Surprise

U.S. Marine Corps

FMFRP 12-1

PCN 140 120100 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-0001

12 October 1988

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-1, Surprise,

is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful

information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be

published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRP's in the 12 Series

are a special category of publications: reprints of historical works

which were published commercially and are no longer in print.

2. SCOPE

This reference publication complements existing training manuals

on deception and provides new perspectives on well known examples

of deception operations and surprises. General Waldemar Erfurth,

a World War II German army general, wrote Surprise as a discussion

of the theory of surprise. The book was translated by Dr. Stefan T.

Possony and Daniel Vilfroy in 1943.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. SULLIVAN

Major General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commander for Warfighting

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION: 11

CONTENTS

Page

Translators' Comment • Author's Introduction 31

Surprise; Means for Victor'y in Recent Wars 39

Strategic Surprises; Early Phases of War 45

Surprise; War of Movement 63

Deployment for Battle 67

Battle 93

Pursuit, Retreat, Diversion, Counter-attack 127

Surprise; War of Position, Attack 161

Surprise; War of Position, Defense 181

Surprise; Value, New Wcnpons and Combat Techniques 19L

Results and Conclusions 195

MAPS

"Kessels" 4

Vistula Campaign, South Poland, 1914 84

Battle of Tannenberg 94

Battle of I-Iermannstadt 98

Battle of the Arges 102

Battle of the Masurian Lakes 110

Battle of the Marne 134

East Prussia, 1914 138

Lodz Offensive, 1914 146

Battle of Warsaw, 1920 12

Translator's Comment

GENERAL Erfurth's book on

"Surprise in 'War" is the first treatise on the importance of

surprise in modern military literature. Surprise was considered

as an essential element of victory by almost all ancient military

writers. Frontinus and Polyaenus, for instance, had written

a whole collection of ways and means of surprise—almost text

books for victory. These books, especially Frontinus', were

known to every military commander in the later period of

antiquity and throughout the Middle Ages. Machiavelli, the

founder of modern military science, heavily drew on Frontinus.

During the eighteenth century, the problem of surprise again

attracted the attention of military writers. The Chevalier de

Cessac wrote an entire book on surprise. Frederick the Great

never tired in advising his generals on the importance of surprise

and declared that in war one should alternately don the skin

of the lion and of the fox.

Yet the military school which began with Guibert and ended

with the generals of World War I did not fully understand

the role which surprise may play in war. For them, as Napoleon

pointed out in a famous dictum, only one thing counted: mass.

To be sure, almost every one of these military writers did mention surprise. Clausewitz himself, as can be seen from the

quotations which General Erfurth faithfully collected, insisted on the importance of surprise. Occasionally surprise methods

were applied on the battlefield.

Yet surprise was not considered as the basis of military

planning nor as the conditio sine qua non of victory.

Rather, it was considered as a welcome by-product which

sometimes completed and facilitated victory. Surprise was luck,
2 SURPRISE

but not the result of strategy. The generals of the nineteenth

and early tweqieth century were more concerned with the

problem of the inner and outer lines, with the principle of

concentration which had been first formulated by Carnot, at a time when the role of surprise was almost completely forgotten. Later on, the attention of military thinkers centered

on the importance of the flank.

To assess the real value of General Erfurth's book, one must

realize not only that it was written before the outbreak of

World War 11, but also that it amounts to a more or less

complete break with traditional military thinking. To be sure,

General Erfurth tries hard to prove that his ideas completeiy

tally with the doctrines of Clausewitz, Moltke and Schlieffen.

Yet, whatever his cluotations may say, it is easy to realize that

the doctrine of surprise and the doctrine of the flank attack, as

propounded by Schlieffen, do not go together. Either surprise

is 'the key to victory" or the attack against the enemy's flank

is. This does not mean that surprise and flank attacks cannot

sometimes be combined. Yet it is obvious that surprise cannot,

principle, always and exclusively be achieved on the enemy's

flank. If it is known a priori that whatever else one does, one

attempts to launch a flank attack, obviously surprise can never

be accomplished. After all, the enemy knows where his flanks

are. Where To Ajiack ihe Enemy

Jf we assume that the enemy can only be defeated by surprise operations, it is clear that he should not know where

these operations are going to take place. A strategy which is

based upon the principle of surprise can therefore not be bound

by Schlieffen's doctrine. Instead, the general who relies on

surprise must have a completely open mind as to whether he

should attack on the flank or at the center or somewhere else.

The strategy of surprise replaces the traditional principle: 'Attack on the flank" by the broader and more general principle:

"Attack wherever the enemy is off guard."

Besides, General Erfurth makes a rather loose use of the

term 'flank." The flank of a Roman legion or of Napoleon's

army can hardly be compared to the flank of a modern army

which usually rests upon the frontier of a neutral country or upon

impenetrable terrain. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that,
sURPRIsE 3

under modern condition of continental warfare, flanks in the

traditional sense do not exist or do not offer any prospect for

envelopment maneuvers. In modern war flanks are available

only at bulges and wedges, but the sides of a wedge are not

necessarily more vulnerable than its peak or other sectors of the

front.

As a matter of fact, modern strategy, including German

strategy, has liberated itself from the dogma of the flank.

General Wetzeil, Ludendorif's Chief-of.operations, writes:

"The enemy is not necessarily weakest on his flanks, nor will

he make most of his mistakes on the wings. His weakness and

his errors may occur at other places. The main condition of

success is to discover weaknesses and errors wherever they re"

and to attack the enemy wherever he is weak and whenever

he has committed an error.

"It is remarkable," Wetzell continues, "that Field Mar3hal

Count von Schlieffen in his war games of iSo4 and 1905 soon discontinued .his flanking attack through Belgium in orde- to

exploit mistakes which had been committed by the enemy. Alier discovering the cnelnys mistakes, he immediately re- groLmped his entire forces and tried to dccide the war by patial victories west and east of tIme Moselle, and renounced seeking

the decision in Belgium and northern France. There i3 a

tendency to overrate the irriportance of envelopment and

flanking attacks. Instead, one should do what Schlieffen himself did: exploit the mistakes of the enemy."

In other words, there is a difference between Schliefferi the

theoretician and Schlicffen the soldier. The soldier Schlieffcn

was a pupil of Moltke and the Gerhians, on the whole, are

going back to Moltke's concept: "Strategy is a system of ex- pedients and makeshifts." Rommel, says Fuller, "has never

worked on what may be called a fixed plan." We are thus

coming back to Napoleon's: "On f'engage el uis on you,"

Wetzell summarizes this new, or old, strategical thought as fol. lows: "The greatest surprise for the enemy is a lost battle, wherever this battle takes place. Victory can be achieved by

many different methods and sometimes by mere luck. But the

surest way to win is to exploit the enemy's weaknesses and errors

by the immediate forming of a center of gravity at the enemy's

vulnerable points."

Even a casual glance at the history of the two World Wars
ENEMY LINES 

ARMORED TROOPS ARMORQ FORCES 

MOT TROOPS MOT TROOR 

FORCES 

WEDGE AXD TRAP 

The knl und @ref (wcdgc and trap) tactics us& by the Germans in Russia stem directly 

strategy of destroying the cncmy by cncirclcmcnt rcsuldng from outflanking action. Kd rrn

tzking huge bites out of the hostile position, detro)ing th: cncmy forccs in a given secto

prcxxss in another sector. The krif or wcdgc, Figure I, is driven by strong ~rmorcd forccs, su

foot troops, which push deep into the enemy rcar. Usually two such wdgcs arc drivcn, 

from each other. The operation thcn develops into a double pincers movement. The mob

original wedges turn to meet at same point deep in the hostile rcar. Figure 2: The slower 

mobilc forccs, forming an inner set of pincers. This cncirclclncnt forms the krsrd or trap. 
SURPRISE 5

shows that many offensives had been directed against joints,

hinges or pivotal points. The big German offensive of March,

1918, was launched against the joint of the British and French

armies. The German attack against the Allies in May, 1940, was directed against Sedan, that is to say, against the point around which the offensive wing of the Allies turned and

which separated the defensive army group and the Maginot

Line from the offensive, left wing. Other attacks were directed

against points upon which the entire front of the defender

depended and whose fall necessitated a general retreat. Other

operations again were break-throughs. If in modern war the

flank had maintained its traditional vulnerability, break-through

operations were hardly possible, let alone the formation of

"kessels."

General Erfurth's reliance upon the flank should therefore

not be taken as a reflection of modern German strategy. Instead, wherever he says "flank," one should read "vulnerable point." The character of the vulnerable point may change.

Sometimes it may be a long fortification line, or only a strong

point like Eben Emael. Sometimes it may be an important railway junction or a bridge like the Moersdijck bridge in Holland.

At another time, it may be a front where the enemy does not expect an attack, as at the Chemin des Dames in May, 1918.

Enlarging our views as to the necessities of "combined operations," one may also say that the vulnerable point niy be on the

sea or in the air, in the ports or in the factories.

Ecvnonzy Ji7he,: Striking

At bottoip, the strategy of surprise is nothings but an application of the principle of the economy of forct. Obviously,

it is more economical to strike at vulnerable paints than at

points which are not vulnerable, as it is more conomical to

strike when the enemy is not prepared for the blow than when

he has taken all precautions to parry the xpected stroke.

It may be useful to supplement General Erfurth's discussion

by several arguments which have been set forth by the Austrian,

General Alfred Krauss. Krauss, who repeatedly is quoted by General Erfurth, played a major role in the famous battle of Caporetto: he is also known as one of the most important

modern military writers in the German language. His points

are as follows: Surprise does not depend upon lack of care or
6 SURPRISE

cornplet! ignorance on the part of the enemy. To achieve

surprise, it is by no means necessary that the enemy dreams

or sleeps, but that one undertakes an operation which he does

not expect. According to Krauss, the enemy may well know

many important details about the attack in preparation and

still be surprised by its location and timing.

With respect to the two major elements of surprise, secrecy

and speed, General Krauss points out that secrecy cannot

be maintained by hiding ones intention from subordinates.

One should not believe that secrecy can be maintained if only a

handful of superior officers know of the battle plan. (This

is a point which has also been strongly emphasized by Lord

Fisher) . Such secrecy is not desirable, because any operation

must be thoroughly trained and rehearsed if it is to be successful. Besides, many people must be in on the secret, anyway,

and to a watchful enemy the secret is usually given away by

numerous preparatory measures. Secrecy sought by not informing subordinates does not prevent the enemy from knowing

what is afoot, but it does prevent subordinates from doing a

good job. By this method the enemy usually learns more of our

intentions than our own army. 'Real secrecy," says Krauss, "can

only be achieved if, in addition to the correct information which

the e1cmy receives, he is also provided with incorrect information. Confusion is the only effective method of maintaining

secrecy."

Meaning of Speed

Speed, on the other hand, is not necessarily identical with

quick marching and exhausting troops. Speed is merely being

"quicker than the enemy." Forced marches may be an important component of speed. Yet the essential point is to have

everything ready before the operation begins and to carry it out

without interruption and delay. To attack with tired and

hungry troops who do not have enough ammunition and lack

the support of heavy arms is not a correct application of the

principle of speed. Seldom can such an attack be successful.

The idea that something "cannot be done" is one of the

main aids to successful surprise. It frequently happens that military experts consider particular operations as not feasible.

Logistical difficulties, roughness of teirain, military traditions—

all these elements are often over-emphasized. Experts tend to
SURPRISE 7

forget that most military problems are soluble provided one is

willing to pay the price. Many problems are soluble by new

methods. If one has a list of the enemy's prejudices and knows

what he considers as being "out of question" or as "impossible,"

and has in addition some new ideas, one is almost sure to catch

the opponent by surprise. This is the essence of General Krauss'

opinions.

Throughout the whole book, General Erfurth, makes the a

priori assumption that every battle should be waged with a view to the enemy's destruction. It does not require many

words to demonstrate that annihilation under any circumstances,

cannot be the only objective. Regardless of whether war should

ultimately lead to the destruction of the enemy, it is quite clear

that in some periods of the war, annihilation cannot be attempted because the available forces, even in their best possible

disposition, would not be sufficient for so ambitious a goal.

This does not mean that surprise should not be attempted

by an inferior army. Quite to the contrary, surprise will be one

of the important means by which the weaker army may com- pensate for his weakness, at least partly. Yet it does mean that concentration of "everything one has" should not he applied

on all occasions, lest a stronger enemy may annihilate one's ow,n

concentration at a stroke. There are cases in which concentration

may actually be extremely dangerous and wherein an army can be saved only by dispersal. Hannibal, for instance, would

have desired nothing better than the concentration of Fabius

Cunctator's army, as Napoleon prayed for the concentration of

the Russian forces under Kutusov. Guerilla tactics have often

been successfully used and have come as a surprise to a superior opponent. But the essence of guerilla warfare is dispersion and not concentration.

Length of Modern Wars

General Erfurth very often conveys the idea that the enemy's

destruction should be attempted by one single blow. He

apparently considers "victory through a single battle" as the

ideal form of war. As a matter of fact the Vernichtungsschla-cht

[annihilation by one battle] was for a long time considered as

the main element of war. Schtieffen advised to aim at one

single Verzichtungsschlachi because, in his opinion, a modern

war should, or could, not last for a long period of time. This
8 SURPRISE

idea has been abandoned by many modern military writers in

Germany who substituted the Ver;ichiungsfeIdzng (annihilation

by a series of battles) for the battle of annihilation. Wetzell

is of the opinion that the doctrine of the single Vernichim:gsshlachi is an exaggeration of the Cannae concept. "I'he destiuction of a modern mass army cannot be accomplished by

a single victory, however overwhelming. The final decision

is dependent on numerous partial victories. This is the essence

ol Moltke's teachings and of the experience of World War 1.

Il}C partial battles and partial victories must be integrated into

one big operation. In this case they will be of decisive unportancc." As a matter of fact, General Erfurth himself, in a

later publication, admits that under present conditions the

Cannac concept has more tactical than strategical significance.

This, of course, amounts to a definite farewell to Schlieffen's

idea.

General Erfurth refers to deceptive methods which were

employed by the Germans during the last war. By mounting

several secondary or sham operations, the enemy is deceived

as to the time arid location of an impending offensive. It is

indeed true that the enemy can often be deceived only if he does

not know which one of several offensives will turn Out to be

decisive. Here activity behind the lines and sham attacks will

hardly neutralize the enemy's reserves which, as Erfurth rightly

polilts out, is one of the main conditions of a successful offensive. I knee the main offensive should be supported by secon

dary offensives of inferior, although considerable, strength. This does not mean, of course, that one should not use maximum force for the main drive. Nevertheless, this constitutes an

important qualification of the principle of concentration,

Use of Sralegk Reserves

A problem which General Erfurth fails to discuss is the

question of whether strategic reserves should, or should not,

be thrown into the surprise operation, so as to provide for the

greatest possible strength. It is clear again, that there are cases

in which reserves must be spared. The mobility of modern

armies makes it possible to achieve surprises merely by withholding strong strategical reserves which are used only after

the enemy has revealed his counter-moves. In other cases, it

may be impossible to know beforehand where the weak points
SURPRISE 9

of the enemy's lines are. These points can sometimes be determined only by attacks along the entire front. The reserves

should be used where the enemy shows least resistance.

General Erfurth is not very communicative concerning the

methods by which surprise can be achieved in case the enemy

commander has no preconceived ideas and is not willing "to

contribute his own share" to one's victory. He makes casual

reference to raclio-lisLeriing and ruses of war, iii addition to

the aforementioned sham operations. It must be pointed out tlit ruses of war have a much greater importance than hi

remarks convey. On principle, it can be said that surprises

are only accomplished if and when by some kind of a rusç the enemy has been deceived, or confused, as General Krauss

emphasized.

In his discussion of the German operations in Belgium during

August, 1914, Erfurth repeatedly alludes to the apprehensions

of the German army commanders as to the location of the

British Expeditionary Force. He forgets, however, to tell that

these apprehensions were not as unfounded as his recital would

suggest. As a matter of (act, the British had sent a small forc

to Ostend whence it had to advance on bicycles to give tl Germans the impression that the Bdtish would attack from that

region. In addition, stories were circulated about the arrival

of strong Russian forces on theBelgium front and the British

censorship had taken care that these rumors were through 'reliable sources" quickly transmitted to the Germans. The Britih

marines who performed this operation wore uniforms reseinLling the Russian attire. They themselves spread the rumors thtit

they were the Russian advance guard.

Ruse at Gaza

To quote another example, the famous Battle of Gaza by

which General Allenby hastened the end of World War I. if

Allenby had attacked on the left flank of his front, in the region

of Gaza, he would have encountered strong Turkith resistance.

The Turks assumed that on account of the water supply this

was the only sector ,where the British could attack. Allenby

therefore decided to attack on his right wine in-spite of the

scarcity of water in the desert, Still, it. was necessary to get quickly to Beersheba, the only oasis in that reion, if he ''4as

to advance further with sufficient forces against the strong-
10 SURPRISE

points of the Turkish lines. Since J3eersheba was a junction

of good roads, secrecy was indispensable if a coup de main

on that oasis was to be successful. This secrecy, of course could

not be guarded merely by silence. The enemy had to be led

to believe that the main blow would fall near Gaza.

A whole month was spent in sending "misleading messages

by wireless telegraphy in a code which the Turks, by various

fuses, had been taught how to solve, without realizing the

situation." In addition, a l3ritish staff officer on patrol ride let

himself be surprised by a Turkish guard. He feigned to be

wounded and ostensibly lost his haversack with sn especially

prepared note-book, including money, love-letters and several

purported orders and military documents. The haversack was

picked up by tie Turks. The next morning, a notice appeared

in the paper that was issued to the Desert Mounted Corps,

stating that a notebook had been lost by a staff officer on

patrol and that the finder should return it at once to Allenby's

headquarters. ''A small party was sent out to search the country

for the pocketbook. . . . An officer was stupid enough to wrap

his luncheon in a copy of these orders, and to drop it near the

enemy."

These ruses were successful. The Turks prepared themselves

for an attack on Gaza and to make the deception complete

the British actually began to attack Gaza. After Turkish reserves were rushed to the ostensibly menaced front, the real

British attack started on the other end of the Palestinian front.

Almost without effort, the British took Beersheba.

Frequent USC has also been made by dummies, such as dummy camps. dummy tanks and dummy artillery. In 1914,

after the German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" had fled

to Turkey, the British watched the exit of the Dardanelles with

a considerable naval force. The approach of Admiral Count

von Spee's squadron to the South Atlantic made it necessary

to bring all available British naval forces into the Atlantic. The

British war-slips before the Dardanelles were secretly replaced

by ships with exactly the same' appearance. The British victory

of the Falklands was due to this ingenious use of dummies.

Incidetitally, the German squadron had been mislead by their

deciphering of falsified messages from the British Admirality.

Otherwise, it .vould hardly have obligingly waited for superior

British forces to surprise it as it lay immobilized, at anchor.
SURPRISE

Surprise requires extensive and efficient espionage and other

form of intelligence work. For, if one wishes to surprise the

enemy, one must know what he intends to do and how he is

likely to act.

New Technique and Weapons

General Erfurth, c:omparatively speaking, gives little attention

to surprise which may result from new weapons and new fighting

techniques. He somewhat discounts this kind of surprise by

saying that within a short time the enemy will also adept

the new weapons and tactics. This argument is scarcely valtd,

for it is enough if a surprise play works once. After all, neither

can strategic surprise be repeated, no more probably than surprise which results from new techniques and weapons.

In reality, the constant change of tactics offers especially good

opportunities for surprise. The Battle of Caporetto, for instance, was won by a new technique of combat. In this baffle,

it was considered as an axiom of mountain warfare that the

heights dominate the valleys and that, therefore, the heights

should be attacked. General Krauss, however, pointed out

that although the fire from the heights may control the valleys,

it is also true that the party which is in control of the valleys

controls the supply and connmunications of the heights. If

the fire from the heights cannot eject the enemy from the

valleys, the troops on the heights, must capitulate. Krauss concluded from this that one should attack only in the vallys and not bother about the mountains, an idea which led to the

complete surprise of the Italians and almost annihilated tleir

army.

The change from mass-attack to infiltration tactics was the

major reason of the German successes in March, 1918.

General Erfurth entirely fails to realize' that the difficulties

of modern armament production have introduced new problems

into the art of war and opened up wide possibilities for technical

surprises. It is well-known that mass-production "freezes" the

armament, at least to a large degfee. For this reason, technical surprise may have much more lasting effects than General

Erfurth suggests. Unless the enemy knows of,tbe new weapons

beforehand (in which case the surprtser may be surprised, as happened apparently with the magnetic mines) new techtical

surprises can be applied repeatedly.
12 SURPRISE

If today an arflIy uses a superior weapon on the battlefield,

it may take the opponent months, if not years, to produce a

similar weapon or an effective counter-weapon. During tiii.

time of adaptation, the happy owner of the new weapon has

all the advantages and may win one battle after ihe other.

This is not only true for quality, but also for quautity, for it

is next to impossible quickly to step up armament production

and to overtake a substantial lead of the enemy. It is not

different with new fighting techniques, though the time-lag

may be shorter in this case. Experience shows that it often

takes rather a long period of time to re-educate troops for new

tactics. And it is sometimes also diflicult for general staffs to

adapt themselves to new and unforseen situations.

The reader will see from General Erfurth's description of

how Moltke deduced the French war plan from a cheap French

railroad map. While technical progress has made production

more rigid, it rendered transportation much more flexible. It

would be impossible for a present-day Moltke to deduce a

war plan from a railway and road map, for the simple reason

that there are too many railways and too many roads. With the

existing transport facilities, almost any point can be chosen as

basis for an offensive; retreat can be effected in almost any direction. Besides, so-called natural obstacles now ,do not constitute such problems as they formerly did, disregarding the

sea and the desert, but even these have lost much of their

obstacle-value.

Ti,ne and Space In Surprise

In other words, the possibilities of surprise in space have improved. That motorization and the conquest of the air

also improved the chances of surprise in lime goes almost withoutsaying. Future perfection in handling and training air-borne

troops will improve both kinds of surprise. And it has already

been mentioned that technical surprise has also been perfected

and, on account of industrial rigidity, has become more durable.

Only surprises by new ideas and ruses seem to have become more

difficult, although radio offers large and new opportunities for

ruses of war, at least technically. But there is little doubt that

on the whole Gcneril Erfurth underestimaici] rather than overestimated the possibilities of surprise in modern war.

One important, although obvious, point still must be made:
SURPRISE 13

It is not sulricient.to attempt only one kind of surprise for one

operation. On principle, every detail and every part of any

operation should spring surprises upon the enemy. The attack

should come from an unexpected quarter at an unexpected time,

with unexpected violence; new tactics, new techniques and new

weapons should be employed. The important point is to

overthrow all plans and preparations of the enemy. For the

outwitted enemy will lose confidence, hence the surpriser will establish moral ascendancy, whkh is the main condition of

victory.

Key to Victory

The first few years of the Second World War thoroughly

justified General Erfurth's statement: "Surprise is the key to

victory." Surprise could even be achieved in operations the

feasibility of which Erfurth tended to discount, as for instance,

naval surprises. Pearl Harbor is ample evidence of the os- sibility, not only of naval surprises, but even of repetitionsurprises. We are lucky that the Japanese shared Erfurth's

skepticism and therefore probably did not expect their surpriseattack to yield such unprecedented results. Pearl Harbor was

thus a double surprise: for us and for them. The Japanese

success was as unexpected as the Japanese failure to exploit it.

Pearl Harbor may well serve as an example for General

Erfurth's pet theory that an attempt undertaken to annihilate

the enemy should be made with "everything one has." What

was the use of knocking out the Pacific Fleet and the most important mid-Pacific base, and not having ready a superior force

to conquer control over the entire Pacific area?

Turning to the European battlefields, we observe that the

war was conducted chiefly as a war of surprise, at least from

the German side. First of all, the Germans persistently planned

their wars as Ueber/allskrieg. They attacked without warning

and without delivering any declaration of war be/ore the actual

attack. They timed the beginning of their operations in such

a way that the uighting. started before the opponent had completed his armaments and his mobilization. It must be added that

the Germans hereby used a rather novel form of surprise, which

could be called the 'open surprise." By applying political

pressure and by maneuvering they prevented, for instance, the

Poles, Dutch and Belgians from taking defensive measures and
14 SURPRISE

fully mobilizing their armies. The result was that these countries

fought only with a fraction of their actual strength, and whatever force they brought to battle was used up in a planless way,

or, at any rate, not according to a plan concerted with their

Allies.

Coups de main were frequent and successful during this war,

particularly during the early phases of new campaigns. It

may be enough to recall the Norwegian campaign which was

nothing but a sum of many different smaller coups de main.

In the west, the Germans applied particular care to the seizure

of important bridges before the enemy was able to destroy

them. These operations, particularly those against the Meusebridges, were conceived as coup de main tactics. It is, however,

also true that some coup de main operations were unsuccessful as,

for instance, the attempted capture of Queen Wilhelmina and

from the British side, of Marshal Rommel.

Surprise During Approach to the lJaiile field

On the whole, there was no real approach on land during

this war, for the simple reason that most battles began at' the

frontier. Nevertheless, the Battle of Holland was preceded by a

kind of approach, as was the Battle of Norway insofar as both

battles began at wiexpected places and as tht attacking troops were transporlcd to the main battlefield in an unexpected way.

in Norway they arrived in freighters, disguised as sailors, and in

planes; they attacked at places (Narvik) which were believed to

be safe from any attack. In Holland, parachutists and "tourists"

carried out attacks against focal points which were considered as safe. On the other hand the Allies' approach to the Flanders

battlefield did not contain a single element of surprise, but was

effected in exactly the way the Germans expected. Hence the

Allies' crushing defeat.

The Allied landing in North Africa may, on the contrary, be

considered in almost every respect as a surprise approach.

The itinerary, the points of attack, its time, the strength of

the attacking force and, to a certain degree, the method of

transportation (air-transports), all these remained hidden from

the Germans. The secret had been kept by use of many effective

deceptions and ruses. in particular, the enemy was induced to

believe that the Allied convoys would go either to Dakar or to

the eastern Mediterranean.
SURPRISE 15

Surprise of Concentration

In the Polish war, the defenders plan of concentration was

so obsolete that it gave surprise every chance to display its

effectiveness. The Polish General Staff had placed the small

Polish army in a linear formation along an extremely lengthy

border, one of the longest in Europe. There was no concentration of force on the Polish side. The deployment of the Polish

army was a classical example of dispersion as it should never be

attempted. For pofltical reasons, the Poles tried to defend

everything.

The Germans, however, had concentrated their forces into

four different groups, two of which attacked from unexpected

directions. For the first time in the history of war, the Germans

applied the principle of concentration in armored warfare by

organizing armored divisions which they sent out in well-chosen

strategical directions. Due to the thinness of the Polish lines,

the German panzer formations accomplished easy break-throughs,

carved out large masses of Polish troops, isolated them and

progressively reduced all the l'olish forces. The delaying tactics which the Poles in their headless bravery tried to apply until

the last did not serve any reasonable military purpose.

The hitherto most successfM strategic concentration was,

beyond any doubt, the German maneuver of Sedan, in May, 1940.

One may consider this operation as among the leading successful surprise blows of all history. This operation affirmed

one of General Erfurth's basic theories, namely that surprise

requires the opponents coIlaboration."

Former Slow Mobilization

Germany in 1914 had taken advantage of the element of

surprise by launching her troops through Belgium. The op- posing armies met when they had fully developed and taken

up battle position. They came into close contact as late as August 26; the first battle took, place near the Franco-Belgian

border. Such was the slowness of mobilization in 1914, that

the Germans needed three weeks to concentrate, to move less

than 100 kilometers and to begin cothat. When battle was

joined, to the surprise of the French, it appeared thtt the Ger- mans enjoyed an enormous superiority in heavy artillery and

that cohesion and coordination in the German army were better
16 SURPRISE

than in the French. Despite these weaknesses the Allies were

able to avert defeat. Why? Because both armies were more

or less identical in nature, having the same mobility and maneuverability and because the power of machine gun defense made the

rupture of any front impossible. Consequently, no large elements

of any army could be encircled, immobilized and trapped in

one region, and then annihilated. The lessons of the German failure in 1914 had not been

lost. In 1940 the eidée de manoeuvre" was to break into the

French disposition at its very center, while preventing any coordination by swift infiltration. By the same token, the northern

group of the Allied armies sent into Belgium would be cut off

from the eastrrn and southern Allied forces by a resolute and

concentrated attack towards the west. The plan of 1940 was

altogether difkrent from the plan of 1914 when the Germans had

even thought of leaving Alsace-Lorraine to advancing French

formations (with the idea of immobilizing the French by permitting offensive action in a direction with no strategic importance). The Germans in 1940 met the French on the second

day and as close to the French •bases as possible, thus paralyziflg

the French transportation system and impeding the movements

of the French army. In 1940, the French army failed to win a

new Battle of the Marne because, unlike 26 years before, it had been immobilized and because from the beginning the German

army possessed superior mobility.

Ardennes No Obstacle

On the tactical field, the main surprise was the German attack

through the i\rdennes, a deeply cut and wooded plateau which

is a considerable obstacle to movements with strong mechanized

elements. The French believed the Ardennes mountains were

not suitable for large-scale operations. This firm conviction that

no strong enemy attack could ever come from across the Ardennes

is expressed by almost all decisions which the French took during

the critical phase of the operation. The French Intelligence

Service on May 12, advised the Bureau of Operations of the

French General Staff that the main German attack would be

delivered aga:ust the hinge of the Allied fanwise movement at

Sedan. This information did not find credence, and no step was taken to thwart the German maneuver.

The French not only expressed their opinion of the obstacle-
SURPRISE 17

value of the Ardennes quite openly, so that the Germans knew

about it, but they also failed to take precautions in case the

Germans might not also believe in the French doctrine. The

French assumed, or were led to assume by various German ruses

that the Germans would, on the whole, repeat the Schlicffen

plan. That is, concentrate their main forces on their right wing.

In this case, the main battle was to be expected between the

Belgian fortifications and the river Dyle. The Germans, when

drawing up their war plan were sure that the French would

neither attack through the Ardennes, nor have forces enough

ready for a strong defense of that region. The Germans, whfle

also considering the Ardcnncs as difltcult country, believed that

by good planning and after thorough preparation, a strong attack

could be delivered in that sector. The Germans knew quite well

that they took a considerable risk by sending strong mechanized

formations through a region full of fosses, woods, deep valIeys

and steep escarpments. But they decided on it because they

were sure the French air force was not able to interfere with

their movements. They selected the Ardennes as the poiit

of the essential attack, because it was there that surprise was

most likely to be effective. It was an attack directed at the joint

between the offensive and defensive wings of the Allied army.

All other attacks were made in part to protect the flanks of the

main German offensive group, in part to draw the Allied forces

on to a battlefield where no decision was sought. The Allies

were induced to advance as far as possible into Belgium; the

main blow was delivered only four days after the offensive

had begun.

The 'collaboration" of the French went as far aS it could.

The French High Command, it seems, refused to believe reports

of the presence of strong German units in the Ardennes. The

French forces assigned to defend the Meuse, weak as they were,

(lid not arrive in time. French reserves were not available for

the defense of the decisive point. On account of their disposition,

the re-grouping of the Allied armies was no longer possible

once the break-through had occurred.

Be/giiii a German Trap

The Germans effected a noteworthy surprise by luring the

Franco-l3ritish army into Belgium. They were careful not o

impede the seemingly offensive move of the Allies and refrained
18 SURPRISE

from bombing tie advancing Allied left wing. The farther the

i\llics moved into Belgium, the easier it would be for the

Germans to crush them. By their inconsiderate advance, which

was facilitated for them to the utmost, the Allies immobilized

themselves. This shows that surprise can also be achieved in

other forms than by concentration and attack.

The disposition of the Anglo-French armies was indeed

singular. lithe Allied generals had the intention of helping

their enemy, they could not have acted differently. The battle

was to be fought defensively. The advantage of defense, as

Erfurth reminds us, is that the attacker must reveal his plan first.

Yet this advantage exists only if the defender can profit from

this revelation. And he can profit from it only:

(a) if he conLentrates his main forces behind;

(b) if he forces the enemy to deploy his forces at an early

moment;

(c) if he has strong reserves which can quickly be thrown at

menaced points.

The French followed none of these rules; they neither held

substantial forces in reserve, nor did they put their reserves in

the right place. There were three groups of reserve forces in

the rear. One was centered around St. Quentin and Laon; the

second east of Cornpiègne and the third around Chalons-surMarne. All of them faced northward and were earmarked to

follow the movements of the French First Army in Belgium.

No mobile reserve was held behind the Ninth and Second Armies,

or in the region of Montmédy-Caregnan. Two armored divisions

attacking from that sector could have seriously compromised the

German advance. If the left flank of the German troops advancing through the Ardennes had been attacked, General

Gamehin could have practically profited by the military advantages

which theoretically were gained by the advance into Belgium.

It is still more astonishing that on their left wing, which was

supposed to fight the decisive battle, the Allies concentrated approximately only one-third of their army. The remaining twothirds were in and behind the Maginot line. Besides, this weak

ollcnsive ing was not used, as it could and should have been,

because one entire army, the Seventh Army under General Giraud, was given the insoluble task of fighting in southern

Holland, with the result that this army practically did not in-
SURPRISE 19

tervene in the decisive lighting. According to their own assumptions, the French should have had concentrated two-thirds of

their armies, or even more, behind the Belgian frontier and

before moving them ahead they should have waited until the

Germans had revealed their plan.

But whatever the French disposition, it is hard to explain

why in the most critkal sector, at the hinge of Sedan, there were

only reserve divisions and some motorized divisions but no

strong mobile force which could have effectively counterattacked.

The basic idea of French strategy was to abandon the artiflci&.

and weak positions at the Franco-Belgian frontier and to figh.

instead on the stronger as well as shorter line of resistance

which is marked by the river Meuse, by the fortress of Namur

and the river Dyle. Unfortunately, this plan left the center door

of the French house wide ajar.

Erroneous Assumptions

Part of these strategical errors may, however, be traced back

to erroneous tactical and technical assumptions, or in other words, to surprises of a tactical and technical nature. Among these

assumptions were the belief that

(a) the Belgian fortifications would hold out at least live

clays, giving theY Allies eiough time to advance into

Belgium and occupy the Dyle line;

(b) the speed of the German army would not exceed the

speed of the Allied army;

(c) the Allied .tank defenses, in spite of their short-comings.

would considerably reduce the striking-power of the

German army.

The disregard of the principle of concentration is even more

pronounced if we consider what use the Allies made of their

tanks and planes. Briefly, they never concentrated their tanks,

although, in fact, they had considerable numbers of excellent

tanks (most of which have later been used by the Germans).

The tanks were dispersed in many units, and even the available

armored and mechanized divisions were used in driblets.

Besides, many of them were wasted in defensive operations

instead of being held for concentrated cotrner-attacks. The air

force, small as it was, was squandered in operations which

could have no immediate effect on the battle that was proceeding, as in bombing of the Ruhr; or in useless work, like bomb-
20 SURPRISE

ing bridges which were either not used by the Germans or

which, in case they were hit, were, repaired within a few hours.

Every available Allied aircraft should have been used instead

against the German air force itself.

The essential causes of the French defeat are extremely few.

The Germans attacked at an unexpected place; the French fought

on the passive and static defensive by sitting tight behind the

natural obstacle of the Meuse; the French forces were excessively

dispersed; there were no reserves. For these reasons, the German

surprise attack was successful beyond expectation. At the first

blow, the French were completely immobilized, the German exploitation was immediate and irremediable. After the breakthrough at Sedan, the French army no longer existed. There

were only numerous separate and independent French units which

bravely foughi according to circumstances nd possibilities.

There is hardly a more successful case of surprise in any war.

Pjiss,a,zs and French

The beginning of the war in Russia is quite different fTom

the initial phases of the French campaign of 1 9'10. Terrain

conditions are not the same. The Russian army is both stronger

and more modern than was the French; the possibilities of retreat arc much greater. An invader cannot reach the heart of

Russia in one good stroke as can be done against France. in

France, the German victory was consummated on May 13, 1940,

at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, less than three days after the start

of active hostilities. Against, the Russians, such speed could

not be dreamed of. On May 10, 1940, the Allies had massed

101 divisions along the Frarico-Belgian frontier. (91 French, 10

British). They had practically no reserves. They had ap- proximately 3000 tanks and less than 2000 first-line planes.

On June 22, 1941, Russia had 215 divisions immediately

available, more than 200 other divisions available within a few

weeks, plus a considerable quantity of non-divisional troops. The Soviets had probably 14,000 planes both in line and in

reserve and more than 15,000 tanks. With these quantities, they

had a considerable numerical, though not qualitative, superiority

over the Germans both in personnel and in materiel.

From the start, the Germans proposed to deal a blow to the

Russians from which they coild not recover. The Germans also

planied to attack in such way that the Russian disposition would
SURPRISE 21

be disrupted and at the same time large and efficient Russian

formations annihilated. The German plan was a combination of

many different surprise attacks. Tactically, they had perfected

the team-work between plane-tank-gun. They had also per- fected the method of launching attacks against the enemy's rear.

And in addition, they did make effective use of the Pripet

marshes which cut the battlefield in two. Tannenberg was repeated on an immense scale.

The Germans almost succeeded. Their tactics and strategy

were well worthy to match the blows they had dealt to France.

Russia was saved by the valor of its men; but the bravery and

tenacity of the Russian soldier would have been of no avail if

behind the positions overrun by the Germans other positions could not have been found on which the Russian army could

consolidate. Russia was saved primarily by her spaces, the area

for maneuver at her disposal.

The Russian General Staff committed similar mistakes as the

French. The Russian generals were confident that the advance

of the armored columns which the Germans launched forward

as in l'oland and France, could be checked by allowing them to venture into the Russian rear. With depots and commando

posts protected against sudden attacks, the defending troops would close behind the armored 'invaders, cut them off from

their bases and infantry support and destroy them. This concept

of defense in mechanized warfare had already conspicuously

failed in the Polish war. The Russians also sent their troops

too close to the German main concentration, not realizing that

the mobility of the German army was much greater than theirs,

so that the enemy's armored columns were able quickly to eleminate all forces imprudently sent ahead of strong defensive zones.

Defense Helped Attack

The defenders played into the hands of the attacker by con- centrating too near the Pripet marshes. These rendered any

lateral shifting of forces impossible. Thus the Germans were

able to attack large Russian units separately with superior

strength and to apply Napoleon's strategy to tackle the different

enemy armies at different times, and each Qf them with overwhelming force. The initial German srâtegy in the Russian

campaign was a classical application of the principle of con1

centration.
22 SURPRISE

On the contrary, if the advanced flat regions were strongly

held by the Russians, the Stalin line was undermanned. The

lar,'es reserve forces were concentrated west of Moscow. The

attacker could penetrate quickly into the Russian defense system,

annihilate strong forces and considerable equipment and gain

contact with the main line of resistance without loss of time.

This line was almost as easily reduced as was the futile

line of the Allies in 1940, the K. W. line between Antwerp and

Sedan. At the beginning of the war, the Russians showed themselves unable to concentrate sufficient forces at the right time

and at the right place. During the Battle of Moscow they accomplished their first strategically correct concentration, obviously

because they knew the main objective of the German offensive.

But at that time the Germans had already conquered the

Ukraine.

German indecision Fatal

The Germans, although convinced partisans of the principle

of concentration, frequently failed to apply it. In particular,

they were unable to make up their mind as to where (lie decision

of their struggle for world hegemony was to be sought. The

attack on Britain was not undertaken with a real concentration

of force, because the air-force aloie was thrown into the fight.

Regardless of whether the German army was ready to attack

Britain or whether after the naval defeats during the Norwegian

campaign, enough naval forces were available for amphibious

attack, the offensive should never have been undertaken unless

the whole strength of Germany could be used against the then

main and strongest enemy.

After the failure of the Battle of Britain, the main German

strength shouki have been used for the concjuest of the Near

East. The Balkan campaign was useless, the Libyan position was

not properly employed, and the operations in Syria and Iraq

were stopped before they really began. The offensive against

Russia was launched before the Germans had secured their

rear. This sin against the principle of concentration was only

surpassed by their folly in declaring war on the United States

before Germanys European enemies were liquidated. Since

Germany had no chance whatsoever to strike at the United

States, her declaration of war also was a radical abandonment

of the principle of surprise.
SURPRISE 23

On the other hand, dogmatism is never effective in military

matters. Deviations from the principle of concentration may

ometiincs be justified. The dispatch of the British Eighth Army

to Egypt during the worst military crisis of British history was

beyond doubt not compatible with the principle of concentration.

This decision required high courage and it may be presumed

that the Axis powers based their plans on the assumption that

Britain would keep all her soldiers at home. They were much

surprised when they discovered their error. And this British

heterodoxy led to remarkable success. Indeed, it saved the Near

East and Africa and thereby—who knows ?—prevented the Allies

from losing the war.

