Present: All the Justices 

SHERRI ANN POLSTON, s/k/a 

SHERRI ANNE POLSTON 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 971536 April 17, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 Sherri Ann Polston entered a conditional plea of guilty 

to the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248. Pursuant to Code 

§ 19.2-254, she reserved her right to appeal that portion of 

the Chesterfield Circuit Court’s judgment denying her motion 

to suppress the marijuana which she claims was the fruit of an 

unlawful search. The trial court accepted her guilty plea and 

fixed her punishment at 10 years’ imprisonment, which was 

suspended subject to certain conditions. The Court of Appeals 

affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, Polston v. 

Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 738, 485 S.E.2d 632 (1997), and we 

awarded the defendant an appeal. 

 The following facts are relevant to our disposition of 

this appeal. Stuart G. Powell, a Chesterfield County 

detective, along with an unidentified informant, appeared 

before a magistrate on January 6, 1995. Detective Powell 

submitted an affidavit to the magistrate which stated in 

relevant part: 
“On this date 1-6-95, a citizen appeared before the 

magistrate of the Twelth [sic] Judicial District 

Court and stated the following facts under oath and 

the penalty of purgery [sic]. This citizen stated 

that within the past 72 hours he/she observed a 

quantity of marijuana being stored and being offered 

for sale at the apartment mentioned in section two 

of this document. 

* * * 

“I was advised of the facts set forth in this 

affidavit, in whole or in part, by an informer. 

This informer’s credibility or the reliability of 

the information may be determined from the following 

facts: 

“The citizen mention[ed] in section 4 of this 

document made these statements while under oath and 

after being advised of the penalty of purgery [sic] 

by your affiant. Your affiant has been a police 

officer for over six years and is currently employed 

in the Vice and Narcotics Unit of the Chesterfield 

County Police Department. Your affiant has made 

several drug arrests and is familiar with the drug 

culture in and around Chesterfield County. The 

citizen has decided to remain anonymous for fear of 

retaliation.” 

 The magistrate questioned the informant under oath, and 

the informant stated that he was familiar with the local drug 

culture and that he had used marijuana at least once per week 

for a number of years. The magistrate or Detective Powell 

added the following sentence to the affidavit: “This citizen 

is a self-admitted drug user and is familiar with the drug 

culture in and around Chestserfield [sic] County.” 

 The magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of 

the defendant’s apartment. When Detective Powell, along with 

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Chesterfield County police officers, conducted the search, the 

defendant directed them to a dresser in her bedroom which 

contained approximately one pound of marijuana. The officers 

also found a “bong” in the defendant’s apartment, and the 

defendant told the officers that she sold marijuana. 

 The defendant argues that the magistrate did not have a 

substantial basis to find probable cause necessary for the 

issuance of the search warrant. The defendant observes that 

the “citizen” referred to in the affidavit was actually an 

individual who had been arrested by police officers earlier on 

the day that the search warrant was issued. Continuing, the 

defendant says that Detective Powell “conceded that he had 

made no effort of any kind to investigate or verify either the 

informant’s credibility or the reliability of the information” 

contained in the affidavit. Responding, the Commonwealth 

asserts that the magistrate did have a substantial basis for 

finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the 

warrant and that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant 

was also admissible on another basis, the good faith exception 

to the warrant requirement established in United States v. 

Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 

 In Leon, the United States Supreme Court held that 

“suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should 

be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those 

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unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of 

the exclusionary rule.” 468 U.S. at 918; see also

Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 (1984). The 

Supreme Court also stated that “the exclusionary rule is 

designed to deter police misconduct . . . .” Leon, 468 U.S. 

at 916. This deterrent is not present when a police officer, 

acting in objective good faith, obtains a search warrant from 

a magistrate and conducts a search within the scope of the 

warrant. Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 422, 410 S.E.2d 

662, 667 (1991). We have embraced and applied the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 422-23, 410 S.E.2d 

at 667; McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 232, 321 S.E.2d 

637, 644 (1984). 

 The Supreme Court stated the following test which we must 

apply to determine whether suppression of evidence is an 

appropriate remedy: 

 “Suppression therefore remains an appropriate 

remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a 

warrant was misled by information in an affidavit 

that the affiant knew was false or would have known 

was false except for his reckless disregard of the 

truth. . . . The exception we recognize today will 

also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate 

wholly abandoned his judicial role. . . . [I]n such 

circumstances, no reasonably well trained officer 

should rely on the warrant. Nor would an officer 

manifest objective good faith in relying on a 

warrant based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia 

of probable cause as to render official belief in 

its existence entirely unreasonable’ . . . . 

Finally, depending on the circumstances of the 

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particular case, a warrant may be so facially 

deficient -- i.e., in failing to particularize the 

place to be searched or the things to be seized -- 

that the executing officers cannot reasonably 

presume it to be valid.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 

(citations omitted). 

 We hold that, regardless of the actual validity of the 

search warrant, the evidence seized during the search of the 

defendant’s apartment is admissible because of the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule. The evils identified in 

the Leon test are simply not present here. When the police 

officers conducted the search of the defendant’s apartment, 

they acted in good faith, reasonably, and under the authority 

of an apparently valid search warrant. The magistrate was not 

misled by any information in the affidavit, and he did not 

abandon his judicial role. Rather, acting in his judicial 

role, the magistrate questioned the informant about the 

informant’s knowledge of drug activity in Chesterfield County. 

Additionally, the warrant is not so lacking in indicia of 

probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 

entirely unreasonable, and the warrant is not facially 

deficient. 

 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 

Appeals. 

Affirmed. 

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