 

However, the delay statistics (see statistics reflected in table 1 on page v) do 

not accurately portray the magnitude of long, on-board delays because carriers 

are not required to report a delay if the flight is cancelled or diverted. For 

example, if a flight taxies out, sits for hours, and then taxies back in and is 

Findings 
21

cancelled, the cancellation is recorded but the delay is not. Therefore, there is 

no record of how long a flight remained at the gate or sat on the tarmac before 

it was cancelled. This was the case with some JetBlue flights at JFK on 

February 14, 2007. Also, if a flight is diverted to an airport other than the 

destination airport and sits on the tarmac for an extended period of time, the 

flight is not recorded in delay statistics. This was the case with American’s 

flights that were diverted to Austin on December 29, 2006. 

BTS is looking into whether changes are needed in how the airlines record 

long, on-board delays. BTS should make this a priority and implement the 

necessary changes in the airlines’ on-time performance reporting requirements 

to capture all events resulting in long, on-board delays, such as flight 

diversions and cancellations. 

• Conduct incident investigations involving long, on-board delays. Also, 

based on the results of this review, the Department’s Office of General 

Counsel—in collaboration with FAA, airlines, and airports—should review 

incidents involving long, on-board ground delays and their causes; identify 

trends and patterns of such events; and implement workable solutions for 

mitigating extraordinary flight disruptions. 

• Oversee the airlines’ policies for dealing with long, on-board delays. The 

Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings should ensure that airlines 

comply with their policies governing long, on-board delays, especially in the 

event that health and safety hazards arise from such delays, and advise 

Congress if the airlines retreat from the Commitment provisions or dilute the 

language in the current contracts of carriage. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

In order to improve the accountability, enforcement, and the protection afforded to 

air travelers, we are making the following recommendations to the Secretary of 

Transportation: 

1. Require each certificated and commuter airline that provides domestic 

scheduled service using any aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats to 

(a) define what constitutes an extended period of time; (b) set a time limit on 

delay durations before deplaning passengers; and (c) incorporate such 

policies in its contract of carriage and post on its Internet site. 

2. Require all airlines that report on-time performance to DOT pursuant to 

14 CFR Part 234 to establish specific targets for reducing chronically delayed 

or cancelled flights. 

Recommendations 
22

3. Require all airlines that report on-time performance to DOT pursuant to 

14 CFR Part 234 to post on-time flight performance information on their 

Internet sites. 

4. Require all airlines that report on-time performance to DOT pursuant to 

14 CFR Part 234 to disclose to customers at the time of booking, without 

being asked, the prior month’s on-time performance rate for those flights that 

have been delayed (i.e., for 30 minutes or longer) or cancelled 40 percent or 

more of the time. 

5. Require each certificated and commuter airline that provides domestic 

scheduled service using any aircraft with more than 30 passenger seats to 

self-audit their customer service plans. 

6. Require large- and medium-hub airport operators to establish and implement 

a process for monitoring and mitigating long, on-board delays that involves 

contacting the airline to request a plan of action after an aircraft has remained 

for 2 hours on the tarmac. 

7. Establish a national task force of airlines, airports, and FAA to coordinate 

and develop contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays, such as working 

with carriers and the airport to share facilities and make gates available in an 

emergency. 

8. Require BTS to implement the necessary changes in the airlines’ on-time 

performance reporting requirements to capture all events resulting in long, 

on-board delays, such as flight diversions. 

9. In collaboration with FAA, airlines, and airports, review incidents involving 

long, on-board ground delays and their causes; identify trends and patterns of 

such events; and implement workable solutions for mitigating extraordinary 

flight disruptions. 

10.Direct the Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings to ensure that 

airlines comply with their public policies governing long, on-board delays, 

especially in the event that health and safety hazards arise from such delays, 

and advise Congress if the airlines retreat from such policies. 

Recommendations 
23

EXHIBIT A. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY, AND 

RELATED AUDIT COVERAGE 

Objectives 

On February 26, 2007, Secretary Peters requested that the Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) examine the airlines’ customer service plans, contracts of carriage, 

and internal policies dealing with long, on-board delays and the specific incidents 

involving American Airlines and JetBlue Airways when passengers were stranded 

on board aircraft for extended periods of time. She also requested that we provide 

recommendations on what actions should be taken to prevent a recurrence of such 

events. 

Consistent with Secretary Peter’s request, we (1) looked into the specific situations 

involving American and JetBlue, in light of whatever specific commitment these 

carriers made concerning policies and practices for meeting customers’ essential 

needs during long on-board delays; (2) examined the airlines’ customer service 

commitments, contracts of carriage, and policies dealing with extended ground 

delays aboard aircraft; and (3) provided recommendations as to what, if anything, 

the airlines, airports, or the Government, including the Department, might do to 

prevent a recurrence of such events, highlighting any “best practices” discovered 

by the industry in dealing with such situations. 