Incidentally, the principle of concentration must also be applied

to production. One must produce most of that weapon, or

those weapons, which one considers as decisive. The Germans

first considered the plane as their basic weapon. Later on, it

seems, they gave preference to the tank, and finally halved their•

main effort between land weapons and submarines. The Allies

were likewise frequently shifting their main effort from one

weapon to the other. The fact, however, that they were able to

maintain their shipping production must certainly have surprised

the Germans and upset parts of their strategic calculations.

Evacuation At Dunkirk

No data are available as yet relating to the development

of the battles which took plae during World War H. Yet.

the main facts concerning surprises in retreat operations are

known, and we may briefly mention them.

There were no surprising features in the retreats of the Polish,

Dutch and Belgian armies, none of which chose the right moment

and the right direction of retreat. Dunkirk, however, is a different story and certainly a remarkable example of effective

surprise.

First, it may be presumed that the Germans counted upon

either the annihilation or the destruction of the trapped Allied

-forces and did not expect them even to attempt to get away.

Secondly, the technical feasibility of embarking more than

300,000 men was certainly questionable, in particular, because

the Germans could hardly expect the British to risk substantial

naval forces within the reach of the victorious German Luftwaffe.

That the performance of the Parisian taxicabs of 1914 [in
24 SURPRISE

uickly transporting troops to the battle front and stopping

the German rush) could be repeated with British yachts and

motor launches was indccd an unexpected occurrence.

Thirdly, the British surprisingly used their Spitfire lighter

plane which up to Dunkirk was held in reserve. The mastery

of the air over the Dunkirk region was wrested from the Germans and a heavy defeat was inflicted on the Luftwaffe whkh

may be considered as the main reason for this successful retreat.

It may be added that the Allies were also luckily favored by

weather: calm sea and poor visibility.

The other phases of the Allied retreat in France are, however,

characterized by all the mistakes which General Erfurth rightly

castigates. The Allies merely fell back from one line to the

other, without ever attempting to maneuver. Besides, they

committed other serious blunders which by no means can be

justified or explained away by their lack of armament and their

general inferiority.

For resistance, the French High comnniand did not select

defense lines with strong natural obstacles, but those which

actually had little tactical value. The Somme, for instance,

is no real obstacle. The Seine and Paris, however, offer strong

defenses. Yet the French chose to light the last decisive battle

on the Sommne, and not on the Seine behind which they should

have withdrawn after performing widespread demolitions in the

fore-field. A second mistake was not to shorten the lines and

to evacuate the Maginot Line when it was still possible, so

that the eastern army group could still be used in the decisive

battle.

It has also been argued that the line of retreat was badly

selected and that instead of retreating to Bordeaux, the French

army should have gone to Britanny where it could have found

strong positions and good communications with Great Britain.

There is little doubt that the Bordeaux maneuver would have

made sense only if the French had reasonable hope of accomplishing a Sort of military comeback. But if this was impossible, as

it indeed was, the only reasonable strategy was to maintain

French bridgehead. This could only have been done in Briftany.

lt is true, however, that retreats require careful planning and

advance thought. The French had made no preparations for

retreat in any direction. Hence they would have hardly been able
SURPRISE 2

to disengage their troops from the enemy and to ship large

parts of thcm to Africa.

Defei:sive- OfJeniive Dociri,:e

The first Battle of El Alamein is almost a perfect illustration

of the doctrine of the defensive-offensive. Here the offensive

party, although victorious, grew disorganized and tired during the

pursuit and offered thereby a chance to the defender, provided

he disengaged himself in time and made a deep withdrawl.

Against an exhausted pursuer a successful stand is possible even

with small forces especially if the defense rests upon strong

natural positions which cannot be turned. However, one should not forget the role airpower played in this battle. If

the British had also lost their air supremacy, they would have

hardly been able to recuperate. The battles in Papua (New Guinea), the ill-fated Japanese

thrust at Port Moresby and the subsequent annihilation of the

entire Japanese detaclunent at Buna were certainly other masterpieces of defensive-offensive strategy. The surprise for the Jap.

anese apparently lay in the fact that the AustralianAmcrican

troops could stand the strain of jungle fighting and that, in

addition, they were able to improvise an air transport system

far superior to anything the Japanese could muster.

The crown for retreat.strategy goes, however, to the Russiais,

and particularly in connection with the Battle of Stalingrad. The

surprise for the Germans was that Stalingrad, unlike Verdun and

Sebastopol, did not offer special limited targets, such as forts.

The major military targets in Stalingrad were dispersed and

not discernable and could, therefore, not be destroyed by German

heavy artillery. In addition, the battle was fought out over an inmensely wide area. Even day-long mass attacks of the German

air force sometimes 1000 or more in a day, could not destroy

the invisible Russian defense system.

On the contrary, the wholesale destruction of houses proved to

be a most efficient antitank protection. Another important point was that the Germans were unable to cut the Russian supply

line acrpss the Volga. When it became clear that Stalingrad

would not fall, an immediate German retrçat was.indicated. This

was not done, with the result that the German Sixth Army was

annihilated. One is reminded of General Erfurth's description of

Falkenhayn's strategy in 1914, when he refused to give up
26 SURPR1SI

conquered soil and to rctrcat voluntarily in order better to prepare

for a new offensive.

Voluntary retreats to prevent enemy offensives, in the style

of the German retreat in April, 1917, also apparently occurred

in this war. Some of the German maneuvers in Russian in

the winters of 1941-42 and 1942-43 faIl into this category. On

the contrary, Wavell's offensive in the winter of 1940 against

Libya caught the Italians before they were ready and during

their own offensive preparations. This operation may be characterized as a preventive offensive."

Stirprise Taclics and New Techniques

We shall conclude this cursory glance at the history of World

War II by mentioning briefly the different surprises which have

been effected during this war outside the realm of strategy. On

the whole, it can be said that none of the weapons of this war

is entirely new.

Only the efficiency which modern armament acquired since

its birth in World War I is new. The tank, for instance, is an

old acquaintance, yet the armored division, the mechanized

and motorized divisions are new corners which behaved in a quite unexpected, though highly successful, manner. The same

is true of the dive-bomber which dates back to 1919, and to

air-power with all its implements and potentialities, including

paratroops. The Germans succeeded in the first surprises with

these weapons and the new techniques. The second round in

aircraft competition was won by the British during the Battle

of Britain, characterized by superior British lighter planes, by

effective and constantly improving night defenses (night-fighters,

radio location) which made possible superior air tactics and

strategy.

The Germans soon had used up their major surprises, with

the exception of the wolf-pack submarine tactics which were

perfected only later on. The only important surprise in land warfare which they developed after the Battle of France was

in connection with the Battle of Crete, although, of course, at

that time, paratroops were rio longer a surprise Nevertheless,

this operation showed that maneuvers on the strategical scale may

be undertak&n with air-borne troops and that the plane may

serve as a useful means of transport in the case of amphibious

operations. Crete, on the whole, was nothing more than an
SURPRISE 27

experiment. It can be presumed that the results of this experiment were more profitable to the Allies than to the German,

which again proves General Erfurth's opinion that one should

apply surprises with new weapons only for decisive operations

and always be careful not to give away technical secrets.

In the case of amphibious warfare, most surprises were

developed by the Allies, from the creation of the "Commandos,"

to he tactics which the' American Marines used at Guadalcanal

and the landing operations in north Africa.

German Errors In Russia

The longest list of successfully accomplished surprises, however, can be presented by the Russians. Generally speaking,

their very resistance is altogether the biggest surprise of World

War II. Surety, the Germans did notexpect to crush the Russians

within three weeks or three months. But would they have attacked had they not been fairly certain that the Red Army would

be crippled or annihilated within a reasonable period? Is it

not probable that Hitler hoped to be in Moscow at the same

time the Japanese attacked in the Pacific? Disregarding all

Nazi doctrines bearing upon the inefficiency of the Russian

political system, the probability of major political changes in

the Russian government, once wr had broken, one may list

the German military expectations and the surprises that came

to them as follows:

1. The Germans depended upon annihilating the strong power of the Red army near the frontier. They hoped to be

able to repeat the strategy so successfully employed by them

against Poland. In the heyday of their advance in Russia they

considered that the Battle of Kiev would prove to be as successfully decisive as was the Battle of Kutno; that after that

anticipated defeat he Red Army would be virtually destroyed

and unable to throw large reserves into battle.

2. Though the Germans expected a "defense in depth," they

never expected that the Russians would organize a defense in

exireme depth, in such a way that the Germans would practically

never be able to operate with their tanks through open and obstructed country. They were merely prepared for more difficult blitz than previous ones; and they vere, b&ng surprised

by the Russian method of 'blitz-grinding.

3. The Germans believed that their 'ker.me1" tactics would
28 SURPRISE

have the same flicicncy in Russia as in wcstern Europe. This

was, however, au error. The encircled Russian units almost never

capitulated, but fought to the last cartridge, thus substantially

reducing the speed and power of the German offensive on which

everything else depended. This Russian "stubbornness,' as the

Germans called it, compelled them to disperse their forces, and

prevented strong German concentrations. On the other hand,

the Russians showed themselves able to withdraw in time,

sacrificing territory for time and man.power.

'1. The Russian partisans revealed themselves as a very

efficient weapon. Their activities also resulted in German dis.

persal and—this is of equal importance—made the Germans

fear that their communications were insecure.

5. The Russians showed that big cities are considerable

military obstacles, the reduction of wbich is extremely costly

and laborious.

(. The Germans (lid not believe in the value of Russian

strategy and considered the leadership of the Red army as

clumsy and incapable of maneuver.

7. The Russians were better equipped for winter warfare than

the Germans.

8. The Russian artillery was much more efficient than expected.

This was one of the main reasons why the German tactics did

not work against the Red army.

9. Russian matérial was greater and of better quality than

the Germans thought.

10. The Germans did not expect that after and despite their conquest of the most important industrial regions of Russia,

the Red army could be constantly equipped with new weapons.

They were surprised that Russian industry continued to operate.

In all likelihood, they never reckoned with the possibility

that the Russians would receive considerable equipment from

Britain and the United States.

11. In particular, the Germans assumed that the Russian

transport system would break down, or work ineffectively. It

was not forseen that, despite indubitable weaknesses, the Russian

transport system would continue to operate and that whenever

necessary the Russians would transform themselves into sorts

of Chinese coolies and on their own backs carry the materiel to

the battlefields.
SURPRISE 29

12. Finally, [lie Gcrmans underestimated the endurance and

(he couragc of the individual Russian soldier.

Conclusion

If the history of World War II ever becomes known in its

exact details, the importance of many more military surprises

will be revealed. ,At present we must content ourselves with

recognizing that a. surprises occurred more often in this war

than in World War I ; b. the results of tile surprises were usually

far-reaching.

Consequently, we are justified in saying that surprise has indeed become one of the essential factors of victory. 'Thether

or not it is the ''key to victory,'' there is little doubt that it is

one of its main conditions. Wherever possible, surprise should

he made the basis of military planning. Successful surprise will

not spare lighting. But, most certainly, it will spare blood.

1)i. SrIIAN 'F. l'OSSONY.

'Ihe lit/i/u/c Vt-.'r Adi',t,ied S/tidy,

Prn,ceirn,, New /e,.iey,

Ala)', 1943.

A utho r's Iit roduction

THE principle of annihilation is

the fundamental Jaw of war. It is intimately connected with the

principle of surprise.

Surprise is a particularly eflident means of defeating the

enemy and as old a method as war itself. The history of war

shows that through the centuries, almost all decisive victories

have been preceded by successful surprises, despite tactical and

strategical changes.

The great importance of surprise in war was strongly cmphasized by Clauscwitz: ''Surpcisc is more or lcss at the bottom

of all mnilitary cntcrprises.'' F-lowevcr, Clausewitz asserted that

surprise can be better applicd in tactics than in strislegy. According to him, it is rare that surprises are achieved in the field

of grand strategy and military politics.

It is obvious that military surprises can be easily accomplished only if small forces and limited spaces are involved

and there are merely minor obstacles to be overcome. That is

why tactical surprises occur more often than strategical sur- prises. In every engagement one should try to surprise the

enemy by the deployment of one's own forces and by the unexpected use of one's weapons. This rule is generally accepted

and it is hardly necessary to illustrate it by examples taken from

recent wars.

Surprise is necessarily less frequent in strategic operations,

nor can one take advantage of surprise in the general conduct

of war. The history of modern wars- shows that the chances

of strategic surprise are small indeed. The question mighi therefore be asked whether in a ai which is fought by many millions of soldiers strategic surprises are still possible at all.
32 SURPRISE

This is one of the fundamental questions of modern strategy.

For annihilation—which is the chief objective of war—cannot

l)C achieved unless the enemy has previously been surprised.

German military regulations consider surprise as "a decisive

means" for obtaining great successes. If the possibility of

surprise is questionable, the possibility of decisive victory must

equally be doubtful. Consequently, the question arises whether

with modern mass-armies decisive victories in the style of

Cannae can still be won.

Count von Schlieffenl who taught the German Army the art

of waging war with mass-armies believed in the possibility of

strategic surprise under modern conditions. The strategy he

had in mind did not aim at the destruction of smaller enemy

units, but at the annihilation of the total enemy force. War

should be decided in one gigantic 'battle. Schlieffen tried to

understand the fundamentals of a battle of annihilation, not in

order to enrich his historical knowledge, but in order to outline the character of future battles. "The basic laws of battle,"

as Schlieffen summarized the results of his historical researcl,

"remained unchanged since Hannibal's victory over the Consul

Terentius Varro at Cannae. A battle of annihilation can still

be fought according to the same plan which Hannibal devised

many ccnturics ago. The enemy front should not be the objective of the main attack. Neither the main concentration of

force nor the reserves should be used against the enemy front.

Only the smashing of the enemy's flanks is essential. Annihilation is complete if the enemy is also attacked from the rear."

Schlietlen did not particularly stress the importance of surprise.

In his numerous historical examples he mentioned surprise only

casually, although he sometimes emphasized the importance of

taking the enemy by surprise.

Bat/Ic's Decisive Factor

Schlieffen was chiefly concerned with the general aspects of

the battle of annihilation. He did not discuss problems of a

more specific character, because he feared that details would

obscure the clarity of his vision. He sought to answer only

one question: What is the general form of a battle of annihilation? How must an army be deployed and what form must

the attack take, if the enemy is to be annihilated? But Schlieffen

by no means disregarded the preponderant role of surprise.
SURPRISE

Hannibal won the battle of Cannae because the Roman commander had been surprised by the deployment of the Carthagian

army. Numerical superiority was always "the most decisive

factor in battle." (Clausewitz). The Roman leader counted on

the vast superiority of his forces. In a speech he delivered be- fore the battle, the Roman expressed full confidence in his

coming victory. He expected to defeat the numerically weaker

Carthagian army in the Roman tradition, by a 'heavy frontal

attack.

Terentius Varro was surprised when Hannibal weakened hs

center and dared to encircle his much stronger opponent in

spite of the numerical inferiority of his own forces. The previ- ous battles of the Ticinus and the Trebia had been won as the

result of victories of the Carthagian cavalry Over the Roman

cavalry. In these battles Hannibal also used encirclement tactics.

Then he detached for the attack against the enemy's flanks only

cavalry and light troops which made it possible for the Romans

to break through his pincers and to salvage a large portion of

their army.

At Cannae2, a Carthaginian victory was already assured when

Hannibal's cavalry attacked the Roman rear. Yet the new and

therefore surprising feature of his battle was the fact that

Hannibal deployed his best troops, not at his center, but on

both of his flanks, where during the first phases of the battle he hid them behind his mounted troops. At a favorable

moment, these troops attacked the flanks of the Roman legions.

It was only this attack against both flanks of the Roman army

that made possible the total annihilation of the enemy. Hannbal lacked absolute numerical superiority, but by his unorthodox

arrangement he established relative superiority at the decisive

point. When the surprised Roman commander finally realize4

what the intentions of his opponents were, it was already too

late to avoid disaster.

The battle of Cannae clearly shows that decisive victory is not the result of a brilliant strategic idea, nor of its effective

and skillful execution alone. Victory is also dependent upon

the attitude of the enemy commander, who must be caugh

unawares and ignorant of the true intentiois of his opponen

until it is no longer possible for him to act on his owni

initiative. The blow must fall swiftly and unexpectedly

strength must be met by weakness if a battle of annihilation.
34 suni'aisi

shall materialize. "To obtain a perfect Cannac it is necessary

to have a Hannibal on one side, a Terentius Varro on the other.

Both of them, each in his own way, contribute together to the

great achievement." (Schlieffen). One belligerent must surprise, the other must be surprised. Only and when the two

commanders play these respective roles will a battle lead to

the annihilation of one army.

Fencers' Surprise Tactics

In the introduction to "On War," Clausewitz compares war

to a gigantic duel. In a duel for life and death, the normal

rules of fencing are not observed. Rather, the fencers try to

deceive and fatigue each other by feints and to hit suddenly and

surprisingly at a vital spot. It is not different in war. Great

commanders always distinguish themselves in the art of surprising their enemy. They hide their intentions and measures

until the hour of decision comes. Only those commanders act

openly who are absolutely certain of victory.

In Clausewitz' opinion, surprise is possible only under favorable conditions. In addition to a good strategic idea and it

energetic execution, many conditions are necessary which cannot'

be influenced or changed by the commander. Luck and merit

on one side, mistakes, negligence and ill luck on the other, are

the conditions in which surprise may be successful. The effects

of surprise are multiplied by the mistakes of the opponent. This

is the reason why Schlieffen taught that to achieve victory, it is

merely necessary to exploit the enemy's errors. The enemy must

be attacked if he has exposed himself by his own mistakes. The

attack on unexpectedly exposed weaknesses is a particular form

of surprise operation which, however, requires quick action.

Otherwise the opportunity may be lost.

The tactical and strategical problems which Schlieffen discussed with his pupils have often been criticized on the ground

that he assumed situations which resulted from mistakes committed by both parties. Schlieffen justified himself by pointing out that military history is nothing more than a chain of

mistakes and, consequently, every military situation is the

product of previous errors. Above all, the soldier must learn

to recognize the mistakes of the enemy and to exploit them,

though this may sometimes require departure from accepted

military rules. The military leader must indeed be able to rid
SURPRISE 35

himself from traditional precepts, yet in doing so, he should

never forget that heterodoxy has its limits beyond which it is

no longer effective, but becomes dangerous.

"Consul Terentius Varro had many pupils at all times," while

examples of Hannibal are much less frequent in the history of

war. Can the great Carthaginian leader still serve as a model for

modern strategists? Can a decisive victory still be won with

the means which have so effectively been applied by his military

genius? Are the principles which Count Schlieffen developed in

his study on the battle of Cannae still valid under present day

circumstances? Is successful surprise still the necessary condition of annihilation? Is annihilation the essential objective

in the wars of mass armies? Is superior generalship today

characterized by executing maneuvers which the enemy does not

expect? And is even the most brilliant strategic idea futile if

the enemy prematurely learns of it? These questions shall be

answered in this book.

NOTES, INTRODUCTION

1. Schlieffen: Count von Schlieffen (1833-1913) is the master and to

a certain extent, the Creator of the German army. Many of the present

generals still received part of theia military education from him, Or

were, at least, educated in his spirit. Schlieffen tried to imbue tie

German Staff with one doctrine and one spirit, so that leadership would

never break down even if the communications between the differesit

leaders were severed.

The reactions of all German leaders were to become identical. In

order to achieve this goal, Schlieffen frequently played war-games with

his otlicers and undertook trips to prospective battle.fronts where practicl

field studies were made. Schljeffen iS also the father of the German

war plan of 1914, although his plan was applied in a modified fori

He had forseen a war on two fronts against France and Russia and

advised the use of three-quarters to four-fifths of the German army

against France.

Since the German-French frontier was heavily fortified, thus making

quick victory improbable, he planned to use the main strength of

the German army for an attack through Belgium by which the French

were to be enveloped and possibly encircled. Later on he even thought of marching through Holland so that his offensive wing could still

further be strengthened; After his zetirCment new army corps were

raised in Germany and at the beginning of World War I used on the

left flank of the German army, which thereby acquired enough defensive
36 SURPRISE

power to beat back a strong French offensive. It has been argued that

these forces should have bern employed on the German right wing,

for the attack through Belgium and the decisive battles north of Paris.

However, it has been shown that the available transport facilities were already overtaxed and would not have permitted a further

strengthening of the German right wing. Ludendorif was the author

of the modified Schlieffen plan.

Despite all shortcomings, Schlieffen's doctrine must still be considered

as one of the best military doctrines which exist, if not the best. It

can be summed up as follows: Form a center of gravity; concentrate

there the greatest superiority you can; attack in the direction of the

enemys flanks and rear and try to envelop and encircle the enemy army;

above all, maneuver incessantly.

Negatively put: Do not disperse and do not attack frontally; be not

afraid of wcaken.ng parts of your front if you need strong forces for

Concentration, do not wait passively, but take and keep the initiative.

2. Cannac: 'I lie battle of Cannae (216 B.c.) in which Hannibal in.

flictcd a major defeat upon the Romans has been discovered as a noll of battle strategy by the German historian, Hans Delbrueck.

Field Marshal Count von Schlieflcn the German chief of stall, 189 t-i06,

framed the German war doctrine according to this model and tried in lis

war plan against France to imitate Hannibal's example. The most important characteristic of the battle of Cannae, according to the German

doctrine, is the attack against both flanks and the rear of the Romàns.

it must, howvcr, be pointed out that the Germans over-simplified

the story of Cannae and that the usual description of this battle is

partly not corrcct and partly unproved by the sources. In particular, it

is doubtful wlicther the Roinans actually had substantial numerical

superiority.

The orthodox figures are: 80,000 Roman infantry plus 6000 Roman

cavalry against 40,000 Carthaginians and 10,000 cavalry. These gures

have been computed by assuming the size of a Roman legion as ten

thousand men. However, more recent studies refute this assumption.

The most prohahic figures arc: 40,000 to 50,0(R) Romans against 35,000

to 'lt),0(0) Carl'aginians, plus the cavalry as indicated above. This makes

the Roman superiority much less impressive, and particularly so because

Hannibal was superior in cavalry, the decisive weapon.

To the Roman defeat many more factors contributed than the attack

on the flanks. First of all, the two Roman commanders were on bad

terms, each of them pursuing his own strategy. Terentius Varro was

a political gencial who had been appointed through public pressure and

who was being forced to accept battle on account of the home situation:

Hannibal's battle plan on the other hand, was successful because the

disposition of his troops was skillfully concealed from the enemy.

1-Iowcver, had the Roman infantry which broke the Carthaginian center
SURPRISE 37

not been seiied by panic, Hannibal would hardly have won his battãe.

Panic, therefore, is certainly as important a factor as the attack on

the flanks. So far as the attack on the Roman rear is concerned, it must

be emphasized that according to some sources Hannibal actually used a

ruse for getting behind the Roman lines. Just before the battle began,

parts bf his cavalry pretended to desert to the Romans who had no

time in which to investigate thoroughly. They placed the 'deserters"

behind the battlehelcL When the battle was approaching its climax, the

deserters" drew short swords which they had hidden and charged

the Romans from the rear.

At any rate, there is little doubt that the victory of Cannae was

due to rather exceptional circumstances. The Germans themselves

acknowledge that in the time between 216 B.C. and 1914 A.D. only

the battle of Sedan in 1870 can be compared to it. Consequeatly,

many victories were won according to quite different patterns. And

it must be added that Cannae did not decide the war, though this

battle figures in history as a "decisive" victory.

Hannibal could not brat the Romans. Fourteen years later he was

himself beaten by Scipio. This is to show that foreign readers of German

military literature should nut accept the German tradition of Cannac

without qualification. Cannac may well be the pattern of an ideal

battle; it is certainly not the pattern of battle as such, nor is it the

only way to victory.

I

Surprise as Means for Victory

in Recent Wars

SURPRISE, in Clausewitz' opinion.

is a product of secrecy and speed. Is is of extreme importance

to hide one's own plans from the enemy until he is unable to

take effective counter-measures. This can be done either by

concealment and camouflage. or by deception. The enemy is

easily deceived if be does not expect a particular decision. Yet

if the existence of a decision is in the air, if everybody talks and

knows about it, the enemy is seldom deluded. If a military

decision is executed with the utmost speed, the chances are that

the enemy will be surprised. Secrecy and speed are mutually

dependent upon each other. If secrecy cannot be maintained, speed must be increased; if speed is not practical, the enemy must be kept wholly ignorait of the impending operatins.

Otherwise surprise can never be achieved.

In modern times, secrecy can be maintained only with great

difficulties. Tho many persons know of the decisions which

have been made, even the most secret, inasmuch as the High

Command is organized according to the principle of divksion

of labour.' As a remedy, every military plan should be exeôited

with extreme speed.. Unfortunately at present ideas can not be

followed by action as quickly as in earlier wars. The movements

of mass armies and the re-grouping of large forces require much

time. A great time-lag between the conception of a plan and

its execution is inavoidable. This time-lag evidently must

affect secrecy. For it will often provide an opportunity for the

enemy to discover and frustrate our plans.

Strategic surprise, therefore, in the 20th century became the

most difficult military undertaking. The often-discussed mediocrity of generalsliip.in modern wars is to a large degree due

to this time-lag between decision and execution which makes

39
40 SURPRISE

strategic surprisenext to impossible. In the wars of the 19th

ccntury and, of course, in previous wars, strategic surprises were

rather frciuently accomplished, because wars were then fought

in small spaces and during short periods of time. Surprise is

obviously much easier under such conditions. But when military preparations must be undertaken in vast areas and over

many months, if not years, the maintenance of a military secret

must be regarded as an extraordinary achievement.

Time-lag Grows Greater

The time-lag seems to have much increased during and after

'World War I. In the last decade, it became more and

more dirncult to hit the opponent mortally by surprise. Very

few brilliant strategic ideas could effectively be put into operation. The danger arose that mass and materiel dominated

the ideas of the general, the military machine became too

cumbersome for swift adaptations and flexible plans. In one

word, the tools became dominant. In Clausewitz' terms, one

could say that ideas were being frustrated by frictions of the

machine.

\X'hat are the result of surprise? Clausewitz asserts that

surprise may create the effect of numerical superiority. Without successful surprise no superiority at the decisive point can be

achieved. Supciiority of numbers is the most general requisite

for victory. Absolute superiority everywhere is unattainable;

hence it must frequently be replaced by relative superiority

somewhere. To achieve relative superiority somewhere is the

main objective of almost all military movements and the essential purpose of generalship. Since relative superiority will

hardly be accomplished if the enemy knows the plan of concentration before the hour of attack, the principle of surprise

is of importance equal to that of the principle of concentration.

To defeat the enemy, he must be attacked with superior numbers at the decisive point; but to possess superior forces at the

point of attack, the enemy must be surprised. nnihilatipn is

not possible without previous surprise.

Surprise, however, is not a means for the offensive only. An army on the defensive fights for victory as well as its

opponent and must therefore also try to surprise the enemy.

Surprise deployments are a particularly effective method at the

disposal of defensive armies.
sun.PlusE 41

Surprise is thus an element of equal importance to offensive

and defensive warfare. All kinds of surprise can be applied

in boli forms of war, except the surprise of a sudden and

unexpected onslaught at the beginning of war, Ueberf all which

is an important element of offensive warfare exclusively.

The intellectual consequences of surprise. are sometimes as

important as the surprise concentration, or application, of force

itself. "When surprise is highly successful," says Clausewitz,

"it leads to confusion and breaks the enemy's courage." Usually

the intellectual and material results of surprise supplement each

other. Together, they are capable of complete'y reversing a

given military situation.

Con/i/cling Orders

Frequently, surprise reduces the unity of the enemy forces

and induces the commanders of the enemy army to issue conflirting orders. Under modern conditions, this danger is

particularly great because the direct influence of the High

Command on the battlefield is comparatively weak, modern dispersion-tactics giving subordinate leaders a rather large measure

of independence. l'he general can, but seldom is, ersonatly able

to, restore the morale of his troops if their will to fight is

paralyzed. Modern wars offer many examples of panic which

lcd to the frantic flight of whole armies. One is reminde4 of

Schiller's Talbot, the commander of the English forces, ho

exclaimed at the sight of his routed and fleeing army:

"They will not hear me—not a man will stand;

Clean-loosed are all the bands of discipline.

As if Hells self had vomited around

Its legions of the damned, delirium wild

Blends in a desperate and senseless rput

The coward and the brave alike. In vain

I strive to muster e'en a tiny band

To rally round me and confront the flood

Of foes who waxing surge into the camp."

(Iviald of Orleans, Act ii, scene 5.)

General Archduke Joseph Ferdinand might have spoken similar words when large parts of his panic-stricken 4th Army were

thrown back behind the river Styr 'by the Russians under Brussilov. The.Italian General Capello had a like experience in the
42 SURPRISE

autumn of 19W when at the Isonzo his army was seized by

panic and could not be halted in its retreat2.

Clauscwitz was quite right when lie asserted that a commander who possesses moral superiority over his opponent is

particularly apt to discourage and outwit the enemy and often

even wins when, according to the niles of military art, he

should lose. Military disasters are usually preceded by moral

collapse on the part of the leaders.

To quote one of Clausewita' dicta wthich is characteristic of

his military ideas: "Only he can surprise who imposes his law

on the enemy.' "To impose one's own law on the enemy" for

Clauscwitz is not, identical with having the "initiative" in military operations. The offensive party usually possesses the

initiative, but offensive operations are not necessarily advantageous. In Clausewitz' opinion, they are only protab1e if

there is some cjsance that the enemy might be surprised by the

offensive moves. If this is not possible, it is preferable to make

dccisions later than the enemy and to take the enemy's N%'iO

(lccisions into proper account.

The general who can execute his decisions imposes the law

on the enemy. If the enemy is able to carry out his own deCiSiOns, the opposing army loses its freedom of action. But

which side can execute its plans? That side which makes the

Jeast mistaks. A military decision which is poorly performed

will miscarry. Faulty dispositions will enable the enemy to

take effective counter-measures and may thus lead to reverses.

If both sides try to surprise each other, the army that commits

the fewest errors will be successful.

NOTES, CHAPTER I

1. A strategic decision can be taken by a few individuals. Yet many

more persons arc necessary to draw up detailed battle orders, and

numerous are those who are in charge of preparations and who therefore must gain knowledge of the plan, whether directly or indirectly, by deduction. It has been asserted that approximately 2000 persons

knew in advance of the Anglo-American operation against North Africa. This, obviously, is the number of persons who had been

officially informed of the enterprise. The number of those who deduced

the Allied intentions from many not uncertain indications was probably

higher. Thus secrecy can not be obtained by merely "saying nothing'.

Secrecy requires the systematic confusion and deception of the enemy.
SURP1U.E 43

Secrecy is one of the main conditions of success in war. Yet it. is

also true that nothing is more abused than the principle of secrecy

which frequently serves as a shelter for incompetence. Very often,

secretiveness is fantastically exaggerated and without deceiving the

enemy, serves only to impair the efficiency of one's army. Sometimes,

information about the enemy is withheld from their own officers.

Many persons think that a secret or confidential document is for

their own use only.

, 'Secrecy" is also an effective instrument for

interdepartmental competition. It is therefore in order to quote Lord

Fisher's remarks on "secrecy and secretiveness":

"There are three types of secrecy: I, The Ostrich; II, The Red Box;

III, The Real Thing.

"I. The ostrich buries his head in the sand of the desert when pursued by his enemy, and because he can't see the enemy concludes the

enemy can't see him! Such is the secrecy of the secretive and detestable

habit which hides from our own officers what is known to the world

in other navies.

"Il. The secrecy of the Red Box is that of a distinguished Admiral

who, with great pomp, used to have his red dcspntch box carried before

huiii (like the umbrella ol no African King), as comilaining tIme most

secret 1)11115; but one tIny, the box lcing unfortunately capsized and

burst open, the only contents that fell out were copies of "La Vie

Parisicnnc! Such, it is feared, was the secrecy of those wonderful

detailed plans for war we hear of in the past as having been secreted

in secret drawers, to be brought olt when the time comes, and when no one has any time to study them, supposing, that is, they ever existed; and, remember, it is detailed attention to minutiae and the

consideration of trifles which spells success. "III. There is the legitimate secrecy and secretiveness of hiding from

your dearest friend the moment and the nature of your rush at the

enemy, and which of all the variety of operations you have previously

practised with the fleet you wilt bring into play! But all your captains

will instantly know your mind and intentions, for you will hoist the

signal or spark the wireless message, Plan A, or Plan B, or Plan Z

2. The "intellectual consequences of surprise" which General von

Brfurth mentions may more accurately be described as "panic". Panics

occur very frequently in war and play an important role in almost any battle in which a numerically not inferior army is decisively beaten,

In spite of the frequency and importance of panics, few military writers

and even fewer official military publications mention or discuss panics

which apparently are considered as something shameful and unmilitary.

Panics happen with unseasoned and under-armed soldiers and in case

troops have not been prepared for the fighting methods of the enemy.

They also happen with experienced armies, particularly when the troops
44 SURPRISE

arc tircd and hungry. Generally speaking, panics arc the result of bad

lenkrshiip and of Jack of confidence on the part of the troops. Good

leaders may he transformed into bad leaders, if a successful surprise

hi. ovcithiwwn their calculations and sapped their sclf.conlidcncc.
II

Strategic Surprises, Early

Phases of War

AT THE beginning of a War the

enemy can be surprised either with respect to time or to space.

The enemy should be ignorant of the date of the zero hour as

well as of when hostilities will start or what the deployment

of the attacking forces will be. Surprise can also be accomplished

by new implements of war and by new fighting-methods. Any

one of these surprises may if successful, put the enemy in a

difficult position.

Almost all great commanders attempted to surprise their

enemies by and at the very outbreak of war. Frederick the

Great began every one of the Silesian wars with a surprise attack. Napoleon always tried to 'take the lead over his enemies

by sudden onslaughts. Moltke won his decisive victories in the

early phases of his wars—a fact which is the basis of the erroneous belief on the part of many pre-Worid War I writers that

quick decisions can still be won as in the period of mass-armies.

After the naval surprise with which Japan in '1904 began

the war against Russia, the question whether war should be begun with or without a formal declaration of war was being

widely discussed. The Japanese attack without the formality

of first declaring war was, however, not a historic novelty. In

former times, diplomatic niceties in this connection were rarely observed, and even in the so-called 'progressive" centuries

many governments failed to deliver a solemn dedaration

of war. When in 1801 England intended to break the alliance

with the Scandinavian countries, the British navy first took up battle positions, and only then, in order to save appearances, was an ultimatum delivered to the Danish government. Thi&

ultimatum contained terms which the Danes could not be expected to accept. After, as foreseen, the Danes rejected the

45
46 SURPRISE

British ultimattn, Nelson began immediately to attack the

Danish fleet and bombed thc fortifications of Copenhagen.

(April 2, 1801). This action is a good example of a naval

surprise-offensive in peacetime.

War In Peace-Time

Some years later, Denmark was again the object of precipitate

military violence in time of peace. In order to increase the

effectiveness of the guerre de course against Napoleon I, the

British government on July 19, 1807, decided to ask the surrender of the Danish fleet. The Ships were to remain in

British custody for the duration of the war against Napoleon.

After this decision was taken, the royal navy anchored in the

harbour of I-{elsingor. Transports carrying 20,000 soldiers

followed the navy. The British envoy presented terms to the

Danish government and warned that, should the ultimatum

be rejected, vioience would again be used. The Danish government again refused to submit. Thereupon the British expeditionary forces were landed. On August 24, 1807, Copenhagen

was encircled, in the evening of September 2, (that is, (cdinically speaking, still in time of peace) bombardment of tic

city began. liiimense fires were started and many persons were

killed. Finally on September 7, an agreement was drawn up

according to which the Danish warships and all naval materiel

and installations in Danish possession were surrendered to the

British. Danish sea power was annihilated for the time being

and was never fully restored. Daird Clowes, the greatest British

authority on naval history at the beginning of the 20th century,

considers the legality of the British attack on Copenhagen as

open to discussion, but thinks that this attack was a wise and

indeed necessary measure. The sea battle of Navarino which preceded the RussianTurkish War of 1828-29 was also a battle in peacetime. This

battle was the outcome of political tension which resembled

somewhat the political situation at the time of the Spanish Civil

War, 1936-39. Great Britain, France and Russia had signed

a pact to protect Greece from Turkish oppression. Thereupon

the Turkish-Egyptian navy, accompanied by an Egyptian landing force under command of Ibrahim Pasha, entered the tort of Navarino at the western coast of Morea. Admiral Codrington, commander of the British naval forces in the Mediterranean,
SURPRISB 47

informed the Turkish Pasha that the Allies would not permit

the Turkish-Egyptian navy to support Turkish land operations

against the Greeks. During several weeks the British and

French squadrons stood guard over ibrahim Pasha's navy. On

October 14, 1827, a Russian squadron joined the Allies and the

Bay of Navarino was effectively blockaded. However, the

prospect' of maintaining a winter blockade did not particularly

please the Allied admirals. They decided to force lbrahim

Pasha to give in. On October 17, 1827, they sent him an

ultimatum of sorts. Unfortunately, their communication did

not reach the Pasha who was ashore and thus unable to reply

promptly. Disregarding this particular circumstance, the Allied

warships sailed into the bay. The Turks notified the Allies that

the entry of the whole Allied fleet into the bay would not be

permitted, although some of -the Allied ships might enter if

they liked. The British admiral curtly replied that he- came

to give, not receive, orders. Should a single shot be fired

against Allied warships, •he added, the Turkish fleet would be

destroyed. The Allied ships continued to move in closer to

the '1 urkisli navy. Codrington's flagship "Asia" set anchor

alongside the Turkish flagship. Again, the vice commander

of the Turkish navy officially demanded what were the intentions of the Allies. Suddenly shots were fired and a general

engagement began. The Turks fught as well as they could.

Finally they succumbed to the superiority of the Allies.

The net result of this surprise attack was the destruction of

the Turkish fleet which, without previous declaration of war,

was sent to the bottom. The British admiral who was responsible for this deed was decorated by the Allied governinents. Yet he was severely reprimanded by British public

opinion and eventually he was recalled. After all, the destruction of the Turkish fleet served better the interests of Russia

than of England. The liberty of movement which the Russians

enjoyed in the Black Sea during the Russian-Turkish War was

granted to them by the British admiral.

Official lY1ar Declarations

After the battle of Navarino none of the Allied Powers delivered an official declaration of war; nor did Turkey. It was

only half a year later, on April 26, 1828, that Russia formally

declared war on Turkey.
48 SURPRISE

The Japane attack on the Russian navy at Port Arthur, of

all the powers, particularly offended Great Britain. Article 1 of the Third Agreement of the Second Hague Convention, signed on October 18, 1907, was largely due to British influence. It provided that "the contracting Powers recognize

that hostilities between them must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned

declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war."

This agreement is probably the reason why, at the outbreak

of World War I, declarations of war were delivered in volume

for which there is hardly a historical precedent. Any delivery

of a declaration of war obviously has definite disadvantages.

The power which delivers the first declaration of war is often

held responsible for the war itself, although it hardly needs

elaboration to show that war guilt not necessarily must have rel:tionship to the first declaration of war. Outsiders and the

general public prefer to overlook the true causes of war, particularly in a period of political tension. The factors which

really are at the bottom of war are revealed only when secret

archives have been opened to historical research. Wise and

far seeing governments will therefore avoid taking upon themselves the blame of delivering the first declaration of war.

Public indignation can be so easily aroused that it is not advisable to take such a risk.

Pre-W1ar Diplomacy

The prudence with which, for instance, Bismarck always

dealt with this difficult problem is instructive. In 1870, by

artful maneuvers he forced the French government to declare

war on Prussia, though he himself considered this war as unavoidable. In 1866, he was particularly careful to prevent Prussia from being considered the aggressor, thus taking into

account the political situation in Europe and Germany as well

as the wish of his king who desired that "the honor of firing

the first cannon shot should be left to the Viennese court."

Bismarck treated each of his prospective opponents with special

and appropriate methods and succeeded in outwitting every one

of them.

Even though by May, 1866, the armies of Austria and her

Allies feverishly were preparing for war against Prussia, Bis-
SURPRISE 49

marck did not yet resort to military counter-meaSures. He pre.

ferred to continue diplomatic conversations, which he could

exploit for putting the responsibility for the war on the shoulders

of his opponents. Despite the. fact that Austria's military

preparations were far in advance, Prussia mdbilized her forces

only step by step, always taking a new provocation on the part

of Austria as a welcopie pretence for proceeding further.

From a military point of view, the Prussian army's position

became more and more difficult. The Austrian army was at

last entirely ready for attack, together with the armies of other German states which had had enough time for completely

mobilizing their forces and which cquld, in Moltke words,

"measure up to realities." Prussia was thus menaced by war

on many fronts, an unpleasant situation which, from the narrow

point of view of the army, would have required immediate

action. Bismarck did not accede to the desires of the soldiers.

Here Prussia purposely renounced the advantages that may resuit from a surprise attack. Her soldiers were not permitted

to begin active operations bcfcre Bismarck was convinced that

he had exhausted all diplomatic possibilities and that the war

guilt was definite!y put on Austria. The Austrian government,

in order to counteract Prussian pressure on smaller German

states, saw itself obliged forma119 to declare that Austria would

give assistance to all countries at war with Prussia. This statement was interpreted by Bismarck as an Austrian act of aggression. According to him, Austria had proved her "hatefulness

by aggression."

