Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1421 | December 9, 2020 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Christa K. Kumming

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Lee Rich,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 9, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-1421

Appeal from the Vigo Superior 

Court

The Honorable John T. Roach, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

84D01-1808-F4-2925

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1421 | December 9, 2020 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] Michael Lee Rich (“Rich”) was serving a sentence through community 

corrections when the State filed a petition alleging that Rich violated the terms

of his placement. After Rich admitted to violating several terms, the trial court

revoked his placement and ordered Rich to serve the balance of his sentence in 

the Indiana Department of Correction (the “DOC”). Rich now appeals, 

arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his placement.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Rich received a five-year sentence for Burglary.

1

 The court ordered him to serve 

the time in community corrections and authorized placement on work release.

[4] In October 2019, Rich was placed on work release. In February 2020, the State 

filed a petition alleging that Rich violated the terms of work release by (1) 

possessing cigarettes in November 2019; (2) failing to report his location for 

more than four hours in December 2019; (3) being in an unauthorized area on 

more than one occasion; (4) testing positive for THC on January 2, 2020; (5)

testing positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and THC on January 

1 At a combined sentencing hearing, Rich received a separate five-year sentence in a different cause that was 

imposed consecutively to the instant sentence. At times, the record refers to an aggregate sentence of ten 

years. Because the appealed order ultimately affected only the instant sentence, we focus on that sentence.
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10, 2020; (6) possessing a lighter in February 2020; (7) possessing a “green leafy 

synthetic lookalike substance” in February 2020; (8) failing to pay fees; and (9)

absconding from work release on February 21, 2020. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 

at 153. The State asked the trial court to revoke Rich’s placement and order

Rich to serve the balance of his sentence in the Vigo County Jail or the DOC.

[5] At a July 2020 hearing, Rich denied that he absconded from placement but 

otherwise admitted to the allegations. The court found that Rich violated the 

rules and inquired about evidence “as to disposition.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. The 

parties then presented evidence and argument. Among the evidence was 

testimony that Rich absconded on February 21, 2020, the day the State filed the 

petition. The State argued that the evidence “show[s] that [Rich] is clearly a 

poor candidate for any type of [c]ommunity [c]orrections in the future.” Id. at 

19. The court ultimately decided to revoke Rich’s placement, ordering Rich to 

serve the balance of his sentence in the DOC. The court recommended that 

Rich be placed in the Purposeful Incarceration program and noted that it would 

consider a sentence modification upon successful completion of the program.

[6] Rich now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] “Both probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to 

commitment to the [DOC] and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial 

court.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999). Because of similarities 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1421 | December 9, 2020 Page 4 of 7

between community corrections and probation, the “standard of review for

revocation of a community corrections placement is the same standard as for a 

probation revocation.” Bennett v. State, 119 N.E.3d 1057, 1058 (Ind. 2019). 

That is, we review for an abuse of discretion, which occurs “when the decision 

is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[8] The trial court has broad discretion to revoke an alternative placement. See Cox, 

706 N.E.2d at 549-50. Indeed, as the Indiana Supreme Court has observed,

“judges must have the ability to move with alacrity to protect public safety 

when adjudicated offenders violate the conditions of their sentences. Put 

differently, obstacles to revoking an alternative sentence may diminish the 

likelihood of community corrections placements being made in the first place.” 

Id. at 550. Furthermore, a defendant “is not entitled to serve a sentence in 

either probation or a community corrections program. Rather, placement in 

either is a ‘matter of grace’ and a ‘conditional liberty that is a favor, not a 

right.’” Id. at 549 (quoting Million v. State, 646 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1995)). Ultimately, once a trial court has “exercised its grace” and ordered an 

alternative placement, the trial court “should have considerable leeway in 

deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007).

[9] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-5(b), if a person on community 

corrections “violates the terms of the placement, the [State] may request that 

the court revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail or [the 

DOC] for the remainder of the person’s sentence.” It is implicit, then, that the 
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court has inherent authority to grant the State’s request.

2 See Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 

550 (noting that flexibility in revocation procedures is “necessary to permit the 

court to exercise its inherent power to enforce obedience to its lawful orders”); 

Flowers v. State, 101 N.E.3d 242, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that a court 

may grant a request to revoke the placement and “consider[] other alternatives

as well”). Generally, revocation is a two-step process whereby the court must 

first identify a violation of the terms, then it must “determine if the violation 

warrants revocation[.]” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008).

[10] Rich does not dispute that he violated the terms of work release. Rather, he 

challenges the decision to revoke his placement for violating those terms.

3

 In 

challenging his placement in the DOC, Rich argues that he struggled with 

substance abuse and was undergoing stress. He notes that his younger brother 

had been diagnosed with cancer and that Rich was soon to be the father of 

twins—stressors that led to a “backslide with sobriety.” Br. of Appellant at 10.

2 The statute pertaining to revoking probation enumerates actions a court may take upon the State’s request. 

See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (stating that, upon finding that a person violated a condition of probation, the 

court may continue the person on probation, extend the probationary period, or order execution of all or part 

of a suspended sentence). However, the statute pertaining to revoking placement in community corrections

does not contain similar language regarding the court’s authority. Compare id. with I.C. § 35-38-2.6-5; see 

Breda v. State, 142 N.E.3d 482, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (discussing the effect of a 2015 amendment).

3 Among Rich’s contentions is that, before revoking his placement for a failure to pay fees, the court should 

have inquired into the reason for the failure to pay. Because Rich admitted to violating other terms, we need 

not address this issue and will instead base our analysis on other admitted violations. See Jaynes v. State, 437 

N.E.2d 137, 140 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (regarding certain grounds for revocation as mere surplusage).
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[11] Rich also points out that he did not admit to the allegation of absconding.

4

 He 

argues that “some of the rule violations were minimal” and “were dealt with 

adequately by the work release facility already.” Id. at 8. Rich asserts that, “for 

each rule violation, [he] received a sanction from the work release center, 

whether it be a verbal warning, increased restrictions on his freedom, or taking 

of his credit time of up to 14 days per violation.” Id. at 11.

[12] Notably, even a single violation supports revoking the placement. See I.C. § 35-

38-2.6-5; cf. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ind. 2013) (“[P]robation may 

be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition.”); Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 

550 (noting that “judges must have the ability to move with alacrity . . . when 

adjudicated offenders violate the conditions of their sentences”). Although 

there is evidence that Rich was undergoing stress, he was nevertheless bound by 

the terms of work release. Shortly after being granted this conditional liberty, 

Rich repeatedly violated the terms. Indeed, Rich failed to report his location for 

several hours. He entered unauthorized areas on more than one occasion. He 

also tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and THC. 

Although Rich characterizes some violations as minimal, he displayed a pattern 

of violating the terms. Moreover, Rich continued to violate the terms even after 

the work release center imposed less-severe consequences. In light of Rich’s 

4 Rich asserts that it is unclear whether the trial court found a violation for absconding, so it would be 

improper to base the revocation on absconding. The testimony about absconding was presented after the 

court found a violation and had turned to evidence “as to disposition.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. We note that

revocation procedures “are to be flexible.” Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550. In any case, we need not address this 

issue and will instead base our opinion only on the admitted violations. See Jaynes, 437 N.E.2d at 140 n.3.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1421 | December 9, 2020 Page 7 of 7

ongoing disobedience, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by 

revoking the placement and ordering Rich to serve his sentence in the DOC.

[13] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.