Scope and Methodology 

We conducted this review between March 2007 and September 2007. The audit 

was conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards prescribed by 

the Comptroller General of the United States and included such tests as we 

considered necessary to provide reasonable assurance of detecting abuse or illegal 

acts. In conducting this review, we relied on computer-generated data from the 

airlines and did not access the general and application controls for each of the 

automated systems. 

To examine the airlines’ customer service commitments, contracts of carriage, and 

policies dealing with extended ground delays aboard aircraft we obtained the 

customer service plans and contracts of carriage from the Air Transport 

Association member airlines. We reviewed these documents in particular for 

references related to the airlines’ handling of long on-board delays and essential 

needs of the passengers. We also obtained and reviewed 13 airports’ policies 

dealing with extended ground delays from selected Airports Council InternationalNorth America member airports. We reviewed these documents in particular for 

Exhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit 

Coverage 
24

references related to the airports monitoring and assisting in handling long, 

on-board delays. 

To evaluate the specific situations involving American and JetBlue, we visited 

JetBlue Airways’ headquarters in New York (including JFK) and American 

Airlines’ in Texas—specifically, Dallas-Fort Worth International and 

Austin-Bergstrom Airports. We reviewed information and data from American 

and JetBlue regarding the events of December 29, 2006, and February 14, 2007. 

We also received information from other carriers providing service from DallasFort Worth, Austin, and New York airports and met with officials from FAA air 

traffic control and those three airports. 

Related Audit and Testimony Coverage 

In the past 7 years, OIG has performed a number of customer service-related 

audits and testimonies. We issued our most recent update in April 2007. 

Report AV-2000-102, “Interim Report on Airline Customer Service 

Commitment,” June 27, 2000. The June 2000 report provided the 6-month 

progress of the airlines in implementing their customer service plans. The Interim 

Report provided the preliminary results and observations on the airlines’ systems 

to measure performance against their plans, discussed the airlines’ contracts of 

carriage in relation to their plans, provided observations of the Department’s 

capacity to enforce consumer protection rights, and discussed the importance of 

customer service in the marketplace. 

Report AV-2001-020, “Final Report on Airline Customer Service 

Commitment,” February 12, 2001 and Testimony CC-2001-090, “Airline 

Customer Service Commitment,” on February 13, 2001. In this final report 

and testimony, we reported that the airlines were making progress toward meeting 

their Customer Service Commitment and that the Commitment has been a plus for 

air travelers. Notwithstanding progress by the airlines toward meeting their 

Commitment, we found significant shortfalls in reliable and timely communication 

with passengers by the Airlines about flight delays and cancellations. Further, we 

found the airlines’ Commitment does not directly address the most deep-seated, 

underlying cause of customer dissatisfaction—flight delays and cancellations, and 

what the airlines plan to do about them in the areas under their control in the 

immediate term. 

Testimony CC-2001-217, “Status Report on Airline Customer Service,” 

June 20, 2001. In June 2001, the OIG presented testimony before the House 

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Aviation 

regarding progress made by 14 airlines in improving customer service since our 

2001 report. We reported that most airlines had: (1) incorporated the original 

Exhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit 

Coverage 
25

Airline Customer Service Commitment into their contracts of carriage, (2) 

established performance measurement systems, and (3) petitioned the Department 

to revise regulations for reporting mishandled baggage and compensating 

passengers involuntarily bumped from a flight. The airlines also formed a task 

force to develop plans for accommodating passengers delayed overnight, ensuring 

airport display monitors are accurate, and providing for passengers’ needs during 

long on-board delays. There were several important recommendations that the 

airlines did not address, such as petitioning the Department to require that each 

airline with a frequent flyer program make available to the public a more 

comprehensive reporting of frequent flyer redemption information in its frequent 

flyer literature and annual reports (e.g., the percentage of successful redemptions 

and frequent flyer seats made available in the airline’s top origin and destination 

markets). 

Report SC-2005-051, “Review of December 2004 Holiday Air Travel 

Disruptions,” February 28, 2005. Pursuant to Secretary Mineta’s request of 

December 27, 2004, we issued a report on our review of the travel disruptions 

experienced over the December holiday travel period by Comair and US Airways. 

We found that Comair’s problems were a function of severe weather at Cincinnati 

and failure of the computer system it used to schedule its crews. In Cincinnati, 

Comair’s flight cancellations and delays ultimately affected approximately 

269,000 passenger itineraries. Additionally, we found that US Airways’ problems 

centered on staffing shortfalls going into the holiday travel period in two critical 

functions—fleet service employees and flight attendants, particularly at its 

Philadelphia hub. Plans to offset the staffing shortages through overtime and 

increasing the required number of hours worked by flight attendants did not work. 

US Airways cancelled 405 flights during the holiday travel period, affecting more 

than 46,000 passengers and delayed over 3,900 flights affecting over 

518,000 passengers. 

Report AV-2007-012, “Follow-Up Review: Performance of U.S. Airlines in 

Implementing Selected Provisions of the Airline Customer Service 

Commitment,” November 21, 2006. In the 2006 follow-up review, we reported 

that the airlines’ customer service plans were still in place to carry out the 

provisions of the Commitment and that the Commitment provisions were still 

incorporated in their contracts of carriage, as we recommended in our prior review. 

We found that the airlines needed to (1) resume efforts to self-audit their customer 

service plans; (2) emphasize to their customer service employees the importance 

of providing timely and adequate flight information; (3) focus on the training for 

personnel who assist passengers with disabilities; (4) provide straightforward, 

comprehensive reporting on frequent flyer award redemptions; and (5) improve 

the handling of bumped passengers. 

Exhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit 

Coverage 
26

We also found that the Department was using its additional resources to oversee 

and enforce air travel consumer protection requirements with a focus on 

investigations and enforcement of civil rights issues, including complaints from 

passengers with disabilities. However, when the Department discovered violations 

and assesses penalties, it almost always forgave a portion of the penalty if the air 

carrier agreed to mitigate the conditions and remain in future compliance with the 

rule for which the penalty was assessed. The Department’s follow-up monitoring 

of compliance with these conditions was limited, and in some cases there was no 

follow-up monitoring by the Department. 

Testimony CC-2007-042, “Refocusing Efforts To Improve Airline Customer 

Service,” April 11, 2007. In April 2007, the OIG presented testimony to the 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reporting that the 

airlines continue to face challenges in mitigating extraordinary flight disruptions, 

including long, on-board delays during extreme weather. The airlines, FAA, and 

the Department cannot prevent significant weather events. What they can do, 

however, is work together to plan for such events and minimize the impact on 

passengers. 

However, there are actions that the airlines, airports, the Department, and FAA 

could undertake immediately without being prompted by Congress to do so. For 

example: 

• Those airlines that have not already done so should implement quality 

assurance and performance measurement systems and conduct internal audits 

of their compliance with the Commitment provisions. The Department should 

use these systems to more efficiently review the airlines’ compliance with 

those Commitment provisions governed by Federal regulation. 

• The Department should revisit its current position on chronic delays and 

cancellations and take enforcement actions against air carriers that consistently 

advertise flight schedules that are unrealistic, regardless of the reason. 

• The airlines, airports, and FAA should establish a task force to coordinate and 

develop contingency plans to deal with lengthy delays, such as working with 

carriers and the airport to share facilities and make gates available in an 

emergency. 

• The Department’s Office of General Counsel; in collaboration with FAA, 

airlines, and airports; should review incidents involving long, on-board ground 

delays and their causes; identify trends and patterns of such events; and 

implement workable solutions for mitigating extraordinary flight disruptions. 

Testimony CC-2007-046, “Actions Needed To Improve Airline Customer 

Service,” April 20, 2007. In April 2007, the OIG presented testimony before the 

House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Aviation 

Exhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit 

Coverage 
27

reporting that the airlines continue to face challenges in mitigating extraordinary 

flight disruptions, including long, on-board delays during extreme weather. 

Similar recommendations were provided to the House committee as were 

presented to the Senate committee the week before. 

Exhibit A. Objectives, Scope and Methodology, and Related Audit 

Coverage 
28

EXHIBIT B. SELECTED AIRLINES’ TERMS AND CONDITIONS 

FOR HANDLING LONG, ON-BOARD DELAYS 

Airline Definition of Extended 

Period of Time Stated in 

Customer Service Plans 

and/or Contracts of 

Carriage 

Time to Deplane Stated in 

Customer Service Plans 

and/or Contracts of 

Carriage and/or Defined 

by Internal Policies (I) 

Alaska 90 Minutes 2 Hours for Arrivals 

Aloha None None 

American 2 Hours 4 Hours (I) 

(as of 4/10/07) 

ATA 1 Hour for Beverages 

4 Hours for Catering 

None 

Continental 2 Hours 4 Hours for Departures 

(as of 6/15/07) 

Delta None None 

Hawaiian 2 Hours 2 Hours 

(as of 8/01/01) 

