[Cite as State v. Earl, 2020-Ohio-1202.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

ABDUL EARL 

 Appellant 

C.A. Nos. 18CA011303 

 18CA011281 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE Nos. 15CR091866 

16CR094318 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: March 31, 2020 

 

TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Abdul L. Earl, appeals from the judgment entries denying his two 

motions to vacate void judgment in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. This Court 

affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} Mr. Earl was sentenced in two separate cases and in two different trial courts. The 

courts initially placed him on community control, but later sentenced him to prison after he violated 

the terms and conditions of his community control. He never appealed any of the judgment entries 

sentencing him to community control or prison. Mr. Earl eventually filed two motions to vacate 

void judgment in each case almost a year after he was sentenced to prison, both of which were 

denied. 
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{¶3} Mr. Earl now appeals from the judgment entries denying his two motions to vacate 

void judgment and raises one assignment of error for this Court’s review. Although he filed 

separate appeals in each case, this Court has consolidated both appeals, as they involve 

substantially similar judgment entries and merit briefs, as well as the same assignment of error. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

APPELLANT WAS SENTENCED TO A []LUMP SENTENCE OF 3 YEARS 

COMMUNITY CONTROL. “LUMPING A SENTENCE IS A VIOLATION OF 

OHIO SENTENCING GUIDELINE[S].” * * *. 

{¶4} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Earl argues that both trial courts erred in 

denying his motions to vacate void sentence because the courts originally imposed “lump” 

sentences of three years community control in each case. We disagree. 

{¶5} Although Mr. Earl has appealed from the denials of his motions to vacate void 

judgment, he is essentially challenging his original sentences in each case. See State v. Williams, 

5th Dist. Stark No. 2018CA00060, 2018-Ohio-3458, ¶ 17. “Most sentencing challenges must be 

brought by a timely direct appeal.” State v. Ibn-Ford, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27380, 2015-Ohio753, ¶ 7, citing State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, ¶ 8. See also State v. 

Slaughter, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011293, 2019-Ohio-2154, ¶ 5. “The doctrine of res judicata 

‘bars the assertion of claims against a valid, final judgment of conviction that have been raised or 

could have been raised on appeal.’” State v. O’Neal, 9th Dist. Medina No. 15CA0052-M, 2015-

Ohio-5181, ¶ 5, quoting State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59. It “promotes 

the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue on 

which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” State v. Saxon, 

109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, ¶ 18. Res judicata applies to other aspects of the merits of 
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a conviction as well, including the determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the ensuing 

sentence, but does not preclude review of a void sentence. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 

2010-Ohio-6238, paragraph three of the syllabus. In other words, unless Mr. Earl’s sentences are 

void, his claim is barred by res judicata. See State v. Isa, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2015-CA-44, 

2016-Ohio-4980, ¶ 9; Ibn-Ford at ¶ 7. 

{¶6} “A void sentence is one that a court imposes despite lacking subject-matter 

jurisdiction or the authority to act.” State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 27. 

“‘Crimes are statutory, as are the penalties therefor, and the only sentence which a trial court may 

impose is that provided for by statute.’” State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 

¶ 20, quoting Colegrove v. Burns, 175 Ohio St. 437, 438 (1964). “‘A court has no power to 

substitute a different sentence for that provided for by statute or one that is either greater or lesser 

than that provided for by law.’” Id. Thus, “[a]ny attempt by a court to disregard statutory 

requirements when imposing a sentence renders the attempted sentence a nullity or void.” State 

v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75 (1984). 

{¶7} “Conversely, a voidable sentence is one that a court has jurisdiction to impose, but 

was imposed irregularly or erroneously.” Payne at ¶ 27. Therefore, when a trial court has 

jurisdiction but erroneously exercises its jurisdiction, the sentence is not void, and the sentence 

can be set aside only if successfully challenged on direct appeal. Id. at ¶ 28. Sentencing errors are 

generally not jurisdictional and do not render a judgment void. State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 

420, 2008-Ohio-1197, ¶ 13. The Supreme Court of Ohio has, in fact, declined to find sentences 

void based on the trial court’s failure to comply with certain sentencing statutes. See State v. 

Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, ¶ 8 (recognizing challenges to a trial court’s (1) 

compliance with the purposes and principles of sentencing, (2) determination of allied offenses, 
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and (3) consecutive sentencing must be brought on direct appeal); but see State v. Williams, 148 

Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, ¶ 28 (separates sentences imposed for allied offenses of similar 

import, even if imposed concurrently, are void). 

{¶8} Mr. Earl claims that his sentences are void because each trial court imposed a 

“lump” sentence of community control for multiple counts in each case. He relies on the Supreme 

Court of Ohio’s decision in Saxon, which addressed and rejected use of the federal sentencingpackage doctrine by Ohio courts: 

Instead of considering multiple offenses as a whole and imposing one, overarching 

sentence to encompass the entirety of the offenses as in the federal sentencing 

regime, a judge sentencing a defendant pursuant to Ohio law must consider each 

offense individually and impose a separate sentence for each offense. See R.C. 

2929.11 through 2929.19. * * * Under the Ohio sentencing statutes, the judge lacks 

the authority to consider the offenses as a group and to impose only an omnibus 

sentence for the group of offenses. 

Saxon at ¶ 9. 

{¶9} This Court has consistently held that the Supreme Court of Ohio “‘has applied its 

void-sentence analysis in limited circumstances’” and we “‘will not extend its reach without clear 

direction from the Supreme Court.’” See, e.g., Slaughter, 2019-Ohio-2154, at ¶ 9, quoting State 

v. Culgan, 9th Dist. Medina No. 09CA0060-M, 2010-Ohio-2992, ¶ 20. Notably, the high court 

has identified several specific areas where it held that a sentence was void: “when the trial court 

fails to impose a statutorily mandated term of post[-]release control,” “when it fails to include a 

mandatory driver’s license suspension in the offender’s sentence[,]” and “when it fails to include 

a mandatory fine in the sentence[.]” Williams, 2016-Ohio-7658, at ¶ 21. The Williams Court 

further determined that separates sentences imposed for allied offenses of similar import, even if 

imposed concurrently, are void. Id. at ¶ 28. Mr. Earl has not alleged that any of these specific 

errors occurred in his cases. Although the Saxon Court determined sentencing courts lack the 
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authority to consider multiple offenses as a group and err in imposing a single sentence for those 

offenses, it did not explicitly state that such sentences are rendered “void.” See Saxon at ¶ 9. Thus, 

“[c]onsistent with our precedent, we will not reach that result in this case.” State v. Occhipinti, 

9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010787, 2016-Ohio-1286, ¶ 5. 

{¶10} Mr. Earl is attempting to use his motions to vacate void judgment as a means to 

obtain appellate review of alleged sentencing errors that he previously failed to appeal. See State 

v. Fields, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28667, 2018-Ohio-1605, ¶ 12, citing State v. Church, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 68590, 1995 WL 643794, *1 (Nov. 2, 1995). “‘[T]he utilization of a subsequent 

order to indirectly and untimely appeal a prior order (which was never directly appealed)’ or 

‘bootstrapping’ is ‘procedurally anomalous and inconsistent with the appellate rules which 

contemplate a direct relationship between the order from which the appeal is taken and the error 

assigned as a result of that order.’” Id., quoting Church at *1. In other words, Mr. Earl cannot 

now use a motion to vacate void judgment and its subsequent denial to present a belated attack on 

his sentences. Because his sentences are not void and he could have raised his sentencing-package 

argument on direct appeal, he is barred from doing so now by the doctrine of res judicata. See 

State v. Hammock, 5th Dist. Richland No. 18CA27, 2018-Ohio-3914, ¶ 25-27; Isa, 2016-Ohio4980, at ¶ 9; Slaughter at ¶ 9. 

{¶11} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial courts did not err in denying Mr. Earl’s two 

motions to vacate void judgment. 

{¶12} Mr. Earl’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶13} Mr. Earl’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgments of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas are affirmed. 
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Judgments affirmed. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 THOMAS A. TEODOSIO 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

ABDUL EARL, pro se, Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and BRIAN P. MURPHY, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.