UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 00-39
M ATI L DA B ONNY , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued September

25, 2002 Dec ided Dec ember 10, 2002 )
Douglas J. Rosinski , o f Wa sh ing ton , D .C. , f or the a pp e lla nt.
Pa tri c ia T

ru jil lo , w ithwh om Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Acting Assistant Gene ral Counsel; and J oa n E . M or iar ity , Deputy

Assistant Gener al Counsel, wer e on the brief

, all of Washington, D.C., for the appe llee.
Be fore KRAMER, Chief Judge , and F ARL EY and IVERS, Judges

. I VERS, Judge : T h e a

p p e l l an t , M a t i l d a

B o n n y, i s t h e w i d o w o f

v e t e r anW i l l i a m H

. B o n n y, who died on August 15, 1995. She seeks rever sal of a September 27, 1999, decision by the B oard of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls ( B VAor

B oa rd ), whichg ra

nte d a c c ru e d b e ne fi ts t o h e r f or the pe ri od

no t to exceed two y ear s prior to the date of her husband' s death. The appellant' s entitlement to acc rued benef its was based on a finding that disability compensation had been due and owingto the veter an up on his de a th. Th e a

pp e lla nt a sse rt s that sh e is e nti tle d to pa y me nt o f t he fu ll amou

nt o f b e ne fi ts due and unpa id to the veteran at the t ime of hi s death. The Court' s jurisdiction to review this matter is e stablished by 38 U.S.C. § 7252. For the rea sons c ontained here in, the Court w ill re verse the Boa rd' s September 1999 de cision and re mand this matter to the B oard f or appr opriate a ction.

I. F AC TS The a ppellant' s dece ased husba nd serve d in the U.S. A rmy from January 1941 to September2

1945. Record ( R.) at 10. He sustaine d service -conne cted gunshot wounds that were evaluated as 3 0 % d i s ab l i n g, co mb i n ed

. R

. at 1 4

. An Au gu s t1 0 , 1 9 9 5 ad m i n i s t r a t i v e r ev i ew o f t h e v et er an 's claims file re sulted in a deter min at i o n t h at a Februa

ry 26, 1948, reg ional office (RO) de cision contained c lear and unmistakable er ror ( CUE) and that the veter an' s combined disability evaluation should have been 50% , eff ective January

28, 1948. R. at 14-16; see R. at 21. The August 10, 1995, administrative dec ision inst ructe d that retroa ctive bene fits should be g rante d acc ording ly

. Id . Five day s after the administrative dec ision, on August 15, 1995, the ve tera n died. R. at 18. I n Se pte mbe r 19 95 , the a

pp e lla nt su bmi tte d an a

pp lic a tio n fo r VAsurv ivi ngsp ou se be ne fi ts. R. at 23 -2 6. An RO deci si on date d th a t sa me mon th g ra

nte d a c c ru e d b e ne fi ts t o th e a pp e lla nt, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5121, "pa y able f or one y ea r p ri or to the vete ran' s death." R. at 35. The appellant disag ree d with the one-y ear limit , pointing out that the veter an had rec eived an aw ard of benef its retroac tive to J anuar

y 28, 1948, and that, ther efor e, the full amount of that awar d should be paid to her. R. at 38- 39, 51. I n the B VA dec ision that is t he subjec t of this a ppeal, the Boa

rd noted a c hang e in the law that enlar g ed the tim e li mit for awar ds of accrue d benef its from one y ear to two y ear s. R. at 4. The B oa rd e xten de d th e awa

rd of a c c ru e d b e ne fi ts t o th e a

ppellan t to the a mou

nt e qu a l to wh a t w ou ld have be e n d

ue to t he ve te ra n for the tw o y e ars pr ior to his de a th, bu t den ie d the a pp e lla nt' s " c la im for pa y ment of di sability compensation due and owing to the veteran from J anuar y 28, 1948." R. at 6.