JetBlue None 5 Hours 

(as of 2/20/07) 

Midwest None None 

Northwest 1 Hour for Arrivals 

3 Hours for Departures 

1 Hour for Arrivals 

3 Hours for Departures 

Southwest 2 Hours 2 Hours 

United None 11⁄2 Hours for Arrivals 

4 Hours for Departures 

(as of 9/05/07) 

US Airways 2 Hours None 

Exhibit B. Selected Airlines’ Terms and Conditions for Handling 

Long, On-Board Delays 
29

EXHIBIT C. SELECTED AIRPORTS’ POLICIES FOR ASSISTING 

IN LONG, ON-BOARD DELAYS 

Airport Plan to Deplane 

Passengers 

Airport Policy* 

Seattle-Tacoma 

International 

Yes Determine remote parking locations for 

aircraft to deplane passengers and provide 

buses if requested. 

Dallas/Fort Worth 

International 

Yes Monitor length of time hold positions of 

aircraft. If over 2 hours, coordinate 

aircraft return to gate. 

Austin/Bergstrom 

International 

No Determine parking spots of diverted 

aircraft. 

Indianapolis 

International 

Yes Provide available gate or remotely 

deplane passengers to buses upon request. 

George Bush 

Intercontinental 

Yes Provide buses when requested. 

Hartsfield-Jackson 

Atlanta 

International 

Yes Provide mobile lounges to take passengers 

to gate when requested by airlines. 

Honolulu 

International 

No Encourage carriers to off-load passengers 

and offer immediate assistance by, among 

other things, offering use of available 

airport facilities. 

John F. Kennedy 

International (New 

York) 

Yes After 2 hours and upon request, help to 

find alternate airport locations to safely 

deplane passengers. 

General Mitchell 

International 

(Milwaukee) 

Yes Provide buses when requested. 

Minneapolis-St. 

Paul International 

Yes Provide air stairs and buses to deplane 

passengers when requested. 

Dallas Love Field Yes Provide emergency services upon request. 

Chicago O’Hare 

International 

No Monitor length of time hold positions of 

aircraft. 

Phoenix Sky 

Harbor 

International 

Yes Help with deplanements via jet bridge or 

remote hardstand and provide buses to 

transport passengers. 

*The policies listed in the table are not all inclusive; these are highlights from the airports’ contingency plans for 

dealing with long, on-board delays. 

Exhibit C. Selected Airports’ Policies for Assisting in Long, OnBoard Delays 
30

EXHIBIT D. STAKEHOLDERS VISITED OR CONTACTED 

Airlines Visited Airlines Contacted 

American Airlines 

Headquarters, Ft. Worth, TX 

DFW International Airport, TX 

Austin-Bergstrom International, TX 

JFK International Airport, NY 

Alaska Airlines 

Aloha Airlines 

American Airlines 

ATA Airlines 

Continental Airlines 

Delta Air Lines 

Hawaiian Airlines 

 

JetBlue Airways 

Midwest Airlines 

Northwest Airlines 

Southwest Airlines 

United Airlines 

US Airways 

JetBlue Airways 

Headquarters, Forest Hills, NY 

JFK International Airport, NY 

N/A 

Southwest Airlines 

 Dallas-Love Field, TX 

 Austin-Bergstrom International, TX 

N/A 

United Airlines 

DFW International Airport, TX 

JFK International Airport, NY

N/A 

Continental Airlines 

 Austin-Bergstrom International, TX N/A 

Delta Airlines 

JFK International Airport, NY N/A 

Airports Visited Airports Contacted 

Dallas/Fort Worth International 

City of Austin Aviation Department 

 Austin-Bergstrom International, Austin, TX 

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 

 John F. Kennedy 

 International, Jamaica, NY 

Chicago O’Hare International 

Dallas Love Field 

General Mitchell International (Milwaukee) 

George Bush Intercontinental (Houston) 

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International 

Honolulu International 

Indianapolis International 

Minneapolis-St. Paul International 

Phoenix Sky Harbor International 

Seattle-Tacoma International 

FAA ATC Facilities Visited or Contacted Trade Associations Contacted 

DFW Air Traffic Control Tower, DFW 

Airport, TX 

Air Route Traffic Control Center, Fort Worth, 

TX 

Austin Air Traffic Control Tower, Austin, TX 

Air Traffic Systems Operations, Tactical 

Operations Northeast United States, 

 Jamaica, NY 

JFK Air Traffic Control Tower, Jamaica, NY

Air Transport Association, Washington D.C. 

Airports Council International-North America, 

Washington D.C. 

Airline Pilots Association, Washington D.C. 

Association of Flight Attendants, 

Washington D.C.

