UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ ALONZO LYDELL MOORE, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. RICK RAEMISCH, Ex ecutive Director, Colorado Department of Corrections; LAURIE TAFOYA, Warden, San Carlos Correctional Facility; CYNTHIA COFFMAN, Attorney General, State of Colorado, Respondents - Appellees. No. 17-1346 (D.C. No. 1:16- CV-02518-RPM) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER DENYING A CERTIFI CATE OF APPEALABILITY *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , HOLMES , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Plaintiff-Appellant Alonzo Lydell Moore seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s de nial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (“Unle ss a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeal s from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus pr oceeding in which the detenti on complained of arises out of process issued by a State court.”) . He also seeks leave to proceed in forma

* This order is not binding precedent, ex cept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, a nd collateral estoppel. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 20, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 pauperis . We deny the request for a COA and dismiss this matte r, and also deny Moore’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis

. I Moore’s trial In 1995, when he was approximately 18 y ears old, Moore was shot in the head. He suffered brain damage to his frontal lo be. Two years later, in 1997, he was charged with first-degree murder, felony mu rder, and two counts of burglary after he stabbed his ex-girlfriend to death. Moor e’s appointed counsel had Moore undergo an examination to determine whether he was co mpetent to stand trial. Moore strongly opposed the examination. Nonetheless, Moore underwent an examination, which produced a report recommending that the tr ial court find Moore competent to stand trial. App. at 137. After the examination, but before the ultimate determination of competency, Moore sent the trial court judge a letter, asking if he “could get another lawyer.” Id. at 86. Moore wrote that his attorney was “not taking this case very seriously,” and explained that Moore was “very upset because [his] lawyer forced [him] into going to the State Hospital for testing, wh ich [he] didn’t need at all.” Id. Eleven days after Moore’s letter, the trial judge found Moor e competent to sta nd trial. At the competency hearing, Moore repeated hi s request for new c ounsel. After asking Moore a series of questions about his counsel—but without hearing from Moore’s counsel—the judge stated “there is not a sufficient basis for removal” of Moore’s counsel. Id. at 121.3 Trial did not begin until approximately 20 months later. Still, Moore maintained the same appointed counsel. During jury selection, Moore and his counsel disagreed about whether to strike a prospective juror whose mother and cousin had been murdered. Eventually, the prospectiv e juror was seated, and was part of the jury that found Moore guilty of both first-degree murder and felony murder. The trial judge later sentenced Moore to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, a senten ce Moore continues to serve. 1 Procedural history Moore filed a direct appeal. The Colo rado Court of Appeals affirmed the firstdegree murder and two burgl ary convictions, but vacated the felony murder conviction. App. at 34–50; People v. Moore , No. 99CA1288, 2002 WL 1764434, at *1 (Colo. App. Jan. 17, 2002). The Colo rado Supreme Court denied Moore’s petition for writ of certiorari. In 2002, Moore filed a petition for pos t-conviction relief in Colorado state court under Colorado Crim. P. 35(c). Th at petition languished unaddressed—despite numerous letters from Moore—and Moore ev entually filed another petition under Crim. P. 35(c) in 2009. See App. at 55. The Colorado state trial court denied the 2009 petition, concluding that it was a succes sive petition. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that the 2009 petition was indeed a successive petition, but noted that the trial court never addres sed Moore’s 2002 Crim. P. 35(c) petition.

1 The judge also sentenced Moore to a c oncurrent term of 12 years for the two burglary convictions. App. at 141.4 It remanded to the trial c ourt to consider that 2002 petition. App. at 62–65; People v. Moore , No. 09CA1675, 2011 WL 2001937, at *1 (Colo. App. May 19, 2011). On remand, the trial court denied Moore’ s 2002 Crim. P. 35(c) petition. App. at 110–14. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the denial. Id. at 67–82; People v. Moore , No. 13CA0988, 2015 WL 1299723, at *1 (Colo. Ap p. Mar. 19, 2015). And the Colorado Supreme Court denied Moor e’s petition for writ of certiorari. Moore v. People , No. 15SC314, 2015 WL 5934719, at *1 (Colo. Oct. 13, 2015). Nearly a year later, with the assistance of counse l, Moore filed this motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting that the state trial court had denied him his Sixth Amendment rights in 1997. The district c ourt denied the motion and denied Moore a COA. With the assistance of counsel, Moore now appeals. II To merit a COA, Moore must make “a substantial show ing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This will occur when “jurists of reason would find it debatable whethe r the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Moore has not made this sort of substa ntial showing, and is not entitled to a COA. As the Colorado Court of Appeal s stated in denying Moore post-conviction relief in 2015, Moore had the opportunity to present facts and re asons in support of his request for new counsel. However, Moore provided only gene ric and conclusory accusations that a conflict exis ted with his counsel, that he did not get along with his counsel, and that his counsel was not taki ng his case seriously. As the Colorado5 Court of Appeals concluded, discord between counsel and a client “does not create a Sixth Amendment violation,” and “a trial cour t cannot be expected to . . . unilaterally decide whether the level of ci vility is concerning” between an attorney and his client. App. at 80 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan , 446 U.S. 335 (1980)); see also Morris v. Slappy , 461 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1983). Because Moor e has failed to present an issue upon which reasonable jurists coul d disagree, his case does not deserve encouragement, and we deny his request for COA. Further, “because [Moore] has failed to present a nonfrivolous argument in support of the issues on appeal,” Thomas v. Parker , 609 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2010), we also deny Moore’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis

. III We therefore DENY Moore’s motion for a COA and dismiss this matter. We also DENY Moore’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis

. Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge