J-A07034-17

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellee

 v.

:

:

:

:

:

THADDEUS THOMAS CRUMBLEY,

 Appellant

:

:

: No. 127 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 28, 2012

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0002820-2012

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JUNE 21, 2017

Thaddeus Thomas Crumbley (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his conviction for first-degree homicide and 

related offenses. We affirm. 

Because we write only for the parties, a full recitation of the facts is 

unnecessary. Relevant to this appeal, Appellant and co-defendant Matthew 

Ebo (Ebo) (collectively, the co-defendants), were tried jointly in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County on charges related to the May 16, 2011 

shooting death of Todd Mattox. A jury found both men guilty of first-degree 

homicide; robbery - serious bodily injury; robbery of a motor vehicle; two 

violations of the Uniform Firearms Act: carrying a firearm without a license 

and possession of firearms by a prohibited person; conspiracy to commit 

criminal homicide; and conspiracy to commit robbery - serious bodily injury. 
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On September 14, 2012, trial counsel filed a motion for extraordinary relief. 

The Commonwealth filed a response and, on October 4, 2012, Appellant filed 

an amended motion. Ebo made an oral motion to join Appellant’s written 

one, and following a hearing on the co-defendants’ claims, both motions for 

extraordinary relief were denied by the trial court by orders dated October 5, 

2012. 

On November 28, 2012, during the joint sentencing hearing, Appellant 

was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for his homicide conviction, 

and an aggregate term of 481⁄2 to 87 years of consecutive imprisonment on 

the remaining counts. No post-sentence motions were filed.

On December 19, 2012, Appellant’s counsel timely filed a notice of 

appeal to this Court, which was docketed at 1997 WDA 2012. Both Appellant 

and the trial court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1 

However, on January 5, 2015, while Appellant’s case was pending on appeal 

before this Court, his counsel petitioned for remand on the basis of afterdiscovered evidence. This Court initially denied Appellant’s request, as well 

as his request for reconsideration of the same, and oral argument was 

scheduled. However, before argument occurred, this Court remanded this 

 

1 The docket evidences that Appellant sought and received multiple 

extensions of time to file his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. In addition, there was a substantial delay while 

the transcripts were being prepared and filed.
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case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Appellant’s afterdiscovered evidence claim merited a new trial.2

On October 29, 2015, the trial court held a joint hearing on the codefendants’ claims of after-discovered evidence. On December 22, 2015, 

the trial court denied the requested relief. Appellant filed timely a notice of 

appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court have complied with the 

mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which we have 

reordered for ease of disposition.

I. The trial court erred in admitting (and failing to suppress) the 

testimony and identification of Saday Robinson:

A. When the Commonwealth failed to provide full and 

timely discovery pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 573; 

B. The identification was inherently unreliable given the 

circumstances and failure to make identification on several 

occasions; and

C. Because the identification was the product of taint and 

/or bias.

 

2 Ebo’s case followed a similar post-trial trajectory. On November 30, 2012, 

Ebo’s trial counsel moved to withdraw from representation. The trial court 

granted this request by order dated December 12, 2012. After being 

appointed by the court, appellate counsel from the Allegheny County Public 

Defender’s Office filed an emergency petition for leave to file post-sentence 

motions nunc pro tunc, which was granted. Ebo’s post-sentence motion was 

subsequently denied by operation of law on June 26, 2013. On July 25, 

2013, Ebo’s counsel timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court, which was 

docketed at 1194 WDA 2013. However, before the appeal was heard, 

counsel filed an application for remand based upon a claim of afterdiscovered evidence. This Court granted Ebo’s request and ordered the trial 

court to conduct a hearing to determine whether Ebo’s claim merited a new 

trial.
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II. The trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion for new 

trial based on [after-]discovered evidence.

III. The trial court erred by admitting improper Pa.R.E. 404(b) 

evidence:

A. Regarding a prior shooting in which the Appellant was 

the victim; the trial court failed to instruct the jury of the 

limited purpose of this evidence at the time of the 

testimony and in its final instruction to the jury.

B. Regarding a Ruger handgun found at the scene of the 

prior shooting in which the Appellant was the victim.

IV. The trial court erred by failing to strike and/or to provide a 

curative instruction when the Commonwealth exceeded the 

reasonable bounds of advocacy in characterizing the Appellant as 

the “Angel of Death” in its closing argument; trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to this argument and/or for failing 

to request a curative instruction.

V. The trial court erred by admitting the testimony of several 

jailhouse informants when the Commonwealth failed to timely 

provide discovery in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 regarding 

other instances in which the informants wrote letters offering to 

testify in other cases.

VI. The trial court erred by failing to give the missing witness 

instruction as to Richard Carpenter, a Commonwealth witness 

[whose] proposed testimony and consideration received in 

exchange for his cooperation [were] discussed at great length, 

but who failed to appear.

VII. Appellant was denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 and the Pennsylvania constitution when the 

trial court granted a Commonwealth continuance because of the 

unavailability of Commonwealth witnesses and the court made 

no finding that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence 

in locating these witnesses.

VIII. The evidence presented was insufficient to sustain the 

verdict; the jury verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
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Appellant’s Brief at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Issues I and II - The Identification, Testimony, and Post-Trial 

Statements of Eyewitness Saday Robinson

Appellant’s first claim of error involves challenges to the admission of 

the pre-trial identification of the co-defendants by eyewitness Saday 

Robinson, her identification of the men at trial, and the credibility of her trial 

testimony.3 Appellant’s Brief at 25-36. Specifically, Appellant claims that 

Robinson’s pre-trial identification was irreparably tainted, and the trial court 

erred in denying a pre-trial motion to suppress those statements. Id. at 36. 

Appellant also argues that the Commonwealth violated Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 5734 by failing to provide complete discovery to Appellant prior to 

trial. Id. at 27-28.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial 

court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining 

whether the factual findings are supported by the record and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct.

 

3 The May 16, 2011 shooting that resulted in Mattox’s death occurred 

outside of Robinson’s apartment. Robinson was presented with a number of 

photo arrays following the shooting, but did not identify Appellant as one of 

the shooters until July of 2012. At trial, Robinson made a positive in-court 

identification of both co-defendants, and noted that it was fear of retaliation 

that prevented her from identifying the men in any of the initial photo arrays 

shown to her in September of 2011. Robinson was cross-examined 

extensively as to the credibility of her identification. 

4 As discussed in more detail below, Rule 573 governs disclosure of

discovery in criminal cases, and permits the trial court a broad array of 

sanctions for non-compliance with a discovery request.
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[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression 

court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the 

court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the 

facts. Moreover, it is within the lower court’s province to pass on 

the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be given 

to their testimony.

When determining the admissibility of identification 

testimony, this Court has held that suggestiveness in the 

identification process is a factor to be considered in determining 

the admissibility of such evidence, but suggestiveness alone 

does not warrant exclusion. A pretrial identification will not be 

suppressed as violative of due process rights unless the facts 

demonstrate that the identification procedure was so infected by 

suggestiveness as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of 

irreparable misidentification.

Due process does not require that every pretrial 

identification of witnesses must be conducted under laboratory 

conditions of an approved lineup. In reviewing the propriety of 

identification evidence, the central inquiry is whether, under the 

totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable.

Additionally, the purpose of a suppression order regarding 

exclusion of identification evidence is to prevent improper police 

action. Thus, where a defendant does not show that improper 

police conduct resulted in a suggestive identification, 

suppression is not warranted.

Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 610 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal 

denied, 145 A.3d 724 (Pa. 2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, “[d]ecisions involving discovery matters are within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of 

that discretion.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 955 A.2d 391, 394 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (en banc).
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Following our review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and the 

relevant law, we conclude that the opinion of the Honorable Beth A. Lazzara 

thoroughly and correctly addresses and disposes of Appellant’s first issue 

and supporting arguments and evidences no abuse of discretion or errors of 

law. Accordingly, we adopt sections A and B of the trial court’s June 25, 

2014 opinion, pages 9 through 23, as our own and hold, based upon the 

reasons stated therein, that the trial court committed neither an error of law 

nor an abuse of discretion in (1) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress 

Robinson’s pre-trial identification of the co-defendants; (2) permitting 

Robinson to testify at trial; and (3) determining that the Commonwealth had 

not committed a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 573.

We next consider Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. 

Appellant’s Brief at 68-73. We address this claim mindful of the following.

To warrant relief, after-discovered evidence must meet a 

four-prong test: (1) the evidence could not have been obtained 

before the conclusion of the trial by reasonable diligence; (2) the 

evidence is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the 

evidence will not be used solely for purposes of impeachment; 

and (4) the evidence is of such a nature and character that a 

different outcome is likely. At an evidentiary hearing, an 

appellant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that 

each of these factors has been met in order for a new trial to be 

warranted.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation 

omitted).
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The after-discovered evidence at issue is the unsworn statement of 

Robinson in which she recanted her pre-trial and in-court identifications of 

the co-defendants. In 2014, after both co-defendants had been sentenced, 

Robinson was interviewed by a defense investigator. This interview was 

recorded in writing and on video; however, Robinson was not sworn, nor did 

she give the statement under penalty of perjury. Robinson told the 

investigator that she did not witness the shooting, that her trial testimony 

was fabricated, and that her identification of the co-defendants was coerced 

by the police. 

Robinson was called to testify at the October 29, 2015 evidentiary 

hearing. At that time, she recanted her statements to the investigator and 

claimed that her 2014 recorded statement was untruthful. When asked why 

she lied, she explained that she had been threatened by persons close to 

Appellant and Ebo and had been offered a large sum of money to recant her 

trial testimony. However, Robinson affirmed at the evidentiary hearing that 

she was telling the truth when she identified Appellant and Ebo as the 

shooters during their trial.

Appellant argues that he met his burden under Rivera and is entitled 

to a new trial based on Robinson’s statement to the defense investigator 

because (1) the evidence of her recantation could not have been obtained 

before the conclusion of trial; (2) the evidence is not corroborative or 

cumulative; (3) the evidence would not be used solely for the purposes of 
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impeachment; and (4) the recantation is of such “immense importance” that 

a new outcome would have resulted had the jury been permitted to hear it. 

Appellant’s Brief at 71-72. 

As our Supreme Court has explained, 

[r]ecantation testimony is extremely unreliable. When the 

recantation involves an admission of perjury, it is the least 

reliable form of proof. The trial court has the responsibility of 

judging the credibility of the recantation. Unless the trial court is 

satisfied that the recantation is true, it should deny a new trial. 

An appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s determination 

absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Henry, 706 A.2d 313, 321 (Pa. 1997) (citations 

omitted).

Here, the trial court determined that a new trial was not warranted 

because, at the evidentiary hearing on the co-defendants’ claims of afterdiscovered evidence, Robinson “credibly recanted her unsworn recantation 

statements” made to the investigator. Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/2015, at 5. 

In so holding, the court found credible Robinson’s explanation for why she 

made false statements to the investigator only to later recant those 

statements at the hearing. Id. The court explained as follows.

As noted by the parties, [] Robinson provided testimony at 

the October 29, 2015 evidentiary hearing, during which she 

recanted the statements that she had made to [the] defense 

investigator ... in videotaped and handwritten form. The 

videotaped and handwritten statements served as the 

recantation evidence upon which the defendants have relied in 

seeking a new trial based on after-discovered [] evidence. It 

should be noted that [] Robinson never took an oath to tell the 

truth prior to giving the videotaped statement and did not write 

the handwritten statement under penalty of perjury. During her 
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testimony at the October 29, 2015 hearing, Ms. Robinson 

explained that the statements that she had made in video and 

written form were untruthful. She explained that she had lied to 

[the] defense investigator ... because she had been threatened 

by people associated with the defendants. Additionally, she had 

been offered a substantial sum of money -- $25,000 -- to recant 

her trial testimony.

The court paid extremely close attention to [] Robinson’s 

demeanor throughout the evidentiary hearing, and it finds highly 

credible her explanation for why she initially attempted to recant 

her trial testimony to [the] defense investigator.... [] Robinson 

acknowledged that she is in fear for her life from the defendants. 

