FAA NEEDS TO IMPROVE ASDE-X 

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS TO ADDRESS 

COST GROWTH, SCHEDULE DELAYS, AND 

SAFETY RISKS 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Report Number: AV-2008-004 

Date Issued: October 31, 2007 
U.S. Department of 

Memorandum

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General 

Subject: ACTION: FAA Needs To Improve ASDE-X 

Management Controls To Address Cost Growth, 

Schedule Delays, and Safety Risks 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Report Number AV-2008-004 

Date: October 31, 2007 

From: David A. Dobbs 

Principal Assistant Inspector General 

 for Auditing and Evaluation 

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-1 

To: Acting Federal Aviation Administrator 

This report presents the results of our review of the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s (FAA) Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X 

(ASDE-X) program. FAA is developing ASDE-X to aid air traffic controllers in 

preventing ground collisions on the airport surface and reducing runway 

incursions.1

 FAA also intended for ASDE-X to improve airport safety by 

operating in all-weather conditions, especially during low-visibility conditions—

such as fog, rain, and snow—when controllers cannot see aircraft or vehicles as 

they move about the airport surface. 

ASDE-X is an important safety program that has undergone significant changes 

since its inception in October 2000. FAA originally planned ASDE-X as a lowcost alternative to its existing Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model 

3/Airport Movement Area Safety System (ASDE-3/AMASS).2

 FAA planned to 

deploy ASDE-X at 25 small- to medium-sized airports that had no surface 

surveillance technology and at 1 larger airport that had ASDE-3/AMASS. 

However, in September 2005, FAA made a major shift in its ASDE-X acquisition 

strategy and now plans to upgrade 25 ASDE-3/AMASS airports with ASDE-X 

and deploy it at only 10 airports that had no surface surveillance technology. FAA 

 

1

 A runway incursion is any incident at an airport involving an aircraft, a vehicle, person, or an object on the ground 

that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, 

landing, or intending to land. FAA’s definition only applies to airports with operating air traffic control towers. 2

 AMASS provides software enhancement for the ASDE-3 radar designed to monitor airport surface traffic and alert 

air traffic controllers to potential collisions on the runways. AMASS is deployed at 34 of the Nation’s largest and 

busiest airports. FAA plans for ASDE-X to build upon AMASS’s capabilities. 

i
concluded that this would yield the greatest return on its investment and that the 

maximum safety benefits would be gained by deploying ASDE-X capabilities to 

airports with larger traffic counts or more complex operations (e.g., airports that 

use the same runways for arrivals and departures). Our audit objectives were to 

determine (1) whether FAA’s strategy for deploying ASDE-X for operational use 

is cost effective, given the changes in the program’s deployment strategy, and (2) 

to what extent the ASDE-X program will reduce the risk of ground collisions or 

accidents caused by runway incursions. We conducted this performance audit in 

accordance with generally accepted Government Auditing Standards as prescribed 

by the Comptroller General of the United States. Our objectives, scope, and 

methodology are discussed in exhibit A. 

BACKGROUND 

The purpose of ASDE-X is to help maintain safe separation of aircraft and 

vehicles on the airport surface and aid controllers in avoiding ground collisions—

some of the most serious aviation incidents. In fact, the worst aviation accident in 

history, in which 583 people were killed, occurred in 1977 on a runway in the 

Canary Islands. Recent examples include the August 2006 accident in Lexington, 

Kentucky, that caused the loss of 49 lives when a pilot mistakenly taxied onto a 

closed runway and executed a take-off roll on a runway that was too short. The 

ASDE-X system is intended to provide direct alerts to controllers of potential 

aircraft collisions on closed runways. 

Prevention of runway incursions and ground collisions has been on the National 

Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) “Most Wanted Transportation Safety 

Improvements List” since 1990. FAA designed ASDE-X in response to the NTSB 

recommendations to require ground movement safety systems at airports with 

scheduled passenger service to prevent runway incursions and provide direct 

warnings to flight crews. 

The ASDE-X core surveillance capabilities are intended to depict aircraft and 

vehicle position and identification overlaid on a color map of the airport. Through 

system enhancements, ASDE-X safety software monitors the traffic for conflict 

and, in various scenarios, is able to produce an alert (visual and audible) to warn 

controllers of pending ground collisions. To determine target positions, ASDE-X 

processes data from airport surface and terminal radars and receives data from 

airfield antennas that transmit and receive both transponder beacon and Automatic 

Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)3

 data. A computer fuses all the data 

into a target position and, based on the trend of the target position movement, 

predicts future positions of aircraft and vehicles. 

 

3

 ADS-B provides accurate Global Positioning System satellite-based position reports for equipped aircraft. 

ii
On October 11, 2000, FAA issued a letter contract to Sensis Corporation (the 

ASDE-X prime contractor) to begin ASDE-X development. FAA and Sensis 

agreed to the contract terms on November 22, 2000, and formed a cost-sharing 

agreement on the first system. The first ASDE-X system was priced at 

$8.3 million; however, the actual production cost escalated to $28.7 million (a 

246-percent increase.) In September 2001, 11 months after development began, 

FAA’s Joint Resource Council4

 (JRC) approved the first ASDE-X program 

baseline at a cost of $424.3 million to implement 26 operational systems by 2007. 

As table 1 shows, significant changes were made to the ASDE-X baseline even 

before FAA shifted its strategy in September 2005 thereby increasing the total 

program cost to $549.8 million and pushing program completion to 2011. 

Table 1. History of ASDE-X Strategy Changes 

Date Purpose No. of 

ASDE-X 

Airports 

Planned 

Completion 

Date 

Cost 

Increase 

($ in millions)

Sept. 2001 First program baseline 26/a 2007 $424.3 

Jun. 2002 Second baseline: upgrade seven more 

ASDE-3/AMASS airports 

 33/b 2007 $80.9 

Oct. 2003 Upgrade two more ASDE-3/AMASS 

airports 

 35/c 2007 $0 

Sept. 2005 Third baseline/major strategy shift: 

upgrade 25 ASDE-3/AMASS airports 

 35/d 2011 $44.6 

Current 

Total 35 2011 $549.8 

Source: ASDE-X JRC baseline documents 

/a 25 airports without surface surveillance and 1 ASDE-3/AMASS airport /b 25 airports without surface surveillance and 8 ASDE-3/AMASS airports /c 25 airports without surface surveillance and 10 ASDE-3/AMASS airports /d 10 airports without surface surveillance and 25 ASDE-3/AMASS airports 

Congress continues to support the ASDE-X program. From 2000 to 2007, it 

appropriated about $400 million for ASDE-X implementation. In fiscal year (FY) 

2006, FAA requested $27.2 million for the program but received an additional 

$3 million due to conferees’ concerns about runway incursions and to expedite 

installation and deployment of ASDE-X equipment. In FY 2007, FAA requested 

$63.6 million—and Congress approved $70.6 million—for further software 

development, additional hardware equipment, test and evaluation activities, and 

program management support. 

 

4

 The JRC is FAA’s senior decision-making body that approves funding for major acquisitions. 

iii
RESULTS IN BRIEF 

The ASDE-X program is at risk of not meeting its cost and schedule goals to 

commission all 35 ASDE-X systems for $549.8 million by 2011 and may not 

achieve all planned safety benefits. When we testified5

 in May 2007, FAA had 

already expended about $288 million (52 percent) and obligated about 

$350 million (64 percent) of ASDE-X program planned funding but had only 

deployed 8 of 35 systems for operational use. Additionally, at the deployed sites, 

FAA had yet to implement the planned capability to alert controllers of potential 

collisions on intersecting runways and taxiways. 

In July 2007, FAA commissioned its ninth ASDE-X system for operational use at 

Louisville International Airport after addressing a number of longstanding 

technical problems. The Louisville system is the first to be deployed with the 

capability to alert controllers of potential collisions on intersecting runways and 

converging taxiways. Under certain circumstances, however, the system still does 

not provide timely alerts for controllers to take appropriate action. Moreover, 

FAA did not test the converging taxiway capability before operations began. 

Additionally, in June 2006, FAA issued policy6

 governing the use of ASDE-X 

during inclement weather after concluding the system was capable of reducing 

excessive false alerts during heavy precipitation. However, the system is 

susceptible to dropping targets during heavy precipitation. While FAA’s efforts to 

address these problems have shown progress, it is too early to conclude whether 

ASDE-X can meet the unique needs of each airport scheduled to receive the 

system. 

To achieve ASDE-X program goals and effectively manage the program, FAA 

needs to (1) improve ASDE-X management controls to reduce the risks of further 

cost growth and schedule delays; (2) resolve operational performance issues with 

key ASDE-X safety capabilities planned to reduce the risk of ground collisions on 

intersecting runways and taxiways, including during inclement weather; and (3) 

work with airlines and airport officials to provide safety enhancements that were 

not included in the ASDE-X program re-baseline but are vital to reducing the risks 

of ground collisions caused by pilot and vehicle operator errors. 

FAA needs to improve ASDE-X management controls to reduce the risks of 

further cost growth and schedule delays. Although the JRC approved the rebaselined cost and schedule estimates for ASDE-X in September 2005, by 

December 2006, FAA had significantly increased cost estimates for six major 

ASDE-X activities. FAA also did not achieve ASDE-X schedule goals in FY 

2006. 

 

5

 OIG Testimony, CC-2007-054, “FAA’s FY 2008 Budget Request: Key Issues Facing the Agency,” May 10, 2007. 

OIG reports and testimonies can be found on our website: www.oig.dot.gov. 6

 FAA Notice N JO 7210.660, “Safety Logic Systems Procedures for ASDE-X 5.0.7.2 and AMASS,” June 1, 2007. 

iv
FAA needs to develop realistic cost estimates through ASDE-X completion to 

determine whether the program can be procured within the revised costs. FAA 

increased ASDE-X cost estimates for six activities central to implementing the 

program by $94 million; despite this significant increase, it did not revise the 

overall estimated program costs. These costs increased for two main reasons: (1) 

FAA underestimated the cost of ASDE-X hardware, software, and program 

management requirements and (2) FAA has not addressed improper contract 

administration practices that we advised the Agency of in June 2006 (such as lack 

of contract terms and conditions and payments to the contractor before the 

completion of meaningful work). 

To stay within the baseline cost of $549.8 million, FAA offset the cost growth by 

decreasing other activities required to complete ASDE-X implementation (see 

exhibit B). However, we question the accuracy of these estimates because we 

found a $20 million disagreement between FAA’s and the prime contractor’s 

estimates of the installation costs. Also, ASDE-X program officials decreased the 

telecommunications cost estimates from $16.5 million to $8.5 million. They later 

reported that telecommunications costs were actually one to two times higher than 

the original estimates, which could increase the cost to at least $33 million. 

ASDE-X program officials need to develop realistic cost estimates for all activities 

required to complete ASDE-X implementation. 

As of July 2007, FAA had expended about $314 million (57 percent) and 

obligated about $378 million (69 percent) of the planned funding but had only 

deployed 9 of 35 systems for operational use. FAA is now challenged with 

implementing the 26 remaining ASDE-X systems at the more complex airports 

with less than half of the planned funds remaining. Although FAA has initiated 

work to implement some of the remaining systems, we remain concerned because 

until FAA develops realistic cost estimates, it will be difficult to determine if 

ASDE-X is cost effective. 

FAA also needs to correct identified prohibited and improper contract 

administration practices. In our 2006 management advisory to FAA (see 

exhibit C), we expressed concern that awarding fees for system enhancements 

based on costs incurred rather than negotiated fixed-fee dollar amounts 

encouraged rather than discouraged cost growth. Because FAA has allowed 

questionable contract practices, has not formalized a final agreement with the 

prime contractor for these activities, and does not compare actual contract funding 

to the current estimates, we are concerned that ASDE-X cost elements (e.g., 

Software Design and Development) do not have credible estimates. 

ASDE-X program officials need a realistic master schedule through ASDE-X 

completion. FAA did not achieve ASDE-X schedule goals in FY 2006—only four 

of seven planned ASDE-X systems were commissioned for operational use. These 

v
schedule delays occurred because of FAA’s failure to establish a realistic master 

schedule through ASDE-X completion that outlines when all activities associated 

with commissioning each system for operational use will be completed. For 

example, at the three airports where ASDE-X systems failed to be commissioned, 

FAA: (1) did not resolve testing deficiencies at one airport, (2) installed equipment 

but did not initiate testing at another airport, and (3) did not install the equipment 

that was delivered to another airport. Delays also occurred because of challenges 

in interfacing ASDE-X with the legacy radar system. FAA has since revised the 

schedule for the three airports but did not report in the updated waterfall schedule 

when the systems will be commissioned for operational use. FAA also no longer 

reports the overall estimated completion date for the remaining ASDE-X systems. 

Since the waterfall schedule was released, FAA commissioned the ninth system in 

Louisville in July 2007; this leaves 26 systems remaining to be commissioned (see 

exhibit D). 

FAA’s plans to expedite ASDE-X deployment at Chicago O’Hare airport from 

2009 to 2007 further highlight the need for FAA to develop a master schedule to 

manage the impact of unplanned schedule changes. According to FAA, 

refocusing resources on a single site can cause a domino effect on the schedule; 

this may impact FAA’s ability to meet its schedule goals for 2007 and its current 

program goal to complete system deployment by 2011. 

To address ASDE-X cost and schedule uncertainty, FAA needs to correct 

identified improper contract administration practices and establish a mechanism, 

such as earned valued management (EVM),7

 to track cost and schedule goals for 

all major activities associated with implementing ASDE-X as required by FAA’s 

Acquisition Management System policy. 

FAA needs to resolve operational performance issues associated with key 

ASDE-X safety capabilities to reduce the risks of ground collisions. The 

ASDE-X program is at risk of not achieving all of its planned safety benefits. 

Although the Louisville ASDE-X system provides key safety capabilities required 

to reduce the risks of ground collisions on intersecting runways and converging 

taxiways, under certain circumstances the system does not generate timely alerts 

for controllers to take appropriate action. FAA also needs to resolve operational 

problems associated with heavy rain that cause ASDE-X to be susceptible to 

dropped targets and subsequent system outages before commissioning this 

capability for operational use at other airports. 

Safety alert capability for intersecting runways and converging taxiways: Last 

year, near collisions between aircraft on intersecting runways and converging 

 

7

 EVM is a management tool that can be used to identify early warning indicators of potential cost overruns and 

schedule delays and to make critical decisions in managing contracts. 

vi
taxiways highlighted the need for FAA to implement this capability at all airports. 

For example, in March 2006, a controller at Chicago O’Hare mistakenly cleared 

two commercial aircraft for takeoff on intersecting runways. Another controller 

spotted the error and ordered both aircraft to abort their take-off rolls. Before 

stopping, however, the 2 aircraft came within 100 feet of each other at the runway 

intersection. In January 2007, there was a collision between two aircraft operating 

on converging taxiways at Milwaukee International Airport. 

In July 2007, FAA commissioned its first ASDE-X system with the capability to 

alert controllers of potential collisions on intersecting runways and converging 

taxiways at Louisville International Airport. FAA commissioned the system after 

testing a new ASDE-X software build at Louisville that incorporates these 

capabilities. During testing, ASDE-X experienced several operational 

performance problems such as unscheduled system outages and untimely alerts to 

controllers. To address unscheduled system outages, FAA upgraded ASDE-3 

radar with new software. The test result concluded that the problems associated 

with unscheduled system outages had been resolved. 

With respect to timeliness of alerts, tests performed by FAA’s Independent 

Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) team raised some concerns. 

Specifically, under certain circumstances alerts on intersecting runways involving 

taxiing aircraft may not allow enough time for controllers to warn pilots or vehicle 

operators. For example, the team observed a scenario where ASDE-X alerts were 

considered to be too slow: an aircraft landed on one runway as another aircraft 

was taxiing on a runway toward the intersection where the other aircraft had 

landed. In a real-life situation, this could have caused a serious collision. 

FAA also did not test the converging taxiway capability, although the 

January 2007 accident in Milwaukee highlighted the importance of verifying this 

key safety capability. Despite these operational performance risks, FAA decided 

to commission the ASDE-X safety alert capability for intersecting runways and 

converging taxiways. In our opinion, FAA needs to take corrective actions to 

address ASDE-X system limitations pertaining to alert timeliness for taxiing 

aircraft. FAA also needs to fully test the converging taxiway capability. While 

FAA’s efforts to address these problems have shown progress at Louisville, it is 

too early to conclude whether ASDE-X can meet the unique needs of each airport 

scheduled to receive the system. 

System susceptibility to dropped targets and system outages during periods of 

heavy rain: A key capability shortfall of ASDE-3/AMASS that ASDE-X was 

supposed to address involved improving airport safety by operating in all weather 

conditions and suppressing false alerts during heavy rain storms. FAA designated 

Orlando as its operational site to test a new ASDE-X software build or “rain 

configuration” that Sensis developed to address this problem. FAA finished 

vii
testing this upgrade and issued policy on June 1, 2007, governing 

ASDE-X usage of rain configuration software upgrade during moderate to extreme 

precipitation. 

While we commend FAA’s progress, we have concerns because (1) the ASDE-X 

upgraded system is susceptible to dropping targets and experiencing system 

outages and continues to generate false alerts and (2) FAA did not test the new 

rain configuration capability with intersecting runways or ASDE-3 radar, which 

are present at the majority of the ASDE-X airports that will receive this upgrade. 

