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74–790 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–481 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY 

THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 
(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

KENT CONRAD, North Dakota 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 
(III) 

CONTENTS 

JANUARY 31, 2012 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia .............. 10 

WITNESSES 

Clapper, James R., Director of National Intelligence ........................................... 13 

Petraeus, David, Director, Central Intelligence Agency ....................................... 48 

Olsen, Matthew, Director, National Counterterrorism Center ............................ 51 

Burgess, Lt. General Ronald, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency ................. 52 

Mueller, Robert, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation ................................ 53 

Goldberg, Philip, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 

U.S. State Department ........................................................................................ 55 

Wagner, Caryn, Under Secretary for Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security .......................................................................... 66 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

List of Counterterrorism Arrests in the U.S. in 2011 and 2012 .......................... 2 

Prepared Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment 

of the U.S. Intelligence Community by James R. Clapper ............................... 17 

(1) 

CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL 

SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss, 

Wyden, Udall of Colorado, Snowe, Rockefeller, Conrad, Mikulski, 

Coats, Risch, Blunt, Warner, McCain, Nelson, and Rubio. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets today in open session for our annual Worldwide 

Threat Hearing. 

This hearing provides the Intelligence Community with an opportunity to present to the nation its views of the threats and challenges we face, and for the Committee to ask questions of our intelligence leaders in public. Today is also an opportunity to take stock 

of what has happened in the last year and what we can expect for 

2012. 

Before looking ahead, I want to congratulate the leaders of the 

Intelligence Community before us today, and the tens of thousands 

of civilian and military intelligence professionals they represent. 

Through their efforts, 2011 was a year of numerous major intelligence successes, including, first and foremost, the operation that 

located and killed Osama bin Laden. 

This past year also saw the removal of top terrorist leaders, plotters and recruiters, including Anwar al-Awlaki, in Yemen; alQa’ida’s linchpin in Pakistan, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman; and numerous others, resulting in the disruption of specific terrorist plots, 

and casting into disarray al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership. 

Closer to home, since our hearing last year, there were at least 

twenty individuals arrested in the United States on terrorism-related charges in seventeen different investigations, which stopped 

them from carrying out or assisting in attacks on the Homeland. 

In the interest of time, I will put a list that describes each of these 

arrests in the record. 

[The List of Counterterrorism Arrests in the U.S. in 2011 and 

2012 follows:] 
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Chairman FEINSTEIN. Arrests like these are the product of coordination between the FBI, other intelligence agencies, the Department of Homeland Security, and state and local law enforcement units throughout the country. 

Also in 2011, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the DEA; 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBI; the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA; and others combined to identify and 

thwart an Iranian plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United 

States, a plot so unusual and amateurish that many initially 

doubted that Iran was responsible. Well, let me state for the 

record, I have no such doubts. 

Finally, the Intelligence Community supported countless United 

States national security and foreign policy actions, including the 

war in Afghanistan, the drawdown in Iraq, the NATO-led mission 

in Libya that removed dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the implementation of sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, the interdictions of weapons of mass destruction shipments, and many, many 

others. Despite the successes, the threats to our nation remain serious, and in many ways, more difficult to understand and even address than in years past. 

The Intelligence Community’s statement for the record, which is 

posted on the Committee’s website and will be summarized by Director Clapper, describes these threats at length. Let me address 

just a few points. 

Terrorism: we are all familiar with the continuing threats posed 

by al-Qa’ida affiliates in Yemen and Somalia, AQAP and alShabaab, as well as that from al-Qa’ida in Iraq, AQI, all three of 

which aspired to conduct attacks outside of their borders. 

I want to mention, with special emphasis, the threat posed by 

the al-Qa’ida affiliate in North Africa, which calls itself al-Qa’ida 

in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM. For the past few 

years, AQIM has been almost an afterthought when discussing the 

terrorist threat. This may be about to change. Recent public 

records point out that AQIM, which has traditionally operated in 

parts of Algeria and Mali, is well positioned to exploit instability 

and pockets of extremism in Libya and Nigeria, and to create new 

safe havens. 

The reports also raised concerns about the tens of millions of dollars AQIM has received from ransom payments for hostages and 

other illicit activities. 

I believe the Intelligence Community needs to move now to be 

prepared to address this possible growing threat. 

Then there is Iran and North Korea. While the overall terrorist 

threat may be down, the threat from the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction from Iran and North Korea is growing. On January 9th, Iran announced that it started enriching uranium at its 

Fordo plant near the city of Qom. According to IAEA reports, Iran 

is enriching uranium to 20 percent, both there and at Natanz. 

IAEA inspectors arrived in Iran over the weekend, and I believe 

they must—and should—have complete access to all Iranian nuclear facilities, and I asked that they make their findings public on 

a regular basis so the world will clearly understand what is happening there. 
9 

According to most timelines I’ve heard, 2012 will be a critical 

year for preventing Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon. In 

North Korea, there is now a 28-year-old dictator ruling over the 

country’s cache of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, which 

should concern us deeply. 

Recently, this Committee received an update from the Intelligence Community on the threat North Korea poses, and it was 

quite sobering. I won’t go into any details, because they’re classified, but I strongly believe this will need to be an area where the 

Intelligence Community continues to focus its resources and attention. 

I think we all know the threat from Cyber. We all know the need 

to pass some legislation in this regard, and we know that the intrusions could be enormous—take down a dam, take down our electric 

grid—and United States companies have cost untold billions of dollars annually. China and Russia have both been named as aggressive and persistent cyber thieves. 

In Afghanistan, the surge of U.S. forces that began in ’09 has 

produced meaningful gains. That said, I think we’re all very concerned about what will happen in 2014 when we reduce our troop 

commitment, and President Karzai’s term is up. Frankly, I don’t 

see a viable strategy for continuing the level of security and stability that we are building after 2014. And I’m also concerned by 

what appears to be a disparity between the discussion of Afghanistan in Director Clapper’s statement for the record, and the bleaker 

description in the December 2011 NIE. 

The Director’s statement notes modest improvements in the challenges that remain. While I’m unable to describe the NIE, as it remains a classified document, news reports of the NIE describe it 

as ‘‘sobering’’ and ‘‘dire’’—those words in quotes—and includes 

phrases like ‘‘mired in stalemate.’’ 

So I would like to ask the witnesses how they assess how stable 

Afghanistan will be in 2012, as well as 2014 and beyond. 

I also want to note that last week I met with Zarar Ahmad 

Osmani, the Afghan Minister of Counter Narcotics, and I was very 

impressed. I believe he’s making good progress in Afghanistan, and 

we should be supportive of his efforts to replicate the Helmand food 

zone in five other provinces to help farmers grow alternative crops 

instead of the heroin poppy. 

Of course, Pakistan remains a huge problem, and I would very 

much appreciate your views on Pakistan’s willingness to be a partner in our efforts against terrorists and in Afghanistan, as well as 

whether the civilian government can survive in light of other political controversies. 

There are a couple of things I want to add, and I’m not sure this 

is a good place, but I’m going to do it anyway. 

In this morning’s edition of the Los Angeles Times, there was an 

article asserting that CIA Director David Petraeus has been inaccessible and guarded in his interactions with Congress and with 

the intelligence committees, in particular, since being sworn in last 

September. As far as I’m concerned, nothing could be farther from 

the truth. And I believe the Ranking Member—the Vice Chairman—would agree with that. 
10 

I spoke to the reporter last Friday and made very clear to him 

that this has not been my experience or, to the best of my knowledge, the Members’ of this Committee. If it had been, I would have 

heard. Director Petraeus has appeared before us every month since 

becoming Director, and the Vice Chairman and I have had several 

phone calls and other meetings with him. He has upheld his obligation to keep the Committee fully and currently informed, and I regret that some people felt the need to engage in anonymous complaints. 

I would also like to say that once again, this Committee has been 

put in a difficult position of trying to avoid any mention of classified matters when various parts of the Executive Branch may be 

doing somewhat the opposite. I ask Members to be careful in their 

questions and statements, and to remember that public discussion 

of some intelligence programs and assets can lead to them being 

compromised. 

On the particular issue of drone strikes, I will only say what I 

was cleared to say in our joint hearing with the House Intelligence 

Committee last September. There’s no issue that receives more attention and oversight from this Committee than the United States 

counterterrorism efforts going on along the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border. These efforts are extremely precise and carefully executed 

and are the most effective tools we have. Noncombatant casualties 

are kept to an absolute minimum. 

So now, if I may, Mr. Vice Chairman, I want you to know it’s 

been a great pleasure for me to work with you. I also want the public to know that together, your side and our side have been able 

to pass three Intelligence Authorization Bills by unanimous consent in both houses. And it’s just been a great pleasure for me to 

work with you. If you have some comments, if you would make 

them now, and then I’ll introduce the speakers. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Very good. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

And let me just echo the same sentiment to you with respect to our 

working relationship. It has been pretty seamless, both at a personal level at the top, as well as with our staff. I thank you for the 

way that you have integrated me into the vice chairmanship over 

this past year, and I look forward to continuing to work in a very 

close way with you. And also, I like your California wine, by the 

way. 

I join the Chairwoman in welcoming our guests today. And this 

is certainly the brain trust of the Intelligence Community, and 

there’s an awful lot of experience here. There’s also an awful lot of 

talent at the table. But I’ll comment more on the brave men and 

women that work for you, and the great job that they’re doing. 

The Committee holds most all of our meetings in closed session, 

so this annual threat hearing is one of the only opportunities we 

have to discuss in public the threats that face our nation. 

It’s also one of the few opportunities we do get to extend our public thanks to the men and women of the Intelligence Community. 

Because of the hard work of the folks who work for each of you, 

2011 was a great year for the Intelligence Community, a year when 
11 

we finally saw the realization of a decade of work to ensure that 

Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki will never again threaten 

this nation. I’m glad to say that we will no longer have an annual 

threat hearing where someone asks the question, ‘‘Where is Osama 

bin Laden?’’ 

Last year’s successes were no small achievement. They resulted 

from transformation and improvement in every IC agency. In particular, I am impressed by the work being done by CIA’s Counterterrorism operators and analysts working together to take down 

terrorists and their network. We have heard from these officers in 

countless briefings that core al-Qa’ida is essentially on the ropes, 

as long as we continue sustained CT pressure on the group. 

Director Clapper, this exact same sentiment is expressed in your 

written statement for the record for today’s hearing. I know I am 

not alone on this panel in believing that we must continue whatever level of pressure it takes to degrade core al-Qa’ida once and 

for all. As we are seeing in Iraq, gains that took a decade to 

achieve can erode quickly if we do not do what it takes to protect 

them. 

I also hope we are learning from other lessons from Iraq. I was 

dismayed by the Administration’s decision to hand over custody of 

Hezbollah operative Ali Mussa Daqduq to Iraq last year. It is too 

late now to prevent what I believe will result in the ultimate release of a terrorist who killed five American soldiers in Iraq. But 

it is not too late to make sure that the same thing does not happen 

with the hundreds of terrorists still in detention in Afghanistan. 

I hope our witnesses can discuss the range of likely threats posed 

by these detainees and the role of the Community in providing intelligence and support of planning for any handover of detention facilities to Afghans. I understand that this is going to be a challenge 

because the Administration still lacks a long-term detention policy, 

but we just cannot keep letting dangerous detainees go free. 

This brings me to my last point. Press reports have outlined the 

Administration’s plans to trade prisoners detained at Guantanamo 

Bay to the Taliban as a confidence-building measure. It appears 

from these reports that in exchange for transferring detainees who 

have been determined to be too dangerous to transfer by the Administration’s own Guantanamo Review Task Force, we get little to 

nothing in return. Apparently, the Taliban will not have to stop 

fighting our troops, and won’t even have to stop bombing them 

with IEDs. 

I have also heard nothing from the IC that suggests that the assessments on the threat posed by these detainees have changed. I 

want to state publicly, as strongly as I can, that we should not 

transfer these detainees from Guantanamo. Moreover, I believe the 

Community should declassify the intelligence assessments on these 

detainees so that we can have a full and open debate without the 

wisdom of this transfer before it takes place. 

Let me conclude with two other comments. First of all, with respect to the LA Times article, Madam Chair, I did not see that this 

morning, but I want to again state in an unequivocal fashion that 

Director Petraeus has done an outstanding job in service to our 

country in many capacities, as his service in the military would indicate. And during the time that he has been the Director of the 
12 

CIA, you’re exactly right—he has stayed in constant communication with the two of us, and I know with our colleagues on the 

House side. He has been readily available to come to the Committee on a formal and an informal basis, as well as being available at any time for us to have a conversation with. And I’m surprised that there would be any question about that. 

