S. Hrg. 111–706 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON RULES 

AND ADMINISTRATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

April 22, 2010; May 19, 2010; June 23, 2010; July 28, 2010; 

and September 22 and 29, 2010 

( 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER 

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WASHINGTON : 

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62–210 2010

S. HRG. 111–706 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON RULES 

AND ADMINISTRATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 22, 2010; MAY 19, 2010; JUNE 23, 2010; JULY 28, 2010; 

AND SEPTEMBER 22 AND 29, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Rules and Administration 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION * 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BEN NELSON, Nebraska 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas 

JEAN PARVIN BORDEWICH, Staff Director 

MARY SUIT JONES, Republican Staff Director 

JENNIFER GRIFFITH, Deputy Staff Director 

JASON A. ABEL, Chief Counsel 

ADAM D. AMBROGI, Administrative and Legislative Counsel 

VERONICA GILLESPIE, Elections Counsel 

CAROLE BLESSINGTON, Administrative Assistant to the Staff Director 

SONIA GILL, Counsel 

JULIA RICHARDSON, Counsel 

JOSH BREKENFELD, Professional Staff 

LAURYN BRUCK, Professional Staff 

SHAUN PARKIN, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

PAUL VINOVICH, Republican Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL MERRELL, Republican Elections Counsel 

ABBIE PLATT, Republican Professional Staff 

TRISH KENT, Republican Professional Staff 

RACHEL CREVISTON, Republican Professional Staff 

LYNDEN ARMSTRONG, Chief Clerk 

MATTHEW MCGOWAN, Professional Staff 

* Senator Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia, was a member of the Committee during 

the 111th Congress until his death on June 28, 2010. Senator Carte P. Goodwin, 

West Virginia, was a member of the Committee during the 111th Congress from 

July 20, 2010, until November 15, 2010. 

Note: Archived webcasts of all hearings and an electronic version of this report are 

available at http://rules.senate.gov. 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

April 22, 2010 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: HISTORY OF THE FILIBUSTER 1789–2008 

OPENING STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 1 

Hon. Mitch McConnell, Republican Leader, a U.S. Senator from the 

Commonwealth of Kentucky ............................................................................... 4 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ......................... 7 

Hon. Lamar Alexander, a U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee ................. 8 

Hon. Pat Roberts, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas ............................... 10 

Hon. Saxby Chambliss, a U.S. Senator from the State of Georgia ...................... 14 

TESTIMONY OF: 

Ms. Sarah A. Binder, Professor, Department of Political Science, George 

Washington University, Washington, DC .......................................................... 17 

Mr. Gregory J. Wawro, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, 

Columbia University, New York, NY ................................................................. 19 

Mr. Robert B. Dove, Parliamentarian Emeritus, U.S. Senate, Falls Church, 

VA .......................................................................................................................... 21

Mr. Stanley I. Bach, Retired, Senior Specialist in the Legislative Process, 

Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC ............................................ 23 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Robert Bennett, Ranking Member, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Utah ...................................................................................................................... 38 

Hon. Robert C. Byrd, a U.S. Senator from the State of West Virginia ............... 41 

Ms. Sarah A. Binder, Professor, Department of Political Science, George 

Washington University, Washington, DC .......................................................... 45 

Mr. Gregory J. Wawro, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, 

Columbia University, New York, NY ................................................................. 50 

Mr. Robert B. Dove, Parliamentarian Emeritus, U.S. Senate, Falls Church, 

VA .......................................................................................................................... 61

Mr. Stanley I. Bach, Retired, Senior Specialist in the Legislative Process, 

Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC ............................................ 67 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD OF: 

Senator Harry Reid, ‘‘The Nuclear Option,’’ The Good Fight, Submitted by 

Senator Lamar Alexander ................................................................................... 79 

Statement of Senator Byrd, Orientation for New Senators, Submitted by 

Senator Lamar Alexander ................................................................................... 102 

Mimi Murray Digby Marziani and Diana Lee, Statement for the Record, 

Brennan Center for Justice, New York, NY ...................................................... 108 

Emmet J. Bondurant, Statement for the Record, Common Cause, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 113 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD OF: 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico, to Committee 

witnesses ............................................................................................................... 118 

Page

IV 

May 19, 2010 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: THE FILIBUSTER TODAY 

AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 

OPENING STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 137

Hon. Robert Bennett, Ranking Member, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Utah ...................................................................................................................... 139 

Hon. Lamar Alexander, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee .................... 141 

Hon. Pat Roberts, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas ............................... 142 

Hon. Richard J. Durbin, a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois ..................... 143 

Introduction of Hon. Walter F. Mondale by Hon. Amy Klobuchar, a U.S. 

Senator from the State of Minnesota ................................................................. 144 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ......................... 156 

Hon. Robert C. Byrd, a U.S. Senator from the State of West Virginia ............... 160 

TESTIMONY OF: 

The Honorable Walter F. Mondale, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, 

MN ......................................................................................................................... 145

The Honorable Don Nickles, Chairman & CEO, The Nickles Group, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 148 

Mr. Steven S. Smith, Kate M. Gregg Professor of Social Sciences, Washington 

University, St. Louis, MO .................................................................................... 166 

Mr. Norman J. Ornstein, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 

for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC ..................................................... 168 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Robert Bennett, Ranking Member, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Utah ...................................................................................................................... 176 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ......................... 177 

The Honorable Walter F. Mondale, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, 

MN ......................................................................................................................... 179

The Honorable Don Nickles, Chairman & CEO, The Nickles Group, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 185 

Mr. Steven S. Smith, Kate M. Gregg Professor of Social Sciences, Washington 

University, St. Louis, MO .................................................................................... 188 

Mr. Norman J. Ornstein, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 

for Public Policy Research Washington, DC ...................................................... 193 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD OF: 

Congressional Research Service, Memorandum, ‘‘Days of Senate 

Consideration of Various Questions Before Filing of Cloture,’’ May 17, 2010, 

Submitted by Senator Robert Bennett ............................................................... 197 

Congressional Research Service, Memorandum, ‘‘Measures on Which 

Opportunities for the Floor Amendment Were Limited by the Senate 

Majority Leader or His Designee Filling or Partially Filling the Amendment 

Tree: 1985–2010,’’ May 18, 2010, Submitted by Senator Robert Bennett ....... 223 

Congressional Research Service, Memorandum, ‘‘Measures Placed on the 

Senate Calendar Via Senate Rule XIV,’’ May 17, 2010, Submitted by 

Senator Robert Bennett ....................................................................................... 242 

Introduction of Hon. Walter F. Mondale by Hon. Charles E. Schumer, 

Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of New York ................................... 245 

Brennan Center for Justice, New York, NY .......................................................... 248 

Scott Lilly, ‘‘From Deliberation to Dysfunction,’’ Center for American Progress 

Action Fund, March 2010, Washington, DC ...................................................... 256 

Panel presented at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, 

‘‘Deliberation, Obstruction or Dysfunction?,’’ March 12, 2010, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 273 

Page

V 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD OF: 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of New 

York, to Committee witnesses ............................................................................. 306 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico, to Committee 

witnesses ............................................................................................................... 313 

June 23, 2010 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: SILENT FILIBUSTERS, HOLDS AND THE 

SENATE CONFIRMATION PROCESS 

OPENING STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 321

Hon. Robert Bennett, Ranking Member, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Utah ...................................................................................................................... 323 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ......................... 330 

Hon. Lamar Alexander, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee .................... 332 

Hon. Mark Warner, U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Virginia ............. 334 

TESTIMONY OF: 

Hon. Ron Wyden, a U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon ................................ 325 

Hon. Chuck Grassley, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ............................. 327 

Hon. Claire McCaskill, a U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri ..................... 328 

Mr. G. Calvin Mackenzie, Goldfarb Family Distinguished Professor of 

Government, Department of Government, Colby College, Waterville, ME ..... 336 

Mr. W. Lee Rawls, Faculty, National War College, Adjunct Professor, College 

of William and Mary, Kensington, MD .............................................................. 337 

Mr. Thomas E. Mann, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, The W. Averell 

Harriman Chair,The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC ......................... 339 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Robert C. Byrd, a U.S. Senator from the State of West Virginia ............... 354 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 357

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ......................... 359 

Hon. Ron Wyden, a U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon ................................ 362 

Hon. Chuck Grassley, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ............................. 366 

Mr. G. Calvin Mackenzie, Goldfarb Family Distinguished Professor of 

Government, Department of Government, Colby College, Waterville, ME ..... 369 

Mr. W. Lee Rawls, Faculty, National War College, Adjunct Professor, College 

of William and Mary, Kensington, MD .............................................................. 378 

Mr. Thomas E. Mann, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, The W. Averell 

Harriman Chair, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC ........................ 383 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD OF: 

Roll Call, ‘‘In Senate, ‘Motion to Proceed’ Should Be Non-Debatable,’’ Charles 

A. Stevenson, Submitted by Senator Tom Udall ............................................... 388 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD OF: 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico, to Committee 

witnesses ............................................................................................................... 390 

Page

VI 

July 28, 2010 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO CHANGE 

SENATE PROCEDURES 

OPENING STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 392

Hon. Robert Bennett, Ranking Member, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Utah ...................................................................................................................... 394 

TESTIMONY OF: 

Hon. Frank Lautenberg, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ............. 395 

Hon. Michael Bennet, a U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado ...................... 397 

Mr. Gregory Koger, Associate Professor Political Science, University of Miami, 

Coral Gables, FL .................................................................................................. 400 

Ms. Barbara Sinclair, Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of American Politics 

Emerita, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los 

Angeles, CA .......................................................................................................... 402 

Ms. Elizabeth Rybicki, Analyst on the Congress and Legislative Process, 

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC ........ 403 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ......................... 420 

Hon. Frank Lautenberg, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ............. 422 

Hon. Michael Bennet, a U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado ...................... 424 

Mr. Gregory Koger, Associate Professor Political Science, University of Miami, 

Coral Gables, FL .................................................................................................. 434 

Ms. Barbara Sinclair, Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of American Politics 

Emerita, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los 

Angeles, CA .......................................................................................................... 442 

Ms. Elizabeth Rybicki, Analyst on the Congress and Legislative Process, 

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, DC ........ 449 

September 22, 2010 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO CHANGE 

SENATE PROCEDURES 

OPENING STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 465

Hon. Robert Bennett, Ranking Member, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Utah ...................................................................................................................... 467 

Hon. Lamar Alexander, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee .................... 474 

Hon. Pat Roberts, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas ............................... 476 

TESTIMONY OF: 

Hon. Tom Harkin, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ................................... 469 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ......................... 471 

Ms. Mimi Murray Digby Marziani, Counsel/Katz Fellow, Democracy Program, 

Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, New York, NY ................ 479 

Mr. Robert B. Dove, Parliamentarian Emeritus, U.S. Senate, Falls Church, 

VA .......................................................................................................................... 481 

Mr. Steven S. Smith, Director, Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, 

Government, and Public Policy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO ........ 482 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Tom Harkin, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ................................... 500 

Page

VII 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ......................... 504 

Hon. Pat Roberts, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas ............................... 515 

Ms. Mimi Murray Digby Marziani, Counsel/Katz Fellow, Democracy Program, 

Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, New York, NY ................ 517 

Mr. Robert B. Dove, Parliamentarian Emeritus, U.S. Senate, Falls Church, 

VA .......................................................................................................................... 532 

Mr. Steven S. Smith, Director, Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, 

Government, and Public Policy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO ........ 544 

STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD OF: 

Scott Lilly, ‘‘From Deliberation to Dysfunction,’’ Center for American Progress 

Action Fund, March 2010, Washington, DC ...................................................... 555 

Center for American Progress, ‘‘Minority Rules,’’ Ian Millhiser, September 

29, 2010, Washington, DC ................................................................................... 571 

Center for American Progress, ‘‘The Tyranny of the Timepiece,’’ Ian Millhiser, 

September 28, 2010, Washington, DC ................................................................ 578 

Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law 

Center, Houston, TX ............................................................................................ 586 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD OF: 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico to Committee 

witnesses ............................................................................................................... 589 

September 29, 2010 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: IDEAS TO REDUCE DELAY AND 

ENCOURAGE DEBATE IN THE SENATE 

OPENING STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 591

Hon. Robert Bennett, Ranking Member, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Utah ...................................................................................................................... 595 

Hon. Christopher J. Dodd, a U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut .......... 595 

TESTIMONY OF: 

Hon. Judd Gregg, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Hampshire ................. 598 

Mr. Marty Paone, Executive Vice President, Prime Policy Group, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 606 

Mr. Norman J. Ornstein, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 

for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC ..................................................... 608 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF: 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico ......................... 626 

Mr. Marty Paone, Executive Vice President, Prime Policy Group, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 650 

Mr. Norman J. Ornstein, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 

for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC ..................................................... 654 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD OF: 

Hon. Tom Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico, to Committee 

witnesses ............................................................................................................... 656 

(1) 

EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: HISTORY OF 

THE FILIBUSTER 1789–2008 

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

SR-301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Schumer, 

Chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Schumer, Udall, Bennett, McConnell, Chambliss, Alexander, and Roberts. 

Staff present: Jean Bordewich, Staff Director; Jason Abel, Chief 

Counsel; Veronica Gillespie, Elections Counsel; Adam Ambrogi, Administrative and Legislative Counsel; Sonia Gill, Counsel; Julia 

Richardson, Counsel; Lauryn Bruck, Professional Staff; Carole 

Blessington, Executive Assistant to the Staff Director; Lynden 

Armstrong, Chief Clerk; Matthew McGowan, Professional Staff; 

Mary Jones, Republican Staff Director; Shaun Parkin, Republican 

Deputy Staff Director; Paul Vinovich, Republican Chief Counsel; 

Michael Merrell, Republican Counsel; Abbie Platt, Republican Professional Staff; Trish Kent, Republican Professional Staff; and Rachel Creviston, Republican Professional Staff. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SCHUMER 

Chairman SCHUMER. The hearing will come to order. 

First, I would like to acknowledge the fact that Senator Bennett 

is planning to be here but he will be a little late. So Senator Alexander is taking over the ranking position until Senator Bennett 

gets here. 

I thank my colleagues for being here. We will do opening statements and then we will go to the witnesses. 

So I want to thank everyone for coming. I want to thank Senator 

Bennett, of course, and my other colleagues for participating in the 

hearing. I especially want to thank two people. One is Senator Robert C. Byrd, who could not be here today, but I want to thank him 

for his interest in our hearing and for the statement he is submitting for the record. As we know, he is sort of the guardian of the 

Senate and the Senate Rules, and Senator Byrd has shown an active role here. 

At the other end of the spectrum, the person who really encouraged me and convinced me that it was a good idea to have a series 

of hearings on this issue is Senator Tom Udall of Mexico. He has 

not been here quite as long as Senator Byrd but we know that he 

has the tremendous potential to be one of the people so knowledgeVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
2 

able about how the Senate works and he is already an outstanding 

Senator. 

This is the first in this series of hearing by the Rules Committee 

to examine the filibuster. It is a topic we hear a lot about from our 

constituents, from our colleagues, from the press. That is because 

filibusters and cloture motions have escalated in recent year to unprecedented levels. 

In the first half of the 20th Century filibusters and filibuster 

threats were relatively rare events. From the 1920s through the 

1950s, an average of about ten cloture motions were filed per decade, and of course, not every cloture motion is to cut off a filibuster. 

That number almost tripled to 28 during the 1960s, the era of 

controversial civil rights legislation. But after that, things really 

started to take off. A total of 358 cloture motions were filed in the 

1990s and from 2001 to 2009 there were 435 cloture motions filed. 

Clearly the filibuster has changed over the years. Not only is it 

used a lot more now but the threat of filibusters has become an almost daily fact of life in the Senate, influencing how we handle virtually everything debated on the Senate floor. 

The filibuster used to be the exception to the rule. In today’s Senate, it is becoming a straitjacket. So especially during the last decade there has been a lot of interest and concern and frustration 

from both parties about where we are in terms of getting things 

done in the Senate. 

There are many people saying we need to change the rules to 

make it easier to get cloture or to handle Senate business efficiently. Four such Senate resolutions have been introduced in this 

Congress including one by our Rules Committee colleague, Senator 

Udall, which we will hear about at future hearings. 

Others say we should not change the rules. As chairman of the 

Rules Committee, I intend to take a thoughtful, thorough approach 

to this topic. 

Since I joined the Senate in 1999, I have seen the use of filibuster continue to increase under both Republican and Democratic 

majorities. So it is not just one party doing it. In 2005 we had a 

near crisis over the so-called nuclear or constitutional option, a crisis that ended when a bipartisan group of senators came together 

to find a middle ground. 

The truth is both parties have a love-hate relationship with the 

filibuster depending on if you are in the majority or in the minority 

at the time. But this is not healthy for the Senate as an institution. 

The last Rules Committee hearing on the filibuster was on June 5, 

2003, under then Chairman Trent Lott. A resolution was proposed 

by Majority Leader Frist to amend the Standing Rules of the Senate to allow a simple majority of 51 votes to end debate on judicial 

nominees. 

In reflecting on the substance of that hearing, it is clear that our 

statements on whether or not to change the cloture rule usually coincided with whether or not we were in the majority or the minority. 

I was a member of this Committee in 2003 as were many of my 

colleagues here, both Democrat and Republican. Not surprisingly 

the words we spoke then might not reflect how we feel today when 

our majority and minority roles are reversed. 

3 

I am sure my colleagues could quote us opposing filibuster reform just as I could quote them in favor of such reform. But that 

is not the point of these hearings. 

The fact is that all of us on both sides of the aisle struggled with 

the same questions. What does the Constitution say about ending 

debate or allowing unlimited debate in the Senate? What does it 

say about how Senate rules can be changed? What are the rights 

of the majority; what are the rights of the minority? When does respect for the rights of the other members of this body become a disregard for the needs of the majority of Americans to have us act? 

We all know that those of us in the minority in one Congress will 

be in the majority in another and vice versa. What we seek is a 

path towards civility, deliberation, and consensus that eventually 

at the proper time leads to the best decisions we can make collectively for our country. 

Only by carefully exploring these issues can we answer the question: should we change the Senate rules and if so, how and when. 

Knowing the history of debate in the Senate and the efforts to limit 

it is the first step. 

So we are starting our hearings today with an examination of the 

history of the filibuster from 1789 to 2008. We will start at the beginning. What does the Constitution say about the Senate? Since 

there was no procedural rule to cut off debate for most of the 19th 

century, how did that affect decision-making in the Senate? What 

eventually prompted adoption of the cloture rule in 1917 that for 

the first time in the Senate allowed Senators by a two-thirds supermajority to vote and end debate? 

Our witnesses will describe how the cloture rule and the filibuster were used during the 20th Century in debates on civil rights 

and the push for filibuster reform in the 1970s that lowered the 

threshold for cloture to 60 votes. 

Finally, we will hear about the modern era of the Senate, including the impact of filibusters and cloture motions in every decade 

since the 1970s as the use of the filibuster escalated drastically. 

Our historical overview will end in 2008 before the start of the 

current Congress. Today’s hearing will establish a common understanding for future hearings and discussions. I hope that informs 

members of this Committee, the Senate and the public at large 

about the development of the filibuster and efforts of the Senate 

over more than two centuries to manage it and deal with its consequences. 

In our next hearing we will look at the filibuster in this Congress, examining issues such as whether it is more difficult for the 

Senate to complete its regular business now than in previous eras 

and the impact of the filibuster on other branches of government. 

In subsequent hearings, we will hear about proposals for changes 

in Senate rules related to the filibuster and consider what kinds of 

changes, if any, are needed. 

I hope all of us on this Committee come to these hearings with 

an open mind, willing to consider the ideas and suggestions presented to us. I look forward to listening to our witnesses who have 

come to share their knowledge and experience with us. 

4 

Now with the permission of the members, we are very honored 

to have Leader McConnell with us and I would turn to him to 

make the first statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MITCH 

MCCONNELL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY 

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and make some observations 

about this extremely important topic. 

Before giving my prepared comments, I would point out that I 

believe it was Washington. It certainly was one of our founders 

who was quoted as saying at the constitutional convention the Senate was going to be like the saucer under the tea cup, and the tea 

was going to slosh out and cool off, and the Senate, he anticipated, 

would be a place where passions would be reined in and presumably progress would be made in the political center. 

It seems to me if you look back over the 200-year history of our 

country, the Senate has certainly forced solutions to the middle and 

most observers would argue that has been good for the country. 

We read the newspapers and I think understand what these 

hearings are about. Some members of the Democratic conference 

would like to eliminate the Senate’s long-standing tradition of the 

freedom to debate and amend legislation. 

This in turn would eliminate the requirement that controversial 

legislation achieve more than just a bare majority support here in 

the Senate. It probably comes as no surprise to anyone that I am 

not in favor of such a proposal. I never have been, including more 

challengingly, of course, when I was in the majority. 

The reason is best described by one of our Senate colleagues who 

once wisely said the following, ‘‘Let us clearly understand one 

thing. The Constitution’s framers never intended for the Senate to 

function like the House of Representatives. The Senate was intended to take the long view and to be able to resist, if need be, 

the passions of the often intemperate House. Few, if any, upper 

chambers in the history of the western world have possessed the 

Senate’s absolute right to unlimited debate and to amend or block 

legislation passed by a lower house. I have said that, as long as the 

Senate retains the power to amend and the power of unlimited debate, the liberties of the people will remain secure.’’ 

That, of course, was Senator Byrd. He delivered those remarks 

in 1997. He was right then and he is right again when he reaffirmed his belief in those principles this year. 

Here is what he wrote in a dear-colleague letter, quote, ‘‘I believe 

that efforts to change or reinterpreted the rules in order to facilitate expeditious action by a simple majority are grossly misguided. 

The Senate is the only place in government where the rights of a 

numerical minority are so protected. Majorities change with elections. A minority can be right. A minority’s views can certainly improve legislation. Extended deliberation and debate are essential to 

the protection of liberties of a free people.’’ That was Robert Byrd 

this year. 

Now why are some in Senator Byrd’s own party proposing to disregard his counsel? The most disingenuous thing I have heard is 

5 

that the Senate’s rules must be changed so the, quote, ‘‘democratic 

process’’ will work. 

I submit that the effort to change the rules is not about democracy at all. It is not about doing what a majority of the American 

people want. It is about power. 

If it were truly about doing what a majority of Americans wanted, the Democratic majority in the Senate would not have muscled 

through a health spending bill that a majority of Americans opposed and opposed by very wide margins. 

When the bill finally passed the Senate by the narrowest of margins, 39 percent of Americans favored it while 59 percent opposed 

it. Other surveys had similar results. 

So this was not about giving the majority of Americans what it 

wanted. It was about power. That is what this is about. It is about 

a political party or a faction of a political party that is frustrated 

that it cannot do whatever it wants whenever it wants precisely 

the way it wants to do it. That is what this is about. 

So rather than throw out 200 years of Senate tradition and practice and throw away the very principles of which Senator Byrd has 

reminded us, I would like to suggest a less radical and more productive solution to those who would like the Senate to function differently. 

First, at the risk of sounding like Yogi Berra, the virtue of a 

supermajority requirement for legislation is that a bill that passes 

enjoys supermajority support, which helps ensure that most Americans will actually support it. 

When the Democratic majority has reached out to the minority, 

which does not mean trying to pick off a few Republicans, we have 

had success. I hope we can have another one with the financial regulatory reform bill and in other areas, but that requires the majority to meet us in the middle. 

My second suggestion is not run the Senator floor like the House. 

The Senate’s tradition of freedom to amend has been a lot less free 

over the last few years. 

Take a look at this chart and you will see, if I can see it, you 

will see that since assuming control of the Senate the Democratic 

majority has been engaged in what my friend the majority leader 

once called a very bad practice. 

And according to CRS it has been engaging in it to an unprecedented extent. What I am talking about is the majority repeatedly 

blocking Senators in the minority from offering amendments by filling out the so-called amendment tree. 

As you can see, the practice of filling up the amendment tree has 

gone up dramatically in the last three years. All majority leaders 

have done it occasionally, but this majority has done it to an unprecedented extent. 

Senator Frist did it 12 times in four years. By contrast, Senator 

Reid has done it more than twice as often, 26 times in a little over 

three years. In fact, the current majority has blocked the minority 

from offering amendments almost as often as the last five majority 

leaders combined. 

I would say to my friends in the majority I know why, because 

members are complaining about having to cast tough votes. They 

really hate it. And the leader of the majority is always pounded 

6 

upon. I remember having a similar experience when we were in the 

majority. Members coming up and saying why do we have to cast 

all these tough votes. Of course, the only way to avoid that is to 

shut the minority out by filing up the tree and filing cloture. 

So if the Democratic majority wants to generate inflated cloture 

vote numbers for political purposes, well, go ahead and keep treating the minority as if they were serving in the House. 

But if you truly do not like all the cloture votes, then let your 

colleagues in the minority offer amendments. True, there may be 

some votes you would rather not cast, but that is not anything 

new. 

What is new is the unprecedented extent to which the majority 

is avoiding have to vote on amendments. As my good friend the 

majority whip likes to say, if you do not like fighting fires, then do 

not become a fireman; and if you do not like casting tough votes, 

then do not run for the U.S. Senate. That is Senator Durbin. 

Finally some of the testimony states that one’s view of the filibuster depends on where one sits. It is true that I opposed filibustering judicial nominees; we opposed that when we were in the majority. But I opposed doing so when I was in the minority as well, 

that is, filibustering judges. And I opposed doing so regardless of 

who was in the White House. 

During the Clinton Administration, I put my votes where my 

mouth was and repeatedly voted with my Democratic colleagues to 

advance a nominee, to invoke cloture, if you will, when a minority 

of those in my party would not consent to do so, even though I opposed the nominee and later voted against him or her. Not surprisingly, I was also against my Democratic colleagues not giving 

President Bush’s judicial nominees an up or down vote. 

In short, I was against expanding use of the filibuster into an 

area in which it traditionally—traditionally—had not been used. 

One can agree with that view or not. But it is one thing to disagree 

with expanding the use of the filibuster into a non-traditional area 

regardless of who is the President and who is in the minority. 

It is another thing to be for expanding the filibuster into judicial 

nominations when one is in the minority, but to turn around and 

urge it its elimination altogether when one is in the majority. 

When it comes to preserving the right to extended debate on legislation, Republicans have been surprisingly consistent. On January 5, 1995, after having just been voted into the congressional majority for the first time in 40 years, Senate Republicans walked 

onto the Senate floor to cast their first vote. It was on Senator Harkin’s proposal to sequentially reduce the cloture requirement to a 

simple majority. This is right after Republicans took control of both 

the House and the Senate for the first time in 40 years. We were 

a rambunctious and a new majority. 

Even though it was in our short-term legislative interest to support Senator Harkin, all Republicans, every single one, voted 

against his proposal, every single one. So did the current vice president, the current Senate Majority Leader and not surprisingly, the 

current Senate president pro tem. That was the right position in 

1995, and it is the right position today. 

In sum, the founders purposefully crafted the Senate to be a deliberate, thoughtful body. A supermajority requirement to cut off 

7 

the right to debate ensures that wise purpose. Eliminating it is a 

bad idea. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for allowing me to give my 

thoughts on this at the beginning of the hearing, and I wish you 

well. I think this is an important subject, and I commend you for 

holding the hearings. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Leader, and you are welcome at any time to take part in what will be a series of hearings 

on this issue. 

Senator Udall. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM UDALL, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Schumer, and thank you 

for your kind statements in your opening and thank you for holding 

this hearing. 

Filibuster reform is an issue that has received a great deal of attention recently. Today’s hearing as well as future hearings will 

allow us to take a rational and deliberative approach to reforming 

not just the filibuster but, other rules that are hampering this 

body. Today is about looking at our past, but also provides guidance for the future. 

Critics of reforming the filibuster argue that it will destroy the 

uniqueness of the Senate. They say it will turn the Senate into the 

House of Representatives. 

But today we will hear that the filibuster has been amended over 

the years, and this body not only survived the reforms, but was 

better for them. We will hear from our witnesses about the creation 

of the cloture rule in 1917 and the history of its reforms over the 

many decades. 

I would like to focus on one part of that history. In the 1940S 

and 1950s, the civil rights debate was raging in the Senate and a 

minority of Senators opposed to the legislation were regularly using 

the filibuster as a weapon of the obstruction. 

In 1953, a bipartisan group of Senators decided they had had 

enough. Led by my predecessor, New Mexico’s Clinton Anderson, 

they attempted to reform the filibuster. Article 1 Section 5 of the 

Constitution states that each house may determine the rules of its 

proceedings. 

As such, Anderson argued that any rule adopted by one Senate 

that prohibits a succeeding Senate from establishing its own rules 

is unconstitutional. But this is precisely what Rule 22 does. 

Currently we are operating under rules approved by a previous 

Senate that require an affirmative vote of two-thirds of Senators to 

end a filibuster on any rules change. 

Anderson’s argument became known as the constitutional option, 

which I believe is very different from the nuclear option. On the 

first day of Congress in 1953, Anderson moved that the Senate immediately consider the adoption of rules for the Senate of the 83rd 

Congress. 

His motion was tabled, but he introduced it again at the beginning of the 85th of Congress. In the course of that debate, Senator 

Hubert Humphrey presented a parliamentary inquiry to Vice President Nixon, who was presiding over the Senate. 

8 

Nixon understood the inquiry to address the basic question, do 

the rules of the Senate continue from one Congress to the next. 

Noting that there had never been a direct ruling on this question 

from the chair, Nixon stated, and I quote, ‘‘Any provision of the 

Senate rules adopted in a previous Congress which has the expressed or practical effect of denying the majority of the Senate in 

a new Congress the right to adopt rules under which it desires to 

proceed is, in the opinion of the chair, unconstitutional.’’ End quote. 

Despite Nixon’s opinion, Anderson’s motion again was tabled. 

Anderson raised the constitutional option once more at the start of 

the 86th Congress, this time with the support of more than two 

dozen Senators. But to prevent Anderson’s motion from receiving 

a vote, Majority Leader Johnson came forward with his own compromise. 

He proposed changes to Rule 22 to reduce the required vote for 

cloture to two-thirds of Senators present and voting. 

As our witnesses will discuss, this was not the last change to the 

filibuster rule. Reform efforts have continued and occasionally succeeded since 1959. The constitutional option has served as a catalyst for change. As the junior Senator from New Mexico, I have the 

honor of serving in Clinton Anderson’s former seat, and I have the 

desire to continue his commitment to the Senate and his dedication 

to the principles that in each new Congress the Senate has the constitutional right to determine its own rules by a simple majority 

vote. 

It is time again for reform. There are many great traditions in 

this body that should be kept and respected, but stubbornly 

clinging to ineffective and unproductive procedure should not be 

one of them. 

We should not limit our reform efforts to the filibuster, but look 

at all the rules. We can, and should, ensure that minority rights 

are protected and that the Senate remains a uniquely deliberative 

body but we must also ensure it is a functional body, regardless of 

which party is in the majority. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I am looking forward to these 

very important hearings. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Alexander. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAMAR 

ALEXANDER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for having 

the hearing. 

President Lyndon Johnson called the Republican minority leader, 

Everett Dirksen every afternoon at 5 PM not for any particular 

reason. That was the kind of relationship that they had even 

though Senator Dirksen had fewer Republican Senators on his side 

then than Senator McConnell has today. 

Why did he do that? The civil right bill, Senator Udall mentioned 

the civil rights bills provided maybe an answer to that. I think it 

is because the President knew that not only did he need to get the 

civil rights bills passed—he had already passed one when he was 

majority leader—but in 1964 and 1968 he needed to get the country to accept them. 

9 

We have seen with health care debate that, as soon as it was 

passed by a bare majority, suddenly all over the country there is 

a campaign to repeal it. Lyndon Johnson I think wanted to avoid 

that in an even more controversial set of legislations. 

So he had the bills written in 1964 and 1968 in the Republican 

leader’s office. He had to get 67 votes to pass those bills. That was 

inefficient. A Democratic majority could have pushed it through but 

maybe the founders were wise to say that there ought to be a process here of checks and balances in Washington, that in this big constitutionally decentralized country that we need, when we make 

big changes, to present the American people with something in 

which they have confidence. 

I think of the financial reform bill today. Senator Chambliss is 

working on that. We need certainty in our country in financial matters. I cannot think of a better way to do it than for the President 

to come out with a large number of Republicans and Democrats 

and say, okay, we are going to rewrite the rules and these are 

going to be the rules for the next five or ten years because we have 

a consensus on it. I think that would be important to the world. 

It might be the tipping point in terms of helping the economy get 

going again. 

So the majority has a choice. Do we ram it through or do we get 

consensus? Alexis de Tocqueville wrote the book that most Americans think is the best book on the American democracy, and in it 

he saw two great threats down the road to the American democracy. He wrote this in the 1830s as a very young man. 

One was Russia. He was awfully right about that. The other was 

what he called the tyranny of the majority. He wondered how a 

purely democratic country would work, whether it would overrun 

the ideas of the minority. That is why we have the United States 

Senate, to provide those checks and balances. 

Senator Schumer talked about the number of times the minority 

obstructs legislation. We in the minority could say it another way. 

We could say that is the number of times the majority has tried 

to cut off our right to debate, our right to offer amendments which 

is the essence of the Senate. 

The only thing different about the Senate is the almost absolute 

right of unlimited debate and unlimited amendment, and if you get 

rid of that, you get rid of the Senate. 

Senator Reid’s book, the Majority Leader, Chapter 7, that he 

wrote recently. This is what he said about the Republican majority 

leader. 

‘‘I could not believe Bill Frist was going to do this. He decided 

to pursue a rules change,’’ said Senator Reid, ‘‘that would kill the 

filibuster for judicial nominations. Once you open that Pandora’s 

box, it is just a matter of time before a Senate leader who could 

not get his way on something moved to eliminate the filibuster for 

regular business as well and that simply put would be the end of 

the United States Senate.’’ 

It would be, and I think it is very helpful to have the history 

here. Before we get bogged down in different rules and different 

current events, I think we need to understand what James Madison meant when he talked about a fence, a necessary fence against 

the danger of passion in the country of the Democratic majority. 

10 

Senator Byrd’s comments in his orientation comments to new 

Senators in 1996. ‘‘Let us clearly understand one thing. The Constitution’s framers never intended the Senate to function like the 

House of Representatives.’’ 

I saw in the newspaper it said a third of the Democratic Senators 

today are in their first term. I am sure for a new Senator full of 

vim and vigor the idea is let us get things moving, let us get things 

going. 

But we saw in the so-called nuclear option a few years ago when 

Republicans tried to do just exactly what Senator Udall said, cooler 

heads prevailed and said we do not want to do that. I do not want 

to create a Senate that is incapable of requiring a consensus on 

major issues so the country will have confidence in what is being 

done in Washington. 

Senator Byrd said in his letter on February 23rd of this year, I 

hope the Senators will take a moment to recall why we have extended debate and amendments. The Senate is a place in government where the rights of a numerical minority are protected. Minorities change with elections. A minority can be right and minority views can certainly improve legislation. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent since my time is now 

up to include the record Chapter 7 of Senator Reid’s book, called 

The Nuclear Option. I think it provides a useful perspective, and 

I would like to include in the record also the remarks of Senator 

Byrd at the orientation of new Senators. He used to do that every 

time. He has not been able to do it the last couple of times. But 

it is a remarkable expression of understanding of why we have a 

Senate and why we require a consensus instead of a majority. I 

bought enough copies for every member of the Committee if they 

would like to have one. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, and I thank you for the statement. 

Would Senator Roberts, Senator Chambliss like to make opening 

statements? Senator Roberts was here first and then Senator 

Chambliss. 

Senator ROBERTS. Thanks to the thoughtful and careful Chairman of the Committee for holding this hearing to examine the role 

of the Senate and the legislative process. I am currently in my 

third term as a Senator. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Excuse me. Without objection, Senator Alexander’s additions will be added to the record. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Sorry to interrupt. 

[The information follows:] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAT ROBERTS, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS 

Senator ROBERTS. No problem. I am currently in my third term 

as a Senator. Before this, I served in the House of Representatives 

for eight terms for 16 years as the Congressman for Kansas’s big 

First District. 

We were in the minority for so many years my main role was to 

set picks for the Chairman during basketball contests. We RepubVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
11 

licans never got to get the ball to shoot but we were always instructed to pass it. 

Chairman SCHUMER. If the gentleman would yield. He was the 

best ‘‘pick setter’’ that I have ever come across in my 59 years of 

playing basketball. 

Senator ROBERTS. I have retired as a result of that as a matter 

of fact. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. But as such I have had first-hand experience in both the houses of Congress, their rules and their respective constitutional roles. I might add two years as administrative 

assistant for Frank Carlson, who was a great friend of Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, and basically 12 years as an aid to my predecessor in the House. So as bucket toter or a staff member I think 

I pretty well covered the waterfront. 

This hearing is about more than the filibuster. It seems to me 

it is about the institutional role of the Senate and its function in 

the legislative process. 

It is clear that the founding fathers intended to create a system 

of checks and balances. The legislative upon the executive. The judicial upon the legislative. And even within the Congress, the Senate upon the House. 

I served as a Congressman in both the majority and the minority. I can testify that the majority is better. I can testify firsthand 

that the House is the institution for the will of the majority. 

However, I think it is useful to highlight some recent trends in 

the House operations in order to distinguish the importance of the 

Senate. 

From the 104th Congress to the 109th, a period of 12 years, the 

percentage of bills brought to the floor with an open amendment 

rules range from 58 percent in the 104th to 19 percent in the 

109th, with an average over the entire period of about 41 percent, 

almost 50. 

By contrast, the number of bills with open amendment rules on 

the floor in the 110th Congress was 14 percent and one percent, 

one percent as of March 19 in this year in the current Congress 

with an average of seven and half percent overall in three years 

and four months. 

So as the open amendment process atrophies in the House, the 

percentage of closed rules has inevitably soared. In the 104th Congress to the 109th, the percentage of bills brought to the floor with 

closed rules range from 14 percent in the 104th to 32 percent in 

109th with an average over the period of 22 and a half percent. 

By contrast, the number of bills with closed rules on the floor in 

the 110th Congress was 36 percent and then an unprecedented 31 

percent as of March 19 as of this year in the current Congress with 

an average between the two of 33 and a half percent. 

These numbers, Mr. Chairman, demonstrate the level of cooperation in the House has dropped precipitously, if not off the cliff. It 

is most striking because public opinion polls are overwhelmingly 

opposed to the legislation coming out of the Congress if you believe 

the polls and you think that is important. 

I understand fully that the motivation of individual members and 

their agenda or their ideology plays an important role, and difVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
12 

ferent parties think obviously in regards to the importance of legislation or the agenda and that public polls should be considered but 

certainly should not be the deciding factor. 

But in its most recent average of polling data from different 

sources, Real Clear Politics, that is an outfit that is an independent 

nonpartisan polling institute, shows that nearly 53 percent of 

Americans are opposed to the recently passed Health Care Reform 

bill and only 40 percent roughly are in favor of it. 

I know that either party would explain if we could explain it 

more they would be for it; and the other party would say if you explain it more, more would be against it. I understand that. 

But at any rate, only 40 percent roughly were in favor of it. We 

could discuss other controversial proposals that have happened in 

the past. The American people oppose like the cap and trade, immigration, federal bailouts, deficit spending. 

But it might be easier to sum it all up in a real clear politics average of polls on whether Americans feel the country is headed in 

the right direction. The most recent poll average shows that almost 

60 percent of Americans think we are on the wrong track. Only 37 

percent roughly think we are on the right track. 

There is a clear disconnect at least publicly or in the image and 

the polling between what is being pursued and what the American 

people want. 

To whom can the American people turn when the House majority 

runs rough shod over the minority and public opinion. You can go 

back to the New Deal or you can go back to the Great Society or 

you can go back to eight years under Eisenhower or you can go 

back to any period of history and say the same kind of thing. 

The answer is the Senate. The founding fathers had the foresight 

to create an institution that was based not on majority rule but 

where each state regardless of size or population had two Senators 

to speak out on their behalf. It is that power to speak, the right 

to unlimited debate that is the hallmark of this body. 

The 63rd article from the federalist papers attributed to James 

Madison explains the necessity of the Senate as an institution that, 

quote, ‘‘sometimes be necessary as a defense to the people. What 

bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped 

if their government had contained so provident a safeguard against 

the tyranny of their own passions. Popular liberty might then have 

escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizenry 

the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.’’ 

I might also indicate, Mr. Chairman, that if you erect a statute 

on one day you might find a lot of pigeons on the next day. 

I know, Mr. Chairman, I have several other comments to make. 

Perhaps I should simply insert that in the record or, if the Chairman grant me, I would try to expedite this very quickly. It is the 

Chairman’s call. 

Chairman SCHUMER. The gentleman’s time is the extended. 

Senator ROBERTS. The filibuster is the essence of the Senate. It 

is not a tool of obstructionism or dysfunction. It is meant to foster 

greater consultation, consensus and cooperation between the parties. It is a means for the minority to make its voice heard and to 

contribute to debate and amend legislation before the Senate. 

13 

In this way, it is impossible to abuse the filibuster because it is 

an expression of the people against majority’s attempt to shut them 

out of the process. Only in the House does the majority take all. 

And as the numbers show, the majority appears to be taking, if not 

devouring, more and more in the last few years. It is disheartening 

to see some members of the Senate, often new and unaccustomed 

to culture of comity and compromise, attempt to rewrite the rules 

of this chamber to be more like the House. 

Cloture is an instrument to cut off debate when the majority is 

not interested in compromise. From the 107th to the 109th Congress, there were an average of 57 cloture motions filed per Congress. In the 110th Congress alone there were 152. That is 152 instances of the majority seeking to cut off debate. 

It is a 267 percent increase over the average over the previous 

three Congresses. Of those 152 cloture motions, 97 were filed the 

moment the question was raised on the floor. That is nearly 64 percent cloture motions were filed before a debate was even allowed 

to take place. The average for the previous three Congresses was 

29 percent. 

We need to consider, Mr. Chairman, the times the majority 

brought a bill to the floor and used a parliamentary tactic called 

filling the tree to prevent the minority from offering amendments. 

From the 99th to the 109th Congress, a period of 22 years, the 

majority filled the tree a total of 36 times, averaging a little over 

three per Congress. This contrasts sharply with 110th to the 

present Congress, a period of roughly three years and four months 

in which the majority filled the tree 26 times with an average of 

13 times per Congress. 

We could go on and on with other instruments that have been 

used by the majority to circumvent regular order in the past and 

in the present, stifle the majority, and force unwanted legislation 

on the people. 

They include the abuse of the reconciliation process. Mr. Chairman, I remember trying to get order to introduce and explain in 

one minute an amendment that you offered and that was passed 

in the Finance Committee, trying to point out it was bipartisan and 

having agreement other than members shouting regular order 

when I reached the end of my comments, and yet it was defeated 

on a party line vote. 

That is just not right. It really is not right. Both of us agreed 

on the merits of the proposal and yet during reconciliation that was 

not possible, at any rate by bypassing the Committee through the 

use of the Rule 14 and the use of the amendments between the 

houses also known as ping-pong instead of conference committees 

to resolve differences in the legislation. 

I might add as a conferee on the farm bill there were 61 members. I think I would have preferred ping-pong at that particular 

moment. 

The filibuster, the right of unlimited debate is synonymous with 

the Senate. It is what the founders intended. I have several quotes 

from current members and I think we have already had the intent 

of that so I will skip through that, except for Senator Kennedy who 

on May 5, 2005, said, ‘‘The Senate rules have allowed the minority 

to make itself heard as long as necessary to stimulate debate and 

14 

compromise and even to prevent actions that would undermine the 

balance of powers or that a minority of Senators strongly oppose 

on principle. In short, neither the Constitution nor Senate rules nor 

Senate precedents nor American history provide any justification 

for selectively nullifying the use of the filibuster.’’ 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Roberts. 

Senator Chambliss. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE C. SAXBY 

CHAMBLISS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks for holding this hearing. I am pleased to have the opportunity this morning to address the need to protect the fundamental 

role of this sacred legislative body. 

Our Nation’s history is not only riddled with evidence of the intent of the framers to preserve the intended differences and structural or procedural design of the House and the Senate but also examples of our government’s lawmaking powers where these differences have preserved and had protected the voice of the minority. 

There are those that may argue that the creation of the filibuster 

is not so rooted in the framers design of this institution but rather 

evolved over the early course of our history unintentionally. 

While some evidence may infer such an argument about the technical evolution of the filibuster and the Senate rules, the concept 

of a single legislative branch divided among two houses in electoral 

duration, representative composition, and rule-making procedure 

could not have been more prevalent or purposefully on the minds 

of our founders and later historical giants of the Senate. These 

things all the filibuster serves to protect. 

Having begun my tenure in the United States Congress as a 

member of the House of Representatives and now serving my second term in the Senate, I am both sorely and fondly aware of the 

differences and legislative process between both houses of Congress. 

One of the certainties of the Senate body is a frustration of the 

majority in the minority’s right to protect from a repressively enacted agenda at complete disregard of the minority will. 

Dysfunctional, gridlocked, stymied are often unavoidable characterizations of a majority’s inability to move a one-sided partisan 

agenda through this legislative body without impediments. 

However, it is these legislative hurdles that are the reason this 

body is regarded as a guardian of checks and balances, and separation of powers. Any reform effort which attempts to weaken the 

protections of minority rights and further enable fast-tracked legislating threatens not only the balance of our bicameral design but 

also the separation of powers within a single party majority among 

executive and legislative branches. 

It is no secret that the filibuster can be the majority’s greatest 

enemy and a minority’s best friend. Yet it is most important to remember this when the political winds shift, and once majority 

party finds itself in the minority. 

There are a few party purists on the hypocrisy of blaming the 

other side of the aisle for obstructionism or a party of no. But we 

15 

must strive to see past a polarizing politics and recall that both 

sides serve in an institution that was designed for purposes of balance, that but for the flaws of impetuous men, limitations would 

not be necessary, that rules to govern how we govern protect the 

rights of those we are sent here to represent. 

In the face of misguided calls for reform of Senate procedure, I 

am often reminded not only of Madison’s description of the need for 

the Senate to service as an anchor of government but also that of 

Jefferson’s exclamation that that government which is best governs 

least. 

And I would yield the rest of my time to Senator Roberts if he 

wants to enter his quotes, Mr. Chairman, or I would yield back to 

you, whichever your prefer. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I think I prefer you yielding back to me. 

But we will add anything Senator Roberts wishes to add for the 

record. 

Senator ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I would just say, and this is a 

personal statement. I did not write this out. But if you look back 

in the history of the House Agriculture Committee, the sometimes 

powerful House Agriculture Committee, you will find Stenholm 

Roberts amendments so prevalent probably more of those than any 

other in 20 years, and then we had the revolution and all of a sudden it was Roberts Stenholm. There was the difference. 

Charlie and I worked together. He was a great Democrat Congressman, and I have never used the word ‘‘Democrat’’. He was just 

a great Congressman. I will not say how he referred to me. 

But at any rate we knew on the Ad Committee we either had to 

hang together or hang separately. I think that was the way I tried 

very hard to represent Kansas. 

Came to the Senate. There were some trying times in House 

when we had the bank and the restaurant and the post office and 

all of that, and I understand all of that, and it became very partisan. 

But you come to the Senate and I must admit in this last year 

its been terribly frustrating. I serve on the Health Committee. I 

serve on the Finance Committee. You know about the jurisdiction 

of those Committees. You know the hours we put in. I even put 

them in when I had pneumonia. 

And eleven amendments on rationing, could never get them done, 

never made an order. Always some parliamentary situation. Tried 

on reconciliation. Could not get there. 

It is a situation where those of us in the minority who have 

worked in the past both in the majority and in the minority have 

come to feel that we have been shut out. 

I know that other people feel the same way when they have been 

in that kind of situation. But suiting up for the ball game and the 

coach never sends you in, that is something that you do not like 

to see. 

So from my standpoint I would really hope that we would, regardless of what we do in terms of alleged reform, let us see what 

lurks behind the banner of reform or if you wave that banner, you 

can be hoisted on your own petard. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator. 

16 

Let me just say before we go to our witnesses, there is large frustration on both sides and we are trying to handle these hearings 

in not a partisan way but in a way to try to break through that, 

and each side has legitimate concerns, very lofty concerns by my 

four colleagues here. 

They are a little less lofty when you realize things like the Marine Mammal Commission is filibustered, members to that, members to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) board of directors, 

the member of the Farm Credit Bureau Administration even after 

they passed out of Committee by unanimous votes. 

So there is frustration on both sides, and maybe these series of 

hearings, and that is what we are going to have, can break through 

that. 

I understand yours. I think you understand ours. But to just continue in this direction, I think, will not make any of us more effective Senators, more effective Senators. So that is the purpose of the 

hearing. 

And you still set good picks. 

I am now going to call on our witnesses and introduce them. 

Our witnesses today are Dr. Sarah Binder. She is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, as well as Professor of Political 

Science at George Washington University where she specializes in 

Congress and legislative politics. She is the author of several books 

including, Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative 

Gridlock. 

Dr. Gregory Wawro is an Associate Professor in the Political 

Science Department at Columbia University. He is the co-author of 

the book, Filibuster:: Obstruction in Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate. He did his undergraduate work at Penn State and received a 

PhD at Cornell. 

Dr. Dove, someone we all know and welcome back, has served as 

Senate Parliamentarian for 13 years and now holds the title of Parliamentarian Emeritus of the Senate, and is a Professor at GW 

Graduate School of Political Management, and counsel to the law 

firm Patton Boggs. 

Dr. Stanley Bach was Senior Specialists in Legislative Process 

for the Congressional Research Service for over 25 years. Since retiring, he served as a consultant in parliamentary development and 

legislative strengthening programs to governments around the 

world. A 2005 paper he authored on the rules of procedure for nationalist assemblies was used in Iraq. 

I thank the witnesses for being here. I thank them for listening 

to our statements which I think again were heart-felt but also well 

done. You may each proceed. I think we will proceed from my left 

to my right. So you may begin Ms. Binder. Your entire statements 

will be read into the record. If you could try to limit your comments 

to five minutes. I am not going to be quite as lenient with you as 

I was with Senator Roberts. Each has seven minutes, excuse me, 

seven minutes. 

17 

STATEMENT OF SARAH A. BINDER, DEPARTMENT OF 

POLITICAL SCIENCE, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Ms. BINDER. Thank you, Chairman Schumer, Ranking Member 

Alexander, members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today about the filibuster. 

I want to offer three arguments. First, historical lore says the filibuster was part of the original design of the Senate. Not true. 

When we scour early history, we discover that the filibuster was 

created by mistake. 

Second, we often call the 19th Century Senate a Golden Age of 

the deliberation but the Golden Age was not so golden. Senate 

leaders the 1840s were already trying to adopt a cloture rule but 

most such efforts to bar the filibuster were themselves filibustered. 

Third, creation of the cloture rule in 1917 was not a statement 

of the Senate’s love of supermajority rules. Instead it was the product of hard-nosed bargaining with an obstructive minority. Shortterm, pragmatic politics shaped contests to change Senate Rules. 

Allow me to elaborate. First on the origins of the filibuster, we 

have many received wisdoms about the filibuster. Most of them 

turn out not to be true. The most persistent myth is that the filibuster was part of the founding fathers constitutional vision for the 

Senate. It is said the upper chamber was designed to be a slow 

moving deliberative body that cherished minority rights. 

In this version of history, the filibuster was a critical part of the 

framers’ Senate. But when we dig into history of Congress, it seems 

the filibuster was created by mistake. The House and Senate rule 

books in 1789 were nearly identical. Both rule books included what 

is known as the previous question motion. The House kept their 

motion. Today it empowers a majority to cut off debate. The Senate 

no longer has that rule. 

What happened to that rule? In 1805 Vice President Aaron Burr, 

freshly indicted for murdering Hamilton, was presiding over the 

Senate and he offered this advice. He said something like this. 

You are a great deliberative body but a truly great Senate would 

have a cleaner rule book and yours is a mess. You have lots of 

rules that do the same thing. And he singles out the previous question motion. 

Today we know a simple majority in the House uses the motion 

to cut off debate but in 1805 neither chamber used the rule that 

way. Majorities were still experimenting. 

And so when Aaron Burr said, ‘‘Get rid of the previous question 

motion,’’ the Senate did not think twice. When Senators met in 

1806, they dropped the motion from the rule book. Why? Not because Senators we think in 1806 sought to protect minority rights 

and extended debate. They seemed to get rid of the rule by mistake 

because Aaron Burr told them to. 

Once the rule was gone, Senators still did not filibuster. Deletion 

of the rule made possible the filibuster because the Senate had no 

rule to cut off a majority by debate. It took several decades until 

the minority exploited lax limits on debate leading to the first real 

live filibuster in 1837. 

Second, the not so Golden Age of the Senate. Conventional treatments of the Senate glorified the 19th Century as the Golden Age. 

18 

We say filibusters were reserved for great issues of the day and 

that all Senators cherished extended debate. 

That view I think misreads history in several ways. First, there 

were very few filibusters before the Civil War. Why so few? First, 

the Senate operated by majority rule. Senators expected matters 

would be brought to a vote. Second, the Senate did not have a lot 

of work to do in those years so there was plenty of time to wait 

out the opposition. Third, voting coalitions in this early Senate 

were not nearly as polarized as they would later become. 

That changes by mid-century. The Senate grew larger, more polarized. It had more work to do. And people started paying attention to it. By the 1880s almost every Congress began to experience 

at least one bout of obstructionism over civil rights, election law, 

even appointment of Senate officers, not all of these great issues 

of the date. 

There is a second reason the Senate was not in a Golden Age. 

When filibusters did occur, leaders tried to ban them. Senate leaders tried and failed repeatedly over the course of 19th and early 

20th Centuries to reinstate the previous question motion. 

More often than not, Senators gave up on their quest for filibuster reform when they saw that opponents would kill it by filibuster because it would put the majority’s other priorities at risk. 

Instead, leaders adopted innovation such as the unanimous consent agreements, a fallback for managing a chamber prone to filibuster. 

Third, the adoption of cloture. Why was reform possible a 1917 

when it had eluded leaders for decades and why did the Senate 

choose a supermajority cloture rule rather than simple majority 

cloture? 

First, the conditions for reform. After several unsuccessful efforts 

to create a cloture rule in the 1900s, we get a perfect storm of 

March 1917. A pivotal issue, a President at the bully pulpit, a very 

attentive press, a public engaged in that fight for reform. 

At the outset of World War I, Republican Senators successfully 

had filibustered President Wilson’s proposal to arm merchant 

ships, leading Wilson in March that year to famously brand obstructionists, quote, a little group of willful little men. 

He demanded the Senate create a cloture rule, and the press 

dubbed the rule a war measure, and the public (with all due respect) burned Senators in effigy around the country. 

Adoption of Rule 22 occurred because Wilson and the Democrats 

framed that rule as a matter of national security. They fused procedure with a policy and they used the bully pulpit to shame Senators into reform. 

Second, why did Senators select a supermajority rule? A bipartisan committee met that year to negotiate the form of the rule. 

Five of six Democrats wanted a simple majority rule. One Republican wanted a supermajority rule. One Republican wanted no rule. 

So negotiators cut a deal. Cloture would require two-thirds of 

Senators voting. Opponents promised not to block the proposal and 

supporters promised to give up on their own plan for simple majority cloture, a proposal that had the support of roughly 40 Senators. 

The cloture rule was then adopted 76 to three. 

19 

We can draw at least three lessons from this history. First, the 

history of extended debate in the Senate belies the received wisdom 

that the filibuster was an original constitutional feature of the Senate. The filibuster is more accurately viewed as the unanticipated 

consequence of an early change in Senate rules. 

Second, there are conditions that can lead a bipartisan supermajority to agree to change the rules. However, the minority often 

holds the upper hand in these contests, given the high barrier to 

reform imposed by Senate rules. 

Third, and finally, Senators in 1917 chose a supermajority cloture rule because a minority blocked more radical reform. Shortterms pragmatic considerations almost always shape the contest 

over Senate rules. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Binder follows:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Ms. Binder. 

Mr. WAWRO. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY J. WAWRO, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 

Mr. WAWRO. Chairman Schumer, Ranking Member Alexander 

and members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to 

participate in this hearing and contribute to the discussion of history of the filibuster. 

I have been asked to discuss the period from 1917 to 1975 a critical period in history of the filibuster that is book-ended by two 

major reforms in the Senate the first being the adoption of the cloture rule in 1917, which has been very ably discussed by Professor 

Binder—and the second being the reform in the 1975 that lowered 

the cloture threshold to three-fifths of the Senate. 

During this period, the use and perception of filibusters in the 

Senate changed significantly. Prior to this period, parliamentary 

obstruction was viewed as less than legitimate, and Senators rarely 

resorted to it. Between 1917 and 1975, the filibuster became deeply 

embedded in the fabric of the institution and became accepted by 

Senators as a legitimate tactic for shaping the course of law making. 

Filibusters expanded in scope and number and were employed by 

a broad range of Senators on an ever widening array of legislation. 

Still, it is important to keep in mind that filibusters remained relatively few in number when compared to the contemporary Senate. 

Three important qualitative changes in the use of filibusters occurred during this period. The first was the use of the filibuster to 

inhibit repeatedly and systematically the passage of a specific class 

of legislation, namely, civil rights reform. 

The second was the development of the strategy of using filibusters to consistently block efforts to reform rules concerning filibusters. The third was the extension of filibusters to Supreme Court 

nominations. 

I will focus on the first two changes in my statement today but 

would be happy to discuss the third if any Committee members 

have questions about it. 

20 

While filibusters undoubtedly altered the course of law making 

in important ways, it cannot be said that they rendered the Senate 

dysfunctional during this period. Despite the quantitative and 

qualitative expansion in the use of the filibuster, the Senate still 

managed to enact significant legislation addressing some of the 

most pressing problems of the day. 

Evidence indicates that Senators generally built larger coalitions 

in support of legislation in order to preempt the use of filibusters. 

The substantial ideological overlap that existed between the parties 

at this time in part made it easier to build larger coalitions. 

Nevertheless, the adoption of the cloture rule, Rule 22, in 1917, 

which required two-thirds of Senators present and voting to end 

debate, did not make it necessary to legislate by supermajorities. 

Although the percentage of significant laws that were passed with 

fewer than two-thirds coalitions in favor declined, many pieces of 

significant legislation were enacted by fairly narrow majorities in 

the decades following the reform. 

Opponents of a bill did not always resort to filibustering nor was 

it assumed that cloture would have to be invoked routinely on significant and controversial legislation—with civil rights bills constituting the key exception. 

Even when minorities conducted filibusters, it was not always 

necessary to invoke cloture since proponents could engage opponents in a war of attrition to wear them down, forcing them to relent and allow legislation to move forward. 

As such, majorities that fell short of two-thirds but felt more intensely about legislation than the relevant minority could generally 

still manage to change policy. This is the key difference between 

the impact of the filibuster during the period in question and the 

impact of the filibuster in the contemporary Senate. 

The extreme demands on both the agenda of the Senate and the 

personal schedules of individual Senators mean that it is no longer 

a viable strategy to fight extended wars of attrition to overcome an 

obstructive minority. 

Although the filibuster was used relatively infrequently during 

this period, its repeated use against civil rights legislation prompted numerous attempts to change Rule 22 to lower the threshold required for cloture. In fact, the passage of civil rights reform became 

deeply entwined with cloture reform. 

By the 1950s it had become virtually a biennial ritual to attempt 

cloture reform at the beginning of a new Congress. Only three attempts to change Rule 22 were successful however. 

The first occurred in 1949 when the Senate adopted a compromise proposal that allowed for the application of cloture to any 

measure, motion, or matter pending before the Senate, excepting a 

motion to take up a rules change in exchange for raising the 

threshold for invoking closure to two-thirds of the entire membership. 

Prior to this reform, it was not clear that cloture was even applicable to several important items of Senate business, including 

nominations. 

The second reform occurred in 1959 when the Senate adopted a 

resolution that changed the cloture threshold to two-thirds present 

21 

and voting, permitted cloture to apply to rules changes, and explicitly affirmed in the rules that the Senate was a continuing body. 

The third reform occurred in 1975 when the cloture threshold 

was changed to three-fifths of the Senate membership. However, 

two-thirds of the chamber would still be necessary to invoke cloture 

on a proposal to change the rules. 

During the many attempts to reform Rule 22, opponents of reform resorted to strategies of obstruction to inhibit the attempts, 

taking advantage of the fact that resolutions to change the rules 

themselves could be filibustered. Thus reform efforts often involved 

attempts to establish precedents via rulings from the chair that 

would enable a simple majority to invoke cloture on proposed rules 

changes at the beginning of a Congress. 