Exhibit D. Stakeholders Visited or Contacted 
31

APPENDIX. DEPARTMENT COMMENTS 

THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590 

September 24, 2007 

MEMORANDUM TO: Calvin L. Scovel, III

FROM: Mary E. Peters 

SUBJECT: Response to OIG Recommendations for Minimizing 

Lengthy, On-Board Flight Delays 

I appreciate the hard work of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in preparing its 

report titled “Actions Needed to Minimize Lengthy, On-Board Flight Delays.” This 

report was in response to my February 26, 2007, request that, among other things, you 

examine carrier policies regarding extended on-ground delays and recommend actions the 

airlines, airports, or the government (including the Department) can take to prevent 

incidents in which passengers are stranded on board aircraft for extended periods of time. 

It goes without saying that lengthy, on-board flight delays are inconvenient to all 

concerned and can be frustrating and stressful for passengers. I am fully committed to 

improving the air travel environment for passengers. Toward that end, I have directed 

DOT staff to carefully consider the recommendations in your report, including those for 

improving the information provided the public and the manner in which passengers are 

treated, including compliance by carriers with their own policies. 

Appendix. Department Comments 
The following pages contain textual versions of the graphs and charts found in this 

document. These pages were not in the original document but have been added 

here to accommodate assistive technology. 
Actions Needed To Minimize Long, On-Board Flight Delays 

508 Compliant Presentation 

Figure 1. Provisions of the Airline Customer Service Commitment 

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Offer the lowest fare available. 

Notify customers of known delays, cancellations, and diversions. 

Deliver baggage on time. 

Support an increase in the baggage liability limit. 

Allow reservations to be held or cancelled. 

Provide prompt ticket refunds. 

Properly accommodate disabled and special-needs passengers. 

Meet customers’ essential needs during long, on-aircraft delays. 

Handle “bumped” passengers with fairness and consistency. 

Disclose travel itinerary, cancellation policies, frequent flyer rules, and aircraft 

configuration. 

Ensure good customer service from code-share partners. 

Be more responsive to customer complaints. 

Source: Airline Customer Service Commitment, June 1999 

Figure 2. Percent of Flights Delayed, Cancelled, or Diverted for Years 2000 to 2007 

Year Percentage 

For year 2000 27.4 percent 

For year 2001 22.6 percent 

For year 2002 17.9 percent 

For year 2003 18.0 percent 

For year 2004 21.9 percent 

For year 2005 22.6 percent 

For year 2006 24.6 percent 

For year 2007 27.8 percent 

Note: The percentage given for the year 2007 is based on January to July data. 

Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics data 
Figure 3. Average Length of Arrival Delays for Years 2000 to 2007 

Year Minutes 

For year 2000 52.5 minutes 

For year 2001 49.2 minutes 

For year 2002 46.8 minutes 

For year 2003 48.9 minutes 

For year 2004 51.4 minutes 

For year 2005 52.2 minutes 

For year 2006 54.0 minutes 

For year 2007 56.7 minutes 

Note: The minutes of arrival delays given for the year 2007 is based on January to July 

data. 

Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics data 

Table 1. Number of Flights With Long, On-Board Tarmac Delays of 1 to 5 Hours or 

Longer for January Through July of 2006 and 2007 

• In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 33,438 flights with on-board, tarmac delays 

of 1 to 2 hours. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 47,558. This represents a 

42.23 percent change. 

• In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 3,781 flights with on-board, tarmac delays of 

2 to 3 hours. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 5,213. This represents a 37.87 

percent change. 

• In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 710 flights with on-board, tarmac delays of 3 

to 4 hours. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 1,025. This represents a 44.37 

percent change. 

• In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 120 flights with on-board, tarmac delays of 4 

to 5 hours. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 189. This represents a 57.50 

percent change. 

• In the first 7 months of 2006, there were 27 flights with on-board, tarmac delays of 

5 hours or longer. In the first 7 months of 2007, there were 44. This represents a 

62.96 percent change. 

The total number of flights with long, on-board tarmac delays of 1 to 5 hours or longer 

for January through July of 2006 was 38,076. The total number of flights with long, onboard tarmac delays of 1 to 5 hours or longer for January through July of 2007 was 

54,029. This represents a 41.90 percent increase. 

Source: Office of Inspector General analysis based on Bureau of Transportation Statistics 

data 
Figure 4. Air Travel Consumer Complaints, 2006 

Complaint Percentage 

Flight Problems Accounted for 29 percent of complaints. 

Baggage Accounted for 22 percent of complaints. 

Customer Care Accounted for 13 percent of complaints. 

