Filed 8/3/23 Lopez v. MUFG Holding Corp. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ARTHUR LOPEZ,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MUFG HOLDING CORPORATION, et 

al.,

 Defendants and Respondents.

 G061254

 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01192499)

 O P I N I O N 

Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Glenn R. 

Salter, Judge. Affirmed.

Arthur Lopez, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Wallace, Richardson, Sontag & Le and Richard Sontag for Defendants and 

Respondents.

* * *
2

Plaintiff Arthur Lopez appeals from the trial court’s entry of judgment 

against him on his complaint against defendants MUFG Holding Corporation, MUFG 

Union Bank, N.A., MUFG Americas Holdings Corporation, MUFG Bank, Ltd., and 

UnionBanCal Corporation. We conclude the trial court correctly sustained defendants’

demurrer without leave to amend and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2007, plaintiff started an auto finance company, using a home equity line 

of credit obtained from defendants (or at least from one of them). Over the next two 

years, plaintiff drew down the entirety of his line of credit in support of his business. 

Plaintiff alleges defendants promised future consideration of a business loan, but later 

reneged. Plaintiff also alleges defendants stole his trade secrets and made discriminatory 

comments against plaintiff and his family, who are Hispanic. In 2011, defendants froze 

plaintiff’s line of credit and later foreclosed on his home. Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy in 

that same year. Plaintiff lost possession of his home on August 28, 2012. 

Initial Litigation in State Court

Plaintiff sued two of the defendants (Union Bank, N.A. and UnionBanCal) 

in the Orange County Superior Court in May of 2012. Plaintiff raised causes of action 

for quiet title, wrongful foreclosure, unjust enrichment, intentional misrepresentation, 

promissory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Business & Professions Code 

section 17200, and estoppel. The factual gist of the lawsuit was that defendants made 

promises to plaintiff with respect to financing for his new business and his home equity 

line of credit and subsequently reneged on those promises, to plaintiff’s detriment. The 

lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice in January of 2013 after a successful demurrer. 

Plaintiff appealed from this dismissal in August of 2017, but the appeal was dismissed as 

untimely. 
3

Litigation in Federal Court

In August of 2015, plaintiff sued defendants in federal court. This time, 

plaintiff alleged civil rights violations, antitrust and securities fraud theories of liability, 

theft of trade secrets, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and various other 

theories. However, these claims arose from the same factual predicate: plaintiff’s 

financing requests to defendants, home equity line of credit, and the subsequent 

foreclosure of plaintiff’s home. The United States District Court for the Central District 

of California granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in February of 

2016. The court denied plaintiff’s subsequent motion for leave to file an amended 

complaint. The court concluded all of plaintiff’s federal claims, save his trade secret 

claim, were barred by res judicata because of the dismissal of his initial state court action. 

The trade secret claim, meanwhile, failed on its own merits. Having thus disposed of all 

the federal claims in plaintiff’s complaint, the federal court declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law claim (intentional infliction 

of emotional distress) and dismissed the action as a whole without prejudice. The Ninth 

Circuit affirmed this decision on August 17, 2017. 

Undeterred, plaintiff filed a new complaint against defendants in federal 

court just a week later, on August 24, 2017. This new complaint (as later amended by 

plaintiff) raised the same nine claims. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint, which the federal court granted. This time, the federal court dismissed the 

action with prejudice. Plaintiff again appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which again affirmed 

on May 21, 2019. 

This Action

On March 24, 2021, plaintiff sued defendants for intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleged essentially the same facts set forth in his 

federal court complaints, even including a “Statement of the Case” from the federal court 
4

actions as part of his complaint. On April 28, 2021, plaintiff filed a declaration under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, seeking disqualification of the trial judge.1

Next, plaintiff filed a motion seeking to transfer the case to Los Angeles 

County Superior Court. In his moving papers, plaintiff alleged (without a declaration or 

other evidence) that defendants’ “principal Southern California corporate office” was in 

Los Angeles County. Plaintiff’s complaint, by contrast, alleged “defendants do business 

within [Orange County] and the violations in this case primarily occurred in [Orange 

County].” Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed after his motion to change venue, also 

alleged defendants’ principal place of business was in Orange County. 