In Bismarck's interpretation, the Austrian statement was almost a formal declaration of war. At any rate, it was depicted

as a notification that a state of war did exist between Prussia

and Austria. Hence there was no reason why Prussia should

furthermore retard her military operations. Bismarck informed

the commanders of the three Prussian armies earmarked for

operations against Austria that a state of war had come into

existence between the two countries and directed them to act

accordingly. He also directed the military authorities to deliver

to the Austrian advanced guards a letter for the Austrian

commander-in-chief. This letter in which the Austrian statement was quoted closed with the following words: "This

declaration [of the Austrian government] officially announces

the existence of a state of war between our two countries. The
50 SURPRISE

signer of this letter [that is, a Prussian officer] has the honor

to notify Your Excellency that the Royal Prussian Army has

received orders to act accordingly." This method of beginning

war by delivering a Ieure d'adieu to the enemy commander, historically speaking, was extraordinary and unique. Usually events

move much too quickly to permit so slow a procedure.

Serbia's Hard Problem

During World War I the advantages of strategic sueprlseattacks were considered on several occasions. To the beginning

of September, 1915, the Serbian army concentrated its main

forces against Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria entered the war on

the side of the Central Powers. The Serbian High Command

planned to attack Bulgaria before the mobilization of the Bulgarian army could possibly be completed. The Serbs occupied

strong defensive positions covered by the three rivers, Drina,

Save and Danube. The strength of the Serbian positions would

have made possible the concentration of large forces against

the Bulgarians without exposing the Serbian army to an Austrian

attack. Such a maneuver was the best possible way to forestall

a concentric attack from several directions by superior forces.

Serbia's allies, however, Russia in particular, objected, in the

vain hope that the Bulgarian government mght at the last

minute change its mind. In view of the. future policy of

Greece, it was deemed advisable to let Bulgaria, and not Serbia, play the role of aggressor.

Only the Russian High Command whole-heartedly supported

the Serbian plan and denounced these delaying tactics. Not to

undertake a promising preventive offensive, and to leave Bulgaria complete freedom of action, appeared to be a serious military blunder. The Russian Foreign Minister, SasonoIf, did not share this opinion and even declared that he would consider a preventive attack on Bulgaria a "crime". The Serhian High Command was thus obliged to defend a line of more than 650

miles by means of passive defensive only. Hence the Serbian

army was confronted by an insurmountable task. By a purely

passiYe attitude, the approaching concentric attack of the Central l'owers against Serbia could not be thwarted, nor could an

effective surprise be staged. Schlieflen warned against static defense when he said: "If the enemy is to be surprised, one must

not stay in fixed positions, but unceasingly move and maneuver."
SuRPRIsE 51

After World •War I the question whether war should be

begun by surprise attacks was widely discussed in military

literature. Time and again, French military experts discussed

this problem and developed the new theory that future wars

should and probably would begin by sudden and unexpected

attacks ("atlaque brusqud").

An Italian, Ulisse Guadagnini, has given a particularly radical

form to the concept bf the surprise war. He developed the

interesting idea that war should be planned like an ambush.

On principle, the first attack of the war should only be launched

when and if the opponent does not expect it, thinking that

peace is not menaced by any military design on the part of

the neighbor. War should erupt suddenly, as a thunderstorm

develops in the mountains or as an earthquake occurs, not

preceded by warning signals. The army, the navy, the whole

people even, must be able to transform themselves with the

shortest delay from potential into actual energy—like an explosive charge.

Moral considerations have validity only in civilian life and

should not interfere with preparations fo- war. There are no

international laws to prevent a stronger and more powerful

people or a better-equipped army from attacking and defeating

an inferior opponent. He who'would win should not suffer

from moral inhibitions. A sudden and unexpected attack is a

decisive factor of victory and it will necessarily apply in any

future war.

'Without giving the opponent the slightest cause for apprehension beforehand, the aggressor must strike with all his forces

arid with extreme violence at a previously determined day and

at a pre-arranged hour." The mortal blow must be struck before the enemy even knows that war is on. The enemy's military power must be so severely hit that he will be unable tr

retaliate. Guadagnini emphasized the necessity of striking by

surprise with both land and naval forces. He was more skeptical

with respect to the chances of surprise by aviation.

In sharp contrast to Guadagnini, another Italian, Giulia

Douhet, firmly believed in the decisive role of aitpower. According to him, air battle must precede batttes on land azd

sea. After the airpower of one belligerent has been destroyed, his land and sea forces are at the mercy of the master of

the airl.
52 SURPRISE

Exploiting Surprise

Once the decision has been taken to wage war, all air forces

must immediately attack the enemy nation and, without bother.

ing about declaring war, exploit the possibilities of surprise to

the utmost.

The theory of victory through an unexpected offensive in time

of peace has, however, obvious weaknesses.

Under modern conditions, thorough large-scale military preparations can hardly be undertaken without knowledge of the

enemy. It will be extremely difficult to accumulate a large

amount of "potential energy,' as Guadagnini wishes, and keel)

this accumulation secret. At present, and probably also in the

future, distrust is a very powerful factor in international relations. The neighbor is often suspected of having evil intentions which actually he does not have. Large-scale preparaions for big offensives are likely to be discovered almost immediately, and one may be sure that such a discovery will lead

to Counter-measures2.

On the other hand, moral considerations retain a greater

importance than many modern writers are inclined to admit.

After all, one can never be sure of victory. Even a statesman

who is firmly convinced that his country is going to win will

hesitate to disregard entirely moral traditions. A country which

launches a surprise attack will internationally be denounced as

the aggressor and, in case of defeat, may be held fully re- sponsible and to account for its actions. If the surprise attack

is not, wholly successful, severe reprisals will be taken against

the country guilty of the breach of peace. The theory that

might is identical with right and that the stronger can do with

the weaker whatever he likes, •has not been universally ac- cepted in the history of mankind. For all these reasons, it is

easier to advise that moral standards be disregarded than to

accept such counsel. Few statesmen will be willing to embark

upon a surprise-attack in the midst of peace.

The doctrine of the ambush-war has assumed many different

forms, Some of its partisans concede that a single surpriseblow, however strong, is unlikely fully to defeat a strong

enemy. Yet a surprise offensive may make possible the seizure

of important regions near the frontier and of objectives of high

military value to the opponent. The Austrian, General Alfred

Krauss, was of the opinion that in 1914 Austria should have
SURPRISE 53

begun the war by the immediate occupation of Belgrade. According to him, the capture of this city would have been the

best start for the Austrian army.. "Serbia's capital, with the

headquarters of all Serhian authorities and with its important

archives was separated from Hungary only by the river Save,

that is to say, by approximately 600 yards. The seizure of the

Serbian archives would .have been of inestimable political value,

while the early crossing of the Save and the establishment of a

bridgehead in Belgrade would have been of equally inestimable

military value.

Another Austrian, General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, on August 10, 1916, proposed to the German Chief of Staff to march into Rumania immediately after the conclusion of an

alliance between Rumania and the Entente should officially be

confirmed by the Rumanian radio. His plan was to attack with

the German forces under Mackensen from northern Bulgaria

across the Danube and to advance toward Bucharest. At the

same time, Austrian and Hungarian units, reinforced by German

detachments, would attack eastward from Transylvania, moving

equally to Bucharest. The Austrian was convinced that this

operation would catch Rumania napping and lead to important

quick successes. The German High Command, at first, did

not expect Rumania to enter th war. On August 18, they

sent a belated and dilatory reply and practically declined Hoetzendorf's idea. His plan was critized by the official Austrian

publication on the history of the World War, on the ground

that it would have required the presence of ready and

powerful forces in Transylvania and northern Bulgaria which were not available at that time. Still, it is conceded that an

attack of that kind could have been very successful.

Mission of Fronlier Troops

Swift action at the outbreak of war is generally considered as

an indispensible feature of effective defense. Very early it

became customary to station troops near the frontier. In case

of enemy attack, these covering units were assigned to the task

of disrupting the enemy's mobilization schedul—and, if possible, pushing his forces back. The exerieiice in 1870 that

France had with such an arrangement was far from satisfactory. The hasty advance of French units not yet fully mobilized

caused general confusion. The mobilization centers and rail-
54 SURPRISE

way stationS were crowded with reservists unable to join their

units, because they did not know where they could find them.

The army corps and divisions lacked the most essential transport services, their field hospitals and administrative personnel.

No provisions were made for the feeding of the troops. Maps

were not available.

After some days, the Ministry of War in Paris did not know

what to do; they left all decisions to the troops and the fieldofficers themselves, hoping that they would be able to muddle

through. However, the confidence in the 'On ic débroullier"

was disappointing. The chaos was not disentangled. At last,

the French High Command realized that, instead of taking the

war quickly across the Rhine into Germany, the French army

had to defend French soil in France. The strategic surpriseattack which the French had planned in 1870 thus was frustrated by the frictions of their own military machine.

The German coup de ,nain against Liege in 1914 is an example of a successful surprise operation at the beginning of war. The h-oops selected for this enterprise were assembled

during the third day after the proclamation of general moblization (August 4), while still in their peace-time formation.

In the night of August 5-6, they were ordered to surprise and

break through the outworks of the fortress and to seize the town

and its transport-facilities. This bold and reckless operation

was accomplished despite almost insurmountable difficulties and

local setbacks. It could easily have failed. Its success was

chiefly due to the energy of one man, Ludendorif, who had

conceived the whole plan himself. Besides, it was executed

by first-class units and, in some respects, favored by luck. The

coup de niain against Liege is one of the very few successful

examples of its kind. Consequently, it must be considered as

an exception, not as a generally applicable precept4.

For sometime prior to World War I, the concentration of

Russian cavalry divisions near the German eastern frontier often

gave cause to apprehensions on the part of the German government. In his time, Bismarck, as Chancellor, felt himself responsibie for. the military preparedness of the Reich and repeatedly drew the attention of the German War Minister to the

possibility that East Prussia might be invaded by Russian

cavalry. He prevailed upon the Minister to take necessary

precautions against that danger. The German General Staff
SURPRISE 55

was, of course, constantly concerned with the same problem.

In 1894, Count Schlieffen travelled with the General Staff in

eastern Germany in order to study the problems which would

arise for Germany's defense in case Russian cavalry had in- vaded Prussia and accomplished the partial destruction of the

railroad system before the German army was mobilized. Schlieffen did not consider a Russian cavalry offensive as likely, or

dangerous.. The events of August, 1914, showed how right he was in this assumption. To be sure, Russian cavalry tried

to cross the boundary and, by destroying railroad facilities, to

disrupt mobilization and deployment of the German army. But

the German frontier-guards were prepared, and the Russian

cavalry achieved but poor results One Russian cavalry division was beaten on August 5, near Soldau, another on August

9, near Bialla.

Defense Becomes Stronger

In modern military literature surpiise raids across the frontier

during the first days of war are frequently discussed and sometimes recommended, because, under modern conditions, they

can be carried out by mechanized and motorized units. Speed and the fire-power of modern mechanized equipment are, of

course, incomparably stronger than'those of the old-time cavalry.

The power of mechanized weapons is sometimes considered as, a promise that surprise raids, which formerly were seldom

effective, can now be successfully performed. One should, however, not forget that the defense against modern offensive

weapons also has become much stronger than it was in 1914

and that no country will neglect the protection of its frontiers. Provided both sides are equally cautious and either side is

unable to begin its mobilization substantially in advance, modern

mechanized units are not likely to be more successful than

the Russian cavalry in 1914.

The early beginning of the Russian offensive in August, 1914,

was largely due to French pressure. The French needed a strong diversion on the eastern front in order to resist the German

attack in the west. The director of the Russian Bureau of

Military Operations, General Dobrorolski, reported that the

Russian army was not prepared to take.the field before August

28. The French, however, insisted on accelerating the Russian

operations. General Shilinsky, a former chief of the Russian
56 SURPRISE

General Staff, who had negotiated the military alliance with

France and who in August, 1914, was the commander of the

Russian armics operating against East I'russia advanced the

date of his OffensiVe to August 17.

The Russian First Army began to move; the Second Army

crossed the frontier on August 18 and 19. The results of this

precipitated action were far from satisfactory. As a conse- quence of their forced marches, the Russian troops, in particular those of the Second Army, were tired and insufficiently

supplied. Nevertheless, the Second Army continued its marches

across the difficult and almost roadless regions near the German

frontier. The Russian troops suffered from the immense heat

of August. Oi August 2'l, the Chief of Staff of the Second

Army, General Posdovsky, was forced to declare that, due to

the exhaustion of the troops, the coptinuatiori of the advance

would be an adventure". General Samsonoff, commander of

the Second Army, shared this opinion and asked the. High

Command for one day's rest. This request was rejected. Consc'quently, the Russian Second Army entered the battle of

Tannenbcrg in a state of exhaustion and with insufficient supplies. Under the circumstances, catastrophe was hardly avoidable.

A postponement of the Russian offensive by four days would

not have been a disadvantage for the Russians. Our present

knowledge about the battle of Tannenberg certainly justifies

this conclusion.

The history of modern war offers not a single example of

a successfully precipitated offensive undertaken with units either

not yet fully mobilized or mobilized more quickly than the rest

of the army. There are many examples to the contrary. In the

most favorable cases, precipitated offensive action led to momenlary and local advantages, but only at the cost of disturbing

one's own mobilization and deployment.

Precipitation will hardly yield better results in future wars.

Success in war usually goes to the side which uses its power in

a premeditated and coordinated way.

Surprises By Sea

The obstacles which prevent quick and early land operations

are insignificant in comparison with the obstacles to surpriseattacks over sea. In an illuminating article, entitled "Naval

Surprise Attacks at the Beginning of War," General von
SURPRISI3

Janson discussed Japan's naval surprise attack against Russia in

1904. The success of this operation, which actually statted

the war, was due to exceptional conditions. It is unlikely that

similar conditions will ever exist again before a war between

(lie great western powers. Besides, the distant coastal areas of Asiatic Russia are hard to defend from European Russia

where the sources of Russia's military power are situated. The

geographical conditions of the Russian empire permitted the

Japanese to dispense with a general mobilization of all their

forces. Instead, they mobilized their divisions successively and

even dispatched them successively to the front, To be sure,

their landing forces in neutral Korea on the Asiatic mainland

(lid not have to fight, but only to secure bases for later operations.

A landing on the shores of a western country would immediately be followed by a difficult battle with a strong military

force. The Russians were unable quickly to counter-attack the

Japanese in Korea, but under normal conditions, the defender

will not be slow in concentrating a strong force against the

invader.

The mdbilization of large landing forces can remain as little

a secret as the assembly of a big convoy of transport ships.

Only a direct attack against the enemy navy itself can be carried

out with surprise. Before extensive landing operations can be undertaken the enemy fleet must be raralyzed if not annihi'

lated.

But such an ambitious goal cannot be reached unless the

attacker is assisted by criminal negligence on the part of the

defender. And yet, notwithstanding the extraordinary negli- gence of the Russians, the Japanese did not succeed in completely crippling the Russian navy in Port Arthur. General

von Janson proved the hopelessness of a naval surprise-attack

under normal western conditions by the indecisiveness of Japans

surprise in 1904. The events of World War I did not

refute General Janson's thesis of the impracticability of naval

surprise attacks. In the meantime, the appearance of military

aviation which enables an effective control of all main seaapproaches has facilitated the defense of coastal lines. Naval

and air-attacks, even if launched only to gain temporary mastery

of the sea and air require extensive preparations. Too, these

preparations take such time that their premature discovery can

hardly be avoided. Large scale surprise-landings must prac-
58 SURPRISE

tically be conslered as an impossibility. They are not an appropriate method to win a war during and by its very start6.

Aviation offers, however, a better chance for surprise than

land and naval weapons. Douliet, the advocate of a surprise

offensive with large fleets of aircraft, has still many partisans.

Indeed, an air-force is able swiftly to attack unsuspecting op.

ponents, although during a political crisis no country will neglect

to perfect extensive air-rajd precautions.

Many plausible objections have been raised against an air

strategy in Doihet's style. The danger of reprisals, for instance, should not be overlooked. On the whole, it is not altogether proballe that future wars vill be started in accordance

with Douhet s recommendations.

Abysfiithz, I/al;' 4/id England

The question must also be asked whether future wars, like World War J, will be preceded by the usual diplomatic forinalities, from the recall of Ambassadors to the official declaration of \var. Every government will leave it to its opponents

formally to declare war while the latter will, of course, try not to fall into the trap. The relations between Great Britain

and Italy during the Abyssinian War showed that one may

even resort to open economic warfare without either side recog- nizing the existence of a state of war. The history of Far Eastern wars also indicates that a state of war may actually

exist, screened as frontier incidents, although no state of war

is recognized by the belligerents or the neutrals.

These examples seem to demonstrate that initial surprise attacks arc of questionable military value and can be successful

only under rare and exceptional circumstances.

The question then arises whether the enemy can be sur- prised by a particular and unexpected disposition of the inihitar)' forces. Schlieffcn remarked that the disposition of an

army is largely dependent upon the peace-time location of troops, the railroad system and the shape of the frontiers of the attacked country. If these three factors are known, the offensive

deployment of any army can be calculated in its general outI ines.'

Field Marshal Count von Moltke in 1870 indicated the exact

disposition and concentration of the French army. "In order

to learn the French war p1ac" commented SchlieIfen, "Moltke
sURPRIsE 59

paid neither many spies nor did he bribe high officials. To get

knowledge of the most important French state secret, he limited

his expenses to the price of a cheap railway-map. In the area

of railroads the deployment of every army is conditioned by,

and dependent upon, the existing railroadso."

Before the First World War, the German General Staff deduced the deployment of the French and Russian armies in the

same way and later events proved their deductions to have been

largely correct. Similar deductions are obviously more difficult

with respect to a country lighting on several separate fronts

because, comparatively speaking, it is free to decide by its own

will against which opponent it shall first concentrate the bulk

of its forces. Consequently, Germany's enemies in 1914 were

at a loss correctly to foresee the German war plan. The Russians assumed that the main German forces would be tied up

in the west. The Russian General Staff therefore.intended to

throw its main forces against Austria-Hungary while Germany

was to be attacked only by limited forces. Yet the Russians

were not sure of their own deductions and prepared a second

substitute war plan in case the Germans should carry their

main effort to the east. Then the mass of the Russian army

would take the offensive against eastern Prussia.

Effective Secret Service

In order to gain the necessary information in time, the Russians had placed secret agents in all German cities with big

garrisons, particularly in Stettin, Posen, Breslau. The agents

had to ascertain in what directions the German corps were

moved. On August 6, that is to say just four days after general mobilization had been proclaimed, the Russians already

knew that Germany would leave only small forces in the East.

The original Russian war plan could therefore be put into

operation.

Nor did the French General Staff dare rely on its own guess.

To be sure, most French officers were convinced of a German

attack through Belgium. However, opinions were divided with

respect to the numbers which Germany could spare for the

Belgian operation, to the direction of their advance (in particular whether they would operate only on the eastern or on both banks of the Meuse) and to the German attitude in

Lorraine. The French therefore devised a plan with two
60 SURPRISE

variations. The second variation was to be a,1ied in case of a

German attack through Belgium. In addition, they put a whole army in second line for use where needed. The second

variation of the French plan was set in motion by August 2, when the Germans asked the Belgian government for free

passage through Belgium. Though the uncertainty of the French

General Staff was thus dispelled, they continued to ignore, the

true German intentions. The French persisted in their belief

that large German forces would be concentrated in Lorraine

and that the German right flank would not extend beyond the

Meuse. "The advance of our strong right flank on the left bank of the Meuse," writes General von Kuhi, "completely

surprised the enemy and disrupted his plan of operations."

Surprise through unexpected disposition and concentration of

forces is certainly a difficult undertaking, yet it is possible and

can be very effective. An army battling on several fronts has

the advantages of the inner lines and can, within limits, freely

choose the direction of its main effort. The disposition and

concentration of armies lighting on the outer lines can, however, be deduced with some probability although, of cotrse,

such deductions may be wrong. It follows that surprises can

also be performed by an army operating on the outer lines.

The tendency to begin war with surprise attacks was a standard

feature of many former wars and still exists in the present

period, even though initial surprise-attacks become more difficult.

An unorthodox and unexpected disposition of the army puts a means of surprise at the disposal of the commander. On

principle, the army should be deployed with a view to sur- prising the enemy, even if the chances 'are small that the attempted surprise will succeed.

NOTES, CHAPTER II

1. Douhet: The Italian, General Giulio Douhet, (1869.1930), is

usually considered as the prophet of air power. He indeed as one

of the first professional soldiers who recognized the vast military

potentialities of aviation. However, his contributions to the emergence

of air power were not considerable, except in the field of propaganda.

His forecast of future wars and future types of military aircraft were

not borne out by facts. He was an enthusiast of his weapon, who had

lost almost all sense of proportion, asserting, for instance, that land

offensives could be no longer decisive. Yet he was indubitably also a

man of vision.
SURPRISE 61

2. Guadagnini: It is obvious that the chances of such a war are much

better than General Erfurth assumed. It may be true that preparations

for attack are detected before the attack is launched. Yet the defender

may not be able to catch up with the advance of the attacket A

mobilization with a lead of only 'a few days may be of inestimable

value, at any rate in a war against a country without space. On the

other hand, one has seen that for political reasons the defender sometimes does not dare to take counter-measurers and actually may fail

to mobilize fully his forces. This happened with Poland. Germany

could not be angered with "provocation."

3. Ambush War: Despite General Erfurth's arguments, in the prent

war Germany as well as her• co-belligerants began all their campaigns with a surprise attack, and delivered their official declaration of

war only after the operations had already started. And there is no doubt, either, that most of the attacks occurred when they were not

yet expected. There is, of course, never a complete surprise. But an

advance of a few hours may decisively influence the first battles and

enable the attacker to seize immediately important territory.

4, Liege: It is quite true that the coup de main on Liege was a hazardous undertaking, for the simple reason that it had not been

thoroughly rehearsed and that the troops did not know their tasks.

Liege was almost a failure, because the principle of secrecy had been

exaggerated. Many of the officers did not know what they were supposed to do and had only insufflcieat knowledge of the situation. The

much more difficult coup de main on Eben Emael which the Germans

performed in 1940, after thorough rehearsing, shows that similar operations are not chiefly dependent upon luck, but can be successfully accomplished, provided they are carefully planned and studied.

5. Naval Surprises: It is hardly necessary to show that actually the

chances for naval surprises are much better. Norway, Pearl Harbour, North Africa would not have been possible, if Erfurth's pessimism

were justified.

6. Moltke: Today, Moltke would be hardly as successful with a

cheap railway map. There are too many railways and too many high- ways and military concentrations can be accomplished wherever one

likes. Under modern conditions, motorized and mechanized units can

partly liberate themselves from railroads and highways. Hence, war plans may now be kept secret easier than they were in Moltke's time.

III

Surprise, War of Movement

INFORMATION gathered in

peace-time about enemy country is not only incomplete, but

loses its value after the enemy army has been deployed and

begins to move. With the beginning of hostilities, however,

information of the enemy army and country becomes corstaritly available.

Yet little military information, whether secret or not, can ever

be accepted as definite anti reliable. For war takes place in the

realm of uncertainty, hence of surprise. "A good deal of the

information gathered during war is contradictory; a still greater

part of it is erroneous and the bulk of military information is

of dubious reliability. Plans whkh are built upon such ground

may fail."

Services of intelligence, whatever their reliability may be, are

indispensable in time of war. The more that is known about an

opponent, the better are the chances that strategic intentions

against him will be effectively carried out and that the enemy

will be surprised. Consequently, intelligence and information

services should be as effective and efficient as possible. Yet

it is one thing to collect abundant detailed information and

another to synthesize it into a general picture correctly re- flecting the general conditions on the enemy side. The corninander-in-chief has the ungrateful task of distinguishing between correct information, willful lies, exaggerations and errors.

From among the numerous and contradictory pieces of information he receives, he is supposed to make a correct sekctiont.

The talent to see things rightly is very rre. Napoleon exclaimed: "Mali c'ejt Ia ,ealité des chosei qii co,nmande," thus

criticizing commanders who base their decisions not upon facts,

but upon their own wishful thinking. Most people are more

63
64 SURPRISE

impressed by dramatic events than by sober calculations and

cold reasoning. In serious situations they tend to see things as

worse than they actually are, while they like to exaggerate their

own successes if the developments are more favorable. They

lack the quality which Marshal Pilsudsky characterized as a good "tête froide d'un chef." This quality is inborn, but can

also be acquired by a long experience in war.

Military situations chane rapidly. Very often a commander

has taken a decision in view of a given situation. But when

he begins to execute his plan, the situation has developed further

and he is already confronted by a totally different set of circumstances. Unless he has self-confidence and liberates himself from the impressions of momentary conditions, he will

become undecided and hesitate. Clausewitz therefore asked

that a true military leader must have confidence in his superior

knowledge and be "like a rock that shatters the waves."

Objective Self-Confidence

Obviously, self-confidence goes hand in hand with the

faculty of objectively and soberly appreciating a given situatjon.

The commander should be able correctly to appraise new

information which may modify or change the situation and he

must examine it without prejudice to decide whether his

original decision is still applicable. It is as wrong to adhere

too long to a previously made decision as to relin9uish it too

enrly. The history of war shows that self-deception on the

part of the High Command is 'a very definite danger, especially

for strong personalities.

Count Schlieffen ironically described the type of military

leader who puts trust only in his own intuition and dismisses

any information which does not tally with his dreams. "It is

wrong to assume," he writes, "that information gained by the

cavalry does invariably influence military decisions or is even

acceptable. Military leaders often like to depict the situation in

a way compatible with their own wishes. If the information

they receive strengthens their belief it is joyfully accepted. But

if it contradicts their assumptions, it is rejected as entirely wrong

and used to prove that the cavalry has again failed in its duties."

Count von Schlieffen wrote these words at a time when cavalry

still was the main instrument for reconnaissance. At present,

reconnaissance is carried out by other branches of the army.
suRplusE 65

But the experience of former wars which Schlieffen thus described is still valid. The World War I offers many examples of how superior commanders rejected information from their

subordinates with the remark that it be only the product of "imagination and pessimism." Warnings were often credited

only when it was too late. Commanders suffer frequently from

the tendency to be over-optimistic. The consequence usually is

that the enemy is able to achieve a surprise, if not against the

troops themselves, then against the commanders. A commander

who fails to accept warnings, facilitates the winning of a great

victory—for the enemy. An erroneous appreciation of the situation is an essential factor of defeat. In recent wars, many successful surprises were made possible by the incredulity of

commanding officers.

The difficulty of correctly appraising a military Situation is still

one of the main bottlenecks in war. It will continue to remain

an essential bottleneck in all future wars.

Note, Chapter III

1. Intelligence Service: One of the reasons why high commanders

are likely not to accept incoming information must he attributed to the

fact that the chief of the intelligence department seldom has equal rank

with the commanding ollicer. In sqme armies, he is not even a general

officer. It also happens that he is Sometimes insufficiently informed 'f

the intentions of the operation department. Care should be taken that

close collaboration and incessant consultation between the department

of military operation and the intelligence department are assured, and

that not as in the French army during World War I, when the Operation

Bureau on principle distrusted any information it received from the

Intelligence Service. (cf. Pierrefeu).

Iv

Deployment for Battle

liP TO the time of Moltke, an

army usually marched a considerable distance before it reached

the battlefield. Since 1914, the open space which formerly

separated two fighting armies before they joined in battle has

been narrowed down. Railroads have been developed to make

possible the deployment of the armed forces in the immediate

vicinity of the frontier. The increasing size of armies has made

the former assembly in different groups impractical. Continuous

fronts are now being established on the very first day of

hostilities.

At the beginning of World 'ar I the German and French

armies deploying at the Franco-erman frontier were separated

from each other by a small ditance. Therefore deployment

in depth was not possible in this area. Further to the north,

bowever, the two armies were separated by the whole width of

Belgium.

The right wing of the German army was consequently compelled to march a considerable distance until it could reach

the battlefields of the Sambre and Meuse. The corps at the

extremity of the German flank between August 12 and August

22 marched approximately one hundred and forty-five miles.

When hostilities began, both sides ignored the condition

of the enemy army. Hence both sides, at least in theory, had

a good chance of surprising the opponent. Yet none of these

many chances was exploited by either side, ts we shall see presently.

The German High Command on August 20, learned some important details of the French plan of concentration. A strong

French army was being assembled between Charleroi and Dinant

67
68 SURPRISE

in the triangle between the Sambre and the Meuse. The Belgian

army had retired into the fortress of Antwerp. The location of

the British Expeditionary Force was not known to the German.

High Command. A Belgian newspaper on August 19, had

published an official London dispatch on the landing of the

British army in France. But the German High Command

still ignored the reference to the port of disembarkation as well

as the whereabouts of the British units.

The concentration of strong Allied forces at the FrancoBelgian frontier confronted the German right wing with the

prospect of a big battle. The German High Command took

measures to ensure a well-concerted attack of the three armies

forming the right German flank against the enemy forces

vest of Namur. The difficulties of this task are not always

fully appreciated today because we are influenced by our historical knowledge about the events. In actual battle the

situation can never be appraised so easily as is possible later

by study of historical books. The exact strength of the opporlent, the direction of his movements and his intentions are

apt to be unknown during actual operations. Movements in

war strongly. resemble a passage through wild, primeval country.

'War is like sailing across an unexplored sea full of reeks

which the captain may well divine, but which he has never seen

and amongst which he now must navigate in a dark night."

(Clausewitz). German leadership had to coordinate the advance

of the three armies so that they could effectively be concentrated on the battlefield itself. Field Marshal Count von Moltke

considered such a coordinating task as the most difficult undertaking of strategic leadership. Indeed, history shows that a similar task has only seldom been successfully performed.

Shoriening Time-Lag

The difficulty lies in the inevitable time-lag between the

arrival of one formation at the front and of other formations

at the enemy's flank or rear. Count von Schlieffen taught that

this time-lag should be shortened by appropriate arrangements on the part of the different army leaders. If the armies a- proach the battlefield and battle becomes imminent, energetic

leadership is necessary to maintain cohesion between the different

units. In such a situation the movements of the advancing

iimiçs must be coordinated by a strong central command, even
SUPR1SE 69

if at the cost of interfering with the iiidependence of the army

commanders. At least, this was the opinton of Field Marshal

Count von Moltke. His own nephew, General von Moltke,

however, did not conform to his uncle's precept and assigned

the central command of the movements of the German right

wing to the senior among the three army commanders, General

von Bulow. Since the three German. army commanders had

different strategic intentions, this solution increased friction on

the German side.

Buelow, the commander of the Second Army, did not belieye

in an early intervention by the British Expeditionary Force.

He ordered on August 20, the First and Second Army to

move on to the south and then to wait until the Third Army

which was still operating in the area of Namur and Givet, could

catch up with them. He planned for a later concentric attack

against the enemy forces assembled between the Sambre and the

Meuse. The First and Second Armies were to attack in a northsouthern and the Third Army in an east-western direction. By

the evening of August 21, the Second Army had turned around

and was facing south. Its advanced guards had crossed the

Canal du Centre and the Sambre, where as a consequence of the

rashness of subordinate leaders, 'some fighting had taken plac3.

Bimlow on August 22, ordered the First and Second Armies fo

stop the southward advance and instead to close the gap between

the two armies.

All three armies on August 23. were to effect a simultaneous

attack on the French south of the Sambre and west of the Meusé.

But during the morning of August 22, General von Bulow

changed his mind. He had gained the impression that only

weak French forces stood south of the Sambre. He could thus

hope to win an important success by launching an immediate

attack. Without hesitation, he ordered the resumption of the

advance and the capture of the difficult terrain south of the

Sambre. The Third Army was directed to attack quickly in the

direction of the Meuse. Bulow ignored the fact, however, that

the commander of the Third Army could be informed about his new plan only around 12 noon, of Augti.st 22. Bulow also

counted upon the full cooperation of the First Army.

In the course of August 22 the true disposition of the French

Fifth Army became increasingly clear. The Second Army di not meet weak French advanced guards south of the Sambre,
70 SURPR-ISE

but with the niass of the French Fifth Army occupying positions,

"worthy of a Terentius Varro." The French positions invited

encirclement. The German armies were thus certainly well placed

to inflict a crushing defeat on the French Fifth Army. The

eastern flank of the French could have been attacked by the

Third Army. Had the German First Army advanced quickly,

where 1ecessary by forced marches, it could have attacked the

western flank of the French positions. Too, had strong

available cavalry units been concentrated on the German right

flank in order to attack the enemy's rear, all essential conditions

for the annihilation of the French Fifth Army would have been

created.

Difficulties of Envelopment

In order to achieve a complete Cannae against the French

Fifth Army, a frontal attack of the German Second Army, tieing

up the main French forces, was indispensable. The frontal

attack was the very condition of successful attacks against the

French flanks. But the German assaults on the flanks and the

rear of the French Fifth Army failed to develop satisfactorily

and were too weak to achieve an annihilating victory.

Schlietlen pointed out that to begin envelopment at the .right

moment and to direct attacking forces in the right direction is

the most difficult part in any battle of annihilation. The battle

of Mous and Namur proves the accuracy of this view.

Germany lacked a Hannibal who would have been able to

coordinate thç operations of the three armies. it was wrong to

deliver the main attack at the Sambre near Namur and Maubeuge.

The main attacks should have been directed against the French

flanks. If, to their surprise, the French and British should

have been outflanked, a definite success was assured. Yet it was

essential that the German flanking marches were carried out

during the night of August 22-23. The attack had to be launched

on August 23. Had it been retarded longer, the enemy would

have avoided the trap. The time-lag between the beginning of

the frontal attack and the first attacks on the flanks could

under no circumstances be extended beyond that date.

At the end of his study on the Battle of Cannae, Count vpn

Schlieffen summarized the conditions of a successful battle of

annihilation. He emphasized that the commander must be assisted by sub-leaders with a strong sense of discipline and a
SURPRISE 71

good understanding of his intentions. Only if the situation of

the enemy is interpreted similarly by all commanders and if

the sub-leaders agree with the commander-in-chief on the plan of operations, is the battle likely to end successfully. Such an

agreement was entirely lacking among the German commanders

in the battle of Mons and Namur.

General von Kluck held opinions about the enemy situation

that differed from those of von Buelow. Von Kluck was convinced that the British Expeditionary Force would soon attack

north of Lille. In the hope of avoiding a British attack

against his right flank, he stopped his advance on August 21

and left his right wing as a protective force behind his main

forces, although, according to Bulow's directions, this wing was

to proceed hurriedly to, the south. Indeed, a surprise attack

against the Allied left flank could not be accomplished by

keeping these forces back.

The opinions of the two commanders were npt harmonized

(luring the next (lays. A stall officer from the High Command

tried toadjust the existing differences, but failed to coordinate

the strategic ideas of the two generals A coordination would

have been possible only by a clear and incontestable order which

I3ulow, for lack of authority, could not issue. Bulow was

merely a prirnus in/er pares .and could not prevent General von

Kluck from making faulty dispositions.

Thus, Kluck maintained his arrangements, although in the

meantime it had been ascertained that the British had taken

up positions on the western flank of the French Army and

could therefore not attack the right wing of Klucks forces. Still,

Kluck was not yet convinced and held that the positions pf the

British left wing were not yet sufficiently known. Consequently,

he continued to protect his right flank with considerable :forces

which he left far behind his front, instead of dispatching them

as quickly as possible to the battlefield. This arrangement was

maintained on August 23'.

Napoleon Demanded Speed

In a similar situation Napoleon had found impressive words

to sure absolute obedience to his çr.ders and to make his marshals act with indicated speed. Bfore the battle of Ligny,

Marshal Soult, upon Napoleon's command, sent an urgent ppeal

to Marshal Ney to direct his immediate advance on to the t,attle-
72 SURPRISE

field: 'You must immediately maneuver to envelop the flank

of the enemy . . . . If you act vigorously, his army is. lost.

The fate of France is in your hands." On the eve of the battle

of Mons a similar order should have been sent to Kiuck.

A commander with the necessary coup d'oeil was also lacking

on the left flank of the German forces. It is a frequent occurrence

in the history of war that reality and its recognition through

the commander are two entirely different things. The commander

of the Third Army did not realize the tremendous possibilities

which offered themselves during the battle of Namur. His attention was fully absorbed by the difficulties of his imminent

attack across the Meuse near Dinant. To be sure, the Meuse

in this region is a very considerable cbstacle. The attack had

therefore to be methodically prepared. Haste would have been

dangerous. Or so it seemed.

August 22 was spent in preparing for the crossing of the

Meuse. The attack against the hills dominating the regions

west of Dinani was ordered for August 23. Yet, on August 18, it

had already been ascertained beyond doLrbt that the regions south

and southeast of Givet were not occupied by the enemy. According to information obtained on August 22, mutually cOrroborated by cavalry and air reconnaissance, it was confirmed

that both banks of the Meuse between Givet and Charleville were

free from the enemy2.

This valuable information failed to cause the commander of the

Third Army to change his plan. However, it should have convinced him that it would 'be more effective to launch a surprise

attack in direction of the gap south of Givet, instead of concentrating the main effort against the strongest part of the

enemy front near Dinant. An attack against the open flank of

the enemy could have smashed the entire Allied defense position on the Meuse.

Ger,nans Mined Chances

The dense forests southeast of Givet would have made pos- sible a secret southward advance of strong German formations.

Enough time was available to prepare a surprise crossing of the

Meuse near Fumay during the night of August 22. This attack would have aimed at the rear of the Fifth Frenth Army. It

would have been the most important contribution to a battle of annihilation, ii the style of Cannae. The historical evidence
SURPRISE 73

conclusively shows that the French would have been totally surprised by a German attack south of Pumay. And they would

have been hit at the most decisive point.

German leadership during August 23 lost the last opportunity

to impose its law on the French army.

The previous night ,the commander of the First Army received a very important message. He was notified that British

troops had occupied positions on the Canal du Centre, that is

to say, north and northeast of Mons. Early in the morning a

cavalry division reported by radio that the British were in

Maubeuge and that the whole territory up to the Scheldt was

free from enemy forces.

But even now no decision was taken to accelerate the advance.

The commander of the First Army did not think to proceed

"iur.Ie.charnp" on to the battlefield and without further delay

attack the enemy's flank. Instead, he still persisted in waiting

for more complete information, in particular about [lie left wing

of the BriUsli Army. Complete and detailed information about

the enemy is, however, never available in war, unless the enemy himself takes the trouble to furnish it, as the Russians did

during the battle of Tanriermberg and during the campaign of

Lodz by broadcasting it by radio. Normally, "imagination and

combination have an import'ant role to play" (Schlieffen).

Before noon on August 23, the commander of the First Army

received a report that since August 22, strong enemy forces

were being detrained near Tourriay. It was not said whether

these troops were British or French. This news caused further

confusion and hesitation; the advance of the First Army was

again stopped. It is opportune here to recall Schlieffen's dictum

that "nothing is more dangerous in war than reliable information." For "reliable" information very often turns out to

be either wrong or out of date.3 In point of fact, information did come in which dispelled definitely all doubts about the

location of the British forces. After 12 noon the commander of

the First Army conclusively knew that the British stood near Mons. He learned in the afternoon that information of the

arrival of troops near Tournay had been erroneous. Cavalry

reported that no enemy forces were present in the area of

Thielt-Kortryk-Tournay. French troops were in the vicinity

of Lille.
74 SURPRISE

At last all concern about the security of the First Army was

removed. The advance was resumed. Yet the corps in the

second line of the First Army were not ordered to push quickly

forward, despite the fact that they still lagged far behind. The

advance of the right wing of the First Army was also retarded

by different counter-orders. Nevertheless, on August 23, the

British front near Mons was strongly attacked by the left wing

and center of the German First Army. Yet a decisive victory

was impossible without a simultaneous attack by the right wing

of the First Army against the enemy flank. This attack :ould

not be launched in time because on the evening of August 23

this wing was still at a distance of twenty to thirty miles from

the front.

The German High Command on August 23 twice notified

the Third Army of a big gap in the enemy front south of Givet.

The High Command advised the Third Army to cross the Meuse

south of Givct "in order to cut the retreat of the enemy forces."

On the other hand, the commander of the Second Army

pressed General von Hausen, the commander of the Third

Army, to advance rapidly in a westerly direction. Obviously,

these two requests were somewhat contradictory.

Hausen was thus faced with the alternative of continuing his

frontal attad:s near Dinant towards the west or of following

tIle advice of the High Command, cross the Meuse south of

Givet and then attack to the northwest. Hausen first decided

to accede to the request of the Second Army and to continue his

frontal attack near Dinant. After a second message from the

High Command he modified his decision and ordered those parts

of his forces which were not tied up at Dinant to proceed

to Fumay. Since the mass of his army was pinned down in the

north, not much could be done in the south. Moreover, the

columns which advanced to Fumay during the day could not get

far beyond the Meuse. The only result of all this was the

establishment of a German bridgehead on the western bank of

the Meuse. The French apparently were retreating from the

Meuse, though their rear guards still put up a stiff resistance.