The only time that such a precedent was established was during 

the reform attempt of 1975 but the precedent was reversed a few 

days later by a vote of the Senate as part of a compromise. 

To conclude, it is generally accepted that the contemporary Senate has become a supermajoritarian institution. The foundation for 

the supermajority Senate was laid with the adoption of the cloture 

rule in 1917 and its refinement in 1975. However, between 1917 

and 1975 the Senate did not have the supermajoritarian character 

that is has today. 

Neither the use of filibusters nor the use of the cloture was a 

part of the Senate’s day-to-day functions. However, toward the end 

of this period, the stage was set for filibusters and cloture voters 

to become routine in the Senate, marking a fundamental and profound change in the operation of the institution. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the Committee’s 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wawro attached] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Wawro. 

Mr. Dove. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. DOVE, PARLIAMENTARIAN 

EMERITUS, U.S. SENATE 

Mr. DOVE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am particularly pleased to be here with Professor Binder. 

We both teach classes at George Washington. I use her text in my 

class and I tell my students that the reason that I want them to 

read the text and to read her conclusions are that I so profoundly 

disagree with them. I think they should see both sides of it. 

But I am not an opponent of the Senate filibuster. The reason 

that I am not I think comes from the three periods that I worked 

for United States Senate. First from 1966 to 1986, I was in the 

Senate parliamentarian’s office working first under the parliamentarian who hired me, Floyd Riddick, and then under Murray 

Zweben, and then the final six years of that period I was the parliamentarian. 

In that period of 20 years, I must say my views on the filibuster 

changed, and they were probably as influenced by anyone as much 

as by Floyd Riddick. Floyd Riddick was a student of the Senate. He 

came to found the Daily Digest in the 1940s, became assistant parliamentarian in 1951, and was the reason I was at the Senate. 

22 

I had done my PhD under the same professor at Duke that he 

had worked under. I feel like I was schooled at his knee as he 

talked about what was happening with the filibuster in that period. 

Some very interesting things were happening with regard to the filibuster in that period. 

The year after I came the Vice President of the United States, 

Hubert Humphrey, and the Senator from South Dakota at that 

time, George McGovern, came up with a strategy to change the filibuster rule, a strategy which would involve the Vice President ruling that a resolution which had not yet been adopted would be enforced by the chair, a resolution to change the filibuster rule, and 

it would be enforced on the basis that a point of order against it 

had been tabled. 

I did not see the logic of the situation at the time but I must say 

I was young and I really thought this was a way of cutting the Gordian knot, a phrase that Senator Javits used on the floor, and was 

secretly behind it. The parliamentarian was not, and the Vice 

President was not ruling based on the advice of the parliamentarian. 

The Vice President did so rule. The Vice President was overturned by the Senate so that attempt came to naught. 

Two years later in 1969 in the final days of Vice President Hubert Humphrey’s time as Vice President, he came up with another 

way of changing Rule 22. He said from the chair that if a cloture 

motion was voted on, quote, at the beginning of the Congress which 

had never had any significance in the Senate in the past and the 

vote was by majority, that he would rule that cloture had been invoked on a rules change, and he so rule. And once again the Senate 

overturned him. So that attempt came to naught. 

Then in 1975 Vice President Nelson Rockefeller together with 

Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota and Senator Pearson of Kansas managed to do what Vice President Hubert Humphrey and 

Senator McGovern had tried to do only they did it successfully this 

time or I would say semi-successfully. 

Yes, the Vice President ruled that the resolution could not be debated and for days the Senate had no debate but it had votes, and 

the only way the Vice President was able to shut that down was 

to start refusing to recognize Senators. 

I had some qualms about that at the time. Evidently the Vice 

President had qualms about that because he came back two weeks 

afterward to apologize to the Senate for refusing to recognize Senators. But of course at that point it was a little late. The rule had 

been changed. 

What I saw after that was that a significant minority of the Senate feeling that they have been crushed in an illegitimate fashion 

began to look for holes in the cloture rule. There were holes in the 

cloture rule. They were demonstrated in 1977 in a filibuster on the 

Natural Gas Act and it was not until 1979 that the cloture rule 

was amended to end those holes by putting an overall cap on the 

post cloture period of 100 hours and then later in the mid-80s a 

30-hour cap. 

Those changes basically were pursued and achieved in the normal course of things. What I remember about the filibuster are two 

instances. One was a fight very soon after the 1975 filibuster rule 

23 

had been changed. A fight over a Senate seat from New Hampshire. A fight between John Durkin and Louis Wyman. 

And having just changed the filibuster rule to make it 60, there 

was the view that the Democrats who then have controlled 62 seats 

in the Senate would probably be able to ram through the seating 

of John Durkin with their 62 votes and cloture but they were not 

because three Democrats went off the reservation and refused to 

vote with them. 

So that election contest ended with the seat being declared vacant. A new election occurring which John Durkin, the Democrat, 

won. And I will contrast that with the fight in the House over that 

McCloskey seat from Indiana when basically the Democrats 

rammed through the seating of someone that the Republican minority felt was being illegitimately seated and I frankly the scars 

of that lasted for years. 

I like the Senate of 1975 which refused to do that to seat John 

Durkin better than what the House did with the McCloskey seat. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dove follows:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Dove. 

Last but not least, Mr. Bach. 

STATEMENT OF STANLEY I. BACH, RETIRED, SENIOR SPECIALIST IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, CONGRESSIONAL 

RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. BACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Bennett, and 

members of the Committee. It is a great pleasure and honor to be 

back before the Committee after an absence of many years and particularly to be in this company. I have great respect for the scholarship of Professor Binder and Professor Wawro. And as for the gentleman to my immediate right he said that he learned at Dr. 

Riddick’s knee. I think I can say that most of what I know about 

the Senate I learned at Bob Dove’s knee when I was just a boy. 

So I am particularly happy to be in the company of my teacher. 

Much of what I was going to talk about already has been covered 

in one way or another in the statements that have already been 

made, so I can abbreviate some of that. 

Basically what I want to do is to focus on the more recent period 

in Senate history and essentially to remind members of this Committee of some developments and trends with which I am sure you 

already are familiar. 

First as has been noted, since the mid-70s, there have been three 

formal changes in Rule 22 and no changes since. The 1975 adoption 

of the current requirement to invoke cloture of three-fifths of the 

Senators duly chosen and sworn has been mentioned as has the 

amendment that came four years later to impose a 100-hour cap 

on post cloture consideration. 

Before then and since, there has always been the limit of one 

hour of debate per Senator after cloture has been invoked, but during the period after 1975, we saw the growth of what became 

known as the post cloture filibuster which led to the imposition of 

the cap on consideration as well as on debate 100 hours of postcloture consideration. 

Then in 1985, I think as part of the resolution to authorize television coverage of the Senate’s floor proceedings, the 100-hour cap 

24 

was reduced to a 30-hour cap. In a sense that was the dog that did 

not bark. The 1985 amendment to Rule 22 evoked very little controversy, very little contention, probably because between 1979 and 

1985 the Senate had never actually used all 100 hours. In fact, 

when I retired from CRS in 2002, the Senate had not at that point 

actually used all of the 30 hours that are available under the current rule. I understand that is no longer the case but it had been 

as of the early years of this decade. 

In addition, there have been a several important developments 

affecting the Senate’s precedents and practices that I do want to 

touch on briefly. Bob Dove mentioned the 1977 debate on the natural gas deregulation bill. I sort of cut my teeth on Senate procedure by trying to explain to myself everything that had happened 

to that bill. 

In the course of the Senate’s consideration of that bill, a series 

of rulings were made which vested considerably more power and 

discretion in the hands of the presiding officer. 

Much of this has become less relevant today because of the 100- 

hour and then the 30-hour cap on post-cloture consideration, but 

under those precedents the presiding officer actually was empowered to rule as dilatory such matters as amendments, certain motions, quorum calls, points of order, and appeals of rulings of the 

chair. 

So it was really quite an extraordinary moment. Fortunately it 

has not been necessary to invoke those precedents very often since. 

In regard to changes in practice, I would want to emphasize two 

developments. One is the greater incidence of cloture motions and 

votes in relation to the motion to proceed. 

The second is the greater incidence of cloture motions and votes 

in connection with the three motions that can be necessary for the 

Senate to send a bill to conference with the House. 

Let me give you a few numbers. With regard to the motion to 

proceed, from 1983 through 2006, there was an average of eight 

cloture motions per year filed on motions to proceed. 

During the following two years, 2007 and 2008, that average 

jumped from about eight to about 30 per year. That is a significant 

development by anyone’s reckoning. 

I do not have similar data with respect to the motions to go to 

conference. All I can say is that at the beginning of this new millennium my colleagues and I at CRS were aware that these three 

normally routine steps that typically were taken by unanimous 

consent could, if required, be taken as three separate motions, each 

of which would be fully debatable under the Senate’s rules. 

We wondered if and when this storm cloud on the horizon would 

actually break over the Senate and I think we have begun to see 

that happen. 

Now let me draw your attention briefly to two tables in my prepared statement on pages 8 and 10. The table on page 8 documents 

the number of cloture motions that have been filed in the Senate. 

If you compare the 1960s with the 1980s and then with the current 

decade—which is not yet over and so the data for which remains 

incomplete—the number of cloture motions filed in the Senate 

jumped from 28 in the 1960s to 207 during the 1980s to more than 

25 

435 during the present decade—one cloture motion for every member of the House of Representatives. 

Another way of slicing reality is to look not at the number of cloture motions filed and voted on, but on the number of discrete 

items of legislative and executive business that provoked one or 

more cloture motions because, as you know, you can have multiple 

cloture motions on a bill in addition to the cloture motions on the 

motion to take up the bill, on the motions to send it to conference, 

on the conference report, and so on. 

That is addressed briefly in the table on page 10. Again if we 

compare the same three decades of the 1960s, the 1980s, and the 

current decade, the number of items of business that gave rise to 

one or more cloture motions grew from 16 in the 1960s to 91 in the 

1980s to 223 during the decade that is not yet completed. 

Mr. Chairman, I think there is a lot to be said for a bicameral 

legislature in which somewhat different decision rules are associated with each house. 

The House of Representatives, as Senator Roberts has emphasized, is unquestionably a majority-rule institution. In the House 

there is really not much need for the majority to compromise with 

the minority if the majority is sufficiently unified to provide 218 

votes from among its own membership. Nor for that matter is there 

much incentive for the minority to work with the majority if the 

alternative is an effective campaign issue that the minority thinks 

it can use to become the new majority after the next election. 

If I can conclude with one further thought, Mr. Chairman, the 

dynamics of the Senate obviously are different, so but let me ask 

a not entirely rhetorical question, and that is, why do Senators filibuster? If the purpose and intent of a filibuster is to exercise a minority veto over legislation or a nomination or whatever, then I 

think defending recent practice is, in my view, an up-hill climb. 

If, on the other hand, the objective of filibustering or the threat 

of filibustering is to give the majority an incentive to take better 

account of policy interests and preferences that it might if the majority were left solely to its own devices, then I think filibustering 

becomes much easier for me to justify. 

So as the members of this Committee think about the subject of 

today’s hearing and ask where do we go from here or is there anything that we need to do about this, I think a useful starting point 

is to ask whether the usual purpose of filibusters today is more balanced legislation or no legislation at all. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bach follows:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. I just want to thank our four 

witnesses. This hearing is a little different than the ones we usually have in that we went into a lot of history. I think it was great 

and helpful. 

Let me begin with a few questions. I am going to try to limit the 

questions to five minutes each because we do have a vote at noon. 

The first question I guess is for Mr. Bach. Using your distinction 

which I think is a valid one, could you draw a distinction between 

filibusters of nominees because you cannot really compromise the 

nominee per se as opposed to filibusters on legislation? One of the 

things that frustrates us is that just about every nominee, I named 

26 

some of them before, even when they pass out of Committee by 

unanimous vote are filibustered. 

Mr. BACH. You start with the easy one, Mr. Chairman. The last 

time I was in this room was to attend the 2003 hearing on S.Res 

138 which the Committee then reported. 

There are two distinctions I think to be drawn between filibustering on legislative business and filibustering on nominations. 

First, as you say, you cannot compromise on a nomination. So I 

think the threat of filibustering a nomination becomes particularly 

important because what you want to try to do is to use your influence before the President actually submits the nomination. You 

want that negotiation to occur in advance. 

The other difference in a sense makes filibustering on nominations more justifiable than filibustering bills because the bill you 

enact today you can amend or repeal tomorrow. If you discover you 

made a mistake on a bill you live with that mistake only as long 

as it takes for the Congress and the President to recognize it. 

When you confirm a judicial nominee, on the other hand, it is an 

appointment during good behavior and that can last for decades. It 

is essentially impossible to remedy a mistake on a judicial nomination whereas you can remedy mistakes on legislation much more 

easily. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Right. That cuts against your first point. 

Mr. BACH. Yes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. To Mr. Wawro and Mr. Dove. So there was 

a period in 1975 where the chair ruled and that held. And then I 

think one mentioned that the actual resolution that was passed 

had so many holes in it that people were required—can you fill us 

in a little more particularly, Professor Wawro, but I would like to 

hear from Mr. Dove too, about those few days. You called it, I do 

not know, I think Mr. Dove said it was more than a few days, between the ruling of the chair initially and the actual rule that was 

passed. 

Mr. WAWRO. I have the exact dates in my written statement. The 

resolution in question was Senate Resolution 4, and by this time, 

as I said in my statement, there was essentially a biennial ritual 

where senators tried to pass cloture reform by seeking rulings from 

the chair to invoke cloture by a majority. 

Prior to this reform attempt, there had not been a committed 

majority in the Senate who wanted to establish a precedent that 

would enable majority cloture on a rules change. 

When the precedent that was established, it was established by 

a very narrow vote, 51 to 42. My reading of the situation is that 

after the precedent was established that Senators were concerned 

about what they had done and it was an unanticipated result to 

an extent. 

There was a filibuster that ensued after the precedent had been 

established that tried to prevent the resolution from moving forward. It was several days later. I do not recall the exact date that 

but a compromise was worked out whereby the cloture would be 

changed to three-fifth of the Senate except for a rules change which 

still required two-thirds of the Senate. But the Senate did actually 

go through the exercise of reversing the precedent and then voting 

for cloture by a supermajority. 

27 

Chairman SCHUMER. In a sense that is because they had buyers’ 

remorse? 

Mr. WAWRO. That is my reading of the situation. There was also 

some concern about how long the filibuster that followed the establishing of the precedent would have lasted. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Mr. Dove and Mr. Bach, just your comments on that brief period. 

Mr. DOVE. The majority leader at the time was Senator Mike 

Mansfield, and he had a lot of questions frankly about what was 

happening on the Senate floor. It was on his suggestion that the 

Senate backup and by unanimous consent in effect undo what they 

had done and then do it in the normal course of things. 

There was indeed a feeling that perhaps what the Senate had 

done had some problems. 

You said holes in the rule they adopted. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I think you mentioned that. 

Mr. DOVE. The holes were not in the rule they adopted. The holes 

were in the rule as it existed because just changing the number, 

that is all they did in 1975 was change the number, had nothing 

to do with the fact that if you wanted after cloture to extend the 

time you could do it very easily through votes, through having 

amendments read, and it was two Democratic Senators, Senators 

Abourezk of South Dakota and Metzenbaum of Ohio who demonstrated what two Senators could do on natural gas filibuster as 

they filed I believe 800 amendments. And after a week of either 

voting or quorum calls, they had used about three minutes of their 

one hour and it was clear that post-cloture filibuster could go on 

for months. 

Chairman SCHUMER. You agree with Mr. Dove. I see you are nodding your head, Mr. Bach. I do not want to go over my time. 

Mr. BACH. What Mr. Dove is pointing to are the elements of the 

post-cloture filibuster which then were the impetus for the imposition of the consideration caps that came in 1979 and 1985. 

I also think a point that deserves emphasis is that a number of 

the changes in the cloture rule that have taken place have been the 

result of compromise: change in one direction combined with 

change in another direction. I think what happened in 1975 affected the question of who was going to have how much leverage 

in the negotiations for the compromise that eventually resulted. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thanks. I want to thank the witnesses. I 

just want to say because I will not speak again that it is clear from 

the history that some people try to say the filibuster is fixed, unchanging, going way back if not from the Constitution from the 

early days, and that is clearly not so. Your testimony makes that 

very clear. 

Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. I am a late arrival. If either of my colleagues 

wants to go ahead first I will be happy to yield to either one of 

them. 

Senator ROBERTS. Unless you would rather we go first. 

Senator BENNETT. I am always ready to speak. You know that. 

It is in a Senator’s genes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Bennett. 

28 

Senator ROBERTS. I have already gone way over my time as described by the chairman. So please. 

Senator BENNETT. All right. It is probably a good thing that Senator Roberts and I are sufficiently separated by space so we will 

not be confused for one being the other. We each get recognized as 

the other as we walk these hollowed halls. 

I have been fascinated by the historical review and have a little 

bit of history of my own to put here because my father was a Senator from 1951 through 1974. So the change you are talking about 

occurred just after he left the Senate. All the time he was here it 

was two-thirds of the Senators present and voting. 

The maneuvering to influence the outcome had to do with how 

many Senators you could keep off the floor as much as it did with 

how many people you could get to vote the way you wanted. Many 

times that was part of the legislative strategy. 

We know it is going to embarrass you if you vote this way or that 

way and you can accomplish what we want by not showing up and 

that will be less embarrassing to you back home with your constituents. 

So I think the rule change that said it is a constitutional supermajority of all the Senators duly sworn is a step in the level of accountability for one’s position with respect to a piece of legislation. 

So I would applaud that change on that basis. 

Mr. Bach, I am interested in your dichotomy here which I agree 

with that if it is used strictly for obstruction, it is different than 

if it is used to try to get a bipartisan solution, and without getting 

into any of the details of where we are right now, I will say that 

in this present Congress we have seen examples of both where it 

was used absolutely to stop a piece of legislation and it was used 

absolutely to force the majority to come to the table in an effort to 

get a good piece of legislation. 

I will not fill in the gaps of the kind of legislation am talking 

about. But I would like your reaction. You are political junkies or 

you would not be teaching political science wherever it is you are. 

My experience is that there is a political price to be paid either 

way. That is, that a party that decides we are going to use the filibuster simply for obstruction runs a political risk of being punished 

by the voters who say we do not like that or can reap a political 

benefit when voters say we want you to stop this at all costs, and 

it becomes a political strategic decision on the part of the leader 

of the minority party. 

Do we run the risk of losing the approbation of the people by 

being seen as obstructionist or do we gain the approbation of the 

people by being seen as principled and standing up against a bad 

piece of legislation? 

So that ultimately the public will make the decision and punish 

or reward the party on its strategic decision to use the filibuster 

and therefore the filibuster becomes a significant weapon, two 

edged sword if you will, in the arsenal of politicians that gives it, 

in my view, a kind of legitimacy as something that should stay in 

the rules. 

I would like your reactions to that particular view. 

Ms. BINDER. I would answer your question this way, the question 

really who pays the cost for obstruction or with perceived obstrucVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
29 

tion, I typically say that majorities tend to be blamed for failure 

to govern rather than minorities feeling the cost of public concern. 

Having said that, it may depend quite a bit on what issue is at 

stake and how much the public is paying attention, and on a highly 

charged issue in a period where partisans tend to divide, majority 

party members or partisans tend to blame the minority for blocking 

and partisans of the minority tend to blame the majority for trying 

to cut off the minority. 

Of course that is the problem we face in the Senate today on very 

highly charged issues. Stepping back though, more often than not 

it does seem that majorities are quite often blamed for failure to 

govern. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Time is up but we will let them answer. 

Senator BENNETT. Yes, any others? 

Mr. BACH. Senator Bennett, I take your point. There will be instances, I am sure, where it is politically advantageous to be Horatio at the bridge, trying to kill legislation entirely. 

I do not think that is going to happen very often though; take 

the health care debate or the current debate over financial regulation. 

If you ask the American people if they are satisfied with the status quo, in both cases they will probably say no. So there is underlying support for some kind of legislation, and I think that even 

when the intent of a filibuster is the kill, it very often may be caste 

in terms of an attempt to get the majority to compromise. 

And the problem that we have from the outside is that we are 

not really able not being able really to judge the merits of the arguments from each side, the minority saying that the majority refuses 

to compromise, and the majority claiming that the minority asks 

too much. 

We cannot judge that unless we are in the room when these discussions are going on. What I think we can say is that this is what 

the media will report as partisan bickering and that does not serve 

the reputation of the Senate well. 

Mr. WAWRO. If I could give a political sciencey answer to your 

question, I do not think we have a very good answer to this question because, despite all of the research that have been devoted to 

the filibuster, we lack in-depth studies about how it plays out in 

the court of public opinion. We do have surveys that go back to the 

1930s that ask questions about filibusters and filibuster reform but 

we do not have the kind of systematic analysis that I, as a political 

scientist, would like to see to reach a definitive conclusion about 

who really pays the price in a very general sense. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Senator Schumer. 

Back in 2005 Senator Hatch wrote an article and I want to just 

quote a portion of that and get our first two witnesses opinion, 

maybe to the two parts of it. 

He said in the article, ‘‘The Senate exercises its constitutional 

authority to determine its procedural rules, either implicitly or explicitly. Once a new Congress begins, operating under existing laws 

implicitly adopts them by acquiescence. The Senate explicitly deterVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
30 

mines its rules by formally amending them, and then the procedure 

depends on its timing. After Rule 22 has been adopted by acquiescence it requires 67 votes for cloture on a rules change. Before the 

Senate adopts Rule 22 by acquiescence, however, ordinary parliamentary rules apply and a simple majority can invoke cloture 

and change Senate rules.’’ 

And then he says in conclusion. 

‘‘Both conservative and liberal legal scholars agree that a simple 

majority can change Senate rules at the beginning of the new Congress.’’ end quote. 

I am wondering, Professor Binder and Wawro, do you have an 

opinion on Senator Hatch? Do you agree with Senator Hatch on 

that point? 

Ms. BINDER. I think the answer comes down to how the Senate 

itself interprets that power. As the debates in 1975 played out over 

whether the Senate is a continuing body or not, we see votes both 

ways. 

We have seen a majority endorse precisely the position of Senator Hatch in 2005, and we have seen perhaps a buyers’ remorse 

stepping back from that once everyone understands the implications of living in a Senate where a majority can do that. It is clearly technically feasible and it has been politically feasible but the 

questions at any given moment is the Senate willing to take that 

vote again. 

Senator UDALL. So basically what you are saying is that it is a 

constitutional issue and then the Senate determines constitutional 

issues, the Senate itself as a body determines that constitutional 

issue? 

Ms. BINDER. Yes, because the Constitution says the House and 

Senate shall adopt their own rules. 

Senator UDALL. Yes, Article I Section 5 of the Constitution says 

each house may determine the rules of its proceedings. So it all 

flows from out of that. 

Ms. BINDER. Yes, and the question is in the Senate at any given 

time is a majority willing to endorse that interpretation of the 

rules. 

Senator UDALL. There is nothing in the Constitution about a filibuster or the Rule 22 provision, things like that. 

Ms. BINDER. Correct. 

Senator UDALL. Please. 

Mr. WAWRO. I would just say one of the great dilemmas of democratic institutions is that it is important to have rules that constrain the behavior of individuals who are members of those institutions but members of those institutions can change their own 

rules. 

The Senate did put in its rules a provision that explicitly affirmed that it is a continuing body. The Senate did this as part of 

a compromise that reformed rules concerning the filibuster. But if 

the Senate wanted to change its rules with respect to that provision, it can do that. 

There may be some issues with the parliamentary maneuvering 

that might be necessary to make such a change and some concerns 

about departures from Senate tradition that this might entail. But 

31 

the Senate has in its power to make the decision itself over what 

its rules are at any given moment. 

Senator UDALL. By a majority vote? 

Mr. WAWRO. By a majority vote simply because the Senate operates on the basis that precedents can be established by simple majorities to fill in gray areas in the rules—aspects of procedure that 

are not clearly established either in the Constitution or in the Senate’s rules. All you need is a majority vote to be able to do that. 

Senator UDALL. Let me ask you both one additional question on 

a long-standing constitutional principle and that principle is that 

one Congress cannot bind a subsequent Congress. 

The simple example could be that you do it in terms of rules or 

you do it in terms of a piece of legislation and say in the legislation 

we pass that no future Congress can change this law unless you 

have 75 votes. That is a long-standing constitutional principle, is 

it not? 

Ms. BINDER. I am not a constitutional scholar. So I would probably send that to Mr. Dove. 

Senator UDALL. I want to ask him a different question. 

Ms. BINDER. I will answer it as a political scientist. The chamber 

has the right to set its rules. Sometimes rules get entrenched because the rules themselves cause a barrier to changing them. It is 

not unconstitutional to create a barrier that is very hard to overcome. 

Chairman SCHUMER. One more question. 

Mr. DOVE. Could I answer that? 

Senator UDALL. Yes. 

Mr. DOVE. Because I helped right the Congressional Budget Act 

of 1974 which binds the Senate in spite of the fact that it is not 

re-adopted every Congress. If your premise is correct, that that 

Congress in 1974 had no right to bind the Congress of today, then 

the whole reconciliation process is gone. 

Senator UDALL. It is not my premise. It is in Supreme Court 

cases repeated over and over and over again. 

Mr. Bach, do you have an opinion on that? And please on any 

of the things said earlier. 

Mr. BACH. There is an interesting and tricky problem here which 

is a problem of both principle and practice. 

In the House of Representatives as many of you know, one of the 

things the House does on the first day of the new Congress is to 

adopt its rules. But that leaves this question: under what rules 

does the House debate the resolution to adopt its rules? 

This is not a problem in current practice because it has all become routinized. But there was a day especially back in the 19th 

Century when the House could go on for days and days to elect a 

speaker which it would do before adopting its rules. 

As I recall, the precedents of the House try to deal with this by 

saying that the House is then governed by general parliamentary 

law, just as Senator Hatch referred to ordinary parliamentary 

rules. 

Well, I would really enjoy finding the book which tells me what 

general parliamentary law is or what the ordinary parliamentary 

rules are. Roberts Rules? Mason’s Rules? Whose rules? So you run 

into a logical problem: how are you going to conduct the deliberaVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
32 

tions over what the rules of the House or the Senate will be if they 

are adopted anew at the beginning of a Congress? 

Senator UDALL. They do not seem to have much problem in the 

House. Thank you for your courtesies, Senator Schumer. 

Chairman SCHUMER. No. My pleasure. The question I am just 

going to ask and leave out hanging there is to Mr. Dove. Maybe 

he can answer it for the record. 

You mean the Senate could not undo, that we are bound to the 

Budget Reconciliation Act? It keeps going from Senate to Senate if 

we do not change it but let us say and you can answer this in writing, all of you. Let us say the Reconciliation Act, the Senate by 51 

votes said we are undoing it? What would happen? 

Mr. DOVE. Of course they can do that but they have not done 

anything about either reconfirming it or trying to change it since 

1974. 

Chairman SCHUMER. It is a different issue though according to 

Senator Udall’s question if they tried to change, it as opposed to 

it continuing without an attempt to change it. Right? 

Mr. DOVE. Certainly they can change it, yes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bach, unless the majority believes the minority is willing to 

kill a bill, how can it persuade the majority to take it seriously in 

changing the bill? When you said a filibuster might be all right if 

you are only going to do it to improve the bill but the way you get 

the attention of the majority is to say, if you do not, we will kill 

it. 

Mr. BACH. This is the issue that Senator Bennett raised earlier, 

what is the minority’s true intention, to kill or to compromise. 

Senator ALEXANDER. How are you going to determine that? That 

is just a matter of human nature. 

Mr. BACH. No one on the outside can determine that. That is a 

question that only Senators can determine in looking at what they 

and their colleagues are doing. 

Senator ALEXANDER. But is it not a fairly simple rule of human 

nature that if you do not think I am serious you are not going to 

pay any attention to me. 

Mr. BACH. Yes, it is. 

Senator ALEXANDER. We all know that. Look at the financial reform bill debate right now. Forty-one Republicans have signed a 

letter saying, you know, we might filibuster this if you do not let 

us have some participation in making it a better bill. 

If the Democrats think there is no chance to we will do that— 

the only reason we think we are getting a chance at some participation is they think we might actually do that. 

So, Ms. Binder, your view, well, let me read this again. Senator 

Reid said, the majority leader, when talking about 2005 which has 

been mentioned a couple of times, Bill Frist was pursuing a rules 

change that would kill the filibuster for judicial nominations. Once 

you open that Pandora’s box, it was just a matter of time before 

a Senate leader who could not get his way on something moved to 

eliminate the filibuster for regular business as well, and that, simply put, would be the end of the United States. 

Do you disagree that? 

33 

Ms. BINDER. The planned of the 2005 use of the constitutional 

option were quite different than the other options. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Do you agree or disagree with Senator 

Reid? 

Ms. BINDER. I am not sure how quite to answer that one. It is 

clearly within the power of the Senate to reform by ruling as opposed to changing the rules. 

Senator ALEXANDER. So you agree there is nothing unconstitutional about having filibusters, right? 

Ms. BINDER. Correct. 

Senator ALEXANDER. But we are going down the basic function 

of the Senate and Senator Reid, a majority leader, been here a long 

time, says, this is the end of the Senate if we change the filibuster 

rule. 

Do you not disagree with that? I mean the whole point of your 

testimony seems to me to be is that the filibuster is bad for the 

Senate. 

Ms. BINDER. The point of my testimony is to point out that the 

filibuster was not an original constitutional feature. That it has 

been changed and that the majorities have struggled with minorities over time to put supermajority rules in place. 

Senator ALEXANDER. I heard that but you characterized it all as 

obstructionism instead of protection of minority rights. Did you 

think it would have been a good idea in 2005 for President Bush 

to be able to put just a steady series of super conservative judges 

on the court without the Democrats being able to slow that down? 

Ms. BINDER. I thought at the time that the proposed use of nuclear constitutional option to reinterpret precedent was the wrong 

way to use the nuclear option. 

Senator ALEXANDER. So you opposed changing the filibuster in 

2005? 

Ms. BINDER. Through the mechanisms that were proposed at the 

time which would be reinterpret Rule 22 in a way that did not 

match up with the actual language of Rule 22. 

Senator ALEXANDER. But you wrote an article, did you not, saying filibusters are a great American tradition in 2005? 

Ms. BINDER. That was the title put on by the editor. 

Senator ALEXANDER. I have that happen to me too. It just seems 

to me your testimony is very much at variance with that of Senator 

Byrd’s though about the Senate, Senator Reid’s thought about the 

Senate, and that may be fine but you think they are wrong as a 

matter of history, and my sense is that you see anything other 

than a majority view as obstructionism. 

Ms. BINDER. On the first, we disagree about how history is read. 

I read it differently than Senator Byrd. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Mr. Dove, if the filibuster were ended, what 

would be the way in which the Senate then could continue to protect minority rights? 

Mr. DOVE. It could not. 

Chairman SCHUMER. On that note we would go to Mr. Roberts. 

Senator ROBERTS. Well, if it could not, we would be in a hell of 

a shape, and the reason I say that is that I was interested in Bob 

Dove’s reference to the situation in the State of Indiana back in the 

1980s where Frank McCloskey was the incumbent and Rick McInVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
34 

tyre was the challenger. The secretary of state of Indiana certified 

Mr. McIntyre as the duly elected member from that district. 

However, when it came time to seat him, he was denied that and 

the matter was referred to the House Administration Committee of 

which I was a member, and a subcommittee was sent to Indiana 

to see if they could not come up with the precise number of votes 

that would determine the election. 

Mr. Leon Panetta, who got his first experience in covert activities, was the Democrat leader and Mr. Bill Thomas, who had a reputation of certainly stating his opinion, was the minority representative. 

As soon as Mr. McCloskey went ahead in the recount, the exercise was terminated and it was decided that Mr. McCloskey had 

won. Mr. Thomas brought back several voters who were not counted, stood them in the House Administration Committee room and 

tried to point out that this was a very severe violation of the rights 

of the State of Indiana and certainly Mr. McIntyre. 

That really caused a ruckus and Republicans were wearing buttons at that times saying thou shalt not steel. The speaker at that 

time, Tip O’Neill said you will not wear these buttons on the floor 

of the House which we did anyway. 

My remarks were such that I said I will take off my button now 

so I can speak but, and then went into my not tirade but certainly 

my point of view. 

That meant that we left the dock of the secretaries of state all 

over the country declaring who would be the winner and who 

would not, and that the House Administration Committee, if the 

vote were close enough, less than one percent, or one percent, the 

committee would decide that, and obviously the majority would declare the majority candidate the winner. 

Then came Idaho and Idaho had a very close vote and the Republican lost and the Democrat won, and I was appointed to go to 

Idaho along with a member of California to recount the election. 

I made the suggestion to Bob Michael and to Billy Pitts at that 

particular time his stalwart assistant that that was not what we 

should do as a party. That if we left the dock of secretaries of state 

determining elections, we were in deep water indeed and that that 

would not be in the best interest of the House, and so we denied 

or we declined to go, and obviously the Democrat won and we had 

quite a discussion as to why Mr. Roberts did not want to go to California by some of our stalwarts. 

Basically we walked out of the House of Representatives, and we 

walked out for several days. That was not a good thing and it also 

led to elections of leadership in the House who basically said we 

were declaring war on the majority. 

I am not sure that was a good thing. As a matter of fact, I am 

very sure that was not a good thing but that is what happened and 

it got into a very partisan kind of situation to say the least. I would 

not want to see that happen in the Senate of the United States. 

Mr. Dove, the current majority of 59 members is the largest held 

by either party in over 30 years. I think I am right. Is that correct? 

Mr. DOVE. The answer is yes. 

35 

Senator ROBERTS. Would you say that those Congresses with 

smaller majorities were more or less functional than the current 

Congress? 

Mr. DOVE. Okay. To me all Congresses are functional. The Senate rules are perfect, as I was told by Floyd Riddick; and if they 

are all changed tomorrow, they are still perfect. 

So I do not want to start qualifying Congresses by being functional but I do emphasize the difference in the fight over the New 

Hampshire seat and the Indiana seat and say it was the filibuster 

that saved the Senate from what the House did with the McCloskey seat. 

Senator ROBERTS. Already you have gotten to my point that I 

was trying to bring up. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Time has expired, Pat. 

Senator ROBERTS. I thought you would say that as a matter of 

fact. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I know that people would like to do other 

questions but this type of hearing does lend itself to written questions because lots of these are historical. So on behalf of the Rules 

Committee, I am going to first thank our witnesses for their presentations this morning. 

They have certainly helped us better understand the history of 

the Senate as it relates to the filibuster and I want to thank my 

colleagues on the Rules Committee who were here today. This is 

really a good opening hearing. 

We will continue on the subject including getting to more specific 

proposals Senator Udall and others have those for future hearings. 

The record will remain open for five business days for additional 

statements and questions from Rules Committee members. And 

since there is no further business before the Committee, the Committee is adjourned subject to the call of the chair. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: THE 

FILIBUSTER TODAY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 2010 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, , at 10:10 a.m., in Room 

301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Schumer, 

Chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Schumer, Byrd, Durbin, Udall, Bennett, Alexander, and Roberts. 

Staff present: Jean Parvin Bordewich, Staff Director; Jason 

Abel, Chief Counsel; Veronica Gillespie, Elections Counsel; Adam 

Ambrogi, Counsel; Sonia Gill, Counsel; Julia Richardson, Counsel; 

Lauryn Bruck, Professional Staff; Carole Blessington, Executive 

Assistant to the Staff Director; Lynden Armstrong, Chief Clerk; 

Matthew McGowan, Professional Staff; Justin Perkins, Staff Assistant; Mary Jones, Republican Staff Director; Shaun Parkin, Republican Staff Director; Paul Vinovich, Republican Chief Counsel; Michael Merrell, Republican Counsel; Trish Kent, Republican Professional Staff; and Rachel Creviston, Republican Professional Staff. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SCHUMER 

Chairman SCHUMER. Our hearing will come to order, and I will 

begin with my opening statement while we wait for Senator Klobuchar. 

I want thank everyone for coming. I want to thank my good 

friend, Ranking Member Bennett, who has been just an invaluable 

and fair member of this committee, not only under my Chairmanship, but long before it. 

I also want to especially thank Senator Byrd for his continued 

interest and participation in these hearings. His dedication of leadership, his unsurpassed knowledge of the Senate Rules and procedures have benefitted us all and we are really very, very fortunate 

that he will be joining us later in the hearing. So I ask unanimous 

consent that when Senator Byrd arrives, he be permitted to read 

his opening statement without objection. 

Now, we have here as one of our distinguished witnesses the 

former Senator from Oklahoma and Republican Whip, Don Nickles, 

a friend of both of ours. He served for 24 years admirably in this 

body. We welcome you, Senator Nickles, and thank you for having 

your time with us. 

Second, there is no former living Senator who can give us more 

insight into the evolution of the filibuster and the cloture rule than 

our first witness, who we are so honored to have, and that is 

former Vice President and former Senator Walter Mondale. As everyone knows, he was 42nd Vice President of the United States. He 

served two terms in the Senate representing Minnesota. 

In early 1975, Senator Mondale, together with Senator Byrd, successfully led the bipartisan debate which resulted in amending 

138 

Senate Rule 22, the cloture rule, to reduce the number of Senators 

needed to invoke cloture. The Senate first determined it could 

change its own rules by a simple majority, and voted three times 

to set that precedent. Reaction to that precedent, which was later 

rescinded, resulted in a compromise. The Senate agreed to move 

from two-thirds of the Senators present and voting to the current 

60-vote threshold for cloture that still exists, as we all know, today. 

In 1977, Mr. Mondale, as Vice President, serving also as President of the Senate, and Majority Leader Robert Byrd played a crucial role in shutting down the post-cloture filibuster of a natural 

gas deregulation bill. This action became the main catalyst for efforts in 1979 to limit post-cloture debate time. 

There is a great deal of debate between those who believe that 

under the Constitution, a majority of the Senate can change its 

rules and those who disagree. Today, we will see a glimpse of the 

Senate at a time when it did face and vote on that very issue, and 

it is very important to look at it because it hadn’t happened before. 

This is the second in a series of hearings by this committee to 

examine the filibuster. The purpose is to listen and learn so that 

we can later consider whether the Senate should make any changes 

in its rules and procedures, and if so, which ones. I have not settled 

on nor ruled out any course of action myself, but as Chairman of 

the Rules Committee, I believe we need to fully and fairly assess 

where the Senate is today and whether we can make it better. 

One thing is certain, however. In recent years, the escalating use 

of the filibuster has drastically changed the way the Senate works. 

Our first hearing on April 22 explored the history of the filibuster. 

We now focus on the filibuster today and its consequences for the 

Senate, for all three branches of government, and ultimately for 

the American people. 

We learned in our first hearing that the use of filibusters has 

reached unprecedented levels. The chart to my right, prepared from 

facts supplied by the Congressional Research Service, shows that 

the use of cloture motions has escalated rapidly in recent Congresses. Cloture motion counts are useful because they represent a 

response to filibuster tactics, actual filibusters, threats, or realistic 

expectations of them. 

During the first period which you see here, from 1917 to 1971, 

there was an average of 1.1 cloture motions filed per year. The next 

period is from 1971 to 1993, where there was an average of 21 filibusters per year. In the period from 1993 to 2007, that number increased by almost a third to an average of 37 cloture motions per 

year. And then we come to the 110th and the beginning of the 

111th Congress. We are now averaging more than 70 cloture motions per year. That is an average of two per week when we are 

in session. 

Before I call on the rest of my colleagues for their statements, 

I want to highlight a few statistics about where we stand with our 

legislative, executive, judicial branches, and the filibuster. In the 

legislative branch, not every bill that passes the House could or 

should pass the Senate. But as we know, members of the House 

have been complaining regularly and rapidly, at least on our side 

of the aisle, that its bills stall out in the Senate, and the numbers 

indicate there is some truth to that. According to the statistics 

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maintained by the Senate Library, there have been 400 bills passed 

by the House in this Congress that have not been considered by the 

Senate. Of those, 184 passed by voice vote. Another 149 passed 

with the majority of House Republicans voting yes on a roll call 

vote, indicating a high degree of bipartisan support, at least for 

those over 300 bills. 

The filibuster is also creating problems for the executive branch. 

For example, for fiscal year 2010, half of all non-defense spending, 

$290 billion, was appropriated without legal authority because 

Congress hadn’t reauthorized the programs. Dozens of Presidential 

appointments are also being delayed or blocked from floor consideration. Many of these were approved unanimously by both Democrats and Republicans in committee and are stuck on the executive 

calendar because of holds. That means executive agencies don’t 

have the leadership and expertise to do their jobs well. Key national priorities are also being undermined. Even nominees to important national security positions are unreasonably delayed by 

holds and filibuster threats in this Congress. This is dangerous at 

a time when we need a Federal Government using all its resources 

to fight terrorism and protect our country. 

And finally, there is the judicial branch. Today, 102 Federal 

judgeships are vacant, a problem which has consequences for 

Americans from all walks of life, direct or, more likely, indirect. 

President Obama has submitted nominations to fill 41 of those. 

More than half, 24, have been reported out of the Judiciary Committee yet languish on the calendar. Of those, 20 were approved by 

the Judiciary Committee with bipartisan, often unanimous, support. What is holding them up? Too often, it is the threat of a filibuster by one or a few Senators. It is true that the Senate increasingly scrutinizes judicial nominations. I myself opposed some of 

President Bush’s nominations to the bench. However, at this point 

in George Bush’s Presidency, the Democratic minority Senate had 

confirmed 52 Federal circuit and district court judges, but today, 

the Senate has approved only 20 of President Obama’s, even when 

candidates have strong bipartisan committee support. So without 

enough judges to staff the Federal judiciary, businesses and individuals alike may feel pushed to give up or settle rather than wait 

years for their day in court. 

These are but a few examples of the consequences of the filibuster. So I hope today’s hearings help inform members of this 

committee, the Senate, and the public at large about the use of the 

filibuster and how it affects our government and our nation today. 

I look forward to listening to our witnesses, and now I am going 

to turn over the podium, of course, to, again, a man for whom I 

have the utmost respect as both a Senator and as a person, Robert 

Bennett. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. 

BENNETT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your chart. Maybe you want to leave it up there, because I 

am going to have a comment or two. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Great. 

140 

Senator BENNETT. I appreciate your holding this series of hearings and the opportunity to offer some introductory remarks. The 

majority has chosen to focus on what it believes to be the abuse 

of the filibuster by the minority, but these hearings have also revealed how the Majority Leader can abuse the rules of the Senate 

to limit debate and amendment. 

At our first hearing, we saw how the leadership tactic of filling 

the tree to prevent consideration of amendments really works, and 

you referred to the Congressional Research Service, Mr. Chairman. 

We went there, as well, and they have a report to which I will be 

referring that talks about how the Majority Leader can use the tactic of filling the tree in order to avoid allowing the minority to offer 

amendments, and we go back 25 years, that is to 1985, when the 

Majority Leader was Bob Dole and document the number of times 

that the Majority Leader, from Dole to Byrd to Mitchell to Dole to 

Lott to Daschle to Frist to Reid have used this tactic. We have 

studied the abuses of the Senate rules by the majority, that is, the 

use of Senate Rule 14 to bypass regular order and avoid committee 

consideration, and the decreasing time between the introduction of 

a matter and the filing of a cloture petition. 

Here are some of the statistics, and we go back to the numbers 

you show on your chart. During the 109th Congress, Rule 14 was 

used a total of 11 times. In the 110th Congress, that number grew 

to 30. CRS reveals that since January of 2007, the majority has 

filed cloture the same day that the matter was offered to the Senate, so that cloture was filed prematurely. Before there was even 

any threat of a filibuster, a cloture petition that would end up in 

that large bar that is at the end of your chart was filed before the 

minority had even an opportunity to make any comment. 

Here is the pattern. The current Majority Leader has used this 

tactic at a rate more than double that of his predecessor and five 

times as often as the last five Majority Leaders combined. So you 

have all of that building up to the time where now we have a situation where either Rule 14 or the filing of a cloture petition and filling the tree occurs immediately in order to make sure the minority 

does not have any opportunity to offer any amendments. 

This has gone unnoticed by the media. I am interested to track 

the media. They were very, very much opposed to filibuster when 

the Republicans were in charge, very much defending it as a tool 

of truth and wisdom once the Democrats got in charge—or the 

other way around, depending on which side of the media—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. No, no, no. You were right the first time. 

Senator BENNETT [continuing]. Okay. Whichever it might be. And 

so these hearings are very valuable to let us look at this thing and 

I appreciate very much the willingness of Vice President Mondale 

and Senator Nickles to come give us their views on this matter and 

look forward to hearing what they have to say. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. All I would say, and I emphasized this at our first hearing, this is not—there is plenty of blame 

to go around, if it is blame. Systems changed because of the actions 

of both parties, and the actions seem to switch when each party is 

in the minority or the majority. And the question is, for the good 

of the Senate over a longer period of time, should we change anything. But you are certainly right to bring up what you bring up, 

141 

Senator Bennett, and I think it should contribute constructively to 

the debate. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you. I ask unanimous consent that the 

CRS memoranda to which I referred be made a part of the record. 

[The information of Senator Bennett submitted for the record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Without objection. 

Usually, I like to let everybody give opening statements, but we 

have the Vice President and Senator Nickles waiting. What is your 

pleasure, Senators Alexander and Roberts? Do you want to make 

a couple of brief remarks? 

Senator ALEXANDER. How about one minute? 

Chairman SCHUMER. Great. Whatever you need. 

Senator ALEXANDER. I don’t know if Senator Roberts can speak 

for one minute. 

Senator ROBERTS. Well, I plan to, as usual, shine the light of 

truth into darkness. That may take a minute and a half. 

[Laughter.] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAMAR 

ALEXANDER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman and Senator Bennett, thank 

you for the hearing and we look forward to hearing the former Vice 

President and colleagues and Senator Nickles. 

I would only say two things. One is, it is interesting to me how 

the Chairman defines a filibuster. A filibuster by his definition is 

anytime the majority seeks to cut off debate or to stop the minority 

from offering amendments. In Senator Nickles’s testimony, he 

points out that between January 2007 and April 2010, cloture was 

filed 141 times on the same day a matter, measure, or motion was 

brought to the Senate floor. So the Senate is supposed to be defined 

by the capacity for virtually unlimited debate or unlimited amendment, so if you count filibusters by saying these bad Republicans 

who happen now to be in the minority have filibustered, the definition of a filibuster is any time we try to shut the Republicans up. 

Well, that happened when the Republicans were in charge, and 

I can vividly remember Senator Byrd’s words to me in our first 

class, and he will be here to speak for himself. He said, sometimes, 

the minority may be right. 

And as we reflect back upon the time when President Bush was 

here and the Republicans were in charge of the Congress, maybe 

our Democratic friends would think that maybe they were right 

about privatizing Social Security. They used the filibuster to prevent President Bush and the Republican Party from privatizing Social Security. They might say that the country is better off after the 

great recession because they used the filibuster. Maybe they were 

right. They slowed down and prevented a whole number of other 

important measures, from tort reform to the appointment of conservative judges. Maybe they were right. 

So I think we should not define filibuster by the number of times 

the majority seeks to cut off debate, and I think we ought to recognize Senator Byrd’s advice that sometimes the minority may be 

right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Roberts. 

142 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAT ROBERTS, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS 

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

At the last hearing, we detailed—and thank you for your leadership on this—the marked decline on open amendment rules in the 

House and the soaring increase in the closed amendment rules for 

legislation brought up before that body. To whom can the American 

people turn when the House majority runs roughshod over the minority and the wishes of the public? That is the Senate. The Framers of the Constitution certainly intended that. 

There is a temptation, I think, on the part of some members in 

this chamber to make the Senate more like the House, to do away 

with the procedures and the precedents intended to foster compromise and comity. 

Since 2007, there has been an unprecedented rise in the parliamentary tactics by the majority to circumvent what we call regular order, and that data is indisputable. I encourage anyone interested in the subject to witness the trend over the last three-anda-half years that is characterized by an increase in the Rule use 

of 14 to bypass committees, a decrease in the use of conference 

committees to resolve legislation, and a drastic rise in the use by 

the Majority Leader of a tactic called filling the tree, which prevents the minority from offering amendments. The use of filling the 

tree is more than double that of the previous leader and exponentially greater than the norm of the last decade. 

I think these trends are alarm bells. Some critics charge the minority with obstruction and point to the number of cloture motions 

filed in the last three-and-a-half years as evidence of, quote, filibustering. The use of cloture, which is an instrument to cut off debate, 

does not really correlate with objections from the minority. A great 

many cloture motions, far more than in any previous Congress, are 

filed the moment the question is raised on the floor. Thus, debate 

is cut off before it can even begin. 

Worse yet, there seems to be a growing inclination intentionally 

to conflate the term filibuster with holds. Everybody knows holds 

are an informal process by which a Senator submits notice that 

they object to a unanimous consent request. Typically, a hold is 

used to prevent a nomination or a piece of legislation from passing 

the chamber without debate or a recorded vote. A hold does not 

prohibit the Majority Leader from bringing a question to the floor. 

I would like to reiterate in closing—over my two minutes, I 

apologize to the Vice President and to Senator Nickles—the framers of the Constitution had the foresight to create an institution 

that was based not on majority rule, but where each State, regardless of size, had two Senators to speak out on their behalf, to debate, and to offer amendments. For anyone who doubts that this 

is what the Framers intended, I encourage them to revisit the Federalist Papers Number 10, attributed to James Madison. He states, 

‘‘Complaints are everywhere heard that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties and that measures are too 

often decided not according to the rules of justice and the rights of 

the minority party, but by the superior force of an interested and 

overbearing majority,’’ and that is true whether it is Republicans 

or Democrats. 

143 

Mr. Chairman, the filibuster is an indispensable tool for controlling the effects of partisanship and factionalism because it compels 

the majority, regardless of party, to meet the minority and the 

American people in the center in order to forge a national policy 

that is based on consensus instead of discord. When Don Nickles 

came up to shake my hand, who has been a longtime friend, he 

said, what is happening? And I said, this place is broken. Help. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much, and I apologize to the gentlemen who are waiting patiently. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I think your concluding lines would find 

favor with the majority of Senators, whatever our diagnosis is, and 

that is the reason we are having these hearings. 

Senator Durbin, our Democratic Floor Leader. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD J. 

DURBIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see the 

Vice President and I thank all of you who are here to testify today. 

I am completing a book now which is a biography of Mike Mansfield and his tenure as the Majority Leader and there was an interesting early chapter there in 1963, when there was a debate in the 

Senate over the Satellite Communications Act and Wayne Morse 

initiated a filibuster against the Satellite Communications Act. It 

became a celebrated cause because the Democratic majority was 

split. The Southern Democrats, who had argued you should never 

cut off debate, because they didn’t want to go to the civil rights 

votes, were in a quandary because they wanted to move to the satellite bill and it meant that they had to cut off debate, vote cloture 

against Wayne Morse’s filibuster on the satellite bill. 

Ultimately, they made the decision to go forward and over 70 

Senators voted for cloture to stop the filibuster by Wayne Morse. 

That is an interesting footnote, but the closing sentence was, I 

thought, the most memorable part. It was the fifth time in the history of the Senate there had ever been a motion for cloture, 1963, 

the fifth time. 

And so this institution which we are a part of and which respects 

the rights of minorities within the institution has functioned 

throughout its history respectful of minorities, but has not gone to 

the extremes we have now reached where we are now using the 

cloture motions and filibusters as commonplace. So we have gone 

beyond deliberation to somewhere near deadlock. For some, that 

complements their political philosophy. They don’t want the Senate 

to do anything, and I guess that is an approach that can be served 

by this use of the rules. But I don’t think it serves our purpose in 

society at large or our purpose in this nation, where we are expected to deliberate but to decide. 

In the last six weeks, I can tell you what our business has been. 

We spent one entire week in the Senate debating on whether we 

would extend unemployment compensation by four weeks. We 

spent the next week in the Senate debating five nominees, all of 

whom passed with more than 60 votes. So there clearly was very 

little controversy associated with them. And now we are on our 

fourth week on the Wall Street reform bill, which we hope to invoke cloture on this afternoon. At this pace, there are so many 

144 

major issues facing this nation and the Senate that cannot be considered. I think it is part of a strategy. Unfortunately, the rules 

complement that strategy and benefit that strategy. 

Now, I have been on the other side of this argument, as well. I 

was a whip when we were in the minority position with 45 votes 

and I needed to find 41, when necessary, to stop cloture. So I know 

that you have to look at this from both sides of the perspective. 

But I do believe that we have reached a point now where the 

American people are losing faith in this institution and I don’t 

think, whatever our purpose may be, that if that is the ultimate 

result, that we are serving our democracy. We have got to find a 

reasonable way to respect the minority but to stop what I think is 

clearly a destined gridlock for this great institution. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Durbin. 

And now, I will ask unanimous consent that my introductory remarks be added to the record, because we have someone far better 

at introducing the Vice President. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Schumer submitted for the 

record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. So we would ask Senator Klobuchar and, of 

course, Vice President Mondale to take their seats at the table. 

Senator Klobuchar. 

INTRODUCTION OF HON. WALTER F. MONDALE BY THE HONORABLE AMY KLOBUCHAR, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

members of the committee, Senator Nickles. 

It is such an honor to be here to introduce the Vice President. 

As you can imagine, he is revered in our State, and you should 

know that my first job in Washington was as an intern, and my 

first assignment as his intern was to do a furniture inventory of 

all of the Vice President’s furniture as well as his staff’s. It was a 

project that took two weeks. I wrote down the serial numbers of 

every piece of furniture, and I can tell you that I tell students, take 

your internship seriously, since that was my first job in Washington and this was my second job in Washington. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. I will also tell the members of the committee that nothing was missing—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator KLOBUCHAR [continuing]. So you have a very honorable 

witness here with you. 

You think about the Vice President’s career and everything he 

has done, the crusading Attorney General in Minnesota, a leader 

in the United States Senate, a Vice President who really defined 

the role of the modern Vice President, the Ambassador to Japan. 

When I was there recently, they referred to him in Japanese, which 

I will not attempt, as ‘‘The Big Man,’’ he was so respected when 

he was in Japan. And he made that very courageous decision when 

Paul Wellstone tragically died to have to take up the mantle for 

our party with only a week remaining in the election. And while 

145 

he was not successful, he handled it, as he has done everything in 

his life, with such civility and such dignity. 

One part of his biography that is often overlooked that you will 

hear about today is when he was in the Senate, frustrated with the 

lack of getting things done, as Senator Durbin so eloquently spoke 

about, and decided to take on the power structure. It is really an 

amazing story, and he was, in fact, successful—maybe not successful enough, as we see where we are right now, but at that time, 

he made a major change, and so I am sure he will enlighten the 

committee with his stories and knowledge, and it is my honor to 

introduce the Vice President. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Vice President, your entire statement will 

be added to the record, and you may proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER F. MONDALE, DORSEY AND 

WHITNEY LLP, MINNEAPOLIS, MN 

Mr. MONDALE. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar, for your kindness 

in introducing me today. We are very proud of Amy in Minnesota, 

and from what I understand, the nation shares that pride today, 

and I am honored that she would be present with me at the commencement of this hearing. 

Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful to the committee for conducting these hearings on the need to reform the rules to protect 

debate and deliberation, so central to the unique role of the U.S. 

Senate, while removing flaws in the procedures that experience has 

proven fuel obstruction and paralysis. 

Perhaps I was asked to testify because of my involvement in the 

successful bipartisan battle to reform Rule 22 in the 94th Congress, 

where we reduced the number of members required to invoke cloture from a maximum of 67 to 60. At about the same time, led by 

Senator Byrd, we changed the post-cloture rules so that at a time 

certain following cloture, the Senate would have to vote on the underlying measure, because we were developing at that time a postcloture filibuster technique which led to endless delay. 

My cosponsor, Jim Pearson from Kansas, a Republican, and I 

called up our proposal at the very opening of Congress. Our strategy was based on the constitutional right of the Senate to propound 

its own rules by a majority vote. Vice President Rockefeller, ruling 

from the Chair, supported our position. The Majority Leader, Mike 

Mansfield, a wonderful human being and leader, appealed the 

Chair’s initial ruling, an appeal we then successfully moved to 

table on a non-debatable motion. 

In that long and sometimes bitter fight—I think we were on the 

floor for a month or more—the Senate on three separate occasions 

voted to sustain the constitutional option, the principle that a majority vote could change the rules. After the sense of the Senate became clear, Mike Mansfield and Bob Byrd, also with Russell Long, 

working with the Republican leadership, reached the negotiated 

compromise that I just outlined, and those are basically the rules 

that govern the Senate today. 

As we completed that process, an argument occurred about 

whether the Senate, in reaching the compromise rules, erased the 

effect of the majority-vote motions to table that I referred to earlier. I think Senator Cranston said it best when he said, ‘‘UpholdVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00155 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
146 

ing the [eventually successful]Mansfield point of order only adds 

one tree to a jungle of precedents we reside in. But above and beyond that jungle stands the Constitution, and no precedent can reverse the fact that the Constitution supercedes the rules of the 

Senate that the constitutional right to make its rules cannot be 

challenged.’’ 

At about the same time, Senator Byrd, who was the key leader 

in these rules reforms, said that at any time that 51 Senators are 

determined to change the rule and have a friendly presiding officer, 

and if the leadership joins them, that rule can be changed and Senators can be faced with majority cloture. 

That constitutional precedent remains today. Some argue that 

the rules themselves require a two-thirds vote for any amendment, 

but as I said earlier, I think the Constitution answers that question: a determined majority can change the rules. 

We took that bold step in 1975 to reduce the cloture requirement 

because we had become paralyzed. We were in a ditch in the Senate and many of us saw an abuse of the rules. Jim Allen of Alabama was a rules wizard. He had a coterie of allies who began the 

march toward what we see today, the use of cloture to paralyze the 

Senate, preventing it from acting on any issue that a motivated minority might seek to block. The constitutional remedy was invoked 

by majority rule in 1975, and the compromise was adopted by a 

large bipartisan vote. 

While the circumstances then differ in detail from what you confront today, fundamentally, what we see now is the logical extension of the paralysis we faced then. The Senate, in fact, has evolved 

into a super-majority legislative body. The ever-present threat of 

filibuster has greatly enhanced the ability of a single Senator, simply through a hold on a nominee or a measure, to prevent any consideration and to do so secretly. Many members of the Senate have 

said that this body is in crisis. Many scholars have said that the 

crisis is more severe than it has ever been before. 

I am heartened to see, particularly among newer members of the 

Senate, and I hope in the Senate at large, that there is a growing 

demand for rules reform, and I hope these rules will be ready for 

adoption at least by the beginning of the next session. 

Let me just mention two suggestions that I have. One, weaken 

the power of holds by making a motion to proceed either non-debatable or debatable for a limited number of time, say, two hours. This 

change has been suggested many times over the years, but today’s 

Senate demonstrates how badly it is needed. The rules should provide that the consideration of any nominee or the debate on any 

measure can begin –begin, not end-by a traditional motion to proceed requiring only a majority vote. 

Secondly, I would hope that the joint leadership could shape a 

reformed Rule 22, as we did in 1975, that would reduce the number 

of Senators required for cloture from the present 60 to, say, somewhere between 58 and 55. There is no magic number. You will notice I do not want to get rid of the filibuster, but as I will argue, 

I think we need a different number. 

Then, we tried to find the line that would assure deliberation 

and prevent debilitation. The number 60 worked for us then, but 

in this harshly partisan Senate of today, I believe it is a hill too 

147 

high. However, it would worry me to reduce the cloture requirement all the way down to a simple majority to end debate. It might 

be more efficient, but the Senate has a much higher calling. It 

must ventilate tough issues. It must protect the integrity of our 

courts. You must shape the fundamental compromises reflecting 

our Federal system. And at times of great passion, you must help 

us find our way, lead us forward, and hold us together. 

I served in the Senate during the most perilous times of executive abuse, when wars were begun and escalated, when funds were 

spent or withheld, when civil liberties and civil rights were under 

assault—all with little public awareness; and no accountability to 

the legislative branch—and it was only when basically here in the 

Senate that Senators stood up and used their special stature that 

we began to make a change. And that is why I don’t want to get 

rid of the filibuster entirely. 

Ironically, however, the use of that right as now practiced threatens the credibility of the Senate and its procedures and, I think, 

adds to the incivility that we discuss. The filibuster should not be 

used to frustrate the very purpose of the Senate procedures, to foster discussion, even extended discussion, to enhance public understanding. 