And as we all know, we have the utmost confidence in his leadership, along with the leadership of the entire Community. And there 

has been, again, a seamless transition from Director Panetta to Director Petraeus, and we’re very confident of his leadership. 

One other issue that I want to mention is that following the 

event of September 11, as a Member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressman Jane Harman and I chaired a 

subcommittee on the Intel Committee that did a review of the facts 

leading up the events of September 11. And we issued the first detailed report on the deficiencies within the Intelligence Community 

that led up to September 11. And we were very critical of the Community in one respect, particularly, and that was the lack of the 

sharing of information between our various agencies within the 

Community. 

Director Mueller, you and I have had extensive conversations, 

since you’ve been here longer than any of the rest of the Members 

here, about that issue. And I just want to say that over the past 

decade, the stovepipes that we alluded to in that report have continued to fall. And I would have to say that today, without question, while we still have improvements to be made, that the sharing of information between all of our agencies is at a superior level. 

And Mr. Olsen, I had the privilege, as you know, of visiting with 

your folks at NCTC recently. It was very impressive to not only see 

the improvement from a technology standpoint, but just to see 

every member of the Intelligence Community sitting around a table 

virtually and discussing in real-time the issues that face the Community from a CT standpoint. It’s very impressive. And I commend 

all of you for the great work you’ve done. 

It’s not been easy, and I know sometimes it’s very difficult to put 

aside some of the previous relationships that might have existed. 

But boy, have you all ever done a good job breaking down those 

firewalls and really engaging with every member of the Intelligence 

Community to ensure that we disrupt and interrupt terrorist activity around the world that’s directed at America, Americans, as well 

as other countries and allies around the world. So I commend you 

from that respect. 

I thank you for being here today, and I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Now I’d like to introduce the distinguished panel before us. 

They are: the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, 

who will deliver an opening statement on behalf of the entire Intelligence Community; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 

David Petraeus; Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Ronald Burgess; Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bob Mueller; Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Matthew Olsen; Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence 

and Research, Philip Goldberg; and Under Secretary for Intel-
13 

ligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security, 

Caryn Wagner. Thank you all very much for being here. 

We will now take your statement, Director Clapper, and we will 

then go into 10-minute rounds based on the early-bird rule. 

Director Clapper, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 

INTELLIGENCE 

Director CLAPPER. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss, and distinguished Members of the Committee, for 

inviting us to present the 2012 Worldwide Threat Assessment. 

These remarks and our statement for the record reflect the collective insights of the extraordinary men and women of the United 

States Intelligence Community, whom it is our privilege and honor 

to lead. And on their behalf, I would thank you both for your acknowledgment and recognition of the great work that these men 

and women do all over the world, day in and day out, in many 

cases at some hazard. 

I won’t attempt to cover the full scope of the worldwide threats 

in these brief oral remarks, so I’d like to highlight just some of the 

issues we identified for the coming year. 

Never has there been, in my almost-49-year career in intelligence, a more complex and interdependent array of challenges 

than we face today. Capabilities, technologies, know-how, communications, and environmental forces aren’t confined by borders and 

can trigger transnational disruptions with astonishing speed, as we 

have seen. 

Never before has the Intelligence Community been called upon to 

master such complexity on so many issues in such a resource-constrained environment. We’re rising to the challenge by continuing 

to integrate the Intelligence Community, as you both alluded to, 

taking advantage of new technologies, implementing new efficiencies, and, as always, simply working hard. But, candidly, maintaining the world’s premier intelligence enterprise in the face of 

shrinking budgets will be difficult. We’ll be accepting and managing risk more so than we’ve had to do in the last decade. 

We begin our threat assessment, as we did last year, with the 

global issues of terrorism and proliferation. The Intelligence Community sees the next two to three years as a critical transition 

phase for the terrorist threat, particularly for al-Qa’ida and likeminded groups. 

With Osama bin Laden’s death, the global jihadist movement lost 

its most iconic and inspirational leader. The new al-Qa’ida commander is less charismatic, and the death or capture of prominent 

al-Qa’ida figures has shrunk the group’s top leadership layer. However, even with its degraded capabilities and its focus on smaller, 

simpler plots, al-Qa’ida remains a threat. As long as we sustain the 

pressure on it, we judge that core al-Qa’ida will be of largely symbolic importance to the global jihadist movement. But regional affiliates, as the ones you mentioned, and, to a lesser extent, small 

cells and individuals, will drive the global jihad agenda. 

Proliferation—that is, efforts to develop, acquire, or spread weapons of mass destruction—is also a major global strategic threat. 

Among nation states, Iran’s technical advances, particularly in ura-
14 

nium enrichment, strengthen our assessment that Iran is well capable of producing enough highly-enriched uranium for a weapon, 

if its political leaders, specifically the Supreme Leader himself, 

choose to do so. 

North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, illustrate the 

reach of the North’s proliferation activities. We don’t expect Kim 

Jong-Un, North Korea’s new young leader, to change Pyongyang’s 

policy of attempting to export most of its weapons systems. 

I would note that in this year’s statement for the record, we elevated our discussion of cyber threats to follow terrorism and proliferation. The cyber threat is one of the most challenging ones we 

face, as you alluded. We foresee a cyber environment in which 

emerging technologies are developed and implemented before security responses can be put in place. 

Among state actors, we’re particularly concerned about entities 

within China and Russia conducting intrusions into U.S. computer 

networks and stealing U.S. data. The growing role that non-state 

actors are playing in cyberspace is a great example of the easy access to potentially disruptive and even lethal technology and knowhow by such groups. 

Two of our greatest strategic cyber challenges are, first, definitive real-time attribution of cyber attacks—that is, knowing who 

carried out such attacks and where these perpetrators are located; 

and second, managing the enormous vulnerabilities within the IT 

supply chain for U.S. networks. 

Briefly, looking geographically around the world, during the past 

year in Afghanistan, the Taliban lost some ground, but that was 

mainly in places where the International Security Assistance 

Forces, or ISAF, are concentrated. And the Taliban senior leaders 

continue to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan. 

ISAF’s efforts to partner with Afghan National Security Forces 

are encouraging, but corruption and governance challenges continue to threaten the Afghan forces’ operational effectiveness. Most 

provinces have established basic governance structures, but they 

struggle to provide essential services. The ISAF and the support of 

Afghanistan’s neighbors, notably and particularly Pakistan, will remain essential to sustain the gains that have been achieved. 

And although there’s broad international political support for the 

Afghan government, there are doubts in many capitals, particularly 

in Europe, about how to fund Afghan initiatives after 2014. 

In Iraq, violence and sporadic high-profile attacks continue. 

Prime Minister Maliki’s recent aggressive moves against Sunni political leaders have heightened political tensions. But for now, the 

Sunnis continue to view the political process as the best venue to 

pursue change. 

Elsewhere across the Mideast and North Africa, those pushing 

for change are confronting ruling elites; sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions; lack of experience with democracy; stalled economic 

development; military and security force resistance; and regional 

power rivalries. These are fluid political environments that offer 

openings for extremists to participate much more assertively in political life. States where authoritarian leaders have been toppled, 
15 

like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, have to reconstruct their political 

systems through complex negotiations among competing factions. 

In Syria, regime intransigence and social divisions are prolonging 

internal struggles and could potentially turn domestic upheavals 

into regional crises. In Yemen, although a political transition is underway, the security situation continues to be marred by violence, 

and fragmentation of the country is a real possibility. As the ancient Roman historian Tacitus once observed, ‘‘The best day after 

a bad emperor is the first.’’ After that, I would add, things get very 

problematic. 

The Intelligence Community is also paying close attention to developments across the African continent, throughout the Western 

Hemisphere, Europe, and across Asia. Here, too, few issues are 

self-contained. Virtually every region has a bearing on our key concerns of terrorism, proliferation, cyber security, and instability. 

And throughout the globe wherever there are environmental 

stresses on water, food and natural resources, as well as health 

threats, economic crises and organized crime, we see ripple effects 

around the world and impacts on U.S. interests. 

Amidst these extraordinary challenges, it’s important to remind 

this distinguished body and the American people that in all of our 

work, the U.S. Intelligence Community strives to exemplify American values. We carry out our missions with respect for the Rule 

of Law and the protection of Civil Liberties and Privacy. And that 

pledge leads me to a crucial recommendation on our highest legislative priority this year, and it requires the support of this Committee and both houses of Congress. 

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act, or FAA, 

is set to expire at the end of this year. Title VII of FISA allows the 

Intelligence Community to collect vital information about international terrorists and other important targets overseas. The law 

authorizes the surveillance of non-U.S. persons located overseas 

who are of foreign intelligence importance, meaning they have a 

connection to, or information about, threats such as terrorism or 

proliferation. 

It also provides for comprehensive oversight by all three 

branches of government to protect the privacy and civil liberties of 

U.S. persons. The Department of Justice and my office conduct extensive oversight reviews of these activities and we report to Congress on implementation and compliance twice a year. Intelligence 

collection under FISA produces crucial intelligence that is vital to 

protect the nation against international terrorism and other 

threats. 

We’re always considering whether there are changes that could 

be made to improve the law, but our first priority is reauthorization of these authorities in their current form. We look forward to 

working with you to ensure the speedy enactment of legislation to 

reauthorize the FISA Amendments Act so that there’s no interruption in our ability to use these authorities to protect the American 

people. 

So I’ll end this brief statement where I began. The fiscal environment we face as a nation and in our Intelligence Community will 

require careful identification and management of the challenges 

the IC focuses on, and the risks that we must mutually assume. 
16 

With that, I thank you and the Members of this Committee for 

your dedication to the security of our nation, your support for the 

men and women of the Intelligence Community, and for your attention today. My colleagues and I look forward to your questions and 

our discussion. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, follows:] 
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Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Director Clapper. 

We will begin with 10 minutes and the early-bird rule. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, I think 2012 is going 

to be a critical year for convincing or preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. In Sunday’s New York Times magazine, 

Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman wrote, ‘‘After speaking with 

many senior Israeli leaders and chiefs of the military, and the intelligence, I have come to believe that Israel will indeed strike Iran 

in 2012.’’ 

How do you assess that likelihood and the response from Iran, 

if that happens, that might be forthcoming? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, our hope is that the sanctions, particularly those which have been recently implemented, would have the 

effect of inducing a change in the Iranian policy towards their apparent pursuit of a nuclear capability. Obviously, this is a very sensitive issue right now. We’re doing a lot with the Israelis, working 

together with them. And of course for them, this is, as they have 

characterized, an existential threat. But this is an area that we are 

very, very concerned about. 

And I would be pleased, because of the sensitivities, to discuss 

that in greater detail in a closed session. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, the Vice Chairman and I have just 

met this past week with the Director of Mossad, so that is a classified meeting, but we do know that. I think—and let me ask this 

of you, Director Petraeus—that the world has to know what’s happening. It’s one of the reasons I believe that the IAEA, when they 

go in—well, they’re in Pakistan now, but when they go into 

Fordo—really must make transparent and public what they find 

there, what they see there, so that we know for sure what is happening. 

I think the world is entitled to that, particularly when you have 

a situation where one country views this as an existential threat. 

They believe it’s their survival. They are determined not to let it 

happen. To really get the correct picture on what is happening, I 

think it’s important. Do you have a view on this? 

Director PETRAEUS. I do, Madam Chairman. If I could up front, 

let me also echo Director Clapper’s remarks about thanking you 

and the Vice Chairman for your kind words on the Members of the 

Intelligence Committee on the accomplishments of this past year, 

some of which obviously were of enormous significance, and thanks 

to both of you, as well, for your comments on the Agency efforts 

to keep the Committee fully and currently informed. We’ve worked 

very hard to be accessible to you; I have, personally, my deputy 

and the staff, and we think that the facts reflect that. 

We have worked hard, also, to shorten the time frame from event 

to notification when it comes to Congressional notifications. And 

we’ve also increased those over the last five months, as well. 

Like you, I obviously met with the head of Mossad when he was 

here. That is part of an ongoing dialogue that has also included 

conversations that I’ve had with Prime Minister Netanyahu and 

with Minister Barak; the latter almost on a monthly basis in the 

nearly five months that I’ve been in the job. 

I think it’s very important to note, as the article did in the New 

York Times, the growing concerns that Israel has and that the 
49 

countries in the region have—and indeed, all of us have—about the 

continued activities by Iran along a path that could, if the decision 

is made—as Director Clapper noted in his opening statement—to 

pursue the construction of a nuclear device. 