Therefore, FAA needs to properly test this new capability as it is being 

implemented to ensure that it meets the unique needs of the 35 ASDE-X airports. 

FAA needs to work with airports and airlines to provide safety enhancements 

that were not included in the ASDE-X program re-baseline but are vital to 

reducing the risks of pilot and vehicle operator errors. Although ASDE-X 

provides direct warnings to controllers of potential ground collisions, it does not 

provide direct warnings to pilots or vehicle operators—even though they caused 

about 70 percent of the runway incursions over the last 3 years. 

Direct warnings to pilots: FAA initially planned ASDE-X in response to an NTSB 

recommendation to provide direct warnings to flight crews (e.g., pilots). 

However, current plans for ASDE-X do not include direct warnings to pilots, and, 

for this reason, NTSB rated ASDE-X as an unacceptable response to its 

recommendation. This is important because over the last 3 years about 54 percent 

of runway incursions were caused by pilot errors, which are precursors to ground 

collisions. 

As we reported in the past,8

 technologies that help pilots know their and others’ 

locations on the runway (e.g., in-cockpit moving map displays and ADS-B) must 

be expedited to avoid close calls that continue to pose a serious safety risk to 

airline crews and passengers. In March 2007, FAA announced plans to expedite 

the certification and use of in-cockpit moving map displays to show pilots their 

actual position on the airport surface. In August 2007, FAA also took important 

steps by awarding a contract for the development and installation of the ground 

infrastructure for ASD-B. 

When displayed in the cockpit, ADS-B information can provide a “second set of 

eyes” by including the pilot in the loop to detect and alleviate hazardous surface 

situations. FAA plans to mandate “ADS-B Out” where aircraft will broadcast 

their position to ground systems but does not intend to mandate the use of 

 

8

 OIG Report Number AV-2001-066, “Despite Significant Management Focus, Further Actions Are Needed To 

Reduce Runways Incursions,” June 26, 2001. 

viii
“ADS-B In” or cockpit displays. FAA hopes the industry will voluntarily equip 

with the technology.9

 

Over the next several years, FAA plans to work with the United Parcel Service at 

Louisville to develop air-to-air and surface applications for ADS-B In and cockpit 

displays. FAA plans to integrate the use of ADS-B, cockpit displays, and ASDEX. This presents FAA with a unique opportunity to determine whether these three 

technologies can be combined to simultaneously alert controllers and pilots of 

potential ground collisions. FAA should then determine the cost and timeline for 

implementing this capability at all ASDE-X airports. 

Positive identification of vehicles operating on the airport surface: ASDE-X is 

designed to reduce the risks of ground collisions caused by vehicle operators by 

providing positive identification of vehicles operating on the airport surface. 

However, this safety feature only functions when airport vehicles are equipped 

with transponders. This capability is important because over the last 3 years, 

approximately 16 percent of runway incursions were caused by vehicle operators. 

For example, in February 2007 at Denver International Airport, an aircraft that had 

just landed nearly collided with a snow plow after the plow driver crossed a 

runway without clearance from air traffic control or airport operations directly in 

front of the aircraft. According to the flight crew, they had to use “significant” 

reverse thrust and brakes to halt the aircraft on the runway. Until airport vehicles 

are equipped with transponders, controllers will be limited in their use of ASDE-X 

because they will not be able to positively identify vehicles operating on the 

airport surface. Therefore, FAA should work with airports to aggressively 

promote equipping their vehicles with transponders as a vital step in reducing the 

risks of ground collisions caused by vehicle operator error. 

To reduce the risk of ground collisions and maximize ASDE-X capabilities, FAA 

needs to (1) work with airlines to determine whether ASDE-X can be used with 

other planned technologies to provide direct warnings to pilots and (2) encourage 

airport officials to equip airport vehicles with transponders. 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 

Our recommendations focus on actions that FAA needs to take to improve 

ASDE-X management controls to reduce cost growth, schedule delays, and safety 

risks. FAA needs a well-defined, executable plan that (a) aligns realistic cost 

estimates with firm schedule goals; (b) identifies when all ASDE-X systems with 

all planned capabilities will be implemented through program completion; 

 

9 OIG Testimony CC-2007-100, “Challenges Facing the Implementation of FAA’s Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance–Broadcast Program,” October 17, 2007. 

ix
(c) corrects improper contract administrative practices; and (d) establishes a 

mechanism to monitor and track ASDE-X program cost, schedule, and 

performance.

To reduce the risks of ground collisions caused by pilots and vehicle operators 

FAA should: (a) determine whether ASDE-X, ADS-B, and in-cockpit moving 

maps technologies can be combined to simultaneously alert controllers and pilots 

of potential ground collisions; (b) determine the cost and timeline for 

implementing this capability at all ASDE-X airports; and (c) work with airports to 

aggressively promote equipping their vehicles with transponders to maximize 

ASDE-X capabilities as a vital step in reducing the risks of ground collisions 

caused by vehicle operator error. Our full recommendations can be found on 

page 16. 

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE 

On August 6, 2007, we submitted our draft report to FAA for comment. FAA 

responded on September 25, 2007, and concurred with all six recommendations. 

FAA stated that each recommendation was valid. However, FAA’s response to 

our recommendation for developing realistic cost and schedule parameters is 

unclear and does not fully address our concerns about reducing risks with this 

important safety program. Further, we strongly disagree with the Agency’s 

comment that during the audit it had already begun employing what we 

recommended. We are concerned that the Agency’s response will have the effect 

of masking ongoing problems with FAA’s ASDE-X program management and 

oversight of contractor performance. 

For example, it has been more than a year since we issued our management 

advisory (see exhibit C) to FAA in June 2006. The advisory recommended that 

the Agency take immediate steps to correct prohibited and improper contract 

administration practices with the ASDE-X program. At the time of our draft 

report submission in August 2007, FAA had yet to take corrective actions to 

address our concerns raised in June 2006. According to FAA’s response, the 

ASDE-X contracting officer planned to establish new procedures with Sensis and 

FAA’s Resident Quality Reliability Officer to correct prohibited and improper 

contract administration practices by the end of September 2007—about 15 months 

after we first brought this to FAA’s attention. 

FAA concurred with our recommendation to develop a realistic cost estimate to 

complete ASDE-X implementation. Although FAA has yet to complete contract 

negotiations with Sensis to obtain reliable and supportable contract cost estimates, 

the Agency states that costs are consistent with the FY 2005 baseline. FAA’s 

response is difficult to understand since it did not plan to finalize cost estimates for 

two significant unpriced contract requirements with Sensis until the end of 

x
September 2007. We continue to believe that ASDE-X is proving more costly to 

implement than expected and that considerable work lies ahead. As we note in our 

report, until negotiations are complete, FAA will not have a firm understanding of 

how much it will cost to complete ASDE-X or what capabilities will ultimately be 

delivered. 

In response to our recommendation that FAA develop a master schedule that 

clearly details when all ASDE-X systems will be fully implemented for 

operational use, the Agency stated that the Program Office is using a “master 

integrated working schedule” to track deployment activities. Despite repeated 

requests during our review for a master schedule, the Program Office did not 

provide our office with this information. Instead, the Program Office only 

provided us with a waterfall schedule. This is an incomplete document because it 

lacks details regarding when all implementation activities and planned capabilities 

associated with commissioning ASDE-X for operational use will be completed for 

each airport. 

FAA officials stated that they did not provide the Office of Inspector General with 

the master schedule because it is an internal document that is not released outside 

of the Agency. The ASDE-X Program Office’s behavior and lack of transparency 

on this matter is unacceptable. This is a violation of the Inspector General Act of 

1978.10 The act authorizes the Inspector General to have access to all records 

relating to Federal programs and request such information or assistance as may be 

necessary for carrying out its duties and responsibilities. Accordingly, we are 

asking the Acting Administrator to take steps to prevent a reoccurrence of this 

problem. 

We do not understand why FAA withheld this information pertaining to the master 

schedule given the importance of the program in reducing accidents on runways 

and recent congressional oversight. We testified before the Senate Committee on 

Appropriations in the spring of 2007, and cost and schedule risk with ASDE-X 

was a central issue of the hearing. ASDE-X is an important safety program, and 

Congress and stakeholders need a clear understanding of what it will take to 

complete this effort with all promised capabilities. 

FAA provided us with an updated waterfall schedule in its response to our draft 

report. We continue to believe that this schedule is incomplete and therefore does 

not meet the intent of our recommendation. We believe that a system deployment 

should not be considered “complete” until all planned capabilities (e.g., core and 

system enhancements) are fully tested and in place. Moreover, while FAA refers 

to a master integrated working schedule in its response, the Agency still has not 

provided us with the information. 

 

10 Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. § 6 (1978). 

xi
FAA’s response included attachments showing its current assessment of the 

ASDE-X program’s cost and schedule along with other program elements. 

However, this information only serves to underscore our concerns. For example: 

• Attachment A - FAA’s calculation of the ASDE-X program’s re-baseline 

cost estimate including distribution of cost in the original estimate: FAA 

commented that the ASDE-X program’s baseline cost estimates have remained 

consistent with the September 2005 re-baseline. However, we question how 

FAA can arrive at this conclusion given the fact that the Agency acknowledges 

in its response that it has yet to complete negotiations with Sensis to obtain 

supportable contract cost estimates. FAA also acknowledges that it has yet to 

establish a mechanism such as EVM to track and monitor ASDE-X cost. We 

repeatedly requested ASDE-X program officials and cost analysts to provide us 

with cost estimates so we could verify ASDE-X original and actual costs. We 

either received conflicting cost information or were informed that the costs had 

changed for some implementation activities and that details did not exist to 

break out the costs for ASDE-X implementation activities. Finally, these 

estimates were released by FAA after we issued our draft report; therefore, we 

could not verify FAA’s source or the accuracy of these estimates. 

• Attachment B – ASDE-X waterfall schedule: This schedule is dated “as of 

August 30, 2007,” but still shows airports without planned commissioning 

dates. This reaffirms our recommendation to develop an ASDE-X master 

schedule detailing when all activities and planned capabilities will be 

commissioned for operational use. Even some airports already listed as 

commissioned still have site enhancements scheduled for completion in 2008. 

• Attachment C - ASDE-X software enhancement schedule: This was 

developed on September 21, 2007, after we issued our draft report. We 

commend FAA for taking action and acknowledge this as a step in the right 

direction. 

• Attachment D - ASDE-X software test events and completion dates: 

According to FAA, this document shows evidence that the converging taxiway 

capability was fully tested by the test team from FAA’s Technical Center. The 

intent of our recommendation was to ensure that FAA fully tests ASDE-X 

planned capabilities at each airport scheduled to receive the system given the 

unique characteristics of each site. 

A complete discussion of FAA’s comments and our response can be found on 

pages 17 through 20. FAA’s complete response is included in the appendix. 

xii
ACTIONS REQUIRED 

We consider FAA’s actions taken or planned to be responsive to recommendations 

2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. We consider these recommendations to be resolved but open 

until FAA completes all planned actions. 

FAA’s response to recommendation 1 (on ASDE-X cost and schedule) only 

partially addresses our concerns. FAA stated that it plans to complete several 

actions by the end of September 2007. Therefore, we request that FAA update its 

response for two specific areas: (1) describe how it finalized cost estimates for the 

two remaining significant unpriced contract requirements (i.e., engineering 

services and installation) and (2) provide a copy of FAA’s new procedures with 

Sensis to correct prohibited and improper contract administration practices. 

FAA also needs to provide an ASDE-X master schedule detailing when all 

implementation activities and planned capabilities will be commissioned for 

operational use. FAA’s master schedule should not count a site as being 

commissioned until all planned capabilities (e.g., core and system enhancements) 

are fully tested and accepted at a site. The ASDE-X Program Office’s behavior 

and lack of transparency on this matter is unacceptable. This is in violation of the 

Inspector General Act of 1978. Accordingly, we are asking the Acting 

Administrator to take steps to prevent a reoccurrence of this problem. 

In accordance with Department of Transportation Order 8000.1, please provide us 

with this additional information within 30 days. If you have any questions 

regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 366-1427 or Kevin Dorsey, 

Program Director, at (202) 366-1518. 

# 

cc: FAA Chief of Staff 

 Acting Director of Terminal Program Operations 

 Anthony Williams, ABU-100 

xiii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

FINDINGS .............................................................................................. 1

FAA Needs To Improve ASDE-X Management Controls 

To Reduce the Risks of Further Cost Growth and 

Schedule Delays ............................................................................... 1

FAA Needs To Resolve Operational Issues Associated 

With Key ASDE-X Safety Capabilities To Reduce the 

Risks of Ground Collisions ................................................................ 7

FAA Needs To Work With Airlines and Airport Officials 

To Address Safety Risks That Were Not Considered in 

the ASDE-X Program Re-Baseline but Are Vital to 

Reducing the Risks of Pilots and Vehicle Operator 

Errors ............................................................................................... 12

RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................ 16

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE .................................. 17

EXHIBIT A. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND 

METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 21

EXHIBIT B. ASDE-X PROGRAM COST VARIANCES...................... 22

EXHIBIT C. OIG JUNE 2006 MANAGEMENT ADVISORY ............... 23

EXHIBIT D. ASDE-X WATERFALL SCHEDULE (AS OF 

AUGUST 14, 2006).............................................................................. 26

APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS................................................... 27
1

FINDINGS 

We found that the ASDE-X program is at risk for further cost growth and schedule 

slips and may not achieve all planned safety benefits. To achieve ASDE-X 

program goals and effectively manage the program, FAA needs to (1) improve 

program management controls to reduce the risks of further cost growth and 

schedule delays; (2) resolve operational performance issues with key ASDE-X 

safety capabilities planned to reduce the risk of ground collisions on intersecting 

runways and taxiways, including during inclement weather; and (3) work with 

airlines and airport officials to provide safety enhancements that were not included 

in the ASDE-X program re-baseline but are vital to reducing the risks of ground 

collisions caused by pilot and vehicle operator errors. 

FAA Needs To Improve ASDE-X Management Controls To Reduce the 

Risks of Further Cost Growth and Schedule Delays 

As of July 2007, FAA had expended about $314 million (57 percent) and 

obligated about $378 million (69 percent) of the planned funding but had only 

deployed 9 of 35 systems for operational use. FAA is now challenged with 

implementing the 26 remaining ASDE-X systems at the more complex airports 

with less than half of the planned funds remaining. Although FAA has initiated 

work to implement some of the remaining systems, we remain concerned because 

until FAA develops realistic cost estimates and schedule goals and establishes 

better contract administration practices, it will be difficult to determine if ASDE-X 

is cost effective. 

FAA’s JRC approved re-baselined ASDE-X cost estimates in September 2005; 

yet, just 1 year later, ASDE-X program officials increased cost estimates by 

$94 million for six activities essential to acquiring and implementing ASDE-X 

(see table 2 on page 2). These costs increased for two main reasons: (1) FAA 

underestimated the cost for its hardware and software requirements for the new 

airports scheduled to receive ASDE-X and (2) FAA has not completely addressed 

improper contract administration practices that we advised the Agency of in June 

2006. Also, since the JRC re-baseline, FAA has not met ASDE-X schedule goals 

and was not able to commission all systems planned for FY 2006. 

FAA Needs To Improve ASDE-X Management Controls by Developing 

Realistic Cost Estimates 

Our analysis of FAA’s revised cost estimates for ASDE-X found that the Agency 

underestimated ASDE-X costs for hardware and software for the new airports 

scheduled to receive ASDE-X. This can be attributed to FAA’s failure to 

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complete site surveys to obtain precise requirements for ASDE-X equipment 

needs for all new airports and FAA’s need to continue developing and deploying 

additional software to meet ASDE-X requirements. For example, through 

November 2006, FAA had deployed 12 software builds to the 8 operational sites. 

By July 2007, FAA completed testing of its latest software build to address safety 

alert capabilities for intersecting runways, and inclement weather. However, FAA 

needs to resolve a number of operational performance issues associated with the 

software that will likely require more software development and additional costs. 

FAA has also established an agreement with Sensis to begin developing and 

testing another ASDE-X software build, which allows ASDE-X technology to be 

used at airports with a precision runway monitoring capability. According to 

Sensis, a new national baseline will be established once this new software baseline 

is complete. FAA had completed negotiations and approved cost estimates with 

Sensis for this capability by June 2007. However, according to FAA, future 

requirements for precision runway monitoring are under review. 

Table 2. ASDE-X Cost Estimates for Six Activities 

(Dollars in Millions)

Cost Element Planned Cost 

Estimate 

(as of Sept. 2005) 

Current Cost 

Estimate 

(as of Dec. 2006) 

Cost Growth 

Procurement/ 

Production 

$142.95 $179.74 $36.79

Program Management $93.47 $120.10 $26.63

Software Design and 

Development 

$38.49 $58.82 $20.33

Logistics Support $11.00 $18.34 $7.34

Second-Level 

Engineering 

$5.50 $7.90 $2.40

Test and Evaluation $5.50 $6.23 $0.73

 Total $296.91 $391.13 $94.22

Source: OIG analysis of ASDE-X basis of estimates and ASDE-X updated costs estimates 

Our review also found that even though the cost estimates for the six activities 

now exceed their planned life-cycle estimates by $94 million, the Agency 

continues to estimate that total ASDE-X program costs will not exceed 

$549.8 million. The largest cost growth occurred in procurement and production 

(about $37 million), program management (about $27 million), and software 

design and development (about $20 million). While FAA attempted to offset the 

cost growth by decreasing other activities required to complete ASDE-X 

implementation, we found that for one activity, installation, there is significant 

disagreement between what FAA estimates the total cost will be and what the 

prime contractor estimates. FAA estimates the cost to install ASDE-X equipment 

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at the remaining sites at $44 million, while Sensis estimates it at $64 million—a 

$20 million difference. 