The constitutional authority to advise and consent found in the 

Senate for Presidential nominations is one of the Senate’s most important responsibilities. Yet there can be no consent without debate 

and there can be no debate if a minority of Senators, even a single 

Senator, can bar the Senate from giving its consent. Under the 

same constitutional provisions that give the Senate the power to 

change Rule 22 by majority vote, it can change its procedures for 

bringing nominations to the floor. 

The Senate’s leadership should have the authority, sustained by 

a majority and a ruling of the presiding officer, if necessary, to 

bring nominations to the Senate. In addition, the Senate’s leadership has the ability to suspend until a particular nomination has 

been resolved the two-track system that has permitted more filibusters, in effect if not in name. 

One of the things we did back in 1975, in addition to reducing 

the number required for cloture, was to institute the two-track system. So the old idea that if you wanted to filibuster, you had to get 

on the floor and make a spectacle of yourself, ‘‘Mr. Smith Goes to 

Washington,’’ and the whole nation and the world can see what you 

were doing had been replaced by a more subtle, silent filibuster 

that allowed for more efficiency in getting the huge backlog of Senate business conducted, but it had a negative side effect because it 

reduced almost all public attention and public responsibility for instituting filibusters and now the holds that, in my opinion, are 

based upon the filibuster. 

I am going to submit the rest of my testimony for the record, but 

let me just close with one statement. When the restored Old Senate 

Chambers were dedicated here some years ago, I think Howard 

Baker was selected to speak at those ceremonies for the Republicans and Tom Eagleton was selected to speak for the Democrats. 

And Senator Eagleton pointed out the unique and even sacred role 

that the Senate has in sustaining the values and the laws and the 

unity of our country. 

148 

He said, ‘‘Here in this room has been sheltered the structural 

side of our democratic government for decades. The government’s 

life force, what makes it work and endure, is our capacity to accommodate differences and to find a way beyond parochial, partisan, 

and ideological concerns to live together as a free nation.’’ I think 

that is the Senate’s unique role, and that is why the work of this 

committee and the decisions of the Senate on how it will conduct 

itself are so crucial to our future. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mondale submitted for the 

record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. That was 

outstanding testimony. You described better than I have heard in 

a paragraph why people don’t stand up and debate the way they 

did when Jimmy Stewart, which is a question all of our constituents ask us all the time. 

Now, we have a little bit of time issues here. Senator Nickles, I 

believe you have to leave by 11:15. If you wouldn’t mind, Mr. Vice 

President, because I know you were going to stay—no, stay where 

you are, if you don’t mind—maybe we can have, with the committee’s permission, Senator Nickles do his testimony, and then we 

will ask them questions together. Is that okay with everybody? 

Thanks. Okay, so let me introduce Senator Nickles briefly. Well, 

we all know Senator Nickles. He was an outstanding leader here 

for 24 years, Republican Whip, and played a major role in many 

different pieces of legislation. It is very kind of you to come and 

give us your views. Without objection, your entire testimony will be 

read in the record and you can proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DON NICKLES, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE NICKLES GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I appreciate your accommodation. I think the world of the Senate. I spent 

24 years in this institution. I love the Senate. I even served on this 

committee for a short period of time, and I think, as Senator Durbin, you called it a great institution. It is a great institution. I was 

with Senator Cochran this morning and he called it a very special 

place, and it is a very special place. 

I sometimes participated in indoctrinating new Senators, or 

newly-elected Senators, and I would usually tell them, the Senate 

is special for a couple of reasons, but amongst legislative bodies, it 

is really special because unlike the House and unlike most parliament procedures, members of the Senate have unlimited debate 

and unlimited opportunities to offer amendments. Sometimes the 

rules curtail that, and I kind of shudder when that happens because that infringes on what really distinguishes the Senate as 

being such a unique body. 

So rules of the Senate, and I heard Senator Mondale talk about 

the abuse of the rules, but the abuse of the rules can go both ways. 

And certainly if the rules are used to abort debate, not shut down 

debate, but just eliminate debate or eliminate amendments, I find 

that offensive to the traditions of the Senate. Some of the proposals 

that some people are talking about really would alter the Senate 

in a way that makes the Senate much more like the House of Representatives, and that would be a serious, serious error. 

149 

I know many of you had the pleasure of serving in the House as 

well as the Senate. I did not. But I really beg you not to turn the 

Senate into a legislative body that is very comparable to the House. 

Granted, you can do a lot of things. You can do a lot of things very 

quickly. You can do a lot of things with very limited debate and 

with the majority vote. That is not the Senate that I served in for 

24 years and it is not the tradition of the Senate and it wouldn’t 

be good for the country. It wouldn’t be good for the legislative process, either. 

Our forefathers showed great wisdom and our leaders in the 

past, including Senator Mondale and others that have worked to 

develop the rules, and the rules aren’t perfect, but they can be 

abused. I think cloture, by its very nature is somewhat abusing the 

process. It is being used way too much and there are way too 

many, quote, ‘‘filibusters,’’ but I would really question what is a filibuster. I can only remember a few filibusters in my career. 

I do remember laying on a cot at night just off the Senate floor 

when we are going on and on and on shortly before Christmas, 

having other members talking about cussing those—not talking 

about cussing, they were cussing members of the Senate who were 

keeping us here so close to Christmas—it probably sounds familiar 

to what you all were hearing this past Christmas season—because 

I was involved in it. That was over a nickel-a-gallon gasoline tax, 

I think, in 1982, and it was very contentious. 

But we didn’t have many filibusters in that period of time. This 

growing explosion of filing cloture—cloture, the whole idea was to 

limit debate and limit amendments, but unfortunately, now, cloture 

is being used to shut off debate and shut off clotures. There is a 

big difference. And when cloture is used to shut off debate and shut 

off amendments prematurely, that is wrong. There is a right way 

to legislate and a wrong way to legislate, and if you are curtailing 

individual Senators’ ability to offer amendments prematurely—and 

I say prematurely, and that is a judgment call. 

I know the bill that is on the floor of the Senate—and I was 

working with Senator Durbin, I wanted to see his amendment—I 

was worried, would this get in before cloture was filed. And I am 

sure that there are hundreds of amendments that are pending 

right now that many members and other people are saying, boy, I 

hope that gets in before cloture is filed because it is going to knock 

our amendment off, and that will probably be a determining factor 

whether you get cloture. 

But I compliment Senator Dodd and I compliment Senator Reid. 

At least you had the bill on the floor and it was debated. It was 

amended. Democrats and Republicans did get to offer amendments. 

That is a healthy change. We used to do that all the time. We used 

to have authorization bills on the floor, subject to amendments, so 

Democrats and Republicans could offer a lot of amendments before 

cloture would come down. And now, cloture is being pulled—I call 

it a quick-draw cloture. It is being filed way to quick, way too often. 

A couple of other comments I will make that are the same thing, 

and I have heard both Senator Alexander and Senator Roberts and 

Senator Bennett mention, and that is Rule 14(b), bypassing the 

committee process. And I am well aware of the fact that we did it 

at times when Republicans were in control. But it is happening on 

150 

an accelerating basis. The rate that that is happening now is accelerating. 

What does that mean? It means we don’t go through committee 

markup. That means the bill is usually written in the Leader’s office. Well, I was in leadership for 14 years. I had my hands on a 

lot of pieces of legislation that we were involved in. But bypassing 

the committee, in my opinion, is a mistake. Committees in general 

usually have bipartisan markups where members are able to massage and legislate. 

I think the health care bill that Senator Baucus marked up with 

Senator Grassley, they had hundreds of amendments. That was 

done well in committee. It wasn’t done well afterwards, in my opinion. Then it went to the Leader’s office. That is not the Senate 

working its will. Bypassing the committee process is dangerous. 

The same thing, whether there is energy legislation. When you 

have major pieces of legislation, it is very important it go through 

the committee process, let all members on the committee who have 

experience and expertise be able to amend it, to massage it, to 

work on it, as well as on the floor. 

And the same thing would apply to filling the tree. And again, 

I know Republicans did it, but I know it is also happening on a 

much more rapid pace today. That is a serious mistake. That is a 

serious infringement on a Senator’s ability to be able to offer 

amendments and to be able to debate. And I think when we did 

it, looking back, I think we made a mistake. 

So any time that the Senate by the use of rules, filling the tree, 

bypassing committee or filling cloture prematurely and denying 

Senators the opportunity to debate or amend, in my opinion, curtails the Senate from being the great tradition, the great legislative 

body, the great deliberative body which is so crucial to passing 

positive, good, bipartisan legislation. 

Lowering the threshold required for cloture, in my opinion, as 

well, would be a mistake, because that is a threshold that almost 

by definition requires bipartisan involvement. It requires some cooperation. You lower that, you increase the tendency or the likelihood for basically the dominant party at the time to steamroll, and 

that, in my opinion, is not good for the process and it is not good 

for the American people. 

I think the rules can be adjusted, but maybe adjusted more by— 

maybe I will take an example, Senator Mondale’s comments when 

you talk about maybe changing the time on motion to proceed. For 

the most part, we didn’t have filibusters on motions to proceed in 

the past and you shouldn’t in the future. Just having an agreement 

with the majority and minority to say, we won’t filibuster the motion to proceed as long as you give us ample time to debate and 

amend. And as long as that understanding is there, we won’t filibuster the motion to proceed. You could eliminate lots of those cloture petitions. You could save two or three days on debating a motion to proceed and actually be amending a bill and make real 

progress. That is just a suggestion. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nickles submitted for the record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, thank you, and I think just putting 

your testimony and Vice President Mondale’s next to one another 

151 

is great because it shows that there are some different points of 

view, but there is a need to fix the system and some areas where 

we can agree. There is often difference in interpretation as to what 

is causing all of these problems, but as I just said to Senator Bennett, maybe there is a way we can come up with a bipartisan way 

to fix things, that deals with both sides’ legitimate complaints. 

The first question I have is for—and I know Senator Udall just 

got here late. He has been instrumental, by the way, in having 

these hearings and leading them and he wants to give an opening 

statement. Because of our time constraints, what I would like to do 

is just give you some extra time when your question period occurs, 

if that is okay. 

Senator UDALL. That would be great, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. My first question is to Senator Mondale—Vice President-slash-Senator-slash-great American Mondale. 

The nub of this debate, not in terms of how to fix it but whether 

we even can fix it, is the contrast of the Constitution, the Article 

I, the Senate ‘shall make its own rules,’ versus the rule that is now 

in place in terms of having a majority of the Senate be elected before you can change the rules, two-thirds, and you mentioned what 

Senator Cranston said. Was there much debate back in 1975 about 

the contrast of those two positions? Could you just elaborate a little 

more, because that is going to be the nub of the issue if we should 

attempt to change anything. Even if, say, Senator Bennett and I 

were to agree on what changes could occur, another Member who 

wouldn’t agree could still force us back into that conundrum. 

Mr. MONDALE. Yes, there was intense debate. One of the key elements of the debate was between our position that the Constitution 

conferred upon the Senate the ability to change its rules by a majority vote, at least at the opening of the session—so I read the rule 

as not limited to that, but that is why I say ‘‘at least’’—and some 

of the opponents who said everything is controlled by Rule 22 as 

inherited and it can only be amended under those rules, the Senate 

is a continuing body, and the other arguments that you have all 

heard again and again. 

So that issue was totally vented. That was the issue contained 

in the motion to table, which we tabled, and our argument was, as 

Senator Cranston put it so well, as Bob Byrd pointed out during 

this debate, that a majority of the Senate with a cooperating presiding officer and leader could invoke majority cloture on its own. 

In other words, the constitutional power was there. That was very 

much at the heart of the debate. 

We argued that if the Framers wanted the Senate to have a 

higher voting requirement to change the rules, it would have provided it, because in five or six places in the Constitution, such as 

confirmation, treaty ratification, and some other measures, it provides specifically that two-thirds of the Senate are required. So we 

think there are a lot of strong arguments for the majority vote 

principle that we made and sustained in that debate. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Would you want to comment on that, Senator Nickles? 

Mr. NICKLES. Just a couple of comments. One, I served—since I 

have been in town, leadership has changed in the Senate six times. 

With Senator Mondale, in that period, the Democrats controlled 

152 

both Houses for decades. And now you have much more volatile 

leadership changes, and I can tell you, if you read past comments 

from Democrats and Republicans, their vantage point and viewpoint changes whether they are in the majority or the minority. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Absolutely. 

Mr. NICKLES. Long-term, I think 60 is a very good number and 

I would hate to think the Senate would reduce that number. And 

Senator Alexander alluded to it. President Bush had control of both 

Houses. If the Senate would have moved to a majority number, say 

51, there was no limit what could have been passed. 

The Senate having a higher number, having 60—and I like 60. 

I think maybe 67 might have been too high. Sixty is a pretty good 

number. It makes the majority work with the minority and—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. But do you think we could change it based 

on the Constitution? 

Mr. NICKLES. No, I am not—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Should we want to? 

Mr. NICKLES. Well, one, I think it would be a disastrous mistake—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Right. 

Mr. NICKLES [continuing]. A disastrous mistake for the Senate if 

you want the Senate to be a deliberative body, if you want the Senate to be different from the House. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Right. 

Mr. NICKLES. If you want a majority body where 51 individuals 

can ram things through, that is not the Senate I know and love. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I am not asking about 60. I mean, let us 

just take the motion to proceed. Do you think the Senate could 

change that rule by a majority vote? Let us say Senator Bennett 

and I agreed that was the right thing to do in exchange for you not 

being able to fill the tree in certain ways. 

Mr. NICKLES. I think—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Do you think we could do that? 

Senator BENNETT. I would stipulate that that agreement is hypothetical. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. NICKLES [continuing]. I think what would be much preferable, instead of changing the rules, would be to have basically a 

caucus agreement, Democrats and Republicans saying, we are not 

going to filibuster motions to proceed. In exchange, we expect time 

and amendment opportunities. Don’t shut us out. Don’t fill the tree. 

Let us legislate like we should. I think you can do that with a 

handshake without amending the rules. 

We are a continuous body. The rules do continue into the next 

time. I know if you went into January and said, oh, under the Constitution, we are going to rewrite the rules, somebody would say, 

the existing rules are still in existence. The officers of the Senate 

are still in existence. And so to do that, you are going to have to 

have 60 votes to get there, or 67, actually—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Sixty-seven. 

Mr. NICKLES [continuing]. Sixty-seven to amend the rules. I 

would prefer, instead of amending the rules, I would urge you not 

to get in that battle. 

153 

One, I would expect, even predict, that the viewpoint is going to 

change after November, what threshold you would want. I would 

just encourage you—like I said, it has changed six times since I 

have been up here. It will change again. Sixty is a good number. 

It works. 

And people say the Senate doesn’t work. Senator Roberts said 

the Senate is broken. There are a lot of things that are broken 

about the Senate, but you don’t have to change the rules of the 

Senate to fix it. A lot of it could be done—Harry Reid—I was Republican Whip and Harry Reid was Democrat Whip for six years. 

We got along very well. We never had a problem, never had a problem. And I can’t help but think leadership working together, maybe 

the whole caucuses working together, saying, wait a minute. This 

is getting carried away. 

One Senator shouldn’t be able to place holds on people forever. 

And people think holds stop all these nominations. No. All it does 

is say, I wish to be consulted. Consult him to say, now we are 

bringing up the nominee, and if you want to block the nominee, get 

prepared to speak because we are going to stay on the nominee 

until we are finished. People have a right to be notified. The Senate operates a lot on unanimous consent. Individual Senators have 

the right to be notified before you bring up the nominee or the bill 

so I can participate in the debate. That makes sense. But they 

don’t have a blanket right to stop everybody indefinitely forever. 

So the hold, the perception of the hold, I think, has been greatly 

blown out of proportion. I hope that we don’t get in the tradition 

of filibustering judicial nominees. That came up in the last few 

years. I think that was a mistake. I mean, the tradition was, we 

had big debates over Judge Bork and Judge Thomas and really not 

so much on—on some nominees, but we still allowed a majority 

vote and I am glad that we did. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. 

Senator Bennett? I mean, there are so many questions, but we 

want to move on here. This is such very good testimony. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, and thanks to both of 

you for your insightful comments. 

I, as a relatively new member of this body at the time, remember 

a situation where President Clinton sent up a nominee that some 

members of our conference didn’t like. We didn’t have enough votes 

at the time, even though we were in the majority, we didn’t have 

enough votes to defeat the nominee because there were some Republicans that would go with the Democrats and the nominee 

would get 51 votes. And the question came up, well, let us filibuster. We have got 41 who are opposed. Let us filibuster. Senator 

Lott, the Majority Leader, said, absolutely not. The tradition in the 

Senate is you do not filibuster judges. And my colleague from Utah, 

Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said the 

Leader is absolutely correct. Under no circumstances do we filibuster judges. And so some of the others who were making this 

case said, oh, all right. 

And making your point, Senator Nickles, Senator Hatch said, the 

time will come when we will have a President, and if we filibuster 

their judge with their President, they will then have the precedent 

to filibuster our President’s proposal for judgeship. And when 

154 

Miguel Estrada came before the Senate and Senator Daschle, as is 

his right under the rules, changed the precedent, we saw a sea 

change in the way things were done around here. 

And that was the point at which I discovered that precedents 

trump the rules. Precedents are easy to change when they are different than the rules, but the precedent that you don’t filibuster 

judges got changed, and now, Mr. Chairman, you have heard the 

exchange on the floor. When a Republican was going to filibuster 

a Democratic judge proposed by President Obama and some of our 

Democratic colleagues started quoting back to us our own statements that we said, no, you don’t filibuster judges, Senator McConnell, as the Leader, said, I made that statement, I believe that 

statement, but you changed the rules and we are now operating 

under your rules. 

I don’t know quite how we rewrite some of the rules to fit some 

of the precedent of comity that we had, but that is the problem we 

are facing. Under the rule, you can, indeed, file a cloture petition 

the same day the bill comes down and you can fill the tree immediately. 

And I remember Senator Byrd doing that as Chairman of the Appropriations Committee on the first supplemental bill when I got 

here brand new as a freshman Senator, and the Republicans raised 

a huge outcry about how unfair that was and backed him down, 

not with votes, but simply the strength of their argument. And I 

remember very clearly—you remember the things when you are a 

freshman Senator—when Senator Byrd more or less apologized to 

the Republicans and said, no, we will allow amendments. We will 

allow this to happen. And he backed away from it and the filled 

tree—I wasn’t smart enough to know how they did it under the 

rules, but the filled tree somehow went away and we went ahead 

with this. 

So even in the relatively brief time I have been here, I have seen 

a sea change as we have moved from the kind of circumstance you 

describe, Senator Nickles, where people sit down and work it out 

on the basis of precedent and comity behind the scene, to a situation where the rule is taken to the extreme, and once it is, whichever party does it, then enables the other party to do it back when 

the control in the Senate changes. 

I have no questions for you, just that comment, listening to the 

two of you and your experience and then adding my own experience, that we should be very, very careful as we proceed in these 

waters because we can mess things up pretty badly, and even 

under the present rule, if we are not careful. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NICKLES. Senator Bennett, if I could just make one comment, 

a lot of this could change if you had several Senators on both sides 

who said, you know what? I am always going to protect your right 

to offer amendments if you will always protect my right to offer 

amendments. If you have enough Senators do that, then cloture is 

not invoked the first time or two. There was even a tradition when 

I was first elected that some Senators wouldn’t vote for cloture the 

first time or two, just because on that very principle. They always 

thought we should have maybe a little more debate and a little 

more amendments. And if you had more debate and more amendVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00164 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
155 

ments, a lot of the hostilities and partisan fever goes away. People 

get pent up. 

I am not aware of how many amendments are pending or are 

going to be shut off on the financial bill, but I know there are a 

lot. But at least the bill has been on the floor and it has had some 

amendments. I love seeing authorization bills, and as a former Senator, I loved having an authorization bill on the floor subject to 

amendment. And I, frankly, even liked the idea that we didn’t have 

a germaneness requirement. So you could be on a bill and offer 

something totally out of the ballpark, even have a little fun that 

way. And it is all right to have a little fun. You should have some 

fun. And you can express yourself that way instead of being so bottled up and so restricted that you never get a chance to offer your 

amendment. That increases the partisan tensions dramatically. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I know you have to go, Senator Nickles, but 

we thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you for being here. 

We are going to continue the questioning with the Vice President, and Senator Udall, you can make an opening statement as 

well as ask some questions. 

Senator UDALL. Senator Nickles, is it 11:15 you have to leave? 

Chairman SCHUMER. Yes. 

Senator UDALL. Because you have two minutes here. I would just 

like to—— 

Mr. NICKLES. Absolutely. 

Senator UDALL. Senator Schumer asked you the question about 

the constitutional option, and you are a lawyer, is that correct? 

Mr. NICKLES. No. 

Senator UDALL. Oh, you are not? Okay. Okay. Well, then no wonder you evaded the question, then. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. NICKLES. I would think—— 

Senator UDALL. But do you have an opinion? I mean, he basically 

was asking, you know, he gave a hypothetical and Senator Bennett 

said he wouldn’t stipulate to it, but the problem we have today that 

you are describing, and you said it very well, you said several times 

there are way too many filibusters. That is your quote. The filibuster is being used too many times. I mean, that is what we are 

seeing over and over again. 

To change that, the key is, as Vice President Mondale said, to 

be able to move with 51 votes and be able to do it as a majority 

under the Constitution. Do you have an opinion on that? The Constitution says in Article I, Section 5, each House may determine 

the rules of its proceedings, and the vote by 51 votes at the beginning of a Congress. Do you have an opinion on that? 

Mr. NICKLES [continuing]. Yes. I think it would be a disaster if 

you did it. 

Senator UDALL. Well, no, but can you do it? 

Mr. NICKLES. Well, one, you still are operating the rules under— 

it is a continuous body. You don’t have 100 percent of the Senate—— 

Senator UDALL. Well, your answer is then no, I think. 

Mr. NICKLES. That would be correct. 

156 

Senator UDALL. Yes. Okay. I understand the continuous body—— 

Mr. NICKLES. I could give you a longer answer—— 

Senator UDALL. No, no. I don’t need a longer answer—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator UDALL [continuing]. Because it is 11:15. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. NICKLES. I appreciate it. 

Senator UDALL. I wanted to try to see if I could get an answer 

from you directly, and I understand the continuous—not to cut you 

off and not to be impolite in any way. I want to let you leave at 

11:15, as you agreed. 

Mr. NICKLES. I appreciate it. Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM UDALL, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Chairman Schumer, very much. Before I ask the Vice 

President a couple of questions, I just want to say a few things. To 

me, today’s hearing is not about examining the current use of the 

filibuster, but the abuse of the filibuster. We would not need to examine the filibuster if it were used sparingly and judiciously, as 

Senator Nickles talked about. Unfortunately, both parties in recent 

years have shown their willingness to use it as a tool of obstruction 

rather than a means to extend debate. 

One of the main reasons I ran for the Senate is because I saw 

the world’s greatest deliberative body turning into a graveyard of 

good ideas. After over a year of observing this body in action, or 

in many cases lack of action, it is clear that we are in danger of 

becoming just that. 

Last month, this committee held its first hearing on the filibuster. It focused on the evolution of the filibuster throughout the 

history of the Senate. At that hearing, several of my senior colleagues on the other side of the aisle spoke about the need to preserve the filibuster in its current form. They argued that it is embedded in the Senate’s tradition of unlimited debate, that any attempt to reform it is simply a short-sighted power grab by a frustrated majority. 

But I believe my colleagues are missing the point. I had been 

speaking for months about reforming the Senate rules, not just the 

filibuster, to make this a better institution. I am not approaching 

this effort with disrespect for this body’s traditions. I hope that by 

reforming our rules, we can restore some of the collegiality and bipartisanship that our Founders intended for the Senate. 

And let me make clear, I don’t necessarily think that the current 

three-fifths requirement to achieve cloture is wrong. What is wrong 

is that only three current members of the Senate, Senator Byrd, 

Senator Inouye, and Senator Leahy, have had the opportunity to 

vote on Rule 22, which was last changed in 1975. What is truly 

wrong with our rules is that they have become entrenched against 

change, something our Founders never intended. 

I am very happy, Vice President Mondale, to see you here today 

because you were one of the leaders of filibuster reform back in 

1975, and I know you believe, as I do, that each Senate has the 

157 

constitutional right to change its rules by a majority vote, and you 

state that very clearly in your testimony. 

The Senate of 1975 thought that the filibuster was being abused, 

but the more recent Senates have demonstrated a whole new level 

of destruction, with Senators from both sides of the aisle increasingly using it as a weapon of partisan warfare. It is time to reform 

our rules, and as I have said many times, I will hold this view 

whether I am a member of the majority or the minority. There are 

many great traditions in this body that should be kept and respected, but stubbornly clinging to ineffective and unproductive 

procedures should not be one of them. 

Now, Vice President Mondale—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Great, and thank you, and now you may 

ask your question. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Senator Schumer. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Vice President Mondale, you heard Senator Nickles talk about 

the idea that any change in the filibuster is going to dramatically 

change the Senate, that the Senate is going to become like the 

House, and we heard this in our last hearing. Several critics of filibuster reform have stated that if the Senate changed the cloture 

rule, changed it in any way, it would make the Senate no different 

than the House of Representatives. 

As a former member of this body, how would you respond to that 

assertion in terms of your experience that you went through and 

what you observe today with regard to the Senate? 

Mr. MONDALE. I don’t want the Senate to become the House. I 

want it to be the unique body that it has always been. 

Senator UDALL. And I agree with you on that. 

Mr. MONDALE. When we adopted these rules in 1975 reducing 

the number needed for cloture, what we heard from the opposition 

was just that, that you are going to change the Senate away from 

what it has been, and now today what I am hearing is 60 is just 

about right. Well, that is a transformation in viewpoint from what 

we heard back then. 

The rules have changed since the beginning of this Senate. At 

first, there was no filibustering going on. Then they went to the— 

it was just move the previous question. Then there were several 

decades where there was no way of closing off debate. And then in 

the middle of World War I, when Wilson couldn’t get the Senate 

to even supply materials to fight the war, he gave a bitter speech 

and the Senate bent and adopted the two-thirds rule. 

And then it came to our time and we were paralyzed. We couldn’t 

get anything done unless everyone agreed to it. And so we changed 

the rule with a broad cross-section of support. Because of the rulings of Vice President Rockefeller, we changed the rules to what 

they are now, and I think that worked for us. It worked for us in 

those times. But what we have now is a harsh partisanship that 

scholars—I know they are going to testify later here—say that the 

situation now is, in terms of abuse of power, in terms of paralysis, 

is worse and different than it has ever been, and I believe that is 

true. 

The number of filibusters that were cited in the charts shown before, the use of holds, which we haven’t yet discussed today, it has 

158 

been done before, but the pervasiveness of the strategy of holds 

now holds up hundreds of nominations. The government can’t get 

going. On any number of measures, often the holds are submitted 

secretly. There are rolling holds, all kinds of holds now. And the 

net effect is that a few are able through secrecy to block the Senate 

from action without any public accountability, and they are able to 

do that because just behind that hold is the threat of a filibuster. 

And the leader knows he can’t make any progress. 

So I think that we need to adjust the rules, not to become the 

House, but to become a restored, effective Senate with the power 

to deliberate so we can do our jobs and do them better. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much. You said we haven’t 

talked enough about holds. I mean, one of the results of holds, and 

you know this, observing us currently, I believe it was the Washington Post reported that after the first year, the Obama administration had been in office for a year, they only had 55 percent—— 

Mr. MONDALE. Right. 

Senator UDALL [continuing]. Of their appointees in place. So basically you have the hold process holding up the administration 

from getting its team in place. That wasn’t what was ever envisioned, I think, by our Founders or by the Constitution. It has been 

completely abused. 

What would you suggest in terms of if you were going to make 

a rule change about holds, specifically? Could you talk to us a little 

bit about that? 

Mr. MONDALE. Yes. What I said in my testimony was that I 

think the Leader ought to be able to move to proceed, and it should 

be done with a majority vote, maybe with a certain time limit for 

the debate. But it shouldn’t be, in effect, filibuster. And I am talking about how you get the measure up for consideration. I am not 

talking about how it is finally resolved. The regular rules would 

apply to that. 

Senator UDALL. Yes. 

Mr. MONDALE. Many times we have seen on these holds that 

they are held up, and then when it finally gets to a filibuster vote 

or a final vote on the nominee, they pass 98-to-two or something 

like that. So it was apparently a false issue. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much, and thank you for allowing me to run a little bit over there—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. It was well worth it. 

Senator UDALL [continuing]. Actually with his answer. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Just to put all this in historical context, the 

Vice President’s last example was exactly what happened to me in 

the spring of 1991 when Senator Metzenbaum held my nomination 

as Education Secretary up for three months and then finally I was 

confirmed at midnight by unanimous consent, you know, after I 

had waited around for about four months. I told the story at the 

earlier hearing, I went to see Warren Rudman and said, what do 

I do about this? He said, ‘‘Keep your mouth shut. You have no 

cards.’’ And he told me the story of how Senator Durkin had held 

him up and he would withdraw his name and run against Durkin 

159 

and beat him in 1976. So there is not so much new about these 

holds. 

Mr. Vice President, this has been very helpful to have you here. 

Senator Udall was talking about his impressions as a new Senator. 

Mine was shock at the filibustering of Judge Pryor, who had 

clerked for Judge Wisdom in New Orleans, for whom I had clerked, 

Judge Pickering, who had been a civil rights advocate in Mississippi when it was unpopular, Miguel Estrada, and Priscilla 

Owen. Do you think it was wrong for the Democratic minority to 

filibuster President Bush’s judicial nominees when he was President? 

Mr. MONDALE. What we are getting at here is whether we are 

all taking situational, tactical positions on the rules – that is using 

them when it serves our purposes and opposing it when it doesn’t. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Right. 

Mr. MONDALE. My view is you have to live by these rules. They 

were bipartisan. We put them in place. I hope they can be bipartisan if there are any changes now. And I don’t see anything in the 

rules that says that you can’t filibuster a nominee as well as a regular measure. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you for that. There had been a precedent, of course, of not doing that. Justice Scalia—well, we won’t go 

into all of that, but it was a big, big change. And when we Republicans, and I was one really on the other side of this issue with the 

Gang of 14 movement, when many Republicans tried to change the 

rules and assert the argument you are now making, the constitutional argument, Senator Reid said it would be the nuclear option. 

It would be the end of the Senate as we know it and it was going 

to be Armageddon. 

Let me go back to my earlier point about the hold that Senator 

Metzenbaum put on me. You mentioned Senator Allen. 

Mr. MONDALE. Yes. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And you remember when you were first 

elected, Senator Williams from Delaware, who would sit on the 

front row and had this high voice. We have always had, at least 

in my experience here of watching the Senate and serving in it, individual Senators who have exercised these rules, and we have 

them today. 

I mean, if you will remember in the 1980s, Senator Byrd and 

Senator Baker operated the Senate on the sort of handshake that 

Senator Nickles talked about. They had these, I guess you would 

call them broad agreements on every bill that came up, that we 

would bring up the X bill, the financial regulation bill, and we will 

have 35 amendments on it, or 36, 18 here and 18 here, and then 

we will vote, and that is how almost all business was done. Of 

course, it can’t be done if one Senator objects, which may be the 

reason we don’t have that kind of thing today. 

So I am going to ask you a question and this will be my last one. 

It seems to me that changing the 60 would only make less likely 

bipartisanship, because when the Democrats have had 60 in the 

last year and a half, they paid no attention to the Republicans and 

they have just jammed their own legislation through, in my judgment. When they get fewer, they will have to pay attention to us, 

or we are in the majority and you have fewer, we will have to pay 

160 

attention to you, and that produces compromise and bipartisanship, 

I believe. 

But maybe there is a different way to deal with the question of 

the individual Senator who puts on too many holds or holds up 

things for too long without changing the 60. I mean, is there a solution for a Senator who the rest of the Senators think is taking advantage of the rules and making it impossible for the Senate to operate under the kind of broad agreements that Senator Byrd and 

Senator Baker once used to manage the flow of the Senate? 

Mr. MONDALE. I think one of the things that many Senators have 

tried to do is make these holds public so the holder must explain 

to his colleagues and to his constituents why he is doing it. As you 

know, there is a rule here now that if you put on a hold for longer 

than six days, the name will be disclosed, and so now there is a 

strategy for rolling the hold so that every fifth day, the name of the 

holder changes. So it has frustrated the disclosure. If there would 

be some way to guarantee public disclosure immediately, that 

might help. 

But there is nothing in the rules about holds. There has never 

been a Senate decision. But it is now not a minor problem, it is a 

pervasive problem, and every leader, Republican leader and Democratic leader, has at one time in his career stood up and lamented 

what holds have done to his ability to conduct a sensible Senate. 

I think we need to deal with holds, because it is now a much bigger 

problem and it is a growing problem because it works, it is secret, 

it is effortless, and it is, I think, very destructive of the purposes 

of the Senate. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Alexander. 

Now, we had asked unanimous consent at the beginning of this 

hearing that when Senator Byrd arrived if he could make his opening statement. I don’t believe he will ask questions. So with everyone’s permission, he has been waiting for a couple of minutes, I 

would like to call on Senator Byrd to make his opening statement. 

Senator Roberts will ask questions and you will be on your way, 

but it has been really helpful for you to be here today. 

[Pause.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you for being here, Senator Byrd. I 

think I join everyone here—Senators, Vice President Mondale, and 

the audience—in really thanking Senator Byrd for going out of his 

way to be here. 

Senator, your name has come up on many, many occasions in 

this hearing and how you were so instrumental in what happened 

and in forging the compromise in 1975 and in many other ways. 

We are honored you are here. I know it will be a token, not just 

to the attendees here but to this committee and the whole Senate, 

of how important you think this subject is. So thank you, and the 

floor is yours. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT C. BYRD, 

A U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

Senator BYRD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, in his 1789 journal, 

Senator William Maclay wrote, and I quote, ‘‘I gave my opinion in 

161 

plain language that the confidence of the people was departing 

from us owing to our unreasonable delays. The design of the Virginians and of the South Carolina gentlemen was to talk away the 

time, so that we could not get the bill passed.’’ 

Our Founding Fathers intended the Senate to be a continuing 

body that allows for open and unlimited debate and the protection 

of minority rights. 

Senators have understood this since the Senate first convened. 

James Madison recorded that the ends to be served by the Senate 

were, ‘‘first, to protect the people against their rulers, secondly, to 

protect the people against the transient impressions into which 

they themselves might be led.’’ A necessary fence against such danger would be the United States Senate. 

The right to filibuster anchors this necessary fence. But it is not 

a right intended to be abused. 

During this 111th Congress, in particular, the minority has 

threatened to filibuster almost every matter proposed for Senate 

consideration. I find this tactic contrary to every Senator’s duty to 

act in good faith. 

I share the profound frustration of my constituents and colleagues as we confront this situation. The challenges before our nation are too grave, too numerous, for the Senate to be rendered impotent to address them, and yet be derided for inaction by those 

causing the delays. 

There are many suggestions as to what we should do. I know 

what we must not do. 

We must never, ever, ever, ever tear down the only wall, the necessary fence, that this nation has against the excesses of the executive branch and the resultant haste and tyranny of the majority. 

The path to solving our problem lies in thoroughly understanding 

the problem. Does the difficulty reside in the construction of our 

rules, or does it reside in the ease of circumventing them? 

A true filibuster is a fight, not a threat, not a bluff. For most of 

the Senate’s history, Senators motivated to extend debate had to 

hold the floor as long as they were physically able. The Senate was 

either persuaded by the strength of their arguments or unconvinced by either their commitment or their stamina. True filibusters were, therefore, less frequent, and more commonly discouraged, due to every Senator’s understanding that such undertakings 

required grueling, grueling personal sacrifice, exhausting preparation, and a willingness to be criticized for disrupting the nation’s 

business. 

Now, unbelievably, just the whisper of opposition brings the 

‘‘world’s greatest deliberative body’’ to a grinding halt. Why is that? 

Because this once highly respected institution has become overwhelmingly consumed by a fixation with money and media. 

Gone, gone are the days when Senators Richard Russell and Lyndon Johnson, and Speaker Sam Rayburn gathered routinely for 

working weekends and couldn’t wait to get back to their chambers 

on Monday morning. 

Now, every Senator spends hours every day throughout the year 

and every year raising funds for reelection and appearing before 

cameras and microphones. Now, the Senate works three-day weeks, 

with frequent and extended recess periods. 

162 

Forceful confrontation to a threat to filibuster is undoubtedly the 

antidote to the malady. Most recently, Senate Majority Leader Reid 

announced that the Senate would stay in session around the clock 

to bring financial reform legislation before the Senate. As preparations were made and the cots were rolled out, a deal was struck 

and the threat of filibuster was withdrawn. 

I strongly commend the Majority Leader for this progress, and I 

strongly caution my colleagues, as some propose to alter the rules 

to severely limit the ability of a minority to conduct a filibuster. I 

know what it is to be Majority Leader and wake up on a Wednesday morning in November, and find yourself a minority leader. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BYRD. I also know that current Senate rules provide the 

means to break a filibuster. I employed them myself in 1977 to end 

the post-cloture filibuster on natural gas deregulation legislation. 

This was the roughest filibuster I have experienced during my 

more than 50 years in the Senate. 

In 1987, I successfully used Rules 7 and 8 to make a non-debatable motion to proceed during the morning hour. No leader has attempted this technique since, but this procedure could be and it 

should be used. 

Over the years, I have proposed a variety of improvements to 

Senate rules to achieve a more sensible balance allowing the majority to function while still protecting minority rights. I have supported eliminating debate on the motion to proceed to a matter (except for changes to the Senate rules), or limiting debate to a reasonable time on such motions, with Senators retaining the right to 

unlimited debate on the matter once it was before the Senate. I 

have authored several other proposals in the past, and I look forward to our committee work ahead as we carefully examine other 

suggested changes. The committee must, however, jealously guard 

against efforts to change or reinterpret the Senate rules by a simple majority, by circumventing Rule 22, where a two-thirds majority is required. 

As I said before, the Senate has been the last fortress of minority 

rights and freedom of speech in this republic for more than two 

centuries. I pray that Senators will pause and reflect long before 

ignoring that history and tradition. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, thank you so much, Senator Byrd. 

First, I think for all of us, we are privileged to be here and hear 

your testimony. Anyone who is sitting here knows why Senator 

Byrd is revered in the Senate just by listening to him for the last 

15 minutes, where in his own inimitable style, he made powerful, 

practical, and traditional arguments. I don’t think need permission, 

and I am going to take the liberty of distributing your remarks to 

every member of the Senate. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Vice President, please. 

Mr. MONDALE. It was my privilege to serve with Senator Byrd 

when he was Minority and Majority Leader, to be Vice President 

presiding when we had some fairly rigorous tests of the rules—— 

Senator BYRD. You bet. 

[Laughter.] 

163 

Mr. MONDALE [continuing]. And I came to deeply admire his understanding and his statesmanlike approach to these rules. Most of 

the rules that did reform the Senate, he himself wrote. They are 

the Byrd Rules, and it is an honor to hear from the Senator again 

today. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. It is really 

one of those moments in the Senate, I think, that many of us will 

just not forget. 

Thank you, Senator Byrd. Thank you so much. 

Senator BYRD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank 

the committee, and I thank the Vice President. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator. That was great. 

I just want to say, as Senator Byrd leaves, that we forget the traditions of the Senate in this rushed, sometimes partisan, angry 

world, and he brings us right back to it. This really was, in my 

opinion, and I think and hope I am not—I don’t think I am overstating it, sort of a hallowed moment. 

Senator Roberts, you may resume questioning of Vice President 

Mondale. 

Senator ROBERTS. That is a pretty tough act to follow, to say the 

least. I recall when we first went to Great Britain on an interparliamentary exchange led by Ted Stevens, thinking that he could 

work things out better on the Appropriations Committee with Senator Byrd if we took him over to Great Britain, and I can’t remember which Brit gave the opening speech, but it indicated that he 

wanted to welcome those of us from the colonies who obviously did 

not understand all of the intricacies of the mother country, but that 

we were certainly welcome. I leaned over to the British fellow to 

my left and said, he will regret those remarks for the rest of his 

life—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROBERTS [continuing] Because it was Senator Byrd who 

responded and then instructed all those present on the reign of virtually every King of England—and queen, and the politics behind 

it. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROBERTS. Two hours later, the guy sitting next to me 

said, ‘‘I say, is he going to continue through every one of them?’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROBERTS. And I said, yes, he is, and he did. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROBERTS. That was signature Bob Byrd, who also enthralled us during the entire trip with a lot of other stories. 

Tom indicated that he was worried as a new Senator about coming to the graveyard of good ideas. Some feel—actually, I feel there 

is a growing number that might say that some of these ideas are 

bad ideas that deserve a decent burial. I think it is very important 

to pass legislation. I think that is probably why we are created, the 

House, the Senate. But it is just as important to prevent bad legislation from passing. 

I kept telling Max Baucus and Chuck Grassley on the Finance 

Committee, Mr. Vice President, that we ought to have a flashing 

light, ‘‘Do no harm,’’ every time we considered a myriad of amendVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00173 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
164 

ments that obviously not many people knew a lot about, with the 

exception of our Chairman. 

At any rate, I stand in admiration of Senator Byrd and his fierce, 

fierce fight for the rights of the minority, and also in regards to the 

executive branch. I think the elephant in the room here as to why 

we have so many problems, or challenges, really, I don’t want to 

call them problems, is that the executive branch obviously has a 

tremendous agenda. I don’t know whether to compare it to the New 

Deal or the Great Society or whatever has been said by the knowing pundits that will testify here, but my goodness, I cannot think 

of any endeavor that affects any person’s interest in the country 

that has not been touched by legislative efforts under the banner 

of change. 

I think if you looked at the primaries, and we have the expert 

on primaries here to my right, who is a dear, dear friend, but I 

think that there has been an obvious reaction with regards to debt 

and spending and government takeovers and jobs and terrorist policy, et cetera, et cetera. And I say that because I think that that 

is the push, and Senator Byrd mentioned the executive that is coming down the pike and it is a lot like a fire hose. If it isn’t legislative, it is done by Executive Order and you read about it on page 

11 of some newspaper, if you read newspapers anymore, and it is 

a pretty shocking kind of thing to you. You say, oh, wait a minute. 

I would like to grab onto that and get it back to committee, but 

we don’t go to committee anymore. 

We bypass committees, and I think that is one of the things that 

Senator Nickles brought up and I am sure the Vice President 

agrees. You have got to go to committees, where the expertise is, 

and then hopefully avoid the appropriators trying to change it and 

then reach some accommodation and that is how it worked. But 

that is not how it is working now, because we are leapfrogging the 

committees on very, very important ideas that Tom has mentioned 

over there in his comments. 

I want to talk about holds just a minute. I put holds on people. 

I don’t like it at all. When I do so, I do it publicly. But I was stuck 

with a situation where there were many reports, and I believed 

that they had legs, where we were going to transfer those in Gitmo 

up to Fort Leavenworth where we had the Command and Staff 

School, and it is the intellectual center of the Army. That is where 

General Petraeus wrote the doctrine that is in evidence today with 

Afghanistan, hopefully that will be successful. 

We have inside-out security, but we don’t have outside-in, and I 

thought the suggestion was ludicrous. I tried with the White 

House, with the Department of Defense, with the National Security 

Council, with DOD, even the CIA, to figure out, is this really going 

to happen? Is there any possibility of this happening? And then finally I couldn’t get any assurance, so I just put a—I said, I want 

assurance from the White House that this is not going to happen, 

and so I put a hold on the Secretary of the Army, who happened 

to be a very good friend of mine, a Republican Congressman replacing Pete Sessions, who was also a very good friend of mine. 

At any rate, he called me and he said, ‘‘Why do you have a hold 

on me?’’ And I said, well, you are a great friend. I just thought I 

would pick you out and give you a little publicity. And he said, 

165 

‘‘Well, what is the problem?’’ I said, I don’t have any problem with 

you, John. It is just I am trying to get an answer from somebody 

to indicate to me where we are in regards to moving incarcerated 

terrorists to Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Well, I finally got what I needed, and I can’t talk about it because it was all confidential, and right now, that whole policy, I 

think, is sitting over there at the Justice Department somewhere 

being decided. But that was a case where I thought at least a hold 

was justified. I am not talking about holds that will last forever to 

hold up the progress of the Senate. That did hold up the situation 

with the Secretary of the Army. I know the head of DOD, Mr. 

Gates, who is from Kansas, certainly let me know how he felt about 

it. 

I have always felt, I would tell the Chairman, that I didn’t want 

any amendment that I would like to offer up to be debated on the 

floor of the Senate. I didn’t even want it debated in the committee. 

I thought if I didn’t have enough merit in the amendment to talk 

to somebody on the other side, regardless of who is in power on the 

committee, to put it in the Manager’s Amendment or just agree by 

unanimous consent, that I probably didn’t have too much business 

offering the amendment, and I certainly didn’t want a vote on the 

Senate floor, where a vote could go the other way and then that 

puts it in cement and then you have lost the issue. I know there 

are those Senators who would rather have the debate and lose than 

they would make any progress with the amendment. So that is just 

my school of thought. 

I think we do reach agreements, as Senator Nickles has indicated, when the rubber meets the road. We did during impeachment. We all met in the Old Senate Chamber and individuals came 

together and we worked a way out of a very difficult situation. 

I don’t know when we are going to meet like that again to reach 

some kind of accommodation with what we have facing us, which 

I say is a very ambitious agenda in a Senate and a country that 

is very Balkanized in regards to the response to all of that. I suspect it will come finally during the time of entitlement reform, 

which we must tackle, and our economic situation, and I think we 

are just going to have to sit down and say, all right, we have to 

do this regardless of the press, as the Senator has indicated, or 

elections or anything else. We will have no alternative. And I hope 

that would be rather a gloomy prospect if that is the only thing 

that can really bring us together. But I would hope that we could 

do what Senator Nickles has pointed out and also what the Vice 

President has pointed out. 

I am way over time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. It is always a pleasure to listen 

to Senator Roberts. He didn’t talk about each King of England, but 

he had a lot of wisdom in what he had to say. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Vice President, thank you so much. 

Mr. MONDALE. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. As Tom Udall went out, his hat was off to 

you and how you have really helped us in this debate. 

Mr. MONDALE. Thank you. 

166 

Chairman SCHUMER. So your generous donation, in a sense, of 

your time, but more importantly of your thinking, is going to help 

us, and certainly I will be continuing to consult you as we move 

forward here. 

Mr. MONDALE. Thank you very much. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. Thank you. 

Let us call our next panel, and I appreciate their understanding. 

I am going to give brief introductions because we are running a little late. We have a great panel here and let me just quickly do the 

introductions of our two witnesses. 

Steven Smith is a Professor of Social Sciences at Washington 

University and Director of the Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy there. He is the author of several books on the U.S. Congress, including ‘‘Politics or Principle?’’, 

which is about the filibuster. He is a former fellow of the Brookings 

Institute. 

Norm Ornstein is a name well known to every one of us here. 

He is a resident scholar of the American Enterprise Institute. He 

also serves as Co-Director of the Election Reform Project and is the 

author of many books about Congress, including ‘‘The Broken 

Branch.’’ He writes a weekly column for Roll Call, is an election analyst for CBS News, and is counselor to the Continuity of Government Commission. 

Gentlemen, each of your statements will be read into the record, 

and if you could keep your testimony to the allotted time, which 

I am sure you will, that would be great. 

Professor Smith. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN S. SMITH, DIRECTOR, THE 

WEIDENBAUM CENTER ON THE ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT, 

AND PUBLIC POLICY, KATE M. GREGG PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Bennett. This 

is a very important set of hearings. The Senate is, I think, at an 

important juncture in its history and the upshot of my testimony 

is that we actually have reached a point in the Senate that is 

qualitatively different than the Senate has been in at any time in 

its past and it is time to consider some changes, both in the rules 

and in how the parties and Senators behave. 

My general argument is that one of the important roles of the 

Senate is to serve as a policy incubator, that is, for Senators to use 

their time and creativity to define and address the important problems of the country. But the Senate in the last ten years and especially in the last five years or so has reached a point where the 

Senate’s most valuable resources, the time and creativity of its 

members, is undercut by how the Senate has come to operate. 

As we have seen throughout the hearing and as the two of you 

know perfectly well, the more vigorous exploitation of minority 

rights and the majority response has had a very pervasive effect, 

and I think a negative effect, on how the Senate is operated. Here 

is what I see. 

In recent Congresses with both Democratic and Republican minorities, very few major measures have been untouched by efforts 

167 

to delay or prevent action. I have some tables at the end of my testimony that you can take a look at. The minority has engaged in 

more silence in response to majority requests for clearance of bills 

for consideration. There have been more frequent objections to majority party unanimous consent requests to structure debate and 

amendments. There are more holds extended to more minor measures and nominations, something for an outsider very difficult to 

count, but plainly true. There are more delays of Senators, and 

sometimes, I think, deliberately minority party Senators to get to 

the floor to offer amendments. And even an increase in the number 

of minority party unanimous consent requests to try to restructure 

floor debate as they see fit. 

Now, the minority’s moves have motivated majority party leaders 

to leave nothing to chance. In kind of a tit for tat fashion, in kind 

of a parliamentary arms race fashion, over the years, the majority, 

indeed, has responded, just as we heard this morning from a variety of Senators on the Republican side. Beyond having a quick trigger on filing for cloture, Majority Leaders and bill managers of both 

parties have more frequently filled the amendment tree, more frequently used their own amendments to prevent other amendments 

from becoming the pending business, a tactic which became an especially sensitive matter just yesterday when the minority took advantage of the fact that a pending amendment prevents another 

amendment from being considered except by unanimous consent. 

This has led to tightened unanimous consent agreements, including the use of 60-vote requirements for amendments, which is a 

relatively new development. And beyond the obvious things on the 

floor, it has moved Majority Leaders to take a closer look at nonconference mechanisms to avoid debatable conference motions. And 

on some sensitive matters, especially on appropriations bills, Majority Leaders have avoided floor action altogether by facilitating 

the creation of omnibus bills in conference to limit the number of 

shots at the bills once they get to the floor. 

Now, this is not the kind of Senate that I heard anyone here 

wanting in the future. This is a question of the power of the Senate. What kind of a Senate is it that fails, because of the desire to 

avoid floor delay and obstruction, what kind of a Senate is it that 

fails to even consider appropriations bills that are the foundation 

of the power of the purse of the Congress in dealing with the executive branch? 

Now, of course, the minority has not remained idle. The minority’s countermeasures include more objections to unanimous consent 

requests, frequently more resolutely opposing cloture on bills. 

There have been any number of instances in which a Senator in 

the minority has said, because I can’t get my amendment up, I am 

going to vote against cloture. So in this context, procedural prerogatives intended to protect an open, deliberative, flexible process 

has, in fact, generated in practice a complicated process that is 

often rigid and procedure-bound. 

Now, the best metaphor for this, I think, is actually a medical 

one. It is really a syndrome, kind of an obstruct and restrict syndrome, one in which well-justified procedural moves on each side 

accumulate and harm the institution. 

168 

Each party now begins with the working hypothesis that the 

other side will fully exploit its procedural options, and so it must 

fully deploy its without any evidence from the other side that it is 

using its procedural options to harm its interests. Now, this can 

hardly be argued to be the kind of Senate in which every Senator 

gets an opportunity to fully explore new policy ideas. It is, in fact, 

a Senate that over the last decade or so has managed to radically 

reduce the incentives for individual Senators to take the time and 

to apply the creativity to address the nation’s problems. 

My second major point is that this is a role that the Senate 

should focus on. We are a country with immense problems. Senators of both sides have argued for years that many of these problems have gone unaddressed. Part of it is in our larger system of 

government, the checks and balances, divided party control of the 

House and the Senate and the Presidency and so on, but a large 

part of it rests right here in the Senate. 

The constitutional features of the Senate that encourage this, of 

course, were the longer terms, the overlapping terms, the continuity of the Senate. All of this gave the Senate a special place for 

the application of creativity in addressing new ideas, building a national constituency for new ideas, and so on. Much of that has now 

been undercut by the system we have. 

I favor a system where we reach a new balance. It is unfortunate, but we can’t reverse history. We can’t really expect the parties to unilaterally disarm. I think it is up to the Senate to figure 

out a few new ways to limit debate and at the same time protect 

minority rights that are currently being threatened by this awful 

obstruct and restrict syndrome. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith submitted for the record] 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Professor Smith. 

Mr. Ornstein. 

STATEMENT OF NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 

RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. It is a particular pleasure 

to testify in front of you and in front of this committee, which is 

filled with people who really do care about the Senate and its role 

in the American democratic process. I am particularly grateful that 

it does not require a motion to proceed for me to move on to my 

testimony or we might be here all week. 

Let me start by saying that I am really not among those who 

want to end Rule 22. I don’t want the Senate to become like the 

House. I actually think that the Senate has become more like the 

House, in part because so many House members, especially the 

Class of 1994 and classes that have followed, have gravitated over 

here and have brought some of the norms of a harshly partisan, 

deeply divided, and perhaps ultra-efficient House into the Senate 

DNA a little bit more than they should have. 

As I listened to the testimony and as I watched the testimony 

from the last hearing—by the way, I want to commend the committee, more than any other, the ability for somebody to be able to 

go to your website and watch what you do and see, by the way, 

169 

how carefully it is done is just a Godsend for those of us who follow 

Congress. 

But I have had some sympathy with both sides in this. We do 

have a chicken and egg problem, as Steve has said. This is a problem for the majority and the minority in a lot of ways, and it is 

a problem of the culture. And it is, as Senator Byrd so eloquently 

said, in some respects a problem of the larger political culture, the 

outside moving and infecting the inside, and some of that outside 

culture is particularly obnoxious at this particular point. But we 

can’t change the culture entirely inside the Senate and we need to 

also focus to some degree on the rules. And hopefully, we can find 

ways to change the norms and the rules together. 

I am not going to spend a lot of time because of the substance 

of this hearing on specific recommendations, although I am very 

happy, and both of us, along with other scholars who follow this 

process closely, have lots of ideas about specific things to do. But 

I want to mention—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. I would just ask, either of our witnesses 

here, if they would like to offer suggestion. But, we are not up to 

specific suggestions yet. 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. Yes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. But if you would, it would be really helpful 

to us if you want to submit in writing some specific suggestions 

and we would add them to the record. Then we might have you 

back again to ask questions about your suggestions, if that would 

be okay. 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. I think both of us would be delighted to do so—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. 

Mr. ORNSTEIN [continuing]. And, of course, to work with the committee in any way that we can to help to move this process forward. 

I want to talk about a couple of elements that I think are a focal 

point of this hearing which really are what all this has done to the 

fabric of governance in America. 

I had great sympathy for Senator Alexander when he was held— 

his nomination for Secretary of Education was held by Senator 

Metzenbaum. Steve Smith turned to me at that particular moment 

and said, well, we have 100 Metzenbaums now. And one of the 

problems is that nominations that are held for three months, or in 

many cases six months, nine months, a year, or more, many leaving nominees to twist in the wind, have an enormous human cost 

for those individuals. I have sympathy for Senator Roberts, having 

a really serious concern and wanting to get the attention of the executive branch and held up Congressman McHugh, which was 

painful to Congressman McHugh. 

But Congressman McHugh was already here in Washington, had 

a job, had a house. Imagine people who make a commitment to 

public service and are living outside the city, as most of them do, 

thankfully, and we leave them twisting in the wind. I think individual Senators often do not recognize the human cost to people. 

They can’t move their families. They can’t time school years. We 

are losing a lot of good people, and at the same time, we are finding agencies, critical agencies, that are left headless or without the 

170 

main people who are designed to run things, career civil servants 

waiting for direction and can’t get them. 

I can tell you from what I have heard from local officials out in 

the country that one of the main problems we had in getting the 

stimulus package actually out there to have a more immediate and 

vibrant effect on the economy was that you had to expedite action 

through waivers of things like Environmental Impact Statements, 

or to move things more quickly than the normal process, and they 

couldn’t do it because the officials were not in place. 

At the same time, one of the great difficulties that we have is it 

is wonderful to have a tradition of unlimited debate and unlimited 

amendments. We are not in the 19th century. There is a huge 

agenda. Whether you like some elements of that agenda or not, the 

regular business of having authorizations done for programs and 

agencies, of having appropriations, is a necessary component for 

good governance. Whether you are a big government liberal or a 

small government conservative, the government that we have to 

protect the integrity of the country, to protect our citizens, ought 

to be run effectively and well. 

We have gone for years in many cases without programs being 

authorized, and that hurts the implementation of those programs. 

Talk to any civil servant or government official trying to administer 

a program when you don’t know what your appropriation is going 

to be, or you have to operate for months on a continuing resolution 

and then all of a sudden get a flood of money coming in. It is no 

way to run a government. Now, that is not entirely attributable to 

the way that the Senate is operating, but in fact, we have been 

forced because of the way the system has become clogged to move 

away from the regular order in too many ways. 

The human cost is there for judges, as well. I must say, Senator 

Bennett, you are absolutely right that we did not have a tradition 

of filibustering nominees, although we did have filibusters before, 

including Justice Fortas. But not to get into that argument, what 

did change long before we had a discussion of filibusters of judicial 

nominees was an increasing practice of holding up nominations to 

try and keep slots open from one administration to the next, and 

that was a dramatic change from what we had had before. 

And we have large numbers of judicial nominees, Elena Kagan 

among them, who sat for long periods of time when there were no 

objections to their individual qualifications—this was true for both 

parties—many of whom ultimately withdrew. Just as for executive 

branch officials, if you are in a law firm or in a university and you 

are waiting to take a leave or trying to leave your firm, you are 

left in limbo. It is no way to run things. 

Frankly, I can make a better case for filibustering lifetime appointments than I can for filibustering temporary appointments for 

any period of time, but in either case, we are not considering the 

human cost. 

There are ways to deal with these things, and the hold itself and 

the way it has exploded as a tactic for holding up hundreds and 

hundreds, not individual nominees, many of whom—most of whom 

now are not held up because of their qualifications or concerns but 

as hostages, and some for the purpose of killing them, can be 

changed. The notion of filibusters on motions to proceed moves 

171 

away from any argument about trying to cut off debate because, in 

fact, that is an attempt itself to cut off debate. And if we took Senator Schumer’s chart and parsed it out, you would find an increasing number of the cloture motions are on motions to proceed. 

And finally, let me say, if we talk about the numbers, one very 

simple change to consider, remember in 1975 we went from twothirds of the Senate—or, excuse me, from two-thirds of the Senate 

present and voting to three-fifths of the Senate—would be to simply move to three-fifths of the Senate present and voting. One of 

the real problems you have got now is if somebody is sick, as we 

saw with Senator Byrd, one individual can create an enormous 

roadblock if you have a rigid number. So there is a way to preserve 

the number 60 but to create a little bit more flexibility. And then 

there are other ways to make sure that we can expedite action 

while preserving the right of a minority and the right of other 

members to offer amendments and have debate. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ornstein submitted for the 

record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Ornstein. I thank both our 

witnesses for excellent testimony. 

We are running much later than we thought, but I do have one 

question. I have a whole lot of questions. I am going to submit 

some in writing. 

The debate that some of us have been focusing on is—is it the 

Constitution that trumps the rule in Rule 22? But Senator Nickles 

had something interesting to say, and Senator Bennett and I were 

chatting here. It really is a ‘chicken and egg’, I think, as I think 

it was you, Professor Smith, said. We say, the majority Democrats 

at this moment say, you are filibustering to delay. The minority Republicans say, we are filibustering because you won’t let us offer 

amendments. 

And, it was always sort of in my mind a tradeoff, having moved 

from the House to the Senate, that I thought, ‘well, that is the 

tradeoff.’ The majority sets the agenda and the minority gets to 

offer amendments, not just to that agenda but other things. It 

seemed to me sort of a balanced system. In a sense, when I moved 

from the House to the Senate, I said it is harder in the Senate because you have to vote on all kinds of things, and you don’t have 

the Rules Committee when you are in the majority. I have served 

minority House, majority House, minority Senate, majority Senate. 

Only one is really bad. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. So there was that sort of balance, and it is 

sort of taken out of the way. Now, I could argue with Senator Bennett that holds on nominees are not intended to prevent debate and 

amendment but just intended to be dilatory. Motions to proceed are 

somewhat different. 

But my question, and I will only ask one here, although I am interested in your views, and I will ask you in writing, on the Constitution versus Rule 22, is this. Do you think there is some hope? 

Senator Nickles said, don’t change the rules. Try to come to some 

bipartisan agreement, you know, agreement between the caucuses, 

I think he called it. 