As both of you noted, Israel does see this possibility as an existential threat to their country. And I think it’s very important to 

keep that perspective in mind as, indeed, analysis is carried out. 

As you noted, the IAEA inspectors are in Iran right now. I believe their past report was a very accurate reflection of the reality 

of the situation on the ground. I think that is the authoritative document when it comes to informing the public, of all the countries 

in the world, of the situation there. 

Iran is supposedly, reportedly, trying to be more open this particular time, perhaps trying to reassure countries as it feels the increased bite of the new sanctions, of the Central Bank of Iran sanction and the reduction in the purchase of oil from some of its key 

customers. And so I look forward, as do others, obviously, to seeing 

what that public report will provide this time, believing, again, 

that it will be, again, the authoritative open source document on 

the program that Iran is pursuing in the nuclear field. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, General Petraeus. 

To me, Pakistan is a very puzzling country. We know that thousands of Pakistanis have been killed by terrorists, and we suspect 

that what Pakistan is doing is trying to essentially—to use a 

vernacular—walk both sides of the street. I think I and most of us 

believe that having a positive relationship with Pakistan, as a nuclear power—a significant nuclear power—is very important. The 

question I have is how do you assess this relationship, which certainly had its low in December and may or may not be improving; 

how do you assess it at this time? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, let me start and I’ll ask Director 

Petraeus to add in. Well, clearly, as you allude to, Chairman Feinstein, this is a challenging relationship, but it’s an important one 

for exactly the reason that you mention, which is Pakistan is a nuclear power. Pakistan and our interests are not always congruent. 

Their existential threat continues to be India. They have also paid 

a huge price because of the militants that they’ve had in their 

country and have suffered literally thousands of casualties in that 

context. 

So sometimes our interests converge, and sometimes they differ. 

But as I would characterize the relationship, it’s crucial that we 

have one and have a positive relationship, even though we’ve gone 

through some trying times. 

Director PETRAEUS. Well, again, the relationship is very important, but the relationship right now is also quite strained. The 

most recent cause of that, of course, is the 26 November border incident between ISAF and Pakistani forces. 

In the Pakistani Parliament, there is a committee that is determining recommendations for the government for the way forward 

with the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. I 

think there’s awareness there, as well, that this is a critically important relationship, that there are areas of considerable mutual 

concern, mutual objectives, while there are also those in which 

there are diverging interests, as Director Clapper noted. 
50 

The activities right now are also complicated, though, because of 

the difficulties in the domestic context there, where there’s a bit of 

tension between the Supreme Court, between the Army Chief and 

the ISI Director, and the government, the President and the Prime 

Minister. That may be calming a bit. There have been signs of that 

in recent days. 

It’s worth noting, by the way, that the former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Haqqani, was allowed to 

leave, and he did arrive in the UAE this morning. Nonetheless, the 

situation, I think as our British colleagues might say, is fraught, 

and it is going to take some time, it’s going to take a lot of diplomacy, engagement, and so forth, to move forward in a relationship 

that’s important to both of our countries. 

I should note that, as a general comment, we believe the relationship between the intelligence services is generally still productive. There is certainly good communication going back and forth. 

And there has been, again, pursuit of important mutual objectives 

between the two services. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you both very much. Mr. Vice 

Chairman? 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Director Clapper, press reports—and I emphasize that—indicate 

that the United States is prepared to trade five Taliban members 

currently detained at Guantanamo as a confidence-building measure in negotiations with the Taliban. 

Now, all five detainees that are named by the press were determined by the current Administration to be—and I quote—‘‘too dangerous to transfer,’’ and are being held as enemy combatants. Now, 

as part of the task force, did the Intelligence Community concur in 

the determinations that these five detainees were too dangerous to 

transfer and should be held as enemy combatants? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I believe that in the original assessments, with which NCTC Director Matt Olsen was involved, that 

was the case. I should say, though, that this proposed so-called 

trade has actually not been decided yet. There’s continued consultation with the Congress. In fact, there will be a session this afternoon with the Senate leadership on this issue. 

And, of course, we are certainly mindful of the provisions in the 

National Defense Authorization Act and the requirement for certifications, and I believe, inherent in that, is continued consultation 

with the Congress on whether or not this would go forward. 

That said, I think the history has been, in almost every case 

where we’ve had hostilities, that at some point in time there are 

negotiations. I don’t think anyone in the Administration harbors 

any illusions about the potential here. And, of course, part and parcel of such a decision, if it were finally made, would be the actual 

determination of where these detainees might go and the conditions in which they would be controlled or surveilled. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Director Olsen, as stated there, you 

did head the Guantanamo review task force that made the determination that these five reported named individuals were too dangerous to transfer. Have you changed your view with respect to 

these detainees? 
51 

Director OLSEN. Vice Chairman, I have not been involved in any 

reviews more recently of those detainees. As you point out, they 

were subject to the review we conducted in 2009 that determined 

that. I believe those were among the 48 who were deemed too dangerous to release and who could not be prosecuted. But I’ve done 

no further review in my current capacity at NCTC. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. So, what you’re saying is that the 

Administration has not asked you for any update of your opinion 

relative to these individuals? 

Director OLSEN. That’s correct. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, sir, I need to inject here, though, that 

in the interagency deliberations, certainly the IC has been asked, 

and we have provided, assessments of the five that are in question. 

So that has been a part of the discussion. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. And has there been a change by the 

Community from the categorizing of these individuals as ‘‘too dangerous to transfer’’? 

Director CLAPPER. We haven’t—no, sir, I don’t believe that under 

normal circumstance—in other words, repatriation to their point of 

origin or their country of origin. This is a little different. This is 

a different condition, though, in terms of the potential for negotiating some form of confidence-building measure with the Taliban. 

And this is very, very preliminary. And, again, no final decision 

has been made. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Let me ask you and Director 

Petraeus, who are very familiar with this—are you comfortable 

with transferring these individuals out of Guantanamo? 

Director CLAPPER. For me, the key would be where they would 

go, the intermediate country where they might be detained, and 

the degree to which they would be surveilled. And that would be 

the key determinant for me. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. And Director Petraeus? 

Director PETRAEUS. Very similar, Vice Chairman. In fact, our analysts did provide assessments of the five and the risks presented 

by various scenarios by which they could be sent somewhere—not 

back to Afghanistan or Pakistan—and then, based on the various 

mitigating measures that could be implemented, to ensure that 

they cannot return to militant activity. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. The Intelligence Community assesses—and, Director Clapper, your statement for the record underscores—that the Taliban remains resilient and capable of challenging U.S. and international goals in Afghanistan. The Community also assesses that Taliban senior leaders continue to enjoy safe 

havens in Pakistan, which enables them to provide strategic direction to the insurgency in Afghanistan without fear for their safety. 

Does the Community assess that Taliban reconciliation is likely 

to have a great deal of success, considering that the group is resilient, maintains the ability to challenge the United States, continues to enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan, and knows the timelines 

under which we plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan? 

Director CLAPPER. I think our assessment is pretty much as you 

stated it, sir. The Taliban remains a resilient, determined adversary. That said, again, I repeat—and I don’t think anybody harbors 

any illusions about it, but I think the position is to at least explore 
52 

the potential for negotiating with them as a part of this overall resolution of the situation in Afghanistan. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. I want to be careful how I ask this, 

and hopefully you can respond in some way with respect to our relationship with Pakistan. The safe havens that do exist have been 

pretty obvious and well-documented publicly. 

How is our relationship with Pakistan at this point in time allowing us to address those safe havens and the cross-border activity that’s taking place there from a Taliban standpoint? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, this is obviously part of the dialogue and 

engagement that Director Petraeus and I have spoken of. And 

clearly, this is a point of discussion with the Pakistanis, and they 

are certainly aware of our concerns. But this is a good example 

where our mutual interests don’t always converge. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Director Petraeus, anything you 

want to add to that? 

Director PETRAEUS. Well, I think, again, the record is obviously 

mixed. There has been progress against some of the extremist elements; in the border regions, in particular. That would include, obviously, al-Qa’ida. When number one, two, and three are removed 

from the picture in a single year, needless to say, that’s a pretty 

significant accomplishment. 

But it’s beyond that. It’s important to note back in October of 

this past year, for example, four of the Top 20 in a single week 

were either captured or killed. And, again, some of this has obviously been undertaken together. 

There has also been progress by our Pakistani partners against 

the elements that have threatened their very existence. We should 

remember that a little over two and a half years ago, it looked as 

if the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani was going to continue to march 

right out of Swat Valley and perhaps into the suburbs of 

Islamabad. They reversed that. They fought very hard. They’ve 

taken very, very significant casualties, and in so doing, they’ve also 

gone after some of the other elements allied with the TTP in the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 

On the other hand, obviously there’s been insufficient pressure 

on the Haqqani Network and some of the other elements—again, 

the allies of al-Qa’ida, such as the Commander Nazir group, the 

IMU, and some others. And then, needless to say, the Afghan 

Taliban has not been pressured sufficiently in the sanctuaries that 

it enjoys in Baluchistan and in other areas, as well. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. General Burgess, you’ve also been integrally involved in this issue relative to the cross-border activity; 

anything you want to add to this? 

General BURGESS. No, sir. In fact, I think Director Petraeus laid 

the line out very well in terms of where things are progressing. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Okay. 

Director Mueller, a month ago the President signed the National 

Defense Authorization Act and issued a signing statement in which 

he outlined his reservations about certain provisions. Regarding 

Section 1022, which mandates military detention for a limited type 

of non-U.S. citizen terrorist, the President stated that he would use 

his waiver authority for entire categories of cases, and would de-
53 

sign implementation procedures to provide maximum flexibility 

and clarity to our counterterrorism professionals. 

Are you aware of any categories of terrorists for whom the President has used, or intends to use, his waiver authority, and if so, 

which ones, and how are the intelligence and law enforcement communities implementing Section 1022 of the NDAA? 

Director MUELLER. Let me start, Mr. Vice Chairman, by saying 

that at the outset, I had reservations in two areas: one was in 

terms of our continued authority to investigate terrorism cases in 

the United States, and that was resolved by the legislation. The 

other part was what happens at the time of the arrest in the 

United States? And the statute provides for the Administration to 

develop a set of procedures that would be applicable to that particular situation. 

Without getting into details, I can say that with the Justice Department and White House, they’re in the process of drafting those 

procedures. I think it’d be premature to talk about any of the specifics because it’s on the drafting stages, but my hope is that as we 

go through and develop these procedures, the remaining concerns 

we have as to what happens at the time of arrest will be resolved. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. I thank you for that comment and 

would just say that, as you know, we had extensive conversations 

between DOJ, the White House, and Congress on this issue as it 

went through that drafting, and I would hope you would continue 

to dialogue with us with regard to the regulations that are ultimately implemented. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Senator Wyden? 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. And let me commend 

you, Madam Chair and Vice Chair, for the way in which you put 

the focus in this Committee in a bipartisan way, and I commend 

you for it. And to all our witnesses at the table, I thank you for 

your outstanding service. This has been an extraordinary year. 

Let me start with you, if I might, Director Clapper, with respect 

to Iran. I’ve come to believe that Iran’s leaders are not going to 

give up their push for a nuclear weapons capability unless they believe it’s going to cost them their hold on power. Do you share that 

assessment? 

Director CLAPPER. Senator Wyden, actually, that comports with 

the Intelligence Community assessment that if the decision is made 

to press on with a nuclear weapon—and there are certain things 

they have not done yet to eventuate that—that this would be based 

on a cost-benefit analysis, starting with the Supreme Leader’s 

world view and the extent to which he thinks that would benefit 

the state of Iran or, conversely, not benefit. 

So that’s, I think, precisely where he is, and it will be done on 

a cost-benefit basis and we don’t believe he’s made that decision 

yet. 

Senator WYDEN. What could convince them, in your view, that 

their hold on power is being undermined by their nuclear effort? 

Director CLAPPER. I think a restive population—because of the 

economic extremis that the country of Iran is incurring. If you look 
54 

at the two indicators that I think are important—the plunging 

value of the rial and the extremely high unemployment rate in 

Iran, I think this could give rise to resentment and discontent 

among the populace. And that’s not to say there haven’t been other 

examples of that elsewhere in the region. 

Senator WYDEN. Now, on another subject, Mr. Director, you referenced a recent report that described how foreign spies, particularly those in China and Russia, are stealing our economic secrets. 