Reservations, Ticketing, and Boarding Accounted for 11 percent of complaints 

Refunds Accounted for 7 percent of complaints. 

Disability Accounted for 6 percent of complaints. 

Others Accounted for 12 percent of complaints. 

Source: Department of Transportation Air Travel Consumer Reports for 2006 

Table 2. Seven Airports Accepting Most of American’s Diversions (on December 

29, 2006) 

Airport Location Number of 

Diversions 

San Antonio Regional 

Airport 

San Antonio, Texas 13 diversions 

Shreveport Regional Airport Shreveport, Louisiana 12 diversions 

Adams Field Airport Little Rock, Arkansas 11 diversions 

Will Rogers World Airport Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 11 diversions 

Austin-Bergstrom 

International Airport 

Austin, Texas 11 diversions 

Tulsa International Airport Tulsa, Oklahoma 10 diversions 

Midland International Airport Midland, Texas 10 diversions 

These airports accepted a total of 78 American Airlines diverted flights on December 29, 

2006. 

Source: Office of Inspector General 
Table 3. Length of On-Board Delay and Outcome of the 11 Diverted Flights to 

Austin 

Flight Origin City and 

Flight Number 

Length of OnBoard Delay Flight Outcome 

Flight Number 1348 out 

of San Francisco, 

California 

On-Board Delay of 9 

hours 16 minutes 

Flight was diverted, remained 

overnight, and arrived at DFW the 

next day. 

Flight Number 2412 out 

of Los Angeles, 

California 

On-Board Delay of 7 

hours 14 minutes 

Flight was cancelled, rebooked, and 

arrived at DFW the next day. 

Flight Number 1008 out 

of Oakland, California 

On-Board Delay of 7 

hours 6 minutes 

Flight was diverted, remained 

overnight, and arrived at DFW the 

next day. 

Flight Number 534 out of 

Fresno, California 

On-Board Delay of 6 

hours 8 minutes 

Flight was diverted, remained 

overnight, and arrived at DFW the 

next day. 

Flight Number 2302 out 

of Seattle, Washington 

On-Board Delay of 2 

hours 26 minutes 

Flight was diverted and then arrived 

at DFW the same day. 

Flight Number 1372 out 

of Fresno, California 

On-Board Delay of 2 

hours 16 minutes 

Flight was diverted, remained 

overnight, and arrived at DFW the 

next day. 

Flight Number 330 out of 

Vancouver, British 

Columbia 

On-Board Delay of 2 

hours 8 minutes 

Flight was diverted and then arrived 

at DFW the same day. 

Flight Number 1074 out 

of Salt Lake City, Utah 

On-Board Delay of 2 

hours 4 minutes 

Flight was diverted, remained 

overnight, and arrived at DFW the 

next day. 

Flight Number 1514 out 

of San Jose, California 

On-Board Delay of 1 

hour 39 minutes 

Flight was diverted and then arrived 

at DFW the same day. 

Flight Number 592 out of 

Orange County, 

California 

On-Board Delay of 1 

hour 32 minutes 

Flight was diverted and then arrived 

at DFW the same day. 

Flight Number 1708 out 

of San Diego, California 

On-Board Delay of 1 

hour 31 minutes 

Flight was diverted and then arrived 

at DFW the same day. 
Table 4. Breakdown of JetBlue’s Long, On-Board Arrival and Departure Delays at 

JFK 

Number of On Board Delays Over 1 hour 43

Number of On-Board Delays Over 4 hours 26 

Number of On-Board Delays Over 5 hours 21 

Number of Passengers That Endured 

On-Board Delays Over 4 hours 

2,962 

Average Time Delay for Arrivals 265 minutes 

Average Time Delay for Departures 298 minutes 

Source: Office of Inspector General 

Table 5. Length and Outcome of JetBlue’s Long, On-Board Delays for Flights at or 

Traveling to John F. Kennedy Airport 

Item 1. On-Board Delays for JFK Arrivals 

• Flight out of Fort Myers, Florida, was delayed over 9 hours. The flight was 

eventually deplaned. 

• Flight out of Nashville, Tennessee, was delayed over 8 hours. The flight was 

eventually deplaned. 

• Flight out of Houston, Texas, (Hobby Airport) was delayed over 7 hours. The flight 

was eventually deplaned. 

• Flight out of Burbank, California, was delayed almost 6 hours. The flight was 

diverted and then arrived at JFK the same day. 

• Flight out of Austin, Texas, was delayed almost 6 hours. The flight was eventually 

deplaned. 

• Flight out of Orlando, Florida, was delayed for 5 and three-quarter hours. The flight 

was eventually deplaned. 

• Flight out of Long Beach, California, was delayed for 5 hours. The flight was 

diverted and then arrived at JFK the same day. 

• Flight out of Oakland, California was delayed for 4 and three-quarter hours. The 

flight was diverted and then arrived at JFK the same day. 

Item 2. On-Board Delays for JFK Departures 

• Flight to Aruba was delayed for 10 and half hours. The flight was eventually 

cancelled.

• Flight to Burbank, California, was delayed for 9 hours. The flight was eventually 

cancelled.
• Flight to Cancun, Mexico, was delayed for nearly 8 hours. The flight was eventually 

cancelled.

• Flight to Syracuse, New York, was delayed for 7 and a half hours. The flight was 

eventually cancelled.

• Flight to Houston, Texas, (Hobby Airport) was delayed for 7 and one-quarter hours. 

The flight eventually departed.

• Flight to Buffalo, New York, was delayed for 7 and one-quarter hours. The flight 

was eventually cancelled.

• Flight to Boston, Massachusetts, was delayed for 7 hours. The flight was eventually 

cancelled.

• Flight to Orlando, Florida, was delayed for nearly 7 hours. The flight was eventually 

cancelled.

• Flight to Phoenix, Arizona, was delayed for 6 and three-quarter hours. The flight was 

eventually cancelled.

• Flight to Burbank, California, was delayed for 6 and one-quarter hours. The flight 

eventually departed.

• Flight to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, was delayed for 6 and one-quarter hours. The 

flight eventually departed.

• Flight to Tampa, Florida, was delayed for 5 and half hours. The flight eventually 

departed.

• Flight to New Orleans, Louisiana, was delayed for 5 and a half hours. The flight was 

eventually cancelled.

• Flight to New Orleans, Louisiana, was delayed for 5 and a half hours. The flight was 

eventually cancelled.

• Flight to Burbank, California, was delayed for 5 and one-quarter hours. The flight 

eventually departed. 

• Flight to Buffalo, New York, was delayed for 5 hours. The flight eventually 

departed. 

• Flight to Seattle, Washington, was delayed for 4 and three-quarter hours. The flight 

eventually departed. 

• Flight to Long Beach, California, was delayed for 4 and a half hours. The flight was 

eventually cancelled.

• Flight to Phoenix, Arizona, was delayed for 4 hours. The flight eventually departed.

Source: Office of Inspector General 
Table 6. Average On-Board Delays on February 14, 2007, at JFK for JetBlue, 

Delta, and American 

Item 1. On-Board Delays for Arrivals 

• JetBlue had 14 arriving flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-board 

delay of 4 and half hours. The longest delay was 9 hours. There were 9 flights with 

delays longer than 3 hours.

• Delta had 15 arriving flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-board 

delay of 2 and half hours. The longest delay was 4 and one-quarter hours. There 

were 6 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.

• American had 15 arriving flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average onboard delay of 1 and half hours. The longest delay was 2 and three-quarter hours. 

There were 0 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.

Item 2. On-Board Delays for Departures 

• JetBlue had 29 departing flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-board 

delay of 5 and three-quarter hours. The longest delay was 10 and one-quarter hours. 

There were 20 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.

• Delta had 39 departing flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average on-board 

delay of 3 and a half hours. The longest delay was 7 and one-quarter hours. There 

were 19 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.

• American had 8 departing flights delayed longer than 1 hour, with an average onboard delay of 1 and a half hours. The longest delay was 4 and one-quarter hours. 

There were 0 flights with delays longer than 3 hours.

Source: Office of Inspector General 

Exhibit B. Selected Airlines’ Terms and Conditions for Handling Long, On-Board 

Delays 

Airline Definition of Extended Period of 

Time Stated in Customer Service 

Plans and/or Contracts of 

Carriage 

Time to Deplane Stated in Customer 

Service Plans and/or Contracts of 

Carriage and/or Defined by Internal 

Policies 

Alaska Definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage = 90 

minutes 

Time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies = 2 

hours for arrivals 

Aloha No definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage 

No time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies 

American Definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours 

Time to deplane defined by internal 

policies = 4 hours (as of April 10, 

2007) 
ATA Definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage =1 hour 

for beverages and 4 hours for 

catering 

No time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies 

Continental Definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours 

Time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies = 4 

hours for departures (as of June15, 

2007) 

Delta No definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage 

No time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies 

Hawaiian Definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours 

Time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies = 2 

hours (as of August 1, 2001) 

JetBlue No definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage 

Time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies = 5 

hours (as of February 20, 2007) 

Midwest No definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage 

No time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies 

Northwest Definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage =1 hour 

for arrivals and 3 hours for 

departures 

Time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies = 1 

hour for arrivals and 

3 hours for departures 

Southwest Definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours 

Time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies = 2 

hours 

United No definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage 

Time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies = 1 

and a half hours for arrivals and 4 

hours for departures 

(as of September 5, 2007) 

US Airways Definition of extended period of 

time stated in customer service plan 

and/or contract of carriage = 2 hours 

No time to deplane stated in customer 

service plan and/or contract of carriage 

and/or defined by internal policies 
Exhibit C. Selected Airports’ Policies for Assisting in Long, On-Board Delays 

Airport Plan to Deplane 

Passengers 

Airport Policy 

Seattle-Tacoma 

International 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to determine remote 

parking locations for aircraft to deplane 

passengers and provide buses if requested. 

Dallas/Fort Worth 

International 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to monitor length of time 

hold positions of aircraft. If over 2 hours, 

coordinate aircraft return to gate. 

Austin/Bergstrom 

International 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? No 

Airport policy is to determine parking 

spots of diverted aircraft. 

Indianapolis 

International 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to provide available gate 

or remotely deplane passengers to buses 

upon request. 

George Bush 

Intercontinental 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to provide buses when 

requested. 

Hartsfield-Jackson 

Atlanta 

International 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to provide mobile 

lounges to take passengers to gate when 

requested by airlines. 

Honolulu 

International 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? No 

Airport policy is to encourage carriers to 

off-load passengers and offer immediate 

assistance by, among other things, 

offering use of available airport facilities. 

John F. Kennedy 

International (New 

York) 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to, after 2 hours and 

upon request, help to find alternate airport 

locations to safely deplane passengers. 

General Mitchell 

International 

(Milwaukee) 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to provide buses when 

requested. 

Minneapolis-St. 

Paul International 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to provide air stairs and 

buses to deplane passengers when 

requested. 

Dallas Love Field Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to provide emergency 

services upon request. 

Chicago O’Hare 

International 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? No 

Airport policy is to monitor length of time 

hold positions of aircraft. 

Phoenix Sky 

Harbor 

International 

Plan to deplane 

passengers? Yes 

Airport policy is to help with 

deplanements via jet bridge or remote 

hardstand and provide buses to transport 

passengers. 

 Note: The policies listed in the table are not all inclusive; these are highlights from the 

airports’ contingency plans for dealing with long, on-board delays. 
Exhibit D. Stakeholders Visited or Contacted 

Airlines Visited: 

• American Airlines—at its headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas, at DFW International 

Airport, Texas, at Austin-Bergstrom International, Texas, and at JFK International 

Airport, New York. 

• JetBlue Airways—at its headquarters in Forest Hills, New York, and at JFK 

International Airport, New York. 

• Southwest Airlines—at Dallas-Love Field, Texas, and at Austin-Bergstrom 

International, Texas. 

• United Airlines—at DFW International Airport, Texas, and at JFK International 

Airport, New York. 

• Continental Airlines—at Austin-Bergstrom International, Texas. 

• Delta Airlines—at JFK International Airport, New York. 

Airlines Contacted: 

• Alaska Airlines 

• Aloha Airlines 

• American Airlines 

• ATA Airlines 

• Continental Airlines 

• Delta Air Lines 

• Hawaiian Airlines 

• JetBlue Airways 

• Midwest Airlines 

• Northwest Airlines 

• Southwest Airlines 

• United Airlines 

• US Airways 

Airports Visited: 

• Dallas/Fort Worth International 

• City of Austin Aviation Department at Austin-Bergstrom International, Austin, Texas 
• Port Authority of New York and New Jersey at John F. Kennedy International, 

Jamaica, New York

Airports Contacted: 

• Chicago O’Hare International 

• Dallas Love Field 

• General Mitchell International (Milwaukee) 

• George Bush Intercontinental (Houston) 

• Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International 

• Honolulu International 

• Indianapolis International 

• Minneapolis-St. Paul International 

• Phoenix Sky Harbor International 

• Seattle-Tacoma International

Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control Facilities Visited or 

Contacted: 

• DFW Air Traffic Control Tower, DFW Airport, Texas 

• Air Route Traffic Control Center, Fort Worth, Texas 

• Austin Air Traffic Control Tower, Austin, Texas 

• Air Traffic Systems Operations, Tactical Operations Northeast United States, 

Jamaica, New York 

• JFK Air Traffic Control Tower, Jamaica, New York

Trade Associations Contacted 

• Air Transport Association, Washington, D.C. 

• Airports Council International-North America, Washington, D.C. 

• Airline Pilots Association, Washington, D.C. 

• Association of Flight Attendants, Washington, D.C.