II. AN AL YSI S Although she rec eived an aw ard of "a ccr ued bene fits" unde r 38 U.S.C. § 5121, the appellant has asse rted that she should be paid the full amount of the past-due benef its awarde d to her husband sh or tly be fo re his de a th. She argue s th a t th e pla in m e anin g of the statut or y c la us e " du e and

un pa id for a period not to exceed two y ear s," a s it appear s in 38 U.S.C. § 512 1(a) , is not as the Boa rd construed a

nd applied it. Appellant' s Br ief (B r.) at 15-23. She contends that the two- y ear limit ation does not apply

to the amount to be paid, but rather sets a time limi t for which pay

ment of an a

war d of bene fits can be pending in order f or the a war d to be paid as ac crue d benef its upon the death of a veter an. Id . at 16. She contends that, beca use her de cea sed husband' s awa rd wa s pending pay

ment3

for only five da y s prior to his death, the f ull amount should be paid to her as acc rued benefits. Id

. a t 16 -1 7. Th e Court

re je c ts this argume nt. Th is C ourt

and the Un ite d St a te s Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls f

or the F e de ra l Cir c uit

(F e de ra l Cir c uit ) have c le arl y de fi ne d the me anin g of the tw o- y e a r limi ta tio n c on c e rn inga c c ru e d b e ne fi ts a va ila ble under 38 U. S

. C . § 5121. The princ ipal decisions from the F eder al Circuit, Ri c ha rd v . W est , 161 F.3d 719 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998), and Ha ine s v . W est , 1 5 4 F

. 3 d 1 2 9 8 ( F e d

. Cir. 1998), cert. de nied , 526 U.S. 1016 (1999), ea ch re inforce d the rule that a cla im for VA disability benef its does not survive the death of a ve tera

n, but that cer

tain survivors of a

vete ra n can c laim acc rued be nefits under 38 U.S.C. § 5121. Rega

rding the two-y ear

limit for a ccr

ued bene fits, the Fe dera l Circuit stated: [The] acc rued be nefits provision [of 38 U.S.C. § 5121] i s limi ted. A survivor may

only seek p ay ment of those bene fits which wer e " due and un pa id" a t th e tim e of the ve te ra n' s d e a th. Th e statut e a lso lim its pay ment to those benef

its that wer e due and unpaid "f or a pe riod not to exceed two y ear s" pr ior to the veter an' s death.
Haines , 154 F.3d at 1300 (citations omitted). L ikewise, in Ma rlo w v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 548 ( 1999), this Court reiterated the mea ning of the tw o- y e ar l imi t, n oti ngtha t it wa s in dis pu ta

ble that th e ve te ra

n in th at cas e ha d b e e n " fu lly compensated during the two y ear s prior to h i s d ea t h " and that, there fore , there wer e no ac crue d benef its to claim. Id

. at 551. The a ppellant' s sugg estion that the two-y ear time limi t means a twoy ear period a fter the death of a vete ran in whic h pay

ment of ac crued bene fits can be made is not persua sive in light of the me aning of the ti me-limit clause that has been repe atedly stated i n case law. As an a lternate argument for this appea l, the appellant has asserted that "ac crue d benef its,"

as re fer ence d in sect i o n 5 1 2 1, are a statutorily define d subset of " periodic mone tary benef its." Ap pe ll ant 's S upple me nta l ( Sup pl. ) B r. a t 10 ; see 38 U. S.C. § 5 12 1( a ). She c la ims e nti tle me nt t o periodic mone tary

benef its to which her husband was entitl ed at death, not to ac crue d benef its arising

a ft e r h is d e a th. Ap pe lla

nt' s Su pp l. B r. a t 10 . U nd e r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s o f thi s ca se , the Court a c c e pts the essenc e of this latter a rg ument as valid. Th e te xt of

pa rt (a ) o f s e c tio n 5 12 1 r e a ds , in re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s: Ex cept as provided in sec tions 3329 and 3330 of title 31, p er i o d i c m o n et ary

b en ef i t s (o t h e r t h a ni n s u ra n ce an d s er v i ce m en 's indemnity) under

laws administere d by

the S ec re t ary

to which an4 individual was entitled at death under e x isting ratings or de cisions, or tho se ba se d o n e vid e nc e in t he fi le a t dat e of de a th ( he re ina ft e r i n th is sect io n an d sect io n 51 22 of th is ti tl e referr ed t o as "accrued ben efi ts ") and due a nd unpaid for a

period not to exceed two y ear s, shall, upon the de a th o f s uc h in div idu a l be pa id a s f oll ow s:

