### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 7, 200 6 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. SHA D T AN KER SLEY
Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 05-04302 Art hur T. B ennett, Judge

No. W2005-02901-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled April 30, 2007

Th e Ap pe lla

nt, Sha d Ta

nk e rs ly , wa s f

ound g uil ty of vio la tin g his pr ob a tio n a

nd or de re d to se rv e his sentenc e in incar cer ation. On appeal, he challeng es t he trial court’s decision to revoke probation, asking this Court t o deter mine whether

a wa rra nt is required to initiate a pr obation revoc ation proce eding and toll the time limi tation within which to revoke pr obation. We hold that T.C.A. § 40- 35-311 plainly

require s the issuance of a war rant to initi ate a

probation re vocation proc eeding , and, that in the absenc e of the issuance of a wa rra nt during the probationary period, a s is the case her e, the re is n o to lli ngof

the pe ri od

. Th e re fo re , w e re ve rs e and re mand the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s R e ve r se d and Re m ande d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

C l a i r b o r n e H

. F e r g u s o n , M e mp h i s , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e a p p e l l an t , S h a d

T an k e r s l e y.
Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; J. Ross Dy er, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Willi a m L . G ibb on s, Di str ic t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, a

nd L e e Cof fe e , A ss i s t a

nt D i s tr ic t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

The followingfac ts are undisputed. On Dec ember 18, 2003, the Shelby

County Gra nd J ury re tur ne d a thr e e c ou nt ind ic tme nt a g a ins t th e Ap pe lla nt, c ha rg inghim

wi th b ri be ry

of a pu bli c se rv ant a nd tw o c ounts of

of fi c ia l mis c on du c t. O n N ov e mbe r 1 6, 20 04 , th e Ap pe lla nt p le d g uil ty to one count of attempted officia l misconduct. I n exchang e for his gu i l t y

plea, the A

ppellant-2-

rec eived a

sentenc e of e leven months a nd twenty -nine da

y s. The trial c ourt suspended the sentenc e and plac ed the Appe llant on probation. The r emaining char g es we re dismissed.

On J une 30, 2005, the Shelby County Gra nd J ury indicted the Appellant for at t empt ed aggr av at ed ra p e. F rom the re cord, it appe ars that the e vents which led to the indictment for attempted ag g ravated ra

pe took place in 2003, prior to the Appellant being place d on probation for
a tte mpt e d o ff

ic ia l mi sc on du c t. B e c a

us e of the tim ingof

the ind ic tme nts and

the g uil ty ple a , th e Sta te did not seek to revoke the Appellant’ s probation. The A ppellant was r elea sed on bond.

On Octobe r 24, 2005, a hara ssment c omplaint wa s filed ag ainst the Appellant and a w arr ant
wa s is su e d f

or his arr e st. On

Oc tob e r 2 5, 20 05 , the Ap pe lla nt a pp e are d in

c ourt in c on jun c tio n w ith the attempted a g g ravated rape charg e. During that hear ing, the State informed de fense counsel of the har assment complaint and wa rra nt for the Appe llant’s arr est. As a re sult of the new c harg e, the tr ia l c ourt c ho se to re vo ke the Ap pe lla nt’ s b on d o n th e ra

pe c ha rg e . T he Ap pe lla

nt w a s ta ke n in to custody at that time.

On Octobe r 28, 2 005, the Appellant a ppear ed with his counsel to be a rra igne d on the ra

pe c ha rg e s. Duri ngthat he ari ng , th e S tat e inf or me d th e Ap pe lla

nt o f i ts i nte nt t o f

ile a pe tit ion to revoke his probation.
On November 7, 2005, t he Appe llant ag ain appe are d in court and pe titioned the trial court to reinstate his bond. At the beginning of t he hearing , the State serve d the Appellant a nd his counsel wi t h a c o p y

o f t h e p et i t i o nt o re v o k e p ro b at i o nt h at h adb ee nfi l edwi t h t h e c o u rt t h at m o rn i n g. Counsel for the Appe llant noted that “[b] ut f or the State’s f

iling today , [t he Appe llant’s probation]
wo uld have e xpir e d N ov e mbe r 1 6

. We kn ow no w that the fi lin g - that the lim itatio ns on that ti me th pe ri od are g oin g to be tol le d. ” At the c on c lus ion

of the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d th e re qu e st t o reinstate bond a

nd set a date for a hear ing on the petition to re voke the Appe llant’s probation. No probation violation warr ant was e ver issued.