Can you give us some sense of what types of secrets these entities 

in China and Russia are most interested in stealing? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, the report you refer to is a National 

Counterintelligence Executive Report that was issued this fall, 

which called out Russia and China—particularly China—for their 

wholesale plundering, if you will, of intellectual property. And of 

course, they seem most interested in our technology. Obviously, if 

they can save themselves the time and expense of doing R&D on 

their own and just steal it from us, then that works to their benefit. 

So, to the extent that they can penetrate unprotected industry 

networks, which they’ve done, unfortunately – 

Senator WYDEN. Which industry networks, Mr. Director, do you 

think are most vulnerable? 

Director CLAPPER. I think it’s across the board. I think a lot of 

it is driven by what they can get access to. But I think it’s pretty 

much carte blanche; obviously, the more high-tech for them, the 

better. And so this is a serious, serious problem. 

Senator WYDEN. Let me move to a third topic, Mr. Director. In 

your view, could the peaceful revolution in the Arab world have 

happened if repressive governments in the region had been successful in censoring Twitter, Facebook, Internet search engines, and 

electronic communications? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, in some cases they tried to do that. I am 

not sure that the success of these upheavals, if you will, was completely dependent on social media. I think the basic problems in 

this region, particularly economic—repression of political freedoms 

and all that—would have bubbled up anyway. I think the social 

media simply helped fulminate and amplify that resentment when 

people understood it was a large collective. 

So I think the social media certainly facilitated it, but I don’t 

think that without it, it would not have happened. Of course, some 

of the governments reacted to that by their attempts to suppress 

such communications. 

Senator WYDEN. I won’t continue on this because I want to ask 

something of Mr. Goldberg, but I don’t know how the word would 

have gotten out. I mean, if you look, for example, at the way 

phones are tapped in the region and a variety of other approaches, 

I don’t think the word would have gotten out. 

And that’s why I’m going to ask you a question, if I might, Mr. 

Goldberg. As you know, there is discussion now in the Congress 

about whether or not Internet search engines should be involved in 

a censorship approach in terms of dealing with intellectual property, specifically. 

Are you concerned that if that is done here, this could be a precedent, which could make it harder for the State Department to go 
55 

forward, for example, with Secretary Clinton’s Internet Freedom 

Initiative? I’ve come to feel that at a minimum, it would be cited 

as a precedent, that if it’s done here, you could have repressive governments around the world say, ‘‘Look at what goes on in the 

United States, and they’re supposed to be the leader in terms of 

freedom; now we’ll pick up on it.’’ 

Are you concerned that this could possibly be a precedent? 

Director GOLDBERG. I think that we’re always concerned with 

many conflicting strains when policy and legislation is being discussed about the Internet and about how to solve various problems 

with the distribution of information, as well as how to protect private property, as is going on in the Congress at the moment. The 

Secretary of State, Secretary Clinton, has made it very clear that 

Internet freedom is a very important principle and the overriding 

principle as we approach all of these issues. 

And I think when we consider whatever precedent is being set, 

whatever legislation is being considered, that that’s the primary interest that we need to consider. The Administration has spoken 

about online piracy and how to deal with that very serious issue, 

and that this can be done in a way that protects those freedoms, 

but is also not going to change the architecture of the Internet. 

Senator WYDEN. Let me wrap up with you, Director Clapper, on 

an issue that I’d asked about before at this open hearing. General 

Petraeus knows about this. This is the question about the use of 

force in a speech that was given by Mr. Harold Koh, the State Department lawyer. And let me note at the beginning that it’s a matter of public record that the Intelligence Community sometimes 

takes direct action against terrorists, and this direct action sometimes involves the use of lethal force. 

And as you know, Director Koh gave a speech outlining our policy with respect to various terrorist groups. He talked about detention, he talked about the use of unmanned drones, and he noted 

that under U.S. law, the use of force against terrorist groups is permitted by congressional authorization, while under international 

law, it is permitted by America’s right to self-defense. 

But in spite of having asked about this on a number of occasions—and General Petraeus, you know that I, too, share the 

Chair’s view with respect to your working with us here on this 

Committee and your being forthright—I have not been able to get 

an answer to this specific question. And I would like to know 

whether that speech that Mr. Koh gave contained unstated exceptions for intelligence agencies? 

Director CLAPPER. With respect to counterterrorism, it does not. 

So it applies to all components of the government involved in 

counterterrorism, be it military or non-military. 

Senator WYDEN. Are there other exceptions other than counterterrorist activities? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I believe his speech dealt with counterterrorism. 

Senator WYDEN. So you believe that his speech—the text of the 

speech, because this would be important—applies to all agencies? 

It applies to the Intelligence Community? His entire speech, the 

overall thrust of the speech, applies to all of the Intelligence Community? 
56 

Director CLAPPER. With respect to counterterrorism, yes. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Udall? 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Good morning. 

Thanks to all of you for the important work you do. 

Let me start by commenting in a follow-on way on the topic that 

Senator Chambliss mentioned, which was the detainee provisions 

in the NDAA. I want to thank all of you for weighing in and for 

sharing, with the Armed Services Committee and the Senate at 

large, your concerns about the detainee provisions as they were 

proposed. 

We had a spirited debate on the Floor of the Senate for a number 

of days. Senator McCain was very involved, as were a number of 

other Senators. I think it was a valuable debate. It was a worthwhile debate. I think it was the Senate at its best. I’m hopeful that 

the compromises that were put into the final product will work. I’m 

going to continue to monitor what’s happening. I think the debate 

as to whether we ought to be prosecuting and delivering justice 

through the military system versus the Article 3 system is an important one. 

Senator Feinstein and I and others have joined to introduce the 

Due Process Guarantee Act, and I think at the heart of our concerns and the center of our mission is to ensure that Americans 

will not be indefinitely detained. So again, I just want to thank everybody for the engagement and the passion they brought to that 

important debate. 

General Clapper, if I could focus on a particular topic—commercial imagery. I was glad to see your comments at CSIS last week 

that you’re a big believer in commercial imagery. You noted that 

it has the benefit of being unclassified, which is great for sharing 

among our war-fighters at all levels and with our coalition partners 

overseas as well as with non-military users. 

In light of those comments, I’ve become concerned about what 

I’ve been hearing about the steep reductions in Fiscal Year ’13 for 

the Enhanced View Commercial Imagery Program. I understand 

that the White House has requested a requirements review for 

commercial imagery consistent with the new Defense Strategy, and 

that this review may well indicate the need for a shift away from 

the national technical means, given that commercial providers can 

collect imagery at resolutions that meet virtually all of the military’s needs. 

So here’s my question. Do—do you believe that the Fiscal Year 

’13 Enhanced View budget will meet the war-fighters’ needs for unclassified imagery? How will it affect the safety of our war-fighters 

and our capacity to work with our allies? 

Director CLAPPER. Senator, as you alluded to, I am a huge believer in commercial imagery, going back to when I served as thenDirector of NIMA and later NGA in the immediate aftermath of 9/ 

11, and we used a lot of commercial imagery then. It continues to 

be of great value for exactly the reasons you cited. It’s unclassified; 

it can be shared in coalition contexts as well as in domestic disaster relief and the like. 
57 

That said, though, we are looking at some pretty steep budget 

cuts across the board in the Intelligence Community. And as a consequence, commercial imagery will be considered in that broader 

look at where we may have to take reductions, and I am not going 

to single out commercial imagery as the only one. It’s my view that 

not only can we satisfy the military requirements, but all the other 

non-military requirements, as well for commercial imagery, at the 

contemplated level of funding. 

I think it is incumbent on the industry to perhaps come up with 

some innovations and business practices and this sort of thing that 

will help us as we look at a more constrained fiscal environment. 

Senator UDALL. I appreciate your attention to this matter. I 

know many of the other participants today on the panel depend on 

this kind of imagery. My concern, I think—and you share it, I hear 

you implying—is that if you cut too far, you reduce the reach of the 

commercial sector, you may lose skill sets and experts that have 

played an important role, and you create a downward spiral that 

may be hard to reverse if it goes too far. 

Director CLAPPER. Sir, this is a concern we have across the 

board, not just in the commercial imagery industry. But as we 

make reductions, particularly in intelligence, obviously that’s going 

to have some impact on the industrial base across the board. 

Senator UDALL. Let me turn to the Middle East, and perhaps direct this question at General Petraeus and Director Clapper—and 

others on the panel, please feel free to weigh in. 

Syria. Do you assess that the fall of the al-Assad regime is inevitable at this point, or is it still in question? If the regime should 

fall, how do you assess what a post-Assad Syria looks like, both 

near-term and long-term? 

And then what are your thoughts on how Hezbollah and Iran 

would be affected, should the Assad regime fall? 

Director CLAPPER. I personally believe it’s a question of time before Assad falls, but that’s the issue. It could be a long time. I 

think two there are factors here. The protraction of these demonstrations and the opposition continues to be fragmented. But I do 

not see how he can sustain his rule of Syria. And of course, postAssad would be exactly the issue. There is a question about who 

would emerge in a post-Assad situation. 

As far as Iran and Hezbollah, what is transpiring in Syria is, of 

course, of great concern to them. It’s why they are both expending 

great effort, in terms of resources and advice and this sort of thing, 

to try to prop up the Assad regime. 

Senator UDALL. General Petraeus. 

Director PETRAEUS. Yeah, I generally subscribe to that as well. 

The opposition is obviously showing a considerable amount of resilience and indeed is carrying out an increasing level of violence. The 

fact is that Damascus and Aleppo now, two previously relatively 

safe cities, the two biggest, are now seeing violence in their suburbs. 

The initiation of offensive operations by the Bashar al-Assad’s regime to try to push them out of the suburbs has met very stiff resistance, and I think it has indeed shown how substantial the opposition to the regime is and how it is, in fact, growing, and how in-
58 

creasing areas are becoming beyond the reach of the regime security forces. 

Post-Assad, one would assume that there would be leadership 

from the Sunni Arab Community of the country, which is certainly 

the majority, as opposed to the Alawi minority that is the core of 

the Bashar al-Assad regime. But that then begs the question of 

what happens to these other elements, to the minorities, to the 

Alawi, to the Druze, to the Kurdish minority? 

Senator UDALL. The Christian Community as well. 

Director PETRAEUS. The Druze Christians and other Christian 

sects as well. 

Clearly, the loss of Syria as a logistics platform, a line of communication into Lebanon to support Hezbollah would be a substantial 

setback for Iran in its efforts to use Hezbollah as a proxy. That is, 

indeed, why the Revolutionary Guards Corps, Qods Force, is so engaged in trying to prop up Bashar al-Assad right now. 

Senator UDALL. Let me turn to another country in that region. 

General Petraeus, you know better than anyone how much we’ve 

invested in Iraq—treasure, our reputation, and of course, the lives 

of Americans from all over our country. If you were to advise the 

policymakers sitting here and in the Senate and the Congress at 

large, what would you suggest we should be doing as Iraq struggles 

to find a democratic path forward? 

Director PETRAEUS. I think essentially continuing what we are in 

fact doing, which is engaging Iraqi counterparts at various levels, 

all the way from the top through the diplomatic communities, intelligence and security services, working hard to help them to resolve 

the ongoing political crisis—and there’s no other word for that, although it has perhaps diminished it somewhat. 

And it now appears, as of the last 48 hours, that the Sunni bloc 

of the political leadership is going to return to the government, albeit with still some hedging of bets. Supporting them as they grapple with the security challenges that have emerged over the course 

of the past two months or so, where al-Qa’ida in Iraq has been a 

bit more active than it was for quite some period, and helping them 

to develop further their security forces and their intelligence services to combat a mutual enemy—we do not want to see the resurgence or the regeneration of al-Qa’ida in Iraq—and very much in 

the interests of both countries and indeed the region and the world, 

working together to combat it. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator 

Snowe? 

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank all of you 

for your contributions to our country. 

I want to follow up on a couple of issues with respect to Iran. 

And obviously it’s deeply troubling in terms of the direction that 

they’re taking. And we predicate a lot, obviously, on the report that 

was issued by the IAEA. 

And I know, General Petraeus, you indicate it’s an authoritative 

document. 

They list in page 8 of their report the number of activities that 

are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including procuring nuclear-related and dual-use equipment, mate-
59 

rials, developed undeclared pathways, the acquisition of nuclear 

weapons development information and documentation, and work on 

the development of indigenous design of nuclear weapon, including 

the testing of components. 

I gather we agree with the fact that Iran has not made a decision 

to weaponize at this point. Director Clapper, do you agree on that? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, but they are certainly moving on that 

path. But we don’t believe they’ve actually made the decision to go 

ahead with a nuclear weapon. 

