Defense Science Board 

2006 Summer Study 

on 

21st Century Strategic 

Technology Vectors 

Volume IV 

Accelerating the Transition of Technologies 

into U.S. Capabilities 

April 2007 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
Volume I of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century 

Strategic Technology Vectors represents the consensus view of the study’s 

membership. This volume (IV) is the report of the Accelerating the Transition 

of Technologies into U.S. Capabilities panel of the summer study. Its findings 

and recommendations were used to create volume I and it provides additional 

detail. Findings and recommendations provided in this and the other panel 

reports (volumes II and III) do not necessarily represent the consensus view of 

the full summer study membership. 

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to 

the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations in this 

report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

This report is unclassified. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS I i

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary........................................................................................iii

Chapter 1. Introduction and Background....................................................1

Chapter 2. Rapid Fielding...............................................................................9

The Acquisition Landscape: Capabilities and Limitations of 

Current Rapid Acquisition Programs.................................................. 10

Creating a Rapid Fielding Organization ............................................. 20

Chapter 3. Traditional Acquisitions ............................................................31

The Requirements Process................................................................... 31

Accelerated S&T Developments ......................................................... 33

Program Acquisition.............................................................................. 37

Chapter 4. Disruptive Programs..................................................................48

Chapter 5. Cross-Cutting Enablers.............................................................51

Human Resources.................................................................................. 51

Systems Engineering.............................................................................. 57

Budgets.................................................................................................... 64

Technology Reach.................................................................................. 65

The Industrial Base................................................................................ 71

Incentives ................................................................................................ 77

Chapter 6. Summary......................................................................................83

Appendix A. Terms of Reference ...............................................................91

Appendix B. Panel Membership..................................................................95

Appendix C. Presentations to the Panel.....................................................97

Appendix D. Potential Charter for the Rapid Fielding Organization ......99

Appendix E. Rapid Acquisition Programs.............................................. 110

Appendix F. Globalization........................................................................ 127

Appendix G. Glossary ............................................................................... 129
ii I TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMNARY I iii

Executive Summary 

The Problem 

 “Technological superiority” is a basic U.S. defense strategy—the 

strategic differentiator. During the Cold War, the objective of the 

Department of Defense (DOD) was to stay ahead of the Soviet Union in 

advanced weapons—for example, U.S. fighter aircraft would be capable 

of outperforming those of the Soviet Union. Since the bureaucratic 

system in the former Soviet Union moved slowly, the long DOD 

development times of 10 to 20 years did not keep the United States from 

meeting that objective. However, transformational changes—including 

the agility of adversaries to rapidly acquire and use new systems, and the 

availability of advanced technology and weapons on the commercial 

and/or global market—make these long development cycles in the 

Department of Defense unacceptable. 

On the supply side, new commercial technology often reaches the 

market in 18 months or less, is of equal or better performance then 

DOD’s, and is available worldwide far faster than historic DOD 

acquisition cycles. At the same time, on the demand side, adversaries 

are no longer trying to match the United States plane for plane, ship for 

ship, or tank for tank. Instead they are using asymmetric approaches—

often with “disruptive” (that is, nontraditional), low-cost, simple 

technologies—such as road-side bombs triggered with garage-door 

openers. In such an environment, the United States needs to be able to 

develop new counter-capabilities in literally weeks. 

Additionally, in the area of major defense systems—such as missiles 

or secure communication systems—many nations with advanced 

military capability have been willing to sell their weapons worldwide, 

either directly or through third parties, to any buyer with money (or 

even through barter). Countries such as Russia, China, North Korea, 

and Iran fall into this category. 

As a result of these evolving conditions, the United States can no 

longer assume that it will stay ahead of its adversaries by simply 
iv I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

spending more on research, development, and procurement. Changes in 

the acquisition process—and the accompanying budget, requirements, 

testing, and other related processes—are required in order to 

dramatically cut the time it takes to field new systems. 

Background 

This desire for shorter acquisition cycles is not new. In fact, for reasons 

of economic efficiency, and to enable products to reach the customer 

faster, it has long been the focus of commercial product competition. 

Thus, in the commercial market, cycle time reductions of well over 50 

percent have been realized, as the data in this report will demonstrate. 

These efficiency and effectiveness benefits have, of course, been 

well recognized as equally applicable to DOD acquisitions; and 

numerous studies have urged that weapons’ acquisition cycles be cut 

significantly. For example, a 1994 Congressional report asked for “a 50 

percent reduction in cycle time;” a 1996 White House report requested 

a “25 percent cycle time reduction for major defense acquisition 

programs by 2000” (from a then-historic average of 11 years); a 1997 

high-level DOD council stated they wanted to “aim for a 50 percent 

reduction in acquisition cycle time” (implemented in DOD policy 

directives); the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2004 

National Military Strategy requested “rapid adjustment to changes in 

the environment;” and numerous prior Defense Science Board reports 

(such as, in 1990, 1996, and 2001) have all strongly urged “greatly 

reduced acquisition cycles.” 

But the empirical data (contained herein) show that as the complexity 

of weapons has greatly increased, and the focus of the acquisition system 

has continued to push the state-of-the-art to its extreme—emphasizing 

maximum performance at the expense of delivery time and cost—the 

actual schedules for most weapon systems have been increasing. 

The greatest difference today, and the reason that “this time it will be 

different,” is that the nation is in a long war and soldiers are being killed 

because it is taking too long to get new equipment to the field—as story 

of the up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

(HMMVV), for example, illustrates (see Chapter 1). It is this change in 
EXECUTIVE SUMMNARY I v

“mission need” that will hopefully drive DOD to implement the 

recommendations of this study. The economic and effectiveness benefits 

that will come from the shorter cycles will simply be an added benefit. 

Summary of Recommendations 

Today, in response to urgent war fighter needs, the combatant 

commanders are sending in requests for new equipment that they need 

“yesterday.” To satisfy this demand, a large number of ad hoc

organizations (reporting to many different places) have been set up—

whose total funding, in fiscal year 2006, reached nearly $3 billion. Yet, 

in many cases, these organizations have run into enormous bureaucratic 

hurdles. Statements such as “there is no official requirement for that,” 

“it is not a program of record,” or “there is no money budgeted for 

that,” are being applied to these programs. Additionally, there is no 

institutional memory among these many, ad hoc groups, and, as a result, 

little transfer of knowledge and experience to other parts of the defense 

establishment. To meet this need: 

Recommendation #1. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of 

Defense create a single, new entity, the Rapid Fielding 

Organization (RFO), with a high-level mandate and full budget 

and program authority, to provide funding for rapid fielding, 

sustainment, and transition to the military services. 

 Needs come directly from fighting forces to the RFO director. 

 The RFO will be based on Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA)-like principles with direct authority 

from the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, through 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics (USD [AT&L]). 

 Establish defense budget funding ($3 billion per year), with 

discretionary funds in year of execution. 

 Its mission is to provide operational capability to war fighters as 

soon as possible (some in months, most in <2 years). 
vi I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 Funding for the RFO, and appropriate emphasis, will allow for 

initial training, support, and operation until the components can 

program for sustainment. 

 The RFO will be initially formed from multiplicity of existing 

programs (such as the Defense Acquisition Challenge, 

Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force, advanced 

concept technology demonstrations, and joint concept 

technology demonstrations). 

 The organization will have alliances with the military services, 

especially their rapid acquisition efforts. 

 RFO programs will normally be executed through a relevant 

military service. 

While the RFO will address the truly urgent war fighter needs, there 

is still an absolute need to change the more traditional DOD 

“acquisition” process. This requires changes in the “requirements” 

process, the science and technology process, the logistics process, and 

of course, the weapons acquisition process itself—all geared to faster 

fielding of higher performance systems (and at lower costs). 

The critical first step is getting systems engineering (which includes 

systems analysis) into the front-end of the requirements process—so 

that trade-offs can be made between desired performance, schedule, 

and cost (for the initial version of the system). This input must be 

captured before the requirement is set in stone. Then, to assure that the 

program can effectively make it through its development on schedule 

(and within costs), there needs to be a mechanism for making these 

performance/ schedule/cost trade-offs as the development evolves—

without going back through the full (and lengthy) requirements process. 

To meet these needs, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

working with USD (AT&L) and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(VCJCS), implement the following recommendations. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMNARY I vii

Recommendation #2. Milestone Decision Authority assure that a 

rigorous systems engineering process underpins input to the 

requirements process. 

This process includes development planning that relates candidate 

technologies and systems development processes to defined war fighter 

needs and technology readiness. It replaces significant elements of the 

current Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). 

Recommendation #3. Establish a process allowing program 

managers, during the program execution phase, to receive timely 

decisions on requirements relief without having to go back to the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council—specifically, decisions 

from the USD (AT&L) and senior user leader (such as the VCJCS). 

The next most critical action is to accelerate the phase of a program 

from its formulation (known as “Milestone A”) through its concept 

development and technology development—so that it is ready much 

earlier for the official start of its Systems Development and 

Demonstration phase (known as “Milestone B”). Note that a favorable 

decision at Milestone A does not mean that a new acquisition program 

has been initiated—that occurs at Milestone B. However, Milestone A 

is currently optional—and, therefore, hardly ever held. It is believed 

that holding Milestone A will force both the program and the science 

and technology (S&T) community to focus on early technology 

readiness (for the initial block of the system), and thus accelerate the 

time at which a program is ready for Milestone B. Therefore, to 

achieve this S&T acceleration: 

Recommendation #4. USD (AT&L) change policy directives to 

make Milestone A mandatory (to initiate program technology and 

concept development) and to 

 plan multiple technology development demonstrations 

 generate more options, with adequate funding, to provide 

alternative solution 

 address affordability, producibility, and supportability 
viii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 create concurrent manufacturing, supportability, and 

interoperability plans and cost estimates 

In order to get military equipment into the field as fast as possible, 

it is necessary to compress the period from when a program is officially 

approved for acquisition (Milestone B) to the initial operational 

capability (IOC) in the field. It is desirable to compress this time to five 

years or less as compared to the current cycle which often is 10 to 15 

years, or longer. To achieve this compression, it is necessary to move 

from the traditional, linear acquisition process to a true “spiral 

development” process—one in which only the first “block” (spiral) is 

clearly defined (in terms of performance, cost, and schedule), and where 

subsequent blocks are to be defined based upon user feedback, 

operational needs, and technology evolution. 

Critical for the success of spiral development is ensure at block 1 

that the technology to be integrated has matured to Technology 

Readiness Level 6, that manufacturing processes are at Manufacturing 

Readiness Level 6, and that the system is at an appropriate Integration 

Readiness Level. While this requirement may result in getting only an 

“80 percent solution” to the desired performance for the program, it 

will result in fielding the system much more rapidly (at about 30 percent 

lower cost, and with much lower risk). It is this earlier fielding of high 

performance equipment that will be so valuable to future operations. 

Finally, to assure that it is fully recognized that there will be subsequent 

blocks (spirals), and that this is not the last chance to get new 

technology into the product (and, thus, to follow the historic pattern of 

forcing technology into a product before it is ready), S&T and advanced 

development for future blocks must be pursued in parallel with the full 

development of block 1. To achieve these objectives: 

Recommendation #5. USD (AT&L) mandate the use of “spiral” 

(or block) development to field initial, militarily useful capability 

in 5 years or less, while continuing research and development for 

later blocks. 

“Spiral development” is radically different from the historic, linear 

DOD acquisition process. Specifically, it will require changes to the 

following: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMNARY I ix

 budget process (continuous research and development [R&D]) 

 requirements process (“desire” may be satisfied in block “n”) 

 acquisition process (strengthening Milestone A and B for each 

block) 

 experimentation (to work out the bugs early) 

 test and evaluation process (testing for “military utility” versus a 

specification) 

 logistics process (using and incorporating multiple 

blocks/spirals) 

 training process (using and incorporating multiple 

blocks/spirals) 

 operational planning process (to maximize benefits of each 

block/spiral as it is fielded) 

 assessment process (net technical assessments and risk 

assessments by block) 

 user feedback (operational units’ inputs on the utility of, and 

problems with, early blocks fed back into the design of later 

blocks) 

In addition to more rapid acquisition, either through the RFO or a 

spiral development process, DOD also needs to place greater focus on 

the exploration and development of disruptive technologies and capabilities—

technologies and capabilities that are “disruptive” in two ways. First, 

they are disruptive to DOD traditions in that they are countercultural—and, as a result, receive significant resistance (remotely piloted 

vehicles, ballistic missile defense, cruise missiles, sea-launched ballistic 

missiles, stealth, and the Global Positioning System (GPS), are 

examples). Second, they are disruptive because they are war fighting 

“game changers.” 

For success, these disruptive activities require strong, senior-level 

support until they have satisfactorily demonstrated their truly-significant 

war fighting advantage. Until then, disruptive activities are usually 

under-funded, considered low priority, and tend to be largely ignored in 

favor of more traditional advances. This area of disruptive technologies 
x I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

and capabilities is, of course, the primary focus of DARPA—to which 

continued attention needs to be directed. However, the services and 

defense agencies should similarly be encouraged to pursue these game 

changers. To do so requires high-level support, so the responsible 

office (Director of Defense Research and Engineering [DDR&E]) 

should frequently keep the USD (AT&L) and the Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense appraised of such efforts. Most critical is that 

these “disruptive” activities receive adequate funding. 

Therefore: 

Recommendation #6. USD (AT&L) assure adequate R&D funding 

for disruptive technologies, products, and processes to provide 

adequate development incentives to overcome the expected 

institutional resistance. Specifically, there should be an additional 

$200 million per year for DDR&E to allocate to the services and 

defense agencies for this purpose. 

While these six recommendations will have a very significant impact 

on the desired acceleration of equipment to the field—and with lower 

risk and reduced costs—they are necessary, but not sufficient. They 

must be accompanied by actions across a set of cross-cutting enablers, 

specifically: 

 human resources 

 systems engineering/systems analysis 

 budgets 

 technology reach 

 industrial base 

 incentives 

Attracting the right people to the acquisition workforce is critical if 

DOD is to be a smart buyer and an organization that, based on 

experienced judgments, can make the decisions required for shorter 

acquisition cycles. Today, unfortunately, there is no career development 

program for DOD civilians comparable to the excellent one for the 

military war fighters and such a program is also lacking for military 

acquisition personnel. Similarly, there are few resources available, in 
EXECUTIVE SUMMNARY I xi

terms of both dollars and time, for civilian personnel training (again, in 

contrast to the military war fighter program). Also, it is becoming 

widely recognized that the nation has a crisis developing in science, 

engineering, and math education. The Defense Science Board urges DOD to 

support initiatives in this area. In addition, there are individual skill areas on 

which the DOD should focus and acquire talent—specifically, systems 

analysts and systems engineers, biotechnologists, and social scientists. 

These skill areas will be critical for DOD in the 21st century. 

Therefore: 

Recommendation #7. The Deputy Secretary of Defense direct the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness—

working closely with the USD (AT&L)—to establish and manage 

career development for the civilian and military acquisition and 

technical workforce, including two-way rotation between industry 

and government. 

Career development should include opportunities for graduate 

education at top ten universities as provided by industry for its 

employees, and competitive research programs to address acquisition 

issues with a portion of the funds set aside for DOD participation. 

Additionally: 

Recommendation #8. Expand the DDR&E’s National Defense 

Education Program (currently $19 million), targeting needed 

system engineering, biotechnology, and social science majors. 

As the DOD moves increasingly to more complex systems, and 

particularly to “systems-of-systems,” often extending across multiple 

services, there is a greater need to apply the broad skills of systems 

engineering (including systems analysis, system architecture, test and 

evaluation, “virtual engineering,” and “virtual product development”) to 

each program. These skills are needed when making the performance, 

costs, and schedule trade-offs that are so essential for effective, 

affordable systems—systems that are delivered on short schedules and 

within cost. Beside the need for the government to build up its skills in 

this area, there is a need to establish clear lines of responsibility, authority, 
xii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

and accountability. Therefore, the panel recommends the USD (AT&L) 

direct that each government major acquisition program manager: 

Recommendation #9. Re-establish a program-level chief systems 

engineer as a subject matter and process expert, with 

responsibility for life cycle costs trade offs, systems design, 

system implementation, and systems-of-systems inter-operability, 

and reporting at a senior program level. 

 Assure clear lines of accountability from government to primes 

to sub-contractors. 

 Use modeling and simulation to facilitate and accelerate system 

design (including system-of-systems aspects) and to create a 

close, positive, systems engineering relationship with users, 

testers, and maintainers—beginning prior to Milestone A. 

Recommendation #10. Establish system-of-systems accountability to assure cost-effective optimization at the systems-ofsystems level, not the pieces. 

For each system-of-systems, assure a specific authority to manage 

cost-effective optimization and integration, as well as interfaces and 

schedules. This accountability needs to extend across services when the 

elements of the system-of-systems are outside of an individual service 

boundary. 

Recommendation #11. Use truly independent, experienced, 

professionally diverse, conflict-of-interest-free red teams to ensure 

quality and to reduce program risks (technology, costs, and 

schedule). 

The essential element to rapid acquisition of advanced weapons 

systems is having the money up-front to make the investments in S&T, 

prototypes, and field testing. Other critical elements are having the 

resources and flexibility to pursue multiple approaches and being able 

to shift resources as the program evolves. “Doing it right,” up-front, 

has been proven to save huge sums of dollars and time later in program 

development. (The return on investment has been shown to more than 

warrant the added, early dollars.) At the macro level, this means 
EXECUTIVE SUMMNARY I xiii

sustaining a high level of DOD S&T investments in order to stay ahead. 

Too often, for short-term needs, the DOD has cut such investments, 

thus “eating the seed corn.” Therefore, the Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense: 

Recommendation #12. Sustain S&T funding at the fiscal year 2007 

budget level, in order to enable future responses to adaptive 

adversaries and to maintain technological superiority. (The DOD 

science and technology budget is currently projected to fall in the outyears by almost $1 billion.) 

Particularly important is supporting basic research for the longterm. Over the past 40 years, the resources devoted to basic research 

have been cut in half, as a percent of DOD’s S&T funding, from 

approximately 25 to 12 percent. 

Then, to achieve the specific objectives of the rapid acquisition 

programs, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary: 

Recommendation #13. Establish funding in the DOD budget ($3 

billion per year) for the new Rapid Fielding Organization, with 

discretionary funds in year of execution. 

Recommendation #14. For all acquisition programs, require 

budgeting to realistic costs (such as estimates from the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group) and 

restore the practice of budgeting management reserves, to handle 

uncertainties (minimizing program schedule impact) and to 

maintain a record of the accuracy of realistic cost estimates for 

use in future cost predictions. 

Recommendation #15. Budget S&T funding throughout the future 

years defense plan for future spirals. 

As noted, in many areas of S&T the DOD no longer leads the 

world. Among G-8 nations alone, 50 percent of S&T investments are 

made outside of the United States, 36.5 percent by U.S. commercial 

firms, 7 percent by other U.S. government agencies, and only 6.5 

percent by the DOD. What is needed is a “prospecting and 
xiv I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

exploitation” focus within the DOD to capture the commercial and 

global technologies for the DOD. 

In fact, today there are even unintended barriers created by 

legislation to prevent this desired use of non-DOD-developed 

technology. For example, the many specialized acquisition and costaccounting regulations which discourage commercial firms from doing 

DOD business: the various “Buy American,” “Berry Amendment,” and 

other similar laws against the DOD buying off-shore; and the “export 

control” prohibitions on “dual-use” products being exported (that 

discourage global firms from developing defense-related products). In 

today’s global economy, these barriers all need to be revised (with due 

consideration of potential vulnerabilities) in order for the DOD to 

remain the world’s technological leader. Therefore, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense should direct the USD (AT&L) to: 

Recommendation #16. Establish and fund a DDR&E Center for 

the Application of Commercial and Foreign Technology. 

 Expand and create a searchable database containing the status 

of DOD-applicable commercial, foreign, and other agency 

technologies (the old Defense Technical Information Center 

1498 database serves as a model). 

 Expand use of “other transactions authority” and other means 

to enable commercial firms to undertake business with the 

DOD. 

 Implement recommendations from the 1999 Defense Science Board 

Report on Globalization and Security, to reduce barriers to acquiring 

foreign technology (see Appendix F). 

In addition, there is a need not only to track what potential enemies 

can get from commercial and global markets, but also to determine 

what potential uses and capabilities they could make of these 

technologies for military application. Therefore, the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence, and the USD (AT&L) to: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMNARY I xv

Recommendation #17. Charge the intelligence community, 

combatant commanders, and DDR&E with identifying foreign 

science, technology, and capabilities. 

 The combatant commanders should provide DDR&E with 

information concerning the operational use of new enemy 

capabilities. 

 The intelligence community should inform DDR&E about 

information it receives from technology prospecting (as 

observed by its sources). 

 DDR&E should develop a means of assessing, summarizing, 

and disseminating the information it collects from the DOD 

S&T community regarding threats and capabilities that result 

from potential adversaries’ use of commercial or foreign 

technologies 

As important as all of these recommendations are (for changes on 

the government’s side), there also needs to be change on the industrial 

side. As is well known, there has been enormous consolidation in the 

defense industry over the post-Cold War years, and (while this has 

probably been stopped at the prime contractor level, with seven large 

firms remaining) there continues to be increasing vertical integration. 

To assure that the government always gets the best-value solution for 

critical subsystems (and/or elements of the “system-of-systems”) the 

USD (AT&L): 

Recommendation #18. Ensure full and open competition for 

second- and third-tier contractors to the primes, and for lead 

systems integrators (essentially, the government oversee the 

“make or buy” decision); ensure the availability of alternative 

potential sources. 

 The government should fund competitive, alternative sources of 

R&D (at the prime and lower-tiers). 

 Alternative sources are needed to ensure continued innovation 

(in performance, cost, etc.) and as a competitive alternative if 

the prime or lower-tier incumbent does not perform or allows 

costs to rise (on either the current block or for the next spiral). 
xvi I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

To encourage firms to perform more research on future defense 

technology, the DOD should invest in companies that are leaders in the 

development of innovative sources of next-generation systems or 

products. Such investments will focus the attention of industry on the 

importance of independent research and development (IR&D) and 

create incentives for longer term investment. For DOD to appreciate 

industry’s investments for the longer term, it needs to return to the 

prior practice of separating IR&D from the short-term, proposaloriented, bid and proposal funds. Both IR&D and bid and proposal 

funds would continue to be allowable costs, covered by overhead, but 

this separation would provide the visibility and incentive for defense 

firms to think more in terms of the long-term future. (Fortunately, this 

change does not require a legislative change—only a change in 

regulation). Therefore, the USD (AT&L) should: 

Recommendation #19. Require separate reporting for IR&D and 

bid and proposal by updating Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulations. 

 Set corporate average as 3 percent of sales, as a target. 

 Use this information to help make funding decisions in new 

technology developments. 

In summary, many of the current processes for technology 

transition to the field actually create disincentives to early 

fielding. For example, to get into the budget, the “need” has to be 

identified and funded inserted two years in advance. Or, to try to get 

new technology into a program, it is far easier to interrupt the slow and 

sequential acquisition process, than to wait for a possible future system 

(which may, or may not, come along). 

All of the proposed recommendations are intended to create incentives

for moving high-quality, high-performance weapon systems into the field 

faster, and at lower overall costs. Given the long war in which the nation 

is currently engaged, and the fact that U.S. military lives are at stake, these 

recommendations need to be implemented immediately. U.S. war fighters 

(and the U.S. taxpayer) deserve no less. 

Figure 1 contains a pictorial summary of these overall recommendations. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMNARY I xvii

Figure 1. Time-Based Technology Fielding 

 

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND I 1

Chapter 1. Introduction and Background 

The need for shorter acquisition cycles has long been recognized 

and accepted. This is especially true in the current world environment 

in which the United States faces a range of potential adversaries, from 

nation states to non-state actors. For example, the Packard 

Commission,1 concluded in 1986 that “an unreasonably long acquisition 

cycle—ten to fifteen years for our major weapon systems ... is a central 

problem from which most other acquisition problems stem: 

 it leads to unnecessarily high cost of development... 

 it leads to obsolete technology in our fielded equipment... 

 and it aggravates the very gold plating that is one of its 

causes...” 

In 1994, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act set the objective 

to “deliver emerging technology to troops in 50% less time.” In 1997, 

Secretary of Defense William Perry stated: “...I am challenging each 

military department and defense agency to establish performance 

agreements that will reduce cycle time by least 50 percent by the year 

2000.” 

Not only is there continued interest in reducing system 

development cycle times, but there is substantial evidence that such 

reductions are feasible. Table 1 shows cycle time reductions that had 

taken place in four different industries in the late 1990s and the goals 

for even further reductions. 

 

1. The 1986 President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense was more commonly called the 

Packard Commission for its chairman, David Packard. 
2 I CHAPTER 1 

Table 1. Evidence that Cycle Time Reductions are Feasible 

Industry Past Recent Goal

Automobile 84 months 24 months <18 months

Commercial Aircraft 8–10 years 5 years 2  years

Commercial Spacecraft 8 years 18 months 12 months

Consumer Electronic 2 years 6 months < 6 months

50%–70% Reductions in Cycle Time are Typical

Source: MIT Lean Aerospace Initiative 

There are also examples, as shown in Figure 2, of development 

cycles that took too long and the associated systems that did not make 

it to the fight in time. The result was that systems that could have 

provided U.S. forces with a significantly increased capability were not 

fielded until one to two years after Operation Desert Storm. 

A recent “horror story,” of equipment that arrived too late to save 

soldiers, is the well-reported up-armoring of the High Mobility 

Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). As the story on page 6 shows, 

bureaucratic behavior resulted in slowing down the needed protection for 

soldiers, which needlessly arrived too late to save many lives. 

Besides this obviously critical basis for a greatly accelerated 

acquisition process to meet field commanders’ urgent requirements, 

there is also a need to get traditional military developments—such as 

missiles, radios, and aircraft—into the field much faster in order to 

meet the rapid changes in the technologies and capabilities used by 

adversaries. Further, in addition to this mission requirement, there is 

also documented evidence that longer development cycle times result in 

a greater likelihood of cost growth (Figure 3) and increased probability 

of program cancellation (Figure 4). 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND I 3

Figure 2. Capabilities Too Late for Desert Storm 

Figure 3. Likelihood of Cost Growth
4 I CHAPTER 1 

Figure 4. Increased Program Cancellations 

Recognizing that there are a number of advantages to shorter 

acquisition cycles, as described above, there are also a number of 

impediments. To begin with, the requirements and acquisition 

processes are designed to meet mid- and long-term needs. There is a 

tendency in the initial requirements-setting process to overreach, in 

order to maximize the probability that a program will be approved. 

There is also a tendency for requirements “creep” to occur during 

program execution, often resulting from the development team’s effort 

to meet operators’ desires order to ensure continued support for the 

program into development. Funding perturbations, both from 

Congressional appropriations and from the DOD cutting healthy 

programs to fund overruns on others, also create turbulence and 

adversely affect program-development baseline schedules. Both 

expanded requirements and budget instability result in increased cycle 

times and cost. 

Other impediments to rapid system development cycle times are 

bureaucracy and process substituting for executive leadership. 

Conflicting lines of authority, accountability, and responsibility for 

committed outcomes contribute to a lack of speed and agility in fielding 

capabilities with new technologies. Bureaucracy and inefficient 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND I 5

processes then replace executive leadership and speed in the decisionmaking process. When there is no single authority to say “yes” and 

many empowered to say “no,” cycle times are not likely to be 

streamlined. What is needed is more effective and efficient 

collaboration among stakeholder communities representing the 

requirement and acquisition processes, Congress, and users. 

Cultural impediments also tend to resist disruptive technologies in 

favor of near-term and familiar approaches. This delays the ability to 

rapidly field technologies that could represent “game changing” military 

capabilities. To successfully transition such technologies requires 

executive leadership and support; collaboration between developers and 

users; and a capable, experienced team accountable for the committed 

outcome of fielding the capability. 

Looking to the future, there are further challenges to rapid transition 

of advanced technologies into fielded systems. Technical expertise has 

been declining in the DOD and, in some ways, in the defense industry. 

The ability of government and industry to execute complex system 

development programs will be challenged with marginal supply chains, 

quality of workforce issues, and S&T funding pressures, which are likely 

to increase in the absence of annual supplements to the defense budget. 

Overall, new acquisition approaches, described in Chapters 2–4, are 

required. In addition, actions are required to improve DOD capabilities 

in a set of cross-cutting enablers, the subject of Chapter 5. The report 

concludes, in Chapter 6, with a summary of findings and 

recommendations. 
6 I CHAPTER 1 

The Up-Armored HMMVV Story 

From its earliest stages, the ground forces in Iraq depended heavily on 

wheeled vehicles. Ground forces patrolled, transported, and re-supplied 

by HMMWV and various trucks. Few of these vehicles were inherently 

armor-protected, leaving the occupants vulnerable to ballistic weapons 

and the growing problem of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 

Beginning in June 2003, the Army recognized a surge of IED attacks. By 

August 2003, the commander of the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) 

Division had requested vehicle armor. Not waiting on the acquisition 

process, soldiers and Marines in the field took it upon themselves to uparmor their vehicles with whatever they could find in Iraq. Sheet metal 

doors replaced rubberized canvas; a weak improvement but an 

improvement none-the-less. Plywood boxes filled with sandbags were 

also prevalent. No solution could be found in theater for glass and 

windows, so they remained vulnerable. The Army logistics community 

established its own “Skunk Works,” with the cooperation of a Navy 

welder and an in-theater contracting officer who bought ballistic steel 

from Turkey. The steel was shipped to Baghdad, where the welder 

formed it into protective boxes that provided protection for crews during 

convoys. 

Units in the field continued to produce such solutions as they waited for 

the institutional portion of the Pentagon to resolve a problem they 

believed should have been predictable. The Army’s Rapid Equipping 

Force (REF), with the support of the Army G-3 and Vice Chief of Staff, 

contracted for and produced four variants of kits to armor various 

configurations of HMMWVs following the 101st Commander’s request. 

In six weeks vehicles were completed and began rapid testing, while the 

bulk of the small buy was sent into theater for soldier feedback and 

analysis. Formal testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds showed various 

performance levels for the different configurations, with some better than 

others. But all were significantly better than no armor protection or many 

of the ad-hoc configurations developed in theater. 

Within days of arriving in theater, a convoy of a particular configuration 

was hit by an IED attack. Testimony from the vehicle driver (in an email 

and digital pictures) showed that he likely would have been killed had he 

not had the protection. With only a few of the kits in theater, additional 

feedback came in from other vehicles hit in IED attacks. Much like the 

first, most feedback included comments from the soldiers involved in the 

attacks, and was accompanied by digital pictures. A truck configuration 

had soldiers in the rear when an IED hit. While the truck sustained 

damage, only one soldier was injured by a piece of shrapnel, because 

he was above the armor when the explosion occurred. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND I 7

The Up-Armored HMMVV Story (continued)

The acquisition community of the Army initially responded to the request 

for armored HMMWVs with inaction. This they justified because there was 

“no requirement” (meaning a formal one, fully staffed and through the 

process). The program of record for up-armored HMMWVs was funded 

and in production, but was not intended to replace all systems in theater— 

only deliver the remaining ones slated to go to military police and 

explosive ordinance disposal teams. This amounted to a few hundred kits 

when the forces in theater were on a path to nearly 10,000 HMMWVs in 

general use. When the problem with attacks on HMMWVs was pointed 

out, the response, which ended up in Congressional testimony, was 

simply that combat patrolling was “not the HMMWV’s purpose.” 

Senior Army leaders directed the acquisition community to implement 

solutions through a rapid process. In response, the acquisition 

community required that all efforts fall under them and the REF kits were 

prevented from going into even limited production in order to wait till 

other alternatives were examined and formally tested. This process 

began in October 2003 and extended testing lasted until January 2004. 

Once the REF kits were stopped, no additional kits were fielded to 

forces in the field, with soldiers again having to depend on their own 

ingenuity. In the meantime, soldiers continued to die at an increasing 

rate. (From October 2003, when IEDs were killing soldiers at a rate of 10 

per month, they rose to a rate of 25 per month in May 2004—with 

approximately ten times that many injured soldiers.) 

Testing showed that the kits developed by the REF performed well. In 

fact, the kit from one vender out-performed the standard up-armor kits 

being produced for the Army’s acquisition team. That Army company 

subsequently purchased the company that had built the improved 

performance kit. 

As part of the process to look at alternatives, the Army Material 

Command directed the laboratory command to develop options. A 

ballistic steel version was produced and tested as well. Part of the 

motivation for such a solution was to find one that could leverage the 

under-utilized Army (organic) Depots for production. While not as good 

as some of the alternatives tested, the armor survivability kits were an 

improvement from rubberized canvas. 

Still, the process of testing and evaluating delayed the initiation of 

production of these kits until February 2004, six months after alternatives 

were available, and without any further appliqué of blast and ballistic 

protection to theater for HMMWVs; and 9 months from recognition of the 

impending need. Yet, Congress had recognized the need and allocated 

$429 million in December 2003, nearly two months earlier. 
8 I CHAPTER 1 

The Up-Armored HMMVV Story (continued)

Congress further recognized the need for all HMMWVs in theater to be 

fully up-armored and allocated an additional $618 million in March 2004. 

Army senior leaders then pressed the acquisition community for a 

significant increase in production of the standard up-armored HMMWVs 

on contract to meet all the needs in theater. 

Production of up-armored HMMWVs finally began in May 2004 just shy 

of a year after recognition of a need. In many ways, this is cited as a 

success for rapid acquisition. However, reflection shows that soldiers 

continued to die, due to IEDs, for nearly a year; while the acquisition 

community carefully came to the conclusion that they should begin 

contracting for an already-proven system. They essentially transferred 

programmatic risk, for which they would have been responsible, to the 

soldier on the ground bearing it as an operational risk—which cost lives 

rather than management risk. 

An alternative view might have been to see the need, begin meeting it 

with additions to the contract in place, buys of the REF kits, or both and 

optimize later. This alternative would have ensured rapid resolution to a 

higher degree than by the ad-hoc, in-theater systems—and in a timelier 

manner than even the “accelerated” acquisition thrust upon the 

community. 

Resistance to such rapid acquisition continues, as the field encounters 

an evolving enemy. The insurgency in Iraq has not limited its IEDs to the 

original design and deployment. Because of this, IEDs have become 

more effective and the original up-armor, kitted HMMWVs have not 

provided the desired protection. Yet, that is the system continuing to be 

procured, essentially unchanged. 

Alternatives have been fielded in-theater and proven effective through 

several of the rapid processes. The REF and the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization have both put South African 

Buffalos and Cougars in-theater to help protect some of those more 

likely to encounter IEDs. To date, no lives have been lost in numerous 

attacks on these vehicles. Still, they have not been adapted for general 

use. Recently, the Special Operations Command requested modified 

HMMWVs (by general purpose vehicles) with an alternative armor 

package that proved very successful in formal testing against IEDs. 

Despite this success, the acquisition system has not purchased any as 

alternatives to the current Ogara-Hess armor package, and backed off 

the Special Operations Command buy from the requested 80 vehicles to 

30. Rapid acquisition, in this case, certainly was hindered by the 

response time of the major acquisition community.
RAPID FIELDING I 9

Chapter 2. Rapid Fielding 

The current threat environment of the global war on terrorism is 

characterized by elusive, fast-adapting adversaries capable of gaining 

temporary operational and tactical advantage by employing creative 

tactics and innovative technologies. Their successes often have farreaching strategic implications. Against such threats, capabilities derived 

from traditional acquisition and development processes are inadequate. 

Adaptable adversaries capitalize on short commercial cycles to rapidly 

acquire and integrate capabilities from commercial and global arms 

markets into asymmetric capabilities faster than DOD can implement a 

countering capability. 

In the current Iraqi conflict, for example, the Joint Improvised 

Explosive Device Defeat Organization estimates that the average time 

for insurgents to analyze and develop a countermeasure to coalition 

technology and non-technology capabilities, is two weeks or less. The 

adversary’s development, acquisition, and delivery cycle is measured in 

days, while the time required for coalition war fighters to gain approval 

and acquire a capability to defeat them is currently measured in weeks, 

months, or even years. This asymmetry places a premium on anticipating 

threats and rapidly fielding capabilities to gain decisive technical and 

operational advantage. The DOD needs to better focus its efforts to 

provide innovative solutions that address urgent operational needs and 

customer requests to field capabilities faster. 

Taken as a whole, the DOD can be described as a system based on 

communities. The communities involved in the delivery of capabilities 

include, but are not limited to, the requirements community, the 

resource community, the S&T community, the acquisition community, 

and the logistics community. Each community operates within its own 

processes and perceives its customers, outputs, and metrics differently. 

Specifically, the S&T community is funded to engage in worthwhile 

science and develop relevant technology. Once advanced technology is 

developed, the money and the accountability runs out. 
10 I CHAPTER 2 

The acquisition community, on the other hand, is charged with 

delivering programs of record that meet the needs of the requirements 

community within specific constraints of cost, schedule, and 

performance. There is little or no incentive to “harvest” what the S&T 

community has produced. It is much more common to depend on 

defense contractors to find and integrate technology into their products 

produced under contract. The department also faces the ever-present 

challenge of funding for execution and budget-year needs inside the 

normal decision timelines of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 

and Execution (PPBE) cycle. All of these factors argue persuasively for 

a more effective way to underwrite and execute programs to rapidly 

meet urgent operational needs. 

Capabilities and Limitations of Current Rapid 

Acquisition Programs 

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stresses the need to 

rapidly develop and field new, innovative, and transformational 

technologies and operational concepts. There are a significant number 

of programs currently operating that are designed to meet these 

challenges and are described, by the department, as falling into either of 

two categories: “rapid” or “agile.” These programs are in contrast to 

the traditional acquisition processes covered by the DOD Instruction 

5000 series framed by the PPBE process. Both “rapid” and “agile” 

programs involve projects that are purposely resourced inside the fouryear, PPBE decision timeline. Such programs are defined as follows: 

 Rapid acquisition programs focus on urgent operational 

needs with an emphasis on meeting initial materiel or logistics 

solutions in 120 days or less. They focus almost exclusively on 

procuring off-the-shelf technologies. It could be debated that 

these are, in reality, rapid “procurement” programs since 

materiel solutions are usually already known and all that is 

required is a procurement decision. The military services and 

the Joint Staff have a number of processes in place to address 

urgent operational needs requiring a procurement decision and 

are the departmental focal point for this requirement. 
RAPID FIELDING I 11

 Agile acquisition programs are often thought of as “applied 

technology” programs; they require little development or 

advancement of the state-of-the-art. The key challenge in agile 

acquisition programs is to integrate technologies, components, 

or subsystems to produce a new capability that can be 

demonstrated in months and fielded in three years or less. 

The failure of the traditional acquisition process to respond to 

urgent operational needs has given rise to an increasing number of 

“rapid” initiatives or programs. Rapid acquisition is most often applied 

to programs focused on meeting very short- or near-term operational 

needs. To meet these needs, acquisition timelines are targeted in 

months, and most frequently in less than two years, but often extend to 

as many as four. 

Current rapid acquisition programs primarily draw requirements 

from war fighting units. All programs share the common attribute that 

they respond to urgent operational needs, most often in the midst of 

combat or complex emergencies to prevent or minimize loss of life. 

The requirements that drive these current processes may be specific to 

a particular military service, or the area of responsibility where the 

capability is needed. 

Most successful rapid acquisition programs were initially formed 

and implemented by small and dedicated groups of qualified, innovative 

people who accepted both the empowerment and accountability to 

accomplish the task. The extreme urgency of the situation attracted 

senior-level interest and support that, in turn, allowed the group to 

bypass, breach, or ignore bureaucratic obstacles as long as they 

remained legally correct. 

Rapid acquisition groups execute their projects using a close 

relationship between the developer and end-user. Definition, 

development, testing, and refinement all occur in a continuous loop 

often on or adjacent to the battlefield or complex emergency site. They 

operate with little congressional or other oversight, and require small 

funding levels to execute, often never exceeding the range of tens to a 

few hundred million dollars. 
12 I CHAPTER 2 

The products from rapid acquisition programs tend to be simple 

purchases or integrations of existing technologies never intended to 

result from any significant technology development. They continue to 

be predominantly integration projects (as opposed to development

projects) and almost exclusively use technology at Technical Readiness 

Level 6 or higher. The main challenge they face is the integration of 

technologies (components, software, subsystems) to produce new and 

improved capabilities. 

Commanders who receive capabilities from rapid acquisition 

programs often use indemnification to relax original requirements when 

they exceed available technology. Solutions of 80 percent capability are 

accepted, while high levels of risk and occasional developmental failure 

are tolerated on the path to quickly reaching a useable solution. 

The success of rapid acquisition programs has engendered a mindset 

oriented more toward developing innovative solutions and less compliant 

with the structured, “formulaic” approach that underlies the traditional 

acquisition approach. The sidebar that follows, on the first ground 

robots, is an illustrative example of a successful implementation resulting 

from these processes. 

Limitations of Rapid Acquisition Programs 

With the exception of large-scale initiatives such as robotics, most 

rapid reaction solutions are either left in-theater or not re-used by units 

in other missions. The effect is large numbers of solutions to common 

problems resulting in duplicative efforts and the need for significant 

“after the fact” integration. 

Another significant point of failure for current rapid acquisition 

efforts are fiscal resources and overall governance; no joint lead is 

designated or empowered to budget for, oversee, or execute joint rapid 

acquisition programs. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC) has no funding authority to resource its directives, and DOD 

lacks any documents akin to the DOD 5000 series governing the 

traditional procurement process. 
RAPID FIELDING I 13

The First Ground Robots

During Operation Enduring Freedom, soldiers faced the dangerous task of 

clearing caves using grappling hooks, a technique unchanged since the 

Vietnam War. The only contribution from the traditional acquisition process 

was a “new” hook forged from titanium, to replace the iron one, and nylon 

rope. This advancement in grappling hook technology, procured by the 

conventional acquisition process, resulted from a two-year development 

effort. 

Although lighter than its predecessor the new hook provided no increased 

safety to soldiers who used them to clear caves of booby traps. Any booby 

traps tripped by the grappling hook caused an explosion exposing the 

operator (hook thrower) to risk of injury or death. The significant amounts of 

unexploded munitions often hidden in the caves increased the potential that 

the initial detonation would ignite these stocks in secondary explosions of 

exponentially higher magnitude. A length of nylon was inadequate to provide 

sufficient protection in such circumstances. 

Recognizing this continued risk to soldiers, the Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army commissioned a small group to rapidly acquire and deploy robots as 

alternatives to grappling hooks for cave clearing. Initially resourced with 

less than $1 million, the program became the Rapid Integration of Robotic 

System (RIRS). 

The inability to leverage resources and programs within the conventional 

acquisition required the RIRS to seek solutions from the private sector. 

The RIRS organic contracting capability allowed them to execute a solesource contract within days, directing the contractor to leverage 

commercial-off-the-shelf items to resolve both the logistical and control 

issues. Within two weeks the rapid acquisition effort produced a wearable 

controller for testing, battery charge, and commercial power tools 

repackaged to support all possible variants. 

The team deployed to Afghanistan with robots, developing the required draft 

operating tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) on the commercial 

flight to theater. On arrival in-theater, team members employed the systems 

and revised the draft TTPs in combat along side combatant commander 

forces before handover to any units. Working closely with the user, including 

selecting and training soldiers who would become the actual operators, 

allowed the team to rapidly define the training protocols as well. As the new 

users were prepared to accept responsibility for aspects of the mission, the 

team withdrew, allowing transition of the robots to the unit in less than a 

month. A final briefing to the Army Vice Chief of Staff occurred within 90 

days of project end and resulted in expansion of the effort to become the 

Army’s Rapid Equipping Force. 
14 I CHAPTER 2 

Few rapid acquisition programs have any institutionalized funding 

source, and they place an increasing drain on programmed service 

budgets to survive. Almost by definition, these programs exist outside 

the PPBE cycle and can never meet its long lead-time forecasting 

cycles. While rapid acquisition programs, by their nature, operate in a 

domain where urgent needs are not known until just before or soon 

after they emerge, the traditional PPBE process only accepts known, 

documented, and validated requirements. 

Over the years, allegiance to service goals were institutionalized and 

reinforced by a PPBE process that vested decision-making for force 

structure with the respective military services. The PPBE process leaves 

little room for exploitation of unanticipated technical discoveries or 

unanticipated urgent operational needs. As a result, virtually every rapid 

acquisition program is either unfunded or survives on supplemental 

funding to the defense budget. Even the JRAC takes funds from current 

service programs and appropriations or rely on supplemental funding. 

Department of Defense appropriations and processes are not designed to 

quickly deliver capabilities directly to the warfighter or through the 

combatant commanders. The process exits to support service 

development, fielding, and sustainment of their core capabilities. Even 

those programs that have the ability to fill the joint rapid acquisition gap 

using existing authorities lack statutory annual appropriations. 

Even with adequate funding, most current rapid acquisition 

programs do little beyond purchase and delivery of equipment. Training 

support for rapidly generated solutions is minimal, normally confined to 

initial user familiarity with no follow-on or sustainment training. This 

situation is particularly problematic given the current operational 

tempo, where rotating units are arriving in-theater unable to fully make 

use of capabilities left by the preceding unit. In one recent example, 

equipment from a high-speed network portal was left in a closet and 

scavenged to network video games when the gaining unit lacked 

sufficient training to operate the equipment. 

Although delivered faster and often focused on providing a specific 

solution, the capabilities resulting from rapid acquisition programs have 

an impact on doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader 

development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). When executed to 
RAPID FIELDING I 15

purchase small quantities used at the tactical level, the impact is minimal 

and often imperceptible. Conversely, programs that buy large quantities 

(robots and counter-IED capabilities, for example), even over time, 

have an enormous DOTMLPF impact. 

Another significant roadblock to current rapid acquisition programs 

comes from attempts by the traditional acquisition community to 

provide oversight and to channel them into existing processes in an 

attempt to fill the need by merely executing the traditional process 

faster. The result is slowing “rapid acquisition” to “faster traditional 

acquisition” by burdening it with attempts to meet formal requirements 

and approval processes. Unfortunately, over time the attempted 

paradigm shift initiated by these rapid acquisition programs is paralyzed 

by the resurgence of traditional bureaucracy. Prudent oversight is 

subsumed by overly rigid control and by attempts to institutionalize 

rapid acquisition programs to make them fit within the existing JCIDS 

and equivalent service processes. The irony is the organizations that 

seek to subordinate rapid acquisition programs are the very ones that 

proved unable to meet the warfighter needs, necessitating the evolution 

of “rapid” capabilities. 

Finally, any limited collection of lessons learned is kept within the 

unit or rapid acquisition element and rarely shared. The result is a 

continuous loop where other services and organizations are forced to 

“re-discover” solutions to common problems. These conditions will 

increase as the military services take on more non-traditional roles 

necessitated by limited DOD manpower and expanding missions of the 

global war on terrorism. For example, Navy personnel are increasingly 

involved in land-based security missions to relieve pressure on overcommitted traditional Army and Marine Corps ground forces. 

The lack of any ability to effectively capture and share lessons learned 

from prior experiences and technology breakthroughs is also having an 

adverse effect on traditional capabilities development. There is no better 

or more demanding laboratory than combat. What is learned there can 

inform requirements and capabilities development better than any 

prolonged academic study or voluminous requirements document. It can 

also provide valuable insights the DOD leadership can use to review 

current long-term programs and assess their viability and to inform 
16 I CHAPTER 2 

decisions on shifting available resources to more beneficial programs. 

This is currently not being accomplished with the ad hoc approaches. 

These flaws in the traditional acquisition process lingered for years 

as continual irritants to combatant commanders and warfighters. The 

pressures of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, as they continually ebb and flow between low- to midintensity conflicts and complex humanitarian emergencies, coupled with 

their evolution from expeditionary to long-term conflicts in the global 

war on terrorism, caused capability faults to burst. The current ad hoc

collection of rapid acquisition programs remains incapable of sustained, 

timely, coordinated response to urgent operational needs. The system is 

in danger of complete collapse under the increasing weight of these ad 

hoc solutions and the increasingly large numbers of systems and 

products they generate with no planned sustainment. 

Summary of Current Programs 

The DOD programs currently in place that are concerned with the 

delivery of new or improved capabilities to the warfighter are varied. 

They range from service S&T programs dating back to the close of 

World War II, to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Organization established in fiscal year 2006. Figure 5 depicts a sample 

of programs currently in place, or approved for fiscal year 2006, that 

focus primarily on “rapid” or “agile” delivery of capabilities to the war 

fighter. Funding profiles for these programs, an organization chart, and 

short description of each are included in Appendix E. 

As Figure 5 illustrates, programs currently in place are aligned in such a 

way as to span the range of technology maturity while involving partners 

both within DOD and in the commercial sector. At the top of the chart, 

the various funding categories of research, development, test and 

evaluation appropriation; procurement; and operations and maintenance 

(O&M) indicate in general terms the type of funding allocated to these 

programs. The second line indicates Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) 

and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs) that reflect the relative 

maturity of the technology and manufacturability. The third line indicates 

acquisition milestones (A, B, and C) that correspond with the approval 
RAPID FIELDING I 17

levels required in the DOD acquisition system. All of the category labels 

are approximate for illustration purposes. 

Figure 5. Example “Rapid” Acquisition Programs 

It is apparent from the figure that DOD has attempted to cover the 

entire path of capability development from science and technology to 

initial procurement. Although these programs are making significant 

progress in fielding capabilities to the warfighter as quickly as possible, 

there are additional measures that would accelerate the process even 

more. Current PPBE processes discourage introduction of innovative 

capabilities lacking established community sponsorship. The lengthy 

process of programming and budgeting across appropriations prevents 

the initiation of urgently needed capabilities and the exploitation of 

perishable technical opportunities without “breaking” existing programs. 

Another effect of the growing rift between current rapid acquisition 

programs and the overly restrictive legacy acquisition process is the 

inability of the current development programs to learn from warfighter 

experiences. While Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom 

continue to birth literally thousands of innovative solutions ranging 
18 I CHAPTER 2 

from robots to means to defeat IEDs, few, if any, successfully 

transition to existing or new programs of record. With no ability to 

capture, leverage, and learn from these experiences, DOD is forced to 

continually re-learn lessons at an increasing cost in terms of dollars and 

human lives. 

Truly innovative military-industry joint ventures and other 

innovative solutions tend to become program orphans because parent 

service organizations do not exist to sustain them or they conflict with 

existing programs of record that the services and program managers 

feel obligated to defend. 

Often, rapid acquisition programs slow to become merely “fast 

tracks” within traditional processes. The paradigm falters, new 

organizations emerge to meet the need, and the cycle repeats. In the 

process, truly innovative solutions are often lost or delayed, thereby 

putting the lives of soldiers, sailors, airman, and Marines at risk. 

The story of door breaching and tactical awareness is another 

example of the barriers that stand in the way of rapidly fielding essential 

equipment to satisfy war fighter needs. 

Door Breaching and Tactical Awareness

Martin Electronics, Inc. (MEI) is an ISO-9002 registered manufacturer 

of pyrotechnic and ordnance devices with over 30 years corporate 

experience. In January 2004 MEI’s Director of Business Development 

was in Singapore discussing a new self-destruct 40mm fuse with 

industry partner Chartered Ammunition. The executive discovered two 

immediate warfighter needs in OIF and OEF were a true “door buster” 

round that would provide standoff for the warfighter and breach woodpaneled steel core doors, and a capability to improve the squad, platoon, 

and company-level commander’s tactical awareness. 

For door breaching, the standard low velocity 40mm ammunition (M433) 

has a tendency to only punch a small hole through the door without 

actually breaching it. This makes it necessary for soldiers to expose 

themselves both approaching the door and while breaching it with other 

means, putting them at risk. 
RAPID FIELDING I 19

Door Breaching and Tactical Awareness (continued)

There is currently no capability that enables tactical awareness below 

the battalion level, such as providing warfighters on the ground the 

capability to observe threats concealed on roof tops or behind buildings. 

Even at the battalion level it is virtually impossible to get an Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle (UAV) tasked, as they are considered “national assets. 

After returning to his corporate headquarters, the executive began 

exploring options to meet the perceived requirement. In early February 

2004, MEI began researching camera companies. Within three weeks of 

that initial meeting First Witness sent MEI their initial camera design and 

the two held their first design review. 

Concurrently with their development, MEI approached the Army Research, 

Development & Engineering Center (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ, 

concerning the ongoing IR&D efforts on the product. In late March, Project 

Manager Maneuver Ammunition Systems (PM-MAS) visited MEI and was 

briefed on all their 40mm products. At the August PM MAS briefing the MAS 

staff suggested MEI and the ARDEC execute a Cooperative Research and 

Development Agreement (CRADA) to jointly complete the development of 

HUNTIR, MEI’s breeching round (HELLHOUND), and another MEI 

developmental prototype round. MEI agreed and submitted a draft CRADA 

to the ARDEC CRADA office in September 2004, followed by an MEI 

briefing to the Program Manager Crew Served Weapons staff in December 

2004. Both PMs requested expanding the CRADA to incorporate all 40mm 

ammunition enhancements. MEI submitted the revised draft CRADA on 

December 22, 2004. 

In February 2005 MEI performed the first public demonstration of the 

HUNTIR round at Fort Benning, GA. The successful demonstration 

generated an enormous amount of interest from the Army Infantry 

Center. In March MEI requested an update from ARDEC concerning the 

CRADA and was told that ARDEC’s Engineering Department declined to 

sign it because they believed they did not need external assistance to 

develop new ammunition types and saw no warfighter requirement for 

the capability. 

To date, MEI and First Witness have completed Version 1 of the 

HUNTIR Round, successfully flying over 75 units. The round goes into 

first lot production by June 15, 2005 to fill order requests for test units 

from the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy SEALS, USSOCOM, Sweden, 

Denmark, and the UK. Total cycle time from capability identification to 

production line start-up was only 7 months. To date, ARDEC has failed 

to field either capability. 

Note: Case study reprinted in its entirety from The Center for Applied Innovation: An 

Innovative Solution for Achieving Global Context through Innovation and Human Creativity 

with permission of Partners International Foundation, www.partners-international.org/cai/ 

index1.htm, copyright 2004, all rights reserved.
20 I CHAPTER 2 

Creating a Rapid Fielding Organization 

In order to satisfy the growing list of warfighter-required urgent 

needs over what is anticipated to be an extended period of “long 

war,” the Department of Defense should create a new RFO,

combining most of the current “rapid” and “agile” programs with some 

programs remaining within the services, but coordinated within the RFO. 

The RFO would provide institutional focus, with memory and knowledgetransfer, on achieving rapid response—weeks, months, or even a few years 

as compared to the longer, traditional acquisition process—and would be 

supported with adequate authority, budget, and incentives. 

A distinction is made in this discussion between rapid “fielding” 

and rapid “procurement.” Succinctly, rapid procurement has often been 

assumed to be synonymous with rapid purchasing. This entails the 

purchase of items and/or capabilities that are then provided to the user 

with minimum familiarization training and virtually no sustainment 

training. Conversely, the RFO would field systems and solutions with 

associated equipment, manning, and training. 

A transformed joint force needs to be decisive across all domains 

and against all threats. DOD requires the capability to expeditiously 

develop, implement, and continually improve force capabilities (in 

terms of organizational design, process, capabilities, concepts, and 

human resources) in an increasingly chaotic world filled with 

asymmetric threats from highly adaptive adversaries. Consequently, 

DOD’s response to these ever-evolving, highly dynamic threats has to 

be equally dynamic and more robust. DOD needs to be able to provide 

viable solutions to the warfighter within 24 months while, at the same 

time, leverage existing processes. This mission can best be 

accomplished by the creation of an RFO. 

Construct of the RFO 

The RFO will be established with a high-level mandate and full 

program and budget authority. Using direct authority from the 

Secretary of Defense, through the USD (AT&L), the RFO will rapidly 
RAPID FIELDING I 21

provide combatant commanders with capabilities necessary to conduct 

military operations. Given the time-sensitive nature of its mission, the 

RFO will be designed such that tasks can be quickly addressed and 

rapidly solved. As such, processes will be streamlined, and best 

practices from the private sector will be incorporated. 

Perhaps most importantly, the RFO will be extricated from the 

complex bureaucracy that encumbers today’s traditional acquisition 

process, including the voluminous requirements and extended lead 

times for study, review, and approval. Even though, technically, it will 

be a “bureaucratic” organization, the RFO will be non-conformist in its 

mode of operation, being more akin to a private-sector firm that is 

focused on delivering innovative, reliable, and cost-effective solutions 

rapidly to its customers. It will also be like DARPA in its independent 

focus on the mission. The RFO will focus on the combatant 

commanders as its well-defined customer base. It will prevent “mission 

creep” and will not duplicate capabilities currently under development 

elsewhere in the DOD. 

The people required for such an elite organization should be handpicked from among the best in government, the services, the private 

sector, and academia. Special emphasis will be placed on the leadership 

and the leadership team. Assignment to the RFO will be by personal 

selection. Experimental Personnel Authority will allow the RFO to hire 

expert program managers from industry at competitive salaries and 

faster-than-normal civil service rules. This structure will ensure only the 

most qualified, innovative, and customer-focused individuals staff and 

operate the RFO. 

Capabilities of the RFO 

The RFO will establish authoritative governance and management 

structures to expeditiously execute capability development and delivery. 

The solution will establish, reinforce, and maintain the practice of 

continuous involvement of the warfighter and developer. This 

approach will help to ensure the rapid fielding of interoperable and 

enabling solutions. 
22 I CHAPTER 2 

The RFO will provide solutions to urgent operational requirements 

across the force. It will pursue rapid prototyping of capabilities to 

ensure they meet urgent, unanticipated, warfighting needs and are 

conceived, developed, and delivered in an expeditious manner. The 

RFO while enable longer-term development by handing capabilities off 

to an appropriate service or agency when they can be included in a 

program of record, and supported by new doctrine and organization as 

required. Succinctly, the types of problems addressed by the RFO are 

normally those that can be resolved by capability improvements across 

the DOTMLPF to include information technology. 

It is essential that the RFO not only provide equipment rapidly to 

the current warfighters, but also supply training and operational 

concepts to current warfighters and supply equipment, training, and 

operational concepts to those troops currently undergoing preparation 

and training to go into the field. This concept is shown in Figure 6. 

Figure 6. Inserting New Capabilities 
RAPID FIELDING I 23

RFO Processes and Operations 

The RFO will execute using a unique operational construct that fills 

the critical gap between DARPA’s disruptive innovation mission and 

the core-capability focus of service rapid acquisition programs. In so 

doing, the RFO will operate as an enabler, drawing off non-core 

mission functions from both, thereby allowing them to focus more on 

their specific missions. DARPA, for example, will be able to focus on 

its disruptive mission and away from programs focused on near-term 

solutions to immediate problems. The RFO will assist in coordinating 

memoranda of agreement with the military services for successful 

transition of DARPA and RFO products. 

The RFO processes will be driven by clear, concise, plain-language 

requirement statements from the combatant commanders that receive 

quick action. Urgent operational needs will flow directly from the 

combatant commanders to the RFO Director who has complete 

approval and execution authority from the Secretary of Defense, as well 

as all required acquisition authority from USD (AT&L). The RFO 

Director considers requests or proposals that come from or are validated 

by a combatant commander or service. In the latter case, if the desired 

capability is for a specific combatant commander area of operations, that 

commander will validate it as an urgent operational need. 

Once a request or proposal arrives at the RFO, the staff conducts a 

feasibility assessment to determine if the requested capability can be 

readily attained or if the RFO has a reasonable expectation it can be 

developed in 24 months or less. This assessment also includes a 

technical assessment, a cost-value analysis, determination of any parallel 

or competing initiative that could better meet the need, an assessment 

of material and non-material approaches to provide the capability, and 

type of evaluation required as well as the evaluation’s initial criteria. The 

request is also assessed against a continually updated list of high-priority 

needs derived from the combatant commanders integrated priority lists 

and other input. Where prioritization of requested projects and 

proposals is required, the RFO Director relies on this guidance, seeking 

clarification only when required. 
24 I CHAPTER 2 

Following legal review by the RFO’s organic General Counsel, the 

RFO Director either approves or disapproves the project or proposal 

and informs the requestor, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the decision, as appropriate. The review and 

approval process will not exceed two (2) weeks.

Project funding is drawn from the RFO’s annual appropriated 

budget. This includes development, deployment, associated training, 

and sustainment until the relevant service either programs long-term 

support, the capability transitions to a program of record, or is divested. 

To ensure capabilities are developed and deployed with appropriate 

training and sustainment within its charter, the RFO will use the full 

range of appropriations. A portion of these funds is discretionary to 

the RFO Director; Congressional notification occurs at the start of each 

fiscal year with revisions by exception. To prevent the RFO from 

becoming burdened with long-term sustainment, sustainment packages 

will normally not be funded for a period exceeding two years without 

approval by the RFO Director. 

Project execution begins when funds are transferred to a relevant 

service for contracting and implementation or, occasionally, when the 

RFO Director designates an internal team to deliver the capability. New 

contracts and modifications to existing contracts will be enabled by the 

RFO’s “other transactions authority.” 

For all RFO projects, the capability is developed and/or acquired in 

close coordination with the user. This will often require in-theater 

development and testing. 

The RFO’s oversight, accountability, and sustainment responsibility 

for individual projects will normally end two years after delivery (when 

the program is fully transferred to the relevant service) unless 

specifically approved by the RFO Director. Throughout program 

execution, rigorous analysis is conducted of the process itself and of the 

products to fuel continual improvement of both, producing lessons for 

incorporation into later programs. 
RAPID FIELDING I 25

Accountability and Measurement Metrics 

Success for the RFO will be measured both quantitatively and 

qualitatively. Initially, success will be measured by the following: 

 the number of urgent need requests that have been successfully 

met 

 the time required to satisfy those needs 

 the number of capabilities developed that transitioned to service 

programs of record 

 the number of innovative public and private sector participants 

engaged by the RFO 

Most importantly, perhaps, success will also be measured by the 

number of unproductive, duplicative, or unnecessary programs 

identified, consolidated, or divested. This metric includes the potential 

consolidation of redundant acquisition programs. 

The RFO will function using a hybrid model of authorities tailored 

to its unique mission as follows: 

 The RFO will be authorized to enter into and administer 

contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements, directly or 

through a military department, in pursuit of its rapid-fielding 

mission. 

 “Other transactions authority” will allow the RFO more flexible 

contracting arrangements than possible under the Federal 

Acquisition Regulations. 

A proposed draft charter for the RFO is contained in Appendix D. 

Implementation Recommendations 

The RFO will be designed to compliment and oversee service and 

joint rapid acquisition efforts. The RFO mission as a fielding 

organization, not only a procurement entity, ensures it will provide total 

support by working with the military services to ensure capabilities are 

provided with the appropriate training (user, replacement, sustainment), 

organizational support, and testing. The RFO’s close relationship with 
26 I CHAPTER 2 

its customers will enable it to fill combatant commander urgent 

operational needs in response to requests flowing directly for fighting 

forces to the director. Prototype development, evaluation, and 

refinement conducted with users in the field will enhance this 

relationship. The RFO can also provide lessons learned and other 

program support, reducing duplication of effort. 

Implementing the RFO is possible almost immediately, but 

establishing the RFO will require a strong Secretary of Defense charter, 

supported by USD (AT&L) on behalf of the acquisition community. It 

requires a designated and empowered joint warfighter advocate, such as 

the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will represent the 

combatant commanders, and with strong private sector support. It is 

impossible to implement the revolutionary, innovative approach the RFO 

represents using legacy DOD management approaches. 

The RFO organizational design and business processes need to be 

as transformative as its vision. As a model, a private enterprise is a 

ubiquitous system; a goal-directed and focused organization of various 

activities, processes, and resources, usually of significant complexity in 

strategic and operational scope and risk. It is a model worthy of 

emulation. Such models need to continually deliver innovative, reliable, 

cost-effective technologies and/or solutions to a very competitive 

marketplace, and in a timely manner. The speed with which this is 

accomplished can be directly correlated to success. Consequently, this 

delivery-oriented mode of operation creates a need for strategic 

simplicity. It also requires that the firm’s executive leadership not only 

communicate its strategy in an effective manner, but also mandate 

measurement metrics that focus product development on the 

achievement of lower development costs, and increased revenue, 

market share, and profitability. 

Among others, what this type of environment creates is incentives 

to maintain an efficient technology development process that is 

constantly focused on and adaptive to changing market conditions, and 

the needs of its current (and prospective) customer base. Further, 

companies that compete in the technology domain realize that ultimate 

success cannot be achieved until new, innovative, and refined 

technologies and/or solutions are successfully transitioned. 
RAPID FIELDING I 27

At the core of the RFO are the interactions and dependencies between 

its stated goals and the processes that are established and implemented in 

order to achieve those objectives. Consequently, it will be incumbent upon 

the leadership team to not only determine but also align the incentives of 

those in its value chain. Table 3 contains some suggested processes that 

should be adopted by the RFO’s director. These processes both determine 

and govern the means to achieve stated enterprise goals and objectives, 

embodied in the operations of the enterprise. 

To begin implementation, the Secretary of Defense direct the USD 

(AT&L) and other appropriate agencies to provide a structure and 

implementation plan. This plan can be developed in 90 days with 

support from the Defense Science Board (DSB) and other private 

sector entities. It is critical this group include innovative and nontraditional industry advisors that will bring the entrepreneurial culture 

critical to the RFO’s success. 

Table 3. Processes of Successful Private Enterprises

Process Process Attribute(s)

Situation assessment The executive team gathers data and information from 

multiple sources to acquire a holistic perspective of the 

enterprise and the world. Its strategic view is derived, 

in large part, from drivers external to the RFO. 

Vision and strategy development The executive team sets and/or refines the vision of 

the enterprise and develops the overall direction and 

strategy. 

Strategic decision-making The executive team makes decisions that affect the 

direction of the enterprise, not tactical, day-to-day 

operational decisions. 

Communication of intent The executive team develops a framework that can 

be used to communicate both strategic and tactical 

information to its stakeholders. 

Recruiting and retention The executive team recruits and retains key 

managers and employees necessary to accomplish 

stated business goals and objectives. 

Designing incentives and 

rewards 

The process of offering incentives and rewards to 

executives and employees for achieving key business 

goals and objectives. 
28 I CHAPTER 2 

The groups’ task will be to develop the organizational design, 

business process, capabilities, concepts, human resources, and other 

business processes required for the RFO and identify changes to 

existing DOD to: 

 Create an environment of continuous involvement with the 

warfighter for a full and open dialogue (vice discussion) of 

capability requirements so developers can quickly determine 

them. 2

 Increase the interaction between warfighters and capability 

builders to increase the speed at which proposed solutions are 

operationally assessed and improved. 

 Increase the speed of fielding capabilities through streamlined 

business practices that enable timely delivery of integrated 

capabilities. 

 Establish an authoritative governance and management 

structure that will allow the RFO to consolidate all rapid 

acquisition programs. 

 Reduce the process impediments to rapid solution development 

and fielding. 

 Reduce the cost of development by using warfighter input to 

more quickly identify and terminate inadequate solutions. 

In his role as the defense acquisition executive, the USD (AT&L) 

has the authority required to empower the RFO. USD (AT&L) can use 

its title 10 authority to establish policies for acquisition (including 

 

2. The term dialogue is specifically chosen to set the tone and the environment for the effort. 

By definition, dialogue means “flow of meaning” while discussion has the same root as 

concussion and percussion—literally “to shake apart” or argue the pros and cons. 

Dialogue is “inquiry-oriented or listening-oriented” while discussion is “advocacyoriented.” This behavior is key to the organization’s approach of free and open discussion 

where participants shed their parochial baggage in favor of contributing toward the best 

solution regardless of source. 
RAPID FIELDING I 29

procurement, R&D, logistics, developmental testing, and contract 

administration) required by the RFO. 

 Initial RFO funding will be drawn from existing rapid acquisition 

programs and supplements to the defense budget, while legislation for 

full funding is developed for its estimated $3 billion annual budget. It is 

critical the appropriations action begin immediately, or the initiative will 

be pushed to the next legislative cycle where it will run the risk of being 

ignored or forgotten. 

DOD has a window of opportunity to take small steps that can be 

easily implemented and that will immediately provide some of the core 

capabilities the RFO requires. These initial steps will establish a firm 

foundation for the RFO and implement a model for real-time 

assessment of proposed RFO attributes while the full capability evolves. 

Most importantly, these initial actions will have an immediate, positive 

impact on the warfighter. 

The warfighter needs the RFO now. The ability to define and 

implement it is now. DOD need only seize this opportunity. Its payoff 

can be immediate. To see this, consider the World War II example in 

the sidebar below. 
30 I CHAPTER 2 

The Rhinoceros: A World War II Innovation

A well-known example of American wartime innovation is the 

development and application of the “Rhinoceros” or “Rhino” hedgerow 

buster. This was typical of the process of decentralized adaptation that 

made the American Army in Europe so successful in World War II. The 

brainstorm of Sergeant Curtis G. Culin, Jr., of the 102d Cavalry 

Reconnaissance Squadron in July 1944, the device consisted of prongs 

fashioned from a German roadblock that allowed a Sherman tank to 

force its way through a hedgerow without having to expose its 

vulnerable underbelly. Fifth Corps commander Major General Leonard 

Gerow recognized the Rhino’s significant potential, and he invited 

General Omar Bradley to view a demonstration. The First Army 

commander was so impressed that he instructed his ordnance chief to 

comb England for arc welding equipment and to mass-produce the 

devices from beach obstacles. By the time of the great Operation Cobra 

attack in late July, 60 percent of American tanks were equipped with 

Rhinos. To ensure surprise, none of those Shermans were allowed to go 

into action before Cobra. Once the attack began, German armor was 

restricted to the roads, while the Americans flanked them through the 

hedgerows. The tactical and psychological impact of Sergeant 

Culin’s innovation, exploited by Omar Bradley, was a major factor 

in the breakout from Normandy.” 

Source: Crane, Conrad C. “Beware of Boldness.” Parameters. Summer 2006, 

pp. 88–97.
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITIONS I 31

Chapter 3. Traditional Acquisition 

The Requirements Process 

At least two recent DSB studies have pointed out deficiencies in the 

“requirements process” as it affects efficient and effective development 

of military systems.3

 

The process of setting initial requirements lacks a rigorous systems 

engineering process to address warfighting needs in light of the 

programmatic challenges relating overall system development cost, 

schedule, performance, and risk. A more rigorous approach would set 

requirements based on warfighter needs and systems analyses that 

included assessments of advanced technology impact on a system’s 

ability to meet those needs. The systems analysis would optimize cost, 

performance, risk, and schedule, within a defined trade space, using 

modeling, simulation, technology demonstrations, and prototyping, as 

appropriate. This approach is shown pictorially in Figure 7. 

The results of this more rigorous approach would be used in 

defining key performance parameters (KPPs). In spiral development of 

a system, the process would be used to define the KPPs for spiral 1. 

Recommendation______________________________________________ 

Milestone Decision Authority assure that a rigorous systems 

engineering process underpins input to the requirements 

process. This process, which replaces many aspects of the current 

JCIDS process, includes development planning that relates candidate 

technologies and systems development processes to defined warfighter 

needs. 

 

3. Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on the Acquisition of 

National Security Space Programs, OUSD (AT&L), Tom Young, Chairman, May 2003; The 

Defense Science Board Summer Study on Transformation: A Progress Assessment, OUSD (AT&L), 

Dr. Robert Hermann and GEN Larry Welch, Chairmen, February 2006). 
32 I CHAPTER 3 

Figure 7. Getting Systems Engineering in Early 

Force providers should assure rigorous systems readiness 

assessments are completed prior to finalizing requirements. This 

includes TRL, MRL, and integration readiness level (IRL) assessments, 

as well as assessments of system affordability, risk, and schedule. 

There also exists a deficiency in the way requirements are managed 

during the program execution phase. In the development of military systems, 

unforeseen problems can arise that lead to cost and schedule overruns. A 

process is lacking to provide program managers with timely decisions on 

their proposed trade-offs of top-level requirements, including KPPs, to 

achieve cost and schedule commitments. Hence, there is a tendency to 

strive to meet KPPs at the expense of cost and schedule, leading to 

overruns and delays in fielding. Program managers should be able to 

suggest (to a designated requirements authority) trade-offs that allow more 

efficient program execution. For example, perhaps the 80 percent solution 

two years earlier and a few billions of dollars less expensive would provide 

a superior military benefit than the baseline system that meets all 

requirements but is years later to the field. In a spiral development 

approach, some requirements could be deferred to a future block. 
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITIONS I 33

Recommendation______________________________________________ 

Establish a process allowing program managers, during the 

program execution phase, to receive timely decisions on 

requirements relief without having to go back to the JROC—

specifically, by decisions from the USD (AT&L) and the Chairman or 

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Finally, programs should not accept a new requirement unless it: 

(1) has been assessed by the business and systems engineering process 

to define cost, schedule, and risk consequences, and any unintended 

consequences; (2) has been approved by the senior designated 

requirements authority; and (3) comes with the budget to cover cost of 

the new requirement. 

Accelerated S&T Developments 

The DOD acquisition process is currently almost exclusively 

focused on readiness plans at Milestone B, followed by continued 

attention on post-Milestone B processes and plans. The Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) has shown that commercial businesses 

focus on reducing risk prior to entering “product development” 

(Milestone B equivalent). To accomplish this focus on early risk 

reduction, commercial businesses establish a gated process that does 

not allow products to move beyond “technology development” until the 

critical technologies achieve a sufficient level of maturity (Technology 

Readiness Level 6 or better). Also shown by the GAO (and discussed in 

the next section), many DOD systems (platforms, weapons, networks, 

systems-of-systems) start Milestone B with immature technologies (a 

TRL of less than 6). These programs offer some form of risk mitigation 

intended to enhance performance to TRL 6 after Milestone B, but the 

result is large schedule slips and significant cost overruns. 

DOD’s attention is not adequately focused on the technology 

development phase (from Milestone A to Milestone B). This lack of 

attention forgoes the opportunity to provide early risk reduction or to 

accelerate technology development and meet warfighter needs sooner. 

DOD is not following the principles described in the Defense 

Acquisition Guidebook: “...the S&T Program is uniquely positioned to 
34 I CHAPTER 3 

reduce the risk of promising technologies before they are assumed in 

the acquisition process.” 

Findings 

Most DOD systems that start with immature technologies have the 

following results: 

 The system is late and costs grow. 

 The technology obsolesces as the program is stretched. 

 When fielding occurs, fewer systems are purchased. 

There are a number of lessons from these circumstances. Often, 

technology in an immature state has been forced into programs because 

it is believed to be the only opportunity for a new technology to move 

forward. This behavior is an unintended consequence of resource 

competition between often dissimilar programs. 

Congress demonstrated its concerns about cost and schedule 

growth in DOD’s programs through the 2006 Defense Authorization 

Act, Section 801. This act requires the USD (AT&L) to certify, prior to 

Milestone B, the needed technologies are at TRL 6 or higher. This 

legislation does allow waivers but requires that the Milestone Decision 

Authority notify Congress within 30 days of the waiver approval. The 

effect will be to reduce the likelihood of program delay or failure caused 

by immature technology. 

With the focus of DOD acquisition on Milestone B onward, the 

result is that Milestone A has become “optional” and is usually not 

held. Having a Milestone A can have a beneficial effect by: 

 focusing earlier thinking on technology readiness by identifying 

the “critical technology elements” and “pulling” those 

technologies into system concepts 

 providing the incentive for a more rapid transition from “A” 

to “B” 

However, adding Milestone A cannot be allowed to put off 

program initiation as it is not a commitment to acquisition. 
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITIONS I 35

S&T executives are driven by developers and users to push 

technology to its limit and service laboratories have similar incentives to 

push technology to the next level. Thus, within the S&T environment, 

emphasis is more often placed on performance, without equal emphasis 

placed on schedule, affordability, supportability, and risk. Users, 

acquisition program managers, and technologists have a role in 

technology directions and plans but are often not working together to 

develop these in coordination. 

Recommendations for USD (AT&L) Implementation_______________ 

The core of these recommendations is to make Milestone A 

mandatory and, thereby, useful for both its technology and 

operational-concept components. Many of the foregoing problems can 

be remedied by focusing attention on Milestone A and the S&T program. 

Such focus will surely accelerate needed capability to the warfighter. 

As supporting elements to the central recommendation, the 

following are added: 

1. Plan and execute multiple technology demonstrations in order 

to generate more options with adequate funding to provide 

alternative solutions (these demonstrations will require added 

up-front resources, which will be more than paid back later in 

reduced risks, earlier fielding, and lower costs). 

2. Address affordability, producibility, and supportability to 

surface potential future “cost killers”; create concurrent 

manufacturing and supportability plans and cost estimates. 

Figure 8 illustrates the importance of tying readiness levels 

(technology, manufacturing, and integration) to a “gated” 

milestone decision process.4

3. All of the above should be done with the understanding that 

until Milestone B has been approved, no acquisition program 

has been approved. A favorable Milestone A decision DOES 

NOT mean that a new acquisition program has been initiated. 

 

4 See the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on The Manufacturing Technology Program: A 

Key to Affordably Equipping the Future Force, February 2006. 
36 I CHAPTER 3 

Figure 8. Readiness Levels Tied to a Gated Milestone Decision Process 

4. To “realize” a strong partnership between the user (or user 

representative) and the program executive officer, the 

component S&T executive should sign a memorandum of 

agreement at Milestone A. During the period between 

Milestones A and B, the program executive officer should 

identify a program manager; during transition to System 

Development and Demonstration, the S&T executive should 

provide a deputy program manager. As the Milestone A to B 

period is completed, the user and developer need to agree that a 

proposed technology solution is affordable, militarily useful, and 

based on mature technology. 

5. An independent red team (or teams if needed) should provide 

the service, DDR&E, and USD (AT&L) its judgment of 

technology, manufacturing, and integration readiness level 

maturity and the probability of success of risk mitigation efforts 

for the critical technologies. More generally, the readiness 

assessment should also assess the health of the program and the 

likelihood of its success in meeting performance, cost, and 

schedule goals at acceptable risk. 
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITIONS I 37

6. The service S&T executive (and/or DDR&E) should be the 

driving force in organizing Milestone A. DDR&E should be 

informed of service Milestone A plans, implementations, and 

progress. 

Program Acquisition 

The traditional acquisition process, from program formulation to 

system realization, takes too long—on the average 10–15 years (in some 

cases even longer). Acquisition costs are high and generally exceed early 

budget estimates. The result is that systems are delivered later than 

needed, program cost growth is funded by destabilizing other programs, 

technology is obsolete by the time of fielding, and quantities are 

reduced because of cost growth. 

There is still a place for traditional acquisition. However, it needs to 

be improved in order to achieve faster deployment of capability at 

lower costs. This section puts forth recommendations toward this end. 

Observations 

The traditional acquisition process is necessary for the acquisition of 

large, complex systems that require significant engineering, design, and 

development. Typical characteristics of such systems include the following: 

 will be used for a long time 

 are complex and expensive 

 require significant systems engineering 

 are peculiar to the military—are not available from a 

commercial catalog 

 have major software as well as hardware content 

 may require in-the-field maintenance 

The requirements and acquisition processes associated with 

traditional acquisition are prescribed in considerable detail in department 

documentation. The requirements are established according to the 

JCIDS, as set forth in CJCSI 3170.01E. (A previous section of this 
38 I CHAPTER 3 

chapter addresses needed changes to the requirements process.) The 

acquisition process is set forth in DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD 

Instruction 5000.2 and the accompanying Defense Acquisition Guidebook. 

These documents will need significant modification to be consistent with 

the approach described below. 

The GAO has criticized the DOD acquisition process on numerous 

occasions, including their March 2005 report, Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessment of Selected Major Weapon Systems. They cite the following 

characteristics of successful programs: 

 mature technology at program initiation, stable designs, 

production processes that are mature and in control 

 S&T organizations being responsible for maturing technologies, 

rather than the program or product development managers 

The GAO stated that, of the nine programs scheduled to hold 

design reviews in the following year, only two were expected to have 

mature technologies at the time of the review. They claimed there was 

often little program visibility or knowledge of the maturity levels. The 

report documents the impact of immature technology on program 

development, shown in Table 4. 

The panel agrees with the general thrust of the GAO report. 

Table 4. Impact of Immature Technology on Program Development 

Technology Status at Based on Beginning of Development 54 programs

Mature Immature 

RDT&E Cost Increase 9% 41% 

Acquisition Unit Cost Increase <1% 21% 

Average Schedule 

Delay 7 months 13 months 

Source: Government Accountability Office, March 2005. 
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITIONS I 39

Many traditional acquisition programs have a number of common 

problems. First, the original program plan often tries to accomplish too 

much “in one bite.” It does not take advantage of incremental (“spiral” 

or “block”) acquisition. Further, requirements may grow during the 

course of development, and funding may be reduced by Congress or 

the department. Such changes cause replanning with accompanying 

delay and cost growth. As the schedule grows, there is likely to be new 

technology coming along (making the technology in the development 

system obsolete) and/or there is likely to be a changed mission 

requirement, causing “requirements creep” and further delay. The 

impact of these conditions is illustrated in Figure 9, which indicates the 

desirability of aiming the initial development-to-deployment cycle at 

somewhere around five years. 

Figure 9. Time versus Uncertainty 
40 I CHAPTER 3 

Another common problem is that the contractor may not execute 

according to the planned schedule, and hence the program lengthens 

with commensurate cost growth. Reasons include the following: 

 overly complex requirements 

 overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates 

 immature technology 

 unanticipated software and system integration problems 

 lack of the anticipated workforce 

 government unwillingness to or delay in relaxing requirements 

 funding instability 

 growth in requirements 

 inadequate early consideration of transition-to-production 

issues 

 lack of consideration of affordability, producibility, or 

sustainability during the S&T phase 

The result is that historic cycle times for new program starts have, 

over the 1996 to 1999 period, averaged well over 10 years, as shown in 

Figure 10. As is also shown in Table 5, many important programs, over 

the last decade and with increasing frequency, have had even longer 

actual cycle times. 

In addition, programs are not designed for minimum schedules, 

because the service is not willing to commit the necessary annual 

funding. This results to a certain degree from the services starting more 

programs than they can afford to fund at levels consistent with a 

minimum schedule. 
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITIONS I 41

Figure 10. Average Historic Commodity Cycle Time 

Table 5. Examples of Long Cycle Time over the Past Decade

Program End Item Commodity Services IOC/FUE

Time to IOC

Months Years

AWACS RSIP (E-3) RSIP MOD Transport/Aircraft Air Force Dec 2006 168 14.0

F-22A F-22 Raptor C3I Air Force Dec 2005 174 14.5

MH-60R Multi-Mission 

Helicptor

Helicopter Navy Dec 2005 149 12.4

MIDS MIDS-LVT C3I DOD Sep 2003 117 9.8

SM 2 (BLKS I–IV) SM-2 BLK IV Missile Navy Aug 1999 156 13.0

JSTARS JSTARS Transport Aircraft Air Force Dec 1997 147 12.3

FMTV FMTV Transport Vehicle Army Jan 1996 104 8.7

NESP NAVY EHF 

SATCO 

PROGRAM

Satellite Navy Apr 1994 147 12.3

NAVSTAR GPS NAVSTAR GPS 

User Equip

Satellite Air Force Mar 1993 165 13.8

DDG 51 DDG 51 

Program

Ship Navy Feb 1993 110 9.2

LHD 1 LHD Ship Navy Nov 1990 100 8.3

NAVSTAR NAVSTAR GPS 

Satellite

Satellite Air Force Apr 1990 130 10.8
42 I CHAPTER 3 

The most recent review of the traditional acquisition process was 

the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment.5

 The findings and 

recommendations provide some good bases for improvements. They 

include: 

 planning the time from Milestone B to initial operational 

capability to be no greater than 6 years 

 greater user involvement in the acquisition process 

 budget flexibility to accelerate programs and later spirals 

 greater visibility by the department leadership into technology 

maturity 

 the use of “spiral development” as the norm 

Spiral Development 

What is “spiral development”? DOD Instruction 5000.2 defines 

spiral development as a process where “a desired capability is identified, 

but the end-state requirements are not known at program initiation. 

Those requirements are refined through demonstration and risk 

management; there is continuous user feedback; and each increment 

provides the user the best possible capability available in a reasonable 

time. The requirements for future increments depend on feedback from 

users and technology maturation.” The panel concurs with that 

definition, and believes that traditional acquisition programs should 

follow that process. 

Figure 11 illustrates spiral development. The initial increment or 

block is designed to provide a militarily useful capability quickly and 

with low risk. Its KPPs are based on essentially-proven technology 

(TRL 6 or better). R&D to support future blocks is ongoing, and when 

ready, milestones for development (and subsequently production) of 

future blocks are conducted. Adequate funding is provided for research, 

development, and procurement of all blocks. 

 

5. Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report, January 2006. 
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITIONS I 43

Figure 11. Spiral Development 

Figure 12 compares the two ways of developing and procuring 

capability. On the left is the one-step or “all at once” approach, which 

is aimed at meeting the system’s ultimate requirements at the time of 

initial deployment. The chart on the right illustrates spiral development, 

where the system is developed, procured, and deployed in blocks. The 

initial blocks in this case are completed significantly sooner than in the 

one-step case, thereby getting enhanced capability to the field sooner. 

Experience shows that there is also about a one-third cost saving, 

because of the greater achievability of the lower-risk development of 

the successive blocks. 
44 I CHAPTER 3 

Figure 12. Near-Term Fielded Capability 

Recommendations _____________________________________________ 

The panel recommends that the USD (AT&L) direct the following 

for “traditional” acquisition programs: 

 Mandate the use of spiral development, entering system 

design and demonstration (SDD) of each block, with 

mature technology, manufacturing, and integration 

readiness levels—technology and manufacturing level 6, and 

an equivalent level of integration readiness; plan the program to 

provide the initial operational capability of each block within 

five years of the initiation of SDD of that block. 

- Establish readily achievable requirements for a militarilyuseful initial block, and be willing to review and relax 

requirements for that and subsequent blocks, as necessary, to 

protect schedule and cost. 

- Minimize required physical testing by the extensive use of 

modeling and simulation, reducing cost and the time 

required for development and testing. 
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITIONS I 45

- Base the program plan on a realistic schedule with realistic 

cost estimates (such as estimates provided by the Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group). 

- Defer all but absolutely necessary changes to “requirements” 

and to the design until subsequent blocks. 

 Design programs for minimum schedule. Do not start a 

program until funding consistent with that schedule is available. 

 Provide program stability in 

- funding—the sine qua non

- requirements 

- adequately experienced workforce and program management 

through a predefined phase of the program 

 Adequate resources for up-front R&D on future blocks, 

running concurrently with the development of prior blocks to 

- maintain a competitive environment 

- reduce future risks 

- assume that there will, in fact, be a future opportunity to 

insert advanced technology (without having to force it into 

the current block) 

 A modular, open-system approach, so that capability can be 

readily added to the basic system. 

- If future improvements are known in advance, program for 

pre-planned upgrades. 

- If not, be prepared to incorporate spiral upgrades as dictated 

by 

 demonstrations of necessary technologies 

 changing operational needs 

 availability of funding (will require a Congressionally 

approved wedge for application to future spiral 

upgrades) 
46 I CHAPTER 3 

 Use truly independent, expert review teams for sanity checks. 

Final Observations 

It is important to recognize that spiral (incremental) acquisition is 

different from one-step acquisition. Changes will be required in many 

processes: 

 Budget. Funding will need to be provided for all phases of 

each block of research, development, production, and 

sustainment—which will overlap. 

 Requirements. Users will need to live with the more limited 

capability of the initial block(s), recognizing that they may not 

have their “full” requirements satisfied until the fielding of a 

later block. 

 Acquisition. Milestones A, B, and C will be established for 

each block. Milestones A and B in particular need to be 

strengthened to ensure adequate maturity in technology, 

manufacturing, and integration before concept approval, and 

especially before entering SDD for each block. 

 Experimentation. Especially in cases where new technologies 

and concepts are introduced, experiments are necessary to 

provide a sound basis for their introduction. 

 Test and evaluation. Test and evaluation should focus on 

military utility as opposed to a pre-set “requirement” 

specification. 

 Logistics. Logistics could potentially be complicated by the 

introduction of successive blocks. Careful planning and 

innovative methods—such as performance-based logistics— 

will be needed to avoid bogging down the logistics system. 

However, logistics could also be simpler since overly complex 

equipment will not be introduced in a single step and fewer 

obsolete components, that cannot be sourced, will be 

introduced. (In many cases the upgrades will be retrofitted into 

prior blocks.) 
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITIONS I 47

 Operational planning. Planners and users will need to be 

aware and take account of the implications of the introduction 

of successive blocks, to maximize the benefits of each block, or 

spiral, as it is fielded. 

 Training. Training will need to mirror the operational planning 

and technology evolution processes. 

 Assessments. Net technical assessments and risk assessments 

should be conducted by block. 

 User feedback. Feedback from operational units on the utility 

of and problems with early blocks should be used in the design 

of later blocks, as well as modification of operational planning 

and training. 
48 I CHAPTER 4 

Chapter 4. Disruptive Programs 

The dictionary defines “disruptive” as the adjective form of the verb 

disrupt, which means to (a) interrupt, (b) separate forcefully, or (c) 

shatter. In application to the subject matter at hand, one might describe 

“stealth” as an enabling platform and force to “shatter” the cohesiveness 

of integrated air defense systems and having the additional ability to 

“separate forcefully” essential linked capabilities of surface-to-air missile 

systems to engage stealth platforms. To continue the examples, largescale integrated circuits could be regarded as disruptive when they are 

employed to shatter the cost barriers that limit pervasive and large-scale 

networks and processing advances. 

A more general discussion of disruptive technologies and/or 

capabilities is found in the work of Harvard Business School Professor 

Clayton Christenson.6

 Essentially these technologies are disruptive to 

current organizations and cultures and/or are “game changers” in their 

application—an example of which is the case of personal computers 

replacing mainframes. Examples in the DOD world include the GPS, 

cruise missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, stealth, remotely piloted 

vehicles, ballistic missile defense, and nuclear weapons. Each of these 

systems made a major, positive change in warfighting capability, but 

was also highly disruptive to the existing organizations and cultures—

unmanned systems versus piloted aircraft and cruise missiles versus 

penetrating bombers are two such examples. 

As would be expected for such counter-cultural cases, the obstacles 

to funding and developing such systems is much greater than for the 

next generation of a traditional system. These obstacles are 

predominantly a lack of understanding of the potential on the part of 

senior leaders and the effects of cultural resistance. Often it takes a 

fielded prototype in the right setting (sometimes in war) to break 

through the cultural barrier and get a well-understood message “up the 

 

6. Clayton M. Christenson, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to 

Fail, Harvard Business School Press: Boston, Mass. 1997. 
DISRUPTIVE PROGRAMS I 49

chain of command.” In almost all cases, deploying a disruptive 

capability has required very strong, high-level support, as well as an 

ability to overcome the institutional systems—which, as expected, will 

fight fearfully to resist the cultural change. 

Recommendations_____________________________________________ 

Because of their crucial importance, disruptive technologies 

and/or capabilities that could be fielded by the United States or 

employed against the United States need senior leadership 

attention. Thus, the DOD senior leadership (including the Secretary 

and Deputy Secretary of Defense, USD (AT&L), VCJCS, and service 

secretaries and chiefs) should receive frequent updates (quarterly would 

be a good target) on the disruptive potential of threats as well as the 

potential for, and status of, fielding of U.S. disruptive innovations. 

The continuing search for challenges and innovations on both sides 

of the equation lies explicitly with DARPA, whose mission is to explore 

technological surprise and breakthroughs that underwrite U.S. 

disruptive innovations, drawing on U.S. foreign and global possibilities. 

The intelligence community has a responsibility to look for and report 

on the disruptive activities of other countries and their potential as 

threats. 

DDR&E and service science and technology organizations have a 

dual responsibility somewhat similar to that of DARPA, to search out 

and exploit U.S. commercial and foreign technologies with disruptive 

potential. It should also be noted that there are analogous efforts ongoing 

at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, with a focus on weapons of 

mass destruction, and the DOE-DOD shared activity, the National 

Nuclear Security Agency, with a focus on nuclear matters. These agencies 

have efforts including cooperative threat reduction, which draws 

technical information from foreign scientists and engineers. 

The panel recommends the following: 

 DARPA focus full attention on their central two-sided 

mission of technology surprise and high-payoff/high-risk 

disruptive innovations. 
50 I CHAPTER 4 

 The DDR&E make disruptive potential (two-sided) a 

priority area of activity and its broad-based focal point.

Working with the service communities, it should commit 

an additional $200 million per year to this crucial area. The 

DDR&E should also consult regularly with Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency and National Nuclear Security Agency 

experts on nuclear and weapons of mass destruction matters. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 51

Chapter 5. Cross-Cutting Enablers 

In addition to the specific recommendations described in the 

previous chapters, there is a set of cross-cutting “enablers” that need to 

be enhanced if the department is to achieve the needed transformation 

to more rapidly, effectively, and affordably field new technologies to the 

fighting forces. These enablers fall in the following areas: 

 human resources 

 systems engineering 

 budgets 

 technology reach 

 industrial base 

 incentives 

This chapter describes recommendations in these six areas, beginning 

with human resources. 

Human Resources 

There is remarkable coherence among many studies about the state 

of the K-12 education system in the United States and the solutions to 

the problem.7

 In its 2001 report, the Hart-Rudman Commission raises 

the problem to the status of a national security crisis: “Second only to a 

weapon of mass destruction detonating in an American city, we see 

nothing more dangerous than failure to properly manage science, 

technology and education ... The inadequacies of our systems of research 

 

7. Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Future, National 

Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine of the 

National Academies, October, 2005; National Defense Education and Innovation Initiative: 

Meeting America’s Economic and Security Challenges in the 21st Century, American Association of 

Universities, January 2006; Losing the Competitive Advantage? The Challenge for Science and 

Technology in the United States, AeA, August 2006. 
52 I CHAPTER 5 

and education pose a greater threat to our national security... than any 

conventional war. ”8

In the view of the panel, this characterization is an accurate 

portrayal of the problem, which amounts to a loss of America’s 

strategic advantage. 

Many surveys and statistics illustrate the crisis in U.S. education. 

One of the starkest is provided in Education at a Glance, 2005, by the 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.9

 This 

report presents data on educational achievements in thirty 

industrialized countries. The data show that for the cohort aged 45 

through 54, the U.S. population is the best educated in the world: #1 

in percent that completed high school and #2 in percent that 

completed college. The looming crisis is illustrated by the 

corresponding statistics for the 25 through 34-year-old age group. The 

U.S. cohort ranks #9 in terms of high school completion and #8 for 

college. Worse, the United States is the only country in the survey 

where the younger cohort is actually less well-educated, in terms of 

actual percentage of graduates, than the older one. 

The problem is most severe, and of greatest importance, in math and 

science. Many math and science courses, particularly at the high school 

level, are taught by teachers who have had little academic preparation in 

these fields. This out-of-field teaching seems to be on the rise.10 The net 

result is that America’s high school graduates are not ready for American 

universities in the math, science, and engineering areas. 

Paradoxically, U.S. higher education in science and technology 

continues to be the envy of the world. In 2004, China’s Shanghai Jiao 

Tong University compiled a ranking of the world’s universities. Of their 

 

8. Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report of the U.S. 

Commission on National Security / 21st Century, February 15, 2001. 

9. Education at a Glance 2005, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 

September 13, 2005. http://www.oecd.org/document/ 

11/0,2340,en_2825_495609_35321099_1_1_1_1,00.html 

10. “Science and Engineering Indicators 2006,” National Science Foundation. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 53

top 20, 17 are American universities.11 Of the internationally mobile 

student population, 40 percent attend universities in the United States. 

This statistic compares to 18 percent in the United Kingdom, 15 

percent in Germany, 12 percent in France, and 6 percent in Australia. 

But it is the future that is of great concern. As observed in a recent 

National Academies report: “The scientific and technical building 

blocks of our economic leadership are eroding at a time when many 

other nations are gathering strength ... This nation must prepare with 

great urgency to preserve its strategic and economic security.”12

James A. Lewis observes that the situation today is more complex 

than when Sputnik took America by surprise in 1957.13 It is in the U.S. 

interest for other countries to grow economically and perforce to grow 

technologically. Therefore the likelihood for technological surprise is 

greater today than fifty years ago, so maintaining the U.S. strategic 

advantage is all the more difficult—and imperative. 

While the consensus that there is a problem is quite broad, some 

contend that the solution lies in reducing barriers to immigration for 

those who have needed skills—or retaining those who are attending 

U.S. schools. After all, historically half, or more, of students on 

temporary visas have stayed in the United States immediately after 

getting their degree, and this percentage has risen in recent years. In the 

period from 1992 to 1995, 68 percent of foreign science and 

engineering doctoral degree recipients stated they planned to remain in 

the United States after receiving their degrees; by 2000–2003, 74 

percent intended to stay. Students on temporary visas earned about 

one-third (32 percent) of all science and engineering doctorates 

awarded in the United States in 2003 (and more in some fields). More 

than half (55 percent) of engineering doctorates were awarded to 

students on temporary visas. 

 

11. http://www.economist.com/markets/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3154661

12. Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a Brighter Future, October 

2005. 

13. James A. Lewis, Waiting for Sputnik: Basic Research and Strategic Competition, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, October 2005. 
54 I CHAPTER 5 

This strategy is certainly part of the solution. Indeed, immigration 

has been a key element of the U.S. strategic advantage in science and 

technology; one-third of all U.S. Nobel Prize winners were immigrants. 

But the immigration strategy does not suffice for DOD’s needs.14 It is 

undoubtedly more difficult for foreign-born citizens to obtain security 

clearances. So it is more than a matter of principle that we fix the 

problems in K-12 education. 

DOD is among the most vulnerable institutions to the impending 

shortage of highly trained engineers and scientists. The DOD civilian 

acquisition corps is particularly vulnerable due to an aging workforce, 

outsourcing of research, and non-competitive pay. There is little career 

development or education (as opposed to training) available for civil 

servants. The situation for the military acquisition workforce is much 

the same and, in fact, has deteriorated from a previous time. (In the late 

1960s, the Air Force ran a Blue Room that was focused on the 

acquisition officer corps that assured the best talent was available to 

manage that service’s programs.) 

There are three specific skill sets that the panel believes are in 

critically short supply in the DOD acquisition corps. One is system 

engineering, but this skill set includes a broader set of disciplines 

including systems analysis and system-of-systems engineering. The 

second is biological science. The third is a broad subset of social 

sciences that deals with organized human behaviors and is identified in 

other volumes of this study as a critical new capability area. 

Recommendations _____________________________________________ 

1. The panel recommends that a dedicated career 

development organization be instituted for DOD’s technical 

workforce—military and, especially, civilian. 

Career development means developing and sustaining the existing 

workforce, as well as developing and executing recruitment strategies 

 

14. National Security Workforce: Challenges and Solutions, Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering, 2005. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 55

for the future. For the existing workforce, best practices should be 

borrowed from industry to effectively indoctrinate and integrate new 

workers. The career development entity should advocate improved 

security clearance policy, including a more expeditious clearance 

process and true reciprocity both within and across agencies, to enable 

workers to be productive early in their employment. It should enable 

rotation between industry and government jobs, where appropriate and 

advantageous. 

Career development also includes identifying the best candidates for 

advancement, and assuring that they get the experience, exposure, and 

training that they need. Continuing education and rotation 

opportunities should be tailored to meet near-term skill needs. 

Retention incentives such as flexible work schedules, non-monetary 

recognition schemes, and opportunities for part-time work without 

disproportionate retirement penalty, should be instituted. For the future 

workforce, the career development organization needs to be closely 

coupled with the outreach programs described below. 

2. Misinterpretation of existing authorities that provide for 

rotating government and industry personnel needs to be reversed 

so that these programs can be effectively used to enhance careers 

and improve performance. 

Existing authorities provide for rotating government and industry 

personnel. However, recently rules governing the ability of private sector 

individuals, who have come into government under the Intergovernmental 

Personnel Act (IPA), to move from government back to industry have 

been punitively misinterpreted, to the detriment of such personnel. 

Similarly, there are existing authorities that can be used to provide 

professional development and education for DOD civilian employees. 

This is an important incentive to government employment. But the 

disincentives to authorize such benefits need to be removed. Staff should 

be sized to workload, taking into account the 10 percent or so of the time 

employees will be away, so that these opportunities do not break morale. 
56 I CHAPTER 5 

3. Retool the Defense Systems Management College and 

the Defense Acquisition University to focus on best practices for 

acquisition outcomes and to incorporate lessons learned from 

the field. 

4. Initiate a sustained outreach program to attract highly 

qualified scientists and engineers into the workforce. 

Hart-Rudman Phase III observed: “While some have argued that 

the ‘Generation X’ cohort is less inclined toward government 

employment, our analysis suggests that this cohort does see government 

as one of several desirable career tracks. If recruiting were resumed, 

many within this age group would seek federal jobs. This is suggested 

by the fact that the one current mechanism for bringing graduate 

students into government—the Presidential Management Internship 

program—has remained highly competitive.” 

The most important element of the outreach is higher education. 

The Science, Math, and Research for Transformation (SMART) 

National Defense Education Program (NDEP) is a new program, 

mandated by Congress in 2005. This program should be protected, 

expanded, and targeted to the most critical DOD needs. It is currently 

funded at only $19 million, but is budgeted to grow to $74 million in 

2011. We strongly urge that this program be protected. 

Internship opportunities should go hand-in-hand with NDEP 

grants to foster early institutional ties. DOD can effect a huge change in 

early motivations to study science and math by (1) committing to 

sponsor a large-scale high school internship program for sophomores 

through seniors; (2) implementing reimbursements through its 

contractors and in-house technical organizations and their people; and 

(3) setting the goal of reaching 50,000 to 100,000 high school students 

per year who work with scientists and engineers as summer interns, and 

earn an average of $2,000 over a period of 10 to 12 weeks. 

The logic for the internship with industry and government 

organizations is simple. It is people-to-people based—the personal 

mentor model—which is likely to be the highest yield mechanism. Why 

the large number of interns and what will it cost? The United States at 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 57

300,000,000 people has 3,000,000 scientists and engineers, including 

those who teach at college and levels above. On the average, a 

replacement rate of 75,000 people a year is needed in the near term to 

balance retirees who have a 40-year career. 

A $2,000 summer internship today competes more than favorably 

with short-term minimum wage employment available to high school 

students. Employing 75,000 interns per year would cost $150 million 

annually, approximately 0.1 percent of the DOD expenditures for 

contracting and funding internal technical organizations. This 

investment is very small, but highly leveraged. It should be reimbursable 

with encouragement to all involved organizations to do more. It should 

also have tracking potential for assessment and fine-tuning—to include 

even e-mail inputs, properly filtered to maintain contact as interns select 

education and career paths. 

This initiative does not replace the 21st Century National Defense 

Education Act, NDEP scholarships, and other initiatives, but should be 

pursued in addition to these. The intern program is a feeder initiative for 

others. Additionally, inexpensive sponsorship opportunities that DOD 

should consider are science fairs and new media, such as podcasts 

(USJFCOM just started producing a series) and online virtual worlds. 

Finally, the problem of producing the needed technical workforce 

should be solved at the national level. There is strong consensus on 

how to do it, but the process must begin now. 

System Engineering 

System engineering is the process responsible for managing the 

trade-offs necessary to develop and field a system that is affordable, is 

sustainable, is delivered on schedule, satisfies user needs, and minimizes 

risk. The term “system” applies to technology, sub-systems, a system 

(as the term is generally used, as in weapon system or command and 

control system), and system-of-systems, as these all interact with their 

environments and are complex assemblages of interacting components 

whose development requires trade-offs. It also includes the concepts of 

operation, training, sustainment, and eventual disposal of the system. 
58 I CHAPTER 5 

In the context of this study, system engineering applies to all modes 

of acquisition that are considered: rapid acquisition; traditional 

acquisition in its pre-Milestone A requirements trade-off phase, its 

technology development Milestone A to B phase, and its system design 

and development Milestone B to C phase; as well as to disruptive 

acquisitions. Put more broadly, system engineering applies throughout 

the life cycle of a system—that is from the inception of mission need 

identification through and including system retirement. Further, it 

applies irrespective of system development style (such as waterfall, preplanned product development, or spiral, for example). 

System engineering is a professional field with tools and techniques 

acquired through education, training, mentoring, and experience. The 

selection and application of the appropriate system engineering 

measures will vary with circumstance—such as the technologies 

inherent in a system, the development status of the system, and the 

mode of acquisition being used. The field of system engineering, as 

used in this report, incorporates the following as sub-fields: system 

analysis, system architecture, system test, verification and validation, 

risk mitigation and management, and virtual (system modeling and 

simulation driven) engineering and product development. In some 

contexts, software engineering and, in other contexts, configuration 

management is properly included in system engineering. 

However, it is one thing to identify system engineering as a critical 

function for the realization of systems, yet another to assess whether 

system engineering, as applied, is provided the responsibility, given the 

authority, and held accountable for the accomplishment of its 

functions. 

Findings 

The findings presented in this section are derived from the 

experiences and observations of the panel members of this DSB study, 

and supported by applicable studies and reports, to include the recent 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 59

Defense Acquisition Personnel Assessment Report and the previous 

DSB reports. 15 

DOD system engineering capability has significantly degraded over 

the past 20 years, an unintended consequence of actions taken for other 

reasons. Aggravating this situation were the manpower ceilings that 

were placed on the acquisition workforce following the collapse of the 

Soviet Union, which were intended to induce economies without 

harmful effect. The anticipated reduction of serious future threats led to 

a consequent reduction in the need for DOD acquisition (including 

system engineering) personnel. 

In parallel, the philosophy of government outsourcing was 

vigorously embraced, to the extent that many previously understood, 

inherently governmental DOD system engineering functions were 

outsourced to private contractors. Thus outsourcing led to a reduction 

in the need for DOD system engineering personnel, and dampened any 

arguments that were made that the acquisition manpower ceilings had 

already reduced DOD system engineering too far. Acquisition reform, 

as interpreted in that time period, played a further role, as its zeal in 

some quarters for “insight” versus “oversight” further reduced the 

DOD system engineering function to one of estranged observer with 

minimal significant participation. 

The net result of the manpower ceilings, extreme outsourcing, and 

changed role was not only to reduce the number of DOD system 

engineers, but also to serve as a deterrent to new technical personnel 

entering that field. Market forces and career growth played their 

expected roles. As senior, experienced, DOD system engineers retired, 

or left the field through transfers, the resulting vacuum was not filled. 

The need for system engineering has evolved differently than 

envisioned. The threat has not gone away but has been replaced by a 

more varied and complex threat, requiring more systems and more 

 

15. The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Final Report, March 21 2006, and Defense Science 

Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on the Acquisition of National Security 

Space Programs, OUSD (AT&L), Tom Young, Chairman, May 2003. 
60 I CHAPTER 5 

sophisticated systems-of-systems to implement current military 

operational concepts, such as network-centric warfare. This in turn, 

creates demand for an increased number of competent DOD system 

engineers, versed and experienced in best practices. In addition, current 

understanding is that “insight” had gone too far, and was associated 

with some of the most grave acquisition failures recently experienced in 

the department. The current lack of adequate DOD system engineering 

is apparent, and correlates with programs in serious trouble. 

Thus, the DOD system engineering workforce has deteriorated in 

capability. It is too small, not adequately empowered for the tasks at 

hand, and too often uses processes and procedures that have not been 

validated as short cuts to compensate for the lack of resources to 

accomplish system engineering tasks. Program management offices are 

understaffed in system engineering and are limited in their ability to 

perform. The DOD cannot function with the expertise required to act 

as a “smart buyer,” one of its most critical functions, in such activities 

as formulating requests for proposals, evaluating proposals, and 

providing technical direction to programs. 

It will take time and well-resourced, informed action to correct the 

current state of affairs. 

Recommendations _____________________________________________ 

The panel’s specific recommendations fall in five general categories: 

1) provide systems engineering the responsibility, authority, and 

accountability it needs to perform; 2) manage system-of-systems 

engineering at the proper level; 3) rebuild the system engineering 

workforce; 4) conduct research to develop better system engineering 

tools; and 5) assess the quality of system engineering using truly 

independent “red teams.” 

1. Re-establish the program level position of chief system 

engineer, properly resourced and reporting at a senior program level. 

Chief system engineers have fallen out of vogue as integrated 

product teams (IPT) and, in particular, system engineering integrating 

teams (SEIT) have overtaken much of that function. Where something 

like a chief system engineer exists, they are often only process experts, 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 61

assuring that all those involved in the system engineering function 

follow a published (not always correct) process. This recommendation 

requires the chief system engineer to be a subject matter expert as well 

as a process expert, responsible and accountable for life cycle tradespace management and all system engineering decisions and actions. 

The chief system engineer reports at a senior program level and has the 

authority to oversee and, if necessary, re-direct decisions made by 

system engineering IPTs and SEITs. This individual should also 

institute and manage a process that assures awareness of and 

involvement in these teams. 

The chief system engineer needs to assure that modeling and 

simulation play a proper role in system development. This includes 

creating simulation models for experimental design in the early phases 

of a program when there are no physical counterparts, and the use of 

physical test and validated models to explore the trade space and 

evaluate alternatives in an accelerated and affordable way. The chief 

system engineer should also assure that a reasonable and coordinated 

allocation of system engineering responsibility flows from the DOD to 

the prime contractor’s lead systems integrator and from there to the 

sub-contractors, including oversight of make-or-buy decisions and 

attaining required program system-of-systems interoperability. 

To succeed, the chief system engineer needs to create a close 

positive relationship on matters effecting life cycle system engineering 

with those generating system requirements, those that will benefit from 

the consequences of system engineering, and those conducting 

independent tests of system performance. As such, the chief system 

engineer will need to forge these relationships through conferencing 

and other collaborative means with users, testers, and maintainers—

from the beginning of development and throughout the period of 

program performance. 

2. Designate a chief systems-of-systems engineer to assure 

systems-of-systems optimization (versus component system 

optimization), overseen by a designated authority reporting to the 

USD (AT&L). This is particularly critical in multi-service systems, 

but applies equally for a single service system-of-systems. 
62 I CHAPTER 5 

A program chief system engineer, as discussed above, will assure 

attainment of the interoperability KPPs as assigned to the program. 

Systems-of-systems are often broken into separate component systems 

with no cost-effective optimization of the elements, or even with no 

integrating responsibility assigned, that would assure that the 

component systems are properly coordinated to achieve the best 

system-of-systems performance. For example, spacecraft often work 

with and though ground terminals and comprise with them a system-ofsystems, but are often broken out as separate programs to achieve 

separate destinies. This recommendation will provide the necessary 

systems-of-systems responsibility and authority, and, if properly 

resourced, capability. 

3. Rebuild the system engineering workforce. 

The system engineering workforce needs to be rebuilt in both 

industry and government. The panel focuses, in this report, on the need 

within DOD. 

System engineering careers need to be actively managed with 

appropriate incentives, including, where possible, higher pay grades and 

better opportunities for advancement. Systems engineering attainment 

must positively count for advancement. System engineers should be 

recruited from the best sources to include the best undergraduate schools 

and qualified applicants from industry. DOD system engineers must be 

given as good or better opportunities as their counterparts in industry for 

quality graduate education at the best schools (through distance and oncampus means) and the opportunity to participate in quality professional 

societies and activities. DOD system engineers should have the hands-on 

experience working in the DOD and industry system integration 

laboratories constructed and operated to support major programs. They 

should also be trained in and use state-of-the-art system engineering 

tools. DOD system engineers should participate in the system 

engineering research activities that are discussed in the next section. 

These recommendations will, in most cases, require some small 

additional resources—but they will pay off, and in the view of the 

panel, are well worth the investment. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 63

In the interim, given the current shortage of DOD system 

engineers, IPAs, transfers from industry, and use of retired industry 

engineers should be used where appropriate. 

4. Use competitive research to develop improved system 

engineering tools and practices. 

The research-sponsoring infrastructure in the United States has 

been honed to support traditional fields of science, engineering, and the 

social sciences. Yet, despite its importance, it is woefully undersupportive of integrating fields such as system engineering. Consider 

the National Science Foundation’s supported research as an example. 

Traditional institutions change with great difficulty. In implementing 

this recommendation, DOD should act directly to sponsor such 

research that is so vital to DOD success, both to create new system 

engineering tools and processes and to validate existing ones whose 

value is suspect. There are a number of private institutions and a 

growing number of universities that will compete for such research, 

given the opportunity, and such competition will provide the most 

qualified participants. However, some of this research needs to be 

performed by the DOD directly as a means to influence the direction of 

the field of system engineering, contribute to its development, and 

maintain a direct means of understanding its potential. 

5. Use truly independent “red teams” to assure quality 

systems engineering is applied to major programs and activities. 

The recommendation to use red teams for the system engineering 

function stems from the failure of humans, whether as individuals or in 

teams, to think and act in an overly conservative or narrowly focused 

way when under pressure. Red teams must have the ability to quickly 

understand and evaluate on-going activity and recommend improved 

means. Therefore red teams, at a minimum, should be composed of 

experienced and very capable subject matter experts and be empowered 

to fulfill their function. However, they also need what they frequently 

lack, professional diversity and a membership that is willing to form its 

recommendations through open debate and consensus-seeking with 

provision for minority positions. 
64 I CHAPTER 5 

Too often, red teams are formed with people who think alike 

because they all work for—or worked for—the same organization or 

even a part of the same organization, with token representation from 

others who are known to have similar opinions. It is critically important 

that truly independent red teams be created with members carefully 

selected with regard to expertise, a modicum of social skills, and 

professional diversity. One technique to provide diversity is to assure 

adequate representation from government, academia, and industry. Of 

paramount importance is that all the members be free of conflict of 

interest, which in some instances will mean that the industry 

participants be retired and/or without substantial stock or other 

ownership positions in affected companies. 

Budgets 

Lack of funding flexibility and adequate fiscal plans for the out 

years are two of the most significant impediments to accelerating 

technology into fielded capability. Currently, two-year budget cycles and 

the inadequate level of S&T reprogramming authority inhibit the 

pursuit of technology options that could support agile acquisition. S&T 

senior managers need to be able to “mercy kill” less promising 

technology efforts and reprogram funds to support technology options 

with higher potential payoff. 

Progress in system development programs in the execution phase is 

often impeded by the lack of an adequate budget from which a program 

manager can create a management reserve. Such reserves are an 

essential tool of program managers to allow them to take timely 

corrective action to address risks or identified problems that always 

emerge in challenging major military system development efforts. Lack 

of management reserves results in delayed action on risks and 

problems, thereby increasing overall cost and cycle time. 

The spiral development approach advocated in this report requires 

that research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) plans be 

developed and funded to support the initial spiral and to support 

systems studies and S&T for future spirals. Faster, less expensive 

fielding of block 1 yields a technology pull that focuses the research 

program, thus quickening development and creating a basis for 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 65

technology prioritization. It also means, however, that since the 

subsequent blocks are dependent on research, that budget turbulence in 

the basic research portfolio can directly and adversely impact system 

spirals. As the Hart-Rudman Commission put it, “Program turbulence, 

often stemming from lack of funds or from budgetary instability, is the 

primary cause of inefficiencies and cost overruns in DOD programs.” 

This will continue to be so and must be addressed. 

Research funding will likely be challenged as budget pressures from 

war operations tighten. S&T investment is a key to providing 

technology options for future military systems. 

Recommendations_____________________________________________ 

Establish funding in the defense budget ($3 billion per year) 

for the new Rapid Fielding Organization and allow discretionary 

funds in the year of execution. 

For acquisition programs, require budgeting to realistic costs 

and restore the practice of establishing management reserves 

within that budget to handle unforeseen problems while 

maintaining schedule and cost baselines. 

Budget RDT&E funding for future spirals through the future 

years defense plan. 

Sustain S&T funding at the fiscal year 2007 budget level in 

order to maintain technological superiority. 

Current projections are that science and technology funding will 

decline by $1 billion in the out years. Of particular importance here is 

the support for basic research. Over the past 40 years, basic research 

has declined as a percentage of overall S&T from about 25 percent to 

12 percent. 

Technology Reach 

Technology is becoming a greater and greater necessity for business 

competition worldwide. Because of this fact, the investment in 

technology is growing internationally. Currently only about half of the 
66 I CHAPTER 5 

world’s investment in R&D is performed in the United States and this 

percentage is getting smaller. Twenty seven percent of U.S. R&D is 

funded by the federal government and less than half of that is funded 

by DOD. In addition, only about five percent of the scientists and 

engineers in the United States are directly employed by the government. 

Federal R&D funding has been relatively flat for the past 30 years and 

in fact has decreased from a peak in 1997. 

In recent years, there has been a shift in U.S. DOD R&D 

investments from research into development. The long-term security of 

the nation still depends on DOD being at the leading edge of applying 

the newest in science and technology. In the past, such leading-edge 

technologies came largely from the U.S. government. That has not been 

the case for quite some time and, as indicated in Figure 13, much of it is 

now international. 

Source: “International Science and Technology Trends,” Pocket Databook 2000, National Science 

Foundation 

Figure 13. Science and Technology Investment

In contrast to DOD, commercial industrial research, until recently, 

has been steadily increasing in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries. The only industry group that receives the 

majority of its S&T funds from the government is the aircraft and 

missile sector, which is less militarily relevant today than it was during 

the Cold War. In the biological and social sciences, which are growing 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 67

in military importance, the DOD investment is extremely small. If 

DOD wants to be a leader in using technology, it needs to become very 

adept at finding and using the globally available resources, whether 

funded by industry or academia or DOD or other government agencies. 

The department needs to become very effective prospectors. 

In the meantime, potential adversaries have shown themselves to be 

quite adept at finding technology relevant to their purposes from global 

sources. Partially, this is because of the transnational nature of this 

threat. During the Cold War, technology in the Soviet Union originated 

from well-known places using a well-understood process. By 

monitoring Soviet research and test facilities, the United States had a 

reasonable chance of knowing what it would be facing on the future 

battlefield. For today’s transnational threat, there is no clear place to 

focus such attention. Yet the urgency is greater since U.S. adversaries 

do not require a long development cycle—which would otherwise 

create a long time period during which to observe their activities. If the 

DOD wants to have an idea of what path the adversary’s threat is 

taking, it needs to more effectively track adversary interests and then 

rapidly develop counters to the potential threat. For this part of the 

challenge, the department not only needs very efficient prospectors but 

also skilled expeditors, such as the Rapid Acquisition Organization, 

described in Chapter 2. 

As a result of major consolidations in the defense industry, as well 

as the increased cost-competitive nature of business in general, there 

has been a reduction in the amount of IR&D investments being made 

in the United States. In addition, the DOD has reduced its oversight of 

IR&D, requiring no descriptive brochures or on-site reviews, making it 

more difficult for DOD to be aware of what is going on, even in a 

DOD-related industry. The commercial industry likewise has not 

wanted DOD business because acquisition regulations intended to 

prevent corruption make doing business with the DOD very difficult; 

as a result, the DOD is often unaware of the developments in U.S. 

commercial industry. 

The panel recommends, whenever appropriate, that “other 

transaction authority” and other means be used to enable commercial 

firms to more easily undertake business with the DOD. However, for 
68 I CHAPTER 5 

DOD to acquire foreign technology, other difficulties may also have to 

be overcome. Export controls are intended to prevent proliferation of 

dual-use technology, but they impede the integration of foreign 

technology and cooperation and hinder U.S. firms from obtaining scaleeconomics. The “Buy America Act,” intended to protect U.S. business, 

forestall off-shoring, and assure trusted sources, restricts the use of 

foreign technology and hinders the development of techniques to 

overcome risks of buying offshore. 

The lack of language skills among most U.S. scientists and engineers 

precludes their reading foreign journals or attending foreign-language 

technical conferences. Thus, there is difficulty in being aware of foreign 

research and development. That combines with reluctance in much of 

the world in supporting U.S. military interests and, in some cases, 

restrictions being placed on the export of technology to the United 

States. The panel believes that implementing the recommendations of 

the 1999 Defense Science Board Task Force on Globalization and Security will 

help to reduce some of these barriers to acquire foreign technology. 

(Appendix F lists the relevant recommendations from that study.) 

As part of the Reliance process, the DOD produces Technical Area 

Review and Assessment reports on selected R&D topics biannually. 

Although these reports are very extensive, their purpose is to inform 

Congress of DOD research. As such, they are not designed for the 

purpose of sharing information among researchers. There was a 

document that was useful for that purpose, the DD Form 1498 

(Technical Effort and Management System), but it has been discontinued 

by the DOD. The 1498s were generated by DOD principal investigators 

any time they invested in internal or contracted R&D. They described 

what the project was about, including its objective, approach, and 

progress. They identified the name and phone number of the 

government investigator, as well as the name of the funded company or 

university and its principle investigator and his or her phone number. 

The 1498 database was maintained by the Defense Technical 

Information Center and made it very convenient to know what other 

DOD organizations were doing and who to contact for collaboration. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 69

Knowing who to contact for collaboration is very important if the 

department wishes to explore what is being done globally. The panel 

recommends establishing an office in DDR&E that will identify 

important global technology. Because of the breadth of interests by the 

DOD it would be cost prohibitive to attempt to fill the DDR&E 

organization with all of the skills needed; therefore, it is critical that the 

personnel in that office have a database like the 1498s that can identify 

the DOD experts and their interests. 

The objective of the DDR&E prospecting office is to make the 

connection between the DOD and non-DOD scientists, so the 

significance of the work to the DOD can be determined. In addition to 

finding research and reporting it to the relevant organizations, the office 

can do special searches for specific research that has been identified by 

the DOD as of critical interest. In the mid 1960s and 1970s there was a 

series of Air Force scientific and technical offices located at NASA 

centers, as well as regional offices, throughout the United States. The 

DDR&E activity would be very similar to these offices except with a 

global prospective. Increasing collaboration between and among 

researchers is an extremely important role of the DDR&E office. 

Collaboration is also needed in determining what research is of 

interest to potential adversaries. Currently there is considerable 

collaboration among DOD organizations when it comes to attacks on 

computer networks (worms, viruses, etc). There is also some effort 

within individual networks to determine what interests are being shown 

in various web topics. For the topical analysis there is little 

collaboration across DOD organizations even though more 

collaborative analysis might indicate a focus on a particular threat area. 

Intelligence organizations are not generally manned to do this type of 

analysis since it requires a detailed technical focus. The DDR&E 

prospecting office, with the help of the DOD scientific community, 

however, could do an effective job at this. As the DOD improves its 

competence in recognizing suspicious technical interest in web topics, it 

will more clearly identify the potential technical threat and ways to 

counter it.
70 I CHAPTER 5 

Recommendations _____________________________________________ 

Establish and fund a DDR&E Center for the Application of 

Commercial and Foreign Technology. 

This office should be selectively manned with experienced DOD 

scientists and engineers with foreign language skills and with a strong 

interest in improving scientific collaboration. The office should be 

funded at 0.1 percent of the DOD S&T budget. Although this is a very 

small funding level, it is not intended to fund research. Rather, it should 

be sufficient to support manning a small number of staff as well as 

provide them travel, data acquisition, and the establishment of a 

searchable database. 

Re-establish the DD 1498 database so that DOD S&T 

activities and their associated key personnel can be identified. 

This database should be located at the Defense Technical 

Information Center and available online to all DOD scientists and 

engineers. These documents, less the financial information and 

proprietary information, should also be available to appropriately 

cleared U.S. contractors. 

Greatly expand the use of “other transaction authority” and 

other means to enable commercial firms to undertake business 

with the DOD. 

To insure that this action is taken, the USD (AT&L) should 

maintain a monthly report of the frequency of the use of these 

approaches as well as the frequency of first-time DOD contractors. 

Annually, the USD (AT&L) should provide an award to the contracting 

agency that has done the best job of reaching out to commercial and 

international business, similar to the Packard Award.16 

 

16. The Packard Award is given to DOD civilian and/or military organizations, groups, and 

teams who have made highly significant contributions or demonstrated exemplary innovations 

and best practices in the defense acquisition process. The award, the Department’s highest 

acquisition award, is named in honor of the late David Packard, a former deputy secretary of 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 71

To enable the contracting offices to take advantage of foreign 

technology requires that many of the barriers to foreign trade be 

eliminated. In 1999 the DSB made specific recommendations in its 

report on globalization and security and these recommendations are yet 

to be implemented. These recommendations need to be implemented 

as soon as possible. 

The DDR&E needs to consolidate the information contained in the 

web logs of all DOD science and technology organizations. These logs 

should identify who accessed the site, when (date/time on and off), and 

the topics searched or viewed. DDR&E should also request web logs 

from other organizations such as National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration centers and national laboratories. Their participation 

would be voluntary but very valuable. DDR&E should develop 

procedures to review these logs and identify suspicious activity. Concerns 

should be reported to the pertinent organizations, so that the technical 

experts might confirm DDR&E perceptions and suggest actions to be 

taken to counter the potential threat. Over time, with the feedback from 

the scientists, it is anticipated that the DDR&E organizations will 

improve their process and generate fewer false positives. 

The Industrial Base 

Since the late 1980s, consolidation has been a fact of life in the 

defense industry. Within the free world, it played out in Germany and 

Great Britain as a free-market phenomenon and in France as a 

government-directed activity. In the United States, at the “Last Supper,” 

the Secretary of Defense assured the leaders of industry that the 

Departments of Defense and State were going to lift the then-barriers to 

consolidation given the anticipated future reduced defense market (at the 

end of the Cold War). This market was at the very least government 

guided and facilitated and operated as a free market activity. The 

government has paid greatest attention to gross competitive matters, not 

those that result from other narrowing influences. 

 

defense during the Nixon administration. He was also the chairman of the President’s Blue 

Ribbon Commission on Defense Management chartered by President Ronald Reagan in 1985. 
72 I CHAPTER 5 

The dramatic narrowing of industry to the current largest prime 

contractors is described in Figure 14. This figure (last updated in 2003) 

depicts how Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, General 

Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin came to be as they are today. 

An observation in 1997 by Lockheed Martin’s Chairman, Norm 

Augustine, about the possible impact on second and third tier suppliers 

and the results of this consolidation on DOD acquisitions is an essential 

view. Augustine stated “...if prime contractors act on new vertical 

capabilities to freeze out competitors’ key product, or to shut out 2nd 

and 3rd tier suppliers it would tend to unfairly favor the largest suppliers 

with the broadest component and technology base. As such this is a 

trend about which our government ... should be evidencing a great deal 

of concern.”17 In some respects, this commentary and its concerns are 

further sharpened by the fact that these same suppliers are increasingly 

global (and some commercial), adding to the government’s challenge. 

DOD’s concern for vertical integration was recently addressed in a 

July 2004 memorandum by Acting USD (AT&L) Wynn on “Selection 

of Contractors for Subsystems and Components.” A key element of 

this concern was “When developing acquisition strategies, program 

managers and contracting officers shall establish insight into a prime 

contractor’s plan for assembling a team to deliver the required system 

capability and foster the use of competition.” Deputy Secretary of 

Defense England’s study, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment, 

commissioned in 2005, further portrays official DOD concern about 

vertical integration and adds to Augustine’s commentary regarding 

competition for critical subsystems. 

 

17. “Unhappy Birthday: American’s Aerospace Industry at 100,” Aerospace America, February 

1997, pp. 24–31. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 73

Figure 14. Narrowing the Field—the Prime Consolidation (through 2003) 
74 I CHAPTER 5 

A major change during the past decade has been DOD’s move 

towards total system performance responsibility. By shifting the primary 

responsibility for military system definition from service system 

commands to industry, the government has created a procurement 

environment in which the business sector has an almost exclusive role 

in determining the best overall design and technical solution to a DODspecified system performance requirement. That a vertically integrated 

prime might skew a system design analysis to favor a component or 

technological capability fostered by internal corporate investment 

should be no surprise—successful corporations are driven by the need 

to maximize sales and profits. 

There is a companion tendency of the primes to retain program 

R&D funds, use them to “get smart,” and develop an internal offering to 

justify selecting it over an outside supplier’s existing offering. When such 

R&D funding does not trickle down to the supplier/vendor level of the 

industrial base, the ability to generate technology advancements for 

future offerings is starved and ultimately crippled. Choking off the flow 

of R&D dollars from the prime to the vendor base ultimately creates a 

self-serving result where the vendor has inadequate resources to evolve 

new product and the prime thus uses that as justification for deciding to 

“make” rather than “buy” the product. 

Highly integrated “super” teams have the ability to provide DOD 

with much more robust systems-of-systems because of their in-house 

capabilities (that less integrated companies cannot possibly attempt to 

offer). At the same time, these beneficial characteristics could cause 

abuse and actually destroy part of the U.S. defense industrial base. 

When there is virtually unchecked authority of these super teams to 

decide how to source products, subsystems, and systems, the vendor 

base that supplies these is increasingly at risk. This vendor base shrinks 

because of such decisions, competition is reduced, and it is unclear that 

the ultimate customer is receiving best value; the best companies and 

products are not always offered to the government for the warfighter. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 75

Findings 

Prime consolidation has led to three challenges to developing and 

fielding affordable and effective war fighting equipment. The first of these 

is that the consolidation of prime and integrating contractors has narrowed 

the field and limited the competition available for DOD programs. 

The second challenge, vertical integration present in the residual 

primes and integrators, poses an additional restraint. Competition 

produces the best and most affordable performance; vertical integration 

can stifle this vital contribution. Primes and integrators have internal 

incentives to select products and subsystems from divisions of their 

company. Such a lack of competition for products and subsystems 

shuts out 2nd and 3rd tier suppliers, withers the industrial base, and 

further strengthens the prime contractors. DOD’s understanding of 

prime contractor make-buy choices is the critical enabler for the 

government to enforce its right to intervene. Many of these challenges 

are compounded by both flaws in requests for proposals and limitations 

in bidder’s lists. 

The third challenge arises from the short-term focus of the 

industrial base. For business and shareholder reasons, industry has 

increased its emphasis on bid and proposal to the detriment of IR&D. . 

And what industry does invest in IR&D tends to have a shorter-term 

focus—such as towards product support rather than new technology 

development for future products. These unsurprising circumstances are 

a result of shrinking DOD acquisition funding and of the DOD move 

to allow contractors to merge IR&D and bid and proposal in their 

allowable overhead. Since primes and their subcontractors, operate in a 

single customer market place, DOD bears a substantial portion of the 

responsibility to change these destructive trends 

Recommendations_____________________________________________ 

The core of these recommendations is focused on two principles. 

The first is that DOD needs to assert its responsibilities to ensure 

warfighter technological superiority and to understand and encourage 

the health of competition and innovation. The second is that industry’s 

role is to provide best cost/value to address war fighter needs and, to 
76 I CHAPTER 5 

do this well, industry needs to better position its investments toward 

future DOD needs. Primes do have the right to compete on system 

products but should do so within a level playing field; that is, primes 

should solicit the vendor base where available and not abuse the system 

authorities associated with the prime role. 

The intent of these recommendations is to protect the integrity of 

the process; foster maximum competition consistent with approved 

acquisition strategies; and ensure that the government receives the best 

value for the system, subsystem, or product procurement that is 

managed by the prime integrator. The existence of a formal make-orbuy policy alone, however, is insufficient unless accompanied by active 

oversight by the government. 

To ensure that the industrial base remains vital, DOD

 stipulate that requests for proposal require primes to establish 

formal and open make-or-buy decision processes 

 ensure full and open competition for 2nd and 3rd tier contractors 

by the prime and integrators 

 oversee formal make-or-buy decisions 

 assure the availability of alternative sources 

 have the Defense Acquisition Board review make-or-buy plans 

for key program areas 

 have the government program office actively monitor the prime 

after award, and approve any exceptions in formal program 

make/buy policy 

To provide for industrial base innovation (with a view for the 

health of the industrial base), the government should fund 

competitive, alternative sources of R&D that provide 

 continued innovation (in performance, cost, etc.) 

 an alternative if the incumbent does not perform or allows costs 

to rise excessively 

 a competitor for the next spiral 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 77

To encourage industry to focus on IR&D, DOD needs to fund 

those companies that develop innovative sources of next-generation 

systems or products. This incentive will focus the attention of industry 

on the importance of IR&D and create incentives for longer-term 

investment. For DOD to understand industry’s investments for the 

longer term, it should reinstitute separate reporting for IR&D and bid 

and proposal (by updating the Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulations). This change does not require legislation; it is simply a 

regulatory change within the department. As a further IR&D 

investment target, DOD should ask industry to set a corporate average 

as 3 percent of sales (comparable to the suggested DOD target of 3 

percent for S&T).18

Incentives 

Transforming technology rapidly into fielded products is a key to 

meeting the national security challenges of the 21st century. The security 

threats the nation now faces present discontinuities to established S&T 

processes, policies, and procedures.19 These processes need to 

transform from sequential, task-based, and budget-cycle based to ones 

that are capable of parallel, opportunistic, and adaptive operations. 

Two dimensions need to be addressed. The first is deploying 

proven technology to operating units in the shortest possible time. The 

second is dramatically shortening the time it takes for technology and 

weapons systems to be conceived and then become fully operational. 

Current acquisition processes do not emphasize these. 

 

18. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Science and Technology Base for the 21st 

Century, June 1998. 

19. Peter Drucker in The Age of Discontinuity forecast the accelerating pace of change faced by 

firms in the 21st century, and those that assume continuity are likely to find keeping up 

with markets difficult or impossible as they are constrained by rules and mental models 

that no longer work. Charles Handy in the Age of Unreason also makes some interesting 

related comments. We are finding it difficult to meet the “market” needs of our 

warfighters vis-à-vis the threats they face in the global war on terrorism. 
78 I CHAPTER 5 

Acquisition policies, practices, and processes are still Cold Warbased. Technology development and fielding is governed by 

measured, sequential events that are paced by the PPBE process that 

requires extensive coordination and concurrence by multiple 

functional communities (logistics, security, personnel, etc.). The 

policies and rules have been set in place to ensure, to the extent 

possible, “no fault” acquisition and deployment of weapon systems 

and technology. The need to be good stewards of the taxpayers’ 

dollars and the national treasury is very important, but too often this 

mentality extends technology fielding times to points of obsolescence 

before fielding and fails to support the real needs of the warfighters. 

The intentions and spirit of current ways of transitioning technology 

have become dysfunctional20 to meet the current need. In the global 

war on terror, this can mean lives lost and opportunities squandered 

while the process operates. 

The panel is not asserting that the entire acquisition system requires 

wholesale sacking. Rather, there needs to be a faster track for moving 

technologies to combat units that will make a difference in battle. 

Furthermore, the timeframes for acquisition for major programs must 

be accelerated. The “clock speed” of technology transition needs to 

more closely match that of technology innovation and the cycle times 

of new and emerging multilateral threats on the current global 

battlefield.21 This necessarily requires that the supporting processes, 

policies, and culture of DOD’s technology transition and acquisition 

processes be transformed. A culture that values innovation, speed, 

agility, and prudent risk-taking must be created. But this evolution will 

take not just mindset and policy changes; it requires incentives. 

Incentives need to be aligned with the desired outcomes. The 

fundamental nature of the economic relationship between the 

 

20 Chapter 2 of Measuring and Managing Performance in Organizations by Robert D. Austin 

presents a good discussion on how dysfunction occurs. 

21 Charles Fine, in Clock Speed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, discusses 

the varying process speeds of industries. Industries that do not recognize the “clock speeds” 

of the industry/market segments they are in will fail. His concepts are useful in thinking 

about current technology transition processes and the “market” they serve. 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 79

government and the defense industrial base, and in the context of the 

overall world economy, needs to be explicitly recognized and 

understood. This includes the monopsonist buyer and the oligopolist 

seller, where the pricing and market are controlled by the governmentcontractor relationships. These relationships have significant impact on 

incentives like profit and return on sales for industry. Economic 

incentives can drive speedy technology transition for new capabilities 

and improvement to in-service systems. 

Recommendations_____________________________________________ 

In attempting to create the proper incentives to encourage the rapid 

transition of technology into operational capability, the panel focused 

on three participants in the acquisition process. First, how can the 

department create the proper incentives so that industry will want to 

embrace the new approach? Second, why should the acquisition 

professionals get behind the process? Finally, what will be the benefit to 

the operational user who is, in the final analysis, the customer? 

Industry Incentives 

Multiple incentives to industry arise from spiral acquisition, as 

envisioned by the panel. First, if the contractor is performing well on 

the contract, DOD would propose that the contractor be continued for 

the next spiral with minimal competition. This approach takes 

advantage of the position on the learning curve that the contractor has 

achieved, which is of benefit to the government in that it doesn’t start 

the learning curve all over with someone else. At the same time, should 

the contractor not be performing well, there is an advantage to other 

contractors to win the next spiral. This means more frequent 

opportunities to enter the acquisition process. The panel also believes 

that DOD should fund R&D of potential competitors to provide 

technical alternative and alternative sources. 

There is also an accountability incentive for the contractor, since 

program managers and their team can remain associated with the 

contract for the entire spiral. This is not the case today where the life of 

the contract is much longer than a normal industry job. Should the 

industry perform well on a spiral, the panel recommends that the 
80 I CHAPTER 5 

contract provide profit incentives that are prioritized, first, on meeting 

schedule (getting something into the hands of the war fighter on time); 

second, controlling cost (so that sufficient quantities can be acquired to 

make a war fighting difference); and, finally, performance that is the 

best available for the cost and schedule. The contractor rewards on the 

spiral should be displayed at the contractor facility to generate pride and 

motivation to all employees working on the contract—and the extra 

rewards shared with the employees. 

Government Acquisition Professionals 

For the people in the government acquisition business there are 

also many incentives to rapid acquisition but none more important than 

that related to accountability. With the short acquisition cycle, it will be 

possible for individuals to directly be associated with program success 

or failure. For example, in 1998 the average ACAT I program had four 

program managers during its average 132-month acquisition time. If a 

spiral can be reduced to 60 months, it may be possible to cut that 

number down to 1 or 2. The short cycle times also provide an excellent 

opportunity for professional development, where staff members can 

experience all aspects of a program from development of the 

requirement; to design, qualification, and testing; to production and 

fielding. This experienced workforce would then be well-qualified for 

programs of greater complexity and cost. Having gone through the 

entire cycle, the acquisition professional will better appreciate the 

effects that decisions made in an early phase of the program have on 

later phases and operations. 

Concerning operations, the panel also believes that the acquisition 

professionals working on a program will be in an excellent position to 

help in transitioning the product to the operational user by deploying 

with the initial operational capability, and then feeding back the lessons 

learned concerning product fixes or improvements that are needed on 

subsequent spirals or block changes. This is a benefit to both the 

acquisition professionals, who see their efforts more relevant, but also to 

the operators who see their needs more rapidly addressed. The 

accountability facilitated by shorter acquisition cycles, as in the contractor 

case, can be helped in the government case by displaying the 

performance that is achieved by various programs and their staffs. This 
CROSS-CUTTING ENABLERS I 81

information should be used to affect promotions and future assignments. 

A caution, however; is that focusing on successful programs should not 

ignore the fact that some programs are much more challenging than 

others, and occasionally the best thing a program manager can do is to 

recommend that a program be expeditiously cancelled. 

Operational User 

The most important incentive for rapid acquisition is to deliver 

effective material into the hands of the operational user. If they do not 

benefit from this process, then the other benefits are irrelevant. The 

benefit to the user can be looked at in several ways. The first way is to 

determine if the process is responsive. For example, if the operational 

user needed something for the Cold War that doesn’t show up until 15 

years after the Cold War is over, and when it shows up it has obsolete 

technology, the system (obviously) should not be considered 

responsive. If a potential adversary can acquire commercial technology 

faster than we could acquire the same technology we should not 

consider our system responsive. 

The fact that many DOD programs have had an average 32 percent 

cost growth, thereby requiring many other programs to become funding 

sources for the overrun, or that many operational quantities are reduced 

because of this cost growth, then the current acquisition system should 

not be considered desirable. If, after large amounts of money have been 

invested, a number of programs are cancelled and the warfighter receives 

no operational capability, the process is deficient. The fact that the nation 

was fortunate enough to have a Cold War adversary whose acquisition 

system was even worse than our own should not make us feel good. 

There is a tremendous incentive to the operational user to have all of 

these deficiencies eliminated. The user will get operational capability 

sooner and more relevant to the operational conditions. The user will be 

able to provide feedback to change needs in future spirals more quickly, 

based upon operational experience. Cost overruns will be reduced, perhaps 

by a factor of two or three, when systems are acquired in 5 years. Previous 

experience has shown overruns of 32 percent for programs that are 14 

years long, compared to overruns of 15 percent for program of 7 years in 
82 I CHAPTER 5 

length. This means that fewer systems will be delayed because of budget 

reductions and the quantities expected will not have to be reduced. 

In general, all parties who are involved with the acquisition process 

will have positive incentives for rapid acquisition. Even Congress and 

the taxpayers who provide the DOD with their resources will see 

greater military capability sooner and at lower costs. 
SUMMARY I 83

Chapter 6. Summary 

Systems acquisition, as defined in the Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation and taught at the Defense Acquisition University, provides a 

systems engineered approach to procurement best suited to large 

acquisitions developed over long periods of time. While extremely 

logical, the system for large scale acquisition is often encumbered by 

late development of technologies and excessive requirements. Programs 

often are established without a Milestone A and arrive at Milestone B 

with technologies that are loosely assessed. They may not be mature 

enough (TRL 6) to ensure meeting the needs of Milestone C. Such 

disconnects may be driven by mandated requirements that can only be 

achieved by more risky technologies. Analysis-of-alternatives are 

required at present but not an analysis of the systems implications or 

relationships between requirements and maturation times (and costs) of 

individual technology solutions. 

These issues were of little consequence when the time to resolve 

requirements and mature technologies had no direct battlefield impact. 

The environment and threat were relatively stable over time, so a long 

deliberate process could be tolerated. With the onset of the terrorist 

threat and insurgency operations, cracks in this system have appeared. 

It was clearly not responsive to the changing needs and capabilities that 

could be had, at least in part, and could not be extracted from the 

“program of record” early. This problem became obvious and was 

addressed incompletely even before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The services, DOD, and joint agencies recognized the need for more 

expeditious acquisition. To meet this need, they established various and 

fragmented acquisition offices and programs. 

Some of these ancillary approaches to acquisition provide unique 

and lasting capability. For example, Foreign Comparative Testing allows 

a mechanism for funding assessments of foreign technologies that 

might be of specific value to U.S. forces. Others have a specific mission 

focus, such as countering improvised explosive devices by the Joint 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. 
84 I CHAPTER 6 

The military services, beginning with the Army’s Rapid Equipping 

Force, established rapid acquisition activities in direct support of 

operational commands that provide an integrated approach to 

requirements development, technology procurement, and limited fielding. 

These organizations tend to leverage more mature technologies or highrisk technical approaches with significant payoff. In such an 

environment, program failures are well tolerated and, by staying close to 

the warfighter, the evolution of solutions often stays current. 

Technology development efforts could be fostered through advanced 

concept technology demonstrations and advanced technology 

demonstrators. These programs focused on getting technologies in the 

hands of the user to determine its usefulness or to refine further 

development. Ostensibly, these programs would leave behind 

technologies with the units that participated in the studies. Subsequent 

sustainment and transition to a program of record would follow. 

However, sustainment often failed after a short period of time, and 

transition rarely fit any existing program, leaving a potentially valuable 

and proven technology languishing. 

These and the many other technology development and limited 

fielding approaches within DOD put a significant number of 

capabilities in the hands of service men and women in the field much 

faster than would have been possible through the conventional 

acquisition process. However, the ad hoc systems suffered from 

redundancy, lost focus, and difficulty in sustainment. 

Further, these programs have not been funded to transition 

technologies to programs of record, nor are budget processes conducive 

to rapid successes. It is well known that there is a gap in the methodology 

for technology transition. The same can be said of development of 

efforts in the laboratory systems and industry. Once a program of record 

exists, it is extremely difficult to rapidly insert into it new technologies or 

leverage material successes. 

DARPA, having the responsibility to provide many defense 

“disruptive” technologies, is well funded, yet rarely can directly 

transition technologies into the field or to programs. Often their 
SUMMARY I 85

technologies require subsequent refinement to make them sustainable 

and to complete all the rest of the DOTMLPF issues. 

For some time, the standard system has been recognized as needing 

supplemental support to provide more rapid acquisition or a more 

appropriate process to acquire, test, evaluate, and field smaller items 

and systems. Many of the efforts were seen by the classic acquisition 

community as anemic, lacking the features of sustainment, training, 

integration, and other aspects of full programs. This criticism is valid, 

not of the individual efforts or the concept of rapid fielding, but of a 

partially designed and developed system. It has become nearly a mantra 

of both those in support of rapid acquisition and those opposed: there 

is no transition mechanism. 

Figure 15 is an attempt to pictorially display some of these 

deficiencies of the current system. 

Figure 15. Current Fielding Approach 
86 I CHAPTER 6 

The proposal of the DSB is to first refine the implementation of the 

classic acquisition process so that enhancements, upgrades, and 

requirements are specifically planned for block 1 of the program of 

record. Second, distill the myriad of individual OSD rapid acquisition 

programs into a single organization, the Rapid Fielding Organization, 

with the responsibility to manage some, facilitate others, oversee service 

programs and enduring rapid acquisition organizations, and facilitate 

and fund a transition process for technologies into fielded capability. 

Third, establish a disruptive technology office to foster discovery of 

disruptive technologies most relevant to operational needs. 

Two key recommendations make up the refinement of the classic 

acquisition process. First, mandate that a Milestone A be held. The 

purpose here is not to add complexity or length to the program, but 

rather to require a program review at a point where requirements can be 

balanced against an initial assessment of the maturity of the necessary 

technologies to fulfill the requirements. If properly assessed, the 

programs should arrive at Milestone B with requirements that can be met 

with the available technologies at TRL 6. Requirements that could not be 

supported with TRL 6 technologies would have to be deferred to later 

spirals. If, in the process of conducting the Concept Technology and 

Development phase, it became clear that a technology was not maturing 

at the pace predicted and its absence at Milestone B would imply missing 

a requirement, a process for relief from requirements could be conducted 

administratively without going through another complete JROC review. 

In this way, Milestone B would more likely reflect both the performance 

and technical aspects of the final Block 1 product. 

The second key recommendation recognizes that this would likely 

mean deferment of capabilities until the technology matures by 

mandating a block development and production process for all 

programs. This provides several functions. First, it allows for growth in 

capabilities as technologies mature to meet them. Second, it offers onramps for innovations not previously expected. Third, it allows the 

requirements, resource, and acquisition communities to generate a 

balanced and achievable solution to program execution. However, it 

does require that R&D for further blocks be funded as the prior blocks 

are advancing. 
SUMMARY I 87

To ensure that the Milestone A decision is best informed and that 

the blocking is sequenced correctly, the general S&T contribution needs 

to be more deliberate and thorough. Specifically, as the requirements 

emerge, research may need to be commissioned in order to meet a 

particular need. Much as is done currently, funding of specific research 

areas by the government labs, universities, or industry should continue. 

However, there are additional sources of critical technologies. 

Understanding not just the specific requirements but the intent of the 

program also allows the technical side to “prospect” for technology 

opportunities that may raise unforeseen but valuable capabilities that 

can then be codified in a requirement. Commercially or globally 

available technical solutions or opportunities can then be pulled into the 

program and impact scheduling, risk, cost, and performance. Similarly, 

prospecting of defense and other industry-independent R&D efforts 

should also be leveraged. 

With such significant data on both the requirements and the 

maturity of the technologies likely to be used in the program, a specific 

analysis needs to be mandated that takes a systems view of the effort to 

facilitate programmatic layout and the Milestone A recommendation. 

This systems analysis of requirements and technologies would define 

the blocks showing the capabilities to be achieved in each and an 

assessment of cost, schedule, performance, and risk. 

Modification to the classic acquisition process enables transition of 

technologies into programs of record. By aligning available and proven 

technologies with the phases of a program of record still in 

development, on-ramps for the technologies exist that generally do not 

occur today. Still, this does not define the sources of the technologies, 

how they are proven, or what funding source there is to transition them 

from their point of inception to be included in the program of record. 

These are the functions of the RFO. 

Establishing the RFO would provide DOD with a central office 

responsible for the funding and facilitation of the service rapid fielding 

efforts and select enduring agencies doing the same but focused on 

specific and unique topics. The RFO is intended to replace a number of 

currently existing offices that, to a lesser degree, perform some similar 

functions. This consolidation would allow the original intent of these 
88 I CHAPTER 6 

programs to be continued if needed while consolidating funding and 

outcome. Most critical to the RFO function will be its responsibility to 

reserve and manage some of its funding to ensure that products that 

have been successfully fielded can be incorporated in the block 

upgrades of relevant programs or that new programs can be established 

quickly and with appropriate budgetary funding to follow. It is this 

bridging function that fills the gap not now met by any ad hoc or 

conventional approaches. 

In a similar way, the Disruptive Technology Organization would 

be chartered to foster, search for, and implement technologies that 

could provide an exceptional degree of operational advantage. It 

would provide the key transition path for DARPA, national 

laboratories, academia, and industry to offer these exceptional 

technologies. In doing so, it would ensure sufficient maturity of the 

technology itself to survive in the operational environment intended, 

and to meet the training packages and sustainment minimums. 

Without this function, the technologies would likely remain unusable. 

Like the RFO, the Disruptive Technology Organization would have 

the responsibility to manage its budget in such a way as to afford 

transition of key technologies into programs of record and to bridge 

the gap caused by the two year delay in the defense budget process. 

This includes sustainment of equipment in the field until a program 

can take over its management. 

The approach recommended resolves key problems with the current 

methodology: 

 Requirements can be managed through block upgrades allowing 

“good enough” solutions to be fielded more quickly without 

compromising ultimate outcome. 

 Evolving requirements stemming from an agile enemy can be 

responded to rapidly and incorporated in appropriate programs. 

 Technology can be managed to rapidly provide “good enough” 

solutions without compromising the ultimate desired outcome. 

 Evolving threat, environment, or technical opportunities can be 

accommodated in a timely manner. 
SUMMARY I 89

 Technology insertion can be accomplished in a managed yet 

rapid fashion with a predictable bridging methodology. 

 Funding for such activities as rapid fielding and bridging can be 

provided and managed. 

 The large investment in the technology base can be better 

leveraged. 

 Disruptive technologies can be pursued with a high tolerance 

for failure and a method of implementing significant 

breakthroughs. 

Figure 16 illustrates this new process. 

Figure 16. An Integrated Approach to Rapid Fielding 

A succinct depiction of this alternative approach to acquisition is 

shown in Figure 17. It shows the modified formal acquisition process 

with its enhanced R&D functionality and systems analysis of 

requirements and technologies that is intended to accelerate S&T 

development and the execution of block spirals. This is then related to 
90 I CHAPTER 6 

the rapid acquisition process, disruptive demonstrations, and 

concurrent efforts in support of future blocks. 

Figure 17. A New Approach to Defense Acquisition 
TERMS OF REFERENCE I 91

Appendix A. Terms of Reference 



PANEL MEMBERSHIP I 95

Appendix B. Panel Membership 

CHAIRMEN 

Name Affiliation

Dr. William F. Ballhaus, Jr. Aerospace Corporation 

Hon. Jacques Gansler University of Maryland 

PANEL MEMBERS 

Dr. Michael Andrews L-3 Communications 

Dr. Elliot Axelband RAND 

Dr. Joseph Braddock Private Consultant 

Mr. Joe Eash Private Consultant 

Dr. Bill Howard Private Consultant 

Dr. Bruce Jette Synovision Solutions 

Mr. Donald Latham Private Consultant 

Mr. Mark Lister Naval Research Advisory Committee 

Brig Gen Robert Mansfield, USAF (Rete) Lockheed Martin Corporation 

Mr. Mark Mykityshyn The White Oak Group, Inc. 

Dr. Al Romig Sandia National Laboratory 

Dr. George Schneiter Private Consultant 

Dr. James Silk Institute for Defense Analyses 

Mr. Robert Soule Institute for Defense Analyses 

Dr. Stephen Squires Private Consultant 

Dr. Michael Yarymovych Private Consultant 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS 

Ms. Mary Margaret Evans Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Advanced Systems and Concepts 

COL Robert Morris, USA U.S. Joint Forces Command 

Dr. Jonathon Porter SAF/AQR 

Col Mark Stephen, USAF SAF/AQR 
96 I APPENDIX B 

STAFF 

Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Sarah Canna Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE I 97

Appendix C. Presentations to the Panel 

Name Topic

MARCH 14, 2006 

Mr. Joe Eash 

Private Consultant 

Discussion of the Advanced Concepts Technology 

Development Process 

Dr. Bruce Jette 

Synovision Solutions

Land Warrior Program Update and Transition 

Technology: A Case-Study-Based View 

Mr. Lee Gazzano 

Deputy Program Manager, REF

Mr. John Geddes 

Tech Advisor, REF

Rapid Equipping Force (REF) 

APRIL 21, 2006 

Lt Gen Ron Kadish, USAF (Ret) 

Chairman, Defense Acquisition Performance 

Assessment

Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 

Ms. Sue Payton 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Advanced Systems and Concepts 

Agile Acquisition and the Technology Transition 

Council 

Mr. Feldman 

Office of Force Transformation 

Rapid Acquisition Projects in the Office of Force 

Transformation 

Mark Lister 

Chairman, Naval Research Advisory 

Committee (NRAC) 

NRAC Study on Technology Acquisition Reform 

MAY 16, 2006 

Myron Hura, Manny Cohen, Gary McLeod 

and Natalie Crawford, RAND Space Capabilities Development 

Mr. Larry Lynn 

Private Consultant; former Director, Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency

Technology Transition 

Kristen Baldwin 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Integrating Requirements, Acquisition, and 

Programming 
98 I APPENDIX C 

JUNE 7–8, 2006 

Paul Francis, GAO Technology Development and Transition 

Bob Buhrkuhl 

Office of the Secretary of Defense Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

JULY 12, 2006 

Beth Cole, Mark Buffler, Dave Hyman 

OUSD (AT&L)/AS&C/OTT Independent Research and Development 

AUGUST 8–11, 2006 

Frank Cappuccio 

Executive Vice President and General 

Manager, Advanced Development Programs 

& Strategic Planning 

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company 

Polecat – High Altitude UAV Technology 

Demonstrator 

Donald G. Reinersten 

Reinersten and Associates A Perspective on Product Development 
RFO CHARTER I 99

Appendix D. Draft Memorandum and 

Directive for the Rapid Fielding 

Organization 

MEMORANDUM FOR 

SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE 

COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS 

ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE 

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 

DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 

DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT 

DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION 

DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES 

DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES 

SUBJECT: Establishment of the Rapid Field Organization (RFO) 

The Global War on Terrorism is characterized by fast-adapting 

adversaries capable of gaining temporary operational advantage with 

creative tactics and technologies. Against such threats, capabilities 

derived from traditional, slow acquisition and development processes 

are inadequate. This asymmetry places a premium on anticipating 

threats and rapidly fielding capabilities to gain decisive technical and 

operational advantage. In response, the Department has initiated a 

variety of new programs and processes in recent years that attempt to 

provide timelier solutions to the new challenges we face. While much 

good has come from these programs and processes, they are not well 

integrated and thus don’t provide the synergy needed to ensure unity of 

effort and prioritization of increasingly scare resources. 
100 I APPENDIX D 

We need to better focus our efforts to provide innovative solutions 

that address emergent warfighting needs and customer requests for 

faster fielding of capabilities. We also face the ever-present challenge of 

funding for execution and budget-year needs inside the normal 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Executive (PPBE) cycle 

decision timelines. All of these things argue persuasively for a more 

effective way to underwrite and execute programs to rapidly meet 

emergent warfighter needs. 

Accordingly, I am establishing the Rapid Fielding Organization 

(RFO) as a joint entity and jointly manned activity of the Department 

of Defense. The mission of the RFO is to rapidly provide capabilities 

necessary to facilitate the use of joint forces in military operations, or 

enhance the interoperability of equipment procured through other 

means in order to meet emergent warfighter needs. The RFO will 

initially be formed from a multiplicity of existing programs and report 

to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). 

I direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics), to provide further detail and implementing guidance 

within sixty days of this memorandum. Additionally, I direct the 

Combatant Commands to provide a single flag-or-SES-level point of 

contact, with appropriate authority to commit your organization’s 

support. I expect all other stakeholders in the Department to support 

and, as appropriate, to participate in this important effort. 

 (SecDef or DepSecDef signature) 
RFO CHARTER I 101

Department of Defense 

DIRECTIVE 

NUMBER xxx.xx 

Date 

DA&M 

SUBJECT: Rapid Fielding Organization (RFO) 

References: (a) Title 10, United States Code 

(b) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Meeting 

the Immediate Warfighter Needs (IWNs), dated September 3, 

2004 

(c) DoD Instruction 5000.2, “Operation of the Defense 

Acquisition System,” May 12, 2003 

(d) CJCSI 3150.25B, “Joint Lessons Learned Program,” February 

15, 2004 

(e) Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 2.1, April 1, 1984, 

supplemented by Defense FAR Supplement, Subpart 202.1 

(g) DoD Directive 8910.1, "Management and Control of 

Information Requirements," June 11, 1993 

1. PURPOSE

Under the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense in reference 

(a), this Directive establishes the RFO as a joint entity and jointly manned 

activity of the Department of Defense with the mission, responsibilities, 

functions, relationships, and authorities as prescribed herein. 

2. APPLICABILITY

This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the 

Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, and the DOD Field 

Activities (hereafter referred to collectively as “the DOD 

Components”). The term “Military Departments” as used herein, refers 

to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps—including 

National Guard and Reserve Units. 
102 I APPENDIX D 

3. BACKGROUND

The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2003 (PL-107-314) Section 806 Rapid Acquisition and Deployment 

Procedures directed the Secretary of Defense to prescribe procedures for 

the rapid acquisition and deployment of items that are (1) currently under 

development by the Department of Defense or available from the 

commercial sector; and (2) urgently needed to react to an enemy threat or 

to respond to significant and urgent safety situations. It also directed 

streamlined communications between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, acquisition community and the research and development 

community in addition to streamlined testing criteria. 

The Global War on Terrorism and recent experiences with 

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, have highlighted the 

institutional challenges the DOD faces in rapidly satisfying the needs of 

the warfighter. Establishment of the Joint Rapid Action Cell (JRAC) in 

2004, reference (b), began to break down institutional barriers that 

prevent timely and effective warfighting support by providing and 

oversight mechanism to track Urgent Operational Needs and 

Immediate Warfighting Needs requiring timely (120 days or less) 

materiel or logistics solutions. 

As the size and scope of military operations grew, it became 

apparent that not only was there a requirement to monitor and 

champion immediate warfighting needs but there was also a need for a 

process that would address urgent operational needs. Such needs are 

more complex in nature but have the potential to better protect fighting 

forces and quickly yield the technological edge against the enemy. 

4. MISSION

The RFO shall rapidly provide capabilities necessary to facilitate the 

use of joint forces in military operations, or enhance the interoperability 

of equipment procured through other means in order to meet urgent 

operational needs. 
RFO CHARTER I 103

5. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

RFO is established as a joint entity and jointly manned activity of 

the Department of Defense under the direction, authority, and control 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics (USD(AT&L)). RFO shall consist of a Director and such 

subordinate elements as are established by the Director within 

resources authorized by the Secretary of Defense. 

6. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

The Director, RFO, shall: 

6.1. Organize, direct, and manage the RFO and all assigned resources. 

6.2. Serve as the DOD point of coordination and catalyst for initiatives 

across the full range of efforts to rapidly provide capabilities necessary to 

facilitate the use of joint forces in military operations, or enhance the 

interoperability of equipment procured through other means in order to meet 

emergent warfighter needs. 

6.3. Provide guidance and assistance, as appropriate, to the DOD 

Components and other U.S. Government activities on matters pertaining to the 

projects assigned to RFO. 

6.4. Recommend to the appropriate decision bodies in DOD, through the 

AT&L, projects that have the potential to replace or enhance existing or 

emerging Programs of Record covered by reference (c). 

6.5. Arrange for the performance of, and supervise, RFO projects assigned 

to the Military Departments, other U.S. Government activities, individuals, 

private business entities, educational institutions, or research institutions, giving 

consideration to the primary functions of the Military Departments. 

6.6. Engage in projects to determine technology investment priorities 

taking into consideration both military needs and commercial potential. Longterm strategies should promote better integration of the military and civilian 

industrial base. 
104 I APPENDIX D 

6.7. Conduct demonstration projects that embody concepts of operation 

and technology appropriate for joint programs, programs in support of 

deployed forces, or selected programs of the Military Departments and, on 

request, assist the Military Departments in their prototyping programs. 

6.8. Keep the AT&L and the DOD Components informed, as 

appropriate, on significant new developments, breakthroughs, and 

technological advances within assigned projects and on the status of such 

projects to facilitate early operational assignment. 

6.9. Prepare and submit to the Comptroller of the Department of 

Defense, in accordance with established procedures, the RFO's annual program 

budget estimates, to include the assignment of appropriation program 

priorities. 

6.10 Coordinate with the Joint Staff through access to the Joint Lessons 

Learned Database covered by reference (d) to ensure that Joint needs are 

satisfied to the maximum extent possible. 

6.11. Perform such other functions as may be assigned by the AT&L. 

7. AUTHORITY

The Director, RFO, is specifically delegated authority to: 

7.1. Place funded work orders with organizations of the Military 

Departments, other DOD Components, or other organizations of the Federal 

Government. 

7.2. Authorize the allocation, as appropriate, of funds made available to 

RFO for assigned projects. 

7.3. Establish for RFO, the Military Departments, and other activities, 

procedures required in connection with work being performed for RFO, 

consistent with policies and instructions governing the Department of Defense. 

7.4. Serve as Head of an Agency and Contracting Activity within the 

meaning of, and subject to the limitations of, FAR 2.1, as supplemented by 

DFARS, Subpart 202.1 (reference (e)). 
RFO CHARTER I 105

7.5. Prosecute assigned projects by contract, grant, cooperative agreement, 

or any other authorized means. 

7.6. Acquire or construct, directly or through a Military Department or 

other U.S. Government Agency, such research, development, and test facilities 

and equipment required to carry out assignments that may be approved by the 

Secretary of Defense in accordance with applicable statutes and DOD 

Directives. 

7.7. Obtain reports and information, consistent with the policies and 

criteria of DOD Directive 8910.1 (reference (f)), and advice and assistance 

from other DOD Components, as necessary, to carry out RFO functions and 

responsibilities. 

7.8. Communicate directly with the DOD Components, other Executive 

Departments and Agencies, foreign research activities, and non-DOD R&D 

activities, as appropriate. Communications to the Commanders of the 

Combatant Commands shall be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

7.9. Exercise the administrative authorities in enclosure 1. 

8. RELATIONSHIPS

8.1. The USD(AT&L) shall exercise authority, direction, and control over 

the Director, RFO. 

8.2. The Director, RFO, shall: 

8.2.1. Ensure that the appropriate DOD Components are kept fully 

informed concerning RFO activities with which they have substantive concern. 

8.2.2. Make appropriate use of established facilities and services in 

the Department of Defense or other Governmental Agencies, wherever 

practicable, to achieve maximum efficiency and economy. 

8.3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Heads of other 

DOD Components shall: 
106 I APPENDIX D 

8.3.1. Provide assistance and support, in their respective fields of 

responsibility and within available resources, to the Director, RFO, as may be 

necessary to carry out the responsibilities and functions assigned to RFO. 

8.3.2. Coordinate with the Director, RFO, on all matters related to 

responsibilities and functions assigned to RFO. 

8.3.3. Direct subordinate elements to follow the procedures 

established pursuant to paragraph 6.3., above. 

9. ADMINISTRATION

9.1. The Director, RFO, shall be a civilian selected by the Secretary of 

Defense based on recommendations by the USD(AT&L). 

9.2. RFO shall be authorized such personnel, facilities, funds, and other 

administrative support as the Secretary of Defense deems necessary. 

9.3. The Military Departments shall assign personnel to RFO in 

accordance with approved authorizations and procedures for assignment to 

joint duty. 

9.4. Administrative support shall be provided by one, or more, of the 

DOD Components, as appropriate. 

10. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately. 

Enclosures - 1 

E1. ENCLOSURE 1

DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

E1.1.1. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, and 

subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and in 

accordance with DOD policies, Directives, and Instructions, the Director, 

RFO, or in the absence of the Director, the person acting for the Director, is 
RFO CHARTER I 107

hereby delegated authority as required in the administration and operation of 

RFO to: 

E1.1.1.1. Establish advisory committees and employ temporary or 

intermittent experts or consultants, as approved by the Secretary of Defense, 

for the performance of RFO functions consistent with 10 U.S.C. 173; 5 U.S.C. 

3109(b); and DOD Directive 5105.4, "DOD Federal Advisory Committee 

Management Program," September 5, 1989. 

E1.1.1.2. In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 7532; Executive Orders 10450, 

12333, and 12356; and DOD Directive 5200.2, "DOD Personnel Security 

Program," May 6, 1992; as appropriate: 

E1.1.1.2.1. Designate any position in the RFO as a "sensitive" 

position. 

E1.1.1.2.2. Authorize, in case of an emergency, the appointment 

of a person to a sensitive position in the RFO for a limited period of time and 

for whom a full field investigation or other appropriate investigation, including 

the National Agency Check, has not been completed. 

E1.1.1.2.3. Initiate personnel security investigations and, if 

necessary in the interest of national security, suspend clearance for personnel 

assigned, detailed to, or employed by RFO. Any action under this paragraph 

shall be taken in accordance with procedures prescribed in DOD 5200.2-R, 

"Department of Defense Personnel Security Program," January 1987. 

E1.1.1.3. Authorize and approve: 

E1.1.1.3.1. Temporary duty travel for military personnel 

assigned or detailed to the RFO in accordance with Joint Federal Travel 

Regulations, Volume 1, "Uniformed Service Members." 

E1.1.1.3.2. Travel for RFO civilian employees in accordance 

with Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 2, "DOD Civilian Personnel." 

E1.1.1.3.3. Invitational travel to non-DOD personnel whose 

consultative, advisory, or other highly specialized technical services are required 

in a capacity that is directly related to, or in connection with, RFO activities, in 
108 I APPENDIX D 

accordance with Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 2, "DOD Civilian 

Personnel." 

E1.1.1.3.4. Overtime work for RFO civilian employees in 

accordance with Chapter 55, Subpart V, of 5 U.S.C. and applicable Office of 

Personnel Management regulations. 

E1.1.1.4. Approve the expenditure of funds available for travel by 

military personnel assigned or detailed to the RFO for expenses incident to 

attendance at meetings of technical, scientific, professional, or other similar 

organizations in such instances where the approval of the Secretary of Defense, 

or designee, is required by 37 U.S.C. 412, and 5 U.S.C. 4110 and 4111. 

E1.1.1.5. Develop, establish, and maintain an active and continuing 

Records Management Program pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3102 and DOD Directive 

5015.2, "Records Management Program," March 22, 1991. 

E1.1.1.6. Establish and use imprest funds for making small purchases 

of material and services, other than personal services, for the RFO, when it is 

determined more advantageous and consistent with the best interests of the 

Government, in accordance with DOD Directive 7360.10, "Disbursing 

Policies," January 17, 1989. 

E1.1.1.7. Authorize the publication of advertisements, notices, or 

proposals in newspapers, magazines, or other public periodicals as required for 

the effective administration and operation of the RFO, consistent with 44 

U.S.C. 3702. 

E1.1.1.8. Establish and maintain, for the functions assigned, an 

appropriate publications system for the promulgation of common supply and 

Service regulations, instructions, and reference documents, and changes 

thereto, pursuant to the policies and procedures prescribed in DOD 5025.1-M, 

"DOD Directives System Procedures," August 1994. 

E1.1.1.9. Enter into support and service agreements with the Military 

Departments, other DOD Components, or other Government Agencies, as 

required, for the effective performance of RFO functions and responsibilities. 

E1.1.1.10. Enter into and administer contracts, directly or through a 

Military Department, a DOD contract administration services component, or 
RFO CHARTER I 109

other Federal Agency, as appropriate, for supplies, equipment, and services 

required to accomplish the mission of the RFO. To the extent that any law or 

Executive order specifically limits the exercise of such authority to persons at 

the Secretarial level of a Military Department, such authority shall be exercised 

by the appropriate Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary of Defense. 

E1.1.1.11. Exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary of 

Defense by the Administrator of General Services on the disposal of surplus 

personal property. 

E1.1.1.12. Exercise the authority of the Head of an Agency pursuant 

to Chapter 137 of 10 U.S.C. 

E1.1.1.13. Enter into and administer grants, cooperative agreements, 

and other authorized transactions with any Agency, university, nonprofit 

corporation, or other organization to carry out or support work required to 

execute any assigned advanced research project, and establish procedures for 

RFO to carry out all the authorities and responsibilities contained in 10 U.S.C. 

2358 and 2371. 

E1.1.1.14. Promulgate the necessary security regulations for the 

protection of property and places under the jurisdiction of the Director, RFO, 

pursuant to DOD Directive 5200.8, "Security of DOD Installations and 

Resources," April 25, 1991. 

E1.1.1.15. Establish and maintain appropriate property accounts for 

RFO and appoint Boards of Survey, approve reports of survey, relieve personal 

liability, and drop accountability for RFO property contained in the authorized 

property accounts that has been lost, damaged, stolen, destroyed, or otherwise 

rendered unserviceable, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. 

E1.1.2. The Director, RFO, may redelegate these authorities as 

appropriate, and in writing, except as otherwise specifically indicated above or 

as otherwise provided by law or regulation. 
110 I APPENDIX E 

Appendix E. Rapid Acquisition 

Programs 

The accelerated pace of global technology development challenges 

the DOD’s ability to quickly respond to ever-changing, asymmetric 

threats. Transformation and QDR goals continue to stress an emphasis 

on rapidly developing and fielding new innovative and transformational 

technology and operational concepts. There are a number of programs 

currently in the DOD designed to meet these challenges, and these 

programs, by and large, can be described as falling into one of two 

acquisition categories: rapid and agile. These programs are in contrast to 

the traditional acquisition process that is directly linked to a formal, two 

year PPBE process. In contrast, the rapid and agile programs involve 

projects that are purposely resourced inside the PPBE process. 

Rapid acquisition programs focus on urgent operational needs with an 

emphasis on meeting initial materiel or logistics solutions in 120 days or 

less. Rapid acquisition programs focus almost exclusively on procuring 

off-the-shelf technologies. It could be debated that these are, in reality, 

rapid “procurement” programs since material solutions are usually 

already known and all that is required is a procurement decision. The 

military services and the Joint Staff have a number of processes in place 

to address urgent operational needs requiring a procurement decision, 

and are the departmental focal point for this requirement. Yet these 

activities report to many organizations, as shown in Figure E-1. 

Agile acquisition programs are often thought of as “applied 

technology” programs; they require little development or advancement 

of state-of-the-art. The key challenge in agile acquisition programs is to 

integrate technologies, components, or subsystems to produce a new 

capability in three years or less. 
RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS I 111

Figure E-1. Rapid Acquisition Programs in DOD
112 I APPENDIX E 

What follows are examples of DOD programs currently in place to 

rapidly transition technology into acquisition or procurement pathways, 

thus increasing capability for the warfighter. Viewed collectively, as 

shown in Figure E-2, just these example programs total more than $2.9 

billion in fiscal year 2006, include multiple appropriations, and cross the 

spectrum of technology and manufacturing readiness levels. Not 

included in this listing are agile acquisition efforts in the service S&T 

laboratories, or the defense agencies (such as DARPA, the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, or the Defense Information Systems 

Agency). The combatant commanders are also not included, though 

they significantly influence the rapid and agile programs. Likewise, the 

Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program is not included, 

although many have argued that it could be more effectively used to 

rapidly transition technology into capability for the warfighter. 

Figure E-2. Examples of Current Rapid Acquisition Programs
RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS I 113

Examples of Rapid and Agile Acquisition 

Programs 

Technology Demonstration Programs. The Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program, started in 1995, allows 

the warfighter to evaluate a technology’s military utility in a new or 

vetted operational concept of employment before committing to a 

major acquisition effort—a “try before you buy” and “80 percent 

solution” methodology. As of fiscal year 2005, 154 ACTD and Joint 

Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) have been initiated. 

Approximately 54 of these have provided capabilities that our troops 

are using today in direct support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 

Overall, more than 70 percent of the ACTDs initiated to date have 

transitioned at least one product to the warfighter. 

Despite the agile and innovative nature of ACTDs, an improved 

business model, the JCTD program, was initiated in fiscal year 2006 

that will replace the ACTD program over the next few years. The JCTD 

model will improve on the ACTD design by reducing development 

time by at least one year with 80% transitioning at least 50% of their 

products to sustainment. The JCTD business model will be linked 

closer to combatant commander needs, with the goal of providing a 

spiral capability within a year and the potential for transition funding if 

the capability proves to have significant military utility. JCTDs address 

GAO, congressional, and QDR direction to quickly respond to 

combatant commander and asymmetric/joint warfare capability gaps—

a “demand-driven” process. 

The new model will accelerate agility, innovation, customer focus, 

and oversight for transition of joint, coalition, interagency, and 

transformational capabilities. Closely associated with the JCTD business 

model is the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) pilot program. This 

pilot program aims at taking a very few “joint peculiar” ACTD or 

JCTDs that are providing a significant residual capability but are not yet 

in a service program of record. The DAE pilot will provide a horizontal 

bridge across services until an appropriate program of record can be 

established via an executive agent who may not have the resources 

available to fund the integration of a particularly “joint” initiative. 

Combined, the JCTD and DAE pilot program create a “cradle-to-
114 I APPENDIX E 

grave” approach for the most critical “joint peculiar” capabilities that 

require a horizontal integration across the services. 

Coalition Warfare. Coalition Warfare is a defense-wide effort to 

assist the combatant commander, services, and defense agencies in 

integrating coalition-enabling solutions into existing and planned U.S. 

programs. The program focuses not only on short-term, 

interoperability-enhancing solutions, but also on early identification of 

coalition solutions to long-term interoperability issues (architectures, 

coalition requirements, major system acquisition) with a broad range of 

potential coalition partners. Coalition Warfare provides the Office of 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(OUSD (AT&L)) with the ability to initiate projects in prioritized 

capability areas determined by the USD (AT&L) and his counterparts. 

Coalition Warfare projects are selected for their emphases on 

warfighter solutions that offer combatant commanders the capabilities 

they demand, such as coalition tactical communications; coalition 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; coalition combat 

identification; and coalition logistics. In addition, the program considers 

candidate projects for their portability and ability to be fielded in 

developing solutions that are applicable to multiple combatant 

commands and reach warfighters quickly. Lastly, to conserve funds and 

maximize the benefit to the U.S. government, the program aims to 

support projects that leverage financial contributions, man-hours, 

technology, infrastructure, and prior investment of both foreign and 

other DOD partners. 

Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID). 

The CWID is the annual event by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff that enables U.S. combatant commanders and the international 

community to investigate new and emerging technologies that can be 

moved into operational use within 6–12 months following the 

execution period. The demonstration builds a temporary global network 

over which cutting edge communications technologies interact to 

support scripted scenarios. Technologies are evaluated for utility, 

interoperability with existing and new systems, and security. CWID 

traces its history to the establishment of the Secure Tactical Data 

Network series originated by the U.S. Army in 1994 to demonstrate 
RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS I 115

emerging command, control, communications, and computer 

capabilities. 

Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT RIF). 

The CbT RIF selects and funds technologically sound solutions for 

physical security equipment and site improvements to prevent terrorists 

from gaining access to, and causing mass casualties at, the combatant 

commands. Physical security equipment includes such things as 

personnel mass notification systems, surveillance systems, lighting, 

access control, and body armor. Examples of physical security site 

improvements include minor construction of perimeter and entrance 

fences, barriers, and gates. CbT RIF initiatives are not intended to 

subsidize ongoing projects, supplement budget shortfalls, or support 

routine service responsibility activity. CbT RIF funds are strictly O&M 

and procurement, and do not include research and development. 

Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF). The 

CTTTF was created in September 2001 to provide a forum to bring 

DOD, laboratories, and various agencies together to focus on 

technology solutions addressing the global war on terrorism. The 

Department does not have a specific funding line for CTTTF, however 

resources from the Quick Reaction Special Project (QRSP) line have 

been used to accelerate development and fielding of transformational 

technologies (see QRSP description below). CTTTF has gone through 

four phases: 

 Phase I (Sep 2001 to Feb 2002). CTTTF actions dealt with the 

immediate post-9/11 events leading up to and including 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. DDR&E 

quickly assembled experts across the department, the defense 

agencies, and Joint Staff to identify technology opportunities 

covering the full spectrum of combating terrorism requirements 

from prevention to protection. 

 Phase II (May 2002 to May 2003). CTTTF actions directly 

supported preparation and the deployment of advanced 

technologies for OIF. The key DDR&E objective was to 

address anticipated technological needs and develop near-term 

capabilities for the combatant commanders, with a focus on 

fielding prototype units within six months. CTTTF operations 
116 I APPENDIX E 

were modified to focus on operational capabilities for the 

Central Command (CENTCOM) and Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM). 

 Phase III (May 2003 to Dec 2005). Initiatives focused on 

operator-requested assistance to improve force protection 

capabilities. While specific programs are classified, actions are 

underway to “stop the bleeding” stemming from terrorist use of 

weapons such as IEDs, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. 

Key focus is on the detection and defeat of IEDs, with 

predictive analysis capabilities to attack enemy leadership and 

infrastructure. 

 Phase IV (Dec 2005 – present). “The long war” outlined in the 

QDR has acknowledged the need for a long-term commitment 

to countering international terrorism. CTTTF is now addressing 

the global threat across a broad range of focus areas. 

Concepts Experimentation (CE). The CE effort is a key 

innovative tool that provides the Army with the ability to capitalize on 

emerging technologies, emerging warfighting concepts, and new materiel 

initiatives. Executed by the Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) Futures Center, CE efforts fund concept development 

through experimentation and exercises that are critical to the success of 

the Army’s unit of action IOC. CE is an analytically designed, integrated, 

and synchronized program of small- through large-scale experimentation 

using multiple live, virtual, and constructive venues to efficiently provide 

validation and quantifiable data supporting the development of required 

capabilities across the domains of DOTMLPF. The Army uses 

experimentation as the central focus to refine and mature warfighting 

concepts, and identify and validate critical decisions related to conceptbased required DOTMLPF capabilities. 

As capability gaps identified by deployed forces reveal shortfalls 

that impact effectiveness or interoperability, and these capability gaps 

are prioritized by the Army, the CE program provides the ability for the 

Army to evaluate high-priority/high-leverage solutions from industry 

during the current year, with highest priority going to candidates that 

cover multiple capability gaps. Funding provides the ability to identify 

and insert leading-edge technology from industry to deployed forces in 
RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS I 117

an incremental manner by leveraging the best ideas of best-positioned 

program manager/program executive officers and pulling or spiraling 

them forward for immediate use in the theater. 

Combating Terrorism Technology Support (CTTS). The CTTS 

program develops technology and prototype equipment to address needs 

and requirements with direct operational application in the national effort 

to combat terrorism. Projects are distributed among a number of mission 

categories: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat; Blast Defeat: 

Infrastructure Protection; Investigative Support and Forensics; Physical 

Security; Training Technology Development; Special Projects; 

Surveillance, Collections, and Operations Support; Tactical Operations 

Support; and VIP Protection. This program is a non-system, advanced 

technology development effort that demonstrates the utility or cost 

reduction potential of technology when applied to combating terrorism 

requirements. It includes technology development and proof-of-principle 

demonstrations in field applications and coordination to transition from 

development to operational use. 

Defense Acquisition Challenge (DAC). The DAC program is 

the “on ramp” for business’ (regardless of size) to challenge a system 

currently in the acquisition cycle. DAC funds are used to test and 

evaluate mature technologies or commercial products, with the 

potential to accelerate insertion and influence the technology transition 

inside the budget cycle by: 

 introducing innovative technologies and products into DOD 

acquisition programs 

 enabling any person or activity to propose alternatives, known 

as “challenge proposals,” that improve the performance, 

affordability, manufacturability, or operational capability of an 

acquisition program 

 providing an “on-ramp” for small- and mid-sized businesses 

into the DOD acquisition process and a competitive path into 

DOD programs of record. 

Authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 2359(b), DAC 

was established in fiscal year 2003 as a five-year pilot program and one 

of three sub-elements under the QRSPs. Congress directed transfer to a 
118 I APPENDIX E 

separate 6.5 Program Element in FY 2005 to refocus the program on 

more mature technologies. Response from U.S. vendors/industry and 

DOD acquisition programs has been exceptional. Since 2003, over 

1,300 proposals have been submitted by industry and government, of 

which 274 were endorsed by programs of record, and 63 have been 

selected for funding, totaling approximately $93 million. Other points 

of interest: 

 From fiscal years 2003 to 2005, 70 percent of the projects 

awarded went to U.S. small and medium enterprises. 

 DAC enables entry of non-traditional defense industry into 

DOD acquisition. 

 Ten DAC projects have yielded equipment currently in use 

today in support of the global war on terrorism. 

Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative (DeVenCI). DeVenCI is a 

program being proposed as a POM-08 initiative; planning activities in 

fiscal years 2005 and 2006 have been funded out of QRSP. The 

objectives of this program will be to speed DOD adoption of 

promising new commercial technologies, and to encourage broader 

commercial support of the DOD supply chain. DeVenCI will use 

workshops, technical expositions, industry outreach, and a web portal 

to increase the visibility of DOD needs to commercial companies and 

technology area experts. It will also provide timely information to 

DOD users about emerging technical innovations and opportunities. 

DeVenCI will be a catalyst initiative that does not fund the 

development of new technologies or businesses, but rather focuses on 

knowledge brokering by encouraging and facilitating information 

sharing to speed emerging solutions to DOD user needs. 

The core program is responsible for tracking the full range of 

technology areas relevant to the DOD, but over time it will spin off 

technology sector initiatives that will focus on specific areas such as 

information technology, biotechnology, energy, materials and 

nanotechnology, and space. The goal of each technology sector 

initiative will be to move oversight of that area closer to a DOD 

customer with a strong interest in the area. 
RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS I 119

The first such technology sector initiative is proposed to be in 

information technology, which will be overseen by the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/ 

Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (ASD [NII]/DOD 

CIO). The information technology sector will identify and speed the 

transfer of information technologies that move the DOD towards a 

network-centered model of warfighting and improve support for the 

DOD’s Global Information Grid. 

Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT). The FCT program grew out 

of the Foreign Weapons Evaluation Program started in 1980. In 1989, 

the Congress created FCT under 10 U.S.C. 2350a (g). FCT funds the test 

and evaluation of mature equipment and technologies developed by allied 

and coalition partners to satisfy U.S. defense requirements, thereby: 

 accelerating the acquisition process and reducing development 

costs (avoiding new starts) 

 enabling transition within the budget cycle by testing and 

insertion within six months to two years 

 enhancing interoperability with coalition partners, strengthening 

defense relationships and armaments cooperation, and serving 

as a catalyst for partnering between domestic and overseas 

defense industries. 

Since 1980, 26 coalition partners have teamed with U.S. industry in 

31 states. The transition rate, from testing to procurement to fielded 

products, is 80 percent over the past five years. 

Independent Research and Development. Major defense 

contractors spend about $3 billion annually on IR&D activities. R&D is 

considered a cost of doing business, and defense contractors are 

allowed to recover a portion of their IR&D expenses as an indirect 

expense on contracts subject to cost accounting standards. On average, 

defense contractors recover about half of their IR&D expenses. 

Summaries of contractor IR&D projects are voluntarily submitted to 

DOD and included in the IR&D database. Changes to IR&D law in the 

early 1990s caused a significant change in DOD’s visibility of 

contractor IR&D. Prior to these changes, major defense contractors 

were required to submit IR&D plans for DOD review and approval, 
120 I APPENDIX E 

and ceilings were established on the amount of IR&D costs each 

contractor could recover as indirect expenses under Defense contracts. 

The current IR&D law, enacted in 1991, phased out the DOD approval 

requirement and the reimbursement ceilings. While applauding these 

changes, contractors have expressed concerns about decreased 

feedback on their IR&D activities, and there is a perception that IR&D 

summaries are an under-utilized resource. 

IR&D includes: basic research, applied research, development, and 

systems/concept formulation studies. DOD policy encourages 

contractors to undertake IR&D activities that may further national 

security in a broad sense, may lead to a superior military capability, or 

may lower the cost and time required for providing that capability. 

DOD components are required to consider the work and 

accomplishments of contractor IR&D programs when planning, 

programming, and budgeting for DOD-funded R&D. Policy on IR&D 

can be found in 10 USC § 2372 and DODD 3204.1. 

Joint Experimentation. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

designated USJFCOM “as the Executive Agent for conducting joint 

warfighting concept development and experimentation within the 

Department of Defense.” The Secretary of Defense signed the 

USJFCOM’s Joint Warfighting Experimentation Charter on May 15, 

1998. Coordinated experimentation effort is an indispensable supporter 

of transformational objectives and is critical to improving DOD 

military capabilities in the “long war” against terrorism. Development 

of advanced techniques, tools, and organizations through the Joint 

Experimentation Program ensures the effectiveness of the future joint 

force. Input for conceptual and prototypical ideas for experimentation 

come directly from the combatant commanders and services. 

USJFCOM conducts internal analyses to determine best areas for joint 

experimentation investment. joint experimentation has the potential to 

provide exceptional return on investment in areas including joint 

operational concept development, joint training, S&T, acquisition 

validation, and test and evaluation. 

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO). Established as a task force in the fall of 2003, JIEDDO’s 

mission is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DOD actions in 
RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS I 121

support of the combatant commanders and their respective efforts to 

defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. The JIEDDO is a joint 

entity operating under the authority, direction, and control of the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

JIEDDO efforts include serving as the DOD point of coordination 

and catalyst for initiatives across the full range of efforts necessary to 

defeat the IED threat; integrating all IED defeat solutions throughout 

the DOD, seeking interagency assistance as necessary, and identifying 

innovative near-term solutions; developing transition plans for proven 

joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD programs of record for 

sustainment and further integration; and rapidly acquiring and fielding 

equipment. In addition, the JIEDDO coordinates with the DOD 

components to develop, publish, and update the DOD IED Defeat 

Strategic Plan which provides an overarching framework to guide the 

DOD components’ long-term counter-IED efforts. 

Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). To overcome institutional 

challenges in quickly satisfying warfighters’ urgent needs, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense directed the USD (AT&L), and the USD, 

Comptroller, to establish the JRAC as a single point of contact within 

the DOD for meeting immediate warfighter needs. In January 2005, the 

Secretary of Defense also designated the JRAC as the DOD focal point 

for coordination of rapid acquisition authority (RAA) for which the 

Secretary of Defense make a written determination to implement the 

authorities granted in Title VIII of the Ronald W. Reagan National 

Defense Authorization Act of 2005. 

The JRAC tracks the resolution and timeliness of actions on IWNs, 

and provides regular reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 

USD (AT&L) and the USD (C). The JRAC process supplements the 

rapid needs validation and resourcing processes of the military 

services—it does not replace them. The JRAC focuses on resolving 

immediate warfighter needs within 120 days. Some solutions may take 

longer, but will likely be far quicker than normal budgeting and 

acquisition processes. The JRAC receives, coordinates, makes 

recommendations, and tracks the progress of rapid acquisition authority 

determinations for the Secretary of Defense. These determinations may 

waive any provision of law, policy, directive or regulation (short of 
122 I APPENDIX E 

criminal statutes) to procure materiel solutions when a combat 

deficiency has resulted in combat fatalities. 

JFCOM Prototyping. A number of directorates at Joint Forces 

Command conduct prototyping to address joint capability gaps 

identified through analysis and experimentation. These prototypes can 

take the form of developmental operational concepts or limited materiel 

solutions. Though limited in scope, these prototypes can provide 

unique capabilities to joint operational commanders. A wide variety of 

JFCOM sources fund these efforts. 

Joint Systems Integration Command (JSIC). The JSIC, a 

subordinate command stood up under USJFCOM in November 2001, 

rapidly integrates technology solutions, drives resolution of C2 

interoperability problems, and provides unbiased evaluations of existing 

and emerging C2 capabilities to improve the joint warfighters’ ability to 

plan and execute operations. FY 2006 interoperability demonstration 

projects include the Joint Systems Baseline Assessment 2006 (JSBA-06), 

Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2), Joint Test 

and Assessment (JT&A) for the Joint Close Air Support (JCAS), Joint 

Mission Thread (JMT), and the Deployable Joint Command and 

Control (DJC2) interoperability demonstration. FY 2006 warfighter 

utility assessments included blacklight, speech-to-speech technology, 

desktop reduction for DJC2, secure configuration tool suite, and the 

joint capabilities requirements tool. Prototype efforts focused on 

delivering the executive command and control capability. Systems were 

delivered to Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan; Multi-National 

Forces-Iraq; Multi-National Corps-Iraq; Commander, USEUCOM; and 

CJTF (Coalition Joint Task Force)-76. 

Joint Warfighting Program (JWP). The JWP is designed to 

invigorate participation by the combatant commanders in joint 

experimentation, as directed in the transformation planning guidance. 

All elements of the JWP assist combatant commanders in specifying 

operational needs and developing solution alternatives for capability 

gaps. Projects are selected from nominations submitted by combatant 

commander staffs. DDR&E is the resource sponsor for JWP. JWP 

supports three activities: 
RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS I 123

 The Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) captures 

lessons learned and assessments from joint contingency 

operations and formulates advanced joint concepts to be tested 

with joint experiments. JAWP is a catalyst for innovation and 

change supporting Defense transformation. JAWP staffing 

includes IDA analysts and USJFCOM military staff officers in 

the USJFCOM Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA). 

The annual task list is reviewed and approved by a Board of 

Directors, chaired by USJFCOM and including Joint Staff J7, 

DDR&E, and OSD/Policy.

 The Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART) challenges 

conventional perspectives on Defense needs and solutions. 

Employing facilitated subject matter expert focus groups, expert 

investigations, and war gaming analysis, DART develops 

innovative and resilient concepts for conducting joint and 

coalition operations. 

 Technology Feeder Support (TFS) subsidizes joint 

experimentation by major geographic and functional combatant 

commanders. In many cases, TFS is the main funding source 

for joint experimentation undertaken by combatant commander 

headquarters staffs. This activity permits development of 

complementing operational employment concepts and validates 

the usefulness of the demonstration capability. It also funds the 

incremental cost of including technology-based demonstrations 

in joint experiments. 

Marine Corps Advanced Technology Demonstrations. The 

Marine Corps Advanced Technology Demonstrations program 

develops and demonstrates advanced technologies and system concepts 

in a quasi-operational environment in the less-than-lethal target effect. 

The program focuses on transition into the demonstration and 

validation phase, as well as prototypes that can be fielded to reduce risk 

in engineering and manufacturing development. Joint service efforts are 

in line with Science and Technology Project Reliance agreements and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Warfare Capabilities. This program also 

funds the Combatants Warfighting Laboratory that provides conceptual 

operational assessment of emerging technologies. This program directly 

supports the Marine Corps’ capability to promptly engage regional 
124 I APPENDIX E 

forces in decisive combat on a global basis, as well as the capability to 

respond to all other contingencies and missions in the full spectrum of 

combat capabilities. 

Office of Force Transformation (OFT). The OFT is the 

principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on transformation within 

the DOD and is tasked to be the catalyst for transformation with the 

department. OFT applies limited RDT&E funding to achieve 

potentially high payoff transformational capabilities to satisfy 

deficiencies highlighted during the QDR, Transformation Planning 

Guidance, and various transformation appraisals. Examples of RDT&E 

efforts to date include work on a prototype full-spectrum effects 

platform for use in urban operations; a capability to re-direct laser 

energy at the tactical level for tactical applications/effects; performance 

trials of a high speed, composite watercraft with hydrodynamic lift; and 

creation of a concept development and experimentation program to 

promote joint war fighting capabilities. 

Quick Reaction Special Projects (QRSP)—The QRSP supports 

three separate projects that provide rapid funding to expedite 

development and transition new technologies to the warfighter: the 

Quick Reaction Fund (QRF), the Rapid Reaction Fund (RRF), and 

the Technology Transition Initiative (TTI), a congressionally 

mandated project. 

 The QRF provides the flexibility to respond to emergent 

warfighter needs in the execution years. With the rate of 

technology maturation, there is a need to take advantage of 

technology breakthrough in rapidly evolving disciplines. The 

QRF is managed by DDR&E, Plans and Programs. Each 

proposal is vetted through technology experts and the Joint 

Staff. Selected projects focus on new ideas or technology 

opportunities that can be completed within 6–12 months.

 The RRF provides financial resources for the CTTTF to 

accelerate development and fielding of transformational 

technologies. (See CTTTF description above). 

 The TTI addresses the funding gaps that often exist between 

the time a technology is demonstrated and the time funding can 
RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAMS I 125

be programmed for procurement for use in an intended weapon 

or support system. The TTI Program was authorized by Section 

242 of the fiscal year 2003 Defense Authorization Act. Its 

purpose is to facilitate the rapid transition of new technologies 

from the S&T base into acquisition programs. The statute 

requires DOD to establish a Technology Transition Manager 

reporting directly to USD (AT&L) and a Technology Transition 

Council (TTC) consisting of acquisition executives from each 

Military Department, members of the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council, and the S&T executives from each Military 

Department and each Defense Agency. Since the start of the 

TTI Program in FY 2003, TTI has funded the new start 

activities of 32 transition projects. To date, eight of the projects 

have transitioned to service/agency programs of record or 

acquisition contracts. The MIOX Water Pen, Automated 

Change Detection, Titanium Nitrade Coating for H-46 

Helicopter Compressor Blades, and the Semantic Web Network 

are being used by the warfighters 18–24 months earlier than 

would have been possible without TTI. Thirteen of the 

additional projects are in the process of being transitioned 

during FY 2006. Fourteen new projects were added in 2006. 

Rapid Equipping Force (Army). The REF has a broad mission to 

rapidly increase mission capability while reducing risk to soldiers and 

others. The REF accomplishes this mission by (1) equipping operational 

commanders with off-the-shelf (government or commercial) solutions or 

near-term developmental items that can be researched, developed, and 

acquired quickly; (2) inserting future force technology solutions that 

engaged and deploying forces require by developing, testing, and 

evaluating key technologies and systems under operational conditions; 

and (3) assessing capabilities and advising Army stakeholders of findings 

that will enable U.S. forces to rapidly confront an adaptive enemy. The 

REF seeks to provide equipping solutions within 90 days and insertion 

solutions within 360 days. The REF organization takes its guidance from 

the Army G-3 and reports directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Rapid Technology Transition (Navy). The mission of the RTT 

program is to increase the rate that new, innovative, and potentially 

disruptive technologies are inserted into the Department of Navy 
126 I APPENDIX E 

acquisition programs and the hands of the warfighter. A key aspect of 

the RTT program is its charter to transition technology from any 

source, including those not traditionally associated with defense 

technology. An effective and robust integration of commercial and 

military technologies can reduce costs and improve naval capabilities by 

keeping pace with the fast-moving changes in technologies and 

operational needs. The RTT program is structured to bring transition 

efforts to closure quickly, and to provide execution year funding for a 

rapid start, bridging the gap until the program of record can fund the 

completion of the technology insertion. The RTT program is designed 

to be pro-active in identifying opportunities and to work with resource 

sponsors, fleet and force users, and program managers in constructing 

viable technology transition efforts. 

Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (Air Force). WRAP was 

created in August 2000 to speed proven innovations into official 

development programs in a fraction of the time that the PPBE process 

normally takes. WRAP cuts the timeline by offering RDT&E funds 

shortly after a candidate initiative requests WRAP funds that essentially 

fill the gap between innovation demonstration and POM funding. 

Beginning in fiscal year 2006, a single candidate may enter the process 

anytime, no longer waiting until September 1 as originally required. 

Further, the recommendation level has been delegated down from the 

Air Force Board to a council of HAF directorate chiefs, two/three-star 

military and civilian equivalents. The first initiative assessed (for $2.1 

million) under the revised process took only nine calendar days from 

HAF receipt to a decision by the council. 
GLOBALIZATION I 127

Appendix F. Globalization 

The Departments of Defense and State need to work together to 

successfully access the benefits of globalization, while at the same time 

contain its risks. 

Recommendations from the report of the Defense Science Board 

Task Force on Globalization and Security (December 1999) address 

this balance. 

1. Modernize career management practices in the Department 

of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls. Experienced 

personnel consistently choose other assignments for 

advancement. 

2. Establish a single DOD authority for arms transfer decisions. 

3. Liberalize International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 

spare parts exemptions for NATO partners. 

4. Modify ITAR implementation to facilitate cross-border 

collaborative relationships. Exploit existing alliance “bloc” 

approvals and foreign military sales exemptions (applies to 

recommendation #3 as well). 

5. Improve flexibility of DOD international agreements. ITAR 

authority already exists to do this. 

6. Establish uniform requirements for drafting agreements. 

7. Make much greater use of industrial nondisclosure 

agreements to obtain certification of compliance for 

employees, partners, and other entities and individuals. 

8. Define “inherently military” products for ITAR purposes; 

document non-inherently military products and parts. 

9. Clarify, in positive terms, regulations regarding the scope 

and limitations of dual citizenship requirements for 

licensing. 

10. Develop processes that permit expanded routine use of 

multiple destination licenses. Use licensing arrangements of 

a jointly-developed U.S. and South Korean jet trainer sales 

to two dozen buyers, as an example of success. 
128 I APPENDIX F 

11. The Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce should 

establish a collaborative electronic licensing process and 

system. 

12. Eliminate multiple licensing requirements. Move to onestop licensing reviews for collaborative projects. 

13. Reduce requirement for DOD review of technical data and 

hardware. DOD should document countries, end users, 

technical data, and hardware that no longer require review. 

14. Expedite the exception to the National Disclosure Process. 

Over time it has doubled from an average of 135 days to an 

average of 210 days for difficult cases, while routine cases 

take no more than 30 days. 

15. Increase emphasis in educating officials involved in arms 

transfer and international cooperative arms programs. The 

global arms and commercial worlds have changed 

dramatically and commercial capability has expanded to 

include a wider range of products and services. 

16. Provide specific guidelines to U.S. defense industry 

concerning information necessary to be included in export 

license application. 

17. Develop umbrella license structures for major foreign firms 

who are recipients of U.S. munitions list equipment or 

technology. 

18. Reform the nontransfer and use certificate process through 

elimination of cases that are redundant or have already 

received waivers. 

19. Examine and choose from options available from advanced 

technology to mitigate the consequences of unauthorized or 

inadvertent classified or export controlled disclosure. 

20. Establish a consultative NATO process to address defense 

trade regulatory issues. 

21. Provide clear ITAR definition of technical data. 

22. Narrow focus of ITAR to reflect contemporary technology 

trends. 

23. Provide resources for a modern export control system. 
GLOSSARY I 129

Appendix G. Glossary 

ACAT acquisition category 

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

ARDEC Army Research, Development & Engineering Center 

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense 

ASD NII Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration 

ASD SO/LIC Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity 

Conflict 

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 

C2 command & control 

CbT RIF Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund 

CJTF Coalition Joint Task Force 

CE Concepts Experimentation 

CENTCOM Central Command 

C3I command, control, communication, and intelligence 

CTTS Combating Terrorism Technology Support 

CTTTF Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force 

CW Coalition Warfare 

CWID Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 

CWP Coalition Warfare Program 

DAC Defense Acquisition Challenge 

DAE Defense Acquisition Executive 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DART Defense Adaptive Red Team 

DDG guided missile destroyer 

DDR&E Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

DeVenCI Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative 

DISA Defense Information Agency 

DJC2 Deployable Joint Command & Control 
130 I APPENDIX F 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOD CIO Department of Defense Chief Information Officer 

DODD Department of Defense Directive 

DOE Department of Energy 

DOTMLPF doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development, 

personnel, and facilities 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

FCT foreign comparative testing 

FMTV Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HAF Headquarters, Air Force 

HMMVV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

IDA Institute for Defense Analyses 

IED improvised explosive devices 

IOC initial operational capability 

IPA Intergovernmental Personnel Act 

IPT integrated product teams 

IR&D independent research and development 

IRL integration readiness level 

ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

IWN immediate warfighter needs 

JAWP Joint Advanced Warfighting Program 

JBMC2 Joint Battle Management Command & Control 

JCAS Joint Close Air Support 

JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

JCTD Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

JMT Joint Mission Thread 

JRAC Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 
GLOSSARY I 131

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

JSBA Joint Systems Baseline Assessment 

JSIC Joint Systems International Command 

JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 

JT&A Joint Test & Assessment 

JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 

JWP Joint Warfighting Program 

KPP key performance parameter 

LAA limited acquisition authority 

LANTIRN Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night 

LHD multipurpose amphibious assault ship 

LRIP low-rate initial production 

MIDS Multifunctional Information Distribution System 

MRL manufacturer’s readiness level 

MS A, MS B, MS C Milestone A, Milestone B, and Milestone C 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NDEP National Defense Education Program 

NESP Navy EHF SATCO Program 

NRT Near-real time 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OFT Office of Force Transformation 

O&M operations & maintenance 

OSD Office of Secretary of Defense 

OUSD Office of Under Secretary of Defense 

OUSD (AT&L) Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics 

PGM precision guided munitions 

POM program objective memorandum 

PPBE planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 
132 I APPENDIX F 

QRF Quick Reaction Fund 

QRSP Quick Reaction Special Project 

RAA rapid acquisition authority 

RAA rapid acquisition program 

R&D research and development 

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation 

REF Rapid Equipping Force 

RFO Rapid Fielding Organization 

RIF Readiness Incentives Plan 

RIRS Rapid Integration of Robotic System 

RRF Rapid Reaction Fund 

RSIP radar system improvement program 

RTT Rapid Technology Transition 

SA situational awareness 

SAR synthetic aperture radar 

SBIR Small Business Innovative Research 

SDD system design and demonstration 

SEIT system engineering integrating teams 

SMART Science, Math & Research for Transformation 

SM-2 Standard Missile-2 

SOCOM Special Operations Command 

S&T science and technology 

TFS Technology Feeder Support 

TRADOC Training & Doctrine Command 

TRANSCOM Transportation Command 

TRL technology readiness level 

TTC Technology Transition Council 

TTI Technology Transition Initiative 

TTPs tactics, techniques, and procedures 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
GLOSSARY I 133

USD (C) Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller 

USEUCOM U.S. European Command 

USJFCOM U.S. Joint Forces Command 

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command 

VCJCS Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

WRAP Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Process