Her fear is due, in part, to her knowledge of the reputation of 

the defendants, their friends, associates and families, as well as 

the events she herself witnessed. She indicated, convincingly, 

that she would rather have lied than lost her life. [] Robinson 

was in fear from the defendants, given that people associated 

with them kept finding her despite several moves. Further, she 

testified credibly that she believed that, if she cooperated with 

the defense efforts, she would be left alone by the defendants. 

The court also found highly credible her explanation for why she 

recanted her post-trial recantation statements during the 

evidentiary hearing. [] Robinson indicated that she did not want 

guilty people to be let out of jail and that the defendants 

deserved to be in jail for what they had done. [] Robinson did 

not waver in her testimony at the evidentiary hearing and was 

adamant that her post-trial recantation statements were made 

out of fear and not as a result of any crisis of conscience that 

she was experiencing as to the certainty of her observations. At 

the October 29, 2015 hearing, [] Robinson very clearly, 

convincingly, and without hesitation, identified the defendants as 

the perpetrators of the murder. It must be noted that this was 

the second time that she made her identification of the 

defendants as murderers in a courtroom, in the presence of the 

defendants and under oath.

This court had the benefit of sitting through the original 

homicide trial, and it observed firsthand [] Robinson’s demeanor 

when she provided her eyewitness account of the brutal murder 

and identified the defendants as the perpetrators. [] Robinson 

shook uncontrollably throughout her testimony and was clearly 

frightened to be involved in the case. As the Commonwealth 

noted in its brief, [] Robinson had nothing to gain and everything 
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to lose by testifying against the defendants during the homicide 

trial. This holds equally true with regard to her testimony at the 

evidentiary hearing related to her supposed recantation. [] 

Robinson has nothing to gain and everything to lose by recanting 

the unsworn recantation statements[.] She continues to place 

herself in danger of retribution by maintaining her position that 

the defendants were the perpetrators of the murder, which 

makes her identification testimony all the more credible. The fact 

that she maintains her identification of the defendants as 

murderers when under oath and forced to confront them face-toface, and in light of her fear of the defendants based on their 

reputations, threats made to her, and her inability to remain 

hidden, makes [] Robinson’s identification ring with truthfulness 

and credibility.

Accordingly, after taking into account the strength of [] 

Robinson’s identification testimony at trial and after finding [] 

Robinson’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing credible in all 

respects, this court finds that a new trial is not warranted under 

these circumstances. Given that [] Robinson has consistently 

identified the defendants while under oath, and given that her 

identification testimony has been very credible each time, the 

court does not find that the purported recantation evidence 

would “likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were 

granted.” Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 363 (Pa. 

Super. 2010).

Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/2015, at 2-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted; 

emphasis in original).

Based on our thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the unsworn statement 

offered to the defense investigator was not credible, and that Robinson had 

fabricated the statements out of fear of the co-defendants and their 

associates. Importantly, we agree that Appellant’s argument fails as to the 

fourth prong of the applicable test. When presented with the purported 

recantation testimony, the circumstances surrounding Robinson’s statement 
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to the defense investigator, and Robinson’s later recantation of those 

statements under oath, it is unlikely that the verdict would be rendered in 

Appellant’s favor. As such, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant a 

new trial based upon this evidence.

Issue III - The Admission of Other Bad Acts Evidence Pursuant to 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying 

a motion in limine, filed by Appellant and joined by Ebo, which sought to 

exclude from the co-defendants’ joint trial evidence regarding other bad acts 

attributable to Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 36-46. In order to address this 

claim, we provide the following background. 

The police recovered seven .40 caliber shell casings and two 357 Sig5

shell casings from the scene of the May 16, 2011 shooting that resulted in 

the death of Mattox. Forensic testing showed that two of the recovered .40 

caliber shell casings had been fired from one gun, while the other five had 

been fired from another. The presence of the two 357 Sig shell casings 

recovered from the scene evidenced the involvement of a third gun. 

On June 2, 2011, a few weeks after the Mattox shooting, Appellant 

was injured in a shootout in Swissvale, Allegheny County. When police 

arrived at that scene, they found a number of spent shell casings in and 

 

5 As explained during trial, “the 357 Sig caliber is a 40 caliber cartridge case 

which is bottlenecked down to fit a nine millimeter [bullet].” N.T., 8/20-

9/4/2012, at 457.
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around the vehicle in which Appellant had been riding. Those shell casings 

were tested and determined to have come from two separate firearms: a 

9mm and a .40 caliber. The 9mm casings were tested, and it was 

determined that all of them had been discharged from a Ruger P89 firearm 

recovered from the vehicle Appellant had been riding in prior to and during 

the June 2, 2011 shootout. Appellant’s blood was found on the side of the 

Ruger and on the barrel. 

Also present at the scene of the shootout was Asa Thompkins, who 

was released after a brief detention. On June 9, 2011, Thompkins was a 

passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by police. Police recovered a .40 

caliber Springfield Armory pistol during a search of that vehicle. 

Three bullets were recovered from Mattox’s body during his autopsy, 

two 9mm rounds and one .40 caliber. At trial, the Commonwealth’s firearms 

and tool marks expert, Raymond Everett, testified that his examination of 

the recovered bullets led him to conclude that the two 9mm bullets were 

fired from the same gun: either a 357 or a 9mm firearm; however, no 

definitive comparison could be made to any 357 or 9mm firearm tested in 

connection with this case. N.T., 8/20-9/4/2012, at 460-61, 471-72. Everett 

testified that the class characteristics present on the .40 caliber bullet 

recovered during Mattox’s autopsy were similar to those made by Springfield 

Armory brand pistols. Id. at 452-53. Further, it was determined that the 

.40 caliber casings recovered from both the May 16, 2011 homicide matched 
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those recovered from the .40 caliber casings recovered from the scene of the 

June 2, 2011 Swissvale shootout. Id. at 451-54.

On May 30, 2012, the Commonwealth filed notice of its intent to 

present evidence, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b), of Appellant’s involvement in 

the June 2, 2011 shootout. The Commonwealth averred that the Ruger and 

Springfield Armory firearms associated with the June shootout linked 

Appellant to the Mattox shooting. Thus, it sought to introduce testimony 

regarding the June 2 incident at the co-defendants’ trial in order to prove 

identity. Following a hearing, the trial court ruled that the evidence was 

admissible at the joint trial, and denied the motion in limine. 

“When reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, we apply an 

evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.” Commonwealth v. 

Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 654 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “The 

admissibility of evidence is a matter directed to the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and an appellate court may reverse only upon a showing that the 

trial court abused that discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) governs admissibility of 

evidence of other bad acts.

Generally, evidence of [other] bad acts or unrelated criminal 

activity is inadmissible to show that a defendant acted in 

conformity with those [other] acts or to show criminal 

propensity. However, evidence of [other] bad acts may be 

admissible when offered to prove some other relevant fact, such 

as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, and absence of mistake or accident. In determining 

whether evidence of other ... bad acts is admissible, the trial 
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court is obliged to balance the probative value of such evidence 

against its prejudicial impact. 

The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

a defendant has committed the particular crime of which he is 

accused, and it may not strip him of the presumption of 

innocence by proving that he has committed other criminal acts. 

Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 98–99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) 

(citations omitted).

As the court explained, the prejudicial effect of the evidence related to 

the June 2, 2011 shootout was outweighed by its probative value with 

respect to the inference that Appellant was involved in the Maddox shooting 

a month earlier. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/2014, at 23-28. Thus, the 

trial court properly admitted the evidence related to the June 2, 2011 

incident as probative of Appellant’s identity as one of Maddox’s assailants. Of 

significance, we note that the trial court offered a limiting instruction 

concerning this testimony, which was rejected by both Ebo and Appellant. 

N.T., 8/20-9/4/2012, at 1318-23, 1411-12.

In light of the forgoing, following our review of the certified record, the 

parties’ briefs, and the relevant law, we conclude that the opinion of the 

Honorable Beth A. Lazzara thoroughly and correctly addresses and disposes 

of Appellant’s third issue and evidences no abuse of discretion or errors of 

law. Accordingly, we adopt section C of the trial court’s June 25, 2014 

opinion, pages 23 through 28, as our own and hold, based upon the reasons 
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stated therein, that the trial court committed neither an error of law nor an 

abuse of discretion in denying the co-defendants’ motion in limine. 

Issue IV - Error Regarding the Commonwealth’s Closing Argument

During his closing argument, in reference to Robinson’s credibility and 

her visible fear of the co-defendants, the assistant district attorney described 

Appellant to the jury as “the angel of death.” 

I want to talk to you first about Saday Robinson. Credibility and 

believability of a witness, you are the judges of the facts in this 

case, you are to determine the credibility. You listen to the 

young lady testify. You didn’t just listen with your ears, you 

could watch her, especially if you were on this end of the jury 

box, she couldn’t stop shaking the entire time. She is petrified. 

She said this is seared into her brain, she will never forget these 

faces. And why would she say she saw the lighter skinned male, 

which is Ebo, and say he looked at me, we locked eyes, I had 

seen him before. She wasn’t afraid to say that and describe him, 

but the angel of the [(sic)] death over here, [Appellant], with his 

hoody up, that has what it takes to walk up to a man, stand over 

him and blow his brains out, she wasn’t as hot on identifying. 

She told the police, hey, come on in here, get in my apartment, 

I don’t want people to see me, snitches get stitches. She doesn’t 

want to be next.

N.T., 8/20-9/4/2012, at 1437.

Appellant argues on appeal that this comment constitutes 

prosecutorial misconduct. However, Appellant’s trial counsel did not object 

to this statement, nor was a curative instruction requested or given, 

although, as appellate counsel points out, trial counsel did include this issue 

in her post-trial motion for extraordinary relief. Appellant’s Brief at 49. 
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As our Supreme Court has held, “[t]he absence of a contemporaneous 

objection below constitutes a waiver of [an] appellant’s [] claim [on direct 

appeal] respecting the prosecutor’s closing argument.” Commonwealth v. 

Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 423 (Pa. 2008) see also Commonwealth v. Butts,

434 A.2d 1216, 1219 (Pa. 1981) (holding that failure to object during or 

after summation constitutes waiver of prosecutorial misconduct claim). 

Moreover, inclusion of this issue in his motion for extraordinary relief does 

not excuse the failure to preserve the issue during trial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 

704(B)(3) (“A motion for extraordinary relief shall have no effect on the 

preservation or waiver of issues for post-sentence consideration or appeal.”). 

Accordingly, this claim is waived. 

Further, although Appellant alleges that his trial counsel was 

ineffective, absent circumstances not present here, “claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel are to be deferred to PCRA review; trial courts should 

not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon post-verdict motions; and such 

claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. 

Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013). Nothing in Appellant’s brief suggests 

that he wishes to waive his right to file a PCRA petition. Accordingly, to the 

extent that Appellant is attempting to litigate claims of ineffective assistance 

of counsel for failing to object to the prosecutor’s comment or request a 

curative instruction, Appellant’s Brief at 46, 49-50, those issues are not 

cognizable in this direct appeal and we decline to address them. 
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Issues V and VI - Error Regarding the Admission of Testimony 

of Jailhouse Informants and Failure to Give a Missing Witness 

Instruction

In his fifth claim of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting the testimony of two jailhouse informants, Richard Carpenter and 

Thomas Brown,6 despite the Commonwealth’s failure to provide complete 

discovery with respect to those witnesses, in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 573. 

Appellant’s Brief at 50-54. We review these claims for an abuse of 

discretion. Smith, 955 A.2d at 394. 

The trial court’s authority to sanction a party for a discovery violation 

is derived from Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E), which states:

If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is 

brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to 

comply with this rule[, which governs discovery matters,] the 

court may order such party to permit discovery or inspection, 

may grant a continuance, or may prohibit such party from 

introducing evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of the 

defendant, or it may enter such other order as it deems just 

under the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 125 A.3d 55, 65 (Pa. Super. 2015).