On Novembe r 17, 2005, the trial c ourt held a he aringon the State’s petition to revoke the Appellant’s pr obation. At the hea ring , counsel for

the Appellant objec ted to the re vocation petition, arguing that t h e p ro b at i o nary period ha d run. The A

ppellant ar g ued that bec ause no w arr ant was
ev er fi l ed , t h e p ro b at i o n ary

p er i o d wa s n ev er

t o l l edan d

h adex p i re d

p ri o r t o t h e h ea ri n g. Consequently , the Appellant a rg ued, the tria l court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation. T h e t r i a l c o u rtd i s a g r e e d , d e t e r m i n i n g t h a tt h e p e t i t i o nw a s f i l e d w h i l e t h e A p p e l l an tw a s i nc u s t o dy, neg ating the nece ssity of the filing of a war rant. The trial c ourt also deter mined that the Appellant
was on notice because he was persona lly serve d with a copy of t he petiti on. At the conc lusion of the hear ing, the trial co u rt re v oked the Appe llant’s probation. The A ppellant filed a

timely notice of
a pp e a l.

An a ly sis-3-

On a pp e a l, t he Ap pe lla

nt c omp la ins tha

t th e tr ia l c ourt wa s wi tho ut jur isd ic tio n to re vo ke his p r o b a t i o nb e c a

u s e t h e r e w a s n o w ar

r an tf i l e d i na c c o r d an c e w i t h T

. C

. A

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 3 1 1

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, the Appellant c ont en d s t h at beca use “no w arr ant was e ver issued a nd the cour

t revoke d the
su s p e n d e d s e n te n c e a f

te r th e r u n n in g o f th e p r o b a ti o n ar y p e r io d ” th e tr ia l c o u rt w a s without jurisdiction to revoke the Appellant’s probation and order him to serve his sentence in incarc eration. The State disag ree s, arguing that beca use the Appellant was in c ustody and befor e the c ourt at the time the petition to revoke his probation was filed, t here was no nece ssity for a war rant to proc ure the Appellant’ s prese nce. I n other wor ds, the Appellant re ceive d notice of the probation re vocation proce eding s beca

use he w as per s o n ally

serve d with the petition to revoke probation in open court and the pe tition t olled the running of the probationary period. Fur ther, the State contends that the Ap pe lla nt c on se nte d to the tol lin g of the pr ob a tio na

ry pe ri od by a c c e pti ngse rv ic e of

the pe tit ion

in court.
The rec ord establishes that the State filed a petition to revoke the A

ppellant’s probation on November

7, 2005, prior to the expiration of the Appe llant’s probationar y period a nd that the petition was pe rsonally

serve d on the Appellant in cour t on that date while he was in custody on other char g es. The undisputed fac ts f urther show that there was never a probation violation warrant issued in this case. The Appellant’s pr obationary period wa s set to expi re on November 16, 2005. The hear ing on the probation revoc ation petition wa s held on November 17, 2005, afte r the Appe llant’s prob ati onary

period e x pired. Conseque ntly , in order to de termine whe ther the tria l court had jurisdiction to re voke the Appe llant’s probation af ter the e x piration of his probationar y period, we must determine whe ther the issuanc e of a war rant is the exclusive method for tolling the probationar

y period a nd initiating a r evocation procee ding.
T.C.A. § 40-35-311 provides the procedure to revoke a suspended sentenc e or pr obation and pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: (a) Whenever

it comes to the attention of the trial judge that any defe ndant, who has been r elea sed upon suspension of sente nce, ha s been guilty of any brea ch of the laws of this State or has violated the conditions of probation, the trial judg e shall have the power to cause to be is sued under such t rial j udg e’s hand a warra nt for the arre st of such defendant as in any other criminal case . Reg ardle ss of whethe r the de fenda nt i s o np r o b a t i o n f

o r a m i s d e m e an o r o r a f

e l o n y, o r w h e t h e r

t h e w ar r an ti s i s s u e d

b y a g ener al sessions court judg e or the judge of a court of rec ord, such war rant may be
exec u te d b y a p r o b a ti o no f

f ic e r o r an y p e a c e o f f ic e r o f th e c o u n ty

in w h ic h the probationer

is found. T.C.A. § 40-35-311( a) ( emphasis adde d).