Senator SNOWE. Well, how will we decide that they have integrated all of these components in a decision to weaponize; at which 

point? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, certainly—— 

Senator SNOWE. What will be our red line? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, without going into sensitive areas here, 

certainly a key indicator would be enrichment of uranium to a 90 

percent level. That would be a pretty good indicator of their seriousness. 

There are some other things they would need to do—which I’d 

rather not go into in an open session—that we would also look for 

part and apart from whatever we could glean from across the Community on an actual decision to go forward. 

Senator SNOWE. General Petraeus, do you care to answer, as 

well? 

Director PETRAEUS. No. I fully subscribe to that. Again, the various components—enrichment, weaponization, delivery, and what 

we think would be evident if there is a decision to enrich beyond 

the 20 percent that they are currently enriching to—to the weapons 

grade—would be very significant, and, I think, a tell-tale indicator. 

There’s no commercial use for that, arguably—in fact, not arguably—I think factually, the amount of 20 percent enriched uranium 

that they have exceeds any requirement, for example, for the 

Tehran Research Reactor for the foreseeable future. So there are 

already concerns just with that. 

Senator SNOWE. And the IAEA report said much of it is dispersed among a number of locations. So, with the inspectors being 

there for however many days, several days, would they be able to 

discern or detect their ability to weaponize at what state they’re in? 

What do we hope to glean from the process? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, as Director Petraeus has alluded, the 

rule of IAEA is extremely important here. And of course, we do 

have to bear in mind that Iran is a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. The facilities that they are now operating are safeguarded, meaning they are required to be inspected by the IAEA. 

So, their presence there, and in fact their extended stay there. 

And it is IAEA’s intent, as they said before, to hopefully resolve 

these ambiguities about Iran’s program and its intent. So, what 

they have to say is crucial, and of course, their continued access is 

crucial. 

Director PETRAEUS. And there’s continuous monitoring, also, by 

other means that the IAEA has as well. 

Senator SNOWE. General Burgess, Iran has issued various 

threats with respect to the Strait of Hormuz. Can you give us some 

analysis of the activities there and what we are doing, in addition 
60 

to—what capabilities does Iran have—or doesn’t have—with respect to having the potential to close the Straits or affect it in any 

way, in terms of international transit? 

General BURGESS. Well, ma’am, what I have said in open discussions on this—a lot would have to be taken to closed session—but 

clearly the Iranians have the capability, we assess, to temporarily 

close the Straits of Hormuz. The concern becomes, then, defining 

‘‘temporarily’’. But they clearly have that capability. But if we go 

any further, I’d prefer to go to closed session, ma’am. 

Senator SNOWE. Do we have a defined time in that respect—on 

temporary? 

General BURGESS. Ma’am, I’d prefer to go to closed session. 

Senator SNOWE. Okay. Thank you. Director Clapper, getting back 

to the issue of Pakistan, there was a senior Administration official 

who was quoted recently in an article talking about developing a 

new normal in terms of relationship with Pakistan. So much of 

what we’re doing in Afghanistan is predicated on effectively addressing and rooting out the safe havens, obviously. And that is the 

predicate and template for the President’s policy that he indicated 

in June, and that obviously we need to have that strong relationship with Pakistan. 

How is our strategy going forward affected by what’s developing 

in Pakistan, especially now, where, as General Petraeus indicated, 

there is a review of our relationship that’s underway within the 

Pakistan government, the Parliament? 

And then secondly, they’re issuing threats about imposing taxes 

on the transit of our materials, both ours and NATO’s, from their 

ports and roads to Afghanistan. So this is deeply troubling. And I 

don’t know if this is a new normal, but how does that affect our 

situation in Afghanistan, and how is it that ever changes the dynamic in Afghanistan? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, it obviously has a profound impact on 

Afghanistan and the prospects for successful resolution there. And 

that is a way of emphasizing the importance of a positive relationship with the Pakistanis. And this is getting into the policy realm 

now outside of intelligence, but it’s crucial that our dialogue proceed and that we find some way of converging on that issue, as 

well, particularly with respect to safe havens. 

Pakistanis are very proud people, and they felt their sovereignty 

was assaulted in the Abbottabad raid, and of course, the regrettable incident in November with the killing of the Pakistani troops 

along the border sort of heightens that. That has caused them to 

collectively reassess the relationship. 

But in the end, I believe they realize they need a positive partnership with us. And hopefully we’ll work through these in such a 

way that we minimize the impact of these safe havens. 

Senator SNOWE. General Petraeus, you’re obviously in an interesting position, being both Commander of the forces and the architect of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and now 

being Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Since you’ve assumed this position, do you view things any different in Afghanistan with respect to our Strategy? 

Director PETRAEUS. No. I can’t say that I do. 
61 

Senator SNOWE. Even with some of the reports that have been 

issued publicly regarding the assessments of Afghanistan, and that 

it is very difficult to make the gains that are essential, precisely 

because of what is happening with the safe havens in Pakistan? 

These issues are ever thus. I mean, nothing’s changed in the dynamic, unfortunately, including the corruption, the government, 

and now, of course, the safe havens. These have sort of been the 

dynamics that have been there since the beginning. 

Director PETRAEUS. There is nothing easy about Afghanistan. As 

we used to say, it’s all hard all the time, but it’s also all important 

all the time. There’s a reason we went there in the wake of 9/11. 

We have hugely important national security interests there and it’s 

very important to that country, to the region, and to the world that 

we do everything possible to try to get that right and to ensure 

that Afghanistan is never again a launch pad for extremist attacks, 

as it was for the 9/11 attacks. 

If I could, by the way—you touched on something that alluded 

to the fact that I had a different viewpoint at various times than 

that of the Intelligence Community. And I was pretty clear, I think, 

in my confirmation hearing, that that typically resulted from the 

fact that the Intelligence Community tends to stop, if you will, a 

clock, and then for six to eight weeks do the analysis, argue within 

the Community itself on the ultimate position, and then actually 

provide the NIE or district assessment or whatever document is 

provided to policymakers. 

And typically, in the four times that I have differed with the Intelligence Community on Iraq or Afghanistan, the reason for it has 

been that lag in a dynamic situation that we continued to make 

progress or, in a couple of cases, didn’t. Because in those four cases, 

twice I thought the assessment was too negative by the Intelligence 

Community, and then once in Iraq, once in Afghanistan, two other 

times, I felt that the Community was actually too positive and that 

we should be more guarded in our assessments. 

Senator SNOWE. Yeah. I appreciate that. I well recall that. And 

I know there is that sort of, you know, difference, and in terms of 

the culture even, but also the lag time. 

Director PETRAEUS. Well, what I should note is that Director 

Clapper and all of us have discussed this. And what we want to 

do is dramatically reduce that amount of time when you stop the 

clock for the analysts to start the writing, if you will, or to finalize 

the writing, so that there is not such a large gap between the end 

of the data and the delivery of the product to the policymakers, to 

Congress, and to the rest of the Community. 

Senator SNOWE. So that probably didn’t happen this last NIE? 

Director PETRAEUS. Actually, I’m glad you asked that, because I 

think that’s worth clarifying. 

First of all, the most recent NIE in an open session addressed 

the post-2014 period. It was not on the past year or how things 

were going in general in Afghanistan; it was assessments by the 

Intelligence Community analysts about the various scenarios. In 

other words, if you make a certain set of assumptions about the 

level of support and a number of other factors in Afghanistan, what 

will be the likely outcome? 
62 

And there were a series of assumptions, groups of assumptions, 

about that. There was relatively little on the state of the insurgency. In fact, in open session it basically said, yes, there has been 

continued progress, but also that the Taliban does remain resilient. 

The military’s concern in this case was a view that there perhaps 

should have been an additional set or even sets of assumptions 

that could be analyzed; in particular, some assumptions that may 

have implied a greater level of assistance than was in those other 

sets. And that was really the issue. 

So I think that the accounts of this have not, in all cases, been 

completely well informed, shall we say. 

Senator SNOWE. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Director PETRAEUS. Thanks. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe. Senator Rockefeller? 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to 

make a couple of comments. One is I was very pleased to hear that 

you want to proceed with the renewal of FISA. Actually, I think 

FISA has served two roles. One, it created a very valuable piece 

of legislation for us. It was not without controversy, but it was a 

right thing to do. 

And secondly, I think it helped what some of us who have been 

here for some years should point out, that I think it helped open 

up the dialogue between the Intelligence Community and this Committee. This Committee went through a long period of time when 

the IC Community treated us very cavalierly. It was not interested 

in sharing. We could only—I guess it was Pat Roberts at the time, 

and myself. We switched one Chair and then the other Chair. 

They would talk with the gang of four, the gang of eight, but 

never both committees. They would never share what they told us 

and there were certain circumstances where we could not share 

what they had told us because it was a specific request, and for 

good reason. 

But it was not a good relationship. It was not a good relationship. I mean, just as—right after 9/11, the first thing that the Congress did was to pass a law saying it was okay for the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI to communicate with each other, 

perhaps even shake hands and perhaps even start to work up a little intelligence on the FBI side. That was a long process. All of this 

is long and painful. 

Now, I lead up to this by saying I cannot describe to you my own 

frustration and sense of wonderment how all of our DNI directors 

have come before these meetings and have, at least in the past— 

you referenced today, Director Clapper, that, far and away, the 

most important matter of national security is something called 

cyber security. The President in his State of the Union actually 

used the words ‘‘cyber threat,’’ which I think is a better way of 

talking about it because it’s more sort of stunning, alarming, and 

less passive. We have made virtually no progress on that subject. 

So on the one hand, the Intelligence Community is telling us that 

it’s the number one national security threat, not, you know, taking 

three of the top five out or, you know, what’s going on here or 

there. But on a sustained basis, national security depends upon our 

ability to form a system wherein private companies working with 
63 

DHS and the government can on their own and decide how they 

want to protect themselves and get some help from DHS. 

We do not over-regulate—some have said that—because we’ve 

made changes. Olympia Snowe and I came up with a bill three 

years ago, and it’s wandered through Melissa Hathaway and Mr. 

Schmidt, and nobody seems to get very excited about either it or 

the subject. And I’m very troubled by this, and I want to discuss 

this with you, specifically. 

You’re in the IC Community. Cyber security is not in your general line of work, General Petraeus, but it’s very much in Director 

Clapper’s line of work, and therefore, all of your lines of work. I 

don’t see, particularly, movement. There were some criticisms 

made of Olympia Snowe’s and my bill that it was too regulatory. 

We have interfaced with hundreds of private stakeholders and companies over the years, and they’re quite satisfied with an almostcompleted bill, or a virtually completed bill that we have. 

And so, our Democratic leader and the President talked about— 

we’ve got to do this. The President, as I say, did mention it in the 

State of the Union. That is important, but nothing has happened. 

And if it is a national security threat, if it is the national security 

threat, I don’t understand why we can’t get working together on 

this and get a bill done. 

You know, FISA was hard, but this makes FISA look like a piece 

of cake and it’s far more in the long term. No, not in the long term; 

it’s probably equal in the long term in terms of its importance. But 

it’s been a very bad demonstration on the part of the Congress, the 

Administration and the public, which really has no particular interest in cyber security because nobody’s explaining it to them, because it’s abstract. It’s not pushed by any one group with particular 

emphasis, and therefore, nobody’s very excited about it. 

We’ve worked out a way that the private sector companies basically take responsibility for their own cyber safety, cyber security. 

DHS helps them and they’re held accountable for it. I grew so frustrated by the lack of action on the part of all of us—the conclusive 

action that I went to Mary Schapiro at the Securities and Exchange Commission and said, look, I can’t do legislation evidently 

right now. Would you please at least post on the SEC website 

where investors go all the time, obviously, to figure out if they’re 

going to invest in private companies or not, and that private company would have to simply say if they had been hacked into, period. That’s all they had to say; not what subject, but just that they 

had been hacked into. 

Sort of a desperate measure, but it was a start. It’s had some effect. People are talking about that effect in Washington. That 

doesn’t interest me unless it’s headed towards a bill. 

So I would like to get your take, General Clapper, and perhaps 

Director Mueller, also, and anybody else who chooses to speak on 

the subject. How can you tell us that it’s the principal national security threat and we have absolutely no bill? We do have a bill, but 

we have no sort of pervasive push to get this accomplished, not just 

a legislative matter. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, first of all, I don’t think there’s any 

question as to the potential here. And there is sort of, I think, two 

dimensions to this. There’s what goes on day-in and day-out in 
64 

terms of our intellectual property being stolen from us, which is a 

real threat. Then there is the potential, although I think it’s less 

likely, of a massive attack, as some have described, that would basically paralyze the country or key segments thereof. 