An important success seemed to be in the offing for the following

day. In ordcr to harrass the French by a quick pursuit, the commander of the Third Army on August 24 ordered a continuance

of the advance in a general southwestern direction.
SURPRISE 75

This decision was altered on the morning of August 24.

The commander of the Second Army dispatched a staff officer to

General von Hausen. This officer requested the Third Army to

move westward in order to assist the Second Army which was

somewhat exhausted by the heavy fighting of August 23. Hausen

felt that he was obliged to give Buelow, whom he believed to

be hard pressed, all the assistance for which he had asked. He

changed his dispositions and thus abandoned the last chance of

strategic pursuit. After several hours, German aircraft reported

that the enemy forces in front of the Second and Third Army

were in full retreat. Consequently, Hausen reverted to his original plan and ordered a new change in the direction of the advance. This general confusion caused much friction and a considerable loss of time. The Third Army on August 24 did not

succeed in forcing the retreating enemy o accept battle.

Poor Results Obtained

The battle of Namur and Mons yielded only mediocre results for the German army, though the relation of force was not

unfavorable for the Germans. The respective dispositions taken

on the eve of the battle would have made possible a repetition of the methods applied in the battle of Cannae. On the central front 137 German battalions with 820 cannon fought against

188 French battalions with 748 cannon. Yet on the Meuse,

101 German battalions confronted only 17 French battalions

while on the western battlefield, the First Army, in theory at

least, could have thrown 120 German battalions with 748

cannon against 52 British battalions with 336 cannon. The

Germans had undoubtedly enough strength for smashing both

Allied flanks. It was only necessary to use the German forces

at the right moment and in the right direction.

The Allies had done nothing to prevent the Germans from

winning a Cannae. Like Terentius Varro, they were ready "to

contribute their share to the great objective."

The French Fifth Army under General Lanrezac which proceedèd northwardalong the Sambre, west of Narnur, on August

21 was informed by the French High Comman cl-that the Germans

advanced with strong forces on both banks of the Meuse. The Fifth Army was directed to attack the northermost German

units by wheeling around Namur. To the British, who had

finished their concentration on August 20, the French High
76 suapitisa

Command suggested that they follow the movements of the Fifth Arrrry by forming, so to speak, the left wing of that

French unit.

When on August 21. the Second Army began its attack across

the Sambre and when the French cavalry corps under General

Sordet was pushed back from the Canal du Centre, General Lanrezac stopped his advance beyond the Sambre. It seemed preferable to him to let the enemy attack across the river and then to

strike a strong counter-blow. He considered his positions south

of the river as sufficiently strong for such strategy, and failed

to recognize that the movements of the German Third Army

threatened his right flank. He even reduced the strength of

this flank at the Meuse in ärder to strengthen his positions

south of the Sambre. By replacing a whole corps through a

reserve division, he virtually opened the door of the Meuse

front to the German Third Army. After the evening of August

22 the flank and the rear of the French Fifth Army lay open

to German attack.

Two French corps on August 22 had suffered considerable

losses in the valley of the Sambre. For the next day, Lanrezac

intended with his main forces to remain on the defensive and to

undertake only a local offensive with one army corps 'against

the east flank of the German Second Army. Yet when the

German crossing of the Meuse south of Dinant was reported,

this attack stopped after it had scarcely begun. In other words,

Lanrezac ordered the same corps which originally were to fight

offensively to protect his flank and rear.

During the evening, General Lanrezac also learned that

the French Fourth Army had been forced to retreat toward

Mézières. Besides, Namur had fallen to the Germans. The

British had been attacked by heavy odds near Mons.

Directions from the French High Command were lacking.

Consequcotly, the commander of the French Fifth Army de- cided, on his own responsibility, to retreat to the line GivetMaubeuge.

The cooperation between the French Fifth Army and the

British Expeditionary Force was still less effective than the cooperation between the different German armies. The British

Field Marshal, Sir John French, was an entirely independent

commander. The French High Command and the Commander

of the French Fifth Army could transmit only suggestions, not
SURPRISE 77

orders to the British leader, which he was free to accept or to

reject.

After the completion of the British concentration on the

evening of August 20, the British commander intended to advance in the direction of Mons. He received on August 21 excellent reports which gave him a correct picture of the situation

of the German First and Second Army. Marshal French had

also ample information of the German strength and knew that

his opponents had six corps in the first and five other corps

in the second line. Nevertheless, the British Field Marshal,

evidently encouraged by French suggestions, persisted in continuing with his offensive operations. The British Army late

on August 22 had reached the Canal du Centre between Nimy

(north of Mons) and Thulin; the British right flank was still

somewhat lagging behind. Incoming information made it clear

that the British were going to be attacked by the Germans and

that their left flank was particularly menaced.

British and French Retreat

Marshal French therefore ordered the advance stopped and

the present positions held, thus giving the German First Army

a good opportunity to outflank the British army during August 23, provided, of course, the Germans had quickly taken the

necessary dispositions for suclt manoeuver.

The British front on August 23 was strongly attacked. The Germans entered Mons and put the British forces east of that

town in a difficult position. The British also lost Jemappes and

St. Ghislain.

Despite these reverses, French on August 24 still intended to

hold on to his positions. As a consequence, the Germans had

a second opportunity to envelop the British army. When on the

following night French was informed that Lanrezac had be.

gun to retreat, he at last also decided to do the same. The

British retreat was ordered at the very last minute and some

British units had already difficulties in disengaging themselves

from the enemy.

We have seen that the German army had a good chance

to score a decisive victory at the expense of the British and

French on August 23. The Allies, like Terentius Varro, had

strengthened their front and weakened their wings. Besides, they had chosen to attack the strongest points of the German
78 SURPRISE

positions, thus again imitating the tactics of Terentius Varro.

The Allies did not use the British Expeditionary Force as a mobile wing operating independently from the French Fifth

Army against the axis of the German advance. To be sure, the

British may not have been able to execute such complicated

strategy. The mere lengthening of the French front by simply

acding the British to the French line facilitated the outfianking

of the Allied armies by the Germans.

On the other hand, the presence of strong British forces

near Mons surprised the First German Army. Yet the British

were not able to exploit this successful surprise because their

positions offered no opportunity for effective maneuvers against

the German flanks. Throughout the whole battle, the German

Army was able to impose its law on the enemy. It would have

been possible to apply Count von Schlieffen's doctrine and

to attack the enemy's flanks with the main German forces, provided the necessary orders had been issued in time and energetically carried out. The two British corps were held up by the

frontal attack of two German corps. Thus, three German

corps and three cavalry divisions were available for at attack on the British flanks. The British could have opposed only

one infantry brigade against these strong German forces This

brigade, just arrived from England, began to move forward

on August 23. The Germans were thus undoubtedly in a position to win a quick and important victory. It is even probable

that they would have cut off the British retreat.

Timorous Generalship

In World War I, envelopment was usually avoided by immediate retreat. Most generals became apprehensive of the

security of their flanks and withdrew their forces when 'a

threat against the flanks materialized. During the initial oper- ations in this war, British generalship was still rather clumsy.

It is questionable whether the British forces would h.ve Cs.

caped from a German pincer-attack. Besides, Marshal French

was quite willing to let himself be surprised. He worried so little

about the situation on his left flank that as late as the evening of August 23 he intended to remain in his positions, assuming, however, that the French would also continue to hold to

theirs.

On the Meuse, German leadership could have taken ad-
SURPRISE 79

vantage of çqually good opportunities. The German attack

south of Dinant took the French completely by surprise. As

we know, Clausewitz taught that surprise is the chief means

of achieving numerical superiority at the decisive point. By

their successful surprise, the Germans had indeed concentrated

vastly superior numbers at the Meuse, which was the decisive

point of the whole battlefield, though here again their supetiority existed only in theory. Had the Germans attacked in greater

strength—which was possible—and had they extended their

offensive further to the south, the French could not have

warded off the threat against their flank and rear. Nor could

they have retreated to the south and southwest. The French would have been obliged to accept battle on a reversed fgont.

Large forces would have undoubtedly been encircled by the

Germans. The hesitations and the confusion on the part of

the German commander prevented the harvesting of the fruits

of successful surprise.

It appears that the British and Frqnch formations were menaced by an attack on their both flanks. If the Germans had

been able to complete their deployment, the Allied forces in

northern France would have been eliminated. As it was, the

German army made, so to speak, only a feint along the lines

of the battle of Cannae. But this feint induced the Allies to

retreat.

The following day, the French High Command. again did

its best to help the Germans win the decisive victory which

had escaped them on August 23. The French High Command

was not in agreement with General Lanrezac's decision to break

battle and to retreat. In their opinion, an attack of the French

Fifth Army could have been successlul on August 24. There

is little doubt that a French offensive move would have pee- suaded the British Field Marshal to stay in his positions at

Mons and thus to offer his flank to a German blow. Nor can

there be any doubt that the strategy devised by the French i-ugh Command would have led the French Fifth Army and the

British Expeditionary Force to disaster.

German Movements Ignored

The history of the German advance' through Belgium shows

that the Germans had good opportunities to deceive thei op- ponents and to surprise them by the disposition and the con-
80 SURPRISE

centration of their forces, despite that the Allies fought in a

country almost entirely inimical to the Germans. An army

lighting on its own, or in a friendly. country is always better

supplied with information. Still, the French and British ignored

the German movements for a considerable period of time.

Up to August 18 the French High Command was not yet sure whether the Germans would operate with strong forces

on both sides of the Meuse or concentrate only small forces

on the left bank of that river and deliver their main attack

against the French Fourth Army. It was not until August 21

that the French Fifth Army received word from the French

High Command that the Germans could be expected to launch

their main attack in the region between Brussels and Givet.

By that time General Lanrezac already knew that the same

German army which had taken Liege had occupied Brussels

and that another German army was about to cross the Meuse

near Namur. He rightly deduced from these facts that the

Germans would soon appear on the Sambre. However, General Lanrezac ignored the situation on the Meuse front south of Namur. He did not know that the Third German i\rmy

approached the Meuse on both sides of Dinant. Instead, he

assumed that only one or two German corps operated in that

sector. Besides, he underestimated the total strength of the

three German armies which he thought to be composed of

nine or ten corps. In reality, the Germans had twelve corps available for their operation on the Sambre and Meuse front

while Lanrezac could muster only seven corps, including the

British.

The British, up to August 20, remained totally ignorant of

the location of their enemy. Until the evening of that day, British cavalry had met with no Germans. On the same day,

air reconnaissance observed a German column marching westward through Louvain. The British on August 22 had full information of the German movements.

On the German side the lack of information was even worse.

They knew by August 20 that a strong French army was being

assembled in the Sambre-Meuse triangle between Charleroi and

Dinant. However, many important points remained obscure.

On the morniug of August 22 the commander of the German

Second Army still believed that only weak French forces, chiefly

cavalry, stood south of the Sambre. General von Hausen ap-
SURPRISE 81

pears to have been ignorant that the French positions opposite

the Third German Army on the Meuse were undermanned.

His information service failed to inform him of the highly

important replacement of a whole French corps by a reserve

division, although this movement was carried out in broad

daylight. General von Kiuck was taken by siirprise when British troops appeared before his front. And it took him quite

a few hours delinitçly to convince him that he was opposed

by the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force. All in all, none of the commanders of the three German armies got a

clear picture of the situation. Every one of them was highly

surprised when, on the morning of August 24, the Allied retreat was revealed.

Each General His Own Judge

The lack of sufficient information of the German commanders was largely responsible for the disappointing outcome of

the battle. Each German commander interpreted the general

situation according to the particular situation at his own front.

The commander of the Third Army was overimpressed by

the natural strength of the French Meuse positions near Dinant as well as by the repeated requests of the Second Army to

lend assistance for the attack in the Sambre sector. The ccrnmander of the Second Army as strongly affected by the violence of the battle south of the Sambre. The Second Aripy had clashed head.on with enemy forces of equal and at sore places even superior strength. Besides, the French positions

were covered by the Sambre; Namur and Mau.beuge, two big

fortresses as yet uricaptured, constituted a virtual threat against

the flanks of Bulow's army. It must be admitted that the Second Army was in a difficult position. It is understandable why Bulow exerted his main efforts to secure first of all tactical

safety for himself. Overestimating the strength and power of his opponent, he wanted to concentrate all available German

units for achieving a tactical victory in his sector. He demanded that the First and Third Army close in with his forces

as much as possible, without considering that by doing so he

narrowed the German offensive front and hence reduced the

possibility of maneuver against the enemy flanks. Bulow paid more attention to the tactical situatioti of his own army than

to the strategic opportunities of the whole German force.
82 SURPRISE

The comnnder of the First Army, on the contrary, thought

more in strategic than in tactical terms. However, General

von Kluck was guided less by the desire to attack the open

flank of the enemy than by anxiety to dispel his uncertainty

concerning the location of the British Expeditionary Force. He

thus tried to solve two different and more or less incompatible

problems.

To command an open and moving flank of the strength

of a whole army is a very heavy responsibility. The right

combination of boldness and prudence cannot be determined

by intellectual reasoning alone. Divination and intuition are

likewise necessary. In difficult situations, the intellect of a military leader is less important than his character. Yet he will

listen chiefly to reasoned arguments. Flanking and encircling

attacks involve heavy risks; a skillful and daring opponent may

be able to launch a counterfianking attack against the flanking

force.

Prudent leadership is in fundamental contradiction with the

idea of annihilation. A prudent general will never be able to

surprise his Opponent. This is why Count von Schhieffen Lime

and again emphasized audacity and preferred bold solutIons

for his tactical and strategical exercises. He emphatically

warned of prudent solutions which would never lead to a decisive victory. A military decision must be determined

by the burni:g desire to beat the enemy and not by the wish

to avoid deleat.'

4n imporiant Principle

In his last discussion of military problems, he once more

drew the attention of his student-officers to the importance of

his principle: "It seems that the idea of the battle of annihilation which permeated the strategy of Frederick the Great and

Napoleon and which is at the bottom of Moltke's incomparable

successes, begins to fall into oblivion and disregard. In the

numerous compositions which you handed to me I found mention only twice of the intention to annihilate the enemy. On

the contrary, most of your studies are concerned with precautionary measures and do envisage only a slightly energetic

blow."

It must b recognized, however, that the German cornjnanders during the battle of Mons could only guess of their
SURPRISE 83

opportunities. In war, complete and reliable information about

the enemy is always Jacking. Clausewitz even went so far as

to assert that three quarters of the facts which one should know

in order to make the right decision remain shrouded in uncertainty. He who waits too long for better information risks

the loss of a good opportunity. Thucydides' famous saying that

good opportunities do not wait is still valid in modern war.

One important fesson must be drawn from the battle of

Namur and Mons, namely that a modern battle of annihilation

should never be commanded by three commanders of equal

rank.

In every war, the absence of one single will was a clear

disadvantage. A divided High Command rarely led to great success. It is true that Prince Eugene and Marlborough together

won the battles of Hoechstaedt and Malplaquet. This was,

however, predominantly due to Eugene's adaptability and per.

sonal modesty. Personalities like Eugene are extremely rare

among great captains. Most soldiers have it in their blood to

stress their independence and object to division of command

as well as to subordination which is not based upon the ordinary military hierarchy.

A military duumvirate was still possible in the War of

the Spanish succession, but is tb longer practical at the present

time. Two hundred years ago, armies were small when measured by todays statdards. Battles were fought on a terrain of the size of a modern drill-ground. The entire battlefield

could be overlooked from a small eminence. Battles did not

differ radically from drill movements. If two commanders were

agreed upon the general plan for the battle, the divisions of

command could hardly interfere with the actual fight.

In this period of mass armies, divided leadership is no

longer feasible. The three German commanders had to improvise the function of the German High Command which

had eliminated itself. They cannot be reproached if they did

not perfectly fulfil their unexpected task. Modern battles cannot be fought with a deteriorated High Command.

The commander-in.chief n,us/ be the only commander and

every opera/iou must be conducted by a single leader wi/b

absolute au/ho rily. For only a leader with ample authority

will be capable of mustering the .ruperhunan strength neces.rary

for commanding a modern battle.
- - 

y" iiu;*fo-2gn, AlS3y 

0 I0 10 I0 40 D IW 1% KM. rG j$t;~t;a-gg!:, 
SURPRISE 85

It may be questionable whether a future war will again

begin with lengthy marches to the actual battlefield, as in August, 1914. Probably, a future war will begin under conditions

similar to those which at the opening of World War I pre- vailed on the German-French frontier. Advances in depth will in future occur only after a gap has been opened in frontier

fortifications. Consequently, the advance to the battlefield will

be but the second act of a future offensive following a victorious

struggle for positions near the frontier.

During World War I, many offensives were carried out on

the Eastern front through regions not yet affected by the war,

such as the advance of the German Ninth Army to the middle

Vistula in October, 1914, and the German advance to Lithuania

and Curland in the spring of 1915.

C'am paign On the Vistula

The German campaign in the loop of the Vistula in October,

1914, ended undecisively. We propose to examine whether

surprise was an important factor in these operaticns.

General von Conrad on September 1 asked the German High Command to send strong and fresh German forces to the Gahician front. He asked for two corps which shoild move towards Przemysl. The Austrian chief-of-staff expected these German forces to change fundamentally the situation on this front.

The German High Cbmmand repeatedly discussed the question

of German assistance to the Austrian army during the first

half of September. It was agreed in principle on september 14

to accede to the Austrian request. At the same time, it was

stipulated that no German troops should be taken from the

western front.

A new German army, the Ninth, on September 15, was

formed for cooperation with the Austrian forces. In an order

of the German High Command, dated September 17, the tasks of this new army were formulated as follows: "To operate

independently, although in conjunction with the Austrian High

Command, against the flanks and rear of the Russian army- group which is in pursuit of the Austrians."

The transportation of the Ninth Army began on the night of September 16-17 in East Prussia. 'he mass of the Ninth

Army was massed in the re.gion of Gleiwitz-Beuthen-Czenstochowa-Lublinitz. One corps wa directed to Cracow, and
86 SURPRISE

other troops into the sector of Kalisz-Ostrovo. The detrainment

began on September lB and was ended on October 2, when

.theammunition supply had arrived. The assembly of the troops

on September 28 was begun behind the positions from where

their offensive was to be launched.

According to the agreement with General von Conrad, the

mass of the German Ninth Army reached the line ChmieinikKielce on September 30. The left wing of this German army

had already reached the regions west of Konskie, Piotrkow

and Novo Radomsk. The German Ninth Army and the Austrian left wing north of the Vistula began to advance on

October 1. The mass of the Austrian-Hungarian army south of

the Vistula began to move forward on October 4.

The offensive aimed at the two flanks of the Russian forces

which, on the left banks of the San and Vistula, occupied a

line from Przemysl to south of Ivangorod. The German

units had to envelop the Russian northern flank, while the

Austrian Second Army in the sector of Przemysl had to outflank the Russian left wing.

This plan had fair chances of giving good results, provided

secrecy to the last minute could be maintained. Its chances

were dubious in case the deployment of strong German forces

north of the upper Vistula and their advance through Poland

became prematurely known to the Russians. For the Russians

would hardly have permitted the Germans to threaten their

right flank without reacting forcefully and speedily.

Radio Messages Unciphered

In effect, the Russians were quickly informed about the

German troop movements in upper Silesia. And this was only

natural, since the assembly of the German Ninth Army was

not effectively screened by Austrian forces. On the other hand,

the Germans and Austrians were equally well informed of the

Russian moves. In that territory, secret agents played an important role for both parties. Besides, the Russians still stuck

to their habit of not enciphering important radio messages, a

habit which already during the battle of Tanrienberg proved to

be very helpful to the Germans.

The commander of the Russian southwestern front received

early intelligence of the appearance of German infantry units

on the river Warthe and of the "daily arrival of thirty-seven
SURPRISE 87

troop trains" in Czenstochova. He took this information as

pretext to protest against the weakening of his right flank

which was planned by the new commander of the Russian

northwestern front, General Russki, who at that time, envisaged his retreat from the line of the Narev.

The first German units, on September 20, arrived in Czenstochova. The first strategic Russian countermove came on

September 22 when the Russian High Command intervened in

the dispute between the commanders of the northwestern and

southwestern fronts.

In view of a probable German offensive in the direction of

the bend of the Vistula, the Russian commander-in-chief, Grand

Duke Nicolai Nicolaievitch, on September 22 prohibited the

retreat of the northwestern front. At the same time, he promised to re-enforce Russki's left wing near Warsaw by two Siberian corps already en ronte. He also directed the commander

of the southwestern front to send three army corps and one

cavalry division to Ivangorod. Thus, the Grand Duke had

already done much to frustrate the German offensive which

had not yet begun.

Nevertheless, the Russians did not yet fully realize the

meaning of the German maneuver. In particular they failed

to understand the unexpected dispatch of German troops to

the Austrian front. The Russians had counted or, a German

offensive from East Prussia in direction of the Narev.

The Russians should not be blamed for their lac,k of understanding, for the German High Command did no know just

what was the sense of a joint German-Austrian operation on

the Austrian left flank. The reasons for which General von

Conrad had supported his request for German troops no loner

existed; the Russian forces formerly in pursuit of the Austrian Army had already been stopped on the line of the river San.

There was no longer any danger of an envelopment of the Austrian fronts.

Offense Changed to Defense

At the time of the German deployment, the Russians had

five and one-half cavalry divisions on the left bank of the Vistula. Originally, this force had been assigned the mission of

outfianking the retreating Austrians. Yet after the appearance

of German troops In southern Poland, this offergsive mission
88 SURPRISE

was changed into a defensive one. Instead of the previously

planned crossing of the Vistula, these cavalry divistons were erdered to remain where they were and to protect and screen

the Russian positions north of that important waterway.

On the same day, September 22, when the Russians began

to organize the defense of the Vistula position, General von

Hindenburg energetically requested the Austrian High Command to send strong Austrian forces to the northern bank of

this river. This move would be a necessary complement to

the movements of the German Ninth Army and would be indispensable to an effective attack against the Russian flank.

On the next day the Austrians promised to dispatch considerable forces across the Vistula.

On the evening of September 24, Russian reconnaissance

units established the presence of strong German forces along

the line Sieradz-Novi-Radomsk-Miechov. A German prisoner informed the Russians moreover of the arrival of a German corps

in the sector Beuthen.Tarnowitz. This corps had formerly been

stationed in eastern Prussia.

From this available information, General lvanov, the commander of the Russian southwestern front de4uced—one week

before the actual beginning of the German offensive—that the

imminent German attack would be directed against the great bend of the Vistula. To counter the German move effectively,

he proposed to retreat behind the Vistula, San and Tanev rivers.

General Ivanov's plan, however, was badly received by the Grand Duke who still on September 25 expected a German

offensive from East Prussia to the south. The Russians had

received ample information of the railroad traffic behind the

German lines. They were convinced that no strong forces had been sent from France to the eastern front.

The Grand Duke on September 26, discussed the situation with General Ivanov. They decided upon an active defense of the Vistula line and reinforced their units on both sides of

the river, placing reinforcements chiefly in the northern and western sectors of the front.

At the same time the Germans learned of the regrouping of

the Russian forces. In particular, that the Russian Ninth Army with at least three corps would open a new front on the Vistula

west of Krasnik, although mainly with a defensive mission,

though this -army could develop a big offensive.
SURPRISa 89

The commanders of the German and Austrian armies thus had

to acknowledge the impracticability of their original plan.

The attack intended against the flank of the southwestern Russian

army group was made impossible by the strong forces which

the Russians had brought up to cover the threatened areas. It

remained dubious whether the Russians would accept battle on

the left or the right bank of the Vistula.

Russians' Succesifiii Parry

The Russians received final and definite information of the

disposition of the German and Austrian forces on September

30, when they discovered in the diary of a slain German officer

that of the six German corps which had fought the battle of

the Masurian Lakes only two still remained in East Prussia.

Thus, the Russian High Command realized that the main

German forces were concentrated along the line Lodz-Kielce,

while other strong forces were near Cracow and behind the

Carpathian mountains. The German concentration between

Lodz and Kielce was rightly considered as extremely dangerous.

The Russians understood that they had to neutralize this threat

by a strong counter-blow and they prepared an attack against

the front of the German Ninth Army. They took measures to

attack the German left flank by awhole army reinforced by

two or three corps. The Russian counter-blow was therefore

ready before the German operation had even begun.

When, on October 1, the German Ninth Army gan to move

forward, a strategic surprise against the Russian in southern Poland was already out of question. The Russians parried

effectively every German move and finally imposed their own

law on the Germans. At long last, the Germans had no other

way out of their difficulties than to retreat into upper Silesia.

This unexpected failure of the campaign in southern Poland

must be ascribed chiefly to the previous failure to surprise the

Russians.

The Germans did not succeed any better with their offensive

in Lithuania and Courland in the spring of 1915. The commander of the German eastern front intended by a surprise.

offensive to push the Russians back fror the Njemen and from

Kowno, with the hope that during The operation strong Russian

forces could be caught in trap. Precautions 'c*ere taken to

concentrate the German attacking forces only shortly before the
90 SURPRISE

zero hour. On the evening of April 26, the German units were

ready and on the following night the offensive began. Much

l'ad been expected from it. Yet the offensive did not succeed.

The Russians had received timely warning of the German

preparations. They frustrated the planned destruction of their

troops by methodically retreating before the German advance.

Despite their desire, the vastly superior German forces could

not ctch up with the Russians, although the Russian retreat

was by no means quick. Surprise is an essential condition of

victory.

Our examples reveal that during World War I the surprise

of the enemy during the advance to the battlefield was possible

in theory, but could be scarcely achieved in practice. In the

present, the difficulties of surprise have become even greater.

In particular, the means and methods of reconnaissance have

improved. If surprise should be attempted in future, it will be

necessary, on one hand, to keep utmost secrecy by improved

camouflage and by executing movements only during the night.

On the other, the speed of operations must be increased by

the use of motorized units hurled against the flanks and the

rear of the enemy. But it is essential to exp'oit a successfully

achieved surprise by concentrating strong forces at the point

where the decision shall be won. Modern strategists have

sinned much too often against the principle of concentration, although this principle has been valid at all times and is now

as valid as ever before5.

NOTES, CHAPTER IV

1.. Klucks halt: The nervousness of the German commanders was

due to a cause which is rarely mentioned in German publications, but

which was of decivise importance: The size of the German Army and

its speed was inadequate for the successful execution of the German

war plan. Besides, forced marches had over-strained the troops as well

as the staffs. There seems to have been a widespread fear among the

German superior officers that a continued advance would necessarily

weaken the German army and make their lines so thin that they would

not be able to resist a strong counter.attack. Before 1933, the

iUihsaer.W'orhenblait repeatedly declared that, if the Germans had not

lost the Battle of the Marne, they would have lost the Battle of the

Seine.

The insufficient strength of the German offensive wing was the main

reason why the Germans did not attempt to envelop Paris, but to by.
SURPRISE 91

pass it in the east, a movement which enabled Galliéni to attack the

German hank.

Many German writers have criticized the German war plan of 1914 on the ground that the German offensive wing was not Made stronger.

That, in particular, two army corps which had been created after

Schlieffen's retirement should have been used on the erman right

wing. This theoretical view however, is hardly borne out by the facts.

The Germans had actually used all the troops which they could possibly

transport through Belgium. There is a limit to any concentration, which limitis usually determined by the existing transport facilities.

2. Crossing of the Meuse: During the Battle of Flanders in World

War II German armored units which had reached the Meuse more

quickly than expected, renounced organizing a systematic crossing, but improvised a swift crossing in order to keep up with the speed of

operation.

3. Reliable Information: The facts related above conclusively show

the necessity of systematically deceiving and confusing the enemy. It

has been reported that during 1942 the Germans added a Section for

Irrejuebrung (that is, for confusing and misleading the enemy) to their

General Staff. There is no reason to assume liat the Germans in

August, 1914, were confused by mere accident. On the contrary, the

British had put an elaborate scheme for misleading thci enemy into

operation. They were successful because they had discovered the

German espionage system in England and used, or rather abused, it

without knowledge on tl part of the Germans. During the first days

of the war they transmitted to Germany the information that the British

army would not leave Great Britain. Later, they spread false information

of the size of the British Expeditionary Force and the points of disembarkment. During the critical phase of the operations in August.

1914, they made the Germans fear a British attack from Ostende, that

is to say, against rear and flank of the German First Army. Moreover,

they spread the rumor that strong Russian forces, recently landed in

England, would attack the Germans in the same region.

4. Approach to battle: The modern defense organization of extreme

depth does prevent big battles at the frontier. In order to forstall surprises, the Jefender forces the attacker to advance deeply into enemy

territory and to reveal the articulation of the offensive army. Consequently, surprises during approach are still possible. . Concentration: General lrfurth's exami4cs show that surprise

has become more difficult (or the attacking,, but not necessarily for the

defending, army. it is possible to let the offensive army advance and

to trap it according to a pre-conceived plan. In August, 1914, the
92 SURPRISE

French intended to let the Germans advance beyond the Sambre and to

aItack the German units south of that river with superior forces. In

October, 1914, the Russians planned to permit a German advance from

eastern Prussia to the east and to counter-attack the German rear flank

from the direction of Warsaw. However, advancing armies did not

Jose all possibilities of surprise. If an offensive army will accomplish

surprise also during approach, it is only necessary to screen effectively

the main concentration of force.
V

Battle

IF SURPRISE is really indisperisable to a battle of annihilation, we should a priori assume that

surprise played an important role in the battle of Tannenberg.

For this was a most perfect example of a modern battle of

annihilation. The German official history of World War I goes so far as to rank Tannenberg higher than all other battles

of envelopment in history and rates i above thc classical modcl

of Cannac itsclf.

The greatness of that German victory is by no means diminished if we acknowledge that faulty Russian leadership considerably facilitate the task of the German command. The

outcome of that battle was dependent as well on the mediocrity of Russion generalship as on the high quality bf that of the

German. The main merit of the. German command consisted

in having discovered, and exploited, the errors of the opponent,

thus multiplying the consequences of the accomplished strategic

surprise.

The Germans in August, 1914, were favored by all the advantages of the battlefield in East Prussia, while the disadvantages of terrain operated against the Russians. In addition,

the staff of the German Eighth Army read all the important

Russian radio-messages and thereby had exact and complete

knowledge of the enemy's intentions. There is hardly a his.

torical precedent for this. The commanders of the two Russian

armies on August 25 informed each other by radio of the disposition of their forces and the objective of their movements.

The Germans intercepted these radiograrns and thus were able

to base their own decisions upon invaluable conpIete information. Hence a surprise move could be attempted under excep93
0 S 10 IS 20&. _______________ BART

0 SINSBURI

_________ RUSSIANS POSITIONS

AND MOYRMONTS ___ GERMANS BATTLE OF TANNENBERG 1914

. O—CAVA1RY v. August 27, Morning

L.-.LANDWEHR (P,ob.bIy Div.)

.—RRS(RVI flY.
SURPRISE 95

tionally favorable conditions. The "Cannae of Eastern Prussia"

was the result of a combination of merit, luck and surprisemethods on the one side and of mistakes, omissions and ill luck

on the other.

In the preceding battk of Gumbinnen the Russians had suffered severe losses, They therefore did not expect the German

retreat which they discovered early in the morniflg of August 21.

They were somewhat suspicious because they did not understand

why the Germans retreated for a second time, inasmuch as they

had delivered a serious blow to the Russian army. (On August 17, German forces had retreated after a successful engagement

near Stallupoenen.) The Russian command expected the Ger- mans to make a new stand on previously fortilied positions behind the Angerapp river. During the next day, however, they

found that the Germans had evacuated this position.

Thereupon, the commander of the Russian Army of the

Niernen assumed that the Germans were retreating behind the

Vistula, although he was prepared for strong German rearguard

actions and delaying tactics in rciared l)ositions. Alter (wG

days of rest, the Army of the .Nicmncn began its advance t

(lie west.

Russian Com,nander's Belief

When General Shilinski, commander of the Russian northwestern front, received information of the evacuation of the

Angerapp line, lie became convinced that the Germans were

retreating behind the Vistula. Since the German civilian population began to flee, he expected the total evacuation of East

Prussia, with the exception of the fortress of Koenigsberg which

was the apparent objective of strong retreating German forces. In the belief that the Russian Army of the Narev was being

opposed by weak German forces, General Shilinski directed this

army to cut the retreat of these German units which were being

pushed back by the Army of the Niemen. He hoped to annihilate them before they could make their escape across the

Vistula.

In the night of August 23-24, after an engagement in 'he

Lahna-Orlau sector, the German XX Corps withdrew its left

flank to a position on both sides of a lake near Muehien. This

move led the commander of the Russian Army of the Narev

erroneously to believe that the whole XXI Corps had retreated
96 SURPRISE

in the direction of Osterode. General Samsonov thereupon decided to concentrate his army further west and to march forward

to the Allenstein-Osterode line, instead of continuing his former

advance toward Sensburg.Allenstein. To protect his right flank,

he left his six corps and one cavalry division near Bischofsburg.

General Samsonov on August 25, saw that his interpretation

of the German disposition had been incorrect. He now believed the XIX German Corps to stand near Allenstein or Ostcrode, the XVII south of Gildenburg, and other German

forces farther west of this area. This new error was due to

the concentration of German landwehr and reserve formations

west of Gildenburg. For the first time Samsonov vaguely suspected that those German units which some days ago had

fought near Gumbinnen had been moved by rail to another

sector. He remained entirely ignorant of the presence of strong

German forces east of Gildenburg, but expected a German

advance from the general direction of Thorn on the Vistula,

that is to say, far from the southwest of Gildcnburg. The attack of the German Eighth Army on the left flank

of the Narev Army did not catch the Russians by surprise.

General Samsonoff awaited the German attack with confidence

and was convinced that the Russian forces concentrated in the

region of Usdau would be strong enough for any emergency.

These Russian troops had two days in which to take appropriate defense measures. Yet the Russian leaders still had a wrong picture of the German dispositions in the Muehien and

Hohenstein-Atlenstein-Osterode sectors.

German Moverne,:ts Missed

As a matter of fact, the German attack on the eastern flank

of the Narev Army developed a complete surprise to the

Russians which they themselves had facilitated. For their

reconnaissance units failed to notice most important German

movements, in particular the march of the XVII German corps

from the north to the sector of Bischofsburg. This march was

a rather remarkable military exploit since the German unit

marched along the front of the Russian Army of the Niemen, thus offering an open flank to the enemy. It is still more remarkable that the Russians remained ignorant of this movement and completely disregarded any possible danger that might threaten the Narev Army from the north. On the night of
SURPRISE 97

August 25-26, the Russian VI Corps still stood near Bischofs- burg, without even taking the precaution to retonnoiter the

areas farther north. The Russians, therefore, learned of the

German advance only on the morning of August 26, when

they were surprised and defeated near Gross-Boessau. This

setback forced the Russians to retire in the direction of Ortelsburg. This local retreat opened the way for a German attack

against the flank and rear of the Narev Army whose commander

for a long time remained in total ignorance of that important

development. Not in the least did he imagine that the German

units which he supposed to be west of Usdau hal actually advanced behind the flank and rear of his army, let alone that

they were about to begin the very attack essential to winning a

battle of annihilation, namely, an attack against his flanks.

General Samsonov learned of the Russian defeat near GrossBoessau around noon on August 27. In the evening of the

same day he received the additional bad news that the Russian

1st Corps had been beaten near Usdau and was falling back on

Mlava.

The Russian commander did not immediately realize the

full implications of these defeats on his both flanks. I-fe gave

ofders to continue with the attack during the next day. It is

true that on the morning of this day he at last understood how

disastrous his decision had been. in his last report which

he dispatched to his superiors in the morning of August 28,

he characterized the situation of his army as "extremely, dangerous." Despite this correct appreciation, the retreat of the

Narev Army was not ordered until the evening of August 28,

much too late to save the mass of the Russian forces.

Mission of ihe Russians

At the outbreak of the war, the northwestern group of the

Russian army had been charged "to annihilate the German units

in East Prussia" or to cut them off from Koenigsberg and

the Vistula. The Russians therefore had to operate on outer

lines. In our discussion of the battle of Mons and Namur,

we have already pointed out that the coordination, of the movements of different and geographically separated units constitutes

the main difficulty of such an operation. The comoander of the

Russian northwestern front was not equal to this admittedly

difficult task. The operations were executed in vast spaces
5 0

CI$TAL POWIRS (AUSTOIANS AND GERMANS) RUMANIANS The BATTLE OF HERMANNSTADT

Situation September 26, evening.

XXXIX.

Res.

.4

0

2 irnny

11 DDf
SURPRISE 99

and he was unable to get a correct view of them. Besides, he

lacked the energy which is so necessary for simultaneously conducting large-scale operations on different fronts.

Nor had the commanders of the two Russian armies the

correct appreciation of the situations involved, thus failing

at a similar task which, during the same weeks, also proved to

be beyond the capacities of the German leaders on the Sambre

and Meuse.

f the Russian generals had been in ppssession of better

information, a quick advance on the part of General von

Rennenkampf and a cautious defensive on the part of General

Samsoriov would have avoided the catastrophe of Tannenberg.

In this battle the Russians possessed huge numerical superiority.

Approximately 485,000 Russians were confronted by only

73,000 Germans of the Eighth Army. However, General

Shilinski, as a disciple of Terentius Varro, did not use his

superiority to concentrate overwhelmipg forces at decisive points,

for the simple reason that he did not believe that the Germans

would accept a big battle cast of the Vistula. After the battle

of Gumbinnen, General Shilinski considered the German Eighth

Army as already beaten and mentally prepared himself for the

operations supposedly imminent on the Vitula. Underestimation of the opponent is always highly dangeous. The Germans

were lucky to have in General Shilinski an opponent who split

his armies and dispersed his forces for secondary operations.

That is the main reason why General Samsonoff had to light

the battle of Tannenberg alone. During the decisive operations,

153,000 Germans, 296 machine guns and 728 cannon were

opposed by 191,000 Russians, 384 machine guns and 612

cannon, although they could have been opposed by at least

twice that number. The Germans possessed one superiority

only. Leadership. It enabled them to strike decisively at the

vulnerable points of the enemy. Incidentally, Tannenberg is

the only battle of World War 1 in which separate advances of

different armies and an attack from two independent fronts led

to victoryl.

Originally, the German Eighth Army's mission was only

defensive. The Germans had practically no chance to hold the

German territory east DI the Vistula unless they separated the

different Russian armies and defeated theri successively. For

that purpose the dispositions of the German forces had to
100 SURPRISE

r.main hidden from the enemy. In point of fact, German

leadership was able thoroughly to deceive the Russians on all

important German dispositions and movements2.

Speed in Inner Line Moves

The German Army operated on inner lines. Since the enemy

cannot be deceived for long, such operations must be executed

with the utmost speed. But once the offensive has begun, the

enemy receives the information he needs by the very movements of the attacking troops. Consequently, surprise can only

be utilized during the preparatory phases of the attack. "Almost

the only advantage of attack," says Clausewitz, is the possilility of surprise with the first blow." The German forces that

won the engagement of Gross-Boessau delivered such a first

blow. Their attack came suddenly and was pressed home

without giving respite to the enemy. Thus it led not only to

the defeat of the Russian VI Corps, but eventually to the

annihilation of the entire Russian Army of the Narev.

Several other attempts were made during World War I to

defeat a numerically superior enemy by an offensive on inner

lines. But a complete victory like that of Tannenberg was not

accomplished a second time.

Some similar attempts led to ordinary victories, as at the

battle of Hcrmannstadt. But other attempts repeatedly miscarried, as the Rumanian offensive west of Bucharest in the

winter of 1916. In the battle of the Arges, the Rumanian High

Command intended to beat the Army of the Danube and to drive

it back across the river before the right wing of the German Ninth Army under the command of General Kuehne could

intervene. The Rumanian forces formerly entrusted with the mission of defending the Danube and a masse de manoeuvre

constituted for the same operation top,ether had to take the

uffensive ajainst the Army of the Danube of the Central

Powers. The three divisions of the Rumanian right wing had

t operate in the direction of Draganescii, while one division and

one infantry-brigade of the Rumanian left wing had to attack

in the direction of Giurgiul. The Rumanian First Army had

o protect the masse de manoeuvre offensive against the German

inits under General Krafft. Between the left wing of the Army of the Danube and the right wing of General Kuehne's

forces was a wide gap, which apparently favored the intentions
SURPRISE 101

of the Rumanian commander, General Presan. The Rumanian

High Command hoped that on receiving the news of a defeat

of the Danube Army, General Kuehne would stop and possibly

retreat. They underestimated the danger which menaced the

Rumanian forces from Kuehne's group. Consequently, they

failed to protect the area between the Rumanian First Army

and the Rumanian masse de manoeuvre with sufficient forces

However, the arrival of several Russian divisions and of one

Rumanian division on the battlefield was imminent. In the

opinion of General Presan, these reinforcements would give

the Rumanians numerical superiority even in case General

Kuehne should continue to advance, after a defeat of the

Army of the Danube.

Both opponents lacked sufficient information about each other.