We also found that ASDE-X program officials decreased telecommunications cost 

estimates from $16.5 million to $8.5 million to remain within ASDE-X program 

baseline costs. However, ASDE-X program officials later reported that the 

telecommunications costs were actually one to two times higher than the original 

estimates, which could increase the costs to at least $33 million or up to 

$49.5 million. Therefore, we question how realistic FAA’s total program costs are 

for ASDE-X and recommend that FAA develop realistic cost estimates for all 

ASDE-X implementation activities through program completion. 

FAA Needs To Correct Identified Prohibited and Improper Contract 

Administration Practices 

Our June 2006 management advisory to FAA points to some possible causes for 

FAA’s ineffective management of the ASDE-X program. We identified 

prohibited and improper contract administration practices on the ASDE-X prime 

contract, including the lack of contract terms and conditions. We found that FAA 

(1) increased contractor fees based on costs incurred instead of the negotiated 

fixed-fee dollar amounts, (2) made payments to the contractor before the 

completion of meaningful work on fixed-price items, and (3) did not adequately 

document contract changes. 

In August 2006, FAA responded to our management advisory. With respect to our 

first concern that the ASDE-X contract has been administered as a cost-plus-apercentage-of-cost contract, FAA disagreed with our position. FAA stated that the 

statute prohibiting cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracts does not apply but 

concluded that its Acquisition Management System (AMS) does prohibit use of 

this type of contract. We continue to believe that FAA is in violation of its AMS 

policy. For example, based on our review of ASDE-X invoices, despite numerous 

program changes to installation, the contractor bills and collects a fee that is a 

percentage of costs incurred. With regard to points 2 and 3, FAA indicated that it 

would begin taking corrective action to address our concerns. We continue to 

view these areas as major watch items that require FAA’s attention. 

Risks for further cost growth exist within ASDE-X cost elements, thus 

increasing the program’s overall risk. FAA pays two of the three 

implementation activities that experienced the largest growth—Software Design 

and Development and Program Management—on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. In 

the 2006 management advisory, we expressed concern that the way in which 

ASDE-X program officials awarded fees for system enhancements (software 

design and development) based on costs incurred rather than negotiated fixed-fee 

Findings 
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dollar amounts encouraged rather than discouraged cost growth. Because FAA 

has questionable contract practices, has not formalized a final agreement with the 

prime contractor for these activities, and does not compare actual contract funding 

to the current estimates, we are concerned that ASDE-X cost elements paid on a 

cost-plus-fee basis do not have credible estimates. 

Procurement and Production estimates are also at risk for further increases because 

FAA has not conducted site surveys to determine precise requirements for 

ASDE-X equipment at all of the airports now on the deployment waterfall 

schedule. While FAA pays for Procurement and Production on a fixed-price basis, 

estimates have grown by $37 million since the last program re-baseline decision. 

Prior to September 2005, FAA had already given the prime contractor all the funds 

to produce systems for the previously planned sites. However, the JRC re-baseline 

decision changed both the airport and the equipment requirements for ASDE-X 

program, thus increasing the demand for Procurement and Production funding. 

Since FAA plans to deploy ASDE-X to more complex airports (i.e., those with 

more runways; more traffic; and multiple, intersecting runways), it will need to 

consider the impact on cost estimates. For example, more complex airports such 

as Chicago O’Hare demand more equipment (such as multiple antennae and 

radars) to ensure that ASDE-X can track aircraft and vehicle targets on the airport 

surface. Until site surveys at all airports are done and precise requirements are 

established, the program is at risk for further cost growth and schedule delays due 

to unforeseen requirements. 

FAA Needs To Address Schedule Delays by Developing Realistic 

Schedule Goals and a Master Schedule Through ASDE-X Completion 

We found that ASDE-X program officials need a realistic master schedule through 

ASDE-X completion to effectively plan and manage ASDE-X implementation and 

avoid further schedule delays. Since the JRC re-baselined the program in 2005, 

FAA has not been able to meet ASDE-X schedule goals. For example, FAA did 

not achieve its schedule goals for FY 2006—only four of seven planned ASDE-X 

systems were commissioned for operational use. We found that FAA failed to 

commission ASDE-X for operational use at Louisville, Charlotte-Douglas, and 

Washington-Dulles International Airports because it did not resolve testing 

deficiencies at one airport, installed equipment but did not initiate testing at 

another airport, and never installed the equipment that was delivered to another 

airport. FAA has since revised the schedule for the three sites and reported July 

2007, August 2007, and July 2008 initial operational dates for those airports, 

respectively, but did not report when the systems will be commissioned for 

operational use. 

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5

We also found that schedule delays can be attributed to challenges FAA faced 

during its first attempts to combine ASDE-X technology with ASDE-3 radars. For 

example, 

• In April 2005, FAA experienced problems with false alerts at Louisville 

International Airport when it interfaced the newer ASDE-X technologies with 

ASDE-3 radar. As a result, FAA decided to delay ASDE-X deployment at 

airports continuing to use these radars until a solution was identified, which 

further complicated the ASDE-X implementation schedule. 

Two of the three overdue sites (Louisville and Charlotte-Douglas) that were 

planned for commissioning in FY 2006 but delayed until FY 2007 cause 

concern about FAA’s ability to execute the remainder of the ASDE-X 

program. Although FAA delivered ASDE-X equipment to these airports in 

early 2004, it took until July 2007 before FAA could establish full operational 

status at Louisville, and Charlotte is still pending commissioning. In 

November 2004, FAA’s testing of the combined system in Louisville resulted 

in the identification of 31 deficiencies that constituted a serious risk to the 

operational deployment of the ASDE-X/ASDE-3 system. In early March 

2005, FAA still found serious deficiencies. After yet another test on 

March 31, 2005, FAA found that the combined system still generated more 

false alerts than the ASDE-3 radar had using the existing system, AMASS. 

• Also, the ASDE-X system had problems with “stealing” the identification tags 

of the targets shown on controller displays. With an incorrect tag, a controller 

could misidentify an aircraft or issue a warning or an instruction to the wrong 

aircraft, thereby creating greater risk of a ground collision. We are concerned 

because the current ASDE-X baseline calls for FAA to deploy ASDE-X to 

21 airports that will continue to use ASDE-3 radars. While FAA’s efforts to 

address these problems have shown progress by FAA commissioning the 

Louisville system in July 2007, it is too early to conclude whether ASDE-X 

can meet the unique needs of each airport scheduled to receive the system. 

Moreover, FAA’s plans to expedite ASDE-X deployment at Chicago O’Hare 

airport from 2009 to 2007 further highlight the need for the Agency to develop a 

master ASDE-X schedule through the program completion. According to FAA, 

refocusing resources on a single site could cause a domino effect on the waterfall 

schedule and may impact FAA’s schedule goals for 2007. For example, ASDE-X 

program officials reported that plans to begin upgrading previously commissioned 

sites with new software to address the safety risks at those airports could slip from 

2007 to later years. ASDE-X program officials also reported that because 

resources have been shifted to Chicago, FAA may not be able to complete full 

system deployment by 2011. 

Findings 
6

We also found that because ASDE-X program officials continue to modify 

ASDE-X schedule goals, the true ASDE-X completion date remains unclear. In 

September 2005, FAA identified ASDE-X schedule goals for ordering, 

constructing, and installing systems along with the operational readiness date for 

all 35 ASDE-X airports approved by the JRC. In August 2006, however, FAA 

released an updated ASDE-X schedule and made significant changes to its 

schedule goals. This updated schedule no longer reported commissioning dates 

for ASDE-X sites. 

FAA also reported different commissioning dates for the ASDE-X system 

deployed at Orlando International Airport. For example, FAA originally reported 

that Orlando was commissioned for operational use in September 2004 but later 

reported a January 2006 commissioning date. These variations in commissioning 

dates underscore the need for FAA to develop a realistic master schedule with firm 

dates indicating when ASDE-X will be implemented. 

To address ASDE-X schedule uncertainty, FAA needs to develop a master 

schedule through program completion. The schedule should detail when all 

activities and planned capabilities associated with commissioning ASDE-X for 

operational use will be completed for each airport. These activities should include 

completion dates for procurement and production, equipment installation, software 

development and deployment, program management support, test and evaluation 

activities, system optimization, initial operational capability, and commissioning. 

These activities normally require long lead-times for FAA and Sensis to 

effectively plan and schedule the resources to complete them; however, according 

to Sensis officials, FAA only schedules work for them on an annual basis. 

Therefore, FAA needs to establish a master schedule with Sensis through ASDE-X 

completion that outlines when all implementation activities and planned 

capabilities will be commissioned for operational use. 

FAA Needs To Establish a Stronger Performance Management Tool To 

Monitor and Track ASDE-X Cost and Schedule Goals 

To address these cost and schedule uncertainties, FAA needs to establish a 

mechanism to monitor planned and actual costs and schedules for all major 

activities associated with implementing ASDE-X, as required by its own 

Acquisition Management System policy. For example, it was not until January 

2007 that FAA requested Sensis to provide estimated costs to complete production 

and procurement, software development, and program management activities 

through the end of the program, just to name a few activities. FAA needs to 

implement a stronger performance management tool, such as earned value 

management, to provide FAA with current and integrated cost, schedule, and 

technical performance information and reliably forecast future performance. Also, 

Findings 
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by implementing earned value management for ASDE-X, FAA decision makers 

could more effectively track and monitor cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

FAA Needs To Resolve Operational Issues Associated With Key 

ASDE-X Safety Capabilities To Reduce the Risks of Ground Collisions 

The ASDE-X program is at risk of not achieving all of its planned safety benefits. 

Although the Louisville ASDE-X system provides key safety capabilities required 

to reduce the risks of ground collisions on intersecting runways and converging 

taxiways, under certain circumstances the system does not generate timely alerts 

for controllers to take appropriate action. FAA also needs to resolve operational 

problems associated with heavy rain that cause ASDE-X to be susceptible to 

dropped targets and subsequent system outages before commissioning this 

capability for operational use at other airports. 

The intent of the ASDE-X acquisition was to procure a first-article or “core” 

system that focused on surveillance capabilities only. The system has the ability 

to process multiple radar sources, transponder-equipped aircraft and vehicle 

information, and ADS-B sensor data to positively identify aircraft and vehicles 

operating on the airport surface to air traffic controllers. After operational 

acceptance of the core system, the acquisition would continue with system 

enhancements. These system enhancements include the ability for ASDE-X to 

operate dual primary radars, remote primary radar tower installation, an interface 

with the ASDE-3 radar, and development of ASDE-X safety logic. 

ASDE-X safety logic is a software enhancement to the ASDE-X core system that 

predicts the path of aircraft landing or departing and vehicular movements on 

runways. Visual and auditory alerts are activated when the safety logic projects a 

potential collision. FAA plans to deploy ASDE-X safety logic software primarily 

in three successive builds. 

• The first build will provide safety alert capability for aircraft or vehicles in 

collision situations on a single runway. 

• The second build will provide alerts for intersecting runways and converging 

taxiways and during heavy rain storms. 

• The third build will provide alerts for more complex runway and taxiway 

operations. Figure 1 shows possible collision situations in which this 

technology would be helpful on single and intersecting runways. 

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Figure 1. Example of a Potential Collision Situation for Single 

and Intersecting Runways 

Source: ASDE-X Safety Logic specification 

FAA completed the first build and began commissioning it for operational use at 

ASDE-X airports. Additionally, in July 2007, FAA began commissioning the 

second build item for operational use in Louisville—key ASDE-X safety alert 

capabilities to reduce the risks of ground collisions on intersecting runways and 

converging taxiways. It is important for FAA to implement these capabilities as 

soon as possible to reduce the risks of collisions and near collisions on intersecting 

runways and taxiways, such as those that occurred at Milwaukee General Mitchell, 

Chicago O’Hare, and Boston Logan International Airports (these incidents are 

discussed below). However FAA must still resolve operational performance 

issues associated with these capabilities. 

FAA Needs To Resolve Problems With ASDE-X Providing Untimely Alerts 

To Warn Controllers of Potential Collisions on Intersecting Runways and 

Converging Taxiways 

There are 22 airports with intersecting runways scheduled to receive ASDE-X. 

FAA has already deployed ASDE-X at six airports with intersecting runways or 

converging taxiways. However, the Louisville system is the first to be 

commissioned with the safety alert capability that will warn controllers of 

potential collisions on intersecting runway and converging taxiways. Recent 

collisions and near collisions between aircraft on intersecting runways and 

converging taxiways highlight the need for FAA to address these serious safety 

risks. For example: 

• On June 9, 2005, a controller mistakenly cleared two commercial aircraft at 

Boston Logan (an Airbus 330 and a Boeing 737) to depart on intersecting 

runways. As the Airbus lifted off the ground, the Boeing pilot saw the 

potential hazard and kept his aircraft on the ground to avoid a collision; 

however, the 2 aircraft came within 171 feet of each other. 

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• On March 21, 2006, a controller mistakenly cleared two commercial aircraft at 

Chicago O’Hare (an Airbus 319 and an Embraer E145) for takeoff on 

intersecting runways. Another controller spotted the error and ordered both 

aircraft to abort their take-off rolls. Before stopping, however, the 2 aircraft 

came within 100 feet of each other at the runway intersection. 

• On January 24, 2007, a controller mistakenly cleared two cargo aircraft at 

Milwaukee General Mitchell (a Beech BE99 and a Cessna 402-B) to taxi on 

converging taxiways, causing the two aircraft to collide. Both airplanes 

sustained substantial damage. The pilot of the Beech suffered minor injuries, 

and the pilot of the Cessna was not injured. 

By July 2007, FAA completed testing of an ASDE-X software build at Louisville 

International Airport that has the safety alert capability to warn controllers of 

potential collisions on converging taxiways and intersecting runways. According 

to the May 27, 2007, IOT&E report, FAA conducted 23 flight tests representing a 

wide range of safety alert situations, with emphasis on intersecting runways. 

While ASDE-X provided timely alerts for most of the test scenarios, the IOT&E 

team raised concern that under certain circumstances, intersecting alerts involving 

taxiing aircraft may not provide sufficient time for controllers to take appropriate 

action. The team observed two scenarios where ASDE-X alerts were considered 

to be too slow. The first involved an aircraft on final arrival to a runway while 

another aircraft was taxiing on an intersecting runway. The other involved an 

aircraft that landed on one runway as another aircraft was taxiing onto a runway 

toward the intersection of the runway where the other aircraft had landed. FAA 

needs to take corrective actions to address ASDE-X system limitations pertaining 

to taxiing aircraft alert timeliness. 

According to FAA officials at Louisville, the new ASDE-X software did alert 

controllers of potential collisions on intersecting runways during an initial test of 

the system. FAA commissioned the system with these capabilities after 

addressing a number of technical problems such as unscheduled outages; there 

were a total of 44 maintenance actions that needed to be addressed. To address the 

problems, FAA updated ASDE-3 radar with a new software build that it believes 

should resolve the problems that were contributing to the system outages. Also, 

Louisville officials did not test the safety alert capability for converging taxiways. 

While FAA’s efforts to address these problems have shown progress at Louisville, 

it is too early to conclude whether ASDE-X can meet the unique needs of each 

airport scheduled to receive the system. 

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During Periods of Heavy Rain, ASDE-X Is Susceptible To Dropping 

Targets and Experiencing System Outages 

A key capability shortfall of AMASS that ASDE-X was supposed to address 

involved improving airport safety by operating in all-weather conditions. 

Although ASDE-X was designed to perform better than AMASS in inclement 

weather by suppressing false alerts, it has had similar problems. Like AMASS, 

the ASDE-X primary radar has not been able to accurately identify targets on the 

airport surface during moderate to heavy rain storms; when this occurs, the system 

generates false alerts. 

FAA designated Orlando International Airport as its operational facility to test a 

new ASDE-X software build that Sensis developed to address this problem. FAA 

completed the upgrade at Orlando and issued policy on June 1, 2007, governing 

ASDE-X usage during moderate to extreme precipitation. The new software build 

upgrades the ASDE-X radar system with a “rain configuration” to avoid false 

alerts during heavy rain. According to FAA, when this configuration is selected, it 

allows full-core alerting capabilities. 

While we commend FAA’s progress, we have concerns because (1) the ASDE-X 

upgraded system is still susceptible to dropped targets (i.e., “missing” real targets) 

and system outages and continues to generate false alerts and (2) FAA did not test 

the new capability with intersecting runways or ASDE-3 radar, which are present 

at the majority of the ASDE-X airports that will receive this upgrade. Therefore, 

FAA needs to properly test the new rain configuration capability as it is being 

implemented to ensure that it meets the unique needs of all 35 ASDE-X airports. 