On June 8, 2012, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to compel 

additional discovery specifically requesting information regarding potential 

Commonwealth witness Richard Carpenter and his participation in the 

 

6 As discussed further below, Carpenter was subpoenaed for trial but did not 

appear. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest on August 23, 2012, 

three days after the Commonwealth had mentioned Carpenter’s anticipated 

testimony in its opening statement. N.T., 8/20-9/4/2012, at 324-35. Brown 

testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. 
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witness protection program. Motion, 6/8/2012. On July 27, 2012, the trial 

court held a hearing in which it addressed all outstanding motions from both 

the Commonwealth and defense counsel. During that hearing, the issue of 

Carpenter’s involvement in the witness protection program was addressed, 

with Appellant’s counsel indicating that she wanted to confirm the 

information she had received on this issue. N.T., 7/27/2012, at 30-33. To 

that end, Appellant’s counsel questioned Detective Anthony Perry regarding 

the details of Carpenter’s involvement in the program, including when that 

participation ended and what compensation Carpenter received. Id. At the 

end of counsel’s questioning, the court asked if that “answered all the 

questions about the witness protection,” to which counsel replied “yes, I 

believe so.” Id. at 32. The court then noted that “the June 8 motion then 

has been entirely dealt with,” and counsel agreed. Id.

Discovery issues were raised again by [Appellant] on the 

morning of August 22, 2012, prior to the beginning of the jury 

trial. Defense counsel requested additional discovery on Thomas 

Julian Brown and [] Carpenter. [The trial court] advised the 

Commonwealth that, if this discovery was not provided to the 

[co-d]efendants, these witnesses would not be permitted to 

testify. Later that same afternoon, on August 22, 2012, 

[Appellant] again raised issues regarding discovery requests not 

being provided to the defense, specifically in relation to Mr. 

Brown’s testimony in other cases on behalf of the 

Commonwealth. [The trial court] advised the Commonwealth 

that this discovery would have to be provided to the [cod]efendants prior to [] Brown testifying at trial. Counsel received 

the requested discovery the following day, on August 23, 2012. 

[] Brown took the witness stand and began his testimony 

on [Friday] August 24, 2012. On [Monday] August 28, 2012, 

after [] Brown’s first day of testimony, [Appellant] requested 
J-A07034-17

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additional discovery related to [] Brown, including records from 

his prior criminal cases and detainers related to those cases. 

The Commonwealth indicated that it did not have these records, 

and [the trial] court instructed the Commonwealth to provide 

whatever it had related to [Appellant’s] request to the [cod]efendants. It should be noted that [] Carpenter ultimately 

failed to appear for trial and did not testify. Thus, any allegations 

of error to exclude his testimony are moot.

Despite these alleged discovery issues, defense counsel 

conducted a thorough cross-examination of a variety of 

witnesses regarding [] Carpenter and [] Brown. For example, 

Detective Perry was questioned extensively regarding money 

paid to Richard Carpenter as part of the witness protection 

program. Assistant District Attorney Mark Tranquilli, who was 

called as a Commonwealth witness regarding [] Carpenter’s 

detainer on [an unrelated] case, was also subjected to a 

thorough cross-examination by defense counsel. Mr. Tranquilli, 

now Judge Tranquilli, was also questioned at length regarding [] 

Brown’s involvement as a witness in other criminal cases. 

[Appellant] called as a witness Assistant District Attorney 

Christopher Stone to discuss [] Carpenter’s sentence on the 

[unrelated] case and [] also called Brown’s probation officer, 

Robert Tutko, who provided detailed information on his dealings 

with [] Brown, including the detainers that he had and the terms 

of his probation. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/2014, at 33-34 (citations omitted.)

The trial court concluded that there had been no violation of Rule 573, 

explaining as follows.

Rule 573(e) provides that, if a party has failed to comply 

with a discovery request, the court may, inter alia, prohibit a 

party from introducing the evidence not disclosed, or may order 

any other remedy that it deems just under the circumstances. 

The Commonwealth does not violate Rule 573 when it fails to 

disclose to the defense evidence that it does not possess and of 

which it is unaware. Furthermore, a discovery violation does not 

automatically warrant relief in the form of a new trial. A 

defendant seeking relief from a discovery violation must 

demonstrate prejudice. Courts have held that discovery turned 
J-A07034-17

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over the day prior to trial is nonetheless admissible if the 

defendant is not otherwise prejudiced by the delay. 

Here, the appropriate remedy for any discovery violations 

was not to exclude the testimony of either witness. All 

information possessed by the Commonwealth was turned over to 

the [co-d]efendants, albeit late. The defense attorneys never 

complained that they had insufficient time to review the 

information, nor did they request additional time to do so. This 

court certainly would have granted any such requests. The 

attorneys for the [co-d]efendants were able to [question 

thoroughly] all witnesses after receiving this information. 

Additionally, given the lengthy and thorough cross-examinations 

of [] Brown and witnesses having knowledge of [] Brown, as well 

as the ability to call witnesses with knowledge of [] Brown on 

behalf of the [co-d]efendants, any delay in turning over 

discovery certainly did not hamper or adversely impact the 

defense in this case. Not every discovery violation justifies 

exclusion of witness testimony. [The trial] court ensured that 

discovery was turned over, and the [co-d]efendants’ ability to 

effectively cross-examine and present witness testimony was not 

impeded by any delays. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/2014, at 34-36 (citations omitted).

Based on our review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in permitting Brown to testify. Significantly, the 

Commonwealth complied with counsel’s request and, as noted by defense 

counsel, the day-of-trial discovery was not voluminous. N.T., 8/20-

9/4/2012, at 325-36. Counsel acknowledged that she would look at the new 

discovery at lunch and would notify the court if she needed additional time. 

Id.

With respect to Carpenter, we find significant that he did not appear 

for trial in violation of his subpoena. Thus, any perceived discovery violation 

is moot. Moreover, the record shows that it was Appellant who put into 
J-A07034-17

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evidence Carpenter’s identification of the co-defendants during crossexamination of Detective Perry. N.T., 8/20-9/4/2012, at 364-68; 373-75. 

Thus, Appellant cannot, at this juncture, claim error on the part of the trial 

court in admitting this testimony. 

In light of the forgoing, we agree with the trial court that the 

Commonwealth did not violate Rule 573; thus, sanctions were not 

warranted.

In his sixth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing 

to give a missing witness instruction7 when Carpenter failed to appear for 

trial in violation of his Commonwealth-issued subpoena. Appellant’s Brief at 

54-61. This claim is waived. Although Appellant included the missing 

witness instruction in his proposed points for charge, see Appellant’s 

Proposed Jury Instructions, 8/30/2012, counsel did not object or offer 

argument on Appellant’s behalf when the court indicated it would not give 

the instruction. N.T., 8/20-9/4/2012, at 1310, 1350. As Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 647(C) makes clear, “[n]o portions of the charge nor omissions 

 

7 The missing witness adverse inference rule provides that

when a potential witness is available to only one of the parties to 

a trial, and it appears that the witness has special information 

material to the issues at trial, and the witness’s testimony would 

not merely be cumulative, if such party does not produce the 

testimony of this witness, the jury may draw an inference that 

the witness’s testimony would have been unfavorable to the 

party having control of the witness. 

Commonwealth v. Boyle, 733 A.2d 633, 638 (Pa. Super. 1999). 
J-A07034-17

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from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are 

made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.” See also 

Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 224 (Pa. 2005) (holding that 

“[t]he pertinent rules [of Criminal Procedure] ... require a specific objection 

to the charge or an exception to the trial court’s ruling on a proposed point 

to preserve an issue involving a jury instruction”). Accordingly, because this 

claim was not preserved for our review, it is waived.

Issue VII - Violation of the Speedy Trial Rule

In his seventh claim of error, Appellant argues that he was denied his 

right to nominal bail under Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(B)(1) when “the 

trial court granted a Commonwealth continuance [on June 8, 2012] because 

of the unavailability of Commonwealth witnesses and the court made no 

finding that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence in locating these 

witnesses.” Appellant’s Brief at 61. 

We review challenges to Rule 600 rulings pursuant to the following 

standard and scope of review:

In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of 

a trial court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with 

law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, 

after hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not

merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the 

law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, 

discretion is abused.
J-A07034-17

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The proper scope of review ... is limited to the evidence on 

the record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the 

findings of the [trial] court. An appellate court must view the 

facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en 

banc).

Rule 600(B)(1) provides that “[e]xcept in cases in which the 

defendant is not entitled to release on bail as provided by law, no defendant 

shall be held in pretrial incarceration in excess of ... 180 days from the date 

on which the complaint is filed.” However, the Pennsylvania Constitution 

provides that “[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless

for capital offenses or for offenses for which the maximum sentence is 

life imprisonment[.]” Pa. Const. Art. I, § 14 (emphasis added). See also

42 Pa.C.S. § 5701. Because Appellant was charged generally with the 

offense of criminal homicide, two grades of which are punishable by life 

imprisonment, he was not entitled to release on bail. Thus, Appellant’s Rule 

600 challenge is without merit. 

Further, Appellant’s argument that the court failed to make a 

determination as to the Commonwealth’s due diligence is belied by the 

record. The court held a hearing on June 13, 2012, in which that issue was 

specifically addressed. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/2014, at 42-46; N.T., 

6/13/2012, 29-44.. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this 

issue.

Issue VIII - The Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence
J-A07034-17

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In his final issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the weight and the 

sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain the verdict. Appellant’s Brief 

at 65-68. 

With respect to his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, it is well-settled 

that, in order preserve the issue, the appellant’s 1925(b) statement needs to 

specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient, or 

the claim may be waived. Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 

1257-58 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, Appellant was convicted of seven 

offenses, yet his four-page-long concise statement presents only a 

boilerplate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant’s Concise 

Statement, 2/10/2016, at 4. Accordingly, we find this claim waived.

We address Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim mindful of the 

following.

The law pertaining to weight of the evidence claims is wellsettled. The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for 

the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new 

trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony 

and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them 

equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. 

On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is 

confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

finding that the jury verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, 

appellate review of a weight claim consists of a review of the 

trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a review of the underlying 
J-A07034-17

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question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, Appellant assails the credibility and admissibility of the 

testimony and witnesses presented by the Commonwealth. The substance 

of Appellant’s argument asks this Court to reweigh the evidence in his favor. 

This we will not do. Our case law is clear that a jury sitting as finder of fact 

is “in the best position to view the demeanor of the Commonwealth’s 

witnesses and to assess each witness’ credibility.” Commonwealth v. 

Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). The jury 

was free to find the Commonwealth’s witnesses’ testimony credible and 

resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s favor. See generally 

Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 286 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding 

that Horne’s weight of the evidence claim could not prevail as “the jury 

resolved the inconsistencies among the testimonies as it saw fit and reached 

a verdict”). Based on the foregoing, the trial court determined that the 

verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. We discern no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s finding. Accordingly, Appellant’s weight claim 

does not warrant relief. 
J-A07034-17

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For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence. The parties shall attach a copy of the trial court’s June 25, 2014 

opinion to this memorandum in the event of future proceedings.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/21/2017
i1 

r 

m 

CJ 

Jessica L. Herndon, Esquire 

Office of the Public Defender 

400 County Office Building 

542 Forbes Avenue 

Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

Sally Frick, Esquire 

437 Grant Street 

Suite 407 

Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

Michael W. Streily, Esquire 

Office of the District Attorney 

Allegheny County Courthouse 

Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

Copies Sent To: 

OPINION 

BETH A. LAZZARA, JUDGE 

Court of Common Pleas 

No. CR 2821~2012 

Defendant. 

MATTHEW EBO, 

v. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

Defendant. 

THADDEUS CRUMBLEY, 

v. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

Circulated 05/22/2017 01:32 PM
2012. On appeal, the Defendants have raised numerous allegations of error, 

which will be set forth and discussed below. Many of the issues raised by the 

and September 4, 2012, and the Defendants were sentenced on November 28, 

Robbery -- Motor Vehicle, Carrying a Firearm without a License, Conspiracy -- 

Robbery and Conspiracy - Murder. The trial occurred between Auqust 22, 2012 

were found guilty of First Degree Murder, Robbery -- Serious Bodily Injury, 

imprisonment for both Defendants following a jury trial in which both Defendants 

This is an appeal following the imposition of sentences to life 

OPINION 

Defendant. 

MATTHEW EBO, 

CC: 2821-2012 

vs. 

COMMONWEAL TH OF CRIMINAL DIVISION 

PENNSYLVANIA, 

Defendant. 

THADDEUS CRUMBLEY, 

CC: 2820-2012 

vs. 

COMMONWEAL TH OF CRIMINAL DIVISION 

PENNSYLVANIA, 

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 
2 

1. The court failed to exclude the testimony of Saday Robinson due to 

alleged violations of Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 573. (Section Ill. A.) 