172 

Do you think that is possible in this day and age, where the majority would say to the minority, we are going to ensure your right 

to offer several amendments, or a bunch of amendments, not to be 

dilatory, not to take over. It would be unfair, it seems to me, for 

the minority to spend more time on their amendments that are not 

relevant to the bill than the majority spends on the bill itself. That 

would take away the power to set the agenda. But we will guarantee you your right to offer some non-germane amendments, but 

in return, you don’t slow things down unnecessarily. 

I don’t know, maybe that tradeoff could work, especially given 

the fact that each of us realizes we may be on the other side, majority-minority, several times in our career, as has happened to me. 

So that is my only question. I would ask each witness to give an 

answer, and then we will call on Senator Bennett and let people 

go. 

Mr. SMITH. Senator Schumer, I certainly favor some kind of a 

mixed package that, on the one hand, limits debate at least on 

some motions, the motion to proceed. I would like to see some limits on motions to go to conference. I would even like to see limits 

on debate on amendments, which would have the effect of guaranteeing the minority a vote on an amendment that is taken up on 

the floor. And in exchange for that, some real guarantees for the 

minority to offer amendments and to debate those amendments 

and the bill. 

Now, whether that is a tradeoff that would be acceptable to the 

minority, I am actually very dubious about that. If some kind of a 

tradeoff like that is not possible, then we do fall back on the question of how the majority can change the rules without making the 

case that the Constitution allows it to do so by a simple majority. 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. I would love to see this handled informally. I have 

sympathy for the minority. I must say, though, one problem that 

I have seen and I mention in my testimony, we have had a number 

of bills that ended up passing unanimously or near unanimously 

that had to go through filibusters on the motions to proceed and 

on the bills themselves and took days and days. I mention a nomination for a court of appeals where this poor woman was held 

twisting in the wind for months and months and then ultimately 

got through on a near-unanimous vote. 

The only reason for doing that—this is not about the concerns 

about having an opportunity to debate. This is to stretch out an 

agenda. And so you have got to come to an agreement, and whether 

that agreement can be reached, I don’t know. 

More generally, I just believe that people who make the sacrifice 

for public service deserve at some point a vote, and in almost every 

instance, it ought to be an up or down vote. And so I don’t think 

you can achieve that without some change in the rules that takes 

nominations to a different level, and it seems to me that there may 

be some opportunity there for a bipartisan agreement. You are 

going to have to do some mix of informal negotiations between 

leaders and among members, and I hope some bipartisan consensus 

on a modest package of rules changes, but I don’t see any other 

way out. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Obviously, if we had bipartisan consensus, 

we wouldn’t have to debate whether we need 67, 60, or a majority. 

173 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. Yes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both 

of you for your patience today and your thoughtful consideration. 

Mr. Ornstein, I would make just one comment about the objection to the motion to proceed. I will not speak for Senator McConnell, but I have been at the leadership tables where the decisions 

are made as to whether or not we will object to a motion to proceed, and in every instance, there is a significant negotiation that 

takes place where this becomes ultimately his ultimate weapon in 

his conversations with Senator Reid. It is not entered into lightly. 

Okay, Senator Reid, we will give you the motion to proceed if we 

can have your word that the following things will happen. And 

again, I am not privy to any of the conversations, only as they get 

reported in the leadership table, and I am going to be very careful 

not to violate any confidentiality that comes out of that. 

It is my guess, I will put it that way, that there are circumstances where Senator Reid would like to accommodate Senator McConnell but feels he cannot because of the reaction he 

would get within his conference. And it is my guess that there are 

times when Senator McConnell would like to be more accommodating to Senator Reid but cannot because to do so would arise the 

ire of the Republican Conference. 

I remember Senator Dole saying to me, ‘‘I am supposed to be the 

leader around here,’’ and this was when we were in the minority, 

and, he said, ‘‘I have got 42 independent contractors I have to deal 

with,’’ every one of which has the right to object to a unanimous 

consent agreement and without giving any hint of circumstances or 

context. I have seen Senator McConnell be frustrated in a very legitimate kind of action that he would like to proceed with, frustrated by a single Senator who refused to give a unanimous consent agreement. And I have seen Senator Reid in the same circumstance, where a single Senator on his side has caused Senator 

Reid to, perhaps injudiciously, but I will protect him, make some 

less than flattering comments about a member of his own conference, as we then end up in the situation where we do. 

The only other comment I would make, I think the—and I do lay 

this at Tom Daschle’s door because he is the first one I saw who 

used it—the inability to appoint conferees by unanimous consent 

was always done. The leader picked the name. The unanimous consent agreement was made. The conferees were appointed. And Senator Daschle was the first one that I saw who said, no, we will not 

allow you to appoint conferees. We will allow you to pass the bill. 

Indeed, we will vote for it so we get credit with our constituents 

as being in favor of it. But we will not allow the bill to ever survive 

because we won’t allow you to appoint conferees. And that gives 

the minority power to dictate the results of the conference. 

And one of the things that has disturbed me, Mr. Chairman, as 

much as all of the filibusters and the holds, is that we are not having conferences anymore. 

Chairman SCHUMER. That is true. That is true. 

Senator BENNETT. When I first came here, it was, okay, we are 

going to write this bill in conference. We understand we have got 

to work with the House. We have got to work this out. We will 

174 

write the bill in conference, and it goes through. Okay, take that 

amendment in order to get to conference. And increasingly, we are 

not having any conference. 

So I say somewhat facetiously, the Senate is superbly structured 

to deal with the problems of the 19th century and we need to, 

whether it is done with precedent or whether it is done with rules 

changes or whether it is done with greater comity within the various conferences, we do have a problem. 

That being said, I reserve the right to object to anything you 

want to do—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BENNETT [continuing] With respect to changing the 

rules. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. And on that happy note—— 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER [continuing]. This was a great hearing. My 

only wish is that every one of our colleagues could have witnessed 

it, and maybe they will look at parts of it. It really has helped shed 

light on the big problems we all agree we face, even if we can’t yet 

agree on solutions. 

I thank the witnesses here—— 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER [continuing] And the earlier witnesses. I 

thank my fine colleague, Senator Bennett. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: SILENT FILIBUSTERS, HOLDS AND THE SENATE CONFIRMATION PROCESS 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 2010 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

SR–301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Schumer, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Schumer, Murray, Pryor, Udall, Warner, Bennett and Alexander. 

Staff Present: Jean Bordewich, Staff Director; Jason Abel, Chief 

Counsel; Veronica Gillespie, Elections Counsel; Adam Ambrogi, Administrative and Legislative Counsel; Sonia Gill, Counsel; Julia 

Richardson, Counsel; Lauryn Bruck, Professional Staff; Carole 

Blessington, Executive Assistant to the Staff Director; Lynden 

Armstrong, Chief Clerk; Justin Perkins, Staff Assistant; Mary 

Jones, Republican Staff Director; Shaun Parkin, Republican Deputy Staff Director; Paul Vinovich, Republican Chief Counsel; Michael Merrell, Republican Counsel; and Rachel Creviston, Republican Professional Staff. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SCHUMER 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. The hearing will come to order, and 

first I want to thank my good friend, Bob Bennett. He is always 

here, always diligent, always thoughtful. And all of my other colleagues for participating, Lamar Alexander who is here regularly 

and Mark Pryor who is here regularly, so thank you both for being 

here. 

And I also want to appreciate the participation of our most senior 

member, Senator Byrd, who watches these proceedings like a 

hawk. He knows the rules better than anybody else, and so I would 

ask unanimous consent that his written statement be submitted for 

the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator submitted for the record:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Now today I am also very glad to welcome 

Senators Wyden, McCaskill and Grassley as our first panel. All 

three of them have been leaders in efforts to end anonymous or secret holds and shine light on the kinds of long-term delays that can 

hold up a nomination or a bill or weeks or months or even longer, 

and it is done in the dark of night. 

I applaud Senators Wyden and Grassley for their sustained commitment over more than 10 years to this issue, again and again 

and again urging the Senate to take action. 

I also congratulate Senator McCaskill for her energetic and now 

successful campaign in this Congress to break loose nominations 

that have gotten stuck. I say ‘‘successful’’ because more than twothirds of Senators have signed her letter, pledging not to use secret 

or anonymous holds themselves. 

322 

I look forward to hearing from these three witnesses in our first 

panel. 

Now this is the third in a series of hearings I have called for this 

Committee to examine the filibuster and its impact on the Senate. 

Our first hearing in April focused on the history of the filibuster. 

Our second hearing in May dealt with the impact of the filibuster 

in the current Congress and on the functioning of the government. 

Today’s focus is on this, the title, ‘‘Silent Filibusters, Holds, Secret 

and Otherwise, and Senate Confirmation Process.’’ 

Now we did have some good news on this front yesterday with 

the passage by unanimous consent of 64 stalled nominations. Three 

of them, who nobody voted against, were first nominated on July 

9th of 2009. That is almost a year ago. Why were they blocked for 

so long? That illustrates vividly the problem we are examining in 

this hearing. 

Despite the easing of the logjam yesterday, what we have seen 

overall in this Congress is the worst obstruction of presidential 

nominations in recent memory, and the delays in confirmation are 

affecting the ability of both the Judiciary and the Executive Branch 

to do their jobs. Even under a Senate that flipped to Democratic 

control, President Bush’s nominations fared far better than have 

President Obama. President George Bush’s Cabinet was fully confirmed in 13 days; President Obama’s took 99 days. 

As this Congress has progressed, the President’s nominees continue to language, often when they have little or no real opposition. 

As of June 17th, President Obama had 137 nominations pending 

on the Executive Calendar. At the same point in his first term, 

President Bush had only 45. 

Here’s another indicator, judgeships. As of June 21st, of 84 

judges nominated by President Obama 34 had been confirmed; that 

is 40 percent. For President Bush in the same period, 57 out of 105 

judges had been confirmed; that was 54 percent. Now if this pace 

keeps up, President Obama will have the lowest judicial confirmation rate for his first Congress of any modern President. That is 

not a superlative that any of us should be proud of. 

As for nominations to the executive agencies, at the end of 2009, 

President Obama had more than one-third pending confirmation 

than President Bush had at the end of his first year, one-third 

more. That meant that almost a quarter of all Obama nominations 

were carried over to the second session of this Congress, and they 

are waiting longer to be confirmed than the typical nominee in previous administrations. 

For too many nominees, like some of those confirmed yesterday, 

it is months, even a year longer. Clearly, something is wrong, and 

we need to do something about it. Many of these delays relate to 

current Senate procedures, and here we can get into a back and 

forth where I think neither party is blameless. But there is a logjam, and we are trying to work in a bi-partisan way to figure out 

our way out of it. 

What do we mean by hold or silent filibusters when we talk 

about Senate procedures? While there is no single definition, it 

generally refers to the indication by an individual Senator a party 

that if a bill or nomination is brought up in the future they would 

object to debating it. This threat of a filibuster is what gives holds 

323 

their strength even though there is no requirement for a Majority 

Leader to honor a hold request. So it is sort of the first step backed 

up by the filibuster, which is what we have been talking about, 

whether they are silent, whether they are secret, or not. 

As the use of anonymous holds has escalated over the last 35 

years, there have been repeated attempts to address their use, as 

our first panel of witnesses will discuss today. Under the Advice 

and Consent Provisions of the Constitution, the Senator is responsible for confirming or rejecting presidential nominees. But it appears that the Senate, an institution designed to be deliberative 

and slow, is now dangerously close to gridlocked. 

When we are not able to get good, qualified people to be confirmed to government positions in a timely manner, it hurts the 

Country. We will hear more from our second panel about how the 

excessive delays are devastating to the operation of government 

and to the efforts to recruit people to Federal jobs. If it is known 

that once you are nominated and leave your job you are going to 

have to wait months and months and months, and then you might 

not be confirmed, who is going to take a Federal job in the future? 

And that is going to hurt all of us. 

Today’s hearing will continue what I hope is a thoughtful, deliberative examination of issues related to the filibuster by this Committee. As I said before, we are not trying to put blame on one 

party or the other; we are trying to deal with the problem that has 

brought us close to gridlock. We hope it will serve as a basis for 

future discussions. I believe it will show that we need to consider 

reforms to improve the confirmation process. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Schumer submitted for the 

record:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. All Committee members and witnesses are 

asked to limit their remarks to five minutes. We will not have 

questions after the first panel, but we will, time permitting, have 

questions for the second. I look forward to listening to our colleagues and the experts who have come to share knowledge and experience with us, and now turn to Senator Bennett. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. 

BENNETT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our colleagues here. 

I do not have an opening statement but will respond just briefly 

to the comments that you have made, particularly to the numbers 

with respect to those that have been held up. Speaking, if I may, 

however presumptuous it may sound, on behalf of my Leader, Senator McConnell, who has been Chairman of this Committee, I 

would point out that prior to Memorial Day Senator McConnell 

asked unanimous consent to approve over 60 people who had been 

held, and it was a Senator of the Majority Party who objected to 

that. 

And there were 64 nominations cleared yesterday by unanimous 

consent, with Senator McConnell’s support. Most of them were on 

the list of those that he offered on the 27th of May to be cleared, 

and, as I say, they were objected to by a member of the Majority. 

324 

So I do not dispute in any way, Mr. Chairman, the numbers that 

you have cited, but I do not want to leave the impression that all 

of the obstruction that has come as a result of the use of holds has 

come from the Minority side. If indeed these 60 that Senator 

McConnell tried to get through by unanimous consent had in fact 

been approved in May, the statistics you have referred would have 

taken the number of people being held down from 108 to 48, which 

is very close to the ballpark of that that you had cited for previous 

Presidents. 

That does not change the import of this hearing because the 

hearing is to talk about holds generically, without respect to party. 

I think it is an appropriate hearing to be held, and I appreciate 

your having called it and look forward to the testimony of our colleagues. 

Chairman SCHUMER. With the indulgence of my other colleagues 

here, we usually have opening statements from all of the members 

of the panel, but we have three members waiting. Would it be all 

right to go forward with our three panel members? 

Do you want to say something, Lamar? 

Senator ALEXANDER. I would, but I will be glad, could I do it 

after they make their statements. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Is that okay with everybody? 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, I would like to do the same thing. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Great. Okay. Terrific. 

Okay. Well, we have three panel members who all really deserve 

to be here by their work and their records. 

Since 1977, Senator Ron Wyden has been a powerful force in the 

crusade to changing Senate rules that allow Senators to block 

nominations and legislation anonymously. Since that time, along 

with Senator Grassley, Senator Wyden has been undeterred in his 

efforts to end secret holds. His current initiative, the Secret Holds 

Elimination Act, reduces the disclosure deadline from six days to 

two, requires disclosure whether or not the bill or nomination has 

been brought to the floor. As a matter of practice, Senator Wyden 

publically announces any hold he has placed on a nominee or a 

piece of legislation by inserting that statement in the Congressional Record. 

Senator Chuck Grassley, for over a decade, has been one of the 

primary voices to increase transparency and accountability in the 

Senate by strengthening the disclosure requirement for holds. In 

1999, Senator Grassley sent a letter to the Senate leaders that outlined a provision where any Senators placing a hold must notify 

the sponsor of the legislation and the Committee jurisdiction. In 

both the 109th and 110th Congresses, along with Senator Wyden, 

he authored the initiative to require the public disclosure of holds 

in ethics reform bills. 

Senator Claire McCaskill has been a vocal critic of the use of secret holds since she has been here and is currently calling for 

changes in Senate rules that would end the use of secret holds definitively. She has spearheaded a letter to the Senate leadership requesting them to bring an end to the practice of permitting secret 

holds. This letter also serves as a pledge for Senators to sign, 

promising that they will not place secret holds on legislation or 

325 

nominations. As of yesterday, 68 Senators had signed the pledge, 

and Senator McCaskill told me she expects the number to grow. 

Senators, your entire statements will be read into the record, and 

proceed as you wish. 

Senator Wyden, you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RON WYDEN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM OREGON 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and there 

certainly should not be a filibuster at any Senate reform hearings. 

So I am going to be very brief, and I thank you and colleagues for 

your courtesy. 

As you indicated, Mr. Chairman, for more than a dozen years, 

Senator Grassley and I, a Democrat and a Republican, have sat at 

tables just like this one, pulling out all the stops to persuade the 

United States Senate to stop doing public business in secret, and 

we are very pleased to be joined by Senator McCaskill who brings 

us energy and passion and skilled advocacy to the cause. 

What I thought I would do, Mr. Chairman, is just take a few 

minutes and walk the Committee through the odyssey that this reform journey has been on. The fact is the United States Senate has 

already voted repeatedly—repeatedly, Mr. Chairman and colleagues—to ban secret holds. In 1997 and again in 1998, the Senate actually voted unanimously for amendments to ban secret 

holds. This is not an abstraction. It is not a question of what you 

ought to do. The Senate voted twice to ban holds, unanimously. In 

fact, seven years almost to this date, I was before this Committee 

as well, talking about how we were finally going to get this done. 

But every time the Senate voted to pass legislation ending holds 

in the Senate, bills ending secret holds would then get changed in 

secret, usually in a conference committee. 

So the question is would you not think that a bill reforming Senate procedure, that the Senate passed overwhelmingly, would come 

back from a conference with the House with a ban on secret holds 

being intact? That would be logical, and it would be wrong. 

Now we have tried, Senator Grassley and I, a whole host of efforts to finally ban these holds. In 1999, we actually got personal 

commitments from both the Democratic and Republican Leader 

that neither Leader would honor unless it was formally made in 

writing. That commitment was made in a letter to colleagues. It 

was published in the Congressional Record. So the Democratic and 

Republican Leaders, Mr. Chairman, said they would not honor a 

secret hold. 

However, that pledge was not enforced, and, as Senator Grassley 

and I have pointed in this 12-year-long odyssey, both Democrats 

and Republicans continued to employ secret holds in the 106th 

Congress. 

Now that year, Senator Grassley and I got another amendment 

passed here in the Senate to ban secret holds. This was a recorded 

vote, colleagues, 84 to 13. That was included in the House, in the 

Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, and it was passed 

into law. 

That also came back from conference riddled with loopholes. The 

practice of secret holds has continued. 

326 

So, Mr. Chairman, our message, and it is a bipartisan one, is the 

stalling on secret holds reform has gone on long enough. It is time 

to end this stranglehold on the question of public business being 

done in public. It ought to be non-negotiable. If you cannot do it 

in public, you really should not be doing it, and that ought to be 

the rule with respect to Senate procedures. 

And thanks to Senator McCaskill’s good work, we have got new 

strength for this final push to stop flouting the public’s right to 

know. The American people want accountability. 

You have outlined the fact that this has gone on, on both sides 

of the aisle, and let me just touch on a couple of additional arguments. 

First, some claim that a secret hold does not prevent the Senate 

from considering a nomination or piece of legislation. The reality 

is it actually does, Mr. Chairman and colleagues. If the Leader has 

to file cloture, go through all of the procedures, especially at this 

time of the year, as a practical matter, it is not going to happen. 

So a secret hold, in effect, is one of the most powerful tools that 

a United States Senator has. It can be exercised in secret, and for 

all practice purposes it means that the American people will not 

even get a peek at a bill or a nomination. It was an incredible 

power that Senators have picked up. It has never been written 

down anywhere. 

The history of these holds, there is the hostage hold, the rolling 

hold, the Mae West ‘‘come up and see me sometime’’ hold. The Senate has as many versions of holds as pro wrestling, and the power 

to tie the Senate in knots is just as incapacitating as a smack-down 

wrestling move. 

Let me close with one last point that is not really brought up, 

Mr. Chairman. Secret holds and ending them will take a weapon 

out of the arsenal of lobbyists. The fact is that at lobbyist’s dream 

is to get some Senator to put a secret hold on something. The lobbyist’s fingerprints are not on it. There is no public debate. If you 

can get a United States Senator to put an anonymous hold on a 

bill, it is a lobbyist’s jackpot. And some of them are so good they 

can play both sides of the street as a result of being able to do it. 

So I close, Mr. Chairman, with this: The essence of holds reform 

is eliminating them altogether, requiring public disclosure of any 

hold or objection in the Senate and consequences if a Senator fails 

to disclose a secret hold. 

Mr. Chairman, it is time to end this dozen-year debate in the 

United States Senate about whether or not public business is going 

to be done in public. Senator Grassley and I are going to prosecute 

this cause until it actually happens, and we are very, very happy 

to have the passion and energy of Senator McCaskill. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Wyden submitted for the 

record:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Grassley. 

327 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHUCK GRASSLEY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY. The three of us, Mr. Chairman, just want to 

bring some transparency to the practice of holds in the Senate. It 

is a very informal process in the Senate, so it is easier said than 

done, just how to make them public, but I think our proposal does 

the trick. 

You know a hold arises out of a Senator’s right to withhold when 

unanimous consent is asked. A Senator has a right to object to a 

unanimous consent request if the Senator does not support it or he 

needs more information. A Senator, in fact, has an obligation to object if he feels an item is not in the interest of his constituents or 

if he has not had the opportunity to make an informed decision. 

Now in the old days, it was quite simple to do this, when Senators did most of their business at their desk on the Senate floor, 

just to stand up and say, I object. But now since most of us find 

the necessity of being off the Senate floor, in committee hearings 

or meetings with constituents and for a lot of other reasons, we 

rely on our Majority and Minority Leaders to protect our rights and 

prerogatives as individual Senators by asking them to object. 

Just as any Senator has a right to stand up on the Senate floor 

and publically say, I object, it is perfectly legitimate to ask another 

Senator to object in his behalf if he cannot be there. Senators have 

no inherent right to have others object on their behalf, however, if 

they want to keep that fact secret, and particularly if it is motivated out of secrecy. 

So what I object to is not the use of holds, because I do that myself, but the word ‘‘secret’’ in secret holds. If a Senator has a legitimate reason to object to proceedings, to a bill or a nominee, then 

he ought to have the guts to say so publically. 

A Senator because he does not agree with the substance of the 

bill or because the Senator has not had adequate opportunity to review the issue. Regardless, we should have no fear of being held 

accountable by our constituents or anybody else if we are acting in 

their interest. I have certainly not experienced any negative reaction from my policy of making public the fact of who it is, Chuck 

Grassley, and why I put a hold on a nomination or a bill. 

So, over a decade ago, as Senator Wyden has said, we started 

with a simple proposed rule that any Senator placing a hold must 

publish that hold in the Congressional Record, which Senator 

Wyden and I have done voluntarily ever since. That proposal was 

blocked in the Senate, but we were offered a non-binding policy by 

the Leaders instead. Of course, as Senator Wyden, that did not 

really do the job. 

We kept trying, and when Senator Lott became Chairman of the 

Rules Committee he took an interest in the issue as former Majority Leader, to deal with the issue of secrecy. In fact, we had a hearing like this, as Senator Wyden said, seven years ago. 

Senator Lott offered to work with us, and, along with Senator 

Byrd, we crafted a proposal that was more workable and enforceable. That proposal was adopted, as Senator Wyden said, 84 to 13. 

But you know what, even with that outstanding vote, it never got 

enacted. 

328 

Then our proposal was included in the so-called Honest Leadership and Open Government Act. Ironically, in a move that reflected 

neither honest leadership nor open government, our provisions 

were altered so substantially behind closed doors before the bill became law that they were not workable. 

Our current proposal would restore important features that were 

in that very amendment as originally adopted in the Senate and 

make it even more enforceable. In our proposed standing order, in 

order for a Majority or Minority Leader to recognize a hold, the 

Senator placing the hold must get a statement in the record within 

two days and must give permission to their Leader at the time they 

place the hold to object in that Senator’s name. Since the Leader 

will automatically have permission to name the Senator on whose 

behalf they are objecting, there will no longer be any expectation 

or pressure on the Leader to keep the hold secret. 

Further, if a Senator objects to a unanimous consent request and 

does not name another Senator as having the objection, the objecting Senator will then be listed as having that hold. 

So this will end entirely the situation where one Senator objects 

but is able to remain coy about whether it is in their own objection 

or some other unnamed Senator. All objections will have to be 

owned up to. 

Again, our proposal protects the right of individual Senators to 

withhold their consent but makes it public. The public’s business 

ought to be public. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley submitted for the 

record:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Grassley. 

Senator McCaskill. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLAIRE MCCASKILL, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member Bennett and the other members of the Committee, for having this hearing. 

I, first and most importantly, want to thank Senator Wyden and 

Senator Grassley. I am clearly standing on their shoulders. They 

have been tilling in this field for years and years, and they have 

been the leaders on this issue. I am happy to join their cause and 

perhaps provide some of that obnoxiously pushy passion that can 

maybe get this across the finish line. I have a feeling that this is 

one of the traditions of the Senate that is going to take some obnoxiously pushy passion to actually end. 

This practice reminds me of my kids when they were very little, 

when I would watch them play in the back yard, and one of them 

would try to get the other one to do something, and then they 

would stick out their tongue, put their hands on their hips and say, 

try to make me. 

This is an issue where Senators have voted shamefully—shamefully. Senators have voted for Senator Grassley’s and Senator Wyden’s proposals, and taken on the cloak of accountability and reform, and then behind closed doors have participated in the very 

practice they voted to end. That is the definition of cowardice. That 

329 

is the definition of a tradition that really smears the good name of 

the United States Senate. That is not what this body is about. That 

is not the kind of people that should be in the Senate. And that 

is the kind of practice that we need to finally, once and for all, end. 

Imagine the public humiliation that would have occurred yesterday when there was unanimous consent that was successfully shepherded through the Senate, and there were 64 people that were 

confirmed, and there were a handful of them that had been on the 

Executive Calendar for months and months and months, and yet 

there was not one negative vote against their nomination. Not one 

negative vote. They hung out on that Executive Calendar for 

months on end because someone wanted them to, but we will never 

know who it was. 

And what would have their explanation been to the press yesterday and to the people they represent, when they voted to confirm 

after months and months and months? They do not want to have 

to make that explanation. That is why the secret hold has such a 

powerful hold on the body, because you can avoid accountability. 

This is a very simple message. This is not about ending the hold. 

I respect the tradition of the Senate on holds. It should be a Senator’s prerogative to object to anything that is trying to be done 

unanimously, but there is no good reason for it to be done in the 

darkness of night. 

The simple message is there are now 68 Senators I am representing at this microphone this morning: 56 Democrats, 2 Independents that caucus with the Democratic Party and 10 Republicans. They have all said in writing, they want to abolish the secret hold and they will not participate in secret holds. 

The secret holds a courtesy granted to Senators at the expense 

of our democracy, and democracy is only as strong as the faith the 

American people have in it. They must believe that it truly is a democracy, and the hit our democracy is taking at the expense of secret holds is not worth the convenience to Senators to avoid the accountability. 

This is a political era where I think it is obvious that secret holds 

have been used by both sides of the aisle as a political tool, not as 

a method to take more time to learn about a nominee or to get 

questions answered, but as a political tool in the overarching game 

of the success of our team is the failure of the other team. And I 

indict both parties for this conduct. It is not just the Republican 

Party that is now in the Minority. I think both parties are guilty 

of it. 

And it is that game, that the success of our party is defined by 

the failure of yours, that is leading to the cynicism that is rampant 

in America right now about what we have chosen for careers, and 

I cannot blame them, especially if we cannot find it within ourselves to do away with the secret hold. 

If we can do away with the secret hold, then I think we maybe 

will be striking the note that America is looking for—that we can, 

on a bipartisan basis, say there are certain traditions here that 

maybe are not such a good idea anymore, that openness and transparency is what the people of this Country deserve. This is an urgent matter. 

330 

We have laws on the books, but they are not enforceable. I look 

forward to working with this Committee, and with Senator Grassley and Senator Wyden, to find the right approach that is enforceable. The attempts have been incredibly important, that Senator 

Grassley and Senator Wyden have made to end this practice, but 

the problem is the enforcement. That is where the rub is. That is 

where Senators want to avoid those uncomfortable moments that 

they are going to be called on the carpet and enforced to name who 

they are holding and why. That is the key here. 

And in the coming days, I will be working as hard as I know 

how, with Senator Grassley and Senator Wyden, through their 

leadership and the leadership of this Committee, to find the right 

approach, so that we can get this done once and for all. I think 

America deserves it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCaskill submitted for the 

record:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, I want to thank all three of our colleagues for really excellent and passionate testimony. 

I have to say after all the years that Senators Wyden, Grassley 

and McCaskill have worked on secret holds, I believe it is an idea 

whose time has truly come in not de jure, if you will, but de facto, 

relating to Senator McCaskill’s point. So we are going to work together to end secret holds, and I commit to the three of you today 

that I will work with you to achieving that end. 

With that, I thank our three witnesses for coming, and we will 

now go to opening statements. 

Senator Udall, would you like to say something? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM UDALL, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Schumer, and thank you 

for holding this hearing. I very much appreciate—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Before you begin, Senator Udall, and then 

after you, Senator Alexander, I have to step out for a brief second. 

Senator UDALL. [Presiding.] Okay. I appreciate the testimony 

today of our three colleagues. 

Over the past few months, during this series of hearings, we 

have discussed and debated example after example of how the filibuster in particular and the Senate’s incapacitating rules in general too often stand in the way of achieving real progress for the 

American people. Today’s topic, secret holds and the confirmation 

process, is just one more example of how manipulation of the rules 

continues to foster a level of gridlock and obstruction unlike any we 

have ever seen before. 

I want to commend Senator McCaskill for her dedication to 

transparency and government. Her fight to end the practice of secret holds is a worthy one that I wholeheartedly support. 

Earlier this year, I was proud to sign onto her letter, and today 

we have heard from her, and she has gathered enough to support 

to surpass the 67-vote threshold required to consider and amend 

the Senate rules. That is no small task, as everyone in this Committee would attest. She should be congratulated for her work, as 

331 

should all of our colleagues, Democrat and Republican, who have 

signed onto this effort. 

This bipartisan effort is proof that we are capable of working together. But the mere fact that we have to have this conversation, 

that Senator McCaskill had to work for months for 67 votes, to 

change rules that the Constitution clearly authorizes us to do with 

a simple majority vote, illustrates that secret holds are just another symptom of a much larger problem. 

The problem is the Senate rules themselves. The current rule, 

specifically Rule V and Rule XXII effectively deny a majority of the 

Senate the opportunity to ever change its rules, something the 

drafters of the Constitution never intended. As I have explained 

numerous times throughout this series of hearings, a simple majority of the Senate can adopt or amend its rules at the beginning of 

a new Congress because it is not bound by the rules of the previous 

Congress. Many colleagues, as well as constitutional scholars, agree 

with me. 

It is through this path by a majority vote at the beginning of the 

next Congress that we can reform the abusive holds, secret filibusters and the broken confirmation process. We can end the need for 

multiple cloture votes on the same matter, and we can instead 

begin to focus on the important issues at hand. 

Now critics will argue that the two-thirds vote requirement for 

cloture on a rules change is reasonable. They will say that Senator 

McCaskill managed to gather 67 Senators, so it must be an achievable threshold. As I said a moment ago, I commend her for her diligence in building support to end secret holds, but I think it is also 

important to understand that other crucial reform efforts have 

failed because inexplicably it takes the same number of Senators 

to amend our rules as it takes to amend the United States Constitution. 

The effect of holds on both legislation and the confirmation of 

nominees is not a new problem. In January, 1979, Senator Byrd, 

then Majority Leader, proposed changing the Senate rules to limit 

debate to 30 minutes on a motion to proceed. Doing so would have 

significantly weakened the power of holds and thus curbed their 

abuse. At the time, Leader Byrd took to the Senate floor and said 

that unlimited debate on a motion to proceed ‘‘makes the Majority 

Leader and the Majority Party the subject of control, and the will, 

of the Minority. If I move to take up a matter, then on Senator can 

hold up the Senate for as long as he can stand on his feet.’’ 

Despite the moderate change that Senator Byrd, it did not have 

the necessary 67 votes to overcome a filibuster. 

Efforts to reform the motion to proceed have continued since. In 

1984, a bipartisan study group recommended placing a 2-hour limit 

on the debate of a motion to proceed. That recommendation was ignored. 

In 1993, Congress convened a Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to determine how it could be a better institution. 

Senator Peter Domenici, my immediate predecessor, was the CoChairman of the Committee and at the hearing he said, ‘‘If we 

abolish the debatable motion to proceed, we have gone a long way 

to defusing the validity of holds because a hold is predicated on the 

fact that you cannot get a bill up without a filibuster.’’ 

332 

Despite a final recommendation of the Joint Committee to limit 

debate on a motion to proceed, nothing came of it. 

Talking about change and reform does not solve the problem, but 

we can hold hearings, convene bipartisan committees and study the 

problem to death. But until we agree that the Constitution provides the right for each Senate to adopt its rules of proceedings by 

a majority vote, there will be no real reform. 

Thank you, Chairman Schumer. 

And I would just ask that a Roll Call article on motion to proceed 

be included in my statement. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. [Presiding.] Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Udall and information submitted for the record:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. And again I want to thank Senator Udall, 

not only for his excellent testimony today, or his excellent opening 

statement, but for his interest in this whole issue which helped importune this Committee to call this series of hearings. 

Senator ALEXANDER. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAMAR 

ALEXANDER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

having the hearing. 

To put matters in perspective from my point of view, to begin 

with, one, I have supported abolishing secret holds and will again 

and was one of ten Senators to write the conferees in 2006 in saying do what we voted to do. 

Two, there is nothing new about them. I have told the story here 

of how when President Bush, the first, nominated me for Education 

Secretary, Senator Metzenbaum held me up for three months, and 

how Senator Rudman was held up by a Senator. He found out who 

made the hold and ran against him and beat him. So this all goes 

back through history. 

And at the beginning of this Congress I convened a couple of bipartisan breakfasts on the subject of slow confirmations, and I 

wrote an article and made a floor speech called ‘‘Innocent Until 

Nominated’’ out of concern that President Obama and other Presidents were not being allowed to get people in place. I found it was 

a little more complicated than it seemed. One reason was the President was slow making nominations. 

But I am willing to do more of all that and would like to see us 

address that in a bipartisan way, and I ask consent to include my 

article ‘‘Innocent Until Nominated’’ in the record of the hearing. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Without objection. 

Senator ALEXANDER. I also appreciate Senator Bennett’s comments on numbers. As I heard the Chairman’s numbers, the 65 executive nominations that were approved yesterday bring down to 

45 or 53; the number is still pending. That is about the same as 

President Bush had at this time, 45. 

And we do know who was holding those up. It was the President. 

It was the White House. According to the Republican Leader, the 

White House persuaded Senator Reid to object to moving those 

nominations unless they included Craig Becker, who in a bipartisan vote was not approved to go on the NLRB because of the fear 

333 

that he might eliminate the secret ballot in union elections by administrative fiat. So the White House then agreed to remove his 

name from the list, and all 64 nominations went through. 

So there was no Senator holding up those 64. It was the White 

House, and we do know who did that. So that is important to say. 

I think Senator McCaskill is right, that the problem with this 

idea is not the idea of getting rid of secret holds; it is enforcing 

that. 

And I would suggest that a better way to approach the problem, 

if the problem is delayed nominations, is simply to use the rules 

that we have. Senator Byrd suggested that might work. 

We did a little computation, and let’s look at this month. The 

Senate has accomplished nothing in the last three weeks except by 

unanimous consent. So Senator Reid could have moved on any controversial nomination on the 7th—that was the Monday we came 

back—to bring up nominees, and by the end of this week he could 

have forced through 8 controversial nominations if he had 60 votes. 

That would have respected the weekends, that would have respected the no-vote days, and it would have required a few allnight sessions. So that might have persuaded those who objected 

not to object to others. 

If Senator Reid wanted to continue to do that next week, he 

could have had 12 done, respecting weekends and no-vote days. 

So the Majority Leader can bring up a motion. No motion to 

bring up an executive nomination requires 60 votes; it just requires 

51. So the Majority Leader already has the authority. 

And insofar as legislation goes, the nature of the Senate is that 

it is a place to have unlimited debate and the right to amend, and 

so it is not a place where a freight train is supposed to run 

through. It is just the reverse of that. It is a place that operates 

by unanimous consent for a reason. 

If we change things, as the Senator from New Mexico would propose, we would have two Houses of Representatives operated by a 

majority vote. That might seem fine when you are in the Majority, 

but the shoe can quickly be on the other foot. It might be on the 

other foot by next year. 

And what if the freight train running through the Senate is not 

the Democratic freight train, but the Tea Party Express? There 

might be some members who are on the other side of the aisle who 

would like to use their Minority rights to protect, say, privatization 

of Social Security or John Bolton as the United Nations Ambassador, which is exactly the way they used those votes before. 

So secret holds, we should get rid of them. Getting rid of the Senate’s ability to protect Minority rights and defend against the tyranny of the Majority and slow things down so we can have a consensus as we did on Social Security, Medicare, civil rights, rather 

than run things through with a partisan vote as we did on health 

care, that is really what the debate is about, and that is why these 

hearings are important. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. 

334 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK R. WARNER, 

A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize about 

being late and missing our colleagues’ comments. 

I have to preface this by just saying as a new guy here and somebody who has never been a legislator—I have been a CEO in business and a CEO at the State level—I have enormous respect for 

the Senate and its traditions. Some of the traditions just do not 

seem to make sense. I mean I think, and I do believe that we can 

respect the traditions of this institution, that we can respect the 

rights of the Minority. I concur with Senator Alexander’s comments 

about protecting those rights, but I cannot in any way explain to 

folks in Virginia, why in a kind of a secret way someone can put 

somebody’s future on hold indefinitely makes any sense. 

When the American public questions what we are doing in the 

first place up here, to explain that this courtesy that was my understanding historically created back in the time when folks came 

to Washington on horseback and they wanted to have a courtesy 

to make sure that they could have somebody put on hold until the 

Senator got here, to say that in the 21st Century, even as bad as 

air traffic may be, that that needs to be maintained, and that people are not willing to fess up and explain why they are against 

someone being confirmed and then have that vote on someone, 

makes no sense to me. 

I have been proud to be with Senator McCaskill and Senator 

Whitehouse as we collected those colleagues’ efforts. I know we are 

at 67 right now. I think there are a number of other colleagues who 

may join us. I would love to see this hit 75 or 80 and truly be a 

bipartisan effort. It is long overdue, and the sooner we can act on 

this the better. 

Again as somebody new, I hesitate to counter Senator Alexander’s comments, but this idea that we should be spending all our 

time going through cloture votes and 60-vote margins for nominees 

that are supposed to be viewed as somewhat controversial because 

they have either been put on hold or someone wants to filibuster 

them, and then they pass, as the case of a judge that we had up 

for the Fourth Circuit that was a former Supreme Court in the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, supported not only by both Senator 

Webb and I but also by our Republican Governor, Governor McDonnell—to have Barbara Keenan left in limbo for months on end and 

then confirmed 99 to nothing. 

I may not be a total student of American history, but my memory 

of civics class in American history is that the filibuster has been 

traditionally reserved for issues of great consternation and requiring that supermajority and requiring being able to protect the 

rights of the Minority. It is a sham to me when we have the time 

of the Senate delayed to go through all this process and then time 

and again these judges are confirmed, and others are confirmed, at 

north of 90 votes. I do not get it. 

And again, respectful of the Senate’s rules, it seems to me to be 

a waste of time. It seems to be an abuse of power. It seems to me 

to be reflective of if we are going to attract good people. Whether 

there is a Democratic President or a Republican President, I think 

we will not attract quality folks. 

335 

I think Senator Alexander’s comments about innocent until nominated reflect a lot of the feeling around here. Yes, it is true that 

perhaps majorities can turn, but if this becomes the rule de jour 

on a going forward basis, we are going to, I think, undermine the 

ability for any administration to get their people in place in a timely manner. 

It is ridiculous that 18 months into this President’s Administration, we have so many senior members of this Administration still 

waiting to see whether they are going to be able to serve. As a 

business guy and as a former governor, that is simply unacceptable. 

So I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides 

of the aisle to try bring a little—while respectful of the Senate’s 

traditions and respectful of Minority rights—a little more rationality to this process. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, I thank you, Senator Warner, for your 

excellent comments, and again you are right. Senator Alexander, 

you know, calculated it would take us eight days to do four nominees, or four days to do eight nominees. They need 60 votes, and 

that is your point here. And they do not give us the 60 votes, and 

then we have wasted all that time and not nominated. 

Senator WARNER. And if they do get 60 votes, then—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, once they come to a hold agreement, 

but you cannot do them seriatim without 60 votes, the way it has 

proceeded. 

Okay. Well, we have three excellent witnesses, and I would like 

to call them forward, and I will introduce them as they come forward. 

We first have G. Calvin Mackenzie. Professor Mackenzie is currently the Goldfarb Family Distinguished Professor of Government 

at Colby College. He is author of several books including The Politics of Presidential Appointments and Innocent Until Nominated: 

The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointment Process. Professor 

Mackenzie is a graduate of Bowdoin College and has Ph.D. in Government from Harvard. 

W. Lee Rawls is on the faculty of the National War College, is 

an adjunct professor at the College of William and Mary. He is the 

author of the book In Praise of Deadlock: How Partisan Struggle 

Makes Better Law. Professor Rawls served as Chief of Staff to Majority Leader Bill Frist, as Chief of Staff to Senator Pete Domenici 

and as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legislative Affairs at the U.S. Department of Justice. 

Finally, Thomas Mann is the W. Averell Harriman Chair and 

Senior Fellow in Governance at Brookings. He has also served as 

the Executive Director of the APSA, the American Political Science 

Association, and co-authored the book The Broken Branch and 

many articles on congressional reform. He has taught at Princeton 

University, Johns Hopkins University, Georgetown University, the 

University of Virginia and American University. 

We thank all three of our distinguished witnesses. I have read 

the testimonies. They are excellent. They will all be submitted to 

the record. Each of you may proceed as you wish, and if you can 

336 

limit your statements to five minutes the Committee would appreciate it. 

Professor Mackenzie, you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, THE GOLDFARB FAMILY DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, COLBY COLLEGE 

Mr. MACKENZIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Bennett and members of the Committee, for having me here. 

For almost 40 years, I have been a student of the presidential 

appointments process, and in that time I have interviewed hundreds of presidential appointees, observed scores of confirmation 

hearings, collected and analyzed reams of data on this process. 

That is the work of scholarship, and that is my business. I am not 

partisan. I have no ox to gore and no one’s axe to grind. 

What has carried me through all of these years is a simple notion, and that is that in a democracy the purpose of an election is 

to form a government. Those who win elections ought to be able to 

govern. That is, to say simply, there ought to be a presidential appointments process that works swiftly, effective, rationally, to permit the President to recruit and emplace the talented Americans 

whose help he or she will need to govern this country. Nothing, it 

seems to me, could be more basic to good government, but we do 

not have a presidential appointments process that works. 

In fact, in this wonderful age when new democracies are blooming all over the world, many of them have copied aspects of our 

Constitution and our government, but one process that no other 

country has chosen to copy is the way we fill the top executive 

posts in our government, and for good reason. Even those untutored in democracy know a lemon when they see one. 

Our appointments process now undermines the very purposes it 

was designed to serve. It does not welcome talented people to public service; it repels them. It does not smooth the transition from 

the private to the public sector; it turns it into a torture chamber. 

It does not speed the startup of new administrations elected by the 

American people; it slows that process to a standstill. 

Blame for this, for the deterioration of the appointments process, 

lies at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. This Committee’s jurisdiction does not extend to the other end of the avenue, so let me 

focus on the Senate confirmation process. 

There are problems with this process, but primary among those 

are delay, redundancy, inconsistency and uncertainty. The confirmation process is not the sole source of delay in filling executive 

or judicial positions, but the simple fact is that it takes far too long 

to confirm presidential appointees. The time required for a typical 

confirmation, not a controversial one, a typical one, has steadily 

grown over the last three decades. Even with a Senate controlled 

by his own party, as the Chairman indicated in his opening remarks this morning, President Obama’s appointees have been confirmed more slowly than any of his predecessors. 

Why is this? Well, first there are too many appointees and too 

many hearings. For the first 130 years of our history, there were 

no confirmation hearings at all. Now we hold them for even for the 

lowest ranking nominees in all agencies, creating scheduling nightVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00346 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
337 

mares for Senate committees, overworked staffs, and long delays 

for many nominees. 

That problem is compounded by the growing use of holds, which 

you have a heard a lot about here this morning. For scholars like 

me, holds are a formidable research problem. Counting them is a 

little like counting moonbeams or weighing fairy dust; they are awfully hard to see. But we all know that holds, especially in the confirmation process where nominees make especially convenient hostages, have become epidemic in the Senate. 

Filibusters are another source of delay. Nominations are rarely 

filibustered in practice, but the threat of a filibuster has become so 

common and constant that we now know that it takes 60 reliable 

supporters in the Senate to get almost anybody confirmed. 

Delay occurs as well because every nominee must now endure an 

obstacle course that is littered with questionnaires, reports, investigations and vetting. These are inconsistent in the information 

they seek, and they are often redundant, especially of similar investigations and questionnaires managed by the White House. 

All of this imposes a heavy burden of uncertainty on those who 

are willing to be nominees. Once they agree to enter the appointment process they never know when, or if, they will emerge. When 

a friend says I have been nominated by the President to a position 

in government, is it congratulation or commiseration which we 

offer? 

These are human lives, and I think this is a very important part 

of this concern that is overlooked. Good people have agreed, often 

at significant personal sacrifice, to serve their Country. Far too 

often, we treat them like pawns in a cruel game. They are forced 

to put their lives on hold, to step aside from their careers and jobs, 

to forego income, and then to twist in the wind while the fates of 

their appointments are decided by a Senate with little or no sense 

of urgency. 

We must do better than this, and I believe that we can. We have 

recognized the ailments of the confirmation process and the cures 

for those ailments for a long time. I have suggested some of those 

in my written testimony, and I would be pleased to talk about 

those in our question period after this. 

But what is needed now, more than anything else, is simply 

some common sense, some commitment to undertake this task and, 

most importantly, some leadership. I commend this Committee and 

its Chairman and its members for taking on that task, and I hope 

you are successful in doing it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mackenzie submitted for the 

record:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Professor Mackenzie. 

Mr. Rawls. 

STATEMENT OF W. LEE RAWLS, FACULTY, NATIONAL WAR 

COLLEGE AND ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 

Mr. RAWLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Bennett. My pleasure to be here. 

338 

I think of the three folks before you, I will be the minority voice 

with respect to the nominations process, both judicial and for the 

Executive Branch nominees. My written testimony is basically an 

unrepentant defense of extended debate. My view is that whatever 

bipartisanship, moderation, continuity and consensus that are anywhere to be found in the American legislative process come from 

the filibuster. Absent that leverage, it will not exist. So my feeling 

is the Senate plays an extremely important role where this point 

of leverage from the Minority requires that all parties sit down and 

negotiate, and sometimes it works, sometimes it does not. 

I have in my mind the filibuster as a two-sided coin. On one side, 

you have the virtues I have just mentioned. The other side, you 

have the fact that matters are slowed down to the point that individual members, as expressed here today, feel extremely frustrated. 

My belief is the U.S. Senate is unique in the known legislative 

universe. It is unique because of the permissive rules involved and 

Minority rights, and that any change with respect to the rules, 

with respect to extended debate, would fundamentally alter the 

DNA of the United States Senate and how it works. 

In addition, America, despite all the failings indicated, is still the 

richest, most powerful Nation in the world, and so I think the Committee should be very cautious when it considers any changes to 

one of the key branches in the constitutional scheme for separation 

of powers, recognizing that the filibuster was not in the original 

Constitution. 

With my defense of first principles on the filibuster on the 

record, let me just turn quickly to the issues before the Committee 

today, basically the nominations process, and I will say my counterpunching views on several matters. 

First, when I was nominated to be Assistant Attorney General 

for Legislative Affairs, I was held up. I was held up by a member 

of today’s Majority. And, lo and behold, it was for good reason. Now 

I felt that it was something of a waste, but it took us a while to 

negotiate, to get through, but I certainly recognized the rights of 

that particular member, and he had a particular gripe with respect 

to the department at the time. 

I was held with two other members’ nominees of the department. 

My view at the time was he should have held them and not me because my job is to go down to the Legislative Affairs and take 

phone calls from the members. I felt like I deserved something like 

combat pay rather than to be held, but we will leave that as a personal view. 

I would like to echo Professor Mackenzie’s view that there are 

just too many nominees that come to the Senate for review. It 

would not take much to cut that by a third to a half. It has become 

very elaborate. We have tax documents. We have investigators. I 

was at the FBI for a while. We have all sorts of people. We spend 

a lot of time. 

I think the members should just ask, who do we really want to 

talk to? And my criteria would be if a member of a committee 

wants to talk to the individual nominee, is willing to meet with 

them and goes to their hearing, then that nominee should be subjected to advice and consent. Absent that, I hate to say it, but 

339 

something like Assistant Dogcatcher at the FEC, I do not see why 

the members are spending their time on that many nominees. 

Generally, the Cabinet goes pretty quickly, and then we just lose 

track somewhere with respect to middle management, and I think 

there is a compelling case to be made for moving faster with respect to middle management. One of the things is just to focus, set 

priorities. And if I had a gut instinct it would be that the problem 

really comes mostly from committee staff on both sides that are reluctant to surrender nominees and the member themselves would 

be really quite willing. 

On judges, my view is, having been here in the Senate as Chief 

of Staff for Senator Frist when we had a 51–49 margin, that I have 

a tough time kind of pulling out the violin for folks who have a 59– 

41 margin. So I will, in a sense, take a pass on that. The judges 

are lifetime appointees, and I think some close scrutiny is completely in order. Again, I think it is a matter of focus. 

The last point I would make is that when I was with Senator 

Frist we spent a lot of time on nominees. We even kept some of 

the members of the Majority and Minority in all around the clock 

on one occasion. So, given that, I am probably on a different wavelength than some of my colleagues here. 

Given that, I would be prepared to discuss any nuances in question and answer. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rawls submitted for the record:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you for your counterpunches, Mr. 

Rawls. 

Mr. Mann. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. MANN, SENIOR FELLOW, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AND THE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN CHAIR, 

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Senators Udall 

and Warner, first of all, I want to commend you for holding this 

series of hearings on filibusters and holds. 

We have seen now through the testimony that has come before 

us, through statements by Senators and discussions, that changing 

norms and practices regarding use of filibusters, holds and cloture 

petitions have produced something very different than what my 

dear friend Lee Rawls has been talking about—that in fact, in recent years there has been an extraordinary increase in the frequency of extended debate-related problems on major measures and 

nominations that come before the Senate. 

We also ought to face up to the fact that this is driven by the 

ideological polarization of the parties in the Country and in the 

Senate, combined with the increased partisanship that flows from 

it and the fact that Majority Party control can change in an election. The stakes are so high that the incentives are powerfully driving a form of behavior that a colleague who testified earlier, Steven 

Smith, called a procedural arms race by both the Minority and responses by the Majority, that have diminished the Senate as an institution and weakened the Country’s capacity to govern. Those are 

serious charges, and I commend you for wrestling with them because the Country depends upon it. 

340 

My testimony adds to the evidence, the statistics that the Chairman gave, that my colleague Cal Mackenzie has given on judicial 

nominations and senior executive positions, and I will not take the 

time to go through those now. 

The reality is that, of course, there are thousands, tens of thousands of nominations that come before this body, and 99 percent 

are routine and confirmed, but there are problematics with circuit 

court judicial appointments and with senior level executive appointment that cannot be denied. Confirmation rates have declined 

dramatically in the courts. These delays in confirming appellate 

judges have led to increased vacancy rates which have produced 

longer case processing times and rising caseloads per judge on the 

Federal dockets. Moreover, the controversies and delays over appellate judges are spilling over into district court appointments, which 

used to be a pretty routine process. 

The same evidence is available on senior executive positions. The 

delays are really quite extraordinary, but you know the statistics 

actually understate the problem because it does not look at the variability across agencies. 

Some Senate committees have a practice of doing full-fledged IRS 

tax investigations that depopulate, or disallow, a new administration from populating, staffing the Treasury Department when the 

financial system is on the verge of collapse. It really is a tragedy 

in some of the stories. One nominee, a former colleague of mine at 

Brookings, nominated for a crucially important position, waited 13 

months in the Senate—13 months over, we think, a minor tax matter that was the same as her husband’s. They filed a joint return. 

He was confirmed in less than two months a year earlier, but 

somehow her nomination was held up. These stories are legendary 

and are a real problem. 

Listen, Senators have long viewed the confirmation process as an 

opportunity to express their policy views and to get the administration’s attention on matters of importance today. But the culture of 

today’s Senate provides no restraints on the exercise of this potential power, no protection of the Country’s interest in having a 

newly elected President move quickly and effectively to form a government. You just cannot allow old rules to be so twisted by new 

norms and a culture of permissiveness that really damage our capacity to govern. 

There are things to be done. Secret holds are a start, but let me 

just suggest that in many confirmations actually many holds are 

public, but they are extended and do as much damage as private 

holds. 

So what I urge you to do, in conclusion, is think about increasing 

the burden on those who wish simply to delay action—maybe 60 

percent to get a cloture vote of those present and voting, maybe 

fast-tracking nominations as we have done in various other aspects 

before the Senate. Think ambitiously. This is a serious problem. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mann submitted for the record:] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Professor Mann, and I thank 

everyone for their really excellent testimony. 

I have to make a quick phone call, so I am going to call on Senator Udall to ask the first round of questions. Then we will go to 

Senator Bennett. Then we will finish up. 

341 

Senator UDALL. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator Schumer, and I 

thank all of three of you for your very, very thoughtful testimony 

here today. 

Professor Mackenzie, you discuss in your testimony the negative 

consequences of the filibuster on the confirmation process. One possible reform you mention is the resolution considered by this Committee in the 108th Congress, Senate Res. 138, and that resolution 

would have altered Rule XXII by placing a steadily decreasing 

threshold for cloture on nominations until after successive votes. 

Cloture could be achieved by a majority. 

The lead sponsor of that resolution was Majority Leader Frist, 

and its co-sponsors included three current Republican members of 

this Committee. 

Do you see any negative consequences with this proposal, and 

what if it was extended to cover all matters and not just the confirmation of nominees as Senator Harkin has proposed? 

Mr. MACKENZIE. Thank you, Senator. I do not profess expertise 

on all matters before the Senate, so let me just address the question of confirmations. 

One can understand that there may be a time when a Senator 

or several Senators would like more time to contemplate a nomination. They would like to get more facts. They would like to carry 

through an investigation that has not been completed, or something of that sort. So there may well be a time when postponing 

action on a nomination, whether it is through a hold or a filibuster, 

is appropriate. 

But where is the end game in all of that? You see these processes 

through the eyes of those Americans who have committed no crime 

other than saying yes when the President asked them to serve 

their Country, and they have no idea when the end game is going 

to occur, if it is ever going to occur. 

I think a process like the one that would have a decreasing majority needed to sustain a filibuster or to bring it to cloture would 

make a good deal of sense, just to force those who wanted more 

time to use that time in some profitable way and get it done, and 

then let’s have an up or down vote on the nominee. 

Senator UDALL. Now Professor, and you heard a member of this 

Committee say earlier that if we make any of these changes like 

you have just talked about, that we are going to turn the Senate 

into the House and thus become exactly like the House. Do you 

have any comment on that? 

Mr. MACKENZIE. It was the first time I had ever heard the words 

‘‘freight train’’ in the same paragraph with ‘‘the Senate.’’ That is 

not a fear that most Americans kept awake at night about. 

I would ask those of you who have to make decisions on this: 

What does a filibuster really accomplish other than delay and, in 

some cases, defeat of a nomination? 

Does a filibuster change people’s minds? 

Does it convert doubters into supporters for a nomination? 

Is there an actual debate that occurs on a filibuster that people 

listen to and are open-minded about? 

I think anybody who follows this body knows the answers to 

those questions are usually no, and that a filibuster is a procedural 

tactic designed to prevent, or at least delay, a nomination from 

342 

being confirmed. That is problematic for new administrations, it is 

problematic for old administrations, and it is certainly problematic 

for the people whose nominations are under consideration. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Tom Mann, would you also respond to this idea that if we change 

the rules, respecting Minority rights, that somehow we are turning 

the Senate into the House? 

Mr. MANN. I do not. The filibuster, the routine filibuster was 

never anticipated by the framers when they purposely set out to 

design two very different institutions. The length of term, the 

method of appointment, the size of constituency—they expected the 

Senate to be the saucer to cool the hot tea or coffee of the House, 

even without this. So I think there are other safeguards built into 

the system. 

Having said that, you can go a long way in adjusting the rules 

of the Senate without completing eliminating the possibility of a 

determined Minority to stop some action in the Senate. You can do 

many things short of a blanket ultimate Majority cloture vote, although I am not arguing against that or for it. I am saying there 

are many things you can do. 

You could say the nomination process to staff an administration 

should be so routine a part of a new presidency or a new governorship that that is going on to a separate track. It is already on the 

Executive Calendar. You could set up rules that have a time limit 

associated with that, and you would not have to go through the 

trouble of filing cloture motions. 

It seems to me there are various ways of making adjustments in 

the rules to confront the new reality that they are producing, in 

this new world of polarized politics and self-indulgence of individual Senators, a very destructive pattern of behavior. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Chairman Schumer. Thank you very 

much. 

Chairman SCHUMER. [Presiding.] Thank you. 

Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, and thank you for your 

testimony, all of you. 

I wish this were a college seminar where we could get more deeply into all of the issues that you raise because I have a number of 

reactions to some of the things that you are saying. The first one, 

coming out of my own experience, is that there is a judgment call 

that is made in this situation, and it is made by the Majority Leader. 

Let me give you an example out of my own experience. I do not 

use holds as a regular device. Very, very seldom, do I put a hold 

on any nomination, and I always do it publically. I do not play the 

secret hold game. 

This Administration performed something—we will not get into 

the details and take the time—that I thought was absolutely egregious and outrageous, and the only way I could demonstrate my 

concern about that was to put a hold on a nomination. It was 

David Hayes, the Deputy Secretary of the Interior, against whom 

I have absolutely nothing, no objection whatsoever, but the only 

way I could demonstrate my outrage at what the Administration 

343 

and the Secretary of Interior had done was put a hold on Mr. 

Hayes’s nomination. 

You say you do not see the point? I immediately got everybody’s 

attention to the issue that I was talking about, and I had no other 

leverage with which to do that. 

I got a phone call from the Majority Leader: Bob, what is the 

problem? 

I described the problem. 

He said, that is legitimate. See if you can work it out. 

I had a phone call from Ken Salazar. We talked the thing 

through. As it turns out, we cannot work it out, at which point I 

get a phone call from the Majority Leader: Bob, I am going to have 

to file cloture on David Hayes’s nomination. 

All right, fine. He files cloture. 

I go to my fellow Republicans, make a presentation to them as 

to what had been done by the Department. Republicans who have 

absolutely no understanding of a public lands State, who come from 

the East Coast original 13 colonies, do not have the slightest idea 

what I am talking about, said to me, well, if they could do this to 

your State, maybe they could do this to mine, and we are going to 

stand with you. 

And we defeated that cloture petition, whereupon I get some 

more phone calls, and some more negotiation goes on. Ultimately, 

while I did not get a reversal of the proposal, pardon me, a reversal 

of the action, I get a commitment that David Hayes will go to 

Utah, sit down with the constituents, experience firsthand—and he 

has told me rather ruefully it was not the happiest experience of 

his life—the outrage that was there in the State, and we got some 

kind of a progress going forward on it. 

I do not think that that is a violation of anything the founders 

had in mind, and I do think that is something that a member of 

the House could never, ever do. So I do suggest that we might be 

turning the Senate into the House if we get rid of this. 

Now, by contrast, do any of you know the individual whose nomination from President Obama, in a Democratically-controlled Senate, whose nomination has been on the calendar the longest? 

Mr. MANN. A member of the FEC. 

Senator BENNETT. Right, John Sullivan, who has been nominated 

for the FEC. 

Do you know who is holding him? It is not a secret hold. 

All right. It is Senator Feingold and Senator McCain. 

All right. Take the example I just gave of my experience with 

David Hayes. The Majority Leader made a decision to file a cloture 

petition because he felt David Hayes’s nomination was sufficiently 

important that he move forward, and he ultimately prevailed because I could not hold of the Republicans all of the time on that 

one. We got the attention we wanted, and then there were Republicans who said I cannot keep voting against cloture on this, Bob, 

and the thing moved forward. 

The Majority Leader has made a decision not to proceed for John 

Sullivan, and he has been on the list longer than any other nominee. This is not a decision the Minority has made. This is a decision the Majority Leader has made, and I am not questioning (A) 

344 

his right to make it or the fact that he may have made the right 

decision. 

But let us understand that the way the institution works is not 

quite the way it may sound in a classroom. And there are ways to 

break a filibuster, there are ways to move a nominee forward, and 

there are ways to make political points. 