The ASDE-X rain configuration capability is susceptible to dropping targets 

and experiencing system outages during periods of heavy rain. FAA issued its 

new policy after concluding that, with the newly tested rain configuration, ASDEX is now capable of suppressing excessive rain-generated false targets and 

preventing false alerts from occurring. However, FAA based this decision on its 

testing period at Orlando, during which only 20 hours worth of data were 

collected. In our opinion, this amount of data cannot fully indicate the new 

upgrade capabilities. Also, Orlando officials told us that even when ASDE-X 

operates with the rain configuration, it is still capable of missing real targets on the 

airport surface and displaying false targets. They also stated that if the new 

capability is operational the majority of the time, a certain level of risk is 

acceptable. We believe that to address safety risks the system needs to be fully 

operational. 

We also note that FAA’s IOT&E Assessment Report for the “ASDE-X Upgrade,” 

dated May 25, 2007, concluded that ASDE-X is susceptible to target loss and 

system outages during periods of heavy rain. These problems occurred because 

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the radar interface unit and video detection malfunctioned during periods of heavy 

rain, and this caused the video levels to go below the threshold, resulting in 

dropped targets and system outages. Upon system restoration, not all aircraft were 

displayed. The operational impact of ASDE-X missing targets decreases the 

system’s ability to provide data on the condition of the runways for aircraft and 

vehicle operations and decreases the system’s ability to generate alerts, which 

could result in a collision. In addition, it reduces controllers’ confidence in the 

reliability of the system. 

The IOT&E team rated this as a “High Risk” area and recommended that heavy 

precipitation causing dropped targets and system outages should be resolved 

before ASDE-X operational readiness declaration at Louisville and initial 

operational capability at subsequent ASDE-3/AMASS sites. Additionally, to fully 

achieve the safety benefits of the ASDE-X Upgrade system, the IOT&E team also 

recommended that enhancements continue to be implemented to maximize system 

usage in heavy precipitation. We agree that FAA should resolve this problem 

prior to deploying the system at other airports. 

To address false targets, FAA also issued policy that allows controllers to 

temporarily “drop” or remove ASDE-X false targets from their displays and from 

the safety logic processing after they have positively verified, either through 

pilot/vehicle operator position reports or visual observation, that the target is 

indeed false. We are concerned about the timeliness of verifying false targets in 

this way and the ability of controllers to accurately do so while managing air 

traffic. 

FAA’s testing for the rain configuration software upgrade did not consider 

requirements at other ASDE-X airports. The Orlando airport differs from the 

majority of the other ASDE-X airports in that it has no intersecting runways and 

does not use ASDE-3 radar input. We are concerned because: 

• Although FAA’s policy states that the ASDE-X rain configuration software 

upgrade provides full-core alerting capability, FAA never tested it with 

intersecting runways or ASDE-3 radar. Therefore, implementation processes 

that worked with Orlando may not be easily transferable to other sites. We are 

concerned because 22 of the 35 airports planned to receive ASDE-X have 

intersecting runways, and 21 of the 35 will retain their ASDE-3 radar. 

Integration of new upgrades with these radar should be thoroughly tested since 

a key problem with AMASS’s inability to operate during heavy rain storms 

was ASDE-3 radars causing false alerts. 

• Each airport will be required to set site-specific parameters for determining 

when safety alerts should be generated for ASDE-X rain configuration because 

precipitation behaves differently depending on the location. Because each 

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airport has a unique layout and other requirements, this will take time and 

could further impact the waterfall schedule. 

FAA Needs To Work With Airlines and Airport Officials To Address 

Safety Risks That Were Not Considered in the ASDE-X Program 

Re-Baseline but Are Vital to Reducing the Risks of Pilots and Vehicle 

Operator Errors 

Although ASDE-X is intended to provide direct alerts to air traffic controllers to 

warn of potential ground collisions, it does not address similar safety risks caused 

by pilot or vehicle operator errors—even though these types of errors caused about 

70 percent of the runway incursions over the last 3 fiscal years (see figure 2). To 

reduce the risks of ground collisions and maximize ASDE-X capabilities, FAA 

needs to (1) determine whether ASDE-X can be used with other planned 

technologies to directly alert pilots to potential ground collisions and (2) 

encourage airport officials to equip vehicles with transponders so that controllers 

can positively identify vehicles operating on the airport surface. 

Figure 2. Three-Year Comparison of Runway Incursions 

by Incident Type 

 Source: FAA Runway Safety Office: FY 2004-FY 2006 runway incursion data 

97 105

89

171 168

56 53 51

190

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

FY 2004 

(Total 324)

FY 2005 

(Total 326)

FY 2006 

(Total 330) 

Operational Errors Pilot Deviations Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations

PD

VPD

OE OE

PD

VPD

 OE

PD

VPD

Note: Operational Errors (OE) are runway incursions caused by air traffic controllers. 

Pilot Deviations (PD) are runway incursions caused by pilots. 

 Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations (VPD) are runway incursions caused by vehicle operators and pedestrians. 

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The ASDE-X System Does Not Provide Direct Alerts to Pilots, Which Has 

Been a Longstanding NTSB Recommendation 

FAA designed ASDE-X in response to the NTSB recommendation to require 

ground movement safety systems at airports to provide direct warnings to flight 

crews. However, in November 2006, the NTSB reported that ASDE-X is an 

unacceptable response to its longstanding (6 years) safety recommendation 

because it does not provide direct warnings of potential ground collisions to flight 

crews. 

Providing warnings directly to flight crews is a potentially significant tool to 

prevent runway incursions, since over 54 percent were caused by pilot error over 

the last 3 years. Pilots are subject to physical limitations that restrict visibility of 

the airport surface, including cockpit/vehicle line-of-sight restrictions. Pilots also 

rely on radio communications with controllers as a primary means of receiving 

airport surface movement instructions. Misinterpretation of these 

communications, which is a common occurrence, can lead to deviations from the 

stated instructions. 

As we reported in the past, technologies to help pilots know their and others’ 

locations on the runway, such as in-cockpit moving map displays and ADS-B, 

must be expedited to avoid close calls that continue to pose serious safety risks to 

airline crews and passengers. In March 2007, FAA took the first step to assist 

pilots by announcing plans to expedite the certification and use of in-cockpit 

moving map displays to show pilots their actual position and movement on the 

airport surface. However, moving map displays alone do not provide pilots with 

the capability of seeing the intent of other aircraft movement on the airport surface 

nor do they provide the shared situational awareness between pilots and 

controllers. 

In August 2007, FAA also took important steps by awarding a contract for the 

development and installation of the ground infrastructure for ASD-B. When 

displayed in the cockpit, ADS-B information can provide a “second set of eyes” 

by including the pilot in the loop to detect and alleviate hazardous surface 

situations. However, FAA plans to mandate “ADS-B Out” where aircraft will 

broadcast their position to ground systems. FAA does not intend mandate the use 

of “ADS-B In” and the use of cockpit displays but hopes the industry will 

voluntarily equip with the technology. 

Over the next several years, FAA plans to work with the United Parcel Service at 

Louisville to develop air-to-air and surface applications for ADS-B In and cockpit 

displays. FAA plans to integrate the use of ADS-B, cockpit displays, and ASDEX. This presents FAA with a unique opportunity to determine whether these three 

technologies can be combined to simultaneously alert controllers and pilots of 

Findings 
14

potential ground collisions. FAA should then determine the cost and timeline for 

implementing this capability at all ASDE-X airports. 

One key to reducing accidents caused by runway incursions is to provide “Shared 

Situational Awareness,” where both the pilot and controller are viewing a common 

picture simultaneously while interacting with the data. FAA has identified ADS-B 

technology as the surveillance solution that can meet these needs by providing 

critical flight information simultaneously to pilots and air traffic controllers. 

ADS-B transmits air traffic and flight information to aircraft, vehicles, and ground 

stations to improve situational awareness and provides an unprecedented level of 

service both to the cockpit and air traffic control facilities. While ASDE-X as 

currently designed has the capability to receive and transmit ADS-B information 

to air traffic controllers and is intended to provide direct alerts to controllers of 

potential ground collisions, it does not provide a similar capability to pilots. 

FAA plans to deploy ASDE-X and ADS-B in Louisville, Kentucky, in 2007. 

Therefore, FAA should determine whether ASDE-X, ADS-B, and in-cockpit 

moving maps technologies can be used to provide direct alerts to controllers and 

pilots simultaneously to reduce the risks of ground collisions caused by pilot 

errors. FAA should then determine the cost and timeline for implementing this 

capability at all ASDE-X airports. 

Airports Scheduled To Receive ASDE-X Must Equip Their Vehicles With 

Transponders To Maximize ASDE-X Capabilities 

The ASDE-X system is designed to reduce the risks of ground collisions caused 

by vehicle operators by providing positive identification of vehicles operating on 

the airport surface. However, airport vehicles must be equipped with transponders 

for ASDE-X to provide this key safety feature; otherwise, the system cannot 

positively identify vehicles. 

Of the 9 airports (out of the 35 planned) that have received ASDE-X, the 2 we 

visited (Milwaukee and Orlando) had their vehicles equipped with transponders. 

We were informed that ASDE-X funds were used to pay for the transponders at 

these airports because they were both key test sites for ASDE-X. FAA paid 

$3,000 per vehicle to equip a fleet of 78 vehicles at General Mitchell International 

airport in Milwaukee Wisconsin. 

It is important for FAA to encourage airport officials to equip vehicles with 

transponders because about 16 percent of the runway incursions were caused by 

vehicle operators, which poses a serious safety risk. For example, on 

February 2, 2007, at Denver International Airport, a commercial aircraft (a Boeing 

737) that had just landed nearly collided with a snow plow, after the plow driver 

Findings 
15

crossed a runway without clearance from air traffic control or airport operations 

directly in front of the aircraft. According to the flight crew, they had to use 

“significant” reverse thrust and brakes to halt the aircraft on the runway. 

Until airport vehicles are equipped with transponders, controllers will be limited in 

their use of ASDE-X because they will not be able to positively identify vehicles 

operating on the airport surface. Therefore, FAA should work with airports to 

aggressively promote equipping their vehicles with transponders as a vital step in 

reducing the risks of ground collisions caused by vehicle operator error. 

Findings 
16

RECOMMENDATIONS 

To improve ASDE-X management controls and reduce the risks of further cost 

growth, schedule delays, and potential ground collisions, we are recommending 

that FAA: 

1. Develop (a) realistic cost estimates for all activities required to complete 

ASDE-X implementation and (b) a master schedule through ASDE-X 

completion that outlines when all implementation activities and planned 

capabilities will be commissioned for operational use. 

2. Correct prohibitive and improper contract administration procedures by (a) 

discontinuing the practice of increasing contractor fees based on costs 

incurred rather than negotiated fixed-fee dollar amounts, (b) discontinuing 

the practice of making payments before meaningful work has been completed 

on fixed-price items, and (c) adequately documenting any contract changes. 

3. Implement a comprehensive earned value management tool to monitor and 

track ASDE-X cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

4. Resolve operational performance issues identified during system testing 

before implementing key ASDE-X safety capabilities at other airports by (a) 

addressing timeliness of safety alert capabilities for intersecting runways and 

fully testing converging taxiways capability, (b) addressing problems with 

dropped targets and subsequent system outages during heavy rain storms, and 

(c) testing rain configuration software upgrades at airports with ASDE-3 

radars and intersecting runways and taxiways. 

5. Determine (a) the feasibility of combining ASDE-X, ADS-B, and in-cockpit 

moving maps technologies to simultaneously provide controllers and pilots 

with direct alerts to warn them of potential ground collisions and (b) the costs 

and timeline for implementing this capability at all ASDE-X airports. 

6. Work with airports to aggressively promote equipping their vehicles with 

transponders to maximize ASDE-X capabilities as a vital step in reducing the 

risks of ground collisions caused by vehicle operator error. 

Recommendations 
17

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OIG RESPONSE 

On September 25, 2007, FAA provided comments (see appendix) to our 

August 6, 2007, draft report. FAA concurred with all six recommendations. 

When successfully implemented, FAA’s completed or planned actions will meet 

the intent of all but recommendation 1. 

Recommendation 1: FAA concurred with our recommendation. FAA 

acknowledged that it has yet to complete negotiations with Sensis to obtain 

supportable contract cost estimates. FAA responded that the ASDE-X contracting 

officer planned to complete negotiations with Sensis to finalize cost estimates for 

the two remaining significant unpriced contract requirements (i.e., engineering 

services and installation) by the end of September 2007. FAA also acknowledged 

the importance of establishing a quantitatively supportable contract cost estimate 

for all activities required to enable ASDE-X commissioning. FAA indicated that 

baselining this estimate, as a function of a contractual requirement, is critical to 

evaluating the program’s cost and schedule goal attainment. 

FAA commented that the ASDE-X program’s baseline cost estimates have 

remained consistent with the September 2005 re-baseline. However, we question 

how FAA can arrive at this conclusion given the fact that the Agency 

acknowledges in its response that it has yet to complete negotiations with Sensis to 

obtain supportable contract cost estimates. FAA also acknowledges that it has yet 

to establish a mechanism such as EVM to track and monitor ASDE-X cost. We 

repeatedly requested ASDE-X program officials and cost analysts to provide us 

with cost estimates so we could verify ASDE-X original and actual costs. We 

either received conflicting cost information or were informed that the costs had 

changed for some implementation activities and that details did not exist to break 

out the costs for ASDE-X implementation activities. Finally, these estimates were 

released by FAA after we issued our draft report; therefore, we could not verify 

the accuracy of these estimates. 

Also at issue is our assessment that cost estimates for six activities now exceed 

their planned life-cycle estimates by $94 million. FAA stated that our conclusion 

is based on the re-baselined Life Cycle Cost Estimate that only includes data for 

fiscal years 2006-2030, not the distribution of costs in the original baseline. We 

disagree with FAA and question its disregard for our assessment for the following 

reasons. 

To calculate the distribution of the original cost, we used data depicting the 

percentage of cost for each ASDE-X implementation activity from FAA’s Life 

Cycle Cost Estimate document. We considered this data to represent the total lifecycle cost estimate of $549.8 million, which was approved for the re-baseline 

Agency Comments and OIG Response 
18

decision in September 2005. The data does not reference fiscal years 2006-2030 

as the scope period of the work. We briefed FAA on our preliminary findings 

during the final stages of our review, and the Agency never took issue with our 

conclusions. For example, in February 2007, we briefed ASDE-X senior officials 

on our cost growth assessment and informed them that we used FAA data from its 

Life Cycle Cost Estimate document—the FAA officials did not disagree with our 

finding at the time. Moreover, in April 2007—prior to our May 2007 testimony 

before Congress on ASDE-X cost, schedule, and performance risks—we again 

provided ASDE-X senior officials with a briefing that highlighted details of our 

conclusion about the $94 million cost growth. Again, FAA did not provide any 

comments questioning the accuracy or validity of our conclusions. 

FAA did not dispute our conclusions about potential costs growth with ASDE-X 

installation and telecommunications activities. The Agency responded that 

wherever possible, it is trying to reduce telecommunications costs by using 

alternatives to the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure, such as tying into 

existing FAA-owned communications lines. As for equipment installation, FAA 

stated that costs have been reduced by streamlining activities. However, FAA 

needs to complete negotiations with the ASDE-X contractor to finalize the 

installation cost. Until it does so, the ASDE-X program baseline remains at risk 

for potential cost growth. 

In response to our recommendation that FAA develop a master schedule that 

clearly details when all ASDE-X systems will be fully implemented for 

operational use, the Agency stated that the Program Office is using a “master 

integrated working schedule” to track deployment activities. Despite repeated 

requests during our review for a master schedule, the Program Office did not 

provide our office with this information. Instead, the Program Office only 

provided us with a waterfall schedule. This is an incomplete document because it 

lacks details regarding when all implementation activities and planned capabilities 

associated with commissioning ASDE-X for operational use will be completed for 

each airport. 

FAA officials stated that they did not provide the Office of Inspector General with 

the master schedule because it is an internal document that is not released outside 

of the Agency. The ASDE-X Program Office’s behavior and lack of transparency 

on this matter is unacceptable. This is a violation of the Inspector General Act of 

1978. The act authorizes the Inspector General to have access to all records 

relating to Federal programs and request such information or assistance as may be 

necessary for carrying out its duties and responsibilities. Accordingly, we are 

asking the Acting Administrator to take steps to prevent a reoccurrence of this 

problem. 

Agency Comments and OIG Response 
19

FAA’s response continues to show airports that it considers as commissioned, 

even though planned system enhancements at those airports are scheduled for a 

later date. For example, FAA reported that Providence, Rhode Island; Houston, 

Texas; and Seattle, Washington, airports were commissioned in 2005 or 2006. 

Yet, the system enhancements are not scheduled for completion until 2008 (see 

attachments B and C of FAA’s response). FAA also stated that 11 systems have 

been commissioned, but its schedule only shows 6 with current system 

enhancements. We continue to believe that a system deployment should not be 

counted as commissioned for operational use until all planned ASDE-X 

capabilities (e.g., core and system enhancements) are fully tested and accepted at a 

site. 

Recommendation 2: FAA concurred and stated that the ASDE-X contracting 

officer planned to establish new procedures with the ASDE-X contractor and 

FAA’s Resident Quality Reliability Officer (QRO) by the end of September 2007 

to correct prohibitive and improper contract administration procedures. 

