SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1068 

KA 09-01028 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, GREEN, AND GORSKI, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STEFFEN A. JONES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

BRUCE R. BRYAN, SYRACUSE, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (JAMES P. MAXWELL

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E.

Fahey, J.), rendered April 25, 2008. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree,

criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and conspiracy in

the second degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25

[1]), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03

[former (1) (b)]) and conspiracy in the second degree (§ 105.15). We

reject defendant’s contention that County Court erred in refusing to

sever the counts of the indictment relating to the murder of one

victim from the counts relating to the murder of the second victim and

from those related to the attempted murder of the third victim. The

counts related to the murders were properly joined inasmuch as both

murders were allegedly perpetrated as the result of a dispute between

one group of men that included defendant and another group that

included the victims, and proof of the offenses related to one murder

was material and admissible as evidence-in-chief upon a trial of the

offenses related to the other murder (see CPL 200.20 [2] [b]; People v

Major, 61 AD3d 1417, lv denied 12 NY3d 927). Further, proof of the

offenses related to both murders was material and admissible as

evidence-in-chief upon a trial of the offenses relating to the

attempted murder of the third victim, who gave a statement to the

police implicating defendant in both murders (see People v Kelley, 46

AD3d 1329, 1331-1332, lv denied 10 NY3d 813). “[O]nce the offenses

were properly joined, the court lacked the statutory authority to

sever” (People v Cornell, 17 AD3d 1010, 1011, lv denied 5 NY3d 805).

Defendant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to
-2- 1068 

KA 09-01028 

support the conviction because the principal witnesses against him

lacked credibility. We reject that contention (see generally People v

Smith, 272 AD2d 713, 715-716, lv denied 95 NY2d 871). Defendant

failed to preserve for our review his further challenges to the legal

sufficiency of the evidence (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19; People

v Cole, 35 AD3d 911, 912, lv denied 8 NY3d 944). In addition, we

reject defendant’s contention that he was deprived of a fair trial

based upon misconduct by the prosecutor during his opening statement. 

Defendant preserved that contention for our review with respect to

only one alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct and, in any

event, we conclude that each instance of the prosecutor’s alleged

misconduct during his opening statement identified by defendant was

not so egregious or improper as to deny defendant a fair trial (see

generally People v Walker, 50 AD3d 1452, 1453, lv denied 11 NY3d 795,

931). 

The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. We note, however,

that the certificate of conviction incorrectly reflects that defendant

was sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 12 to 25

years for the conviction of conspiracy in the second degree, and it

must therefore be amended to reflect that he was sentenced to an

indeterminate term of incarceration of 121⁄2 to 25 years for that

conviction (see generally People v Barnes, 56 AD3d 1171).

Entered: November 10, 2011 Patricia L. Morgan

Clerk of the Court