Back in the time when I was in the Minority the first time, we 

had a Majority member who was mad at the Department of Interior, who put a blanket hold on every nomination out of the Department until he got what he wanted in terms of a National Park 

designation. And it was very frustrating to every one of us on the 

Committee. 

I was on the Interior Committee. Now it is called the Natural Resources and Energy. I am old enough to call it the old Interior 

Committee. 

Every nominee before that Committee was held up by this Senator, and the hold was honored. That blanket hold on every nominee regardless of who they were—he did not even know their 

names—was honored by the then-Majority Leader, George Mitchell, 

and as a consequence nothing moved forward until the Senator got 

what he wanted. 

So I am opposed to secret holds, but I recognize in the volume 

of things—and I think your point about the volume of nominations 

is legitimate—the Majority Leader gets to make decisions here. I 

will shine the spotlight on this one, and I will quietly endorse the 

position of the Senator who says nobody from this department can 

go forward until that Senator gets what he wants, and it is the Majority Leader who plays a role here that a lot of us are not paying 

attention to. 

Not a question, but a reaction to our excellent panel of witnesses 

and the comments that they have made to us, and if they want to 

react, I will assume that I will take the time of the others who are 

not here and allow them to react on their time. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, that would be a change in the Committee rules if that is okay. 

Senator BENNETT. All right. Never mind. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Go ahead. Do you guys want to react to 

that? 

Mr. MANN. Well, I just wanted to say, Senator, it is a classic collective action problem. You tell a legitimate story of trying to get 

a foothold, some attention, to be the squeaky wheel that gets the 

grease, that brings an administration’s attention to a problem that 

you see. 

What if every Senator does that, multiple times, sometimes for 

less serious matters than you have raised? And we can come up 

with a lot of examples of those. Then it begins to do real damage 

to the capacity of the Senate to operate, and to an administration 

to get up and running. 

You have other resources. You powerfully sit on committees. You 

have effects over appropriations. You can hold press conferences. 

You can get attention other than taking nominations hostage. And 

it may just be that the cost of you and 99 of your colleagues doing 

this on a regular basis is too great, and you ought to use other resources. 

345 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple of comments, first of all, Senator Bennett, you started 

I think very good comments with something that increasingly 

seems to be absent. You said it has to be used with judgment. I 

have enormous respect for you, and I could live with the situation 

as long as we got rid of the secret holds, as long as there were 99 

Bob Bennetts all exercising some level of judgment. 

I do want to try to let Mr. Rawls, who I know is chomping at 

the bit. I am going to give you good time to weigh in here. 

But I have to tell you, again as a new guy and never been a legislator, I am increasingly concerned. I hear it on my side. I hear 

it on your side. This is an institution where it seems like people 

start to hold grudges that have nothing to do with policy, and I 

have heard time and again from Minority members now, well, we 

are doing this because you guys did it. 

You know, I am trying to be this bipartisan guy, and they are: 

Well, we are doing this because you guys did it when we were in 

the Majority. 

Lord knows if it flips back and the Republicans are in the Majority, you are going to have an awful lot of Democrats who go 

through this litany of people. I just do not know how you run a 

modern, 21st Century government in that fashion. 

I am very biased as a non-legislative background, that I think, 

in short, the chief executive ought to have their team in place. If 

there is something wrong with somebody, it ought to be debated 

and the person ought to be voted up or down. And if they stink, 

the CEO ought to replace that person with somebody else. 

I am not sure it is an all or nothing proposition. There may be 

a proposition that says get rid of secret holds, and then you have 

some judgment, and if you go beyond X you only got so many cards 

you got to play. I do not know what the right, but there should be 

some way we could sort through this. 

I do want to make sure Mr. Rawls, who I would have gone to 

even earlier because as a William and Mary adjunct professor I 

want to honor that, if he actually lived in Virginia as opposed to 

Kensington, Maryland. 

Mr. Rawls, I guess the thing I want you to respond as the 

counterpuncher is the use of filibuster. I do not see it as anything, 

agreeing with our other witnesses, in most cases, other than delay 

when the person is then confirmed 99 to nothing, or 95 to nothing. 

If the person is confirmed even 80–20, even 90–10, there is still 

somebody felt strongly enough to make the case, and they may 

have lost the case, but they made the case for some reason. 

There was no case made when people are confirmed unanimously 

after being held in limbo for extended periods of time, whether you 

are judges or as Professor Mackenzie said. 

I have had the challenge of trying to recruit people to government. It is a hard, hard challenge. Never before have we needed 

more quality people to be willing to serve. If you are left in limbo 

for months, and now going on years on end, I do not care whether 

it is a Republican or Democratic President, we are not going to get 

good folks. 

346 

So I just ask you this; how do you jar that need to have a thorough examination with these unanimous or near unanimous votes 

on these items? 

Mr. RAWLS. Strangely enough, there is consensus at the table on 

the need to severely pare the number of nominees that get advice 

and consent. Once you say advice and consent in the Constitution, 

and then you have any form of delay and extended debate, you are 

going to get various examples. 

I have to say that Senator Bennett’s world that he described is 

more than my world during my 13 years of staff on the Hill, where 

there are lots of negotiations. Usually nominees have a mentor or 

godfather, either in the Executive Branch or here. When that nominee is in trouble, the first thing the mentor does is get to the Hill 

and start talking and work it through. I have personally been part 

of a fair number of examples where things have worked through. 

So I just say that is more my world. 

Senator WARNER. I would ask you to do a real-time check with 

some of your colleagues right now. As a new guy, that is not my 

experience of what is happening. 

Mr. RAWLS. So my reaction would be, first, get the number of 

nominees down. As an executive for the State of Virginia, if you 

were having trouble with the legislature and they had 100 and you 

said to them: Why don’t we really look at 10 and let’s fight those 

fights, like Senator Bennett fought? Then get rid of the other 90. 

They do not need to come up. 

I am not an expert on the number of military that come up here, 

but you get dumped thousands. 

Mr. MANN. Sixty-five thousand. 

Mr. RAWLS. Sixty-five thousand from the U.S. Military, that is 

some monster waste. Then occasionally a member of one side or the 

other holds them all for some purpose, and you have a flap. 

So I think that not to put the full burden on the Senate, but I 

think the Senate itself should take a look at the nomination process. At the Department of Justice, there are five or six folks you 

need to be concerned with. You do not need 20 or 30 and all that 

machinery that goes with it. So I suggest that for starters. Then 

if you have a problem after that, then you can keep grinding away. 

I would say there was one point made with respect to circuit 

court nominees. So that is the real issue on the judges’ side. 

Districts move, they get slowed, but they go through, and usually 

they have a home State Senator that starts fighting and holding 

the other guys’ stuff at some point. 

Supreme is so in the public that you play that. It is at a higher 

order. 

The circuits are where the risk is. I do not have an easy piece 

for it because in fact both sides have activated large-scale groups 

that follow these nominees very closely and come on in when there 

is a nominee they do not like and urge one side or the other to 

limit those circuit court nominees. So that is the dilemma before 

the Committee. Because it is a lifetime appointment, I do not think 

you are going to get around that. And to the extent that the courts 

have become more activist over the years, it just seems to me it is 

part of a fact of American life. 

I would like to make one last—— 

347 

Senator WARNER. Can I just add one. I mean my time is way 

over, and the Chairman is probably not going to invite me back. 

Mr. RAWLS. Yes, I am probably over too. 

Senator WARNER. We have just done a lot of district court nominees that have had to have been filibustered with 90 unanimous 

nominees. So it is not just circuit court. 

Mr. RAWLS. Right. The only thing I would say is that this is a 

function of the U.S. Senate has so much time each year in setting 

its priorities for nominees, legislation. The focus has been legislation. I do not think the Nation has been diminished. Anybody that 

can do TARP, stimulus, major health care reform and getting financial reform is actually not broken and is not diminishing the 

United States of America. If the fact is that a limited number of 

judicial nominees have been held along the way because there has 

not been floor time, that comes with it. That is the role of the Senate—is setting those priorities. 

And the only other point I would make is if you give up Minority 

resistance to this, the role of the Senate vastly changes within the 

entire legislative machine. The Majority of the Senate determines 

what gets conducted, strategically and operationally. If you take 

away Minority resistance, the role the Majority Leader and his senior leadership plays vastly changes in the whole game. 

That is just a tirade on the side there. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Warner and Mr. Rawls. 

Senator Murray. 

Senator MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank you for 

having this hearing, and Senator Bennett and all of the panelists 

who have participated. I have watched a little bit from my office, 

and I just wanted to say I think this really an important discussion. It affects not just our quality of life but a whole lot of people 

who have been hung up in this process and any administration’s 

ability to get anything done. 

I have joined with the majority of my colleagues in pledging to 

not use the secret hold procedure. I think that is a good first step. 

Particularly though, I find it very troubling that a single Senator 

hiding behind an arcane rule of the Senate can obstruct the nominations of literally dozens of presidential appointments usually, we 

are finding, for reasons that have nothing to do with that person 

or their background or the issue at hand. Earlier this year, there 

was a Senator who put a blanket hold on 70 nominees, and it was 

widely reported that the reason was that he was focused on 4 of 

those 70 and really just 2 issues within their entire purview. 

So to me, this is out of control, and we have to look at how we 

can change this, so the Senate can function, so these individuals 

can be appointed. And really to me, part of the problem is this secret hold. You do not even know who to go talk to, to work out an 

issue at this point. 

So I think this hearing is very important, and I am really 

pleased that the Chairman and Ranking Member are having hearings and looking at how we can move this. 

I do not have a lot of questions. I just wanted to ask the panelists sort of both sides of this. What is a valid reason for a secret 

hold? And secondly, are there other examples of the extremist use 

of this procedure besides the one I just mentioned? 

348 

Mr. MACKENZIE. I do not think there is a valid reason for a secret 

hold. 

I can imagine a circumstance when there might be a valid reason 

for a hold. I have argued over the years that holds ought to be 

time-limited, say 14 days. Then if the person placing the hold 

wanted to extend the hold, if they could get the concurrence of the 

majority of the Senate to do that, they could extend that. 

Senator MURRAY. So with 50 percent? 

Mr. MACKENZIE. But if—excuse me, Senator. Go ahead. 

Senator MURRAY. A majority, 51 Senators? 

Mr. MACKENZIE. Yes, a simple majority. 

But in a situation like the one that Senator Bennett described 

earlier, of having a substantive policy reason for wanting to work 

something out with the Interior Department, if 14 days is not long 

enough to do that and it is important enough to the Senate to hold 

up that nominee, that person going through this process, for a 

longer period, and a majority of the Senate would go along, that 

does not seem unreasonable to me. 

Secret holds, it is hard to make a brief for those. 

Senator MURRAY. Mr. Rawls. 

Mr. RAWLS. Well, I have no defense on secret holds. I would have 

to say, and maybe just because I am a little bit of a dinosaur, but 

usually when somebody, as one of the staff when I was working in 

the Majority Leader’s office used to say, if somebody takes a hostage, wait for the ransom note. 

So, as a general rule, at some point you can figure out who has 

the hold because at least—and I will just defer to Senator Bennett 

on this—on the Minority side the procedure is that the Majority 

Leader can find out who the hold is and, if it affects another Minority member, will inform them. So, within the Minority, they are not 

secret. 

If on a Committee, let’s say the Judiciary Committee, if the Majority member were to go the Minority and the Minority member 

supported him, then it will not be secret. We will let that Minority 

member know. 

So I do not really know. I have to say at this stage I cannot say 

that I know exactly how the hold process is working in the Senate. 

But it used to be you would eventually penetrate, and you would 

know who it was, and then you would go over and negotiate. 

Senator MURRAY. But I do not get the point of secret. If I put 

a hold on somebody, I want the world to know what I am fighting 

for, and I also want my constituents to know what my logic is. I 

represent them. I do not come here uniquely, just somebody with 

a grudge. I represent people. So everybody has a right to know why 

I have placed a hold on somebody, and I need to make that public 

and make my arguments. 

So I do not understand the reason for secret. 

Mr. RAWLS. I do not either. I was just saying as a matter of 

course, and maybe it is a lot worse today. Historically, you would 

find out who held, and then you would go talk to them. But if it 

is a real problem, then I do not have a brief on the secret side. 

Senator MURRAY. Mr. Mann. 

Mr. MANN. It has become a problem, much more so in recent 

times. It is complicated. The holds are informal processes, right? 

349 

They are an indication of the possibility of objecting to a U.C. if it 

is raised on the floor. So Majority Leaders have to manage this information, and right now it is not in their interest in managing the 

floor to publicize and embarrass an individual Senator who wants 

it to be secret. 

So having the full body take some action, taking a moral stand 

if you will, even though it is difficult implementing it and you have 

be wary of building a hold into the rules, which does not now exist, 

and therefore legitimizing it to an extent it would not otherwise be 

legitimized. That is a very important matter, and so I urge caution. 

But sometimes moral suasion and shame can go a long way. If 

you build a strong norm, with support on both sides of the aisle, 

that this is not the way to do business, you may have some luck. 

But I think you are going to have to go beyond that if you are really going to discipline this process. 

Senator MURRAY. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Murray, and thanks for 

coming. 

I guess I am questioning last here because I did not go first. You 

are all against secret holds. I want to thank all of you for testimony. 

Senator McCaskill, I think made the point that it is the enforcement that is difficult, if not impossible. You could make sure, if you 

wanted, that someone’s name was attached, but you know you 

could end up with the tradition that the Majority or Minority Leader would just put their name on all the time. Then there is an argument, well, the opprobrium that would attach to a Minority or 

Majority Leader who just blocked everything might discourage it. 

I am not so sure that is true. 

Of course, I want to get rid of secret holds. I think they are 

wrong, and at least having someone’s name attached is better than 

having nobody’s name attached. 

I also think your comments make a lot of sense, Professor Mann. 

To actually do a rule, we would have to put a hold. We would make 

it official that holds exist, which is now more by tradition. I am not 

sure that is good idea. 

So what would you think of the idea—and I would ask, again I 

am going to ask all three witnesses about this general question— 

the idea of a standing order as opposed to a rule change which 

might do the same thing? 

So those are my questions to you all. Any thoughts on what 

would happen if it was just the Majority or Minority Leader who 

became de facto the only objector ever? Obviously, you can write in 

the law that if someone asked them to do it that person would have 

to put their name in. Very hard to enforce, and there is a way of 

not asking: Oh, gee, Majority Leader, I am not asking you to do 

this, but this would really hurt my State, kind of thing. 

Views about a rule versus a standing order, and general views 

about enforceability on secret holds. We are not arguing about 

holds now, but secret holds. 

So would you like to begin, Professor Mackenzie? 

Mr. MACKENZIE. Sure. I do not have an informed opinion on the 

difference between a standing order and rules change, but I think 

350 

you are exactly right that the Senate is never more ingenious than 

when it is trying to avoid constraints on the behavior of individual 

members. I would expect that. 

There used to be a Senator here who some people called Senator 

No. One can imagine there might be a Senator Hold, who if you 

wanted to have a hold but did not want to have it identified with 

you, you might go to this Senator and he or she would willingly 

stand up and take the heat for that. 

So one does not know. Enforceability is always going to be a 

problem, but I do not think that ought to be a deterrent to going 

ahead and trying to make good rules. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Mr. Rawls. 

Mr. RAWLS. I would put myself down as agnostic on rule versus 

standing order. I had not thought about the Majority/Minority 

Leaders becoming the official holders, and my gut is that is where 

you will end up. So that would be a substantial problem. 

I had in fact even envisioned there might be that each side would 

have an official Senator Hold, but I do think it will flow then down 

to the leadership. So I see that as a fundamental problem, not one 

that I think is easily solvable. 

So I think you are going to have a continuing problem with enforcement. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Mr. Mann. 

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I do believe there are enormous problems in enforcing any kind of a prohibition on secret holds. 

I think your best—there are two things you can do. One is to retreat back to Rule XXII and make changes in that that would 

achieve the objective, but that would probably lead you to move in 

a more aggressive reform action than you may be prepared to do. 

The other is really a matter of moral suasion, of building an expectation. I mean norms change all the time in the Senate, and 

getting behind an effort to say what is legitimate and sort of moral, 

and we live in an era in which transparency is increasingly important in all aspects of our lives and of governance more generally. 

So it may be that is the direction, which would lead me to say 

a standing order, or a sense of the Senate, rather than trying to— 

I recommend against giving a hold a formal standing in the rules. 

I think that would do real damage. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. 

One final question and then we will call it a day. Mr. Rawls mentioned limiting the number of nominees who actually came before 

the Senate. He proposed, actually I guess it would be object as you 

go, or something. People would have to demand a hearing or whatever, and otherwise they would go through. Could you each talk 

about that, just limiting who actually has to be confirmed? 

Mr. RAWLS. And I was not for being that formal. I was just 

thinking that the committee themselves should ask themselves 

which of these nominees do we want to hear from, who do we actually want to meet. 

Chairman SCHUMER. But did you mean generically or specifically, in other words, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement? I do not even know if there is one. 

Mr. RAWLS. I was going to say generically. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Generically. 

351 

Mr. RAWLS. I think the committees should look at their nominees 

and then make a concerted effort to reduce the number, so that 

there is a focus on the senior folks that provide oversight, and I 

would leave that really—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. And then we would somehow institutionalize that, that only these six people in the Department of Interior would need confirmation. 

Mr. RAWLS. Yes, yes, along those lines. 

Chairman SCHUMER. What does Professor Mackenzie and Mr. 

Mann think of that? 

Mr. MACKENZIE. I have argued for almost 30 years that there are 

too many presidential appointees. I wish we could go back to 30 

years ago when the number was a lot smaller than it is now. What 

we thought was a nightmare then looks like the golden of presidential appointments now. 

The system is overwhelmed. It is not just the system down here. 

In many ways, it is the system at the other end of the avenue. The 

ability of a President, new to government, to come into office, to 

find the hundreds of very good people with enormously different 

skills sets—a lot of these are very technical jobs—and to get them 

into the pipeline and down here, and then for all of you to deal 

with them, I think we simply have not been able to do it very successfully. At some point, we ought to say maybe there are just too 

many of these. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Mr. Mann, last word. 

Mr. MANN. I strongly urge you to look into this. The Constitution 

gives the Congress, under its advice and consent authority, to 

power to delegate to others, including the President, the lone appointment of other offices of the Executive Branch. So it is done by 

statute. 

You could explicitly reduce the number of presidential appointees 

that require Senate confirmation. That would still retain enough 

for the Senate to have, as Senator Bennett’s examples, where they 

could go get the administration’s attention. But it would clear up 

the process a great deal. It would be a huge advance. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Great. And on that harmonious note, concurrent note, first, the record will remain open for five business 

days for additional statements and questions from Rules Committee members. Since there is no further business before the Committee, we are adjourned. 

I want to thank all the witnesses here and our colleagues, as 

well as my colleagues who came today. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: LEGISLATIVE 

PROPOSALS TO CHANGE SENATE PROCEDURES 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 28, 2010 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in Room 

SR–301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Schumer, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Schumer, Durbin, Nelson, Udall, Goodwin, 

Bennett, Alexander, and Roberts. 

Staff Present: Jean Bordewich, Staff Director; Veronica Gillespie, 

Elections Counsel; Adam Ambrogi, Counsel; Sonia Gill, Counsel; 

Julia Richardson, Counsel; Lauryn Bruck, Professional Staff; Carole Blessington, Executive Assistant to the Staff Director; Lynden 

Armstrong, Chief Clerk; Matthew McGowan, Professional Staff; 

Mary Jones, Republican Staff Director; Paul Vinovich, Republican 

Chief Counsel; Michael Merrell, Republican Counsel; and Rachel 

Creviston, Republican Professional Staff. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SCHUMER 

Chairman SCHUMER. The Rules Committee will come to order. I 

apologize to my colleagues for being late. 

I want to first thank my friend, Ranking Member Bob Bennett, 

and my other colleagues present for participating in this hearing. 

Bob, I apologize. We were at the Archives dedicating the Roosevelt 

papers, which have finally been brought back to Hyde Park. There 

was a grand ceremony with all the members of the Roosevelts family. 

Senator BENNETT. Having wrestled with Washington traffic, I 

understand your excuse exactly. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I apologize for that. 

Senator BENNETT. And I accept it. 

Chairman SCHUMER. But I am sorry for my delay. 

Before we begin, I do want to thank Bob and my other colleagues 

for participating in this hearing. This is the fourth in our series of 

hearings to examine the filibuster. There is one person whose contributions I think we would all like to recognize, and that is our 

friend, Senator Robert Byrd. Senator Byrd served on the Rules 

Committee longer than any Senator in history. He became a Committee member on February 25, 1963. That was before Michael 

Bennet was born. Is that true? 

Senator BENNET. That is true. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. That is true. How about before Frank Lautenberg was born? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Mr. Chairman, please, order. 

[Laughter.] 

393 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. In any case, he gave service to 

his State and country much longer than that, but today we honor 

his 47 years on this Committee. Senator Byrd’s knowledge of the 

Senate rules and procedures was unsurpassed. He took a very active interest in this series of hearings on the filibuster. He made 

a moving personal appearance at our hearing in May and submitted written statements for our April and June hearings. No one 

who was here on May 19th, and I know a few of you were—Senator 

Udall, Senator Bennett, and Senator Alexander, I think we were all 

here—will ever forget Senator Byrd’s words to us that day. He 

leaves to this Committee a legacy that will long be remembered in 

the history of our Nation. 

And now it is my pleasure to welcome to this Committee a new 

member taking Senator Byrd’s place, and that is Senator Carte P. 

Goodwin, Senator from West Virginia. Carte was appointed to our 

Committee last week, and on behalf of my colleagues, I would like 

to say we all look forward to working with Senator Goodwin for his 

tenure on the Rules Committee. Thank you and welcome, Carte. 

We are glad you are here. 

Senator GOODWIN. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Over the course of these hearings, we have 

looked at the development of the filibuster since the beginning of 

our country and the growing challenges that it presents to the Senate. And today we are going to look at two of the very interesting 

solutions to the problem created by abuse of the filibuster. The first 

two proposals we are going to examine are Senate Resolution 465, 

introduced by Senator Lautenberg, and Senate Resolution 440, introduce by Senator Michael Bennet. I am very pleased to welcome 

both Senators to our panel. 

I read Senator Lautenberg’s resolution. It is ingenious, and many 

people say, well, if you are going to filibuster, you ought to get up 

there and be required to talk about it. And everyone says, well, 

there is no way that can happen. You will hear about Senator Lautenberg’s proposal from him as he speaks, and I think people will 

be very interested. He addresses the problem of unnecessary delay 

by expediting a cloture vote under certain circumstances and requiring those who are opposed to cloture to take responsibility for 

continuing debate on the floor. 

Senator Bennet’s resolution is also extremely interesting, and he 

has worked long and hard on this issue for much of the time since 

he has been here. It contains half a dozen key provisions aimed at 

changing the way filibusters and cloture votes are handled and also 

addresses secret holds, the topic of our last hearing. 

Both proposals remind us the Senate is designed as a place for 

debate. We want full, fair, and robust debate. We know that with 

actual debate minds are changed, positions are moved, compromise 

is reached. However, often we see the filibuster being used merely 

to delay or obstruct Senate action. Some delays are not even intended to block the underlying bill, but to delay consideration of 

other legislation. Senator Lautenberg’s bill addresses this problem. 

We also want Senators on both sides of the aisle to work together 

and for the views of a minority to be heard. And when you sit 

through our hearings, each side has expressed legitimate complaints. We say—Democrats say, ‘‘It is delay, delay, delay, even 

394 

over trivial things.’’ Republicans say, ‘‘We have no choice but to 

delay, unless we are allowed the opportunity to offer amendments 

because, in general, the majority sets the agenda, but then the minority can offer amendments. And, of course, though we hope not, 

every one of us knows we might be sitting on both sides of the majority and minority divide. So we are trying to be fair and down the 

middle of this issue. 

Senator Bennet addresses the abuse of the filibuster when it is 

used as a tool for pure partisanship, rather than a tool for discussion and thought. 

Our second panel is going to include several experts in Senate 

procedures—Professor Barbara Sinclair of UCLA and Professor 

Gregory Koger from the University of Miami. They are going to 

share their thoughts about the context for these reform proposals. 

We are also going to hear on the second panel from Elizabeth 

Rybicki, an analyst on Congress and the legislative process at CRS. 

Although the Committee’s practice is not to have staff members 

from CRS testify at hearings, I have agreed to our Republican colleagues’ request to have her appear in this circumstance to provide 

informational testimony related to these two proposals. 

I believe the first three hearings that we have had have shown 

the filibuster has been abused more and more in recent Congresses, 

and it is time for the Senate to consider what to do about it. Our 

first hearing focused on the history of the filibuster. The second 

looked at the impact of the filibuster on the Senate today and on 

the functioning of our Government. Our third hearing examined 

the problem of secret holds and delaying impact. A special note is 

given to a member of our Committee, Senator Udall, who has been 

long pushing that we have these series of hearings and explore 

these issues. 

With the groundwork we have laid in past hearings, we are going 

to turn today to consideration of specific proposals for reforms. I 

plan future hearings to consider resolutions proposed by Senator 

Tom Harkin and Senator Udall, a member of this Committee. I 

look forward to listening to my colleagues and experts who have 

come to share their knowledge and experience with us. 

I am now going to turn to Ranking Member Bennett for his opening statement. Then we will go to our two witnesses. After Senator 

Lautenberg and Senator Bennet have testified, we will have other 

members make opening statements. I know both Senators have 

busy schedules after they testify. 

Senator BENNETT. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. 

BENNETT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do not 

have an extended opening statement. I welcome our two colleagues 

both for their willingness to testify and for their thought they put 

into their proposals. 

The whole question of minority rights in the Senate is one of the 

most significant ones we can deal with, and the filibuster has 

changed over the years. I have discovered, as I have said in these 

hearings before, that the Senate has rules and the Senate has 

precedent, and basically the precedent trumps the rules. That is, 

395 

the way we do things seems to be more important than, well, the 

rule says you can. And I have witnessed a sea change in precedent 

with respect to the filibuster in the relatively brief time I have 

been in the Senate. Comparing me to Robert C. Byrd, it is a brief 

time indeed. And we have seen the filibuster go from, when I first 

came, a tool that was used relatively rarely and on only the most 

significant issues to a standard understanding between both Leaders that anything significant requires 60 votes. And I have heard 

my colleagues lament this change and will not take the time of the 

Committee to go back in my view of history and where it came 

from and from whom it came. But it has been an interesting thing 

for me to see the precedent shift quite dramatically in the period 

of time that I have been here. 

So we are faced now with the reality that it takes 60 votes to 

get anything through the Senate. Is that a good thing or a bad 

thing? And do we want to move in a direction that leaves the minority more in the position of the minority in the House of Representatives? And I remember a Speaker once asked—I cannot remember which speaker it was—‘‘What are the rights of the minority?’’ And he said, ‘‘The minority have the right to draw their paychecks and to make a quorum.’’ And, fortunately, in the Senate 

that has not been the case. The minority has had the right to be 

heard. The minority has had the right to have an influence and an 

impact. And as we go forward in this effort, we need to be very 

careful, I believe, not to create a circumstance where the minority 

in the Senate is reduced to the status of the minority in the House. 

So I am looking forward to the specifics of the proposals made 

by our two colleagues and to the commentary of the other witnesses on those specifics and how these proposals would really 

work in practice. 

So I thank you for calling the hearing and look forward to what 

it is we have to learn. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Bennett. 

Now we will proceed to Senator Lautenberg. Your entire statement will be read in the record, and you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FRANK LAUTENBERG, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member Senator Bennett. Senator Bennett, you, I know, are kind 

of in the twilight of your service in the Senate, but you were always someone who I saw got down to business and did not use a 

lot of time casually. And I have always respected that and your 

thoughtfulness as well. So your presence certainly will be missed. 

This is not a picture of me in a younger day, but it is Jimmy 

Stewart, and his performance here was really iconic. 

We have got to improve the pace with which the Senate moves 

its legislative agenda. There is no doubt about that. We have managed to alienate the public for all kinds of things, and one of the 

things they say frequently is, ‘‘Nothing happens there.’’ And I guess 

that is from watching a TV screen and a digital clock ticking away. 

To maintain his filibuster, Mr. Smith stood on his feet on the 

Senate floor and spoke continuously for 23 hours, and we know 

that there were actually Senate filibusters here that took longer 

396 

than that, one Bob Byrd, another one Senator Strom Thurmond. 

But eventually Mr. Smith’s passion, fortitude, and arguments won 

the day. The movie’s portrayal of a filibuster has seeped into Americans’ consciousness, but few realize that the movie version of the 

filibuster bears little resemblance to what is going on in the Senate 

today. 

The filibuster was intended to extend debate, but today the filibuster is not about debate at all. The filibuster, which used to be 

an extraordinary event, has become nothing more than routine dilatory tactic, and it is now a silent filibuster. You can expend next 

to no effort to slow down and stop the Senate from considering legislation. These days you do not even have to come to the floor or 

even be in Washington to launch a filibuster. And a silent filibuster 

is not just being used to thwart contentious bills. Legislation is 

often stalled, and non-controversial nominees are often blocked for 

no other reason than to delay the Senate calendar. 

And, by the way, I have served in the majority and the minority 

and know that what goes around comes around, and the fact that 

any rules we make now with the majority as it is structured could 

shift. We are hopeful that it does not, obviously, but the fact is that 

that is real life. 

Now, here is the effect of the silent filibuster. We are not getting 

the people’s business done, and ordinary Americans are losing faith 

in our Federal Government and the legislative process. The Framers of the Constitution intended the Senate to be a deliberative 

body, not a chamber of silence. 

The filibuster itself was meant to keep the flow of the debate 

going, not to stop the Senate dead in its tracks. And my bill—common sense, I believe—the Mr. Smith Act, is a modest measure that 

will bring Mr. Smith back to Washington by bringing the Senate 

back to its roots. My bill preserves the rights of the minority and 

maintains a 60-vote threshold to end debate. It simply requires 

Senators who want to filibuster to actually filibuster. 

Once cloture is filed on a motion, nomination, or legislation, Senators who wish to keep the debate going are going to have to come 

to the floor and voice their position to their colleagues and to the 

country at large. And if at any point these Senators give up the 

floor, we can move to an immediate cloture vote. 

The Mr. Smith Act will bring deliberation and seriousness back 

to the world’s greatest deliberative body, and it will end the practice of delay solely for delay’s sake and to try to restore America’s 

confidence in the legislative process. 

Mr. Chairman, there are few people that I have met in my lifetime that I have had more respect for than Senator Robert C. Byrd 

of recent memory. And as we all know, his knowledge of Senate 

rules and procedure were unmatched. While Senator Byrd never 

stated a position on my bill specifically, he was a fierce defender 

of the Framers’ intention that the Senate be a model for debate, 

discussion, and deliberation. 

This past April, in a statement submitted to this very Committee, Mr. Chairman, he said Senators should—and I quote him 

here—‘‘be obliged to actually filibuster, that is, to go to the floor 

and talk instead of finding less strenuous ways to accomplish the 

same end. 

397 

And I believe the minority rights are a hallmark of the Senate, 

but I do not believe that we are doing the right thing for this body 

or for our country by allowing legislative tools to be misused. We 

must put the public good ahead of partisan politics, and we must 

insist that Senators take a stand, come out in the open, and let the 

public know what you really think, instead of just wiling away 

their time and patience as we lose their confidence. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for 

inviting me to testify today and, more importantly, thanks for holding this critical meeting. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg was submitted 

for the record.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg, for your 

excellent testimony and even more excellent idea. 

Senator BENNET. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL BENNET, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM COLORADO 

Senator BENNET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bennett, my fellow witness 

Senator Lautenberg, and members of the Committee, I am pleased 

to have the opportunity to talk with you about solutions I propose 

to an important problem that impedes our Government’s ability to 

respond to the needs of American families. I am talking about the 

Senate’s rules. The Senate’s rules are intended to encourage the 

body to function collegially, protect the rights of individual Senators, and foster debate. Yet a few of these rules are actually having the real-world outcome of inhibiting all of those legitimate purposes. 

The pervasiveness of the filibuster deployed every day for multiple purposes in this body has started to cause the Senate to descend into complete dysfunction. I am not here to advocate banning 

the filibuster. The Senate can and must protect individual or small 

groups of Senators, and filibusters, used properly, can extend debate on important matters while members advocate for their constituents and engage in the battle of ideas that is the hallmark or 

should be the hallmark of this body. 

Yesterday’s failed procedural vote on Chairman Schumer’s campaign finance legislation is the perfect example, in my view, of the 

abuse of Senate rules. The filibuster, deployed for years to extend 

debate in the Senate, sometimes for a whole day at a time, actually 

is now being used to undermine ever even having debate. By filibustering the ability of the Senate to begin debate on the DISCLOSE Act, yesterday’s minority denied the American people a full 

airing of the recent Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. 

FEC and how that decision might affect our democracy. 

I have introduced Senate Resolution 440 that in a very practical 

way would have ensured that we could have moved ahead to the 

debate stage on the DISCLOSE Act. By making motions to proceed 

undebatable, my resolution eliminates filibusters that, rather than 

extend debate, actually are abused to prevent debate. My resolution would help the body operate more efficiently. Making motions 

to proceed non-debatable is a practical step in the right direction 

398 

that is worth incorporation in a larger Senate Rules Committee 

package of suggested rules amendments. 

Another type of filibuster that prevents rather than extends debate is the hold. Holds are the most antidemocratic form of the filibuster because just one Senator can, even in a secret manner, block 

Senate business for long stretches of time. 

Senate Resolution 440 makes significant improvements to the 

holds process, including eliminating the secret hold. 

My approach would require holds to be published in the Congressional Record, require them to be bipartisan at that time. They 

would be limited to 30 days. 

Neither party will be able to place secret holds. It is important 

that citizens have the ability to find out why things do not get done 

in Washington. 

Mr. Chairman, my fellow witness Senator Lautenberg has some 

very interesting ideas about how to ask more of the filibustering 

Senators who seek to block legislation. I would like to discuss the 

reform proposal in my resolution on this matter as well. 

The Senate’s rules effectively require an affirmative 60 Senators 

to vote to end debate on an item. Yet members in the minority do 

not even have to show up or vote to continue on with a filibuster. 

My resolution would actually require at least 41 Senators to 

show up and vote to block cloture, or else the legislation could 

move forward. If you want to block the majority from moving 

ahead, then you at least ought to be required to show up for the 

vote. 

An atmosphere of overly bipartisan gridlock has rendered this 

body too often at an impasse. I think the rules are contributing to 

this hyper-partisanship, only making a difficult environment for 

working across the aisle that much harder. 

Mr. Chairman, the American people want to see their elected 

representatives work together. There is a sense, often a correct 

sense that the parties are trying to score political points instead of 

attending to the people’s business. 

We conduct votes with very, very partisan outcomes, and filibusters serve only to dig members in on one side or the other. 

My resolution is in part an effort to build in some incentives to 

help the Senate work through legislative impasses in a more constructive, bipartisan manner. 

These proposed rule changes address situations where the legislative process has already begun to break down. Following three 

failed attempts at ending a filibuster, new incentives are activated 

that should encourage the parties to negotiate. 

First, the 41-vote threshold that the filibustering minority must 

meet in order to maintain the filibuster under my proposal would 

increase to 45 Senators unless the minority is able to attract at 

least one Senator who caucuses with the majority to vote for the 

filibuster. This provides considerable incentives to the minority to 

keep an open dialogue and work with members of the other party. 

I believe building in this incentive can have a positive marginal effect on minority negotiations with members of the majority. 

A second piece of the resolution builds on this first one. Once the 

minority has convinced a member of the majority party to support 

a filibuster, then the threshold necessary to block cloture can still 

399 

rise to 45 if the majority is able to attract three members of the 

minority to support cloture. So the Majority Leader, able to make 

substantive changes to the legislation at hand, now has incentives 

to negotiate with members of the minority in the hope that he can 

break the filibuster with their help. 

While rules changes cannot fix Washington culture, they can reduce the incentives for the inertia that too many times since I have 

gotten here has left the Senate in paralysis. 

Encouraging bipartisanship through the Senate rules is at best 

only a partial answer, but I believe that improving some of the 

rules under which this body functions can begin to replace some of 

the bad habits Washington has developed with better ones. 

The single most important thing we can do to improve the chance 

for success of a reform proposal is to get the partisan intent out 

of it. We need substantial bipartisan support to update the Senate’s 

rules, so let us put together a package that would improve the 

rules whether you are in the majority or in the minority. And let 

us make it crystal clear that that is our intent. 

My resolution has been cosponsored by Senator Shaheen, and it 

is my sincere hope that some of them will be incorporated in a bipartisan reform package that can pass this body. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and to all the members of the 

Committee, for conducting this important hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Bennet was submitted for 

the record.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Again, these are very interesting ideas. I 

know you, Senator Bennet, have been pushing this for a long time, 

even before most people have focused on it. Speaking, I think, for 

all of us, we are going to pay careful attention to the ideas that 

you have put forward as well as the proposal of Senator Lautenberg. These are two excellent testimonies that will help guide us. 

We thank both of you for being here. 

Senator BENNET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. Do any other members wish to make 

opening statements? Feel free. 

[No response.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. Then let us move on to our second 

panel of witnesses. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just ask to 

put my opening statement in the record. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, and without objection, it will so 

be put, if that is grammatically correct. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Udall was submitted for the 

record.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. Well, welcome to our three panelists, 

and let me introduce all three of you, and then we will proceed. 

Our first witness is Professor Gregory Koger. Professor Koger is 

an associate professor of political science at the University of 

Miami. He specializes in the study of Congress, elections, political 

history, and political institutions. He recently authored the book, 

very timely for these hearings, Filibustering: A Political History of 

Obstruction in the House and the Senate. Professor Koger preVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00409 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
400 

viously worked in Congress and received his Ph.D. in political 

science from the University of California at Los Angeles. 

Speaking of the University of California at Los Angeles, Professor Barbara Sinclair is the Marvin Hoffenberg Professor of 

American Politics Emerita at UCLA. She previously served as 

Chair of the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political 

Science Association. Professor Sinclair is the author of several 

books on the U.S. Senate, including Party Wars: Polarization and 

the Politics of National Policy Making and Transformation of the 

United States Senate. 

Our third witness is Ms. Elizabeth Rybicki. Ms. Rybicki is an analyst on the Congress and legislative process for the CRS. She was 

previously a research fellow at the Brookings Institution and a specialist in congressional history and political science at the National 

Archives and Records Administration, where I was just at, dedicating the Roosevelt papers, which, by the way, I would note to my 

colleague Senator Durbin, Anna Roosevelt was there and said to 

say hello and thank you for your help in that regard. She is your 

constituent. 

So each of you will have your entire statement read in the 

record. Please proceed as you wish. We will try to limit each testimony to about 5 minutes. Thank you. Professor Koger, you go first. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY KOGER, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR 

POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA 

Mr. KOGER. Thank you, Senator Schumer, and thanks to the 

Rules Committee for the opportunity to discuss filibustering and 

the Lautenberg proposal. 

I want to briefly stress two points I make in my written testimony. First, filibustering, as you know it, is a very recent development. If this Committee wants to make reforms, it is important to 

understand how and why filibustering became the norm and not 

the exception in the U.S. Senate. 

Second, I want to discuss Senator Lautenberg’s proposal, which 

I think would help to even the playing field by simplifying the cloture process. 

First, how did we get here? For the first 170 years of Senate history, a filibuster meant that Senators had to actually occupy the 

floor of the Senate to prevent a final vote on a bill or nomination. 

Senator Byrd stated this nicely in his testimony before this Committee this year when he said, ‘‘For most of the Senate’s history, 

Senators motivated to extend debate had to hold the floor as long 

as they were physically able. The Senate was either persuaded by 

the strength of their arguments or unconvinced by either their 

commitment or their stamina. True filibusters were, therefore, less 

frequent and more commonly discouraged due to every Senator’s 

understanding that such undertakings required grueling, grueling 

personal sacrifice, exhausting preparation, and a willingness to be 

criticized for disrupting the Nation’s business. 

This classic style of filibustering is portrayed fairly accurate in 

the movie ‘‘Mr. Smith Goes to Washington.’’ They actually consulted with the Senate Parliamentarian as they were doing the 

movie. However, by the 1960s, Senators no longer had the patience 

401 

to wage these classic wars of attrition. The Senate had too much 

public business to attend to, and individual Senators were too busy 

traveling back to their States or around the country to take part 

in prolonged floor fights. 

Instead, they began using a then-dormant cloture rule that had 

been around since 1917 but had fallen into disuse. This shift from 

attrition to cloture had severe unintended consequences. 

First, filibustering became less visible, so Senators were less accountable for their obstruction. 

Second, filibustering became much easier. As Senator Byrd said, 

just the whisper of opposition brings the world’s greatest deliberative body to a grinding halt. It is cheap and effective to prevent actions, so Senators do it more often. 

Third, the current cloture rule was designed for us on rare occasions in a slow-paced chamber. The delays built into the cloture 

process are too long and too costly given the breadth of obstruction 

in the modern Senate. This is the problem that the Lautenberg 

proposal addresses. Essentially it reduces the delay built into Rule 

XXII in cases where no Senator is interested in discussing the targeted measure. 

After cloture has been filed, it is in order for the Majority Leader 

to move that the vote on cloture begin immediately as long as, A, 

no Senator seeks recognition to speak and, B, Senators have had 

a full opportunity to file amendments. Furthermore, if cloture is invoked on a nomination or a motion to proceed—which, of course, 

cannot be amended—the same principle applies. If no Senator 

seeks recognition to speak, the Majority Leader can initiate a final 

vote on the nomination or motion. 

In my view, this is exactly the sort of proposal the Committee 

should be considering. Like many members of the Committee, I appreciate the benefits of selective obstruction to ensure fair and open 

debate, to promote moderate and bipartisan solutions, and to force 

new issues onto the Senate’s agenda. But the current system is far 

too biased towards inaction by the ease with which Senators can 

filibuster and the difficulty and delay in bringing debate to a close. 

The resolution, Senator Lautenberg’s resolution, does not alter 

the three-fifths threshold for cloture but merely helps the Senate 

to decide if a bill or nomination has enough support to clear that 

threshold. 

This proposal would ensure that delay occurs only as long as 

there is some sort of debate on the Senate floor. If Senators are not 

speaking against the obstructive measure, then no one is deprived 

if debate time is cut short. 

Personally, I think this proposal would be most effective and fair 

when combined with enforcement of the Pastore rule, which requires that debate be germane to the pending measure for at least 

3 hours a day. That way Senators who are opposed to a measure 

could only delay a cloture vote by providing an explanation for 

their obstruction. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Koger was submitted for the 

record.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Professor Koger. 

Professor Sinclair. 

402 

STATEMENT OF BARBARA SINCLAIR, MARVIN HOFFENBERG 

PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN POLITICS EMERITA, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 

Ms. SINCLAIR. Thank you for inviting me to testify. My task, as 

I understand it, is to tell you what my research reveals about the 

impact of Senate extended debate rule and practices on Senate decision making and about how partisanship has conditioned that impact. 

Your task is especially difficult because it involves weighing cherished values against one another. Most everybody agrees that, to 

function well, a legislative process needs to strike a balance between deliberation and inclusiveness, on the one hand, and expeditiousness and decisiveness, on the other. Now, there is a lot less 

consensus about what the optimal balance is and about what rules 

would best implement that balance. 

Well, to summarize my research briefly, I find that the use of extended debate and of cloture to cope with it began to increase well 

before the parties became highly polarized. However, as partisan 

polarization increased, so did the likelihood of major legislation encountering some sort of extended debate-related problems in the 

Senate, and this is a big increase, from 8 percent in the 1960s, to 

27 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, then to 51 percent for the 103rd 

through the 109th and 70 percent in the 110th. That is, the last 

full Congress, 70 percent of major legislation encountered some sort 

of filibuster-related problem. 

Second, the Senate, at least according to the measures that I 

have available, is more likely to produce legislation that incorporates minority preferences than the House. That can be seen as 

the upside of current Senate rules. However, heightened partisan 

polarization has significantly affected legislative productivity in the 

Senate. The Senate has a lot more difficulty passing legislation 

than the House does. In the pre-1990s period, major measures were 

just about as likely to pass the Senate but then not pass the House 

as vice versa. In the more partisan period—and I mean the 103rd 

through the 110th—this has really changed dramatically—from 

only 1 percent of major measures pass the Senate but not the 

House; 20 percent pass the House but not the Senate. The House 

Democrats’ frustration is understandable in those terms. Finally, 

partisan polarization depresses legislative productivity in the Senate mostly through the increased use by the minority party of extended debate. 

Now, because it is still in session, I do not have data for the 

111th, but it does look likely there some of these records will be 

broken. So my research suggests that if current minority party 

practices continue when the majority party’s margin is smaller, 

whichever party is the minority and the majority, the Senate really 

is in danger of near gridlock, of being incapable of legislating without so much difficulty that nothing much of significance gets done. 

The chamber already fails to pass most of its appropriations bills 

as individual bills simply because it does not have the floor time. 

So perhaps it is time for the Senate to consider whether the balance between deliberation and decisiveness has tilted too much 

away from decisiveness. Certainly supermajority requirements 

403 

have a much greater impact on the chamber’s ability to legislate 

in a context of high partisan polarization than it did when the parties were polarized. 

So rules that encourage by bipartisanship or ways of encouraging 

bipartisanship are certainly worth looking at. I am a little unclear 

about the extent to which rules can do that because I think the 

roots of partisanship are deeper than that. I think both the Bennet 

and Lautenberg rule proposals are very useful to look at in the 

terms of putting more of the burden on those who want to stop legislation versus those who want to actually move it. Now the burden 

tends to be all on the side of those who want to go further. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sinclair was submitted for the 

record.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Professor Sinclair. 

Ms. Rybicki. 

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH RYBICKI, ANALYST ON THE CONGRESS AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Ms. RYBICKI. Mr. Chairman, Senator—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Could you move the microphone? Thank 

you. 

Ms. RYBICKI [continuing]. Mr. Chairman, Senator Bennett, and 

members of the Committee, I am truly honored to have been invited to testify before you today on these two proposals to amend 

Senate rules. 

I would like to say at the outset that the procedure experts at 

the Congressional Research Service work as a team, and I want to 

thank them, first and foremost among them Rick Beth, for their assistance. 

Both of the resolutions under discussion today—Senate Resolution 440 and Senate Resolution 465—require some clarification and 

elaboration before the Committee could fully evaluate their impact. 

To assist the Committee in this evaluation, in my submitted testimony I ask a series of questions to indicate possible areas of ambiguity in the implementation and interpretation of these rules. 

For example, Senator Resolution 440, submitted by Senator Bennet of Colorado, proposes a way for a supermajority of the Senate 

to expedite the cloture process. It first creates a motion to reduce 

the 2-day ripening period by a two-thirds vote. Would this motion 

set the date and time for the cloture vote? Or would it specify the 

number of hours remaining? Would the motion be amendable? 

Could the ripening time be reduced to zero, allowing an immediate 

vote on cloture and preventing any amendments from being filed? 

Perhaps more centrally, is the motion itself debatable? I assume it 

is intended to be non-debatable because otherwise you would need 

the cloture process to end debate on the motion, and that would 

kind of defeat the purpose. 

This same resolution also creates a motion to reduce the 30-hour 

post-cloture time by a three-fifths vote. The resolution in this case 

explicitly states that the motion is not debatable. But is it amendVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00413 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
404 

able? And could this motion reduce the post-cloture debate time to 

zero and prevent Senators from offering amendments? 

Depending on the interpretation of the resolution, it might be the 

case that, taking the various provisions together, a supermajority 

of the Senate could prevent debate and amendments and bring the 

chamber to a vote on a measure with just four votes: First, the vote 

on the motion to proceed, which under Section 1 is not debatable, 

as we heard. The Senate would then be on the matter, cloture 

could be filed, a motion could be made to reduce the ripening period, and a two-thirds vote of the Senate could reduce that to zero. 

The Senate would then vote on cloture, and then a motion could 

be made to reduce the post-cloture consideration time to zero. And 

in this way, with four votes, the Senate could immediately vote on 

the question of final passage, something the Senate does in terms 

of passing measures quickly, but by unanimous consent under current procedures. And this on one interpretation might allow a 

supermajority to do that. 

The other resolution under discussion today, Senate Resolution 

465, submitted by Senator Lautenberg, similarly seeks to create a 

method to expedite the cloture process. This resolution provides 

that the Majority Leader can ‘‘move the question on cloture’’ if no 

Senators are willing to engage in floor debate during the 2-day ripening period. Is the intent of the resolution to create a new motion 

that the Senate would then vote on whether or not to vote on cloture? Or is it the intent of the motion that the Majority Leader 

would effectively announce that it is time to vote and the Senate 

would vote immediately, as long as no Senator is seeking recognition? 

Under current Senate procedures, it is already the case that if 

no Senator is seeking recognition, the presiding officer will put the 

question—a natural practice, of course, as Senators know, an accommodation generally made to allow Senators who wish to speak 

to come to the floor at their convenience. 

How, then, will this resolution alter existing practice? Is it the 

intent of the resolution that by giving this new authority to the 

Majority Leader this will discourage these practices that have developed in the Senate? And if it does discourage the practice, will 

it expedite the cloture process? 

One effect of the process established in the resolution could be 

to increase the actual floor time spent on a matter before a cloture 

vote. Under current Senate practice, the Senate often conducts 

other business during the 2-day ripening period, and then the vote 

to invoke cloture brings that matter back before the Senate. 

The resolution as submitted would require that the matter remain pending before the Senate during that 2-day ripening period. 

Is it the intended operation of the rule that if the Majority Leader 

wanted to reduce the ripening time, the Senate could not conduct 

other business and the Senate Majority Leader would have to stay 

on the floor the day after cloture was filed from 1:00 p.m. until adjournment, hoping that Senators stop speaking so that he could 

make this proposal to move the question on cloture. 

In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I will stop there. My submitted testimony has additional questions about other provisions, 

including those concerning Section 3, which deals with holds, which 

405 

is the subject of another hearing. I will be happy to discuss other 

provisions of the resolutions if you have questions. 

I would conclude by saying, as members of the Committee know 

better than I, that evaluating the effect of any rules change on Senate procedure and practice can be very challenging. The impact of 

rules in the Senate is sometimes not directly observable since much 

of the time Senators do not need to actually exercise their procedural rights because they are accommodated in negotiations over 

unanimous consent agreements as well as in norms of Senate practice. 

It is also difficult to assess the proposed consequences of rules 

because it is hard to anticipate all courses of proceeding and context in which the new rule may be applied. 

I hope posing these questions concerning implementation and interpretation of the submitted resolutions here today and in my 

written testimony can assist the Committee in its evaluation. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rybicki was submitted for the 

record.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well done. There are a lot of questions, as 

you have posed. Okay. 

My first question, and we will try to take 5 minutes and then we 

will go to a second round if members so wish, is to Professor Koger. 

Do you actually believe that Senator Lautenberg’s proposal would 

change the number of actual filibusters? That is the fundamental 

question. And, second, would it alter the number of secret holds as 

well? 

Mr. KOGER. I am not sure. I think the—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. I think Senator Lautenberg would probably 

argue it would. I cannot speak for him, but I am sure he would say 

yes, at least on the first and probably on the second, too. 

Mr. KOGER [continuing]. To reduce the number of filibusters, I 

think that is certainly the intent. In practice, yes. I mean, so any 

Senator who is—especially placing a hold that that Senator would 

not want to defend publicly or argue on behalf of, that sort of hold 

would probably—Senators would probably think twice about filing 

that sort of hold. 

Chairman SCHUMER. A secret hold. 

Mr. KOGER. Right. 

Chairman SCHUMER. And what about on filibusters themselves? 

Mr. KOGER. I do not know that it would reduce the number of 

filibusters. It would probably make it easier for the Senate to 

churn through sort of—filibusters against minor legislation, so the 

Senate has to spend less time, you know, on nominations to lowerlevel positions, Cabinet positions. So I think the primary goal is to 

make it easier for the majority to deal with the filibusters that it 

has now. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Do either of you have an opinion on that, 

Professor Sinclair or Ms. Rybicki? Go ahead, Ms. Rybicki. Assuming the answer to most of your questions, which were very good, 

is answered in the way of shortening the amount of time necessary, 

and not saying, well, we could go for another vote on deciding this, 

this, or the other thing. 

406 

Ms. RYBICKI. Mr. Chairman, I was just going to say the Congressional Research Service does not take an opinion, and I cannot answer the question. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I know. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. How about Ms. Rybicki? No. I do not want 

to put you on the spot. Go ahead. 

Ms. RYBICKI. My mentor at the Congressional Research Service 

was once asked by the House Rules Committee Chairman what he 

thought, and he responded, ‘‘I am not allowed to think.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Professor Sinclair, you are allowed to 

think? 

Ms. SINCLAIR. As Elizabeth Rybicki said, if we—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Just pull the microphone forward, please. 

Ms. SINCLAIR [continuing]. It really can be difficult to kind of 

trace the effects of a rule because it—I mean, all those little ramifications that seem so minor initially might come back and bite 

you. But it does seem as if the likelihood is that you would, in fact, 

get debate. You know, I posed it as kind of deliberation versus decisiveness, but it seems in many cases now you have the worst of all 

possible worlds. 

Chairman SCHUMER. We do not have much deliberation, and we 

do not have much decisiveness. 

Ms. SINCLAIR. Right, right. And often you are not even talking 

about what it is that is at base in contest. And while pretty clearly 

if the Majority Leader has to get 60 votes for everything, well, that 

is an enormous incentive then to use procedures like filling the 

amendment tree so as to prevent amendments. I mean, you have 

got to do the 60 anyway. Why should you then allow the others to 

amend things? 

Chairman SCHUMER. And that is the debate we have been having 

back and forth on each side here as we have gone through these 

hearings. 

Let me ask you a separate question. Senator Bennet makes a 

real effort to say, well, if you are going to use this process, there 

ought to be an incentive for some degree of bipartisanship. What 

did you think of his specific proposals and more broadly the idea 

of saying, well, if you get someone or a small number from the 

other party, there is an incentive for you? 

Ms. SINCLAIR. I am a little pessimistic of the ability of rules to 

promote bipartisanship. I do think that the roots of the current 

partisanship are, you know, much greater and deeper than simply 

a matter of something that could be solved by rules. You know, if 

it were easier to change Senate rules, one might say, well, why not 

try it? And shall we say at this point I am grateful that this is your 

decision and not mine. 

As I said, I think that both of these proposals have the intent 

and I think probably the effect of putting more of the burden in 

this process on those who want to stop things, and I think that is 

a good idea, and also to some extent make that more transparent. 

You know, to the extent that you get a robust debate, there is 

at least some chance that there will be some public engagement 

407 

and that things will be decided on the basis of, if not rational arguments, at least arguments. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. 

Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much. I have enjoyed your 

testimony. 

A quick comment Professor Sinclair. You made reference to the 

appropriations bills and how in recent years they have ended up 

in either an omnibus bill or a continuing resolution. I am a member of the Appropriations Committee, and I can remember the first 

time we got to an omnibus bill. It was not because the Senate did 

not pass the bills. It was because the House did not appoint conferees, and we never got bills that could go to the President. So the 

ability to delay—and, frankly, it was a Republican House and a Republican Senate, so I am criticizing my own colleagues here. The 

ability to obstruct is not unanimously and solely part of the United 

States Senate. 

The core here of what I think we have been talking about is the 

decision to move to a dual track. If we go back to ‘‘Mr. Smith Goes 

to Washington’’ and Senator Lautenberg that was the way filibusters always were. When I was a staffer here and my father was in 

the Senate and a filibuster would come, he would get out the cots. 

Everybody has to be on the floor. It was ‘‘Mr. Smith Goes to Washington’’ time. And at some point—and I do not know who the Majority Leader was—we got into the position of a dual track so that, 

okay, we file a cloture motion; now we move—the Majority Leader 

has the right to move to other business, and so you can have what 

you have been decrying here: the circumstance where a filibuster 

has been set in motion, but the Senate continues to function. And 

if we did away with the dual track, which is what the Lautenberg 

proposal does, says as soon as a filibuster has started, nothing else 

is in order, then you do have the ‘‘Mr. Smith Goes to Washington,’’ 

but the Senate cannot function, cannot take up any other business. 

I would like you to comment about the wisdom of being in that 

situation. I remember as a very freshman Senator we mounted a 

filibuster against one of President Clinton’s proposals, and Senator 

Dole said, Okay, we are in it, and put up the chart, and we all 

signed up for a time. And I was junior enough that my time was 

2 o’clock in the morning. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BENNETT. And so I showed up just before 2 o’clock, took 

that whole hour. There was one Democrat on the floor to make 

sure I did not make some outrageous unanimous consent request 

so that he could object. He came out of the cave in the Democratic 

cloakroom to complain that I was reading a newspaper column and, 

therefore, it was not germane and should be struck down. And I 

pointed out that the newspaper column was on the subject we were 

debating, and the Chair ruled in my behalf. 

You know, so, yes, we have done that and we can do that and 

the minority can mount that, but the Senate cannot function when 

we are doing that. 

Comment on whether or not moving to that single track that 

used to be the norm is really going to improve getting legislation 

through the Senate. 

408 

Ms. SINCLAIR. I think it was Mansfield, Majority Leader Mansfield that went to the dual track. 

Senator BENNETT. It would not surprise me. He was a very reasonable man. 

Ms. SINCLAIR. And your point, I think is extremely well taken, 

and, you know, a lot—and this gets back to, say, all these attempts 

to deal with holds. Well, you know, holds are not in Senate rules. 

The Majority Leader does not ever have to, in fact—— 

Senator BENNETT. If we could move—we held a whole hearing on 

holds. 

Ms. SINCLAIR. Yes. 

Senator BENNETT. I do not mean to be disrespectful. 

Ms. SINCLAIR. Oh, yes. 

Senator BENNETT. But let us talk about this other question rather than holds. 

Ms. SINCLAIR. But the real problem, of course, is the Majority 

Leader is trying to get things through the Senate. There is limited 

time on the floor, and so you end up going to things like the dual 

track because it makes it a little more possible to get certain business done. But it then encourages these other uses of the rules to 

stymie other things, including this kind of hostage taking where 

you are stymieing one nomination or one bill because you really are 

upset about something else. So the question is: How can you somehow get this all where the incentives are not to use the rules to 

block unless it is really something very important that you are willing to go to the mattresses on? 

Senator BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, could we Professor Koger—I 

know my time is up, but—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. That is okay. 

Mr. KOGER. Yes, please. Quickly, on the Lautenberg proposal, the 

way I understand it is it would create an option for the Majority 

Leader to require what you would call a single track debate, you 

will stay on the issue that is being filibustered. But as Ms. Rybicki 

has noted, often the Senate will switch to other issues after the cloture petition has been filed, and that would still be around as an 

option. 

If the majority party would prefer to stick on an issue and compel the obstructionist to actually debate the issue, then that would 

be an option that they could use. But it would not be mandatory 

in every single case. 

Senator BENNETT. So the Lautenberg proposal preserves the 

right to move on the dual track. 

Mr. KOGER. Yes. 

Senator BENNETT. I see. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess when I moved from the House to the Senate I was looking forward to Senate debate. Think about it, the greatest deliberative chamber in the world and all the history that went with it. 

And the first time I had a chance to offer an amendment on the 

floor, and the staffer came up to me and said, ‘‘You have one hour,’’ 

I said, ‘‘Is that equally divided?’’ And she said, ‘‘No. You have one 

hour.’’ 

409 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DURBIN. I thought, ‘‘What am I going to do with one 

hour?’’ So I said the Republican Senator on the other side, can I 

ask unanimous consent that we split this up and that we debate 

this back and forth?’’ And he said, ‘‘I object.’’ And I started to realize that this may not be the great debate chamber. 

So today I would argue that the Senate is not only not functional, it is not very interesting. To have debate break out on the 

floor of the Senate is—you know, somebody put out a press release. 

Two Senators are actually engaging one another in exchange of 

ideas. And so I think there is something that we have to get to, 

and it is not just whether this place functions and produces debt 

which leads to votes and perhaps legislation, but actually has a 

process that engages thinking and expression of thought. And I do 

not think this process does it. 

Now, the fear that all of us have, whether we are sitting on that 

side or this side, is, What if the tables are turned? What if they 

become the majority and we want to stop them? You know, if we 

change the rules, we are going to have to live with it. We may accommodate changes on the rules that make it easier. 

So it is that basic fear, concern, that I think guides us on this 

in terms of how far we want to go. But I would argue at this point 

we have to do something. There is something fundamentally wrong 

with this institution. 