Specifically, the contracting officer was to request all contractor milestone 

payments for review and concurrence by the FAA QRO. The contractor was to 

submit the FAA QRO validation of the milestone event designated quantity as 

supporting documentation with the invoice. Additionally, the contracting officer 

planned to evaluate the proposed fixed fee to determine its reasonableness. The 

contracting officer was to comply with timely documentation of contract changes 

via contract modification. These are important steps that FAA must implement to 

address concerns raised in our June 2006 management advisory to FAA about the 

credibility of the program’s cost estimates. 

Recommendation 3: FAA concurred and stated that the Office of Management 

and Budget has mandated that all major FAA programs have strong business cases 

and are executable within budget. To ensure it meets these requirements, FAA has 

committed to the Office of Management and Budget that every major acquisition 

program will implement an Earned Value Management System. The ASDE-X 

Program Office is working with FAA’s Earned Value Management Council to 

implement this system by December 2007. 

Recommendation 4: FAA concurred and stated that the ASDE-X program 

thoroughly tests every system enhancement before it is implemented at an 

operational site. FAA’s response indicates that Development Test and Evaluation 

is completed by the vendor to ensure the enhancement meets the requirements and 

does not negatively impact other aspects of the system. FAA test personnel 

complete Operational Test and Evaluation for the ASDE-X program at FAA’s 

William J. Hughes Technical Center. Also, in certain cases, Independent 

Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) personnel complete additional testing, 

usually when new systems are being introduced into the National Airspace 

Agency Comments and OIG Response 
20

System. IOT&E was conducted on the “base” ASDE-X system, ASDE-X Safety 

Logic, and the ASDE-X Upgrade (ASDE-3 Interface.) As part of the ASDE-X 

Upgrade IOT&E assessment, the IOT&E team also tested intersecting runways. 

Additionally, Factory Acceptance Test, Site Acceptance Test, and Field 

Familiarization are performed on each system. We continue to believe that FAA 

needs to fully test and resolve any operational performance issues to ensure the 

ASDE-X system can meet the unique needs of each airport scheduled to receive 

the system over the next 4 years. 

Recommendation 5: FAA concurred and stated that it is examining emerging 

capabilities, including in-cockpit moving map technologies, to determine the 

feasibility of such systems. Honeywell International and Sensis Corporation in 

cooperation with FAA recently demonstrated cockpit advisory technology using 

the ASDE-X system. The technology detects and communicates potential runway 

incursions directly to an aircraft cockpit crew. The demonstration took place at 

the FAA’s Interim Contractor Depot Level Support facility at Syracuse Hancock 

International Airport and used an ASDE-X test system and a Honeywell test 

aircraft. Once the feasibility of this technology is determined, the Agency will 

begin to build the business case which will include cost and schedule information. 

In addition, FAA recently established the Runway Status Light Program Office for 

a new automatic system that conveys runway status directly to pilots and vehicle 

operators. A final investment decision on this program is expected in early FY 

2008. 

Recommendation 6: FAA concurred and stated that with the deployment of 

ASDE-X to the field, industry began producing squitters that operated on the 1090 

MHz frequency. In the meantime, the FAA adopted the ICAO 978 MHz standard 

for the Universal Access Transceiver and instructed airports that vehicle squitters 

would have to operate under that frequency as well as the 1090 MHz frequency. 

Since there were no commercial squitter products available using the 978 MHz 

frequency, the FAA is expediting an interim rule that would allow airports to use 

1090 MHz, 20-watt squitter until products are available that transmit in the 978 

MHz frequency. To provide initial guidance for the voluntary acquisition and 

operation of this equipment in airport vehicles, FAA is planning to publish an 

advisory circular in early FY 2008. 

Agency Comments and OIG Response 
21

EXHIBIT A. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

Our objectives for this performance audit were to determine (1) whether FAA’s 

strategy for deploying ASDE-X for operational use is cost effective, given the 

changes in the program’s deployment strategy, and (2) to what extent the ASDE-X 

program will reduce the risk of ground collisions or accidents caused by runway 

incursions. 

To achieve our objectives, we analyzed contract data, budget data, acquisition 

documents, cost and schedule projections, and other supporting documentation 

from FAA. We also reviewed relevant data from Sensis Corporation, the prime 

contractor. We reviewed FAA’s ASDE-X budget and cost estimates and ASDE-X 

strategy documents for reasonableness and cost effectiveness. We also examined 

FAA expenditure and obligation data for ASDE-X to determine how much has 

been spent for the ASDE-X program from its inception to July 2007.

We interviewed key FAA and ASDE-X program officials at FAA Headquarters in 

Washington, D.C., including senior FAA executives responsible for Terminal 

Program Operations and FAA staff members in organizational units reporting to 

these executives. We discussed with these officials whether ASDE-X can meet 

overall airport safety needs and to what extent this technology will reduce runway 

incursions, ground collisions, or accidents. We interviewed ASDE-X prime 

contractor officials at Sensis Corporation to discuss the contract and the status of 

the system development, installation, and implementation. In addition, we visited 

FAA’s Southern, Central, and Great Lakes Regional Offices to determine the roles 

and responsibilities of the regions in the installation, implementation, and 

deployment of the ASDE-X system. We visited several air traffic control towers 

(St. Louis, Missouri; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Atlanta, Georgia; Orlando, Florida; 

and Washington, D.C). We discussed with these control tower staff the 

functionality, reliability, and maintainability of the system. We also had various 

discussions to determine the status of ASDE-X’s operational use at the control 

towers and whether its use meets airports’ individual safety needs. 

We performed our survey and verification work from August 2005 through 

January 2007. This work was performed in accordance with generally accepted

Government Auditing Standards as prescribed by the Comptroller General of the 

United States and included such tests as we considered necessary to provide 

reasonable assurance of detecting abuse or illegal acts. 

Exhibit A. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 
22

EXHIBIT B. ASDE-X PROGRAM COST VARIANCES 

(Dollars in Millions) 

Cost Element Planned 

Cost Estimate 

(as of Sept. 2005) 

Current 

Cost Estimate 

(as of Dec. 2006) 

Cost 

Variance 

Procurement/Production 142.95 179.74 36.79

Program Management 93.47 120.10 26.63

Software Design and Development 38.49 58.82 20.33

Logistics Support 11.00 18.34 7.34

Second Level Engineering 5.50 7.90 2.40

Test and Evaluation 5.50 6.23 0.73

Subtotal 296.91 391.13 94.22

 

Disposition 60.48 28.90 -31.58

Construction 82.47 56.85 -25.62

Installation* 54.98 44.11 -10.87

Site survey 16.49 8.17 -8.32

Telecommunications** 16.49 8.49 -8.00

Logistics 11.00 6.13 -4.87

Systems Engineering 5.50 2.74 -2.76

Other 5.50

Subtotal 252.91 155.39 -92.02

 

Grand Total $549.82 $546.52 

Source: OIG analysis of ASDE-X Life Cycle Cost Estimates: September 2005 and current cost estimates 

* Sensis submitted FAA cost estimates to complete ASDE-X installation totaling $64 million. 

The $20 million difference between the FAA and Sensis estimates ($64 million versus $44 million) 

would increase ASDE-X implementation costs to $566 million and exceed the current ASDE-X program 

baseline. 

** We also found that ASDE-X program officials decreased telecommunications costs estimates from 

$16.5 million to $8.5 million to remain within ASDE-X program baseline costs. However, FAA later 

reported that the telecommunications costs were actually one to two times higher than its original 

estimates, which could increase the costs to at least $33 million or up to $49.5 million. 

Exhibit B. ASDE-X Program Cost Variances 
23

EXHIBIT C. OIG JUNE 2006 MANAGEMENT ADVISORY 

Memorandum

U.S. Department of 

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General 

Subject: ACTION: Management Advisory on Contract 

Number DTFA01-01-C00011 (ASDE-X) 

Date: June 20, 2006 

From: David A. Dobbs 

Assistant Inspector General 

 for Aviation and Special Programs Audits 

Reply to 

Attn of: JA-10 

To: Vice President of Acquisition and Business Services 

Federal Aviation Administration 

During our current audit of the Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X 

(ASDE-X) program, we identified prohibited and improper contract 

administration practices that should be brought to your immediate attention. 

These conditions relate to the prime contract for ASDE-X. Based on our 

limited review of the contract, responses from the Contracting Officer, we 

concluded that (1) the ASDE-X Contracting Officer is increasing contractor 

fees based on costs incurred rather than negotiated fixed-fee dollar amounts, 

(2) FAA is making payments before meaningful work has been completed on 

fixed-price items, and (3) the Contracting Officer is not adequately 

documenting contract changes. 

These practices violate Federal statute and FAA’s Acquisition Management 

System (AMS) best practices. Specifically: 

• Federal statute and AMS guidance both prohibit the payment of a fee 

computed as a variable of cost. 

• On firm-fixed-price items, AMS guidance requires that payments be 

made based on completion of meaningful work unless advance payment 

criteria are met and procedures followed. 

Exhibit C. OIG June 2006 Management Advisory 
24

• AMS guidance specifies that contract modifications should be properly 

documented to describe the changes made to the scope of work, the 

contract price, the period of performance, and other contract terms. 

Our concerns about the contract administration of ASDE-X fall into the 

following three categories. 

Administration of the contract bases contractor fees on a percentage of 

costs incurred rather than a negotiated fixed-fee dollar amount. Some 

contract items (e.g., installation and system enhancements, funded at 

$28 million and $56 million, respectively) have been administered using a 

methodology called “cost plus a percentage of cost”, which is prohibited by 

statute and the AMS. The Contracting Officer described the fee for installation 

as a percentage of cost instead of as a negotiated fixed-dollar amount. 

Our review of ASDE-X invoices also indicates that, despite numerous program 

changes to installation, the contractor bills and collects a fee that is a 

percentage of costs incurred. In a 1980 legal decision, the U.S. Comptroller 

General stated, “The evil of this [cost plus a percentage of cost] system is that 

the contractors have an incentive to pay liberally for reimbursable items, 

because higher costs mean higher profits.”1

 

When fees increase with increases in costs, the contractor has an incentive to 

encourage cost growth. We also understand that many changes in the contract 

were negotiated after work began. However, even if the fees were not set as a 

percentage of cost in those instances, negotiating contract costs and fees after 

the work has been performed has the same result because the contractor had no 

incentive to control costs. 

The contract provides payments before any meaningful work has been 

completed on fixed-price items. Most of the fixed-price line items 

inappropriately allow payment in advance of any meaningful work. As the 

AMS states, advance payments are the least preferred method of contract 

financing and must be used sparingly. We found examples showing that, as 

soon as the Government exercises its option to purchase a fixed-price item, this 

contract triggers a payment of 25 percent of the price. To date, FAA has 

exercised options that allowed over $21 million in payments of this type, 

which do not serve the Government’s best interest. 

Based on our preliminary review, these payments are advance payments made 

without following AMS procedures. Specifically, the procedures require that 

advance payments are made only after ensuring that partial or progress 

 

1

 Comp. Gen. B-196, 556, Matter of Dept. of State—Method of Payment Provisions, Aug. 05, 1980. 

Exhibit C. OIG June 2006 Management Advisory 
25

payments are not feasible and that private financing is not reasonably available. 

Before advance payments are made, the Chief of the Contracting Office must 

review and approve them. These procedures must be followed because they 

help prevent the Government from expending money for no assured benefit. 

The contract lacks adequate documentation of contract changes. We 

found that on numerous occasions the Contracting Officer did not document 

contract changes properly or in a timely manner. The Contracting Officer 

added funds to the contract but did not identify the changes in the scope of 

work, the prices, the periods of performance, or other terms. For example, 

Contract Line Item 30 was added to the contract in May 2003 and funded at 

$445,000, but the Contracting Officer did not include any description of the 

work to be done, a negotiated price, or a ceiling value. Since then, the 

Contracting Officer has repeatedly added funding, and this line item now 

includes $56 million in funds. However, the Contracting Officer has not yet 

defined this work in the contract. In another example, the Contracting Officer 

told us that funds added to the contract in March 2005 were for new work but 

has not modified the contract to include or define this new item. 

Documenting contract changes is a basic and fundamental responsibility of the 

Contracting Officer. Unless the contract includes a clear definition of the work 

and its price, the Government is at risk of overpaying or paying for something 

it does not want. 

We recommend that FAA thoroughly investigate these issues and take 

immediate steps to correct these practices. Please advise us within 30 calendar 

days of the actions taken and planned to resolve these issues. If I can answer 

any questions or be of further assistance, please contact me at (202) 366-0500 

or the Program Director, Kevin Dorsey, at (202) 366-1518. 

# 

cc: Deputy Administrator 

 Chief Operating Officer 

Exhibit C. OIG June 2006 Management Advisory 
26

EXHIBIT D. ASDE-X WATERFALL SCHEDULE 

(AS OF AUGUST 14, 2006) 

# ID New Establishment Airports Delivery Date IOC Date ORD Date

1 MKE General Mitchell International (Mil. WI) 3/12/02 6/5/03 10/30/03 

2 MCO Orlando International 9/25/03 9/1/04 9/30/04 

3 PVD Theodore Francis Green State (Prov. RI) 12/1/03 7/2/04 5/16/05 

4 HOU William P. Hobby Airport (Houston, TX) 10/29/04 8/4/05 8/31/05 

5 BDL Bradley International Airport (Hart. CT) 3/14/05 6/7/06 6/21/06 

6 PHX Phoenix Sky Harbor International Nov-07 Dec-08 TBD 

7 FLL Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood May-08 Apr-09 TBD 

8 SNA John Wayne-Orange County Mar-09 Feb-10 TBD 

9 MDW Chicago Midway Aug-09 Jul-10 TBD 

10 HNL Honolulu International - Hickam AFB Sep-09 Aug-10 TBD 

ASDE-3/AMASS Airports

11 STL Lambert-St. Louis International 12/3/03 10/21/04 5/24/06 

12 SEA Seattle-Tacoma International 12/23/04 1/27/06 2/24/06 

13 ATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International 7/11/05 5/5/06 6/7/06 

14 IAD Washington Dulles International 12/20/05* Jul-08 TBD 

15 SDF Louisville International –Standiford 

Field 3/8/04 Aug-07 TBD 

16 CLT Charlotte Douglas International 1/13/04 Jul-07 TBD 

17 LAX Los Angeles International 2/23/06* Jun-09 TBD 

18 MSP Minneapolis-St. Paul International Mar-09 Feb-10 TBD 

19 DFW Dallas/Ft. Worth International Apr-09 Apr-10 TBD 

20 MEM Memphis International May-10 Apr-11 TBD 

21 DEN Denver International Jun-08 Jul-09 TBD 

22 ORD Chicago O'Hare International Jul-08 Aug-09 TBD 

23 LAS Las Vegas McCarran International Sep-08 Aug-09 TBD 

24 IAH George Bush Intercontinental Dec-08 Nov-09 TBD 

25 DCA Ronald Reagan Washington National Feb-10 Jan-11 TBD 

26 BWI Baltimore-Washington International Jul-09 Jun-10 TBD 

27 EWR Newark International Jun-08 May-09 TBD 

28 DTW Detroit Metro Wayne County Aug-07 Aug-08 TBD 

29 BOS Boston Logan International Feb-08 Dec-08 TBD 

30 JFK John F. Kennedy International Aug-08 Jul-09 TBD 

31 MIA Miami International Sep-09 Aug-10 TBD 

32 LGA New York LaGuardia Mar-10 Feb-11 TBD 

33 PHL Philadelphia International Jan-09 Dec-09 TBD 

34 SLC Salt Lake City International Jun-09 May-10 TBD 

35 SAN San Diego International Apr-10 Mar-11 TBD 

Support Systems

T1 ICDLS Vendor Facility/ICDLS 10/16/01 N/A 

T2 PSF FAA Program Support Facility 2/27/04 N/A 

T3 FAAAC FAA Academy – OKC 6/10/04 N/A 

Washington Dulles (IAD) and Los Angeles International (LAX) delivered to airport but not yet installed. 

Source: FAA Internal Program Review, March 2007 

Louisville (SDF), Charlotte (CLT), and Dulles (IAD) International Airports did not meet their FY 06 ORD dates. 

Initial Operating Capability (IOC) – The declaration by site personnel that the ASDE-X system is ready for conditional 

operational use in the NAS and denotes the end of Field Familiarization at that site. 

Operational Readiness Date (ORD) - Signifies the official date to switchover to the new system. 

TBD- to be determined and N/A-not applicable

Exhibit D. ASDE-X Waterfall Schedule 

(as of August 14, 2006) 
27

APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS 

Federal Aviation 

Administration 

Memorandum 

Date: September 25, 2007 

To: Robert E. Martin, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and Special 

Program Audits 

From: Ramesh K. Punwani, Assistant Administrator for Financial Services/CFO 

Prepared by: Anthony Williams, x79000 

Subject: OIG Draft Report: FAA Needs to Improve ASDE-X Management Controls 

To Address Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, and Safety Risks, Federal 

Aviation Administration 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the findings and recommendations of the 

subject draft report, dated August 6. As each of the recommendations is valid, the FAA 

concurs with all six of them. However, FAA would like to outline the various actions that 

have already been taken with respect to the recommendations, and also to present our 

assessment of the total baseline cost of the ASDE-X program. 

The DOT OIG announced the audit of the ASDE-X Program in August 2005. Five months 

later in January 2006 the objectives of the audit were revised. Two years after the audit was 

first announced the draft report was issued to the FAA. During these two years the FAA had 

already begun employing most of what is being recommended. These actions and any 

additional actions the FAA plans to take are described below. 