2. The court failed to exclude the testimony of Saday Robinson due to 

police taint or bias in the identification. (Section Ill. B.) 

3. The court erred in admitting evidence of a subsequent shooting 

involving Defendant Crumbley, failed to give a limiting instruction 

regarding the evidence and failed to exclude evidence relating to a 

Ruger handgun. (Section Ill. C.) 

4. The court failed to either strike a comment, or provide a curative 

instruction related to the comment, made by the Assistant District 

Attorney referring to Defendant Crumbley as "the Angel of Death." 

Additionally, Defendant Crumbley has alleged ineffective assistance of 

counsel due to his counsel's lack of objection to the comment. (Section 

Ill. 0.) 

Defendant Crumbley: 

The Defendants have raised numerous allegations of error in their Concise 

Statements of Matters Complained of on Appeal. These are listed below, by 

Defendant, and it is further noted at which section of this opinion the alleged 

error is discussed. 

I. ALLEGATIONS OF ERROR 

Defendants are identical, which is why this court has chosen to address them in a 

single opinion. 
3 

This court disagrees with the Defendants' allegations of error and asserts 

that it has committed no errors. This court requests that its rulings, the jury's 

verdict and the sentences of the Defendants be upheld. 

1. The court failed to exclude the testimony of Saday Robinson due to 

alleged violations of Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 573. (Section Ill. A.) 

2. The court erred in admitting evidence of a subsequent shooting 

involving Defendant Crumbley, failed to give a limiting instruction 

regarding the evidence and failed to exclude evidence relating to a 

Ruger handgun. (Section Ill. C.) 

3. The court failed to exclude the testimony of Saday Robinson due to 

police taint or bias in the identification. (Section Ill. B.) 

4. The verdict was against the weight of the evidence. (section Ill. H.) 

5. The court failed to exclude testimony of certain "[allhouse" witnesses 

due to alleged violations of Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 573. (Section Ill. E.) 

6. The court failed to give a "missing witness" instruction as to witness 

Richard Carpenter. (Section Ill. F.) 

7. The court violated Defendant Crumbley's right to a speedy trial by 

granting a continuance on June 7, 2012 (Section Ill. G.) 

8. The evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. (Section Ill. H.) 

9. The verdict was against the weight of the evidence. (section Ill. H.) 

Defendant Ebo: 
4 

1 The notation ''T.R. 8/20/12" refers to Volumes I and II of the trial transcript for August 20, 2012 through 

September 4, 2012. 

described seeing Defendant Ebo going through the pants pockets of Mr. Mattox 

shooting at Mr. Mattox three (3) times. (T.R. 8/20/"12, p. 53"1 ). Mr. Mattox fell to the 

ground after the gunshots were fired. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 53"1). The witness then 

eyewitness described seeing a man that she later identified as Defendant Ebo 

and backing away from them with his hands up. (T.R. 8/20/"12, pp. 529, 53"1). The 

American males with handguns. (T.R. 8/20/"12, pp. 528-529). She was able to hear 

Mr. Mattox pleading for his life, offering the two (2) males everything that he had, 

being pushed out the front door of the apartment complex by two (2) Africanpeople running down stairs. (T.R. 8/20/"12, pp. 527-528). She then saw Mr. Mattox 

above her apartment in the minutes before the shooting, followed by the noise of 

An eyewitness, Saday Robinson, described the sounds of an altercation 

On May "16, 20"1 "1, Todd Mattox was shot to death in the parking lot of the 

Leechburg Garden apartments in Penn Hills. (T.R. 8/20/"12, p. 240) 1. He had 

suffered three (3) gunshot wounds, two (2) to the trunk and one· ("1) fatal shot to 

the head. (T.R. 8/20/"12, pp. 246-26"1, Ex. 4-"16). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
5 

It should be noted that other witnesses corroborated key points contained 

in Ms. Robinson's description of the events that night. For example, John 

Gardone also testified that Mr. Mattox was chased by two (2) African-American 

males before he was shot several times in the parking lot of the Leechburg 

Gardens. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 591-592). He also saw the two (2) suspects enter a 

white vehicle and speed from the parking lot. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 492-493). Another 

witness, Yurri Lewis, heard multiple shots that day, although he did not witness 

the shooting. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 513). He did, however, see an African-American 

male going through the pockets of a man lying in the parking lot of Leechburg 

Garden Apartments. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 515). He saw the man who had been rifling 

through the victim's pockets enter a white car and speed out of the parking lot. 

(T.R. 8/20/12, p. 515). Detective Anthony Perry confirmed that the right front 

pants pocket of Mr. Mattox was pulled out when he arrived at the scene. (T.R. 

8/20/12, pp. 302-304, 330-334, Ex. 41). The left front pocket was in its normal 

position. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 302-304). 

before she saw a person that she later identified as Defendant Crumbley walk up 

to Mr. Mattox, stand over his body as it lay in the parking lot, and shoot him 

directly in the head. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 532-534). She then indicated that she saw 

the Defendants get into Mr. Mattox's white Nissan and speed out of the parking 

lot. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 534). Mr. Mattox's vehicle was later found after it had been 

set on fire on Hill Street in Penn Hills. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 757-759, 762-780, 782-787, 

804, 818, 841; Ex. 58-63, Ex. 66-67). 
6 

The Defendants became suspects in the Todd Mattox murder following a 

string of events occurring over the course of the several months following the 

slaying. On June 2, 2011, Defendant Crumbley was involved in a shooting in 

Swissvale, in which he was shot several times. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 855-858). Two 

types of shell casings were recovered from the scene, including the same type of 

shell casings that were found at the Todd Mattox murder scene, those being from 

a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson Springfield Armory pistol. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 885- 

886). A friend of Defendant Crumbley's, Asa Thompkins, was present at the 

scene of the shooting. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 847, 852). One week later, on June 9, 

2011, Asa Thompkins was pulled over for a traffic stop in South Park. (T.R. 8/3/12, 

p. 20; T.R. 8/20/12, p. 1009). A Springfield Armory pistol was found under the front 

passenger seat of the car, and Mr. Thompkins said that the gun was his. (T.R. 

8/20/12, pp. 1010-1011). 

Despite the fact that th_ere were several eyewitnesses to the events that 

occurred on May 16, 2011, none of the witnesses interviewed by either Penn Hills 

police officers or Allegheny County detectives were able to positively identify the 

actors. 
7 

Defendant Crumbley became a suspect in the Todd Mattox murder In 

September 2011, after Detective Anthony Perry received a report connecting the 

handguns used in the Todd Mattox homicide with the weapons used in the 

Swissvale shooting on June 2, 2011, and after witness Thomas Brown came 

forward with information about the homicide. (T.R. 8/20/11, pp. 1017, 1020, 1021, 

1025). Defendant Ebo also became a suspect at that time. (T.R. 8/20/11, p. 1017). 

On September 6, 2011, Thomas Julian Brown wrote a letter from the 

Allegheny County jail to Detective Garticki, of. the Allegheny County police, 

asking that he be put in touch with the detective who was handling the Todd 

· Mattox homicide. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 697). He indicated that he was willing to 

provide information on that case. (T.R. 8/2C/12, pp. 697-698). Mr. Brown further 

indicated that he had heard, several months earlier, Defendant Crumbley saying 

that he had "smoked" Todd Mattox. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 698-699). Mr. Brown's 

cousin was Asa Thompkins, and Mr. Brown's son, Leron Brown, was a friend of 

Defendant Crumbley. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 695-696). Leron Brown was found shot 

dead in January or February 2012, inside a car with Roman Herring, a cousin of 

Defendant Crumbley's, who was also found dead in that same car. (T.R. 8/20/12, 

pp. 948, 991). Roman Herring was allegedly involved in the burning of a vehicle 

on Hill Street in Penn Hills. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 945). 
9 

... 

Robinson's pretrial testimony about the alleged intentional misidentification, and 

defense counsel's request for any report that detailed the misidentification, this 

court advised the Commonwealth that, if discovery related to the 

officers or Allegheny County homicide detectives. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 82). After Ms . 

misidentification was not reported in any police report by either Penn Hills 

like" Defendant Ebo. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 59-61). However, this alleged 

indicated that, during one of the photo arrays prior to July 24, 2012, she had 

pointed to a photograph and said that the individual in the photograph "looked 

the basis that the identification was the product of bias and taint, Ms. Robinson 

motion seeking exclusion of Ms. Robinson's identification of the Defendants on 

During testimony taken on August 21, 2012 in connection with a pre-trial 

violation of Pa. R. Crim Proc. 573. The Defendants allege that the Commonwealth 

failed to provide full and timely discovery by failing to provide information to the 

Defendants regarding Ms. Robinson's "misidentification" during presentation of a 

photo array. 

testimony should have been excluded as a sanction for the Commonwealth's 

The Defendants' first allegation of error is that this court erred in admitting 

the testimony of eyewitness Saday Robinson. The Defendants argue that the 

A. Alleged Discovery Violation regarding Saday Robinson 

Ill. ARGUMENT 
10 

Q. Did that in fact occur? Did you point to somebody else and say that 

this is the guy that did the crime? 

A. You are confusing me. 

Ms. Robinson took the stand on August 22, 2012 to continue her testimony 

related to the pre-trial motion. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 155). She again stated that she 

had previously pointed to someone who looked like Defendant Ebo in a photo 

array prior to July 24, 2012. {T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 166-167). Her clearest discussion of 

the issue was in the following exchange with Defense Attorney Wendy Williams: 

Q. Okay. Are you saying now that you mistakenly said that or that you 

were lying under oath yesterday? 

The following day, while the jury was at lunch, Assistant District Attorney 

Steven Stadtmiller indicated that, after speaking with the officers involved in the 

investigation, he was advised that the misidentification did not occur. (T.R. 

8/20/12, pp. 152-154). Detective Hitchings, who had shown Ms. Robinson the 

November 4, 2011 lineup, which was the first photo array to contain Defendant 

Ebo, indicated that no identification at all had occurred on that date. {T.R. 

8/20/12, p. 153). 

misidentification was not turned over to the Defendants, Ms. Hobinson would not 

be permitted to testify. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 83). 
Following Ms. Robinson's testimony, Detective Anthony Perry took the 

stand and testified regarding the photo arrays that he had shown to Ms. 

Robinson. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 186-203). Detective Perry had shown Ms. Robinson 

two (2) photo arrays, one in June 2011 containing Asa Thompkins (T.R. 8/20/12, 

pp. 187, 189) and one in September 2011 containing Defendant Crumbley. (T.R. 

8/20/12; p. 187). He did not show Ms. Robinson any photo arrays containing a 

picture of Defendant Ebo. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 188). A photo array containing Mr. 

Eba's photo was not prepared until October 2011, and that array was presented to 

Ms. Robinson in November, 2011 by Detectives Hitchings and Langan. (T.R. 

8/20/12, p. 188). Detective Perry emphatically stated that any alleged 

misidentification by Ms. Robinson did not occur when he showed Ms. Robinson 

any photo arrays. (T. R. 8/20/1 2, pp. 193, 195, 196). He clearly stated that no 

i 1 

Ms. Robinson also testified that the misidentification occurred when she was in a 

car with Detective Perry before her grandmother died. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 176-177). 

It should be noted that only the September 16, 2011 photo array meets all three 

(3) of these criteria. Ms. Robinson also specifically denied that Detective 

Hitchings was present during the alleged misidentification. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 176). 

A. Yes. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 163). 

A. No, I said that this looks like the guy who did the crime. 

0. Okay. And you pointed to somebody other than Mr. Ebo and Mr. 

Crumbley? 
12 

Following the testimony of Ms. Robinson and Detectives Perry and 

Hitchings, this court found that there was conflicting evidence regarding any 

alleged discovery violation and any alleged misidentification, but stated that the 

issue could be revisited later, after further development of trial testimony, if 

necessary. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 214-215). 

Detective Steven Hitchings also provided testimony related to the issue of 

a misidentification. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 204-207). He indicated that he showed Ms. 

Robinson two (2) photo arrays on November 4, 2011, one containing a photo of 

Defendant Crumbley and the other containing a photo of Defendant Ebo. (T.R. 