The most likely proponents of that would be a nation-state; specifically, China or Russia. That’s why I pushed hard to have that 

unclassified report published by the National Counterintelligence 

Executive that highlighted that threat. 

I think that is an important responsibility of the Intelligence 

Community to advise all and sundry—whether it’s Administration 

officials, whether it’s the Congress, or the public—of the nature of 

that threat. 

I do think the government has a responsibility to provide support 

and advice, as exemplified, in my mind, by the Defense Industrial 

Base Pilot program that was championed by former Deputy Secretary Bill Lynn in the Department of Defense, which evolved, I 

think, a very workable formula whereby threat data is provided to 

key companies, particularly those involved in the defense or, for 

that matter, the intelligence business. 

But I think the bigger issue here is how do we protect the nation’s cyber? And that is an open question, and I’m not sure that’s 

completely the responsibility of the Intelligence Community. I do 

not view it that way. I think there needs to be a government-private partnership. They have to participate, and they have to be 

open about that, as well. 

As far as championing a bill, I personally have sort of deferred 

to the White House on—— 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Director Clapper, my time is about to run 

out. You cannot—it’s not your job to champion a bill. But I just— 

you know, at some point, you start asking, if you and your predecessors—Mike McConnell and others—have come up and—you 

know, said this is our number one national security threat, and 

you’re in the threat business, to say that I don’t—this is not necessarily what we do, frankly, I’m just using this forum to scream 

out—who is going to start paying attention to this? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think a lot of people are paying attention. And certainly, the President’s mention of it—there’s a White 

House coordinator for it who’s orchestrating this across the board. 

It involves the Intelligence Community. It involves the Department 

of Defense. It involves, clearly, the Department of Homeland Security. And I think that the leadership for that has to be in the interagency. 

So I don’t know that it’s fair to say that, you know, the Administration doesn’t care. It certainly does. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I’m just saying that we have made no 

progress. We have made no progress, and that is embarrassing in 

view of what you and your predecessors have said about the nature 

of the threat. 

Director Mueller, do you have any comments? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, Senator. I think it’s wrong to say we’re 

excited—or somebody should be excited about it. I can tell you that 

we are exceptionally concerned about that threat. I do not think 

that today it is necessarily the number one threat, but it will be 

tomorrow. Counterterrorism and stopping terrorist attacks is a 
65 

present number one priority for the FBI. But down the road, the 

cyber threat, which cuts across all programs, will be the number 

one threat to the country. 

We look at it in three different perspectives. The first is, inside 

the FBI, we have to change our organizational structure. In the 

same way we changed to address terrorism, we have to change to 

address cyber crime. We have to recruit and hire and bring on the 

persons who are capable of doing it. We have to understand that 

our role is to investigate intrusions and to thwart further intrusions. 

And secondly, in the same way we had to share intelligence in 

the wake of September 11, we have to share information and intelligence between the various entities who address this particular 

threat. At the time of intrusion, you do not know whether it is a 

state actor, a Russia or a China. You don’t know whether it’s an 

OC, organized crime entity, or the high school student down the 

street. 

And consequently, you can’t allocate it to a particular agency, 

which is why we developed the National Cyber Investigative Task 

Force with the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, Secret Service, all of those 

who have a role to address this kind of threat. And so we have to 

build up the collective addressing of that threat in the same way 

that we did so and broke down the walls in the wake of September 

11. 

And lastly, in terms of legislation, we have pushed in the legislation two areas that are of concern to us. One is a national data 

breach requirement. There are 47 states that have different requirements for reporting data breaches. There has to be a national 

data breach requirement for reporting, and we should be recipients 

of that reporting. 

And secondly, there has to be in the statute, in my mind, the 

ability to share the information indicative of a crime with the Bureau and others who have that responsibility. But it is something 

that we as an organization are focusing on as the next substantial 

threat. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rockefeller. 

And I have a data breach law that’s been pending for some time, 

so hopefully you’ll include it. 

Next is Senator Conrad. 

Senator CONRAD. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank 

you and the Vice Chair of this Committee for conducting this Committee in such a thoroughly professional way. I really have enjoyed 

my service on this Committee and in no small measure because of 

the leadership of this Committee. I think it’s just—it’s a very good 

example for the rest of the Senate. 

I also want to thank all those who are here testifying on behalf 

of the Intelligence Community. Let me just add my voice with respect to the press reports reflecting on Director Petraeus by these 

unseen, unnamed sources. 

You know, as far as I am concerned, these people that work behind the cloak of anonymity attacking people are cowards. If they 

have something to say about somebody, if they want it to have 

some credibility, they ought to have the courage to stand up and 

say it and put their name behind it. And I’d say to the press they 
66 

ought to quit printing anonymous attacks on people; it does not reflect well on them, either. 

So with respect to Director Petraeus, as far as I’m concerned, 

he’s a patriot. He’s demonstrated that not only in his military career, but on taking on this assignment. That was, to me, an act of 

patriotism. It would have been very easy for him—he didn’t need 

to do this for his reputation or his career. So he deserves our 

praise, not these nameless, faceless attacks that, frankly, have no 

basis in fact, either. 

And my—my experience is I have been quite pleasantly surprised 

at how open the Intelligence Community has been with this Committee, quite to the contrary of this report. 

Director Mueller, thank you for agreeing to serve another couple 

of years. I think that, too, is an act of patriotism. It’s very much 

appreciated. At this time of threat to our country, for you to agree 

to take on additional years of service deserves our public praise. 

And we thank all of you. I can’t neglect mentioning Mr. Olsen 

because his parents are from my home state. I know them well; 

couldn’t have finer people. We’re very, very fortunate to have people of that quality and character serving. 

I’d like to ask each of you in turn, since this is an annual meeting—what is your assessment of whether or not we have made 

progress in our ability to handle the terrorist threat to this country? Have we made progress? If so, how? Are we slipping? What is 

your assessment of how we have done compared to where we were 

a year ago? 

I’d start with Mr. Goldberg and go right down the line. 

Mr. GOLDBERG. I think, as it was said earlier, Senator Conrad, 

that progress has been made in various parts of the counterterrorism fight, especially against al-Qa’ida senior leadership. But 

there are many other challenges out there, and it remains a very, 

very dangerous part of our work. 

Senator CONRAD. Ms. Wagner. 

Ms. WAGNER. Senator, I think we have made a lot of progress, 

particularly in a couple of key areas. I think it was already mentioned the extent to which many of the stovepipes have been broken down in terms of information-sharing between the elements of 

the Community. I think we have made huge progress in that 

realm, and in fact, we operate as a team. And I am daily interacting and operating particularly with my colleagues at the FBI 

and at NCTC, looking at the terrorists that are abroad as it 

projects to the Homeland, and then dealing with the FBI on the 

issues that are inside the Homeland. 

In the second area, I would just say quickly that where we’ve 

made a lot of progress, I think, in my own Department, is in the 

ability to which we have been able to harness the intelligence from 

the Intelligence Community to inform our instruments, if you will, 

to keep people out at our borders, to make sure that the wrong people are not getting on airplanes at last points of departure, and to 

make sure that people who shouldn’t get them are not receiving 

immigration benefits from the Department. 

So we’ve really tightened our ability to take what the Community 

is producing and operationalize that in Homeland Security. 

Senator CONRAD. Mr. Mueller. 
67 

Director MUELLER. The removal of bin Laden and al-Awlaki was 

a huge benefit to the security of the United States, my brothers 

and sisters in the other agencies. By the same token, there are still 

leaders in both Yemen and Afghanistan-Pakistan border area that 

have the capability of launching attacks domestically. 

Most of the arrests that we’ve made over the last year, year and 

a half, had been lone wolves, those individuals who have been 

radicalized, trained on the Internet, and have the capability of developing IEDs and other mechanisms on the Internet. 

And as we have been relatively successful in addressing these 

particular plots, nonetheless, the ability of persons to utilize the 

Internet, to be both individually radicalized but also get the information they need to undertake attacks, has increased. 

Senator CONRAD. Director Clapper. 

Director CLAPPER. Sir, just to take perhaps a little longer perspective, this is my third job in the Intelligence Community in the 

last 12 years. I started at NIMA two days after 9/11. I think we’ve 

made tremendous progress. 

The transformation of the FBI into an intelligence-driven organization is just one case in point. The maturation of Department of 

Homeland Security, the expansion of the Intelligence Community 

to include both foreign and domestic aspects, the sharing at the 

federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector level, I think, demonstrate improvement. 

That’s not to say we should rest on our laurels. We always have 

more issues to deal with. And this is not, particularly with respect 

to counterterrorism, it’s not a threat that’s going to go away. 

Senator CONRAD. Thank you. 

Director PETRAEUS. Senator, first of all, thanks for your words of 

support. We have made considerable overall progress over the 

course of the last year. Any time the top three leaders of the most 

significant terrorist organization that faces us are taken out, that, 

needless to say, is really quite a banner year. And al-Qa’ida in the 

Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab, and other organizations have sustained important losses as well. 

Having said that, the threat of terrorism remains significant and 

we must sustain the campaign, we must maintain the pressure on 

al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and other violent extremist organizations, wherever they may be. 

Beyond that, I also concur with Director Clapper that there has 

been continued important progress in the organizational aspects of 

the war on terror. The counterterrorist campaign has benefited 

enormously from the continued efforts to better integrate intelligence for the various elements of the Community to work together 

more effectively and, frankly, even within individual agencies to 

further the progress in the integration of efforts between, say, the 

CIA operators, as well as analysts, in bringing together all of the 

different components of our organization and the rest of the Intelligence Community, say, in the Counterterrorist Center and some 

of the other centers that we have, as well. 

Senator CONRAD. General Burgess. 

General BURGESS. Sir, I guess the phrase up here is I would like 

to associate myself with the remarks of those that have gone before 

me. As a plank holder in the Office of the Director of National In-
68 

telligence, I agree with Director Mueller and Director Clapper. We 

have made great strides in many different areas. 

Having said that, we still have work to do and we still have challenges remaining. 

Senator CONRAD. All right. Mr. Olsen. 

Director OLSEN. Consistent with the other comments, the bottom 

line, I think, is that al-Qa’ida is weaker now than it has been in 

the past 10 years. That said, we face a more diffuse and decentralized threat from al-Qa’ida’s affiliates in Yemen and Somalia, as 

well as the threat from lone actors in the United States. 

As Director Clapper said, I think from an organizational perspective, in answering your question, our ability to handle the threat— 

we are better positioned, and I think the operative word is it’s a 

team approach. We’re better positioned to share information, as the 

Vice Chairman commented at the beginning of the hearing; we do 

a better job of integrating that information and analyzing it. 

At NCTC we’ve made improvements in watch listing and in providing situational awareness. And overall, again, it’s a team effort 

among all of the agencies represented here. 

Senator CONRAD. Just in terms of summing this up, what I hear 

is significant progress, serious threats still remain to the United 

States, and that the teamwork in the Intelligence Community itself 

has dramatically improved. I’m hearing that quite consistently. 

I think that’s very important for the people that we represent 

here, that they understand, yes, we’ve made progress, in some 

ways very dramatic progress, especially against al-Qa’ida, but that 

significant threats remain and that we’ve got to continue to be vigilant, which means we’ve got to continue to put resources to these 

issues. 

I thank the Chair. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Good morning, everybody, though it’s mostly 

heading into the afternoon. I would like to thank each and every 

one of you for the wonderful work you do every day, in every way, 

protecting our country. 

So much progress has been made since 9/11 in reforming the Intelligence Community, making it more effective, making it an integrated unit. The fact that all of you are here at the table at the 

same time points to our successes, and probably one of our greatest 

has been what we have done to dismember and decapitate alQa’ida. 

But I’m going to pick up on the issue that Senator Rockefeller 

raised about Cyber. I’ve been kind of almost a ‘‘Johnny-One-Note’’ 

on this issue in what I focus here. I share Senator Rockefeller’s 

frustration over a lack of urgency. I think it’s partly due to the Executive Branch, and also due to the Congress itself. My questions 

are going to go to Clapper, Mueller, and Wagner. 

First, just a comment about urgency: it’s now been—when we get 

to April, it will be five years since the attack on Estonia, in which 

we thought we were going to trigger Article V of NATO for the first 

cyber war. So we’ve had five years of supposed to being on the edge 

of our chair on this issue. 