The trial court struck plaintiff’s disqualification request as untimely. In 

response to the motion to change venue, the trial court first sought additional briefing 

from plaintiff, then denied the motion, citing plaintiff’s allegations in his first amended 

complaint. 

While the motion to change venue was pending, Defendants demurred, 

arguing plaintiff’s causes of action were barred by both res judicata and the applicable 

two-year statute of limitations. The trial court found plaintiff’s causes of action were 

barred by the statute of limitations and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, this time alleging eight new 

causes of action: quiet title, wrongful foreclosure, unjust enrichment, negligent 

misrepresentation, violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200, intentional 

misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and estoppel — the same eight causes of action he 

alleged in his first state court lawsuit. Defendants demurred again, making the same 

arguments. The trial court sustained the demurrer, this time without leave to amend. 

This time, the trial court concluded plaintiff’s causes of action were barred by res 

judicata. The trial court entered judgment for defendants and plaintiff timely appealed. 

1

 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise stated. 
5

DISCUSSION

1. Procedural Issues

Our review of this matter is hampered by serious deficiencies in plaintiff’s 

briefs. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires references to the record 

when discussing facts.2 Rule 8.204(a)(2)(A) requires the appellant’s opening brief to 

identify the relief sought in the trial court and the judgment or order appealed from. Rule 

8.204(a)(2)(C) requires the appellant’s opening brief to provide a summary of the 

significant facts limited to matters in the record. Rule 8.204(b) requires any brief to be 

“reproduced by any process that produces a clear, black image of letter quality,” and 

controls font, font size, line spacing, and margins, all of which are intended to allow the 

court to adequately read and comprehend the arguments of the litigants. Rule 

204(c)(1),(2) govern the length of briefs, and limit briefs produced via computer to 

14,000 words and briefs produced via typewriter to 50 pages. Rule 8.74(a)(1) requires 

documents filed electronically to be text searchable. Rule 8.74(a)(3) requires electronic 

bookmarking of headings, subheadings, and all components of the brief.

Plaintiff’s opening brief fails to comply with any of these rules. Plaintiff’s 

brief contains few citations to the record. Instead, plaintiff’s factual summary contains a 

rambling, handwritten account of plaintiff’s litigation efforts over approximately 15 years 

against defendants, interspersed with copies of documents from or relating to these events 

and arguments regarding those events, and entirely disconnected from the record on 

appeal. Plaintiff’s arguments contain similar extraneous material and few or no citations 

to the record. In addition to being handwritten, plaintiff’s brief is single-spaced and 

poorly reproduced, and as a result some portions of the brief are illegible. Plaintiff’s 

brief, at 159 pages, also appears to be oversize under either standard (though it is unclear 

which would apply, given that plaintiff’s handwritten brief was evidently not prepared 

2

 All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 
6

with a typewriter or computer). Plaintiff also made either no attempt or a grossly 

defective attempt to comply with the electronic filing rules by rendering his brief textsearchable or placing electronic bookmarks.

Plaintiff’s reply brief fares a little better. Like plaintiff’s opening brief, it 

contains few record citations and includes an improper “exhibit,” as well as copies of 

portions of two California Supreme Court cases. At 50 pages, the reply brief is at least 

presumptively compliant with the typewriter rule for length, but the brief also contains a 

certificate of compliance referencing the computer-produced brief rule. The certificate 

asserts that the brief contains approximately 7,000 words and that plaintiff relied on the 

word count function of the computer program he used to prepare the brief. This is a 

surprising assertion, as (like plaintiff’s opening brief) the reply brief is handwritten. Like 

plaintiff’s opening brief, the reply brief is poorly reproduced and often illegible. Lastly, 

plaintiff again made either no attempt or a grossly defective attempt to comply with the 

electronic filing rules by rendering his brief text searchable or placing electronic 

bookmarks.

Though this is the first appeal in this matter to result in a full opinion

(plaintiff’s earlier appeals in this case having been dismissed for lack of an appealable 

order), Plaintiff is no stranger to this court or its rules; plaintiff was specifically warned 

of similar violations of the California Rules of Court in connection with four of his 

recent, prior appeals in another matter (In re Marriage of Lopez (Feb. 26, 2018, 

G054262) [nonpub. opn.]; In re Marriage of Lopez (May 26, 2020, G057278) [nonpub. 

opn.]; In re Marriage of Lopez (Sept. 30, 2020, G057649) [nonpub. opn.]; In re Marriage 

of Lopez (Dec. 29, 2021, G059648) [nonpub. opn.]). 
7

While we acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s understanding of the 

rules on appeal is, as a practical matter, more limited than an experienced appellate 

attorney’s and, whenever possible, will not strictly apply technical rules of procedure in a 

manner that deprives litigants of a hearing, we are nevertheless required to apply the 

California Rules of Court and substantive rules of appellate review to a self-represented 

litigant’s claims on appeal, just as we would to those litigants who are represented by 

trained legal counsel. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; In re 

Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)

The deficiencies in plaintiff’s briefing are arguably sufficient to justify a 

waiver of his claims on appeal, but we nevertheless address his claims on the merits.

2. Substantive Issues

Plaintiff raises several arguments regarding the trial court’s rulings in this 

case. None have merit.

First, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’

demurrer without leave to amend because (1) the initial state case did not afford plaintiff 

“a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim”; (2) the initial state case did not end in a 

judgment on the merits; and (3) the initial state case was not based on the same cause of 

action.

“Res judicata” has two meanings under California law, commonly referred 

to as “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion.” (DKN Holding LLC v. Faerber (2015) 

61 Cal.4th 813, 823-825.) Here, we analyze only claim preclusion, as we need not reach 

the issue of whether any of plaintiff’s claims are barred by issue preclusion.

Claim preclusion bars a subsequent lawsuit that “‘involves (1) the same 

cause of action (2) between the same parties [or their privies] (3) after a final judgment 

on the merits in the first suit.’” (Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of 

Conservation (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1219.) Plaintiff’s present action involves all 
8

of the same causes of action litigated in his initial state court action: quiet title, wrongful 

foreclosure, unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Business & 

Professions Code section 17200, intentional misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and 

estoppel. Defendants Union Bank, N.A. and UnionBanCal were also defendants in the 

initial state action, and plaintiff’s allegations make clear that the remaining defendants 

are privies of the original two. The initial state action ended with a dismissal with 

prejudice after a successful demurrer; contrary to plaintiff’s contention, that is a final 

judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes. (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.

(2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 793.) Consequently, the eight causes of action duplicative of 

those in plaintiff’s initial state court action are barred by res judicata.

3

Plaintiff asserts, in summary fashion, that the prior state court judgment 

was obtained fraudulently “since the Superior Court in concert with volunteer employee 

judge/defense counsel and other involved attorneys participated in a charade/scheme to 

defraud plaintiff and derail [the] case premeditatively and by purposely keeping plaintiff 

excluded from processes (due process) and obscure of information and documentation 

including defective and absent rules of court required documentation.” This vague 

allegation is not supported by any citation to the record, and our review of the record 

reveals no effort by plaintiff in the trial court to explain the alleged fraud or provide 

factual support for its existence.

This conclusion leaves only plaintiff’s causes of action for negligent and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The applicable statute of limitations for these 

causes of action is two years. (§ 335.1; Wassman v. South Orange County Community 

College Dist. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 852-853.) These causes of action accrued 

3

 Defendants argue, and the trial court found, that plaintiff’s other two 

causes of action, for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, were also 

barred because they arose from the same primary right. We do not reach this issue 

because these causes of action are clearly barred by the statute of limitations.
9

when plaintiff “‘suffer[ed] severe emotional distress as a result of outrageous conduct on 

the part of the defendant.’” (Id. at p. 853.) This occurred, at the latest, on August 28, 

2012, when plaintiff lost his home. Plaintiff’s present lawsuit was filed on March 24, 

2021, more than eight years later, taking it well outside the statutory period.

Plaintiff argues the doctrines of equitable estoppel, equitable tolling, the 

alternative or second claim tolling rule, the continuing violations doctrine, and/or 

statutory tolling provisions should save his causes of action. We disagree.

Equitable estoppel, in the statute of limitations context, occurs when a 

defendant induces a plaintiff not to sue during the limitations period. (Lantzy v. Centex 

Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 384 (Lantzy).) Plainly this doctrine does not apply here. 

This is plaintiff’s fourth separate lawsuit against defendants, dating back to 2012. 

Plaintiff cannot argue defendants induced him not to sue when, in fact, he did sue 

defendants.

“Equitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine ‘which operates independently 

of the literal wording of the Code of Civil Procedure’ to suspend or extend a statute of 

limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.” (Lantzy, supra, 

31 Cal.4th at p. 370.) Equitable tolling only stops the statute of limitations from running 

during the event justifying the tolling. (Ibid.) Once the tolling event is over, the statute 

begins running again. (Ibid.) Here, the relevant tolling events are the pendency of 

plaintiff’s other lawsuits. Assuming for the sake of argument that all these lawsuits tolled 

the statute throughout their pendency, the statute of limitations nevertheless expired well 

before plaintiff filed this action. Plaintiff’s initial state action was dismissed with 

prejudice in January of 2013; his next action, in federal court, was not filed until August 

of 2015, more than two years later.

The alternative or second claim tolling rule is another name for this same 

equitable tolling doctrine. Plaintiff’s argument on this point therefore fails for the same 

reasons.
10

“‘The continuing violations doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or 

injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as 

accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them.’” (Willis v. 

City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1124.) Plaintiff’s operative complaint 

does not allege wrongful conduct by defendants beyond August of 2012. Accordingly, 

the continuing violations doctrine does not aid plaintiff.

Lastly, plaintiff points to certain statutory tolling provisions, none of which 

revive plaintiff’s cause of action. Plaintiff’s reference to certain COVID-19 related 

tolling rules is irrelevant, as the statutory period for plaintiff’s causes of action lapsed in 

January of 2015 at the latest, well before COVID-19 existed. Plaintiff also argues section 

358 tolls the statute of limitations permanently due to plaintiff’s disability arising from 

head and spinal injuries he suffered on December 22, 2015. This argument also fails 

because the statute of limitations had already lapsed when plaintiff became disabled. 

Plaintiff also argues section 356 tolls the statute of limitations because plaintiff was in 

bankruptcy proceedings in the 2011-2012 timeframe. However, plaintiff admits he was 

discharged on November 19, 2012, which terminated the automatic stay and renders this 

statute irrelevant to the two-year gap between January 2013 and January 2015, during 

which nothing tolled the running of the statute.

Plaintiff argues he should have been granted leave to amend. We disagree. 

Nothing plaintiff suggests in his brief would cure any of the problems with his causes of 

action.

Plaintiff raises two additional arguments. First, plaintiff argues the trial 

court erred by ruling on his motion to disqualify the trial judge. Plaintiff is mistaken. “A 

trial court has jurisdiction to rule on the timeliness of a peremptory challenge pursuant to 

section 170.6.” (Shipp v. Superior Court (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 147, 151, disapproved on 

other grounds in People v. Superior Court (Lavi) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164, 1180, fn. 13.) 

Plaintiff’s peremptory challenge to the trial court was indeed untimely, as it was filed 
11

April 28, 2021, more than 15 days after the case was assigned for all purposes to the trial 

judge. (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) Plaintiff’s arguments based on sections 170.3 and 170.4 

are irrelevant, as those sections do not control the peremptory challenge procedure 

invoked by plaintiff.

Second, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

change venue. As a preliminary matter, we note plaintiff had the power, at any time 

during these proceedings prior to issuance of the trial court’s ruling on defendants’

demurrer, to dismiss his action without prejudice and refile in Los Angeles County, thus 

unilaterally effectuating the change of venue he sought via motion. Plaintiff failed to do 

so, even after this option was suggested to him by the trial court. As for the motion itself, 

the trial court correctly denied it. Plaintiff’s complaint, including the amended versions 

he filed after filing his motion to change venue, alleged defendants’ principal place of 

business was in Orange County.

3. Briefing Misconduct

Plaintiff’s briefs contain references to the ethnic backgrounds of several

attorneys and several judicial officers. These references are gratuitous, unrelated to any 

of plaintiff’s substantive claims or arguments, and wholly inappropriate. Were plaintiff a 

licensed attorney, we would have no choice but to report him to the State Bar for 

discipline. (See Martinez v. O’Hara (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 853, 856.) Instead, we 

caution plaintiff: further references of this kind, whether in this case or any other future 

case, to the racial, religious, or ethnic backgrounds of litigants, attorneys, or judicial 

officers, where those facts are unrelated to the issues of the case, may give rise to 

sanctions.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.