Foggy weather made air reconnaissance difficult. The advance

of Kuehne's forces was effectively screened by the cavalry corps

under General Schmettow. On the whole, the German leaders•

had the trump cards in their hands and were in a more favorable situation for achieving surprise than the Rumanians, although the Rumanians, too, tried to surprise their enemy. In

effect, the German commanders ignored the fact that forces, of the left flank of the Rumanian masse de manoeuvre advanced

southward. Thi southern move, according ko Presan's plan, was the most decisive one; it was frustrated, .although only in

the last hour, when most unexpectedly Gereral Kuehne ap- peared on the focal sector of the battlefield. Thus, the Rumanian surprisers became the surprised.

Luck an Element

It must be admitted that in this battle the Central Powers

were favored by luck. The headquarters of a Rumanian di- vision which fought on the open flank of the masse de manoeuvre had on December 1, been effectively bombed by German aircraft. Consequently, the leadership of this key

division became wholly insufficient. On the same day, General von Falkenhayn, commander of the German Ninth Army, gained full knowledge of the Rumanian battle-plan by the

seizure of a written order carxied by two Rumanian staff-officers who were taken prisoner. To this moment, Falkenbayn had been entirely ignorant of the Rumanian intentions, but after a thorough analysis of the captured orders he realized that
0 S tO 30 30 40 50KM

_________ CONTRAL POWERS

(AUSTRIANS AND GERMANSI

• RUMANIANS

FORCES UNDER GEN. MORGEPI FORCES UNDER GRN. KRAFFI FORCES UNDER GEN. SCHMRTIOW

FORCES UNDER GEN. KUHP4E

The BAflLE of the ARGES

Situation on November 29, evenIng.

115
SURPR1SE 103

General Kuehne's forces were in an exceptionally favorable

position not only to parry a dangerous Rumanian blow against

the left wing of his Army of the Danube, but also to hit the

enemy strongly and offensively at a decisive point. For the

Rumanians, while attacking, opened themselves to attack on

their flank and rear. Falkenhayn, therefore, ordered General Kuhne to hurry to the battlefield.

Incidentally, before the capture of the two staff-officers,

another Rumanian order had fallen into German hands. This

was an order from General Presan himself, dated November

29 and addressed to the division on the open flank of the

macse de manoeuvre. The order contained ample information of

the Rumanian plan and in particular of the mission of the masse de manoeuvre. Yet, the staff of the cavalry division which came into its possession apparently failed to transmit

this valuable document to General von Falkenhayn.

Such incidents are typical and inavoidable in a war with

mass-armies. Every student of World War I will know many other examples of the kind. Important orders, even those

emanating from the highest military authorities, were capttgred

by he opposing army during practically every big operaon. In former times, operational orders were seldom lost to the

enemy. This, particular danger to secrecy ztrose under modern

conditions, when it became necessary to multiply important orders

because numerous persons must know them. There is hardly

a way of dispensing with the multiplication of orders, although

this will certainly continue to be the source of difficulty.

Care sho:dd he takez to inform .rubordinate comnmanders only

of the most necessary details and to reveal to them only those

points which they must know for accomplishing their particular

tasks. The enemy should be unable to deduce the whole plan

from a single captured order. To give orders in such a way

is certainly a laborious process, but the additional troubles which

the staff must incur when editing such orders will undoubtedly

be worth while. The orders for the Rumanian First Army

carried by the two captured staff-officers contained the orders

for all divisions of the masse de. manoeuvre. This, of course,

was unnecessary. Since he advance of the open wing of the masse de manoeuvre afid its reinforcement by a division from

the First Army clearly constituted a heavy risk, as do all marches

along the front of the opponent, it was of extreme importance
104 SURPRISE

to keep these movements as secret as possible. Yet they were

mentioned in the captured documents.

TranyIvanian Campaign

The campaign of the German Ninth Army in Transylvania

began with a surprise. In September, 1916, the Rumanian army

stood in a semicircle around the units of the Central Powers

in Transylvania, threatening to annihilate them by concentric

attack. The situation was similar to that in which the Austrian.

Hungarian Army found itself on the Russian southwestern

front in the summer of 1914. The Rumanians were numerically much stronger than the forces of the Central Powers.

Yet in order to attack they would have been obliged to travel

over several mountain-passes and to divide their forces. Thus,

the Central Powers could find a chance successively to beat

the different parts of the Rumanian army.

To avoid the danger of a Rumanian concentric attack on the

German Ninth Army, a German offensive had to be undertaken

against the westernmost Rumanian units. General von Falkenliayn decided to strike his first blow against the Rumanian

forces near Hermannstadt. He estimated the Rumanians at

twice the number of his own force. This, of course, ruled out

a frontal attack, for by attacking frontally, General von Falkenhayn would have had no troops left for an operation against the Rumanian flanks and would have run the risk of being

attacked himself on his own wings by superior forces.

General von Falkenhayn was informed that, contrary to expectation, the mountains of Cibina could be negotiated by

strong detachments, comparatively speaking. If it was possible

to advance through these mountains towards the Red Tower

Pass, the enemy could be outflanked and his only supply road

cut. If this was done, there was a good chance that a frontal

attack would also be successful, despite numerical inferiority.

General von Falkenhayn did not plan the battle of Her. mannstadt as a battle of single or double encirclement. Instead, he attempted to combine an attack against the enemy's only

supply line with a rather reckless frontal attack.

Falkenhayn on September 20 discussed his plan with his

commanding generals. General Krafft von Dellmensingen was

directed to prepare the attack of Alpine troops through the mountains of Cibina Two days later the mountain troops
SURPRISE 105

began to move while other German forces were being concentrated north of Hermannstadt.

General von Falkenhayn intended to launch his attack on

September 26. A whole corps was to move forward on both

sides of Hermannstadt in the general direction of the Red Tower

Pass. By the same date, it was expected that the Alpine detachments would approach the pass, and also attack. German

cavalry units, supported by Austro-Hungarin infantry, were

directed to divert from the battlefield the Rumanian Second

Army which had taken up positions east of Hermannstadt. For

an intervention of the Rumanian Second Army would have endangered the whole position of the German Ninth Army.

Moa'niain Operations

The crux of Falkenhayn's plan depended upon whether the

Alpine detachment would arrive in time in the enemy's rear

and would be able effectively to close the Red Tower Pass. True

enough, the Rumanians were surprised by the unexpected raid

of these troops across mountains over six thousand feet high,

using mule-tracks and stony paths as roads. rhe commande ?f

the Rumanian First Army, General Culcer, had given orders to

watch the moutitains of Cibina, yet the officer in command of

this front, who did not believe in the practicability of an enemy

thrust through these inhospitable mountains, had recalled all

guards to reinforce his positions near Herrnannstadt. The history of war offers many examples of a sector which is re- putedly not negotiable being passed by strong forces and thus

used for surprising the enemy. Some Rumanian guards were

still in the mountains when the first Germans appeared. One

Rumanian position fell to the advanced guards of a Bavarian

brigade, but its garrison escaped. Rumanian shepherds also informed the Rumanian command of the German advance, but

the Rumanian commander whose attention was concentrated on

other operations, did not consider these reports as important.

Some types of military commanders prefer to believe in their

own intuition rather than in- reliable intelligence. Only one

battalion and some guns were diverted for the protection of

the Red Tower Pass; another battalion was dispatched to protect the regions west of the pass. These two battalions were

attacked the next day by the German mountain troops.
16 SURPRISE

At long last, the Rumanian commander realized the situation

and hurriedly dispatched reinforcements to the pass. On

September 27 further Rumanian reinforcements arrived at the

southern exit of the pass. They immediately counter-attacked

through the pass as well as through the mountains farther

west, while additional reinforcements arrived from the north.

The German units were much too weak effectively to close

the pass and to defend many miles of the pass road against an

enemy, 'by now numerically superior and trying his utmost to

reopen his only supply line. Besides, the supplying of the

German detachment through the mountains was extremely diflicult. The Germans in the pass were soon in a critical situation.

They were unable definitely to disrupt the enemy's communicattons, although they effectively disordered them. Falkenhayn's

plan was not a complete success, but this menace against the

rear and the Red Tower Pass communications of the Ruinanians considerably helped the Germans in the battle of

l-lcrmannstadt.

l7alkenhayn was more successful with his plan to keep the

Second Rumanian Army far from the battlefield. The Rumanian High Command and the commander of the Rumanian

Second Army realized the difficulties of the First Army too late.

During the afternoon of September 27 the Second Army was

ordered to move to the west and to begin a powerful westward

offensive which, at first, made good progress. But on September 29 the right wing of the Rumanian army was stopped

and finally beaten back. Other Rumanian forces on both banks

of the river Alt could make but little progress against German

cavalry and were unable to intervene in the battle of Hermanntadt. On the other hand, the units of the Rumanian First

Army which had fought north of the Red Tower Pass were

exhausted and had already begun to retreat.

As a result of the incomplete control of this pass by the

German mountain troops, the Rumanian retreat succeeded, a!-

Lhough the Rumanians lost most of their vehicles. Too, the

iioralc of their troops was seriously impaired by this operation.

Forces Too Weak For Tack

Falkenhayn's plan to cut off the Rumanian communications

near Hermannstadt and to encircle strong Rumanian forces failed.
SURPRISE 107

True, the Rumanian commanders had been surprised by the unexpected dash of the mountain units through the mountains of

Cibina. But the German detachment was too weak for its

task. It was not strong enough at the beginning of the operation,

let alone after the Rumanians had been reinforced.

We remember that, according to Clausewitz, surprise should

be the means to achieve local numerical superiority. An operation which had not been expected by the opponent is only effective if undertaken by really superior forces. The degree of

numerical superiority of the forces executing the surprise move

must be determined by the opportunity to reinforce speedily,

and also by the ability of the opponent to bring up reinforcements.

In the battle of Hermannstadt both parties, numerically speaking, were more or less equal, although the Central Powers had

vast superiority in artillery. It was probably impossible to throw

stronger forces against the Red Tower Pass. A decisive victory

was therefore beyond Falkenhayn's powers and he was unable to

harvest all the Profits from his successful surprise. Nevertheless,

the daring move through the Cibina mountains facilitated the

frontal attack and jnade the Rumanian retreat véy difficult. The

Rumanian First Corps was thoroughly beaten; in this battle.

But the German forces which operated against the enemy's rear

were too weak to achieve the annihilation of their opponent.

In his study on the Battle of Cannae, Count von Schlieffen

emphasized that a battle of annihilation was raely won by inferior forces, If the enemy's numerical superiority is too great,

his front cannot be attacked and no forces can be spared for a

flanking operation. In such a case, the only expedient left

is to launch the ,,,ain auack against the flank, or, if possible,

against the rear and to push the enemy against an unpassable

natural obstacle and to outflank him after he has been immobilized. In that way Frederick the Great once tried to win a

battle of annihilation against an army twice as strong as his.

But in his time, the envelopment of the enemy was a dicult

undertaking. Unless the turning movement remains a secret to

the enemy, its success is doubtful; If the enemy has time to

take appropriate counter-measures, the flanking maneuver must

fail. And only if secrecy can be combined with speed, is surprise possible.

During World War I strategic envelopment was repeatedly
O8 SURPRISE

attempted. We will examine sonic of these attempts in order to

determine just what role surprise played in them.

Before and during the battle of the Masurian Lakes both

sides had incomplete knowledge of the impending movements

of the enemy. The Germans were no longer assisted by Russian radio messages in plain language.

The commander of the German Eighth Army was under the

impression that the Russian Army of the Niemen prepared for

a long stand northwest of the Masurian Lakes. Yet the possibility of offensive moves on the part of the Russians could

not be ruled out. The exact strength of the enemy was unknown. In particular, the Germans disregarded the distribution

of the Russian forces east and south of the Masurian Lakes and

the question of whether reinforcements were approaching. As

it so often happens the Germans overestimated the Russian

strength, believing that they were opposed by twenty infantry

divisions. In reality, General von Rennenkampf, who in the

beginning of September had sixteen and one-half infantry divisions and five and one-half cavalry divisions, began the battle

with only fourteen infantry divisions.

Flank and Fro,:i Anack

The main Russian forces stood between the Kurische Haff

in the north and Lake Mauer in the south. A mere frontal

attack against their strong positions did not offer promising

prospects. An enveloping movement against the Russian northern flank, which was protected by the Baltic was, for geographical reasons, out of cjuestion. The German commander,

therefore, decided to combine a frontal attack with an attack

against the Russian southern flank. The difficult terrain south

of Loetzen, however, made a flanking maneuver extremely

complicated. The numerous lakes in this sector necessitated a

division of the German attacking forces, so that the Russians

could find an opportunity to fall upoi the German units piecemeal. Those German troops which had to advance south of the

lakes were particularly in danger of being attacked by strong

Russian units from the area of Lonsza and Grodno.

During the early phases of the battle, the German command apprehended a Russian counter-attack on the German

northern flank, although, with our present knowledge of the

situation, this fear is hard to understand. For in this case
SURPRISE 109

the Russians would have been obliged to evacuate very strong

positions and to attack the German forces supported from the

fortress of Koenigsberg. However, the German command was

justified in taking precautions. An army concentrating the

bulk of its forces against one of the enemy flanks always risks

a heavy counter-attack from the enemy's other flank. These

apprehensions were strengthened by the report of German

flyers, according to which the Russians had concentrated large

forces far behind their northern flank. The German leaders,

therefore, decided to reinforce their left wing Yet it proved

to be impossible to divert units from the right to the left

flank because the right wing had already advanced too far

to the east. This impossibility of reinforcing the left wing at

the expense of the right flank was very fortunate for the Germans, for they saw themselves compelled to resort to a ruse of war which not only deceived the Russians into taking

faulty positions, but also enabled the. Germans to achreve a sucessful surprise. It was particularly important to prevent a

Russian attack on the German left flank. The German radio

on September 7 transmitted a message en c/air suggesting the

arrival of two corps from the western front behind the German left wing.

The exact timing of the German frontal attack with the

attack against the Russian flank proved to be a major difficulty. It was hard to tell just bow long the crossing of the

lake sector would last, since the terrain offered good possibilities for delaying defensive action by even weak forces. In

point of fact, the enveloping movement was too slow for a

decisive German victory against the Russian Army. of the

Niemen.

The battle began on September 8 with the capture of the

Russian advanced positions. The main frontal attack was to

begin on September 9, yet the speed of its execution was to

be timed with the operations against the Russian flank. The

lake sector was crossed during September 6 and 7; the German troops had been opposed only by weak Russian forces.

Serious opposition had been encountered only on the right

flank, but had been overcome.

On the evening of September 9, the German right flank had

arrived near Lyck and in the zoile of Kruglanken-Possessern.
BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES

Situation, Sept. 9th, 1914, evening

P. 0. C..POST OF COMMAND

FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF GIN. VON DEl GOLTZ

f 0 10 20 30 40 S0&.

vu

of! tOo® a'ov (MSHA

RUSSIAN — GERMAN

43. RUSSIAN DIV. AND PARTS OF 7E DIV. 3RD. RESERVE DIV. AND ST. CAY. IRIS.
SURPRISE 111

The German command had the impression that the flanking

operation proceeded according to plan, but thought that the

capture of the Russian main positions would require a major

effort. It seemed advisable to postpone the main frontal attack

until the German flank had advanced still farther.

An Unexpected Evacuation

To the great surprise of the German leaders, the Russians

evacuated their main positions on September 10. This complete

and unexpected change was not immediately comprehensible.

In view of the strength of the Russians the German command

did not dare to begin a swift pursuit. Instead, they ordered

a limited advance and strongly admonished the troops to be

cautious.

Only after Rennenkatnpfs retreat had clearly been established

by air reconnaissance was a c1uickcr pursuit ordered, yet it did

not get under way before September 11.

How did the Russian leaders interpret the German strategy

before and during this battle? Still influenced by memory

of the catastrophe of Tannenberg, the Russians were uncertain whether the Germans would turn against th Army of the

Niemen or that of the Narev. They also considered the possibility of a German thrust against Warsaw which, after the

arrival of German forces from the western front, was certainly

within the realm of possibility. The Russian press by August 30

had already reported this important German troop movement

from the western to the eastern front.

Originally, General von Rennenkampf planned to fight defensively and to hold his strong natural positions behind the

line of the Deinie-Alle-Omet rivers and to cover his left flank

by the Masurian lakes. He expected a German attack in the

vicinity of Loetzen, but not a flanking movement farther south

which turned around the region of the lakes. He concentrated

his reserves behind his northern flank, fearing German amphibious operations across the Haff and perhaps by the Baltic.

On September 7 to his surprise-he learned of the German move- ment to the east along -the southern frontier of East Prussia. Realizing that the Germans were attempting to envelop his weak southern flank, he gave orders to attac strongly on a broad front the open flank of the wheeling Germans.
112 SURPRISE

Rennenkarnp/'s Irreso1,iticn

On the same day, however, the Russians received the German radio-message about the alleged arrival of two German

corps behind the northern flank. Rennenkampf became irresolute and could not make up his mind whether he should accept

battle or withdraw. In the hope that the Germans had made

available for their flanking maneuver only weak forces, he

finally resolved to make a stand.

The hope of stopping the envelopment attack- of the German right wing by a strong attack against its open side soon

proved vain. The Germans speedily overcame the Russian resistance, did not bother about the Russian forces in their flank

and rear and hurriedly proceeded northward.

This unexpected development obliged General von Rennenkampf to withdraw strong forces from his right flank and

to reinforce his threatened left wing. Yet this move came too

late to prevent the defeat of a Russian division on September

9 near Possessern. But on the next day th Russian left flank

had been reinforced by four infantry and three cavalry divisions. The Germans had not yet launched a really serious

attack on any of the Russian positions. The RussiAn general

had therefore no reason prematurely to break battle. Nevertheless, he preferred to extricate his troops from the threatening envelopment. During the afternoon of September 9 he

ordered the retreat of all Russian units north of the lakes.

This order came as a surprise to the Russian troops in the first

lines as well as to the Germans who just prepared their main

effort. The Russian retreat began in the night of September 10

and was completed without incident.

The Germans had thus won a victory. They had been victorious in an ordinary battle, but they had not achieved a decisive success. The result did not correspond to the hopes of

the German leaders. The Russians could not be compelled

to fight the battle out to the bitter end. They maintained an

open line of retreat and withdrew undisturbed, according to

their own will.

Numerically speaking, the situation was much more favorable for the Germans than at Tannenberg. The Germans

had 184 battalions, 99 squadrons and 1074 guns against 228

Russian battalions, 173 squadrons and 924 guns. Nor did the
SURPRISE 113

quality of Russian leadership prevent the Germans from win- ning a more decisive victory. The Russian commander saw

dangers which actually did not exist and put his reserves behind his right flank which never was in danger. On the other hand, he failed to protect his left wing and was caught by

surprise when the Germans began their envelopment maneu- ver. Consequently, the responsibility for the unsatisfactory out- come of the battle does lie on the German side.

According to the German plan, two thirds of the German forces

had to deliver a frontal attack on the Russian front; the last

third was ordered to outflank the Russian position. If General

von Rennenkampf had continued to fight until September 10

the German leaders would have discovered that their enveloping flank was to weak to achieve a quick and definite success.

By then they would have met strong Russian reinforcements

and in all probability would have been stopped.

Reserves lVcre Lacking

The Gerrans did not possess enough reserves to maintain

the superiority of their flank after the Russians had thrown

in their reserves. After all, since numerical superiority was

lacking in the Wattle of the Masurian Lakes, it was indispensable to achieve at least relative superiority at the decisive

point. The envelopment operation was conceived as the most

important part of the German attack. The decisive point, therefore, was on the German rght flank. Consequently, ac- cording to theory, the bulk of the German forces had to be

used on the right flank.

The commanders of the German Eighth Army disregarded

Count von Schlieffen's doctrine in. many essential points.

Schlieffen considered the flank attack as the essential operation

and advised that, in case of insufficient numbers, the necessary numerical superiority must be made available for the

flank by delivering the frontal attack with minimum strength.

But even with very weak numbers, the forces of the center have to do more than merely immobilize the enemy by long

distance artillery lire. "The enemy front," wrote Schlieffen, "must under all conditions be attacked." The postponement of the German frontal attack during the Mastirian battle en- abled the Russians to move their reserves behind their left

flank. One can be sure that General von Rennenkampf would
114 SURPRISE

not have dared to risk his reserves had he envisaged a German onslaught against his center. A German attack against

the Russian northern flank would have been particularly help.

ful, since it would have incited the Russians, who were already confused by the German radio message, to keep at least

some of their reserves in the north.

When on the night of September 9-10 General von Rennenkampf began to retreat, the German offensive against the

Russian front had not begun. The German flanking move had

not yet progressed sufficiently to deprive the enemy of his

initiative. The Russians were not yet enveloped, the German

flank was still far from advancing perpendicularly against the

Russian positions. Annihilation can only result from an attack

from two or three fronts. In the battle of the Masurian Lakes

the envelopment of only one flank was feasible. The Germans

should therefore have pushed the Russians back to another

line and forced Rennenkampf to retreat in an unfavorable

direction, preferably to the north against the Haff and the

lower Memel. But this was not possible before the German

flank, comprising the majority of the German forces, had

wheeled around Lake Mauer and was progressing northward.

The German offensive never matured. When on September 9

the Russian retreat started, the German center as well as

the German flank still faced due east.

None of the many attempts in World War I to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy by an attack against one single

flank was entirely successful. Most of these attempts led to

a greater or smaller victory, but none ended with the annihilation of the enemy. The battles of Leuthen and Zorndorf cannot

be easily imitated in modern war. The turning marches which Frederick the Great was still able to perform within a few

hours in the immediate vicinity of the battlefield, at present take days, if not weeks; moreover, they spread Out over vast

expanses of terrain. Surprise can hardly be achieved under

these circumstances. The opponent pre1iiaturely recognizes our

intentions and prepares appropriate counter-moves. The enemy

can either evade the flanking attack or withdraw his endangered flank. He may also extend his front and counter-attack with new forces.
SURPRISE 115

Success/ui Counter-Moves

In recent wars such counter-moves were fre9uently and successfully executed; for instance, by the Russians near Lodz

and Wilna. Even in wars under more primitive conditions, it proved to be difficult to annihilate the enestiy by a double

flank attack. In the Abyssinian War, particularly in the second

battle in Tembien and in the battle of Schiré, Badoglio tried

to annihilate his enemy by a pincer-attack. He could not accomplish his purpose since the Abyssinians slipped away be.

fore the Italian forces joined. In the Chinese War, the main

Japanese army under the leadership of General Terauchi could

not destroy the Chinese by a combined flank and frontal attack

in the battle of Paoting which took place in September, 1937.

The Chinese realized the Japanese's intention and retreated

before they were effectively turned. Some weeks later the battle

of Jengding took a similar course.

The experience of the Germans in the battles of Mons and

the Masurian Lakes caused the command of the German Ninth

Army to begin the frontal attack in the battle of Vloclavek on

whole day earlier than the flank attack. In addition, they placec

chiefly cavalry forces on their enveloping flank. However these

forces proved too weak to accomplish their task. The Russian

leader had enough time to extend his threatened wing and so

to forestall any envelopment. Besides, the sujiporting strong

infantry forces, despite a forced march, did not reach the

battlefield in time to defeat the Russian forces which successfully held up the German cavalry. The Russians had enough

time to retreat, because the Germans were unable to advance

deeply into the enemy's flank. All the battles mentioned above

show that an enveloping force can never arrive in time if it is

organized in deep echelons. Echelon formations with the main

forces in the second line are good only for defense, for it is

very difficult to transform them quickly into a formation with

the strongest forces in the first line, that is to say, into an

offensive echelon. Flanking attacks with defensive echelon

formations were rarely successful In recent wars, despite the

fact that they sometimes mislead the enemy. The method of outfianking the enemy with troops taken

from the first center lines, which the Germans tried before

Vilna, is still more unsatisfactory. On September 8, 1915, on

the eve of the battle of Vilna, seven German divisions (four
116 SURPRISE

of which had little value) stood against fifteen Russian divisions south of th, river Vilia. North of the Vilia eight and

one-half Russian divisions were confronted by ten and onehalf German infantry and four cavalry divisions.

The German offensive against Vilna was planned as a decisive operation which should lead to the annihilation of the

Russian units. Obviously, the relation of force did not favor

such an ambitious undertaking. Already on the first day of

battle, September 9, the German northern flank was leing

immobilized by strong Russian resistance. Only three infantry

divisions and one cavalry unit could be made available for the

attack on the flank. The German commanders intended to reinforce their attacking flank gradually by units no longer needed

on the central front. But superiority on the flank could not

be achieved by this method. It is true that the Russians were

surprised by the speed of the German wing, but its numerical

weakness enabled the Russians to deprive the German flank

attack of its strategic, potentialities.

Overlapping of Fronts

Instead of letting the encirclement proceed the Russians

retreated. At the same time they dispatched strong forces

from their central front to the threatened wing. Having all transport facilities of their own country at their disposal, they

were quicker than the Germans and, despite almost incredible

iiiarching performances of the German troops, extended their

line more speedily so that the Russian front soon overlapped

the German formations.

Finally, the Russians launched a counter-offensive against

the other German flank and on September 26 obliged the Gerrian commander, General von Eichhorn, to cease his offensive

moves altogether. By this time Eichhorn's forces were confonted by almost double Russian numerical superiority (181/z C•erman infantry and five cavalry divisions against 34 Russian

infantry and six cavalry divisions.) The battle of Vilna had

taken a course exactly contrary to that planned by the Ger- man command.

This battle suggests the conclusion that any attempt to

evolve flanking attacks from the first center lines must prove

futile.

An imitation of Frederick's oblique order was never tried
SURPRISE 117

in World War I, though this would have been possible by using an echelon formation with its main forces in the first

line for the envelopment attack. If an offensive echelon can

operate from an angular position against the enemy center, the chances for decisive victory are much better than if only a

defensive echelon is used, as in the battle of Viocavek. However, such a disposition will not remain secret for long. The

enemy will soon find out about the movements 'of the flank

and, since the main forces are in the first line, he will be

able to deduce the intended maneuver without difficulty. By

using offensive echelons, the attacker plays his trump-card first.

This is a definite disadvantage which demonstrates the value

of the use of offensive echelons for flanking maneuvers only

under exceptional circumstances.

The chances of flank attack would be considerably improved

if turning movements could be accomplished more quickly

than the advance of the frontally attacking center. The motorization of modern armies which permits the setting up of forinations with a speed superior to that of the infantry, opens

vast new possibilities. The speed of the new land weapons and of the air force has given back to military leadership the chance of surprising the enemy by speed, so that he may

be prevented from organizing an appropriate defense in time. An attack from two or three sides against the wings of the

enemy has therefore better chances in a future war than during

World War I. However, sufficient offensive striking-power of

the flanking units, which must at least be strong enough to

smash weak and defensive flanks, is still an essential condition

for a battle of annihilation. In addition, leadership has to

perform the difficult task of coordinating the movements of

several units with different speeds and of timing effectively

frontal with flank-attacks.

Concentric Movements

A battle of annihilation can also result from concentric

movements of independent armies comiag from different directions. This strategy led the Prussian Army "from Belle Alli- ance via Koeniggratz (Satlowa) to Sedan." Theoretically,

today it is still the simplest and most promising way to gain

a decisive victory. Yet, a concentric operation of the kind

requires secrecy. To maintain the secrecy of approaching
118 SURPRISE

armies in the era of air power will be more difficult than ever

before. In 'World War I, this strategy was successfully applied

at Tanncnberg, while in the campaign against Serbia in the

autumn of 1915 and during the offensive of the Central Powers

against Bucharest at the end of 1916, effective junctions of

the independent armies on the battlefield could not be achieved.

The encirclement of the Serbian army failed on account of

the difficult terrain and the tenacity and skill of the Serbs in

dcfense and retreat. Besides, one of the Austrian flanking

armies possessed only insufficient strength while the Bulgarians

advanced much too slowly. Nevertheless, the concentric attack

pushed the Serbians •back into inhospitable regions and put

them practically Out of the war. In the campaign against Bu- charest the Central Powers were hindered by the terrain, the

weather and the opponent himself. In particular, the skill and

mobility of the Rumanian High Command frustrated the German plan to maneuver the Rumanian army into a strategic situation where it could be encircled and destroyed. When the

intentions of the Central Powers became clear, the Rumanian

commander broke battle and saved his army.

In an operation on outer lines, energetic and unified leadership is indispensable. This has already been pointed out. In

both campaigns against the Serbs and the Rumanians, leader.

ship on the side of the Central Powers was much less unified

than on the side of their opponents who moreover were lightirg on the inner lines. The German and Austrian commanders

areed on the unification of their command only after the decisive battle for Valachia had already begun. Modern technical

fcilities will certainly help to improve the coordinated coin- n'nd of separate units.

It is no longer necessary, as in the nineteenth century, to

is;ue 'directives" in order to regulate the movements of separate

uiits for several days3. Operations on outer lines are theref.re favored by technical progress. On the other hand, the

tcchnical power of the defense, whith is so characteristic for nijdern war, facilitates operations on inner lines more than

ccncentric attacks. Operations on outer lines are purely offeisive enterprises while operations on inner lines are a corn- bation of offense and defense. Considering all elements, a concentric offensive of several armies was more difficult' to

xccute with the weapons of World War I than in the period
SURPRISE 119

between Leipzig and Koeniggratz (1815-1866). Schlieffen had

foreseen this development and had trained his students for

operations on inner lines. Moltke, however, had won his

classical victories by operations on outer lines. Since in all

modern armies weapons have been introduced to increase the

power ofoffense, the chances of the outer lines have been improved.

The rarity of concentric attacks in World War I must, at

least in part, be explained by the fact that the essential condi.

tions for such operations were usually lacking. Shortly after

the beginning of the war, the continuous front led to the re- emergence of linear strategy. Independent armies were not

created and gaps were filled before they even occurred.

Separation and Union

Moltke's doctrine that the art of leading big masses consists

in having thctn separated as long as possible and in quickly

uniting them on the battlefield soon fell into oblivion. In the

autumn of 1914 the art of war fundamentally changed after

the battle of the Marne when new methods had to be adopted.

The German victodes up to this moment were4 possible because the Germans could impose their law on an neiny entirely

taken by surprise. Ii was clear, howcver, that the enemy could neither be surprised again on the same front, nor with the

same methods. The French had strongly reinforced their left wing and they were careful to prevent new Geçman victories

on that flank. Consequently, the Germans could achieve new

successes in that sector only if they were able by surprise to

concentrate vastly superior masses. Yet the attack by larger

forces would have required larger spaces than were at the disl)osal of the German troops. It would therefore have been

necessary to give up a good portion of the conquered territory

and to withdraw the whole German army over a considerable

distance. Otherwise the necessary space could not be made

available. The moral and political consequences of such a bold decision had courageously to be trceepted.

It was particularly necessary to prevent the establishment of

a continuous front, because flanking attacks are only possible

if the front is not continuous. New military units should have

been formed and put together in one big shock army. This

new army should then have been assembled far behind the
120 SURPRISE

front and of course, should have operated independently from

the already existing and lighting German units. This is selfevident, according to all military theory. "If one undertakes

large scale strategic operations," said Moltke, "the separation

of the different armies must be maintained."

The strategic decision which General von Falkenhayn made

in the night of September 14-15, 1914, marks a turning point

in the history of strategic thought. At first, remaining within

the framework of military tradition, he envisaged a continuance

of the war of movement and attempts at a new enveloping offensive against the open flank of the Entente. For this, he

wished to take the German Sixth Army out of the front in

Lorraine and to concentrate it iii the vicinity of Maubeuge, where,

as a sort of shock army, it was to operate independent of the

rest of the German right wing.

It is doubtful whether this army would have been sufficiently

strong for this task. To fill the time-lag between the moment

when this decision was made and [lie moment when (lie Sixth

Army would have been ready to take (lie field, the right wing

of (lie German army had to retreat in an ecentric direction.

l'his was an excellent solution and quite in the pirit of German

military tradition. Yet, new strategical ideas determined Falkcohayn's decision. He decided against withdrawing the right wing of the German army and refused to relinquish con- cjuered territory. He was particularly anxious to avoid gaps between his different units, and after some hesitation, dismissed

(lie idea of an excentric retreat. Instead lie resolved to wage a new battle on the Noyon-Reims-Verdun line and to keep

the German army as close together as possible.

A Coniradiciory Task

The Sixth Army was transported to the sector of St.

Quentin, that is to say, much closer to the German right wing

than was originally intended. It was no longer to be used

for the offensive exclusively, but also to protect the right wing

of the German army. The explanation for this somewhat contradictory task lies in the fact that on September 15, General

von Falkenhayri became convinced that Joifre's intentions were

s;nilar to his own. The envelopment of the German flank by

the French and British could only be avoided by reinforcing

tl2e German wing and by extending the front-line.
SURPRISE 121

This was the origin of that singular and fateful operation

known to history as the course 1 Ia mer, the race to the sea.

Surprise is, of course, impossible in a race. Both sides know

the intentions of the opponent and both sides have the same

strategic objective. One is astonished to detect how small a

force each of the commanders employed for a battle which

both of them considered as decisive and final. Rarely in his.

tory were military leaders confronted with a similarly gigantic

task and, at the same time, with similarly even chances. But

the means both of them employed were insufficient. Joifre and

Falkenhayn failed, therefore, by necessity.

The main forces must fight on the front where the decision

is sought. If the main attack is to be delivered against the

enemys flank, the main forces must be thrown against it, if

possible in a direction perpendicular to that of the central

front. There was little chance in September, 1914, to surprise

the French by attacks at unexpected times or places. They could only be surpriscd by superior utimbers which should have attacked at a point where a dcciion was possible. But

numerical superiority on the German right flank was impossible

without recklessly weakening the center and the southern

flank of the German army.

As a matter of fact, this recklessness was the quintessence of

Schlieffen's doctrine. But none of the two commanders dared

to concentrate sufficient numbers for the decisive operation,

thereby risking the weakening of his other fronts. General

Joifre did not find any impressive solution for his strategical

problems despite the fact that he was in possession of an

excellent railroad system which still was unimpaired. Both

commanders committed the same errors and thus prevented a

decision on either side. The mistakes of one side were neutral.

ized by the mistakes of the other.

Forces Dribbled Away

In the race for the open flank, the method of "too little" prevailed. The forces of both armies were used up in driblets.

Despite the bloody sacrifice of the troops, the operation ended

in a draw; nowhere a real success was gained. At the end, the original plan to outflank the opponent had evaporated and was

replaced by a simple purpose, running faster than the op- ponent. The race led to the exhaustion of both armies. When
122 SURPRISE

it came to a stop, both commanders were confronted with the

new and unexpected problem of how to launch frontal infantry attacks against an enemy equipped with modern rifles

and machine-guns. An open flank no longer existed.

The aide de camp to the German Emperor, General von

Plessen, noted on September 28 in his diary: "It is incomprehensible why our right wing cannot defeat the French. Five

army corps arc unable to inflict a definite defeat on them,

though the French do not have numerical superiority." This

remark shows that the problem was not properly understood.

\Ton Plessen ignored that, as a result of the efficiency of modern

weapons, defense had become, technically speaking, more powerful than the offensive. Moreover, the difficulties of attack had

been considerably increased by the unfortunate strategic dispositions of the German High Command and the complete

absence of strategic surprise.

If generalship yields disappointing results, it is habitual to

appeal to the morale of [lie troops. In former times, this

expedient was sometimes quite successful. Iti the battles of

Leopold of Dessau and Frederick the Great, the Prussian troops,

after patriotic appeals, were sometimes capable of taking

by a 'brutal offensive' even "impregnable positions." In the

'var of 1870, it was already rather difficult to rely exclusively

(in heroism and to ignore the deadly effects of modern weapons.

Nevertheless, the impressive victory of Gravelotte-St. Privat

must largely be ascribed to the valor of the German troops who

defeated the enemy despite bad leadership and numerical and

technical inferiority. For a long time this "victory put the German army at the top of all European armies" (Count von

Schlieffen). Success a! Heavy Cost

One should not forget, however, that Gravelotte.St. Prival was

one of the bloodiest battles of the nineteenth century, nor that

the German success was extremely costly. In modern times,

even the utmost bravery is not an efficient expedient against

t1uick-uiring artillery and machine guns in prepared positions.

German subordinate commanders in 1914, had considerable

difficulty in explaining the new situation to their superiors who

could not understand why the advance of the troops was so

slow in comparison with the speed shown in former wars. If

the German leaders had taken into account the incomparable
suanus 123

efficiency of modern material, they probably would have understood that appeals to the morale of the troops are futile and

that victory is exclusively dependent upon appropriate strategic

dispositions, that is to say, upon surprise and concentration of

force. Masterly generalship usually has immediate positive

effects on the morale of the troops and is much more capable

of increasing their courage than even the most impressive and

convincing appeals in the order of the day.

On the other hand, unjustified optimism on the part of

the High Command has a very negative influence on morale.

The troops quickly Jose their confidence if reality substantially

differs from the situation as it has been depicted to them by

their commanders. Generals who lack the sense for the realiti

des choses tend to wishful thinking, especially in difficult

situations.

It must be admitted that during the difficult weeks of 1914,

the German High Command and some army commanders indulged in undue optimism. Time and again they were convinced

that they had smashed the flank of the enemy and that decisive

victory was within their grasp. When a new unit, however small,

was thrown into the battle, General von Falkenhaynwas confident that it would tip th balance in his favor. He consistently believed that the enemy was exhausted and that his lines were

about to crack. Falkenhayns optimism prevented the German

commanders from concentrating a numerically decisive superiority

of force on the German right flank.

But the strategy of the French Command in like manner failed.

On October 5, 1914, when the battle of Arras had reached its

peak, fourteen German divisions fought against fifteen French

divisions north of the Somme. That is to say, on the very

battlefield where both sides were out to gain a decisive victory,

both sides threw approximately only one-sixth of their total

strength into this supposedly decisive battle. At that moment,

the German Army had a totaJ strength of 831⁄2 divisions;

the Franco-British Army was composed of 851⁄2 divisions.

Under such circumstances, definite restilts cannot be achieved by

either side. The only result of this battle was a stedy expansion

of the front line. Never ir history had a simil* battle been

fought. Commanders of the past would have ndt understood

a battle fought against all the rules of art, developing mechanically and automatically without showing the influence of any
124 SURPRISE

strategic idea. Both commanders lacked a creative mind which

is so necessary for the solving of new military problems.

On account of technical progress, the art of war had not become

inapplicable during World War I. The art of war had not

been applied. The principles of concentration at the decisive

point and surprise as the means of achieving relative numerical

superiority were replaced by the undefinable rules of linear

strategy. The war of movement had come to an end.

Instead, a disastrous war of position was fought which could

never yield any clear decision.

NOTES, CHAPTER V

1. Battle of Tannenberg: The Battle of Tannenberg must indeed be

considered as a strategic masterpiece. Had the Russians not decisively

lost this important battle, they could have continued their offensive

into eastern Germany and should have bean able during the first weeks of World War I to advance at least beyond the Vistula. Tlii advance

would have fundamentally changed Gcrmanys strategical situation and

might have led to an early victory of the Entenic.

At the end of August, 1914, the Russian Army of the Narev moved

forward to the west. It was first attacked on its left flank, while its

ccntcr continued to advance successfully. When th German attack

did not develop satisfactorily, the center of gravity was shifted against

the Russian right wing. Later, the Germans also launched an attack

against the rear of the Narev Army. This latter attack was made

possible by the previous Russian advance which had driven a wedge

into the German lines. The German forces used for the attack on the

Russian right wing and rear had been taken out of the front opposite

the Russian Army of the Niemen. This army therefore was opposed

by practically no German forces.

The Germans would never have taken the risk of leaving the Niemen

Army alone if they had not by their radio monitors learned all important

details of the Russian disposition and intentions. If the Russians had

attacked with the Army of the Niemen, the Battle of Tannenberg would

probably have ended with a German defeat. According to some sources,

the inactivity of General von Rennenkampf was due to personal enmity

ngainst General Samsonoff.

2. German War Plan: While the German war plan of 1914 against

lie western powers is usually considered as a strategic masterpiece

tdespite the fact that driving Great Britain into the war definitely re

ulted in Germanys defeat) the German war plan in the east was

wholly insufficient. The Germans were favored by luck. Had Russian
suitI'1usi 125

kadcrship been morc capable, the Germans should ha4c lost the Battle

of Tannenberg and would have got into a very diflicult situation.

The main criticism made by the Germans themselves is that they

failed to cooperate closely with the Austrian army and to have one

single Austro-German war plan against Russia. Both countries together would have been able to oppose the Russian with adequate

torces, prticuIar1y so if the Austrians had not undertaken the superfluous campaign against Serbia. As it was, each of the countries

operated according to its own plan. The consequence of this faulty

strategy was that the Austrian army lost its striking power in an unequal offensive light against Russia.

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Austria was destroyed during

the fall of 1914. It is known that the breakdown of the Austrian empire

precipitated the German collapse. Incidentally, it is characteristic of

German strategy in 1914 that the Germans had buiit numerous and

strong fortifications in the west, where they intended to fight offensively,

but had almost no fortifications in the East, where they planned to remain on the defensive.