. . . . (2 ) Up on

the de a th o f a

ve te ra n, to t he liv ingpe rs on

fi rs t listed below: (A) T he vete ran' s spouse. 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)

. The punctuation and wording of this parag raph c onvey its plain meaning

. See Ga rd ne r v . B ro wn , 5 F.3d 1456, 1458- 59 (F ed. Cir. 1993), a ff 'd , 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (holding that if lang uag e of statute is c lear , no further inquiry into intent of Congre ss is required)

. The c omma in the middle of para g raph ( a), be tween " decisions" and " or," and the use of the

c on jun c tio n " or " a ft e r the c omm a , ind ic a te that th e se pa ra te d p hr a se s st a te su

bs tanti ve a lte rn a tiv e s. 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)

. The parag raph provides for pay ment of (1) periodic monetary benef its to which

an in div id ual w a s e nti tle d at de a th u nd e r e xistin g ratin g s o r d e c isi on s, wh ic h th e Court wi ll c a ll "be nefits awa

rded but unpa id", or

(2) pe riodic monetar

y benef its based on evidenc e in the file at the date of an entitled individual's death and due and unpaid for a per iod not to ex cee d two y ear s, which

are called " acc rued be nefits" for pur poses of sec tions 5121 and 5122. Id

. The Court notes that the r eg ulation promulgated by the Secre tary for implementation of 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a), 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000, potentially chang es the e ffe ct of the punc tuation in the statute. Th e re g ulatio n r e a ds , in

pe rt ine nt p art : [P ]eriodic monetary

benef its .

. . authorized under la ws administered by [VA] , to which a p ay ee w as entitled at his death under e x isting rating s or decisions, or t hose based on evidenc e in t he file at date of de a th, and

du e and un

pa id fo r a pe ri od no t to e xce e d 2 y e ars pr ior to the last date of

entitlement as provided in § 3.500(g) wi l l, upon the d e a th o f s u c h p e r s o n , b e p a id

[t o c e rta in

li s te d in d iv id u a ls ]. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000(a) . I n the re g ulation, the Secre ctar y added a comma that could have the e ffe ct of imp os ingthe tw o- y e ar lim itatio n on be ne fi ts awa rd e d bu t un

pa id a s we ll a s on

a c c ru e d b e ne fi ts. Any such interpr etation of the r eg ulati o n wo uld conflict with the intent expressed in 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a) , as ex plained above , and would be be y ond the Secr etar y ' s authority

. See G ardner , 5 F.3d at 1464 (holding that the S ecr etar y ' s statutory authority to make r eg ulations may only car ry out the5

purposes of a

n act of Congr ess, and may

not amend the a ct). The important distinction betwee n the two ty pes o f p er i o dic monetar

y benef its is t hat one ty pe of be nefits is due to be pa id to the vetera n at his death and one ty

pe is not. As to the former , when the be nefits have been a war ded but not paid pre -death, an el i gi b le survivor is to rec eive the entire a mount of the awa

rd. The r ight to re ceive the entire amount of per iodic monetary benef its that

was a war ded to the elig ible individual shifts to the elig ible survivor when pay ment of the a

war d was

no t ma de be fo re the e lig ibl e ind ivi du a l di e d. Th is i nte rpr eta tion o f 3 8 U .S. C. § 51 21 (a ) i s completely consistent with the plain lang uag e of the statute, as previously quoted an d i n t erprete d here in. As to the latter ty

pe of periodic monetary benef its, what is determinative re g ardingacc rued benef its is t hat evidenc e in the individual' s file at the date of de ath support s a dec ision in favor of

awa rd ingbe ne fi ts. B e c a

us e the be ne fi ts ca

nn ot be awa

rd e d to the de c e a se d in div idu a l, a n e lig ibl e survivor ca

n claim a por

tion of those acc rued be nefits. See Ri c ha rd , Haines , and Marlow , a ll su pr a . T h e Se c r e ta

r y h a s ar g u e d th a t th e te r

mi n a ti o n - o f

- r ig h t p r o v is io n o f 3 8 U

. S.C. § 5112(b) applies in this case to pre clude the a ppellant from a

ny awa rd other than the ac crue d benef its award that she ha s re c e ive d. Se c re tary ' s Su pp l. B r. a t 15 -1 6. Th e Se c re tary c ite s Seym our v. Principi , 245 F.3d 1377 ( Fe d. Cir. 2001), in support of this arg ument, for the sa me rule a s that found in Ri c ha rd and Haines , th a t is , th e ru le that a surv ivo r of a vet eran may purs ue a c la im f or a c c ru e d b e ne fi ts. Secre tary ' s Suppl. Br. at 15-16. We r ejec t the Secre tary ' s argum ent bec ause, in Seym our a s in Ri c ha rd and Haines , the appe al involved ac crue d benef its, not benefits awa

rded but unpa id. The Court has explained here in the distinction between these two ty pes of be nefits ava ilable to survivors of ve te ra ns un de r 38 U. S.C. § 51 21

. Mo re ov e r, the Se c re tary a c kn ow le dg e d a t or a l argume nt t hat, when a veter an is the re cipient of pe riodic monet ar y benef its under 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a) by virtue of the de a th o f a

n a pp or tio ne e of that ve te ra

n, purs ua nt t o re g ulatio n, that vet e ra n is no t li mit e d to

rec eiving two y ear s of benefits but rathe r would be e ntitled, if applicable, to re ceive the full amount of bene fits involved. See 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)(1) ; 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000(b)(1)

. The pa rties to this appeal do not dispute the B oard' s conclusion that the ap p el lant, as the spouse of the de cea sed vete ran, was elig ible to rec eive be nefits under 38 U.S.C. § 5121. Cf. W

ilkes v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 237, 242 (2002) (finding that the appellant was not person e ligible to re ceive6

benef its under 38 U.S.C. § 5121where benef its had been a

war ded to veter an but wer e unpaid upon his death). The Court holds that the appellant was entitl ed to rec eive section 5121 benef its awarde d but unpa id, that is, the full amount of per iodic monetary benef its to which her dec ease d husband, the veter an, wa s entitled at death under a n exis ting de cision, the 1995 VA a dminist rative de cision. The B oard de termined that all periodic monetary benef its refe rre d to in 38 U.S.C . § 5121 are

acc rued be nefits, re g ardle ss of their adjudicat i v e s t at u s
. R. at 5. The B oard f ound no appar ent statut or y ba sis fo r d isb ur sin g to the a pp e lla nt the e nti re a mou

nt of mon e y that ha d be e n awa rd e d to her dece ased husband befor e his death. Id

. By distinguishing two ty pes of benef

its provided under 38 U.S.C. § 5121, the C o u rt h as n eg ated the B oard' s more limiting interpre tation of the statute. Be cause the B oard' s err oneous interpr et at i o n o f 38 U.S.C. § 5121 resulted in an aw ard to the appellant of

acc rued be nefits, and the Court ha s determined that she was entitled by law, under 38 U.S.C. § 5121, to be nefits awa rded but unpa id, the Boa rd' s decision will be re verse d. See OteroCastro v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 375, 380- 82 (2002) ( discussing r ever sal with reg ard to statutory and regulatory

interpre tation).

III . C ON CL USI ON Ac c or din g ly , th e Se pte mbe r 2 7, 19 99 , B VAde c ision is RE VERSED and thi s matte r i s REMANDED to the B oard f or an aw ar d t o the appe llant of the full amount of pe riodic monetar y benef its due and owing her de cea sed husband, the ve tera n, as dete rmined by

the Aug ust 10, 1995, VA administrative de cision.