In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-2502

DONNA L. SEYMOUR,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROL HUG et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL OF:

LESLIE V. MATLAW

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 C 2041—Jeffrey Cole, Magistrate Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2007—DECIDED MAY 3, 2007

____________

Before MANION, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. Attorney Leslie V. Matlaw

represented plaintiff Donna Seymour in this case. Ms.

Matlaw, acting on her own behalf, seeks to set aside the

settlement agreement reached in this case and related

orders entered by the district court. Ms. Matlaw lacks

standing to bring this appeal and therefore the appeal

is dismissed.
2 No. 06-2502

I. HISTORY

Plaintiff Donna L. Seymour filed a lawsuit in March

2004 alleging that she had been discriminated against on

the basis of race in violation of the Fair Housing Act when

she tried to purchase a home in suburban Chicago. The

defendants are the real estate agents, potential sellers and

others associated with the contested transaction. The

case was initially assigned to District Judge George M.

Marovich. In August 2004, the parties consented, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to proceed before Magistrate Judge

Ian Levin. Judge Levin retired from the bench and the

Executive Committee of the Northern District of Illinois

reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole in

May 2005.

In June 2005, the parties reported to Judge Cole that

they had reached a settlement and were in the process of

finalizing the settlement document. Judge Cole dismissed

the case with leave to reinstate within sixty days and

retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.

In July 2005, the parties returned to Judge Cole filing

cross motions to enforce the settlement agreement.

In a thirty-seven page opinion issued in November 2005,

Judge Cole granted the defendant’s motion to enforce the

agreement and denied the plaintiff’s cross motion. He

concluded that the plaintiff and her attorneys had been

less than honest during the settlement proceeding. Judge

Cole stated that the parties’ intent during the June 2005

settlement was to reach an agreement that covered both

the plaintiff’s claims and her minor children’s potential

claims against the defendants. Although the children

were not parties to the case, the plaintiff referenced

alleged harm to her children in her complaint and during

discovery. As such, the defendants wanted, and Judge Cole

concluded that the plaintiff had agreed to, a global settlement covering both the mother’s actual claims and any
No. 06-2502 3

potential claims by the children. To account for the children’s claims, the settlement required an allocation of the

total settlement amount between the plaintiff and her

children.

The plaintiff and children are residents of the State of

New York. Under New York law, the plaintiff does not

have authority to settle her children’s claims. Instead, a

petition must be brought before the New York Surrogate

Court which makes an independent evaluation of the

children’s claims to insure that the children’s interests

have been fairly represented. Consequently, the settlement agreement required the plaintiff to petition to the

Surrogate Court and obtain approval as a condition of

settlement. The settlement agreement also required the

plaintiff to bear the costs of petitioning the Surrogate

Court.

Judge Cole concluded that the plaintiff and her attorneys

acted improperly in their representations to the defendants during the settlement and in their petition to the

Surrogate Court. According to Judge Cole, the plaintiff

decided that the entire settlement amount should go to

her and none should be allocated to the children. To

achieve this goal, the petition to the Surrogate Court

incorrectly represented that the children had no independent claims and therefore had no interest affected by the

settlement agreement. The language in the settlement

agreement was also altered to make it appear that it did

not cover any potential claims by the children. Judge

Cole concluded that the plaintiff and her attorney had

deceived both the Surrogate Court and the defendants

because the children’s potential claims had been an

integral part of the original settlement. Judge Cole ordered

the plaintiff and her attorneys to make a second petition

to the Surrogate Court and readjust the settlement

agreement to properly reflect the parties’ agreement as to

the children’s potential claims. Judge Cole also met
4 No. 06-2502

informally with the parties and suggested that the defendants be compensated for the attorney’s fees incurred

for enforcing the settlement agreement. The plaintiff

filed a motion for reconsideration a week after the original

opinion but Judge Cole denied the motion.

In April 2006, Judge Cole entered the new settlement

agreement reached by the parties. He again dismissed the

case with leave to reinstate, this time within ninety days,

and also stated that he would retain jurisdiction to enforce

the settlement. Two weeks later, Ms. Matlaw, on her own

behalf and before Judge Marovich, filed objections to the

settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Matlaw objected to Judge

Cole’s findings that she had been dishonest in the settlement proceedings and before the Surrogate Court. She

also argued that the April 2006 settlement had effectively

reduced the amount of attorney’s fees and costs that she

would receive.

Apparently, in light of Judge Cole’s November 2005

order, the parties had allocated a portion of the original

settlement amount to the defendants’ attorney’s fees

incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement. Ms.

Matlaw stated that she was to receive a percentage of the

award received by the plaintiff. Consequently, her fee

amount was reduced under the April 2006 settlement

agreement because the overall amount awarded to the

plaintiff was less. However, the April 2006 settlement

agreement does not mention Ms. Matlaw or any payment

of fees to her. Any agreement between her and the plaintiff relating to fees was done separately and not placed in

the April 2006 settlement agreement.

Judge Marovich issued an order on May 19, 2006

denying Ms. Matlaw’s objections and informing her that

his participation in the case ended when the parties

consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction back in
No. 06-2502 5

August 2004. His order cited 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) and

informed Ms. Matlaw that the appropriate procedure was

a direct appeal to the court of appeals. Ms. Matlaw then

filed a notice of appeal on May 26, 2006 appealing Judge

Marovich’s denial of her Rule 72 objections and Judge

Cole’s November 2005 opinions. Ms. Matlaw presently

characterizes her Rule 72 objections as a Rule 59 motion.