OIG Recommendation 1: Develop (a) realistic cost estimates for all activities required to 

complete ASDE-X implementation and (b) a master schedule through ASDE-X completion 

that outlines when all implementation activities and planned capabilities will be 

commissioned for operational use. 

FAA Response: Concur. (a) The FAA acknowledges the importance of establishing a 

quantitatively supportable contract cost estimate for all activities required to enable ASDE-X 

commissioning. Baselining this estimate, as a function of a contractual requirement, is 

critical to evaluating program cost/schedule goal attainment, and taking appropriate 

corrective action to address identified variances that may adversely affect program success. 

Appendix. Agency Comments 
28

The ASDE-X Contracting Officer (CO) has taken the following corrective action to address 

these concerns. 

1. Issued Letter No. ASDE-X-2027 dated 1/20/07 informing Sensis Corp (ASDE-X 

Contractor) that the CO was considering incorporating EVMS reporting 

methodology, consistent with AMS 4.16 and Part 2, Section I clause 1.13-2 EVMS 

(April 2000). The ASDE-X contract, at inception, only required cost/performance 

reporting for contract line item number (CLIN) 0001. 

2. Issued Letter No. ASDE-X-4007 dated 7/30/07 outlining the required actions 

necessary to definitize the remaining unpriced CLINs. Sensis Corp. provided their 

comprehensive Estimate at Completion (EAC) summary via email dated 8/10/07. 

3. Issued Letter No. ASDE-X-4007a dated 8/25/07 providing CO comments to the 

Contractor’s EAC submittal and advising same of additional supplemental 

information required to support the planned negotiation for CLINs 0004 and 0023 

scheduled for 9/6-9/7/07. 

ASDE-X program baseline cost estimates have remained consistent with the September 2005 

rebaseline. The DOT OIG assessment that “cost estimates for six activities now exceed their 

planned life-cycle estimates by $94 million” and the “FAA attempted to offset the cost 

growth by decreasing other activities...” is based on the data in the rebaseline Life Cycle 

Cost Estimate (LCCE) including fiscal year (FY) 2006-FY 2030 only and not the distribution 

of the costs in the original baseline 1. See Attachment A for rebaseline life cycle cost 

estimate including distribution of cost in the original baseline. 

The report indicates the DOT OIG believes installation costs and telecommunications costs 

are particularly at risk of increasing. The ASDE-X Program Office has implemented 

measures to control the telecommunications and equipment installation costs. Wherever 

possible, the FAA is trying to reduce telecommunications cost by using, alternatives to FTI, 

such as tying into existing FAA owned communications lines or installing Radio Frequency 

(RF) modems. As for equipment installation, costs have been reduced by streamlining 

activities, conducting activities in parallel when possible, and reducing iterations of written 

reports and other contract deliverables. 

(b) The ASDE-X schedule is on track with the September 2005 rebaseline. Although 

Charlotte2

, Louisville3 and Washington Dulles4 were delayed from the planning schedule 

included in the rebaseline LCCE the next five sites, including Chicago O’Hare (1 year 

expedited schedule), completed on schedule and all current implementation activities are on 

or ahead of schedule. 

 

1

Section 2.1 of the LCCE “Ground Rules and Assumptions; Estimating and Programmatic - Life 

cycle Cost Estimate analysis timeframe is FY06-FY30. “

2

 Charlotte delayed due to Remote Unit (RU) siting and site prep issues 

3

 Louisville delayed due to the decision by the Office of Independent Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) to 

conduct ASDE-X Upgrade key site testing at Charlotte (both Charlotte and louisville were further delayed by the higher 

Agency priorities of Seattle (cost share with Airport Authority and the ADE-3 tower had to be dismantled to accommodate 

the Airport’s new runway) and Atlanta (to accommodate new air traffic control tower and new runway) 4

 Washington Dulles was delayed due to delays in the new tower construction 

Appendix. Agency Comments 
29

The ASDE-X Program Office uses a master integrated implementation schedule to manage 

and track all implementation activities. This is not the waterfall schedule. The waterfall 

schedule is a public reporting tool that maps to the September 2005 baseline. It is a risk 

adjusted schedule that now only reports two high level milestones, equipment delivery and 

Initial Operating Capability (IOC)5 until a system achieves Operational Readiness Date 

(ORD)6. For all intents and purposes the system is operational at IOC. The FAA has 

previously provided the DOT OIG with complete copies of the waterfall (system delivery, 

IOC, ORD)7

 although the report only referenced an incomplete waterfall pulled from an 

Internal Program Review package. The current ASDE-X Waterfall is included as 

Attachment B. 

To manage the program, the ASDE-X Program use a master integrated working schedule to 

track deployment activities including the development test and implementation of change 

orders (major software builds) and the retrofit of change orders into systems that 

commissioned with an earlier software build. It is a site by site rolling schedule broken down 

by phase then by activity. The schedule dates in the working schedule are more aggressive to 

allow for contingencies without missing the baseline schedule dates. The working schedule 

dates are provided to the ASDE-X prime vendor Sensis Corporation contractually to ensure 

diligence towards meeting the dates. The ASDE-X working schedule comes in two formats 

– the Work Plan, a graphical representation of the plan for each site by phase, and the 

Integrated Master Schedule (IMS), a Microsoft Project schedule by activity, maintained by 

the vendor. The IMS is updated, at a minimum, on a monthly basis to reflect the current 

status at each site, i.e., completed dates are added, schedule may be readjusted based on 

current status, etc. The vendor works with the ASDE-X Implementation team to update the 

IMS. The vendor uses the IMS for cost and resource planning. The working schedule is an 

internal schedule that is not released outside the agency. 

There are currently eleven commissioned systems. The remaining 24 systems are in various 

stages of the ASDE-X deployment process. It takes approximately three years for an ASDEX system to become operational at an airport. This process includes site survey, site design, 

lease approval, completion of environmental requirements, site preparation and construction, 

installation, system optimization, training, and acceptance and commissioning activities. 

All planned system capabilities have been deployed. The site by site software build and 

system enhancement status and schedule is included as Attachment C. 

 

5

 IOC is the declaration that the ASDE-X system is ready for conditional use in 

the National Airspace System. After IOC is declared, the system is considered fully 

operational. The air traffic controllers in the tower cab are using the system in what’s known as the Operational Suitability 

Demonstration (OSD) period prior to “commissioning” the system. OSD is a time period during which the system is 

operated under intense scrutiny to ensure the system satisfies all operational requirements including: availability, 

compatibility, interoperability, reliability, maintainability, safety, human factors, and logistics supportability. 

6

 Once the site determines that they are comfortable with the new system, they declare ORD. ORD signifies the end of 

OSD, at which time, switchover to the new system is complete. ORD is usually about 30 days after IOC. Once the system 

is formally accepted by the site via the Joint Acceptance Inspection (JAI) process, the system is commissioned. 

7

 In February 2006 the FAA provided Partial ASDE-X Waterfall as of February 22, 2006 (reflected 2005 rebaseline, but 

only included 17 airports; the names of the other airports had not yet been released); in May 2006 the FAA provided ASDEX Waterfall (Del-IOC-ORD) as of April 27, 2006 

Appendix. Agency Comments 
30

OIG Recommendation 2: Correct prohibitive and improper contract administration 

procedures by (a) discontinuing the practice of increasing contractor fees based on costs 

incurred rather than negotiated fixed-fee dollar amounts, (b) discontinuing the practice of 

making payments before meaningful work has been completed on fixed-price items, and (c) 

adequately documenting any contract changes. 

FAA Response: Concur. (a) In addition to the actions described in the response to 

Recommendation 1 above, the CO has completed the definitization of CLIN 0030 via 

Modifications 0033 & 0034. These modifications established the estimated cost and fixed 

fee for CLIN 0030. As noted above, the CO has informed the Contractor of the plan to 

complete the definitization of CLINs 0004 and 0023 which represent the two remaining 

significant unpriced contractual requirements. The CO will negotiate these two CLINs on 

the basis of the Government’s analysis of the Contractor’s proposed cost and distinct 

evaluation of the proposed fixed fee to determine its reasonableness. The target completion 

date for the definitization of CLINs 0004 and 0023 is the end of September 2007. 

(b) The CO has revisited Part 2, Section G, Contract Administration, Clause G-8, Milestone 

Payments to ascertain the allowability of payments on fixed-price line items. This clause 

specified milestone payments defined by contract deemed commensurate with promoting 

efficient and economical contract performance. Each applicable CLIN allowing for 

milestone payments has a defined milestone event which the Contractor must achieve and 

document before he is entitled to receive a percent of the dollar value of the CLIN. The 

Contractor must submit a written certification to the CO concurrent with his invoice for 

payment. To ensure that this clause is properly administered the CO has taken the following 

corrective action: 

1. Contractor requests for milestone payments submitted in accordance with G-8 must 

also include a review and concurrence by the FAA Resident Quality Reliability 

Officer (QRO) attesting to having accounted for the types and quantities of fixedprice items conforming to the percent of total items defined for the specific CLIN 

milestone being billed. 

2. The FAA QRO validation of the milestone event designated quantity will be 

submitted by the Contractor as supporting documentation with his invoice. Only 

those line items allowing for milestone payments in accordance with the clause will 

be allowed for this type of payment arrangement. The CO acknowledges the need to 

ensure that this clause is administered properly to achieve its desired effect without 

increasing the risk to the government of not incentivising payment for commensurate 

performance. 

The CO has verbally informed the Contractor and the QRO of the above actions and plans to 

issue a formal letter by the end of September 2007. 

(c) The CO acknowledges the significance of untimely documenting and memorializing of 

contract changes via contract modification, as a significant contributor to the potential for 

cost growth and improper contract administration practices. The CO will comply with timely 

documentation of contract changes via contract modification. 

Appendix. Agency Comments 
31

OIG Recommendation 3: Implement a comprehensive earned value management tool to 

monitor and track ASDE-X cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

FAA Response: Concur. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has mandated that 

all major FAA programs have strong business cases and are executable within budget. To 

ensure meeting the requirements of the mandate the FAA has committed to the OMB and the 

General Accounting Office (GAO) that every major acquisition program will implement an 

Earned Value Management System (EVMS). The FAA’s Acquisition Management System 

(AMS) was subsequently updated to include EVM policy. The ASDE-X Program Office is 

working with the FAA’s EVM Council to implement an EVMS that is compliant with 

ANSI/EIS 748 Standard. The target date for completion is December 2007. 

In the mean time the CO plans to incorporate cost reporting methodology consistent with 

AMS EVMS requirements as a part of the definitization process for CLINs 0004 and 0023 

(see response to Recommendation 1 above) by September 28, 2007. 

OIG Recommendation 4: Resolve operational performance issues identified during system 

testing before implementing key ASDE-X safety capabilities at other airports by (a) 

addressing timeliness of safety alert capabilities for intersecting runways and fully testing 

converging taxiway capability, (b) addressing problems with dropped targets and subsequent 

system outages during heavy rain storms, and (c) testing rain configuration software 

upgrades at airports with ASDE-3 radars and intersecting runways and taxiways. 

FAA Response: Concur. The ASDE-X Program thoroughly tests every system 

enhancement before it is implemented at an operational site. Development Test and 

Evaluation is completed by the vendor to ensure the enhancement meets the requirements 

and does not negatively impact other aspects of the system. The FAA also completes 

Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) either at a site or in a simulated lab environment 

using recorded data from one or more sites. On the ASDE-X Program, OT&E is completed 

by FAA test personnel at the FAA’s William J. Hughes Technical Center. Also, in certain 

cases, Independent Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) completes additional testing, 

usually when new systems are being introduced into the National Airspace System. IOT&E 

was conducted on the “base” ASDE-X system, ASDE-X Safety Logic, and the ASDE-X 

Upgrade (ASDE-3 interface). As part of the ASDE-X Upgrade IOT&E assessment, the 

IOT&E team also tested intersecting runways. 

Additionally, Factory Acceptance Test (FAT), Site Acceptance Test (SAT), and Field 

Familiarization is performed on each system. FAT is performed by the vendor to verify 

manufacturing defects are not present in the production system. SAT is performed in the 

field by the vendor to ensure the system is installed and working correctly. Field 

familiarization is conducted by second level engineering and site personnel to ensure the 

system meets operational requirements and the site is ready to transition to the new system. 

ASDE-X software build 5.0.7.2 test events and completion dates are included as Attachment 

D. 

Appendix. Agency Comments 
32

(a) The specific example the OIG refers to when discussing the timeliness of the safety 

alerting capability comes from IOT&E’s ASDE-X Upgrade Assessment Report. Of the 23 

intersecting runway scenarios tested by IOT&E, the IOT&E team felt that 2 scenarios alerted 

in an untimely manner. The ASDE-X Program Office analyzed these events and found that 

while the system can be adapted to provide an increase in warning time for these particular 

events; however, doing so would increase the likelihood of nuisance alerts for vehicles 

approaching the runway intersections and for aircraft performing certain land and hold short 

operations. Nuisance alerts impact system safety. These default parameters were not 

changed at Louisville, the IOT&E test site. Since Louisville achieved Initial Operating 

Capability in March 2007, there has been no report of missing or nuisance alerts involving 

intersecting runways. 

The converging taxiway capability fully tested by the test team from the FAA’s William J. 

Hughes Technical Center (see Attachment D). 

(b) Due to the nature of radar, heavy rains do have the potential to degrade radar 

performance. This is a fact for all radar systems, not just specifically for ASDE-X. 

However, because of improved radar processing and the addition of multilateration, the 

ASDE-X system performs significantly better in all levels of rain as compared to the ASDE3 system. The ASDE-X Program also implemented a rain configuration system enhancement 

designed to allow the ASDE-X system to operate in full core alerting mode during inclement 

weather (including moderate to heavy rain). Suspected weather induced false tracks on the 

runway(s) are eliminated from ASDE-X safety logic processing; however, they remain as 

unknown icon(s) on the ASDE-X tower display. 

The specific example that the OIG references regarding “problems with dropped targets and 

subsequent system outages during heavy rain storms” comes from IOT&E’s ASDE-X 

Upgrade Assessment Report. This assessment was completed in March/April 2007 at 

Louisville. The ASDE-X system was adapted to address all Louisville rain events so that a 

system outage would not occur in the event of heavy precipitation. After IOT&E and prior to 

commissioning, Louisville had three significant rain events without an outage. The facility 

was satisfied with the system performance and commissioned on July 19, 2007. 

(c) Regarding the recommendation to specifically test the rain configuration enhancement at 

an airport with an ASDE-3 radar, the ASDE-3 data or the ASDE-X Surface Movement Radar 

(SMR) data is fused with the multilateration system data prior to safety logic processing so 

safety logic functions the same regardless of the source of radar data. The rain mode 

configuration was thoroughly tested at Orlando. High speed data playback analysis was 

conducted, in addition to operational testing, to evaluate the performance of the rain 

configuration. Thirty days of previously collected data from Orlando was played back and 

analyzed along with an additional 20 hours of specific rain event data collected over a 30 day 

operational testing period. Rain mode became operational at Orlando in June 2007. Rain 

mode configuration is also operating with positive results at the 3 commissioned ASDE-X 

airports with ASDE-3 radars Louisville, Charlotte, and Chicago O’Hare. 

Appendix. Agency Comments 
33

OIG Recommendation 5: Determine (a) whether ASDE-X, ADS-B, and in-cockpit moving 

maps technologies can be combined to simultaneously provide controllers and pilots with 

direct alerts to warn them of potential ground collisions and (b) the costs and timeline for 

implementing this capability at all ASDE-X airports. 

FAA Response: Concur. (a) The FAA is examining emerging capabilities including incockpit moving map technologies to determine the feasibility of such systems. Honeywell 

International and Sensis Corporation in cooperation with the FAA recently demonstrated 

cockpit advisory technology using the ASDE-X system. The technology, which detects and 

communicates potential runway incursions directly to an aircraft cockpit crew, was 

demonstrated at the FAA’s Interim Contractor Depot Level Support facility at Syracuse 

Hancock International Airport with an ASDE-X test system and a Honeywell test aircraft. 

(b) Once the feasibility of the capability is determined, the FAA will begin to build the 

business case including cost and schedule. 

Additionally, the FAA has recently established the Runway Status Light (RWSL) Program 

Office. RWSL is an automatic system of airfield lights that convey runway status directly to 

pilots and vehicle operators. A final investment decision is expected early in FY08. 

OIG Recommendation 6: Work with airports to aggressively promote equipping their 

vehicles with transponders to maximize ASDE-X capabilities as a vital step in reducing the 

risks of ground collisions caused by vehicle operator error. 

FAA Response: Concur. With the deployment of ASDE-X to the field, industry began 

producing squitters that operated on the 1090 MHz frequency. In the meantime, the FAA 

adopted the ICAO 978 MHz standard for the Universal Access Transceiver and instructed 

airports that vehicle squitters would have to operate under that frequency as well as the 1090 

MHz frequency. Since here were no commercial squitter products available using the 978 

MHz frequency, the FAA is expediting an interim rule that would allow airports to use 1090 

MHz, 20 watt squitters until products are available that transmit in the 978 MHz frequency. 

To provide initial guidance for the voluntary acquisition and operation of this equipment in 

airport vehicles, Advisory Circular 150/5220-XX was drafted and will be published early 

next fiscal year. 

