1

SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

RICHARD R. COOCH NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE

RESIDENT JUDGE 500 North King Street, Suite 10400

 Wilmington, Delaware 19801-3733

 (302) 255-0664

Robert C. Collins II, Esquire

Benjamin A. Schwartz, Esquire

Schwartz & Schwartz PA

1140 South State Street

Dover, Delaware 19901

Attorney for Plaintiff 

Roger D. Landon, Esquire

Murphy & Landon

1011 Centre Road, #210

Wilmington, Delaware 19805

Attorney for Defendants Delaware Sleep

Disorder Centers, LLC, Delmarva Sleep

Diagnostics, Inc., and Springside, LLC

Re: Loretta Morabito v. Delaware Sleep Disorder Centers, LLC, 

Delmarva Sleep Diagnostics, Inc., and Springside, LLC

C.A. No. N14C-10-005 RRC

Submitted: April 17, 2015

Decided: June 23, 2015

On Defendant Springside, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint.

DENIED.

Dear Counsel:

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Springside, LLC has moved the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Complaint.1 Defendant contends that the issue is ripe for decision as the questions 

 1 The Court notes that for clarity, reference to “Defendant” is a reference to Defendant 

Springside, LLC, unless otherwise stated. The Court also notes that present counsel for 
2

to be decided by this Court are questions of law. This Court disagrees and finds that 

the record has not yet been sufficiently developed to make the determinations that 

Defendant seeks at this juncture. Defendant Springside’s Motion to Dismiss is 

therefore DENIED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

Plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell in the shower area of a sleep study 

suite in which she had spent the night as part of testing for sleep apnea. As part of 

the test, electrodes were applied to Plaintiff’s scalp using a sticky substance. The 

morning following the overnight sleep study, Plaintiff proceeded to take a shower in 

order to remove the sticky substance from her hair. Plaintiff finished her shower, 

and once outside the shower, Plaintiff began to slip, attempted to grab a wall to keep 

from falling, but fell despite her attempts.

3 Plaintiff cites the following as factors 

contributing to her fall:

a. The shower curtain did not keep water from escaping onto the 

bathroom floor;

b. The shower knob system was confusing, so rather than turning the 

water off as planned, she turned the water to a very hot temperature. 

This forced her to attempt to step out of the shower before getting 

burned by the water;

c. There was no bath mat or floor mat outside the shower;

d. The floor outside the shower was made of smooth tile;

e. There was standing water outside the shower when Plaintiff exited the 

shower;

f. No bath rails or handholds were nearby the shower to grab onto.4

Plaintiff commenced this action alleging negligence and seeking damages 

against Delaware Sleep Disorder Centers, LLC, Delmarva Sleep Diagnostics, Inc., 

and Springside, LLC. Defendants Delaware Sleep Disorder Centers, LLC, and 

Delmarva Sleep Diagnostics, Inc., operate a sleep study practice in Newark, 

Delaware.5 Defendant Springside “built and manages the suite and leases it to 

 

Defendants entered an appearance as new counsel for Defendant Springside only after briefing 

on the motion was completed. 

2 This case is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, so this Court is required to accept all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint and any inferences drawn therefrom as true. See, e.g., 

Precision Air, Inc. v. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc., 654 A.2d 403, 406 (Del. 1995) 3 Pltf.’s Complaint at ¶¶ 33-36, D.I. 1 (Oct. 1, 2014).

4 Pltf.’s Complaint at ¶¶ 18-37. 5 Pltf.’s Complaint at ¶ 8.
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Defendants Delaware Sleep and Delmarva Sleep.”6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 

Delaware Sleep and Delmarva Sleep “had a duty to maintain the premises in a 

reasonably safe condition for business invitees” as the lessees of the property, and 

that they knew or should have known of their failures to make the shower area safe.7

 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Springside are discussed infra. 

III. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Plaintiff’s Contentions

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Springside had ultimate control over the 

sleep study suite and thus had a duty to maintain it in a safe condition for business 

invitees. Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendant was negligent in failing to maintain 

a safe premise for invitees, failing to ensure its tenants did not create a hazardous 

condition in the sleep study suite, and failing to ensure that the shower area had 

reasonable safety devices.8

B. Defendant Springside’s Contentions

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief 

because “Delaware law does not impose an obligation, or a legal duty upon a 

premises owner to undergo safety measures in warning, or shielding an occupant, of 

the dangers associated with bathing or showering.”9

 Defendant suggests that even if 

this Court were to accept the alleged facts as true, “[t]he specific facts alleged by 

Plaintiff establish that no negligent act was committed by Springside, or that 

Springside even owed Plaintiff a duty.”10 Defendant contends that this case falls 

squarely within the purview of Brown v. Dover Downs, Inc., which held that an 

innkeeper does not owe guests of an inn a duty to provide a bath mat in the bathtub 

in the guest’s room.