In July 2006, Ms. Matlaw filed a Rule 60 motion before

Judge Cole to amend the April 2006 settlement agreement

arguing that there had been a mutual mistake of fact

and law by the parties. Judge Cole denied Ms. Matlaw’s

Rule 60 motion in August 2006. During the briefing of this

appeal, the defendants filed a motion with this court

arguing that Ms. Matlaw’s appeal is frivolous and that

she should be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 38 of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The defendants

also have a pending motion for sanctions before Judge

Cole.

II. ANALYSIS

Ms. Matlaw seeks to overturn the April 2006 settlement

agreement and Judge Cole’s November 2005 and July 2006

opinions that were critical of her conduct in this case. She

argues that she is able to bring this appeal on her own

behalf because: (1) Judge Cole’s opinions have negatively

affected her reputation, and (2) the April 2006 settlement

agreement has effectively reduced the amount of attorney’s fees and costs she would have otherwise recovered

in this case.

The “general rule [is] that a nonparty cannot challenge

on appeal the rulings of a district court.” Gautreaux v.

Chicago Hous. Auth., 475 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2007)

(citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (per

curiam); B.H. ex rel. Pierce v. Murphy, 984 F.2d 196, 199

(7th Cir. 1993)). We have recognized that an attorney can
6 No. 06-2502

bring an appeal on her own behalf when challenging a

district court decision imposing monetary sanctions on the

attorney, but this rule does not allow an appeal of otherwise critical comments by the district court when no

monetary sanctions have been imposed. Crews & Assoc.,

Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2006);

Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co. Inc., 972 F.2d 817,

820 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d

572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984)). Judge Cole has not imposed a

monetary sanction on Ms. Matlaw in this case and therefore she cannot base her appeal on the alleged damage to

her professional reputation regardless of how harmful

Judge Cole’s comments might have been.

Ms. Matlaw notes that our position of limiting an appeal

to monetary sanctions conflicts with the positions taken

by other circuits. We recognize that other circuits allow

appeals involving critical comments but those circuits

have split among themselves over whether the district

court must formally sanction the attorney to allow the

appeal or whether critical comments by themselves,

without a formal sanction, are sufficient for an appeal. See

Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524,

542-44 (3d Cir. 2007); Bulter v. Biocore Med. Tech., Inc.,

348 F.3d 1163, 1166-69 (10th Cir. 2003); Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1350-53

(Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1998)

(discussing the positions of the various circuits in this

area of law).

We reaffirm our decision that it is appropriate to limit

an appeal to situations involving monetary sanction only.

This limitation on our jurisdiction is based on the realization that allowing appeals by those allegedly harmed by

a judge’s comments, including “[l]awyers, witnesses,

victorious parties, victims, [and] bystanders” would result in a “breathtaking expansion in appellate jurisdic-
No. 06-2502 7

tion.” Bolte, 744 F.2d at 573; see also Hoagland ex rel.

Midwest Transit, Inc. v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von

Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Jurisdictional rules ought to be simple and precise so that

judges and lawyers are spared having to litigate over not

the merits of a legal dispute but where and when those

disputes shall be litigated. The more mechanical the

application of a jurisdictional rule, the better.”) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). Our rule faithfully

adheres to the traditional maxim that as an appellate

court we “review . . . judgments, not statements in opinions.” E.E.O.C. v. Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423, 1431 (7th

Cir. 1996) (quoting Black v. Cutter Lab., 351 U.S. 292, 297

(1956)); see, e.g., Acevedo v. Canterbury, 457 F.3d 721, 723

(7th Cir. 2006) (“ ‘[W]e review judgments, not opinions.’ ”)

(quoting Rubel v. Pfizer Inc., 361 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir.

2004)). Finally, as we recognized in Bolte, an attorney

who believes that she has been wronged is not without a

remedy because a petition for a writ of mandamus is

available. 744 F.2d at 573.

Ms. Matlaw’s other argument for standing is that she

has effectively lost money in this case because the April

2006 settlement agreement resulted in reducing the

amount of attorney’s fees that she was otherwise to

receive. However, her claim to attorney’s fees was not

spelled out in the settlement agreement and it was

plaintiff Seymour’s actions in this case that resulted in the

April 2006 settlement and the alleged reduction in Ms.

Matlaw’s attorney’s fees. Thus, any dispute over whether

Seymour’s actions breached the client agreement is

between Seymour and Ms. Matlaw. This is a traditional

contract claim that should be brought in another proceeding. There is no need for the district court to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over this dispute because the

original federal claims have already been dismissed. See

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc.,
8 No. 06-2502

72 F.3d 1294, 1298-1301 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting a district

court’s ability to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

a fee dispute between an attorney and client when the

agreement to award attorney’s fees is codified in the

settlement agreement).

Finally, we note the defendant’s pending Rule 38 motion

for sanctions. A pending motion for sanctions is also before

Judge Cole. We conclude that it is better to allow Judge

Cole to evaluate that motion first and therefore we deny

the defendants’ Rule 38 motion. We also note our view

that it is in the best interest of all involved that this

case be at an end.

III. CONCLUSION

The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The

defendant’s motion for sanctions of June 23, 2006 is

denied.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—5-3-07