One was—how do we protect dot-mil, and so on? But what we’ve 

now seen is the issues related to dot-gov and dot-com in recent 

meetings with you, Director Mueller, because of your involvement 
69 

to the Appropriations Committee, and with Ron Noble, Interpol, 

and the Interpol team, it is the protection of the dot-com. And he 

spoke most eloquently about the counterfeit and fake drugs coming 

into European countries, to Canada, and to ourselves. 

In a meeting with Dr. Hamburg yesterday at FDA, when we 

were talking about a new regulatory framework to get drugs to the 

market fast and yet safe, one of her biggest challenges is protecting 

the secrets that she has of America’s pharmaceutical biomedical device community and the supply of the drug chain. 

Right now, there is a bigger criminal penalty for a knockoff of a 

Louis Vuitton handbag than there is for fake heparin, which is a 

blood thinner that came into our country that could kill thousands 

of people. 

So you get what I’m saying here. The growing issues around protecting dot-mil in our country, organized crime—Interpol says 

Cyber is the growing crime, and it affects state secrets, trade secrets, and then also this other stuff there—the corruption, that 

where there is a weak government there is a strong organized 

crime element. 

So we’ve got to really move on this. Senator Rockefeller has spoken about his frustration with the Executive Branch. I’m frustrated 

with the Legislative Branch. We have turf battles, we dither and 

diddle over policies, and so on. He has a great policy, and so on. 

So let me get, though—because to me, there are three issues: urgency, foggy policy—particularly on governance, and the need for 

bipartisan camaraderie among ourselves to pass the bill. 

So let me get to the governance issue, and it goes to Director 

Clapper, and then Ms. Wagner, and then Director Mueller. 

So the question is who’s in charge? We all diddle and dither over 

the governance issue. Article 10 and Article 50; Homeland Security; 

is it dot-mil, et cetera. So let’s take our President. He is at the 

Democratic Convention and the lights go out in San Diego. He said, 

‘‘Oh, my God.’’ He turns to Napolitano and says, ‘‘What is this?’’ 

While he turns to Napolitano—and the lights only go out for maybe 

three hours, the lights go out in Boston, et cetera. So he turns to 

Napolitano and says, ‘‘What the hell are we doing here and what 

can we do?’’ 

My question is, is Napolitano in charge? We know the President’s 

in charge. Okay, we know the President’s in charge. But what is 

the President in charge of? And I need to know who would respond, 

and so on, because I feel that it is the governance issues that are 

the number one issues, and we continue to diddle, dither, and punt. 

Ms. WAGNER. I’m just going to jump in here. You know, if the 

lights go off—and we’re talking an electrical power grid issue—then 

I would say that, you know, my secretary would be the logical person to turn to because we have a clear role. 

Senator MIKULSKI. And what would she do? 

Ms. WAGNER. Well, if I could answer the question I didn’t get to 

answer last time, and then I’ll get to that. 

Your first question about who’s in charge—there’s never a simple 

answer to that question, especially in this town, because we all 

have pieces of the pie. But I can tell you that where we are, where 

our responsibilities lie is in securing the dot-gov, and then securing 
70 

the parts of the dot-com that are associated with critical infrastructure and key resources, including, in your example, the power grid. 

So we would hope that we would have been notified because of 

procedures that we would have already put in place, the relationships we would have built, the education we would have given, that 

they had detected some kind of issue or intrusion. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Have you done this? 

Ms. WAGNER. Yes, we have. And we would then turn to our partners. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, why don’t they feel that? 

Ms. WAGNER. I think, ma’am, we still have a ways to go in terms 

of educating and building up this network that we’ve been working 

on. And we are trying to bring a sense of urgency to that. 

We then turn to our partners in the FBI and NSA, because, as 

Director Mueller mentioned earlier, you never quite know what the 

genesis of these attacks are. It could be crime. It could be a state 

actor. It could be an accident. It could be a disgruntled former employee. 

So we work this as a triad. We make sure that we’re bringing 

to bear the appropriate technologies to bring things back on line as 

quickly as possible, and we ensure that we have an investigation 

going to try to determine the source and the attribution. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Ms. Wagner, first of all, my job—I don’t want 

to harangue you, so just know that. But I don’t believe this. I 

mean, I really have—— 

Director Clapper, what do you think here? So there you are. Is 

the President going to call you? You’re the DNI. 

Director MUELLER. Well, the President calls us. I mean, the fact 

of the matter is this happens a fair amount now. DHS is responsible for the infrastructure. But when it comes to attribution, identifying the attribution of a particular domestic intrusion, it generally falls to us. And what we currently do is we get ourselves and 

DHS at the table and we will put a team out. As soon as we got 

the word, there would be a team. Generally, we would lead that 

team, but we’d have DHS there because of the infrastructure. And 

wherever the outages are, wherever the investigation leads us, we 

would have a team of ourselves, DHS, and, if it goes overseas or 

if we need expertise, we’d have NSA and others from the Community in there. And we do this as a matter of course now when we 

get a substantial intrusion that needs immediate investigation. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Director Clapper. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think what Director Mueller has described kind of captures the essence of what I believe is the Intelligence Community’s responsibility, which is the detection and attribution of an attack writ large, whether foreign or domestic. 

I just might mention that it just so happens that the Administration is sending a senior-level team to brief the entire Senate on 

cyber security tomorrow on the threat and what needs to be done 

about it. Secretary Napolitano, I’m told, will be there, my Deputy, 

John Brennan from the White House, the Deputy Secretary—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. There are 11 coming. There are 11 coming. So 

that means that there are 11. But I’ll come back not only—I mean, 

it’s great that they’re going to come and brief us. It’s great that the 

National Security Council has come to this issue. 
71 

But my question is still, going back to the Rockefeller and the 

sense of urgency, do you feel that the current authorities related 

to Title 10 and Title 50, and then the issues around Homeland Security—we’re not talking about the current situation, our proposed 

goal, or the way it ought to be when the repository of knowledge 

inside rests in a military agency at the National Security Agency. 

Director CLAPPER. I would say that there probably could be more 

done to take advantage of that technical expertise that you recognize that resides in NSA. You know, the Department of Defense’s 

response to that was to establish Cyber Command as a war-fighting headquarters, but smartly, though, having the Director of NSA 

dual-hatted as the Commander of Cyber Command for military application. 

I think there is a debate, frankly, that maybe perhaps the responsibility of DoD is bigger than just to defend itself. This would 

be a good topic to bring up at this session tomorrow. 

Director MUELLER. If I may just interject, we have built up a 

substantial expertise in this arena over a period of time; not only 

domestically, but internationally. We have agents that are positioned overseas to work closely with, embedded with our counterparts in a number of countries. And so we have, over a period of 

time, built up an expertise. That is not to say that NSA doesn’t 

have a substantial expertise, also, understanding where it’s located—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. But it’s a different kind. 

Director MUELLER. Well, no, much of it is the same kind. Much 

is the same kind. In terms of power, I think NSA has more power 

in the sense of capabilities. In terms of expertise, I would not sell 

ourselves short. 

Senator MIKULSKI. We wouldn’t sell you short, either. 

Ms. WAGNER. And ma’am, I’d like to add that we’re committed 

to leveraging NSA’s expertise in technology to bring to bear for the 

sectors where we have responsibility. And we think we’ve made a 

lot of progress in that regard. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, my time is up, but I think, Senator 

Feinstein, this shows that some of the issues are here. We can— 

we can’t stop the threat. We can only stop ourselves. This is why 

I think we need to have a robust new legislative framework and 

we have to de-conflict these issues. And instead, we just remain 

foggy and keep punting. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I thank you; you headed our Cyber Task 

Force. I thank Senator Rockefeller for his interest. I think you both 

are absolutely correct. I think we need to get cracking on it. My 

own view is that there’s, kind of, one overwhelming issue where 

there’s a difference of opinion, and that’s whether the standards 

mean something or whether they’re purely voluntary in the dotcom area. This needs to get resolved and we need to move. 

So I thank you both for the work you’ve done. As Chairman of 

Commerce and as our Task Force Chairman, thank you very, very 

much. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me move on and give you the list, as it 

remains, because it’s going to take us close to one o’clock. We have 

Senator Coats, Senator Risch, Senator Nelson, and Senator Rubio. 
72 

So it would be my intention, unless there’s objection, not to do a 

second round, but to complete this round. 

Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Madam Chairman, thank you. I’d like to pursue 

an issue that you brought up in your opening, Chairman, Madam 

Chairman, relative to the situation as it exists with Iran and its 

pursuit of nuclearization and the potential Israeli response. 

And I think based on what was said earlier, if there’s any dispute to the fact that sanctions to date have not brought about results that we would hope for—and I think, Director Clapper, you 

indicated in your statement, ‘‘We hope that sanctions will prevent 

the necessity for an Israeli response.’’ 

I don’t think—I think the evidence is clear unless there’s hard 

evidence to the contrary that we are not aware of, that sanctions 

to this point have not made any kind of difference with the regime 

in Iran. Does anybody dispute that? 

Director CLAPPER. No, sir, Senator Coats. That is precisely the 

Intelligence Community view or assessment that to this point, the 

sanctions, as imposed so far, have not caused them to change their 

behavior or their policy. 

Senator COATS. And secondly, Director Clapper, you said, ‘‘We 

judge Iran would likely choose missile delivery’’—no, I’m sorry— 

‘‘We judge Iran’s nuclear decision-making is guided by a cost-benefit approach. Iranian leaders undoubtedly consider Iran’s security, 

prestige and influence, as well as international political and security environment when making decisions about its nuclear program.’’ 

Is there any indication that sanctions to date have changed their 

view relative from a cost-benefit standpoint? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think it’s fair to say, and we could go 

into this in more depth in a closed environment, that there is dissension and debate in the political hierarchy of Iran. So there is 

not unanimity about this. And I do think that to the extent that 

the international community is united on this, with U.S. leadership, I do think they pay attention to international opinion and 

what others think of them. 

And certainly if there are impacts on their oil exports and to the 

extent that that would affect their financial situation, that could 

have, I think, a profound impact on their decision-making calculus 

in terms of, as we said, the cost-benefit. 

Senator COATS. But that’s more of a hope and a wish than it is 

a hard reality, from what I understand. 

Director CLAPPER. As I said, to this point, the sanctions have not 

caused that calculus to change, apparently. But as the pressure 

ratchets up, there is the prospect that they could change. 

Senator COATS. Would a dramatic decrease in oil prices have a 

bearing there? But what is the likelihood of that, given the world 

demand for oil energy sources? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, it could, and that’s what we’ll have to 

see how this plays out. And this, in turn, is dependent on the willingness of the main customers of Iran to support that position. 

Senator COATS. But to date, those main customers are not supporting these sanctions. 
73 

Director CLAPPER. I wouldn’t say that. Again, we can discuss this 

in closed session, as to who is and who isn’t. 

Senator COATS. Okay. We can discuss that in closed session. I 

don’t see any public acknowledgement that China, India, some of 

the fast-growing Asian nations, have joined us in supporting rejecting any kind of export. 

Director PETRAEUS. If I could, Senator, actually publicly, it is 

well known that China reduced its imports of Iranian oil in the 

purchases. I mean, these are matters of public record. It remains 

to be seen whether that continues. It appears that Saudi Arabian 

production is ramping up and can fill some of the demand that 

might have been met by Iranian exports now that there are the 

sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran. 

Senator COATS. Thank you, Director. But aren’t we in a situation 

where the clock is ticking? 

Director PETRAEUS. Certainly. 

Senator COATS. The clock is ticking on the side of the Iranian 

pursuit of nuclearization and perhaps weaponization of nuclear capability. And it has been for some time. 

My own view is that it’s going to take tougher sanctions than 

currently exist in order to beat that clock that’s ticking toward a 

nuclear Iran. And so—but also, we’re—you know, we see how difficult it is to ratchet up that next level of sanctions and get the 

world community’s support. I mean, it took us a long time to get 

European support for the current level of sanctions. We don’t have 

Chinese or Russian support for it. It’s unlikely that we would, unless something changes that I’m not aware of. 

And when you put that in the context of what the Israelis must 

be thinking—and everybody acknowledges that it’s an existential 

question for them, we’ve got a time factor here. And I just want 

to be realistic about the fact that the hope that sanctions—it’s been 

described as the hope that sanctions—can bring about the desired 

results that we all want, both from the Iranian standpoint and 

from the Israeli standpoint. I don’t know if any—you’d like to comment? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, sir, I think you’ve very accurately captured the gravity of the situation and what’s at stake here and particularly for what’s at stake for the Israelis. 

Senator COATS. Would a naval blockade—which I guess would be 

an act of war—naval blockade achieve the kind of cost-benefit ratio 

that would give them real pause about changing their attitudes? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I don’t know, sir. We’d have to take that 

one under advisement, but perhaps to air out the possibilities there 

in a closed session. 