I read a book which some friends sent to me. Francis Valeo, who 

is a former Secretary of the Senate, if I am not mistaken, wrote 

this biography of Mike Mansfield, and the most interesting thing 

I ran across was a story in 1962 when Wayne Morse decided to filibuster the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. And the interesting thing was this was odd that a liberal was going to initiate 

a filibuster. To that point, the conservatives and Southern Democrats had been using filibusters to stop civil rights. In comes Morse 

who said, ‘‘I am going to filibuster the Communications Satellite 

Act because I think it is a monopoly, and I am for public ownership,’’ and so forth. And so they test it. 

Well, here is how it ended. I thought the ending was the best 

part of it. He lost. Cloture was invoked. And the interesting—it 

was 73–27. Another consequence, Valeo writes, of the Morse cloture 

vote was that the entire Senate had witnessed the successful operation of Rule XXII to end the filibuster. Previously, only Hayden 

of Arizona could claim that distinction. It was the first time in 35 

years that the Senate had voted to shut off debate and only the 

fifth time in its history, 1962. 

Now look where we are. We face it every day, almost every day. 

Can I get to a practical question? One of the things that stops 

movement of debate and discussion on the floor is the quorum call, 

and right now the Majority Leader can come in and he can lift the 

quorum call. But ordinary Senators cannot. One Senator can object, 

and the quorum call just continues. 

I will ask Ms. Rybicki first. Did you find in any of these rule 

changes a way to address that question about how you actually get 

the floor? 

Ms. RYBICKI. Senator Bennet’s proposal, Senate Resolution 440— 

no, I am sorry. It is Senate Resolution 465, Senator Lautenberg, 

410 

does have in it against dilatory quorum calls. That term is not defined, so I just have more questions whether the intent is to have 

the presiding officer decide whether it is a dilatory quorum call 

and, if so, on what grounds. Would that decision be subject to appeal? Is that appeal debatable? But it is mentioned in Senate Resolution 465. 

Senator DURBIN. Back in a previous life, I was a Parliamentarian 

of the Illinois State Senate for 14 years, and I wrote the rule book, 

and it was such a joy. It was like writing the Tax Code. I could 

always find a provision to take care of my needs. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DURBIN. And I loved your questions because they start 

thinking about where we go. We now are embarking on a new 

thing that is being used by the Republican side, and that is suspend the rules after cloture is invoked. We are getting a long list 

of motions to suspend the rules to bring up a lot of different topics. 

The point I am making is you raise a lot of practical, good questions about how these things will work, and if we are not careful, 

there will be some other opening in our rule book which will allow 

more efforts to delay, divert the efforts of the Senate to reach some 

sort of conclusion. 

But I have come to the point, even though I think we have had 

one of the most productive sessions in history, I have come to the 

point that if this is going to be an enjoyable experience for Americans as well as for Senators, I think we need fundamental change. 

I think Michael Bennet and Frank Lautenberg are on the right 

track, and I thank you for your testimony. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Roberts. 

Senator ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was just wondering what a repeat performance would be like by Robert C. Byrd, 

our great colleague and Senator who made an appearance before 

this Committee. You were very eloquent in describing his contributions to the process. And if there was ever a person who defended 

the filibuster, it was Robert C. Byrd and what he would be saying. 

I am not trying to say I am going to emanate that example or try 

to duplicate what he would say. 

Mr. Koger, you state in your testimony filibustering has skyrocketed. You describe it as obstructionism. There are others of us 

that would say that it would be better to stop a bill, i.e., it is important to pass legislation, but it is also to prevent bad legislation 

from passing. And if this is the only tool you have in your toolbox, 

then it is not obstructionism. It is preventing something that we 

do not want to see happen. 

But based on the research you have conducted for your book, can 

you tell me about the practice of filling the amendment tree, which 

I think is a big contributor to why we have the filibuster? 

Mr. KOGER. Thank you, Senator. Briefly, I use the term ‘‘obstruction’’ just as a descriptive term. 

Senator ROBERTS. Yes, I know. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. KOGER. No, I mean, I use the term ‘‘filibustering’’ and ‘‘obstruction’’ just to refer to the strategic use of delay to prevent an 

outcome on an issue. There is no pejorative sense. 

411 

Anyway, filling the amendment tree. So one of the classic reasons 

for filibustering both in the modern Senate and going back into the 

19th century House is because the minority of any sort is trying 

to prevent the majority from curtailing their opportunity to—I will 

not say ‘‘debate,’’ but to offer amendments. And, yes, I understand 

that filling the amendment tree—— 

Senator ROBERTS. Well, how would you describe your relationship between filling the tree and filibustering? One contributes to 

the other, I think. 

Mr. KOGER. Well, if you look at time trends, the explosion in filibustering started at the end of—you know, starting in the 1960s, 

increased in the 1970s, precedes the increased use of filling the 

amendment tree. So it may very well be true that one of the incentives to filibuster in the contemporary Senate is a reaction against 

filling the amendment tree. But certainly the explosion that we observe is not simply—— 

Senator ROBERTS. Wait. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. May be 

contributing. We have in 18 months here—I serve on the HELP 

Committee, on the Finance Committee, and have been through 

hundreds of hours of testimony, had 13 amendments that I wanted 

to offer, all in relation to health care rationing. All were defeated 

on a party line vote or just said they were not germane. And the 

only vote that I ever got was during reconciliation when I introduced an amendment that was first introduced by Senator Schumer, who then turned around and voted against his own amendment. Shame on the Chairman. But, anyway, I thought he had a 

great idea. But at any rate, I had 1 minute. One minute. That was 

it. And today you can have a very major overhaul of legislation. 

You do not go back to Committee. You do not have hearings. We 

had the DISCLOSE Act. The Chairman did at least have some debate on the floor, but we did not really debate it here in Committee, and I find that true in almost every Committee I serve on. 

So, consequently, the bill goes to the floor, and then we really do 

not have debate on it on the floor. The Majority Leader and Charlie 

Rich, sitting behind closed doors, and all of a sudden the bill appears, and we have not seen it. And it could be 2,000 pages, 2,300 

pages, 2,600 pages, whatever. Usually the manager of the bill indicates, well, we will find out when we pass it. And then we do not 

have any chance to make any amendments. And so, consequently, 

what else do we do other than, you know, file cloture? I mean, 

what do we do in this instance when regular order has really sort 

of broken down? 

Now, I understand that the people who are for this have an 

agenda, and they believe in that agenda. They obviously would not 

do it if they did not believe in it. Some may have a different point 

of view, like myself. And just as an example, we have a situation 

here where we have a small business reform bill coming up, and 

the Leader is considering amendments. One amendment I had was 

a sense of the Senate that we at least ought to vote in the Finance 

Committee on the confirmation of Dr. Donald Berwick, who is 

going to un health care. You would think that we would want to 

have a vote on the confirmation. Well, the answer to that is no, we 

are not. We may have a hearing on how he might run CMS. The 

412 

distinguished Chairman is a member of that Committee. But I 

want my vote. 

Now, what recourse do I have? I guess I could go to the floor and 

I could put the place in a quorum call, and if I have a lot of fortitude and can sit there for a long period of time—or maybe pass 

it off to somebody else, but I am not sure that would happen—I 

could maybe tie it up. We just had that example with Senator Lincoln in regards to a bill where, in order to get out, we had to accommodate her down the road in regards to an agriculture disaster 

bill. But she had to shut down the Senate, put a crowbar in the 

whole place. And that is on the other side. I still want my vote on 

Dr. Berwick, and what would you advise I could do here? Because 

we are filling the tree, and one leads to the other. 

Mr. KOGER. Actually, this may be a case for Dr. Sinclair, because 

it gets to—— 

Senator ROBERTS. Well, please tell me what you think. I understand the distinguished—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Time has expired, so decide who should answer the question, and we will move on. 

Mr. KOGER. Briefly, I mean, these are the problems of the combination of a highly polarized congressional environment and rules 

that allow minority obstruction and, you know, the majority then 

trying to short-circuit the exercise of minority rights by the minority. And so these are the sort of things we observe. 

Senator Durbin mentioned that, you know, he wonders what sort 

of rules changes he would want if he were in the minority, and I 

think this is—since there has been some switching back and forth 

of chairs and gavels, I think this might be an opportunity for people to see the world from both sides. 

Senator ROBERTS. Ms. Rybicki. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Okay. Senator Udall. 

Senator ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, could I just make one observation? Ms. Rybicki, I think it is, if you are not allowed to state what 

you think, you might want to think about employment in the intelligence community. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROBERTS. Just a thought. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Coming from the former Chairman of the 

Intelligence Committee. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much, Chairman Schumer, and 

thank you for holding this hearing. I very much appreciate the witnesses today. 

When I first arrived here—I also spent a number of years in the 

House, as some of the other members that are on the Committee, 

and I was surprised—I had been observing the Senate, but I was 

surprised when I arrived here about you talk about decisiveness 

and deliberation, the lack of both. And I think that is really the 

key issue here, is how we bring accountability back to the institution. And what I want to ask you about in talking about accountability has to do with how hard it is to change the rules. 

I think, Ms. Sinclair, you at one point in your testimony said if 

it were easier to change the Senate rules. Well, you know, who 

made these rules? Why are they here and who voted on them? One 

of the remarkable things to me is that of the entire Senate body, 

413 

when we deal with Rule XXII, the last time it was changed was 

in 1975. So two Senators were here, Senator Inouye and Senator 

Leahy, and that is it, of the sitting Senator. Ninety-eight of us had 

nothing to do with the rules. 

So if you had rules which could be established with every Congress every 2 years, as the House does and most legislative bodies 

around the world or parliaments do around the world, would you 

get more accountability? And what I am referring to there is what 

I call the constitutional option. In the Constitution of the United 

States, it says each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. Three Vice Presidents as presiding officers have ruled 

that at the beginning of a Congress, you can, by a majority vote, 

adopt the rules. And so if we proceed at the beginning of the 112th 

Congress—which I intend to do. I am going to offer a motion to 

adopt rules for the 112th Congress on the first day. Wouldn’t you 

think if we had a tradition of adopting rules every 2 years, that 

would bring accountability to the system more than anything, because each side would know if you really abuse the rules, you are 

going to have the possibility they are going to be changed in 2 

years. 

Please, any of the witnesses who would like to answer. 

Ms. SINCLAIR. Well, yes, I think that that is by far the most likely way of being able to change the rules without doing, you know, 

serious damage to the institution, to essentially reverse that precedent, whether it is the rule of the Senate or the continuing body. 

And it would certainly provide a certain amount of flexibility, and 

in the end, yes, I think one of the real problems is that with supermajorities required for just about everything, it does make it hard 

for the public to hold anybody accountable for what does or does 

not get done. 

You cannot expect people, you know, who have to work and take 

care of their kids and all that sort of stuff to become experts in 

Senate procedure. And so there is that kind of ‘‘a pox on all of you’’ 

sort of sentiment when it seems that the Senate cannot function. 

Senator UDALL. Mr. Koger. 

Mr. KOGER. Well, Senator Udall, the part I liked about the 

standing body strategy in the mid-20th century was that it was an 

effort to force a critical vote on a parliamentary ruling about 

whether or not—that if the reformers won, it would promote their 

effort to change the rules of the Senate. 

I think one of the problems they ran into is that when they put 

themselves in a box of saying we can only do this at the beginning 

of a Congress, that then limited them. What if actually their real 

incentive to change the rules happened in the middle of the Congress and that is when they got really angry? Well, then, they 

would have to wait. And often there are things to be done at the 

beginning of a Congress that then butted up against their effort to 

have a long, prolonged debate about the rules. 

As Dr. Gregory Walrow mentioned earlier, I mean, I hold the 

view that if you have a committed and creative majority of Senators willing to go to the floor of the Senate and vote for, you know, 

the right to parliamentary rulings, you can do that any day, and 

I would not necessarily constrain yourself to the first few days of 

a Congress. 

414 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, thank you. Senator Udall has been 

sort of pushing this idea for a long time. 

Senator Bennett and I talked about this. It is very relevant to 

the question that Tom asked and you answered, Professor Koger. 

Is this different than the moments with Bill Frist and the nuclear 

option? And the one big difference, if it makes a difference, is 

this—the nuclear option was attempted in the middle of a session. 

And at least it is my reading—and now I have read a lot on this, 

and I will be reading more and we have had a hearing on this. But 

if there is a conflict between the two-thirds rule and the constitutional provision that the Senate shall make its own rules, it is the 

only time, in my judgment, and I guess I would disagree with you. 

I think Tom is in agreement with me. I am not sure of this. The 

only time where the constitutional provision might trump the Senate rule is in between sessions of Congress, because it is awfully 

hard to do otherwise. Because you have an ongoing rule in the middle of a session, but you just do not necessarily have an ongoing 

rule between sessions, although I know the way the rule was constructed it almost goes in perpetuity. 

But that is a debate we will be having. It is a fundamental question that we are going to have to address. And I have to say this, 

there is even division within our own caucus about this. So it is 

going to be something that is going to take a lot of work and a lot 

of thought. I just wanted to say, before I call on Carte, about Ms. 

Rybicki’s many questions. It is true, we asked you a question and 

we get five back, and that is good. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. It shows how difficult this is and how much 

thought it all involves, not just thought but there may be unintended consequences as well if you do not think it through very 

carefully. 

Do you want to say something, Senator Bennett, before we call 

on Senator Goodwin? 

Senator BENNETT. When you said there are divisions in your caucus, I simply wanted to add, ‘‘As there are in ours. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Great. Senator Goodwin, is this your first 

time asking questions at a hearing? 

Senator GOODWIN. I believe we are up to number three, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Number three, good. Well, so you are an old 

hand already. 

Senator GOODWIN. A seasoned vet. 

Senator UDALL. And he was in the chair yesterday, so, you know, 

we are really breaking them in here. 

Senator GOODWIN. That is right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

I would also like to thank our panelists, including our Senate colleagues, Senators Lautenberg and Bennet, for giving their time 

today and sharing their testimony. 

I would also be remiss if I did not also acknowledge Senator 

Byrd’s long service to this Committee and to the State of West Virginia. Senator Byrd was a stalwart of Senate procedure in history. 

He quite literally wrote the book on it, or at least a book on it. And 

as a dean of the Senate, Senator Byrd understood the rules and 

procedures of this body as well as anyone, and his love of this body 

415 

was rooted in the deep appreciation of those rules and procedures, 

including the filibuster. 

I know that this Committee has been holding a series of hearings 

to examine this issue, and I certainly look forward to getting up to 

speed and getting a better understanding of the issue in the days 

ahead. 

I have one very brief question for Professor Koger. In your testimony, you refer to a shift from attrition to cloture. Talk a little bit 

about what prompted that shift and to what extent the shift became formally embodied in the rules of the Senate. 

Mr. KOGER. Certainly, thank you. Well, if you remember back— 

I do not have it here, but the picture of Mr. Smith filibustering, 

your focus is drawn to Smith, but in the background there is a majority of the Senate waiting for him to collapse. And that is the 

trick, right? Because you had to have a quorum of the Senate 

present—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Those are called ‘‘extras.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. KOGER. But in real life, they are duly elected extras, you 

know, and you have to wait around day and night for whoever is 

filibustering to be exhausted. 

We have actually been talking about it indirectly. The critical period, I think, was in the 1960s when Mike Mansfield took over as 

Majority Leader and said that is a really stupid way to run the 

Senate because, you know, we have gotten to the point where it 

just does not. You cannot keep a majority around as long as, you 

know, 10, 15, 20 people are holding the floor. They will always win, 

because we are just too busy. We have other things to do. They 

have other places to be, and it is just not an effective way. 

Senator Durbin mentioned the COMSAT filibuster of 1962. Well, 

that was a pivotal moment because it was the first time cloture 

had been invoked in decades, and that moved—and part of that 

was that Senators who had always proclaimed that they were 

philosophically opposed to invoking cloture—‘‘I would never do 

that,’’ freedom of debate—well, lo and behold, when it is liberals 

doing the filibustering, their attitudes shifted a bit, and they voted 

for cloture. And that sort of changed the context in the Senate, and 

then the next big step would be the 1964 Civil Rights Act when for 

the first time you had cloture invoked on the Civil Rights Act, 

which had always been sort of in the background of people’s thinking about cloture. 

So those two events then moved the Senate and the realization 

that attrition was just numbingly ineffective moved the Senate 

away from, you know, waiting out filibusters and towards, ‘‘Eh, we 

will see if we have enough votes.’’ 

But as I argue in my testimony, that then had unintended consequences because they did not think through how that would 

change Senators’ calculations as they are deciding whether or not 

to filibuster. It makes it too easy, and the existing cloture rule 

made it too difficult to invoke cloture on particularly minor things, 

you know, minor nominations, bills to change the names of post offices. I mean, anything that can be used as a hostage that does not 

invoke the passion of a majority of the Senate becomes an easy victim in this game. 

416 

Senator GOODWIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, Panel. 

Thank you to my colleagues on behalf of the Rules Committee. 

Anyone have a second round? Tom? 

Senator UDALL. I would like to just ask one question, Chairman 

Schumer. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Go ahead. 

Senator UDALL. You know, one of the arguments that is made— 

and all three of you might weigh in on this because I think you 

have experience in this area. One of the arguments that is made 

is that if we change the Senate rules, somehow the Senate will become identical to the House. And there is this great fear, you know, 

that the Senate will be identical to the House. And that is expressed in a number of different ways. 

And so I guess my question to you today is: If either Senator 

Lautenberg’s or Senator Bennet’s proposals, which you both seem 

very up on at this point, were adopted, do you believe it would 

make the House and the Senate identical institutions? 

Ms. SINCLAIR. No. 

Senator UDALL. And could you explain why? 

Ms. SINCLAIR. Well, both work actually to encourage real debate, 

and neither makes it easy, the way it is in the House, to simply 

put very stringent time limits on debate or to make decisions by 

a simple majority right off the bat. I mean, that would—I had always thought that if you wanted to do something, some kind of variation of—I think it is the Harkin proposal, with—— 

Senator UDALL. The declining threshold you are talking about, 

from 60 to 57. 

Ms. SINCLAIR. Yes, but I think that the important thing also 

would be to guarantee the minority some real debate time so that, 

you know—I mean, there you would not want the Senate to be able 

or the Majority Leader to be able to simply say, well, we will move 

to something else, and then, you know, we have the vote and then 

we did move to something else, and we have the second vote, et 

cetera. I mean, the minority—because what you want is if this is 

so important an issue that we are going to insist that a supermajority is required from both the opponents’ and the proponents’ 

point of view, I think it is important that you actually have debate 

and that there is a real chance for the minority to make its point. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Any other comments? 

Senator UDALL. Yes, any other thoughts? 

Ms. RYBICKI. Senator, even the Congressional Research Service 

can say that these reforms will not make the Senate and House 

identical. 

Senator UDALL. I thought you would be willing to comment—— 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. RYBICKI. The fundamental premise of House procedures that 

the same majority that could pass a bill can set the terms for its 

debate. Neither Senate Resolution 440 or 465 establishes the way 

for a simple majority of Senators to end debate. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well put. 

Senator UDALL. Good. Mr. Koger. 

Mr. KOGER. That is exactly what I was going to say. I would just 

add that—I mean, I think the intent of both of these proposals is 

417 

to make the Senate more like the Senate and actually require debate about the topic that is being filibustered. 

Senator UDALL. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. KOGER. Without changing the cloture threshold. 

Chairman SCHUMER. That was a good and appropriate ending. 

On behalf of the Rules Committee, I would like to extend special 

thanks to both Senators Lautenberg and Bennet. We appreciate 

that they took time to appear before us to explain their proposals. 

To our panel of academics and scholars, thank you for your presentations on these legislative proposals. 

The record will remain open for 5 business days for additional 

statements and questions from the Rules Committee members. 

Since there is no further business before the Committee, the Committee is adjourned subject to the call of the Chair. Thank you, one 

and all. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: LEGISLATIVE 

PROPOSALS TO CHANGE SENATE PROCEDURES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 

305, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Schumer, 

chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Schumer, Nelson, Pryor, Udall, Goodwin, Bennett, Alexander, and Roberts. 

Also Present: Senator Harkin. 

Staff Present: Jean Bordewich, Staff Director; Jason Abel, Chief 

Counsel; Veronica Gillespie, Elections Counsel; Adam Ambrogi, Administrative and Legislative Counsel; Sonia Gill, Counsel; Julia 

Richardson, Counsel; Lauryn Bruck, Professional Staff; Carole 

Blessington, Executive Assistant to the Staff Director; Lynden 

Armstrong, Chief Clerk; Jeff Johnson, Staff Assistant; Mary Jones, 

Republican Staff Director; Shaun Parkin, Republican Deputy Staff 

Director; Paul Vinovich, Republican Chief Counsel; Michael 

Merrell, Republican Counsel; and Rachel Creviston, Republican 

Professional Staff. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SCHUMER 

Chairman SCHUMER. The hearing will come to order. Good morning everyone. As always, I want to thank my friend Ranking Member Bennett and all my other colleagues for participating in this 

legislative hearing. It is the fifth in our series of six hearings to 

examine the filibuster. I particularly want to thank our first panels, Senator Harkin and Senator Udall, who have been very active 

in this issue for agreeing to be witnesses here today. 

It is clear that the topic of right to debate and the use of the filibuster are of deep interest to members of this Committee. Only 

yesterday afternoon several of our Republican colleagues participated in what I felt was a very thoughtful and wide ranging discussion on these issues on the Senate floor after the vote on the motion to proceed on Defense Authorization Bill failed. 

We will be having a sixth hearing at 10 a.m. next Wednesday to 

examine specific ideas related to encouraging debate, as well as reducing unnecessary delays. One of the issues we will cover in that 

hearing is the one that you folks raised in your colloquy, and that 

is the issue of limiting debate through the procedure known as filling the amendment tree. When you are in the minority, you hate 

it that the tree is filled, and when you are in the majority, you like 

it that the tree is filled. 

I appreciate the participation of Senators Bennett, Alexander, 

and Roberts, who are members of this Committee, and others who 

have attended these hearings and provided their comments and 

input. They have raised important issues during our discussions, as 

466 

have the Democratic members of this Committee, Senators Udall 

and Nelson. We welcome Carte Goodwin, who has been here for 

every hearing we have had since he has become a member and 

thank him for that. 

My view is that while this session has seen its share of milestone 

moments, it has seen the filibuster become the norm, not the exception. Even motions to proceed are routinely blocked, stopping debate before it can ever begin. I believe that to the public a filibuster 

is not supposed to mean endless debate. Today it essentially means 

no debate at all. Just yesterday we failed to even proceed to debate 

on the substance of the Defense Authorization Bill. We are supposed to be spending today debating that important measure, but 

it was rejected for consideration altogether. Once again, the Senate 

showed up for work, but failed to earn its paycheck. 

No matter what happens in the upcoming elections in November, 

I worry that more brinksmanship is in store next year unless we 

consider meaningful rules changes. We can disagree what the solution is, and after listening to my Republican colleagues speaking on 

the floor yesterday, I think we agree on both sides of the aisle that 

the current system is broken. 

The Senate is supposed to be the saucer that cools the drink, but 

to me it sometimes feels like an icebox where reasonable pieces of 

legislation get put in a permanent deep freeze. That is why we 

have been having these hearings. 

And I just want to say another note. One of my Democratic colleagues came to me yesterday. He had been around the Senate a 

long time and he said, you know, we may be in the minority next 

year. I do not think that will happen at the end, but we may be 

in the minority next year, and you may want to be careful about 

making any changes. And I said to him, whether you are in the minority or the majority, the place is broken and we ought to fix it 

without a mind to what particular ascendency each party has. That 

is my view, and so that is why we have been having these hearings. 

Over the course of the hearings, we have looked at a number of 

issues—the development of the filibuster since the earliest days of 

the Senate, the growing challenges that the use and some would 

say abuse of the filibuster presents to the Senate, the impact of the 

filibuster on nominations, and other matters. Our last hearing in 

July examined filibuster-related legislation introduced by Senators 

Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey and Michael Bennet of Colorado. 

Today we take a look at two other Senate Resolutions that have 

been introduced to address concerns about abuse. 

The two proposals we will examine today are Senate Resolution 

416, introduced by Senator Harkin, and Senate Resolution 619, introduced by Senator Tom Udall. Senator Harkin has been a leader 

for more than a decade in trying to make the Senate function better and fulfill its purpose as a deliberate body. His resolution, as 

I am sure he will explain, was introduced more than a decade ago 

when he and the Democrats were in the minority. 

So it goes back to what I mentioned before. His legislation contains what is known as a ‘‘ratchet’’ where the threshold to achieve 

cloture is decreased after successive cloture votes. It certainly is 

467 

time for us to listen to Senator Harkin’s thoughts about how to 

make this institution better. 

Senator Udall joined the Senate only this Congress after much 

distinguished service in the House of Representatives, but in less 

than two years, he has become a strong and visible advocate for 

change. Frankly, it was him—it was he—— 

Senator BENNETT. He. 

Chairman SCHUMER [continuing]. It was Senator Udall—— 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER [continuing] Who suggested that we have 

these hearings and start delving into this issue. So I thank him for 

that. He has been to every hearing we have had. He has actively 

questioned almost every witness. As a new member of the Rules 

Committee, he has urged this Committee to look seriously at the 

problems associated with the filibuster, and he is an advocate for 

the so-called Constitutional option, which is not a specific change, 

but sort of opens the door to allow specific changes. 

His current proposal, S. Res. 619, would express a sense of the 

Senate that ‘‘the Senate of each new Congress is not bound by the 

rules of the previous Senates under Section 5 of Article 1 of the 

Constitution.’’ And on this issue, I might add, Senator Udall is following in the tradition of one of his distinguished predecessors, 

Senator Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, whose seat Senator 

Udall holds. Back in the sixties and seventies Senator Anderson argued in support of the same constitutional issue to the Senate. 

Our second panel is composed of outside experts in Senate procedures and it will include some familiar faces. Our first witness is 

Mimi Marziani, an attorney who works with the Brennan Center. 

Our second witness is Robert Dove, who is well known to all of us 

as the former Senate Parliamentarian. And our third witness is 

Professor Steven Smith of Washington University. They are going 

to share their thoughts about the context of the proposals introduced by Senators Harkin and Udall. 

I look forward to listening to my colleagues. I am going to ask 

Senator Bennett to make an opening statement, and then we will 

go right to our witnesses, if that is okay. But I will give other people on the panel time to make additional statements when we get 

to the question and answer period. 

Senator Bennett. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. 

BENNETT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for the hearing and for your thoughtful analysis of what the 

issue is before us. 

While I may not share some of the solutions that have been proposed, I do share a sense of significant unease over what has been 

happening in the Senate and I raised that yesterday in my statements on the floor. It is not an easy problem to solve, as the witnesses we have had in previous hearings and as I think some of 

the witnesses we will have here today will once again reinforce. 

You refer to history and let me give my own personal reflections. 

As many of you know, I was an intern here as a teenager. My 

father was a senator for 24 years. I served on his staff as his chief 

468 

of staff. Back in those days it was not assumed that every senator 

was automatically dishonest and every member of his family automatically corrupting. Several senators found that having members 

of their family work for them ensured loyalty and security and I 

hope, in my case, some degree of competence. 

The Senate is obviously very different from the one that my father served in. It is also different than the one that I entered. I 

remember just relatively short time, 18 years ago, that the filibuster was very seldom used. When it was used it was very seriously examined by the people who entered into it because they recognized they were undertaking a significant step in the direction 

of trying to stop the legislation. 

I think in my first two years as a senator, we only had one or 

two filibusters and they were bipartisan. We had a filibuster over 

the question of western land use and while the Republicans made 

up the majority of the votes against it, it was some western Democratic senators who crossed the line to get us over the 41 and Secretary Babbitt, then the Secretary of Interior, came to see me to 

say what can we do to work this out in such a way as to get enough 

votes to pass this particular bill. 

It turned out, as I recall, the answer was nothing and the filibuster was successful and the bill did not get passed. But there 

was serious negotiation on the issue in an effort to say let us get 

ahead and move. Now a motion to invoke cloture is filed the same 

day the bill is filed or the same day the motion to proceed is filed. 

There is no period of discussion. 

Without imputing any evil motives to any leader, we see situations where a bill is constructed in such a way as to guarantee that 

a filibuster will be successful. The leader will say, okay, I don’t 

want to vote on this, this or this because it will hurt too much in 

the campaign, so I will put them altogether into a single package. 

I will know the other side will filibuster that. I can check the box 

to say I tried to bring this, this and this up. The other side prevented me from doing that. Aren’t they terrible? And I have saved 

my members from the responsibility of having cast a vote on any 

of these controversial items. 

I do not think that is what the original filibuster rule had in 

mind, but it has become the norm. And however much Senator 

Roberts and Senator Alexander and I complained about it on the 

floor yesterday with respect to the Defense Authorization Bill, since 

I am leaving the Senate, I can—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Regrettably. 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. I cannot worry about the consequences 

to my career in the next Congress and say that I have seen Republican leaders do the same kind of thing. 

So I think these hearings are useful, but I hope we recognize the 

tangled nature of the problem we are trying to solve and do not 

look for a quick strike of the sword through the Gordian Knot and 

say well that’s going to solve everything immediately, because 

there are things that we need to be careful about in terms of the 

side effects and the way the Senate protects minority rights. 

All of us have served in the minority and many of you will serve 

in the minority again regardless of your party, and making sure 

that the minority is protected from the kind of absolutism that exVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00478 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
469 

ists in the House of Representatives is a very important challenge 

that we have here on this Committee. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to comment. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Bob. And now we will turn to 

our witnesses. First, Senator Harkin, your entire statement will be 

read in the record, and you may proceed as you wish. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM HARKIN, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM IOWA 

Senator HARKIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your 

opening statement and also Senator Bennett’s opening statement. 

But thank you moreover for having these hearings. I can’t think of 

anything more important for the future of this country than to unravel the Gordian Knot, as Senator Bennett has alluded to, on getting legislation through the United States Senate. 

The Senate is dysfunctional and I think the general public understands that. I’m not saying who they blame, but I think everyone recognizes it is just dysfunctional. And so at the outset I just 

want to thank you for having these hearings and hopefully moving 

this along to some resolution, at least by the time of the next Congress. 

Mr. Chairman, if I can sort of say that if I can describe the Rules 

Committee as a court of equity, I come with clean hands in this 

court of equity. As you said, I first proposed this, my approach, 

when we were in the minority, 1995. I did so at that time, but it 

was not just something flippant. I had been thinking about it for 

some time before that in watching how things had transpired in 

the United States Senate. 

I predicted at that time that an arms race was underway. With 

each succeeding change in the majority in the Senate, and minority, the use of the filibuster would escalate. I said that in 1995. Unfortunately, it has come true. I have been here now, we have had— 

Senator Bennett, we have had six changes since I have been here 

in the Senate, since 1985, six changes. Each time the number of 

filibusters has gone up. As sure as I am sitting here, we may be 

in the majority now. 

Some time we will be in the minority, just like it has changed 

since 1985, and the arms race will continue. It will get worse. It 

is not going to get better. It is going to get worse because every 

time they do a filibuster on us, we are going to do two on them. 

We do two on them, they are going to do four on us when they get 

back. That is the way it has been and it has just been escalating. 

So I proposed this when I was in the minority and I had a lot 

of my fellow Democrats saying to me, what are you doing? This is 

nonsense. You cannot do that. Well, I pushed it to a vote. There 

is a little procedure when you come into session, when a new Congress starts and different rules are set down that you can propose. 

There is a procedure for doing that under the rules of the Senate. 

So I offered mine. I got 19 votes for it. So there were at least 19 

people willing to change the rules at that time. 

Quite succinctly, Mr. Chairman, my proposal, as you said, would 

be relatively simple. On the first cloture vote it would take 60. If 

60 votes were not obtained, two days but one, as they say in the 

book, two days but one or three days would pass and then you 

470 

would have another vote. And then you would need 57 votes. If you 

did not muster 57 votes, two days plus one, but one would pass, 

and you would have another vote and that would be 54 and then 

finally 51. So it would be about an eight-procedure if it was drawn 

out. 

There are three things I think that this approach covers and I 

think commends it. Number one, it promotes majority rules. And 

again—and I am going to say a little bit more about that in just 

a second, but it promotes majority rule. Secondly, it provides for 

debate and deliberation. You can slow things down, but you cannot 

absolutely put it in the icebox. You can slow it down, get your 

views out, alert people as to what is going on, hopefully change 

some minds, but you can’t stop it. 

And third, I think my proposal promotes true compromise and 

consultation. I read the testimony of former Senator Nichols, who 

was here, testified earlier, and he had said that the present system 

promotes compromise and consultation. I could not disagree more. 

Why should the minority, any minority, compromise? If they know 

they got the 41 votes and they can stop something, why compromise? 

I think this approach that I am advocating really does promote 

compromise for these reasons. Number one, the minority knows 

that at some point in time the majority is going to rule. So therefore, better come to the table, let’s compromise, let’s do some consultation, figure some things out, because in the end, the majority 

will absolutely be able to determine. 

Now why would the majority want to compromise if they know 

they—because the majority—one thing I have learned here in all 

these years, majority, the most precious thing they have is time 

and if you are going to chew up eight days on this motion and eight 

days on that motion, the majority is going to want to say wait a 

minute, we do not have the time for that, let’s talk about it. 

So I think it would bring both sides together to compromise. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, you have gone to—been a lot of people have 

talked about the history of Rule 22 and the history of the filibuster. 

I am not going to go into that in any great detail, but I think there 

is one takeaway from all the history of Rule 22 and the takeaway 

is this, it is not written in stone. It has been changed many times 

and we can change it again. The world will not come to an end or 

anything like that. No damage will happen if we change Rule 22. 

Let me just close by reading a couple of things. I just gave a lecture at the Brennan Center, New York University Law School, recently and I just want to—couple things I said there that I would 

just like to emphasize. At issue is a principle at the very heart of 

representative Democracy, majority rule. Alexander Hamilton, describing the underlying principle animating the Constitution, wrote 

that ‘‘the fundamental maxim of Republican government requires 

that the sense of the majority should prevail.’’ 

The Senate itself has been a check and is a check on pure majority rule. As James Madison said, ‘‘the use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system and 

with more wisdom than the popular branch.’’ 

Now to achieve this purpose, citizens from small states have the 

same representation as large states. Furthermore, we are elected 

471 

every six years. All those things, they give the Senate a different 

flavor and a different approach than the House of Representatives. 

The provisions in the Constitution, I believe, are ample to protect 

minority rights and restrain pure majority rule. What is not necessary and what was never intended is an extra Constitutional empowerment of the minority through a requirement that a super majority of senators be needed to enact legislation or even to consider 

a bill. 

Such a veto leads to domination by the minority. As former Republican leader Bill Frist noted, the filibuster ‘‘is nothing less than 

a formula for tyranny by the minority.’’ 

In fact, as you know, Mr. Chairman, the Constitution was framed 

and ratified to correct the glaring defects in the Articles of Confederation. The Articles of Confederation required a two thirds vote to 

pass anything. Never get that done. The framers were determined 

to remedy that and they did that, and I think that’s one of the reasons why the framers put in the Constitution five specific times 

when you needed a super majority. I think my implication, meaning that everything else just needed a majority. 

A super majority requirement for all legislation and nominees 

would, as Alexander Hamilton explained, mean that a small minority could ‘‘destroy the energy of government.’’ The government 

would be, in Hamilton’s words, subject to, and I quote, ‘‘the caprice 

or artifices of an insignificant and turbulent or corrupt junta.’’ End 

of quote. Alexander Hamilton. 

Well, Mr. Chairman, I am not going to say that the minority is 

a turbulent or corrupt junta anymore than I would say the former 

minority of the Senate was a corrupt junta, but I think his point 

is well taken. And as James Madison said, that there has to be a 

way for the majority to eventually determine legislation, but a procedure whereby the minority rights are protected, where the minority can be heard, where they can cast their votes, offer amendments and where the majority just can’t run roughshod over them, 

over the minority. I believe that my approach, I think, covers that 

adequately and that is why I am still after 15 years, and have been 

ever since promoting it, whether I am in the minority or in the majority. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Harkin included in the 

record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Harkin, not just for 

your excellent statement, but for your leadership—your long-term 

leadership on this issue. You do come before this Committee with 

clean hands. 

Senator Udall. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM UDALL, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much, Senator Schumer and 

Ranking Member Bennett. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you in 

particular for convening this fifth hearing and doing a total of six 

on this very important subject and I want to thank you also for 

your very kind words at the beginning. 

472 

But you have shown real leadership in terms of tackling an issue 

and moving it forward. As members of this Committee over the 

past few months, we have heard from a distinguished group of men 

and women who have come before us to testify about the state of 

the Senate rules. I thank them for sharing their knowledge and expertise. They have helped us further define the challenges we face. 

As I take my turn in the chair today, I believe more strongly than 

ever that our Senate rules are broken. And from the testimony we 

have heard over the last few months, and Senator Harkin’s today, 

and from all the feedback I have received on my own proposal, I 

know that I am not alone. 

I commend my Senate colleagues who brought their own solutions before this Committee. Like me they have seen for themselves 

the unprecedented obstruction we faced over the last few years. In 

July we heard about reform proposals from Senator Lautenberg 

and Senator Bennet of Colorado and today discuss Senator Harkin’s proposal to amend the cloture rule. 

He gave a very fascinating history, I think, on his experience 

here in 20-plus years and his proposal, I believe, deserves very serious consideration and discussion. But I would like to be clear that 

my proposal differs from the others. Unlike those specific changes 

to the rules, which I think all deserve our consideration, my proposal is to make each Senate accountable for all of our rules. That 

is what the Constitution provides for and it is what our founders 

intended. 

These hearings have shown that the rules are broken. But they 

are not broken for one party or for only the majority. Today the 

Democrats lament the abuse of the filibuster and the Republicans 

complain that they are not allowed to offer amendments to legislation, and as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the debate on the floor 

with regard to filling the tree yesterday. 

Five years ago, those roles were reversed. Rather than continue 

on this destructive path, we should adopt rules that allow a majority to act while protecting the minority’s right to be heard. Rule 22 

is the most obvious example of the need for reform and the one my 

colleague’s proposals focus on. It also demonstrates what happens 

when members of the current Senate have no ability to amend the 

rules adopted long ago. The rules get abused. 

I have said this before, but it bears repeating, of the 100 members of the Senate, only two of us have had the opportunity to vote 

on the cloture requirement in Rule 22, Senators Inouye and Leahy. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Interesting. 

Senator UDALL. So 98 of us, Tom Harkin, 98 of us have not voted 

on the rule. And what is the effect of that? Well, the effect is that 

we are not held accountable to them. We can start to abuse the 

rules and with a requirement of 67 votes for any rules change, that 

is a whole lot of power without restraint. But we can change this. 

We can restore accountability to the Senate. I believe the Constitution provides a solution to this problem. 

Many of my colleagues, as well as constitutional scholars, agree 

with me that a simple majority of the Senate can end debate and 

adopt its rules at the beginning of a new Congress. Critics of my 

position argue that the rules can only be changed in accordance 

with the current rules and that Rule 22 requires two-thirds of senVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00482 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
473 

ators present and voting to agree to end debate on a change to Senate rules. 

But members of both parties have rejected this argument on 

many occasions since the rule was first adopted in 1917. In fact advisory rulings by Vice Presidents Nixon, Humphrey and Rockefeller, sitting as the president of the Senate, have stated that a 

Senate at the beginning of a Congress is not bound by the cloture 

requirement imposed by a previous Senate and may end debate on 

a proposal to adopt or amend the Senate standing rules by a majority vote. 

That is what our founders intended. Article 1, Section 5 of the 

Constitution clearly states each house may determine the rules of 

its proceedings. There is no requirement for a super majority to 

adopt our rules and the Constitution makes it very clear when a 

super majority is required to act, as Senator Harkin pointed out. 

Therefore, any rule that prevents a majority in future Senates from 

being able to change or amend rules adopted in the past is unconstitutional. 

The fact that we are bound by a super majority requirement that 

was established 93 years ago also violates the common law principle that one legislature cannot bind its successors. This principle 

dates back hundreds of years and has been upheld by the Supreme 

Court on numerous occasions. So first thing, at the beginning of the 

next Congress, I will move for the Senate to end debate and adopt 

its rules by a simple majority. 

At a previous hearing, one of my colleagues on the Republican 

side questioned whether I would be willing to still do this if my 

party is in the minority. The answer is yes. This is not a radical 

idea. It is the constitutional option. It is what the House does. It 

is what most legislatures do and it is what the U.S. Senate should 

do to make sure that we are accountable both to our colleagues and 

to the American people. And it is not, and I want to really emphasize the not here, it is not the nuclear option, which was a recent 

attempt to have the filibuster declared unconstitutional in the middle of a Congress. 

The constitutional option has a history dating back to 1917. It 

has been the catalyst for bipartisan rules reform several times 

since then. The constitutional option is our chance to fix the rules 

that are being abused, rules that have encouraged obstruction like 

none ever seen before in this chamber, and amending our rules will 

not, as some have contended, make the Senate no different than 

the House. The Senate was a uniquely deliberative chamber before 

the cloture rule was adopted in 1917. Our framers took great steps 

to make the Senate a distinct body from the House, but allowing 

the filibuster was not one of them. 

So in January, on the first day of the new Congress, we should 

have a thorough and candid debate about our rules. We should discuss options for amending the rules, such as Senator Harkin’s proposal, and after we identify solutions that will allow the body to 

function as the founders intended, a majority decides that we have 

debated enough, we should vote on our rules. And even if we adopt 

the same rules that we have right now, we are accountable to 

them. We cannot complain about the rules because we voted on 

them and if someone is considering abusing the rules, they will 

474 

think twice about it because they will be held accountable. We need 

to come together on this for the good of the Senate and the good 

of the country. It is the job the American people sent us here to 

do. 

Thank you again and I ask unanimous consent to include several 

articles in the record that were discussed in my submitted testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Udall included in the record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Without objection. 

[The information of Senator Udall included in the record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. I want to thank both our witnesses. Really 

outstanding testimony and I mean that seriously. 

Now, two points of business here. First, Senator Udall is on the 

Committee and will resume his seat on the panel here. Senator 

Harkin has a long history, so I checked with Senator Bennett and 

Senator Harkin, if you would like to come to the panel and ask the 

next panel of witnesses some questions, without objection I would 

ask consent to do that. 

Thank you. And then it is so ordered. 

And second, both Senators Alexander and Roberts, who have 

been here every hearing we have had, have asked to make some 

opening brief statements and I think that would be a good and reasonable thing to do. So if they can decide who is going to be more 

polite and who will go first and who will go second, I would turn 

to them and I am going to ask Senator Nelson if he wishes to make 

a statement as well. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will defer to my 

colleague. 

Chairman SCHUMER. You guys decided who is going first? 

Senator ROBERTS. I think we are going to flip a coin. I am going 

to yield to seniority, not in terms of service here in the Senate, but 

certainly on the Committee, which I think is a rule that perhaps 

the senator from New Mexico would not try to do away with. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Great. Senator Alexander. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAMAR 

ALEXANDER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. We just try to limit each statement to five 

minutes. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Senator, from Kansas, and I 

thank Senator Udall and Senator Harkin for their—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. I do not have to ask you to do that, Senator 

Alexander. I know that. 

Senator ALEXANDER. No, you know I will stay within my time. 

I would like to make three points. In his last testimony before any 

committee, I think in May, Senator Byrd made an eloquent argument here and he said number one, we do not have to change the 

rules to get things done in the Senate. He suggested how to do 

that. That was the first thing, and I think we ought to pay attention to that. 

Second thing he said, the second thing I would like to say is that 

if there has been any abuse of the existing rules it has been by the 

Majority Leader, who has 39 times during the last two Congresses 

475 

used procedural maneuvers to limit amendment and limit debate. 

That is called filling the tree and then filing a motion for cloture 

on the same day that the major was raised. He had done the lateral 141 times. 

And in the last two Congresses, he has filled the tree 39 times. 

That is six times more than all the previous majority leaders. That 

is more than the last six majority leaders, excuse me. The effect of 

that is the real obstruction. It denies the minority the right to 

amend and the right to debate, which is what makes the Senate 

unique. 

Senator Byrd again is probably the most eloquent advocate of 

that, saying what makes this body unique is the unlimited right to 

amend and the unlimited right to debate. And the American people 

know that it is not just the voices of the senator from Kansas, the 

senator from Iowa that are suppressed when the majority leader 

cuts off the right to debate and the right to amend; it is the voices 

that we hear across this country who want to be heard on the Senate floor. 

So my hope is that—and I believe my colleagues on the Republican side, and I hope Democrats, will say that when the new Congress convenes we ought to look at what the Senate does, but we 

ought to restore it to its traditional role as the deliberative body 

where we have amendments and we have debate. That is the way 

it used to operate. When Senator Baker and Senator Byrd were the 

leaders, about everybody got their amendments, not in every case, 

but most people got their amendments and they had to be here at 

night and they had to be here on Fridays and Saturdays sometimes, but they got them. 

The voices of the country were heard. I would like to see that 

happen again. It is hard to say this is a dysfunctional Senate when 

it has passed a healthcare law, a financial regulation law and a 

trillion dollar stimulus. Some Democrats say it is the most productive Congress in history, maybe the most unpopular too because of 

what they got done. But it was not dysfunctional. It achieved a lot. 

And second, what it achieved was a good argument for why we 

should not make the changes that were suggested, because what 

the American people have seen in the last two years is the ability 

of a majority that has so many votes to run over the minority and 

not take their views into account. And that is what would happen 

when you have—if you had 51 votes. And of course Senator Harkin 

and Udall are very honest about this in saying they want to impose 

majority rule on the Senate. 

The whole idea of the Senate is not to have majority rule. It is 

to force consensus. It is to force there to be a group of senators on 

either side who have to respect one another’s views so that they 

work together and produce 60 votes on important issues. In Senator Byrd’s view, and in the views of many historians, that has 

been the way the Senate has been supposed to work during the 

whole time. And of course the shoe is not always on one foot. Many 

on the other side have been glad to have the right to filibuster 

when the issue was the privatization of Social Security or the repeal of the estate tax or the war in Vietnam or the war in Iraq, 

the war in Afghanistan. Senator Frist may have talked about the 

tyranny of the minority, but Alexis de Tocqueville talked about the 

476 

tyranny of the majority and Rule 22 and the right of unlimited debate and amendment have historically in our country been the way 

to avoid that. 

So I think it is a fair point to say that the enthusiasm for allowing the Senate to become the House of Representatives where a 

majority can run over the minority by one vote may not be so attractive to those on the Democratic side when the freight train is 

running through the Senate is the Tea Party Express. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, and Senator Pryor, we are 

doing opening statements now. We have heard great testimony 

from Senators Harkin and Udall. If you would like to say something, feel free and then we will call on Senator Roberts. 

Senator PRYOR. I do not, Mr. Chairman, but thank you and I am 

really here to listen more than anything. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Roberts. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAT ROBERTS, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS 

Senator ROBERTS. I would like to follow the example of my friend 

from Arkansas, but obviously will not. This will be somewhat repetitive, but there is a personal twist that I would like to add in. And 

thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is the fifth hearing this Committee has held on the filibuster and I think, as you indicated, we are going to have a sixth 

hearing. Maybe during the lame duck we can have the seventh and 

eighth. 

But at any rate, I think it is somewhat counterproductive to hold 

multiple hearings on and on and on on filibusters, which is nothing 

more than the right to debate legislation without understanding 

the wider context in which they occur. I am talking about the practice which you have referred to, and my friend from Tennessee has 

referred to, of filling the amendment tree. It is time for this Committee, I think, to hold a hearing specifically on that practice. It 

is appropriate in light of the multiple hearings we have had on—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. If the gentleman would yield. Next week we 

do intend to do that. There is right on both sides here. 

Senator ROBERTS. I appreciate that. 

Chairman SCHUMER. There is right on both sides. 

Senator ROBERTS. I appreciate that. Give me 15 seconds back. It 

is appropriate in light of the multiple hearings we have had on 

measures that would curtail the minority rights without addressing 

clear abuses by whoever happens to be in the majority. 

We have examined multiple approaches to curtailing filibusters, 

but now there is a proposal that threatens more than just minority 

rights. It threatens the very nature of the Senate and I am referring to the resolution introduced by my friend, my colleague, my 

neighbor and the distinguished senator from New Mexico, the resolution that would declare Senate rules unconstitutional. Yes, that 

is right, unconstitutional. On page 2: the procedure ‘‘To amend the 

Senate Rules is unconstitutional because its effect is to deny the 

majority of the Senate of each new Congress from proceeding to a 

vote to determine its own rules.’’ 

477 

Senator Goodwin was here, but I wish he would have been 

here—I wish everybody could have been here—to hear Senator 

Byrd in his poignant and emotional testimony. To say that what 

we have been operating under and what Senator Byrd championed 

is unconstitutional, and how he would proceed to, if not lecture or 

give a sermon on the rules to every new member who came to the 

Senate—bipartisan—I can’t imagine his reaction to that. 

But at any rate, there has been an incessant attempt on the part 

of some of the majority to paint the minority obstructionist and 

that this is a broken institution. It is not—what is broken is not 

the Senate rules, but the attitude and approach to legislating by 

members of the majority that is fundamentally at odds with the atmosphere of comity and compromise that our rules are intended to 

foster. 

It is not the minority that is the obstructionists. As my friend 

from Tennessee has pointed out, it is the majority and I am not 

saying it is the current majority that bears all the responsibilities. 

That has happened before when we have been in the majority, but 

the tactics like filling the tree, Rule 14 and ping ponging back with 

the House have now been used on a scale never before seen in the 

history of this body. 

Now, I do not know what is going to happen in November, but 

for anyone that can read the tea leaves, or at least the gurus and 

the pundits, it would appear that there is a wave out there. I do 

not know how high it is. It could be Katrina and it could be a simple seventh wave that everybody reads about that appreciates what 

happens in the ocean. It appears the current majority, however, 

may be somewhat slimmer than it is in 2000—I mean in 2011. 

So rather than accept the will of the voters who are rejecting the 

policies enacted by the 111th Congress, the senator from New Mexico and many of our colleagues on the other side simply want to 

abolish the Senate as we have understood it for over 200 years and 

remake it in the House’s image. Let me be clear, rather than doing 

the hard work of building a bipartisan consensus, this resolution 

is an attempt to rewrite the rules to favor a narrower majority. 

I would like the rest of my statement be put in the record at this 

point. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Roberts included in the 

record] 

Senator ROBERTS. And I want to go back to a time in 1985 when 

I served in the House and there was an election in Indiana and the 

Secretary of State declared the winner. His name was Rick McIntyre. But it was very close. And somehow it got referred to the 

House Administration Committee, of which I was a member, and 

somehow there was a partisan vote where a group went out to Indiana to recount the votes—this is the Administration Committee— 

despite the fact the Secretary of State had declared Mr. McIntyre 

the winner. 

It was over, and the incumbent was declared the winner on a 

partisan vote by the House. We walked out. The Republicans 

walked out and it became a situation where I said at that particular time and I had to go back and figure it out here because 

I think this is what would happen if the distinguished senator from 

478 

New Mexico’s resolution was adopted, ‘‘this wound will not heal 

without a terrible price and a scar that will be with this House for 

many years,’’ just substitute Senate, ‘‘it would appear, Mr. Speaker,’’ Mr. President, ‘‘there are two kinds of members within your 

majority. We have those who listen and work with the minority 

and those who do not believe we are fully-fledged partners in this 

House. In baseball terms, they are the ones who call for their pitcher to stick it in the batter’s ear. The unmitigated gall occurs when 

once you make us hit the dirt, you take offense when we come up 

swinging.’’ 

Now, that was pretty strong rhetoric and I said that this would 

lead to things that we could not really anticipate, and it did. Michael no longer was leader. Newt Gingrich became leader. This was 

the spark that started the so-called Revolution of ’94. Some obviously would agree with some of that. I was part of it. I became a 

chairman. So I really was not objecting to that, but the way that 

it was done I think was a very bad road to follow. 

And let me just point out that during the healthcare debate, both 

on the HELP Committee with Senator Harkin and with the gentleman from New York and with the senator from Montana being 

Chairman Max Baucus, I had 11 amendments and every one of 

them were voted down without even any debate. Some were ruled 

non-germane, or whatever. So then I decided I would pick an 

amendment that was introduced by the distinguished chairman, 

Senator Schumer. So I offered his amendment under my name, and 

it was defeated on a party-line vote. Nobody even bothered to read 

it. 

And I thought to myself, you know, it is important to pass legislation here, but it is important to prevent bad legislation from 

passing and I thought I had an amendment to prohibit rationing 

and that is what it was all about. And then I tried it under reconciliation, and again I brought up Senator Schumer’s amendment, 

which I thought was a pretty good amendment, and it just by rote, 

bingo, down. That is not bipartisanship. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I am glad I did not cut you off at five minutes. 

Senator ROBERTS. I appreciate that. That seems to be a continuing challenge for you, sir. I understand that. If we are going 

to do this in a bipartisan way, we ought to change attitudes around 

here and at least give us the opportunity to offer amendments and 

to be considered and to discuss them, and that is exactly what Senator Bennett said yesterday. Here we were using the military as 

a laboratory as civil rights for a particular situation regarding sex, 

gender, race, whatever—but this happens to be sexual orientation—in the middle of a war and we are trying to get the Joint 

Chiefs to come back with a study to say is this going to work? 

It is a tough issue on both sides. And then we tossed in immigration and then we could not even—you filled the tree—we could not 

even bring amendments that were related to military issues or national security. That is why this happened. And so filling the tree 

is a very important matter and if we do that during the next hearing it just indicates the tremendous bipartisanship of the chairman 

and what he is trying to do. 

I yield back. I’m done. 

479 

Chairman SCHUMER. I thank my colleague from Kansas who always is an eager and very valuable participant here. The only 

thing I would say is there are abuses on both sides, and we tend 

to focus on some and you tend to focus on others. Many would 

argue that if we could try to solve both those abuses—and it is not 

a clear cut way to do it—you do not want to allow unlimited 

amendments by one member forever to slow things down either. 

The Senate would be a better place no matter who is in the majority or who is in the minority. 

That is the only thought I would have. But I have not, I don’t 

think, throughout these hearings said the abuses are just on your 

side. They are on both sides. Our job is to fix them. 

Let me call on our next second panel and ask them to come forward please and I will read the introductions while they come forward to save a little bit of time. 

Steven Smith. Dr. Steven Smith is a professor of social sciences 

at Washington University in St. Louis and director of the 

Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government and Public Policy there. He is author or co-author of several books on the U.S. 

Congress, including Politics or Principle?, which is about the filibuster. He is a former fellow at the Brookings Institution. 

Ms. Mimi Marziani is counsel with the Brennan Center at New 

York University School of Law, where she also serves as an adjunct 

professor. She has studied the filibuster from a constitutional law 

perspective, and has contributed columns about Senate procedures 

to several newspapers. 

We all know Dr. Robert B. Dove. He served as the Senate parliamentarian for 13 years and now holds the title of Parliamentarian 

Emeritus of the Senate. He is currently a professor at George 

Washington’s University Graduate School of Political Management 

and is counsel at the firm of Patton Boggs. 

Your entire statements, folks, will be read into the record. Who 

are we going to begin with? We are going to begin with Dr. 

Marziani first, Ms. Marziani first, excuse me. 

STATEMENT OF MIMI MURRAY DIGBY MARZIANI, COUNSEL/ 

KATZ FELLOW, DEMOCRACY PROGRAM, BRENNAN CENTER 

FOR JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 

Ms. MARZIANI. I was not going to correct you there. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. And excuse me, your entire statements will 

be read into the record and if we could keep the testimony to five 

minutes, because we will have extensive questions. 

Ms. MARZIANI [continuing]. Thank you very much for inviting me 

to testify. I have been asked to address whether a Senate majority 

has the right to override obstruction and affect a rules change at 

the start of a new Congress. The weight of constitutional history, 

scholarship and doctrine overwhelming answers yes and today I 

will offer three main points in support of my conclusion. 

First, there has long been robust support for the constitutional 

argument offered today by Senator Udall and me. For example, 

when Senator Henry Clay confronted the Senate’s very first filibuster in 1841, he threatened to stop debate by ‘‘resorting to the 

Constitution and acting on the rights ensured in it to the majority.’’ 

480 

Since then, numerous senators and at least three vice president 

have agreed. At the start of the 94th Congress in 1975, a majority 

of the Senate voted to allow a simple majority to end debate on 

new rules, thereby setting a new precedent. While the Senate later 

purported to reserve this incident, the fact remains that the Senate 

had already exercised its constitutional authority. 

Second, this position is undoubtedly correct under constitutional 

law. The Constitution authorizes each chamber of Congress to determine the rules of its proceedings. In U.S. v. Ballin, the Supreme 

Court explained that this authority is continuous, meaning that 

each Senate has equal power to set its procedures. So a past Senate cannot enact rules that decrease the rulemaking power of future Senates. If legally binding, super-majority barriers to amending the Senate rules would also violate the age-old principle 

against legislative entrenchment. 

As the Supreme Court recognized long ago in cases like Ohio Life 

Insurance v. Debolt, this principle is vital to our democratic structure. Each legislature made up of representatives elected by the 

people must be equally able to serve the public good. If yesterday’s 

senators are allowed to use the Senate rules to reach into the future, today’s senators can no longer effectively serve their constituents’ current desires, plus, by insulating the 60-vote cloture rule 

from amendment, the rules perpetuate similar accountability problems now posed by the filibuster itself. Blunting accountability is 

a serious constitutional problem because it cripples the most important check on government power, which is the voters. 

Third, the notion that the Senate is a continuing body cannot 

justify trapping the Senate under super majority barriers to rules 

change. To start, there is no reason to believe that the Framers intended for structural differences between the Senate and the House 

to reduce the scope of the Senate’s rulemaking power. Plus, in 

many ways, the Senate does not actually act like a continuing 

body. 

For example, pending bills die at the end of each Congress and 

nominations cannot survive the end of a term. Instead, the president must resubmit nominations to the next Congress. 

More importantly, however, even assuming that the Senate is a 

continuing body in some meaningful way, this alone cannot justify 

entrenchment. To say that today’s Senate shares an identity with 

yesterday’s does not explain why the Senate has the power to bind 

itself in perpetuity. After all, the Senate is an agent of the people. 

It derives its power from those it represents. 

Each election, voters elect a senator to address the country’s current and future problems. Why would the voters allow the Senate 

to handicap itself under old procedural rules? In fact, self-binding 

creates the exact same problems with democratic representation 

and legislative accountability. For all of these reasons, a simple 

majority must be able to override a filibuster and vote to revise the 

Senate rules at the start of a new Congress. 

Thank you very much and I am very happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mimi Murray Digby Marziani included in the record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Ms. Marziani. 

Mr. Dove or Professor Dove, whichever you prefer. 

481 

Mr. DOVE. Bob. 

Chairman SCHUMER. We will now call on witness Bob. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. DOVE, PARLIAMENTARIAN EMERITUS, U.S. SENATE, PROFESSOR, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. DOVE. I normally teach a class at this time on Wednesday 

and I suggested to the members of that class that this would be 

far better than any class I could teach them and I am really glad 

that they could come. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Dr. Dove’s class, thank you for being here. 

Mr. DOVE. As my class will not be surprised to hear, I hold a contrary view to this first witness. I do believe that the Senate is a 

continuing body and I have always loved the statement, I believe, 

of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that the life of the law is not 

logic but experience. 

The experience of the Senate is that it has always considered 

itself a continuing body. It was mentioned that with regard to bills 

that die at the end of a Congress, that is evidence that the Senate 

does not consider itself a continuing body, that the nominations 

which by specific rule of the Senate not only die at the end of a 

session, they die when the Senate goes out for more than 30 days. 

But treaties were not mentioned and the reason I think they 

might not have been mentioned is that we have had some very significant treaties sent to the Senate. And I remember very well the 

genocide treaty, which was sent to the Senate by President Truman 

and ratified under Majority Leader Bob Dole years and years and 

years later. It did not have to be resubmitted by the president to 

the Senate. 

But when I am talking about experience, I was intrigued by Senator Roberts’ account of the election in Indiana, because I use that 

election when I talk about the differences between the Senate and 

the House because there was an earlier election contest in the 

1970s that I remember very well, the fight between Louis Wyman 

and John Durkin for the New Hampshire Senate seat. 

And that fight occurred when there were 61 members of the 

Democratic caucus and it occurred just after the cloture rule had 

been changed in January of 1975 and there was a general assumption that the Democrats would use that new cloture rule; they 

would shut down debate and they would seat the Democrat in that 

contested election. Only because there were three Democrats who 

refused to vote for cloture every time it was filed did the Senate 

not go down that road and indeed declared the seat vacant. A new 

election was held. The Democrat won and the Senate did not have 

the period of bitterness that the House had after the Indiana election contest. 