8/20/12, p. 204). Detective Hitchings clearly indicated that Ms. Robinson made no 

identifications from either photo array and, further, that she did not indicate that 

any of the photos "looked like" one of the actors. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 204-5, 206, 

207). In fact, he was "absolutely sure" that no identifications occurred on 

November 4, 2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 207). 

identifications at all were made when he presented photo arrays to her (T.R. 

8/20/12, pp. 195-196), and that, had there been an identification, he would have 

followed his regimented protocol of having her circle or initial the person 

identified. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 193). 
In this case, there was no clear evidence of a discovery violation at all, let 

alone one of such seriousness to justify complete exclusion of Ms. Robinson's 

testimony. There was clearly conflicting evidence as to whether a prior 

identification or misidentification had even occurred. While Ms. Robinson said 

that she had pointed to someone in a photo array and said it "looked like" 

Defendant Ebo, not a sing le detective who had presented a photo array to her had 

any recollection of this occurring. Each detective was also aware of his 

responsibility to place an identification or misidentification in a police report. 

(T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 193, 198, 205). None of the police reports indicate any 

identification occurred. (T.R. 8/20/12 p. 79; Ex. A, C). This court was presented 

with no evidence, facts or questioning from which it could conclude that any of 

the detectives testifying during pre-trial motions or who were involved in the 

On appeal, the Defendants assert that the court erred in permitting Ms. 

Robinson to testify because the Commonwealth had not turned over police 

reports detailing a prior misidentification. Rule 573(e) of the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Criminal Procedure provides that, if a party has failed to comply with a 

discovery request, the court may, inter a/ia, prohibit a party from introducing the 

evidence not disclosed, or may order any other remedy that it deems just under 

the circumstances. Pa. R. Crim. P 573. The Commonwealth does not violate 

Rule 573 when it fails to disclose to the defense evidence that it does not possess 

and of which it is unaware. Com. v. Collins, 957 A.2d 237, 253 (Pa. 2008). 
In failing to find that an identification or misidentification occurred, this 

court is not indicating that it in any way disbelieved Ms. Robinson's testimony. 

On the contrary, Ms. Robinson was a tremendously compelling witness, who 

clearly became involved in this case against her best interests and all of the 

advice of her family and friends. It was obvious that she was terrified as she 

testified during the pre-trial motion proceeding, and again when she gave her trial 

testimony. Ms. Robinson shook and trembled throughout the entirety of her 

testimony. As to the misidentification, it is possible that she indicated to police 

that someone else "looked like" Mr. Ebo. It is also possible that she remembers 

thinking that someone looked like Mr. Ebo, but did not actually verbalize that 

thought to the detectives. Ms. Robinson even indicated at one point in her 

testimony that she did not tell the officers when she picked out the wrong person, 

with her answer being somewhat ambiguous as to whether she told the officers 

that she had picked someone or whether she told the officers that it was the 

wrong person. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 67). It is also possible that she mentioned 

someone looking like Defendant Ebo to the detectives, but was so vague about it 

that the detectives did not consider it to be an "identification" as they understand 

that word. No matter what occurred at the time, there was no clear evidence of a 

discovery violation having occurred, and, therefore, this court did not err in 

failin.g to exclude evidence or testimony in order to cure a non-existent violation. 

14 

presentation of photo arrays to Ms. Robinson had lied, hid information or were in 

any way negligent or lacking in their duties. 
15 

A photographic identification is unduly suggestive if, under the totality of 

the circumstances, the identification procedure creates a substantial likelihood of 

Questions regarding the admission and exclusion of evidence are within 

the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent 

an abuse of discretion. Com. v. Kendricks, 30 A.3d 499, 503 {Pa. Super. 2011). An 

abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might 

have reached a different conclusion, but requires a showing that the trial court's 

conclusion was the result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous. Com. v. 

Brougher, 978 A.2d 373, 376 {Pa. Super. 2009). 

B. Alleged Error Regarding Tainted Identification Given by Saday Robinson 

Defendant Crumbley's second allegation of error, and Defendant Eba's 

third allegation of error, is that this court erred in permitting Saday Robinson to 

testify because her identification was the product of taint and bias. More 

specifically, the Defendants assert that her identification of them on July 24, 2012 

resulted from taint, bias and influence from the media exposure related to this 

case, from information provided to tier by neighbors or friends, and from 

comments made by the police to her prior to that identification. 
Before Ms. Robinson testified in front of the jury at trial, this court heard 

lengthy testimony by her regarding the circumstances surrounding her 

identification of the Defendants, including her interviews by police, her exposure 

to media coverage of the case prior to her July 2012 identification of the 

Defendants, and information that she may have heard in the community regarding 

this murder. She was subjected to extensive cross-examination on these issues 

16 

misidentification. Com. v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102, 112 (Pa. 2004). Photographs 

used in photo array line-ups are not unduly suggestive if the suspect's picture 

does not stand out more than those of the others, and the people depicted in the 

array all exhibit similar facial characteristics. Com. v. Fisher, 769 A.2d 1116, 1126 

(Pa. 2001 ). The photographs in the array should all be the same size and should 

be shot against similar backgrounds. Kendricks, supra, at 504. When an out-ofcourt identification is alleged to be tainted, an in-court identification may still 

stand if, again considering the totality of the circumstances, the identification had 

an origin sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. 

Kendricks, supra, at 506. The factors a court should consider in determining 

whether there was an independent basis for identification include: (1) the 

opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the 

witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description 

of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness during the 

confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. 

Com. v. Abdul-Salaam, 678 A.2d 342 (Pa. 1996). 
17 

Ms. Robinson moved from Allegheny County across the country in midOctober 2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 41, 68). Aside from a brief return to Pittsburgh in 

November 2011 for the funeral of her grandmother, she did not return to the area 

until July 2012, when· detectives asked her to return to make an identification of 

the shooters. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 42). Ms. Robinson testified that she saw no media 

coverage, pictures or video of the Defendants either before she left the area or 

after. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 42). She specifically indicated that she saw no photos of 

The Defendants assert that several factors tainted the identification of the 

Defendants by Ms. Robinson, including media exposure, information from 

neighbors identifying the alleged shooters and improper comments from the 

· police. In terms of media exposure, it is true that there was media coverage of 

this case, which included televised and printed photos of the Defendants 

following their arrest, and there may have been media coverage of Mr. Crumbley 

as a result of the shooting in which he was a victim in early June 2011. Ms. 

Robinson denied seeing any such coverage repeatedly during her testimony 

regarding the pre-trial motion in limine. 

by the attorneys for both Defendants. This court ultimately ruled that Ms. 

Robinson was permitted to testify and that she was permitted to provide 

testimony regarding her July 2012 identification of the Defendants. She was 

further permitted to make an in-court identification of the Defendants. 
During her pre-trial motion testimony, Ms. Robinson also addressed the 

issue of whether her identifications were the product of information from 

community members. On the night of the murder, a neighbor indicated to Ms. 

Robinson that "Mo" was the shooter. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 42-43). Later, a friend 

named Ace told her that "Mat-Mat" was responsible. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 58). Ms. 

Robinson was clear that: she did not know Defendant Ebo to be called "Mo" prior 

to the shooting (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 42-43); she did not know anyone named "Mo" 

prior to the shooting (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 169); she never learned Defendant 

Crumbley's name (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 68); she did not know Defendant Eba's name 

when she saw him at the apartment complex (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 169-170); she did 

18 

Defendant Crumbley prior to being shown the first photo array in September 

2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 64, 68). She also denied seeing any media coverage from 

the time of the shooting until being contacted by telephone by detectives in late 

June, early July, 2012. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 70-71). She advised the detectives during 

that phone contact that she had seen no media coverage ragarding the case. (T.R. 

8/20/12, pp. 158-159). She also indicated that she did not have a computer until 

she started school, which did not occur until after October 2011, when she left 

Pennsylvania. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 157-158). The credible testimony in the case was 

that Ms. Robinson had seen no media coverage related to the Defendants prior to 

her identification of them in July 2012 as the shooters. It should be noted that 

Ms. Robinson testified consistently to this lack of exposure to media coverage 

during her trial testimony. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 624, 626-628). 
Lastly, the issue of whether police comments had tainted Ms. Robinson's 

identification was explored. Ms. Robinson was contacted in late June or early 

July by detectives who asked her to return to Pittsburgh to look at photo arrays. 

At the time that she was contacted, she was told that two gentlemen had been 

arrested (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 182, 183) and that the detectives thought that these 

men were responsible for the murder of Todd Mattox. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 174-175). 

At no point did the detectives tell her the names of who they thought was 

responsible for the shooting. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 175). The detectives also did not 

suggest who they thought was responsible for the murder when they showed Ms. 

Robinson the photo arrays. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 175). Ms. Robinson did have an 

understanding that photos of the responsible people were contained in the photo 

arrays that she was shown, but no detective told her that. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 183- 

185). Additionally, she was unaware that a trial was scheduled to begin at the 

point when the police contacted her in July, 2012. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 183). The 

19 

not know anyone named "Mat-Mat" (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 171 ); she never found out who 

"Mat-Mat" was (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 71 ); and she did not know anybody named "Mo" or 

"Mat-Mat" when she picked out Defendant Eba's photo. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 178-179). 

Ms. Robinson was very clear that she selected the Defendants' photos from the 

photo arrays because she saw them shoot Mr. Mattox. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 44, 178- 

179). Again, the credible testimony did not support that Ms. Robinson's 

identification was in any way tainted, biased or even influenced by the comments 

made by her neighbor and friend. 
20 

Even though this court does not believe that there was any taint, bias or 

suggestion in Ms. Robinson's identifications, the court will note that there are 

strong independent bases supporting Ms. Robinson's identifications here. It has 

never been disputed that Ms. Robinson's vantage point from her apartment 

window gave her a clear view of Todd Mattox's murder. Her window was 

approximately 8-10 feet from the front door of the building and 70-80 feet from the 

parking lot. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 283, 1179; Ex. 28). According to Detective Perry, 

Ms. Robinso'n had the best vantage point to see the events that night. (T.R. 

8/20/12, p. 377). There were no obstructions of her view of the parking lot from 

her window. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 167). The Defendants were only ten (10) feet away 

from her during the incident, and it occurred while it was still light outside. (T.R. 

8/20/12, pp. 168-169). Additionally, she indicated that the entire incident lasted 

ten (10) minutes, that she watched the entire incident, (T.R. 8/20/12, p, 178), and 

she had seen both Defendants in her apartment building prior to the shooting, 

(T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 44, 177-178), making them familiar to her at the time of the 

shooting. 

credible testimony eliminated from further consideration this issue of possible 

taint from police comments in the identification of the Defendants by Ms. 

Robinson at the photo array in July, 2012. 
21 

Although defense counsel focused on Ms. Robinson's failure to select 

either Defendant from previous photo array lineups as strong evidence that her 

July, 2012 identification must have been the product of taint or bias, this court 

instead focused on Ms. Robinson's understandable fear to be a witness in this 

case. Ms. Robinson was immediately interviewed after the shooting and made 

herself available for questioning. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 540). However, even from this 

beginning interaction with the police, she was afraid, telling the police officers of 

her fear on the night of the shooting and inviting them into her apartment so that 

she would not be seen talking with them. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 53). As was mentioned 

earlier, Ms. Robinson shook through the entirety of her testimony, both during 

What Ms. Robinson witnessed was a brutal, unprovoked shooting of a man 

begging for his life, and then the execution of a wounded, fallen man. Images 

from such violent events tend to remain imprinted in one's mind, especially the 

faces of the perpetrators of such a horrific event. Ms. Robinson indicated this 

herself during her trial testimony, stating that the faces of the Defendants were 

"stuck in her head." (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 547). While not exceptionally descriptive, Ms. 

Robinson did provide relatively accurate descriptions of the two men involved in 

this shooting, including skin tone, relative size and clothing. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 

413, 590-593, 1166-1170). Even if her identification was in some way tainted by 

media coverage or comments from nslqhbors, friends or police, which this court 

strongly believes is not the case, Ms. Robinson certainly had independent bases 

upon which to make her July, 2012 identifications. 
22 

Ms. Robinson also certainly verbalized her fear during her trial testimony, 

indicating that she did not want involved in this case because of the culture in her 

community that perpetuated the phrase "snitches get stitches" (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 

535-536), a sentiment echoed by another witness to the shooting, John Gardone. 