3. Speed of Fighting: General Erfurtl dma not takc into consideration that the speed of fighting has cnnsideinbly incrcaed, n that even

with the most perfect communications it will be diflicult to receive

detailed orders in time. "For every sixty minutes we had at our dis.

poal in muscle-moved warfare, in machine warfare we have nine when

faced by tanks and two when faced by aircraft. The old system of

command is therefore manifestly useless; for once thiigs get moving

there is no longer sufficient time to make out detailed operation orders

and filter them down to the troops, the men of action

"To do so in a division normally took about eight hours in the last

war, and in eight hours a tank may have moved 100 miles or more

and an airplane 2,000 . . . In watching and studying (Romrnel's)

several campaigns it has become clear to me that, so far, he has never

worked on what may be called a fixed plan . . . He has relied on

rapid decisions, spontaneously made to fit changing events. Instead

of working on detailed orders, it would appear that his subordinate

commanders have been taught to elaborate their actions from simple

ideas and in accordance with a few simple rules . . . It would appear

that the secrets of his tactics are to make fuller use of intelligence

than of obedience; to impregnate his soldiers with his ideas and then

leave it to the men on the spot to c1aboate them" (Major General

J. F. C. Fuller),

VI

Pursuit, Retreat, Diversion,

Counter-Attack

BEFORE the First World War,

pursuit was considered one of the essential elements, if not

the most essential element of war. Clausewitz pointed out that

victory without pursuit never yields great results. Schlieffen, too,

thought highly of an energetic pursuit which he regarded as

the necessary complement of a battle of annihilation. Pursuit

must be undertaken, he taught, irrespective of the fatigue of the

troops. No atUrntion should be paid to commanding officers who,

on account of the exhaustion of their soldiers, would like to discontinue pursuit.

Neertheless, "a direct pursuit, however energetically it may

be carried out, offers little chance of success." The pursung infantry as a rule is unable to,march quicker than the rct,reating

enemy. The opponent cannot be forced to accept battlq anew,

consequently his annihilation cannot be completed. Any pursuit

must stop after a short while. Direct pursuit should only be

undertaken by weak forces in an effort to win all successes they

can without spending themselves in excessive efforts. But the

bulk of the pursuing army must not advance in the same direction

as the fleeing enemy; instead there should be attempt to cut the

enemy line of retreat. Such a pursuit against the enemy's communication line is indispensable if the battle is to end decisively.

The theories of pursuit which date from the time before World

War I can be supported by many examples from Napoleon's campaigns, but by not a single example from the wars in the

second half of the nineteenth Century. No pursuit occurred in

the war of 1866, disregarding one insignificant exception. In

the war of 1870-1871, the Prussian army was equally unable to

pursue the fleeing enemy, at least not in a manner that would

have corresponded to theoretical exigencies. Moltke explained

127
128 SURPItISli

tiis by his subordinate commanders' lack of understanding of the

importance of pursuit.

But other reasons may have been more effective. The most

efficient form of pursuit is a march almost parallel to the enemy's

line of retreat, aiming at an important objective in the rear

of the retreating army. But such a march is possible only

under exceptional conditions. On the whole, it is only possible

if a strong and early attack has been launched against the

cnemys flank and rear. Where the battle consists of frontal

operations only, a pursuit to overtake the enemy should not be

undertaken.

After a frontal battle, pursuit consists of nothing more than

a mere following of the beaten enemy by the vietor; both

victor and vanquished have to take the same road. This kind

of pursuit occurred frequently during the fifty years previous to World War I. In the period of linear strategy, the "frontal pursuit" became the rule. Recent wars re.emphasized the old

experience that in a pursuit in which the enemy is merely

followed, instead of being cut off from his line of retreat, the

vanquished army is soon able to outrun its pusuer, to complete

its retreat undisturbed and even to resume battle whenever it

choses and its commanders think it is in a position to do so.

In the years following the 1914-18 war, however, several classical

pursuits were accomplished in mindr wars. In August, 1922,

the Turks were able to annihilate the Greak army by an effective pursuit which cut the Greek line of retreat. Similarly, the

Abyssinians were annihilated while retreating after the battle of Lake Ashangi.

Pursuit Difficulties Increased

The strong defensive power of modern armament is a new

clement which further increases the difficulties of pursuit.

Generally speaking, most pursuits stop after dusk, or are halted

at the next more or less strong natural position defended by a

few rearguards. If a pursuit is interrupted once, it is extremely

difficult to resume it. Modern technique has not only weakened

the attack, but also paralyzed pursuit while it favors the possibility

of retreat. It may be said that by the development of modern

matéx'iel, the whole strategy of retreat has been fundamentally

changed. This statement, however, loses its value if the pursuer
suiu'iusn 129

possesses mastery of the air and large superiority in mechanized

and motorized equipment as well. The pursuit operations in the

Abyssinian War were exceptionally effective because the Italians

could attack the helpless Abyssinians from the air. After the

battle in Schiré, the flight of the Abyssinians before the Italian

planes assumed "a tragic character." The Abyssinian retreat after

the hattie of Lake Aschangi became disorderly, not only on account of a successful Italian flanking maneuver, but chiefly because of the incessant air attacks1.

Before World War I military theory strongly opposed any form

of retreat, without even distinguishing between, voluntary re- treat and a retreat due to, or forced by, enepy superiority.

Even the breaking off of minor engagements was considered a

risk. According to the oflicial German doctrine, a unit which

with its major forces had been involved in a fight could only

under rare circumstances dare a discontinuance of the struggle.

Unless the disengaging maneuver was protected by terrain or

by strong cavalry, it was said to involve great dangers. Movements to the rear were supposed to be morally disintegrating even

if ordered without previous enemy pressure. It was held that

voluntary retreat would be equal to an avowal of defeat. Prewar manuals therefore advised that any fight should be continued

up to its final decision and, if necessary, by throwiig all available

reserves into the struggle. 'Moltke formulated tiis doctrine in

a rather dogmatic way: "He who waits until th opponent has closed, must fight it out." This opinion wal perhaps still

justified in Moltkes time; yet the disintegrating effects of retreat were certainly overestimated before World' War I.

At any rate, Moltke's doctrine lost validity after the machinegun was introduced into modern warfare. For this weapon enables the retreating army to stop the pursuer with only weak

rear guards while getting away with its main torces. An orderly

and well conducted retreat must be no means lead to a moral

crisis. This has repeatedly been proved during World War I.

Nevertheless, the official German doctrine stuck to Moltke's

formula and even Schlieffen still considered it as valid. He

usually refused to accept from his students any solution of

military problems in which voluntary retreats were envisaged,

regardless of whether the situation would be improved by the

proposed retreat. For Schlieffen any retreat was a defeat.
130 SURPRISE

0/Jensive Re/real Principle

This attitude on the part of the German authorities was the

main reason why the strategic potentialities of voluntary re- treats were not understood. In France, the principle of the

re/our o/Jensi/ was generally accepted, while German writers

emphasized only in rare instances that a combination of retreat

with counter-attack could be highly effective. In contrast to

German conceptions, French strategy and tactics tended to confuse and deceive the opponent. According to the French, the

re/our offensif is one of the most effective means of deception;

an especially appropriate method for achieving surprise. Consecuently, the army has to be trained not only for attack, but also

for retreat and in particular for the difficult switch from retreat

to counter-attack.

The French doctrine of strategic retreat was one of the main

reasons why, after the loss of the battle of the frontiers, the

French High Command quickly determined "to give up terrain

in order to organize a counter-attack farther inland," as General

J off re telegraphed to the French Minister of War. The Germans

were entirely mistaken about the characte and the purpose

of the French retreat. They overestimated the significance of

their own SUCCeSSeS and thought that they had already imposed

their law on the enemy. The official German attitude with

respect to retreats also influenced General von Falkenhayn when,

in September; 1914, he rejected the idea of withdrawing the

German right flank in order to gain increased strength for a

renewed attack and, instead of such mobile strategy resolved to

fight on in the positions he occupied at the time.

As long as World War I still remained a war of movement,

voluntary retreat and pursuit, diversion and counter-attack played an important role on all theatres of war. Modern weapons seemingly eliminate the war ofmovement in favor of a wa.r

of position. But in reality the war of movement was preserved,

at least to a certain extent, in operations of elusion and in

retreat-counter-attack combinations which, in some instances, must be considered as a paticularly energetic form of the war

of movement. This is not an entirely new phenomenon; former

wars offer many examples for successful counter-attacks after

retreat. Clausewitz compared the retreat of a great leader commanding an experienced army to the exit of a wounded lion.
SURPRISE 131

Modern warfare offers good opportunities for retreat-counterattack combinations.

In point of fact, most of the really great battles of our time

have actually been waged as a counterattack after a retreat

(for instance, the Battle of the Marne, the campaign of Lodz.

the Serbian counter-offensive late in 1914, the Battle of Warsaw

in August 1920). In all these battles, the factor of surprise assumed an important role. Each of these battles began with the

unexpected decision to disentangle an army from a difficult

position by voluntary retreat. These retreats, if begun n time

and commanded skilfully, usually succeeded—contrary to the ex- pectations of pre.World War I military theory. Even if the

enemy had envisaged the possibility of retreat, he was usually

surRrised when the retreat actually started. And from the very

beginning of retreat the retreating party usually improved its

situation.

Reireat Confused Russia,,,

During the night of August 20-21, 1914, the German Eighth

Army retreated from the battlefield of Gumbinnen. The Rissians were highly surprised next morning, when they discovered

this sudden change. However, the Russian command became

confused by that unexpected development and ordered that the

offensive should not be resumed before the Russian units had

rested, reorganized and receivd reinforcements.

The German leaders on September 10, 1914, were surprised

by the unexpected retreat of the Russian Army of the Niejien.

Since they did not grasp the intentions of the Russians, they kept

their troops back and waited for a further clarification of the

Russian tactics.

The Germans had been surprised by the Anglo-French retreat from the Sambre on the night of August 23-24, 1914.. The

retreat of the Central Powers from Poland in October, 1914, came

as an equal surprise to the Russians. General von Mackenseri,

on October 17, while still attacking Warsaw, confidentially informed his subordinate commanders that a retreat was imminent.

After the thorough destruction of railway, telegraph and telephone facilities, the blowing up of bridges and the evacuation of

all other military equipment the retreat commenced on the night of October 20. General von Mackensen vaiished like a ghost and left nothing behind. Only a few stragglers remained.
132 SURPRISE

The retreat of the Austrian First Army of October 26 on

the ncxt day was discovered by the Russians. It was similar to

the retreat of the German Eighth Army from the LötzcnAngerapp position, after the Germans had delivered a successful

blow near Stallupoenen on November 7 and 8, 1914. Similarly,

the Germans learned about the Russian retreat from Lodz, which

began in the evening of December 5, 1914, during the following morning.

The German retreat from the Marne on September 9, 1914,

was a complete surprise for the French 1-ugh Command. General

J offre did not understand the new situation until a whole day

had elapsed. On the evening of September 10 he issued

a general instruction in which, for the first time, he informed

the French Army of the German retreat and directed an enegetic

pursuit from the French center and left flank.

Voluntary elusion and evasion from the enemy is, however,

merely the first step towards a greater success. Disengaging from

the enemy may bring about a certain easing of a difficult situation. Yet the gain of time which results from voluntary retreats may be partly cancelled by loss of terrain and thereby

of space which is necessary for maneuver. Retreat can alter a

military situation only if it is used for re-grouping on&s forces

and for launching a new attack in the right direction. The

counter-attack should provide a second opportunity to surprise

the enemy (the first surprise having been the timely disentangling

from the enemy). This surprise should be accomplished with due

regard to time and terrain as well as to the numbers which

are required for making the counter-blow sufficiently powerful.

Military writers of pre-Worid 'War I times usually recommended retreat in an excentric direction. An excentric retreat

was supposed to screen one's own intentions better than a simple retreat along the axis of the previous advance. More.

over, the excentric retreat was believed to render pursuit more

difficult. Yet, during World War I, the simple retreat expedient

everywhere enjoyed marked preference. One usually withdrew

on a broad front, without the idea of launching a new offensive

from a rear-position. The intention was merely to continue with a passive defense farther back. The essential factors of

strategy—maneuver and movement—were discounted by the

tactical conceptions of trench-warfare.
SURPRISE 133

Retreats in Depth

The deep retreats of the Russian Army in 115 were simple

backward movements to new positions. Dariilov, the Russian

general, rghtly considered the absence of maneuvering as the

chief reason why the Russian retreats were so exceptionally

deep. Linear strategy, however, reached its peak in the RussianPolish War of 1920. After the Russian offensive in July north

of the Pribjat, the Polish army without offering resistance fell

back first on the old German positions from the World War,

then with increasing speed to the line Szczata-Niemen, later

to the line Bug-Narcv and finally almost to the Vistula. This

enormous retreat of nearly four hundred miles brought the

Polish capital and the battlefield closely together. Marshal

Pilsudski blamed the far-reaching results of the Russian victory

on the Auta to the trench warfare tactics dear to the heart of

the commander of the Polish northern front. Indeed, this officer

did not act in accordance with Schlieffen's precept that in order

to surprise the enemy one should never take up fixed positions,

but must. keep moving. He was satisfied with falling back from

one fortified line to the other, instead of trying to stop the

Russian offensive .(as Pilsudski had recommended) by maneuver

and counter-attack.

Tuchatchevski, the Russian comritinder-in-chif admitted that

after the Russian victory of July 4, 1920, he had no clear ideas

about the intentions of the Poles. it was therefore difficult

for him to take appropriate measures. After any success, he

wrote some years later, the commander of the victorious army is

confronted by a difficult choice. Shall he continue his offensive

in the former general direction and maintain the existing

disposition of his forces, or shall he re-group and select another

direction? Shall he leave all his forces in the front-line or

shall he form a reserve force? Shall he, therefore, pursue with weak forces and have strong reserves ready in case the reinforced

enemy strikes back or shall he recklessly advance? Tuchatchevski

rightly emphasized that an army can-hardly be re-grouped during

a speedy offensive, partictdarly if the destruction of railway

facilities makes the shiftiuig of large units almot impossible.

These were the same difficulties which in August, 1914, confronted the German chief-of-staff after the Franco-British army

had begun to fall back on the Marne. Actually, the Russians did

SURPRISE 135

not expect that the Poles would still be able Co execute strategic

maneuver. They counted upon a simple retreat on a broad front

which, at the beginning, the Poles carried out. The Russians

hoped to disintegrate the Polish army by merely pursuing them.

Neither side ever thought of surprise operations, though the

possibilities for very effective surprises were certainly not lacking

for either army. In particular, the Poles would have been able

to ly a trap for the Russians. The retreating army is usually

better informed about the opponent and what he is doing than

the pursuer, especially in the former's own country. During the

advance to the Marne, the German Army could learn many

details about the advantages of lighting in their own country.

Doubts and Possibilities

Military writers sometimes tend to doubt the possibility of

strategic surprise. They allege that surprise can never be achieved,

unless the opponent has previously been forced to occupy those

very positions which the surprising party wants him to occupy.

Otherwise the opponent could never be ott-maneuvered ahd

surprise accomplished. The opponent must either be immnke'1

or else completely unable to move and to rllaneuver. n

serted that unless he passively permits himself to be enveloped,

surprise is out bf the question.

These doubts seem to be partly justified, yet history shows

that not only surprises have effectively been staged, but that

also the attacked army usually contributed its own share to the

success of the attacker. Nevertheless, the switch from retreat

to attack . is an extremely complicated maneuver and is dependent upon some kind of aid from the pursuer. According

to Schlieffen, the main difficulty is to deprive the enemy of his

initiative and to regain the initiative for oneself after it had

been lost in previous phases of the battle. To remain on the

defensive and to continue with a retreat until the favorable

moment arrives, requires strong nerves and Napoleon's coup

d'oeil for strategic possibilities. The decision must be. made at

a moment when possibilities can only be dimly discerned.

The difficulties which oppose the strategy of counter-offensive

revealed themselves clearly during the opeltations of August,

1914, in Alsace-Lorraine. During these operations, the opinions, orders and counter-orders of the highest German military
136 SURPRISE

ahorities did not cease wavering2. Count von Schlieffen was

certainly justified in saying that lack of harmony between the

intentions of the commander-in-chief and the independence and

initiative of subordinate commanders constitutes the main trouble

of big armies. Harmony may only be achieved, says Schlieffen,

if the commanders of th different army groups adapt themselves to the ideas of the commander-in-chief, so that only one

single thought directs the entire army.

In Alsace-Lorraine, the divergence of views had to be eliminated by a clear order from the High Command. But on both

German flanks, the necessary energy of command was lacking.

Instead of issuing clear and binding orders, the High Command

contented itself with "wishes" and "proposals'' and timidly gave

in when the subordinate did not deign to accommodate himself

to the desires of the chief.

Traps and Their Chances

?vfilitary theorists are fond of asserting that successful surprises are more or less improbable because the enemy rarely

rtins into a trap which has been set for him. This prejudice

was the main reason why at the outbreak of World War I in

1914, the commander of the German Sixth Army gave up the

promising plan of falling back behind the river Saar and withdrawing on the Lorraine front in order to lure the French

into Germany and to attack them at both flanks after they had

driven a sufficiently deep wedge into the German lines. True,

Marshal Joifre after the war affirmed that he would not have

marched into a sack which the Germans had obligingly opened

for him. This statement, however, does not prove that he

would not actually have helped the Germans by walking into

the trap. At any rate, he had given orders to the French First

and Second Army to attack in direction of Saarburg. These

orders permit us to question whether his post-war assertion has

any real historical value.

To choose the right moment for the start of an undertaking

of any kind is very difficult. But in strategy the choice of the

right moment is particularly hard and, moreover, is of crucial

importance. Striking too soon means spoiling even a perfect

chance. The commander must not permit himself to be taken

in by the enthusiasm of the troops. He should not follow their

natural impulse to advance but, if need be, should be able to
SURPRISE 137

check his troops and curb forward movements, however promising they may look to victorious soldiers.

The German Army began the Battle of Lorraine too soon,

hence it could win only an "ordinary victory." The French did

not expect a German counter-attack on August 20, and were

effectively caught by surprise. But the German counter-attacking

forces were too weak and the direction of the German move

did not correspond to the strategic plan. It proved to be impossible to force the enemy into a different position. The

French were attacked only frontally. Therefore, they were

able to disengage and to withdraw to their original positions.

The German attempt at least to cut the retreat of some French

units was unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that the German

units were ordered to pursue relentlessly in the direction of

the Meurthe.

A counter-attack by an army retreating on a broad front is

not easy. It is particularly difficult to choose a direction that

may yield strategic results. Frec1uently, the counter-attacking

units will crash head-on into a strong enemy line. It is also

possible that two attacks clash and that no result will be achieved

despite a bloody and exhausting fight.

Results at St. Queztiz

T11is, for instance, was the fate of the counter-attack of the

French Fifth Army near St. Quentin on August 29-30, 1914, the

failure of which was easily predictable. It may be presumed

that General Joifre intended at first merely a diversion-attack

to relieve the hard-pressed British army. However, General

Lanrezac objected to this project with apparently rather good

reason and the French generalissimo had to use strong language

to make himself obeyed. He declared that the fate of the

whole campaign depended upon Lanrezac's attack on St. Quentin

and that, by means of surprise, this move could give "decisive

results." He asked General Lanrezac to execute his orders

'sans discuter."

Lanrezac was not convinced, but began the attack in the

morning of August 29. The ceufse of events proved him to be right and disproved General Joifre. It is true that the

French counter-attack was a complete surprise for the German

command and for most of the German diyisions. On the

western bank of the Oise, a serious crisis occurred in
0 5 10

The Battles on November 7th and 8th,

1914

in EASTERN PRUSSIA

000

of U'yaIyr
SURPRISE 139

German ranks. However, the situation was soon well in hand

again and the French did not succeed in forcing the Germans

on the defensive. On the second day, the attack of the French

Army petered out and the Germans launched an attack of their

own from the southern bank of the Oise near Guise.

Some hours later, the French Fifth Army was already in

difficulties; General Lanrezac reported to the commander-inchief that his army might be cut off, if it remained much longer

in the present position. Since he was under formal and strict

'orders to attack he would Continue to do so, but not on his

own responsibility. Instead, the French High Command itself

had to assume the responsibility for this opertion. General

Joifre was not prepared to accept such a heavy risk. During

the night of August 29-30, he ordered the French Fifth Army

to resume its retreat. General Lanrezac received this order

late in the morning of August 30, and was obliged to break

off battle in plain daylight. During the disengagement, the

French suffered heavy losses and could retreat but slowly.

As a consecluence of this two-day-battle and the subsejucnt

retreat, the French Fifth Army had lost much of its striking

power. Yet the Germans let the French go and most of the

German soldiers were permitted to rest. The German commanders were con'tent with pursuing the French with artillery

and smaller infantry detachments in light march4ng order. Such

a pursuit, of course, could not lead to any rea' success. One

may be sure that under similar circumstances Count von Schhieffen would have driven ahead and paid not the least attention to

the fatigue of the troops and the apprenhensions of the commanding generals. Incidentally, the conduct of the Battle of St. Quentin was

greatly facilitated for the Germans by the seizure of important

documents. On the evening of August 29 they captured the

chief-of-staff of one of the French corps who carried the complete French order of attack in his pocket. This order revealed

every detail of the. French plan and informed the Germans of

the numerical strength of the French. The information proved

to be very helpful on the second dy of the battle.

Resulij in East Prussia

In East Prussia the Germans were more successful with a

combined retreat-counter-attack than the French near St. Quen-
140 suas'iusii

tin. On November 6, 1914, they stopped their retreat beyond

the Prussian eastern frontier. On November 7, 1914, they

launched a counter-attack against the Russian forces in the

vicinity of Stallupoenen. Because the region of Lake Wysztyt

and the brushwoods of Rominten can hardly be negotiated by

strong formations, the commander of the German Eighth Army

had correctly foreseen that the Russians would divide their

forces into two parts. This was a good opportunity to attack

the Russian units which passed north of this impenetrable

sector, namely the Russian Third Corps. This corps could be

attacked from the region of Stallupoenen on both flanks by a

corps under General von Bulow and in addition by the German

First Corps which proceeded by forced marches into the vicinity

of Tollmingkehmen. On November 7, the Germans attacked

the advancing Russian Third Corps (which had just been reinforced) on both sides of the Wirballen-Stallupoenen railroad

and also the Russian Cavalry corps near Mehlkebmen under

General Gurko which protected the Russian left flank. The

Russians were hard hit by this surprise attack and alter having

suffered heavy losses retreated beyond the German frontier.

The engagement of Stallupoenen may serve as an example for a

well planned and executed diversion attack. Despite numerical

inferiority, the Germans were able to concentrate superior

numbers in the region where they intended to strike. Their

surprise attack was therefore successful.

The Austrian offensive in December, 1914, which was aimed

at the southern wing of the Russian army under the command

of General Diinitricv and which led to the battle of LimanovaLapanov shows strategical similarities. It also ended with a

marked success. According to the testimony of General Russki,

who at that time commanded the Russian northwestern front

• 'this dashing operation completely surprised the Russians and hit them at the most vulnerable spot of their entire front."

General Russki rightly called the battle of Limanowa "a

strategical masterpiece."

Reasons for Rendis

On the whole, a strategic counter-attack after a preceding retreat is a more ambitious, and hence more difficult, enterprise

than a diversion-attack with limited objectives. In recent wars,

a re/our offensif has been sometimes attempted in order to
suaius 141

alter the strategic situation as a whole. We sicaii now discuss

some of these attempts and see why they have dr have not been

successful. In particular, we shall try to detetmine what role

the factor of surprise played during these operations.

The analysis of the Battle of the Marne in September, 1914,

yields interesting results. First, it shows that the French made

their counter-attack with astonishingly weak forces which were

certainly not in proportion to their task; and, secondly, that the

Germans really had been surprised by the French maneuver.

The French generalissimo was not alone responsible for the

assembly of a new army in the region of Paris: This measure

must in part be attributed to the French Minister of War,

Messimy, who claims to have been solely responsible for it.

However this may be, Messimy asked on August 25 that three French corps should be earmarked for the defense of Paris. The next day, the Governor of Paris, General Galliéni, who worried about the security of the French capital, insisted on

the urgent dispatch of additional troops to Paris. Had these

troops not been formed into the Army of Paris, the French

attack on the right German wing would have been still weaker

than it actually was. As it was, the old principle that one must be strongest at the decisive point was by, no means adhered to.

At the end of the five-day battle on the Ourcq, the German

First Army comprised 128 battalions. These German battalions

were attacked by 127 French battalions, and at the beginning

of the battle even by a lesser number, It is trtc that the French

fought in conjunction with 64 British battalions, yet at the

most decisive point of this battle, at the extreme left wing of

the French army, the Germans possessed almost threefold superiority.

The German command had thus accepted the risk of being

numerically weaker on most parts of the front in order to concentrate a real striking power at the focal point. If the French

desired to win a final victory on the Marne, they should have

attacked with overwhelming odds. In discussing a similar

strategic situation, Schlieffen oncv remarked that a flanking

attack against the enemy's line of retreat should never be

launched "with four corps, but with everything one has3." With

a superiority of a few divisions the French could not expect to disrupt the German front, let alone overthrow the German
142 SURPRISE

army. It is true that the French commander did not have so

ambitious a plan. He did not wage a decisive battle north

of Paris; he merely attempted a limited counter-attack against

the two German flanks on the Meuse and near Paris respectively,

without. forming a center of gravity on either spot.

Gaiiéni vs. Joffre

General Galliéni had a much clearer view of the German

situation, but Joifre was not at all pleased with the former's

proposal to attack strongly the flank of the German First Army.

At first, Joifre even refused to be dragged into a "premature

offensive." Galliéni, however, accepted no refusal and insisted

that the circumstances were favorable for a counter-attack, since

the flank of the German Army was protected by only one

single corps. Joifre finally realized the opportunity himself

and on September 4 accepted the Plan of his subordinate.

The Germans made many contributions of their own to the

success of the French counter-attack. After the battle of the

frontiers, the German High Command belkved the French to be

in full retreat towards Paris. They expeèted the French to

make several stands, first behind the Aisne and then behind the

Marne. They also considered possible a French concentration

on the lower Seine and believed in a French diversion-offensive

in Lorraine. The German Army was therefore ordered to pursue

the French to Paris. The German High Command evidently

exaggerated the importance of the victories which had already

been won. The French were supposed to be exhausted and a

retoiir oJJ ensif was considered out of question.

According to the German High Command, relentless pursuit

would definitely break down French resistance. Consequently,

no re-grouping of the German forces nor a concentration of

strong forces at one point was deemed to be necessary. On

the evening of August 30 the German High Command changed

the direction of the advance and turned the wing of the German

army from southwest to south. On September 2 the German High Command announced its intention to push the French

back to the southeast, instead of forcing them into Paris. The

German First Army was ordered to advance more slowly than

the Second Army whose flanks it had to cover.

At that moment, however, the German chief-of-staff received

advance warning of impending misfortune. Air reconnaissance
SURPRISE 143

disclosed that the French had begun to move large bodies of

troops to the southwest. In spite of the hot- German pursuit,

the French, with the help of their railways, were apparently

still capable of re-grouping. On the next day, these reports were confirmed and the Germans suspected that the French

withdrew troops from Lorraine, a conjecturer which was con- firmed on the afternoon of September 4. 'lIhe German commander could no longer doubt that the French were preparing

a large scale counter-blow.

On the same day serious trouble arose for the German chiefof-staff. He suddenly received unexpected information that

the German First Army, instead of following the German

Second Army farther behind, had crossed the Marne west of

Chateau-Thierry. In the evening of September 4 he had a

radio message from the First Army informing him that this army had continued its advance (luring the whole day. The

First Army tried to envelop the French Army in a southeastern

direction, while the protection of its flanks had been entrusteji

to small forces. - Attack From Paris Feared

What would happen if the French launched a strong attack

from Paris? Was there still a chance to forestall the danger

which menaced the German right flank? The moment had

come to reconsider whether the operations 'ust in execution were to be continued, or if the maintenance of the original

plan would not lead into serious trouble. Had the German

operation still a good chance to warrant tie acceptance of

heavy risks? The German chief-of-staff was confronted b

the alternative of either stopping the pursuit of the Frenc

army and re-grouping his forces for a new operation, or of

leaving everything as it was and continuing the advance. He

adopted the latter solution and thus contributed to the success

of the French counter-attack.

The French enterprise was also being favored by unexpected

luck and favorable circumstances Still, as late as the evening

of September 4 it was possible t protect effectively the German

right wing against a Ftench blow from Paris. It was merely

necessary to re-group the German First Army. The German

commander-in-chief issued an order to that purpose, but unfortunately worded it in so complicated a way that it was not
144 SURPRISE

understood by his subordinates. The order ran as follows:

"First and Second Army remain in front east of Paris, the

First Army between Oise and Marne, the Second between Marne

and Seine."

When Moltke wrote this order he already knew that a great

part of the First Army stood south of the Marne and had advanced far away from the Oise. Instead of ordering the First Army to remain east of Paris, he should have ordered the

retreat to the positions between Oise and Marne. This retreat

was unavoidable, if the German flank was to be protected at

all. Besides, the commander of the First Army should have

been informed about the re-grouping of the French army, but

for some reason or other he never received this vital information.

Air Survey incomplete

To make things even worse, the First Army completely failed

to reconnoiter in direction of Paris. The available aircraft was

used only for reconnaissance to the south. The Second Army

reconnoitered in the same direction; the extreme German flank

had no aircraft at all. Only one corps reconnoitered to the

west and indeed did not fail to report the concentration of strong

French forces northeast of Paris. This report, however, was not

transmitted to the commander of the First Army. The lack

of information was therefore exclusively due to the faulty use of air reconnaissance.

Yet the commander of the First Army interpreted it as proof

that the German flank was safe. Consequently, General von

Kluck on September 5 continued his advance to the south, thus

getting further away from Paris. A rapid forward movement,

he felt, would hasten the disintegration of the French army.

Some of his oflicers warned him, however, of the great risks involved in this advance, yet he rejected their objections as being

"imaginations of pessimistic minds." I-fe saw the situation of

the enemy through the lens of his own wishes and refused to

be disturbed by the "Ghost of Paris" until he had seen it in

flesh and blood.

So the singular situation arose that the governor of Paris

was lying in wait for his game and spotted all the movements of the Germans. Galliéni could deliberately choose the right

moment, because the Germans had concentrated their attention

to the south and ignored the dangers from Paris. They con-
SURPRISE 145

tinued to march southward thereby more and more uncovering

their flank, against which a lurking enemy was about to strike

a hard blow.

As it was, the French attack on September 5 from. Paris took

the German First Army completely by surprise. On that day,

the disposition of the German units was particularly unfavorable -. The danger for the whole German flank was extreme.

The numerical weakness of the French attacking forces was

solely responsible for the limited French success, although the

German leaders at last became equal to their responsibilities

and, together with their troops, showed themselves able to

master a particularly difficult situation. Had the French attacked with stronger forces, a disaster for the German army

would have been unavoidable. Had the French attacked with

double or triple the strength of Galliénis force, and had they

encountered an opponent of lesser military qualities, their attack

would possibly have decided the whole war

In the Battle of the Marne, the French commander certainly

sinned against the principle of concentration. His mistake 'as

repeated by the German chief-of-staff when in November, 1914, he sought not only to smash by a counter-attack the right flank

of the Russian 'army, but by pressing against. their rear to force

the Russians to accept battle on a reversed front. If General

von Falkenhayn with twelve German corps had adhered to his

original plan of. making a surprise attack in the region of Thorn, a great victory would have been won aid the war in the east

would perhaps have been triumphantly ended.

Viciories Bred Crisis

The German Eastern Army was to weak fr such an ambitious

undertaking. Big victories require big means. The offensive

of Lodz, attempted with insufficient forces, came quickly to a

standstill and despite brilliant victories led to a serious crisis

for the Germans. It miscarried because it proved to be impossible to maintain numerical superiority throughout the

battle.

The Germans started thek offensive under particularly favorable circumstances. The German commander knew all the details of the Russian strength, disposition anti organization. In

the last minute, he learned beyond any doubt that the Russians had ceased to advance farther to the south. Hence he was
IUDAPS1 November 3, 1914

so o soo

Hungary —

MIS1$ANS AND

HUNGARIANS = RUSSIANS
SURPRISE 147

able to take strong forces away from the south.rn front and

to organize an offensive center of gravity in the area of Thorn.

The reports of German air reconnaissance and of the German

land forces were confirmed by lengthy Russian radio messages which the Germans deciphered without difficulty. Thus, the

enemy facilitated the German preparations for a battle of

annihilation. It was only necessary to hide from the Russians

the transport of German shock-troops from southern Poland

and East Prussia to Thorn. Extensive precautions were

taken to keep the German troop movements secret. The weaker

one's own force, the more is surprise esse,ztial.

The successful surprise of the Russians was facilitated by a

set of favorable conditions. The Russians did not yet possess

modern air reconnaissance. The brevity and relative darkness of

November days made the screening of marches and railway

transports comparatively simple. The concentration of the

German offensive force could be covered by German cavalçy

because the Russians remained passive and were not at all eag4r

to learn about developments behind the German lines. Tila

Russians ignored the fact that some German formations had

been diverted from southern Poland to adother front; the

Russian cavalry had failed to push on with ts pursuit behind

the retreating German Eighth Army. There is little doubt, therefore, that the Germans were favored by luck when preparing the maneuver of Lodz.

If motorized reconnaissance units had existed at that time,

heavy railroad traffic almost under the noses of the Russians

could hardly have remained unnoticed. Besides, the tspeed of

the German maneuver contributed to the success of the surprise operation. The decision to attack the northern Russian

flank was made on November 3. On November 4, the as- sembly of the German attack formation began. On November

10, the German concentration was terminated and the German

cavalry began its forward movement. On November 11, the

offensive started in full.

The Russians unwittingly and, carelessly continued to inform

the Germans about their dispositions by tranmitting inter-army

orders and intelligence in clear by radio. Like General Galliéni

before the Battle of the Marne, General vomi Mackensen prior

to the offensive of Lodz knew everything about the Russian

situation. In addition, the Russians failed to discover the
148 SIJftPRISE

German concentration near Thorn and learned of the impending

storm only a short while before the Germans actually began

to move.

Fruits of Surprise Lost

This surprise concentration of the German Ninth Army was

an excellent performance and had been recognized as such by

the Russians themselves. General Danilov writes: "Our slowness and incapacity for gaining information of the opponent

must be contrasted with the German speed and with their accomplished art of maintaining secrecy. Therefore, their blow

caught us entirely by surprise."

Neither German efficiency nor the luck by which the Germans

were favored, nor finally the information which unconsciously

the Russians vouchsafed to the Germans were, however, sufficient for gaining a really decisive success. The surprise

which had so brilliantly been accomplished was not exploited

by the Germans who failed to achieve numerical superiority at

the decisive point. They did not succeed in concentrating more

troops than the enemy expected. Obviously, surprise alone can

never be effective, it is only a condition of success, not the

success itself. Surftrisc' tunsi be .rnppleiienied by ,,umerical

superiorily which, under all co,zditions, remains the most insportent objective of the strategical art and the most general principle of victory. (Clausewitz). The offensive of Lodz, it is true, was begun on the German

side with a small margin of superiority, but this margin was

speedily lost. Eleven German infantry and five cavalry divisions marched on November 11 against four Russian infantry and five cavalry divisions. Up to November 25, when

the offensive finally stopped, the Germans had been reinforced

by five weak Landsturm brigades, that is to say, by a secondrate reserve force, hardly suitable for active warfare. During

the same period, Russian infantry had grown to 261⁄2 divisions.

Altogether about 123 German battalions with about 800 guns

fought against 204 Russian battalions with 750 guns in the

region of Lodz. In the area of Lovitch, the situation was still

more unfavorable for the Germans. Here, 34 German battalions

with 100 guns were opposed by 160 Russian battalions and

384 guns.

In a modern battle, even the highest heroism cannot compen.
SURPRISE 149

sate for such inferiority. The overwhelming importance of

numerical superiority did not diminish in the least with the

improvement of modern materiel, regardless of whether it is

absolute or merely a relative superiority achieved by good

generalship. The failure to concentrate sufficient forces for the

Lodz offensive was largely due to the fact that Germany had

to wage war on two separate fronts. Before World War I, Count von Schileffen had often

discussed the strategic implications of a simultaneous war against

France and Russia. He repeatedly pondered situations which

necessitated the shifting of the main effort from one front to

the other. Schlieffen emphatically warned against dividing the

German Army so that it would be numerically weaker on both

fronts. According to him, the minimum force for large-scale

strategic operations against Russia was an army of nine to

eleven corps. To conclude this chapter, we desire to discuss several cxainpies of successful strategic counter-attacks. The Serbiari carepaign of autumn 1914 is one of the most impressive examplçs

of that kind. The Serbian commander-in-chief, Voyvod Putnik;

evaded the Austrian-Hungarian offensive until the Austrian

army had over-xtcnded its communication lines and slowed

down its movements. The Serbian leader had strong enough

nerves to wait for a long time for striking back, though the Serbian army had suffered severely under the strain of the

continuous retreat and though the commanders of the Serbian

armies urged an early counter-offensive.

Co,zceniration and Surprise Won

The Serbian counter-offensive was launched after the Serbian

wing had been strongly reinforced. The Serbs had concentrated their main striking power at the point where they wished

to make their main effort. The Serbian counter-offensive proved

to be highly successful, particularly because he Austrian com- mander, General Potiorek, did not believe that the Serbs were

still able to attack. He thought that after long weeks of retreat the Serbs were at he end of their rope. Thus, Putnik

held both trump cards, surprise and concentration, in his hands

and achieved with his little army a brilliant yictory against two

entire Austro-Hungarian armies.

The most impressive example of a surprise-counter-attack is
150 SURPRISE

the Battle of Warsaw which decided the Russian-Polish war.

On the night of August 7-8, 1920, the Polish northern front

continued its retreat from the line Biala.Janov, north of SiediceSokolov-Rozan. During the retreat, the Polish army was to be

re-grouped for the counter-offensive ordered by Marshal Pusudski on August 6. This offensive was based upon the fundamental idea that the Poles should hold a line along the Orzyclarev rivers and along the Vistula as far down as Ivangorod.

They should also try to retain the strongly fortified bridge-heads

of Modlin and Warsaw. The main Polish attack was to be

launched from the positions along the Wieprz river to the

north and northeast against the southern flank of the advancing

Russians. The Polish striking force was to comprise two in.

fantry divisions and one cavalry brigade of the Polish southern

front and three and one-half infantry divisions of the Polish

northern front. During the evenin of August 7, the Polish

Fourteenth, Sixteenth and Twenty-First infaitry divisions held

positions southwest and west of the Bug river,- as it is shown

on the map. In the following nights, these divisions retreated

due west to the line Siedlce-Lucov-Kock. During the night of

August 11-12, they turned around and moved southward to

the Wieprz river.

This perpendicular march across the axis of the enemy's advance resembles somewhat, the German deployment for the Battle of Tannenberg. The Russian Army of the Niemen in

1914 ignored the frontal march of two German corps. Similarly in 1920, the Russian Sbcteenth Army and the Russian High

Command failed to discover the departure of three Polish di- visions to the southwest and south. Tuchatchevsky, the commander of the Russian western front made the a priori assumption that the Poles ouId continue to retreat behind the Vistula.

He was therefore also convinced that the three Polish divisions

which had disappeared were continuing their retreat to the

west.

Tuchatchevsky was firmly resolved not to change his opinions

concerning his opponents attitude. He had the "strong con- viction" that' the Poles would never accept a decisive battle

east of the Vistula with the river in their rear, but would use

the Vistula as a military obstacle. Hence they would concentrate

their forces west of the river and so protect their capital and

their vital supply line with the port of Dantzig.
SURPRISE 151

Poles Surprise4 Russians

Tuchatchevsky planned to concentrate his main strength on his northern flank in orcer to envelop the Polish left wing

north of Warsaw. His own left wing had to deliver a frontal

attack on the bridgehead of Warsaw. For the protection of the Russian left wing itself, Tuchatchevsky had earmarked only

a small force. To protect himself in that zone he counted

entirely upon the early arrival of the Russian Twelfth Army

and of a large cavalry force which was still held u near

Lemberg. His plan, however, was purely wishful thinking, for the expected reinforcements for the Russian left flank

failed to appear.

In conclusion, three Russian armies moved northward while

the Russian Sixteenth Army operated directly towa&.'

'with its main concentration in the northern sector oi

field. The protection of the Russian left flank became the

mission of the small Mosyr group, some four thousand men,

which was ordered to move forward towards Parczev-Ivangorod.

This strange disposition of the Russian army certainly facilitated the execution of Marshal Pilsudski's plan. The three

Polish divisions 'which marched southward t take up their

positions on the Wieprz disengaged themselves from the enemy

and marched along his front without great difficulties. They were only in intermittent contact with the Mosyr group and

could calmly prepare for their counter-attack.