My experience has only been working for the Senate. I never 

worked for the House of Representatives, but my experience in 

working for the Senate has been one in which I saw the great value 

of a kind of enforced comity between the two parties because of 

Rule 22. I remember so well a conversation with a presiding officer, 

a member of Congress who had been in the House. He was a very 

conservative senator from the Republican Party and he told me 

that when he was in the House he had never spoken to any DemoVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00491 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
482 

crat. He had no reason to speak to Democrats. They were irrelevant to his life. They could do nothing for him. 

And he was telling me with such glee the issue on which he was 

working was a very liberal Democrat because what he saw in the 

Senate was that was how things got done in the Senate, that if you 

could put on the same issue a liberal Democrat and a conservative 

Republican, you had a very good chance of carrying the day. And 

I just remember that conversation and in a sense, that is what I 

thought the Senate was about. 

Now, I understand the frustration of the filibuster. I have sat in 

the parliamentarian’s chair and watched filibusters and they are 

not all that much fun to watch. I came to the Senate in 1966, back 

when they had real filibusters, and back in 1966 it did not take a 

two-thirds vote to end a filibuster. But I also remember a 1968 vote 

when the Senate had been debating the Fair Housing Act and they 

had had four cloture votes and on four cloture votes they had failed 

to get the necessary two-thirds. And then on that fifth vote, I remember those senators who had been voting no standing up—there 

were five of them—and one by one they gave the necessary twothirds and that law was passed. 

My view is that the Senate has benefitted from the struggle to 

pass legislation. I was a graduate student during the debate on the 

1964 Civil Rights Act. I found that debate incredibly frustrating as 

it was described on the CBS Evening News every night. But what 

I remember is that after the end of that debate, and it went on 

more than 80 days, the senator from Georgia went on television to 

talk to the people of Georgia and explain that he had fought that 

bill with every weapon at his command, and he was good, but that 

that law was now the law of the land and the people of Georgia 

needed to follow it. 

I do not know if the Senate had been able to easily pass the ’64 

Civil Rights Act whether it would have had the effect that it did. 

I was living in the south. I was living in Charleston and I remember the effect it had. It was like someone had turned a light switch 

and suddenly things were different. 

So yes, I think the experience of the Senate is that the Senate 

is a continuing body, but I think the logic of that experience is that 

that has been a good thing and that basically is where I come from. 

[The prepared statement of Robert Dove included in the record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Bob. And now we will hear 

from Mr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN S. SMITH, KATE M. GREGG PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DIRECTOR, WEIDENBAUM CENTER ON THE 

ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. SMITH. Well, it is a great pleasure to be here again. I was 

here in May when I spoke of a syndrome of the expansive use of 

parliamentary rules and precedents by both the minority and the 

majority in such a way that it has really changed the character of 

the Senate over the last few decades. I know there is a tendency 

to see this as a minority versus majority matter, but in fact, both 

parties have been behaving strategically, that is, that they are beVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00492 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
483 

having in a manner that anticipates the behavior of the other. 

They are connected at the roots. 

So to address the minority concern about opportunities to debate 

and offer amendments and the majority concern about the ability 

in most circumstances to get a vote on an issue is something that 

I think that the Committee should address simultaneously. 

The real problem here is the nature of the Senate and the role 

of a senator. You know, there are now strong reasons to believe 

that the full exploitation of the rules is a long-term condition of the 

Senate and that it is time to consider a proposal like Senator Harkin’s. The modern increase in the obstructive use of rules really 

dates to the early 1970s in the aftermath of the civil rights battles 

and when senators in the early 1970s leading up to the 1975 reform spoke of the trivialization of the filibuster. 

So what has changed since the 1960s? Well, for one thing, a 

major restraint on filibustering evaporated. As the 1960s came to 

an end, Senate Democratic conservatives no longer limited their 

filibusters to civil rights legislation so as to avoid more impetus, 

more reform. They more freely joined with the minority to pursue 

filibusters in the early 1970s, which was a primary impetus for the 

reform of 1975. 

The policy community in Washington has changed radically. Organized interests and lobbyists and party factions have really 

ratcheted up pressure on senators to fully exploit their parliamentary weapons. Party politics has changed. Each party has become 

more homogeneous internally and in doing so, the resistance from 

within each party to the full use of parliamentary tools by their 

own party leaders has faded. No longer is there that moderate Republican or moderate Democrat telling their own leaders do not obstruct, do not fully exploit your tools, I am going to get hurt. Fewer 

senators are being hurt by that obstructionism. 

In the strategic premises of change, each party now seems to assume the worse about the opposition and as yesterday showed is 

usually right and acts accordingly. Now these have proven really 

to be lasting conditions really on the order of decades now and 

more than just merely a passing phenomenon. Now in the middle 

of this process, Senator Harkin in 1995 introduced his proposal to 

reduce the number of votes required for cloture in a stepwise manner. Of course, since that time, partisan strategies have made obstructionism and restrictions on the minority an even more severe 

problem. I will not even bother reviewing the evidence for you. 

But the consequences of these developments are pervasive. The 

focus tends to be on what the threshold for cloture should be in 

blocking legislation. But just consider what these minority strategies and the majority responses have contributed to. They have 

moved many policy decisions from committee rooms to party leadership offices as leaders try to bargain over cloture. 

It has led to the demise of standard amending opportunities on 

the Senate floor. It has elevated packaging strategies and the use 

of omnibus bills. It has contributed to the demise of the appropriations process as majority leaders do not dare bring most appropriations bills to the Senate floor. It has stretched the reconciliation 

process, my dear Bob, beyond recognition and it has led to the 

avoidance of conferences on a wide range of important legislation. 

484 

Add it up. Fundamental changes in the role of standing committees and party offices, the nature of amending activity and debate 

on the Senate floor, the appropriations process, the reconciliation 

process and conferences, what has not been fundamentally changed 

by this new turmoil, this new syndrome of obstruction and restriction? The Senate has been thoroughly changed by these changes in 

practice. It is time to consider the reforms that have been suggested by Senator Harkin. 

[The prepared statement of Steven S. Smith included in the 

record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, these have been three really excellent 

witness. This has been a very good and thoughtful day. Let me ask 

a question first to Mr. Dove, but others can comment. It is sort of 

two questions. I’m just trying to think this through. 

In the golden days of the sixties, and I think you are right, Mr. 

Parliamentarian Emeritus, for lack of a better term, that because 

the Civil Rights Act passed with such a large amount of support, 

it was the law of the land, and it was more effective than if had 

it passed by 51/49. The difference we face today is that was a bipartisan coalition and partisanship seems to have enveloped our 

politics over the last 30 years. One of the reasons is actually the 

great reform of primaries because primaries, puts the Democratic 

Party to the left and the Republican Party to the right only because 

there are too few participants. 

Senator BENNETT. Tell me about it. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, it is true. It is true. You are right. 

And it is with regret—I think everyone of us feels the incredible 

loss of Bob Bennett. We will feel it next year for that reason. So 

the question is, does what you are saying apply to today? Should 

it matter? Maybe this partisanship is a temporary. You know, 

maybe it is a 30-year process, and we should not change how the 

Senate works regardless. 

And then the third question, which relates to Mr. Smith’s testimony. Can’t you make an argument—he did—what do you think of 

his argument?—and I would like to address his argument to my 

colleagues on the other side who say we have to keep the Senate 

as it is. But what Professor Smith is saying here is that this rule 

has changed the Senate. We do not have conference committees. 

We do not have deliberation. We do not have amendments on the 

floor. And I am trying to do this from, you know, as bipartisan or 

nonpartisan a way as possible. When I was in the minority, I used 

to say—look, they can set the agenda. We should offer amendments. I understand that. I have been in all four positions—minority/majority in both the House and Senate. Only one really is horrible, and it is not in the Senate at either side. So could you address this a little bit? 

And then the second question, I will let each of you speak on 

this, is there a way then we would not need Senator Udall’s legislation to solve the complaints of the minority about filling the tree 

and not allowing amendments, and the complaints of the majority 

about obstruction on every little thing that goes way beyond. I 

think you know, I do not think you wonder if the tree is filled when 

we do not allow the District judge from the Southern District of 

485 

New York—let’s leave out the New York District judge—and instead we do not allow the District judge from the Southern District 

of Florida to be put on the Senate floor. 

So if Bob could address that and that is my only question. 

Mr. DOVE. Well, first of all, there was some mention in an earlier 

statement about coming here with clean hands. I unfortunately, do 

not come here with clean hands. I helped write the Budget Act in 

1974 which created the reconciliation process. All I can tell you is 

we meant well. 

That process has evolved into what I think is a monster which 

allows the majority to trample the minority. It is the one process 

that the Senate created which if the budget resolution for any particular year creates a budget that has reconciliation instructions 

and I will say on my advice in 2001, we were in a situation where 

the House came out with a budget resolution that I think was 

going to create seven reconciliation bills over the course of that 

year. I gave the advice no, you can only create one. 

That led to an unfortunate situation for me as I ceased to be parliamentarian. But that, I believe, has been followed. That to me is 

a process that needs reform. My reaction—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. And not slowing down the Senate to a crawl 

on every issue. Are the two resolvable together? 

Mr. DOVE. Well, my reaction, as long as the majority party sees 

that they are using reconciliation, they can pass things by a bare 

majority, even no majority at all. If you have a tie vote and you 

have the vice presidency, you win with reconciliation. The filibuster 

amendments have to be germane. 

To me, that is the process that has distorted the Senate more 

than anything else. Yes, I know the enormous power that the majority leader has with the right of recognition to offer amendment 

after amendment until no more can be offered and I have seen majority leaders use their powers. To me the most powerful majority 

leader I ever witnessed was Robert Byrd in the period of ’77 to ’81, 

when he set precedent after precedent using his powers as majority 

leader. 

And there was pushback when the Republicans took the Senate 

in the 1980 election because of the power of that particular majority leader. And I have used this phrase before in testimony, that 

I do not think, as Shakespeare said, that the fault is in our stars 

but in ourselves. To me there are senators who can make this place 

work with the rules that you all have and I do not think the problem, frankly, is the rules. 

I think the problem is restraint in effect on the part of various—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. Professor Marziani and Smith, do you want 

to comment on my question, or try to answer it, or comment on 

what Bob Dove said. 

Ms. MARZIANI. To start, there is no reason to believe that the intense partisanship that we see in today’s Senate is going anywhere. 

We have seen a ratcheting up of partisan politics in at least the 

last 30 years and as one of my colleagues at NYU, Rick Pildes, has 

written about eloquently, this for better and for worse is very likely 

the face of national politics in the 21st Century. So with that understanding in mind, perhaps best case scenario, we would address 

486 

that intense partisanship, but without being able to figure out 

what to do with that situation, I think that we need to adopt new 

rules that work for a modern Senate. 

The Senate is an extraordinary institution and it is one that everybody agrees was intended for deliberation. 

In other institutions intended for deliberation, like a courtroom, 

we have simple rules that are purposed to achieve just and equitable results, like Criminal Rules of Procedure or the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. And in my opinion, the best way for the Senate 

to move forward, recognizing as Senator Bennett said earlier today 

that there are many complex considerations involving rules change 

would be to convene some sort of bipartisan group that can seriously deliberate and think about ways to preserve the minority’s 

right to debate, to actually debate and to offer amendments, but 

while allowing the majority to represent their constituents and the 

will of the people and actually make a decision once debate is over. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Professor Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I think that Senator Harkin has actually laid out a 

framework that could be used as the basis for addressing both sets 

of concerns. He provides for a stepwise process of reducing the 

threshold for cloture. A weakness I think of Senator Harkin’s approach, if I may, Senator, is that there is no guarantee for debating 

amendments between the cloture votes, just as there is no guarantee of debate now following the filing of the cloture motion. 

I would elaborate on Senator Harkin’s approach by guaranteeing 

say 10 hours of debate on a measure between the cloture motions, 

between consideration of the cloture motions and perhaps in those 

10 hours guarantee the minority opportunities to offer relevant 

amendments. That could be done by guaranteeing each leader alternating amendments. 

It could be done by guaranteeing a senator who voted in the minority an opportunity to write an amendment. But the brilliance of 

this framework is that it creates a time structure within which 

those minority amendments can be considered. I would guarantee 

them those rights. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Interesting, very interesting. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

one of the things that has developed, the byplay between the three 

of you that I want to highlight is that it may very well be that the 

solution to the problems that we talk about as a dysfunctional Senate lies somewhere other than amending the filibuster rule. And I 

have made notes—I have listened to you—of some of the things 

that I have observed that in my opinion have been detrimental to 

the functioning of the Senate and very few, if any of them, have 

anything to do with the filibuster rule. 

Mr. Smith, you got into this a little. One of the things that I 

have seen in my time here is Mr. Dove, you talk about the problem 

lies in ourselves, breaking of a Senate precedent as opposed to a 

Senate rule, that conferees are always adopted by unanimous consent. Without naming any names, one minority leader broke the 

precedent and said we will not allow the appointment of conferees 

on this bill unless we can get an absolute ironclad agreement out 

of the majority that the conference report will say the following 

things, thus putting himself in the position where the minority 

487 

leader of the United States would dictate the final version of the 

bill over the opinion of the majority of the House of Representatives and the majority of the Senate or not allow it to go through. 

And that was sufficiently arcane that it did not get into any editorial in the New York Times. I will not comment any further 

about what I think about the editorials in The New York Times, 

other than to say that I think they are basically irrelevant. 

The concept of ping-ponging a bill, the Senate was unable to 

produce a certain bill for a variety of reasons and so the Speaker 

sat down with the Majority Leader and given the power of the 

party in power in the House, wrote a bill in the House, rammed 

it through with the requisite number of votes in the House and 

then the majority leader had already pre-committed to the Speaker 

that the bill would be held at the desk, voted on in the Senate, 

never referred to a committee, never a subject of a hearing, and 

with the ability of the majority in the Senate to overcome a filibuster by virtue of numbers passed through. 

Those of us who wanted to debate it, to amend it, to have anything to do with it, we never got any opportunity at all. 

And then we go, Mr. Smith, to the omnibus bill. I am an appropriator. I have participated in the drafting of omnibus bills and as 

I came out of my session with the two chairmen, the chairman of 

the House Appropriations Committee and the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I said to my staff, we better call 

Senator Kohl and tell him what we just did. He was the ranking 

member of the subcommittee and he had no input whatsoever 

under that system. 

Increasingly we are seeing the appropriations bills structured so 

that they will not go to the floor and they will go to an omnibus 

and the omnibus ultimately is decided between the two chairmen 

of the two houses and the two leaders of the two houses and you 

might as well not have an Appropriations Committee under those 

circumstances and I have seen it happen over and over again. 

As I sit here and listen to this and contemplate, what occurs to 

me is I hear you. It occurs to me that this has nothing to do really 

with changing the filibuster, and if we change the filibuster rule 

and allow all of these other things to continue to go on, we will see 

minority rights trampled on in far greater degree than they are 

now. So I give you that response to your testimony and I would like 

to hear your response to the observations that I have. 

I will make this one observation. I do believe the Senate has the 

right to change its rules and I do believe the Senate has the right 

to say we will do it at the beginning of each term. That is what 

Vice President Nixon said. That is what Vice President Humphrey 

said. I think that is a given. 

I disagree with Senator Udall that it can happen at any time in 

the course of a session. I think once it happens, at the beginning. 

And I agree with Vice President Nixon when he said if the Senate 

does not act, it de facto says we are a continuing body and we will 

go by the old rules and that is the precedent that we always follow. 

But that does not mean we should willy-nilly say well, since we 

have the power to do it, let us tinker with the rules at the beginning of every single session, the beginning of every Senate. 

I have now filibustered past my time and I apologize for that. 

488 

Chairman SCHUMER. I am not sticking to the time limits. This 

has been a great discussion. I am not sticking strictly to the time 

limits so we can hear from our panel. 

Professor Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, I agree with much of what Senator Bennett 

suggests, but let me just say two things. One is I think he is right 

on the question of the Senate as a continuing body. My view is that 

the Senate has the right by simple majority to reconsider the rules. 

If it has that right under Article 1, Section 5, it has the right to 

do that at any time. 

Obviously the Senate has adopted rules throughout its sessions 

over the centuries, but I do not see why this power should be restricted to the beginning of a Congress. I think that would be unwise for the Senate to restrict itself in its interpretation in that 

way. 

I do think though, Senator, that the use of instruction—obstructionist tactics by the minority and the majority’s response in trying 

to get its program enacted has played a fundamental role, though 

it is not the only cause, in many of the problems that we have encountered in the demise of regular order in the Senate, the demise 

of the role of standing committees, the transformation of the role 

of the floor and especially individual senators amending opportunities, the use of conferences. All of this has been directly affected 

by these strategies of the two parties in the Senate. 

Now, there are other contributing causes, but surely the use and 

abuse of the rules is a core part of it. Now, what I do not agree 

to is the claim that this is only about the polarization of the parties 

in American politics more broadly or in the Senate. Because in the 

1970s, long before the modern polarization, the polarization we 

have seen in the last 20 years has occurred. We saw a ratcheting 

up of the use of obstructionist tactics. Why? Because the policy 

community within which senators operate had already begun to 

transform. The pressure and the incentives for individual senators 

to more fully exploit their parliamentary prerogatives was tremendous. 

Senator Byrd complained about lobbyists walking into senators’ 

offices and asking them to place holds on bills. This was something 

that was emerging in the 1970s, before most of you got here, but 

was already a part of the environment. When that was combined 

with the polarization of the parties, you can see where that would 

lead. 

But it is, I think, a bit pollyannish to think that if we simply had 

better behaving leaders, better behaving senators that the pressure 

for them to exploit their—fully exploit their parliamentary prerogatives would disappear. I do not think that is true. The world has 

changed. 

Chairman SCHUMER. With the indulgence of my colleagues here, 

could we ask either of the other witnesses if they want to say something about what Senator Bennett said? Professor Marziani or Mr. 

Dove? Just try to make it brief, that is all. 

Mr. DOVE. I will talk about what happened yesterday because all 

the focus—— 

Chairman SCHUMER. You got to put your microphone on. 

489 

Mr. DOVE. I am sorry. All the focus was on the failed cloture 

vote. Something else happened yesterday. A bill was passed in the 

Senate by voice vote, jointly sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy 

and Senator John Cornyn, to amend the financial regulatory law 

with regard to the Freedom of Information Act. 

To me that is how the Senate works. That is what the Senate 

does. Maybe there was not a big article about it in the paper, but 

to me that kind of thing happens all the time. Senators from very 

different perspectives on most issues get together across the aisles 

on something that they care about and the Freedom of Information 

Act is something that happens to be in the purview of both Senator 

Leahy and Senator Cornyn, and it would be something they really 

do care about and they get it through. 

So I am not of the mind that the Senate is dysfunctional. It is 

doing things. They just do not happen to make the papers. 

Chairman SCHUMER. The third level issue is not first. That is the 

only thing I would say. I agree with you. Professor Marziani. 

Ms. MARZIANI. Sure. My one quick response to Senator Bennett, 

you know, I think that you highlight the complexity of current Senate procedure and I do think there is a lot to be said for thinking 

of rules reforms that make the rules more simple and thus easier 

for voters to understand and to follow, because I do think that that 

would therefore enhance legislative accountability. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Bennett, 

I think that the principle you have recognized is an important one, 

the principle with different presiding officers. And I think you had 

mentioned Vice President Nixon and Vice President Humphrey, 

also Vice President Rockefeller, all sitting as the presiding officer 

of the Senate and making a ruling at the beginning of a Congress 

for the two-year period at the beginning of a Congress that the 

Senate has a right to adopt its rules by a majority vote. I mean 

that is an important principle and I think that that is what I have 

tried to embody in my testimony. And I think that is what Ms. 

Marziani has been talking about in terms of the constitutional 

scholarship here. 

I would like to focus with Ms. Marziani on this whole idea that 

we hear raised over and over again, if we change the cloture rule, 

that we are somehow making the Senate just like the House. Now, 

to me one of the biggest differences is every member of the 

House—and I served in the House for 10 years—you stand for election in two years and so it does have—the forces of the election 

have a result on the legislative process, while in the Senate at any 

one time, we have two-thirds of the senators at least four years 

away from an election. 

So could you comment on the idea that has been raised here that 

if the Senate changed the cloture rule it would make the Senate 

no different than the House of Representatives? 

Ms. MARZIANI. I believe quite strongly that reforming the rules 

would not make the Senate more like the House, but would in fact 

make the Senate more like the Senate is supposed to be. And specifically, I mean, as we have heard in each of these hearings, the 

current rules are not promoting deliberation. Instead they are 

incentivizing obstruction. They are being used not to achieve just, 

490 

equitable and compromised decision making, but they are many 

times unfortunately used for little more than game playing. 

With that, if you look at the history of the structure of the Senate, the Framers surely wanted the Senate to be a stable body. 

There is no indication that they anticipated that the rules would 

somehow lead to stability or that the rules would be entrenched 

and that would make the body more stable. Instead, the framers 

gave senators longer terms that were overlapping and they thought 

in this way senators would have more time and have more experience as legislator, but also learn more about specific issues that 

they grappled with. 

They also thought that the staggered terms would allow older 

senators to mentor younger senators that having some continuity 

of membership would make the Senate a more respectful institution both nationally and domestically and it would make it harder 

for people to kind of strategize and come into the Senate with conniving motivations. 

So with that all in mind, I think that it is very fair that changing 

the rules will not make the Senate anything like the House. The 

Senate will remain a distinctive body and instead the Senate will 

become much closer to its ideal. 

Senator UDALL. Could you also comment on the continuing body 

argument that is out there and whether or not you think the entrenchment of the rules—and describe for people entrenchment. 

You have used that term several times. What do we mean when 

we say the rules are entrenched and how does that relate to the 

constitutionality? 

Ms. MARZIANI. Legislative entrenchment is typically the term 

used for laws that are insulated from later amendment or appeal. 

So the Senate rules, the current Senate rules in setting a twothirds threshold of 67 senators to agree to stop debate before the 

rules can change clearly entrenches those rules. 

As far as the continuing body theory goes, as I said earlier, there 

is no indication that the Framers intended for the structure of the 

Senate to somehow give the Senate a unique rulemaking authority 

that would allow entrenchment. Instead, as I noted before, and as 

Senator Udall has noted, legislative entrenchment has long been 

recognized as an illegal procedure. 

Also, of course, the Senate in many ways does not act like a continuing body. Mr. Dove pointed out some ways the Senate may act 

like a continuing body. There are many ways that it does not. The 

point of that is the Senate does not consistently regard itself as a 

continuing body and probably more importantly, there is no other 

way in which the Senate allows itself to become entrenched. 

For instance, the president pro tem of the Senate is assumed to 

go forward to future terms unless changed. But of course, if there 

is a shift between minority and majority party, everybody understands that the president pro tem can be replaced at the start of 

a new term. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Senator Howard 

Baker told me that in 1968 he was sitting in his father-in-law’s office, the Republican leader, Everett Dirksen, and the telephone 

rang and he heard Senator Dirksen say, no, Mr. President, I cannot 

491 

come down and have a drink with you tonight; I did that last night 

and Louella is very angry with me. 

And about 30 minutes later, there was a rustle outside and two 

beagles and a president showed up and President Johnson arrived 

and said well, Everett if you will not drink with me, I will come 

drink with you. David Gergen told me that President Johnson 

called President Dirksen every afternoon at 5:00 to find out how he 

was doing. He did that for a variety of reasons, but one reason was 

he had to if wanted to pass the Civil Rights Bill. 

He not only knew that he had to pass it, but as Mr. Dove said, 

he had to create an environment in which the country would accept 

it. Now, it seems to me listening to what is being proposed here 

is to make the Senate permanently like it has been the last 18 

months where the majority had enough votes to run over the minority and pass bills with no bipartisan support and the result has 

been, it scared the country to death, produced an upheaval and in 

the case of the healthcare law, a determination to repeal it from 

the day it was passed. 

So you want a bipartisan consensus forced in the Senate, not just 

to pass a bill, but so that the country will accept it, will look up 

there and say well, Senator Harkin is for it and Senator Roberts 

is for it, so it may not be as bad as I think it is. I mean, that is 

sort of the way to look at it. 

Now, Mr. Dove, and to any of the witnesses, Senator Bennett 

made the point that it was not just a filibuster and the Senate also 

operates by unanimous consent. That is quite separate from the filibuster issue and there is nothing new about senators insisting on 

their prerogatives. I can remember Senator Metzenbaum sitting 

down at the front of the Senate negotiating with every single senator on every single piece of legislation that came up. And Senator 

Allen did the same and Senator Williams did the same in the sixties. I mean, this has been going on forever. It is a way of causing 

deliberation. You can call it entrenchment or obstructionism if you 

want to. Others call it the asserting of their right to amend or right 

to speak, their right to have a say. 

But my question is this, Mr. Dove, what years were you in the 

parliamentarian’s office? 

Mr. DOVE. I entered the office in 1966. I was parliamentarian 

from 1981 to ’87 and then once again from 1995 to two thousand—— 

Senator ALEXANDER. You saw it during the years that Senator 

Byrd was the Democratic leader and Senator Baker was the Republican leader. 

Mr. DOVE. Oh, yes. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Now, if I am not mistaken, during that 

time, didn’t they, during that eight-year period when one was the 

majority leader four years, one for four years, didn’t they pretty 

well run the Senate in a way that created an environment where 

the majority leader brought up a law, a bill or a motion and then 

they basically gave senators their right to amend and their right 

to debate, and in exchange for that, the senators gave back an ability for the majority leader to manage the floor, and that produced 

a lot of votes, some late nights, some weekends, but Senator Byrd 

first, Senator Baker next, basically took the position that under the 

492 

existing rules we have then and today, we can move what we need 

to move? 

As I mentioned earlier, this Senate—and I would disagree respectfully with the chairman—this Senate has not been passing 

second- and third-level bills. It has passed a healthcare law and a 

financial regulation law a trillion dollar stimulus. But my point is, 

is it not possible in the current rules as shown by the way Baker 

and Byrd operated the Senate that the Senate can operate quite 

well given quite a bit of ability for senators to bring up amendments, debate them and vote on them if the leaders will just do it 

in that way under the rules we have today? 

Mr. DOVE. Well, the instance I remember probably most vividly 

was the issue of the Panama Canal Treaties, which were submitted 

by President Carter when Senator Byrd was the majority leader 

and Senator Baker was the minority leader. 

Senator ALEXANDER. And where both of those senators actually 

changed their views on that issue during the debate. 

Mr. DOVE. They worked together hand in glove frankly and those 

treaties were debated for eight weeks. Cloture was never filed on 

those treaties. Every amendment that any senator could dream up 

was offered, debated and voted upon, and at the end of the period, 

the necessary two-thirds voted in favor of ratification. 

Those were not popular treaties. If you saw the polls, about twothirds of the American public were against those treaties. But the 

Senate decided in its wisdom that they were important enough to 

be ratified. I thought it was a high point for the Senate in the way 

that it ran. And yes, the Senate could function under its rules and 

achieve big things, yes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you, Senator Alexander. Senator 

Harkin. 

Senator HARKIN. I am not on the committee. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Actually, yes, I think we will go to Senator 

Roberts because Senator Harkin is not a member of the Committee. 

You are right, thank you. 

Senator ROBERTS. Well, I am going to be talking about Senator 

Harkin in my remarks, so it is fine. Thank you too, Sir Robert. I 

do not call him Bob. I call him Sir Robert. 

When I first came here in 1996, I dragged him over to my office, 

my temporary office and said how on earth am I going to understand all this parliamentary procedure that is different from the 

House? And I went through Sir Robert’s six-hour, quick six-hour 

period of—I thought maybe by osmosis or something that it would 

get into my head. 

But he finally told me, he said, Pat—we were friends, so he said 

Pat, you just ask me what you want to know up there when you 

are acting presiding officer and I will tell you and you do that and 

you will be fine. We could have started that at the first of the six 

hours, but you remember that Bob, I am sure. 

I only did something untoward once or twice. Once I adjourned 

the Senate subject to call of the chair, which you cannot do if you 

are the acting presiding officer, but it was Saturday and they had 

forgotten me and I had been up there for three hours and it was 

a matter of personal need. 

So at any rate, I came back and we went back into session. 

493 

Then there is the time that I kicked Trent Lott off the floor into 

the Cloak Room and Bob said, was that wise? And I said, he has 

already assigned me to the Ethics Committee, but what else can 

he do? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator ROBERTS. So we had a good time and some of the things 

that my antics—I sure got on the film of your annual inter-parliamentary session of whatever, and I plead guilty. So thank you 

for coming. 

Ms. Marziani, I plead guilty. I am an obstructionist. I could not 

figure out TARP. I did not know what a credit default swap was 

until somebody could explain it to me and Mr. Paulson could not 

and Mr. Geithner could not and so I voted no. 

AIG, I did not know how deep that hole was going to be dug and 

I do not know why we let Lehman go one way and AIG the other, 

so I thought that was wrong. The automobile bailout, I could not 

figure out why were closing dealerships in small towns. As it turns 

out, it was not needed. The inspector general has said now that 

somebody just said well, we decided everybody ought to share the 

pain. 

That is not the way to run the government. Cash for clunkers, 

good at the time, now, no. I opposed that too. Stimulus I and II, 

ObamaCare, there are 41,000 regulations now coming out, being 

enforced by the IRS, but also implemented by a man that has 

never been confirmed. We have financial reform, 243 regulations, 

30 of them aimed at our community banks, card check, cap and 

trade. Actually, they are trying to do that outside of the Congress 

by executive order through the EPA. Depending on your point of 

view, that is good or bad. 

All of the executive orders that are coming out, not even being 

promulgated in the Federal Register. And also no confirmation 

hearings. And I am opposed to this. So I am an obstructionist and 

I want to say no, that we ought to do it a different way. I have 

alternatives. A lot of us have alternatives. 

So I think I go back to it is important to pass good legislation, 

but it is equally important to prevent bad legislation from passing. 

My idea of what to do, Tom Harkin and I, who have had our differences in the Agriculture Committee to say the least, we agreed— 

you know, Tom came to me and said you know a lot about this 

Farm Bill stuff and Kansas and wheat and obviously Tom knows 

about Iowa and corn and et cetera, et cetera, and he said, why 

don’t we get together, just see if we can come up with a better 

Farm Bill? 

So we met in his hideaway. This is a secret. Nobody knows this. 

This is classified. And we did. We got about three meetings and we 

were really agreeing on some things until the word leaked out that 

you know what, Harkin is meeting with Roberts. Oh my God. And 

then on our side, they said Roberts, you are meeting with Harkin? 

So we got the pants put on us and then as it turned out, my dear 

friend, in the markup of the bill, we pretty well ended up where 

we would have ended up, what was it, six months prior to that. 

And so I think my—the way I would like to approach amendments, 

I do not want to have an amendment. I do not want to have it 

voted on. If I cannot get the minority or the majority, either way, 

494 

to agree to my amendment, put it in the manager’s amendment or 

just agree to it and just zip, get it through by UC or just everybody 

understands it, then I haven’t done my work if I have an amendment and I have to have a vote and then stand to lose. 

But there are some in either party who want to bring amendments to lose, to make a point, to make a speech. Now, what happens—and the best way to cut that out is called peer pressure. We 

have had several current members and past members who want to 

stand up and make amendments. I have told them, why don’t 

you—you might want to cut that down from 10 a day to five, maybe 

three, or why don’t you just go make a speech in front of a group 

and just get it out of your system? 

There is many times I have come to the floor and say why are 

we voting on this, for my own party, let alone others? So I think 

peer pressure can do an awful lot and I would tell Mr. Smith, who 

obviously came to Washington, that if a lobbyist came into my office and said, I want you to put a hold on somebody because of 

what they were interested in, I would kick them out. The only hold 

I have ever put on anybody is the Secretary of the Army because 

the administration wanted to put the terrorists at Fort Leavenworth, which was the intellectual center of the Army, which I 

thought was one of the silliest things I have ever heard. But that 

was public. 

And so I do not think members do that so much anymore and 

I do not think in terms of partisanship that this is any worse 

than—let me just go back to the days that I first started, intense 

partisanship. Oh, hey, hey, LBJ, how many babies did you kill 

today, during Vietnam. I mean, that was terribly partisan. The 

Nixon resignation, my word, that was unprecedented. 

I just have two more. The resignation of three speakers, if you 

really count the one that would have, impeachment, we have come 

through some very difficult times in the history of the Senate and 

it has always been partisan. We are a reflection of the balkanization of American society. I would agree with Mr. Smith on that. 

But I think we can do it better with peer pressure and with good 

people like the chairman and myself and Mr. Bennett. 

That is exactly what Bob said. He stood up when he was badgered by another member of our party and defended himself in such 

a way that that individual started to behave himself. Amazing. It 

seems to me that would be a better answer than messing with 

these rules. 

Senator HARKIN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for letting 

me sit in on this panel today. I particularly wanted to hear this 

panel and to at least ask a couple of questions, but first, an observation or two. One, that in looking ahead as to what we need to 

do to reform the rules, if we want to do that, I am not certain it 

serves us very well to go back and fight old wars. We can do tit 

for tat, tit for tat, this example, that example. We will never get 

anywhere. 

For every example that one person has on one side, we got one 

on this side and we are back fighting those old battles again. So 

I would hope that we get away from that sort of tit for tat kind 

of thing. Secondly, on the entrenchment of the rules, let us say an 

anomaly happened that there was 90 senators of one party and 

495 

they changed the rules and they said, here are the rules we have 

now and in the future there has to be 90 senators to vote to change 

it. We would have to live by that forever and ever? 

So 90, well, how about 67? At what point do you say this is— 

no, that does not sound right, that cannot be? Why is 67 so profound? The reason 51 is profound is because of the structure of our 

whole government and the structure of the way the framers framed 

it and the way we set it up for the majority to eventually be able 

to do something. 

The process in the Senate, I think there are a lot of ways that 

the Senate will never be like the House. As long as we have sixyear terms, as long as we do not have a Rules Committee, as long 

as a bill has to pass both houses in exactly the same form, as long 

as the president has a veto, as long as the Senate has the veto 

power along with the House, and on and on, the Senate will never 

be like the House. 

Those are just a couple of observations. I just had one question 

though. I understand, Dr. Smith, your problem with my construct 

is fine, but I think you hit on a point, and all of you have, and that 

is, how do you structure it so that the minority is able to offer 

amendments and has some input? So if one desired to allow those 

opposed to the cloture to be able to offer a number of germane 

amendments, and I use that word ‘‘germane’’ amendments—let me 

digress here for a second. 

We do have an opportunity—I wish Pat hadn’t left—we do have 

an opportunity in the Senate almost every year to vent and get 

amendments out there that we think will score points. We do that 

under that—— 

Senator UDALL. Vote-a-rama. 

Senator HARKIN [continuing]. Vote-a-rama. You get one minute 

to speak and somebody else gets a minute, and you vote and there 

is all these ridiculous amendments that are out there. The people 

think they are scoring points on. Quite frankly, I do not think they 

score points. I do not think one of those votes has cost anybody an 

election yet, but I guess we go through that exercise. 

But that is why I use the word ‘‘germane.’’ If you wanted to have 

those opposed to cloture to be able to offer a number of germane 

amendments, how do you structure that? How do you structure 

that portion of a new rule? Any thoughts on that? Any of you? 

Mr. SMITH. Well, I suggested a couple of ways and I would be 

happy to have the others comment. I guess my view of this is that 

there are two or three days between each cloture vote on the cloture motion under your proposal. 

Senator HARKIN. Right. 

Mr. SMITH. I think that is an excellent idea. I like the idea that 

it would be in a stepwise fashion reduced to a simple majority over 

the course of about a week or so. The question is, is between those 

cloture motions, what guarantees the minority an opportunity to 

debate and offer an amendment? 

The common procedure for the majority in the modern Senate is 

to file a cloture petition, get on with other business, get a vote. If 

it goes down, go on to other business, and the debate on the bill 

subject to the cloture motion never actually starts. Even if it is a 

motion to proceed, there is no debate on the motion to proceed, the 

496 

majority leader is off to something else. Who can blame him? He 

has other activities. 

So my view is that if there was a cloture motion on a bill or a 

cloture motion on a conference report or a cloture motion on a 

House amendment to a Senate bill, that that be followed by a guaranteed period of debate and amendment on the bill, and that there 

be guarantees. I would leave it to you to give that further consideration. It might be on the basis of alternating amendments between 

the two sides. 

And I would loosen it a little bit from germaneness to relevant 

just because the germaneness requirement under Senate precedent 

is exceedingly tight. Relevant would allow the issues to be fully 

aired and eventually, of course, the new cloture motion would ripen 

in a day or two and you would get that next cloture vote. You get 

both then, minority debate and amendment and simple majority 

rule eventually. 

Senator HARKIN. Mr. Dove. 

Mr. DOVE. I am struck a little bit by the discussion over the cloture on the motion to proceed, because under Senate rules as they 

exist, you do not have to have debate on a motion to proceed. All 

you have to do is make that motion during the first two hours after 

an adjournment. 

Senator Byrd used to do that when he was majority leader. It 

seems to me that what has happened is that majority leaders have 

found it very handy to make that motion when it is debatable and 

file cloture and get this symbolic vote at least on going to a bill and 

then be able to either argue that they have been frustrated or if 

they get it then they know they have 60 votes for the eventual bill. 

But since the rules already allow getting to a bill without debate, 

it seems to me that it might be a possibility that majority leaders 

could resume the practice, as I say, that Senator Byrd did when he 

was majority leader and used that morning hour, the first two 

hours after an adjournment and make motions to proceed. 

Senator HARKIN. Am I correct in assuming, Bob, that your position is that the Rule 22 ought to remain as it is without change? 

Mr. DOVE. Okay—— 

Senator HARKIN. I mean, it seems to me that that is what your 

position is. 

Mr. DOVE [continuing]. I have seen it changed. I have seen it attempted to be changed. I was there when Vice President Humphrey 

made his ruling in 1967, which was overturned by the Senate. I 

was there when he made his ruling in 1969, which was overturned 

by the Senate, and then I was there when Vice President Rockefeller came back and had to apologize to the Senate for what he 

had done during the 1975 change to the rules. 

Those are not situations that I think lend themselves to well, 

that is a nice way of dealing with things. 

Senator HARKIN. Ms. Marziani, do you have any thoughts? 

Again, my initial question was if you had a construct where the 

majority would finally be able to bring something to a vote, how 

would you construct it so that the minority has some rights to 

offer? I said germane or maybe relevant amendments; how would 

that be constructed? 

497 

Ms. MARZIANI. I think that is an excellent question. I think Dr. 

Smith gave a very good answer. Right now I do not think I have 

an answer that is better than Dr. Smith’s, but I am perfectly happy 

to go back to the Brennan Center and discuss that question—— 

Senator HARKIN. Think about it. 

Ms. MARZIANI [continuing] With my colleagues and submit further written testimony. 

Senator HARKIN. I would appreciate it. 

Ms. MARZIANI. Great. 

Senator HARKIN. One last thing. You know, you talk about providing for consultation, compromise, that type of thing, but how do 

you respond when someone—when a conferee—or no, a nominee, 

presidential nominee for judge or something like that is blocked for 

several months and gets by with a 99–0 vote? It seems to me that 

that obstruction is not—and like I say, both sides have done that 

one. There are no clean hands on that one. 

But it seems to me then that is not done for the purpose of debate and discussion. It is done simply for obstructing something. 

Mr. DOVE. I have also seen that, in which case I have seen nominations that were blocked for nothing about the nominee at all, but 

some side issue that the obstruction gives leverage. 

Senator HARKIN. Yes. 

Mr. DOVE. Again, my reaction to what that represents is basically how powerful every individual senator is. I think it is one of 

the reasons that people like to come to the United States Senate. 

You really are incredibly powerful. 

Senator HARKIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you. It has often 

been said and it is true, the power of a senator comes not by what 

we can do, but what we can stop. That is the power of a senator, 

and no one wants to give it up. We all want to keep some semblance of that power and I am saying for the good of the country, 

for the good of the Senate, we got to give up a little bit of that 

power, that right that we have to stop something. 

I am willing to give it up. I hope others are willing to give it up, 

I think, for the benefit of having a better functioning United States 

Senate. So I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SCHUMER. That is a very appropriate place to conclude. I think this was an excellent hearing, no matter what your 

view is. We have heard a lot of diverse opinions, and it is going to 

help us as we move forward. 

I want to thank all five of our witnesses, all of whom are here, 

because this hearing really advanced things a great deal. And I 

want to thank Senator Bennett, who has been a great partner in 

running constructive, thoughtful, non-partisan hearings on an issue 

that lends itself to partisanship. 

Thank you. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: IDEAS TO REDUCE DELAY AND ENCOURAGE DEBATE IN 

THE SENATE 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2010 

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Schumer, 

chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Schumer, Dodd, Durbin, Udall, Goodwin, Bennett, Alexander, and Roberts. 

Staff Present: Jean Bordewich, Staff Director; Jason Abel, Chief 

Counsel; Veronica Gillespie, Elections Counsel; Adam Ambrogi, Administrative and Legislative Counsel; Sonia Gill, Counsel; Julia 

Richardson, Counsel; Lauryn Bruck, Professional Staff; Carole 

Blessington, Executive Assistant to the Staff Director; Lynden 

Armstrong, Chief Clerk; Jeff Johnson, Staff Assistant; Mary Jones, 

Republican Staff Director; Shaun Parkin, Republican Deputy Staff 

Director; Paul Vinovich, Republican Chief Counsel; Michael 

Merrell, Republican Counsel; and Rachel Creviston, Republican 

Professional Staff. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SCHUMER 

Chairman SCHUMER. The hearing will come to order. And I want 

to thank everybody, including my friend Bob Bennett, for participating in this hearing. It is the sixth and final in our series of 

hearings to examine the filibuster. 

Over the course of these hearings we have looked at a number 

of issues:The development of the filibuster since the earliest days 

of the Senate; the growing challenges that the use—and abuse—of 

the filibuster presents to the Senate; and the impact of the filibuster on nominations and other matters. 

Our hearing in July examined filibuster-related legislation introduced by Senators Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey and Michael 

Bennet of Colorado. Last week we had a hearing of the proposals 

sponsored by Senator Harkin and our Committee member Senator 

Tom Udall. 

These hearings will hopefully inform some of the discussions at 

the beginning of the next Congress. While the membership of the 

Senate will change, problems posed by the abuse of the filibuster 

are not going away. 

This week, I would like to turn to some every interesting ideas 

that have been proposed over the last few decades but have not yet 

been a focus of our hearings. We have had focus on some of the 

ideas, but not all. 

These ideas have been promoted by members of both parties. We 

have already heard testimony in previous hearings on ideas to limit 

debate on nominations, whether they be judicial or executive. 

Now, first, motion to proceed. 

592 

And I want to welcome Senator Dodd here. 

The first idea concerns limiting debate on the motion to proceed. 

The motion is intended to be a procedural step that allows the Senate to begin consideration and debate on a measure, a substantive 

piece of legislation. However, far too often in today’s Senate is the 

decision to begin debate itself is filibustered. This does not encourage serious debate and deliberation—it blocks it. 

The motion to proceed was not covered by Rule 22, the cloture 

rule, when it was first adopted in 1917, because cloture then was 

applied only to legislation, not to procedural motions. In 1949, however, Rule 22 was expanded to include most procedural motions, 

and the motion to proceed for the first time became subject to cloture except on rules changes. In 1959, Rule 22 was again expanded 

to apply cloture also to ending debate on motions to proceed on 

changes to the Standing Rules. 

In the decade since, leading Senators of both parties have tried 

to further limit debate on the motion to proceed, so the Senate 

could move on to the real business at hand. Most noteworthy, in 

the 1980s, Senators Robert Byrd and Ted Stevens, obviously a bipartisan effort, both Leaders and members of this Committee, introduced resolutions to prevent filibusters on the motion to proceed 

by limiting the amount of time the Senate could spend debating 

it.Senator Byrd already had tried that once before in 1979 as a Majority Leader, and of course as an expert on Senate procedures. 

In 1984, the Temporary Select Committee to study the Senate 

Committee system recommended a two-hour limit on debate for a 

motion to proceed. It is rationale was to: ‘‘ensure that unlimited debate is permitted only on substantive issues.’’ That is something we 

are still talking about today. 

As use of the filibuster has escalated, it is being used increasingly on the motion to proceed by both parties when they have 

been in the Minority. This chart shows it all. [Chairman points to 

chart.] And as you can see, in 2007 to 2008—that is the last full 

session of Congress—the number of cloture votes on the motion to 

proceed skyrocketed. Let us see here. It more than doubled any 

previous year. 

The way we operate today, the Senate rules basically provide 

Senators with two bites at the filibuster apple before a Bill can 

even get to a vote on the floor. It is fair to ask whether this is overkill. Even the most obstructionist-minded Senator only needs one 

filibuster to block a Bill they oppose. 

The frustration with filibusters on the Motion to Proceed can 

prompt a Majority Leader to file cloture sooner and more frequently and with less time given foramendments.The effect of 

being able to filibuster the same Bill twice can be to launch a procedural arms race that thwarts efforts to debate, improve and pass 

legislation. 

The second issue we will look at is post-cloture time requirements. And I am going to take a little more time today with the 

indulgence of my colleagues, because we have so many issues before us, and I want to lay them out. And I will give Senator Bennett equally more time if he wishes. 

The second type of proposal we will examine today are those that 

offer greater flexibility during post-cloture time. Currently, after 

593 

cloture is reached, there are 30 hours of time allocated for debate 

prior to voting on final passage. Each Member has up to one hour, 

though clearly not all one hundred Senators can take a full hour 

before the 30-hour period expires. Too often, we do not have substantive discussion, or consider amendments on the Senate floor 

during these 30 hours—we are just ‘‘burning the time.’’ We have 

all seen the empty floor as we wait until the clock expires. 

Changes that would make better use of post-cloture time, or reduce it if there is not much real debate, have been proposed over 

and over, for many years. As one of his many recommendations to 

change the Standing Rules, Senator Byrd introduced resolutions 

several times during the 1980s, as did Senator Stevens, to reduce 

the total hours of post-cloture time or to move more quickly to a 

vote on final passage if Senators have finished real debate. 

The next issue we will look at is filibusters on going to Conference. In an ideal world, Conference Committees allow the House 

and Senate to work out differences in a negotiated, bicameral manner that results in the best possible legislation. I remember from 

the days I was in the House, the ‘‘joy’’ of being on a Conference 

Committee on major pieces of legislation, even as a newer member 

in the House, and having a real back-and-forth, and not knowing 

how the legislation would turn out. The coalitions develop as the 

amendments are introduced. It almost always was bipartisan, at 

least on the Committees that I was on, and even here in the early 

years of the Senate. 

But this ‘‘joy’’ is sort of not available to newer Senators. Why? 

Because Conference Committees are actually on the verge of extinction. And abuse of the filibuster may be to blame. 

Here is this chart. [Chairman points to chart.] It shows that 

while reasons can be hard to pinpoint exactly, there has been a 

real decrease in using Conference Committees to reconcile differences in recent years. This is the number of times that—I am 

going to hold it up. 

This is the number of times that the Conference was used. As 

you can see, it is at a real all-time low in the last full Congress, 

2007–2008. This is the percentage of laws where Conference Committees were used, two percent. 

One reason. many believe, is that threats of filibusters have 

made it a lot harder to agree to a Conference and appoint conferees. 

In the history of the Senate these three actions—one, ask that 

the Senate insists on its amendments or disagree to the House 

amendments to the Senate Bill; two, request a Conference with the 

House; and three, request that the Chair be authorized to appoint 

conferees—are usually agreed to, or have usually been agreed to, 

by unanimous consent. 

However, debate—and thus a filibuster—is permitted on each of 

these three actions. If the Senate has spent two to three weeks on 

a controversial Bill, a reasonable Leader might seek to avoid Conference filibusters because they take a long time. That is when we 

see the so-called ping-ponging of Bills between the House and Senate. Or other strategies designed to pass a Bill without going to 

Conference. 

594 

And on this one I think, at least my view from my 30 years experience on both the House and Senate sides, is that Minority Senators whether in the House or Senate have a much greater ability 

to shape legislation when there are Conference Committees. 

The need to streamline the process of going to Conference is also 

not new, but I believe it has become more urgent. We will hear 

from our witnesses today about several ideas to eliminate or limit 

the filibuster that have severely restricted the use of Conference 

Committees. 

Another issue we will address is ‘‘filling the amendment tree’’. I 

know this is an issue that has vexed many members on the Minority side, or many members when they are in the Minority, whatever party they are a member of. And I know Senator Gregg will 

talk a lot about that today, and we welcome him here for that. 

Under Senate procedure the presiding officer of the Senate acknowledges the Senate who first seeks recognition. By precedent 

the first Senator recognized is the Majority Leader. So under Senate procedures, a Senator may offer amendments to a pending Bill 

in the order in which he or she is recognized. This allows the Majority Leader to offer a certain number of first-degree and seconddegree amendments to the measure up to the maximum possible. 

This creates what is called the ‘‘amendment tree’’. 

Once the maximum number of amendments has been offered by 

the Majority Leader, no more are allowed, and the ‘‘tree’’ is considered ‘‘filled’’. Depending on the floor situation, the tree may be 

filled with as few as three or as many as eleven amendments. The 

effect of filling the tree is that no member can propose any further 

amendments to that measure without consent. Which in most all 

cases means—no new amendments. 

How is this procedure tied to the discussion about the filibuster? 

Well, when a Majority Leader fills the tree, other members are prevented from submitting their own amendments. Filling the tree 

also gets around ‘‘filibuster by amendment,’’ where the Minority 

Party uses the amendment process to keep offering amendments in 

the first and second degree with the intent of killing the Bill. 

Members of the Minority Party—of course, that only happens if 

the tree is—that only occurs when the tree is filled later, not when 

it is filled immediately. And members of the Minority often argue 

that filling the tree eliminates an opportunity for substantive 

change or improvement to the legislation. The Majority, by contrast, often argues that filling a tree is actually a way to get a vote 

on a Bill or prevent obstructionism by amendment. 

But it certainly gets in the way. I mean, when I first got here, 

people said, the power of the Majority is to set the agenda, the 

power of the Minority is to offer amendments that would put the 

Majority on the spot or question their agenda. When we fill the 

tree, of course, that does not happen. 

So today we are looking at hearing, as I mentioned, from our colleague Senator Gregg. He will be leaving the Senate at the end of 

the year, and I think I can speak for every member of this panel 

and say, ‘‘to all of our regret,’’ and probably not to his. 

Senator Gregg, last week, during last week’s hearing, I mentioned the colloquy you had with some of our Republican colleagues 

on the Committee on the Senate floor following the failed cloture 

595 

vote on the Defense Authorization Act. During that colloquy, you 

described the frustration on your side of the aisle. And I think it 

is fair to say you are not alone. There is a frustration on both sides 

of the aisle, and I hope these hearings and testimony such as yours 

will move us toward meaningful reform. So we thank you for testifying before this Committee about your thoughts about Senate 

rules and procedures related to the filibuster, filling the tree, and 

sharing with us your experience and insights. 

Senator Bennett. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT F. 

BENNETT, A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH 

Senator BENNETT. Well, thank you Mr. Chairman. I think you 

have laid out the past history very well. And rather than prolong 

the hearing, I will simply stipulate that your charts are accurate. 

And look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

Now I will reserve perhaps a little more time later on when we 

get into the give and take of the question period. But I understand 

Senator Dodd wants to speak, and has to go to another assignment. 

So I will defer now, and be available a little later on if things require a steady hand to straighten out some misconceptions that 

might arise. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Your hand is always steady in these matters Senator Bennett and we appreciate it. Senator Dodd has to 

leave. 

I know has given a lot of thought to these issues, because we 

have discussed them. So would it be okay with the Committee’s 

consent, I would like to recognize Senator Dodd. 

Senator DODD. Well, I thank you Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Only Senator Durbin objects. 

Senator DURBIN. I withdraw. 

Chairman SCHUMER. He has withdrawn his objection. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER J. 

DODD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator DODD. Well, I will try and be brief with my colleagues. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. It is Bob Bennett and I and Judge 

Gregg all days away from departing the Senate. I have enjoyed my 

tenure on this Committee over the years. The work of the Committee, we have had some raucous meetings in this room over the 

years on various matters that have come before the Rules Committee. And I chaired the Committee for a while, including when 

we passed the Help America Vote Act, that Mitch McConnell and 

I wrote back a number of years ago. 

And I apologize for not having been here for a good many of the 

hearings you have had on this subject matter, since my Banking 

Committee responsibilities kept me from attending. And I commend you Mr. Chairman for exploring this issue as much as you 

have. 

I recall back in the snowstorms of this past winter there was a 

reporter for the Washington Post who wrote and talked how Washington had been immobilized by snow, and then went on to say this 

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ators, at the time. And that probably reflects the views of an awful 

lot of people in the country. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senators do not melt. 

Senator DODD. No, you do not melt, that is true. Well there has 

been a lot of truth in this. And there is a serious conversation 

going on about how we address these procedural issues in the Senate, and the problem of endless delays of legislation. A conversation 

among those both outside the body and within it who have been observers of the Senate during their careers, including Norm 

Ornstein who you will hear from later this morning, and others 

who have been talking about this. 

And I regret that my other Committee assignment’s obviously 

made it hard for me to participate in this debate along the way. 

Because I do have some strong views on it after 30 years in this 

body. And having been an observer of it for longer than that, as 

both I and Bob Bennett and our parents served in this institution. 

I served as a page back in 1960, and so I have almost 50 years of 

being around this building over the years, and watching the Senate 

operate. It had great days and less than great days in its performance of its duties. 

And obviously we have been hearing some wonderful people. I 

mentioned Norm Ornstein obviously who we know and appreciate 

immensely. Thomas Mann. Experts from the Brennan Center. Obviously Senator Byrd. People like Senator Gregg, Don Nickles and 

others who have come before us and shared your views on this subject matter. 

But as Senator Byrd so eloquently reminded the Committee 

when he testified, prior to his death in June, the Founders intended the Senate as a continuing body that allows for open and 

unlimited debate, and the protection of Minority rights. Minority 

rights. And he noted that our system established a necessary fence, 

to use Madison’s words, as the principle author of the Constitution, 

against the dangers of fickleness, to quote Madison, and of the temporary passions of our public life. 

He observed that that fence is the United States Senate. Now I 

recognize the source of my colleagues’ frustrations. I have heard it 

in our meetings, caucus meetings, cloakrooms, on the floor of the 

Senate, and in private conversations. I have heard it more importantly for years among the people of our country, who are sometimes angry and frustrated that the Senate often appears to be tied 

up in procedural knots when we should be focused on moving the 

country forward. A time like this certainly is evidence of that. 

It is true that during this Congress, the Minority has threatened 

to filibuster almost every major proposal for Senate consideration, 

including the two largest and most substantial measures that we 

have considered over the last two years. That is of course the 

Healthcare Reform Bill and the Financial Reform Bill. 

And I note that it was only after Majority Leader Reid explicitly 

threatened to keep us in around the clock that eventually we were 

able to proceed and act on the Wall Street Reform legislation. 

On items large and small, the Minority has either threatened or 

acted to block legislation that we put forward. And I have been a 

frequent critic of such unnecessary delays and such abuses of the 

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lem necessarily lies in lowering the 60-vote threshold to break the 

filibuster. I know there are a lot of other issues which you are 

going to discuss, but the fundamental question, whether or not we 

ought to lower that number, is something I have strong reservations about and would strongly oppose. 

Even after a series of sequential votes, which lowers the threshold each time, or an otherwise fundamental altering of the structure of the filibuster rule itself. I’m not sure what the right answer 

is. It may lie in forcing actual filibusters rather than allowing the 

hint of a filibuster to rule of the day. It may lie in eliminating debate on the motion to proceed altogether, or in scaling back the 

time required for debate on cloture or on the motion to proceed. 

It may and I think certainly does lie in exercising greater discipline in the way each United States Senator, those of us who 

have been privileged, a small number out of more than two centuries of Americans, who have had the privilege to come here and 

serve here, in how we apply and use the rules that we have been 

given, often to our own advantage. 

On the last point, there is clearly considerable room for change. 

I find abuses, the way I have seen in recent years, on holds placed 

on confirmation process, and holds placed on uncontroversial items, 

to be used as leverage elsewhere on opposing virtual requirement 

that anything we try to do of any significance requires 60 votes. 

These tactics, run contrary to every Senator’s duty to act in good 

faith as members of this body. 

There are many ideas put forth by my colleagues about what we 

should do to address these problems and abuses. But I stand with 

our late colleague, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, when it 

comes to measures designed to eliminate or substantially limit the 

basic structure of current filibuster rules. I think would be unwise 

to change the current filibuster rule threshold and limit the rights 

of the Minority to leverage important changes to legislation 

brought forth by the Majority. That is a right crucial to this institution. And we should exercise great, great care, when we consider 

any changes to it. 

During the course of my 30 years, three decades, in the Senate, 

I have served both in the Majority and the Minority. I have served 

in every imaginable configuration with Chief Executives. And I 

caution my colleagues on my side that it was not long ago that we 

exercised the filibuster or holds—more discriminatingly, I believe, 

more carefully than it is true today—on matters we thought of such 

import, of such great historic moment, where we made the judgment that we needed to use those tools to protect our rights within 

the Minority. 

For example, it was just ten years ago that we exercised the filibuster to combat the Estate Tax, an extension of the Tax Relief Act 

of 2006; on an extreme version of the US Patriot Act reauthorization; and a similarly extreme version of the FISA legislation that 

threatened America’s fundamental civil liberties. The Federal Marriage Amendment, to amend the Constitution to define marriage 

within its text. An extreme and unwise version of the Patients 

First Act of 2003, part of the Medical Malpractice Reform Bill. And 

the ill-advised Energy Policy Act of 2003. All major measures that 

598 

we were able to stop, slow, or in some cases, force changes to using 

the filibuster. 

So Mr. Chairman, let me again thank you for doing these, having 

these hearings. I think they have been very enlightening and 

worthwhile as we go forward. 

For over two centuries, the Senate has been the bulwark within 

our democratic political process of Minority rights and the freedom 

of speech. It has been the only institution in many ways that provides that unique opportunity. 

And I would hope that my colleagues, and those who will come 

after us here, as guardians of this institution and its rules and procedures, which have made such a unique contribution to our Constitutional process, would operate with great caution, no matter 

what their frustrations, and I know they are deep, and we all feel 

them. But we bear a higher responsibility to this institution and 

the future of it, by guarding the very principles that allow for that 

Minority voice to be heard, to be having the time to express itself. 

And I worry deeply that we may change that in such a way that 

the Senate would lose the essence of its existence. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I think you very much for allowing 

me to share these few thoughts. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Dodd, as usual, your statement is 

thoughtful, and intelligent. And you speak your mind, and I just 

want to think you for your many years of service to this Committee, as Chair, as ranking member, and as member. 

Senator DODD. Thanks. 

Chairman SCHUMER. And without objection, what I would like to 

do now is call on Senator Gregg, let him make his statement. As 

you can see, even though we just had two Democrats speak, we had 

different views. 

I said to Senator Bennett, Senator Dodd might have well represented the Minority, whatever party it might be, on his view on 

this issue. 

Senator DODD. I see Marty Paone as well here, and I apologize. 

Marty, I knew you were going to be a witness, I did not see you 

sitting there. Thank you for your service here as well over the 

years. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thanks Chris. So what I would like to do 

with the Committee members’ indulgence is call on Senator Gregg. 

There will not be, as usual, there will not be questions of Senator 

Gregg. But when we go to the Second Panel, if people want to 

make a few minutes of opening statements, it will not detract from 

their time. Is that okay with everybody? 

Okay. Good. Then we will move on to Senator Gregg. Your entire 

statement will be read into the record. And welcome here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JUDD GREGG, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator GREGG. Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you for your 

kind comments. And let me associate myself with Senator Dodd, as 

I often do, because I agree one hundred percent with his opening 

statement, and think it was an eloquent recitation of the importance of the filibuster and the rules of the Senate in protecting the 

Minority. 

599 

I was asked to speak today a little bit about a number of issues 

dealing with this and my perception of them. I appreciate it and 

am honored at the chance to talk about it. But everybody at this 

dais knows as much as I know about this issue. And you have certainly been studying it. 

So let me just reflect both in historical terms and on a personal 

experience level why I think this is so critical. You know, this Committee’s taking up a rules issue, but what you are really taking up 

is the Constitutional structure of the greatest government ever created in history. We are the freest, the most prosperous, the most 

extraordinary nation in the history of the world. And we are that 

was because we have a constitutional government that has given 

us the freedoms and the prosperity that we benefit from. 

And I happen to believe that at the center of that constitutional 

government is the Senate. Some would argue of course it is the 

House, because they have the ability to initiate appropriations and 

tax policy. But I do not believe it. I believe that it is the Senate 

because the Senate is where the rights of the people of this nation 

are protected. Especially Minority rights. 

It was created for that purpose when Madison and Randolph 

were thinking of how do you where going to structure this government I am sure they had in mind the parliamentary systems that 

they had seen in Europe. The fact that they move too quickly and 

that they trample the rights of the minorities. And so they setup 

this structure of checks and balances which is throughout our system, but the ultimate check was and is the Senate of the United 

States. 

It is been expressed in a lot of different ways but let me just read 

a few because I think it is important to go back to the folks who 

have made a difference in this body, and who understood the body 

with more depth than I do. And I would say this. I am leaving the 

Senate as is Senator Dodd and Senator Bennett. I do not leave in 

a disgruntled way, just the opposite. I am a tremendous admirer 

of the Senate as an institution, and the people who serve it. 

I just think I have had the chance over my 18 years to come in 

contact with some of the best most committed people that I have 

ever come across in my walk of life. They are just, there are a lot 

of special people here. Both Senators and Staff who are committed 

to doing what is right. Well we have philosophical differences, quite 

a few. But as a very practical matter, this is the place where good 

people come to try to make this nation better. 

So let me read a couple of quotes that I think really capture the 

essence of the purposes of the Senate. And we will begin with Webster, who of course was from New Hampshire, although he represented Massachusetts in the Senate. ‘‘This is a Senate of equals, 

of men of individual honor and personal character, of absolute independence. We know no masters, we acknowledge no dictators. This 

is a hall for mutual consultation and discussion.’’ 

And then the other member of the triad, Clay. ‘‘The Majority 

ought never to trample on the feelings or violate the just rights of 

the Minority. They ought never to triumph over the fallen, nor 

make any but temperate and equitable use of their power.’’ 

And then the third member of the triumvirate of great Senators, 

Calhoun. ‘‘The government of the absolute Majority instead of the 

600 

government of the people is but the government of the strongest interests. And when not efficiently checked, it is the most tyrannical 

and oppressive that can be devised.’’ 

And then another Senator who should be in the triumvirate. ‘‘It 

is the Senate where the Founding Fathers established a repository 

of checks and balances. It is not like the House of Representatives 

where the Majority Leader or the speaker can snap his fingers and 

get what he wants. But the reason we do not always work by the 

Majority rule is very simple. On important issues, the Founding 

Fathers wanted, and they were correct in my judgment, that the 

slimmest Majority should not always govern when it comes to the 

vital issues that is what they want.’’ That was Senator Schumer. 

You can go on and read Byrd, or read Howard Baker, or read 

Lyndon Johnson, or Harry Reid. They all came to the same conclusion, the Senate is about protecting the rights of Minority. And at 

the essence of protecting the rights of the Minority is the filibuster 

rule. 

Now, I was asked to speak a little bit about the filling of the tree. 

The tree, as was explained very accurately by the Chairman, the 

filling of the tree basically cuts off the Minority rights in a most 

intemperate and inappropriate way, because it makes it impossible 

for the Minority to come forward with amendments. 

When I arrived here, the whole purpose of the Senate was to 

bring Bills to the floor. And anybody who wanted to come to the 

floor and amend the Bill in any way they wanted to pretty much 

got to do that. I can remember when we brought appropriations 

Bills out of the Appropriations Committee, I had the good fortune 

to chair two different Appropriations Committees that Bills went 

across the floor every year, I would plan when I had the Commerce, State, Justice Committee, to get amendments on everything, 

everything under the sun. 

There would be gun amendments. There would be marriage 

amendments. There would be Mexico City amendments. You name 

it, it was going to come on the Bill. I expected that as the Leader 

on the floor responsible for this piece of legislation. And it was 

good. It was a good discussion. And we always reached a conclusion, took a little longer usually depending on who was around. But 

it took a little longer to get to a conclusion, but we always did it. 

When you fill the tree, you cut off the Minority’s ability to make 

those types of amendments and it really is detrimental to the institution itself because if you do not allow the Minority to amend, in 

fact if you do not allow every member of the Senate to have an opportunity to amend, then you are basically undermining the whole 

purpose of the Senate. 

Now regrettably, filling the tree has become an unfortunate practice here. In fact, in this Senate the tree has been filled more than 

it has been filled under the last six Majority Leaders. That is not 

healthy. 

And the Chairman talked a little bit about filibustering the motion to proceed. Why is the motion to proceed a critical motion? 

And why should filibuster still be applicable to the motion to proceed? It is because at that point that the Minority Leader has leverage to negotiate, to the extent that negotiation occurs, how the 

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ment process will be. If you shut off that point of pressure, then 

you once again close down the capacity of the Minority to make its 

case and get the Bill to the floor in the form where amendments 

can be allowed. 

So I believe very strongly, as the Chairman has outlined in his 

opening statement relative to filling the tree, and as Senator Dodd 

has outlined relative to the filibuster, that at the essence of the 

Senate is the ability of the Minority to amend. That is simply what 

it is all about. And if you foreshorten the ability of the Minority 

to amend, you undermine the purposes of the Senate and you undermine the constitutional form of government we have. 

And I thank the Chairman for his time. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Gregg included in the record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. I thank Senator Gregg for his excellent 

statement. And maybe since it was brief, does anyone have a question they would want to ask Senator Gregg? 

Well, I have one. We do have—from your statement maybe you 

do not believe the Senate in the last couple of years has sort of become more dysfunctional. And neither side gets what they want. 

The Majority does not get to move forward on legislation. The Minority does not get to offer amendments, either germane or not. 

And does the Senator think there might be some grounds for 

compromise, where say, for instance—and I understand his point 

on the motion to proceed—where you would not be allowed to filibuster the motion to proceed but at the same time, and someone 

proposed this at our last hearing, there might be a guaranteed 

right for the Minority to offer at least a number of amendments not 

to be dilatory but have that opportunity as sort of a tradeoff. 

Some of our witnesses last week said that they thought the Senate had departed from its function of being the great society where 

the great debate occurred, the issues were debated, etcetera, given 

the gridlock we have here, without pointing fingers of blame. 

Tell me what you think of that kind of tradeoff. 

Senator GREGG. I think it is dangerous. I think because you can 

never anticipate what the Minority needs. I cannot anticipate that. 

The Republicans may be in the Majority in the next Senate or the 

following Senate; you do not know what the Minority position is 

going to be on a piece of legislation because you cannot anticipate 

the legislation. 

So the Minority has to be able to retain as many rights as possible to the floor, and to the ability to amend on the floor. 

I agree that there is a problem in the Senate right now. But I 

think it is the fact that we do not take Bills up on regular order. 

The fact that we basically have a reticence within the Senate to 

make the tough votes on the floor. I mean, we have done some fairly complex legislation around here. We have a lot of floor activity. 

The Financial Reform Bill, for example, was a very complex piece 

of legislation which was on the floor for a long time, and which was 

debated and amended. The managers kept the amendments on target, and strong managers can do that. 

We did it with the Immigration Bill. That Bill was on the floor 

for a long time. Aggressively amended. 

And the Healthcare Bill started off that way. Of course it got 

foreshortened at the end, which was really I thought unfortunate. 

602 

But it is just a question of getting a calendar where the Majority 

understands that if it is going to take big pieces of complex public 

policy to the floor, it is going to have to spend two or three weeks 

to do it. And I do believe that that is very doable. And I think we 

have shown we can do it as a Senate. 

And I think the body functions well if it is given the opportunity 

to amend. People run out of energy, we all know that. These 

amendments stop coming after a while. And people have to make 

tough votes. That is what it comes down to. People willing to make 

the tough votes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. My proposal was not curtailing the right to 

require tough votes. It would be dealing with something like unlimited amendments, or the ability of—now obviously one person cannot do this, one person can slow it down but cannot stop it—but 

the ability to even prevent an issue from coming to the floor, unless 

you have 60 votes. 

And forestalling the kinds of debates that you talked about was 

not used for Immigration, was not used for, as you say it was for 

healthcare later, but the other issue you mentioned, I cannot recall 

it. 

Senator GREGG. You know, theoretically, I think you probably 

can make an argument for that decision. But I cannot predict, nor 

can anybody in this room predict the practical needs of the Minority as it goes forward. And I think you have to reserve as much 

authority to the Minority to be able to influence its ability to make 

its case on the floors as possible. Presently that means being able 

to filibuster the motion to proceed until you get to a point where 

the Minority feels its rights to amend are protected. 

Chairman SCHUMER. All right. Anyone else? Senator Alexander. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Senator Gregg, Senator Byrd indicated in 

his testimony earlier this year that he thought that while there 

were abuses of the current rules, that the Senate could work under 

the current rules if the Leaders would just use them. And he used 

examples of, in terms of the filibuster, just confronting those who 

wished to filibuster and keep the Senate in session, just one day 

after another, and other such steps. 

And I am wondering whether you, as you look back over at your 

years here, think that we could get to a situation where a Minority 

could insist of the Majority, whichever party, that there had to be 

amendments and debate, and where the Majority could by holding 

the Senate in session, keep filibusters under control? 

In other words, can this be done without changing the rules? 

Senator GREGG. Well, my experience is that the 24 hour attempts 

to try to break a filibuster do not work, because basically it is the 

Majority that has to produce the people. And that is really, the Majority’s never going to be able to break a Minority by keeping you 

here all the time, because the Minority really does not have to be 

here. All they have to do is keep somebody on the floor to object. 

So I just do not, I have never seen that as the best way to address how you—visually and politically it might have an effect. The 

population may say, well, they are there all night, look at that, this 

is an important issue. But I do not think it subsequently affects the 

capacity to deal with a filibuster. 

603 

I suppose you could change the rules so that if you go into a filibuster status, those seeking the filibuster would have to attend in 

order to pursue the filibuster. That is a possibility. And maybe a 

Minority that wants to filibuster should have that responsibility. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. I would like to follow up on that, because we 

had a classic example where a member from your side forced a vote 

on a Saturday on a filibuster. And then when 60 or 70 of us 

changed our schedules to not go home to our families, the Senator 

who forced the vote did not show up for it. Was at a wedding in 

his home state. 

It strikes me that this really is offensive, that someone says, I 

have got to protect my rights, but in absentia, I have got things 

to do back home, so why do not you all stay on the floor here and 

come up with 60 votes. 

Senator GREGG. I think that is a legitimate point, Senator. 

Senator DURBIN. Well, I also want to ask this question. Do you 

not believe though—I like Jimmy Stewart, do not get me wrong— 

but he has created an impression of the Senate which I do not 

think reflects the reality of the Senate. 

Senator GREGG. I have always thought of you as a Jimmy Stewart liking figure. 

Senator DURBIN. Yes, that is me. And, Spirit of Saint Louis. 

But the point I want to get to is, do not you believe that there 

should come an obligation with those who initiate the filibuster to 

at least be present? Or those who support their position to be 

present on the floor, if we are going to ‘‘burn 30 hours’’? What a 

terrific waste of time. 

At the heart of this is something that goes unspoken in most of 

these hearings, why do we want to avoid controversial amendments? Because we want to avoid controversial ads running 

against us in the next campaign. Once you have been around for 

a few years and you have cast thousands of votes, you figure there 

is plenty for them to work with and I do not have to worry about 

tomorrow’s vote. 

And secondly, the reason why we cannot burn off the hours, for 

example the Food Safety Bill, which you and I had worked on for 

over a year, and want to bring to the floor, the one Senator who 

is holding it up says, well if you want to bring it, we’ll just go 

ahead and file cloture. Knowing full well we do not have the time 

for it, because members cannot stay in town as much, because they 

are out raising money for their campaigns. 

So I mean, does not this reflect the new reality that maybe Senator Byrd did not have to live within his political experience, that 

now is the reality of the Senate? 

Senator GREGG. Well, I think that was the point that Senator 

Alexander was also raising, which I think is legitimate to look at. 

Whether if you are asserting the filibuster right you should have 

to be available to defend that right on the floor. 

I would simply point out the Food Safety, like you I would like 

to see it passed, but to get it passed it should have been on the 

calendar earlier. You know as well as I do that if you push up 

against an adjournment event, the power of a single Senator grows 

exponentially as we head towards adjournment around here. 

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But yes, I think it is worth considering whether or not those asserting their rights under the filibuster should have to be present 

to defend that right, and presently they do not have that. 

Chairman SCHUMER. And we had a hearing on that, Senator 

Lautenberg actually proposed that as a rule change. 

Senator Roberts for a question. 

Senator ROBERTS. Well first of all, I want to say to Jimmy Stewart that I like your role in the Glenn Miller Story. I thought you 

played an excellent role. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I thought he played an excellent clarinet. 

Senator ROBERTS. I think it was a trombone. 

Senator GREGG. It was a clarinet. 

Senator ROBERTS. Was it Glenn Miller? 

Senator GREGG. Oh was that Benny Goodman, I am sorry. 

Senator ROBERTS. That is right. 

Senator ALEXANDER. Here is another example of gridlock in the 

United States. 

Senator ROBERTS. I offer an amendment to clarify the record. 

Senator GREGG. Please, I withdraw my comment. 

Senator ROBERTS. All right. Bob Byrd came here in one of his 

last appearances before Committee, it was a very poignant time. 

And said that a Minority can be right, and Minority views can certainly improve legislation. The bottom line of my statement which 

I will insert for the record and save time when we get to that, is 

that Mr. Chairman the way forward is not through rules changes, 

it is understanding the purpose of our rules to foster consensus, bipartisanship, and moderation. 

Let us try to return to our Senate tradition before embarking on 

a radical rule change that sounds almost like kindergarten stuff, 

really, given the challenges that we face, or a hope that cannot 

come true. 

But let me ask Judd, as you have been here as long as I have, 

and we came to the House together. What do you see down the 

road? Because partly what impacts this is not so much—well, it 

does impact it in terms of filling the tree and finding cloture and 

all of these things. But rightly or wrongly, the Congress reflects the 

Balkanization of the American public. And it seems to me that we 

are terribly Balkanized, and it seems to me that if we reinforce 

that with the information that we receive, everybody gets their 

netherworld of information now from the Internet and the Web and 

Facebook and tweets, and all the things that I do not understand. 

And that my staff does not let me see. 

But at any rate, it is a far different world. Somebody said something about going to Conference, and it helps matters at the last 

Conference that I attended was the 2008 Farm Bill, we had 41 

members. Half of them had never seen a farm. They could spell 

farm, but not agriculture. I think Charlie Rangel was the head of 

the Conference, and announced that he did not know why he was 

there, but that the Speaker had asked him to be there, so he was 

there, and then left. 

Usually during a Farm Bill Conference we had 15 or 16 people 

including the Senator from Illinois—who was for corn, I was for 

wheat, by the way, but that is how that would work. But we 

worked it out. And I am just wondering if there are not elements 

605 

that are at play here with our society that makes this much more 

difficult. The Senator from Illinois said everybody has gone to raise 

money, actually you are here to raise money. 

Well, some people go to places where there are water holes where 

I guess you can drink more freely from in terms of money for campaigns. But there is a Tuesday-Thursday mentality here as opposed 

to earlier times when people socialized together. People knew one 

another. People at least spent some degree of time in the other person’s shoes. And I think it is that, that we have lost. Or that we 

have really seen dwindle away. 

Where are we going to be five years from now if this keeps up 

in terms of the Balkanization we see in all of this talk about, we 

have lost comity and everything else? Part of that I do not think 

is right, because you and I have served here during the Vietnam 

days, during the impeachment, during Nixon resignation, during 

you can name any number of issues here that were great great 

challenges that produced an awful lot of rhetoric and a lot of challenges. But at any rate, where are we headed here? Where are we 

going to be in five years, Judd? 

Senator GREGG. Well, my biggest concern would be that we end 

up like the House of Representatives. That we end up basically as 

an institution which this not have the openness that traditionally 

and historically this institution requires, relative to debate and 

amendment and discussion. 

As to collegiality, there is much more pressure on every Senator 

now to be off somewhere, to be doing something. I think Dick 

Lugar described it most effectively when he said the Senate is a 

one hundred carrier task force going down the hallway. It is an unfortunate fact. But that is the nature of our times. Times change, 

and we obviously are representing an extremely sophisticated society that requires a great deal of its government. And especially 

those who represent it. 

So I do not think you are going to put the genie back in the bottle and suddenly have what used to happen in the 50s and 60s 

where people hung out in the afternoon and had drinks and spent 

the weekends with each other. But you can keep the place collegial 

just by keeping it open, so that people do not feel that their rights 

are being shut off, and so that people do feel that they are a single 

individual who can make a different within the Senate, which is 

what the Senate is all about. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, on that note we thank you, Senator. 

Senator GREGG. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you for your thoughtfulness and participation here today. 

Let me now call on our next panel of witnesses. There are two. 

A warm welcome to them. They both are regulars here, and we 

thank them for that. 

First is Marty Paone. And by the way, I was just informed that 

you like it Paone not Paone, so I apologize for all the years of calling you Paone. In any case, it is good to see you back. And we 

know you hold the Senate in great esteem, as does your colleague 

Senator Ornstein. 

Marty Paone is a veteran of the United States Senate, he began 

working on the Senate floor for the Democratic Leadership in 1979. 

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From 1995 to 2008 he served as an officer of the Senate in the position of Democratic Secretary, and he is currently Executive Vice 

President of the Prime Policy Group. 

Mr. Norman J. Ornstein is a resident scholar at AEI, the American Enterprise Institute, where he also serves as the co-director of 

the Election Reform Project. He is author of many books about 

Congress, including the Broken Branch. He writes a weekly column 

for Roll Call, is an election analyst for CBS News and a Senior 

Counsel to the Continuity of Government Commission. 

Gentlemen, both your statements will be read into the record in 

their entirety, and you may proceed as you wish. We will begin 

with Mr. Paone. 

STATEMENT OF MARTY PAONE, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, 

PRIME POLICY GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. PAONE. Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am honored to be here discussing the procedures of the 

Senate, a subject that I learned to cherish while working for Leaders Byrd, Mitchell, Daschle and Reid. 

I served on the Senate floor for almost 29 years. During that 

time, I was Secretary for the Majority twice and Secretary for the 

Minority twice. I had two sets of cards, depending on the election. 

Following the election, if there was a change in the Majority I 

would joke with my Republican counterpart that in addition to 

handing over the presiding work, we would also trade speech folders. One accused the other of being an obstructionist, while the second complained of the trampling of the Minority’s rights. 

Today it is my understanding you will be focusing on four aspects 

of filibuster reform. Motion to proceed. Eliminating a debate on a 

motion to proceed would save time and put the legislative calendar 

on an equal footing with the executive calendar. A middle ground 

would be to institute a time limit on the motion to proceed. Any 

modification of this motion would streamline the operation of the 

Senate but for just that reason could be expected to be met with 

Minority opposition. 

Post-cloture term. During the 30 hours post-cloture, each Senator 

is entitled to speak for up to one hour. One member could still 

cause considerable delay, because quorum calls, while counting 

against the 30 hours, do not count against the member’s hour. 

While you can force the opponent to remain on the floor or else 

the Chair will put the question, and I think you all skipped over 

that earlier, you cannot force them to debate and consume their 

hour. One possible change would be to charge the quorum time towards the Senator’s hour. 

An alternative idea would be to count any time consumed in a 

quorum call at an accelerated rate. Say a multiple of ten. So that 

every minute spent in a quorum call would count as ten minutes. 

If this were the rule, then during post-cloture time I would eliminate also the ability to object to the dispensing of a quorum so that 

the Majority could not abuse this accelerated clock. 

Over the years a process has evolved so that once cloture is invoked the amendment tree remains filled and even germane 

amendments are blocked out. One suggestion would be to automatically tear down the tree post-cloture, and to provide for a guaranVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00616 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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teed number of amendments from each side. The amendments 

would start to qualify under Rule 22, be timely filed, properly 

drafted, and germane. 

Other possible changes include a reduction in time on nominations, since they are unamendable. Adding a three-fifths vote to reduce the time. Or reducing the threshold to invoke cloture to a 

three-fifths vote of those voting and present. 

There have been complaints about the waste of time spent on 

nominations that are eventually confirmed by nearly unanimous 

votes. One change for nominations with lifetime appointments 

would be a reverse cloture motion. It would work like this. The Majority Leader would ask consent to confirm a nomination or to get 

a time limit on it. 

If there is an objection, then the next day by 4pm the opponents 

would have to file a motion of opposition which would state that 

they intend to vote against the nomination. Sixteen signatures, the 

same as for cloture would be required on that motion. And if it is 

not filed by the appointed time, the Senate would then proceed to 

the nomination, and it would be considered a time limit of two 

hours equally divided. If the 16 signatures in opposition are secured, then the Majority Leader could file cloture motion on the 

nomination, which would ripen the next day. 

Substitute amendments. It is virtually impossible for a Committee substitute or a floor substitute to meet the strict germaneness test of cloture. This necessitates the filing of cloture motions 

on the substitute and on the Bill itself. The latter is a true waste 

of time, since once the substitute amendment has been adopted, 

the Bill is no longer amendable. The substitute amendment should 

be automatically considered germane. 

The appointment of conferees. It takes three separate debatable 

motions to send a Bill to Conference. Many times in the past, these 

were adopted by consent. But over the years, both parties have objected to the appointment of conferees, and not it is the exception 

rather than the rule to see a Bill sent to Conference. 

Combining the three motions into one would still allow the opposition to filibuster this stage of the process. This might also reduce 

the use of the message between Houses method, or what has come 

to be known as the ping-pong process. If this process is to be used 

more sparingly, then not only should the motions be combined, but 

there should also be a prompt cloture vote and a reduction in postcloture time. If the Minority truly wants to participate in Conferences, then they should allow the appointment of conferees. 

Filling in of the tree. Everyone agrees that the Majority Leader 

has priority recognition. It follows then that the Majority is entitled 

to the first vote on a given issue. Majority Leaders from both parties have filled the amendment tree to get a first vote on an issue. 

And sometimes on more than one issue. However at some point in 

order to move the process along, the Majority Leader has to pare 

back the tree and allow other amendments. If amendments are not 

allowed, then the Minority’s natural response is to vote against cloture as a protest for being shut out of the amendment process. 

Majority Leaders from both parties have been asked by their 

members to protect them from certain votes. In my opinion that is 

an unfair request, and it puts the Leader in an untenable position 

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of having to fill the amendment tree and possibly fail to enact the 

legislation in question. 

The solution to this is simple. Do not ask the Majority Leader 

for such protection. Senators should be prepared to vote at least on 

a cloture vote or a budget waiver vote with respect to any and all 

amendments and move on. 

Again, I thank the Committee for this opportunity this morning, 

and I welcome any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Paone in the record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you Mr. Paone. 

Mr. Ornstein. 

STATEMENT OF NORMAN ORNSTEIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 

RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. Thanks Mr. Chairman. It is always an honor and 

a privilege to be in front of this Committee. 

I want to start by saying to Senator Bennett, I was at Brigham 

Young University two weeks ago for Constitution Day, and spent 

a sizeable amount of time there and in Provo. And I can testify to 

the enormous amount of goodwill and warmth that still exists in 

the state for you, and regret that the voters did not have a chance 

to express that again in November. 

This is my favorite Committee in the Senate. I have testified in 

front of it many times over the years. And it is my favorite Committee because the members who are on this Committee understand and appreciate the role of the institution. It includes some 

of my favorite Senators on both sides of the aisle. And I am delighted that we are getting some junior members like Tom Udall 

who are so deeply committed to the institution and throw themselves into that role. 

I want to comment for a minute or two on some of the discussion 

you had with Senator Gregg. I do think the problem is more of the 

culture than it is the rules, that the rules operated better in a previous era. But frankly the reality is the culture is going to get 

worse before it gets better. Because I see the newcomers who are 

going to be arriving in this institution in January, and there are 

many of them who do not fit the mold of the people who are serving 

on this Committee. If we had only people on this Committee cloned 

to make a hundred, I do not think we would have as much of a 

problem, we would not have to spend so much time here. 

But we are going to get a number of people coming in who are 

like the one Senator now who has decided that he is the word and 

the truth and is going to hold up everything, who do not see the 

value of compromise, of respecting and looking towards the views 

of others. And that means that while we cannot solve the problems 

of the culture, I do believe that it requires some significant focus 

on the rules to remove some of the unnecessary and extraneous obstacles that arise that affect both sides of the aisle, but also that 

use up the most precious commodity the Senate has, which is time, 

often just for the purpose of using up that time. 

One other comment relating to something that Senator Durbin 

said. If I could wave my magic wand and do one thing, it would 

not be some of the things we are talking about here. It would be 

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to move the Senate to a schedule which was five days a week, three 

weeks on and one week off, with no fund-raising during those 15 

days a month. You can have 15 days a month to fundraise, I think 

that would be adequate even under the current system. 

But if you were here nine to five, Monday through Friday, it not 

only would provide a better family life, and more opportunities to 

interact socially, but it might create a very different kind of atmosphere in way of operation. But that may be harder than changing 

any of the rules that we are talking about. 

On the rules themselves, I want to associate myself with what 

Marty said, with most of his changes. And I start with the belief 

that we need to look at the idea of a one bite at the apple principle. 

That there is, despite what Senator Gregg said, there are ample opportunities before you ever get to the motion to proceed for the Minority Leader to negotiate with the Majority Leader. 

I do not see that the leverage of another filibuster, which is still 

going to require 60 votes when you get to the Bill itself, is a necessary commodity. And that having two, three, or more bites at the 

apple only serves to provide opportunities for delay and obstruction. I do not believe, and I agree with Senator Dodd, that we 

ought to make the Senate like the House. I do not believe that we 

should move the threshold down, although I do think that moving 

to three-fifths of those present and voting would deal with one of 

the issues and problems that Senator Gregg mentioned, which is 

changing the incentive, so that it is the Minority that has to be on 

the floor if you do have extended debate. 

And I have also, as perhaps you have seen, and part of this flowing from conversations that I had with Senator Udall and his staff, 

think it is worth considering and maybe even just for nominations, 

not just the 16 votes required to file a petition, but make it twofifths of the Senate required to extend debate rather than threefifths of the Senate required to end debate. Shift the focus to the 

Minority if they feel intensely enough about an issue with great national import, then they ought to be the ones who have to provide 

the votes. 

The idea that Senator Byrd, the late, great Senator Byrd, when 

he was extraordinarily ill, had to be forced to come to the floor to 

provide a 60th vote, or that the Senate was frozen in the period 

after his death and before Senator Goodwin came in, just does not 

make a whole lot of sense to me as a way to operate. 

With all of that, I do also believe, and I have a number of suggestions which are a little bit different perhaps in form from Marty’s, 

most of which are now incorporated or will be soon in a resolution 

that Senator Mark Udall is introducing, which I would endorse as 

well, but believe that we need to focus on the filling of the amendment tree as well. 

And I do think that, you know, it is a chicken-and-egg problem. 

But we need to deal with both the chicken and the egg at this 

point. And finding a way to guarantee the Minority an opportunity 

to have its voice and to offer an amendment is a necessary component to any of the other changes in the rules that we implement. 

And I hope with some of these, which I think are common sense 

things, do not detract from the Minority’s ability. When it feels intensely about an issue of great national moment, to extend debate 

610 

or to raise the bar, are things that ought to be able to get enough 

votes, that perhaps we would not even have to turn to the constitutional option. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ornstein in the record] 

Chairman SCHUMER. Well, thank you. And thank you both. Excellent testimony. 

I have specific questions on specific proposals. But I think, I 

would like to ask two questions of each of you in a broader sense. 

As you can see here, you heard Senator Dodd’s testimony, we all 

remember Senator Byrd’s. Here is the broad philosophical division, 

I guess, or disagreement among Senators. And some say, the world 

is moving much more quickly. We are in a globally competitive 

world. We cannot just have delay, as our country has urgent needs, 

over and over and over again. This would reflect not only on delay, 

but 60 votes, because the Minority seems to wield those together 

now. 

The other argument is, this has worked for 220 years, and 

urgencies have appeared at various times in the past. And you do 

not mess with something that has worked, for all the momentary— 

I guess the others, those who would argue this, would say—frustrations. Do we need, does the new world demand, some kind of fundamental change, not to block the Minority from offering amendments, but to allow the Senate to move more quickly? Because it 

has come to a standstill, and as one of you mentioned, next year 

could come to a greater standstill. 

And a Minority Leader could take on seven or ten resolute Senators who say, ‘‘we are going to stop every nickel of spending’’. But 

a Minority Leader generally will not do that, because a Minority 

Leader will have a constituency of 43, and if there are seven adamant people, he just does not want to alienate them. 

Okay, that is the first question, the sort of large question. And 

then the second question relates to what Professor Norm Ornstein 

said. The ideal way to do this, if we were going to make some 

changes, would not be invoking the Constitution, but to get twothirds of the Senators to agree that some changes are needed, 

which by definition says you have to deal with both the Minority’s 

concern, which is—and I believe the Majority and Minority will 

stay the way they are but they could change for all we know in the 

election—you have to deal with the Minority’s ability to offer 

amendments so that they do not slow down the process as a way 

to get amendments. Slow it down to a point of absurdity. 

So I would like both of you to comment, and that is my only 

question, on both those questions. The large picture question, do 

we need change? Does the new world demand change? Or should 

we just stick with what has worked with the most successful nation 

in the world in the past? And then second, what are the chances, 

if we do need change, of getting it to be done in a two-thirds Majority way? 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. I will start Senator. First, on the first question. 

We have operated for 220 years. We have also changed the Senate’s 

procedures numerous times over those 220 years when conditions 

demanded it. We changed the rule in 1917. Of course, we elimiVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00620 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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nated the motion to proceed very early on, which helped to create 

some of the issue that we have with regard to filibusters today. 

We changed things again in 1975. We have to be very careful 

about the changes. I think one of those changes inadvertently 

helped to exacerbate the problems, which is when we moved to an 

absolute number of three-fifths of the Senate. If you have present 

and voting, then Minority does have a reason to stick around to 

meet quorum calls, so you could actually do something with extended debate. 

But I think conditions warrant change. We have passed a lot of 

legislation, it is true. It is not the best way to legislate when you 

can have one, two, or three Senators who are needed to make up 

the 60 votes who exercise an enormous amount of leverage and do 

not necessarily make for better legislation. I would rather have a 

more open amendment process to make it work that way. 

But what also happens is, when you take out, stretch out the 

time, and let us face it, when you have filibusters on nominations 

that pass unanimously, when you have filibusters on Bills that ultimately pass unanimously or near unanimously, this is not a Minority that is trying to express an intense point of view. When that 

happens, then the queue gets longer, and important Bills, like the 

Food Safety Bill or others, get delayed. 

Now, that may—perhaps it could have come out earlier—but the 

fact is we have got a lot of legislation that takes a long time to incubate and work through the issues and to get compromise. If you 

have used up all the time, there is no time left. And so I would 

really think that some of these changes—I should know, I mentioned a couple of others like the idea that you have to read 

amendments word for word if they have been posted online for 24 

hours, I think there are ways of clearing the decks a little bit there. 

But I just think that change is necessary. And ideally, change 

happens with a bipartisan consensus. And I would hope—I mean, 

there are no Senators I respect more than Senator Roberts, Senator 

Alexander, Senator Bennett—that both sides could work together 

to find some common ground here, and try to avoid having either 

a confrontation over the rules or an inability to. 

Chairman SCHUMER. What do you think the likelihood of that 

happening is? 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. I suppose I could invoke George W. Bush, slim to 

none, and slim just left the building. But I actually think—I have 

been impressed with these hearings. These hearings have not been 

confrontational. There are different points of view obviously expressed by Majority and Minority, and by those who have been in 

the Minority before and understand they may be again. But I think 

this has been a search for common ground rather than just position 

taking. 

So I hope from some of the ideas that we and others have discussed, you could find some areas where you could strike the right 

balance, preserve Minority rights but also enable some more efficiency. Because we are going to move from productivity to something that much more resembles gridlock given the changes that 

are going to take place in our politics. 

Certainly in November and heading to January. And it is a dangerous, dangerous time for the country with the issues that we 

612 

face. And I think we have got to grapple with making sure that 

there is an ability to act in a reasonable and balanced fashion. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Mr. Paone. 

Mr. PAONE. Yes, I think it would be good to have some change. 

But in the era—you do have a new era, obviously of instant news, 

the Internet, etcetera, the Senate has changed also. Let’s face it, 

it is a light lift here, these days, working only from Tuesday to 

Thursday afternoon. I mean, working a five day week would be a 

change, but you showed from Thanksgiving to Christmas Eve that 

it can be done. You can use the clock, and if you use the clock, especially at the beginning of a Congress, more efficiently, then you 

do not need a rules change for that. 

If someone says they object to a motion to proceed, say fine, then 

you are going to be on that floor not just when we invoke cloture, 

you are going to be on that floor now, Monday, until we have that 

cloture vote on Wednesday. I do not have to bring in all my members, I am just going to bring in a Presider and a Leader, 24–7. 

And if you go to the bathroom, I am putting the question. 

Now, granted, at the outset, that person will get some help, because everyone will want to help him in a three-to-five am range, 

sure, I will come running over to help you. You do that three or 

four times though and it is going to get of old, and I do not think 

it is going to be as easy to find help in that early morning range. 

Also it will highlight, and it will answer your critics who ask: ‘‘why 

do not they make them filibuster?’’ 

Well Jimmy Stewart’s ‘‘Mr. Smith Goes to Washington’’ was a 

movie, and this will show them what they get with a filibuster. You 

get a quorum call, the senator sitting there reading his mail. But 

you can at least make his life miserable. You do not have to have 

a roll call vote and bring everybody else in to make their lives miserable. In any case , that is something you can do without a rules 

change. 

And it is not inconceivable that you can change the rules. Yes, 

you will need bipartisan ship to change the rules. I mean, in 1986 

when you went on tv there were a number of rules changes that 

were instituted in that resolution. In 2007, the Ethics Bill, a number of rules changes were included in that Bill. It is not inconceivable that you could have a moment in history where there is such 

a momentum for a piece of legislation that you can come to a bipartisan agreement that yes, in this we are going to include a couple 

of modifications on how we operate. But obviously it is going to 

have to be done in a bipartisan way. 

As I said, using the clock in a more efficient way not just on a 

filibuster but working Monday through Friday, working more 

hours, keeping people in town, all of this would go a long way towards improving your efficiency. In the old days, the people used 

to say air-conditioning is what killed this place. Air-conditioning 

and the airlines, because it allowed members to go home on weekends. And then eventually no longer brought their families with 

them to Washington. 

In the old days, you would have a new member come in, he 

would be in the cloak room asking Muskie and Jackson, where do 

I get a realtor? What school should I send my children to? Do I live 

in Potomac or do I live in McLean? And they would end up comVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:23 Dec 03, 2010 Jkt 062210 PO 00000 Frm 00622 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\62210.TXT SHAUN PsN: DPROCT
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muting together. Stevens would commute in with Muskie. One day 

he had a horrible day because he told Muskie not to pass a bill before he could do his amendment, and Muskie went to third reading 

and ignored Steven’ demand to offer an amendment. Mansfield 

then had to come over and undo a vote so that Stevens could offer 

his amendment. 

But you guys used to commute. You used to live in the same 

neighborhoods. And as a result, you went to the PTA meetings together. You got to know each other as people. Not as enemies, not 

as opponents. And so, if you make people stay here five days a 

week, no matter where they live, what part of the country they 

have to go to, for an extended period, I think that would contribute 

to some of that. 

Chairman SCHUMER. And again, question I asked, Mr. Ornstein. 

There is a constitutional option obviously that Senator Udall has 

explored. 

Mr. PAONE. Yes. 

Chairman SCHUMER. So you may not need the two-thirds. But 

obviously I think everyone would agree, that would be preferable 

if rules changes were to be made. What are the chances that we 

could get that two-thirds on some kind of balanced package in 

these times right now? 

Mr. PAONE. Right now I do not think you would get the twothirds. Especially as you are heading into an election which may 

result in many new members. You are even at 15 new people, even 

if everybody gets reelected. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Right. 

Mr. PAONE. So you are going to have new people, and these new 

folks will not have a legislative institutional knowledge of how this 

place operates. And I do not think you would get two-thirds. But 

by the same token, I don’t think it is out of the question that down 

the road, you might be able to get a Bill passed that incorporates 

some rules changes. 

The constitutional option would bring, in my opinion, irreparable 

harm to this body if you were to utilize it. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I have 

enjoyed this morning. I have enjoyed the historic review. Marty, I 

remember the days when Senators spent time with each other. And 

I was here as a staffer when Everett Dirksen determined the wording and direction of the Civil Rights Bill. 

Everybody talks about Lyndon Johnson’s legislative genius creating the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It was Everett Dirksen that 

made that possible. 

And I remember when Bobby Kennedy was the Attorney General, and the writing of that Act. Kennedy’s staff would come to the 

Hill, and they would not go to Mike Mansfield’s office. They would 

go to Everett Dirksen’s office. Because the Southern Democrats 

were threatening the filibuster. Dirksen with his Republicans held 

the balance of power to break the filibuster. And the Administration had to make sure that Dirksen felt okay about it. 

And you may remember that Barry Goldwater, the Republican 

standard bearer in that election voted against the Civil Rights Act, 

which created a problem for my father because my father voted for 

614 

it, and thus guaranteed himself a primary opponent the next time 

he came up. 

So I am familiar with all of the give and take and the historical 

circumstance you described. Let me add just a little historical perspective from my own experience. 

I think the Majority Leader has the authority to crack the whip 

now if he wants to, and clean up a lot of the things that you are 

talking about. And Marty, your comments I think sort of fit in to 

this. Let me give you one historic example. 

Back in 2006, John F. Kerry was in Europe, and Sam Alito was 

up for nomination to the Supreme Court. And basically Kerry 

phoned in the filibuster. He made a phone call to Harry Reid, and 

said, no, I will not allow a vote, and so on. And Harry responded 

to that. And Kerry was out of the country. 

By contrast, I remember managing a Bill on the floor, and a Senator who will remain nameless because none of this got into the 

press as the Kerry thing did, said, I will object if Senator X offers 

this amendment, and my objection will go to such lengths that we 

will have a filibuster. 

I said okay, I am going to notify Senator X of that fact, and he 

is going to come to the floor and offer the amendment. And you are 

going to have to be here on the floor or I will accept it, as the manager of the Bill. 

And Senator X showed up, offered his amendment. The Senator 

who said, I am opposed to this, I want to put a hold on this, was 

not on the floor. And as the manager of the Bill, I said I have no 

objection to this, and there was no objection. 

The Senator’s staff was livid. But I said, if the Senator really, 

really wants to object to this, the Senator has to be on the floor. 

Now, I sound braver than I was. Because I cleared it with the Majority Leader, who said sure, go ahead. 

So here are two examples of a Majority Leader saying, the Senator has to show up or his hold will not matter, or the Majority 

Leader saying to a Senator who called him from Europe, okay I 

will honor that, you do not have to show up, you can continue your 

trip abroad and a de facto filibuster will be on it. 

I would like you both to comment on that. And the pressures, 

maybe Marty you have a better insight into this than any of us, 

the pressure is on the Majority Leader when something of this 

comes up, because if a Majority Leader says, and I have had Majority Leaders tell me, Trent Lott you know, if he does not show up, 

never mind. 

Now it was somebody with whom Trent had a particular problem. But would that kind of action on the part of the Majority 

Leader produce the kind of efficiency that we are talking about 

without any changing in the rules? And what are the pressures on 

the Majority Leader to say, oh no, you do not dare do that. 

Give me some reaction to that. 

Mr. PAONE. Well obviously everything is on a case-by-case basis. 

We had one situation where Mitchell was trying to get an agreement on a Bill and a senator called in who was watching on 

CSPAN, and they called in from their living room and said they 

wanted to object. And I told Senator Mitchell about that Senator 

615 

and where he was and he said, tell him he needs to come to the 

floor if he wants to object. 

And that is why when we as the floor staff would help with new 

staff when they would come over at the beginning of a Congress, 

we would explain to them that letters you write, do not consider 

them hold letters. We call them consults. Because your hold letter 

is only as good as your ability to get a Senator to the floor to object, 

and to debate the motion to proceed. We would warn people that 

just because you say you have an objection does not mean that the 

item is not going to come up. You have to be able to produce the 

senator to fillibuster. 

And like I say, it is on a case by case basis. That one instance, 

on Alito, yes, there was a situation where a member was out of the 

country and he wanted to be involved with the vote or the debate, 

but quite frankly, he was not the only one, if my recollection is correct, that was opposed to Alito. So that is not what completely 

stopped that in its tracks. 

Yes, the Majority Leader does have that ability to ignore a ‘‘hold’’ 

request. But at some point he is also the Leader of his party, and 

he is responsible for looking out for the interest of his members. 

And he will tell them yes I will look out for your interests, but you 

have to at some point come over and do it yourself. You cannot expect me to be the one debating that issue. You are the one who has 

the opposition. I will buy you some time, I will honor your objection 

for a period of time, but eventually you are going to have to be the 

one to come here and oppose this issue. 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. Senator I do think that one real problem with the 

Senate now is that there is way too much deference to individuals 

even though it is a body made up of individuals. My favorite story 

about the Senate is when Senator Mitchell left this body at a very 

young age, and he went out and interviewed to be Commissioner 

of Baseball, and met with the owners. And when he came out, one 

of his friends said, why would you even consider a job like that? 

You would be the handmaiden to 28 of the most out of control egos 

in the world. And Mitchell said, well that would be a 72 percent 

reduction from my current job. 

And of course what happens is people put holds on, and Leaders 

protect them. And when you do not protect them—I thought Trent 

Lott was a terrific Leader, but when he ran into trouble he did not 

have a safety net deep enough, because I think some of his colleagues resented the fact that he did work to make the trains move 

on time. 

Now, Leaders can do a lot more. We are going to get an interesting test to this perhaps now with Senator DeMint. My inclination would be to say, go to the floor, go 24 hours, and make him 

stay there. If he wants to object and deny unanimous consent, then 

that is what he is going to have to do. 

And I would like to see whether his colleagues, the overwhelming 

Majority of whom think that this is, even though there is a reason 

to want to have some time to look at things, not the best way to 

go, will protect him. But I doubt very much that that will happen. 

Now if we could have the change in the way Leaders operated 

with their members, and the members said I will give up some of 

my individual prerogatives to protect the good of the institution, I 

616 

would be delighted with that and it might obviate the need for 

many of these rules changes. 

But going back to where we started, I am afraid we are going to 

get a bunch of people coming into this body, probably more than 

20, a Majority of whom would never even consider something like 

that as being within their universe. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Thank you. Senator Durbin. 

Senator DURBIN. Thanks, both of you for your testimony. And I 

can recall that when I was first elected to the Senate in 1996, and 

sworn in in 1997, I ran across Howard Metzenbaum at an event, 

who had recently left the Senate. And he kind of pulled me to his 

side, put his arm on my shoulder and said, you got to know the 

Senate rules. And you got to realize, that if you do not care if they 

hate—I am going to clean this up a little bit—If you do not care 

if they hate you, you can get an awful lot done in the Senate. 

And I did not see this in my own experience, but I am told that 

there were times when there were three Chairs on the floor. The 

lead sponsor of the Bill, manager of the Bill, the ranking Republican, and Senator Metzenbaum. And the amendments to finance 

Bills cleared all three desks so they did not move. 

And he waited, and dragged things out until in desperation Senator Mitchell or others would come to him on a Friday and say, 

what will it take? And he would hand them a list, and say, this 

is what I am waiting for. And at the end of the day, a lot of people 

were upset with him, but as he said, he achieved some certain 

things. 

I will say one thing in defense of Senator Metzenbaum, he was 

on the floor, from told, and involved in it. Now we get emails from 

Senators, from their staff, serving notice on all of us, that they 

have created something called a steering Committee, on your side. 

I did not realize that there was such a thing, but apparently there 

is. 

And this Senator said, our steering Committee will decided what 

we consider on the floor of the Senate this week. This is a staffer 

saying to other staffers, so please refer anything your interested in 

moving on the floor to us, or it is not going to move. This doing 

things by mail or remote, to me defies logic and should not be protected by this institution. 

Now let me go to a particular point that you raised, Mr. Paone. 

You talked about moving nominations. But now we are not dealing 

with a controversial nomination. We are dealing with a large number of non-controversial nominations, that are being subjected to 

filibuster. Nominations as we have noted came out with overwhelming votes, if not unanimous votes, out of Committee, and will 

probably have the same experience or close to it on the floor, that 

are being filibustered. 

Even if you took your approach, Marty, in terms of where you 

wanted to go, and you had to deal with a hundred nominations, it 

is impossible. Would you find any way of bringing them together, 

say all right, we are going to move these ten nominations unless 

40 members will sign, saying that they are opposed to it? Tell me 

how we deal with the volume that we are being faced with, and the 

number of filibusters that bear no relevance to protecting the 

rights of the Minority which is destined to vote for them. 

617 

Mr. PAONE. It is, I agree, it is a difficult problem. Trying to bundle nominations together, however I can feel Senator Byrd rolling 

in his grave right now, because we would sometimes talk to him 

about, well can you maybe bundle some together in one cloture motion or something like that. And he would point out that you could 

have individuals in that bundle that someone may want and others 

may not. 

So it is difficult to bundle nominations because each one is 

unique. But again, you have to, maybe you cannot get them all 

done, make better use of the clock. Quite frankly, you may end up 

in a situation—I am not in favor of it, I worked for the Democrat 

side, but if the House flips in the upcoming election then next year 

you may not have too much in the way of legislation going back 

and forth between Houses then you may have a lot of time to spend 

on nominations. 

So they will need to be done in a drawn out basis. Some of these 

nominations, yes the Administration was a little slow in sending 

them up. And yes, due to some obstruction, you do have a large 

backlog. You are just going to have to use the clock just like you 

did for Healthcare from Thanksgiving to Christmas. 

Senator DURBIN. I understand what you are saying, but when 

you look at even taking a day or two for each nomination, if—And 

I think there will be some who will be hell bent on exercising the 

filibuster on everything, controversial or non-controversial—It is 

just physically impossible. It makes the Senate not an institution 

to be respected for its principles, but a dysfunctional institution 

which apparently is not even committed to principle. 

If ultimately the Minority is going to vote for the nominee, then 

we are not protecting the rights of the Minority with the rules that 

enshrine the right of some person to make it too days instead of 

two hours to vote on that nomination. 

That to me—I do not think we bring respect on the institution 

nor give ourselves a functioning role in this important process. 

Thank you all very much for your testimony. 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. If I could add Senator Durbin? 

Senator DURBIN. Of course. 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. I am sorry, Senator Alexander left. But I plead 

with you next year to really work on changing the broken nomination and confirmation process. It is damaging to the fabric of governance. We have large numbers of positions that are unfilled. Now 

two years into an Administration. A good part of the problem is an 

Administration that had moved them too slowly, but much of it is 

in the Senate. And there are a lot of things that need to be cleaned 

up. 

But if we are going to make some changes to streamline things, 

I would turn first to the nomination process. And as I suggested 

a little bit earlier, I would be happy if you could move it to a twofifths bar for nominations alone. I think those are different. And 

the way in which people get held hostage by individuals and the 

way in which the process now gets used to use up precious time 

for no appropriate purpose is just not good for the Senate or for the 

country. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Udall. 

618 

Senator UDALL. Thank you Chairman Schumer, and thank you 

very much to this panel. I think this has been a great panel, I 

think it has been very enlightening. And you have explored a lot 

of issues. 

And I would like to take off, Mr. Ornstein, from where you did, 

talking about governance. Because that is the thing that worries 

me the most. I worry about the Senate as an institution, but then 

I worry, if the Senate is not working as an institution, then we are 

not doing the things the American people sent us here to do. 

And we really right now have a broken institution. You talked 

about nominations. Apparently, the judicial Conferences said 44 of 

these judicial nominations are emergencies, and we cannot get 

them done, we do not have the time. 

On the Executive side, I am used to an era when my Dad went 

into the Cabinet, that you had your team in the first couple of 

weeks. Apparently a year after this Administration was in office, 

they only had 55 percent of their Executive team in place. I do not 

know how you run a government under those kinds of situations. 

It has been pointed out on the appropriations process, and Mr. 

Paone, you know this well, in the Senate we get to offer amendments on appropriations. So that is an important role. It is something that, you are almost like you are an appropriator. You do not 

have quite the detail. 

This year, the remarkable thing has happened, no appropriations. So the major thing that we do in government, to keep the 

government running, to make the government efficient, to do that 

oversight, to hold those hearings and then to bring that Bill to the 

floor, we have not done any appropriations Bills and we’re going to 

kick it over until December. So a sixth of the year will be gone. 

And that hurts the ability of government to do the things that I 

think the American people want it to do. 

Authorizations, once again, major departments need to have that 

oversight. We used to do—my memory is on authorizations—we 

used to do at least Defense and Intelligence. This year we have not 

done those. And we had a vote on that. 

And then, the House has passed, I think it is now the numbers 

counting and adding up every day almost 400 Bills that we have 

not dealt with. And all of this, and then the other issues that 

Norm, you, and Marty and others mentioned, I mean, Food Safety, 

Education, Jobs Bills, I mean, the list goes on and on and on. And 

many of those are contained in the House Bill. 

So I see us as a broken institution that is not performing for the 

voters. And we need to break through that, and I think your panel 

has proposed some ideas. But, none of these ideas are going to be, 

and I think you have asked the question, going to be able to be put 

in place unless we take the constitutional option. I do not see us 

having 67 votes. 

And believe me, I want to protect the right of the Minority to be 

heard, but I do not, as Senator Byrd said, want them to govern. 

The Minority should not be put in a governing situation. 

And Mr. Chairman I would ask unanimous consent to put my 

opening statement in the record, because there was a part of that 

when it came, this opening statement when it came to the motion 

to proceed, Senator Byrd was for that. He was for that. He came 

619 

before our Committee and said he was for sensible change. And he 

would like to limit debate on that. 

And actually in 1979 when he was the Majority Leader, took the 

Senate floor and said that unlimited debate on the motion to proceed, and I quote, quote here, ‘‘makes the Majority Leader and the 

Majority party the subject of the Minority, subject to the control 

and will of the Minority.’’ 

Senator Byrd was very powerful on that point. And despite the 

moderate change that Senator Byrd proposed, limiting debate on a 

motion to proceed to 30 minutes, it did not have the necessary 67 

votes to overcome a filibuster. 

So we are really( 

Chairman SCHUMER. Without objection, your statement will be 

put into the record. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Byrd, and he 

argued, you know the 67 votes at the time, Senator Byrd argued 

that a new Senate should not be bound by that rule, stating, ‘‘the 

Constitution in Article 1, Section 5, says that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings. Now we are at the beginning 

of a Congress, the Congress is not obligated to be bound by the 

dead hand of the past.’’ That is what we have done. We have bound 

ourselves by rules that were passed in a previous Congress. 

And so I have used all my time here, but I do want to try to ask 

a question. And I hope you will give me, Mr. Chairman a little bit 

of leeway. To me, there is something that brings accountability. 

And I know Marty, I wrote down your words here, those are, irreparable harm to the body. It is like a dagger in my heart. 

But anyway, I am not trying to bring irreparable harm. There is 

to me a certain accountability to adopt rules every two years when 

you have a Congress. And I am not saying throw out all the rules. 

I am saying, let us be accountable. We hide behind, now, we hide 

behind the rules and say, oh we cannot change them. 

We are all now talking reform. And I hope we have, I really want 

Republicans to join us. The preferable thing to me would be to get 

the 67 votes and to move forward. But if we do not have that, we 

have the responsibility to govern. 

Don’t you see a certain accountability in adopting rules every two 

years, under the Constitution, on the first day of a session? As far 

as I know, all legislatures do that. Parliaments do that, people do 

this around the world, they do it here in the United States. And 

I think that as long as we have respect for the institution and for 

the Minority to be heard, that this will bring accountability to the 

process. 

And that is what—I do not view this as something that is sweeping aside. It makes us accountable, and then everybody knows, well 

hey if we abuse the rules, if you abuse the rules, then they can be 

changed two years from now. 

Please go ahead. And sorry for running on so long there. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Please take your time. 

Senator UDALL. All of these speakers got me all geared up here. 

Chairman SCHUMER. And you have—Senator Udall you have 

done a great job. You have increased awareness of this issue, you 

are the one who suggested these hearings to begin with. Take as 

much time as you want. 

620 

Senator UDALL. Mr. Chairman, you have done an excellent job 

too in putting these together. 

Mr. PAONE. First of all, I would like to at least step back a moment. Everyone is talking about the broken system. This Congress 

will go down in history as probably one of the more productive Congresses in generations. You all have done extraordinary work, even 

with a broken system. Lilly Ledbetter. TARP. Stimulus. 

Healthcare. Financial Services. Two Supreme Court Justices. 

These things take time. And they sucked time away from the authorizations and appropriations. Of course, one of the other reasons 

you do not have an appropriations Bill done is you did not do a 

budget. You cannot have one without the other. Let us face it, 

without the budget, the appropriations process flows a lot more 

slowly. 

Now, as far as—and I did not use irreparable harm lightly. I did 

not mean, that you take it as a dagger. My only point is I look at 

things through the prism of, if I was still here in the Minority, 

what would be my reaction? 

Now, I fast forward to January. I am in the Minority. You are 

still in the Majority, a smaller Majority than you have now probably. You use the constitutional option by Majority vote to change 

the rules in violation of your own rules. Rule 5 says they continue, 

and you cannot change them except in accordance with the rules. 

You have changed the rules using that option, and you even just 

said yourself, every two years we should adopt our own rules. 

Well, that is fine, if that is the body you want to be. That is what 

the House does. So fast forward another two years, I am the Secretary for now the Majority. We have taken the place back. I am 

going to use your template to yes change those rules. Only I am 

not going to be nice and say, all we are taking away is the motion 

to proceed. I am going to say that whatever Bill comes up shall be, 

and whatever nomination, whatever comes to the floor for debate, 

shall be debated under the strictures as dictated by the Rules Committee. And the Rules Committee ratio shall be two-thirds majority, one-third minority. 

And so you as an individual member will have just lost all your 

power to affect change. Because you will not be able to object to 

things coming up. You will not be able to put holds on things or 

be able to filibuster something. You as an individual member will 

then be another House member only in a smaller body. 

And that is why I am afraid that if you go this route, it will be 

used down the road. And if every two years the Majority changes. 

If that is what happens, if that is what the end result of the Senate 

is going to be in the future, so be it. It is your call and ultimately 

you will have to answer to the folks, the voters. But that is my concern, it is similar to what Senator Dodd voiced, and I think Senator 

Byrd voiced in his last meeting here. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Ornstein—I mean, you are almost 

a Senator. 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. That is quite all right, thanks. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Mr. Ornstein. 

Mr. ORNSTEIN. Just a couple of quick comments. One is of course, 

when this was tried in 1975, it brought enough of a jolt to the system that it actually forced bipartisan compromise. And in an ideal 

621 

world for me, we achieve a bipartisan compromise before we ever 

get to that point. If it happened in a way that forced a bipartisan 

compromise, I would prefer that to no change at all. 

I would note that I am not sure that disaster occurred. If we 

could wave a magic wand and go back to having Majority required 

to change the rules, there is actually some restraint that is placed 

on both sides. If you know that it is going to be very easy to implement your own changes, if the Majority changes. So I do not think 

that it brings Armageddon. 

But in the culture that we have now, I think Marty has got a 

point. Doing this would cause enormous inflammation out there. 

And it would be so much better if we could find a way to preserve 

the rights of the Minority and streamline the process to keep rogue 

individuals or even attempts at obstruction for obstruction’s sake 

from occurring, and find two-thirds who would be willing to do it. 

And I would hope that most of our efforts would be devoted to 

that purpose, and we would not have to turn to what—I think 

there is some sound constitutional reason to believe that a body 

cannot bind itself permanently into the future, but it is not a desirable course if we can avoid it. 

Chairman SCHUMER. Senator Bennett has a final comment. 

Senator BENNETT. Yes. Norm, that is why they called it the Nuclear Option. I was there when it was being discussed, and it came 

up with the phrase, the Constitutional Option to put a soft glow 

around it. But I think it was Trent in a moment of candor, for 

which Trent is known, and for which he paid, said, you do that and 

it is like setting off a nuclear bomb. That is the nuclear option. 

And Marty, I think you are exactly right that you go in that direction. Yes, I think the Constitution can be described in a way 

that says you have the right to do it, but just because you have the 

right to do it does not mean it is the right thing to do. 

And I had not thought it through in the way you have, in that, 

okay we will escalate here and here and here. But I think you are 

exactly right, that is what we will do. And if I may, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SCHUMER. Please. 

Senator BENNETT. I remember in our Conference a judge, and I 

do not remember who it was, we had the Majority but President 

Clinton was the President, and the judge was put forward, and our 

Majority was such that we were not going to be able to prevent this 

particular judge from going forward. 

And a group of people within the Conference, very upset, well we 

have got 41 votes against him, we do not have enough to defeat 

him. But we have enough people in the Republican Conference to 

say, we have got 41 votes against him, let us filibuster him. 

And the person who said, absolutely not, was Trent Lott. Because, he said, we do not filibuster judges. And if we were to do 

that, we would change the culture of this place. We just do not filibuster judges. That is not what you do. 

And the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, my senior and 

colleague, Senator Hatch, said, absolutely we do not do that, because we are going to win the Presidency in 2000, and if we filibustered this judge, that means they could filibuster some of our 

judges. 

622 

And so the younger members who had the bit in their teeth 

about, let us start filibustering judges, kind of stood down, and that 

judge went through. I have no idea who it was, I have no memory. 

And when the decision was made to filibuster Miguel Estrada, 

that change took place. And we have all heard on the Senate floor 

when President Obama was sending up some nominees, and my 

friends on the Democrat side were saying now, quoting Mitch 

McConnell, you do not filibuster judges, because filibustering 

judges is the wrong idea. And Mitch said, you are right, I said it, 

I believed it, but you changed things and I am now playing by your 

rules. 

And that is the best example I can think of, of what would happen if you used the constitutional option or the nuclear option to 

start turning around, fooling around with the rules. A future Minority Leader who became a Majority Leader or vice versa, would 

say, I may have said that in the past, but this is where I stand 

now, and you have changed the rules. 

Mr. PAONE. Can I respond? 

Chairman SCHUMER. Please. 

Mr. PAONE. Far be it from me to get into a judicial nomination 

discussion here, but in that era, when you are in the Majority, 

President Clinton was in the White House, you did not have to filibuster judicial nominees, you just did not report them out of Committee. 

And historically, it is not the first time a judge was fillibustered. 

Abe Fortas was denied his Chief Justiceship on the Supreme Court 

as a result of a filibuster. By the way, it was on a motion to proceed. In those days you could still filibuster a nomination on a motion to proceed. He failed to get cloture on a motion to proceed, he 

then withdrew his nomination because there was a filibuster 

against that Supreme Court nomination. 

And there were two judges. Ninth Circuit judges, Paez and 

Berzon, that Senator Lott, good to his word, I have to hand it to 

him, committed to call those up as a result of other negotiations. 

And he called them up and we did get them confirmed. But we did 

have to invoke cloture on both of those circuit nominations because 

there were filibusters on each of those two judges. We did get cloture and those two are on the Ninth Circuit. But I just wanted to 

clarify some of that. 

Chairman SCHUMER. I would just make one other point here. 

And this is for another hearing, and we are going to have to break. 

We got to vote at noon I think. 

But one of the differences that might have happened, even in the 

last ten or fifteen years—I am not sure if this is true—the Leader 

whether it is a Minority Leader or Majority Leader has less desire, 

less ability, call it what you will, to tell a small group of recalcitrant Senators, to stop. 

And what we find on this aisle is many of our Republican—on 

this side of the aisle—many of our Republican colleagues tell us 

they do not like what somebody will do on the other side in terms 

of blocking, but there are always 41 votes there to protect their 

right to do it. And I bet 15 or 20 years ago there might not have 

been. 

So that is another element of this, that we got to think about. 

623 

Bob? 

Senator BENNETT. I will just for the record disagree with your interpretation of what happened to Abe Fortas. I was here when it 

happened and I do not think he was killed by a filibuster. 

Mr. PAONE. There was a cloture vote. 

Senator BENNETT. They went through a procedure but that is not 

why he did not get on the court. 

Chairman SCHUMER. We will not have another hearing on the 

Abe Fortas nomination. 

I thank our witnesses. Very informative. I thank both Senators 

Udall and Bennett. And the others who participated. 

Hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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656 

Æ 


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