(T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 493-494). Her fear throughout her involvement in the case was 

clear through her actions: by her waiting until her neighbors left before she talked 

to the police (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 535); by her taking the police into her apartment so 

no one would see her talking to them (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 53); by only agreeing to 

meet detectives elsewhere for subsequent meetings so that no one would see her 

talking to them (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 583); by her testimony that she deliberately failed 

to identify the Defendants in photo arrays even though she was sure that they 

were there (T.A. 8/20/12, p. 552); by the fact that she told Detective Perry that she 

moved because she was fearful (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 381); and by the fact that she 

finally identified the Defendants only after moving across the country and being 

informed that suspects were in custody. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 550). Ms. Robinson's 

own family warned her that she should not become involved in this case for fear 

that something would happen to her if she did. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 548). 

the pre-trial proceedings and at trial. Her entire demeanor reflected her fear of 

being involved in this case. 
There were two (2) arguments held on the issue of the admissibility of the 

June 2, 2011 shooting. The first took place on July 27, 2012, and the court ruled, 

23 

C. Alleged Error Regarding Admission of Evidence of June 2, 2011 Shooting 

Defendant Crumbley's third allegation of error, and Defendant Eba's 

second, is that this court erred in admitting testimony regarding the June 2, 2011 

shooting in which Defendant Crumbley was a victim. More specifically, the 

Defendants assert that this evidence was improperly admitted under Pa. Rule of 

Evidence 404(b)(2), that this court erred in not granting the Defendants' Motion in 

Limine regarding the evidence and that the court erred in not providing a limiting 

instruction during trial. 

This court does not believe that prior failures to identify the Defendants in any 

way support a contention that the identifications in July, 2012 were the result of 

taint, bias or suggestion. Rather, the prior failures to identify the Defendants 

were the product of a fear so intense that Ms. Robinson exhibited physical 

rnanltestattons of that fear over fifteen (15) months atter the incident that she 

witnessed. This court permitted Ms. Robinson to testify at trial regarding her 

eyewitness identification of the Defendants, finding that there was no media taint 

and no taint from community or police sources. There was an independent basis 

for her identification. {T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 214-215). This court's ruling in this regard 

is well-supported by the record and should be upheld. 
On August 21, 2012, a second argument on the issue of the June 2, 2011 

shooting took place. In this argument, the court entertained Defendants' Motion 

in Limine re~arding a Ruger handgun found at the scene of the June 2, 2011 

shooting in Swissvale. A Ruger handgun was found outside of the vehicle where 

the shooting had occurred, and Defendant Crumbley's blood was found on it. 

(T.R. 8/20/12, p. 10). Defendant Crumbley argued that the evidence of the Ruger 

was irrelevant to the May 6, 2011 shooting of Todd Mattox and was prejudicial to 

the Defendants in that all that it showed was that Defendant Crumbley must have 

had a gun in his hand in the Swissvale shooting so he must also have had a gun 

at the Todd Mattox shooting. (f.R. 8/20/12, pp. 11, 17). The Commonwealth 

argued that photos of the Ruger showed blood on the side of the gun and the 

barrel, which was identified as Defendant Crumbley's. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 12). It was 

the intention of the prosecution to argue that Defendant Crumbley had the .40 

caliber gun at the time of the Swissvale shooting, providing it with circumstantial 

evidence that Defendant Crumbley must have had that same gun two (2) weeks 

earlier when Todd Mattox was killed. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 14). This court, with some 

24 

after argument, that the subsequent shooting involving Defendant Crumbley 

would be admissible as to the issue of identity only, i.e. to show that, becausethe 

same gun, a .40 caliber, was used in a shooting that occurred two (2) weeks after 

Mr. Mattox's shooting where Defendant Crumbley was present, it is circumstantial 

evidence that he was present at the Todd Mattox shooting where shell casings 

from the same gun were found. (f.R. 7/27/12, pp. 58-59). 
25 

8/20/12, p, 1321). 

instructions being read to the jury whether she wanted the instruction. (T.R. 

Crumbley's attorney did, indicating that she would like time to think about it 

overnight, and would advise the court the next day prior to the closing 

I [sic] have heard evidence tending to prove that the defendant Thaddeus 

Crumbley was involved in a shooting incident for which he is not on trial. 

I'm speaking of testimony to the effect that Mr. Crumbley was involved in a 

shooting incident in Swissvale on June 2, 2011. This evidence is before 

you for a limited purpose, that is for the identity of Mr. Crumbley as a 

participant in the May 16, 2011 incident at Leechburg Gardens. This 

evidence must not be considered by you in any way other than for the 

purpose I just stated. You must not regard this evidence as showing that 

the defendant, Mr. Crumbley, is a person of bad character or criminal 

tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer guilt. (T.R. 8/20/12, 

pp. 1318-1319). 

The Commonwealth did not object to the limiting instruction, but Defendant 

she did not want a limiting instruction regarding the June 2, 2011 shooting. (T.R. 

8/20/12, p. 1318). This court read its proposed limiting instruction to all counsel: 

On August 30, 2012, counsel and this court discussed the closing jury 

instructions, including a court suggested limiting instruction based on Standard 

Jury Instruction 3.08 -- Evidence of Other Offenses as Proof of Guilt. (T.R. 

8/20/12, p. 1317). Defendant Crumbley's attorney, Ms. Wendy Williams, stated that 

misgiving, ruled that evidence regarding the Ruger would be permitted, but would 

be limited to the issue of identity only. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 20). 
26 

Evidence of other crimes may be admitted for other relevant purposes, 

such as "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity or absence of mistake or accident," though such evidence should only be 

A trial court's decision to grant or deny a Motion in limine is subject to an 

evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. Com. v. Reese, 31 A.3d 708, 

715 (Pa. Super. 2011). Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of 

the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly 

abused its discretion. Com. v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa. 2002). 

Admissibility depends on relevance and probative value. lQ. Evidence is relevant 

if it tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue 

more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or presumption 

regarding a material fact. IQ. 

The following day, during Defendant Crumbley's closing argument, his 

attorney, Ms. Williams, addressed the June 2, 2011 shooting at length and 

reiterated the defense position that he was nothing more than a victim in that 

shooting. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1363-1368). This court then again discussed its 

proposed limiting instruction with counsel outside the presence of the jury. (T.R. 

8/20/12, p. 1411 ). Counsel for both Defendants agreed that they did not want the 

limiting instruction read to the jury. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 1411). As such, this court did 

not give a limiting instruction in its closing charge to the jury. 
Here, the evidence regarding the shooting on June 2, 2011 and the 

presence of the Ruger handgun were properly admitted. While certainly 

prejudicial to the Defendants, as all evidence tends to be, the evidence of the 

subsequent bad acts was relevant to make a fact in the case, i.e., whether 

Defendant Crumbley was present at the scene of the Todd Mattox murder two (2) 

weeks earlier, more or less probable. The evidence also was relevant to support 

27 

admitted if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for 

prejudice. Pa. R.E. 404(b)(2)-(3), Com. v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 37 (Pa. 2008). The 

particular prejudice that Rule 404(b)(3) seeks to prevent is the misuse of otheroffense evidence. Specifically, the rule is designed to generally eliminate otheroffense evidence, unless admissible for some specific purpose as indicated 

above, so that jurors do not convict a defendant simply because they perceive 

that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity to commit crimes. Reese, 

supra, at 723. Evidence that the defendant possessed a device or instrument that 

could have been the murder weapon is admissible. See Com. v. Miller, 897 A.2d 

1281 (Pa. Super. 2006). Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is 

. harmful to the defendant. Com. v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 2007). When 

other-offense evidence is admitted, the Defendant is entitled to request a jury 

instruction explaining to the jury that the specific evidence was only admitted for 

a limited purpose. Com. v. Billa, 555 A.2d 835, 841-842 (Pa. 1989). The trial court 

is permitted to use its own form of expression to explain difficult legal concepts 

to the jury. Com. v. Spotz, 759 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Pa. 2000). 
28 

D. Error Reaardinq "Angel of Death" Comment in Commonwealth's closing 

Defendant Crumbley's fourth allegation ~f error is that this court failed to 

strike the "Angel of Death" comment made by Assistant District Attorney 

Stadtmiller in his closing, and that this court failed to give a curative instruction 

to the jury regarding this same comment. On appear, Defendant Crumbley also 

asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney 

failed to object to the comment or request a curative instruction. 

The fact that the jurors found the Defendants guilty of all charges does not 

mean that they misused the evidence of the June 2nd shooting. Certainly, the 

strength and compelling nature of the eyewitness testimony from the time of Mr. 

Mattox's murder led more to the verdict than evidence of this subsequent event. 

This court committed no error in the admission of this evidence. 

the inference that Defendant Crumbley was in possession of the .40 caliber gun 

used in Mr. Mattox's murder. Clearly, the evidence of the June 2nd shooting is not 

dispositive of these issues, but there is no requirement in the law that the 

evidence of other bad acts be dispositive on some disputed issue. The jurors 

had the opportunity to hear. effective cross-examination on the evidence 

presented, as well as hear the informed arguments of all counsel on the relevance 

of the subsequent shooting. 
29 

A prosecutor must have reasonable latitude to present his case to the jury, 

and he must be free to present his arguments with "logical force and vigor." Com. 

v. D'Amato, 526 A.2d 300, 309 (Pa. 1987). Comments by a prosecutor do not 

constitute reversible error unless the "unavoidable effect of such comments 

wou Id be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility 

toward the defendant so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and 

render a true verdict." & The prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's remarks must 

be evaluated in the context in which they occurred. l_g_. When no objection has 

been made to the allegedly improper comments, the trial court has been deprived 

of its opportunity to rule on the propriety of the comments and then render 

cautionary instructions to cure any potentially prejudicial impact. ~ at 312. The 

In his closing on behalf of the Commonwealth, Assistant District Attorney 

Steven Stadtmiller made the following statement: "She (Saday Robinson) wasn't 

afraid to say that and describe him (Matthew Ebo), but that angel of death over 

there, Thaddeus Crumbley, with his hood up, that has what it takes to walk up to 

a man, stand over him and blow his brains out, she wasn't as hot on identifying." 

(T.R. 8/20/12, p. 1437). No objection was made by either defense attorney at the 

time that the comment was made or immediately following the Commonwealth's 

closing. In fact, this issue was not raised at all until Defendant Crumbley's PostTrial Motion. 
It must first be noted that Assistant District Attorney Stadtmiller's comment 

was a brief, isolated statement. The language quoted above was the only such 

reference to the "Angel of Death" or anything that could be construed to be 

Biblical in nature made during the Commonwealth's closing or, as a matter of 

fact, at any time during the trial. Assistant District Attorney Stadtmiller certainly 

did not attach this phrase to Defendant Crumbley's name at each mention of him 

or refer to Defendant Crumbley by this phrase instead of using his name. Given 

the context of the single use of the phrase, this court does not deem its use in 

this instance to be improper, inflammatory or unduly prejudicial. This court did 

not err by failing to sua sponte give a curative instruction. This court was never 

asked to give such an instruction, and so did not do so. Throughout the closings 

by the Defendants and the Commonwealth, numerous sidebars were held to 

address statements made by counsel (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1369-1370, 1386-1388, 

1394-1395), and, at one point, this court gave a curative instruction to address an 

improper comment by Defendant Crumbley's counsel. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 1396). 

30 

reviewing court must assess counsel's performance in failing to make an 

objection or request other relief by examining the effectiveness of counsel's 

representation. 1.Q. Specifically, the trial court should examine whether the 

objection or. request would have had arguable merit, and, if so, whether counsel 

had any reasonable basis to not make the objection, which would further his 

client's interests. kL. The court should also consider whether the omission by 

counsel could have prejudiced the defendant. kL. 
31 

Crumbley was no more than passionate, and perhaps overstated, argument. 

certainly aware that Mr. Stadtmiller's singular comment regarding Defendant 

counsel are not evidence. (T.H. 8/20/12, pp. 101-102, 1455). The jurors were 

jury, advised the members of the jury on several occasions that the arguments of 

be noted that this court, in its opening comments and closing instructions to the 

unregarded, as opposed to drawing significantly more attention to it. It must also 

this court's eyes for allowing a comment to pass essentially unnoticed and 

experienced and skilled trial lawyer, and she is most certainly not ineffective in 

more firmly in the jurors' minds. Counsel for Defendant Crumbley is very a 

have done nothing more than increase the impact of the comment and lodge it 

forced to repeat the phrase in order to tell the jury to disregard it. This would 

she objected and requested a curative instruction, this court would have been 

courtroom never registered in their minds, given the brevity of the mention. Had 

Further, this court does not believe that Ms. Wendy Williams, Defendant 

Crumbley's counsel, was in any way ineffective for failing to object or request a 

curative instruction. Had Ms. Williams did as Defendant Crumbley now suggests, 

she would have been calling attention to a phrase that most people in the 

Counsel for all parties were certainly aware that this court would hear them on 

any objection and was willing to provide curative instructions to the jury. 

-, 

) 
Defendant Crumbley filed a discovery motion on June 8, 2012, which was 

argued before this court on July 27, 2012. During this motion, Defendant 

Crumbley requested additional information regarding Richard Carpenter's 

involvement in the witness protection program. At that time, Detective Perry 

answered defense counsel's questions regarding the details of this program. 

(T.R. 7/27/12, pp. 30-32). This appears to have satisfied Defendant Crumbley's 

discovery request regarding the witness protection program as no further 

requests were made regarding this subject. 

32 

E. Alleged Discovery Violations regarding "Jailhouse" Witnesses 

Defendant Crumbley's fifth allegation of error is that this court erred in 

permitting jailhouse informants to testify without the Commonwealth delivering 

timely discovery in violation of Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 573. This allegation of error 

pertains specifically to discovery involving "jailhouse" witnesses Richard 

Carpenter and Thomas Julian Brown. 

This court did not err in regard to this single comment made by the 

Assistant District Attorney. This court neither struck the comment nor gave a 

curative instruction, because neither was requested. Defendant Crumbley's 

attorney was not ineffective. She made a judgment call that was in the best 

interest of her client to not call attention to the phrase. This court should be 

upheld in this regard. 
33 

Mr. Brown took the witness stand and began his testimony on August 24, 

2012. On August 28, 2012, after Mr. Brown's first day of testimony, Defendant 

Crumbley requested additional discovery related to Mr. Brown, including records 

from his prior criminal cases and detainers related to those cases. (T.R. 8/20/12, 

pp. 753-755). The Commonwealth indicated that it did not have these records, 

and this court instructed the Commonwealth to provide whatever it had related to 

Defendant Crumbley's request to the Defendants. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 754). lt should 

Discovery issues were raised again by Defendant Crumbley on the morning 

of August 22, 2012, prior to the beginning of the jury trial. Defense counsel 

requested additional discovery on Thomas Julian Brown (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 84-87, 

88-89) and Richard Carpenter (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 87-88). This court advised the 

Commonwealth that, if this discovery was not provided to the Defendants, these 

witnesses would not be permitted to testify. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 88-89). Later that 

same afternoon, on August 22, 2012, Defendant Crumbley again raised issues 

regarding discovery requests not being provided to the defense, specifically in 

relation to Mr. Brown's testimony in other cases on behalf of the Commonwealth. 

(T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 216-219). This court advised the Commonwealth that this 

discovery would have to be provided to the Defendants prior to Mr. Brown 

testifying at trial. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 219). Counsel received the requested discovery 

the following day, on August 23, 2012. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 326). 
34 

As was previously stated, questions regarding the admission and 

exclusion of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will 

Assistant District Attorney Mark Tranquilli, who was called as a Commonwealth 

witness regarding Richard Carpenter's detainer on a Judge Cashman case, was 

also subjected to a thorough cross-examination by defense counsel. (T.R. 

8/20/12, pp. 1117-1132, 1142-1148). Mr. Tranquilli, now Judge Tranquilli, was also 

questioned at length regarding Thomas Brown's involvement as a witness in 

other criminal cases. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1132-1142). Defendant Crumbley called as 

a witness Assistant District Attorney Christopher Stone to discuss Mr. 

Carpenter's sentence on the Judge Cashman case (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1219-1236), 

and he also called Thomas Brown's probation officer, Robert Tutko, who provided 

detailed information on his dealings with Mr. Brown, including the detainers that 

he had and the terms of his probation. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1187-1216). 

protection program. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1026-1044, 1037-1040, 1041-1043). 

Despite these alleged discovery issues, defense counsel conducted a 

thorough cross-examination of a variety of witnesses regarding Richard 

Carpenter and Thomas Brown. For example, Detective Perry was questioned 

extensively regarding money paid to Richard Carpenter as part of the witness 

be noted that Mr. Carpenter ultimately failed to appear for trial and did not testify. 

Thus, any allegations of error to exclude his testimony are moot. 
35 

Here, the appropriate remedy for any discovery violations was not to 

exclude the testimony of either witness. All information possessed by the 

Furthermore, a discovery violation does not automatically warrant relief in 

the form of a new trial. Com. v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491, 513 (Pa. 1995). A defendant 

seeking relief from a discovery violation must demonstrate prejudice. Com. v. 

Hood, 872 A.2d 175, 181 (Pa. Super. 2005). Courts have held that discovery turned 

over the day prior to trial is nonetheless admissible if the defendant is not 

otherwise prejudiced by the delay. See Jones, supra; Co_m. v. Boring, 684 A. 2d 

561 (Pa. Super. 1996); Com. v. Gordon, 528 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. 1987). 

not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Kendricks, supra, at 

503. An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court 

might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a showing that the trial 

court's conclusion was the result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous. 

Brougher, supra at 376. Rule 573(e) provides that, if a party has failed to comply 

with a discovery request, the court may, inter alia, prohibit a party from 

introducing the evidence not disclosed, or may order any other remedy that it 

deems just under the circumstances. Pa. R. Crim. P 573. The Commonwealth 

does not violate Rule 573 when it fails to disclose to the defense evidence that it 

does not possess and of which it is unaware. Collins, supra, at 253. 
36 

F. Alleged Error tor Failure to Give a Missing Witness Charge 

Defendant Crumbley's sixth allegation of error is that this court erred in 

failing to charge the jury on the missing witness instruction with regard to 

Richard Carpenter. Defendant Crumbley also asserts that, in its closing charge to 

the jury, this court committed error by mentioning "testimony" by Richard 

Carpenter even though Mr. Carpenter never appeared and never took the witness 

stand. 

testimony. This court ensured that discovery was turned over, and the 

Defendants ability to effectively cross-examine and present witness testimony 

was not impeded by any delays. This court committed no error in failing to 

exclude Mr. Brown's testimony. 

in this case. Not every discovery violation justifies exclusion of witness 

Commonwealth was turned over to the Defendants, albeit late. The defense 

attorneys never complained that they had insufficient time to review the 

information, nor did they request additional time to do so. This court certainly 

would have granted any such requests. The attorneys for the Defendants were 

able to thoroughly question all witnesses after receiving this information. 

Additionally, given the lengthy and thorough cross-examlnatlons of Mr. Brown 

and witnesses having knowledge of Mr. Brown, as well as the ability to call 

witnesses with knowledge of Mr. Brown on behalf of the Defendants, any delay in 

turning over discovery certainly did not hamper or adversely impact the defense 
37 

The missing witness instruction should not be given every time that a 

witness does not testify. In fact, our appellate courts have set forth 

circumstances under which the missing witness instruction should not be given, 

including circumstances where: (1) the witness is so hostile or prejudiced against 

the party expected to call him that there is a small possibility of obtaining 

unbiased truth; (2) the testimony of such a witness is comparatively unimportant, 

cumulative, or inferior to that already presented; (3) the uncalled witness is 

equally available to both parties; (4) there is a satisfactory explanation as to why 

the party failed to call such a witness; (5) the witness is not available or not within 

the control of the party against whom the negative inference is desired; and (6) 

the testimony of the uncalled witness is not within the scope of the natural 

interest of the party failing to produce him. Com. v. Evans, 664 A.2d 570, 573-574 

(Pa. Super. 1995). The relevant inquiry in reviewing a trial court's failure to give a 

The missing witness adverse inference rule provides that, when a potential 

witness is available to only one of the parties to a trial, and it appears that the 

witness has special information material to the issues at trial, and the witness's 

testimony would not merely be cumulative, if such party does not produce the 

testimony of this witness, the jury may draw an inference that the witness's 

testimony would have been unfavorable to the party having control of the 

witness. Com. v. Boyle, 733 A.2d 633, 638 (Pa. Super. 1999). 
38 

Before discussion of the closing charge, Ms. Wil Iiams requested, on behalf 

of Defendant Crumbley, that Standard Criminal Jury Charge 3.21A be given by the 

court. As proposed by Defendant Crumbley, the missing witness instruction 

wou Id have read as follows: 

In the case at issue, Detective Perry provided testimony during crossexamination by Defendant Crumbley's attorney that Richard Carpenter positively 

identified the Defendants in photo arrays on December 5, 2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 

364-365). This identification led to the arrest of Defendant Crumbley on 

December 7, 2011. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 366). Carpenter was in jail when he became a 

witness in this case, and he is identified as Witness #1 in the Affidavit of Probable 

Cause. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 367, 373). Mr. Carpenter never appeared to testify 

during the trial, despite being served with a subpoena. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 324-325). 

In fact, a bench warrant was issued due to his failure to appear. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 

325). Although he was referenced many times throughout the trial by all parties, 

he was unable to be located by the Commonwealth and would not answer phone 

calls to determine his whereabouts. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 325). 

jury instruction is whether such charge was warranted by the evidence in the 

case. Boyle, supra, at 639. If the instruction proffered is inapplicable and 

improper, the court should not charge on it. lg. 
3g-· . 

Carpenter was available only to the Commonwealth. While certainly it was in the 

There was no testimony or discussion from which the jury could find that Mr. 

information was provided to the jury regarding the first factor in the charge. 

jury to speculate as to whether the criteria in the charge had been met since no 

Additionally, this court believed that the charge, if given, would have required the 

because he failed to comply with his subpoena. (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 1310). 

Carpenter as a witness. The Commonwealth, rather, could not locate him 

situation involving Mr. Carpenter. The Commonwealth did not fail to call Mr. 

to Richard Carpenter, reasoning that it was not an accurate representation of the 

counsel that it would not give Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 3.21 A in regards 

During discussion of the closing jury instructions, this court advised 

2. If three factors are present, and there is no satisfactory 

explanation for a party's failure to call a potential witness, the jury is 

allowed to draw a common-sense inference that his testimony would 

have been unfavorable to that party. The three necessary factors are: 

First, the person is available to that party only and not to the other; 

Second, it appears the person has special information material to the 

issue; and · Third, the person's testimony would not be merely cumulative. 

3. Therefore, if you find these three factors present, and there is 

no satisfactory explanation for the Commonwealth's failure to call 

Richard Carpenter to testify, you may infer, if you choose to do so, 

that his testimony would have been unfavorable to the 

Commonwealth. 

1. There is a question about what weight, if any, you should give 

to the failure of the Commonwealth to call Richard Carpenter as a 

witness. 

3.21 A (Crim) FAILURE TO CALL POTENTIAL WITNESS 
40 

You have heard evidence that some of the witnesses- John Gardone- they 

have been convicted of crimes. John Gardone was convicted of the crime 

of theft by unlawful taking; Richard Carpenter was adjudicated delinquent 

for burglary and Thomas Julian Brown pied guilty to theft by unlawful 

testimony in its closing, this court read the following instruction to the jury: 

As to the Defendant's assertion that this court referred to Mr. Carpenter's 

witness instruction. 

pursuant to his subpoena, which resulted in a bench warrant being issued for his 

arrest. Thus, the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury with the missing 

Commonwealth was unable to call Mr. Carpenter because he failed to appear 

explanation as to why the Commonwealth failed to call the witness. The 

Commonwealth, another exception applies, namely, that there is a satisfactory 

Commonwealth. Even if it is the case that he was only available to the 

was no evidence that Mr. Carpenter was only available as a witness to the 

Culmer, 604 A.2d 1090, 1098 (Pa. Super. 1992). As was stated previously, there 

Commonwealth, but none of the other exceptions above must apply. Com. v. 

Commonwealth, not only must the witness be solely and only available to the 

Additionally, to .. assert the missing witness instruction against the 

Carpenter as far as this court is aware. The situation that was presented to the 

court regarding the missing witness charge was squarely addressed in Evans, 

supra, and Boyle, supra. 