Appendix. Agency Comments 
Attachment A 

Appendix. Agency Comments 

34

Attachment A: ASDE-X Cost Estimates 

(Items in yellow are directly from the table in Exhibit B of the OIG Draft Report.) 

Cost Element ASDE-X Program 

Rebaseline Cost 

Estimate 

(as of Sept. 2005) 

($M) 

Current 

Cost Estimate 

(as of Dec. 2006) 

[from OIG Draft 

Report, Exhibit 

B] 

Procurement/Production $179.736 $179.74 

Program Management $120.097 $120.10 

Software Design and 

Development 

$58.821 $58.82 

Logistics Support $18.343 $18.34 

Second Level Engineering $7.898 $7.90 

Test and Evaluation $6.231 $6.23 

Subtotal $391.126 $391.13 

Disposition $28.900 $28.90 

Construction $56.849 $56.85 

Installation $44.109 $44.11 

Site Survey $8.170 $8.17 

Telecommunications $8.492 $8.49 

Logistics $6.131 $6.13 

Systems Engineering $2.736 $2.74 

Subtotal $155.387 $155.39 

Other (Leases) $3.324 $3.32 

Grand Total $549.837 $549.84 
ASDE-X Program Baseline Cost Estimate 

WBS Number Cost Element FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 20

Life Cycle Cost Estimate $7.585 $10.792 $22.400 $106.926 $104.285 $48.842 $29.869 $66.309 $41.756 $31.064 $18.803 $11. Facilities and Equipment Costs (F&E) $7.585 $10.792 $22.400 $106.800 $103.900 $47.721 $27.564 $63.908 $37.947 $26.122 $13.230 $4.

3.0 Solution Development $4.300 $7.393 $14.263 $74.120 $51.974 $24.945 $10.848 $28.061 $2.417 $0.835 $0.567 3.1 Program Management3.2 Systems Engineering $0.583 $0.198 $1.481 $0.474 3.2.7.1 Engineering Change Orders3.2.9.1 INFOSEC $0.583 $0.198 $1.481 $0.474 3.3 HW/SW Design, Development and Production $4.300 $6.993 $13.441 $67.203 $43.702 $21.800 $7.096 $24.436 $2.041 $0.835 $0.567 

3.3.1 Hardware Design and Development3.3.2 Software Design and Development $14.756 $14.568 $16.515 $5.977 $6.164 $0.840 

3.3.2.1 Enhancements $11.728 $5.695 $8.031 $4.538 $2.441 

3.3.2.2 New Software Requirements $3.029 $8.873 $8.484 $1.439 $3.723 $0.840 

3.3.5 Procurement/Production $4.300 $6.993 $13.441 $52.446 $29.134 $5.285 $1.119 $18.271 $1.201 $0.835 $0.567 

3.3.5.1 System Hardware $4.300 $6.585 $12.362 $48.121 $26.749 $1.370 $0.114 $15.048 

3.3.5.1.1 Non-Recurring (CLIN 1) $4.300 $5.477 $11.596 $7.479 $0.250 3.3.5.1.2 Recurring $1.108 $0.766 $40.642 $26.749 $11.744 

3.3.5.1.3 New Hardware Requirements $1.120 $0.114 $3.304 

3.3.5.5 System Engineering/Program Management $0.408 $1.079 $4.326 $2.385 $3.915 $1.005 $3.223 $1.201 $0.835 $0.567 

3.3.5.6 Technology Refresh 3.4 Physical and Airspace Infrastructure Design & Development3.5 Test and Evaluation $0.400 $0.822 $1.907 $0.499 $0.885 $0.966 $0.586 $0.166 3.5.2 Test and Evaluation Support $0.422 $1.507 $0.499 $0.385 $0.458 $0.327 $0.166 3.5.5 Government Conduct IOT&E $0.400 $0.400 $0.400 $0.500 $0.509 $0.259 

3.6 Data and Documentation3.7 Logistic Support $4.427 $7.773 $2.062 $1.305 $2.566 $0.210 3.7.4 Industrial Facilities $0.124 $0.474 $1.160 3.7.4.1 ICDLS Setup $0.310 

3.7.4.2 Program Support Facility $0.124 $0.474 $0.850 3.7.4.2.1 Design PSF3.7.4.2.2 PSF Setup $0.124 $0.474 $0.850 3.7.5 Support Equipment $1.880 $0.399 $0.135 $0.069 $0.210 3.7.6 Support Facilities and Equipment Maintenance3.7.7 Initial Spares and Repair Parts $4.303 $4.052 $1.170 $2.498 

3.7.7.1 Radar Spares $4.303 $4.052 $1.170 $2.498 

3.7.7.1.1 Initial Spares-Site $4.103 $1.352 3.7.7.1.2 Initial Spares-Depot $0.200 $2.700 $1.170 $2.498 3.7.8 Initial Training $1.367 $0.504 3.7.8.1 Training Set Up $1.367 

3.7.8.2 Training Development3.7.8.3 Depot Training3.7.8.4 Second Level Training3.7.8.5 Site Technician Training $0.504 

3.7.8.6 ATC Training3.7.8.7 TORWBS Number Cost Element FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 204.0 Implementation $3.285 $3.149 $7.147 $30.678 $50.226 $20.898 $13.576 $34.124 $34.201 $21.026 $7.987 $1.

4.1 Program Management $3.285 $2.327 $4.354 $19.892 $34.813 $11.983 $10.420 $14.352 $6.990 $5.768 $2.985 $1.

4.1.1 Program Planning, Authorization Management and Control $3.285 $2.327 $4.354 $19.184 $33.920 $8.047 $6.439 $8.123 $6.961 $5.709 $2.985 $14.1.1.1 Administrative Support $1.016 $2.908 $4.143 $1.678 $1.530 $2.737 $1.645 $1.128 $0.567 $0

4.1.1.2 Program Office Support $3.285 $2.327 $3.338 $16.276 $29.777 $6.369 $4.909 $5.385 $5.316 $4.581 $2.418 $1

4.1.2 Clin4 (Program Management) $0.708 $0.893 $3.936 $3.981 $6.229 $0.029 $0.058 

4.2 Engineering, Planning, and Design $0.700 $2.136 $3.409 $1.925 4.3 Environmental And Occupational Safety and Health Compliance4.4 Site Selection and Acquisition4.5 Construction $0.451 $5.595 $7.965 $5.290 $0.292 $16.363 $15.561 $5.333 

4.5.1 Site Survey/Design/Preparation $0.451 $3.223 $4.730 $4.790 $0.275 $13.589 $12.903 $4.769 4.5.1.1 Processing Equipment $0.451 $3.223 $1.343 $1.000 $0.051 $1.860 $1.373 $0.316 4.5.1.2 RU's $1.408 $2.750 $0.086 $8.238 $9.950 $3.809 

4.5.1.3 Stand Alone Tower $1.979 $0.440 $0.122 $2.110 

4.5.1.4 Equipment Room $0.600 $0.015 $1.381 $1.579 $0.644 

4.5.2 Construction Labor $2.372 $3.235 $0.500 $0.017 $2.774 $2.658 $0.564 

4.6 Site Preparation, Installation, Test and Checkout $0.822 $2.342 $5.191 $7.448 $2.925 $0.729 $9.725 $9.925 $5.002 

4.6.1 Installation $0.822 $2.342 $5.191 $7.448 $2.925 $0.729 $9.725 $9.925 $5.002 

4.6.1.1 Equipment Installation Costs $0.822 $2.342 $5.191 $7.448 $1.925 $0.415 $5.935 $6.063 $2.815 4.6.1.2 Site Related Costs $1.000 $0.314 $3.790 $3.862 $2.187 

4.6.1.3 PM Activities4.7 Commissioning/Closeout4.8 Telecommunications5.0 In-Service Management $0.250 $0.990 $2.002 $1.700 $1.428 $2.225 $1.659 $0.301 $4.262 $4.676 $2.

5.1 Preventative Maintenance5.2 Corrective Maintenance5.3 Modifications5.4 Maintenance Control5.5 Technical Teaming5.6 Watch Standing Coverage5.7 Program Support

Appendix. Agency Comments 
Appendix. Agency Comments 

WBS Number Cost Element FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 5.8 Logistics $0.127 $1.136 $0.360 $0.671 $0.586 $0.066 $0.608 $1.308 $0.982 

5.8.1 Supply Support5.8.2 Replenishment Spares5.8.3 Repair $0.127 $1.136 $0.360 $0.671 $0.586 $0.066 $0.608 $1.308 $0.982 

5.8.3.1 Logistics Support Management (AML)5.8.3.2 ICDLS $0.127 $1.136 $0.360 $0.671 $0.586 $0.066 $0.608 $1.308 $0.982 

5.8.3.3 Contractor Repair (F&E)5.9 In-Service Training5.10 Second Level Engineering $0.250 $0.990 $1.875 $0.520 $0.782 $0.763 $0.652 $0.166 $0.507 $0.689 $0.527 

5.10.3 Hardware and Software Engineering Support $0.250 $0.990 $1.875 $0.520 $0.782 $0.763 $0.652 $0.166 $0.507 $0.689 $0.527 5.10.3.1 2nd level engineering support5.10.3.2 2nd Level Engineering Services (AOS) $0.250 $0.990 $1.875 $0.520 $0.782 $0.763 $0.652 $0.166 $0.507 $0.689 $0.527 5.10.3.3 Contractor Site Support5.11 Infrastructure Support $0.044 $0.287 $0.791 $0.421 $0.069 $3.147 $2.679 $1.349 5.11.2 Utilities5.11.3 Leased Telecom $0.044 $0.276 $0.769 $0.398 $0.033 $3.050 $2.556 $1.224 

5.11.3.1 (Non-Recurring) $0.038 $0.150 $0.519 $0.171 $2.748 $1.906 $0.735 

5.11.3.2 (Recurring) $0.006 $0.126 $0.250 $0.227 $0.033 $0.302 $0.650 $0.489 

5.11.5 Leases $0.011 $0.022 $0.023 $0.036 $0.096 $0.123 $0.125 

6.0 Disposition $0.450 $0.915 $0.063 $1.028 6.5 Dismantle/Removal $0.450 $0.915 $0.063 $1.028 

WBS Number Cost Element FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 5.0 In-Service Management $0.126 $0.385 $1.121 $2.305 $2.401 $3.810 $4.942 $5.573 $6.861 

5.1 Preventative Maintenance5.2 Corrective Maintenance $0.171 $0.586 $0.468 $0.464 $1.116 $1.631 $1.703 

5.2.1 Corrective Maintenance Staffing $0.140 $0.480 $0.383 $0.380 $0.914 $1.336 $1.395 

5.2.2 SMO $0.031 $0.106 $0.085 $0.084 $0.202 $0.295 $0.308 

5.3 Modifications5.4 Maintenance Control5.5 Technical Teaming5.6 Watch Standing Coverage $0.032 $0.108 $0.016 $0.147 $0.166 $0.068 

5.6.1 Site Technician Training $0.022 $0.065 $0.009 $0.088 $0.100 $0.041 5.6.2 ATC Training $0.010 $0.043 $0.006 $0.059 $0.066 $0.027 5.7 Program Support 

5.7.1 FAA Employee 

5.7.2 Contractor FTE 

5.8 Logistics $0.228 $0.469 $1.195 $1.282 $1.306 $2.121 5.8.1 Supply Support $0.002 $0.004 $0.012 $0.013 $0.013 $0.024 

5.8.1.1 Supply Support Services 5.8.1.2 Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation (PHS&T) - FAALC $0.002 $0.004 $0.012 $0.013 $0.013 $0.024 

5.8.2 Replenishment Spares $0.029 $0.059 $0.163 $0.179 $0.182 $0.326 

5.8.2.1 Consumables $0.026 $0.052 $0.146 $0.161 $0.164 $0.297 

5.8.2.2 E&R/R&R $0.003 $0.007 $0.017 $0.018 $0.018 $0.029 

5.8.3 Repair $0.181 $0.373 $0.942 $1.004 $1.023 $1.629 

5.8.3.1 FAA Repair (Organic)5.8.3.2 Commercial Depot Repair $0.181 $0.373 $0.942 $1.004 $1.023 $1.629 

5.8.5 Support Equipment $0.016 $0.033 $0.078 $0.086 $0.087 $0.142 

5.8.5.1 Standard Test and Support Equipment $0.016 $0.033 $0.078 $0.086 $0.087 $0.142 

5.8.5.2 Special Support Equipment5.8.5.3 Calibration Standards/ Services5.8.6 Technical Data5.9 In-Service Training $0.072 $0.305 $0.043 $0.327 $0.369 $0.266 

5.9.1 Depot Training5.9.1.1 Instructor5.9.1.2 Student5.9.2 Second Level Training $0.062 5.9.3 Site Technician Training $0.055 $0.167 $0.032 $0.223 $0.252 $0.182 

5.9.3.1 Instructor $0.029 $0.066 $0.018 $0.086 $0.096 $0.072 5.9.3.2 Student $0.026 $0.101 $0.015 $0.137 $0.155 $0.111 5.9.4 ATC Training $0.017 $0.077 $0.011 $0.104 $0.118 $0.084 

5.9.4.1 Instructor $0.017 $0.077 $0.011 $0.104 $0.118 $0.084 5.9.4.2 Student5.10 Second Level Engineering Direct work Maintenance Staffing $0.102 $0.310 $0.698 $0.722 $0.942 $1.475 $1.186 $1.058 $1.275 

5.10.1 FAA Personnel $0.102 $0.310 $0.542 $0.569 $0.617 $0.648 $0.680 $0.714 $0.750 

5.10.2 Contractor Personnel $0.156 $0.153 $0.325 $0.827 $0.506 $0.344 $0.525 

5.10.3 Fixed Cost5.11 Infrastructure Support $0.025 $0.075 $0.147 $0.355 $0.463 $0.676 $0.885 $1.043 $1.428 

5.11.2 Utilities $0.025 $0.075 $0.147 $0.294 $0.323 $0.329 $0.496 $0.647 $0.700 

5.11.3 Leased Telecommunications $0.061 $0.140 $0.347 $0.388 $0.395 $0.728 

5.12 Flight Inspections and SIAP Development5.13 System Performance Assessment5.14 System Operations-AT Staffing5.15 Travel to and From FAA Sites
Attachment B 

37

Attachment B: ASDE-X Waterfall (as of August 30, 2007) 

# ID Region Airport Delivery IOC ORD

1 MKE AGL General Mitchell International Airport (Milwaukee, WI) 3/12/02 6/5/03 10/30/03

2 MCO ASO Orlando International Airport 9/25/03 9/1/04 9/30/04

3 PVD ANE Theodore Francis Green State Airport (Providence, RI) 12/1/03 7/2/04 5/16/05

4 HOU ASW William P. Hobby Airport (Houston, TX) 10/29/04 8/4/05 8/31/05

5 SEA ANM Seattle-Tacoma International Airport 12/23/04 1/27/06 2/24/06

6 STL ACE Lambert-St. Louis International Airport 12/3/03 10/21/04 5/24/06

7 ATL ASO Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport 7/11/05 5/5/06 6/7/06

8 BDL ANE Bradley International Airport (Hartford, CT) 3/14/05 6/7/06 6/21/06

9 SDF ASO Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field 3/8/04 3/11/07 7/19/07

10 CLT ASO Charlotte Douglas International Airport 1/13/04 7/6/07 8/30/07

11 IAD AEA Washington Dulles International Airport 12/20/05 Jul-08

12 PHX AWP Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport 4/19/07 Dec-08

13 BOS ANE Boston Logan International Airport Sep-08 Jul-09

14 DTW AGL Detroit Metro Wayne County Airport 5/16/07 Jun-08

15 EWR AEA Newark International Airport Sep-08 Jul-09

16 LAX AWP Los Angeles International Airport 2/23/06 Jun-09

17 DEN ANM Denver International Airport Jan-09 Nov-09

18 JFK AEA John F. Kennedy International Airport Aug-08 Jul-09

19 ORD AGL Chicago O'Hare International Airport 3/26/07 7/29/07 8/29/07

20 LAS AWP Las Vegas McCarran International Airport Feb-09 Dec-09

21 IAH ASW George Bush Intercontinental Airport Dec-08 Nov-09

22 PHL AEA Philadelphia International Airport Jan-09 Dec-09

23 FLL ASO Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood Airport May-08 Apr-09

24 MSP AGL Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport Mar-09 Feb-10

25 SNA AWP John Wayne-Orange County Airport Mar-09 Feb-10

26 DFW ASW Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport Apr-09 Apr-10

27 SLC ANM Salt Lake City International Airport Jun-09 May-10

28 BWI AEA Baltimore-Washington International Airport Jul-09 Jun-10

29 MDW AGL Chicago Midway Airport Aug-09 Jul-10

30 HNL AWP Honolulu International - Hickam AFB Airport Sep-09 Aug-10

31 MIA ASO Miami International Airport Sep-09 Aug-10

32 DCA AEA Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Feb-10 Dec-10

33 LGA AEA New York LaGuardia Airport Feb-10 Dec-10

34 SAN AWP San Diego International Airport Mar-10 Jan-11

35 MEM ASO Memphis International Airport Mar-10 Jan-11

T1 ICDLS

Test & Interim Contractor Depot Logistics Support 

(ICDLS) - Syracuse [Oklahoma City - FAA Logistics 

Center (AML Depot)]