Certainly, that would have impact on their calculus. Whether it 

would move in the direction of a positive outcome or a negative outcome is hard to say. 

Senator COATS. Well, of course, the outcome we want is trending 

very strongly toward a negative—I mean, the outcome that seems 

to be taking place is trending strongly toward a negative outcome. 

And the outcome that we want seems to be diminishing. 

And I hope I’m wrong on this, but it just seems to me that we’ve 

had years and years and years of sanctions. It’s very difficult to 

ratchet those up and tighten them to the point where we see a de-
74 

cided change in the Iranian supreme leadership decisions on this. 

The recent movement of uranium to Qom and enrichment and the 

defiance in terms of public statements that come out of Iran all indicate that, so far—I mean, maybe they’re disputing this internally, 

but so far we have not seen positive results from that. 

And when you’re viewing it from the Israeli standpoint, it clearly, I think, reaches the level of perhaps the number one challenge 

of 2012, as the Chairman has indicated. General? 

Director PETRAEUS. Well, I do think it’s . . . 

Senator COATS. Excuse me—Director. Director General. 

Director PETRAEUS. The latest round of sanctions, of course, is 

really just being felt, and it will take a number of months. But as 

you note, there is a clock ticking during that time, and there is the 

inexorable progress, if you will, and the refinement of additional 

uranium to 3 percent, then 20 percent, and a variety of other activities that are ongoing. 

And again, the IAEA has laid these out very accurately and effectively. But the fact is that the Iranian currency has lost considerable value recently. There are runs on the bank in recent weeks 

that have been seen as the Iranian citizenry tries to get its money 

out of their own domestic currency and into anything that will hold 

its value better as inflation also takes off. Director Clapper talked 

about problems of unemployment as well. But the overall situation 

is one in which the sanctions have been biting much, much more 

literally in recent weeks than they have until this time. 

So I think what we have to see now is how does that play out 

and what is the level of popular discontent inside Iran? Does that 

influence the strategic decision-making of the Supreme Leader and 

the—and the regime, keeping in mind that the regime’s paramount 

goal in all that they do is their regime’s survival? 

Senator COATS. I have additional questions to pursue, particularly regarding the Israelis’ perception of the impact of this, but I 

think that’s better left for closed session. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. Appreciate 

it. Senator Nelson? 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Senator Coats, 

in response, I think it’s instructive to remember what the policy is 

on this, as stated by the President in the State of the Union. And 

he said, quote, ‘‘America is determined to prevent Iran from getting 

a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to 

achieve that goal.’’ 

And then the Secretary of Defense was interviewed on 60 Minutes and said, ‘‘The U.S. and the President’s made this clear. It 

does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. That’s a redline 

for us, and it’s a redline, obviously, for the Israelis, so we share a 

common goal here. If we have to do it, we will do it.’’ 

Questioner: ‘‘What is ’it’?’’ And this is the secretary—‘‘If they proceed, and we get intelligence that they’re proceeding with developing a nuclear weapon, then we will take whatever steps are necessary to stop it.’’ 

Question: ‘‘Including military steps?’’ 

Answer: ‘‘There are no options that are off the table.’’ 
75 

Senator COATS. Would the senator yield just for a quick response? 

Senator NELSON. Of course. Of course. 

Senator COATS. In a previous life, I served here and I heard 

much the same rhetoric regarding North Korea. And now we know 

that North Korea, despite all of our rhetoric, possesses nuclear 

weapons capability. And I just hope we don’t have to talk ourselves 

into a situation where we’re not able to back up what we say. We 

didn’t do it before, and so it raises some skepticism on my part by 

statements made by both Republican and Democrat leadership relative to what you indicated and quoted. But we’ve been down this 

road before. 

Senator NELSON. Well, let’s ask General Clapper. Is that the policy? 

Director CLAPPER. I read it just as you do, sir. It’s not policies 

as much as it’s execution. And in the case of the North Koreans, 

our policy was just words, not action. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I believe—this senator believes the stakes 

are so high that the policy will be executed. 

What I wanted to do was I wanted to give an example from an 

earlier discussion of how we are meeting the terrorist threat. And 

I want to particularly congratulate you, Mr. FBI Director, because 

we just had a plot in Florida, in Tampa, to have several truck 

bombs go off downtown to kill a lot of people. And the FBI was all 

over this, in coordination with the U.S. Attorney, in coordination, 

bringing in local law enforcement, the sheriff’s office, the Tampa 

police department. 

But what is also instructive is help with intelligence out of the 

Muslim Community to identify the potential perpetrator and to 

stop him before he did the act. And I think it’s another example 

of how all of these different stovepipes that weren’t interacting before are beginning to. So I congratulate you. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you, Senator. It was, as I want to use 

the word here, a team effort of particularly state and local law enforcement and the other federal authorities working together over 

a substantial period of time. 

But I particularly want to single out the Muslim Community for 

its recognizing a threat and bringing it to the authorities. And I 

will tell you, over a period of time, many of our cases—most of our 

cases have come with individuals from the Muslim Community or 

the neighborhood who have brought to our attention concerns about 

the potential threat in which we have run and ultimately have resulted in a disruption of a plot. 

Senator NELSON. Madam Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And I thank you, Senator Nelson, for your 

patience. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. Thank you all. For the panelists, I 

think this is kind of a general question. I don’t know who will handle it. It has to do with Iran’s intentions in the Western Hemisphere. 

I think it’s generally accepted, I think it’s fact that Iran is willing 

to sponsor and use terrorism as a tool of its foreign policy and its 

statecraft around the world. And so it’s with alarm that I view, 
76 

having been on this Committee only a year, but that I view a recent trip through Latin America, a four-nation trip, Ahmadinejad 

to Latin America—now, part of it probably is just an effort, I think, 

to show that he’s not isolated, that there are countries that will actually meet with him and talk to him, and part of it is that. 

And I think mutually important, some of these leaders, particularly the one in Venezuela, have these weird illusions that he’s 

some sort of global figure and that, and on that stage he’s actually 

a relevant individual. 

But beyond that is something else that I may be concerned 

about. And maybe, in this open source, you can comment a little 

bit about what else is behind there. 

I mean, a couple things that are concerning is, for example, the 

Venezuelan banking system is a significant banking system where 

billions of dollars flow through there. Could it not be used as a 

place to evade sanctions, for example? 

We also know that I guess they opened up what is called Banco 

Internationale del Desarrollo. I guess it’s the International Bank of 

Development. And I think the largest stakeholder in that is a bank 

by the name of—it’s an Iranian bank—Saderat, if I’m not mistaken, 

which we know is used to funnel funds to Hezbollah and other 

groups like that. 

So we’re concerned about that. Obviously, the resources, uranium 

mining, et cetera, is an issue, and then, you know, any other kind 

of asymmetrical capabilities that that may be establishing in the 

region. 

So, kind of on a global—kind of looking at that, how serious a 

threat is it? How focused are we on it? Obviously, you know, relatively speaking, it’s not what we confront in the Middle East yet, 

but what’s the state of that? Because there’s not a lot of conversations about Iran’s intentions in this hemisphere. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, we are concerned about it. We do follow 

it. And I think you’re quite right and I appreciate your highlighting 

that, Senator Rubio, because in this day and age, the Iranians are 

looking anywhere for a friendly hand. Ahmadinejad’s trip was not 

all that successful. 

Obviously, we are very concerned about the connection with Venezuela. And of course, the most obvious manifestation of this outreach is the plot uncovered to assassinate the Saudi ambassador 

here in Washington, which was uncovered in Mexico—with the cooperation, by the way, of the Mexican authorities. 

So there is more to unfold here. I think they are, consistent with 

their outreach elsewhere, trying as well to penetrate and engage in 

this hemisphere. 

We’ll have to—I would like to research a little bit these financial 

banking, potential financial banking connections. I’m not current 

on that specifically. But I think that if there is, that’s indicative of 

their attempts to, again, evade sanctions, which they have worked 

very assiduously at in the past. 

Senator RUBIO. Just as a follow-up to that, and I appreciate it, 

is—and obviously we’re limited in what we can talk about in this 

setting, nor would I ask you to opine on specific, you know, policy 

decisions that have to be made—but I would just encourage, whether privately or otherwise, for the Administration and those in the 
77 

Intelligence/security Community to think about—I hate to use the 

word red lines, it’s been discussed—but certainly things we’re not 

going to tolerate in the region. Because I think there’s potentially 

always the risk that some may think we’re so distracted in other 

parts of the world that there are certain things they may be able 

to get away with in terms of capability building that we’re somehow not going to respond to. 

So I don’t think we should necessarily be out looking for conflicts, 

but I certainly think there are things that we should not allow and 

that we should consider that as a matter of policy expressing that, 

privately or publicly, whatever, you know, fits the—the needs of 

the Community. 

My last question is about Mexico and just your—any assessment 

that we have with regards to drug violence in that country posing 

a threat to governance and to the government, particularly in such 

an important year where these key elections are going on in that 

country. 

Director CLAPPER. Director Petraeus just returned from a very 

successful trip to Mexico, so I’ll ask him to address that. 

Director PETRAEUS. Well, thanks. I did indeed just visit there. 

There’s no question about the magnitude of the challenges there to 

the rule of law. In certain areas it does not exist. 

But there’s also no question about the determination of the government of Mexico and indeed the progress that they have made 

in a variety of different ways, both in terms of results in taking key 

leaders of the criminal gangs, the narcotic—illegal narcotics gangs 

out of action, very substantial results in that in the last two or 

three years in particular, but also in their organizing for this effort 

and in the building of institutions. 

Indeed, I think that the legacy of the current president will be 

the institutions that he has built during his time in terms of, for 

example, the national police, in coming to grips with some of the 

judicial challenges, the opening up of—or soon to open, for example, more than five additional corrections institutes, and indeed the 

comprehensive approach that they are taking to this effort in truly 

a civil, military, law enforcement approach, because that is, obviously, what it takes to retrieve certain areas that have gotten away 

from the grip of the government and the writ of law, if you will. 

That’s the impression that I took away from this. And clearly the 

fact that this is going to be—continue to be a very tough fight. But 

my sense that the government knows what needs to be done, has 

been building, again, these critical institutions that are necessary 

to carry out this comprehensive campaign that they recognize is 

necessary. 

Needless to say, all of the different elements of the U.S. government are partnering with their respective elements of the Mexican 

structures. The integration of intelligence that we’ve tried to 

achieve here in the United States is something that they’re also 

trying to achieve in Mexico and it’s something with which we’re involved in trying to support. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio. 

Senator Wyden has one last question. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Madam Chair, thank you for your courtesy. 
78 

Director Clapper, as you know, the Supreme Court ruled last 

week that it was unconstitutional for federal agents to attach a 

GPS tracking device to an individual’s car and monitor their movements 24/7 without a warrant. Because the Chair is being very gracious, I want to just do this briefly. 

Can you tell me, as of now, what you believe this means for the 

Intelligence Community, number one, and two, would you be willing to commit this morning to giving me an unclassified response 

with respect to what you believe the law authorizes? 

This goes to the point that you and I have talked, sir, about—— 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, sir. 

Senator WYDEN [continuing]. In the past, the question of secret 

law, as you know. I strongly feel that laws and their interpretations must be public and that of course the important work that 

all of you are doing, we very often have to keep that classified in 

order to protect secrets and the well-being of your capable staff. 

So just two parts: One, what you think the law means as of now, 

and will you commit to giving me an unclassified answer on the 

point of what you believe the law actually authorizes. 

Director CLAPPER. Sir, the judgment rendered, as you stated, was 

in a law enforcement context. We are now examining, as are the 

lawyers, what the potential implications for intelligence are, foreign or domestic. So that reading is of great interest to us and I 

am sure we can share it with you. 

One more point I need to make, though. In all of this, we have 

and will continue to abide by the Fourth Amendment. 

Senator WYDEN. Okay. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. And I’d like to end 

this by thanking all of you. I think it’s been a positive year, as 

much as one can say anything is a positive year in this area. 

I just was looking at the list of the twenty plots that had been 

prevented this past year, and it’s really consequential, the work 

that has been done to protect the Homeland, as well as the work 

that’s been done abroad. 

So I think we really have a very important intelligence team together, and I think it’s really progressing. And I know on behalf 

of the Vice Chairman and myself, we are very grateful to you, and 

I know that includes the whole Committee as well. 

So thank you very much for your dedication, for your talent, and 

for your extraordinary service. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

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