Not even once did Tuchatchevsky. consider the possibility that

Polish units would be diverted from the northeri to the southern

front. This is the more astonishing, as the Russian High Command for a long time had already expected a Polish counteroffensive from the area of Ivangorod and repeatedly drew

Tuthatchevsky's attention to this danger. The Russian commander did not even become doubtful when the southern flank

of his Sixteenth Army failed to encounter any Polish resistance.

Where were the Poles? Had they retreated from this front?

Tuchatchevsky did not doubt for one moment that the

Poles had retreated to the west. When some days before the

start of Pilsudski's' offensive an army order was found on a

dead Polish officer revealing the concentration of a new Polish

army south of Warsaw, Tuchatchevsky consIdered this as a

ruse to mislead him. Like many other generals, he fancied a

situation based on personal wishes, not on reality.
a0

t.fl

4

0
SURPRISE 153

As a consequence of these errors, which pccurred despite

repeated warnings, the Soviet leaders were fully surprised by

the Polish counter-offensive of August 16 against the Russian

southern flank from the Wieprz. The success of this strategic

relour offenjif was beyond expectation. The numerical weakness

of the Polish offensive-group was more than compensated by the

exhaustion of the Russian troops which were. tired by forced

marches of five weeks. The Poles achieved numerical superiority

at their point of attack and inflicted a crushing defeat on the

Mosyr group. The Russian Sixteenth Army was unfavorably

deployed at the time of the Polish attack and as quickly overrun. The Poles continued their northward advance and attacked

the flanks of the Russian Third and Fifteenth Ariy. These armies

tried hard to stop the Polish offensive and to keep open a line

of retreat for the Russian Fourth Army which had advanced

far to the west. But their efforts were in vain. The Third and

Fifteenth Army suffered extreme losses and the Fourth Army

could not be salvaged. It was pushed back to the frontier of East Prussia and uinally forced to save itself by passing ihq

German frontier. "Thus our magnificent operation which made

the capitals of almost every European country tremble caine to'

an end," wrote Tuchatchevsky.

Nevertheles? the Battle of Warsaw did not become a Cannae,

for the simple reason that the forces of Marsh;al Pilsudski were

too weak. Moreover there were no speedy units on the right

Polish flank to overtake the Russians and to cut off their retreat.

The entire Russian western army group could have been encircled

or pushed against the German frontier if the Polish right wing

had possessed greater mobility and speed than it actually had.

But even so, the Polish victory was decisive. The Russian troops

which escaped the Polish pursuit according to Tuchatchevsky

himself, reached the line Grodno-Volkovysk "in a lamentable

state." The Russo-Polish War was decided on the Vistula. The

Battle of the Niemen which took place at a later date was nothing

but an aftermath of the victorious Polish counter-offensive.

Basic Principle lzapplicable

Our survey of recent wars revealed the singular fact that, in

the period of mass-armies, it was rarely possible to apply the

basic principle of warfare and to concentrate superior masses at

the decisive point. That the concentration of vast numbers in
154 SURPRISE

one sector should be particularly difficult, in spite of our modern

transport facilities, is certainly a paradox. There is hardly any

doubt that World War I could have been decided on several occasions if the principle of concentration had been applied. The

failure to exploit strategic opportunities by quick concentrations

must be attributed to many and different causes.

Many promising opportunities were lost as a consequence of

errors of judgment, such as those on the German side in the

Battle of Mons and Namur. Sometimes the surprise could not

be accomplished because the attacked party prematurely detected the intentions of its opponent and was able to take

timely precautions, as did the Russians late in 1914 when they

frustrated the Austro-German advance to the middle Vistula.

It is true that errors of judgment and unsuccessful surprise

moves happen in any war and are by no means typical only of

World War I. It is, however, characteristic of that war that decisive results were not even accomplished in those instances where

the opponent was surprised and had himself contributed to the

surpriser's victory. In such cases, full success was not achieved

because the surprise was not utilized for developing numerical

superiority at the decisive point, as happened in the Battle of the

Marne in September, 1914, and during the offensive of Lodz in

the autumn of the same year.

What is the reason for these repeated failures to utilize succesful surprise for strategic concentration? The military leaders

of World War I realized of course, the necessity of forming a

center of gravity at the point of attack. Most of their actions

certainly served the idea of strategic concentration. Yet in

practice, they were unable to concentrate sufficient masses at

the decisive point. It appears thus that under modern conditions concentration of large forces is much more difficult than in

previous wars. Before World War 1, doubts had been expressed whether operations with an army of millions would be

as easy as with the typical nineteenth century army of one hundred thousand men.

To many soldiers, the conduct of an army of several millions

appeared as an insoluble problem. This view was strongly op- posed by Count von Schlieffen. "It is true," he wrote, "that

the command of an army was always an extremely difficult enterprise, whether the army was small or big. But it will be hard
SURPRISE 15,

to prove that the difficulties of military leadership increase in

the same proportion as the numbers of armies.

Schlieffen repeatedly discussed the question of how the

enemy's flank should be attacked. His answer was: "Not with

one or two corps, but with one or several armies. The attack of these armies should not be directed against the enemy's wing, but against his line of retreat." He admitted, however,

that only a military genius would dare take the risk of moving

all, or the largest part, of his forces against the enemy's flank,

let alone operate in the enemy's rear. His own war plan

against France is an example for such a risk.

Defense Acquires Strength

The principle of concentration is more important in oir

time than it ever was before, for the simple reason that defense has acquired a technical strength unknown in previous

periods and that, moreover, defense quickly increases its power

during battle, while the power of attack diminishes. Consquently, only the commander has a chance of winning a dedsiae

victory who, by snrftrise, is able to concentrate an almost incredible numeric,al superiority at the center of the battle. This

superiority must be so overwhelming that the organization of

the enemy army is immediately crushed.

Moreover, the numerical superiority must be maintained

throughout the entire operation without ever giving the opponent

a chance to re-establish quantitative equilibrium. Schlieffen

proposed to carry out attacks on the enemy flanks with some

twenty corps. This figure is certainly not a fantastic ex- aggeration. A striking force of that size is an absolute necessity

if a victory of annihilation shall be won against a modern

mass-army7.

Such thoughts clearly oppose many uses of modern linear strategy which, on the whole, is the result rather of tedinical

progress than of the numerical increase of armies. The armies

of the Russo-Polish War in 1920 were not larger than those

of the last century, yet linear strategy was applied in this war

still more than in World War 1.

The importance of terrain is being rated jnore highly since 1914 than by the classical writers of the 'ast century. The

maxim "hold whatever you have and never abandon a foot of ground which you won," was regarded by General von
16 SURPRISE

Falkenhayn as a new truth "beyond any doubt." Certainly,

this doctrine would not have found the approval of Napoleon,

Lee, Moltke, nor of Schlieffen who had taught the exact opposite:

"It is better to abandon a whole province than to divide an

army."

Schlieffen clearly recognized that especially in the period of

mass-armies, strategy of annihilation is only possible by continuous movement. Only by movement can rigid fronts be

avoided. It is possible that Falkenhayn spoke more as a politician than as a soldier and a strategist. He who does not

abandon terrain, usually obeys political pressure, but rarely

follows strategic consideration8.

The tendency to fill large spaces with a limited number of

troops in linear deployment, a tendency which made its appearance u-i World War I, Certainly does not correspond to the

opinions of the military classics.

Modern equipment makes it possible to protect vast expanses

by weak forces. This fact may be used as a favorable argument

for the division and dispersion of force which in former times

would have invited disaster. Unfortunately, technical progress

strengthened the old inclination to divide military forces according to unconscious sentiments and "traditional manners

without knowing why." (Clausewitz). Such habits are dangerous because they may prevent the concentration of sufficient

numbers.

Since it is impossible to attack everywhere on a broad front,

the forms of fighting must differ on various sectors. Attack

requires incomparably more force than defense. Therefore

strictest economy of force must prevail on all sectors where no

attacks take place. Schlieffen propounded the rule of diverting

to all secondary fronts "as much French forces as possible by as

few German forces as possible."

Sacrifices Must Be Made

This rule still holds good today; the unimportant fronts, or at least those fronts where the decisive battle is not being

fought, must make sacrifices for the sake of the decisive front. Consequently, the maxim "never abandon any ground" is not valid with respect to secondary fronts. If one wishes to win

a conclusive victory, one should not scatter one's forces in
suaPais. 157

order to hold unimportant terrain, nor protect areas of lesser

importance.

The annihilation of the enemy army is the only objective, not the defense of localities or regions. Also today, in the

period of mass-armies, there is "no higher and, simpler strategic

law than: Hold together all your forces." (Clausewitz). This

sounds easy, indeed. Yet the history of war proves that only

a Titan is able to apply this seemingly simple principle. He

who will win everything, must dare staking everything on one

single card. By doing so, a military genius does not act like

a gambler. He acts rather as a serenely self-cqnfident and bold

personality who is inspired by the "sacred fire" of the will to

win and who aspires to the highest success.

To concentrate overwhelmingly superior numbers at the decisive points is impossible without strategic surprise. The assembly of the shock-group must therefore be done as quickly

as possible in such a way that all units can attack at one and

the same time. "The more 'the concentration can be compressed

into one act and one moment, the more perfect are its results.'

(Clausewitz). To use one's forces "in driblets," as for instance,

during the course a la met' or during the offensive of Lodz, must

be avoided by aLl means. Only a complete ad quick concentration makes possible an attack which, like a mighty avalanche, overwhelms the surprised opponent and everything that is put in its path.

There is little reason to doubt the possibility of a modern

battle of annihilation according to the model' of Cannae, provided all necessary conditions are fulfilled. This opinion can- not be invalidated by the fact that in recent wars only one

perfect Cannae, the Battle of Tannenberg and only one nearCannae, the Battle of Warsaw, were won. For also in former

times an entirely successful battle of annihilatibn was extremely

rare. Two thousand years passed after the Battle of Cannae until

at Sedan in 1940 a new Cannae was won.

In the lengthy period between these two battles numerous

incomplete battles of annihilation were fought and they usually

occurred at historic turning points. If in a future war, a cornmander will appear with all the qualities of Hannibal, then a

perfect masterpiece in the art of war, that is to say a battle of

Cannae, may again succeed. It would be preposterous and
158 SURPRISE

dangerous to deny such a possibility. The essence and nature

of war arc best understood if one supposes that war always

tends to reach its extreme. This happens when "the idea of

war is realized, by an efficient army and an independent will."

(Clausewitz).

NOTES, CHAPTER VI

1. Difficulties of pursuit: During the Battle of France pursuit was

most effectively undertaken by the German army. The reason was that

the German army had overwhelming lire power and that, due to

mechanization and motorization, its average speed was superior to the

speed of the French army. This superiority was however exceptional.

General Erfurths arguments are still valid in the case of more or less

equal armament and motorization on both sides. The war in Russia

and North Africa has shown that effective pursuit soon comes on a standstill and that it is extremely difficult to overtake a beaten enemy.

2. Indccisivc orders: In war one should ncver wait to get the

best possible plan. On account of the scarcity of reliable information,

the best plan is unobtainable. The most important thing is to have

one plan and to adhere strictly to it, so far as possible. The function

of the commander.in.chief is perhaps less to be a genius than to force

his subordinates to obey the one plan which he has adopted. There is

some truth in the old rule that, in war, the simplest plan is the best. "In war so much is always unknown that it frequently happens that

even the simplest actions rapidly become exceedingly complex. As from

the simple to the complex is the rule in war, therefore the simpler, more

direct and clearer the beginning the less likely is action to get out of hand'. (Major General Fuller.)

3. Schlieffen's Idea: It must again be pointed out that such an

'operation with "everything one has," or with more than 20 corps a.,

Schlieffen textually said, is not a practical, but a fantastic idea. There

'will be rarely enough space, or sufficient transportation for moving such

a force. Nor will it be possible to move more than 20 corps around'

the enemy's flank secretly and speedily. Consequently no surprise will be possible if a flanking effort with such a force is attempted. The

German General, Wetzell, Ludendorff's chief-of-operations, asserts that such a strategy would not have been possible during World War I,

even against the Russians, let alone against the western powers.

4. French position: This statement must be taken with several grains of salt. It is undoubtedly true that the French could have attacked

with stronger forces and therefore won the Battle of the Manse much
SURPRISE 159

more conclusively. Yet they would have been unable to use a force

two or three times stronger, as Er(urth suggests. To begin with, they

did not have the means of transporting such a force to the battlefield.

Galliéni's' army may have been small, but it appeared suddenly on

the battlefield and, for this very reason, achieved a surprise which per.

haps was more important for the oitcome of the battle than anything

else. With greater forces, Galliéni would have attacked later and in

all likelihood would have been unable to surprise the Germans.

On the other hand, the concentration of 30 to 45 divisions in the

region of Paris would have dangereously weakened the French between

Verdun and Belfort. The French might have won an important battle

north of Paris, but they would have lost an equally important battle east

of their capital. Nevertheless, the Allies on the Marne did lose an op.

portunity for shortening the war. In addition to stronger French forces

which could have been used, there was also the theoretical possibility

of having on the battlefield those English troops which still remained

in Great Britain, not to mention the possibility that the British might

have entered the war with a few divisons more.

5. Possibilities of Deciding World War I Iarlicr: The attack on

the Dardanelles was one of the best chances of the Allies to win thc

war at an early date because, if successful, it would have made possiblie'

the supplying of Rjssia and moreover strong Allied operations in the

Balkans against Austria. As it is well known, the attack against the

Dardanelles failed because: (a.) no surprise was achieved and (b.) no

strong forces were used. This example is therefore one of the best

arguments for General Erfurth's doctrine of surprise. Incidentally,

is must be noted that the Dardanelles enterprise was opposed by the

British General Staff as a violation of the principle of concentration.

The Allied victory in the war was certainly delayed by the refusal of

orthodox soldiers to use available military strength against secondary

enemies so long as the Allied armies were not strong enough to tackle

Germany herself.

6. Leadership Complex: This opinion is, however, questionable. 'It

may be difficult to decide whether military leadership has become more

"difficult", yet there is no doubt at all that it has become more complex.

A modern commander has tQ concern himself with numerous compli.

cated problems of which his forerunners had no idea, and there is not

a single instance to show that his, task has become easier. A modern

general must have an encyclopedic knowledge of modern industry,

traasportation, economics, sociology, etc. which in former times was

certainly not required. To the end of the 18th century, a military

comminder did not even need a general staff and could issue orders

'on sight". At present, he relies on a wholç academy of scientifically
160 SURPRISE

traincd •officers and the general staff has still a tendency to grow. The

complexity of modern warfare has given rise to a strong military

bureaucracy which, though indispensable, in turn increases the difficulties of command. The "decline" of generalship must 'partly be

attributed to the complexity of modern war.

7. Fantastic Figures: It must again be pointed out that this figure

is fantastic. There will be available rarely enough means of transport

for the concentration of such a force. Neither can such a force be

moved secretly, nor with appropriate speed, so that "concentration of

20 corps" and "surprise" are incompatible notions. For all practical

purposes, the rule should read as follows: Attack with the maximum

of force which you can .quickly and secretly transport. There is an

optimum size for an attacking force which is a product of, or a compromise between, transport capacity, maneuvering space, fire power,

mobility and secrecy. Fire superiority is a relative term and dependent

upon the enemy's lire power at the point of attack,

8. Value of Terrain: This statement certainly requires qualification.

The value of terrain is not equal everywhere; on the contrary, there

is terrain, the conquest of which has decisive importance. Erfurth's

opinion is entirely justified in the case of, comparatively speaking, useless terrain. Falkenhayn could indeed have abandoned parts of conquered Belgium terrain and thereby have improved his position. The

Russians, repeatedly in their history, relinquished vast territory without

impairing their situation, while retreats in the desert usually even improve the situation of the retreating army (shortening of supply lines). Yet it is entirely different with other kinds of terrain. The French

in 1914, abandoned the iron ore mines of Briey and Longwy and this

turned out to be one of the major causes why Germany could maintain

her military strength for four' years, while France had difficulties in

equipping her army. It is also obvious that the loss of Paris, of the

use of the Suez Canal and the Caucaus was of a decisive nature for France,

Great Britain and Russia respectively, but not the loss of Arras, of

El Alamein or of Odessa. To be sure, the main goal in war is the

destruction of the enemy army and not the conquest of territory. Yet

the strength of the enemy army is dependent upon some parts of territory, the loss of which may have the same effect as the defeat of the

enemy in open battle,
VII

Surprise, War of Position; Attack

J URING World War I, both sides

tried to overcome the war of position and to restore the war of

movement. In the first years of this struggle, the importance

of terrain was overstressed. Consequently, it was never attempted to regain liberty of movement by voluntary retreats.

The resumption of the war of movement was chiefly attempted

by a break-through of enemy fronts. The break-throogh, in

turn, required tactical victory. In the course of this war tactical

victories were of:en won and appropriate mQthods had been

developed to master the intricate tactical problems of modern war. Yet this was only the first step. The second step, by

far the more important, was to find a method of developing

tactical into strategic success. This proved to be an extremely

difficult task which was accomplished only under exceptionally

favorable conditions.

Imposed by particular conditions of the war of position,

preparations for attack were frequently prematurely discovered

by the opponent; attacks seldom came unexpectedly. The selection of the point of attack was usually conditioned by the

situation in general and by the shape of the front in particular.

This is especially true of the offensive projects of the Entente

which usually could be deduced beforehand. The Central

Powers had the advantage of inner lines and were therefore

in a better position to surprise their opponents since they had

a certain liberty of choke where 'to strike. A central position

may be an advantage at the beginning of a war because it facilitates the formation of a center of gravity; in a war of

position, it also facilitates strategic surprise.

In the first years of World War I, the Central Powers took

161
SURPRISE

full advantage of inner lines and attacked on various fronts.

They lost the advantage of the central position during the last

year of that conflict. After fighting had ceased on the eastern

front, Germany and Austria were left only with the alternate

choice of attacking either in France or in Italy. The conditions of the Italian front were not altogether favorable for

large scale operations. Consequently, the big German offensive

during the first part of 1918 was not unexpected by the French

and British. The Germans could therefore accomplish only

tactical surprise, and tried to keep secret the strength of their

offensive, the exact point of attack and the time of its start.

To screen the preparations for a big offensive is much more

difficult in a war of position than in a war of movement.

The front lines are very close together and the intelligence

service finds many indications which reveal any kind of unusual

activity, however well hidden. Since the secrecy of offensive

preparations is a dubious affair, surprise should have been attempted by speeding up the execution of the offensive plan.

But speed was made very difficult by the fact that frontal attacks against a modern defensive system which is equipped with most powerful and numerous defensive weapons, requires

an immense amount of military strength. Numerous units and

immense quantities of weapons must be brought to the point

of attack and be deployed before the operation. This preparation lasts, of course, for a considerable period. Thorough

preparation and speed exclude each other.

Surprise Important in Break-through:

We shall discuss a few examples from World War I and

cxamine the importance of surprise for break-through oper- ations in a war of position. We shall also examine whether

Clausewitz's principle to utilize surprise for gaining relative

superiority at the decisive point was followed as it should

have been.

The offensive methods employed by the French during the

winter battle in the Champagne (February to March, 191)

5how many deficiencies which are characteristic of World War I

methods. The greatest deficiency was the complete lack of any

kind of surprise. Already at the end of December, 1914, the

German Third Army reported that a French offensive in the
SURPRISE 163

Champagne was imminent. These reports were confirmed by

secret agents. The French were as yet unexperienced in the

subtle art of camouflaging military preparationst They were

extremely active in the sectors where they intended to attack

and openly built up their assault positions. Their intentions were

betrayed to the Germans by visible lively activity in the French

trenches. Moreover, the French General Staff hoped by several

partial attacks to exhaust the Germans before the beginning of

the main operation. This tactic, of course, only warned the

Germans who finally knew everything about the French plan,

including the date of attack. The result of the offensive was

necessarily disappointing for the military leaders of the Entente. After the failure of the first onslaught, the battle degenerated into protracted and inconclusive lighting. The French

maintained a heavy artillery fire against the German positions

and launched many smaller attacks by day as well as by night

in the vain hope of achieving a break-through.

The course of this offensive suggested that any offensive

should be concentrated into one main effort and that the success

of an offensive operation is dependent upon peed and the power of the lirstblow. Frontal attacks require a very substantial superiority on the part of the attacker. If numerical

superiority cannot be established, the offensive peters Out ifltO

successive blows which become increasingly weaker without yielding any appreciable result. Victory at the decisive point alone

is important and compensates for any losses which may occur

on secondary fronts. Conseqently, the fronts where no decisions are being sought, should be manned with a minimum of

forcel. Everything has to be subordinated to the intention of

bringing "the maximum of force into battle" at the decisive

point. It is a law that heavy blows must be concentrated in

space and time. All the advantages of surprise are sacrificed

if one attempts to reach victory not by one big blow, but by

several simultaneous and successive actions. An insufficient

effort not only leads to failure, but. usually to damage (Clausewitz). An offensive which has been stopped can rarely be

started again.
164 SURPRISE

Auackl Attack! Attack!

The French generalissimo took these lessons into account,

when he launched his next offensive (spring battle in Artois,

1915). He prescribed that the attack should be continued

without respite until the objective was reached. Reinforcements were to be continuously brought up to the first lines. In

the battle of Artois, the Entente used superior forces at the

decisive point at the same time and for one single operation.

But the question must be asked whether they also brought the

maximum of numerical force into battle. The answer is a clear negative. Clausewitz's "first principle of strategy" was

not adhered to by the High Command of the Allies.

Between May 9 and June 18, 33 infantry divisions of the

British First Army and the French Tenth Army tried in vain

to drive 20 German infantry divisions from their positions.

Looking at the relation of total infantry strength on the entire

western theatre of war, it appears that the Allies in June 1915;

had altogether a superiority of around 600 battalions. They

were therefore much stronger than the German army. If they

had complied with the doctrine of Clausewitz, they would have

concentrated far greater forces for their offensive in Artois.

In this case, the Germans probably would have been unable to

prevent a break-through of their lines because even with, comparatively speaking, the small forces which the Allies actually

led into combat, the Allies succeeded in opening a gap of

four miles in the German front. They also took a large part

of the Loretto Hill. The Germans were thus confronted by a

serious crisis.

These initial successes of the Entente were largely due to the

surprise which this time the French had been able to ac- complish. Their troops had been drawn up so skillfully that

the Germans did not realize the impending danger. Firepreparation had been compressed into a few hours. Repeated

intervals in the heavy artillery fire deceived the Germans about the time of the assault. When the operation finally started,

the German command and troops were caught by surprise.

On the contrary, the preparations of the British did not

remain hidden from the Germans. They deployed so openly

that the "German flyers had almost an exact blue-print ol the

offensive the British were preparing" (Krafft von Dellmen-
SURPRISE 16

singen.) No wonder that the British attack failed on the entire

line.

Envelopment Should Have Been Eaiy

On the whole, the Allied offensive was a failure, although

the Allies had many advantages on their side and the shape

of the German line would have made an envelopment comparatively easy. Surprise and superiority made initial successes

possible. But the battle did not develop into a decisive victory,

chiefly because coordination and cooperation between the separate

units of the Allied forces were deficient. To overcome the

tenacious defense of the German troops, who continued to resist even in the most desperate situations, a greater numerical

superiority than the Allies actually mustered at the beginning

of the battle would have been necessary.

But the military leaders of the Entente still were far from

grasping the essential problem. In their next big offensive

(autumn battle in Artois and in the Champagne) they attempted

to break the German lines by an artillery preparation of un.

precedented intensity. The French High Command hoped to

break German resistance by a mass-fire of many days for which

immense quantitie,s.of ammunition had been made ready. They

did not bother about surprise. In the offensive sector, the

French had brought up their first trenches as near to the

German lines as possible. The assault trenches were considerably lengthened and increased. Precautions were taken for the

assembly of large forces. All these preparations were, of

course, easily discovered by German flyers. Their reports enabled the German Command to forecast correctly the details

of the French offensive.

The British, on the other hand, had in the meantime learned

the rudiments of the art of camouflage. Though their preparations in Artois were similar to those of the French in the

Champagne, it was much more difficult to deduce their true

intentions.

The double offensive of the Ent.ente aimed at a strategic

break-through. It was undertaken on a sufficiently broad front and with strong force In addition, the canditions on the

side of the defender favored the plans of the Allies, for the

German High Command was not prepared for the FrancoBritish offensive. Up to the last moment, General von Falken-
166 SURPRISE

hayn refused to believe in a serious attempt at a break.through,

although the Allies had not at all concealed their intentions

and While the commanders of the threatened German armies

had repeatedly asked for reinforcements in order to forestall the

imminent danger. Falkenhayn was convinced that the enemy

was merely feinting. Even the intense Allied artillery preparation and the increase of air activity could not shake his belief.

Falkenhayn rated the moral power of the Allies, and particularly of the French, as poor and did not consider them capable

of a strong military effort. His attitude is an impressive example of the frequent incredulity of senior commanders with

respect to justified warnings of subordinate officers.

Risk in Denying the Obvious

As a result, the enemy achieved a surprise which he had

taken no trouble to prepare. The preparatory artillery fire

started on September 22. But only on September 25, when

the German Third and Sixth Army had reported the launching

of an enemy offensive, did General von Falkeñhayn cease to deny

the obvious. The seriousness of the situation was no longer

doubtful. Few reserves were available and they were far from the

menaced fronts. It was therefore highly questionable whether

the enemy offensive could be stopped. Falkenhayn, however, was

lucky because some German forces returning from the eastern

front arrived in Belgium in time to bolster the weak German

defenses. But even with these reinforcements, there was a considerable danger not only that the German defenders would be

pushed back for some miles, but that their lines would be completely crushed. The numerical superiority of the attacker

should have sufficed for an important victory.

Although the importance of the surprise factor was considerable in all Allied offensives in 1915, the Allies, astonishingly enough, neglected it in their operations during 1916 and

1917. The French generalissimo thought that the maximum

of material force, in particular that of artillery fire, applied on

a front as broad as possible was the surest way to victory. In

addition, the importance of neutralizing or destroying the enemy's

reserves was recognized. The Allies no longer believed in the

possibility of achieving a break-througfi by one single operation,

but thought that it required several successive offensives. With
SURPRISE 167

painful efforts and an immense amount of work and material,

the western powers through, many months systematically prepared the Battle of the Somme. They staked everything on an

overwhelming artillery assault and entirely disregarded the element of surprise. Consequently, the Germans had sufficient

advance knowledge of the coming Franco-British attack.

By vIay 26, 1916, the commander of the German Second

Army had gained the impression that the British were preparing

an offensive north of the Sornme. On June 2 the same Army

reported the aggravation of the situation on its right flank.

A big British offensive seemed to be impending. During the

course of June it became apparent that the French were preparing to participate with considerable force in the British

offensive, despite the still raging Battle of Verdun which tied

up strong French forces. By the middle of June it was definitely established that the French had taken over a part of

the British front north of the Somme.

It is hard to explain why General von Falkenhayn did not'

sufficiently reinforce the threatened front, especially since enough

reserves were available for strengthening the Second Army. General van Falkenhayn made a very economical use of the German reserves before and during the Battle of the Somme,

possibly because lie planned to decide the war in the west by a

German counter-offensive after the British had exhausted themselves by the Somme offensive. He was also thrifty, because

the German reserves had been reduced by the Battle of Verdun

and by General Brussilov's offensive on the Rusian front. This

scarcity of reserves may be the main reason why the German

High Command did not take appropriate measures to transform

the Battle of the Somme into a German victory.

Better Fighting Than Leadership

The Allies began their offensive with a preparatory artillery

assault of seven days. This effort dispelled any doubts about the violence of the impending storm, but it did not change

Falkenhayn's dispositions. When on July 1 the Franco-British

attack broke only seven German divisions, already reduced by

the Allied artillery assault, faced fourteen British and five

French divisions. The Allied offensive was thus undertaken

under particularly favorable circumstances, chiefly because the
• 168 SURPRISE

German defenders had failed to take the necessary precautiOnary

measures and to reinforce the menaced sector of their front

in time. Nevertheless, the western powers did not achieve the

coveted break-through. But this result must be ascribed less

to the skill of the German leadership than to the fighting

qualities of the German troops.

Every subscquent Allied offensive in 1917 was planned according to the pattern of the Battle of the Somme which was

the first battle of materiel in history. Summarizing the lessons

of the Battle of the Somme, the French Grand Quarsier General

acknowledged the importance of surprising the enemy by the

first blows of an offensive. This sound principle was, how- ever, not utilized when the offensives of 1917 were being

planned. Perhaps, the French did not properly understand the

conditions necessary for strategic surprise. They did not believe in the chances of an offensive without an artillery preparation of several days, though obviously the artillery assault served

as a warning signal for the opponent and precluded any real

surprise.

Shortly before the start of the French offensive in the spring

of 1917, General Nivelle became French generalissimo. He

was little favored by luck. First of all, the weather upset his

calculations. His artillery preparations of seven days had to be prolonged, because storm, rain and snow made exact fire impossible.

- The French infantry attack did not begin on April 12, as originally intended, but on April 14.

The Germans had known of the impending French offensive

since the middle of Fchruary. In the course of March, photographic reconnaissance showed many changes in the French positions in front of the German Third and Seventh Army which

indicated offensive intentions on the part of the French. Prisoners confirmed these suspicions. On April 4, during an attack

northwest of Heims, important documents were captured which

contained exact information of the preparations for an offensive

on the Aisne. Some months previous, on December 16, 1916, a new French regulation on offensive tactics had also been

captured by the Germans who therefore knew everything about

the French methods. Thus, the Germans had enough time and

opportunity to make thorough defensive preparations.

Nivelles offensive ended in a serious French defeat. Many
SURPRiSE 169

reasons have been advanced for Nivelle's failure. But all critics

are agreed that its essential cause was the complete lack of

surprise.

The British offensive around Arras which took place altiost

at the same time was not more successful. Also in this case,

the Germans had advance knowledge of the British intentions.

They rightly deduced the exact location of the British attack

and could consequently take all necessary precautions.

Materiel as a Factor

The concept of the battle of materiel is to defeat the opponent

by crushing material superiority without relying on generalship.

It found its extreme expression in the British offensive in

Flanders in the summer and fall of 1917. The war industries

of the western powers and the United States had mobilized to

their full capacity to crush German resistance. In the second

half of June, 1917, the German command expected a big

British offensive in Flanders. The Germans also knew against

which sector of their positions the onslaught would be directed.

They lacked only knowledge of the date of the British attack, but the British artillery preparations did not fail to provide

tem with this bit of important information. The British

bombardment lasted from July 22 to 31. The subsequent British

attack yielded only moderate results which, despite continuous

and repeated efforts and attacks of the majority of the engaged

British formations, could not be improved. By August 25 the

first round of the gigantic struggle came to a standstill.

Altogether the great Battle of Flanders raged more than one

hundred days. It only confirmed the former experience that a

break-through either succeeds quickly or never.

After the failure of these offensives, the Allies adopted a

new theory, according to which a gigantic single blow was

to be replaced by continuous partial attacks with limited objectives. It should have been dear, however, that such technique could not yield important results. The new doctrine was

in flagrant contradiction of Clausewtz's principlo that all forces which are earmarked and available for one stategic purpose,

should be used simultaneously. The idea of a continuous battle

of attrition in Flanders and on the Somme did not provide a

solution for the tactical difficulties of the break-through.
170 SLJAPR.ISE

The numerous Allied offensives until the Battle of Flanders

conclusively proved the indispensability of surprise. Surprise

and concentration are, and remain, the main conditions for any

tactical and strategical success. The break-through in the war of

position is undoubtedly the most difficult form of attack. It

cannot be accomplished without surprise, the purpose of which

is to prevent the defender from organizing his defenses and

bringing up his reserves. If the offensive fails in its initial

phases, its continuation against an alert and warned enemy has

not the slightest chance. Up to the Battle of Flanders in 1917

the western powers had found no solution for the difficult task

of breaking through a front defended with modern weapons.

The German military leaders merit the credit of having developed an efficient method of attack in the war of position.

For them, surprise was the starting point of all their planning.

Surprise in Offensive Technique

In a small engagement near Vailly on October 31, 1914, and

on November 2 near Soupir, both of which had only local

importance, the Germans made their first experiments for developing appropriate offensive methods. The same technique

was later employed in the Battle of Soissons during January,

1915. The methods of Vailly, Soupir and Soissons were improved by the Germans and became the basis of all their later

break-through operations. The essential idea was to surprise

the enemy. The German technique was always effective, provided the enemy had been surprised. On the contrary, it always

failed when surprise could not be accomplished and when the

enemy had been able to take timely precautions. Surprise, it

cannot longer be doubted, is the conditioh sine qua non of any

offensive technique.

The Russians by April 12, 1915, had already rather accurate

information about the Austro-German preparations for an attack in the area of Gorlice. They believed the Germans

would bring up strong reinforcements to counter the Russian

offensive in the Carpathians. They had also gathered indications of a coming German attack against the center of the

Russian Third Army which, if successful, would hit the right flank of those Russian units which had advanced beyond th

ridge of the Carpathians. The attack of Gorlice-Tarnov was
SURPRISE 171

therefore not a complete surprise, although the Russians ig.

nored one essential point: the participation of German units in

the operation. Curiously enough, the Russians despite their

knowledge and the increasing amount of incomiig information,

did nothing to strengthen their menaced front.

ALready in 1914, the Russian secret service functioned poorly.

For instance, the shifting of an entire German army from

southern Poland to the vicinity of Thorn remained unnoticed.

But in the spring of 1915 the performance of the Russian

secret service was even worse. The Russian High Command

failed to learn to which sector of the eastern front the German

forces had been transported from the west. They received many

contradictory reports of the location of these German units

and were therefore unable to gain a reliable picture.

The Germans, of course, had spared no efforts to confuse

the Russians. They circulated false information of strong

German concentrations in East Prussia. In addition, they

skillfully screened their railway transports from the west. The

three railroads to Eastern Prussia were crowded with numerous

trains. The troops which were to go to easterfl Galicia were

first transported or the railroads leading to East Prussia; their

trains were re.directed to Galicia only from the most advanced

railroad junctions. The assembly on the Galician front was made in such a way that Russian air reconnaissance did not

gather any information. German officers who reconnoitered the

enemy positions wore Austrian uniforms.

In contrast to the technique of the western powers, the

German artillery preparation was compressed within a few

hours. The leader of the Russian Third Army realized the

imminence of a strong attack on his forces only a very short

time before the attack actually began. (May 1, 1915). On

the morning of the next day, he received some reinforcements.

They were not sufficient to prevent the collapse of his front. Part of the reinforcements arrived too late.

Verdun Auac'k Belated

The German attack on Verdun in Februaq, 1916, was strangely influenced by the element of surprise. For the first

time during the war, multiple preparations for a difficult offensive had been concealed from the enemy; in particular the
12 SURPRISE

concentration of large artillery forces and of an immense

quantity of ammunition. The importance of secrecy had been

strongly emphasized by the German High Command and every

detail was carried out as secretly as possible. In order to deceive the enemy, the Germans prepared sham attacks on several

other sectors of the western front.

These precautions were effective. If the Germans had really

attacked on February 12, as it was originally intended, they

would have encountered an incompletely prepared opponent.

The French on the afternoon of February 10 received a report

from a "very reliable source" announcing the German offensive.

\Vithin two days the menaced front of Verdun could not be

reinforced. On February 12, the positions around Verdun

were held only by five French divisions. One of the most important sectors of this front was defended by a wholly nsufficient force; one division approached the front, but was still

lagging far behind. Against this weakly defended sector alone,

the Germans had concentrated seven and one-half infantry divisions, six of which had just arrived at the front.

All conditions seemed to be favorable for the German offensive against Verdun. Yet the weather came to the assistance

of the French. Visibility was impaired by torrential rains and

thick fog. The offensive, at first planned as a lightning attack,

was postponed for one day. The weather did not improve and

the offensive finally started on February 21. In this period,

the French were able to make up for all the deficiencies of their

defense organization. Moreover, they received additional in- formation of the German plan and could therefore take all

necessary measures. The defenders of Verdun on February

21 were ready for the German attack.

The postponement of the German offensive against Verdun proved to be fatal. The question has often been discussed

whether this postponement was really unavoidable. Opinions

are divided. But even assuming that as a consequence of

bad weather effective artillery preparation was out of question,

it is certainly hard to approve the decision to wait passively for

ten long days and then to launch the offensive in rigorously the

same disposition, with the same strength and according to the

same plan as that upon which it was to be started ten days

before.

Surprise cannot be accomplished after so long a delay. Yet
SURPRISE 173

the success of the Verdun offensive was dependent upon initial

surprise and extreme speed. The German High Command

could not expect that the French would remain inactive during

ten long days and do nothing to strengthen their defense2.

Consequently, the attacker had to do everything possible to

increase, the power of his own attack. If this was not practical, there remained no other alternative but to renounce the

whole enterprise. To be sure, this would have been an extremely difficult decision, but it was preferable to the useless

expenditure of valuable strength upon an impossible task. The

long battle of Verdun only confirmed the old experience that

a break-through operation which fails at the start, might better

be discontinued.

From their own and from the experience of the Allies the

German leaders had concluded that the time of artillery preparation of an offensive should be still further shortened, if surprise was to be accomplished. The preparation for the Battle of Verdun began only a few hours before the attack was

launched. The Central Powers steadily improved their artillery technique. Their later offensives were characterized by

artillery preparation in minimum time which was supplemented

by many tricks to dceive the enemy. This improved technique

led to the victories in the fall of 1917 in Italy atid in the first

half of 1918 in France.

Cadorna's Theory of Ca pore/to

The question whether the Italian defeat at Karfeit (Caporetto) was the result of successful surprise has been wide!

discussed. It is controversial whether the Austro-German o -

fensive on the Isonzo in 1917 began with strategic or only a

tactical surprise. General Cadorna, then Italian generalissimo, ascribes the collapse of his army less to the efficiency of the

attacker than to the poor morale of the Italians. There is little

doubt that the Italians themselves contributed to their defeat,

quite in accordance with Schlieffen's doctrine relating to the

necessary conditions for a battle of annihilation. It is also

true that many special circumstances favored the success on

the Isonzo. The German attack began at the worst possible

moment for the Italians. Besides, the Germans counted upon

the fact that the fog which at that season prevails in the higher

altitudes would prevent the Italian from observing the ac-
174 SURPRISE

tivity in the valleys. This assumption proved to be correct.

Merit and luck on the part of the attacker paralleled weakness

on the part of the defender.

The Battle of Karfreit is a classical example of Clausewita's

assertion that surprise may have independent intellectual effects

beyond its purely military consequences. Many Italian units

fought with great bravery. Nevertheless, confusion and lack

of courage quickly infected the bulk of the Italian army and

caused its virtual disintegration3. This twelfth battle of the

Isoozo also proved Clausewitz's tenet: "Only he can surprise who imposes his law on the enemy." The Austro-German

armies possessed the initiative throughout the entire battle. The

italians were unable to liberate themselves from their intellcctual subjection to the enemy's measures and to regain their

physical liberty of movement and decision.

Jo the preparation of the German offensive in March, 1918,

the experiences of the Battle of Karfreit and of the tank battle

of Cambrai in November and December, 1917, were taken

into account. The German counter.attack of November 30,

1917, near Cambrai had been successful chiefly because the

Germans were forced to compress their preparations within live

to six days. Hence the preparations for the great offensive in

March, 1918, were reduced to the extreme minimum. In

the meantime the German Captain, Pulkowski, had invented

an artillery technique which made it possible to begin directly

with destruction-fire without previous range testing. This invetion seemed to be the "lacking keystone for an effective

system of surprise" (General von Kuhi). In addition, every precaution was taken to conceal from the enemy preparations

for the offensive. Confusion and deception were systematically

applied in most minute detail. Still the enemy was not enticly fooled. After the Russian collapse, the military and

political leaders of the Entente counted firmly upon an energetic

German attempt to win the war before the American army

could intervene on the European battlefields. During the winter

months, the tension in Paris grew constantly. The French

press conjectured upon the direction and strength of the expected German attack.
SURPJISE 175

Haig Expected Attack

The German High Command did everything possible to screen

its projects. A plan of deception was drawn up for the entire

western front in order to make the Allies believe in a German

offensive between Rheims and the Argonne, or in the vicinity of Verdun. and to reassure them of the safety of the British

sector4. Nevertheless, Field Marshal Haig realized soon enough

that the main German effort would be directed against his own

front. As early as March 2, he expressed this opinion to the

commanders of the different British armies. The presence in

front of the British lines of the German Generals von Hutier

and von Bulow, both reputed to be offensive specialists, confirmed Haig. On the other hand, extensive preparation behind

the German lines in the Champagne suggested an offensive in

that area. General Pétain steadfastedly believed that the Germans would concentrate their main blow against the French

lines. However, shortly before the German offensive, the

British came into possession of reliable information. Their

secret service and their air reconnaissance did good work. The

depositions of prisoneis, and deserters of Alastian and Polish

origin, removed the last doubts. It only remained dubious

whether the German attack on the British lines would not be

supplemented by another operation, possibly in the Champagne.

British military historians bared many different reasons for

the severe British defeat in March, 1918, such as insufficient

numerical strength of the British positions. The commander

of the British Fifth Army also lacked reserves. One British

corps had retreated without any apparent reason because its

commander had interpreted his orders erroneously. Indeed,

there is little doubt that British generalship assisted the German

army and made many precious contributions to the German

victory'.