11

 6 Pltf.’s Complaint at ¶ 9. 7 Pltf.’s Complaint at ¶¶ 39-40. 8 Pltf.’s Complaint at ¶¶ 44-45.

9 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at ¶ 1, D.I. 17 (Feb. 25, 2015).

10 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at ¶ 4, 17, D.I. 17 (Feb. 25, 2015). 11 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at ¶ 5-8, D.I. 17 (Feb. 25, 2015). See also Brown v. Dover Downs, Inc., 

2011 WL 3907536 (Del. Super. Aug. 30, 2011), aff’d, 2012 WL 540930 (Del. Feb. 21, 2012) 

(TABLE).
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IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must examine the complaint 

and accept all well-pleaded allegations as true.12 If the facts alleged in the 

complaint are sufficient to support a claim for relief, the motion should be 

denied.13 “The test for sufficiency is a broad one, that is, whether a plaintiff may 

recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof 

under the complaint.”14 “An allegation, though vague or lacking in detail, is 

nevertheless ‘well-pleaded’ if it puts the opposing party on notice of the claim 

being brought against it.”15

V. DISCUSSION

This Court finds Plaintiff’s negligence claim to be sufficiently pled to survive 

a motion to dismiss because Plaintiff has alleged “a duty, the breaching party, the 

breaching act, and the injured party.”16 Plaintiff has alleged the element of duty by 

alleging that Defendant was negligent in failing to maintain a safe premise for 

invitees, failing to ensure its tenants did not create a hazardous condition in the sleep 

study suite, and failing to ensure that the shower area had reasonable safety 

devices.17 Plaintiff has identified the breaching party as Defendant, and has alleged 

the breaching acts by alleging failure to maintain, failure to ensure no hazardous 

conditions existed, and failure to ensure the shower had reasonable safety devices.18

Finally, Plaintiff has identified herself as the injured party. Whether Plaintiff has 

proved proximate cause in the Complaint is irrelevant because she is not required to 

prove her case at this stage of the litigation.19

 12 See Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (internal citation omitted).

13 See id. 14 Id. (citing Klein v. Sunbeam Corp., 94 A.2d 385 (Del. 1952).

15 Precision Air, Inc. v. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc., 654 A.2d 403, 406 (Del. 1995) 

(citing Diamond State Tel. Co. v. University of Del., 269 A.2d 52, 58 (Del. 1970)).

16 White v. APP Pharm., LLC, 2011 WL 2176151, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 7, 2011) (declining to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim where four elements were sufficiently pled); See also, 65A 

C.J.S. Negligence § 778 (“It is a well established rule that a general averment of negligence in 

doing or omitting a particular act, unless it is too general to give defendants reasonable notice of 

the negligence charged, is good as against . . . a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”).

17 Pltf.’s Complaint at ¶¶ 44-45.

18 Defendant has also set forth claims of negligence against the remaining Defendants in this 

action, but those claims are not relevant here.

19 See White v. APP Pharm., LLC, 2011 WL 2176151, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 7, 2011) (internal 

citation omitted). 
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In opposition, Defendant relies on Brown v. Dover Downs, Inc.

20 for the 

proposition that it does not owe a duty to Plaintiff because the risks inherent in 

showering are “open, apparent, and obvious to anyone who has ever taken a bath or 

shower.”21 Defendant would like this Court to find that it owed no duty pursuant to 

Brown to the Plaintiff and grant its Motion, but the Court finds that the factual 

record is simply too underdeveloped to make such a finding at this stage. The Court 

finds that discovery is needed to understand, among other things, exactly how 

Plaintiff fell, who was in control of the activity in the sleep study suite, how a Sleep 

Disorder Clinig functions insofar as baths or showers of its patients are concerned, 

and whether a Sleep Disorder Clinic may potentially owe different or additional 

duties to guests than the duties owed by an “innkeeper.” Accordingly, since 

Plaintiff’s claim is sufficiently well-pled, Defendant is not entitled to dismissal at 

this stage. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Springside’s Motion to Dismiss is 

DENIED. This action is without prejudice to any right of Defendant Springside to 

file a motion for summary judgment upon the close of the factual record. This Court 

intimates no view as to how any such dispositive motion will be decided. The Court 

will promptly establish a scheduling conference to enter a Trial Scheduling Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 ____________________

 Richard R. Cooch, R.J.

oc: Prothonotary

 20 2011 WL 3907536 (Del. Super. Aug. 30, 2011), aff’d, 2012 WL 540930 (Del. Feb. 21, 2012)

(TABLE). 21 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at ¶ 6.