Commonwealth's interest to call Mr. Carpenter as a witness in its case, there was 

nothing to preclude or prohibit the defense from contacting and/or calling Mr. 
41 

most prudent to include him in the afore-mentioned charge. If this mention of 

and the extensive discussion of his criminal record, this court believed it to be 

not testify himself. Because of this potential issue with Mr. Carpenter's credibility 

they could be required to evaluate Mr. Carpenter's credibility, even though he did 

his identification of the Defendants, the jurors were placed in a position where 

Given all of the testimony with regard to Richard Carpenter, which included 

witnessed the shooting. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 127, 1273, 1275). 

also testified with regard to Richard Carpenter; stating that he could not have 

Stone, especially in regard to his criminal record. Defense witness Rachel Bundy 

discussed extensively by Assistant District Attorneys Mark Tranquilli and Chris 

8/20/12, pp. 1026-1034, 1043~1044, 1037-1040, 1041-1043). Mr. Carpenter was also 

Carpenter by both defense attorneys and the Commonwealth on re-direct. (T.R. 

August 29, 2012, he was extensively questioned again regarding Richard 

(T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 364-367). When Detective Perry was recalled to the stand on 

Mr. Carpenter himself did not testify in this case. However, his 

identification of the Defendants as the shooters in this case was testified to by 

Detective Perry under cross-examination by Defendant Crumbley's attorney. 

taking and has been convicted of theft by unlawful taking and burglary. 

The only purpose for which you may consider this evidence of prior 

conviction is deciding whether or not to believe all or part of the testimony 

of John Gardone, Richard Carpenter or Thomas Julian Brown. In doing so, 

you may consider the type of crime committed and how it may effect the 

likelihood that John Gardone, Richard Carpenter or Thomas Julian Brown 

have testified truthfully in this case. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 1470). 
42 

The trial for the Defendants was scheduled to begin on June 7, 2012. On 

June 7, counsel for Defendant Ebo, Mr. Randall McKinney, submitted a 

postponement, stating that he was not prepared to begin trial and had not had an 

opportunity to review all of the discovery that he had received from the 

Commonwealth. (T.R. 6/7/12, p. 3). Counsel for Defendant Crumbley objected to 

the postponement because he was prepared to proceed to trial. (T.R. 6/7/12, pp. 

Defendant Crumbley's seventh allegation of error is that he was denied his 

right to a speedy trial when th is court granted the Commonwealth's request for a 

postponement on June 8, 2012 due to the unavailability of several Commonwealth 

witnesses. The Defendant asserts that the Commonwealth did not show due 

diligence in bringing the case to trial, and he was prejudiced because Saday 

Robinson identified the Defendants subsequent to this postponement. 

G. Alleged Error with Regard to Granting a Continuance. 

"testimony" with regard to Richard Carpenter was error, it was clearly harmless 

error, as everyone involved in this matter was aware that Richard Carpenter had 

not actually testified. The harmless error doctrine reflects the reality that the 

accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Reese, supra, at 719. 
43 

On June 13, 2012, this court held a bail hearing. The Defendants asserted 

that the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in locating the missing 

witnesses that necessitated the postponement on June 8, 2012. Detective 

Anthony Perry of the Allegheny County Police, homicide division, testified 

This court granted the postponement due to the fact that the missing 

Commonwealth witnesses were essential to the Commonwealth's presentation of 

its case. This court then scheduled a new trial date, as well as set dates for jury 

selection, pre-trial motions and a status conference. (T.R. 6/8/12, p. 7). Both 

Defendants indicated that they would be filing bond motions given that the new 

trial date was beyond 180 days. (T. R. 6/8/12, p. 5). 

3-5). The Commonwealth consented to the postponement. (T.R. 6/7/12, p. 5). On 

June 8, 2012, counsel for Defendant Ebo withdrew his request for a continuance, 

prompting the Commonwealth to ask for a continuance because it needed 

additional time to locate three (3) essential Commonwealth witnesses. (LR. 

6/8/12, pp. 2-3). Both Defendants objected to the Commonwealth's request for a 

postponement, as they indicated that they were both ready to proceed, despite 

the fact that Defendant Ebo claimed that he was not ready to proceed just the day 

before, and that the 180 days to bring an incarcerated defendant to trial, 

mandated by Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 600, would run on June 17, 2012. (T.R. 6/8/12, p. 

5). 
44 

Detective Perry testified regarding his methods for locating witnesses, 

which began with checking the addresses on driver's licenses for witnesses and 

speaking with neighbors. (T.R. 6/13/12, p. 32). He also searched the Allegheny 

County jail search screen and public assistance records. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31, 

38). Despite using these search methods, Detective Perry was unable to locate 

the witnesses. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31, 32). With regard to Yurri Lewis, Detective 

Perry also went to his address on three (3) separate occasions, but could not 

locate Mr. Lewis. (T.R. 6/13/12, p. 38). During his search for Saday Robinson, he 

went to at least four (4) addresses, but cou Id not find her. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31, 

38). One address was abandoned and several were vacant. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31, 

38). He visited many of the addresses on more than one occasion, and he left 

business cards with people who might have contact with either witness. (T.R. 

6/13/12, pp. 36-38). Detective Perry continued to look for both witnesses for the 

entire period between May 24, 2012 and the date of the bail hearing on June 13, 

2012. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 32, 33-35). In fact, Detective Perry was finally able to 

regarding his efforts to locate two missing Commonwealth witnesses, Saday 

Robinson and Yurri Lewis. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 30-38). Detective Perry stated that, 

on May 22, 2011, he had been given subpoenas for witnesses in advance of trial 

and began serving the subpoenas on May 24, 2012. (T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 33, 35). 

Trial preparation interviews were scheduled for May 30, 2012, and Detective Perry 

was unable to serve the subpoenas for Ms. Robinson and Mr. Lewis by that time. 

(T.R. 6/13/12, pp. 31, 34). 
45 

An appellate court's standard of review in evaluating Rule 600 issues is 

whether the trial court abused its discretion. Com. v. McNear, 852 A.2d 401, 404 

(Pa. Super. 2004). The proper scope of review in determining the propriety of the 

trial court's ruling is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 600 

evidentiary hearing and the findings of the lower court. lg_. In reviewing the 

determination of the hearing court, an appellate court must view the facts in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. Due diligence is a fact-specific 

concept that is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. Due diligence does not 

Ru le 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the 

accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society. Com. v. Hunt, 858 

A.2d 1238 (Pa. Super. 2004). In determining whether an accused's right to a . 

speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's right to 

effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain the guilty of crime and to 

deter those contemplating it. .!Q. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 

600 was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith 

prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth . .!Q. 

reach Ms. Robinson and speak with her on the night before this bail hearing. 

(f.R. 6/13/12, p. 33). This court denied the Defendant's request for bond and 

found that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence in attempting to find 

the Commonwealth witnesses. (T.R. 6/13/12, p. 43). 
46 

In this case, Detective Perry put forth reasonable efforts to locate the 

essential witnesses. He visited the last known addresses of the witnesses on 

multiple occasions. He checked the addresses against driver licensing 

information. He spoke to neighbors about the witnesses' whereabouts. He also 

checked public records. While Detective Perry perhaps could have done more, 

this court found that his efforts were reasonable, and this court's findings of fact 

should not be disturbed on appeal. 

While a mere assertion by the Commonwealth that a witness is unavailable 

does not establish due diligence, the unavailability of a witness is a relevant 

factor in determining whether a continuance should be granted. Com. v. Ehredt, 

401 A.2d 358, 360-361 (Pa. 1979). Mere assertions of due diligence and unproven 

facts do not establish cause for an extension. Com. v. Tyler, 555 A.2d 232, 234- 

235 (Pa. Super. 1989). Rather, the Commonwealth makes a reasonable effort to 

locate a witness and insure his presence at trial when the Commonwealth 

demonstrates that it has used several methods to locate a witness and subpoena 

him for trial. See Tyler, supra. 

require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the 

. Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been put forth. lg_. 
47 

The standard of review regarding claims of insufficiency of the evidence is 

well-settled. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court 

must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable 

inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every element of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Com. v. Jones, 954 A.2d 1194 (Pa. Super. 

2008). An appellate court may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute its 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. J..Q. The weight of the evidence is exclusively 

for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. When evidence conflicts, it is the sole 

province of the fact finder to determine credibility and to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence. Com. v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. Super. 2003). An appellate 

court may only reverse the lower court's verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence 

as to shock one's sense of justice. Com. v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 506 (Pa. Super. 

2005). Any question of doubt is for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

The Defendants' final allegations of error are that there was insufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict and that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. 

H. Allegations that the Verdict Was Against the Weight of the Evidence and 

Insufficient to Sustain a Conviction. 
48 

jurors found her credible. In fact, this court found her to be credible and truthful 

certainly does not shock this court's conscience or sense of justice that the 

641-647). As this court stated earlier, Ms. Robinson was a compelling witness. It 

what happened that day, which is within their province. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 561-637, 

' discredit her and sully her credibility, the jury chose to believe her version of 

enqaqsd in a lengthy cross-examination of Ms. Robinson in an attempt to 

the jury in great detail. (T.R. 8/20/12, 525-644). Even though defense counsel 

events of May 16, 2011, and she was able to describe what she saw and heard to 

no direct evidence implicating them in Mr. Mattox's murder, the jury clearly found 

the testimony of Saday Robinson to be compelling. She was an eyewitness to the 

murder of Todd Mattox. Although the Defendants attempt to argue that there was 

direct and circumstantial evidence of the Defendants' involvement in .the brutal 

Here, the jury found the Defendants guilty of all charges after hearing both 

Smith, 568 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. 1989). 

Commonwealth may prove the homicide by circumstantial evidence. Com. v. 

describe the incident which resulted in the death of the victim. Rather the 

by direct evidence; indeed, in many instances, no witnesses are available to 

There is no requirement that the Commonwealth prove a homicide charge 

and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from 

the combined circumstances. Com. v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703 (Pa. Super. 2007): 
49 

While it is true that no forensic evidence linked the Defendants to this 

murder, that fact does not mean that the evidence presented at trial was 

In addition to the testimony of Ms. Robinson, the jury heard testimony 

regarding the eyewitness identification of Richard Carpenter. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 

365-366). The jurors also listened to the testimony of Mr. Thomas Brown, another 

fearfu I witness (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 673-676), who heard Defendant CrumbJey 

essentially admitting to the murder of Todd Mattox (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 698-699), and 

who identified Defendant Ebo as "Mat-Mat." (T.R. 8/20/12, p. 748). They heard the 

testimony of Anthony Snyder, who identified "Mat-Mat" as Defendant Ebo (T.R. 

8/20/12, p. 657), and who had previously told detectives that the victim had told 

him that he was going to see Mat-Mat just prior to the shooting. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 

657-661 ). The jurors heard Ms. Robinson relate that she had been told by "Ace" 

that Mat-Mat was involved in the shootings. (T.R. 8/20/12, pp. 601-603). The jurors 

also had evidence of the presence of the murder weapon at the scene of a 

shooting involving Defendant Crumbley two (2) weeks later. (T.R. 8/20/12, 885, 

927-928, 1011, 1017). 

as well. Her testimony, alone, when believed, is sufficient evidence to uphold this 

verdict. It should also be noted that there were witnesses present who 

corroborated Ms. Robinson's testimony, thereby lending it even more credibility. 

See Trial Court Opinion, II. Factual Background, p. 5. 

) 

) 
47 

Date 

This court committed no errors during this trial. Its rulings should be upheld. The 

jury's verdict was well-supported by the evidence, and its verdict should also be upheld. 

The Defendants' request for a new trial should be denied, and the verdict and 

sentencing in this case should be affirmed. 

IV. Conclusion 

While it is true that no forensic evidence linked the Defendants to this murder, 

that fact does not mean that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain 

the convictions here. It is often the case that forensic evidence is lacking at the scene 

of a crime. Here the jury had the powerful and compelling testimony of a frightened 

eyewitness, as well as circumstantial evidence supporting that testimony. The jury's 

verdict was well-supported by the evidence in the case, and it should be upheld on 

appeal. 

the scene of a shooting involving Defendant Crumbley two (2) weeks later. (T.R. 

8/20/12, 885, 927-928, 1011, 1017).