Yet the surprise which was successfully effected y the Germans must be considered as the essential factor of that victory.

Since October-November, 1914, that is to say, after the first

Battle of Ypres, the British had fought no defensive battle.

They still clung to their outmoded rigid linear-defense system

and were being thoroughly taken aback by the newly developed

efficient German offensive technique. Churchill was entirely

right when he pointed out that the British were being surprised by the violence, the extent and the strength of the German
176 SURPRISE

a'ttack. This explains the enormous intellectual consequences

which followed the German blow and which almost paralyzed

the resistance of the British Fifth Army. But chance also Intervened to the disadvantage of the British. The morning of

March 21, 1918, was particularly foggy. The British troops

were practically blindfolded for a long time and were unable

to use the most important defensive weapon in their possession,

the machine gun. Chance thus made the German assault technique much more effective than could ever have been foreseen.

The German March offensive had, however, one particular

weakness: the Germans attacked at only one sector. Deceptive

information, sham movements and other ruses could not divert

the Allied reserves, let alone neutralize them. In order to prevent

the enemy reserves from intervening in the battle, they had to

be pinned down by strong secondary attacks on distant fronts.

Whether forces could have been, made available for such a purpose, is another question. Yet the previous'offensives of the

Entente showed that even a successful break-through cannot

strategically be exploited unless the enemy-reserves are neutralized. A break-through attempt against the center of a broad front

is the most difficult of all attacks, since the defender can bring

up his reserves from both sides and thus compensate for the numerical superiority of the attacker before the decision has

fallen. Only a very heavy numerical superiority can counter- balance this advantage for the defender. The German offensive

gained considerable initial successes, but its strong power was presiaturely exhausted.

Allies' Inijial Surprise

The Allies accomplished their first surprise in November

1917, when the British unexpectedly attacked on a quiet front.

A new technique of attack was the main feature of the British

success near Cambrai. For the first time, the infantry assault

was not prepared by artillery, but by tanks, which also for the

first time were used in considerable quantity. The attack broke

with a suddenness hitherto unknown. The technique of Cambrai

was refined and used in all later offensive and counter-offensive

operations of the Entente. The tank provided the western

powers with an offensive weapon superior to anything the Germans had developed up to the end of the war.

The Franco-American counter-offensive of July iS, 1918,
SURPRISE 177

and the Franco-British attack of August 8, 1918, did not surprise the German soldiers on the battlefield, bu the German

High Command. This must be emphasized if the right con- clusions are to be drawn from these operations. Béf ore July

1918, the Germans already had been told by reliable agents and

deserters of the presence of strong enemy concentrations in the

forest of- Villers-Cotterets. They were specifically warned that

an enemyattack between the Aisne and the Marne was imminent.

The German troops did everything to improve their defenses.

The High Command expected an Allied offensive by July 15.

When this offensive failed to materialize it was assumed that,

as a consequence of the then proceeding German offensive on

both sides of Rheims, the Allies had no force available for this

operation. This optimism was not shared by the troops of the

menaced front who were ready for the enemy when he attacked

on July 18; as ready as was possible in the weak German

positions and with the insufficient strength of their garrisons.

Again the German troops reported about enemy offensive preparations at the beginning of August, 1918. On August 3

pronounced sound of motors in movement were noticed which disclosed the imminence of an enemy tank attack from the

region of Villers-Pretonneux. These reports were laid to

imagination and nerves. Nothing was done to improve the

German tank defenses in that sector.

A German flyer on August 6 discovered about one hundred

tanks in front of the German Second Army. The commander

of this army received this information from his superior authorities, although, characteristically, without comment. The

German High Command, the commander of the army group and

even the commander of the Second Army did not believe in the

possibility of a strong enemy offensive until on August 8 a gigantic blow smashed the front of the Second Army°.

This strategic surprise was in part due to the enemy's mastery of the air. Nevertheless, the German High Command lacked

perspicacity. They should have become suspicious after one

hundred tanks had been reported near the flank of the Second

Army and after two Canadian divisions had disappeared without

trace from a position where they had fought for only a very

short time.

The troops themselves were surpised by the Allied offensive

technique. Strangely enough, the troops of the Second Army had
178 SURPRISE

never been informed of the experience resulting from the Battle

of Cambrai and the recent battle of July 18, 1918 west of Soissons. The German High Command had not taken pains to tell

the troops what to do In case the enemy attacked with tanks and

without artillery preparation. It must be admitted, however,

that they could not provide the troops with efficient means of

counter-technique. It was impossible to furnish effective antitank weapons to the troops. And no other expedient would

have been effective.

NOTES, CHAPTER VII

1. Fronts and Force: This statement is correct in case there is no

doubt which front is to be considered as the main front. One should

not forget, however, that the earth is round and that "every road leads

to Rome". It is quite possible that the enemy takes advantage of the

subtle destinction between primary and secondary fronts and considers

a front which we fancy to be of secondary importance as a primary front,

Napoleon considered Spain as a secondary front; the collapse of Germany in 1918 bcgan in Palestine.

In a great war, there are many decisive points, hence many primary

and only few secondary fronts. The difficulty of applying the principle

of concentration is caused lust by this fact: It is almost impossible to

make a neat distinction between primary and secondary fronts. One

has to cover all decisive points and that may practically mean dispersion

of force. It is strange that Erfurth does not realize that strategic stirprise is very often the result of choosing that front which the enemy

considers as secondary as one's primary front of attack. Throughout

history, British strategy excelled in this kind of surprise strategy,

while the continental armies usually had very rigid and narrow notions

about the location of the primary front. In World War I, for instance,

the Germans as well as the Entente would have had good possibilities

for striking decisive blows in and through Italy. Yet neithei side did,

despite Caporetto which had demonstrated the strategic potentialities of the Italian front.

2. Verdun: The idea of launching a surprise attack against one of

the strongest fortifications in the world sounds strange indeed. Such

an attack may have been possible if the Germans, as in 1940 at Eben

Emael had used new tactics and techniques. But at Verdun, the German attack, even under the most favorable circumstances, would have

lasted a considerable period of time, so that the French probably would have been able to bring up their reserves at any rate. Erfurth

fails to point out that the main purpose of the Verdun offensive was

to bleed the French army white, and that therefore the Germans had
SURPRISE 179

a certain interest in prolonging the battle. This example shows that

surprise should not be limited to the purely strateic field, but that in

principle every strategic surprise should be combined with tactical and

technical surprises. The enemy must be surprised not only by the

"where?" and "when?" but also by the "how?".

3. Surprise at Caporetto: The Battle of Caporetto is a remarkable

example of surprise operations. The Italian army had suffered heavy

losses in their previous offensive on the Isonzo. Therefore, their units

comprised many young and unexperienced recruits. In addition, the

hazard of the previous battle had left the Italians in rather unfavorable

and vulnerable positions. The Austro-German amies launched their

attack against the weakest parts of the Italian frort. The Italians were

not prepared for an attack by the best German shock troops and had

expected merely an attack from the Austrians. Moreover, the attacker

employed new tactics. The main blows were delivered is the valleys,

instead of across the mountains, as it was the tradition of mountain

warfare. A very effective kind of artillery preparation (gas-shells)

was applied, a surprise on the Italian front. Besides, the attacker waS

favored by fog.

Of course, the Italians themselves contributed to their own defept.

Onc of the principal Italian commanders had been ill (or several days

and was therefore unable to supervise the defense preparations. Due

to a misunderstanding, the Italian artillery held bac its lire until it was

too late. The numerous Italian recruits became panicky when, un- expectedly, they ere attacked by gas. Had the Italians not spent a large

part of their striking power in a dozen unsuccessful offensives on the

Isonzo, the moral resistance of their troops would have been considerably stronger.

Of equal importance was the panic which seized the Italian High

Command when they (rained that one of the positions which they considered as vital (Monte Maggiore) had fallen. When General Cadorna

received news of the fall of Monte Maggiore, he immediately ordered

the retreat behind the Tagliamento and even began to make preparations for a retreat across the Piave. There is little doubt that he

attached too great an importance to Monte Maggiore. The Italians could

have fought on in their positions without this little fort.

Thus the most important effect of successful surprise is the disorganization of the enemy command. The High Command loses its

control; it ignores the true situation. Orders are no longer transmitted,

hence every division or even regiment makes its own decision. Besides,

the general tension prevents clear and sober thinking. The degree of

the defeat is overestimated nd a retreat is ordered, for fear that parts of the army may be cut off and annihilated, The fall of the weak

positions sweeps away the strong ones; the strong positions failed to

bolster the weak.
180 SURPRISE

4, Vor. Hutier: The British deduced thc location of the German

attack from an obituary in a povincial German newspaper which was

signcd by General von Hutier. The date-line of the obituary also indicated the place of Hutier's command. Since Huticr was the foremost

German expert for offensive operations, the British had no dithculty in

drawing Correct conclusions as to the sector of the German offensive.

5. Uncoordinated Command: The main reason for the German

success was the uncoordinated command of the British and French

Armies. Pétain and Haig had different strategic conceptions and apprhensions, fience each placed his reserves where he thought he

needed them most. The result was that the weakest spot of the entire Allied front—the joint between the Frcnch and British—remained

virtually unprotected and without reserves.

6. August 8th: The surprise of August 8, 1918 was much more important and far-reaching than would appear from Erfurth's text. As

a matter of fact, the German High Command believed that as a consequence of the German spring and summer offensives, the offensive

power of the Allies was broken and that for a long time to come they

would be unable to resume active warfare.

This dream was definitely shattered on August 8, 1918, the day

which Ludendorif christened the 'black day of the German Army".

He realized that he himself had broken the offensive power of his own

army, but not of his enemy. This intellectual surprise was at the

bottom of the German capitulation. The surprised Ludendorif had lost

his faculty of sober reasoning and was unable to understand how Germany could fight on on the defensive. The top became panicky, and

the panic spread all over the country and infected the army.

Erfurth, fur reasons of loyalty, cannot write openly and obectively

on these events. Had he done so, he could have made clear that surprise has a still greater military importance than his text conveys. The

successful surprise of August 8, 1918, spared the Allies at least one

further year of war. Space prevents further elaboration on this point.

It suffices to emphasize that time general impression, created by numcr• uus incorrect historical accounts, according to which Germany, in

November, 1918, was "finished", does not correspond to the facts.

The German food supply was improving, the German submarine strength was again increasing, while the Allies were approaching a serious

transport crisis. There was no material necessity for the Germans to

capi late. Wa tli t liei r army and with t mci r mu ition and food so pply, they would have been able tii continue the war, at least on the defensive. The main causes of the German collapse were of a psychological nature and the main psychological cause was the surprise bred by a realization that the Allies were not beaten and therefore never

could be beaten.
VIII

Surprise, War of Positioiz; Defense

THE possibility of surprising the

attacker after he has made his plan clear by his actions is one of the most important advantages of defense, according to

Clausewitz. Defensive surprise requires not only a very mobile

but an active defense wherever possible. After the beginning

of positional warfare in the World War I, defensive battIs

were conducted in a different form. The defender did not flglft

as he should have done, for victory and for e annihilaticn o

the opponent, but merely for his positions.

Defense was 'rigid and passive. By renouicirig mobile and

adive tactics in defense one did, by the same token, renounce

the advantages of surprise. For a long time the Germans clung

to the peace time principle that a single line should be occupied and defended. Only gradually and slowly did they overcome this doctrine of rigid defense. After the Battle of the

Somme the idea of linear defense was definitely abandoned.

Hence forward defense was organized in depth and conducted

in a mobile and active way. Defensive tactics again took advantage of the element of surprise.

Yet, as has been pointed out by Liddell Hart, strategic surprise in the defensive was re-discovered only at the end of the war. The main elements of classical strategy, maneuver and

movement, were replaced by trench warfare. According to

Marshal Pilsudski, a special "trench-psychology" had developed

which exercised a strong influence on almost all military

leaders in both camps. It is indeed astonishin to see how long

a time it took before the strategical concetks of the World War leaders were divested of such errors arid reconciled with

old and experienced truths. The strange dogma that every

181
182 SURPRISE

position, however unnecessary or unfavorable, should be defended to the very last caused many unnecessary losses and led

to many belated evacuations. Heavy fighting fora locality often

degenerated into a contest for mere prestige. In this case,

sentiment interferes with reason and prevents arriving at appropriate decisions. World War I witnessed numerous examples

of this unfortunate strategy. We may only refer to the refusal

of the German High Command to evacuate the undefendable

arc of Wytschaete in June, 1917. The result was a successful

British surprise-attack and bloody as well as useless fighting.

Immobility of the troops and clumsiness of the leaders were

the almost natural consequence of the long positional war. The easy expedient of forestalling a strong blow by a timely

retreat to rear positions was rarely executed, although by such

a surprise move even a thoroughly prepared offensive could

have been frustrated. To evade a heavy artillery assault by with.

drawing the first lines to positions farther behind seems today

a fairly simple device. Yet it was invented only rather recently.

In March, 1917, the Germans retreated before an impending

strong French offensive which, as a consequence, became a

blow at a vacuum. It required a great deal of courageto break

with General von Falkenhayn's principle "not to relinquish a single foot of conquered ground." Indeed, the German High

Command could not carry Out this strategic retreat without encountering very serious objections of a politico-military nature.

Public Opinion Feared

The Italian High Command Jacked the necessary boldness

for a similar decision, although long before the Austro-German

offensive on the Jsonzo in October, 1917, in case of attack

they intended to abandon their unfavorable positions and to

fight the opponent from a stronger defense line. For a long

time the Italians hesitated to put their plan into effect. At last

it was too late to retreat successfully.

It is today hardly comprehensible why the British did not

evade the extremely strong German offensive of March, 1918.

When on May 26, 1918, through the deposition of two prisoners,

the French were informed of the German offensive against the

Chemin des Dames which was to begin two days later, they

also considered a voluntary retreat because they were by no

means prepared for that battle. This expedient however, was
SURPRISE 183

rejected tinder the pretext that it would endanger near-by

positions.

In reality, the French generals were afraid of public opinion,

believing that the people would not understand the abandonment without a fight of a position for which the French had

made so many bloody sacrifices.'

-The Poles, at the end of June, 1920, followed this disastrous

French example. After Marshal Pilsudski had recognized that

the Polish army would not be able to resist the Russian offensive, he recommended a timely and ordetly retreat. General

Szeptycki, one of Pilsudskis advisors, believed that a defense

from prepared Polish positions would be more promising than

a retreat into the open rear. Pilsudski finally agreed with him. Like the French at the Chemin des Dames, the Poles remained

in their positions although they knew well what they were

facing. In. both cases this kind of passive defense enabled the

attacker to win a considerable victory.

One of Clausewitz's main principles was never to assume

a passive attitude, but to attack the front and the flank, even of

an offensive enemy. According to Clausewita, the "offeqsive

defense" should start at the very moment the enemy launches

his offensive. ,In Clausewitz's opinion, it ma' sometimes be practical to retreat in order to lure the enemy into unfamiliar terrain

and then to strike back from every side. Clausewita would

probably have considered the German strategic retreat of March,

1917, as incomplete, since it lacked a strong surprise counterblow against the pursuing enemy.

As a matter of fact, such an operation had been discussed

by the German High Command. It was rejected with reasons which certainly are not convincing. The Germans did not pro.

pose to destroy the French Army. Their intention was merely

"to reach as quickly as possible new positions, to re-group and

to make strong reserves available." Gain of valuable time and

the evasion of the enemy offensive were thus the main results

of this operation. The voluntary retreat of the German army

therefore did not serve as a means to render the western front

more mobile and active. It most be emphasized that the Germans had effectively camouflaged the pteparations for their

retreat, although they lasted several weeks. At the last moment,

the enemy captured several German orders revealing most important details. For unknown reasons these orders had been for-
184 SURPRISE

.gotten in a German dug-out. But they were found when it was

too late to attack the retreating German formations and to

interfere with their plan.

No German Counter-Offense

During World War I, the Germans were unable to launch.

a large scale counter-offensive on the western front. When a

big counter-offensive would have been practical, as for instance

after the Allied offensives in 1915 and after the Battle of the

Somme, sufficient German forces were not available and only a

weak counterbiow would have been' possible. The situation was,

however, somewhat different after the failure of Nivelle's

spring offensive in 1917 and after the battles of Flanders in the

summer and fall of the same year.

After the collapse of Nivelle's offensive, the great moral crisis

of the French army would have strongly favored a German

counter-stroke. Painlevé, the French Minister of War, observed

that the situation would have become extremely critical, had

the Germans energetically attacked. The French army was

discouraged; its morale was seriously affected. Yet the German

intelligence service reported these important facts only after

the French High Command had already overcome the moral

crisis of its army.2 It is as yet unknown whether the German

High Command had ever envisaged a counter-offensive and, if

so, for what reasons this offensive was rejected.

The Germans soon discovered the preparations for the British offensive in Flanders (summer 1917). The General Staff of

the army group under the command of Field Marshal Crown

Prince Rupprecht discussed the question of a voluntary retreat

to new positions prepared in advance. But at the end of June the

resolution was taken to accept battle and not to retreat. "With

respect to the particular conditions on the Flanders front, a

retreat could not offer many advantages. The positions farther

back were not yet ready. On the other hand, the German cornnander considered his present positions strong enough to resist

any attack. It appeared, therefore, that the evacuation of the

German positions in Flanders would have offered more disadvantages than advantages." It is almost a law that local com-

;nanders, particularly in a protracted war of position, object to

the evacuation of a well equipped and effectively organized defensive system in exchange for positions farther back, especi-
SURPRISE l8

ally if they have reason to believe that these "positions" exist

only in theory.

A very strong will on the part of the High Command is

necessary to transform passive into active defense. To be sure, the Germans in the summer and autumn of 1917 won a considerable defensive victory in Flanders. But immense German

forces were necessary to stop the British offensive, namely 86

divisiOns, 22 of which were used twice during this battle, and,

moreover, the bulk of the German medium and heavy artillery.

The question might well be asked whether with the same forces

the Germans could not have attained more than: the mere passive

holding of their lines. If a timely voluntary retreat had been

followed up by a strong counter-offensive with the firm intentIon to crush the enemy, the Germans would have won a much

greater success. Only in the last year of the war were similar

solutions adopted, in particular by the French and Americans

during the Battle of Soissons in July, 1918.

Brussilov's Cou,:Ier- Offensive

On the eastern front the Germans made frequent use

counter-offensives. Yet it never became necessary to precedie

counter-offensives by voluntary retreats. Provided the counteroffensive was undertaken with sufficient strenth and it began

with an effective surprise, it usually led to success. The only

exception was the counter-offensive after Brussiiov's big offensive

in 1916.

The Russian leader in due time recognizecf the danger of a

German counterbiow and brought up strong reinforcements

to bolster his menaced flank. Besides, the German divisions

were prematurely thrown into the battle, in some cases even

before their assembly was finished. The Germans were compelled to do so, because the Austrian divisions began to give

way. The Austro-German units lacked striking power and hence

could not neutralize the Russian, reserves. Conditions did not

favor this particular counter-attack, which was commanded by

General Linsingen. It was different in the case of Kerensky's offensive in 1917.

General Hoffmann, the German commander of the eastern

front had foreseen the Russian move, a counter-offensive

in the general direction of Lemberg-Tarnopol. At first, things did not develop quite according to plan, since the Russians
186 SURPRISE

achieved considerable successes and in the area of Stanislau

broke into the Austrian lines. Three German divisions which

just arrived from the western front for the counter-offensive

against Tarnopol hurried to the assistance of the Austrian army.

Finally, Kcrensky's offensive was stopped and the Germans

launched their long premeditated counter-offensive. The right

flank of the Russian offensive formation on July 19, 1917, was

broken on a front of thirteen miles. As a result, the entire

Russian front collapsed. The German attack on Tarnopol is

one of the most brilliant examples of successful counter-offensive. It liberated almost two Austrian provinces from the enemy.

Rewards of Couner-Offenüve

Clausewitz's doctrine of active defense maintains its value

in the war of position. An effective defense requires continuous

movement and repeated surprise. It is never profitable to assume

passive attitudes. On the contrary, one should strike surprise

blows against the enemy even during defensive operations. A

strong counter-offensive is undoubtedly the defender's most

efficient means of thwarting the plans of th attacker. Under

favorable circumstances, a counter-offensive may lead to a major victory and perhaps to the destruction of the enemy army,

a result which passive defense can never attain.

it is therefore not astonishing that Hans Delbrueck considers

the counter-offensive or the "defensive-offensive" as the strongest

form of modern war. Liddell Hart praises the advantages of a

baited offensive, that is'to say, of a combination of offensive

operations with defensive tactics. In World War I the

"baited offensive" was a very effective method indeed. Its

advantages increased in the same degree as the emergence of

modern materiel makes other methods more difficult. Its success,

however, is dependent upon effectively accomplished initial surprise.3

We may be permitted to mention briefly the importance of

surprise for virtually all kinds of special operations. The

crossing of a river, for instance, will be possible only after the

opponent has been surprised, or rather fooled. The larger the

river and the more difficult the terrain (steep banks, etc.), the

more necessary it is to surprise the enemy. If the opponent

realizes our intention to cross the river, severe losses will be

the consequence and the crossing may fail. Similarly, crossing
SURPRISE 187

of, or attack across, mountains is not practical unless the defender can be surprised or deceived. Since the time of Leonidas,

attempts to cross reputedly impassable terrain to get at the

enemy's rear are characteristic for mountain warfare. Change of

weather, fog, rain and snow often favor attacks in the mountains

and may favor the defender to cope with many unexpected situation.4

Darkness was always a precious ally of surprise. Night

attacks are usually launched for the sake of surprise, but on

the whole the difficulties of night operations permit only local

engagements. Large scale attacks occur rarely during the night.

They are possible, however, if the attacker has already gained a

strong moral ascendancy. In a war of position, night operations may be practical on a larger scale. But in a war of movement, darkness should only be utilized for marches and for the

approach to the battlefield, while the actual attack should not

be launched before dawn. The German soldier traditionally is

not a great admirer of night fighting. Yet it may safely be

predicted that in future night operations will occur more

quently, for darkness is sometimes the only effective protectiGn

against modern weapons. Increased night activity would automatically lead tq a higher frequency of surprise.5

NOTES, CHAPTER VIII

1. Chemin des Dames: The French generals were certainly afraid

of public opinion, but the main reason why they did not abandon the

Chemin des Dames was the hope that the enemy could be held. Indeed, the Germais would have had difficulties with their offensive, if the

French commanding general had not stubbornly stuck to antiquated

tactics and refused to adopt modern, more appropriate tactics which,

months before had been worked out by the French General Staff and

which were most successfully applied six weeks later by the French

troops under General Gouraud.

2. Morale: Ancient writers like Frontinus, who have written of

surprises and roses of war, devote much spjce to ways and means of

restoring morale. Pétains main achievement as French commanderin-chief was that he succeeded in repairing the shaken morale of the

French Army. He applied three methods: 1. He remedied abuses, par

ticularly with respect to food, and leave. 2. He made it clear

to the troops that he did not intend to sacrifice them in costly and useless offensives, and that he was eager to save as much blood as possible.
188 SURPRISE

3. He restored the self-confidence of the troops by organizing, offensives

with limited objectives which were bound to be successful, using at the

same time these offensives for experimenting with new fighting techniques. It can be seen from this example that an offensive must not

always necessarily aim at the tota' destruction of the enemy. Operations

with too ambitious goals very often contribute to one's own weakness

rather than to the weakening of the enemy.

3, "Baited Offensive:" One of the few advantages of combined

operations is the possibility of staging a "baited offensive". If the

attacker makes a successful landing, he can then remain on the de.

fensive, That is to say, he undertakes a strategic offensive, but has a

chance to fight, tactically speaking, on the defensive.

4. Natural Obstacles: Natural obstacles of all kinds have offered

many promising possibilities for surprise attacks. It is a habit among

second-rate soldiers to overrate the difficulties of natural obstacles,

while a military genius is usually characterized by his conviction that

natural obstacles can be overcome, however difficult and costly it may be.

For a military genius there are no "insurmountable" mountains,

nor "impassable" rivers. On the contrary, most great captains won impressive victories by attacking at places where their enemies thought

that they could never attack.

In modern times, there are few natural obstacles left that an enemy

cannot overcome, Disregarding a few exceptions, one can say that

military operations have become possible everywhere.

However, the former problem of the natural obstacle still exists

under the term "transport difficulties". Rivers or deserts are today no

longer limiting factors in warfare, yet transport facilities, or rather

their lack, are. A modern military operation is considered feasible or

not according to the available means of transport. It is obvious that

surprise may play a big role with respect to the transport problem.

The military genius will find unexpected solutions of difficult transport

problems and attack at a place where the enemy does not expect him,

or at least not with sufficient force, while the second rate soldier will be

hypnotized by transport difficulties and undertake only operations for

which he has abundant means of transport.

5. Night operatiois: At that place. General Erfurth discusses the

importance of surprise in "combined operations." He refers to an article

by Captain Sorge in "Militaerwissenschaftliche Rundschau," 1938 in

which the German attack on the Baltic island of Oesel in 1917 is

analyzed. The opinions of both Erfurth and Sorge with respect to

combined operations, however, are out of date. It is obvious that

surprise is a most important element in any combined operation, as

incidentally evidenced by the Battle of Dieppe.
SURPRISE 189

An attack which comes from the sea is by necessity much weaker

than defense on the shore, because the defender ha stronger hre.power,

superior mobility and also usually the mastery of the air. The problem,

therefore, is to hit the defender either when he is unprepared or when

and where he cannot bring his superiority into play. In addition, the

attacker must operate unexpectedly, so that the defender is unable to

use the strength he possesses. And finally, the attacker must concentratea greater military force than the defender is prepared to meet. On

the whole, combined operations on a large scale will only be successful

if the defender of the attacked coast has been successfully deceived as

to the point of attack. It must be added that the emergence of air.borne

troops may change the characteristic of combined operations and possibly facilitate them. (Crete. This example is not typical because the

British had inferior fire.power). At any rate, it cart be said that the traditional opinion, according to which combined operations against strong

opposition have little chance of success, is no longer entirely correct.

Ix

Surprise Value of New Weapons

and Combat Techniques

THERE is one important military

principle of almost eternal validity: if, at the beginning of a

war, absolute numerical superiority is not obtainable, one should

try to be superior at least in one important weapon. The im?

mense importance of superiority in modern equipment, aircraft,

tanks and, in particular, artillery has been demonstrated by all

recent hostilities. It would not be reasonable to expect gruat

differences between the armaments of the major powers. 'kiet

special progress in technical inventions is always possible. During the last war1 science offered many assets to the German High

Command. Still, the mere existence of new implements of war does not solve all military problems. The art of waiting and

using new weapons at the right moment is particularly difficult.

A new weapon must be put in use suddenly and in great quantity, nay, in maximum quantity. Otherwise, the surprise of the

opponent is neither complete nor decisive. Consequently, one

must wait until the new weapon is available in large numbers.

But even in this case, its effects will depend upon the absence

of any offsetting factors on the enemy side.

Poison gas was used by the Germans as a- surprise, although

the first gas attack of April, 1915, in the salient of Ypres, served only a modest purpose. On the whole, it was nothing

more than an experiment for testing the new weapon. In vain

Professor Haber, who is credited with being the inventor of

poison-gas, pleaded with the General Staff to hold large forces

in reserve for the exploitation of the success which, in his

opinion, was sure to come. The commander of the German

Fourth Army in whose sector the experiment was to be carried

Out, also asked General von Falkenhayn for reserve, but only

191
192 SURPRISE

for one division. Even this modest request was flatly rejected.

Thus, an especially good chance to achieve a decisive success

on the western front was lost, although the opponent had done

his share to facilitate German victory. Prisoners and deserters,

as well as secret agents who were stationed in Belgium, had informed the Allies of the German preparations. Even the Allied

troops in the trenches had acquired similar knowledge. None

of these warnings was •taken seriouly by the Allied general

staffs. Hence surprise was accomplished in spite of the betrayal

of the German intentions.

The material effects of the German gas-attack were extraordinary. However, its moral effects were still greater, chiefly

because the Allied troops lacked anti-gas equipment. In the

evening of April 22 a wide gap had been opened in the Allied

front. Yet the Germans missed their chance because no German

forces were ready for immediate action. Consequently, the

German success developed into a conspicuous failure. The

Allies gained enough knowledge of the new weapon to organize

quickly efficient protective measures. A new weapon can surprise

but once. If it is used for the second time the opponent is

already more or less ready for it.

The German air raids on England failed similarly. The

Germans several times failed to profit from excellent chances

which arose as a consequence of German technical progress in

the development of aeronautical weapons. In the first two

years of World War I British air defenses were poor; Britain

was more or less defenseless against German Zeppelin attacks.

The German air ships in 1917 were able to fly at an altitude

far beyond the reach of British antiaircraft defense. In the

fall of 1917, when Britain did not yet have trained nightfighters, the Germans initiated night-bombing. All these dif.

ferent possibilities were not exploited as they could, or should,

have been.

Submarines Could Have Won War

The submarine was a weapon which, if correctly used, could

have won the war for Germany. At the outbreak of the war,

German submarines were the most modern of their kind and

the only ones which could be used strategically and as an independent force. Germany's opponents had virtually no antisubmarine defenses. It can hardly lojger be doubted that the
SURPRISE 193

submarine would have decided the war, had it not been used

prematurely. Before a large number of submarines was available,

the blockade of Great Britain should not have been started.

Having assembled a considerable submarine fleet, every single

German submarine should have been thrown into battle at one

stroke and with maximum energy. Of course, no political restrictions should have hampered this submarine offensive. In

this case, the insufficient British anti-submarine organization

would scarcely have been able to prevent an effective, and

possibly decisive, blockade of the British Isles.

These theoretical principles sound simple and convincing.

They are, however, seldom applied in practice. All new weapons

which were invented during World War I were used prematurely

and in small quantity. Perhaps human imagination is incapable

of forecasting correctly the effects of a new weapon. Usually

these effects are exaggerated by those introducing it. One likes

to be optimistic.

In a long war, timely changcs and incessant improvement

of lighting techniques arc of extreme importance. The opponent can be fundamentally surprised by new techniques. N4vl

methods can basically change the course of the war. Consequently,

thescience of ,war should never be suppressed; even, or rather

particularly in time of war, it should supplement and direct

the practice of the battlefield. It is the task of the theorist to

understand quickly every novelty and to advise on their adoption. We have pointed out how long a time it took for the

Entente to find an effective defense against German artillery

assault. Only by the summer of 1918, had the Italians on the

Piave and the French on the Marne abandoue passive for Inqbile

defense.

To the end of the war the Germans were unable to devise

an efficient antitank method, though the Entente had committed

the error of warning them beforehand of the tank. For the

Allies did not wait until they had a sufficient number of tanks

available. The famous tank battle of Cambrai, November 20,

1917, had been preceded by many tank-operations; for instance,

during the Battle of the Somme in the fall of 1916, later

near Arras and on the- Aisne in April, 1917, and in October

of the same year near Laffaux. The number of tanks employed

in the attack increased each time. But at Carnbrai the Allies

used new technique and replaced their traditional lengthy
194 SURPRISE

artillery preparation by a concentrated mass-attack of tanks.

This new technique made possible a high degree of surprise and was used for all later Allied offensives after July 18, 1918.

Had the Allies used their new technique with a sufficient number of tanks and supporting troops and not tried it Out beforehand with small tank formations and virtually no support from

other weapons, they possibly would have been able to win a

decisive success at the first stroke. In this case it would have

been necessary to postpone the big tank offensive until enough

tanks were ready. However this may be, the German High Command had received ample warning of the new weapon and its

tactical potentialities. When the first enemy tank appeared on

the battlefield, the German High Command was confronted with

the alternative of either building tanks in great numbers in

order to catch up with the enemy's lead or, if this was not

practical, to develop efficient antitank defenses. There was no

other possible solution.

Every new weapon is immediately imitated in time of peace hy the neighbor; in time of war by the enemy. No country

has a monopoly of any weapon. This is law. No technical

advantage lasts for a long period of time.
x

Results and Conclusions

IODERN strategy does not differ

fundamentally from the strategy of former times. Count von

Schileffen was justified when he wrote: "The conditions and

structure of battle do not change. A battle of annihilation can

bc' fought today according to the same pattern that had been

thought out by Hannibal." On the whole, the entire strategical

art can be summarized in the old law, that numerical superiority

must be concentrated at the decisive point. The only difference

in comparison to former periods is that as a consequence of

the increased power of tiefense, a three-fold numerical superiority

at the decisive point is by no means too much,

On the contrary, many experts will consider such a superiority

as a minimum and all of them will agree that it is better to

launch an attack with still heavier odds. The best method is

to attack at the decisive point with "everything one has." This

advice of Schlieffen's certainly amounts to the rejection of linear

strategy. And let there be no doubt: A modern battle must be

fought in depth!

The concentration of three-fold superiority at the decisive

point is possible only if the enemy is surprised. If the enemy

learns of our intentions, or if he is able to make a correct guess,

he will take counter-measures and frustrate our plan for battle,

The experience of recent wars shows that the chances of attack

depend chiefly upon successful surprise. In some way or other

the accomplished surprise must pra1yze.the defender's resistance.

Surprise is today more indispensable than ever before. Every

military plan and its execution should be conceived in view of

the necessity of surprise.

Surprise thus appears a.s the primary objective of military

195
196 SURPRISE

planning. The importance of surprise has often been overlooked.

It was sometimes supposed that surprise could not be prepared

but was simply a welcome by-product of other military measures.

This opinion has already been refuted by Clausewitz, who

particularly opposed the "dark idea" that a surprise attack can

be improvised. In reality, strategic surprise is an extremely

difficult performance. Secrecy requires painful planning and

careful thinking, if all possible leaks are to be closed. If in spite

of all endeavours, secrecy is impossible to maintain, speed must

be increased to the extreme limit.

The commander who concentrates strong forces for quick and

annihilating blows must possess a very strong will. In addition,

he must be able to maintain high mobility, A military leader

about to surprise his opponent must be able to adapt himself

quickly to changing conditions. He also must find new solutions

if the operation develops in an unexpected manner. If surprise

cannot be accomplished, it is altogether preferable to call off

the offensive. A leader who aims at mobility should not be afraid

to strain his troops to the limit in order that they may reach

the battlefield in time. Many victories were made possible by

forced marches. Mobility equals increase in numbers.

Axioms of Martial Operatio:s

Surprise is a necessary element of all military operations, not

only of attack b'ut also of defense.

Only a mobile defender can surprise. Schlieffen's doctrine

that the defender must constantly move and maneuver if he aims

to surprise the attacker was fully confirmed in all recent wars.

All great commanders of the past fought their defensive battles

actively.

Inversely, success in war depends upon the commander's

ability to prevent the enemy from accomplishing his own surprise. Good commanders usually have a particular talent for

foreseeing the actions of the enemy. They are good psychol- ogists who can put themselves into the position of their opponent and guess his decisions. A military leader should always carefully inquire whether his acts favor the intentions of the

enemy or facilitate their execution.

In peacetime military training the factor of surprise should

also gain the attention it actually deserves, Military operations are only too often represented as a mechanical development
SURPRISE 197

which is neither materially nor intellectually influenced by surprise. Mobile maneuver-strategy frequently interferes with the

intentions of the officers in charge of the maneuver. If the

maneuver is planned beforehand, the commanders of the different parties have no liberty left. Of course, the conduct of

maneuvets is made considerably more difficult if the command. ers are free to do whatever they like and, in particular, to

attempt surprises.

Questions to Be Decided

On principle, however, the element of surprise should be

taken into account in every maneuver and also in the discussions which usually conclude them. These discussions should

clarify the lessons of the maneuver. Therefore, it is pertinent

to ask constantly the following questions: Was one party able

to effect surprise? How did surprise actually affect the operations of the surprised party? What expedients have been

adopted?

As night is usually an element indispensable to surprise,

training in. marches and deployment must be repeatedly given

during the dark hours. The troops must become accustarned

to night operations'. Disengaging and re-grouping of large

forces during the night in order to launch an attack at an unexpected point, is a very difficult undertaking which requires

much exercise. The German maneuvers before World War I

provided for adequate drill for night operations. There is little

doubt that an army capable of executing large scale night

operations will possess a distinct military advantage and will

often surprise its enemies.

It is not enough to pay mere lip-service to surprise. Strong

emphasis should be laid upon new tactics, for these offer the

best way of achieving surprise. Novel ideas should constantly

be tested, and old ideas not always repeated. Theory and practice must cooperate to find fresh ways and means of war.

Ruses As Essentials

Ruses form an essential, if sometimes minor, part of any

surprise. This has always been stressed by Clausewitz. Ruses

are by no means a weapon exclusively for a weak army. They

can also be used to the advantage of the strorrger. Nor did

they lose their value in the period of mass-armies. A modern
198 SUItPRISE

war is not like a tourney. The code of honor of feudal times

is no longer valid. Every means is permitted whtch deceives

the enemy and induces him to take wrong steps. The lion's

bravery and the fox's cleverness must combine to wrest the

victory from the enemy.

In mass-warfare, systematic deception and camouflage re- quire a considerable amount of time and strength. Weak means,

so-called demonstrations, will make little impression on the

enemy. The sham concentrations of strong German formations

before the offensive in March, 1918, in France and of the

Austro-German troops before the offensive on the Isonzo in

the autumn of 1917, are illustrative examples of how the enemy

can be deceived.

During World War I many offensives were prematurely betrayed by deserters and prisoners. Important orders and maps

showing the dispositions of the troops were frequently captured

by the enemy. The frequency of such incidents makes it necessary to adopt preventive remedies. The troops must be educated for secrecy and they must learn to guard important documents very carefully. Every private shotld know that success

in war is dependent upon the maintenance of secrecy. He must

know how to behave if, unfortunately, he is taken prisoner.

Never should lie allow himself to be intimidated and he should

know that after the war he will be held responsible if he betrayed military secrets to the enemy.

Recent wars showed that radio sometimes may be the means

of betraying important secrets. During World War I, when

radio was used for the first time, all belligerents used to broadcast falsified orders in order to deceive the enemy. Before

the offensive on the Isonzo a whole net of radio-stations was

built in Tyrol to detract the attention of the Italians from the

Isonzo to the Tyrolean front. On the eastern front, as we

already related, the German army profited from the amateurish

way in which the Russians used their radio. The French were

also clever at deciphering German orders and actually detected

German movements before the Battle of the Marne by radio

listening. According to the French Minister of War, Messimy, the chief of the French radio and cipher bureau was a kind

of sorcerer who, within the shortest time, discovered some of

the deepest German secrets. He was helped in his task by the

Germans themselves. Once two German codes fell into the
SURPRISE 199

hands of the French, while at another time some German

staffs simultaneously broadcast the same text en c/air and enciphered. Messimy asserts that the services rendered by the French cipher bureau were"éclaia,z:."

Also the British excelled in the art of deciphering. A pro. fessor from Edinburgh, A. Ewing, was in charge of this im- portant work for the British Admiralty and became famous

in. his country. By the end of August, 1914, Russian divers

removed the German naval code from the stranded and abandoned.cruiser Magdeburg. The code was quickly dispatched

to the British Admiralty which profited largely from it.

In the Russo-Polish War radio listening played an important role and often revealed the intentions of the enemy to

the last details. The Poles deciphered the Russian orders for

the Russian counter-offensive in the Ukraine in May, 1920.

In Abyssinia only the Italians profited from the radio messages

of the opponent. Marshal Badoglio revealed that the few

Abyssinian transmitters were actually more helpful to the Italians than to the Abyssinians. It goes without saying that pre- cautions must be taken against such occurrences. The army whose radio-messages are read by the opponent renounc all

chances of surprise, while it offers vast strategic possibiilties

to the enemy.

It is to be hoped that in future wars, and as a consequence

of new weapOns, complete and decisive victories will again be

possible. New arms and new techniques will certainly give

excellent opportunities for good generalship. But the main

condition of future victories lies in the çestoration of the art

of maneuver. Movement makes surprise possible and surprise

opens the way for new movements. Surprise is dependent upon

secrecy and speed.

Secrecy, speed, movement and surprise are thus the pre- requisites of victory. Luck .and art must combine to catch the

enemy by surprise. In war, the unexpected is the most successful. Thus, surprise is the key to victory.'

NOTE, CH-APTER X

1. Five Principles: Feller mentions five "prerequisites of victory:'

security, surprise, mobility, cuncentrationo( forte and cooperation which,

according to him, result in economy of force. 'The more force is
200 SURPR1S1

economized, the more can be held in reserve and in consequence the

higher will be the staying power of the attack'. These different pun.

ciples should be integrated in the simplest way. Fuller thus believes

that simplicity is the highest principle of war. Foch's famous "de quoi

i'agit-iI??" is nothing but a different form of the same idea. The principle of surprise closely tallies with this general idea. For this pun.

ciple essentially says only this: Strike at the enemy where, when and

how he does not expect you; strike at weak and unprotected points

War has become a form of gigantic collective jiu.jitsu.

*U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996—414—275—60079