10/16/01 N/A

T2 PSF Oklahoma City - NAS Engineering Program Support 

Facility (PSF) 2/27/04 N/A

T3 ACA Oklahoma City - Academy 6/10/04 N/A

mm/dd/yy = actual

Appendix. Agency Comments 
Attachment C 

Appendix. Agency Comments 

38

Attachment C: ASDE-X Software Enhancement Schedule 

# ID Region Airport

5.0.7.2.2

Deployed

[Includes Rain Mode, 

Tower Config, 

Intersecting Runway 

Alerts, ASDE-X 

Upgrade (formerly 

ASDE-3X)]

Change Order 6

NLT IOC date

[Includes PRM-A, Split 

Ops, Security 

Enhancements]

1 MKE AGL General Mitchell International Airport (Milwaukee, WI) Jul 2007

2 M

3 P

4

5 S

6 S

7 A

8 B

9 S

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

Build & System Enhancements Status by Site (09/21/2007)

CO ASO Orlando International Airport Jan 2007

VD ANE Theodore Francis Green State Airport (Providence, RI) Feb 2008

HOU ASW William P. Hobby Airport (Houston, TX) May 2008

EA ANM Seattle-Tacoma International Airport Feb 2008 (key site)

TL ACE Lambert-St. Louis International Airport Feb 2008

TL ASO Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport Sep 2007

DL ANE Bradley International Airport (Hartford, CT) Feb 2008

DF ASO Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field Jul 2007

CLT ASO Charlotte Douglas International Airport Aug 2007

IAD AEA Washington Dulles International Airport Jul 2008

PHX AWP Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport Dec 2008

BOS ANE Boston Logan International Airport Jul 2009

DTW AGL Detroit Metro Wayne County Airport Jun 2008

EWR AEA Newark International Airport Jul 2009

LAX AWP Los Angeles International Airport Jun 2009

DEN ANM Denver International Airport Nov 2009

JFK AEA John F. Kennedy International Airport Jul 2009

ORD AGL Chicago O'Hare International Airport Aug 2007 Nov 2008 (2nd tower)

LAS AWP Las Vegas McCarran International Airport Dec 2009

IAH ASW George Bush Intercontinental Airport Nov 2009

PHL AEA Philadelphia International Airport Dec 2009

FLL ASO Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood Airport Apr 2009

MSP AGL Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport Feb 2010

SNA AWP John Wayne-Orange County Airport Feb 2010

DFW ASW Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport Apr 2010

SLC ANM Salt Lake City International Airport May 2010

BWI AEA Baltimore-Washington International Airport Jun 2010

MDW AGL Chicago Midway Airport Jul 2010

HNL AWP Honolulu International - Hickam AFB Airport Aug 2010

MIA ASO Miami International Airport Aug 2010

DCA AEA Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Dec 2010

LGA AEA New York LaGuardia Airport Dec 2010

SAN AWP San Diego International Airport Jan 2011

MEM ASO Memphis International Airport Jan 2011

Current Enhancements

Upcoming Enhancement
Appendix. Agency Comments 

Attachment D: ASDE-X Software Build 5.0.7.2 Test Events and Completion Dates 

Test Event Test 

Organization 

Test Location Test Dates 

ASDE-X Software Build 5.0.7.2 Factory Acceptance Test [Includes Rain Mode, Tower Configuration, Intersecting Runway Alerts, ASDE-X Upgrade (formerly ASDE-3X)] 

Sensis Syracuse, NY 1. Engineer

11/16/06 

2. FAA-Wi

11/2706 

3. Formal T

12/15/06 

ASDE-X Software Build 5.0.7.2 National Baseline Test [Includes Rain Mode, Tower Configuration, Intersecting Runway Alerts, ASDE-X Upgrade (formerly ASDE-3X)] 

FAA Technical Center 

1. ASDE-X Lab in 

Washington DC 

2. Orlando, FL 

1. 9/1/06 to 2. 1/9/07 to 

ASDE-X Upgrade Independent Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) Assessment [Includes converging runway capability] 

FAA Office of Independent Operational Test & Evaluation 

Louisville, KY 3/11/07 to 4/
The following pages contain textual versions of the graphs and charts found in this 

document. These pages were not in the original document but have been added 

here to accommodate assistive technology. 
FAA Needs To Improve Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X 

(ASDE-X) Management Controls To Address Cost Growth, Schedule Delays, 

and Safety Risks 

Section 508 Compliant Presentation 

Table 1. History of ASDE-X Strategy Changes 

Item 1. Date of change: September 2001. Purpose of change: first program baseline. 

Number of ASDE-X airports planned: 26 (Note: these airports were comprised of 25 

airports without surface surveillance and 1 ASDE-3/AMASS airport). Planned 

completion date was 2007. Cost increase $424,300,000. 

Item 2. Date of change: June 2002. Purpose of change: second baseline—included plan 

to upgrade seven more ASDE-3/AMASS airports. Number of ASDE-X airports planned: 

33 (Note: these airports were comprised of 25 airports without surface surveillance and 8 

ASDE-3/AMASS airports). Planned completion date was 2007. Cost increase 

$80,900,000. 

Item 3. Date of change: October 2003. Purpose of change: to upgrade two more ASDE3/AMASS airports. Number of ASDE-X airports planned: 35 (Note: these airports were 

comprised of 25 airports without surface surveillance and 10 ASDE-3/AMASS airports). 

Planned completion date was 2007. Cost increase: $0 

Item 4. Date of change: September 2005. Purpose of change: third baseline and major 

strategy shift to upgrade 25 ASDE-3/AMASS airports. Number of ASDE-X airports 

planned: 35 (Note: these airports were comprised of 10 airports without surface 

surveillance and 25 ASDE-3/AMASS airports). Planned completion date is 2011. Cost 

increase: $44,600,000. 

The current total number of ASDE-X airports planned is 35. The current planned 

completion date is 2011. The current ASDE-X cost estimate is $549,800,000. 

Source: ASDE-X JRC baseline documents 
Table 2. ASDE-X Cost Estimates for Six Activities 

Cost Element: 

Procurement/ 

Production 

Planned Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

September 2005) 

$142,950,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

December 2006) 

$179,740,000 

Cost Growth: 

$36,790,000 

Cost Element: 

Program Management 

Planned Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

September 2005) 

$93,470,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

December 2006) 

$120,100,000 

Cost Growth: 

$26,630,000 

Cost Element: 

Software Design and 

Development 

Planned Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

September 2005) 

$38,490,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

December 2006) 

$58,820,000 

Cost Growth: 

$20,330,000 

Cost Element: 

Logistics Support 

Planned Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

September 2005) 

$11,000,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

December 2006) 

$18,340,000 

Cost Growth: 

$7,340,000 

Cost Element: 

Second-Level 

Engineering 

Planned Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

September 2005) 

$5,500,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

December 2006) 

$7,900,000 

Cost Growth: 

$2,400,000 

Cost Element: Test 

and Evaluation 

Planned Cost 

Estimate: 

(as of September 

2005) $5,500,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate: (as of 

December 2006) 

$6,230,000 

Cost Growth: 

$730,000 

The total planned cost estimate for these six activities (as of September 2005) was 

$296,910,000. The total current cost estimate for these six activities (as of December 

2006) is $391,130,000. The total cost growth for these six activities is $94,220,000.

Source: OIG analysis of ASDE-X basis of estimates and ASDE-X updated costs 

estimates 

Figure 1. Example of a Potential Collision Situation for Single and Intersecting 

Runways 

Item 1: Depiction of two aircraft causing a single runway head-on alert. 

Item 2: Depiction of two aircraft causing an intersecting runway alert. 

Source: ASDE-X Safety Logic specification 
Figure 2. Three-Year Comparison of Runway Incursions 

In fiscal year 2004, there were 324 runway incursions. Of these, 97 were operational 

errors (caused by air traffic controllers), 171 were pilot deviations (caused by pilot error), 

and 56 were vehicle/pedestrian deviations (caused by vehicle operators and pedestrians). 

In fiscal year 2005, there were 326 runway incursions. Of these, 105 were operational 

errors (caused by air traffic controllers), 168 were pilot deviations (caused by pilot error), 

and 53 were vehicle/pedestrian deviations (caused by vehicle operators and pedestrians). 

In fiscal year 2006, there were 330 runway incursions. Of these, 89 were operational 

errors (caused by air traffic controllers), 190 were pilot deviations (caused by pilot error), 

and 51 were vehicle/pedestrian deviations (caused by vehicle operators and pedestrians). 

Source: FAA Runway Safety Office: FY 2004-FY 2006 runway incursion data 

Exhibit B. ASDE-X Program Cost Variances 

Cost Element:

Procurement/Production 

Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$142,950,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006) 

$179,740,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: 

$36,790,000 

Cost Element: Program 

Management 

Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$93,470,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$120,100,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: 

$26,630,000 

Cost Element: Software Design and 

Development 

Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$38,490,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$58,820,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: 

$20,330,000 

Cost Element: Logistics Support Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 

2005):$11,000,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$18,340,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: 

$7,340,000 

Cost Element: Second Level 

Engineering 

Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$5,500,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$7,900,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: 

$2,400,000 
Cost Element: Test and Evaluation Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$5,500,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$6,230,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: 

$730,000 

The subtotals for these cost 

elements are as follows: 

Planned Cost 

Estimate subtotal 

for these elements 

(as of September 

2005): 

$296,910,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate subtotal 

for these elements 

(as of December 

2006): 

$391,130,000

Cost Variance 

subtotal for 

these elements: 

$94,220,000 

Cost Element: Disposition Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$60,480,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$28,900,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: -

$31,580,000 

Cost Element: Construction Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$82,470,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$56,850,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: -

$25,620,000 

Cost Element: Installation* Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$54,980,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$44,110,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: -

$10,870,000 

Cost Element: Site survey Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$16,490,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$8,170,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: -

$8,320,000 

Cost Element:

Telecommunications** 

Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$16,490,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$8,490,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: -

$8,000,000 

Cost Element: Logistics Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$11,000,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$6,130,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: -

$4,870,000 
Cost Element: Systems 

Engineering 

Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 

2005):5,500,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$2,740,000 

Cost Variance 

for this 

element: -

$2,760,000 

Cost Element: Other Planned Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

September 2005): 

$5,500,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate for this 

element (as of 

December 2006): 

$0 

 Cost Variance 

for this 

element: $0 

The subtotals for these cost 

elements are as follows: 

Planned Cost 

Estimate subtotal 

for these elements 

(as of September 

2005): 

$252,910,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate subtotal 

for these elements 

(as of December 

2006): 

$155,390,000 

Cost Variance 

subtotal for 

these elements: 

-$92,020,000 

The grand totals for all cost 

elements are as follows: 

Planned Cost 

Estimate grand total 

for all cost elements 

(as of September 

2005): 

$549,820,000 

Current Cost 

Estimate grand total 

for all cost elements 

(as of December 

2006):$546,520,000 

Cost Variance 

grand total for 

all cost 

elements: Not 

Applicable 

Source: OIG analysis of ASDE-X Life Cycle Cost Estimates: September 2005 and 

current cost estimates 

Note: Sensis submitted FAA cost estimates to complete ASDE-X installation totaling 

$64 million. The $20 million difference between the FAA and Sensis estimates 

($64 million versus $44 million) would increase ASDE-X implementation costs to 

$566 million and exceed the current ASDE-X program baseline. 

Note: We also found that ASDE-X program officials decreased telecommunications 

costs estimates from $16.5 million to $8.5 million to remain within ASDE-X program 

baseline costs. However, FAA later reported that the telecommunications costs were 

actually one to two times higher than its original estimates, which could increase the 

costs to at least $33 million or up to $49.5 million. 
Exhibit D. ASDE-X Waterfall Schedule (as of August 14, 2006) 

Table Item 1. New Establishment Airports 

1 Airport 

Identification: 

MKE 

General Mitchell International (Mil. WI) Delivery Date 

3/12/02 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

6/5/03 

Operational 

Readiness Date

10/30/03 

2 Airport 

Identification: 

MCO 

Orlando International Delivery Date 

9/25/03 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

9/1/04 

Operational 

Readiness Date

9/30/04 

3 Airport 

Identification: 

PVD 

Theodore Francis Green State (Prov. RI) Delivery Date 

12/1/03 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

7/2/04 

Operational 

Readiness Date

5/16/05 

4 Airport 

Identification: 

HOU 

William P. Hobby Airport (Houston, TX) Delivery Date 

10/29/04 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

8/4/05 

Operational 

Readiness Date

8/31/05 

5 Airport 

Identification: 

BDL 

Bradley International Airport (Hart. CT) Delivery Date 

3/14/05 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

6/7/06 

Operational 

Readiness Date

6/21/06 

6 Airport 

Identification: 

PHX 

Phoenix Sky Harbor International Delivery Date 

November 2007 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

December 2008 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 

7 Airport 

Identification: 

FLL 

Ft. Lauderdale/Hollywood Delivery Date May 

2008 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

April 2009 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 

8 Airport 

Identification: 

SNA 

John Wayne-Orange County Delivery Date 

March 2009 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

February 2010 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 

9 Airport 

Identification: 

MDW 

Chicago Midway Delivery Date 

August 2009 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

July 2010 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 

10 Airport 

Identification: 

HNL 

Honolulu International - Hickam AFB Delivery Date 

September 2009 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

August 2010 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 

Table Item 2. Airports with Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model 3/Airport 

Movement Area Safety System (ASDE-3/AMASS) 

11 Airport 

Identification: 

STL 

Lambert-St. Louis International Delivery Date 

12/3/03 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

10/21/04 

Operational 

Readiness Date

5/24/06 

12 Airport 

Identification: 

SEA 

Seattle-Tacoma International Delivery Date 

12/23/04 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

1/27/06 

Operational 

Readiness Date

2/24/06 

13 Airport 

Identification: 

ATL 

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Delivery Date 

7/11/05 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

5/5/06 

Operational 

Readiness Date

6/7/06 

14 Airport 

Identification: 

IAD 

Washington Dulles International Delivery Date 

12/20/05* 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

July 2008 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 

15 Airport 

Identification: 

SDF 

Louisville International –Standiford 

Field 

Delivery Date 

3/8/04 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

August 2007 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 

16 Airport 

Identification: 

CLT 

Charlotte Douglas International Delivery Date 

1/13/04 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

July 2007 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 

17 Airport 

Identification: 

LAX 

Los Angeles International Delivery Date 

2/23/06* 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

June 2009 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

18 Airport 

Identification: 

MSP 

Minneapolis-St. Paul International Delivery Date 

March 2009 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

February 2010 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 
19 Airport 

Identification: 

DFW 

Dallas/Ft. Worth International Delivery Date 

April 2009 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

April 2010 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined 

20 Airport 

Identification: 

MEM 

Memphis International Delivery Date May 

2010 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

April 2011 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

21 Airport 

Identification: 

DEN 

Denver International Delivery Date June 

2008 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

July 2009 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

22 Airport 

Identification: 

ORD 

Chicago O'Hare International Delivery Date July 

2008 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

August 2009 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

23 Airport 

Identification: 

LAS 

Las Vegas McCarran International Delivery Date 

September 2008 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

August 2009 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

24 Airport 

Identification: 

IAH 

George Bush Intercontinental Delivery Date 

December 2008 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

November 2009 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

25 Airport 

Identification: 

DCA 

Ronald Reagan Washington National Delivery Date 

February 2010 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

January 2011 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

26 Airport 

Identification: 

BWI 

Baltimore-Washington International Delivery Date July 

2009 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

June 2010 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

27 Airport 

Identification: 

EWR 

Newark International Delivery Date June 

2008 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

May 2009 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

28 Airport 

Identification: 

DTW 

Detroit Metro Wayne County Delivery Date 

August 2007 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

August 2008 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

29 Airport 

Identification: 

BOS 

Boston Logan International Delivery Date 

February 2008 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

December 2008 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

30 Airport 

Identification: 

JFK 

John F. Kennedy International Delivery Date 

August 2008 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

July 2009 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

31 Airport 

Identification: 

MIA 

Miami International Delivery Date 

September 2009 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

August 2010 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

32 Airport 

Identification: 

LGA 

New York LaGuardia Delivery Date 

March 2010 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

February 2011 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

33 Airport 

Identification: 

PHL 

Philadelphia International Delivery Date 

January 2009 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

December 2009 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

34 Airport 

Identification: 

SLC 

Salt Lake City International Delivery Date June 

2009 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

May 2010 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

35 Airport 

Identification: 

SAN 

San Diego International Delivery Date 

April 2010 

Initial Operating 

Capability Date 

March 2011 

Operational 

Readiness Date

to be determined

Table Item 3. Support Systems

T1 

Interim 

Contractor 

Depot Level 

Support 

Vendor Facility/ICDLS Delivery Date 

10/16/01 

T2 Program 

Support Facility FAA Program Support Facility Delivery Date 2/27/04 

T3 

Mike Moroney 

Aeronautical 

Center 

FAA Academy – Oklahoma City Delivery Date 

6/10/04 
Note: Washington Dulles (IAD) and Los Angeles International (LAX) delivered to 

airport but not yet installed. 

Note: Louisville (SDF), Charlotte (CLT), and Dulles (IAD) International Airports did not

meet their FY 06 ORD dates. 

Note: Initial Operating Capability (IOC) – The declaration by site personnel that the 

ASDE-X system is ready for conditional operational use in the NAS and denotes the end 

of Field Familiarization at that site. 

Note: Operational Readiness Date (ORD) - Signifies the official date to switchover to the 

new system. 

Source: FAA Internal Program Review, March 2007