“‘The most basic principle of statutory construction is to asce rtain and give eff ect to the leg islative intent without undul y restric ting or

expanding a

statute’s coverag e beyond its int ended scope.’ ” Carte r v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Te n n

. 1 9 9 5 )). “L eg islative intent and purpose is to be a scer tained primar ily

from the-4-

natura l and ordinar

y meaningof the languag e used, w ithout a fo rc ed o r subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaningof the languag e.” I d. We should “assume that the leg islature
us e d e a c h wo rd

in t he statut e purp os e ly

and that th e us e of

[ea c h] w or d c on ve y e d s ome int e nt. ” State v. L evandow ski, 955 S.W .2d 603, 604 (Tenn. 1997)

. L egis lative intent must be derived f rom the plain and ordina

ry meaningof the statutory lang uag e if the statute is de void of ambig uity . Mooney
v. Sneed, 30 S.W .3d 304, 306 (Tenn. 2000). When the l ang uag e is ambig uous, the entire statutory scheme must be examined to deter mine leg islative intent a

nd purpose. Fr eema

n v. Marc o Transp. Co., 27 S.W .3d 909, 911 (Tenn. 2000) . Moreove r, an ambiguity in a cr iminal statute is construed in favor o f t h e d efendant. L evandow ski, 955 S.W .2d at 604. I ssues of statutory construction ar e questions of law reviewe d de novo without a pre sumption of corre ctness. Walls, 62 S.W .3d at 119.

There fore , looking at the unambig uous lan gu age of the statute, it appea

rs that the cle ar intention of the leg islature was to require the i ssuance of a warr ant for the arr est of a de fenda nt who has committed a proba

tion violation i n order

to initi ate the pr ocedur e to re voke probation.

I n State v. Anthony , 109 S.W .3d 377, 381-82 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2 0 0 1 ), this Court deter mined that “the e x piration of a term of probation is stay ed by the filing of a violation warra nt [rather than a probation violation r eport] a nd the probationar

y term rema ins in e ffe ct until the trial
c ourt ru le s on the vio la tio n wa

rr ant. ” I n An tho ny , the a

pp e lla nt ple d g uil ty

to t wo c ha rg e s, on e wi th
a six -y ear term and one with a two- y ear term, to be ser

ved conse cutively . The a

ppellant was or dere d to serve six mont hs in incarc eration and the balanc e of the sentenc e on probation. After se vera l probation violation repor

ts were filed, the trial court issued an arrest warra nt for the a

ppellant. The appellant a dmitted the violation, but wa s returne d to probation. Severa l additional probation violation reports we re f

iled ag ainst the appellant and eventua lly a second probation violation warra nt
wa s is su e d f

or the a pp e lla nt’ s arr e st. Th e tr ia l c ou rt re vo ke d th e a

pp e lla nt’ s p ro batio n o n b oth
c ha rg e s, or de ri ng the a

pp e lla nt t o s e rv e the e nti re e ig ht- y e ar s e nte nc e in i nc arc e ra tio n. On a pp e a l, the appe llant argued that his six -y ear sentenc e had e x pired prior to the issuance of the second w arr ant
and , a s a re su lt, the tr ia l c ourt

on ly ha d the a uth or ity to or de r him to se rv e the tw o- y e ar s e nte nc e in incar cer ation. This Court ag ree d, deter mining that the wa

rra nt, rather than the probation violation repor t tolled the statute of limitations for probation revoc ation. The fir st warr ant was f iled during the six -y ear sentenc e, but the sec ond war rant wa s not filed until after the e x piration of the a ppellant’s six- y e ar s e nte nc e

. Con se qu e ntl y , thi s Cou rt de te rm ine d that the tr ia l c ourt on ly ha d the a uth or ity to revoke the appe llant’s probation on the two-y ear sentenc e. I d. at 381-82.
Thus, acc ording to Anthony , it appear s that althoug h a petition to revoke probation and/or actua l notice of the r evoca tion p ro ce ed i n g s may

satisfy due proc ess conc erns in re vocation of probation proc eeding s, only a wa rra nt will tol l the probationar y period.. See I d.

We n ote , h ow e ve r, t hat in S ta te v. L e wi s, 91 7 S. W.2 d 2 51 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ), thi s Court held:

Th e tr ia l c ourt

may e xer c ise its a

uth or ity ov e r a su sp e nd ed sen ten ce “ a t any tim e within the max i m u m time which was dire cted a nd order ed by

the cour t for suchT

. C

. A

. § 40

- 21

- 10 7, en t i t l ed “ P r ocedur e t o re voke s us pens i on or probat i on, ” wa s r epeal ed by 198 9 T enn es s ee 1 Publ i c Act c h apt er 591 s ec t i on 7 a n d r epl ac ed by t h e Cr i mi n al Se n t en ci n g Ref or m Act of 1989 wi t h T

. C. A. § 40- 35- 311, t he st at ut e at i ss ue herei n.
-5- su sp e ns ion .” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 40 -3 5- 31 0. I f a pe tit ion to r e vo ke is i nit ia te d w ith in the term of the sentenc e, any limit ation of the time within which to ac t is tol led.

I d. a t 25 6. Thus , in

L e wi s, thi s Co ur

t ind ic a te d that the fi lin g of a pe tit ion to r e vo ke tol ls t

he tim e limit ation for r evocation of probation. However in L ewis, this Court based its decision on State v. Carden, 653 S.W .2d 753 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), and S tate v. McG uire, 292 S.W.2d 190 (Tenn. 1956). In both Carden and McGuire , revoc ation of probation was permitted eve n afte r the e x piration of the pro b ati onary

period whe re the defe ndant had a ctual notice of the proc eeding s prior to the expiration of t he probationary period. See Carden, 653 S.W.2d at 754-55; McGuire , 292 S.W .2d at 192-93. At the time that Ca rden and McGuire wer e decide d, howeve r, T

. C

. A. § 4 0 -21-107, 1 pre s c r ib e d

th e p r o c e d

ure to re voke suspension or pr obation that statute clea rly indicated that issuanc e o f a narre s twa rr an twa s n o tt h e e x cl u s i v e m e a n s fo r i n i t i at i n g a p ro b at i o nre v o ca t i o np ro ce ed i n g. I n fac t, T.C.A. § 40-21-107 provide d that a defe ndant could be a rre sted for a

violation of probation with or without a war

rant. Spec ifically , T.C.A. § 40-21-107 state d:

Whenever

it shall come to the attention of the trial judg e that any defe ndant who has been r elea sed upon suspension of sente nce ha s been guilty of any brea ch of the laws of thi s state or wh o ha s vio la te d th e c on dit ion s o f h is p ro batio n, the tr ia l ju dg e sh a ll have the power

in his discretion to cause to be issued under his hand a war rant for the
arr est of such de fenda

nt as in any

other c riminal case . Said w arr ant may be executed by a probation or parole of fice r or an y peac e off

icer of the c ounty

in which the pr o b a t i o n e r i s f

o u n d

. A n y p r o b a t i o n o r p ar o l e o f f i c e r f o r c a u s e m ay a rr e st a probationer

without a war

rant. (Emphasis adde d).

After revie wing both L ewis and A nthony and the plain lang uag e of T.C.A. § 40-35- 311, we deter mine that the better

rea soning is conta ined in Anthony . When the statute was r ewr itten as part of the Criminal SentencingReform Ac t o f 1 9 8 9 , i t wa s written to provide that the issuanc e of a
wa rr an t was the e x clusive cha rg ing me chanism for

the initiation of a probation re vocation pr oc e e din g . T o a do pt t

he State ’s int e rp re ta tio n of the statut e wo uld re qu ir e thi s Co ur

t to e ff e c tiv e ly
a me nd the statut e . We are un wi lli ng and un a ble to take su c h me a sure s. Any po lic y c on c e rn s w ith the statute should be addressed to the s tate legislature

. Acc ording ly , we conclude that the clea r intent of the leg islature in dea ling with pr obation violations wa s to r equire the issuance of a w arr ant, and the issuance of such a war rant is the only event which tolls the expiration of the probationar y period. Be cause it is undisputed that there was no war rant filed in this case , the Appel l an t ’s p ro bationary period e x pired prior

to the trial court’ s ruling on the petition to revoke probation. Consequently , the tr ia l c ourt wa s w ith ou t juri sd ic tio n to r e vo ke the Ap pe lla nt’ s p ro batio n a

nd or de r t he Ap pe lla

nt t o serve his sentence in incarc eration. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is reve rsed a nd rema nded.-6- Conclusion

For the fore g oing rea sons, the j udg ment of t he trial court is re verse d and re manded f or fur ther proce eding s in acc ordanc e with this opinion.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE